And Libya goes on...

[Fuchs]

As I've pointed out several times now, not all aircraft have defensive systems. And, since this is supposedly a humanitarian mission, there presumably will be civilian aircraft bringing in supplies at some point and they don't have defensive systems either.

And none of them needs to fly into the engagement envelope of any Libyan air defence battery anyway. That's only an issue for strike fighters which engage heavy ground combat systems in order to 'protect civilians'.

[J Wolfsberger]

And none of them needs to fly into the engagement envelope of any Libyan air defence battery anyway.

True, if the loyalists are gracious enough to site the air defense batteries where we'd like them to be. Otherwise, arbitrarily declaring where we do and don't need to fly on the basis of the presence of ADA doesn't strike me as making much sense.


That's only an issue for strike fighters which engage heavy ground combat systems in order to 'protect civilians'.

And - no. It's an issue for air superiority fighters engaging aircraft flying ground attack missions - to get them to break off or shoot them down in order to protect the civilians who might be living in what the loyalists decide to declare a target.

It's also an issue for air superiority fighters engaging the loyalists' air superiority fighters. No, I don't think the Libyan air force would or will pose a serious threat. But I also think that assuming that all the loyalists pilots are stupid, cowardly or lazy is not a Good Idea.

I agree that this whole adventure is poorly thought out, probably shouldn't have occurred and will almost certainly turn out badly (and I would be delighted to have events prove my assessment wrong). But there are a lot of better reasons and ways to challenge it than specious, information free argument by conjecture and supposition regarding whether or not to take out the opponents ADA before flying over his territory. Not doing so is a very stupid risk to run, and arguing that the risk should be taken isn't serious.

[Fuchs]

Neither nor.

Gadaffi has lost enough territory for safely supplying all the major resistance centres by air, far away from the moderately ranged SAMs.

Similar point about the CAP; AMRAAM clearly outranges the air defence sites, so it would be easy and safe to intercept an A/G mission with AMRAAMs even if said A/G mission was taking place on top of a functional SAM site of any kind.

[Steve Blair]

Similar point about the CAP; AMRAAM clearly outranges the air defence sites, so it would be easy and safe to intercept an A/G mission with AMRAAMs even if said A/G mission was taking place on top of a functional SAM site of any kind.

Perhaps, but these days you're not especially likely to see BVR engagements without some sort of visual identification of the target.

[Stan]

And none of them needs to fly into the engagement envelope of any Libyan air defence battery anyway. That's only an issue for strike fighters which engage heavy ground combat systems in order to 'protect civilians'.

Most of us would probably try and see your salient points if:

1. You were a veteran fighter pilot who frequently escaped near-death experiences with vintage SAMs and lived to tell about it
2. You were a senior officer or NCO with years of service on the dark continent (transiting airports does not count)
3. You were an AWAKS driver
4. You were a president or foreign minister with years behind the helm intentionally making decisions that put people in harm's way and prepared to back your Bravo Sierra with your reputation
5. Own and fly a Learjet
6. All of the above

Since you probably are not any of the above, your opinions are not well grounded and putting mucho cash and people at risk defending your opinion is a bit hard to swallow.

[Fuchs]

Hmm, personal background instead of argument?

Maybe I should tell you a tale about the great qualification of some Mr. Udet and some Mr. Göring in air war, both being aces and all - they still got almost everything wrong. Göring was especially known for brushing aside arguments with references to his superior experience.

I think your method is systematically flawed.

- - - - -

Many arguments were held back on my part because they're unlikely to resonate in this environment, but since you refer to lives put at risk, I will -as an observer from a neutral country- nevertheless now pull out some of those arguments:

In worst case a nasty surprise by Libyan air defence effectiveness may cost about five pilots' lives.

Meanwhile, the cruise missile strike has -if the positions weren't abandoned anyway- likely killed about 20-200 men. As a neutral observer, I cannot ignore these costs of war so perfectly as you do.

- - - - -

There's also a more general theme about elegance in warfare (sounds weird, but "elegance" is really about reducing something to the necessary extent). The lack of attention to elegance has grossly increased costs of warfare and defence policy in general. I do more than just suspect a very widespread negligence here, and this topic is merely a symptom of it.
To make the point about elegance properly would require a two-page article, though. It's not a good topic for a forum reply and I don't expect anyone to understand this point.



edit:
There was recently a speech of Obama about the Libya crisis. He said "...the U.S. will stand up for ... the dignity of all people."
Well, where I come from, "dignity (in this case apparently meaning ~"Menschenwürde") means a lot, and killing several people in favour of reducing the risk to one or two own people is not understood to being the same as "to stand up for the dignity of all people".

Maybe - just maybe - people here could get away from business as usual with its "victory" focus, accept that this time it's really about being the "good ones", not about pursuit of "interests" - and think accordingly.

[Entropy]

Fuchs,

The problem with your arguments, in my view, is that your credibility suffers when you offer a series of contradictory arguments in support of the same conclusion. Variously you've suggested that the Libyan air defense system is no threat at all, that it's a threat that can be mitigated by ECM and HARM, and finally that it's a threat that can be mitigated by avoidance. The Libyan air defense system cannot be essentially harmless and, at the same time, enough of a threat to require specialized equipment and/or avoidance. Which is it? Please pick one and at least be consistent. It's hard to have a rational debate with someone who changes the supporting "facts" and assumptions of an argument at every turn. FWIW I'm finished trying.

[Stan]

Hmm, personal background instead of argument?

Maybe I should tell you a tale about the great qualification of some Mr. Udet and some Mr. Göring in air war, both being aces and all - they still got almost everything wrong. Göring was especially known for brushing aside arguments with references to his superior experience.

I think your method is systematically flawed.

It’s not an argumentative issue when lives and money are at stake and you, as a self-proclaimed neutral, have no stake in the matter.
Yes, experience generally means you know what you’re talking about. In another thread you quickly concluded some new-fangled device would cure what years of training have already proven to so many of us. If you told me you employed the M2 for 20 years then I would be inclined to believe your statements. At this point I am not, but I do have 23 years that says otherwise.



In worst case a nasty surprise by Libyan air defence effectiveness may cost about five pilots' lives.

Meanwhile, the cruise missile strike has -if the positions weren't abandoned anyway- likely killed about 20-200 men. As a neutral observer, I cannot ignore these costs of war so perfectly as you do.

You first dismiss Libyan defenses and now are willing to dismiss five pilots as if it's a drop in the bucket. It's not out of ignorance that I defend the destruction of AA sites. It is however routine and logical to reduce our casualties.


Maybe - just maybe - people here could get away from business as usual with its "victory" focus, accept that this time it's really about being the "good ones", not about pursuit of "interests" - and think accordingly.

What other focus should a military have other than victory ? Sorry, but the pursuit of interests sounds political in nature, and I am not a political party member.

[Fuchs]

I have several arguments that don't seem to fit together in your opinion because the opposing positions differ and are all not up to the arguments imo.


The SAMs may be unmanned - even if they are manned, the personnel may be incompetent - even if the personnel is competent, the SAMs may still be inoperable due to age - even if they were still (or again) operable despite Gaddaffi's neglect, they have still been obsolete for decades - even if you don't have the self-evident equipment to counter threats from four decades ago, you can still easily avoid their smallish effective firing envelopes.

There's no contradiction, I merely provided a load of arguments for everyone, no matter how much confidence the other person has in regard to Libyan AD effectiveness.
This is based on a normal technique for contact with people about whom you don't know much or who are very heterogeneous; you adapt and serve each of them the appropriate package.
One size fits all packages don't work well.


Coming back to the diversity - isn't it obvious that way too many things must come together in favour of Libyan AD to create a significant AD threat that justifies a (even short) DEAD phase?

[Fuchs]

It’s not an argumentative issue when lives and money are at stake and you, as a self-proclaimed neutral, have no stake in the matter.
Yes, experience generally means you know what you’re talking about. In another thread you quickly concluded some new-fangled device would cure what years of training have already proven to so many of us. If you told me you employed the M2 for 20 years then I would be inclined to believe your statements. At this point I am not, but I do have 23 years that says otherwise.

There are other armies with NCOs of decades experience with the not at all new item - and those NCOs are laughing at your approach of attempting to address a 90 y.o. design fault through training instead of spending a electron microscopic amount of the budget on a fix and saving the training for something else.


You first dismiss Libyan defenses and now are willing to dismiss five pilots as if it's a drop in the bucket. It's not out of ignorance that I defend the destruction of AA sites. It is however routine and logical to reduce our casualties.

Why so selectively? I wrote "worst case" and "200" as well. You only focus on "five". This kinda proves your field of view on the topic is too narrow.


What other focus should a military have other than victory ?

After five attempts - all deleted by myself because they would yield infractions - I think I can write this:
You are in really, really evil company with this attitude and just earned a huge load of disrespect by writing that line.


Sorry, but the pursuit of interests sounds political in nature, and I am not a political party member.

I'm sure my text was not ambiguous, yet still you don't seem to have understood that part.

[J Wolfsberger]

What other focus should a military have other than victory ?

After five attempts - all deleted by myself because they would yield infractions - I think I can write this:
You are in really, really evil company with this attitude and just earned a huge load of disrespect by writing that line.

You have been asserting that it was inappropriate to use cruise missiles to eliminate Libyan air defense. You haven't yet presented any coherent justification for the assertion. (And I'm including your critique that it was an inelegant approach under the category "incoherent." I understand the point you wanted to make. You failed to make it.)

Now you have me completely baffled. Would you please explain what focus you think a military should have?

Random slaughter of surplus male population? Economic stimulation? Handing out blankets and field rations? Armed social work? Parades on national holidays?

Somebody is losing respect over this, but it isn't Stan.

[Stan]

There are other armies with NCOs of decades experience with the not at all new item - and those NCOs are laughing at your approach of attempting to address a 90 y.o. design fault through training instead of spending a electron microscopic amount of the budget on a fix and saving the training for something else.

The E2 was only fully tested at APG in May of 2010. Decades of NCOs ? They may very well be laughing... I am !


Why so selectively? I wrote "worst case" and "200" as well. You only focus on "five". This kinda proves your field of view on the topic is too narrow.

Yep, but, those five in my view are in fact our five.


After five attempts - all deleted by myself because they would yield infractions - I think I can write this:
You are in really, really evil company with this attitude and just earned a huge load of disrespect by writing that line.

You already sent me a PM last year to look over your blog and even warned me that it was not pro-American. Why stop now? Considering where I've been, I'll deal with your load of disrespect just fine :D


I'm sure my text was not ambiguous, yet still you don't seem to have understood that part.

Response was already provided and needs no editing on my part...



... your credibility suffers when you offer a series of contradictory arguments in support of the same conclusion.

[Fuchs]

Stan; the E2 thing was only one in several attempts to fix the issue that should be a non-issue. NIH products have been available for decades.


You have been asserting that it was inappropriate to use cruise missiles to eliminate Libyan air defense. You haven't yet presented any coherent justification for the assertion. (And I'm including your critique that it was an inelegant approach under the category "incoherent." I understand the point you wanted to make. You failed to make it.)

Now you have me completely baffled. Would you please explain what focus you think a military should have?

First; it's not necessary to justify non-violence. Violence requires justification, even in war (which this isn't, by the way - at least not for non-Libyans). I provided many points, the pro-attack side didn't provide any point that I didn't address so far except the zero tolerance fetish that utterly disregards everything but friendly casualties.


So what should be the focus right now (on the level of involved military forces)?

Short story: There was a few years a go a computer gamer who 'won' in every game. Someday he played a new game and found no end. He wasn't able to 'win'. He wrote a letter to the game producer and asked about how to win this. The reply was 'There's no way to win this game. This isn't called everquest for no reason''. The player committed suicide, for he wasn't able to accept that he cannot win.

I don't think you will repeat that, so I tell you: You cannot win this game.
This time it's not about winning (at least not on the military level).
This isn't even a war.

This is more like police work; they go to their job every day, but they cannot 'win' against crime. They can only do their job.

- - - - -

Aside from this, it should be utterly obvious that to focus on 'victory' alone is excessively unethical. Such a focus means to ignore all ethical aspects of life.
If you think that war is only about winning/victory, you put yourself on one level with the most evil henchmen of the most evil bastards - officers who merely did their job and attempted to 'win' the war. Tools of evil.

Is that what you aspire to?

