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SWJED
11-28-2006, 10:56 PM
Smithsonian - Waging Peace in the Philippines (http://www.smithsonianmag.com/issues/2006/december/philippines.php) by Eliza Griswold.


"They'll slit your throat on Jolo," people told Col. Jim Linder, head of a U.S. military task force in the Philippines. He recalled the prediction as we buzzed toward Jolo Island in a helicopter. Linder, a 45-year-old South Carolina native who has the remnants of a Southern drawl, has led Special Forces operations in the Middle East, Central and South America, Eastern Europe and Africa for the past 20 years. His latest assignment is the remote 345-square-mile island at the southernmost edge of the vast Philippines archipelago. Jolo is a known haven for Al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups, including Abu Sayyaf, or "Bearer of the Sword," which has used the island for 15 years to train terrorists and to coordinate attacks.

Curiously, Jolo was also one of the first places where the United States ever battled Muslim insurgents. On March 7, 1906, less than a decade after the United States seized the Philippines in the Spanish-American War, the people of Jolo—known as Moros, after the Spanish for Moors—revolted, among other reasons because they feared that the American effort to enroll their children in schools was part of a plan to convert them to Christianity. The Moros, armed with little more than swords, launched an insurgency against U.S. troops.

"They chased a bunch of Moros up that old volcano and killed them," Linder said to me, pointing out of the helicopter window. Below, the island rose into a series of steep volcanic ridges, each one glowing a lush green against the silvered surface of the Sulu Sea. In the Battle of the Clouds, as the confrontation on Jolo 100 years ago is called, U.S. forces killed 600 to 1,000 people. "It was commonly referred to as a massacre," Linder added quietly.

Today, a crucial but little-known battle in the expanding war on terror is under way on Jolo Island. Designed to "wage peace," as Linder says, it's an innovative, decidedly nonviolent approach by which U.S. military personnel—working with aid agencies, private groups and Philippine armed forces—are trying to curtail terrorist recruitment by building roads and providing other services in impoverished rural communities. The effort, known to experts as "the Philippines model," draws on a "victory" on the Philippine island of Basilan, where U.S. forces in 2002 ended the dominance of Abu Sayyaf without firing so much as a single shot. "It's not about how many people we shoot in the face," Linder said. "It's about how many people we get off the battlefield."

On Jolo, U.S. military engineers have dug wells and constructed roads that allow rural farmers for the first time to transport their produce to markets. This past June, the Mercy, a U.S. Navy hospital ship, visited Jolo and other islands to provide medical and dental care to 25,000 people, many of whom had never seen a doctor. American military medical and veterinary teams have held mobile clinics, where Special Forces, speaking native Tausug and Tagalog, gathered information from local residents as they consulted on agriculture and engineering projects. American soldiers are even distributing a comic book designed for ethnic Tausug teenage boys thought to be at risk of being recruited by Abu Sayyaf. The story, Barbangsa: Blood of the Honorable, tells of a fictional young sailor named Ameer who defeats pimply-faced terrorists threatening his Philippine homeland.

The southern Philippines has long served as a "war laboratory," says Marites Vitug, author of Under the Crescent Moon and a leading authority on armed rebellion in the region. "All sorts of armed groups dominate a populace long neglected by government," she says. "Local rulers compete for legitimacy with armed rebel groups, bandits, Muslim preachers, Catholic volunteers, loggers legal and illegal, the Marines, the Army. In this sense, Abu Sayyaf was ripe for growth. Modern history has proved that whenever the legitimacy of a state suffers and the economy goes down, other forces come to the fore as an alternative."...

Much more at the link...

GS
11-29-2006, 02:58 PM
This is fantastic. When I was part of OEF-P in 2002 we weren't allowed to even think about staging operations on Jolo.

SWJED
01-06-2007, 12:44 PM
The Islamic Insurgency in the Philippines Part 1 (http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2007/01/islamic-insurgency-in-philippines-part.html) - The Belmont Club.


The story of the Islamic insurgency in the Philippines is the story of the gradual and partial reversion of Philippine territory, originally incorporated by the American wars against the Moros in the early 20th century, to its former state. Prior to the US pacification campaign against the Moros between 1899 and 1913 the Sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao and Buayan -- Muslim Mindanao -- were effectively independent from Spain. Although the Spaniards nominally claimed the entire extent of what is now called Palawan, Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, they did not exert effective control over it, and could not have bequeathed it to a successor Filipino state. It was the Americans who accomplished that...

Jedburgh
01-06-2007, 02:39 PM
....there was also a decent piece (http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2006/11/first-iraq.html) on the Belmont Club back in November comparing Iraq and the Philippines.

The potential for lessons learned seems to be bouncing through many minds lately, as there recently was a related discussion on INTELST (http://www.s2company.com/files/intelst_info.htm), stirred up by an individual posting the old 'net e-mail about Pershing and pigs. However, I have to say that the old thread on SWC (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1157) was far more substantive...

SWJED
02-22-2007, 10:33 PM
22 February VOA - Southern Philippine Island Plays Out Drama in War on Terror (http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-02-22-voa32.cfm) by Douglas Bakshian. Posted in full per USG guidelines.


Far from the headlines and the rest of the world a drama in the global war on terror is playing out on Jolo island in the southern Philippines. A Muslim guerrilla group called Abu Sayyaf is on the run from the Philippine military while U.S. water, road, and health projects are making life better for the people. But is it yet time to declare victory? Douglas Bakshian recently traveled to Jolo for a look at things.

There is much talk these days in Philippine and U.S. military circles about winning the war on terror on Jolo island, and ending a long struggle against the Abu Sayyaf Islamic terrorist group.

Years of fighting the guerrillas failed to produce peace. So the Philippine military, with the help of U.S. advisers, began addressing civilian needs - roads, schools, water systems and medical care.

By alleviating some of the desperate poverty on Jolo, the military defused some of the anger and frustration that fuels violent movements.

General Juancho Sabban, commander of the Philippines Marines who are in the forefront of the operation, says this is all about winning public support.

"The secret of all these operations should be the people," he said. "If you win the people, you win the war."

The Abu Sayyaf is one of several groups that over the past 30 years have fought to create a Muslim homeland in the southern Philippines, a predominately Christian country. The government has negotiated peace deals or ceasefires with the two dominant militant forces.

Unlike other separatist groups, the Abu Sayyaf has become best known for a series of deadly bombings and brutal kidnappings and murders.

Since 2002, American special forces have provided training, analysis and intelligence to the Philippine military in the fight against the Abu Sayyaf. U.S. Navy Commander James Marvin helps lead the joint task force for the operation. He says the goal is to build confidence in the people that the military is a good thing and to drive a wedge between the terrorists and the people.

"Basically, you take the bullies that are on the playground and you get all the kids on the playground to stick up for themselves, and tell the bullies, 'we don't want you here anymore.' And they are no longer bullies, they cannot function in that capacity and they move," he said.

At the same time, the Philippine military focused its combat effort on smaller patrols conducting intelligence-driven operations that target terrorist leaders. It also adopted guerrilla tactics to fight in the dense jungles of Jolo.

As a result, in recent months, several Abu Sayyaf leaders have been killed, and their followers driven into the hills.

But will this mixture of the missionary approach and the iron fist be enough to eradicate a problem that was decades in the making?

General Sabban says he thinks the Abu Sayyaf leaders will fight to the death.

Radullan Sahiron, in his 70's is the main senior leader left. Sahiron's son, Ismin, was killed in a clash with the military last year. But before he died the general spoke with him by cell phone.

"And I was trying to convince him to come down and live a normal life, go back to the mainstream," he said. "But he said 'we have an ideology that we are fighting for. I'm sorry, we really want to establish an Islamic state.' And then I told him, 'How about your father?' He said, 'my father will die here in Patikul [a Jolo area], fighting. It's either you get out of Sulu, or my father dies here.'"

Some political analysts say the Abu Sayyaf can be wiped out, but that is not enough to bring lasting peace to Jolo. Ramon Casiple, head of Manila's Institute of Political and Electoral Reforms, says the problems that fostered the group's rise must be addressed.

"But if you are asking me if the factors that give rise to Abu Sayyaf have been eliminated, and therefore in the future will there be more Abu Sayyaf? I think these factors have not been eradicated even with all the civic action that has been done already," he said.

Sulu province, which includes Jolo, is one of the poorest regions in the Philippines. It has suffered neglect by the central government and long-standing grievances have powered successive rebellions.

It also has a rigid hierarchical social structure with a few wealthy families at the top and dozens of clans. Casiple says previous development programs in the region have failed because only certain families or groups benefited.

"There are certain sections that have been getting wealthier from all the aid. But the farmer at the bottom level has not improved," he said. "That is the breeding ground of rebellion. I mean you can have a road, but if the family doesn't have a car or a vehicle to use it, it is nothing for them."

For all this to be untangled after so many decades of neglect will require a lot of work, and a fundamental and sustained change in Jolo's economic, social and political structures. More importantly, analysts say, Manila must shift from a policy of neglect to a serious commitment to better the lives of all Jolo's people.

Jedburgh
02-26-2007, 02:20 PM
BBC, 22 Feb 07: Philippine Army Linked to Murders (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6385319.stm)

...The commission's report came a day after a UN envoy accused the army of being in "denial" over the issue of extra-judicial killings.

A rights group said 830 activists had been killed since President Gloria Arroyo came to power in 2001.

Ms Arroyo said she would take the findings and allegations seriously....
Here's the actual report:

Independent Commission to Investigate Media and Activist Killings (http://www.tingog.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/melo_commission_report.pdf)

pinoyme
03-02-2007, 11:59 AM
Hi:

What the Melo report indicates is that the Philippine military is still suffering from the consequences of having Marcos once as their commander in chief.

Neither the NPA nor the Armed Forces of the Philippines holds the high moral ground in my country's COIN campaign.

I condemn these alleged political murders. I also believe they are counterproductive.

Nonetheless, the Philippine public is indifferent. There is no uproar right now.

This is due to the fact perhaps that most victims have been identified with the Maoist left. No one among the victims was ever identified with other political groups--the middle forces included.

The indifference could be interpreted as the NPA's being isolated politically.

But if the COIN campaign in the Philippines is to be brought to a successful conclusion eventually--no matter how long this takes--steps must be taken to further speed up institutional reforms in the AFP.

SWJED
04-10-2007, 10:05 AM
I received the following via e-mail from the Philippines:


From the MILF Secretariat Web site: MILF concern over CMO.

Civil-military operations more lethal, MILF says
Date: Monday, April 09 @ Malay Peninsula Standard Time
Topic: News
April 9, 2007

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has described the latest approach to the insurgency problem in Mindanao by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which is civil-military operations, as more lethal than brute force. Khaled Musa, deputy chairman of the MILF Committee on Information, told Luwaran that this approach has a chilling effect on Moros fighting the government who are less in ideological armor, saying this was tested during the early years of the MNLF when practically everybody surrendered to the government, if the basis of counting is government statistics.

He said it was mainly due to the policy of attraction pursued by the Americans that worked effectively against Moros who were up in arms.

But he clarified that using this approach to hard core ideologues of revolutionary struggles would only scratch the surface of things.

"Dedicated and rightly guided revolutionaries," he said, "do not expect material rewards for sacrificing everything dear to them."

AFP chief General Hermogenes Esperon Jr. said the military would abandon Oplan Ultimatum and focus on civil-military operations against the Abu Sayyaf in Mindanao.

"We are shifting to civil-military operations," Esperon said during an interview over ANC cable news television.

More than 5,000 troops under Oplan Ultimatum have been pursuing the Abu Sayyaf since last year and it had its successes following the killing of its chieftain, Khadaffy Janjalani, and his deputy, Abu Solaiman, late last year.

Esperon said the change in strategy was meant to address the problem of innocent civilians displaced by the encounters between government troops and the Abu Sayyaf.

"There have been a lot of people who have been displaced and so we want to go into their areas and tell them that we... did not intentionally displace them. This was all part of the security operations that would benefit them anyway," he said.

Jedburgh
07-30-2007, 01:01 PM
HRW, Jul 07: Lives Destroyed: Attacks on Civilians in the Philippines (http://hrw.org/reports/2007/philippines0707/philippines_lives_destroyed.pdf)

....In all, bombings against civilians in the Philippines have caused over 1,700 casualties in the last seven years, more than the number of people killed and injured in bombing attacks during the same period in neighboring Indonesia (including the 2002 Bali bombings), and considerably more than the number of those killed and injured in bombings in Morocco, Spain, Turkey, or Britain. Moreover, in addition to bombings, extremist groups in the Philippines have carried out numerous kidnappings and targeted killings, including beheadings, and have extorted large amounts of money from Philippine civilians in ransom and extortion payments.

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), based in the southern Philippines, have claimed responsibility for many of these crimes. ASG is a radical Islamist group whose members broke away in the 1990s from more established ethnic Moro insurgent groups (“Moro” is a Philippine term for Muslim). RSM, a group composed of converts to Islam, is closely tied to ASG. The two groups purportedly aim to push Christians out from Mindanao and the Sulu islands and “restore” Islamic rule over the Philippines.

Both ASG and RSM maintain links with current or former members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the violent Indonesian Islamist group responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings. Philippine government officials also claim that elements of the longstanding Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) have, over the last few years, provided sanctuary or assistance for ASG, RSM, and JI members.....
Full 32 page report at the link.

SWJED
09-18-2007, 08:12 AM
Flashpoint: No Bungle in the Jungle (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/09/2926516) - Peter Brookes, Armed Forces Journal


Whether you agree with it or not, it's likely there will be some changes to the current size and shape of U.S. forces in Iraq over the next year. For reasons from the political to the practical, the current troop surge in Iraq isn't going to last forever.

So, as the politicians and policymakers search for a future strategy in Iraq that would be amenable to the American people, Congress, the Pentagon and the White House, it makes sense to open the intellectual aperture pretty wide in the search for good ideas.

In some corners of defense intelligentsia, the U.S.-backed effort in the southern Philippines against the al-Qaida-affiliated Abu Sayyaf group ("Bearer of the Sword") is being touted as the most successful counterterrorism campaign of the post-Sept. 11 period. Indeed, some are promoting Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) as a model counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operation. Although not everyone would agree with that characterization, it's worthwhile to take a look at OEF-P to see whether the strategy and policy might be applied to the ongoing challenges in Iraq — or elsewhere...

pinoyme
09-19-2007, 07:04 AM
Hi:

Yup.

Many Filipinos are happy about this even if they do not take to the streets to march.

Nonetheless, maybe it would be nice also if US policymakers were to craft an indirect program to rid a number of AFP officers and enlisted personnel of their Bonapartist tendencies. This bad habit they picked up during the latter part of the Marcos dictatorship.

There is still the threat this progress shall not be sustainable. This if a number of AFP troopers shall think it is they who are the saviors of the Philippines.

It is about time all learned to respect civilian supremacy even if the Philippine government does have warts.

True, the country may have governance problems and this also includes the Philippine Army and the rest of the AFP.

A coup d'etat however is no solution.

Cheers and Mabuhay.

Jedburgh
10-16-2007, 03:38 PM
The Long War Journal, 15 Oct 07:

To Raise Them Up. Part 1: The Lesser and Greater Insurgencies of the Philippines (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/to_raise_them_up_par.php)

B.A. Patty was recently embedded with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In part one of his three-part series, Patty examines the roles of organizations such as Abu Sayyaf and MNLF in the insurgency and what Filipino and US troops are doing to squelch terrorist activities.....

