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Jedburgh
02-12-2009, 01:19 PM
ISN Security Watch, 12 Feb 09: Bahrain's fraught sectarian divide (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=96445)

Sectarian violence has again flared in Bahrain following a wave of arrests associated with an alleged plot to attack national day celebrations.

Described as a fraud by government opponents - who allege the strengthening of repressive mechanisms and measures and moves to promote discrimination in recent years - the alleged terrorist conspiracy and rioting in predominantly Shia areas underlines the fraught nature of sectarian relations in the Gulf kingdom......

Detailed ICG backgrounder, Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge (http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Bahrain/Bahrains%20Sectarian%20Challenge.ashx), dated 6 May 05.

jcustis
02-17-2011, 03:49 PM
Seems the Bahraini security forces "aren't screwing around," as one journalist on the streets put it.

Hmmm, this has interesting implications. It is HQ 5th Fleet after all.

I am curious about a particular fact though, and that is what strata of society the protesters are from. Ruling families, TCN residents, or disenfranchised Arabs who claim Bahrain home but do not have any ties to ruling class?

This quote from the current article on the CNN site left me curious about the notion of the right to assemble that she highlights. Do Bahraini's have the right to assemble peacefully? It would seem that the security forces have cracked down under the guise of public safety for all, considering the protesters had occupied a traffic circle, presumably causing traffic problems throughout Manama.

"Catherine Ashton, the European Union foreign policy chief, deplored the violence and loss of life. "She also calls on the Bahraini authorities to fully respect and protect the fundamental rights of their citizens, including the right to assemble peacefully. The peaceful expression of people's concerns should be met through dialogue," according to a statement from her office."

I suspect that this thread, the Egypt thread, and the few others that will be spawned, will be merged together down the road in a larger thread with a different title, noting the discord throughout many Muslim countries.

Rex Brynen
02-17-2011, 04:38 PM
I am curious about a particular fact though, and that is what strata of society the protesters are from. Ruling families, TCN residents, or disenfranchised Arabs who claim Bahrain home but do not have any ties to ruling class?

Approximately 70-80% of the citizen population are Shiites. The ruling Al Khalifa family are Sunni, and the political and parliamentary system has been designed to limit Shiite political influence. Consequently, the protesters have been largely (although not exclusively) Shiite.

Historically, both the Bahraini military and the security services have relied of significant numbers of foreign personnel. I'm not sure what the current situation is (although certainly one hears complaints--true or not--from Bahrain protesters that many of the riot police are non-nationals).

Bob's World
02-17-2011, 05:21 PM
Official exclusion of 70-80% of the populace of any nation is a recipe for disaster. When you add economic disparity along a religious faultline, eventual revolt is inevitable.

Hopefully the Department of State is scurrying to get in front of all such inevitiable (and entirely predictable) uprising to work with these governments to identify, announce, and begin implementation of reasonable reforms. These are not new issues, it is only that they have never had to address them before.

The Having the 5th Fleet headquartered there is primarily a problem in that it is a bold strategic communication to that populace and the world that "we approve this government."

jcustis
02-17-2011, 05:49 PM
Hopefully the Department of State is scurrying to get in front of all such inevitiable (and entirely predictable) uprising to work with these governments to identify, announce, and begin implementation of reasonable reforms.

Sir, is that really State's responsibility, and isn't that the sort of meddling that many of us seem to advocate we should step further away from?

How can DoS does this without approaching the appearance of being the infidel intruder who is absolutely meddling?

In your experience in the PI, how much do back channel efforts even resonate with the host nation?

Rex Brynen
02-17-2011, 06:42 PM
Official exclusion of 70-80% of the populace of any nation is a recipe for disaster.

Really? The US effectively excluded 70% of the population (the poor, women, non-whites) and from effective political participation until 1920 or so. While you did have that nasty civil war over slavery, I'm not sure that the history of the United States between 1776 and 1920 could be described as a "disaster."

China has effectively excluded 95% of the population from political participation since 1949, and has been stunningly successful over the past 20 years.

I'm being provocative, of course--we academics get paid to be argumentative. I certainly think democracy is, in the long run, a good thing. I'm also with you on the overall merits of a stronger US stance in favour of political reform in the Arab world.

However, I am suggesting that the relationship between political exclusion, revolt, and national "success" is far murkier than we might wish.

jcustis
02-17-2011, 06:55 PM
Really? The US effectively excluded 70% of the population (the poor, women, non-whites) and from effective political participation until 1920 or so. While you did have that nasty civil war over slavery, I'm not sure that the history of the United States between 1776 and 1920 could be described as a "disaster."

China has effectively excluded 95% of the population from political participation since 1949, and has been stunningly successful over the past 20 years.

These seem to me to be exceptionally apples and oranges comparisons.

It's easy to oppress a minority and keep the lid on things, for a long time at that. Different with majorities, whether they be the poor, or a different sect.

And I think we (US) had a civil war in the 60's and 70's as well, but it just didn't bubble up to the level of conflict that we would identify as a civil war from traditional perspectives. It was also localized to geographic areas. My parents never felt quite the effects that Blacks in the deep South did.

China's a rather homogeneous state, and could probably be stratified mostly by the classic Marxist means of looking at the problem from a proletariat and bourgeois perspective. I haven't touched those old Communism in modernity texts in a long time though, so the analysis there could be off.

I would say, however, that the cases you mentioned are outliers because of these facts.

omarali50
02-17-2011, 07:25 PM
Local are claiming the Pakistani army is also involved in the Bahrain suppression. I have heard from friends that 11 AK regiment is stationed there, though I have no idea if they are actively involved (remember, General Zia personally led an armor unit in suppressing the Black September uprising in Jordan in 1970...the Pak army is very conscious of its role as defender of the rulers of the faithful and the monetary rewards this defence brings..incidentally, now that the US and GHQ are not always on the same page, GHQ is likely to be more cooperative with Arab despots, since they anticipate having to scramble for foreign exchange if the US dollar pipeline eventually gets constricted).
And of course, the Sultan has always had battalions of Pakistani mercenaries as added insurance (led, at one point, by an ex-SSG commando colonel, but I have forgotten his name).
Saudi troops seem to be directly involved as well.

Rex Brynen
02-17-2011, 07:37 PM
These seem to me to be exceptionally apples and oranges comparisons.

My argument was, in part, that there are quite a few outliers, and that as a consequence the actual relationship between political inclusion, discrimination, and stability (let alone "success") was rather murky.

The State Failure Task Force Report (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/publications/papers/SFTF%20Phase%20III%20Report%20Final.pdf) (2000) for the USG provides some large-n statistical evidence of this. In Africa, for example, it certainly found that ethnic discrimination increased the risk of state failure (by a factor of 4.8). However, political inclusion also increases the risk of state failure by a similar or even larger amount (4.7 for full democracies, 30.1 for partial democracies). In Muslim countries (globally), interestingly, neither economic nor political discrimination has any statistically-significant effect on state failure, although might be a function of how discrimination is measured.

In short... murky :D

Rex Brynen
02-17-2011, 07:42 PM
Local are claiming the Pakistani army is also involved in the Bahrain suppression.

Certainly Pakistanis are:

Bahrain security forces accused of deliberately recruiting foreign nationals (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/17/bahrain-security-forces-sunni-foreign)
Al Khalifa regime hires non-native Sunni Muslims in concerted effort to swing balance in Shia-majority Bahrain, say analysts

Ian Black, Middle East editor
guardian.co.uk, Thursday 17 February 2011 14.56 GMT


Bahrain's security forces are the backbone of the Al Khalifa regime, now facing unprecedented unrest after overnight shootings. But large numbers of their personnel are recruited from other countries, including Jordan, Pakistan and Yemen....

That being said, beware the almost universal habit of blaming security force violence on foreigers (in Iran, many demonstrators claimed that Lebanese and Palestinians were putting down opposition protests, since no Iranian would ever do that...).

Pete
02-17-2011, 08:37 PM
Bahrain has a state security force that is largely recruited in Pakistan. As I understand it the organization is separate from the army and police. When I was there as a contractor in the 1990s uniformed members of the force with H&K 9mm SMGs guarded the transient billets for the U.S. Navy base in Juffair. A Navy contracting officer told me that after Gulf War I he had quite a time forcing various DoD elements out of the villas and seaside estates they had leased for themselves over there. TAD/TDY costs for the region were soaring through the roof, particularlty because at any given time roughly half of DoD personnel in the theater were in a temporary duty status.

Dayuhan
02-20-2011, 11:05 PM
Hopefully the Department of State is scurrying to get in front of all such inevitiable (and entirely predictable) uprising to work with these governments to identify, announce, and begin implementation of reasonable reforms.

Who exactly are "these governments", and why would they want to work with the US State Dept on internal reforms or other matters of domestic policy? To put it very simply, they will not "work with" the US on these issues, which they consider none of our business, and we haven't the power to compel them to do so. They aren't client states, and we aren't an empire.

If the Chinese came round suggesting that we "work with" them on matter of domestic fiscal reform (which arguably they have a right to suggest, as a major creditor) how do you think we'd react? Why would other governments react any differently to the suggestion (or dictation) that they "work with" the State Dept on domestic policy issues?

Steve the Planner
02-21-2011, 12:05 AM
Dayuhan:

Your trying to separate reality from delusion. There are no people in the State Department doing any of this, nor is it their role.

There was a high-level meeting with Ambassador Crocker/Gen. Petreaus in 2008, where they went to Bahrain to thank the leaders for their support on Iraq matters (Wikileaks source).

I doubt any delegation from the US would really accomplish much other than what they did. Absent curtailing US funding (not likely), this is just one of those duck and cover events.

Rex:


Really? The US effectively excluded 70% of the population (the poor, women, non-whites) and from effective political participation until 1920 or so. While you did have that nasty civil war over slavery, I'm not sure that the history of the United States between 1776 and 1920 could be described as a "disaster."

China has effectively excluded 95% of the population from political participation since 1949, and has been stunningly successful over the past 20 years.

I'm being provocative, of course--we academics get paid to be argumentative. I certainly think democracy is, in the long run, a good thing. I'm also with you on the overall merits of a stronger US stance in favour of political reform in the Arab world.

However, I am suggesting that the relationship between political exclusion, revolt, and national "success" is far murkier than we might wish.

This dumbass question of a government which operates with the "consent of the people" seldom seems to mean active, participation or universal sufferage. There are many ways and means where "consent of the people" can actually be interpreted as many are pissed off and disenfranchised but not enough to either do something about it, or change the status quo.

JCustis's point about the 60's and 70's is a case in point where many things in the US reached a Billy Jack moment (Civil Rights, Viet nam, etc...) which led to notable changes, but did not rise to wide-spread conflict.

Certainly, the level of violence and destruction in many urban areas did reach catastrophic levels, but limited to urban neighborhoods. Nonetheless, it was part and parcel of a successful shift in civil rights.

Vietnam protests, without dispute, marked the end of universal conscription, and the shift to a volunteer army, the results of which are still playing out in US History. Can we trace elective wars to that shift? Would we have ever considered Iraq with universal conscription still in operation? (I think Afghanistan would have been different as to a limited incursion/occupation).

I'm constantly aware of Bob's arguments for an Afghan constitutional change, but wary that it is all too easy to forget that power politics in a capital does not always equate to "consent of the people," nor that "consent of a majority" might not mean oppression of substantial minorities.

This government stuff sure seems to be complicated!!!!

AdamG
03-15-2011, 12:39 PM
MANAMA, Bahrain — A day after Saudi Arabia’s military rolled into Bahrain, the Iranian government branded the move “unacceptable” on Tuesday, threatening to escalate a local political conflict into a regional showdown with Iran.


On Monday, about 2,000 troops — 1,200 from Saudi Arabia and 800 from the United Arab Emirates — entered Bahrain as part of a force operating under the aegis of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a six-nation regional coalition of Sunni rulers that has grown increasingly anxious over the sustained challenge to Bahrain’s king, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa. “This is the initial phase,” a Saudi official said. “Bahrain will get whatever assistance it needs. It’s open-ended.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/world/middleeast/16bahrain.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Bob's World
03-15-2011, 01:54 PM
Really? The US effectively excluded 70% of the population (the poor, women, non-whites) and from effective political participation until 1920 or so. While you did have that nasty civil war over slavery, I'm not sure that the history of the United States between 1776 and 1920 could be described as a "disaster."

China has effectively excluded 95% of the population from political participation since 1949, and has been stunningly successful over the past 20 years.

I'm being provocative, of course--we academics get paid to be argumentative. I certainly think democracy is, in the long run, a good thing. I'm also with you on the overall merits of a stronger US stance in favor of political reform in the Arab world.

However, I am suggesting that the relationship between political exclusion, revolt, and national "success" is far murkier than we might wish.


Rex,

Come now, the American example you give list segments of the populace with no historic expectation of inclusion in politics directly. As our society continued to evolve under this new model of governance it created such expectations over time and had to adjust to bring these new stakeholders into the fold.

It is a far different matter to exclude, or discount the inclusion of some segment of the populace that has such a historic expectation of inclusion or degree of influence. For the influence of landed gentry such as the American founding fathers to be discounted by half merely because they lived in the colonies rather than in England. Or in Afghanistan, to strip influence and participation from one segment of society and vest it all in another every time the tide of war shifts the balance of power under the hand of some external power or another.

How many of that 95% of the Chinese populace has a historic expectation of inclusion? This is not a game of simple math, but one which requires taking into account (as my Contracts professor used to say) "all the surrounding facts and circumstances," and not just what is written within the four corners of the contract document itself.

The issue in the Middle East today, and I suspect in China tomorrow, is a change in expectation fueled by the modern information age. Just and changes in American society created an expectation in Women that had to be addressed; just as WWII created changes in expectations of the African American society that had to be addressed.

The world is changing, expectations are changing. Governments, however, have been held static. Many don't want to change. It's good to be King. Many we don't want to change. It's good to have a King monitor ones financial and security interests. But Kings who cling too long to too much in eras of such social change end up with their heads in a bucket or their necks in a noose. Sponsors of such kings who cling too long in the face of such change find themselves beset by "Anarchists" or "Terrorists"; or mired in "COIN" campaigns dedicated to preserving the status quo.

I stand by my argument, but you have made me have to flesh it out a bit with your challenge, and for that I thank you.

Bob

joelb
03-15-2011, 07:54 PM
i was wondering what a match up like this would look like could be a good pretext war remember the Maine Saudi's could win its a missile air war even if paratroopers could be sent from iran any one have any thoughts

RTK
03-16-2011, 12:10 AM
i was wondering what a match up like this would look like could be a good pretext war remember the Maine Saudi's could win its a missile air war even if paratroopers could be sent from iran any one have any thoughts

My only thoughts have to do with punctuation and protocol.....

Dayuhan
03-16-2011, 01:49 AM
Sponsors of such kings who cling too long in the face of such change find themselves beset by "Anarchists" or "Terrorists"; or mired in "COIN" campaigns dedicated to preserving the status quo.

Who is sponsoring kings? I don't see the US sponsoring any.

We're mired in COIN campaigns in places where we expelled and replaced regimes, not where we tried to preserve them.

Pete
03-16-2011, 01:51 AM
The last time when I was in Bahrain in April 1995 there was an episode of Shiite protesting that occasionally led to incidents of violence. Helicopters were flying over Manama, there were a couple of pillars of smoke rising in the air, and from a distance of about 400 meters away I saw a traffic control point with an APC or two. I wasn't particularly concerned about my personal safety and just went about my business as usual -- it wasn't as though it was Normandy or anything like that.

I was there because the heaviest rainfall in Bahrain since 1945 had caused flooding in a warehouse next to the U.S. Navy base there that contained U.S. Army war reserve medical stuff. (Over there they don't build stormwater drainage systems like we do because they rarely need them.) The damage to the medical supplies was negligible but I found holes torn in the roof of the warehouse that had been caused by high winds during the storm. I told the Navy about it because their contracting office was the organization leasing the facility.

During the period of '94-'95 when I went back and forth to Bahrain I saw occasional news stories about Saudi crackdowns on Shiites living on the east coast of Saudi Arabia by the Persian Gulf. The stories invariably said the troubles were caused by Iranian provocation. I don't know whether that was actually true or just something the Saudis were saying. I'd like to see a map of the region that shows the percentages of Shiites living in the coastal areas of eastern Saudi Arabia, vis-a-vis the Sunnis. It would also be interesting to see the same thing about the other smaller Gulf nations.

Bob's World
03-16-2011, 10:56 AM
Who is sponsoring kings? I don't see the US sponsoring any.

We're mired in COIN campaigns in places where we expelled and replaced regimes, not where we tried to preserve them.

Dead Wrong.

First, We really aren't conducting "COIN Campaigns" anywhere;

Second, neither Irarq nor Afghanistan are truly central to the issues driving the spate of international terrorism over the past 15 years or so being executed by Sunni Arabs affiliated with radical Islamist organizations such as Al Qaeda;

Third, the bulk of the direct and indirect support to said movements has generated from the very populaces that are at this very movement either celebrating their liberty from some generational despot, or are plotting or implementing the same.

4th. The US acted early in the Cold War to shape a controlling influence over this same region, denying Soviet and European influence alike; and has then dedicated a large portion of our diplomatic and military energy over the past 60 years to the shaping and sustaining of a status quo that we felt best served our national interests in the region.