- - - - -

Aside from this ethical aspect, there are many more aspects that prove that a focus on winning/victory alone is *not safe for this forum expression*.

Think of Finland's defense in the winter war 39/40, for example. Their fighting wasn't about victory at all (not victory by the common definition at least). How could it be? They had no, nil, nada chance to 'win'. They had a chance to survive.
People from great powers rarely grasp this, but war isn't about winning/victory. You can hardly ever 'win' anyway, for as soon as you consider your expenses you're pretty much always in a deficit.

A proper definition of victory - for example "to reach a less terrible outcome than possible without organised violence" - would give less importance to other things than victory. It wouldn't change the ethical problem, of course.

- - - - -

Oh, by the way. Neutral or not - to kill 20-200 foreign people in order to mitigate some undetermined risk to 0-5 people of your own group is in my book unethical. Always.
In fact, I'd rate it worse than to push an elderly man in front of a fast subway train.

Again, I experience difficulties to express my disdain politely. This is actually a repeated experience of mine in the SWC forum because of the widespread disdain for foreign human life and foreign sovereignty that's summed up in here.

This forum would clearly be beyond politically incorrect if it was German forum. I won't elaborate on this, for any appropriate description would only deteriorate this thread.

[Coinoperator07]

Libya is in Civil War. What is America's national interest in this conflict (other than the natural resources)?

From my foxhole, this looked to be a more emotional response than a well thought through military action. Again, the US has involved itself in a conflict without asking all the "then what" questions. If there is an endstate to this operation, it has not been clearly defined. Why get involved in Libya and not in Yemen? Bahrain? Syria? Iran?

Also, this is NOT in the pervue of NATO. No NATO nations or partners were attacked. NATO has no mandate, here. If the UN wants to get involved militarily, it's the UN's baby.

I hate to see innocent people killed and I think Qaddafi is a terrible dictator, however, there are laws and rules that must be followed or chaos ensues.

Let's all take a breath, have a strategy, make a plan, and execute violently to an end that is suitable to the betterment of humanity and that's within the Rule of Law as currently exists in the UN Mandate.

[Ken White]

Maybe you missed it but everyone (except you apparently) now agrees that the NFZ is in place and effective (and was from day two). So keeping it that way be expensive and boring (for the pilots). Was rather simple wasn't it?At least as many if not more who think it stupid disagree. I sure do not think it is (a) effective, (b) smart, or (c) likely to achieve the stated goal.

No, it wasn't rather simple -- at least not to judge from all your carping about it. Before we ascribe it to the 'was' column, let's wait until it's over...:rolleyes:
BTW any idea why you think the Gaddafi controlled TV and radio is still on the air?Uh, yeah -- because no one has been told to shut it down. That and a lot of other things are reasons your "was" is premature.

You and I agreed the US was dithering, we both put it down to a lack of knowledge and other problems. While I know the US system is designed to cause that, you chose to ignore it -- which is certainly okay -- but the real difference between us was I disapproved of the whole idea -- and still do. Whereas you were a cheerleader for the action.

That dithering was likely not intended to force others to step up and do things but it fortuitously did just that. Long overdue, too... :wry:

So-called humanitarian interventions in my observation and experience generally do more harm than good and arguably rarely if ever change the body count much -- just who the targets were and generally both sides were and are at fault.

Your "three cruise missile" attack presumes accurate targeting info and success. Probably not as certain as you seem to presume and it would have left us attacking yet another Islamic nation for little benefit to anyone including those that were to nominally be 'saved.' Had they all missed, we'd have looked even sillier than we do...

BTW, your post on another thread on that topic, so-called humanitarian intervention, failed to mention the five paragraphs of valid criticism of the concept. To rectify that omission on your part, here are some quotes from those paragraphs and the LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanitarian_intervention):


"Some argue that humanitarian intervention is a modern manifestation of the Western colonialism of the 19th century."

"Others argue that dominant countries, especially the United States and its coalition partners, are using humanitarian pretexts to pursue otherwise unacceptable geopolitical goals and to evade the non-intervention norm and legal prohibitions on the use of international force."

"Henry Kissinger, for example, finds that Bill Clinton's practice of humanitarian intervention was wildly inconsistent. The US launched two military campaigns against Serbia]] while ignoring more widespread slaughter in Rwanda, justifying the Russian assault on Chechnya, and welcoming to the United States the second-ranking military official of a widely recognized severe human rights violator - the communist government of North Korea."

"During the G-77 summit, which brought together 133 nation-states, the "so-called right of humanitarian intervention" claimed by powerful states was condemned."

Those in order seem to indicate a massive amount of western / European hearth presumed superiority and egos at work; the US is guilty of using 'humanitarian' issues to further its own interests -- so are the others who think it a grand idea; the inconsistency is routinely noted by others whiule the proponents blow those concerns off with various rationales, regardless it appears quite hypocritical to most of the world; one such rationale can be and is applied to the G-77 'Well, of course, they object...'

As I wrote, sneering European condescension and egos. ;)

[Fuchs]

I think it's a good idea to leave this discussion after some final remarks.


I hinted at how it's difficult to express the opinion here. Maybe I found a way that's not going to yield a ban.


Several generations ago, hundreds of thousands of mostly very competent - and in some cases highly experiences - officers were wrong. They fought for victory. They failed their men, they failed their profession, they failed their country and they failed humanity.

This is an experience that added to my country's and our armed services' collective wisdom. It's not about victory alone, not by a long call.
Decades of sitting on a potential battlefield with our very own allies plotting my nation's annihilation with nuclear weapons helped us not to forget this.

Someone (I never really memorise who does such thing) came up with a criticism of my background, asserting that my background is insufficient. He seemed to think that my background wasn't good enough to lend weight to my view.
It was HIS background that wasn't sufficient. It was my country and only very few others which ever -EVER - really learned the most valuable lessons about war.

We have these lessons here, and others don't have them. That's a cultural failure - the failure to learn from others' experiences. We do it a lot, too. In fact, we even begin to forget our own lessons or distort them beyond recognition. Humans are fallible.
The background of whoever criticised me for lack of credentials didn't suffice to teach him about the aspect that made up most of the my motivation in this discussion. His autodidact drive and skill didn't suffice to bridge the gap either.


I joined this discussion telling you about incompetence of Arab soldiers, obsolescence of Arab air force material, missile ranges - stuff that Americans, British, Australians usually understand.
It was a tailored approach, but it failed because arguments - no matter how many and no matter how powerful - do not count much in this discussion (as usual). Backgrounds don't do either. The only thing that counts is the attitude you have when you enter the fray. No matter who's wrong here (maybe all of us?) - cognitive dissonance is clearly at work, and it's more powerful than the Czar bomb ever was.


Think about it (I know, this is pure psychological torture because it forces most readers here to experience cognitive dissonance again):

The U.S. forces were sent into this conflict supposedly to save the Libyan people, Libyan civilians.
The first thing they did was to kill dozens if not hundreds of Libyans who pointed no gun at civilians, and most likely none of them was ever in a position of power.
The U.S. forces decided on this course of action, and I criticised it as a habit or custom. I stick to my position that it was not a smart move based on necessity in this specific case.

A human life is a human life, it has a high value. A uniform does not change that. It's not important what boot camp tells us - all human life is valuable.
You need a really good justification to take it without being evil. Even more so if it's about dozens or hundreds of human lives.

The killing of dozens or hundreds of people can hardly be justified with a reduced level of risk for a handful of other people.
Sure, group think, drill sergeant, culture, nationalism and a lot of other psychological effects and ideas may tell you otherwise, but a free man can see through this veil.



A final provocation (and it's a pity that this is a provocation, for it shouldn't be one):
I told you about my disdain. Now you can guess how great it is and where it comes from.
Many SWC participants are in my opinion on one level with people whom they would gladly fight a "good war" against, like their granddaddies. Their mirror doesn't tell them how they look to me. If they knew, they wouldn't like it.
Right now, they only don't like me for my behaviour is so alien to them.
They don't see what I see.


Now I'll test my self-discipline by promising myself to never look into this thread again. Done.

[davidbfpo]

Fuchs,

The latest series of posts SWC here are IMHO within our ROE:
Small Wars Council is a community of interest for professional dialog by practitioners and students of Small Wars. New and unpopular ideas, contrary viewpoints, and healthy debate are welcome. Personal attacks, threats, intimidation, profanity, and coarse or insulting exchanges are not acceptable. All members are expected to maintain a tone of civility and mutual respect, even in the midst of spirited debate.

Link:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/faq.php?faq=small_wars_council_faq#faq_conduct

Like you I am not an American and it is my strong opinion that non-American members, from around the world, add greatly to SWC whether we are neutral or committed.

Meantime back to the dialogue.

[Surferbeetle]

.... and it is my strong opinion that non-American members, from around the world, add greatly to SWC whether we are neutral or committed.

I fully agree with you David, and I greatly appreciate the wide variety of perspectives and discussion that I encounter here at SWC. This website and format help me to broaden my understanding as well as to think more deeply about a wide variety of subjects.

Stick to the ROE and keep 'em coming Fuchs :wry:

[Surferbeetle]

Intervention in Libya, Taking humanitarian justification seriously (http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/03/intervention_libya), Mar 23rd 2011, 14:06 by W.W. | IOWA CITY, at The Economist blog Democracy in America


Nevertheless, despite our natural biases, it remains both possible and necessary to intelligently estimate how much suffering and death we can expect intervention to avoid. When opponents of intervention ask us to consider, for example, how many lives could be saved were we to spend the cost of a military mission on anti-malarial bed nets, I understand them to be insisting that we take the stated humanitarian justification for this intervention seriously. If our foreign policy aims to prevent suffering and death with finite resources, it makes sense to ask whether this war makes sense on those grounds. I grasp the tiresome point that the choice on the table was not a choice between taking out Libya's air defences and buying bed nets. The choice was between taking out Libya's air defences or not. But the question nagging some of us is why this was the choice on the table. Why did this come up as a matter requiring urgent attention and immediate decision? Why is it that the choice to express our humanitarian benevolence through the use of missiles and jets gets on the table—to the top of the agenda, even—again and again, but the choice to express it less truculently so rarely does? If our humanitarian values really set the agenda, how likely is that that the prospect of urgent military intervention would come up so often?

[jcustis]

edit:
There was recently a speech of Obama about the Libya crisis. He said "...the U.S. will stand up for ... the dignity of all people."
Well, where I come from, "dignity (in this case apparently meaning ~"Menschenwürde") means a lot, and killing several people in favour of reducing the risk to one or two own people is not understood to being the same as "to stand up for the dignity of all people".

I think if you had said this at the outset, most folks would have understood where you were coming from, and how that sentiment framed your arguments.

I am going to go out on the limb and speak for what I believe is a quorum and state that the community discusses a variety of hot topics and the best ones are where the participants agree to disagree as necessary.

Some posters enjoy discussing the technical of policy aspects of an issue or crisis, and choose to avoid the ethical, moral, or religious. That they do so doesn't make them ignorant, or slow, or a bad person.

Recognizing restraint when discussing a topic and "letting it go" is an admirable trait that we should all strive to demonstrate. The same goes for having the savvy to read a post for what it is, grasp the point of view, and respond appropriately. I hope you are not surprised that a good number of members here would support our military's actions, and vigorously defend the goings-on when someone without experience in it casts a stone :D. The same is true for our policymakers and administration.

Letting differences of OPINION grind your gears is neither fruitful nor healthy. If cold, hard facts are at issue, that is one thing, but the subtle nuances of opinion are a killer when trying to debate a point of view. It is often better to simply agree to disagree and move on.

At the end of the day, the brain waves expended typing away at a scathing post are unlikely to impact the policymakers who have sent men and women into harm's way, so we could all remember to take a deep breath every once in a while. Barring the effectiveness of that approach...take it to PMs!!!!!!

[JMA]

Which is why I think we should have sat this one out. Getting screeched at by the usual cast of characters and not spending billions of dollars for the privilege is far more appealing than getting screeched at by the usual cast of characters and spending billions of dollars for the privilege. I would have much preferred a position along the lines of: "We are saddened by the violence in Libya. However, this is a Libyan problem for the Libyans to solve. Regardless of the outcome, we look forward to resuming normal relations with the victor."

As it is now, I have the feeling we've been suckered into a game of "let's you and him fight." We should have known better.

So I guess you would go for this statement of a time some 70 years ago?