Jedburgh
10-18-2007, 01:21 PM
The Long War Journal, 17 Oct 07:

To raise them up. Part 2: The role of the Philippines in the Long War (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/to_raise_them_up_par_1.php)

B.A. Patty was recently embedded with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In part two of his three-part series, Patty examines the the Philippines' role in the Long War.

Zamboanga, Philippines: Colonel David Maxwell is the commanding officer of the US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. In a two-hour interview he spoke about counterinsurgency in the Philippines and the larger Long War.....

B A Patty
10-21-2007, 06:25 AM
The last part of that series is here:

To raise them up. Part 3: Investing in people (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/to_raise_them_up_par_2.php)

I'm a longtime reader of SWJ. If anyone wants to discuss the series, I'll be happy to do so.

pinoyme
10-22-2007, 08:59 AM
Hi:

Interesting.

Comes now the issue. Marcos politicalized what was once a relatively professional Armed Forces of the Philippines.

He also allowed--no, encouraged--AFP officers and men to help themselves to the public coffers--as long as they went along with his politics.

For any long term results, the US will also have to help address these also.

A good number of AFP officers still harbor Bonapartist tendencies. They will have to learn to respect civilian authority once more.

At the same time, their grievances will have to be addressed.

Incidentally, hazing at the Philippine Military Academy will have to be addressed. Much anecdotal evidence suggests that this hazing is what had made many of them torturers and perpetrators of human rights violations during Marcos' dicatatorship.

This helped fuel the Maoist insurgency in the 1970s and 1980s.

As one notorious torturer is reported to have said, and quoted in a book:

"What I did to them (i.e. the torture she committed on political dissidents) was only what was done to me as a plebe in the PMA."

Will the US help address this?

B A Patty
10-30-2007, 09:38 AM
I think the answer to your question, "Will the US help address this?" is "Yes, within the context of its overall strategic goals."

The US strategy depends on maintaining at least, and increasing if possible, the GRP/AFP legitimacy in the eyes of the population. There are signs that is working, esp. in the case of Task Force Zamboanga (where the police and AFP work in teams, and therefore watch each other as well as cooperate). US advisors are always working to improve the professionalism of the AFP and police forces for that reason.

That said, this is and has to be a GRP-led and GRP/AFP "out front" issue. The main thing the US can't do is visibly 'push' them in one direction or another. It has to be done through offering training that they're free to accept or reject. They are accepting it, but it is a gradual process.

CalmSeas
11-11-2007, 03:49 AM
Just ran acros this site & consequently this thread.

Having been in & around this country for the past 30-years & a resident for the last 10-years, I just to comment on your article (Part 3 would not open by the way).

First, the AFP has no desires whatsoever for the "War" to end in Mindanao,or for the NPA threat, to come to a conclusion. Why, you might ask? Simple... GREED. Dig deeper into the AFP/PNP brass & follow the money (USAID) & I would wager that you would be hard-pressed to find a poor retired officer...quite the contrast to the poverty that AFP/PNP enlisted live in.

Secondly, I would challenge your assumptions that the PMA is compareable with West Point, or that there is a strong AFP NCO Corps...it is just simply false. You were obviously, as with all embedded journalist, shown what they wanted you to see.

As for Mindanao...the majority of Filipinos (yes, they are considered seperate from the Bangsa Moros) could care less what happens to the Muslims in the South, or everywhere else in the PI. You must scratch the surface & discover the REAL Philippine culture in order to break down the psychological make-up of the Filipino psyche. They could care less about their country, as they are only concerned, in the following order, with Self, family, tribe (Ilocano, Bisaya, etc.). They only start shouting "Pinoy Ako" when it is in reference to some foreign perceived insult such as the "Desperate Housewives" slant. Yes, absurdly patriotic.

What is the real underlying factor that keeps this country in terminal poverty? A deeply ingrained culture of CORRUPTION! As one Filipino General (Lim, I think) wrote: "The Filipino cannot help to be corrupt...it is in his blood." When Filipinos see Gloria sitting up in malacanang doing her best to make the Marcos' look like petty thieves, you soon hear them saying "If the the President can steal from the country, then why not me?"

While the U.S.military is trying to regain some sort of foot-hold in the Southern Philippines, the DoS is blindly throwing the money at the problem, thus emboldening Philippine authorities to steal even more. All the while the Chinese must be laughing their ass off. They know how to play the game here in SE Asia. They will continue to "LOAN" the Philippines $Billions$, thus establishing a debt that the Philippines cannot even begin to pay back. This is how they will eventually regain control of the South China Sea (oil drilling rights, etc.) and continue to expand their influence over the area.

On one final note: keep an eye out for a land deal for peace coming from Gloria. She is on record as saying that ARMM (Autonomus Region of Muslim Mindanao) will be given a very huge chunk of land as part of the Malaysian (Muslim) peace brokered deal.

Sarajevo071
11-11-2007, 04:01 AM
Just ran acros this site & consequently this thread.

Having been in & around this country for the past 30-years & a resident for the last 10-years, I just to comment on your article (Part 3 would not open by the way).

Try now:

To raise them up. Part 3: Investing in people
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/to_raise_them_up_par_2.php

CalmSeas
11-11-2007, 10:01 AM
Hi:

Yup.

Many Filipinos are happy about this even if they do not take to the streets to march.

Nonetheless, maybe it would be nice also if US policymakers were to craft an indirect program to rid a number of AFP officers and enlisted personnel of their Bonapartist tendencies. This bad habit they picked up during the latter part of the Marcos dictatorship.

There is still the threat this progress shall not be sustainable. This if a number of AFP troopers shall think it is they who are the saviors of the Philippines.

It is about time all learned to respect civilian supremacy even if the Philippine government does have warts.

True, the country may have governance problems and this also includes the Philippine Army and the rest of the AFP.

A coup d'etat however is no solution.

Cheers and Mabuhay.

Interesting. Espousing that the U.S. indirectly get rid of Philippine military members, or their tendencies.

This is a common conflict of desired involvement that Filipinos voice. When the U.S. does get involved they are "Imperialist," but when they let Filipinos try & solve their own problems, they should do more.

My take...a revolution will eventually be the ONLY way this country will rid itself of the Oligarchy that controls it. There is a website that list the controlling family of each town, city, province here (sorry, couldn't find it right now). It is amazing that this stuff is still prevelent here in 2007. Does anybody really think they will be giving up power voluntarilly anytime soon?

As one local editorialist recently wrote, citing a popular saying during Marcos times..."There are 85 million cowards in the Philippines and One Bitch in charge." Until Filipinos get their heads out of the sand and take charge of their country they will continue to be slaves in their own country and will continue to get the same old corrupt, Do nothing, kleptocratic government that they deserve.

Global Scout
11-11-2007, 04:17 PM
My take...a revolution will eventually be the ONLY way this country will rid itself of the Oligarchy that controls it.

CalmSeas (I would hate to see rough seas if this is calm:)), I understand your frustration with the corruption in the Philippines (and other developing and non-developing nations), but when I think of revolutions I think of Castro, Mao, and Lenin who led revolutions to throw the bastards out, only to be replaced with much worse systems. The book answer is to ensure that the government enforces its anti-corruption laws, but of course we know that is a joke, the enforcer will not throw him/herself in prison.

Transforming the government has always been the most challenging, and often unattainable, goal for COIN or peace enforcement missions, especially in places in the Philippines, most of Latin America, and all of Africa, where corruption is embedded in the culture. We can develop tactically and technically competent security forces, but as we all know this isn't enough.

I'm sure there are a few discussion threads on this somewhere in SWJ, but without this government/cultural transformation any victory will only be transient in nature.

CalmSeas
11-12-2007, 12:13 AM
CalmSeas (I would hate to see rough seas if this is calm:)), I understand your frustration with the corruption in the Philippines (and other developing and non-developing nations), but when I think of revolutions I think of Castro, Mao, and Lenin who led revolutions to throw the bastards out, only to be replaced with much worse systems. The book answer is to ensure that the government enforces its anti-corruption laws, but of course we know that is a joke, the enforcer will not throw him/herself in prison.

Transforming the government has always been the most challenging, and often unattainable, goal for COIN or peace enforcement missions, especially in places in the Philippines, most of Latin America, and all of Africa, where corruption is embedded in the culture. We can develop tactically and technically competent security forces, but as we all know this isn't enough.

I'm sure there are a few discussion threads on this somewhere in SWJ, but without this government/cultural transformation any victory will only be transient in nature.

Then..what would be your recommendation for solving the morass here in the Philippines?

Remember...the Philippines has had their Independence since 1946 and WAS the most promising nation circa 1950s, but due to greediness, corruption and what is commonly referred to as "Ako muna (Me first, selfish, individualistic mentality)" they are almost in last place here in SE Asia.

Democracy is a sad joke here, with massive cheating at all levels of elections. The current "Illigetimate President" resorts to buying off the congress in order to kill impeachment raps and political salvagings (state sanctioned murders) have topped 800+ and some reports have them at over 1,000.

From a moral stance this place has turned into "Sodom and Gomorrah (sp.)."

You hit it on the head that there needs to be a "Cultural Transformation," since this is the main excuse given for many of the things that occur here (It is part of our culture).

Believe me, I have racked my brain trying to figure out another avenue of establishing some form of normalacy here but it is beyond hope at this time in history. If you have a better idea lets hear it.

Not all "Revolutions" are in aid of establishing a communist type regime. One could argue that our own "War of Independence" was a Revolution. The French had their own Revolution, etc. A Revolution of the entire system (ruling elite http://www.endpoliticaldynasty.com/) is what needs to occur. If it can be done within the constitution, then all is good, but we know that that is not going to happen. A "rough and questionable model" would be S. Africa, in which the controlling elite is made to answer for all of their past sins...but I do not see the masa (people) having the intestinal fortitude for such a feat. :)

pinoyme
11-15-2007, 08:20 AM
Calm Seas:

What is your beef really?

Truth to tell, I cannot fathom from where you are coming from politically? In this thread, you sound as if you were a Filipino campus radical of the early 1970s crying out bloody revolution.


Yet, in the other, you sounded as if you were someone to the right of the political spectrum, even if only to the right of center.



A revolution to knock off the oligarchy? For starters, no attempt at armed struggle to topple the government has ever succeeded.

So, history would be immediately against those who advocate such in my country.

And Yes, there is an oligarchy. And yes, there is corruption here. Which is sad.

But Filipinos have the tendency to highlight their shortcomings while failing to count their strengths.

Have you ever wondered why the Philippines has never sank into the ocean, in spite its bad press since the 1950s? Its because of the Filipino people's resiliency.

And inspite the political heat right now in the Philippines, its economy is still doing fine, Thank You.

My take as to why this is so: reforms of the political and economic variety since Corazon Aquino's time are now having a cumulative effect.

It would be best for US security interests to nudge these incremental steps towards progress further.

And that goes also for the Armed Forces of the Philippines--an institution where the United States has plenty of clout.

pinoyme
11-15-2007, 08:50 AM
Calm seas?

The tenor of your postings belies the avatar you have chosen for yourself. Hence, the question mark as you can see.

You appear to be frothing with anger at the Philippines and Filipinos.

Why so?

Yup, you bash us Pinoys as we have been bashing ourselves.

Yes, there was cheating in the elections. In the usual place where they have been done--in that distant area in Mindanao where the birds and the bees have voted as a matter of course since 1949.

Incidentally, such practices were also rampant in US cities in the late 1800s where machine politics dominated. But did the US of A sink into the depths of the ocean never to recover?

So, you have been here 10 years already.

OK.

Yet, you fail to have seen sectors among the middle class in this country who have been advocating for reforms. You have failed also to see the incremental progress taking place over the past two decades.

Or that the Philippine economy is humming once more. Or that the NPA is nothing more now than an extortionist gang stupidly mouthing Maoist slogans.

Or that the Abu Sayaff is a threat only in a very tiny slice of Mindanao. And that the rest of this island has an economy now on the bounce.

So, where have you been in the Philippines all these years?

And once again, what have you got really against my country?

As for PMA not the equal of West Point. Maybe.

But it does have alumni whose tactical and operational skills are first rate.
Now if only hazing there were to be minimized, many of them would perhaps not be that brutal as they conduct COIN operations.

And the US could play a key role in influencing this badly-needed reform.

Meanwhile, pray tell me: what happened to you here that you are so angry at the Philippines, Filipinos, and US policies in this country?

acostaraybies
01-17-2008, 05:44 AM
I pretty much agree with "Calm Seas", much to the chagrin of "pinoyisme". I too, lived in the Philippines for more than 10 years, speak the language and have always viewed the AFP and their exploits with a healthy dose of skepticism. Jeez, with all of the coups that were initiated by members/former members of the military, you start to wonder whose side they were fighting on. Gringo Honasan never received so much as a slap on the wrist for his role in the coups and eventually became a senator of the land. In another instance, the AFP surrounded a whole group Abu Sayaaf members in a hospital somewhere in Basilan (probably around 1998 time frame) only to let them slip through their "cordon sanitaire" once money exchanged hands. I got to see the AFP in action up close and personal on March 29, 2003 when the NPA decided to try and celebrate their 34th anniversary with a bang near my house on the boundary of Angat and Pandi in Bulacan. I don't question the loyalty and bravery of the enlisted soldiers, who went into battle without many of the advantages and the gear that American soldiers have. That battle raged almost constantly for more than 13 hours, but somebody in the chain of command had the audacity to schedule a lunch break promptly at 1200 and then call off the attack at 1815 local even though they had military superiority, several armored vehicles and had the bad guys boxed in. Barking dogs let everyone know the egress route of the NPA, but the AFP had called it quits because it was getting dark. I could list other specific examples, but why bother. Just please explain to me how someone with an AFP military salary obtains the money to buy houses in exclusive neighborhoods and properties in the provinces if their are no shenanigans going on? I'm sure things have improved incrementally as they always do in the Philippines, but let's deal with reality and not view things as the spinmeisters wish they would be.

pinoyme
01-20-2008, 02:58 AM
acostaraybies:

I do not know what nationality you are. But your bluntness indicates you might be American. Or at least in the Western Hemisphere of the world.

The AFP has many problems. Including its having been heavily politicized by Marcos. It also tasted political power, because of him.

Solving this problem is like putting back toothpaste into its canister. That is a tough job. And that is why many of the problems regarding the AFP have persisted.

But haven't you noticed? Several parts of the Philippines are enjoying an economic boom, fueled by the country's natural competitiveness in services. And also by the money being sent in by Filipino contract workers.

And that is why the Philippines is not about to go under. And it never will.
Inspite of the AFP's faults which you have cited.

Yup, incremental progress is being made. The reality of the Philippines dictates this is the way to go.

As for Gringo? Well, what about Oliver North?

Does North's behavior and appeal speak for the entire US Army?

Like it or not, the insurgency in the Philippines is a symptom of the painful process the country is going through as it moves towards a mature economy and democracy.

Due to its history, this will be a long,uphill, and plodding slog.

But the Philippines does have its strengths and talking points. Better to work with these than to knock it down for its faults.

And so, you have been in my country for 10 years. So that means since 1998.

It still has not sunk, hasn't it?In fact, most parts of it are floating very well, thank you.

So please don't punch more holes into it. Plugging those found on Good Ship Republic of the Philippines is a difficult task. But inspite everything, the job is mostly being done.

I ask you to be patient. Please do not try to do to the Philippines what the US did to Vietnam. Abandon it in its most desperate hour when progress was already being made under General Abrams.

Cheers.

selil
01-20-2008, 03:04 AM
As for Gringo? Well, what about Oliver North?
Does North's behavior and appeal speak for the entire US Army?