5th. During that same time national leaders now secure from external threats were free to design and implant internal security measures and limitations on civil liberties that could only be described as "despotic" and that have left this region largely frozen in time as they watch through new technologies the world moving rapidly around them

6th. At the core of each of these distinct nationalist movements is a private, personal insurgency that is not some component of a "global insurgency" but rather is independent and distinct. AQ has worked to connect itself to as many of these movements as possible, like a virtual flea attached to the backs of a pack of dogs. Yes the flea is an irritant and motivates the dogs to bark and scratch; but it is their respective masters that have locked them in small kennels and treated them so poorly that drives their quest for liberty (My apologies to my Muslim brothers for this analogy, I in no way call you dogs, but rather attempt to communicate why so many are so motivated to be free).

Lastly, and if you take away only one thing, FACTS are immaterial in insurgency, and PERCEPTION is everything. No one cares about our facts, they only care about their perception, and it is their perception that brings terrorism to our shores, and it is there perception that is driving the to the streets to face national security forces that have held them in check for generations.

So, we can argue over what their perceptions are, but don't argue your facts, because they don't matter. Many the colonial power argued the facts all the way up to the point they were driven from their respective acquisitions. They still argue those facts. They are probably right, just has Harry Summer was right when he told the Vietnamese officer that we had never lost a battle. All of your arguments may be technically and factually correct. However:

"That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant."

RTK
03-16-2011, 12:45 PM
I'd like to see a map of the region that shows the percentages of Shiites living in the coastal areas of eastern Saudi Arabia, vis-a-vis the Sunnis. It would also be interesting to see the same thing about the other smaller Gulf nations.

It doesn't show percentages, but it shows majority in various areas.

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/MidEastReligionCore_lg.jpg

Bob's World
03-16-2011, 01:26 PM
Shiites have long been an oppressed minority on the Arabian Peninsula; though a disproportionately large portion of the known oil deposits is drawn from their land. The northern Saudi oil, Bahrain are notable, and it looks like the oil producing part of Yemen as well.

Knowing that the Brits had Iranian oil cornered when the US made a move on Arab oil; I would not be surprised if this influenced our perspectives as to who to throw our lot in with. To elevate Shiite leadership may have been seen as too likely to fall under Britiish influence.

This is a division we could play to our advantage today, both to help stabilize and reduce the strategic significance of the Saudis; and also to open better lines of communication with the Iranians. Both of those are vital US interests.

The Gulf States sending security forces understand this very well, and those leaders are acting far more to sustain their own status quo than they are to ensure there are no temporary disruptions of oil flow. Temporary they can live with; but the creation of 1-2 Shiite states on the AP? I suspect that makes them very nervous indeed.

Next thing you know the Hashemites will re-exert their claim on leadership of the region...

JMA
03-16-2011, 03:12 PM
Shiites have long been an oppressed minority on the Arabian Peninsula; though a disproportionately large portion of the known oil deposits is drawn from their land. The northern Saudi oil, Bahrain are notable, and it looks like the oil producing part of Yemen as well.

Knowing that the Brits had Iranian oil cornered when the US made a move on Arab oil; I would not be surprised if this influenced our perspectives as to who to throw our lot in with. To elevate Shiite leadership may have been seen as too likely to fall under Britiish influence.

This is a division we could play to our advantage today, both to help stabilize and reduce the strategic significance of the Saudis; and also to open better lines of communication with the Iranians. Both of those are vital US interests.

The Gulf States sending security forces understand this very well, and those leaders are acting far more to sustain their own status quo than they are to ensure there are no temporary disruptions of oil flow. Temporary they can live with; but the creation of 1-2 Shiite states on the AP? I suspect that makes them very nervous indeed.

Next thing you know the Hashemites will re-exert their claim on leadership of the region...

Are you expecting Obama/Clinton statements along the lines of: Obama Says Libyan Officials Could Be Held for War Crimes (http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/03/08/obama-says-libyan-officials-could-be-held-for-war-crimes) or do you think Saudi and the Gulf States have seen the US is all bark and no bite in these matters and are just ignoring the US?

Bob's World
03-16-2011, 03:48 PM
Are you expecting Obama/Clinton statements along the lines of: Obama Says Libyan Officials Could Be Held for War Crimes (http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/03/08/obama-says-libyan-officials-could-be-held-for-war-crimes) or do you think Saudi and the Gulf States have seen the US is all bark and no bite in these matters and are just ignoring the US?

I think we lack the moral convictions to stand consistently by our express principles as a nation. Sometimes hard interests demand that to be the case; but when one takes a principle-based approach I think they need to clearly communicate that they are taking a deviation from that path knowingly, and why.

As I understand it, Bahrain used to be the entire Gulf Coast of the AP, like the right post of a capital H. The al Sauds were constrained to the highlands across the center, much like the crossbar of that H, where they tied into the Hashemites that ran along the Red Sea, completing the H. The Portuguese conquered Bahrain, and then in turn were run off by an insurgent movement that opened the door for Iran to extend its influence and Shia-ism into the Gulf Coast of the AP in the 1600s. At the end of the day, the Iranians are rolled back, leaving pockets of Shiite Arabs, the Hashemites are awarded the booby prize of Iraq and Jordan; and the al Sauds get the bulk of the AP.

And here we are today. Our principles and our interest are in direct conflict in all of the Gulf states. Can a middle ground be struck? I doubt it. Can liberty be once again suppressed by these governments? For some period of time, certainly. Can it be denied indefinitely? No. This might not be the final push by the people, but that push is coming.

This is a time for hard diplomacy rather than hard action. To sit and hope it all smooths out is a bit Polly Anneish. "Smart Power" could turn down the temperature of the GWOT several notches if we could convince these leaders that the best way to stay in power is to make smart, reasonable, moderate concessions to their people. To trend toward a parliamentary system with a more ceremonial role for the Royals seems logical to me; while granting greater justice in the judicial systems, and a greater voice in governance to the populace. This would also allow the Royals to get closer to Islam as most want, while allowing the government to become a bit more secular. Creating a bit of an artificial separation that Muslims seem quite happy with, but that baffles Westerners (such as going to a western country and partying like a rock star, then returning to pious Islam once back at home with no sense of sin or hypocrisy).

Personally, I think we'll F this up.

slapout9
03-16-2011, 04:30 PM
I think we lack the moral convictions to stand consistently by our express principles as a nation.

That is the whole problem both for our foreign policy and our domestic policy. The law, the rules, don't matter anymore. Which ever party is in power will bend and twist them to suit their agenda. Keep doing that and soon there want be any laws or principles just a struggle for survivial....greed backed by force.

JMA
03-16-2011, 05:09 PM
That is the whole problem both for our foreign policy and our domestic policy. The law, the rules, don't matter anymore. Which ever party is in power will bend and twist them to suit their agenda. Keep doing that and soon there want be any laws or principles just a struggle for survivial....greed backed by force.

A return to the "wild West" we saw in the movies?

slapout9
03-16-2011, 06:57 PM
A return to the "wild West" we saw in the movies?

Yea, I call New World Disorder.


Video of a some close range usage of non-lethal weapons in Bahrain. Don't think you are supossed to use them this way.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9W_-0uGN1E&feature=player_embedded&skipcontrinter=1

Pete
03-16-2011, 07:35 PM
As I understand it, Bahrain used to be the entire Gulf Coast of the AP, like the right post of a capital H.
The al Khalifa dynasty has been ruling Bahrain since around 1776; they're Sunnis and the name has the same meaning as our word caliph. IIRC the British made it a protectorate in the 1840s following an anti-piracy campaign in the Persian Gulf. In essence the al Khalifas were allowed to rule the place domestically and let the British take care of foreign affairs. The British pulled out in about 1972 and we located our naval base in the old Royal Navy station there.

One Bahraini who worked for our Navy said many Bahraini residents have had their families in the country for two or three generations but they are not given complete citizenship rights because they're Shiites with roots in Iran. One of the sources of Shiite resentment are the many guest workers there, people from Pakistan, India and the Philippines who are seen as taking "their" jobs away. This is all off the top of my head and I'm sure the CIA's online page on the country has more precise information.

Dayuhan
03-17-2011, 12:12 AM
I think we lack the moral convictions to stand consistently by our express principles as a nation. Sometimes hard interests demand that to be the case; but when one takes a principle-based approach I think they need to clearly communicate that they are taking a deviation from that path knowingly, and why.

Our principles as a nation apply to us. There is nothing in those principles that requires or recommends their export to or imposition on others.


As I understand it, Bahrain used to be the entire Gulf Coast of the AP, like the right post of a capital H. The al Sauds were constrained to the highlands across the center, much like the crossbar of that H, where they tied into the Hashemites that ran along the Red Sea, completing the H. The Portuguese conquered Bahrain, and then in turn were run off by an insurgent movement that opened the door for Iran to extend its influence and Shia-ism into the Gulf Coast of the AP in the 1600s. At the end of the day, the Iranians are rolled back, leaving pockets of Shiite Arabs, the Hashemites are awarded the booby prize of Iraq and Jordan; and the al Sauds get the bulk of the AP.

There are lots of ways it "used to be". As with most of that region, the islands now called "Bahrain" have been conquered by and incorporated into a rather wide variety of entities over the centuries. There was never any static "the way it used to be" that was disrupted by the colonial age.


And here we are today. Our principles and our interest are in direct conflict in all of the Gulf states. Can a middle ground be struck? I doubt it. Can liberty be once again suppressed by these governments? For some period of time, certainly. Can it be denied indefinitely? No. This might not be the final push by the people, but that push is coming.

There is no conflict between principles and interests, because there is nothing in our principles that requires us to demand that other nations live up to our principles. Our principles are our principles. We need to live by them. That doesn't mean we can or should impose them elsewhere.


This is a time for hard diplomacy rather than hard action. To sit and hope it all smooths out is a bit Polly Anneish. "Smart Power" could turn down the temperature of the GWOT several notches if we could convince these leaders that the best way to stay in power is to make smart, reasonable, moderate concessions to their people.

We can't convince these leaders of anything, as we just saw in Bahrain. We recommended concessions and reform. Our recommendations were rejected. Not much we can do about it.

Back in the Cold War we got used to assuming that any despot who was nominally on our side was sponsored by us, sustained by us, accountable to us, and could be directed by us. That's no longer the case. We're not dealing here with Somozas or Marcoses. These guys don't care what we think, we have no leverage over them, and they will do what they please no matter what we say or want.


To trend toward a parliamentary system with a more ceremonial role for the Royals seems logical to me; while granting greater justice in the judicial systems, and a greater voice in governance to the populace.

Seems logical to me too, but nobody in these countries gives a damn what you or I think, or what America wants. We don't have the influence that many think we do.


This would also allow the Royals to get closer to Islam as most want

I don't think you should be telling us what "most want", because you don't know. As with most places in the world, people in these countries want lots of different things, many of them conflicted and contradictory: all over the Arabian Peninsula the same people who speak in romantic terms of glorious traditional Islamic asceticism are wallowing in as much western-style material consumption as they can... so how do we judge what they "want"? By what they say or what they do?

Most often, when people talk in simplistic terms about "what the populace wants" they are simply imposing constructs compatible with their own assumptions. It's never quite as simple as that.


Personally, I think we'll F this up.

We can neither fix it up nor F it up, because we haven't the influence to do either. The governments involved and the populaces involved will sort out their own accommodations in their own way and we will cope with the process and the outcome as best we can.

We are neither the cause of nor the solution to these problems. We didn't break it and we can't fix it. They will sort it out their own way, and we will cope. it's not about us. It affects us, but we are not in control of it.

Dayuhan
03-17-2011, 12:13 AM
That is the whole problem both for our foreign policy and our domestic policy. The law, the rules, don't matter anymore.

When did they ever matter?


Which ever party is in power will bend and twist them to suit their agenda.

And when has that not been the case?

Ken White
03-17-2011, 12:23 AM
Our principles as a nation apply to us. There is nothing in those principles that requires or recommends their export to or imposition on others...

...We are neither the cause of nor the solution to these problems. We didn't break it and we can't fix it. They will sort it out their own way, and we will cope. it's not about us. It affects us, but we are not in control of it. (emphasis added / kw)All in between was correct but those two are really important...

JMA
03-17-2011, 01:42 AM
I think we lack the moral convictions to stand consistently by our express principles as a nation.

Yes indeed... and it is the same thing we try to teach kids when we tell them that at times it takes moral courage to stand up against the flow and do what is right.

In the adult world it is much the same but we also have the "everything is negotiable" and "we must just go with the flow" crowd who are quite prepared to sell their mother on the nearest street corner - and be able to rationalise it and justify it and explain it away without any remorse.

It takes a certain kind of courage to make a stand on principle (IMHO a higher level of courage than mere physical courage) and that is why we find so few politicians able to step up to the plate.

In the case of Libya the French and the British have taken a half step forward while the US dithers - not saying yes or no but just a big maybe and the Germans kiss the Bear's ass. It doesn't come more pathetic than this.

The Libyan opposition are asking "where is NATO", "where is the West" and instead of telling them "we are not coming" the message is that "we are thinking about it so do try to die well in the meantime".

If we don't have the balls to stand up for the western democratic principles we supposedly hold so dear then at least try to summon up the courage to admit it.


Personally, I think we'll F this up.

That sadly is a certainty.

JMA
03-17-2011, 01:44 AM
All in between was correct but those two are really important...

Ken, that is absolute nonsense and I think you know it.

Pete
03-17-2011, 01:51 AM
A slight digression -- when I did the contract work in Bahrain in the '90s many military and civilian employees of the Army organization I worked for thought my interest in the country was a thorough waste of time. To them an Army medical logistics job was a job, be it in Abilene, Texas, Landstuhl, Germany, Soeul, Korea, or somewhere in Antarctica. Maybe I wasn't cut out to be a medical supply weenie after all, where it's all document registers, DoD Form 2765, requisition status codes, fund cites, MIPRs and all that other miserable stuff. I thought when you conduct operations overseas you should scout out the lay of the land and learn a bit about the place. I still think so, but supply weenies are what they are and we need a certain few of them to keep the institution running.

Dayuhan
03-17-2011, 03:11 AM
Yes indeed... and it is the same thing we try to teach kids when we tell them that at times it takes moral courage to stand up against the flow and do what is right.

What exactly would you want us to "do" in Bahrain?


In the case of Libya the French and the British have taken a half step forward while the US dithers - not saying yes or no but just a big maybe and the Germans kiss the Bear's ass. It doesn't come more pathetic than this.

The US is overcommitted elsewhere and is not in a position to take on another bite, especially where no direct US interest is involved. Those other commitments may or may not have been wise, but they exist and while they exist they are major constraints on new action.

If there is going to be action in Libya somebody else will have to lead it. The US may be able to help but it is neither practical nor reasonable to expect the US to solve everybody else's problems, everywhere.


The Libyan opposition are asking "where is NATO", "where is the West" and instead of telling them "we are not coming" the message is that "we are thinking about it so do try to die well in the meantime".

Did anyone ever promise them that they'd be bailed out if they bit off more than they could chew?


If we don't have the balls to stand up for the western democratic principles we supposedly hold so dear then at least try to summon up the courage to admit it.

Our principles apply to us. We are supposed to preserve them in our own countries. There is nothing in those principles that requires or advises us to export or impose those principles elsewhere.

This is about Bahrain; there's another thread for Libya... so I'll repeat the simple question:

What exactly would you want us to "do" in Bahrain?

Dayuhan
03-17-2011, 03:59 AM
Knowing that the Brits had Iranian oil cornered when the US made a move on Arab oil; I would not be surprised if this influenced our perspectives as to who to throw our lot in with. To elevate Shiite leadership may have been seen as too likely to fall under Britiish influence.

The US dealt with those who were in power at that place and that time. No need to read any more into it than that. If the Sauds hadn't been willing to deal we might have tried to set up a Shi'a state and broken off the valuable chunk of the Peninsula under a regime that we could control, but there wasn't any need for that... and I somehow suspect that in the long run such actions wouldn't have worked out terribly well.


This is a division we could play to our advantage today, both to help stabilize and reduce the strategic significance of the Saudis; and also to open better lines of communication with the Iranians. Both of those are vital US interests.

That kind of manipulation and interference in the affairs of others is completely uncalled for and would probably be disastrous. The most likely outcome that I can project would be a complete mess and lasting loathing from Shi'a and Sunni, Saudi and Iranian.

What ever happened to minding our own business?

Same question I asked JMA: what exactly would you want to see us do about Bahrain?

Ken White
03-17-2011, 04:17 AM
Ken, that is absolute nonsense and I think you know it.It's a great deal of sense that is counter to the nonsensical delusion of those that would have the US flitting about the globe fixing things others screw up. We have puttered around with that, generally not done it very well -- there are a few exceptions -- and all it gets us is folks like you carping about not doing it your way.

Most of the carpers do not understand the US, how it works and that Americans almost all left somewhere else because they didn't want to be there and didn't want to live by the rules of their former nation. Then they find that many of their nominally educated elite want to copy the mores and attitudes of other nations. All our attitudes and processes predicated on those of other nations are generally flawed -- they do not mesh with the psyches of those who left those other places for something different. So we are now copying the mores and attitudes of Europe -- just as Europe is undergoing major changes and casting those social democratic ideas aside as they discovered what they though they wanted to do was unaffordable.

That's the point of this rant. Unaffordable. You advocate a lot of muscular US involvement in petty machinations here and there. Easy to do from your armchair with no responsibility for the execution or the funding of those neat little adventures. We've done numerous interventions for most of my adult life -- and we could not afford to do it the way we did it. We took a marginally trained force and, too often, sent it to a job that was not possible for that force structure. That we did as well as we did is a tribute to the Troops who went and gave it a shot.

That they were sent to do things they should not have been sent to do -- in the form and manner they were sent -- is a lick on the Politicians who sent them and the senior officers who allowed it to happen. There are a lot of factors that contributed to all that and there's plenty of blame for many people and entities but any way you look at it, the force was too often sent to do really dumb and generally unnecessary things. Most of the carpers are unaware of details in those interventions, they just cue in on the big items and the after glow which buries most of the foulups.