"We are saddened about the ongoing problems between the Jews and the Nazis. This problem should be resolved between the two parties themselves and we see no reason to interfere. Regardless of of the methods used or the motives behind the problems we look forward to resuming normal relations with the Nazis one they have solved this problem."

MODERATOR COMMENT: A warning has been issued with regard to this post. It gives the appearance of being structured to either provoke or attack J Wolfsberger, and further conduct such as this will result in additional moderator action.

[Presley Cannady]

Still recent enough to be relevant now:


The Origins and Strategic Objectives of the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA514010)

In 2007, the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged after the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) aligned itself with Al-Qaeda. This development captured the world's attention and led several scholars and policymakers to ask the question: Why did this merger take place and what does it say about the motivations of GSPC? This research investigates three hypotheses: (1) This merger is merely an ideological one without operational implications; (2) this merger is ideological, operational, and logistical; or (3) this merger is merely a rebranding of a failing organization that needed to survive and, therefore, is not a genuine threat to the United States and its European allies. Exploring the evolution of Algerian Islamism, from the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) to the GSPC and AQIM, this study concludes that hypothesis 3 is the best explanation of the merger between GSPC and Al-Qaeda.

[JMA]

Hey JMA,

As an American I sometimes wonder why the African Union and Arab League are not leading the way with regards to COL G and others of his ilk. All of us here at SWJ are aware, however, that the realities of the world often differ from what we might wish them to be...:wry:

Why are you wondering when so many people know?

Take a look (as a simple example) at the Democracy Index (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) and see where the Arab and African countries group.

The majority (like China and probably Russia) see the support of humanitarian intervention as something which could backfire on themselves. Why would a brutal dictatorship (Arab or African) want to spend money and effort on freeing citizens of another country who when free may be tempted to do the same in return?

There is your first point. Thereafter it has been important for the world powers to keep these Mickey Mouse countries weak and divided and as a result more easily manipulated. To suddenly expect these "dependent" countries to step up and show initiative is pretty naive.

If the US has tired of being a super power then they should tell the world so and stop feeling sorry for themselves when ever there is a requirement for the country in the position they created for themselves to act for the general good of all.

Go through that list of nations and figure out in which countries the US has had a hand in shaping their current position and recognise that it will not be that easy to just walk away.


Let's hope for the best, however, we soldiers have an obligation to be clear-eyed and honest about what the probable outcomes are. IMHO the NFZ in Libya has a high probability of escalating into something more costly :cool:

"We" (that we again) soldiers have the duty to act in accordance with the (often changing) policy and objectives of the politicians.

Sure you can introduce a throw away line about the likelihood of an escalation without any substantiation. Just a gut feeling?


IMHO the international community has to equally share the burden of policing and fixing our broken world. Continually asking the US to solve the majority of the world's problems is not a realistic solution.

Steve

That is why NATO has been increasingly dragged into dealing with these problems.

Look at the converse. Do you not think that the other members of NATO are a little weary of being dragged into ill advised wars of US making - in Iraq and Afghanistan for example?

Then you will be told that as the US has been the super power with its finger in every pie that somewhere it has been a cause or at least a contributing factor in many of these problems that now need attention?

[JMA]

You have been asserting that it was inappropriate to use cruise missiles to eliminate Libyan air defense.

No he didn't.

He said in post #462


I disagree. The DEAD (destruction enemy air defences) phase has become a custom, it was no necessity. Most of those air defence missiles are 1960's vintage, they could probably not even kill civilian aircraft any more.

I suggest an apology to Fuchs for misstating his position is due.

[JMA]

I think it's a good idea to leave this discussion after some final remarks.

I hinted at how it's difficult to express the opinion here. Maybe I found a way that's not going to yield a ban.

[snip]

Now I'll test my self-discipline by promising myself to never look into this thread again. Done.

In case you have the will power to not look at this thread again I will PM this to you as well.

I agree with your initial statement in #462


I disagree. The DEAD (destruction enemy air defences) phase has become a custom, it was no necessity. Most of those air defence missiles are 1960's vintage, they could probably not even kill civilian aircraft any more.

I see nothing controversial in this view and it is a legitimate criticism of what we call the "condom approach" to military operations being where one solution fits all circumstances.

While I find the views of many of the (obviously still serving) US servicemen on this board illuminating as to why the US military approaches certain situations in certain ways they too benefit IMHO from your views if only they would pause to listen.

This all takes me back to when I was in a position to encourage and manage officer type tactical discussions on like matters. What I always did (I must have learned it from someone) was once the initial discussions had taken place and the positions on the matter at hand by the individual course members had become apparent I would place them in syndicates and task them with arguing the view opposite to what they seemed to hold. It forced lateral thinking.

Somehow I don't see you as a quitter. Your view on the Libyan intervention remains interesting to me.

[JMA]

At least as many if not more who think it stupid disagree. I sure do not think it is (a) effective, (b) smart, or (c) likely to achieve the stated goal.

Doesn't matter about the "smart". I simply stated that the NFZ was in place and effective. "Smart" is a variable that you are attempting to introduce.

Noted on SkyNews (TV) last night that a Brit air force spokesman declared that the sky over Libya were safe enough for military aircraft to use the airspace with impunity.

NFZ in place and effective, some remaining effort to stop "ceasefire violations" of Gaddafi's forces.


No, it wasn't rather simple -- at least not to judge from all your carping about it. Before we ascribe it to the 'was' column, let's wait until it's over...:rolleyes:Uh, yeah -- because no one has been told to shut it down. That and a lot of other things are reasons your "was" is premature.

Sorry Ken but the whole exercise was simple. Had it been put into place earlier (before Beghazi was attacked and other cities/towns overrun) it would have been even more simple.


You and I agreed the US was dithering, we both put it down to a lack of knowledge and other problems. While I know the US system is designed to cause that, you chose to ignore it -- which is certainly okay -- but the real difference between us was I disapproved of the whole idea -- and still do. Whereas you were a cheerleader for the action.

I have constantly attempted to separate the political and the military in my discussions. I don't ignore anything. I just chose to repeat/remind of what I consider to be limitations... and sorry if is seems like I repeated touch a nerve.

Yes I was and am a cheerleader for action. I think I have articulated what I IMHO have thought was the best course of action to take. The politicians came to the party late and the military is doing its thing. Of course I don't know what limitations have been imposed on the military by the politicians and I stand by my criticisms/questioning of certain military actions.


That dithering was likely not intended to force others to step up and do things but it fortuitously did just that. Long overdue, too... :wry:

Glad you have come to that realisation.


So-called humanitarian interventions in my observation and experience generally do more harm than good and arguably rarely if ever change the body count much -- just who the targets were and generally both sides were and are at fault.

There are two parts to this. One, is the rationale behind the intervention. Most often it is of noble intent.

The second is the implementation. Should the conduct of the intervention be ineffective or incompetent that has nothing to do with the fundamental rationale behind the intervention. In much of Africa (despite having maintained embassies for years) the interventions have in the main been sub-optimal (trying to be nice here).

Take for example Somalia 1993. Initial reason for deployment solid IMHO (500,000 Somalis dead and 1.5 million refugees or displaced). All going reasonably well until the mission shifted and they forces started to go after Aidid. Delta Force and the Rangers got ahead of themselves and the rest is history. So one accepts in the face of the bloodiest battle since Vietnam people would ask "why are we there?" A bad operation in no way (in my mind) negates from the original purpose for the UN deployment in the first place.


Your "three cruise missile" attack presumes accurate targeting info and success. Probably not as certain as you seem to presume and it would have left us attacking yet another Islamic nation for little benefit to anyone including those that were to nominally be 'saved.' Had they all missed, we'd have looked even sillier than we do...

Yes it is a little simplistic, but there is a principle there.

It goes something like this: "Get in quick and hit the snake(s) on the head."

You really don't have much confidence in the accuracy of your precision weapons do you?


BTW, your post on another thread on that topic, so-called humanitarian intervention, failed to mention the five paragraphs of valid criticism of the concept. To rectify that omission on your part, here are some quotes from those paragraphs and the LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanitarian_intervention):

Those in order seem to indicate a massive amount of western / European hearth presumed superiority and egos at work; the US is guilty of using 'humanitarian' issues to further its own interests -- so are the others who think it a grand idea; the inconsistency is routinely noted by others whiule the proponents blow those concerns off with various rationales, regardless it appears quite hypocritical to most of the world; one such rationale can be and is applied to the G-77 'Well, of course, they object...'

As I wrote, sneering European condescension and egos. ;)

I posted the link and that's good enough. Good to see you followed it.

Did you find any of the arguments against such intervention persuasive? I didn't. Silly really.

There are 26 full democracies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) in the world. Should care somewhat what they think... beyond that... a pinch of salt.

[J Wolfsberger]

Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger View Post
You have been asserting that it was inappropriate to use cruise missiles to eliminate Libyan air defense.
No he didn't.

He said in post #462


I disagree. The DEAD (destruction enemy air defences) phase has become a custom, it was no necessity. Most of those air defence missiles are 1960's vintage, they could probably not even kill civilian aircraft any more.
I suggest an apology to Fuchs for misstating his position is due. .

By way of explanation, Fuchs had not only been asserting that taking out the air defenses was unnecessary, he had also been pointing to the number of casualties as excessive. That would have made the level of force used inappropriate. I was summarizing his line of argument, not quoting him, and I think accurately.

[J Wolfsberger]

So I guess you would go for this statement of a time some 70 years ago?

"We are saddened about the ongoing problems between the Jews and the Nazis..."



No, I wouldn't have gone with that. I would have supported intervention, just as I did support intervention in Bosnia and Rwanda, and would support intervention to stop any attempted genocide in the future.

That does not, however, translate into an open ended commitment to support any group of unknowns involved in civil violence with their government. Especially not in a region where the people calling on us to intervene are likely to condemn us for it the day after we do.

It most definitely does not translate into using less than all available resources to ensure that our troops conduct it as safely to themselves as possible.

[Ken White]

Doesn't matter about the "smart". I simply stated that the NFZ was in place and effective. "Smart" is a variable that you are attempting to introduce.No, I introduced that variable two weeks ago. It was dumb then, it still is...
Noted on SkyNews (TV) ...NFZ in place and effective, some remaining effort to stop "ceasefire violations" of Gaddafi's forces.Yes, the "remaining effort" should be the interesting part.
Sorry Ken but the whole exercise was simple. Had it been put into place earlier (before Beghazi was attacked and other cities/towns overrun) it would have been even more simple.I agree with both those statements. However, simple does not equate with effective and neither is the same as success (in either case) ;)
I have constantly attempted to separate the political and the military in my discussions. I don't ignore anything. I just chose to repeat/remind of what I consider to be limitations... and sorry if is seems like I repeated touch a nerve.You seem to have this fetish about nerves. Mine are long gone...

Your military commentary is usually accurate IMO. Your political commentary I often agree with as a statement of goals but I almost invariably disagree with the practicality of implementing most of your recommendations.
Yes I was and am a cheerleader for action...I have no problem with action, all for it in fact -- I simply prefer smart action to stupidity and the all too often western habit of doing something even if it's wrong. We can disagree on the advisability of what is being done -- as to who's correct, we'll have to wait and see.
Glad you have come to that realisation.Good try -- I realized that long ago, your incorrect assumption that it was spin -- you do that a lot -- led you astray. As occurs frequently when one misconstrues for whatever reason. A lot of things the US does, good and bad, are pure serendipity. Function of the rather chaotic governmental process...
There are two parts to this. One, is the rationale behind the intervention. Most often it is of noble intent.Ah yes, those things with which the road is paved... :D
The second is the implementation.... (trying to be nice here).No need to be. They were -- as are most, everywhere.
Take for example Somalia 1993... A bad operation in no way (in my mind) negates from the original purpose for the UN deployment in the first place.That's where we differ; you believe noble intent is adequate in the face of or to offset flawed execution and exacerbated situations. I disagree. Consider the force or forces to be involved and all too often one creates more problems than are solved. Noble intent not realized or thwarted for whatever reason is quite simply a waste.
You really don't have much confidence in the accuracy of your precision weapons do you?I have great confidence in the weapon -- I have almost none in the intelligence community to provide the same degree of accuracy...