Oliver North was in the Army (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oliver_North)? That explains a lot

pinoyme
01-20-2008, 03:39 AM
Selil:

I apologize for the booboo.

But in the Philippine context, my statement would have meant, " Does he speak for the US Armed Forces?"

I stand by the rest of my post.

selil
01-20-2008, 04:43 AM
Selil:

I apologize for the booboo.

But in the Philippine context, my statement would have meant, " Does he speak for the US Armed Forces?"

I stand by the rest of my post.

In the sense of American military politics saying a Marine is from the Army would be likely saying the finest rare breed Rottweiler (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rottweiler) is a poodle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poodle). Please accept the humor in which it was meant.

Jedburgh
02-22-2008, 03:12 PM
Zachary Abuza, writing for the Jebsen Center for CT Studies, 21 Feb 08:

The Philippine Peace Process: Too Soon to Claim a Settlement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front? (http://fletcher.tufts.edu/jebsencenter/pdfs/JCCTS_ResearchSeries_3.3_Abuza_02-2008_FINAL.pdf)

Peace talks between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the government of the Republic of the Philippines were stalled for more than eleven years until November 2007, when a breakthrough was reached. Yet, in the following month, the MILF walked out of the peace talks, and they now remain deadlocked. Back-channel talks continue, but the issues are complex, and spoilers on all side abound. What is at stake in the Philippine peace process, and what are the implications for international security and counter-terrorism?
Complete 8 page paper at the link.

Jedburgh
02-22-2008, 07:19 PM
USIP, 20 Feb 08: Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines: A Summary and Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003-2007 (http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr202.pdf)

Summary

• The Muslim inhabitants of Mindanao and Sulu in the southern Philippines, known as Moros, have resisted assimilation into the Christianized national culture for centuries. Since Spanish colonial times, Moros have been marginalized from Philippine society, politics, and economic development. Moro-dominated areas have suffered from the effects of war, poor governance, and lack of justice. High crime rates, internal clan-on-clan conflicts, and corruption and abuse by local leaders also beset Moro communities. For nearly four decades, Moros have rebelled against the Philippine government and sought self-determination. The rebellion was led first by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and then by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In 2003, the U.S. State Department, seeking to prevent international terrorist groups from exploiting the conflict in the Philippines, engaged USIP to facilitate a peace agreement between the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF. The State Department felt that the Institute’s status as a quasi-governmental, “track one-and-a-half” player would allow it to engage the parties more broadly than an official government entity could. To accomplish its mandate, USIP launched the Philippine Facilitation Project (PFP).

• PFP faced many difficulties at the outset. The Malaysian government had served as host and facilitator of the GRP-MILF peace talks since 2001 and opposed an American presence at the negotiating table. Moros suspected USIP’s presence, motives, and relationship with the U.S. government. USIP, lacking a permanent base in Mindanao, also faced challenges in establishing strong channels of communication with the GRP, MILF, and civil society. Multiple changes in the composition of the GRP negotiating team, and divergent perspectives and agendas within the Moro leadership and communities further complicated the peace facilitation effort. At times, senior GRP officials’ lukewarm support for an equitable and effective peace agreement hampered the efforts of skilled and committed negotiators. Corruption and criminality among the Moros, exacerbated by centuries-old clan loyalties, created other hurdles.

• Despite the challenges, USIP managed to build productive relationships with both the GRP and the MILF, helped the parties come up with creative solutions to stubborn issues of ancestral domain, and started dialogue between disparate Moro ethnic groups. PFP’s multifaceted approach included directly sharing lessons learned by principals from other conflict areas around the world; training civil society leaders in conflict management; promoting interfaith dialogue and cooperation via the Bishops-Ulama Forum; supporting the training of Mindanao history teachers on teaching a historical narrative that is more inclusive of the Moro experience; and launching dialogue among young Moro leaders. To improve media coverage of the conflict, PFP held two training workshops for media representatives. It also conducted six workshops on conflict management, negotiation, and communication for Philippine military officers.

• Through its activities, USIP introduced concepts and approaches that were useful to both government and MILF peace panels. It helped inform the Philippine population, and elites in Manila in particular, of issues underlying the conflict in Mindanao, while presenting potentially viable means of resolving them. The Institute’s efforts have added marginally to more balanced media coverage. USIP funding supported the publication of policy papers, which were distributed to scholars, analysts, journalists, and policymakers. USIP also sponsored educational materials for use in Philippine schools.

• Philippine economic progress and U.S. counterterrorism objectives will remain precarious until the Mindanao conflict is resolved. The roots of conflict in Mindanao are primarily political, not economic or religious. Preference for military “solutions” will likely miss the delicate nuances of intergroup conflict and could even worsen the situation. To move the peace process forward, U.S. policymakers must give higher priority to the GRP-MILF negotiations and commit to working with both parties long enough to reach an agreement and implement it. The Philippine government, for its part, will need to muster the political will to address Moro grievances more effectively, especially on land claims, control over economic resources, and political self-governance. When an agreement is reached, implementation will require long-term monitoring by a committed international body. Today’s complex diplomatic landscape increasingly requires new tools and techniques of conflict management, including quasi- and nongovernmental actors, to accomplish U.S. foreign policy goals. Because of its ability to deal with nonstate actors and sensitive issues underlying civil conflict, USIP can be a useful instrument for advancing U.S. interests.
Complete 24 page paper at the link.

Kenyatta
05-07-2008, 02:44 PM
I think the main problem is not the Filipino people but the Philippine gov.

The Philippine gov is basically a corrupt oligarchy in which power is basically in the hands of political, business families and reform to change to country has to come from the top and not from the bottom.

First the Philippines has to have political change then economic then social.

I think the Philippines is not ready for U.S. style democracy and I think a South korean/Singapore authoritairan type gov. but done right(developing and reforming the economy) before democracy. Marcos could have done it but he was corrupt. The South Koreans and Singaporeans were lucky to have Park Chung Hee and Lee Kuan Yu.

I also come from the Philippine and while I highly agree that the Philippines has tribal ethnic prejudices(Ilocano, Tagalog etc.) many Filipinos are patriotic in the western sense. Depends on the crowd you meet but many Filipinos think of themselves as Filipino first----tribe second----. This is more prevailent among the educated and the cities.

But when compared with the USA(and I have lived there btw), our ethnic groups live in relative harmony with each other(try walking and driving as a Chinese and Asian in Watts Los Angeles and you'll know what I mean, ). You may hear news in Mindanao but the Christians and Muslims live in OK harmony there too(I know of many instances where after fighting each other, the same AFP and MILF troops would drink with each other in the same bar while resuming fighting the next day).

As for self first.....I think this is very much prevailent in the world not just in the Philippines.

As for the AFP, the AFP is not as bad as it looks. The AFP has basically defeated the NPA, the MNLF and the MILF(while the NPA and the MILF still exists, they are basically emasculated though the MILF might be a future threat). If it was poor quality it could not have done this.

Also the AFP has poor equipment when compared to its neighbors since it does not have a major foreign threat or dispute(the Spratly dispute with China is laughable) and it relies on the USA for its foreign defense(USA-Philippine defense pact). Its equipment is good for its counterinsurgency situation.

Steve Blair
08-12-2008, 01:49 PM
Story from BBC here (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7555584.stm) about some recent operations.

The Philippine military says it has "liberated" five more villages from rebel control, as the fighting in North Cotabato province continues.

Rebel commanders have confirmed that their forces are withdrawing to camps in adjacent Maguindanao province.

And here (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1695576.stm) is a link to a decent, short BBC backgrounder for those who might want more information about some of the factions involved.

Juan Rico
08-23-2008, 08:32 AM
http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/DC22Ae01.html

"No one is allowed to get our natural resources," vows Margani, with an intense gaze and a clenching handshake. "We want the United States to help us develop our oil, as long as they recognize our sovereignty."

Observers note the irony of intense Muslims calling for American liberators. "The Americans who uprooted the Sulu sultanate [90 years ago] are coming back to install the sultanate," says a respected Muslim professor. "They are here to advance their protection of oil fields and shipping lanes. That's why the sultan of Sulu is pro-balikatan [balikatan: literally shoulder-to-shoulder, joint Philippine exercises with US soldiers]. That's why Malaysia is scared of the American presence here."

http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/5025/

Liguasan Marsh, the country's largest wetland, had been the site of major encounters between the government, Moro rebels and lawless elements in the past using its forested portions as lairs.

Tons of bombs have been dropped and bullets fired at the jungle portion of the marshland that severely eroded its environment.

But just recently, two programs aimed at salvaging the marsh from further destruction has been launched at S.K. Pendatun town in Maguindanao.

http://www.intellasia.net/news/articles/resources/111247285.shtml

The Liguasan Marsh holds a huge reservoir of natural gas worth hundreds of billions of dollars and the Bangsamoro people could become one of the richest if this area is placed under their control, the chief of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) said over the weekend.

MNLF chair Nur Misuari revealed this during a peace summit held in Patadon village of this city where he addressed his followers and other participants.

Misuari said that some American oil engineers told him about the abundance of natural gases in the Liguasan Marsh, the country's largest wetland.

The Americans estimated total earnings from the natural gas of Liguasan -once explored -will amount to US$580 billion, Misuari said.

Juan Rico
08-23-2008, 12:48 PM
(RUMINT)

http://blogs.inquirer.net/current/2008/08/15/greater-malaysia/


What many don’t know is that no less than US Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte discreetly came to Manila right after the Supreme Court temporarily halted the signing of the controversial GRP-MILF agreement last week. Prior to that, rumor has it (I can’t really confirm this) that US Ambassador to the Philippines Kristie Kenney went to Bangkok to meet with President George W. Bush, who was then en route to China for the opening of the Olympics, to brief him on the Bangsamoro issue. Ambassador Kenney, by the way, had been meeting with MILF leaders before this whole imbroglio broke out.

These only prove the fact that the United States’s involement and stake on the Bangsamoro issue is deeper than we all thought. And as always, the Americans would do all it takes- even thread dangerous waters if need be- just to pursue their national interest.

I believe the United States is coddling- if not outright aiding- the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in exchange for major pro-US concessions.

As early as 2003, the United States Institute of Peace, which is funded by the US Congress, has been involved in the “peace process” in Mindanao.

Jedburgh
10-25-2008, 01:17 PM
ICG, 23 Oct 08: The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/b83_the_philippines___the_collapse_of_peace_in_min danao.pdf)

On 14 October 2008 (http://philippinecommentary.blogspot.com/2008/10/supreme-court-split-8-7-on-moa-ad.html) the Supreme Court of the Philippines declared a draft agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippines government unconstitutional, effectively ending any hope of peacefully resolving the 30-year conflict in Mindanao while President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo remains in office. The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD or MOA (http://www.filipinovoices.com/grp-milf-memorandum-of-agreement-on-ancestral-domain)), the culmination of eleven years’ negotiation, was originally scheduled to have been signed in Kuala Lumpur on 5 August. At the last minute, in response to petitions from local officials who said they had not been consulted about the contents, the court issued a temporary restraining order, preventing the signing. That injunction in turn led to renewed fighting that by mid-October had displaced some 390,000......

Jedburgh
02-18-2009, 03:23 PM
ICG, 16 Feb 09: The Philippines: Running in Place in Mindanao (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/philippines/b88_the_philippines___running_in_place_in_mindanao .pdf)

.....Peace is not around the corner in Mindanao. No one should have illusions that the government’s move toward reestablishing its negotiating team presages a new political will to address the complex issues that scuttled the MOA. But if a settlement seems unlikely during the Arroyo administration, there is still much to be done now that might help make a future peace stronger. The MILF negotiators have studied many of the autonomy agreements reached around the world in the last decade, but there are still lessons to be learned not just in what provisions were included but how compromises were reached and what tactics were used......

Bill Moore
06-02-2009, 03:51 AM
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/MAN494095.htm


COTABATO CITY, Philippines, May 27 (Reuters) - Fighting between Philippine troops and rogue factions of a Muslim rebel group has spread beyond oil and gas-rich wetlands in the south, and more guerrillas could get involved, a rebel leader said.

Rogue MILF factions went on the rampage last August and attacked Christian-majority towns after a peace deal between the government and the MILF leadership was aborted. Nearly 600 people have been killed since then.

MILF leadership generally accepts Philippine security force operations against rogue MILF elements, but now that conflict is effecting main stream MILF areas, and it is creating a significant humanitarian problem for the Moros who have been displaced by the fighting, thus risking another war with main stream MILF (which would be significant). A few stray operations can easily undue years of hard won gains through a hearts and minds approach. This really creates a catch 22 situation for the security forces.


Tens of thousands of villagers have fled areas near the marshlands because of artillery bombardments, taking refuge in mosques, school buildings and gymnasiums elsewhere. At least 500,000 people are described as internal refugees.

"They're trying to drain the pond to catch the fish, but that counter-insurgency strategy has been proven to be a failure," said Iqbal of the offensive. "I don't think the government can defeat us militarily. We have the support of the people."

Iqbal said his group has not abandoned attempts to resume peace talks, but any deal was unlikely under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who leaves office next year.

There is another side to this story, but it is interesting to hear the views of MILF leadership.

Bob's World
06-02-2009, 10:08 AM
There are always many sides, and many perspectives.

My greatest (not sole, but greatest) frustration with OEF-P is that if the MILF of Mindanao and the MNLF of the Sulu Archepeligo wanted the ASG and JI (our two targets of OEF-P, and the reason for US engagement) out of the Philippines, those guys would be gone within a week. So long as they provide sanctuary instead, the security forces of the Philippines will never be able to drive them out. So the clear main effort is to get the Government of the Philippines to work out a compromise with these two main groups that contains that removal of those other two groups as a contingency, while granting the first two full legitimacy in the government.

We should offer the Philippines aid and support contingent on them working seriously to do this (carrots); and tell them quite seriously that if they won't help the populace of the south, then we will, and that while a separate Moro state is not our ideal situation, if that is how government wants to play it, then that is their choice (sticks).

Second order effect would likely be a push by the communist insurgency in the north and a toppling of the ever-fragile national government by either them or by the military. Regardless, we would be able to work with whichever group took power and continue to work toward accomplishment of all of our national objectives in the region if this did occur. The Fils know this; and I am sure they often wonder why don't do the obvious.

Dayuhan
06-20-2009, 09:37 AM
Bob,

I certainly share the frustration, but I think you're missing a few points.

if the MILF of Mindanao and the MNLF of the Sulu Archepeligo wanted the ASG and JI (our two targets of OEF-P, and the reason for US engagement) out of the Philippines, those guys would be gone within a week.

First, minor point: getting ASG "out of the Philippines" really isn't an option. They didn't come from out of the Philippines, they are indigenous, and sure as hell nobody else wants 'em.

More important, I think you're overlooking the reality that the only effective chain of command in Mindanao belongs to the US Armed Forces - and I very much include the Philippine civilian and military authority structure in that estimation.

Does the MILF Central Committee have the capacity to stop its base commands from dealing with JI? Realistically, no. Maybe under Hashim Salamat that kind of centralized authority existed, but Al Haj Murad simply doesn't have it. Look at the problem he has with les rogues du jour, Umbra Kato and Commander Bravo. Murad can't confront Kato because Kato belongs to the Maguindanao aristocracy that forms Murad's key support base, and if push came to shove they might well support Kato. Bravo is just a thug, but he's a Maranao thug and the other Maranao base commands will stick with him; if Murad confronts him he risks losing the entire Maranao contingent.

Don't assume that power and internal legitimacy flows from the Central Committee to the base commands. It's more the other way around. Murad is "in charge" because the field commanders let him be "in charge". He's more spokesman than commander.