All that cost money. Aside from wasted lives and general stupidity, it was terribly expensive. So we now have an affordability problem of massive proportions. Quite simply, we cannot afford to go gallivanting around the world fixing stupidity -- we have enough of our own in any event...:rolleyes:

That's the point of the aside on America's fetish with copying Europe in a better late than never mode. We may come from the European hearth but we are not European and trying to copy them has put us in the fix we are in. So we're now trying to do more dumb stuff -- dumb stuff we can't afford -- that's why we need to stop trying to play Mr. Fixit. At least until we get our own act together...

No, those two statements are not nonsense. The nonsense comes from those who do not understand all they know about what they advocate and believe that every minor eruption or festering sore must be fixed and Uncle Sugar must do it.

I'll just repeat Dayuhan's comments as some may have misread or misunderstood them:

""Our principles as a nation apply to us. There is nothing in those principles that requires or recommends their export to or imposition on others...

...We are neither the cause of nor the solution to these problems. We didn't break it and we can't fix it. They will sort it out their own way, and we will cope. it's not about us. It affects us, but we are not in control of it. (emphasis added / kw)""

Your stated objections to our interference in Rhodesia back in the day are supported by that first item. We were exporting and attempting to impose our principles some place they weren't appropriate and we really had no business doing that. So you objected then -- properly so IMO -- but now you think it would be good if we exported... :confused:

The second item isn't totally correct, we did in fact cause some of those problems by our previous muddled and poor attempts to export and impose (as you have pointed out elsewhere and I have agreed). So that meddling is part of the reason we need to back off the meddling. However, the rest is pretty well correct -- we did not really break most things into pieces (Iraq is another story...) -- but we certainly cannot fix other nations. We can help, but not to the extent that we have over the past 60 years. We literally have broken our own bank; FDR deliberately drove Britain to bankruptcy, the last few US Presidents have stupidly driven their own nation to bankruptcy. And you advocate we continue running around trying to export and impose. If I didn't know better, I'd think you were trying to bankrupt us or something... :D

Sorry, that is just not smart. We really need to quit that. :wry:

I acknowledge that we could do more and better but it will really require a significant rethink (and political will I'm not sure is available) and retooling if it is to be effective and truly accomplish some good things.

So, to properly do the things you and the other idealists want, we need to reorient the force, buy different equipment sets, significantly improve our training, completely re-do our personnel policies and find some testicular fortitude in the political and military leadership here plus get some money without borrowing it...

I suspect the only thing you can contribute to that is advice in the training arena which I'm sure will be very freely given. Well and perhaps some money. You can just hit this LINK (https://www.pay.gov/paygov/forms/formInstance.html?agencyFormId=23779454).

Granite_State
03-17-2011, 04:19 AM
Our principles apply to us. We are supposed to preserve them in our own countries. There is nothing in those principles that requires or advises us to export or impose those principles elsewhere.



America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. - John Quincy Adams

Bob's World
03-17-2011, 10:52 AM
Our principles as a nation apply to us. There is nothing in those principles that requires or recommends their export to or imposition on others..

That is what I said. That is what I always have said. Hold ourselves to our own express principles.

When interests demand that we bend those principles, as interests will often do, be upfront and say "Due to these vital interests we will deviate slightly from our stated path for some period of time."

No one cares when the minister goes down to the corner bar for a couple of drinks and a smoke. They care when he spends Saturday night doing that, while spending Sunday morning condemning the congregation to hell for doing the same thing.

Which brings us to the second crazy interpretation you made when I discussed US interests and US principles being in conflict. You say:

"There is no conflict between principles and interests, because there is nothing in our principles that requires us to demand that other nations live up to our principles. Our principles are our principles. We need to live by them. That doesn't mean we can or should impose them elsewhere."

I'm not even sure where you got that from, other than your reflexive urge to argue with anything I post. The US has express principles that we say we stand for. The US has express interests that we say we will exert ourselves to promote. Many of those interests are in the Middle East in general, and in places such as Bahrain in particular.

In the past we have promoted our interests by focusing on the stability that comes from sustaining specific governments in power. It made sense at the time. How they governed was their business. No matter how dissatisfied their populaces might be there was little consequence, other than the occasional moral judge ment, for such arrangements.

Now to the conflict of interest. How they govern is still their business. The US still has interests in the region. What has changed, creating the conflict, is that in today's globalized environment, with empowered populaces and non-state actors there are consequences for such stability achieved through such support.

So now, I submit, the terms of the contract have changed. If these governments want US support to sustain them in power they are going to have to deal with some invasive new terms. They had been fooling themselves that their situation has not changed. They had internal challenges before, they have internal challenges now. They know full well how to keep a populaces on it's knees, and do not need our help in that regard. But now the same tools of information and transportation that brought nationalist discontent in countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia to the shores of the US is now bringing open revolt in Tunisia to other other Arab lands as well. The Genie is out of the bottle. So, again, the terms of the contract have changed.

This does not mean the imposition of US principles or values on anyone. It does mean, however, that it is in the best interest currently for all the parties involved for these governments to finally make some concessions on HUMAN principles, as shaped by their own distinct culture, religion and situations. The people of Egypt are not fighting for US principles. They people of Libya are not fighting for US principles. The people of Bahrain, Yemen and Saudi Arabia are not fighting for US principles. They are fighting for human principles as shaped by their respective situations.

The only US principle in play, and the one we have the greatest conflict with, is our express commitment that these people, and people everywhere, have a god given right to fight for such things. If we help these governments suppress their people in this desire, then there will be consequences paid in increased acts of terrorism for our actions.

Which brings us to my recommendation that now is the time for hard, smart diplomacy. To renegotiate the contracts of our relationships with these governments based upon new and emerging conditions; and to do so in a manner that is as consistent with our stated principles as possible.

Ken White
03-17-2011, 02:58 PM
That is what I said. That is what I always have said. Hold ourselves to our own express principles..."There is no conflict between principles and interests, because there is nothing in our principles that requires us to demand that other nations live up to our principles. Our principles are our principles. We need to live by them. That doesn't mean we can or should impose them elsewhere."...

I'm not even sure where you got that from, other than your reflexive urge to argue with anything I post.That may be what he does but I don't think so, I think he's pointing out apparent but probably unintentional dichotomies.

Without regurgitating all the arguments pro and con, it appears to me that you often produce a perhaps unintentional conflict by saying 'we should not impose a governmental model' and OTOH you quite often -- perhaps too often :confused: -- insist 'our model is superb' and cite historical examples.

You may not be saying directly that they should -- sometimes even 'must' -- 'do as we do' but IMO, you quite often posit a very strong implication to that effect and it can be a bit disconcerting.

The frequent comment that we should not intervene or dictate methodologies is often overridden by comments like this:
Which brings us to my recommendation that now is the time for hard, smart diplomacy. To renegotiate the contracts of our relationships with these governments based upon new and emerging conditions; and to do so in a manner that is as consistent with our stated principles as possible.The implication there IMO is that we need to be forceful, adhere to our principles and adapt to current events. Agreed. however, the way that's worded can offer a very strong 'do it our way' quotient in those negotiations; the "as possible" seems to get lost there at the end as it was sort of cancelled out by the preceding "hard, smart..."

Pardon the intrusion. Pray continue...:wry:

Bob's World
03-17-2011, 03:40 PM
Ken, you know I promote the example of the US experience as a model for government structure in principle rather than as some cure that must be taken on face value. I advocate for the COIN value of ensuring no single element of government can become too effective or powerful, and for ensuring the populace is always armed, informed, and allowed to peaceably assemble as a additional check on government; also that in protecting some core collection individual and collective rights and in identifying clear mechanisms for affecting governance one can keep a populace from drifting in to insurgency.

What type of government, what rights, what procedures? It is the logic behind the framework that is important, not the specific framework or what is hung upon it.

No one will ever hear me promote 6 years as the perfect term length for a senator, or 25 as the model for eligibility for congress, or that two houses is the only way to go, etc, etc, etc.

Only that this document was written with a keen eye to preventing insurgency, and has several mechanisms designed for that purpose that have proven quite effective. But until one is willing to swallow the hard fact that the vast majority of insurgent causation radiates out from government, rather than in toward government from some "malign actor" employing "radical ideology" it may well be hard to appreciate the importance of such a governing document in the prevention of insurgency.

Similarly, until one is prepared to swallow the even harder fact that the vast majority of causation for international terrorism radiates outward as well in the form of foreign policy and engagement it may well be hard to appreciate the importance of reframing our approach to the world to better suit the one we live in today, rather than the one that existed some 60 years ago.

These uprisings in the Middle East are fueled by the same popular discontent that fuels those who bring terror to Western countries. Each of these countries will have to work out a solution to their distinct situation. I would encourage them to consider their role in causation and to make smart changes in how they govern. Yes, I would say "see what the US did, now understand why, and see if you can achieve similar functions that make sense for your country and your culture. I would also point out what Afghanistan did, and say, "don't do this, they created a constitution as rough on the Pashtuns as the Treaty of Versailles was on the Germans. Such vengeful, power hungry controlling documents sound good at the time, but they never seem to play out well in the long run.."

As for the US? This is our best opportunity yet to finally turn the corner on the GWOT, yet for that everyone is focused on what GEN Petraeus has to report from Afghanistan; and Libya and Bahrain are seen as largely unrelated to the war on terrorism. This is the sad irony. It is Iraq and Afghanistan (post the first 6 months) that have been largely unrelated to the GWOT; and our foreign policies in these places that are now on fire that should have been the main effort.

Ken White
03-17-2011, 04:01 PM
However, it can give the appearance of that inconsistency of which I wrote:
What type of government, what rights, what procedures? It is the logic behind the framework that is important, not the specific framework or what is hung upon it.That's true and you usually write words to that effect -- but then things like this appear:
No one will ever hear me promote 6 years as the perfect term length for a senator, or 25 as the model for eligibility for congress, or that two houses is the only way to go, etc, etc, etc.

Only that this document was written with a keen eye to preventing insurgency, and has several mechanisms designed for that purpose that have proven quite effective. But until one is willing to swallow the hard fact that the vast majority of insurgent causation radiates out from government, rather than in toward government from some "malign actor" employing "radical ideology" it may well be hard to appreciate the importance of such a governing document in the prevention of insurgency.I'll agree that you are not pushing the US Model -- but I have to say it sure reads as though you are -- and frequently, you more assertive along that line...

Note the incongruity. First para offers unlikely and throwaway possibilities in one short pithy sentence, a one liner in essence. The second para pushes the 'US Model' of excellence in quite a few more words...

It's not the detail, it's the overall impression. I offer that not to be a picker of gnits but just as a casual observer and for your consideration, no more. I will now go get more coffee... ;)

Dayuhan
03-17-2011, 10:09 PM
[QUOTE=Bob's World;117605]So now, I submit, the terms of the contract have changed. If these governments want US support to sustain them in power they are going to have to deal with some invasive new terms.

Who wants or needs US support to sustain them in power? Not Bahrain, or Saudi Arabia, or Libya, or Qatar or the UAE. None of these countries receive US support or rely on it to sustain them in power. When those who rule Bahrain wanted help, did they ask us?

I can't for the life of me grasp why you keep talking about these governments as client states, dependent entities that we sponsor and support and protect against their enraged populaces. This is an illusion, and a dangerous one, because it assumes influence that we cannot actually wield. If these governments did in fact rely on our support or sustenance, we could influence their behaviour by threatening to unilaterally rewrite the "terms of the contract" and impose "invasive new terms". They do not rely on our support, and we are not in a position to impose terms on them. If they tell us to insert our invasive terms in an awkward and uncomfortable place, what exactly do we propose to do?


The only US principle in play, and the one we have the greatest conflict with, is our express commitment that these people, and people everywhere, have a god given right to fight for such things. If we help these governments suppress their people in this desire, then there will be consequences paid in increased acts of terrorism for our actions.

We aren't "helping these governments suppress their people". They are doing that all by themselves.


Which brings us to my recommendation that now is the time for hard, smart diplomacy. To renegotiate the contracts of our relationships with these governments based upon new and emerging conditions; and to do so in a manner that is as consistent with our stated principles as possible.

You're basing your proposal for "hard, smart diplomacy" on assumed influence that we don't actually have. That's not likely to turn out well. What's your carrot? What's your stick?



Similarly, until one is prepared to swallow the even harder fact that the vast majority of causation for international terrorism radiates outward as well in the form of foreign policy and engagement it may well be hard to appreciate the importance of reframing our approach to the world to better suit the one we live in today, rather than the one that existed some 60 years ago.

That's your opinion. It remains largely unsupported and highly debatable.


Each of these countries will have to work out a solution to their distinct situation. I would encourage them to consider their role in causation and to make smart changes in how they govern. Yes, I would say "see what the US did, now understand why, and see if you can achieve similar functions that make sense for your country and your culture.

Go ahead and encourage, go ahead and say it. You and I and Barack Obama can say this 50 times a day, or 100, and it won't make any difference. Nobody cares what we say. These governments are not going to make changes in the way they govern, smart or otherwise, because of anything we say.


As for the US? This is our best opportunity yet to finally turn the corner on the GWOT

How?

I asked this simple question of you and JMA, and received no answer:

What exactly would you want us to do in Bahrain?

Emphasis on "do", because "say" without "do" means nothing.

If we speak of American principles, I commend to you the item quoted earlier by Granite State:


America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. - John Quincy Adams

It may seem to you that I argue with everything you say. American principles, of course, suggest that I've a right to an opinion, but I'd also point out that it seems to me that you keep making the same points over and over again without acknowledging or incorporating the reasonable counterpoints made by quite a number here.. This does impose a somewhat cyclic nature on the conversation, which I suspect will be broken only when boating season is back and I haven't time to continue it. But then there's Ken, and others...

Ken White
03-18-2011, 01:33 AM
from my Wife, thank you berry much...:o

Ah, the benefits of retardation coupled with retirement. :D :D

Bob's World
03-18-2011, 01:48 PM
Dayuhan.

"But for" the US those countries would all be the colonies of some European country, or would be provinces of some combination of Iraq and Iran. This is not lost on the leaders of these countries, and yes, it does give us influence in the region. Just as the fact that if we were so inclined we could put them under a US flag in short order as well. This is real leverage, counter threats to not sell oil are a false leverage that relies upon our good will to play along with such coercion, and even if we did play along are not sustainable options for any of these countries.

You discount that, I realize, but it is the elephant in the room that others cannot ignore.

So, with that elephant standing quietly behind us, I do think we should sit down and talk with these guys about how to best regain stability in their respective countries. Their instinct is likely to simply ratchet up the oppression until the people finally return to a state of well suppressed insurgency. This is the forced stability that has been gradually weakening over the past 20 years, and that has been targeted by bin Laden and his AQ organization to grow his own influence in the region.

By employing our influence to convince these gentlemen to engage their people in conversation rather than with cluster bombs and chainguns we have our best chance at a stability that actually begins to reduce the conditions of insurgency in these populaces; and thereby reduces the likelihood of acts of terrorism against the US. and the West. Small, reasonable reforms, on their terms and IAW their culture and values, will vent the pressure that is threatening to burst these countries wide open.

And yes, the US constitution was designed to do just that, and provides keen insights as to what type of procedures and rights are most important in such an endeavor of tailoring governance so as to not inflame a populace. It is not the only answer, but it is a good one. A point of departure.

Dayuhan
03-18-2011, 02:21 PM
"But for" the US those countries would all be the colonies of some European country, or would be provinces of some combination of Iraq and Iran. This is not lost on the leaders of these countries, and yes, it does give us influence in the region.

That's the past. This is the present. There is no longer any threat of European colonial occupation. There is no longer any threat from Iraq. There is a hypothetical threat from Iran, but Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States no perfectly well that we will resist any Iranian attempt to take the Gulf no matter how they govern. That's not about defending them, just as Iraq wasn't about defending them. It's about defending ourselves: the US is not going to let a hostile or potentially hostile power take full control of the Gulf oil reserves. They and we know it, so threatening to withdraw defense against external aggression is not a viable stick.

Again: we cannot pretend that these countries are clients or dependencies that have to jump at our request. They aren't. We aren't helping or enabling them to oppress their populaces either. They don't need or want our help to do that.


Just as the fact that if we were so inclined we could put them under a US flag in short order as well. This is real leverage

It is no leverage at all: they know very well that we are not going to conquer and colonize the Gulf. We know it too, so there's not much point in talking about it.


So, with that elephant standing quietly behind us, I do think we should sit down and talk with these guys about how to best regain stability in their respective countries.

That elephant is still standing squarely in the middle of the room. "These guys" are not going to talk to us, or listen to our lectures, about the internal politics of their countries. They don't have to, and they won't.

Realistically, what are your carrots, and what are your sticks? Why should they listen to us, especially if we come off with some high-handed "daddy white man knows best, and you benighted slobs need to re-organize your country as we see fit" routine? That may not be what you intend to say, but that's how it comes across, and people on the receiving end won't like it. The governments won't like it, and neither will the populaces: they won't see us standing up for them, they'll see us treating their leaders and their countries like backward children. It comes off as arrogance and contempt, and that doesn't make good relationships.

And again:

What exactly would you want us to do in Bahrain?

Emphasis on "do", because "say" without "do" means nothing.