I also have fair confidence in the ability of the evildoers of this world to outsmart our ego driven attempts.
I posted the link and that's good enough. Good to see you followed it.I try to be polite and generally follow links others provide, most often to see what they left out. I'm rarely disappointed. Was not in this case... :D
Did you find any of the arguments against such intervention persuasive? I didn't. Silly really.What you and I think about them is largely irrelevant -- what affected populations and politicians think is another thing entirely. We can discount that and post merrily on any discussion board -- the other folks may end up involved -- or losing an election over it. That may not matter to you -- it matters to them.
There are 26 full democracies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) in the world. Should care somewhat what they think... beyond that... a pinch of salt.Nah, not salt -- try the pepper. Old Soldiers should be math whizzes. I figure your 26 as really being ~600M people (Nations are neat but they don't fight, people do), add another similar amount for the 'almosts' and you get 1.2B. That's ~20% of the nominal global population. You may not be concerned about that other 80% but someone better be... :wry:

[Surferbeetle]

JMA,

Given your history, here at SWJ, of regularly advocating for the ultra-violence it is interesting to me to note your recent concerns regarding humanitarian issues in Libya.


The majority (like China and probably Russia) see the support of humanitarian intervention as something which could backfire on themselves. Why would a brutal dictatorship (Arab or African) want to spend money and effort on freeing citizens of another country who when free may be tempted to do the same in return?

Indeed

Please reread my previous response to you (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=118067&postcount=490).

The two articles which I linked to, highlighted South Africa’s flip-flopping regarding intervention in the internal affairs of Libya, and mapped out a portion of Libya’s political patronage network within the AU by project and country.

You will find that the articles were intended as an answer to my rhetorical question to you.


There is your first point. Thereafter it has been important for the world powers to keep these Mickey Mouse countries weak and divided and as a result more easily manipulated. To suddenly expect these "dependent" countries to step up and show initiative is pretty naive.

…and so your argument is that only America is qualified to make appropriate choices for say, South Africa?

The popular expectation that a leader will place the needs of a nation above that of his or her personal enrichment and amusement is not limited by geography.

The various leaders of Africa have had, and continue to have, myriad opportunities to decide between these two options. The opportunities arising from China’s investment in Africa as well as that of the International Community are ongoing.


If the US has tired of being a super power then they should tell the world so and stop feeling sorry for themselves when ever there is a requirement for the country in the position they created for themselves to act for the general good of all.

The US has not tired of being a super power; instead decisions regarding what furthers the interests of the US will, by definition, not please everyone within the international community.

It appears to me that you are not pleased with the decisions made by the US with respect to Libya. Our nation’s decisions will not be changed to please you. :wry:


"We" (that we again) soldiers have the duty to act in accordance with the (often changing) policy and objectives of the politicians.

That responsibility includes providing frank and objective advice regarding military operations.


Sure you can introduce a throw away line about the likelihood of an escalation without any substantiation. Just a gut feeling?

My statement that NFZ’s generally escalate into something more than a NFZ is based upon more than a gut feeling.

I have been following the evolution of ‘Kurdistan’ for a number of years and served in a supporting role in Europe during the establishment of Operation Provide Comfort (later Operation Northern Watch (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Northern_Watch)). I served on the periphery of Yugoslavia, watched it’s disintegration, followed Bosnia, and had trained up for Kosovo when Iraq intervened and I was attached to the 101st during OIF1.


Look at the converse.

Surely


Do you not think that the other members of NATO are a little weary of being dragged into ill advised wars of US making - in Iraq and Afghanistan for example?

Discounting your characterization of ‘ill-advised’, history nonetheless reflects that the national interests of NATO members have overlapped sufficiently to formulate joint responses to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya.


Then you will be told that as the US has been the super power with its finger in every pie that somewhere it has been a cause or at least a contributing factor in many of these problems that now need attention?

It would appear that this has been done :wry:

Will you acknowledge the successes that have accompanied the failures? Will you acknowledge that the US is not the only actor implementing changes? Will you further acknowledge the responsibilities of a nation’s leaders and inhabitants to effect positive change? ;)

[JMA]

No, I wouldn't have gone with that. I would have supported intervention, just as I did support intervention in Bosnia and Rwanda, and would support intervention to stop any attempted genocide in the future.

The definition of genocide is weak in that it excludes the mass murder of political groups. But it was clear that such was in the process of playing out in Libya and there was most certainly a tribal factor in play.

So I would assume then that you would be supporting of such an intervention in Libya and also in (another brewing cesspool) Ivory Coast (where the mix there is both tribal and religious)?


That does not, however, translate into an open ended commitment to support any group of unknowns involved in civil violence with their government. Especially not in a region where the people calling on us to intervene are likely to condemn us for it the day after we do.

Did I, did Fuchs, has anyone proposed an open ended commitment to rebels, future government or what ever in Libya? Don't think so.

It appears that (with some justification) there is a pathological fear (in some quarters) about Libya becoming another swamp into which the US military will be sucked.

My point all along has been that to cause the Gaddafi regime to collapse is pretty easy (if you go for the pressure points and not try the multiple body blow routine).

I remain interested in these so-called "unknowns". Many countries have maintained embassies in Libya and no doubt had intel assets constantly on the go but when something major happens every shouts that no one could have seen it coming and that they don't know who these people are (the rebels). (I don't want to get started on the competence or otherwise of the State Department or the CIA - or indeed the British Foreign Office and MI6)

But surely they knew that the military structure designed to protect the state against a military coup was inherently weak and that the weapons systems were somewhere between obsolete and obsolescent?

You only need to use what is needed to deal with a particular situation. Any more is wasted.


It most definitely does not translate into using less than all available resources to ensure that our troops conduct it as safely to themselves as possible.

My point was that it clearly backfired when the number of Tomahawks used was announced in the press. It freaked out the weak and the vacillating. A PR mistake which they seem to have learned from.

[JMA]

No, I introduced that variable two weeks ago. It was dumb then, it still is...

But the point of mine you challenged was:


The saving grace of course is that the military will step in, wrap it up in a few days, then hand the lot over to some politically correct structure who is likely to screw it up..

You expressed that you were dubious about that and I asked which of the two... and we are still going on with that.


Yes, the "remaining effort" should be the interesting part.

Yes, like when does protecting civilians translate into CAS for the rebels.


I agree with both those statements. However, simple does not equate with effective and neither is the same as success (in either case) ;)

Effective in terms of the NFZ means that none of Gaddafi's aircraft can get airborne (which the Brit air Force chap assured the world on TV last night was the case) without getting shot down by "coalition" aircraft themselves at next to no risk from Gaddafi's air defences.

I talk here of the ease of establishing a NFZ over a Mickey Mouse country with few military skills and obsolescent equipment. My opinion on what happens later was not covered in that post.


You seem to have this fetish about nerves. Mine are long gone...

In this case I would think it is prudent to be concerned about the nerves of the "coalition" who may if freaked out enough may withdraw their support for the exercise.

As to my nerves I have more nerves about being paid on time these days than I ever had in the military. Back then life was simple, dangerous but simple. (I did not appreciate either then)


Your military commentary is usually accurate IMO. Your political commentary I often agree with as a statement of goals but I almost invariably disagree with the practicality of implementing most of your recommendations.

That's fine Ken. My recommendations are based on the information I have to hand on any issue and also on my experience both in this neck of the woods or in the military. I would (humbly) suggest that most of my recommendation would work but due to a number of reasons (like the dithering incompetence of politicians and the inability of the military to think out of the box sometimes) would be impossible to implement.

Take for example the Ivory Coast development (http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE72L0NK20110322).


The U.N. peacekeeping mission to Ivory Coast said Laurent Gbagbo's forces were readying an attack helicopter and multiple rocket launchers on Tuesday and condemned the growing use of heavy weapons against civilians

Now you don't need to be a rocket scientist to realise that one missile per target will fix this little problem (based on the fact that they will not be expecting any strike and this this weapons may well be grouped together.) As easy as that. Will it happen...nah.


I have no problem with action, all for it in fact -- I simply prefer smart action to stupidity and the all too often western habit of doing something even if it's wrong. We can disagree on the advisability of what is being done -- as to who's correct, we'll have to wait and see.

As I have stated elsewhere there are two actions in play here. One, to intervene and two, how to intervene.

On the first I agree but criticise the late decision (with the cost in Libyan lives) and on the second I can merely comment based on what I hear with the possibility that some of those actions the military carries out may be governed by the decisions of the politicians.


Good try -- I realized that long ago, your incorrect assumption that it was spin -- you do that a lot -- led you astray. As occurs frequently when one misconstrues for whatever reason. A lot of things the US does, good and bad, are pure serendipity. Function of the rather chaotic governmental process...

I am a believer in the eponymous law of Hanlon's Razor - "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity."


That's where we differ; you believe noble intent is adequate in the face of or to offset flawed execution and exacerbated situations. I disagree. Consider the force or forces to be involved and all too often one creates more problems than are solved. Noble intent not realized or thwarted for whatever reason is quite simply a waste.

Clearly we are at odds on this point. One comes before the other. The decision to intervene is made then a military strategy is formulated. Timing is often at a premium so, yes, certainly political interference and the abilities of the units available will count heavily in terms of the potential for success. I wonder how much the military has learned about being prepared for the least expected at the least opportune time?


I have great confidence in the weapon -- I have almost none in the intelligence community to provide the same degree of accuracy... I also have fair confidence in the ability of the evildoers of this world to outsmart our ego driven attempts.

So what you saying here? That it has less to do with the merits of the intervention but rather more to do with your confidence in being able to execute the intervention effectively?


What you and I think about them is largely irrelevant -- what affected populations and politicians think is another thing entirely. We can discount that and post merrily on any discussion board -- the other folks may end up involved -- or losing an election over it. That may not matter to you -- it matters to them.

And this is only possible with an uneducated electorate?


Nah, not salt -- try the pepper. Old Soldiers should be math whizzes. I figure your 26 as really being ~600M people (Nations are neat but they don't fight, people do), add another similar amount for the 'almosts' and you get 1.2B. That's ~20% of the nominal global population. You may not be concerned about that other 80% but someone better be... :wry:

Oh I am concerned about the people but as per the context of my post I am speaking about being concerned about what the dictator or non-elected so-called leader of a captive nation says. This is the problem in the UN.

[JMA]

JMA,

Given your history, here at SWJ, of regularly advocating for the ultra-violence it is interesting to me to note your recent concerns regarding humanitarian issues in Libya.

Why? It is quite possible to target only very evil people with extreme violence. Hence my saying that if you take Gbagbo out, take Gaddafi out, take Mugabe out by violent means you are actually doing the world and their respective countries a favour for which they will be eternally grateful.


The two articles which I linked to, highlighted South Africa’s flip-flopping regarding intervention in the internal affairs of Libya, and mapped out a portion of Libya’s political patronage network within the AU by project and country.

What you need to learn about South Africa is the following:

Opposition challenges dropping of 16 criminal charges against President Zuma (http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=20110301083718454)

and

ZUMA’S SON TO BE THE YOUNGEST SA BILLIONAIRE (http://newsdzezimbabwe.wordpress.com/2011/02/28/zumas-son-to-be-the-youngest-sa-billionnaire/)

So you do realise that South Africa has already been bought and sold. The decisions which can be influenced by those means have been and will continue to be made. So you need to figure out how to do business with the current government (which is obvious).


It appears to me that you are not pleased with the decisions made by the US with respect to Libya. Our nation’s decisions will not be changed to please you. :wry:

I am entitled to an opinion. I am entitled to take a position. I have no expectation that I will be in step with US thinking and actions more than on the odd occasion. This worries me not... as it shopuld not worry you.


My statement that NFZ’s generally escalate into something more than a NFZ is based upon more than a gut feeling.

I have been following the evolution of ‘Kurdistan’ for a number of years and served in a supporting role in Europe during the establishment of Operation Provide Comfort (later Operation Northern Watch (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Northern_Watch)). I served on the periphery of Yugoslavia, watched it’s disintegration, followed Bosnia, and had trained up for Kosovo when Iraq intervened and I was attached to the 101st during OIF1.

What do you think the US Administration see as "mission accomplished" in Libya? This you probably realise may go beyond UNSC resolution 1973.


Discounting your characterization of ‘ill-advised’, history nonetheless reflects that the national interests of NATO members have overlapped sufficiently to formulate joint responses to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya.

Some believe the Libyan intervention to be ill-advised. I personally believe that NATO was arm twisted into Iraq and Afghanistan. Have not read anywhere where European "national interests" were served by their Iraqi and Afghan involvement other than to keep uncle Sam happy.