Ironically, the shaky position of the MILF central leadership stems at least partly from the reality that the MILF has never had a consistent source of external funding. If they had money flowing from the outside, the ability to allocate or withhold resources would give Murad some leverage. At this point, he has very little. The money flows from internal taxation/extortion and other business/criminal ("/" = "blurred distinction") activities, and the base commands, which actually hold territory, are in a better position to collect revenue than the center.

If the MILF has weak leadership, the MNLF has none. Nur Misuari is a spent force and no credible successor has emerged. Field commanders are making whatever deals and whatever alliances suit their immediate personal needs, with all manner of strange bedfellows involved.

The situation of the Philippine Government is in many ways similar to that of the MILF. For the last 5 years or so the Macapagal administration has been mainly preoccupied with keeping power, which it has done by shoving candy down the throats of various support blocs and trying to keep everyone on board. Arroyo cannot take charge of the military and she cannot take charge of the powerful Mindanao politicians/feudal lords, neither of which really wants a peace deal: she needs their support too badly. Once again, the puppets are pulling the strings.

Nothing productive will happen until the 2010 election is done. Best case scenario there would be a clear winner with unquestioned legitimacy, but the probability of that is low. In the meantime, the AFP will play whack-a-mole with the ASG, the Americans will pat each other on the back and call it all a great success, the MILF and the AFP will avoid both war and peace... in short, things will carry on much as they are.

We should offer the Philippines aid and support contingent on them working seriously to do this (carrots); and tell them quite seriously that if they won't help the populace of the south, then we will

I'm curious: how exactly do you propose to help anyone outside the framework of the Philippine Government? For all the mess, it remains an allied sovereign state.

Second order effect would likely be a push by the communist insurgency in the north and a toppling of the ever-fragile national government by either them or by the military.

The communist insurgency is not in a position to topple anything, except possibly itself. I would not anticipate a successful military coup either, and if that happened it would be close to a worst-case scenario for US objectives.

Regardless, we would be able to work with whichever group took power and continue to work toward accomplishment of all of our national objectives in the region if this did occur. The Fils know this; and I am sure they often wonder why don't do the obvious.

Most unlikely: neither a communist government nor a military one would be likely to give priority to US objectives. Has it occurred to you that "the Fils", individually and collectively, may have objectives of their own, and that they may not be inclined to prioritize US objectives over their own?

When you find yourself wondering why somebody doesn't "do the obvious", there's usually something in the picture that you don't see.

Bob's World
06-20-2009, 12:19 PM
Fair comments, and I recognize yours are made with a greater knowledge of the Philippines from your time living there, and mine made with a greater knowledge of the nature of populace-based conflict.

The reality is of course, is that "it's complicated."

The US, realizing that as a maritime nation with an economy rooted in trade needed the proper "infrastructure" to sustain a naval presence along key trade routes, looked at a map of the Pacific and placed pins in the three largest harbors across that broad ocean: Pearl in Hawaii; Apra in Guam; and Manila in the Philippines. Our interests in the region have driven our engagement in the Philippines for about 110 years now; and while that has paid many benefits for them, it has come with baggage as well.

Today US interests still drive our engagement in the Philippines. Our concerns with terrorism, far more than any altruistic desire to help the Moro people, drives our presence and the nature of our engagement in the South. Our concerns with China, far more than any altruistic desire to help the Philippine people as a whole, drives our presence and the nature of our engagement with the government in Manila; and also shapes the nature of our engagement in the South. The surface tells one story, beneath that surface are many others.

For the Philippine people this is equally true in terms of their own engagement, actions and inactions. It's complicated.

But I do hold to my position that any true solution in the south, both to the things that concern the US and drive our presence there, and the things that are of greatest concern to people of that region, lie in the north. We must get straight with the central government before we can get straight with the problem in the south. (Same, by the way is true in Afghanistan, Pakistan and many other places).

The problem is that "getting straight" with each other is not a thing that governments and politicians are particularly keen to do. I'm not one, so I don't pretend to understand their rationale. Far easier to focus on some secondary or tertiary manifestation of poor governance, and send the military in to "resolve" the problem there instead.

I welcome your insights to this forum. The Pacific / Asia area is a critical one for the world and the US; and our focus, as the focus of SWJ, has been elsewhere of late.

Dayuhan
06-20-2009, 01:53 PM
The reality is of course, is that "it's complicated."

On this we agree.

We must get straight with the central government before we can get straight with the problem in the south. (Same, by the way is true in Afghanistan, Pakistan and many other places).

The problem is that "getting straight" with each other is not a thing that governments and politicians are particularly keen to do. I'm not one, so I don't pretend to understand their rationale. Far easier to focus on some secondary or tertiary manifestation of poor governance, and send the military in to "resolve" the problem there instead.

I suspect that the problem is not entirely a need for the US and Philippine Governments to get straight with each other. What is needed is for the Philippine Government, and the Philippine governing class, to get straight with their own people, and to confront the reality that the traditional prerogatives and privileges of the Philippine governing class (primarily effective exemption from the law) are fundamentally incompatible with effective governance. US objectives in the Philippines will not be achieved until this happens, and there is very little the US can do to make it happen. This has caused a lot of frustration and will cause a lot more.

Military victory - or at least a level of dominance that could pass for victory - has been achieved in Mindanao on a number of occasions. Without effective governance, the conflict simply re-emerges, often in more radical form. Effective governance cannot be achieved while those who govern are above the law and are free to use that privilege to advance their personal interests.

Realistically, even with effective governance the Mindanao conflict would be very difficult to resolve. Without it.... close to impossible.

Dayuhan
07-01-2009, 01:50 AM
The older Moro National Liberation Front fragmented into factions after the group and the Filipino government signed a peace treaty in 1996…. it disaggregated a large insurgent group into multiple factions

This is simply wrong. The MILF split from the MNLF began in 1977, in Jeddah, during negotiations between the MNLF and Philippine Government representatives. Hashim Salamat and other Maguindanao and Maranao MNLF leaders, upset at the way MNLF Chain Nur Misuari was handling the negotiations, tried to take over leadership of the organization. Misuari denounced them as traitors and expelled them. They set up their own group, the “New MNLF”, and formally initiated the MILF in 1984. The Abu Sayyaf formed in 1990-91.

This is not obscure information, it’s available to anyone with access to Google and 5 spare minutes. I find it disturbing that an article like this can be published apparently without the slightest attempt to check basic facts.

This is not a minor detail. The presumption appears to be that this process of “disaggregation” disables the insurgency. If you look at the actual track record in Mindanao since the split, the disaggregation has made the fight more difficult. “Disaggregated” groups, such as the MILF and ASG, are more radical, less susceptible to negotiation, and more inclined to associate with international terrorist groups. Recently the MILF itself has shown a tendency to splinter, with disaggregated groups proving to be less inclined to engage in a peace process, more violent, and more inclined to harbor JI terrorists. They are also not necessarily easier to defeat, either militarily or politically. The failure of the MILF Central Committee to bring back any results from its negotiations and generally more moderate stance has enhanced the prestige of the breakaway radicals and raised the possibility that the entire organization may shift in that direction.

Abu Sayyaf is an international terrorist organization with ties to al Qaeda and part of the global insurgency being waged from New York to Iran, from Iraq to Afghanistan, from Pakistan and Thailand to Indonesia and the Philippines. Two other networks – for they are that more than armies – are Moro separatists…

This is a glib oversimplification that has been reappearing in many of the more superficial articles published on Mindanao. The MILF’s ties to JI and AQ are deeper and more continuous than ASG’s. The MILF often disowns ASG and publicly announces withdrawals from areas where operations against ASG are ongoing, but at the same time the MILF or some of its constituent parts will be cooperating with ASG, and with groups like the Pentagon and Al Khobar gangs, which do exactly the same things as ASG but are generally referred to as criminal syndicates, rather than terrorist groups.

ASG has been through a series of discontinuities in both leadership and agenda, wandering across a continuum between Islamist terrorism and outright banditry. ASG has reached its peak in manpower and influence in its purest bandit incarnation: ASG’s expansion in 2000-2002 was a consequence of large ransom payments, not a sudden burst of enthusiasm for jihad. ASG has been most effective as a terrorist group when its manpower resources and territorial control have been severely constrained, and at one point military success against the bandit incarnation of the ASG generated greater connections to foreign terrorist groups and a return to a terrorist agenda.

This article does not seem to have been supported by much real research into the backgrounds and histories of these organizations – bearing in mind of course that much of the secondary source material on these issues is highly questionable and based on information from individuals and institutions with vested interests in a particular presentation of events.

The battles between the AFP and Abu Sayyaf and MNLF make the papers, but they miss the real story of the counterinsurgency in the Philippines. The real story is the movement of the populace away from support for conflict and toward a support for the peace processes. This has followed “a shift in strategy since April,” according to Raphael, to focus on what are called civil military operations, which focus on dealing with problems afflicting the people. “A lot of the villages have insufficient water,” the general said. “They have no schools. We are doing massive infrastructure projects.” Acting in cooperation with the JSOTF-P, the AFP have held numerous meetings at which medical treatment is provided to anyone who showed up, with any problem that could be handle in the field. The AFP has built schools and community centers…

Meanwhile, the villagers – deciding whether to support the guerrilla – examine the situation based on their self-interest. If the government defends their interests and does not oppress, the villagers often choose prosperity over conflict. If the government is corrupt and suppresses the things they care about, the people often support an insurgency.

The problem with this formulation is that the government IS corrupt. Corruption is institutionalized and embedded, and has been for generations. Why do you think there are no schools, water systems, or health care; why do you think these projects are necessary? Corruption is not just a matter of appropriating money, imposing huge kickbacks, etc. Virtually every politician on Mindanao maintains a private armed force accountable to nobody but the boss. These forces are used to ruthlessly suppress dissent and political or economic competition.

This corruption cannot be fought by training or education of civilian and military officials. Corruption exists not because leaders aren’t aware of its adverse affects, but because it is extremely profitable, and because an entrenched culture of immunity has virtually eliminated risk associated with corruption.

Corrupt officials do not have horns and tails. The articulate, sophisticated politician who parrots back all the rhetoric of international development for beaming American visitors is likely to be the same one who’s been raiding the treasury, collaborating with bandits, and maintaining a squad of goons to make sure nobody interferes with personal interests. The officer who recites COIN dogma and speaks earnestly of hearts and minds may be the same one who has sold arms to the ASG, taken cuts of ransom payments, and participated in a list of human rights violations as long as your arm – if you’re Yao Ming. The guy sitting next to him in the same uniform may be completely straight, but he will never rat out the guy sitting beside him, partly because the culture of institutional loyalty forbids it, partly because talking too loudly can endanger a career, and at times a life.

The US has an advantage here that it lacks in many GWOT theaters. Aside from a tiny cadre of ideologues, the anti-US rhetoric of the Islamic fundamentalists has very little traction in Mindanao. Philippine Muslims generally don’t care about Israel and the Palestinians, American influence in Saudi Arabia, or American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan: their concerns are a lot closer to home. They do appreciate the projects, though they know quite well that the money isn’t coming from the Philippine government. More than that, they appreciate the impact that the US presence has had on the Philippine military: a Muslim cleric related by marriage to a senior ASG leader once told me that the human rights performance of Philippine troops is “1000 times better” when Americans are around.

The US has won some hearts and minds. The problem with that is that the US is not a party to the conflict. If this change is to mean anything, the respect earned by the US has to be transferred to the Philippine government, and that is not happening. People will tell us whatever we want to hear as long as we’re the big dog on the block, but everyone down there knows that the Americans will leave, and when they do the same people who have been ripping them off and kicking them in the teeth for the last 40 years will still be in control.

You cannot measure progress in Mindanao by Commanders killed or captured, or by transient territorial gains, or by forced rearrangements of the alphabet soup of insurgent acronyms: all this has been done before, with little to show for it in the long term. A better measure of progress would be evidence that the culture of impunity that lies at the core of Mindanao’s institutionalized crisis is finally being addressed. A real indication of progress would be a few Congressman, Governors, Mayors, Generals successfully prosecuted for corruption and collusion with terrorists and criminals, private armed forces disbanded and their members called to account for their crimes, members of Christian militias prosecuted for killing Muslim civilians. The first challenge faced by the Philippine Government is not to defeat insurgents, but to bring its own representatives within the rule of law.

US forces cannot “win” the fight in Mindanao. All they can be expected to do is to create a secure space for the Philippine Government to step in, not with cosmetic projects but with real reforms in governance. Unfortunately there is little to suggest that the Philippine government has the will or the capacity to do this.

Dayuhan
07-01-2009, 06:44 AM
Looking back at that, I’l say that this:

Virtually every politician on Mindanao maintains a private armed force accountable to nobody but the boss.

…was an exaggeration. Northern and Eastern Mindanao do suffer from the same syndrome, but not to nearly the same extent. It would be more accurate to say that virtually every prominent politician and political clan in the conflict zones of Mindanao (and in some areas that are not currently conflict zones) maintains a private armed force accountable to nobody but the boss.

A few other comments:

Someday soon, someone is going to make his fortune in hardwoods from Tawi-Tawi. He will find a skilled, willing, English-speaking workforce. He will find it cheap and easy to get the goods to the shipping route that takes it to Japan or California, where he will get the best prices in the world. He will find that Sanga-Sanga is “going green,” as the Special Forces soldiers say.

Cutting down the trees seems a strange way of “going green”, but possibly there’s a meaning there that I’m not picking up.

It is very likely that someone, someday soon, will make a fortune out of Tawi-Tawi hardwood. It’s already happened on a lot of other islands. Generally the fortune is made by an influential local clan working with influential people in Manila. The only part of the money that will come to Tawi-Tawi will be the derisory wages paid to those who do the cutting, which will be spent before the last log is shipped out. The real profits will end up in Manila or abroad, and the only way anyone in Tawi Tawi will see any of it is if one of the principals is kidnapped and pays ransom.

The logging itself will be absolute. You can talk about reforestation and sustainable logging, but that’s not the way it works in the Philippines: when it’s done the island will look like the “after” picture in a Gillette ad. If you want to see what happens next, you can look at any one of hundreds of islands that serve as an example. Without the trees the topsoil washes off with the first rains, choking reefs under masses of silt. Agriculture on these islands depends on inland forest cover: without it rainfall runs off in destructive flash floods and when the rain stops the land goes dry. Without surface water retention streams stop running, and people rely on pumping more and more ground water. Without forest cover the rainfall runs off too fast to replenish the aquifers (these islands are not large), and soon groundwater pumping leads to salt water intrusion, and the wells start yielding salt water.

This is not imagination, it has happened on too many islands to count. You can make a good quick buck from cutting the trees, but the long term implications for the populace are very harsh.

And this is what’s suggested as the kind of economic development that can provide a long term solution to insurgency? Allah weeps.

manola
07-20-2009, 09:20 AM
I also believe they are counterproductive.
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Shawn Boyer
07-23-2009, 04:04 PM
All of the above poster have valid points / counter-points on the failings and successes of the situation in the Philippines.

I believe that the root cause of all of these issues can be more aptly summed up to a lack of an effective legal system. While this is more evident in the rural, conflict-affected regions it is also true in the urban areas. Over the years I've heard the southern Philippines described as the "Wild West," in a reference to the US in the 1800's. While most people say this with a smile on their face, they are more accurate than they truly recognize. During the USA's time of manifest destiny there was no effective legal system to govern the land. There were no means to settle a dispute through deliberation or legal proceedings; there was only the rule of the gun. Additionally, there was widespread corruption which was facilitated through this rule of the gun. Those with the power (guns) were the ones to rise to office and the ones to reap the rewards of corruption. This model holds true most accurately in the Bangsa-Moro areas of the southern Philippines though is also applicable to the "communist" NPA areas throughout Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

The fighting between the AFP (which is a fairly effective fighting force as shown through the last few years' operational successes) and these "insurgents" will continue until this root problem is resolved. Government legitamacy (real, not just perceived) and an effective legal system (nationalized judges and a truly nationalized police force that are not accountable to local politicians) are absolute priorities to cutting the root.