Bob's World
03-18-2011, 04:59 PM
That's the past. This is the present. There is no longer any threat of European colonial occupation. There is no longer any threat from Iraq. There is a hypothetical threat from Iran, but Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States no perfectly well that we will resist any Iranian attempt to take the Gulf no matter how they govern. That's not about defending them, just as Iraq wasn't about defending them. It's about defending ourselves: the US is not going to let a hostile or potentially hostile power take full control of the Gulf oil reserves. They and we know it, so threatening to withdraw defense against external aggression is not a viable stick.

Again: we cannot pretend that these countries are clients or dependencies that have to jump at our request. They aren't. We aren't helping or enabling them to oppress their populaces either. They don't need or want our help to do that.



It is no leverage at all: they know very well that we are not going to conquer and colonize the Gulf. We know it too, so there's not much point in talking about it.



That elephant is still standing squarely in the middle of the room. "These guys" are not going to talk to us, or listen to our lectures, about the internal politics of their countries. They don't have to, and they won't.

Realistically, what are your carrots, and what are your sticks? Why should they listen to us, especially if we come off with some high-handed "daddy white man knows best, and you benighted slobs need to re-organize your country as we see fit" routine? That may not be what you intend to say, but that's how it comes across, and people on the receiving end won't like it. The governments won't like it, and neither will the populaces: they won't see us standing up for them, they'll see us treating their leaders and their countries like backward children. It comes off as arrogance and contempt, and that doesn't make good relationships.

And again:

What exactly would you want us to do in Bahrain?

Emphasis on "do", because "say" without "do" means nothing.

I told you. You just disagree so cannot hear. But now you are suddenly the "do something there" guy? Pick one.

As to the Past, if you really think that we live in some conflictless age, where nations no longer are willing to use power to achieve gain, I find hard to believe. It is the US presence in the region and commitment to preserving governments in power that makes Iraq not a threat, likewise for iran. and Russia and quite possibly Turkey, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, China or any of another number of countries who would like to own that stretech of oil soaked beachfront property.

As to what the US will certainly never do, that is one bet I would never put much money on. We would never liberate Kuwait. We would never invade Iraq. There is no such thing as "we would never." That all depends on the assessment of our national interests at a given time by a relatively small number of leaders. We don't like to be pushed, and tend to overreact when we are. People understand that about America if nothing else. We may be a "Christian Nation" as some like to say, but that has never prevented us from "getting Biblical" with those who cross us.

But none of that needs to be in the conversation. It is implied. The conversation needs to focus on what these leaders do to best stabilize their own countries.

Dayuhan
03-18-2011, 10:12 PM
I told you. You just disagree so cannot hear. But now you are suddenly the "do something there" guy? Pick one.

You're telling me about broad generalities that offer no practical support for the diplomatic pressure you want to exert.

You're the one who wants us to do something. You want us to change how these governments govern. I'm asking what you propose to do to achieve that goal. Sermons and suggestions are not going to do it: there have to be immediate, meaningful, practical carrots and sticks on the table if we want to change anyone's behaviour. What are they?

Lecturing these governments on how we think they ought to govern is meaningless. It will be ignored. It has already been ignored: we told the Bahrainis what we thought they should do, and they went to the Saudis instead.


But none of that needs to be in the conversation. It is implied. The conversation needs to focus on what these leaders do to best stabilize their own countries.

Unless we have some way to persuade or compel them to do what we think they need to do, discussion of what we think they need to do is abstract to the point of meaninglessness.

Sure, we can lecture them on democracy and human rights, in public and private. That makes us sound noble to ourselves, and preachy and obnoxious to others, but it's tradition. Just don't expect it to produce change.

Here's what I'm hearing from you:


I do think we should sit down and talk with these guys about how to best regain stability in their respective countries....

By employing our influence to convince these gentlemen to engage their people in conversation rather than with cluster bombs and chainguns


I would encourage them to consider their role in causation and to make smart changes in how they govern. Yes, I would say "see what the US did, now understand why, and see if you can achieve similar functions that make sense for your country and your culture.


convince these leaders that the best way to stay in power is to make smart, reasonable, moderate concessions to their people. To trend toward a parliamentary system with a more ceremonial role for the Royals seems logical to me; while granting greater justice in the judicial systems, and a greater voice in governance to the populace.


So now, I submit, the terms of the contract have changed. If these governments want US support to sustain them in power they are going to have to deal with some invasive new terms.

How does this not come down to lectures and sermons? If they are ignored - which they will be - what do you propose to do? How do you propose to impose "invasive new terms" on these countries? You say we have "influence", but how specifically are we going to deploy that supposed influence to achieve the result you want to achieve?

Take it a step forward. You've given your lecture on how we think they should govern. It's something we've done before. They've nodded gravely, promised to take your opinions under consideration, and ignored you, which is what they've always done before. What's the next move?

Granting that our self-image requires us to lecture a bit, what's the point, in this case, in spouting words that we aren't prepared to back up with action?

Bob's World
03-19-2011, 01:33 AM
When I was a platoon leader a few years ago I had these two E-4s who always thought whatever leadership came up with was lame.

One day at a MOUT site at Graf while we were doing an AAR after a platoon attack on the site these two were in the back row, as usual, offering criticisms of the past operation, but not offering any more viable alternatives.

So I told the platoon that we were going to form a new plan and attack again in an hour. Spc X would be the Platoon leader, and Spc Y would be the Platoon Sergeant for the coming attack. Dead silence in the back row.

SFC Bowen and I worked with the two new leaders and helped them as they struggled to formulate a plan. We conducted the attack, had problems, but more importantly the entire platoon realized that it was far easier to follow and criticize than it was to lead.

So, fine, I know I have opinions and I offer them up here knowing that there will be keen eye and minds upon them. It helps me to refine my ideas and make them better.

Help me out. So far your criticisms tend to fall in the category of "that sucks." Ok, fine. Personally, I do think the US has tremendous influence and that negotiations from a US leader is far more than some "lecture."

But I'm open Spc Dayuhan, you're in charge. What is your plan?

Pete
03-19-2011, 02:37 AM
Apples and oranges. American foreign policy in general and small-unit leadership techniques in the U.S. Army are separate subjects, though the two may occasionally overlap a bit.

Dayuhan
03-19-2011, 02:59 AM
Personally, I do think the US has tremendous influence and that negotiations from a US leader is far more than some "lecture."

I don't think we're discussing negotiations here. Negotiations take place between two parties on matters of mutual interest. We're not in a position to tell the Saudis or the Bahrainis that we want to "negotiate" over their domestic policies. They don't have to negotiate with us over those matters, which they do not see as legitimate subjects of interest for us. We cannot compel them to negotiate, or to do as we think they should.

How would we feel if the Chinese told us they wanted to negotiate with us over our domestic economic policies, and impose intrusive conditions on our fiscal policies? Arguably they've a right, as a major creditor, but I doubt we'd take it too kindly.

It's all very well to speak of generic "influence", but using that influence to achieve any specific goal is a bit more complicated. Changing the behavior of people who don't want to change requires specific, immediately applicable carrots and sticks. If we want others to do as we say they should, we have to offer immediate tangible reward or penalty... and what have we go to offer in this case?

As a general rule, making statements we aren't willing to back up with specific action makes us look like ineffectual windbags, and is to be avoided.


But I'm open Spc Dayuhan, you're in charge. What is your plan?

For Bahrain? I don't have a plan. I don't think we need a plan. We'll state that we think the Government should pursue political reform and move toward democracy, but acknowledge that as a sovereign nation they've no obligation to do as we say. This we have, essentially, already done. They will, of course, ignore us. Then we wait and let things sort out as they will. We are not in a position to direct or manage events. We can state that we won't assist the Bahraini government against domestic insurrection, but that's a non-issue because they already know that and they won't ask for our assistance. There's really no need for us to be any more involved than that.

We do not want to be seen preaching sermons to Muslim governments, because people don't pay attention to the substance of what we preach. They just see us preaching our gospel to Muslim governments, and it comes off as intrusive, arrogant and contemptuous behaviour.

I realize that I get pissy and obnoxious and repetitive on the subject, but it's frustrating to see the repeated advocacy of solutions that we haven't the capacity to implement. Good governance is a wonderful and admirable solution. I've no doubt that it would be an effective solution. Unfortunately we cannot govern Bahrain or Afghanistan, Libya or Saudi Arabia, ourselves. Neither can we persuade or compel those who rule to govern the way we think they should. It's a great solution, but it's not a solution we can impose.

In a broad sense, I think we need to recalibrate our foreign policy ends to match our means and our capacities. Too often in the recent past we've pursued goals that we haven't the capacity to achieve, and it hasn't worked out well for us. People who bite off more than they can chew tend to choke: we've a limited chewing capacity at the moment, and we need to choose our bites very carefully.

Pete
03-19-2011, 04:32 AM
Oh well, I was in Bahrain a few times many years ago but I hardly consider myself to be an expert on the place. The thing about learning is realizing how much you don't know.

If folks would let me digress a bit I'd like to introduce an analogy. A British forum about the First World War has an off-topic subforum for members who have a certain number of posts. By and large people in Britain are very well informed about events taking place in the U.S.

However, when the mass-shooting happened at Virginia Tech a few years ago there was a long thread in the off-topic forum about what madmen we are to have the gun laws that let it happen. These are people who speak our language and know a lot about our country, but most of the nuances of the gun control/Second Amendment debate in the U.S. escape them. What I'm talking about are cultural nuances, and if British people can't read them in regard to gun control in America than I doubt Americans can see them in regard to certain issues the Middle East or Central Asia, where the people speak other languages.

My point is that we ought to be careful about lecturing people overseas about how they ought to lead their lives. If American and British people could have such a collision of opinions when we speak the same language and share a common heritage it means we ought to be a bit careful about hectoring foreign countries.

Cannoneer No. 4
03-23-2011, 01:22 AM
Would anybody care to identify what unit(s) of Saudi Arabian National Guard or Royal Saudi Army or KSA Ministry Of Interior or whoever are in Bahrain?

Specifically seeking to confirm or deny presence of SANG Military Police Battalion.

Jedburgh
04-07-2011, 07:10 PM
ICG, 6 Apr 11: The Bahrain Revolt (http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Bahrain/105-%20Popular%20Protests%20in%20North%20Africa%20and% 20the%20Middle%20East%20-III-The%20Bahrain%20Revolt.ashx)

Manama’s crackdown and Saudi Arabia’s military intervention are dangerous moves that could stamp out hopes for peaceful transition in Bahrain and turn a mass movement for democratic reform into an armed conflict, while regionalising an internal political struggle. They could also exacerbate sectarian tensions not only in Bahrain or the Gulf but across the region. Along with other member states of the GCC, Saudi Arabia purportedly is responding to dual fears: that the popular uprising could lead to a Shiite takeover, and a Shiite takeover would be tantamount to an Iranian one. Both are largely unfounded. It also is concerned protests might inspire similar movements among its own Eastern Province Shiites (http://www.mafhoum.com/press8/249S28.pdf), oblivious that its involvement is likelier to provoke than deter them. Bahrain’s brutal crackdown and Saudi interference fan flames both want to extinguish. The most effective response to the radical regime change threat or greater Iranian influence is not violent suppression of peaceful protests but political reform. Time is running short and trends are in the wrong direction....

Pete
04-07-2011, 08:16 PM
Jedburgh, this situation has been latent with the possibility of happening for several decades now. On one of my trips there in the 1990s during a period of Sunni-Shiite strife the Navy contracting office at our Naval base in Bahrain forbade the hiring of Shiites for construction projects at a contingency-use U.S. Air Force base on the southern desert end of the main island.

The facility consisted of runways, temporary buildings, maintenance bays and fuel tanks that remained vacant and unused but were being improved for contingency use later should the need arise. The Air Force had Red Horse teams (combat engineers) there in TDY status improving the facility and they occasionally wanted contracted labor. The woman at the Navy contracting office in Bahrain who ran the contracts for work at the airbase was Japanese-American from San Francisco and was probably the daughter of parents who had been incarcerated during WW II. Thus she felt pretty strange about banning an ethnic/religious category of people.

The concern about having Shiites on the job site was because it was believed that official U.S. support for the Sunni ruling dynasty of Bahrain might motivate blue collar Shiite day laborers on the job site to blame their plight on the U.S. and take some sort of revenge while they were there.

davidbfpo
04-29-2011, 08:07 PM
Has anyone noticed - within or in parallel - with the Saudi Arabian role a Pakistani military involvement?

I am aware that historically some Gulf states have employed large numbers of Baluchi soldiers, notably Oman and a couple of decades ago Pakistan deployed both active duty troops (division equivalent) and enabled others to serve.

Pete
04-29-2011, 08:28 PM
Bahrain has a state security force that recruits heavily in Pakistan.

davidbfpo
04-29-2011, 09:37 PM
Distracted by chores and once again watching a wedding.

A quick search found a large number of references and there is a comment on a Pakistani military blogsite. So as an example only:http://www.news24.pk/detail.php?nid=1642

Which has:
A foundation affiliated to the Pakistani army is recruiting retired military personnel from the Pakistan Army, Navy and the Air Force who will be deployed in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain at exorbitant salaries....Over 1,000 Pakistanis have so far been recruited in March 2011 alone, while 1,500 more would be hired in the next few weeks, reports say.

The Pakistani Newsweek has:
Pakistan already has a presence in Bahrain: a battalion of the Azad Kashmir Regiment was deployed there over a year ago to train local troops, and retired officers from our Navy and Army are part of their security forces. Media estimates put the number of Pakistanis serving in Bahrain’s security establishment at about 10,000. Their removal has been a key demand of protesters in the kingdom.

Link:http://www.newsweekpakistan.com/the-take/287

There are other, shorter suggestions of recent and current recruiting in Balochistan for the army and in Lahore for the national guard.

blueblood
05-01-2011, 05:31 AM
Saudi forces attacked Hazrat Zainab Masjid in Hamad town and set it on fire and burned all holy objects including holy Quran.

The masked men threw Molotov cocktails in to the Masjid and burned it.

http://english.irib.ir/radioislam/news/islam-in-asia/item/77978-two-more-mosques-desecrated-destroyed-in-bahrain-by-saudi-forces

http://babulilmlibrary.com/news/anti-mosque-destroyer-sentiments-rising-in-bahrain-saudi-forces-burns-holy-quran-in-the-mosque

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ACKskuYUqt4&feature=player_embedded

davidbfpo
08-03-2011, 11:33 AM
Bahrain continues to "bubble" along and catching up my reading of the RUSI website I found this review of the Pakistani role:http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/07/2011725145048574888.html

Nothing startling.

Rex Brynen
08-06-2011, 01:44 PM
al-Jazeera English has broadcast an outstanding documentary (http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/2011/08/201184144547798162.html) on the ongoing repression in Bahrain:



Bahrain: Shouting in the dark
The story of the Arab revolution that was abandoned by the Arabs, forsaken by the West and forgotten by the world.

Bahrain: An island kingdom in the Arabian Gulf where the Shia Muslim majority are ruled by a family from the Sunni minority. Where people fighting for democratic rights broke the barriers of fear, only to find themselves alone and crushed.

This is their story and Al Jazeera is their witness - the only TV journalists who remained to follow their journey of hope to the carnage that followed.

This is the Arab revolution that was abandoned by the Arabs, forsaken by the West and forgotten by the world.

AJ Arabic has rather downplayed Bahrain since GCC intervention there, so the broadcast of this on AJE is quite interesting.

Bob's World
08-06-2011, 02:15 PM
Bahrain is a sneeze for the US; Saudi Arabia is the flu.

We ignore the sneeze to our peril.

But this is a great case study of the tremendous dilemma for the US in the greater Middle East. We have acted "consistently" across the region, in that we consistently act or don't act in places and manners hat we think will best serve our interests. That is fine to a degree, but becomes problematic when it takes a nation too far afield from their stated principles. This is doubly true for a nation so arrogantly verbose about the superiority of its principles to those of others, such as the US is. This is even more true when those principles include in a prominent manner the recognition of the right and duties of people everywhere to rise up in insurgency to form a government of their choosing when THEY believe the current government to be too out of touch with the people and un-reformable through legal means.

During the Cold War the US intentionally compromised some of our principles in order to create an effective scheme of Containment to thwart Soviet, and later Chinese, expansion of influence.

Some 22 years ago we did not see the end of the Cold War; no, we saw the collapse of the Soviet system of controls and externally focused national governments over the populaces of the states surrounding them as people, empowered by an emerging information age took advantages of conditions shaped by Western pressures and problems internal to Russia. That was the first boot hitting the floor.

Now in Arab Spring we finally hear the second boot hit. Finally the populaces of the greater Middle East, also empowered by far more sophisticated information technology are rising up to challenge the system set in place to contain the Soviets. Granted, US controls were far different than Soviet Controls; and Middle Eastern Despots are far more independent to act than their Eastern European counterparts.

Every conflict has two sides, we over focus on the other side. We were much quicker to roll back Cold War Containment measures in Europe and even Asia; but largely let it ride in the Middle East. The people there had no voice at that time, and the governments in power were happy to stay in power, so there was no change. Now the people have a voice, and change is happening.

The US needs to look at Arab Spring as a whole and understand it for what it is. If we do this right we will empower a new era of legitimacy of government and freedom of people across this region that will do far more to disempower AQ and similar organizations than any of the military operations of the past 10 years.

Too bad we're so internally focused on nonsensical political posturing over who will occupy the White House after the next election, all in the guise of fixing the economy. Our civilian leadership is earning an "F" on all counts. At home and abroad.

Dayuhan
08-07-2011, 12:49 AM
Bahrain is a sneeze for the US; Saudi Arabia is the flu.

I'd say the lesson we need to take away from Bahrain is not that we need to roll back our control, but that we haven't really got any control to roll back. When disorder broke out in Bahrain, the US came out with statements recommending dialogue, reform, and reconciliation. The Bahrainis, with Saudi assistance, completely ignored us. We did nothing about it, because realistically there was nothing we could do.