Will you acknowledge the successes that have accompanied the failures? Will you acknowledge that the US is not the only actor implementing changes? Will you further acknowledge the responsibilities of a nation’s leaders and inhabitants to effect positive change? ;)

To the first, I'm a bit lost as to list any successes... please help.

To the second, yes... but quite often they need a little help ;)

[davidbfpo]

The UK-based think tank, the Quilliam Foundation, which has an ex-LIFG senior member as a staff member, have published a paper 'The jihadist threat in Libya':


Noman Benotman, a senior analyst at Quilliam and a former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, said:

‘Gaddafi has tried very hard to give the impression that the Libyan opposition is controlled by al-Qaeda. This ideas flies in the face of all the evidence. The opposition is a diverse coalition of Libyans from many tribal and political backgrounds. Just because some Islamists support the opposition against Gaddafi this does not make the opposition Islamist.

‘At the same time, there are some extremists who want to manipulate the Libyan conflict for their own ends. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is looking for ways to play a greater role in this conflict. Since the start of the year it has tried to move men and arms into Libya from its bases in Niger and Mali, near Libya’s southern border. At the same time, al-Qaeda’s leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan are trying to portray the international intervention in Libya as a ‘crusader’ attack on Muslim in order to further their own agenda.’

James Brandon, Director of Research at Quilliam, said:

‘Although Gaddafi’s claims that the opposition is an al-Qaeda front are utter nonsense, it is clear that the fighting in Libya has created a vacuum in which extreme groups – including al-Qaeda – may be able to operate. There are signs that al-Qaeda leadership, both in Pakistan and in North Africa, believe that events in Libya could be a chance for them to create a second Iraq. The international community needs to work with the opposition leadership in Libya in order to shut out these extremists before they can hijack Libya’s popular uprising for their own ends.’

‘But while there are significant extremist elements active in Libya, we should welcome the fact that many members of the Libyan opposition movement say they are fighting Gaddafi out of religious conviction. If these people sincerely believe that democracy, human rights and freedom are compatible with Islam, this is all the more reason why we should support them in their struggle. Such people are the best antidote to groups like al-Qaeda that believe that democracy and human rights are incompatible with Islam.

‘The small number of extremists fighting against Gaddafi should not distract us from the fact that most of the opposition – and indeed most Libyan people – aspire to create a modern, democratic and open Libya. We need to distinguish between extreme Islamists who dress up their anti-democratic politics in religious language and mainstream Muslims who express their opposition to Gaddafi through religious language and references.

Link:http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/pdfs/libya24march11.pdf

[ganulv]

Some globalpost coverage (http://www.globalpost.com/video/5631921/raw-feed-benghazi-under-fire) of the opposition forces. Does the United States Government know how to pick a winner or what?

[Ken White]

I talk here of the ease of establishing a NFZ over a Mickey Mouse country with few military skills and obsolescent equipment. My opinion on what happens later was not covered in that post.My point is you cannot -- or certainly should not -- ever divorce the two. Such thinking, that divorce, effectively puts the contributing nations and the Libyans (both or all sides /parties) in never-never land...

That flawed thinking has occurred all too frequently in these interventions. Plain old simple backward planning could fix most of that.
Clearly we are at odds on this point. One comes before the other. The decision to intervene is made then a military strategy is formulated. Timing is often at a premium so, yes, certainly political interference and the abilities of the units available will count heavily in terms of the potential for success. I wonder how much the military has learned about being prepared for the least expected at the least opportune time?My reluctance to support such operations is induced by participation in a couple and observation of many more all of which show that the military (generic / worldwide) has learned, or more correctly, instilled little. That and the seemingly almost mandatory vacillation of all politicians...

Noble intent is laudable and desirable; at least marginal competence, consistency and will are desirable and IMO more important. The first will be wasted in the absence of the latter. I believe the Hippocratic dictum of "First, do no harm..." applies.

The usual error is indeed to decide to intervene then direct a 'strategy' or plan be devised. What should happen is that nations who espouse such an interventionist policy should develop a strategy on intervening, insure it is resource and effective and then wait for a need -- but that requires more foresight than most are willing to support.
So what you saying here? That it has less to do with the merits of the intervention but rather more to do with your confidence in being able to execute the intervention effectively?Yes. That is based on the dual premise that failure in not achieving aims and thus potentially doing more harm than good to the affected populace also induces in others a perception of weakness or incompetence on the part of the intervening nation or force that frequently leads to more such 'crises.'
And this is only possible with an uneducated electorate?Sadly, that does seem to be always correct... :(
Oh I am concerned about the people but as per the context of my post I am speaking about being concerned about what the dictator or non-elected so-called leader of a captive nation says. This is the problem in the UN.I got the context but the broader problem is as you say... :wry:

[slapout9]

Why? It is quite possible to target only very evil people with extreme violence. Hence my saying that if you take Gbagbo out, take Gaddafi out, take Mugabe out by violent means you are actually doing the world and their respective countries a favour for which they will be eternally grateful.



Absolutley agree 100%. Why do we fret and worry about being mean to people who are absolutley evil. I just don't get it myself:confused:

[slapout9]

That flawed thinking has occurred all too frequently in these interventions. Plain old simple backward planning could fix most of that.

Absolutely! do they even teach that anymore? I was taught that as 18 year old Paratrooper. What is that saying Americans have a memory or attention span of about 5 minutes.

[Ken White]

Both due in my belief to the fact we've allowed, even encouraged, the inmates to take charge of the institution. :rolleyes:

:D

[Surferbeetle]

Why? It is quite possible to target only very evil people with extreme violence. Hence my saying that if you take Gbagbo out, take Gaddafi out, take Mugabe out by violent means you are actually doing the world and their respective countries a favour for which they will be eternally grateful.

IMHO this is not a reasonable course of action nor is it recommended at this time. :rolleyes:

Your suggested COA does not address reasonable legal and moral restrictions regarding the prohibition of assassination of heads of state.

IMHO all projects have at least three primary components; political, economic, and technical. Leaders of all ranks and positions remain leaders because they are able to consistently harmonize these three components.

As presented, your recommended course of action is focused exclusively upon a small portion, belonging to the security portion, of the technical component of a solution. To reiterate, it does not address the full range of issues involved and would result in more problems than it would solve.

A case study of the trial of Saddam Hussein (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trial_of_Saddam_Hussein) is a place to look for possible answers.


I am entitled to an opinion. I am entitled to take a position. I have no expectation that I will be in step with US thinking and actions more than on the odd occasion. This worries me not... as it should not worry you.

I recognize your right to an opinion and position and do not think or imply otherwise. I too have an opinion and will not be deterred in expressing it either. ;)

Between these two positions there is ample room for both of us to discuss a variety of events and experiences, and I look forward to discussing additional ones with you. :wry:


What do you think the US Administration see as "mission accomplished" in Libya? This you probably realise may go beyond UNSC resolution 1973.

I am concerned that the publicly stated objectives for the NFZ are based upon a simple and static viewpoint while the actual problem is a very complex one, which is also quite dynamic and not constrained by arbitrary national borders.

Turkey attacks France on Libya ‘crusade’ (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fe514f9c-5631-11e0-8de9-00144feab49a.html#axzz1HMbgIKQ3), By Delphine Strauss in Ankara, Published: March 24 2011 17:00 | Last updated: March 24 2011 17:00, at the FT


The Turkish government on Thursday lashed out at France over its approach to military intervention in Libya and its refusal to confer sole command of operations to Nato.

Ahmet Davutoglu, foreign minister, also said it would be “impossible for us to share responsibility in an operation some authorities have described as a crusade” – a reference to the gaffe made earlier this week by Claude Guéant, French interior minister.

Reçep Tayyip Erdogan, prime minister, cast doubt on the motives for the French-led intervention, telling a conference: “I advise our western friends, when they look at this region, to see the hungry children, the suffering mothers, the poverty . . . I wish they would not only see oil, gold mines or underground wealth.”

[jmm99]

Two reports from the CRS (Congressional Research Service):

No-Fly Zones: Strategic, Operational, and Legal Considerations for Congress (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41701.pdf)


Summary

The ongoing uprising in Libya against the government of Muammar al Qadhafi has been the subject of ongoing domestic and international debate about potential international military intervention, including the proposed establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. Congress may wish to consider issues surrounding the strategy, international authorization, congressional authorization, operations, and costs of establishing and maintaining no-fly zones.

The military strategy designed to support the grand strategy, it has been suggested, might be based on these considerations: the operational-level military objectives that need to be achieved, to support the overall grand strategy; and the extent to which a no-fly zone — as one set of ways and means — helps achieve those objectives.

Practitioners and observers have debated what constitutes international “authorization” for the establishment of a no-fly zone. Given the paucity of relevant precedents, and the dissimilarities among them, there may not exist a single, clear, agreed model. The concept of authorization is typically considered to be linked to the ideas of both “legality” and “legitimacy” — the three concepts overlap but are all distinct. The precise meaning of each of the terms is still debated. Express authorization from the U.N. Security Council provides the clearest legal basis for imposing a no-fly zone.

In addition to international authorization, debates have addressed the question of congressional authorization—whether and when there is a need for congressional approval based on the War Powers Resolution for a proposed no-fly zone. The question of whether and how congressional authorization is sought for a proposed operation could have an impact on congressional support — including policy, funding, and outreach to the American people — for the operation. Since the War Powers Resolution gives the President the authority to launch U.S. military actions prior to receiving an authorization from Congress for 60-90 days, it is possible that the President could direct U.S. Armed Forces to take or support military actions in accordance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, or in support of NATO operations, and then seek statutory authority for such actions from Congress.

No-fly zone operations can conceivably take a number of different forms, and can themselves vary a great deal over time. Key considerations include, but are not limited to, the following factors: the nature, density, quantity, and quality of adversary air assets; geography; the availability of “friendly” assets; the adversary’s military capabilities and responses; the U.S. military’s concept of operations, and the rules of engagement.

The costs of establishing and maintaining a no-fly zone are likely to vary widely based on several key parameters. They could be the specific military tasks that a given no-fly zone operation calls for, the geography of the adversary’s country, the duration of the no-fly zone, the extent to which the U.S. is joined by international partners in the effort, and the extent of “mission creep” — how, if at all, the operation expands to include a broader array of activities designed to achieve the same military and strategic objectives.

Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf)


Summary

From the Washington Administration to the present, Congress and the President have enacted 11 separate formal declarations of war against foreign nations in five different wars. Each declaration has been preceded by a presidential request either in writing or in person before a joint session of Congress. The reasons cited in justification for the requests have included armed attacks on United States territory or its citizens and threats to United States rights or interests as a sovereign nation.

Congress and the President have also enacted authorizations for the use of force rather than formal declarations of war. Such measures have generally authorized the use of force against either a named country or unnamed hostile nations in a given region. In most cases, the President has requested the authority, but Congress has sometimes given the President less than what he asked for. Not all authorizations for the use of force have resulted in actual combat. Both declarations and authorizations require the signature of the President in order to become law.

In contrast to an authorization, a declaration of war in itself creates a state of war under international law and legitimates the killing of enemy combatants, the seizure of enemy property, and the apprehension of enemy aliens. While a formal declaration was once deemed a necessary legal prerequisite to war and was thought to terminate diplomatic and commercial relations and most treaties between the combatants, declarations have fallen into disuse since World War II. The laws of war, such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions, apply to circumstances of armed conflict whether or not a formal declaration or authorization was issued.

With respect to domestic law, a declaration of war automatically triggers many standby statutory authorities conferring special powers on the President with respect to the military, foreign trade, transportation, communications, manufacturing, alien enemies, etc. In contrast, no standby authorities appear to be triggered automatically by an authorization for the use of force, although the executive branch has argued, with varying success, that the authorization to use force in response to the terrorist attacks of 2001 provided a statutory exception to certain statutory prohibitions.

Most statutory standby authorities do not expressly require a declaration of war to be actualized but can be triggered by a declaration of national emergency or simply by the existence of a state of war; however, courts have sometimes construed the word “war” in a statute as implying a formal declaration, leading Congress to enact clarifying amendments in two cases. Declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force waive the time limitations otherwise applicable to the use of force imposed by the War Powers Resolution.