Dayuhan
07-26-2009, 12:05 PM
I believe that the root cause of all of these issues can be more aptly summed up to a lack of an effective legal system.


With this I agree... I wrote about this problem in some (probably excessive) detail here:

http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/journal_of_democracy/v015/15.4rogers.html



While this is more evident in the rural, conflict-affected regions it is also true in the urban areas.


It's possibly even more true in the urban areas, simply because there's more at stake: the urban areas are where the power and the money are. The twisting of the law is slightly less obvious, because it's less likely to involve overt violence, but it's no less present.



Additionally, there was widespread corruption which was facilitated through this rule of the gun. Those with the power (guns) were the ones to rise to office and the ones to reap the rewards of corruption.


It works both ways: guns can get you money, but money buys guns, and the loyalty (no matter how nominal and transient) of those who carry guns. Much of the fighting in Mindanao (and elsewhere in the Philippines) has more to do with money than with ideology or political goals.



This model holds true most accurately in the Bangsa-Moro areas of the southern Philippines though is also applicable to the "communist" NPA areas throughout Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.


It's certainly most visible in Muslim Mindanao, though again I'd say the same syndrome is every bit as present, though more quietly manifested, in many other areas. I'm not sure that there's anywhere in the country right now that I'd call a "communist area", but the NPA have certainly (and unsurprisingly) been best received and established their most durable presence in areas dominated by the essentially feudal old-school political dynasties.



The fighting between the AFP (which is a fairly effective fighting force as shown through the last few years' operational successes) and these "insurgents" will continue until this root problem is resolved. Government legitamacy (real, not just perceived) and an effective legal system (nationalized judges and a truly nationalized police force that are not accountable to local politicians) are absolute priorities to cutting the root.

I would agree that real progress cannot be made in the Philippines until local politicians, the police, and the justice system are brought within the rule of law. I'd also have to add the AFP to that list, because corruption and illicit business interests among AFP personnel, often in cooperation with local politicians and businessmen, are a major part of the problem.

There's an old Manila joke that sort of sums it up...

A Berliner, a New Yorker, and a Manilan were discussing police efficiency in their cities.

The Berliner declared "in my city, when a crime is committed, the police are there within five minutes.

The New Yorker snapped back "that's nothing... in my city, when a crime is committed the police are on the scene in less than three minutes".

The Manilan just smiled: "in MY city, when a crime is committed... the police are already there."

Dayuhan
07-26-2009, 12:23 PM
Certainly counterproductive from the standpoint of the central Government: the individuals being killed are not significant players, and pose no real threat. The Government loses far more in the public relations battle that it gains in the fight against insurgency from these incidents.

It's important to remember, though, that political violence in the Philippines is overwhelmingly local and very frequently personal. We often hear about the numbers killed during elections and campaigns, what we hear less often is that it is not national campaigns that spur violence, but contests over local offices. This is where the old family feuds and personal vendettas come into play.

In many of these cases there are direct personal conflicts involved: "militants", generally on the left, often come into direct conflict with local leaders and military commanders. Many of these people are thin-skinned and do not take well to accusations and perceived insults. They are also effectively above the law.

The NPA also survives in most areas through "revolutionary taxes", which essentially amount to extortion. This process often runs up against local economic interests, which generally overlap closely with political power. In some cases local political and military figures are running very similar protection rackets, and when the rackets rub up against each other violence often ensuers. One response is violence directed at those known to be NPA allies, who are often easier targets than their comrades in the mountains.

It is also completely true that many of these "militant" groups are closely allied with the NPA and that in many cases their memberships overlap. This is, as stated above, a reason for the general lack of public concern. A common "man on the street" reaction would be "kasama 'yan sa laro"... literally, "that's part of the game", though a more accurate equivalent might be the old aphorism "if you can't take the heat, stay out of the kitchen".

I very much doubt that the killings are directed by the central Government, but the Government does not have the will or the capacity to stop them.

Global Scout
10-02-2010, 05:51 PM
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39462815/ns/world_news-asiapacific


“The safe havens are getting smaller on the islands,” said Master Sgt. Wade Christensen, a U.S. Army Special Forces instructor who came to Mindanao in 2003 on his first tour. He’s now on his second as part of JSOTF-P. “Since we’ve been here, there have been no attacks on the U.S. from terrorist organizations that originated here or terrorists that were trained in the Philippines.”

So if the mission to defeat terrorist networks and to eradicate safe havens has been successful, why are U.S. Special Forces still operating in the southern Philippines?

“The simple answer is that the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist groups are still here,” said U.S. Navy Captain Robert Gusentine, the JSOTF-P Commander. “They’re still active. They still aspire to violence. They still aspire to be a regional threat.”

I have high confidence that MSG Christensen is an educated, level headed, and very dedicated warrior, so I suspect the media took the liberty of taking his statement out of context; however, since there are those who believe this is a success metric I would like to offer a counter view. There has been no terrorist attacks on the U.S. from a number of countries where we both have troops and don't have troops. The metric in itself is completely irrelevant.

The reality is that the JI (and they're continually morphing, but done the less they retain their core ideology) and to a lesser extent the criminal/terrorist group ASG still pose a regional threat. I think the U.S. is getting a good return on its investment. If pressure is removed the problem will most likely get much worse, instead of slowly decreasing in scale. Ultimately the solution in the S. Philippines is a political solution, but JSOTF-P was immensely successful in reducing the level of violence in the region. It is time (has been time) for the diplomats to take advantage of the reduced violence and implement a sustainable political agreement.

As for the claims that JSOTF-P is there to counter China, I have a hard time buying that is the reason they're there, but if it is a collateral benefit from being there so much the better. Based on comments by a few Philippine leaders, they're as worried about China's claims to hegemony over the South China Sea as much as we are, so instead of questioning our altruism for being in the S. Philippines, I think this is just another issue that the Philippines and U.S. will agree to partner on.

Dayuhan
10-04-2010, 11:13 PM
The originally cited article is riddled with inaccuracy and omission. Just a few from page 1: the ASG was not involved in the plot to kill the Pope in Manila, they did not provide sanctuary to Ramzi Youssef, and the American missionary couple kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf were collateral damage in a move aimed at a specific non-American target, not a target in themselves. This is so typical of reportage on the Abu Sayyaf, especially from the big-name parachute journalists who occasionally deign to grace us with their presence, that it no longer raises an eyebrow. When I got to this bit, though:


It struck me that the most pressing problem in today's Philippines isn't terrorism or even government corruption but poverty and a lack of social mobility.

I have to admit that I had a rather severe encounter with the "thank you for that astonishingly perceptive observation, now excuse me while I gag" moment. What is it that possesses Americans and persuades them that they can walk into environments of which they are clearly ignorant, look around in a full circle, and gravely pronounce to the world what "the most pressing problem" is... through the good offices of The Smithsonian, who really ought to know better? The superficiality is almost blinding.

Looking at the pieces cited on this thread, I have to say I don't for a minute believe that our people on the ground here are as ignorant and naive as they come across, and I suspect that this theater is simple being used, as so often before, as a source for a few feelgood stories.


There has been no terrorist attacks on the U.S. from a number of countries where we both have troops and don't have troops. The metric in itself is completely irrelevant.

If this is the metric of choice we'd have to wonder why we're in the Philippines in the first place. Some people who have attacked the US have gone to ground here, and the explosives acquisition for the Bali bombing was done here, but have any of the groups here directly attacked the US?


Ultimately the solution in the S. Philippines is a political solution, but JSOTF-P was immensely successful in reducing the level of violence in the region. It is time (has been time) for the diplomats to take advantage of the reduced violence and implement a sustainable political agreement.

A sustainable political agreement is extremely unlikely, and there's very little that diplomats can do to produce one, let alone implement one. We tried once before, with support and pressure for the MOA/AD with the MILF, and managed to make matters worse. Possibly unwise to repeat.


So if the mission to defeat terrorist networks and to eradicate safe havens has been successful, why are U.S. Special Forces still operating in the southern Philippines?

I suspect that we've accomplished all we're likely to accomplish, and it wouldn't surprise me at all to hear that we're maneuvering toward extrication. Of course that would mean a return to business as usual (and the word "business" is not there by accident) but that was always going to be the case.


This is fantastic. When I was part of OEF-P in 2002 we weren't allowed to even think about staging operations on Jolo.

In 1982 I spent a fair bit of time on Jolo and Basilan, among other places we don't go now... alone. Things were different then; couldn't have done that in '72, '92, or '02. Still, it was... interesting, for want of a better word. Also interesting, the editors with whom I discussed plans to write about the situation all told me that the Muslim conflict was over and done, and the issue was Marcos vs the NPA. Tides ebb and flow; it is their nature. Fundamental change... maybe someday, but I suspect not in my lifetime.

Dayuhan
02-06-2011, 03:31 AM
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/regions/view/20110206-318713/Ex-MILF-leader-forms-new-armed-group


Ex-MILF leader forms new armed group

COTABATO CITY, Philippines—A senior Moro rebel commander blamed for the attacks that left 60 civilians dead in several central Mindanao towns in 2008 has admitted forming a new armed group.

Ameril Ombra Kato also blamed members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF) central committee for his decision to split from the MILF and form the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)...

This has actually been coming on for a while. Umbra Kato's 105th base command and a couple of the Lanao base commands have been effectively outside MILF control for some time, though this is as far as I know the first time one of them has declared itself as an independent organization.

A number of things could happen...

There's a fair possibility it will go nowhere, and that Umbra Kato can be brought back into the fold with a greater role in the MILF Central Committee and a few other concessions. Personal issues are, as always, very much a factor.

There could be a bifurcation in the MILF, with more radical members that are less amenable to negotiation coalescing behind Umbra Kato and the demand that the "peace agreement" trashed by the Philippine Supreme Court be reinstated, which of course the government cannot do.

There could be a general splintering, with local commanders who are already largely autonomous formally going their own way.

The government response will also be interesting to watch. There will be pressure from Mindanao's Christian politicians and some quarters of the military to declare Umbra Kato (who was heavily involved in the outbreak of violence after the Supreme Court decision) outside the ceasefire with the MILF and come down on him hard before he draws any more support. There will also be calls to wait and see: if he fails to draw support it would do more to affirm the leadership of the negotiation-minded Murad faction (also called the Central Committee, though it seems less and less central), which would be placed in a very awkward spot if the AFP mounts a major attack on Umbra Kato. Umbra Kato is also well up in years, and won't be around forever. I don't know enough about his second tier at this point to speculate on succession.

This all traces back to the proposed MOA/AD and it's rejection by the Supreme Court, which hugely weakened Murad's pro-negotiation faction and left much of the Muslim populace doubting that there's any real point in negotiation. Less reported, but equally a concern, the Government's initial support for the agreement was seen as absolute betrayal by the Christian population, whose already weak trust in Manila took a further hit. There are reports of independent militias quietly reorganizing, and it should be remembered that the war in the early 70s began not with secessionists fighting the government, but with fighting between Christian and Muslim militias (though in truth they spent more time attacking each others unarmed supporters than attacking each other).

Proponents of "disaggregation" might see this as a step forward; I have doubts. It's difficult to negotiate with a fractured organization, and having a mass of independent commanders, all needing to feed and pay their soldiers, seems a recipe for all kinds of trouble.

It seems to me overall that in both the Maguindanao/Maranao mainland and the Tausug/Yakan islands there's less coherent leadership than there has been for some time (much more so in the islands of course). That shouldn't be confused with progress. Dislike and distrust of both Manila governance has been if anything increased in much of the area, and tension between indigenous Muslims and Christian settlers is as strong as ever. The number of armed men is as large as ever. Makes one wonder what emerges next.

Of course it all may come to nothing, and they may shake hands and get back together tomorrow....

jmm99
02-06-2011, 07:38 PM
in Beyond the Abu Sayyaf (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59528/steven-rogers/beyond-the-abu-sayyaf), by Steven Rogers (January/February 2004 Foreign Affairs).

Perhaps a trustworthy bundoks source.

:D:D:D

Mike

Dayuhan
02-08-2011, 01:25 AM
in Beyond the Abu Sayyaf (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59528/steven-rogers/beyond-the-abu-sayyaf), by Steven Rogers (January/February 2004 Foreign Affairs).

Perhaps a trustworthy bundoks source.

:D:D:D

Mike

If I was going to write that again I'd change a few things. Not all that much, but some... clarity with hindsight, I guess. Of course that dealt more with the islands to the west... a quite different situation from Central Mindanao, though with similarities.

There is actually a window of opportunity at this point (driven by both the MILF's uncertain control and the overreach and subsequent divorce from government of the Ampatuan dynasty) for the Philippine Government to step in with a strategy that is both within its legal capacity and capable of real progress toward reducing, if not fully resolving, the tension in Central Mindanao, and for that matter in the islands. Might almost be worth another article... but nobody would read it, the strategy would never be adopted in any event, it would be a hell of a lot of work, and I wouldn't get paid for it, all of which induce a certain lethargy.

Meanwhile, back at the ranch, Umbra Kato's boys are allegedly up to some nasty work...

http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=655487&publicationSubCategoryId=200



COTABATO CITY, Philippines (Xinhua) - Suspected followers of a former Muslim rebel field commander blamed for the attacks that left 60 civilians dead in several southern Philippine towns in 2008 torched houses as they raided a Christian community in the southern Philippines yesterday, military said today.

Seven houses of civilians in a remote village in the township of Mlang in North Cotabato province were set on fire by suspected followers of Ameril Umbra Kato during the raid, the military said, adding the rebels also took away farm crops and animals as they fled.

Emphasis on "allegedly" and "suspected" here... Umbra Kato and Co. are certainly capable of this sort of thing and may very well be responsible, but others are equally capable, and there are a number of groups who would have an interest in provoking military action against the breakaway faction. Never wise to assume that things are as they seem, or as they are reported.

Dayuhan
02-08-2011, 07:57 AM
There's a major corruption scandal unfolding in Manila. Started with investigation of a retired general who served as military comptroller and who had allegedly accumulated a personal fortune of roughly 300 million pesos; a plea bargain was hit and the usual sweep-under-the-rug was in progress, but a bunch of witnesses have emerged from the closet, including retired officers and a retired auditor, and the beans are spilling faster than anyone can count. Allegations include massive diversions of troop pay, the modernization budget, UN funds paying for peacekeepers, US exercise budgets, and almost everything else imaginable. Numerous instances of huge purchases from unknown suppliers, multiple accounts being billed for the same expenses. Large payments to legislators are being openly discussed. Lots of names on the table. Various hearings going on and a great deal of amnesia being expressed on the witness stand.

It all escalated today, former defense Secretary and General Angelo Reyes apparently committed suicide. Doubts are being expressed. He knew a lot of stuff about a lot of people, to put it mildly, and was coming under intense pressure.

There's undoubtedly a great deal to reveal, and it runs from top to bottom: these guys don't have skeletons in their closets, they have cemeteries. Hard to know how far it will go or what will come of it, but well worth watching. Long term it's undoubtedly a good thing; short term there could be significant operational disruption.