Change will happen in Saudi Arabia, but it will happen in its own time and way, not because of anything we do.

Anyone expecting the Arab Spring to usher in a golden age of freedom and democracy is being wildly optimistic. It might be a step along that road, but there's a long rough road ahead and the early stages are probably not going leave the neighbors eager to follow the same route.

As always in these discussions, I come away wondering what you want us to actually do. While I'm well aware of the negative perceptions that the US has incurred thorough past meddling, I really don't think we're going to change those perceptions by meddling more. I also don't think we're going to change those perceptions by making statements of any kind... and making statements that we aren't prepared or able to back up with action only underscores our own ineffectuality.

The perceptions are what they are. Nothing we do or say will change them overnight or in the immediate future. If we mind our own business and stop meddling in anything that does not directly and gravely threaten us, those perceptions will eventually - as in a few decades - change.

Supporting or protecting locally initiated attempts at change that enjoy clear popular support is fine with me, as long as we don't try to take over leadership or step in with regime change. Trying to initiate, direct, or control political change in other countries.... bad, bad idea, IMO.

Bob's World
08-07-2011, 01:35 AM
Ahh. So wait a few decades absorbing terrorist attacks from nationalist insurgents who believe that they must break US support to the regimes they are up against first before they can succeed at home?

Wait a few decades, when we our teetering economy is so dependent on stable flow of oil from the Gulf states, for massive internal disorder to erupt at any moment that may well destroy the infrastructure that keeps the oil flowing?

We can do a great deal and I have laid it out dozens of times, only to have you say "no, I disagree, the US is like distilled water in the Middle East, we have no influence there and did nothing to shape the current conditions." You need to get some oxygen brother.

We have options. We can do nothing . Bad Choice. We can over engage as we have been throughout the past 10 years. Worse Choice. Or, we can recognize what is going on and attempt to take a role to facilitate evolution of government on terms worked out between these populaces and their governments in an effort to avoid (and yes, they are avoidable)the revolutions that will continue to ripple across the region otherwise.

Rex Brynen
08-07-2011, 01:40 AM
Or, we can recognize what is going on and attempt to take a role to facilitate evolution of government on terms worked out between these populaces and their governments in an effort to avoid (and yes, they are avoidable)the revolutions that will continue to ripple across the region otherwise.

In the Bahraini and Saudi cases, what exactly would that entail?

Bob's World
08-07-2011, 02:32 AM
Small changes in certain factors have tremendous impact.

1. Putting greater justice into the rule of law

2. Dignity/respect: addressing any formal or traditional forms of discrimination supported by the government.

3. Legitimacy: Appreciating to what degree the populace percieve that the governmetn draws its legitmacy from sources that they recognize, and if not, taking actions to repair those perceptions

4. Creating legal venues for popular input and control of governance.

This is fundamental. All the US need do is recognize that these factors are far more important than silly metrics of effectiveness that we love, and to use our considerable influence to bring these governments and their people to the table, rather than the square, to discuss these issues and to work out reasonable evolutions that make sense within their cultural context, to move incrementally toward a more sustainable future.

Dayuhan
08-07-2011, 04:57 AM
Ahh. So wait a few decades absorbing terrorist attacks from nationalist insurgents who believe that they must break US support to the regimes they are up against first before they can succeed at home?

Who said we were attacked by "nationalist insurgents who believe that they must break US support to the regimes they are up against first before they can succeed at home"? That seems a highly speculative assumption at best.


We can do a great deal and I have laid it out dozens of times, only to have you say "no, I disagree, the US is like distilled water in the Middle East, we have no influence there and did nothing to shape the current conditions." You need to get some oxygen brother.

What I see laid out always seems to come down to issuing statements that we're not in a position to back up with any meaningful action. As I said before, I don't see that words unsupported by action are going to do anything but underscore our lack of influence. How much attention did the Bahrainis and Saudis pay to American statements urging dialogue, restraint, and reform in Bahrain? Nothing we say is going to make any difference, and it certainly isn't going to change anyone's perceptions. Action might, but what action do you propose to take?

I didn't say that we "did nothing to shape current conditions". We did a good deal. A lot less than some would suggest, but still a good deal. That doesn't mean that we can correct the impact of yesterday's meddling by counter-meddling today. If meddling makes a mess, we don't need better meddling, we need to stop meddling.

The perception of the US as self-interested meddler is deeply entrenched and nothing we say or do will change it quickly. If we stop meddling and mind our own business, that perception will - give it some decades - eventually change. More meddling will only make it worse.


Small changes in certain factors have tremendous impact.

1. Putting greater justice into the rule of law

2. Dignity/respect: addressing any formal or traditional forms of discrimination supported by the government.

3. Legitimacy: Appreciating to what degree the populace percieve that the governmetn draws its legitmacy from sources that they recognize, and if not, taking actions to repair those perceptions

4. Creating legal venues for popular input and control of governance.


All these things would have impact, but they aren't things that Americians can do in another country.


All the US need do is recognize that these factors are far more important than silly metrics of effectiveness that we love, and to use our considerable influence to bring these governments and their people to the table, rather than the square, to discuss these issues and to work out reasonable evolutions that make sense within their cultural context, to move incrementally toward a more sustainable future.

How exactly do you propose to do that? What exact form of "considerable influence" will you bring to bear? Perhaps more important, what on earth makes you think that anyone in Saudi Arabia wants the United States to impose itself as an uninvited mediator in Saudi Arabia's internal politics? Do you really think an uninvited attempt to impose American influence on Saudi governance is going to disempower AQ? I'd guess the opposite. Foreign meddling is what they thrive on, and no matter how many times we say we're acting for the good of the populace, I don't bet you'd find one single Saudi who would believe it. I doubt you'd find more than a handful of Americans who would believe it.

Rex asked a very legitimate question: "what exactly would that entail"? I second it... with emphasis on "exactly". Imagine you're President. What exactly and specifically do you propose to do?

Bob's World
08-07-2011, 12:45 PM
Who said we were attacked by "nationalist insurgents who believe that they must break US support to the regimes they are up against first before they can succeed at home"? That seems a highly speculative assumption at best.



What I see laid out always seems to come down to issuing statements that we're not in a position to back up with any meaningful action. As I said before, I don't see that words unsupported by action are going to do anything but underscore our lack of influence. How much attention did the Bahrainis and Saudis pay to American statements urging dialog, restraint, and reform in Bahrain? Nothing we say is going to make any difference, and it certainly isn't going to change anyone's perceptions. Action might, but what action do you propose to take?

I didn't say that we "did nothing to shape current conditions". We did a good deal. A lot less than some would suggest, but still a good deal. That doesn't mean that we can correct the impact of yesterday's meddling by counter-meddling today. If meddling makes a mess, we don't need better meddling, we need to stop meddling.

The perception of the US as self-interested meddler is deeply entrenched and nothing we say or do will change it quickly. If we stop meddling and mind our own business, that perception will - give it some decades - eventually change. More meddling will only make it worse.



All these things would have impact, but they aren't things that Americans can do in another country.



How exactly do you propose to do that? What exact form of "considerable influence" will you bring to bear? Perhaps more important, what on earth makes you think that anyone in Saudi Arabia wants the United States to impose itself as an uninvited mediator in Saudi Arabia's internal politics? Do you really think an uninvited attempt to impose American influence on Saudi governance is going to disempower AQ? I'd guess the opposite. Foreign meddling is what they thrive on, and no matter how many times we say we're acting for the good of the populace, I don't bet you'd find one single Saudi who would believe it. I doubt you'd find more than a handful of Americans who would believe it.

Rex asked a very legitimate question: "what exactly would that entail"? I second it... with emphasis on "exactly". Imagine you're President. What exactly and specifically do you propose to do?

You are so trapped in your paradigm.

The "exactlys" must be tailored to each specific situation, but before I play President for you, to answer a couple other questions you pose:

Who says we were attacked by nationalist insurgents who believe they must break the support of the US to the regimes of the region before they can achieve success at home? I do. This is political and rooted in a dozen diverse national situations; not just evil or ideological. AQ has no populace and no land. They must always borrow other's. We overly focus on their sales pitch to do so, rather than on their organization's true political purpose, and that of those who opt to work with them directly or merely accept their support.

I make this based upon my training and experience, my understanding of the region and insurgency, my analysis of positions that focus on Ideology, terrorism, caliphates, etc, etc and find all to be seriously wanting in logical basis. You don't have to agree with me. You are convinced of your position, I post these things for others who still retain open minds and also see the flaws of much that is out there but can't quite put their finger on what's wrong about them. Sure, they always have to climb over the "no you are wrong" fences you feel compelled to build around my every post, but in so doing they see how you always conveniently ignore the qualifying terms I use to recast my posts in absolutist terms that better fit the arguments you post on your perspective.

Second, I never say that American leadership needs to sit back and lecture these leaders publicly, nor that we need to make these changes ourselves. This is not a time for speeches or direct interventions to shape things to what we thing the specific solution should be. This is a time for tough love behind the scenes. These despots suffer from the same problem the US does. They are still in denial as to their role in the problems they face.

We need to accept our role, they need to accept their role, and then it needs to be "how do we work together to fix this," demanding major changes on the parts of all the parties. There will need to be public messages on these changes, and also clear changes in actions that coincide with our messages. Maybe all we can do is get these guys to the mediation table and guarantee protections for those who have the moral and physical courage to participate in such talks. This means guarantees to leaders emerging from the populace (regardless of what group or ideology they may be associated with) and also for the governmental leaders, be they friend or foe. (We are making a HUGE mistake in not making a major effort to gain a pardon and respectable retirement for Mubarak; and the same needs to be clearly there for Qadaffi and others as well regardless of our past histories).

As to my Presidential guidance? Let me think about that a bit.

Rex Brynen
08-07-2011, 04:47 PM
Small changes in certain factors have tremendous impact.

1. Putting greater justice into the rule of law

2. Dignity/respect: addressing any formal or traditional forms of discrimination supported by the government.

3. Legitimacy: Appreciating to what degree the populace percieve that the governmetn draws its legitmacy from sources that they recognize, and if not, taking actions to repair those perceptions

4. Creating legal venues for popular input and control of governance.

This is fundamental. All the US need do is recognize that these factors are far more important than silly metrics of effectiveness that we love, and to use our considerable influence to bring these governments and their people to the table, rather than the square, to discuss these issues and to work out reasonable evolutions that make sense within their cultural context, to move incrementally toward a more sustainable future.

And what if the Bahraini royal family doesn't care about that "considerable influence" -- or, for that matter, doesn't even view the US as having much influence?

The US has only limited economic leverage over Bahrain, short of full-scale sanctions. It won't use military force. Bahrain can always ask the 5th fleet to move.

What would be an actual US action that might push the King into taking steps that he, quite rightly, would regard as antithetical to his core political interests (indeed, as an existential threat)?

I'm all in favour of pushing Bahrain hard on human rights issues, but working out how to do so isn't that simple.

Bob's World
08-07-2011, 07:48 PM
And what if the Bahraini royal family doesn't care about that "considerable influence" -- or, for that matter, doesn't even view the US as having much influence?

The US has only limited economic leverage over Bahrain, short of full-scale sanctions. It won't use military force. Bahrain can always ask the 5th fleet to move.

What would be an actual US action that might push the King into taking steps that he, quite rightly, would regard as antithetical to his core political interests (indeed, as an existential threat)?

I'm all in favor of pushing Bahrain hard on human rights issues, but working out how to do so isn't that simple.

The "what if" is that the populace sees that we are not blindly supporting this continued oppression by their government. They have an ally in the US, and not just AQ or (likely Iran or some Shiite rooted NSA in Bahrain's case). Even if we are seen as a neutral it improves our position in the region and reduces the risk of terrorist attacks against the US and our citizens. Will the government reform? Or more importantly make the right type of reforms that history shows have the greatest effect in reducing the conditions of insurgency in a populace? Who knows.

At the end of the day, it's not our job to fix this government or any other. But it is our job to not take positions that increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks on Americans. So long as we blame the current unrest on ideology, or radicalized people, or the difference between Islam and Christianity, etc we will continue to reinforce the very status quo that creates the problems we agonize over.

If we label these nationalist insurgents "terrorists" because they accept assistance from some organization we have placed on a terrorist list and wage CT against them; we make the problem worse.

If we merely call them insurgents, and commit resources to build the security force capacity of the government of Bahrain to employ in the suppression of the same; we make the problem worse.

Those are the two biggest "cures" we are bringing to this problem here and elsewhere, and it is guided by a very flawed understanding of the problem and flogs at the symptoms in ways that make the problem worse.

So too if we pour in massive Development that goes to projects that totally miss the mark of the major drivers of insurgency; or if they are weighted to bring benefits to that element of the populace already favored by the government, thereby exacerbating the disparity of service to the segment of the populace the insurgency rises from; we make the problem worse.

We employ COIN tactics derived from TTPs for sustaining colonial governments or conducting containment. That is not COIN.

We apply an understanding of insurgency that casts it as warfare, and that too misses the true essence of such internal discontent.

We can do better, but first we must look at the problems differently than we currently do. In the general nature of insurgency, and in the post Cold War re-balancing of Arab Spring; and in the way AQ is political and leverages this widespread political discontent to fuel their cause; and in the unique aspects of each of these separate cases.

Rex Brynen
08-08-2011, 01:41 AM
The "what if" is that the populace sees that we are not blindly supporting this continued oppression by their government. They have an ally in the US, and not just AQ or (likely Iran or some Shiite rooted NSA in Bahrain's case).

What, however, would the US actually do? Verbal condemnation? Economic sanctions (if so, how severe)? What else?

If the US verbally calls for reform (which it has already done)but does nothing (ditto), it can often be read in the region as the US failing to put its (oil) money where its mouth is. So what would you do, above and beyond what the Obama Administration has already done?

Dayuhan
08-08-2011, 02:46 AM
This sort of summarizes what I find so frustrating in this recurring dialogue...


Who says we were attacked by nationalist insurgents who believe they must break the support of the US to the regimes of the region before they can achieve success at home? I do. This is political and rooted in a dozen diverse national situations; not just evil or ideological. AQ has no populace and no land. They must always borrow other's. We overly focus on their sales pitch to do so, rather than on their organization's true political purpose, and that of those who opt to work with them directly or merely accept their support.

I know you say that. What I haven't yet seen is evidence supporting that contention, or the contention that foreign fighters travel to Iraq or Afghanistan to break US support for regimes in their own countries.

AQ has certainly tried to ride on the resentment of various populaces toward their governments. It has generally failed: where has AQ ever managed to translate resentment to actual insurgency (they aren't the same thing), or generated anything close to a critical mass of popular support for an effort to overthrow an Arab government? The narrative that has worked for them is "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful".

By the mid-90s, despite conditions that were extremely favorable to them in Saudi Arabia (oil glut, economic crisis, US troop presence), AQ's efforts in Saudi Arabia had utterly failed, and the organization was reduced to a very marginal level. They needed a foreign antagonist, and above all they needed foreign intervention in a Muslim country... hence jihad against the US.

Is there any systematic study of foreign fighter motivations that points to a desire to break US support for home-country government as a primary cause? The studies I've seen don't come to that conclusion.

You posted this to Rex:


The "what if" is that the populace sees that we are not blindly supporting this continued oppression by their government. They have an ally in the US, and not just AQ or (likely Iran or some Shiite rooted NSA in Bahrain's case).

In order for any populace to see something, we have to do something. Not say, do: hearing and seeing are different things and nobody believes the words anyway. Like Rex, I'm wondering what you want us to do that will make anyone see anything? What course of action are you prescribing here?

Where exactly has a populace decided that it has an ally in AQ? Seems to me that it's AQ turning to Arab populaces for support, not the other way around. As long as AQ is fighting foreign occupation of Muslim lands, they get support from Arab populaces.

I'd also have to point out that it's generally quite impossible for us to be an ally of "the populace", because like all populaces, they are far from monolithic. Different factions of these populaces have very different complaints and seek very different solutions. If we become an ally of one faction (generally one that tells us what we want to hear), we're likely to generate fury from other factions... and as we know, a furious faction of a populace doesn't have to be anything like a majority to cause us all kinds of grief.

In Saudi Arabia I expect you'd find that about the only thing virtually all factions of the populace agree on is that they do NOT want the US meddling in Saudi internal politics.


I never say that American leadership needs to sit back and lecture these leaders publicly, nor that we need to make these changes ourselves. This is not a time for speeches or direct interventions to shape things to what we thing the specific solution should be. This is a time for tough love behind the scenes.

Now I'm confused. You told Rex that the populace has to see that we are on their side. Here you're saying that we should work behind closed doors so that the populace will NOT see us meddling in their country's domestic affairs? Is that not a contradiction? It looks like one.

How exactly is "tough love" our role here? We're not their parents. If we offer tough love and they tell us to %$#@ off, or if they listen, nod gravely, thank us for our advice, and continue as before, what do you propose to do about it?


We need to accept our role, they need to accept their role, and then it needs to be "how do we work together to fix this," demanding major changes on the parts of all the parties.

Who defines "our role"? It sounds like you want us to define it. It also sounds like you propose to tell the leaders of other countries that we have decided that they have to work with us to resolve what we perceive as their internal problems... and that we are demanding "major changes" on their part. Don't you think that's going to come across as more than a bit arrogant and more than a bit patronizing? What foreign leader anywhere, unless they are completely dependent on us, is going to talk to us on those terms? And again, when they tell us to %$#@ off, or if they listen, nod gravely, thank us for our advice, and continue as before, what do you propose to do about it?