This report provides historical background on the enactment of declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force and analyzes their legal effects under international and domestic law. It also sets forth their texts in two appendices. The report includes an extensive listing and summary of statutes that are triggered by a declaration of war, a declaration of national emergency, and/or the existence of a state of war. The report concludes with a summary of the congressional procedures applicable to the enactment of a declaration of war or authorization for the use of force and to measures under the War Powers Resolution. The report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

cont in pt 2

[jmm99]

Also from Jack Goldsmith (who headed OLC during part of the GWB administration), The Legal Reason Why the Obama Administration Won’t Call the Libya Action “War” (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/03/the-legal-reason-why-the-obama-administration-won%e2%80%99t-call-the-libya-action-%e2%80%9cwar%e2%80%9d/) - which primarily discusses two OLC opinions made during the Clinton administration (for Haiti (http://www.justice.gov/olc/haiti.htm) and for Bosnia (http://www.justice.gov/olc/bosnia2.htm) - no OLC opinion on the legality of the Kosovo intervention exists on the public record).

Jack makes the following two points:


I think the Obama administration embraced these [Dellinger] arguments because, like the Clinton administration, it did not want to rely on broader theories of presidential power. Going this route also avoids having to embrace (or explain away) the awkward post-Dellinger, Clinton-era unilateral intervention in Kosovo, which involved eleven weeks of intense aerial bombardment. Nonetheless, using the Dellinger rationale in Libya is awkward for at least two reasons.

First, the Haiti and Bosnia interventions were different. Dellinger gave considerable weight to the fact that Haiti and Bosnia were consensual interventions. The Libya intervention is not. Dellinger suggested in the Haiti opinion that “the limited antecedent risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the deployment” (JG emphasis) weighed against the intervention being a war that required congressional authorization. In Libya, both significant armed resistance and substantial casualties from a week of heavy bombing could have been anticipated. Dellinger also said in the Haiti opinion that “other aspects of the planned deployment, including the fact that it would not involve extreme use of force, as for example preparatory bombardment [JG emphasis], were also relevant to the judgment that it was not a ‘war.’” Extreme use of force and preparatory bombardment are what Libya is about. Cutting in the other direction, both the Bosnia and Haiti deployments involved (or were anticipated to involve) a lot of U.S. troops on the ground – troops that are harder to disengage from fighting than mere aerial bombardments. Nonetheless, those troops were being sent there as part of consensual peacekeeping or stability missions, not as a coercive force. For these reasons, it seems to me that characterizing the Libya intervention as not “war” requires an expansion, possibly significant, of the Dellinger rationale for unilateral presidential power.

Second, the Dellinger rationale becomes less persuasive with each passing day as the duration of the conflict grows longer and the casualties and physical damage pile up. It also starts at some point to look like Kosovo, the precedent the administration apparently wants to avoid.

It is impossible for outsiders to know how much the “no war” rhetoric and the imperative for the United States to withdraw soon from active hostilities are being driven by domestic and international politics, and how much are being driven by the Justice Department’s (or the White House’s) skittishness about indulging a broader theory of presidential power. The more the administration keeps insisting that the Libya intervention is “not war” in the face of growing domestic skepticism about the claim, the more I think legal considerations are driving the rhetoric.

Please note that all of these are "political questions". As such, it is highy unlikely that SCOTUS will address them directly.

Regards

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

Please note that all of these are "political questions". As such, it is highy unlikely that SCOTUS will address them directly.

Regards

Mike

Mike,

As always I greatly appreciate these insights and lessons. ;) :)

Cheers,

Steve

[tequila]

Despite Libyan claims, little evidence of civilian casualties (http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20110324/wl_csm/372058)- A nasty part of me wants this regime to survive, if only because propaganda this inept is so rarely found nowadays.

[Presley Cannady]

This forum would clearly be beyond politically incorrect if it was German forum. I won't elaborate on this, for any appropriate description would only deteriorate this thread.

It would be an interesting thread in its own right, probably best in "The Coalition Speaks." For what it's worth, I imagine Germany's last two military crescendos means she gets as much a pass where it concerns the common defense as Japan.

[JMA]

Despite Libyan claims, little evidence of civilian casualties (http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20110324/wl_csm/372058)- A nasty part of me wants this regime to survive, if only because propaganda this inept is so rarely found nowadays.

Yea, this indicates are that the word precision has been put back into the use of these weapons. Excellent work all round. This must surely lead to greater confidence in the ability stand off (no boots on the ground) and if not bring a rogue regime down at least cripple its ability to wage war against its own people or others. This is the big plus to come out of this exercise.

The Libyan claims of civilian casualties are merely playing to the emotions of the anti-US and anti-West lobby who dutifully take up the refrain. Still can't think of why Gaddafi's TV and radio have not been jammed. Still can't think why radio and TV FREE LIBYA are not broadcasting from a ship off the coast. The value of Psyops seems still to be vastly underrated.

[JMA]

IMHO this is not a reasonable course of action nor is it recommended at this time. :rolleyes:

Your suggested COA does not address reasonable legal and moral restrictions regarding the prohibition of assassination of heads of state.

Your personal opinion.

Yes the US has put itself out of play because of the law (which I don't know much about the exact wording) but that does not extend to all nations (for this read those that still can take out a criminal head of state.)

You can of course be forgiven for seeing everything through the single lens of US perspective but perhaps one day the scales will lift and you will begin to see a big world of vastly differing perspectives out there.

Lets monitor the body counts in Libya and Ivory Coast (just these two as we have open threads on them here) and see what the trade off has been between some pretty stupid US law and the lives and livelihoods of people. That will be painful I know and no doubt the emotional knee-jerk responses will fly.

You see I place the lives of humans way above the discussions around why the US should or shouldn't get involved with humanitarian intervention. I get outraged at the obvious inhumanity of what is increasingly coming out of the US. (this is why I snip your next two IMHO nonsense paragraphs)


I recognize your right to an opinion and position and do not think or imply otherwise. I too have an opinion and will not be deterred in expressing it either. ;)

That is as it should be... and lets hope that it stays that way around here.


Between these two positions there is ample room for both of us to discuss a variety of events and experiences, and I look forward to discussing additional ones with you. :wry:

Fine with me.


I am concerned that the publicly stated objectives for the NFZ are based upon a simple and static viewpoint while the actual problem is a very complex one, which is also quite dynamic and not constrained by arbitrary national borders.

Focus upon Libya. If (now) NATO is able to enforce the NFZ and protect the civilians from Gaddafi's forces then it will be mission accomplished.

You don't write like someone who has served in the military (so hopefully not sounding condescending) I suggest you take cognisance of the first principle or war (at least the Brit one) which is "Selection and Maintenance of the Aim". The aim must be given to military commanders and they must be given the tools to achieve that aim. Once the politicians start to fudge the aim daily/weekly/monthly it makes it all but impossible for military commanders.

So yes these issues can be discussed for as long as you have time and the number of cups of coffee those you want to discuss this stuff can manage... but eventually you have to cut to the chase, establish the aim and let the military get on with it.

I tried some days ago in post #380 to ask the question:


When the regime collapses there is no doubt that there will be excesses by the rebels and victims of the regime unless there is a mechanism to establish effective policing in the country. What is the plan here? Is there a plan? Who will be involved in such a plan? Who should be involved in such a plan?

It is clear there is no plan. In fact it is equally clear that the State Department have absolutely no idea of what's happening on the ground (nor probably the CIA).

What do you think the plan should be for when either Gaddafi folds or the situation reaches a Libyan East/West stale mate?

[JMA]

My point is you cannot -- or certainly should not -- ever divorce the two. Such thinking, that divorce, effectively puts the contributing nations and the Libyans (both or all sides /parties) in never-never land...

I agree with that and that is why I asked the question in post #380 "What's next?"


That flawed thinking has occurred all too frequently in these interventions. Plain old simple backward planning could fix most of that.My reluctance to support such operations is induced by participation in a couple and observation of many more all of which show that the military (generic / worldwide) has learned, or more correctly, instilled little. That and the seemingly almost mandatory vacillation of all politicians...

I understand your frustrations from personal experience and personal observation. But I as stated elsewhere can't accept a refusal to intervene on humanitarian grounds based on implementation problems. The US military has had enough experience in these matters to have lined up all the contingency plans (including those covering their own politicians incompetence) for all possible scenarios. All politicians are broadly incompetent especially when it comes to small wars and interventions but with large powerful countries the damage they can do is in proportion to their size and the stupidity of their politicians.


Noble intent is laudable and desirable; at least marginal competence, consistency and will are desirable and IMO more important. The first will be wasted in the absence of the latter. I believe the Hippocratic dictum of "First, do no harm..." applies.

As I have alluded to above the as time passes the military has few options to pass the buck to the politicians. The military should be learning too.


The usual error is indeed to decide to intervene then direct a 'strategy' or plan be devised. What should happen is that nations who espouse such an interventionist policy should develop a strategy on intervening, insure it is resource and effective and then wait for a need -- but that requires more foresight than most are willing to support.Yes. That is based on the dual premise that failure in not achieving aims and thus potentially doing more harm than good to the affected populace also induces in others a perception of weakness or incompetence on the part of the intervening nation or force that frequently leads to more such 'crises.'Sadly, that does seem to be always correct... :(I got the context but the broader problem is as you say... :wry:

This is an important point. I thought where were forces called "Rapid response (something)" under NATO which could be used fior just such a purpose. (I am assuming here that the command and control issues have all been sorted out for such operations at NATO level?)

Just as one would set up standby peace keeping forces from 2nd tier (and less resourced) militaries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, India, Pakistan and the rest there should be a peace-making force from the likes of the US, UK and France - with some Muslim input on stand-by for boots on the ground operations such as from Algeria, Egypt, Malaysia and Indonesia.

This UN business is a sheer waste of time and it and the veto power at the UNSC is probably the largest cause or contributing factor to the loss of life in the last few hundred years. Totally ineffective and useless.

So given the circumstances I understand the frustrations you and many other have experienced from having tried to soldier under these sub-optimal circumstances. One thinks of that poor man Lt-General Roméo Dallaire in Rwanda as an extreme example.

Then of course we get to RoE which seems to be at the heart of the problems in Afghanistan. This gives more than a mere perception of weakness or incompetence it must be said.

The bottom line is that if the US can't get it right then there are few others who possibly could.

[Ken White]

You're right on most of these and that is -- indeed -- the problem...
I agree with that and that is why I asked the question in post #380 "What's next?"That you and I ask it is nice. That a lot of politicians in a lot of nations and a lot of serving military people asked it as they did (and are still doing...) is far better and more important. The questions remain:

Why did the decision makers not address that or listen to their advisors prior to commitment?

Why is this a recurring problem involving most nations at one time or another?
But I as stated elsewhere can't accept a refusal to intervene on humanitarian grounds based on implementation problems. The US military has had enough experience in these matters to have lined up all the contingency plans (including those covering their own politicians incompetence) for all possible scenarios. All politicians are broadly incompetent especially when it comes to small wars and interventions but with large powerful countries the damage they can do is in proportion to their size and the stupidity of their politicians.In order, I don't agree because I'm convinced that all our (the world's) experience points to a rather common lack of success in the efforts -- I suggest we need to rethink 'humanitarian' intervention totally.

You'd think. Alas, re the US military, countering anticipated incompetence and politicians world and US experience to date shows that human fallibility and egos intrude in both the political and military arenas and thus the significant potential for flaws stays with us, year after year, administration after administration. The same phenomenon can be seen in all nations, all to my knowledge, that intervene anywhere for whatever reason. Same errors, over and over... :(

It is possible to do what you suggest but it would take a major cultural shift (and that worldwide, not just US specific) that I do not foresee.
As I have alluded to above the as time passes the military has few options to pass the buck to the politicians. The military should be learning too.I agree but must say that it obviously does not and possibly, even probably, will not...:mad:
This is an important point...Algeria, Egypt, Malaysia and Indonesia.Again, you and I agree -- what are we going to do about those stupid nations that won't listen to us??? :eek: :mad:
This UN business...Totally ineffective and useless.True.
...One thinks of that poor man Lt-General Roméo Dallaire in Rwanda as an extreme example.Agree in part but must say I'm not a Dallaire fan nor am I sympathetic...
Then of course we get to RoE which seems to be at the heart of the problems in Afghanistan. This gives more than a mere perception of weakness or incompetence it must be said.True. The ROE are not solely to blame, our marginal training and deeply flawed personnel policies as well as political factors intrude. Combined, they equate to tying hands and literally forcing weakness and less than stellar competence...
The bottom line is that if the US can't get it right then there are few others who possibly could.That is scarily correct -- and that IS the problem because we, the world in general as well as the US, apparently -- obviously -- cannot and will not get it right. My belief is that we have not a political, military or planning problem in relation to interventions, humanitarian or otherwise but rather a significant and constant human foible problem that must be considered in designing a different approach for the future.