Rachamim
03-19-2011, 03:04 AM
Although it is certainly true that Kato is NOW off the reservation that has only taken place within the last 8 months. The belief that he, Abdurahman Macapaar, aka"Kumander Bravo" (102 Base Command) and Aleem Sulaiman Pangalian, aka "Kumander Pagnalian" (103 Base Command) have been "outside of MILF control" isn't rooted in fact. Two of the last three MILF "wars" ("Estrada's All Out War" in 2000 and "MoA" in 2008 and 2009 were calculated gambits on the part of the MILF Central Committee to try and force the government's hand in the Peace Process. The third, "Bundiok Complex" in 2003 was reactionary but entirely condoned by the leadership since the AFP's stated objectives (Policing of KFR on the edges of Liguasan Marsh, primarily against the "Pentagon" organisation) was merely a ruse to force the MILF's hand after GMA found herself neck deep in a failed Peace Process that was very quickly spinning out of control.

GMA, like all Filipino Presidents was incredibly insecure on her status vis a vis the AFP (the actual seat of power in the Philippines). Coming to power in a coup less than 2 years before she had immediately and literally begged Malaysia to assume the role of Facilitator in the Peace Process. Having internationalised what should have been solely a domestic issue, and having done so with a nation who until the early 1990s had largley been responsible for the existence of the MILF she was terrified of having the MILF gain the upper hand. Of course the moment GMA appealed to Malaysia in 2001 the MILF had gotten that and a whole lot more.

Estrada's war was a war of opportunity and though it turned out very well for the government alot of factors have been overlooked; As they say, "timing is everything." On the very same day Kumander Bravo stormed Kauswagan a very large contingent of the Marines 1st Brigade re-deployed to Camp Evangelista (Cagayan del Oro, Misamis Oriental Province in Northcentral Mindanao) Kumander Bravo's 102 Base Command (rather, what would soon become the 102 Base Command since the BIAF, the MILF military wing only converted its conventional structure into more mobile "Base Commands" following this very war. At the time of the attack the 102 Base Command was still the 303rd Brigade) decided to push the Estrada Government back to the table by invading and occupying the largely non-Muslim town of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte Province. The Marines were in the very next province and hadn't even unpacked their kitbags.

I won't go off onto a long tangent about that conflict. Sufficient to say that the 102 Base Commandzg303rd Brigade was operating with full knowledge AND agreement of the MILF central commamd structure. Here is a unit commander (Kumander Bravo) who, if we buy into media accounts (dictated by the Philippine Government), single handedly decides that for an unstated reason he simply wants to take over a large non-Muslim town, terrorise, pillage and kill. This act then leads to the near destruction of the MILF at the height of its power. Its 11 main camps functioned completely independently of the government, with hundreds of thousands of peasants living as quasi-citizens of the MILF's parallel government. Kumander Bravo's actions led to the loss of every single one of those camps, near total destruction of that parallel government and the deaths of what is generally believed to be 1,200 guerillas, a huge loss. So what does the MILF do to Kumander Bravo for causing all this? Not a thing. He isn't even publicly censured.

Of course, you cannot blame a commander when you yourself were the one who ordered the attack on Kauswagan.

Fast forward to the summer of 2008. After nearly 2 decades of Talks, public and private, the Philippine Government goes for broke and takes a gigantic gamble by agreeing to the Memorandum on Ancestral Domain, aka"MoA." This is done in secrecy so as not to have to circumnavigate what would be years of political and judicial opposition (and to a lesser degree the threat of military coup). The MILF Central (and Executive) Committee sit with baited breath knowing that the very next day both sides will ink the document. That afternoon though the Supreme Court issues a Restraining Order barring the signing as it deliberates on the legality of the document. Imagine the feeling on the MILF Central Committee. Then Kumander Kato launches his attack on the non-Islamic portion of North Cotabato Province.

Again, the traditional narrative, courtesy of the Philippine Government, is that Kato undertook this wide scale attack on his own, despite his AOR intersecting with that of 5 other Base Commands. MILF Base Commands operate independently of one another and view encroachment, without full coordination (usually affected via the Central Committee), as Casus Belli. Despite this huge operation that encroached upon 3 of those other Base Commands not one case of in-fighting took place. The attack was extremely well coordinated. When Kumanders Bravo and Pangalian jumped into the fray the MILF STILL refused to condemn their actions which if we buy into that traditional narrative, effectively constitute mutiny. In fact, the MILF did everything it could to stymie AFP interdiction.

There was actually 1 renegade Base Command in that war, the 107. It had recently relocated its AOR to Sarangani Province where it launched a large opportunistic attack on the municipality of Ma'asim. Unlike the other 3 Base Commands the 107 was dissected by the AFP who rapidly captured its main camp in the hills above Ma'asim. In fact, MILF Central Committee provided valuable intel that played a central part in the 72 IB's attack on that camp.

Back to Kato...Despite his having done no worse than Kumander Bravo it was Kumander Kato who became the central villain in the Govenment's narrative. Pressuring the MILF for a huge concession the Government was handed a Goodwill Gesture when the MILF Central Committee replaced Kato with his Executive Officer, sub-Kumander Goma, in early 2010. Kato was laterally transferred into the political echelon and given a paper position as an Ustadz (Islamic Scholar, in this case acting as a consultant) for the MILF Shari'a Court (Islamic Court). This gesture was given because Kato's star was in ascendance. Ironically the Philippine Government's concentrating on Kato had turned him into an icon in Central Mindanao. A huge cult of personality has developed around him. Having commanded he BIAF's largest and best armed Base Command (the 105) he was clearly a force to be reckoned with. In addition he had been quite blunt in his disdain for the Central Committee's abandonment of its most valued objective, full independence for the "Bangsamoro." He saw the evolution of independence into a "state:sub-state solution" as tantamount to sacrilege. Finally, al Haj Murad (Murad Ebrahim, Chairman of the MILF) had a debilitating stroke in the autumn of 2010. Transported to Sabah (in Malaysia) for hospitalisarion the MILF was sinking into chaos. Knowing that IF he were to cleave from the MILF/BIAF he ought to do it BE0fORE Murad died because of the lack of suitable replacement (the probable successor, Vice Chairman Jafa'ar lacks charisma and support amongst the BIAF Command).

So, in October Kato set out his shingle and created BIFF (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters). As yet he's playing it close. The organisation has less than 800 Regulars but there are a great many MILF/BIAF that are almost ready to join him (just as in the 104 and 111Base Commands many guerillas are jumping to the 2 MNLF factions in their respective AORs). To date BIFF has 2 engagements though the Midsayap KFR they were accused of was not connected to the group.

Rachamim
03-19-2011, 04:28 AM
Re "militias have been quietly forming"; Paramilitaries have existed here since the post-WWII Era and have never gone away. The poster is correct to note that the Islamic Insurgencies began with Muslim and non-Muslim (not "Christian" per se) paramilitaries fighting in the late 1960s. It actually began in Lanao del Norte Province with the Dimaporo Clan and its paramilitary, the "Barakudas." The Barakudas merely existed to exert control on the Dimaporo lumber concessions, at first. To the south. In North Cotabato Province the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM, later re-named Muslim Independence Movement) spawned a militant faction known as the "Black Shirts." It was these Black Shirts who actually spawned the communal fighting still ravaging the island today.

As the Black Shirts were first forming, a non-Muslim group began taking shape in what is now the municipality of North Upi, in Maguindanao Province. At the time Maguindanao was part of North Cotabato. The town of Upi (now split into Upi and North Upi) was home to very poor Ilonggo whose forbears settled there in government re-settlement schemes from 1904 until the late 1950s. At the same time the area was largely populated with a Lumad ("Lumad" is a Cebuano word meaning "Born of the Soil," synonymous with "Hill Tribes"and denotes the non-Negrito Animists of Mindanao, analogous to the "Igorot" of Luzon) group, the Teduray. Both the Lumad and the Ilonggo co-existed perfectly, respecting each others different life styles. The 3rd facet of the dynamic in Upi/N.Upi was the Maguindanowan Tribe. They are a Moro (Muslim) group inhabiting the lowlands and flood plains in that area.

Since shortly after Islamisation in the late 16th Century the Maguindanowan had exploited the upland Teduray and this included laying claim to all Teduray lands which they then deigned to "permit" Teduray" to work as sharecroppers. Since the 3 Moro Sultunates (actually 2 Sultunates and a confederation of principalities constituting the 3rd "sultunate": Maguindanao, Buayan and Maranao in respective order) refused to recognise American Law and Civil System the sultunates' lands largely remained unregistered until late in the Modern Era. In Upi/N.Upi this led to Ilonggo peasants being given lands claimed by the Manguindanowans. In one particular case a poor Ilonggo family moved to Upi/N.Upi in the 1940s and was settled on a tract of uncultivated land on a steep mountainside. After this family, surnamed "Luces," had cleared and terraced their small plot the chief of a Maguindanowan Clan surnamed "Ampatuan" (people familiar with the Philippines will probably know that name well) claimed it. Having been cleared and made arable it was now worth a decent amount of money.

The Luces were told to pay a very high price for land they already owned and so naturally they refused the Ampatuan's offer. Before too long Ampatuan Clansmen came and murdered the entire family, an event all too common in that era and in fact not unusual now. The family's son Felipe escaped death because he had been at the town's main market on an errand. Hearing what had happened he turned to Teduray friends who introduced him to a group of extended families who had refused to bow to the Maguindanowans, and who were periodically doing battle, mostly over land related issues. Felipe then lived among them and eventually rose to leadership of the small group. Adopting the moniker, "Kumander Toothpick" his victories attracted more Teduray, and eventually fellow Illongos as well as ( to a lesser degree) Cebuanos as well (Cebuanos and Ilonggos are culturally similar, both rooted in the Visayan Islands).

As the Black Shirts began launching attacks against Ilonggo and Cebuano villages in North Cotabato Province low level local politicians appealed to the PC (Philippine Constulbary, a COIN force organised by the Americans in 1901 and disbanded by the Philippine Government in 1991) for succor. Soon recognising that it would be advantageous to have an allied group not constrained by protocol and Standard Operating Procedure the PC encouraged Kumander Toothpick to work with the afore mentioned politicians.

Toothpick's group, still loosely organised, were referred to as "Ilaga," a Cebuano/Ilonggo word meaning "Rats." Moro propaganda claims that the word is actually an acronym standing for, "Ilonggo Land Grabbing Association." Forgetting that the group wasn't known for its English speaking skills, what organisation would define itself as "Land Grabbing"? For those not familiar with the nuance. In the Southern Philippines "Land Grabbing" is a euphanism for "Land Stealing." As the Ilaga expanded, and it expanded rapidly, it became more cohesive and received formal training AND weaponry from the PC (all the more so after 1971 when the Ilaga joined the fray against the NPA, the Communist Insurgency).

By 1969 the Barakuda to the north had taken on an ideological sheen and converted themselves into "Mujahadin" ( Islamic Warriors fighting in defence of the faith). Spreading from Lanao del Norte into the Zamboanga Peninsula and to a lesser extent into Misamis And Lanao del Sur Provinces they were far out numbering the Black Shirts who along with their parent organisation MIM fell by the wayside. Thus the Ilaga followed the outbreaks of violence by the Barakuda with neither group gaining the upper hand.

By the time of Martial Law in late 1972 the Ilaga had primarily become a tool for the anti-Communist push. It was in this vein that the Ilaga would become infamous as it absorbed Tad Tad elements. "Tad Tad" is Cebuano for "Chop Chop" and is applied to synchrestic Christian faiths that engage in canibbalism. Probably the case that defined, and tainted, the Ilaga was the case of Father Tullio Favali and Ilaga "officer" Norberto Manero Jr. In Tulunan, North Cotabato Province. Fr. Favali was an Italian priest and communist sympathiser who was killed and partially eaten in broad daylight un the spring of 1985. After its hey day in the mid 1980s the Ilaga faded into obscurity...until its re-emergence in response to the MILF/BIAF "MoA War" in 2008 and 2009.

The Ilaga are merely 1 group however, with literally every province on the island having several pro-Government paramilitaries. Whether as part of the CAA Program (CAFGU,CVO and SCAA) or as part of the Force Multiplication facet of the current and preceding ISPs, particularly the ISP-IPs (Internal Security Plan-Indigineous Peoples). Code named "Oplan Alsa Lumad" (Operational Plan Lumad Arise) it has created extremely well armed pro-Government paramilitaries like BULIF/bLA (Bungkatol Liberation Force/Army) amongst the Higaon-on Lumad in Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte and Bukidnon Provinces, BLPs (Bagani Longrang Platoons) amongst Manobos in the Davao Region and so on.

Dayuhan
07-12-2011, 07:43 AM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/armed-men-abduct-filipino-wife-of-german-national-son-nephew-on-southern-philippine-island/2011/07/11/gIQAMNZs9H_story.html


MANILA, Philippines — More than a dozen armed men abducted three people before dawn Tuesday, including a 50-year-old naturalized American woman and her 14-year-old son, from a southern Philippine island near a stronghold of al-Qaeda-linked militants, officials said.

Suspicion fell on the notorious terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, which has been blamed for ransom kidnappings, beheadings and bombings in the last two decades, or a Muslim rebel commander whose group has been linked to previous abductions.

Apparently the woman is Filipina, from Basilan, and owned the resort, presumably through relatives.

The Abu Sayyaf will certainly be blamed, and ASG or one of its splinters may actually be responsible. There are other possible culprits as well, both organized groups and simple armed gangs that snatch people and "sell" them on to larger groups who are more capable of negotiating ransom, for a share of the profits. Silly place to be for an American, really, even one with Basilan roots.

Too early to tell yet how it will play out, and what role US capabilities in the area will have in the response.

Rachamim
07-18-2011, 02:45 PM
The answer is both yes AND no. When the AFP issued its SOMO in July of 2009, and the MILF/BIAF reciprocated a couple of days later, they did so without consulting Kato. For 3 months prior to the SOMO Kato had been effectively sidelined from the chain of command. A sub-Kumander by the name of Zacarias Goma had been made de facto Kumander of the 105 Base Command (Kato-s unit). Goma was issuing orders to Kato's #2, sub-Kumander Alo Binago on behalf of the BIAF General Staff (BIAF being Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, the armed wing of the MILF). So then the SOMO, and Kato feels he was being excised from the unit he himself created (the 105 existed before Kato transferred from the 109 but was ineffective).

At that point Kato admits he began sending out feelers to allies within the BIAF about possibly branching out on his own. Then, when the Peace Process resumed, the BIAF General Staff had been in regular communication with Kumander Bravo, CO of the 102 Base Command, and had even promoted Kumander Mars (Pangalian) of the 103 Base Command, the other 2 being the Base Commands who with Kato, formed the so called "Lawless" faction of the MILF/BIAF. They ignored Kato, they didn't try to resolve the warrants issued against him for the 2008 War, they continued to refer to him as "Lawless" so that in effect they condoned the AFP/PNP campaign being waged against his Base Command without considering it a violation of the SOMO, or previous Ceasefire mechanisms.

Kato says that this caused him, in the early months of 2010 to resign his commission as Kumander of the 105 while simultaneously having both underlings AND the MILF political machine within his AOR submit petitions to both the BIAF General Staff and MILF Central Committee NOT to accept Kato's tendered resignation. Instead, the BIAF stayed silent and the MILF CenCom accepted the resignation and offered him a position as a teacher's aide, knowing he would reject it (he is a distinguished theologian in addition to his military experience which only began in middle age).