I don't see how we're going to help matters by swaggering in, behind the scenes or otherwise (and it wouldn't stay behind the scenes for long), and declaring "we've decided that you have a problem and you have to work with us to fix it, and we demand major changes in your domestic policies". I can't imagine any head of state, anywhere, accepting that kind of dictation.

I don't want to sound excessively harsh here, but I feel like I'm seeing conclusions based on scant evidence and prescriptions that range from contradictory to impractical... I just don't see it as practical for the US to demand that other countries work with us to implement changes that we think they should make to domestic policy. I also feel that you're assuming far more influence than we actually have... and basing actions on influence that is presumed but not demonstrated seems a fairly uncertain course. On what basis does this presumed influence rest? Carrots? Sticks? if not, what?

Like Rex, I remain more than a bit curious about what you actually propose to do when words prove ineffective... as they have in Bahrain.

Ken White
08-08-2011, 03:40 AM
I was told that most people could identify problems with about 90% assurance and about 80% of those would broadly agree on the pertinent issues and they would be generally correct. I was told not to waste much time on that front end because the assessment of what was wrong was relatively easy and generally straightforward. It was also said that excessive effort on the front end often led to much second guessing and revisions of the generally more accurate first impressions.

Instead I was to search for solutions to the identified problem(s), solutions that should not be based on ideal circumstances but that could be applied in the messy real world; they should invariably be based on worst case possibilities. Never on desirabilities, not on 'probabilities,' rather only on the most adverse potentialities. I was given several examples of actual problems and attempted solutions and was shown how those solutions rarely worked because they were based on flawed perceptions by decision makers and the fact that people invariably and messily intruded -- mostly by not doing what everyone thought they would or should do. That and rejection of potential worst case scenarios...

"Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose..." :D

I've been watching the US in the world for a long time. We get things right often but we err equally often -- and most errors are due to the wrong person being in the wrong place at the time a decision was needed. Luck of the draw in a democracy.

We are tolerated due to our wealth and the fact that most Americans, gauche as we are, are pretty decent and it is not them but the US government that has proven it is not too reliable in anything less than a MAJOR crisis. That is due not to evil intent but to a form of government that is not conducive to coherence -- by design.

The guy who taught me that initial bit above also emphasized that a 75% solution today was almost always better than a 95% solution tomorrow -- he noted that only rarely since TR and Elihu Root et.al. introduced excessive bureaucracy has the US been capable of the rapidity of action to do that...

I wouldn't change that. I would attempt -- have long attempted -- to embed knowledge or awareness of those traits in the minds of those who would affect US foreign policy. Those domestic pluses and international shortfalls have led to far more failures of the US on the international stage than any other single thing IMO.

Folks should also recall that we bribe a lot. We do that reasonably well. So did the Byzantines. As did the Mongols. Difference between those two and us other than the eras and mores of the day is twofold. The amount of political toughness available should bribes fail (as they often do...) and the concentration of power to act as opposed to our deliberate diffusion of it to deter action. We have problems in both areas. Still, we've bribed well and bullied and bluffed rather poorly for years.

Influence others? Very rarely.

Never reliably...

Bob's World
08-08-2011, 04:22 PM
Dayuhan,

Organizations that conduct Unconventional Warfare as a major tactical approach (Russian and the US in the Cold War; AQ today) do not create insurgencies. No amount of ideology or effort will create an insurgency where the conditions for such popular revolt do not already exist. In effect, a populace must first be radicalized by their own government before some external party can come along and move them to insurgency. (Or as I often express, "the Pied Piper is a fairy tale).

So when you ask questions such as "Where has AQ caused an insurgency" you demonstrate what I believe to be a flawed understanding of the fundamentals of insurgency and UW. The better question is "where has AQ effectively leveraged nationalist insurgencies and insurgent individuals to act in ways that advances AQ's ends?"

As to the term "actual insurgency" I assume based on your many posts that you do not recognize insurgency in a populace until such time that it takes a particular form or engages in particular activities. The horse is long out of the barn and civilian government failure is nearly complete by that point. That is the classic reactive "counter-insurgency. This is the majority view, and I believe it to be a dangerously short-sighted one.

We see counterinsurgency in the west as a governmental response to popular insurgency.

Far more helpful to see insurgency as a response to governmental failures along a few critical high order humanistic psychology lines of operation.

I realize this is a "chicken or the egg" type analysis; but as one who grew up in the country, I assure you, that it is far easier to gather eggs than it is to catch chickens.

By changing our perspective and becoming more proactive, with an emphasis on the actions of civil governance to prevent the growth of the conditions that give rise to insurgency over the actions of militaries to come in after the fact of such failure and attempt to restore stability, one is able to get in front of the problem.

Most stable countries are stable because they in effect "gather eggs" day in and day out. They don't think of it as COIN, they just see it has how governments must work in the service of the populace. In countries that are unstable this is generally not the case.

Pete
08-08-2011, 04:37 PM
During 1994 to 1996 I worked as a contractor managing the U.S. Army medical war reserve supplies stored in a leased warehouse adjacent to the U.S. Navy base in Juffair, Bahrain. I made four trips there, two of them when tensions were high and there was a slight possibility of getting hurt.

I went out of my way to learn all I could about the country -- from tourism brochures, newspapers, and about a dozen books from the library. Based upon my research the recent sectarian conflict there does not surprise me at all and the places where the violent confrontations have taken place are familiar to me. They are places where I've been.

My rant is that nobody in the office, either in U.S. Govt or in my company, thought my research on the country was the least bit interesting or worthwhile. To them a medical supply job was a medical supply job, be it at Ice Station Zebra, Antarctica, Landstuhl, Germany, Camp Zama, Japan, or Columbus, Georgia. It's all antiseptic, just doing a narrowly technical job.

That went against all my instincts -- a good combat arms leader recons his area and learns what he can about the lay of the land. SF and Intel folks try to learn all they can about the Area of Operations.

During the Balkan peacekeeping mission I read that the DoD contractor Brown & Root forbade its employees from even speaking to local nationals.

I want the U.S. to be sucessful overseas but with narrow-minded and insular attitudes and policies like that we deserve to lose.

Dayuhan
08-09-2011, 11:02 PM
Organizations that conduct Unconventional Warfare as a major tactical approach (Russian and the US in the Cold War; AQ today) do not create insurgencies. No amount of ideology or effort will create an insurgency where the conditions for such popular revolt do not already exist. In effect, a populace must first be radicalized by their own government before some external party can come along and move them to insurgency. (Or as I often express, "the Pied Piper is a fairy tale).

So when you ask questions such as "Where has AQ caused an insurgency" you demonstrate what I believe to be a flawed understanding of the fundamentals of insurgency and UW. The better question is "where has AQ effectively leveraged nationalist insurgencies and insurgent individuals to act in ways that advances AQ's ends?"

Where has AQ succeeded in transforming "the conditions for popular revolt" into actual insurgency?

The point I think you're not addressing is that AQ's UW campaign in Saudi Arabia in the 90s was an absolute failure, despite very conducive conditions: oil glut, economic crisis, high unemployment, large American military presence. Certainly there was discontent, but AQ never managed to rally anything like a critical mass of the populace behind the attempt to convert that discontent to actual insurgency. That might be because the discontent was not as pervasive as an American would think it should have been, or it may be because the Saudi populace, despite discontent, did not see AQ as a viable or desirable vehicle for expressing that discontent... or likely a bit of both. The observed fact remains that while AQ draws very substantial support from the Saudi populace when they attack the US or fight to drive perceived foreign aggressors out of Muslim countries, their attempts to rally the Saudi populace against their leaders have drawn a very tepid and very limited response. I don't think your conclusions are accounting for that observed reality.


As to the term "actual insurgency" I assume based on your many posts that you do not recognize insurgency in a populace until such time that it takes a particular form or engages in particular activities. The horse is long out of the barn and civilian government failure is nearly complete by that point. That is the classic reactive "counter-insurgency. This is the majority view, and I believe it to be a dangerously short-sighted one.

I realize that you have your own definition of "insurgency", and that it complicates dialogue: it's hard to discuss something when people are applying different definitions for the basic terminology.

I don't think popular discontent is insurgency. It may be a precondition for insurgency, it may be a warning sign of insurgency, but it doesn't become insurgency until it's expressed in sustained, organized action.

Poor sanitation is a precondition for a cholera outbreak and a warning sign of a possible cholera outbreak, but poor sanitation is not a cholera outbreak. The cause and the effect are different things and have different names.


I realize this is a "chicken or the egg" type analysis; but as one who grew up in the country, I assure you, that it is far easier to gather eggs than it is to catch chickens.

By changing our perspective and becoming more proactive, with an emphasis on the actions of civil governance to prevent the growth of the conditions that give rise to insurgency over the actions of militaries to come in after the fact of such failure and attempt to restore stability, one is able to get in front of the problem.

Most stable countries are stable because they in effect "gather eggs" day in and day out. They don't think of it as COIN, they just see it has how governments must work in the service of the populace. In countries that are unstable this is generally not the case.

Of course it's easier to deal with the cause before the effect manifests itself, and it's better to prevent insurgency than to try to correct it. I don't see anyone disputing that. The question is how the US can proactively persuade or compel other governments to to take the actions we think they need to take to prevent insurgency or alleviate the conditions supporting insurgency in their countries, especially where we have limited leverage and influence. Even assuming that we are accurately reading the internal political dynamics of other countries (and there is a very lively possibility that we are not reading those dynamics accurately at all), there are real questions about whether we have the capacity or the right to impose ourselves as the arbiter of internal policy in another country.

Which brings us back to the original question... what exactly do you propose to do to persuade or compel the Saudis or Bahrainis to accept our dictation on matters of domestic policy?

Ken White
08-09-2011, 11:38 PM
You don't never chase a Chicken, ya lure 'em with somethin' they like... :D

ganulv
08-10-2011, 12:09 AM
My rant is that nobody in the office, either in U.S. Govt or in my company, thought my research on the country was the least bit interesting or worthwhile. To them a medical supply job was a medical supply job, be it at Ice Station Zebra, Antarctica, Landstuhl, Germany, Camp Zama, Japan, or Columbus, Georgia. It's all antiseptic, just doing a narrowly technical job.

I have heard a variation on that from a number of friends who have had a Fulbright to do anthropological field work. They make a trip to the capital to make sort of transaction at the Embassy and while there end up having lunch with a State Department lifer whose (lack of) knowledge of the country as a whole suggests he or she doesn’t leave the immediate area of the Embassy except to go to the airport. I assume that interacting with local elites takes up the greater part of their time, but it still just seems ridiculous to me to not make some effort to know a bit more about the country you’re going to call home for years at a time.

Bob's World
08-10-2011, 11:23 AM
Dayuhan,

While I am one who is firmly in the camp that "insurgency has not changed"; I am also firmly in the camp that "we have shaped our understanding to date through a lens heavily clouded by hundreds of years of Western Colonial interventions and decades of Cold War Containment interventions."

So, yes, I am spending a lot of time thinking about insurgency itself, the effects of modern information technologies and recent (since WWII) external manipulations of governance in the regions where insurgency seems most problematic today, and a wide range of other factors that attempt to remove it from the military/warfare context that most historic writings are cast in, and find some clearer understanding.

It's a journey, and like most journeys the obstacles and challenges one encounters along the way tend to lead to discoveries one would have likely missed other wise. That is why I share so much of my journey here where it is open to input and scrutiny from a wide range of perspectives. Some emotional, some fixed in doctrine, some very open an insightful; and all helpful in some degree.

In the model I produced (and continue to play with and evolve) there are essentially 4 quadrants, with the upper right quadrant essentially being the classic, warfare-based, Maoist described manifestation of insurgency. I have not changed anything about that, all I have done is opened the aperture to look at what is happening in the other three quadrants below and to the left, to explore where insurgency comes from, and where it might go if resolved or merely suppressed; and what it might look like if tactical choices opt for non-violent responses rather than violent ones, etc.

The idea is to look at insurgency as a condition that ebbs and flows within every populace-governance dynamic, with most happily hovering down in that lower left quadrant of "peace" or "stability." The primary benefit of such a perspective IMO is that it places the onus for stability on government. Civilian government. It allows a better appreciation that the best "COIN" is in fact preventative, not warfare at all, but simply government approaching its duty in a manner that is sensitive to popular perception along a few critical lines that match closely with the higher order human needs identified in the field of humanistic psychology that Maslow made famous.

As I said its a journey. But you ask fair questions. What indeed does a country like the US do if in some region where we deem ourselves to have vital national interests at stake we see a government failing in its duties to its populace, we see a populace frustrated in its lack of control over government through legal means, slipping toward what may well become the type of violent, warfare-like interaction that occurs in that upper quadrant? How to do so in a manner that avoids pasting a big target ourselves as promoters of insurgency or despotism either one?? Difficult stuff.

But it begins by looking at the problem through a fresh lens.

Bob

Dayuhan
08-11-2011, 08:12 AM
So, yes, I am spending a lot of time thinking about insurgency itself, the effects of modern information technologies and recent (since WWII) external manipulations of governance in the regions where insurgency seems most problematic today, and a wide range of other factors that attempt to remove it from the military/warfare context that most historic writings are cast in, and find some clearer understanding...

In the model I produced (and continue to play with and evolve) there are essentially 4 quadrants, with the upper right quadrant essentially being the classic, warfare-based, Maoist described manifestation of insurgency. I have not changed anything about that, all I have done is opened the aperture to look at what is happening in the other three quadrants below and to the left, to explore where insurgency comes from, and where it might go if resolved or merely suppressed; and what it might look like if tactical choices opt for non-violent responses rather than violent ones, etc.

I realize that, and I think there are virtues to the model... though I'm not convinced that all cases of insurgency fall within the model, and I think we have to be very careful about assuming that our definitions or assumptions about what makes governance good or bad are universal. A model can be a useful tool, but if we get to devoted to it we can fail to see that which falls outside it.


What indeed does a country like the US do if in some region where we deem ourselves to have vital national interests at stake we see a government failing in its duties to its populace, we see a populace frustrated in its lack of control over government through legal means, slipping toward what may well become the type of violent, warfare-like interaction that occurs in that upper quadrant? How to do so in a manner that avoids pasting a big target ourselves as promoters of insurgency or despotism either one?? Difficult stuff.

Difficult indeed. For me the default assumption about meddling in another country's internal affairs should be "don't". If we're going to move away from that default we need to be very, very sure of what we're doing and why, and to review out assumptions very carefully indeed.

I've mentioned this before, but the frequency with which terms like "the populace", "a populace", "it's populace", all treating "populace" as a singular noun, is disturbing to me. We have to be aware at all times that populaces are anything but singular, and that they have deeply divergent assessments of what's wrong with a country, what needs to be done to fix it, and to what degree - if any - foreign participation is acceptable in the process. Actions taken in support of one segment of a populace - or of an agenda that we assume is that of "the populace" - may deeply alienate and even enrage parts of that same populace. Any time we catch ourselves thinking we are supporting or acting on behalf of "the populace" we need to slam on the brakes and reassess, because we are likely deceiving ourselves (something we're good at).

It also seems to me - and I may be wrong here - that you are very confident that Americans have the ability to accurately diagnose the internal ailments of other nations and to prescribe effective remedies. I confess that I do not share this confidence. Even in the unlikely event that we can persuade or compel another country to do what we think they should, I think there's a very good chance, in most cases, that we may not make things better and could make them worse.

Bob's World
08-11-2011, 11:04 AM
I watch our government with no confidence. However, I have tremendous confidence in our constitution, and what it was designed to do: create trust trust within and between diverse segments of a complex populace necessary to allow them to work and grow together as a nation; and to prevent government from ever becoming so efficient as to someday grow to where it might seek to exercise inappropriate degrees of control over that same complex populace, or any segment of it.

We are fortunate, and when I watch the fiasco of recent monetary debates between our national "leaders" I can at least take solace that such inept buffoonery is a clear metric that the Constitution is still performing its primary function.

But, like all nations, the US has interests. Some are indeed vital, and where we have to power (not just military, but economic, influential, etc) to act to guard those interests we should have both the moral and physical courage to act, and the wisdom to act in a manner best designed to produce the best effects for us in a manner with the least possible negative effects onto others.

We enter a new era though. Historically while some have always held in high regard considerations as to the impact on the people, the fact was that even if the people were ruthlessly screwed over there was not much they could do about it. Locally, sure, but not across vast oceans to take their grievances to our heartland. As we all know, today that is no longer the case. The old playbook is obsolete, yet we still use it all the same.

In cases like Bahrain there is great opportunity, as well as great risk, but first we must assess if indeed vital interests exist there, and then we must have a new playbook to operate from.

In recent days new national strategies for dealing with both violent extremism and transnational crime have hit the airwaves. Both, sadly, are still based on the old playbook. Words like "hope and change" are easy to say, and easy to hear; but they prove perhaps to be the most "wicked problem" of all to actually implement.

"How" belongs to the executor. That is tactical and there are many ways up any mountain. What I offer attempts to provide some strategic insights for the leadership who may have to make those tactical choices or provide guidance to those who will craft or implement efforts to address such problems.

Until the massive investment our President made with the bail out funds in the development of new sciences and new effective energy come on line (oh, wait, that's right, he didn't invest that money in the future as promised, but instead applied it to double down on failing flagships of the past, such as GM and the efforts in Afghanistan), we will be vitally interested in what happens in places such as Bahrain. To not act would perhaps be the most tragic action of all.

Dayuhan
08-12-2011, 02:42 AM
I watch our government with no confidence. However, I have tremendous confidence in our constitution, and what it was designed to do: create trust trust within and between diverse segments of a complex populace necessary to allow them to work and grow together as a nation; and to prevent government from ever becoming so efficient as to someday grow to where it might seek to exercise inappropriate degrees of control over that same complex populace, or any segment of it.