I doubt it'll be an easy fix...

[Bob's World]

This is not peace keeping, peace making, or war.

How about "Violence Mitigation"? The whole idea should be to encourage both sides to shift to less violent tactics and to get them to a mediated resolution of their own design.

Sometimes the big guy needs to step in, crack some heads together, and make people work it out. He can't solve it for them, and he shouldn't help one side win either. Just set some parameters and let them work it out.

[AdamG]

The pervading feature of the conflict in Libya has been the ineptitude of the main rebel force. Time and again they have failed to take advantage of weaknesses among Muammar Gaddafi's troops and, just as frequently, they have fled in the face of fire.

The most glaring example was the opportunity offered by the air strikes carried out by the West which destroyed the regime's tanks and artillery outside Benghazi and forced its soldiers into a terrified retreat to the next city, Ajdabiya.

Rather than press home their advantage and retake Ajdabiya, the rebel fighters – known as the Shabaab – were too busy having their pictures taken with the wreckage or looting anything left intact from the supply trucks. A desultory attack late in the day was easily repulsed by the regime's forces which then dug in around the city.

*
The rebels' operations are further undermined by an absence of command and control. On Monday two men standing within a hundred yards of each other, "Captain" Jalal Idrisi and "Major" Adil Hassi, claimed to be in charge of the fighters who were meant to be attacking Ajdabiya. A brief advance soon turned into a chaotic retreat. Major Hassi then claimed that the misjudgement in going forward had been Captain Idris's idea. But why didn't they liaise? "We haven't got communications equipment" he responded. But the Captain is standing just over there, journalists pointed out. "I don't talk to him," said Major Hassi. :eek:

(Then again, how often have we encountered a more-subtle version of 'left hand, meet right hand' in 1st World Armies?)

http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/kim-sengupta-the-resistance-has-foundered-on-its-own-indiscipline-and-farcical-ineptitude-2251298.html

[M-A Lagrange]

This is not peace keeping, peace making, or war.

How about "Violence Mitigation"? The whole idea should be to encourage both sides to shift to less violent tactics and to get them to a mediated resolution of their own design.

Sometimes the big guy needs to step in, crack some heads together, and make people work it out. He can't solve it for them, and he shouldn't help one side win either. Just set some parameters and let them work it out.

Bob, I think you're right. The whole purpose is to bring some proportionality into this. And some gentlemen manners on G side.
The rest is left to them to solve.

[Entropy]

This is not peace keeping, peace making, or war.

How about "Violence Mitigation"? The whole idea should be to encourage both sides to shift to less violent tactics and to get them to a mediated resolution of their own design.

Sometimes the big guy needs to step in, crack some heads together, and make people work it out. He can't solve it for them, and he shouldn't help one side win either. Just set some parameters and let them work it out.

Can you provide any example where what you've described has actually worked?

[Ken White]

Great question... :D

[Bob's World]

Can you provide any example where what you've described has actually worked?

Where it worked? Or where the intervening party was able to constrain itself from pressing for its own agenda and carrying one side to victory that they thought would best serve their interests?

I will have to think on that, and I suspect there are very few examples due to the historic fact that in the past, establishing a beholding regime was the proven method of advancing one's interests in some region.

That model has been failing at an accelerating rate for at least 150 years in correlation with advances in information and transportation technologies.

In today's environment, the US's interests are best served by a solution that the local populace perceives to be of their own design and making. At some point one has to break with the past to move forward. Perhaps this is that point where we finally turn loose and take that risk.

[davidbfpo]

Entropy,

I would suggest the Lebanon, where IIRC Syria intervened in the civil war, effectively freezing the situation in Beirut and yes violence lessened, the issues did not go away alas. I am sure Rex B. or Wilf can comment better.

Near to home I would say Northern Ireland, underpinning the UK's response to violence was containment and the prevention of escalation. It took a long time and was a "bumpy" journey. Certainly at the start of the latest round, 'The Troubles' in 1969 few would have foreseen the Good Friday Agreement, let alone today Sinn Fein and the DUP in a governing coalition.

Maybe Cyprus? Further back I think the interventions of the League of Nations in post-1918 Europe merit some attention, Upper Silesia comes to mind and the population transfer between Greece and Turkey.

[jmm99]

You should clear out some deadwood in your PM storage box.

Cheers

Mike

[slapout9]

How about "Violence Mitigation"? The whole idea should be to encourage both sides to shift to less violent tactics and to get them to a mediated resolution of their own design.



Point 1:There is an old expression and I don't remember who said it but it goes like this. "Don't strike the King unless you intend to kill him."

Point 2: Daffy is a psychopathic megalomaniac.....mediate??? If Daffy survives he will just become bolder, that is how these people work. And I use the term people loosely because he is not a People, he is an animal in disguise. You need to go after him, his thugs and all their personal property. If you don't, sooner or later he will extract revenge. The man wears an elephant hat:eek: and remember elephants don't forget.

[AdamG]

Point 1:There is an old expression and I don't remember who said it but it goes like this. "Don't strike the King unless you intend to kill him."

Point 2: Daffy is a psychopathic megalomaniac.....mediate??? If Daffy survives he will just become bolder, that is how these people work. And I use the term people loosely because he is not a People, he is an animal in disguise. You need to go after him, his thugs and all their personal property. If you don't, sooner or later he will extract revenge. The man wears an elephant hat:eek: and remember elephants don't forget.

Either
Ralph Waldo Emerson (http://books.google.com/books?id=TZRP2CuHESAC&pg=PA56&dq=%22when+you+strike+at+a+king+you+must+kill+him% 22#v=onepage&q=%22when%20you%20strike%20at%20a%20king%20you%20m ust%20kill%20him%22&f=false)

or Machiavelli (the jist, at least), take yer pick.

"And here we must observe that men must either be flattered or crushed; for they will revenge themselves for slight wrongs; whilst for grave ones they cannot. The injury, therefore, that you do a man should be such that you need not fear for revenge." - Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter 3.

[Bob's World]

Point 1:There is an old expression and I don't remember who said it but it goes like this. "Don't strike the King unless you intend to kill him."

Point 2: Daffy is a psychopathic megalomaniac.....mediate??? If Daffy survives he will just become bolder, that is how these people work. And I use the term people loosely because he is not a People, he is an animal in disguise. You need to go after him, his thugs and all their personal property. If you don't, sooner or later he will extract revenge. The man wears an elephant hat:eek: and remember elephants don't forget.

Isn't this what so many said about Saddam? Blowing out the old and creating a power vacuum for everyone to fight to fill is no high road to success.

Neither is latching onto some side, like the Northern Alliance and carrying them to victory, only to get stuck to their own bad politics, ill will and poor governance like the proverbial tarbaby.

What do they say we use, 20% of our brains? Might be about time to dip into the reserves for another 1%.:)

[Ken White]

I would suggest the Lebanon... Upper Silesia comes to mind and the population transfer between Greece and Turkey.But to learn your thoughts on these, are any of them (what one could call) 'resolved?'

If not, do you consider the intervention or mediation of others to be of net benefit?

[M-A Lagrange]

But to learn your thoughts on these, are any of them (what one could call) 'resolved?'

If not, do you consider the intervention or mediation of others to be of net benefit?

Depends on what you call net benefit. If the benefit of syrian intervention was to crush israel influence in lebanon: did work :rolleyes:

[Bob's World]

To be clear, I think most such domestic disputes are none of our business to mess with at all, but this one is special for reasons that are sadly missed by most of our senior leadership.

I listened to Pat Buchanan today on the Morning Joe, and he was ranting about how stupid this was, not in our interest, comparing it to the Sudan, Rwanda, etc.

For me, it all comes back to how do we best reduce the threat to the American populace, our infrastructure and our interests from the surge of terrorist attacks coming out of the Sunni Muslim populaces of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula?

The experts rail about ideology, radicals, terrorists, etc I'm not buying it. I think it comes down to the fundamental quest of people for liberty on their own terms under governments that they accept as having the right to government them. We the west over centuries of colonialism, and we the US over decades of Cold War Containment-driven controls, and 20 years of simply being too big for our britches and doing whatever we damn well please, have corrupted this process.

In Libya, as follow-up to Tunisia and Egypt, there is an opportunity to frame the message. To get it right and communicate it to the populaces and the leadership of the region. Leaders cannot count on us to simply retain them in power regardless of how they act, and neither can populaces assume we will come and carry their revolution to success. It is time for everyone to evolve.

Frankly, I think the President is playing this damn smart. If more "experts" thought so as well I would probably have to reassess.

[Entropy]

David,

Agree with Ken that I'm not sure those are "resolved" and, of course, it's hard to know the counterfactual. I'm not saying it can't be done, but those two examples would indicate that it's not simply a matter of "cracking some heads" together to get people to work out their differences - rather it's an effort that takes decades of commitment.

Given everything going on in the US I feel pretty confident in predicting that the US doesn't have the resources or national will/interest for that kind of commitment.

[Ken White]

M-A Lagrange: I think you made one of my points. There'll generally be a benefit. A net benefit, though, accrues to most if not all parties and is long term. I think that a good portion of benefit should apply to the 'recipient' of the 'assistance.' I'm not sure Lebanon or anyone other than Syria derived much benefit from that intervention...

Bob's World:
We the west over centuries of colonialism, and we the US over decades of Cold War Containment-driven controls, and 20 years of simply being too big for our britches and doing whatever we damn well please, have corrupted this process.I understand your point but I'm not buying the 'we' the west item -- to wit the 'we.' I didn't participate in that and while I acknowledge it occurred and the ills (and ill feelings) that were caused have effects that must be considered, the foolishness of 'western guilt' is dangerous and is a strong contributor to the political class's desire to intervene for 'humanitarian' reasons. It's a foolish delusion to think you can make up for two centuries of someone else's wrongdoing by firing a few Tomahawks. Or doing much else. I agree with your oft stated dictum we should change our ways but you at the same time advocate interventions for spurious reasons -- that is a conflict and many have called that to your attention. Either you wish we would change or you want us to keep doing what we've been doing but do it your way. Can't have it both ways. :wry:

I also dispute your "20 years of being too big for our britches" -- I realize that tallies with your experience but the reality is the period is not 20 years but about 50 -- the first 30 went by with only one real comeuppance, Viet Nam. So the follow on Administrations allowed their egos to block that lesson that should have been but was not learned -- or the wrong lessons were learned, viewpoint dependent.

Among those not learning the right lessons were -- and are -- the bulk of the Armed forces of the USA. That, BTW, includes USSOCOM. ;)
In Libya, as follow-up to Tunisia and Egypt, there is an opportunity to frame the message. To get it right and communicate it to the populaces and the leadership of the region.The problem is that it will not be done your way; it will be done in our usual well-meaning but bumbling way and therefor will almost certainly do more harm than good.

All you strategerists should really learn to think tactically -- worst case everything and backward plan... ;)

[slapout9]

Isn't this what so many said about Saddam? Blowing out the old and creating a power vacuum for everyone to fight to fill is no high road to success.

Neither is latching onto some side, like the Northern Alliance and carrying them to victory, only to get stuck to their own bad politics, ill will and poor governance like the proverbial tarbaby.

What do they say we use, 20% of our brains? Might be about time to dip into the reserves for another 1%.:)

That may all true but none of that matters anymore. My point is Daffy will see the US(not NATO,Plato,Snoopy or Droopy) as targeting him, no matter what the spin is. The administration has put our country at great risk by thinking you can mediate with a psychopath, he is going to take it personally and he want forget.

[Bob's World]

Ken,

I agree that the US approached the world much differently in the past. From our initial focus on just getting our own act together; shifting to expanding across North America to the Pacific; then to a bit of Colonialism in the first half of the last century to pick the jewels from a fading Spain's crown with a keen eye to securing the access to the Caribbean and Panama; as well as the very best harbors and coaling stations to expand a naval security blanket over our commerce into the Asia-Pacific Region. Next big bump was getting involved in WWI, then II and the subsequent role of leading the West in the Cold War. The final escalation was the hegemon phase upon the collapse of the Soviets. Now here we are today. (Realize you were there for most of that, so the update was more to help organize my own rambling thoughts...)