In December of 2010 he firmly separated from the MILF/BIAF and publicly outted his new organisation BIFF. However, this outting caused unexpected problems for the MILF in that it offered the Government a way in which to hedge in the Peace Process, to avoid substantiative progress while placing the onus on the MILF. Since then both Kato and the MILF Central Committee have played both sides of the fence, refusing to burn that final brisge. It is all rhetoric.

Even when Kumander Bravo deployed 4 senior officers to try and cajole Kato into renouncing this new group Kato has remained steadfast. Moreover, the MILF CenCom has co-operated with the AFP in framing BIFF (Kato's group) for every hiccup in Central Mindanao. CenCom did avert a meltdown when it created the new Base Command, the 118, to sap the 105 and 106 of disaffected personnel so as to circumvent a jumping of ship to BIFF but that is neither here nor there.

Rachamim
07-18-2011, 03:05 PM
She is a Sama from Sacol Island, Gerpa Usman, who was adopted by American missionaries at age 9 and brought to the US. There they changed her first name to render it phonetically correct, Gerfa, and with her new last name, Gerfa Yeatts. In America she met a half Japanese half Norwegian man, Hiko Lunsmann, whom she worked with at the healthcare corporation Health Central in Lynchburg, Virginia. Togetjer they bough a tract home in Campbell County, continued working together and had a son, Kevin Eric Lunsmann, now 14.

After having a baby she felt as if a part of her was missing, never having kept in touch with her family in Mindanao. It was shortly after the birth of her son that she took the first of what would become six trips to re-connect with her family. Finding her Sama family living a common life, but by her American-bred standards unbelievably poor, sh did the wrong thing, she began throwing money at them. In fact, the island where the kidnapping took place? 8 km off of Zamboanga City proper? She had had three inter-connecting compounds built. One was simply for her to use on visits every two or three years. The other was for her mother and siblings. Still, like many Filipino-Muslims she had a fair number of half siblings and this is where the problem lies.

One sister, Alma Jakaria of Malmawi Island off of Isabela City on Basilan had asked her for cash after Gerfa's arrival at the end of June. Gerfa only gave a relatively small amount. One day before the kidnapping Ms.Jakaria arrived with a 19 year old sold. Though it isn't being released at this point the young man is ASG, and led his pals to the island in question. After the kidnapping the Lunsmanns were sighted entering Tuburan (Basilan, not Cen.Min.) from al Barka. They are currently with the same ASG sub-faction that took them but if there is no hand over in the next few days they will be sold to Jamiri who has taken a loss on his last 4 KFRs.

Anyway, another day in paradise. My issue though is the last American KFR in Misamis Oriental 2 months ag being overlooked but more so, we have Pinoy (and others, currently 1 Japanese, 1 Malaysian, 1 Indian from UAE) being grabbed every other day. This woman gets got and the PNP Dirrector General hops on a plane within two hours. Maybe if they took all KFRs this seriously we would have far fewer...well maybe.

Dayuhan
07-19-2011, 01:00 AM
One sister, Alma Jakaria of Malmawi Island off of Isabela City on Basilan had asked her for cash after Gerfa's arrival at the end of June. Gerfa only gave a relatively small amount. One day before the kidnapping Ms.Jakaria arrived with a 19 year old sold. Though it isn't being released at this point the young man is ASG, and led his pals to the island in question. After the kidnapping the Lunsmanns were sighted entering Tuburan (Basilan, not Cen.Min.) from al Barka. They are currently with the same ASG sub-faction that took them but if there is no hand over in the next few days they will be sold to Jamiri who has taken a loss on his last 4 KFRs.

I doubt they would have needed to be led to the island; the location would have been common knowledge... but the inside guy is quite likely. As for the rest of it; yes, that's the way it typically works, on both sides. Americans often believe that the rash of people ratting out ASG members was a consequence of development projects winning over the people, more often than not it came down to internal fights over distribution of ransom. People who get less than they think themselves entitled to have a way of taking action...


Anyway, another day in paradise. My issue though is the last American KFR in Misamis Oriental 2 months ag being overlooked but more so, we have Pinoy (and others, currently 1 Japanese, 1 Malaysian, 1 Indian from UAE) being grabbed every other day. This woman gets got and the PNP Dirrector General hops on a plane within two hours. Maybe if they took all KFRs this seriously we would have far fewer...well maybe.

Maybe to keep the local subordinates from trying to get in on ransom payments? Not that they're likely to get much of that from Americans. We shall see. In any event, business as usual, emphasis on business. Interesting to see what, if anything, the US does...

Dayuhan
07-21-2011, 01:10 AM
It was these Black Shirts who actually spawned the communal fighting still ravaging the island today.

That depends on who you listen to. As discussed elsewhere, both sides in that conflict have adopted self-serving historical narratives casting themselves as victims and their opponents as aggressors. Neither narrative is particularly credible. There were acts of outright aggression and atrocity on both sides, and the militias on both sides preferred to target the other side's unarmed civilian base.


In one particular case a poor Ilonggo family moved to Upi/N.Upi in the 1940s and was settled on a tract of uncultivated land on a steep mountainside. After this family, surnamed "Luces," had cleared and terraced their small plot the chief of a Maguindanowan Clan surnamed "Ampatuan" (people familiar with the Philippines will probably know that name well) claimed it. Having been cleared and made arable it was now worth a decent amount of money.

The Luces were told to pay a very high price for land they already owned and so naturally they refused the Ampatuan's offer. Before too long Ampatuan Clansmen came and murdered the entire family, an event all too common in that era and in fact not unusual now. The family's son Felipe escaped death because he had been at the town's main market on an errand. Hearing what had happened he turned to Teduray friends who introduced him to a group of extended families who had refused to bow to the Maguindanowans, and who were periodically doing battle, mostly over land related issues. Felipe then lived among them and eventually rose to leadership of the small group. Adopting the moniker, "Kumander Toothpick" his victories attracted more Teduray, and eventually fellow Illongos as well as ( to a lesser degree) Cebuanos as well (Cebuanos and Ilonggos are culturally similar, both rooted in the Visayan Islands).

That would be Feliciano Luces, no?

Again, I've heard that version of the story... spent a lot of time with Mindanao Ilonggos in the late 70s and early 80s and emerged well steeped in their mythology. I then spent some time in Cotabato listening to their mythology. The two are very different, and obviously incompatible, yet both sides accept them as absolute truth.

The refrain about settlement on "unused land" only goes so far. Anywhere that you still have indigenous control in the Philippines, tribal units have extensive tracts of "unused land" within their ancestral domain claims... these may be disputed by different tribal groups, but none of the disputing parties would generally be amenable to outside settlement. In my area forest, hunting grounds, watersheds, and simple buffer zones between groups are all considered an integral part of the tribe's territory, even though those areas might seem "unused" to an outsider. Certainly if someone tried to settle there and claim the land (none of which has government-recognized titles) an immediate and probably violent reaction would ensue. Looking back at the history the surprise is really that settlement went on so long before it produced a violent backlash.


Toothpick's group, still loosely organised, were referred to as "Ilaga," a Cebuano/Ilonggo word meaning "Rats." Moro propaganda claims that the word is actually an acronym standing for, "Ilonggo Land Grabbing Association." Forgetting that the group wasn't known for its English speaking skills, what organisation would define itself as "Land Grabbing"?

I never heard anyone claim that "Ilaga" was actually intended to stand for "Ilonggo Landgrabbers Association", and I've listened to some extreme propagandists on both sides. It was an assigned meaning, bit of black humor. Lang grabbing did go on, and lots of it, often with the cooperation and in some cases participation of the military.

You could go on forever trying to decipher who started the actual violence, and never come up with a really satisfactory answer. Certainly you'd have no chance of coming up with an answer accepted by both sides. Ultimately, though, the cause of the conflict was clearly the sponsored large-scale migration into Cotabato and Lanao. That had been going on a long time, but it accelerated dramatically in the 50s and 60s, to the point that areas where settlers achieved a numerical majority and political control in areas where indigenous groups once had both. There's no way a government can impose that sort of demographic change without producing violence.

It's useful to see the Moro propaganda for what it is, but the propaganda from the other side is no less distorted. It's a bit like listening to Israeli and Palestinian narratives: it's useful (if depressing) to know what both sides think, but one wouldn't want to confuse either version with truth.

Dayuhan
07-30-2011, 02:16 AM
This one sounds pretty grim:

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5j4-MSsovIY5tOMMdHcVbaHenBi8g?docId=91dfa45b70cd4f6aa3 88cbedf91d4b5c


7 Filipino troops die, 21 wounded in rebel clash

By JIM GOMEZ, Associated Press – 1 day ago

MANILA, Philippines (AP) — Abu Sayyaf militants killed seven Philippine marines and wounded 21 others who were about to raid their jungle camp Thursday in some of the fiercest fighting this year between the military and the al-Qaida-linked rebels.

About 30 marines maneuvered in stormy weather close to the encampment of more than 50 militants in mountainous Patikul township in southern Sulu province, setting off the gunbattle before dawn, regional military spokesman Lt. Col. Randolph Cabangbang said.

It was not immediately clear if there were casualties among the militants, who were led by Radulan Sahiron, a one-armed commander long wanted by U.S. and Philippine authorities for a string of bombings and kidnappings, Cabangbang said.

The Government is trying to spin it as a "strategic victory", but 7 dead and 21 wounded out of a unit of 30 sounds like the kind of "victory" you wouldn't want much of.

Subsequent coverage; apparently beheading and mutilaation are still very much part of the ASG repertoire:

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/33101/5-marines-beheaded-by-abu-sayyaf-aquino-mad

And another angle:


Villagers 'set up' soldiers vs Abu Sayyaf?

MANILA, Philippines – Members of the Marine Battalion Landing Team-11 were not expecting to face 70 heavily armed terrorists when they headed to the base of Abu Sayyaf commanders Radulan Sahiron and Isnilon Hapilon in Barangay Panglahayan, Patikul, Sulu on July 28, authorities said.

One military official, who declined to be named, said the soldiers were "set up."

He added that several residents came to the aid of the Abu Sayyaf.

Reports are not entirely clear and some are inconsistent. Later reports refer to 7 dead and 26 wounded, though the Marine unit apparently numbered only 30. Possibly other Marine units arrived on the scene. Also very possible that some or all of the reports are not accurate... that's quite common with incidents in that area.

Not at all clear what actually happened, but it doesn't sound like anything good.

Bill Moore
07-30-2011, 04:06 AM
The Philippine press isn't always accurate, but I suspect there is some truth to this, and if it happened as described then the locals in the area were very likely pro Abu Sayyaf and anti-government/military. This once again calls into question the efficacy of our approach to countering insurgencies through development efforts, since we have spent tens of thousands of dollars in that area on civil affairs activities, etc., and of course conducted MISO for years, and yet the ASG still maintains considerable support from the populace. This ties into another discussion we had on the blog about the importance of honesty when addressing problems, and not creating false perceptions of success by cherry picking happy stories to present to the public. There are deep structural problems within the Phlippine Goverment and its military, and U.S. assistance is only effective at the superficial level (tactically, and then only when the military is willing to listen and apply the lessons). Building a school, building a road, building a clinic are all humanitarian acts that have obvious humanitarian value, but they do not represent real change in the relationship between the populace and the government. The Filipinos need to honestly seek out why the populace supports the ASG and develop a more effective approach than the standard fare of random COIN tactics that have been applied again and again year after year with the same effect.

Dayuhan
07-30-2011, 05:00 AM
Meant to include a link for the last story referenced:

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/07/29/11/villagers-set-soldiers-vs-abu-sayyaf

US development projects have generated some real goodwill... toward the US. This has not really extended to the Philippine Government, and there's no reason why it should. The local folks know where the largesse is coming from, and it only serves to underscore the decades of neglect they've had from Manila. They can also see for themselves that the local plutocrats are still very much in charge.

I don't really see the MISO side as having any meaningful impact on local sentiments. People generally know who their enemies are, even if they're told differently. People also have long memories, and there's a long history of human rights abuse in that area. It's going to take a fair bit more than what's been done to convince the Muslim villagers of inner Basilan that the Philippine military and government are no longer their enemies, and it's not something the US can do, even with all the miso in Japan, or wherever it comes from.

I recall a comment here (or in an article referenced here) from a US military officer, to the effect that we need information ops so the people will know how cruel the Abu Sayyaf are. That's just appallingly naive: they already know exactly how cruel the Abu Sayyaf are. The average Basilan villager knows more about the Abu Sayyaf than the CIA. They also know what we apparently do not: the Philippine military also has a long record of cruelty, and that cruelty has been directed at them.

I certainly don't know what specific grievances the villagers in this case had that led them to act as they are said to have acted, but I'd be willing to bet that it's local, likely personal, and has nothing to do with support a global jihad agenda or the very nominal Islamist agenda of the ASG.


The Filipinos need to honestly seek out why the populace supports the ASG and develop a more effective approach than the standard fare of random COIN tactics that have been applied again and again year after year with the same effect.

First they'd have to ask whether the people support the ASG or whether they simply oppose the government, and support anyone who fights against it.

Ultimately they will come up against the need for fundamental changes in governance, and against the desperate need to bring the government's own functionaries in the military, police, and local government within the rule of law. In Basilan and Central Mindanao they will also come up against the need to mediate long-festering fights between entrenched settler populations and indigenous populaces, which is going to be very close to impossible. Typically these issues are not addressed, because nobody in power wants to touch them. Again, there is very little the US can do to address this. It's not our fight.

Bill Moore
07-30-2011, 08:04 AM
Typically these issues are not addressed, because nobody in power wants to touch them. Again, there is very little the US can do to address this. It's not our fight.

You're correct in my opinion, we have little leverage to push the Gov of the Philippines to change at the local and national level, and the locals in the Muslim south very well know that the acts of kindness they benefit from are "mostly" driven by the U.S., and if we weren't there it is unlikely that the military would reach out to the locals.

This isn't our fight, and much like other efforts we get involved in we find it difficult to extract ourselves from these activities. Our military involvement in the Philippines is small relative to Iraq and Afghanistan, and perhaps affordable, so the real question then is should it be sustained?

With the current President of the Philippines I think it is worth having a little more patience to see if he can push his promised reforms through, but to date he has not yet demonstrated that he has the leadership ability of Magsaysay, and doesn't yet appear capable of pushing his reform agenda through to completion. However, he does seem to have a good vision, one that we should support in my view. Of course it is the Philippines, and it may turn out he is as corrupt as everyone else.

Dayuhan
07-31-2011, 12:09 AM
This isn't our fight, and much like other efforts we get involved in we find it difficult to extract ourselves from these activities. Our military involvement in the Philippines is small relative to Iraq and Afghanistan, and perhaps affordable, so the real question then is should it be sustained?

My own opinion is that we've achieved all we're likely to achieve, and that hanging around is not likely to accomplish more. The issue now is not achieving military dominance, which the government has and has achieved before, but to follow that up with meaningful effort to change the style of governance. This, honestly, is not likely to happen: the political will is simply not there, and the US can't make it be there. No point in staying there and being seen as an accessory to the return of business as usual.


With the current President of the Philippines I think it is worth having a little more patience to see if he can push his promised reforms through, but to date he has not yet demonstrated that he has the leadership ability of Magsaysay, and doesn't yet appear capable of pushing his reform agenda through to completion. However, he does seem to have a good vision, one that we should support in my view. Of course it is the Philippines, and it may turn out he is as corrupt as everyone else.

I wouldn't expect too much of the current President, especially where Mindanao is concerned (or for that matter anywhere). I don't think he's personally corrupt, but he also hasn't the commitment or force of character to drive real change (which requires more than just challenging corruption).

Historical side note: while Magsaysay effectively marketed the idea of reform, he also failed to push the agenda to completion, and actually produced very little change at ground level... one reason why the Huk rebellion subsequently re-emerged as the NPA.