Our Constitution works well, for us. I wouldn't want to assume that it, or its principles, are going to work for anyone else. Even if we make that assumption, it's not our place to be telling others how to run their governments. Easy for us to believe that our solution is best for everyone, but if we choose to act on that belief we're skating on very thin ice.


like all nations, the US has interests. Some are indeed vital, and where we have to power (not just military, but economic, influential, etc) to act to guard those interests we should have both the moral and physical courage to act, and the wisdom to act in a manner best designed to produce the best effects for us in a manner with the least possible negative effects onto others.

Yes, we have interests, though our assessment of those interests may change from day to day, and what's seems at any point to be in our immediate interest may not turn out so well in the long run. Again, before we decide to act on any momentary perception of interest - especially when the action involves meddling in other countries - we really need to remember that all our meddling in the past was also done in accordance with our perception of our interests at that time. It didn't always turn out well. It may not turn out well this time either.

"Where we have the power to act" is an important question. We should recall that "influence" is a function of tangible carrots and sticks. If we can't define and quantify exactly what our influence comes form and we propose to do to wield that influence, we probably don't have any.

Thus, questions, in any given case...

Are we really sure that any given proposed action is really going to be in our long-term interest? Have we adequately assessed the potential for unintended adverse consequences?

Do we really have the power to act? What influence will we bring to bear, and on what bases does it rest?

I donm't sdee much good in acting until those questions are answered.

Look at these two quotes...


Words like "hope and change" are easy to say, and easy to hear; but they prove perhaps to be the most "wicked problem" of all to actually implement.


"How" belongs to the executor. That is tactical and there are many ways up any mountain. What I offer attempts to provide some strategic insights for the leadership who may have to make those tactical choices or provide guidance to those who will craft or implement efforts to address such problems.

So "how" is the "wicked problem"... but that's what you're not telling us. Adopting a strategic goal that we have no viable tactics to achieve is not a good recipe for success, and I have a feeling that "change the way Saudi Arabia is governed" is a goal that fits into that category, not unlike "install democracy in Afghanistan".

Isn't bailing on "how" a bit of a cop-out? Seems to me that one of the major reasons for our deficiencies in execution lately is that our executors have been handed goals that are not practical, achievable, and specific. Do we want to repeat that?


we will be vitally interested in what happens in places such as Bahrain. To not act would perhaps be the most tragic action of all.

That brings back the same old question... what action do you propose? All very well to say not acting would be tragic and thus we must act, but it doesn't say much unless there's a proposed course of action to go with it.

Bob's World
08-30-2011, 05:33 PM
This clip from an article on al jazeera rings true to me, and is an important perspective to appreciate:


The Gulf states' reaction, mainly the sending of Saudi Arabian and United Arab Emirates security forces to help quell the protests, underscored that the official Gulf order would not hesitate to do anything to maintain the status quo of the rule of the few.

The demands of the Bahraini protesters for elected officials accountable to freely elected parliaments, even under the umbrella of the monarchy, were intolerable to Gulf leaders. Such ideas challenged the notion of absolute control practiced in these countries and went far beyond the parliamentary system allowed in Kuwait.

The implicit and even explicit message that was sent from the Gulf to the rest of the Arab world, is that what happened in Bahrain was different than the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Monarchs framed Bahrain's protests as an Iranian-backed sectarian Shia "conspiracy" to destabilise the Gulf and dominate the Arab World.

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/08/20118301473301296.html

Dayuhan
08-31-2011, 04:36 AM
In much of the Gulf there's a perception that the hereditary aristocracies are fundamentally different from, say, a Saddam Hussein, a Gadhafi, or a Mubarak. The perception is based on a traditional, conservative respect for tribal institutions and the tribal system - strange though it may seem to an American, hereditary rule is seen in some places as an inherently legitimate - and on the belief that a ruler earns legitimacy by delivering security and prosperity. Of course these beliefs prevail among the aristocracy, but - again, surprising as it may be to n American - they are shared by a larger portion of the populaces in question than many of us would think likely.

Obviously the Shi'a of Bahrain don't think their rulers are legitimate, but many in Qatar or Saudi Arabia would see no inconsistency in supporting the rulers of Bahrain against a rebellion and supporting rebellion against the rulers of Syria or Libya. In our view there may be no difference, but our view isn't universal.

We don't approve, of course, but the Saudis, Qataris, etc really don't care whether we approve or not. They'll do what they think is in their interest.

Bob's World
08-31-2011, 10:14 AM
Actually, while I agree with your assessment of Middle Eastern governance in general, I suspect (and the rise of AQ, where those who support them come from, expressions of discontent captured in the media, the massive up-tick in internal security arrests, etc all being metrics) that there are far more who feel it is time for such an evolution as described in this Bahrain example within SA and other Sunni dominated states than you are willing to recognize. Perhaps less than I believe as well, but as those of us who study and deal with insurgency well know, it does not take a large minority to fuel a successful insurgency.

Europe was little different, Asia as well. The people of the Middle East must find a solution that works for them, and we must not attempt to create those solutions for them. That would be illegitimate from the outset. Similarly we must not ignore what is going on for what it is and discount it as the actions of a few "terrorists" who have employed an evil twisted form of Islam to ideologically brainwash otherwise satisfied members of these populaces to join their cause or to act out against blameless governments at home or abroad.

Saudi Arabia has their Oliver Cromwell, and he is probably already born, and possibly already an adult (and likely taking sanctuary in Yemen or perhaps Pakistan, or is a student in the US or Europe). It is not if, it is when these changes will occur. Encouraging and supporting evolution on the important issues (popular perceptions of legitimacy, justice, respect, and the creation of legal options to influence government) is far wiser than to simply amp up security efforts until the revolution finally explodes.

If the Saudi Royals do not take heed, the recent escalation of beheadings employed to control a dissident populace will one day shift to them being on the receiving end of the sword. That would be an unfortunate, and wholly avoidable situation. But it will happen if they do not take current events serious and shift from their tactics of increased internal security and social bribes to one of exploring and adopting true social change that makes sense for them and their people and that gets at those critical popular perceptions described above.

Dayuhan
09-01-2011, 04:42 AM
Actually, while I agree with your assessment of Middle Eastern governance in general, I suspect (and the rise of AQ, where those who support them come from, expressions of discontent captured in the media, the massive up-tick in internal security arrests, etc all being metrics) that there are far more who feel it is time for such an evolution as described in this Bahrain example within SA and other Sunni dominated states than you are willing to recognize. Perhaps less than I believe as well, but as those of us who study and deal with insurgency well know, it does not take a large minority to fuel a successful insurgency.

Has AQ been rising in the Gulf lately? Not to any great extent I would think... and while Gulf populaces have been generally supportive of jihad against the West, and against foreign intervention in Muslim lands, the response to AQ's calls for jihad against Gulf governments has been tepid at best.

I wouldn't want to predict what will happen in the Gulf or when, and I doubt that anyone could with any accuracy. Bahrain is of course somewhat unique in the area, owing to the "Sunni minority ruling Shia majority" dynamic.

I'd agree that there's a lot of desire for evolution in the Gulf. I don't think there's any great consensus on what direction that evolution should take, though. I think the desire for evolution is also tempered by a very real fear of the possible consequences. The possibility that political liberalization, let alone democracy, would lead to chaos, and subsequently foreign domination, a takeover by a military strongman, or domination by radical Islamists - all of which are deeply feared by much of the populace - is on a lot of minds, and drives an acceptance of the status quo that might not otherwise be present. Populaces in the Gulf are generally much more comfortable and have much more to lose than those in, say, Egypt or Tunisia.


Similarly we must not ignore what is going on for what it is and discount it as the actions of a few "terrorists" who have employed an evil twisted form of Islam to ideologically brainwash otherwise satisfied members of these populaces to join their cause or to act out against blameless governments at home or abroad.

"What is going on" meaning exactly what? Obvious of course in Bahrain, less so in the rest of the Gulf.


Saudi Arabia has their Oliver Cromwell, and he is probably already born, and possibly already an adult (and likely taking sanctuary in Yemen or perhaps Pakistan, or is a student in the US or Europe).

They may not need an Oliver Cromwell. One of the interesting (and to me appealing) aspects of the Arab Spring movements is that they do not seem leader-driven or personality-driven at all. That may complicate succession of course, as there's no visible "leader of the revolution" to step in, but leaders of revolutions have generally not done terribly well as leaders of nations.

I think it unlikely that whatever political change eventually occurs in the Gulf will be driven by anyone from the AQ "sanctuary in Yemen or perhaps Pakistan" world. The Saudi populace has already been offered that option, and showed little interest, even in the 90s, an environment very conducive to success for that kind of movement. Very hard to predict how the current dissatisfaction will coalesce and express itself... we should not assume that people want the type of change that we would want in their place.


It is not if, it is when these changes will occur. Encouraging and supporting evolution on the important issues (popular perceptions of legitimacy, justice, respect, and the creation of legal options to influence government) is far wiser than to simply amp up security efforts until the revolution finally explodes.

The degree to which any outside power can effectively "encourage and support evolution" in the Gulf is going to be very limited IMO, and our assessment of "important issues" may be very different from local assessments. We are not in a position to choose between reform and amped-up security... not our country. If a movement for reform emerges with real popular support it might under some circumstances be a good idea to support it... whether that's the case and what type of support would be appropriate can't be assessed until that happens. Trying to initiate change would be a most inappropriate role for us, and would not be appreciated at all by the populaces in question.


If the Saudi Royals do not take heed, the recent escalation of beheadings employed to control a dissident populace will one day shift to them being on the receiving end of the sword. That would be an unfortunate, and wholly avoidable situation. But it will happen if they do not take current events serious and shift from their tactics of increased internal security and social bribes to one of exploring and adopting true social change that makes sense for them and their people and that gets at those critical popular perceptions described above.

Possibly so... but our opinions on this matter not at all. They will do as they will and reap the consequences. We will watch and respond to circumstances as they emerge.

Bob's World
09-01-2011, 08:40 AM
Do not misunderstand unconventional warfare. An outside party cannot "create" insurgency. It's kind of like starting a fire, AQ may bring spark and a desire to create a fire; but unless the conditions for fire are present all one will get is frustration. A "wet" populace will not burn. Good governance is really just another term for such a wet populace, a populace that is generally satisfied with their situation under their current governance. They feel they are treated with respect, they feel they have justice under the law, they recognize the right of this government to govern them, and they feel that they have legal venues available to express their concerns and to affect change when necessary.

AQ does not "create" insurgency anywhere. AQ does not really "radicalize" populaces anywhere either. AQ goes to places and populaces where conditions of insurgency already exist, to populaces and individuals who have already been "radicalized" by the actions and policies of their own government, and provides a focus, a vision, an offer of support. AQ is not the problem, AQ is a small, opportunistic organization that without the highly flammable conditions of poor governance that are so prevalent across the entire greater Middle East would be little more than noise.

AQ is a symptom, they are not the problem. But when the actual problems are not recognized and addressed such symptoms can grow in influence and power and become problems. There is a tremendous state-level parallel in Adolf Hitler. Without the conditions that existed in post WWI Germany he would have been just another wing-nut spouting off down at the beer hall. He was a spark. But a single spark can destroy a forest, and must be taken seriously. But true prevention is not in fighting sparks, but rather in understanding and addressing those factors that make a conflagration likely.

We tend to overly fixate on the Insurgent or the UW actor, but both are symptoms. Alternatively we overly fixate on the populace, but they are simply the matrix all of this occurs within. The government has full onus as both the cause and the cure of such illegal, often violent, political unrest. Few governments accept that proposition. They blame the populace, they blame the insurgent, they blame the external UW actor. They blame the tools of ideology that such actors employ. Governments don't take responsibility for the negative effects of their actions, because governments are made up of politicians and princes.

So no, I do not think AQ is "causing" insurgency anywhere, but I do appreciate that they are waging UW across the Middle East. I do appreciate that they had no real target audience in the AFPAK region until we acted to elevate the Northern Alliance to power and then helped them to form and then protect the type of government that exists there now. Prior to that AFPAK was just a safe place to operate from, now it is less safe to be sure, but it is a place they actually operate. We created that change.

But most nationalist insurgents do not want to go off to help someone else with their problems, they want to resolve their own problems at home. So AQ started building outlets in the sanctuaries closest to where these populaces existed. Most notably in Yemen to service the populaces of the Arabian Peninsula, and in the Maghreb to service the populaces of North Africa.

But all of this is nothing new to what I was pointing out long before Arab Spring began to erupt. Those movements had and have little to do with AQ, but certainly they (AQ) will seek to influence events and outcomes, and seek credit where little is due. Those events were caused by the governments of those respective countries and the nature of their relationships with their respective populaces. Factors like hard economic times and the presence of ideological actors such as AQ certainly make action more likely, but such factors do not cause action.

These are populaces who could use a champion. Someone to engage with their governments to help them to see that it is well within their power to turn these conditions around. But there are two huge obstacles to this. First is that our own leadership does not understand this very well and sees the symptoms as being the problems; we also tend to focus on aspects of governance that WE don't like, rather on the aspects of governance that are the true drivers of poor governance based on the perceptions of the populaces that are actually involved. Interventions shaped by such perspectives are not likely to be very helpful, nor to produce enduring, legitimate results. Second is that the affected governments have no desire to change, and certainly do not take responsibility for the conditions of unrest they face. They blame outside factors, they blame the populace, they blame the economy, they blame ideology, etc. As I have said before, the best COIN begins with a governmental 12-step program.

Hello, I am the government of country X, and I have a problem... Poor governance, like addiction cannot be cured so long as the affected party continues to rationalize their behavior and place blame anywhere but upon themselves. An outsider cannot "fix" an addict, but very rarely will an addict take the first steps on their own to fix themselves. Our interventions need to be in the role of that friend who has a hard conversation. that friend who recognizes that his own behavior is enabling the problem and changes that enabling behavior (yes, security force capacity building is often enabling behavior).

We must change much or our own understanding and approaches; but we also must have hard conversations with our troubled friends, even if it means losing some friendships in the process. Any that end are dysfunctional relationships that needed to change or end long ago anyway.

(a bit of a meandering post, but that is what happens when one wakes up at 0330 and logs into SWJ...)

M-A Lagrange
09-01-2011, 11:38 AM
Do not misunderstand unconventional warfare. An outside party cannot "create" insurgency. It's kind of like starting a fire, AQ may bring spark and a desire to create a fire; but unless the conditions for fire are present all one will get is frustration. A "wet" populace will not burn. Good governance is really just another term for such a wet populace, a populace that is generally satisfied with their situation under their current governance. They feel they are treated with respect, they feel they have justice under the law, they recognize the right of this government to govern them, and they feel that they have legal venues available to express their concerns and to affect change when necessary.

Bob,

With all respect, this is not completly exact. South America insurgencies/rebellion have proven this to be only partially true.
What you describe here are the perfect conditions for an insurgency to not find ground to be rooted.
The other option for an insurgency to not be able to develop is a strong and extremely well targetted repression. (Cf issurgencies started by Che Gevara after Cuba or other small insurgencies in South America.)

You may argue that it just delay the insurgency growth (which is true) but staying in power and maintaining the status quo isn't the goal of a partly legitimate power? Especially in such a case.

Dayuhan
09-01-2011, 12:15 PM
Do not misunderstand unconventional warfare. An outside party cannot "create" insurgency. It's kind of like starting a fire, AQ may bring spark and a desire to create a fire; but unless the conditions for fire are present all one will get is frustration. A "wet" populace will not burn.

AQ's attempt to light a fire in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s went flat, despite very conducive conditions. Is that because the populace was "wet", or because the spark didn't appeal to them? It's not enough to have discontent; the spark has to offer something the populace, or at least a substantial part of it, thinks could be an improvement. AQ didn't achieve that.


Good governance is really just another term for such a wet populace, a populace that is generally satisfied with their situation under their current governance. They feel they are treated with respect, they feel they have justice under the law, they recognize the right of this government to govern them, and they feel that they have legal venues available to express their concerns and to affect change when necessary.

I think you underestimate the extent to which a government's ability to provide security and prosperity contributes to popular acceptance. Maybe it shouldn't be that way, to an American, but it still is that way in much of the world.


AQ does not "create" insurgency anywhere. AQ does not really "radicalize" populaces anywhere either. AQ goes to places and populaces where conditions of insurgency already exist, to populaces and individuals who have already been "radicalized" by the actions and policies of their own government, and provides a focus, a vision, an offer of support. AQ is not the problem, AQ is a small, opportunistic organization that without the highly flammable conditions of poor governance that are so prevalent across the entire greater Middle East would be little more than noise.

I agree, AQ does not create insurgency. AQ has only really succeeded, though, when they oppose foreign intervention in Muslim lands, not when they oppose bad governance in Muslim lands. The narrative that AQ has used successfully is not about bad governance, it's about resistance to infidel intrusion.


AQ is a symptom, they are not the problem... a single spark can destroy a forest, and must be taken seriously. But true prevention is not in fighting sparks, but rather in understanding and addressing those factors that make a conflagration likely.

Possibly so... but our capacity to address these factors in other countries is limited at best. We haven't the duty, the right, or the ability to go about fixing what we see as flaws in other governments.


These are populaces who could use a champion. Someone to engage with their governments to help them to see that it is well within their power to turn these conditions around.

Possibly so, but who says these populaces want us to be their champion, still less to appoint ourselves as their champion? Do we really know what these populaces want? Do they trust us, or believe that we would ever act on their behalf? Do they want us mucking about in the internal affairs of their countries?

The idea of Americans leaping on the white horse and appointing themselves as champions of Muslim populaces, uninvited and unilaterally, fills me with horror. I suspect it would fill AQ with delight. Foreign intervention, after all, is what they thrive on.

We can claim to be acting as champion of a populace. We may even believe it... but nobody in the Muslim world will believe it. Most Americans wouldn't believe it. I'm not sure I'd believe it. The assumption will be, not unreasonably, that we are intervening to advance our interests.


Our interventions need to be in the role of that friend who has a hard conversation. that friend who recognizes that his own behavior is enabling the problem and changes that enabling behavior (yes, security force capacity building is often enabling behavior).

What makes you think that any of the GCC governments would listen to us... or that any GCC government or populace wants us meddling in their internal affairs?


We must change much or our own understanding and approaches; but we also must have hard conversations with our troubled friends, even if it means losing some friendships in the process. Any that end are dysfunctional relationships that needed to change or end long ago anyway.

None of these relationships have anything to do with friendship. They're about interests.

I don't see any leverage the US has that would put us in a position to persuade or compel these governments to change, nor do I think the US should be in the business of appointing itself as anyone's saviour, or trying to change the way other countries are governed.

They may need to change; that doesn't mean it's our job to change them, or that we can change them, or that any of the populaces involved want us involved.

Bob's World
09-01-2011, 12:55 PM
Bob,

With all respect, this is not completly exact. South America insurgencies/rebellion have proven this to be only partially true.
What you describe here are the perfect conditions for an insurgency to not find ground to be rooted.
The other option for an insurgency to not be able to develop is a strong and extremely well targetted repression. (Cf issurgencies started by Che Gevara after Cuba or other small insurgencies in South America.)

You may argue that it just delay the insurgency growth (which is true) but staying in power and maintaining the status quo isn't the goal of a partly legitimate power? Especially in such a case.

As I understand your post, you wish to make the point that a government that is failing its populace (creating in effect a dry, highly flammable forest of a populace through its poor governance) may well prevent insurgency through aggressive programs of "fire" prevention and suppression? This is very true. Certainly the Saudis currently, Saddam, Mubarak, The Shah of Iran, Qaddafi, etc, etc, etc all did this in their respective day and situation. Karzai does this with our tremendous assistance at this very moment.

This is well within the legal right of government to do. Such legal governments are also "legitimate" in the sense of that word that they are legally recognized as the official government of some place and populace. Insurgency, however, is by definition illegal; and the type of legitimacy that matters in insurgency is not that of black letter law, but more that of the equitable principles of the common law. It is a form of legitimacy based in perceptions of the populace and their acceptance and recognition of the right of some government to govern over them.

Certainly a government that is merely legally and officially legitimate may remain in power through dilligent efforts to suppress illegal challenges from a populace that finds them to be illegitimate in the sense that they no longer (or never did) recognize their right to govern.

But insurgency is not about the rule of law, it is not about the facts, it is not about what those outside the populace or inside the government know. It is about what some distinct and significant (though often quite small) segment of the populace believes.

Many find this too fuzzy of a concept to work with, and persist in wheeling out arguments based in fact and law and officalness. Such arguments are interesting, but they have little to do with insurgency. The fact that the vast bulk of our COIN doctrine and material are based upon the facts as understood by official governments in their efforts to enforce the rule of law creates a tremendous bias in our understanding of this human dynamic of insurgency. The fact that most of those same writings are derived from second party experiences in efforts to sustain Colonial or Containment controlling relationship executed through some "legal" (though typically higly illegitimate in the eyes of the populace) local government, further clouds our vision.

ganulv
09-01-2011, 12:58 PM
Cf issurgencies started by Che Gevara after Cuba

If you mean Guevara’s foray into Bolivia then you’re dead wrong. It has been a few years since I dug into that history, but IIRC from reading his Bolivian Diary (http://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1967/bolivian-diary/index.htm) Guevara became increasingly frustrated the longer he spent in Bolivia with his failure to start anytihng.


or other small insurgencies in South America.

As regards the Sendero Luminoso, I will say that every anthropologist I have known who had done work in Peru described the life of a Quechua peasant at the height of the internal conflict there as a nightmare of being caught between a brutal state security apparatus and the at least as brutal Senderistas.

The FARC de facto controls a large enough area that I don’t know that I would call it a small insurgency at this point. I’m no expert, but my impression is that can hardly be called a bottom-up movement at this point.

M-A Lagrange
09-02-2011, 08:14 AM
Gav :
I can be wrong but I am not talking of Guevara experiene in Bolivia but other small insurgencies initiated in the 70th in South America. Unfortunately, I cannot remember where. There is an excellent exemple in that book: Les guerres irrégulières : XXe-XXIe siècle, Guérillas et terrorismes, Gérard Chaliand; most probably the original version of this book: Revolution in the Third World.
The question is not what did the peasants do today or during the presence of insurgent groups but rather what/how did they feel before such groups come. Once the groups are there: too bad for the peasants and what they tink of the insurgents and the government. :o

Bob:

You got me right but I think there is a need to make a distinction between faith and identity based insurgencies and ideologically protracted ones. My point being that in the case of several communist insurrections there was a “need” to educate the populations to make them realize the ones who were ruling them were illegitimate. While in your understanding of insurgencies (that I mostly sopport and agree with), it is assumed that there is already a level of frustration which creates the necessary conditions for insurgencies to grow.
But I agree with the distinction you do about understanding mechanisms which lead to insurgencies and response mechanisms (mainly security ones)which are based on RoL.

Dayuhan
09-02-2011, 08:29 AM
My point being that in the case of several communist insurrections there was a “need” to educate the populations to make them realize the ones who were ruling them were illegitimate. While in your understanding of insurgencies (that I mostly sopport and agree with), it is assumed that there is already a level of frustration which creates the necessary conditions for insurgencies to grow.

The two aren't necessarily incompatible. Formal insurgent groups have to turn generic popular discontent into directed opposition toward governance and support for them. Sometimes they succeed, sometimes they fail. Even where they fail, it doesn't necessarily mean the populace is content, it can mean that the populace didn't see that particular insurgent group as worthy of support.

On a general level I largely agree with Bob's assessment of where insurgency comes from, though I think it's a bit more varied and less absolute than he sometimes seems to suggest. Where we disagree is on our assessment of the American capacity to insert ourselves into the governance/populace dynamics and political competitions of another country and produce positive results.

Bob's World
09-02-2011, 12:09 PM
The communists often worked in vulnerable populaces where the government held strong control over the media/message, and where means for self-education that allows one to compare their own situation to others elsewhere were difficult at best.

"Prophets" like Che carried the message to the people to create awareness that they did not have to live under those conditions and that others elsewhere had risen up and created change. A generation ago with the information technology that leveraged widespread popular movement for change in Eastern Europe to throw off the Soviets and their puppets at the end of their side of the Cold War control system; and now with the even greater information technology that is empowering populaces of the greater Middle East to challenge and throw off Containment driven controls established by Western Governments and their puppets (in large part) are largely self-educated.

The prophets of illegal political change are not necessary, but they are still out there targeting these vulnerable populaces.

Look how we employ security force capacity building to help governments that are challenged by their own populace to exercise control over the same. This is a very symptomatic approach that sees the threat as the problem and sustainment of the status quo as success. This is a perspective that is based on legal legitimacy as recognized by outsiders trumping popular legitimacy as assessed by the governed populace. One must deal with the treat, one must deal with the populace, but one must either FIX or REPLACE the government in such situations if one wants to ever get to an enduring result.

Populaces do not fail governments, it is governments that fail populaces. Often not the entire populace, look at the Northern Alliance-based government of Afghanistan. They are completely dedicated to the support of the Northern Alliance populace; but equally dedicated to the exclusion and suppression of those segments of the populace that are outside that circle of trust. In such political conditions insurgency is inevitable. One can not grasp this if they see insurgency as being caused by insurgents or ideology.

I agree with Dayuhan that there are no absolutes, but one must have a core start point for analysis. I shift that core, and I believe we become far more successful in our approaches when we shift that core.

Similar problems that lack that core are not insurgency. If one is facing a profit or power driven challenge to government, such as in Mexico today with the cartels, or in Sierra Leone with the grab of the diamond industry; we call it insurgency, but it really isn't as it is of a very different causal genus, and therefor demands and will respond to very different solution sets. Pure CT would work much better on such situations. (Particularly if coupled with major changes to the market to legalize and legitimize what is generating so much illicit income and power).

Seek first to understand, then to be understood. We wonder why others do not appreciate and understand what we are doing for them. It is because we first do not understand them or the problem we are genuinely attempting to "help" them with.

Dayuhan
09-02-2011, 11:09 PM
One must deal with the treat, one must deal with the populace, but one must either FIX or REPLACE the government in such situations if one wants to ever get to an enduring result.

That raises a rather glaring question... who in that bold-type statement is "one"?


look at the Northern Alliance-based government of Afghanistan. They are completely dedicated to the support of the Northern Alliance populace; but equally dedicated to the exclusion and suppression of those segments of the populace that are outside that circle of trust. In such political conditions insurgency is inevitable.

Straying a fair distance from Bahrain here, but if we attribute the Afghan insurgency solely to the governance of the Karrzai regime, don't we risk overlooking the herd of elephants in the drawing room that is our presence? Occupying armies also have a tendency to stimulate insurgency, do they not?

Bob's World
09-03-2011, 01:05 PM
"One" is whoever; but your implied point is a critical one. Any solution that is even perceived to be created by some external, and therefor inherently illegitimate, or lacking standing, party is not likely to endure. This is why I encourage shifting from those approaches derived from Western Colonial heritage of interventions that are aimed at creating a governmental vehicle to represent Western interests in some land/populace, and then working to reduce threats and control the populace to sustain those governmental systems. We must shift to less controlling, less intrusive, far more diplomatic approaches that focus on encouraging governments to make reasonable accommodations with their populaces, but not to protect them from the same. Insurgency in governance, like wildfire in nature, is a natural process for cleansing unhealthy situations. The urge is to suppress both due to their uncontrollable violence and destruction, but one should never do so without understanding the essential benefit and necessity of such natural cleansing events.

We made the controversial decision to let Yellowstone burn a couple decades ago; such things as wildfire are ugly and inconvenient, and often economically disruptive in the short-term, but inherently good and beneficial in the long-term. The Native Americans employed fire as a regular tool to manage the "wilderness." Europeans arriving in the New World had no idea that what they found was not truly "wild" but actually a sophisticated, man-managed ecosystem. They did not appreciate that fire did not destroy the magnificent wilderness, it created it. So too with insurgency. We fear the destructive violence and the temporary disruption of such political cleansing events, but they occur for a reason, and when they are artificially suppressed, the reason goes unaddressed and typically worsens. Insurgency does not destroy good governance, it too creates it (in time...)

As to insurgency in Afghanistan or in Bahrain; both are unique, yet both are the same at their core. One big difference is that we dedicate ourselves to suppress the Afghan populace, while stand back and condom government in Bahrain for doing much the same thing. Such is the nature of politics and policy. But to your specific question, yes, as I often point out the insurgency in Afghanistan has a clear dichotomy to it. There is the Revolutionary insurgency, that is the much more politically driven aspect centered in the grievances of the populace that supported the Taliban originally and that were systematically dis-empowered and disenfranchised by the Northern Alliance when we elevated the latter into power. The second aspect is the resistance insurgency that has been building yearly since 2005 in response to the very presence of ISAF and the efforts of ISAF to support the sustainment of the Northern Alliance government we created.

Sadly this dichotomy is not recognized officially by us. If it was we could then design much more effective engagement (and disengagement) that would address each aspect uniquely based on the unique factors of revolution vs resistance. We have our Colonial derived doctrine, we have our threat-centric military-led perspective, and while everyone knows it really isn't working, we have yet to really develop an appetite to evolve.

Meanwhile US causalities for August set a new record. Such is the nature of resistance, the harder one pushes against it, the harder it pushes back. Such is the nature of revolution, so long as the core political issues go ignored and unaddressed, the insurgency will always regenerate.

Dayuhan
09-04-2011, 09:43 AM
"One" is whoever

As long as it ain't us...


We must shift to less controlling, less intrusive, far more diplomatic approaches that focus on encouraging governments to make reasonable accommodations with their populaces, but not to protect them from the same.

Reasonable enough, as long as we realize that our encouragement will generally be ignored.

We also have to realize that our understanding of these situations is often very incomplete, and our assessment of "reasonable accommodations" may be dangerously inadequate. For one thing, what one segment of a populace might consider a "reasonable accommodation" might be highly inflammatory to another... if mutually agreeable solutions were easily available there wouldn't be violence in the first place. If we see what we think is an easy and obvious solution, there's a good chance we're missing some kinks in the picture. We often do, even when out intentions are good.


As to insurgency in Afghanistan or in Bahrain; both are unique, yet both are the same at their core.

The presence of an occupying army and a government placed in power by an occupying army might in some circles be considered a difference.


One big difference is that we dedicate ourselves to suppress the Afghan populace

We suppress a portion of the Afghan populace, which is trying to get back into a position to suppress the portion that we are supporting. Let's not kid ourselves, this isn't about disenfrachisement, it's about power. At the end of the day somebody's going to have it, and that somebody is going to suppress whoever doesn't have it. If we decide that our way out of Afghanistan is a functioning democracy, we'd better prepare to be there for a long and messy time.


while stand back and condom government in Bahrain for doing much the same thing.

I refrain, with prodigious effort, from comment :D

Jedburgh
01-25-2012, 04:06 AM
IMS, 24 Jan 12: Justice Denied in Bahrain: Freedom of Expression and Assembly Curtailed (http://www.i-m-s.dk/files/publications/BahrainMissionReportJanuary2012FINAL.pdf)

Following the fall of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, hundreds of thousands of Bahraini protesters took to the streets of Manama, the capital city, on 14 February, 2011, to peacefully call for democratic reform. Officials were quick to crack down on protests, and the access of the international media was limited2 almost immediately after the start of the protests. Unlike other citizens demonstrating across the Arab World in 2011, the protests in Bahrain have received very little coverage, particularly considering the disproportionate number of people jailed and killed in the tiny country of 1.2 million people. Furthermore, the messages of the protesters – calling for reform, equal rights and opportunities and greater democracy – have largely been distorted by both the government and the international community which have instead focused on sectarian interpretations and regional geopolitical issues.
CRS, 29 Dec 11: Bahrain: Reform, Security and US Policy (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf)

...US officials are concerned that the instability in Bahrain could render US use of the naval headquarters facilities untenable, but there are no evident moves to relocate it. Beyond the naval facility, the US signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain as a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated US weapons systems. Bahrain also receives small amounts of US security assistance. New US sales and aid are coming under criticism from human rights and other groups and, in response, the Administration put on hold a major new proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. Factoring into the US position is a perception that Iran might seek to take advantage of Shiite unrest in Bahrain to reduce US influence and the US military presence in the Persian Gulf. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers in GCC initiatives to resolve regional issues such as uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen....

davidbfpo
02-12-2012, 11:15 AM
Gone, but not overlooked. A small, strategic island still protesting:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17002308


Bahrain Sunni-Shia split manifests itself in mistrust. Supporters of Bahrain's Sunni government fear the influence of Shia Iran. Anti-government protests in Bahrain were suppressed last year with the help of Saudi Arabia, but the tensions between the Sunni leadership and the Shia majority population are never far below the surface. The BBC's Bill Law has been to a mosque in the Bahraini capital Manama to get behind the continuing sectarian split.

A reminder this UK-based website continues to report on the protests in Bahrain and beyond:http://www.enduringamerica.com/

KingJaja
02-23-2012, 08:56 PM
These are rhetorical questions, the purpose is to get us thinking about the impact of fifty years of US Middle East policy on the perception of the US in that area.

What is the difference between Bahrain and Syria or Yemen and Syria?

What is the difference between Homs and Fallujah?

Americans tend to assume that when they speak, all the World listens because their words carry moral authority and their cause is right. That could have been true in the past, but I am not sure it is true today.

Dayuhan
02-23-2012, 10:07 PM
Americans tend to assume that when they speak, all the World listens because their words carry moral authority and their cause is right. That could have been true in the past, but I am not sure it is true today.

Who assumes that? People listen when the US speaks (or at least pretend to listen) because the US wields financial and military power, period. Moral authority has nothing to do with it. There might have been some semblance of moral authority during the Cold War, based purely on being arguably less immoral than the other guys, but even that was shaky at best and could hardly be seen as a significant source of influence.

Sanctimony is by no mean the exclusive province of the US... the Europeans are much devoted to it, the Chinese drip with it, etc. All nations pretend to be morally elevated. It's mainly devoted to the domestic audience. Nobody believes them (except a few naive members of the domestic audience), and nobody should. People listen to power, not sanctimony.

ganulv
02-24-2012, 03:22 AM
Americans tend to assume that when they speak, all the World listens because their words carry moral authority and their cause is right.
The first night of my visit to Cuba in 1997 a group of young people struck up a conversation with me as a I walked by. At one point someone started making some loud–enough–for–me–to–hear nasty comments about all of the things Americans were doing to Cuba. The young man I was talking to shot him a look and said to me (and him, of course), “Most of us in my country can tell the difference between you and your government.”

davidbfpo
04-10-2012, 01:07 PM
A BBC report which suggests IIRC this is the first IED attack on the police:
Seven policemen have been injured in a "terrorist attack" in the Bahraini village of Akr, the country's public security chief has told state media.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17663642

In my limited reading the police have faced petrol bombs aplenty and been injured, but have not faced an IED attack:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17076387