The Philippine government has on several occasions achieved transient "victory" in its various COIN campaigns, but has never cemented that "victory" by following it up with real reform. The reason, in a nutshell, is that the local/regional elites refuse to surrender their traditional prerogatives, which are fundamentally incompatible with real progress.

Rachamim
07-31-2011, 01:56 AM
Dayuhan: I) The Black Shirts were the first organised paramilitary, having been officaly formed in 1969. The Ilaga on the other hand, despite the Muslim propaganda that imagines them to have been created by a group of Ilonggo mayors, only coalesced under the PC in late 1970 so there isn't a question there. Prior to that sanctioning by the PC there were sporadic acts of violence but they were devoid of political ideology and context. You are correct that both sides targetted non-combatants but only on side did so without provocation, the Black Shirts. Each Ilaga atrocity was a reaction to a specific atrocity commited by the Black Shirts, and later the Barakuda, and then the MNLF. This simple gameplan was imposed upon them by their PC handlers. They weren't handed rifles and unleashed (well, not in the MNLF Era anyway).

II) Yes, Feliciano Luces, the infamous Kumander Toothpick. He is still alive and farming ube in Maguindanao. Not suprisingly he is left alone.

III) On land ownership and "settlement." The main problem is that the issue really only boils down to competing claims within the MILF AOR in Central Mindanao, yet the MNLF and MILF have portrayed it as island wide. Muslims, despite their claims, never controlled more than a very small amount of land on Mainland Mindanao. In modern terms the land in question comprises parts of N.Cotabato, Maguindanao, slivers of Bukidnon, S.Cotabato, Sarangani, and virtually all of Lanao del Sur Provinces. Within those areas the land was controlled by Sultans, Rajahs and their lesser Datus. There was no private ownership.

At the dawn of the American Colonial Era all groups were offered the chance to formally register their ancestral lands. Much has been made about the lower maximum amounts permitted for Muslims but the rationale was that if given free rein, the Tribal Aristocracy would compel its subjects to register land that would then be under the de facto control of the aristocracy. The Americans of course envisioned a Western style system of private land ownership that would enable the peasantry, as well as the aristocracy, to own land. Of course in reality the Americans allowed gross abuse of their own system by American owned corporations and investors but that is neither here nor there. The point being that the system now in place, first implemented by the Americans, sought to empower all groups.

Unregistered lands became Public Lands, which were then used in re-settlement scemes beginning with the Colorums but reaching full stride under Magsaysay in his anti-Huk COIN programme. I cannot speak on the Cordillera, at least authoritatively, but on Mindanao it is a bit more complicated. The Islamicised Tribes existed under a very different system of governance. The Lumad, the Animists, were non-sedentary so that becomes an easier subject to approach and if the Government ever reconciles its schizoid Mineral Rights policies I do believe it will go a long way towards solving that end of the equation. In the Islamicised areas however, the aristocracy owned everything ("owned" as in "controlled"). This is never going to reconcile with a Western based system of land ownership.

I believe that if the Government were ever willng and able to offer reparations in the form of socio-economic entitlements, it would neutralise most of the Muslim arguments over land. You never see conflict breaking out over fallow land. It is only cultivated, productive land, and to a lesser degree land under speculation for development. This is because unlike the Lumad, whose worldview and religion are intrinsically tied to specific geographic locales, the Islamicised Tribes view land as an indicator of wealth, or more specifically, productive land. IF a socio-economic package were offered in lieu of specific, tenable claims on land parcels it would stop a whole lot of the bloodshed.

"Ilonggo Land Grabbing Association." That is an incredibly widespread belief and repeated by Islamic groups as a mantra, especially the MILF/BIAF. I have been hearing that for as long as I can remember.

"The influx of non-Muslims into Central Mindanao during the Magsaysay Era caused the violence.": Surely you know that that region has never been devoid of incessant warfare. Datu Ali? Or in Lanao, the SE corner of the Lake? They have been attacking and slaughtering non Muslims for as long as written history has existed on the island. General Rufino (an Insurrecto operating out of Oroquieta in what is now Misamis Occidental) was dealing with the very same dynamic in 1902. If you couch it as "the influx aggravated the conflict" I would be in agreement but it didn't cause it. What caused it was the inability of Muslims to co-exist with non-Muslims, as Politically Incorrect as that may be.

Dapitan, Karaga, Surigao, and Misamis were all Christianised when Central Mindanao was Islamicised. Muslims do not pre-date any other group and never formed a cohesive society, nor exerted unified control. Challenging the right of a sovereign government to utilise Public Lands at the expense of a tyrannical ogliarchy like the disparate Islamicised aristocracies is non-sensical. There is a lot to be said about how the government handled, or mis-handled the issue(s) but when all is said and done the Muslims are fighting over formerly unused land that just happened to sit within one or another petty ruler's line of sight. In more than a few cases, such as with Luces, Christians and Lumads purchased tracts from Muslims (in Luces case his father bought their rocky hillside from Andal Ampatuan Sr's father) only to have the Muslims re-claim it by force once it was cleared and productive.

When the Muslims refer to all Christians as "settlers," there can never be peace. I have never met a single Christian on Mindanao who denied that Muslims have a right to live in Central Mindanao. Conversely, I have never met a single Muslim on Mindanao who would concede that all Christians are NOT "settlers." Using that as a barometer I think it is possible to assign a greater responsibility to Filipino-Muslims. Co-existence is inevitable, Christian Mindanowans are not going to flee en masse. If the Filipino-Muslims refuse to co-exist then yes, I place the onus on them.

Rachamim
07-31-2011, 02:02 AM
The ransom is a no-brainer. Her husband has a Consultant negotiating so now its a question of price. On being led, the island is one of literally 120 off of Zam City, even city officials use guides. Sama live in mangroves, on boats (not just Badjao), etc.

Rachamim
07-31-2011, 02:16 AM
When the AFP labels something a "camp" people tend to imagine a conventional setting. It is simply a village where most men of fighting age are fighters. Those that aren't are still effected by clan ties. The involvement of villagers is par for the corse on Jolo. The Xmas Eve IED in Camp Asturias? Though the church was inside a PNP compound the camp was protected only by chainlink and razor. All along the fence are squatter homes. ASG guerillas, assisted by friendly residents, infiltrated the compound via the roof of a squatter home. On and on and on.

Also, more would have been decapitated in this last incident but all they had was a rusted bolo (machete).

Bill Moore
07-31-2011, 04:34 AM
On and on and on.

sadly I think that sums it up....

Dayuhan
09-03-2011, 04:22 AM
Responding here to some things that are here and some that were posted elsewhere… again to keep the NPA/Eastern Mindanao stuff on one thread and the MILF/Central Mindanao stuff on another.


When we speak of Bisaya (Visayans) nowadays we tend to be talking about Cebuanos but from Oroquita City all the wat aropund the island, moving east, until the border of Davao Oriental and Davao del Sur was populated by Bisaya.

Who’s “we”? Cebuanos tend to use “Bisaya” and “Cebuano” interchangeably, but “Bisaya” or “Visayan” reasonably refers to native speakers of the primary Visayan languages (Waray, Cebuano, Ilonggo, Kinaray-a) and sub-dialects. Boholanon, Surigaonon, Butuanon are not discrete languages, but mutually intelligible variants of Cebuano. “Boholanon” is Cebuano with an accent; if it’s a language, so is Australian.

Not that any of that is really germane to the issue.

As I’ve said a number of times, the Mindanao Muslim historical narrative is undoubtedly distorted and twisted to support Muslim political aims. The Visayan narrative is no better. If you’re hearing the story from Mindanao Visayans, you’re hearing a version of the story that’s every bit as distorted and inaccurate as what you’d hear from the Muslims.

It’s true that there have always been Visayans in Mindanao, mainly along the northern coast with some minimal penetration up river valleys. What’s disputable is the assumption that because there have always been Visayans in Mindanao, Visayans from other islands therefore have the right to settle anywhere on Mindanao that they please.

It’s certainly not true that all Visayans on Mindanao are settlers. It is, however, very true that virtually all Visayans in the parts of Mindanao now afflicted by insurgency – whether the MILF insurgency or the NPA/Lumad insurgency – are settlers. You cannot reasonably ignore the impact of settlement from the causation of these conflicts, especially given the scale of settlement and the demographic shift, in which indigenous groups have moved from majority to minority in so many areas, and the extreme pro-settler bias shown by government agencies, the “justice” system, and the security apparatus.

Yes, there has always been conflict: I should have referred to THIS conflict; thought that was assumed.


The Lambangians, Tedura, B'laan, and T'boli Tribes all lived as sub-humans and in exchange for giving the majority of their crops were allowed to remain on ancestral lands. The problem isn't Christians.

At least they were allowed to remain. The settlers, especially the logging, mining, plantation and ranching interests, don’t want tribute, they want the land… and they take it. What’s the threat to these groups now? Are the settlers treating them any better than the Muslims did?

Certainly the Maguindanao and Maranao political culture is feudal and abusive, but the political elite in the Visayas, and among the Mindanao settler community, aren’t exactly shining examples of egalitarianism and social justice themselves. How well have the indigenous communities in Panay or Negros – what’s left of them at least – been treated? What’s happened to indigenous groups in settler-dominated areas? That shoe fits more than one foot. There’s little doubt that Mindanao’s Muslims have suffered as much from the execrable quality of their own leadership as from anything else, but the settler political leadership hasn’t been a great deal better.


You are correct that both sides targetted non-combatants but only on side did so without provocation, the Black Shirts. Each Ilaga atrocity was a reaction to a specific atrocity commited by the Black Shirts, and later the Barakuda, and then the MNLF.

That I fear is a complete load of bollocks. Settlers were as often as not aggressors, and initiated as many atrocities as they responded to. Of course you won’t hear it that way from them… you’ve obviously heard their side, have you spent equal time with Muslims - especially the ordinary farmers who took the brunt of it - and heard their stories? If you’ve read the academic literature on the conflict, you surely realize that nobody who has systematically studied the events of that period shares that conclusion… do you really believe that they’ve all been duped by Muslim propaganda, and only the Mindanao Visayans are telling the truth? Surely you know what happened in Manili in June ’71… was that a “reaction to a specific atrocity”? I’m sorry, but it’s a complete crock of one-sided self-serving nonsense.

In the early 80s I spoke to many militia members who were perfectly open about having attacked Muslim villages, not in response to any particular incident, just because Muslims needed to be killed. They thought it perfectly reasonable and defensible to kill Muslim civilians, including women and children… after all, the boys would grow up to kill Christians and the girls would have sons who would grow up to kill Christians. Easier to kill them when they’re small. These things were spoken as self-evident truth, often accompanied by display of assorted trophies. I was also told, among other things, that if I was ever speaking to a Muslim I should be certain never to turn my back, because if I did the Muslim would be possessed by an irresistible urge to stab me.

Of course I’ve heard the story of Luces and the Ampatuans. I’ve also heard a few other versions of the same story. The Ampatuans were notoriously the worst of the datu families when it came to treatment of settlers and the Muslim peasantry alike, and there were confirmed incidents of the Ampatuans allowing land to be settled and then taking it back. Whether those incidents involved Luces remains debatable: the confirmed incidents happened in Ampatuan town, not Upi, and Upi was Sinsuat territory, not Ampatuan. Again, if you’re hearing the stories from Mindanao Visayans, you have to consider the possibility that what you’re hearing is distorted, and if you’ve not bothered to seek out the other side of the story at source, you’re not seeing the whole picture.

I notice that your account completely omits the role of the settler political elite… are we supposed to pretend that they didn’t exist, that all the settlers were poor earnest hard working victims?

Poor Muslims were pushed off cultivated land, in substantial numbers. Most of them ended up migrating to Cotabato City shantytowns, where populations soared in the 60s and beyond.

Settler communities were exorbitantly favored by national government agencies: investment in roads, irrigation, schools, health care, etc was almost exclusively devoted to settler communities. Of course the settlers claimed that the stupid Muslims didn’t care and wouldn’t accept help, but that claim doesn’t stand up to even the most casual research or the most transitory look at period sources. It’s BS, to put a simple word on it.

When the violence began, the government took the side of the settlers, exclusively. Muslims who fought settlers were outlaws, pursued by the PC and the army; settlers who killed Muslims were considered assets and given arms and support. No attempt has ever been made to bring settlers who committed atrocities against Muslim civilians to justice… unless of course they subsequently committed atrocities against Christians. A number of Muslims pointed out to me that the Manero brothers killed Muslim civilians openly and with impunity for years and were considered valuable assets of the state. Killing one Catholic priest made them public enemies.

The extraordinary level of anti-Muslim prejudice, discrimination and outlandish caricature that prevails among the Christian populace, dating back to Spanish times (the Spanish of course had their own issues with Islam) is well documented and real. It exists to this day.


What caused it was the inability of Muslims to co-exist with non-Muslims, as Politically Incorrect as that may be.

Again, look at the scale of migration, the demographic shift, the enormous bias of government toward the settler communities. Hard to expect anyone to simply “co-exist” on those terms.

There’s a similarity, at times uncanny, to Palestine. Whoever you think is “right” or “wrong”, at the end of the day the fact remains that if you introduce a new population into an inhabited area against the will of the current inhabitants, and the new population becomes dominant and begins taking over political control, violence will ensue… and each side will develop an exclusive historical narrative that serves their interests. This may be right or wrong, good or bad; not my place to say. It’s inevitable.

The only thing that stopped the migration was the outbreak of violence. If the war hadn’t started, do you think the settlers would ever have stopped coming? Or would the settlement have continued, until the Muslims were relegated to the same role the Lumad now play in the east? What has happened to every Philippine indigenous community that decided to “co-exist” with settler intrusion?


When the Muslims refer to all Christians as "settlers," there can never be peace. I have never met a single Christian on Mindanao who denied that Muslims have a right to live in Central Mindanao.

In the areas affected by the Central Mindanao insurgency now prevails, virtually all Christians are in fact settlers. I’ve met quite a few Christians who told me that only a Muslim-free Mindanao will ever have peace. It’s been a bit of a mantra among the militias, and among the settler political elites when they think no outsiders are listening.

Not possible to boil this one down to right and wrong, good guys and bad… unless you want to take sides of course. We’re all free to do that, but representing either of the constructed narratives in this conflict (as with most similar conflicts) as truth is a bit of a farce.

AdamG
09-18-2011, 01:40 AM
How do you say "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose" in Ancient Greek? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lysistrata)


MANILA, Philippines - Women ended armed clashes in 2 Mindanao villages by not having sex with their husbands unless the men laid down their weapons, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The success of the "sex strike" allowed families to start rebuilding their communities, the UN's refugee agency said.

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/09/15/11/womens-sex-strike-ends-fighting-mindanao-villages-unchr

Van
09-18-2011, 06:39 AM
Well, in modern Greek; "το πιο πράγματα αλλάζουν. τα περισσότερα πράγματα μένουν τα ίδια".

Dayuhan
09-30-2011, 01:46 AM
This is as good a description as any of the latest round in the sporadically recurring effort toward a negotiated peace in Mindanao

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/B125%20The%20Phillippines-%20A%20New%20Strategy%20for%20Peace%20in%20Mindana o.pdf

I'm not at all optimistic. Possibly a few lessons have been learned from the complete fiasco that resulted the last time out - the doomed-from-the-start MOA/AD that I once nominated for a "Peace Process Least Likely to Produce Peace" award, but still few grounds for optimism.

All discussion of Mindanao peace negotiations, past or current, is welcome!