Personally and professionally, I don't think the US needs to apologize to anyone. Where we stepped on toes, others stomped on balls. It hasn't been all goodness and light, but in the big scheme of things (realizing that I cannot help but be biased) think the world could have done a whole lot worse.

But here we are today. We are not the same country we were at the end of WWII, and we do not operate in the same world that emerged from WWII either. Prior to WWII we were constrained in our actions by more powerful or more established European countries. We were more humble, more apt to mind our own business, and almost always could offer a deal that made us look way better than the European alternative.

People appreciated that, particularly in the context of our own national narrative of how we had stood up to the Euro big dogs and prevailed, and the powerful promise of liberty contained in our national principles was a shining light to little guys everywhere.

Then we grew up and became our parents; when others held up our own documents and demanded their own freedom, we turned our backs and allowed their old European masters to resume their old dominion over them. As nationalist China fell, the Russians got nukes and the Cold War got a whole lot colder, we rolled up our sleeves and got a whole lot dirtier as well. Ike and the Dulles brothers learned that manipulating governments was not all that hard. The proverbial slippery slope. Big business loves dictators, the US loves big business, so the US learned to love dictators as well.

It all worked great until Al Gore had to go and invent the Internet!! (kidding) But the advances in info-tech and transportation-tech that coincided with the fall of the Soviets was a HUGE change. But it was the Clinton era, and we were too busy partying to notice. Every now and then some genocide would compel us to lend a hand, but we did little or nothing to change how we did business. We put the chips on the table and we let it ride.

9/11 was a wake up call. On a certain level we should have thanked bin Laden for the cold slap in the face, kicked his ass and changed our ways. Instead we dug in deeper. No one was going to make us change! Classic addict behavior. Anger, denial, self-destructive behavior. We had all the classic signs.

The new boss is signing up for recovery. A national 12-step program, if you will. Obviously there are strong urges within the national body to stay the course and not change. Such change is hard, and it comes with pitfalls.

We have an opportunity here. My opinion. Also my opinion that we are playing this about right. As we debate Libya on the Small Wars Journal, government leaders and resistance group leaders are meeting (separately, for obvious reasons) in countries across the region and they are discussing this too. We need to remember that, as they are the critical audience for this message.

I predict we see a spike in arrests in many countries, as revolutionary minded citizens break cover in attempts to get better organized; and as governments crank up their efforts to avoid being next. But this is inevitable. It will spread, and there will be more, and it will happen in places that affect our security and economy directly. Count on it.

[Bill Moore]

I saw an interview with GEN Ham last night on ABC and he said (paraphrased)if you're intervening based on humanitarian reasons (to stop the killing), then you have to intervene relatively fast or what's the point? That means we may have to commit forces to stop the killing before we have a military end state figured out.

O.K. I don't entirely disagree with that logic as far at it goes, but getting to Slap's point, Qadhafi has employed terrorism and sponsored militant activity against his foes for years to include the U.S. (the disco bombing in Germany, and possibly PanAm 103, but understand there is still debate on whether that was ultimately sponsored by Iran or Libya), and while never truly an ally, he is definitely an enemy now and we're going to leave him untouched and negotiate with him? State sponsored terrorists can be much more dangerous than non-state terrorists based on the State's ability to provide intelligence, move money, weapons, people, etc. In the past State sponsored terrorism attacks were limited in scale, because they wanted to make a point not start a war. However, if we're already at war why would they limit the scale of their attacks? I agree with Slap that Americans are at great risk now due to this adventure.

If we are authorized to employ all means to stop the murder of Libyan civilians by their Government, then it would seem to me that the person ordering their murder would be a legitimate target? Why not? The longer the coalition waits to kill him the more of hero he will become because he is defying the West. We need to kill him now before he reaches folk hero status. We made this mistake with Sadr in Iraq, so here we go again.

Once again we're seeing the limits of air power. First off the Libyan Air Force was not the main military element killing civilians, it was their ground forces, and their ground forces now are reportly putting on civilian clothes and moving into areas to kill civilians who may be counter government.

GEN Ham's point above is right as far as it goes, but it is also true if you leap before thinking it through then you'll generally end up in a quagmire. Since we leapt and are currently in ankle knee deep mud this is no time to be paralyzed by indecision. Once we're in mud up to our mid thighs it will be too late to exit with honor and actually accomplish something.

[davidbfpo]

But to learn your thoughts on these, are any of them (what one could call) 'resolved?'

If not, do you consider the intervention or mediation of others to be of net benefit?

Ken,

From my viewpoint, which I surmise is quite different from the America, resolving conflicts is seen differently. Stop or reduce the violence, encourage reconciliation, even compromise (surrender to some) and let the passage of time help. I suspect we see things in a longer time frame than you do; we certainly did in the past.

Lebanon - the civil war ended, a communal resolution of sorts emerged and yes with many issues unresolved.

Northern Ireland - civil insurgency much reduced, to a tiny Republican core, with an overwhelming majority wanting peace and yes a wide resolution on key issues: NI remains part of the UK and non-majority government.

Upper Silesia - irregular violence ended by the international forces presence, begrudging acceptance of the borders and as history teaches us resolved in 1945 with the German population being expelled.

Crisis de-escalation has been paramount in each case cited, although in some places like the Caucasus it has clearly not been a factor.

The intervention or mediation of others in conflicts takes many forms, from the 'Blue Berets' to the quieter, low profile work of Italian priests in Mozambique IIRC and the Scandinavians elsewhere.

[M-A Lagrange]

M-A Lagrange: I think you made one of my points. There'll generally be a benefit. A net benefit, though, accrues to most if not all parties and is long term. I think that a good portion of benefit should apply to the 'recipient' of the 'assistance.' I'm not sure Lebanon or anyone other than Syria derived much benefit from that intervention...

Once again Ken, it really depend on which side you are. For many lebanese: Israel departure is preceived as a good thing. For many in the US, probably not.

As I said previously, this intervention is aimed to equilibrate the conflict and if possible kick G out of power. This does not mean his government would disapear. As David just said, it's rather a way to force negociations. But I would be less confident in the long term benefits. Zim has proven (for many other reasons) that it was agueable.

I personally would not oppose to boots on the ground but only at the condition it's limited to special ops and advise. Bringing troops in such context would be endangering US and EU. Bringing adequate shadow support to finalise popular push would be certainly more profitable.

Like in chess: remove the queen and then you're in better position. Does not need you will win 100%. But in that case, you certainly have an immediat benefit in the arab world.

[Surferbeetle]

Your personal opinion.

Yes the US has put itself out of play because of the law (which I don't know much about the exact wording) but that does not extend to all nations (for this read those that still can take out a criminal head of state.)

You have failed to convince me as to why your suggested COA should be followed. :wry:

I see your suggested COA as conflating the Law of War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laws_of_war) with the Rule of Law (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_law), while tripping over the golden rule (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Golden_Rule).

You did not mention it, but COL G's military rank throws an interesting technical curve ball. As far as free press reporting goes, however, it would seem that COL G is not leading the troops from the front and is instead acting as a head of state.

My position is unchanged; Heads of State are out of bounds for reasonable legal and moral reasons.


You see I place the lives of humans way above the discussions around why the US should or shouldn't get involved with humanitarian intervention. I get outraged at the obvious inhumanity of what is increasingly coming out of the US. (this is why I snip your next two IMHO nonsense paragraphs)

As I have previously mentioned, US national interests trump JMA's interests.

Regarding my two paragraphs which you refer to, they are a simplification of the concept of DIME - Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic.

Let’s explore it further.


Focus upon Libya. If (now) NATO is able to enforce the NFZ and protect the civilians from Gaddafi's forces then it will be mission accomplished.

A good commander maximizes his options and minimizes those of his opponent. :wry:

Let's run a quick/incomplete free press SITREP using a DIME filter to see if NATO is following COL G’s hopes and your recommendation that we focus exclusively upon what is occurring inside of Libya:

Diplomacy


The Arab League continues to back the operation ( Arab League reiterates support for Libya action (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/40efd34e-53dc-11e0-8bd7-00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=4965b382-497c-11e0-b051-00144feab49a.html#axzz1HMbgIKQ3), By Roula Khalaf in London, Published: March 21 2011 23:24 | Last updated: March 21 2011 23:24, at the FT )


Military


NATO has taken control of the operation. ( French, British Forces Strike Libya as NATO Steps In (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-25/jets-from-france-britain-strike-libya-ground-forces-as-nato-takes-control.html), By Patrick Donahue and Gregory Viscusi - Mar 25, 2011 12:13 PM MT, Bloomberg )


Information


Saudi Arabia has previously experienced a failed attempt on Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and has an interest in Libya as well ( Assassination Attempt Targets Saudi Prince (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125144774691366169.html), MIDDLE EAST NEWS, AUGUST 29, 2009, By MARGARET COKER, WSJ )


Economic


Russia is helping to bring pressure to bear on Libya (Russia bans arms sales to Libya (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2011/03/20113107287576160.html), Last Modified: 10 Mar 2011 09:45 GMT, Al Jazeera)



Saudi Arabia has increased oil output in order to make up for the loss of Libyan Oil (Iraq Refinery Bombed; Libya Plant’s Supply Cut: Persian Gulf Oil ("http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-28/iraq-refinery-bombed-libya-plant-s-supply-cut-persian-gulf-oil.html), By Anthony DiPaola - Feb 28, 2011 5:14 AM MT, Bloomberg


I am sticking with DIME; IMHO what is going on behind the curtain is just as, if not more so, as important as what is occurring on the stage.


What do you think the plan should be for when either Gaddafi folds or the situation reaches a Libyan East/West stale mate?

IMHO, whether COL G is bought off and retires somewhere or dies, the international community will still have a significant problem in Libya. As I have previously mentioned Libya’s Civil Institutions (free markets/private enterprise, free press, mosques/churches, universities, guilds, and associations) appear to have been significantly weakened by a parasitic, kleptocratic, and centralized government. It should be noted that the reported per capita GDP in Libya is high, $16,210 USD (per The Economist’s 2011 Pocket World in Figures for reference Egypt’s was $5,430 USD) and so expectations within Libya will be high with respect to any follow on government. I have not seen any free press BDA on the Libyan oil and gas facilities which will be needed to reconstruct/restore/fund efforts so this, as well as the potential renegotiation of production contracts remain a wild card.

IMHO an East/West stalemate will also be problematic for the international community for many of the same reasons I have outlined in the departure COA above. The stalemate will also require training and arming of an Army for the Eastern portion of Libya as well as a technocratic training and equipping push for basic governance skills. Figuring out how to split the Nation’s oil and gas proceeds will most likely be painful and reminiscent in some way of the UN Oil for Food program we saw in Iraq.

The impact upon the international community surrounding and external to Libya is not a trivial calculation and will take some more time…I’ll think about it, but life is busy and so I may or may not post about what I think



It is clear there is no plan. In fact it is equally clear that the State Department have absolutely no idea of what's happening on the ground (nor probably the CIA).

There is always a plan. The US is a super power and it runs 24/7.

IMHO the more appropriate question to ask is: Is the current plan a good plan? I suspect that quote attributed to PM Churchill applies here: “You can always count on Americans to do the right thing—after they've tried everything else”


You don't write like someone who has served in the military (so hopefully not sounding condescending)

No offense taken:wry:

Pesky Americans are difficult to pigeon-hole. There are over 300 million of us, we don’t buy into the royalty/authority thing, we often question/ignore doctrine, we have a moon rock, and we will not go quietly :D

[Surferbeetle]

You should clear out some deadwood in your PM storage box.

Cheers

Mike

Mike!

Done!

Best,

Steve

[jmm99]

As our surfer boy correctly points out:


from SB
Pesky Americans are difficult to pigeon-hole....

I found the latest set of Rasmussen polls (see this post for links (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=118219&postcount=103)) re: Libya and other related issues very interesting - especially the gulf between the American Political Class on one hand, and the Mainstream and Most Likely Voters on the other hand.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

From my viewpoint, which I surmise is quite different from the America, resolving conflicts is seen differently. Stop or reduce the violence, encourage reconciliation, even compromise (surrender to some) and let the passage of time help. I suspect we see things in a longer time frame than you do; we certainly did in the past.Very much so, I think -- we are entirely too impatient. That impatience is a known factor and should be included in our planning and other strategic evolutions. Unfortunately, it is not...
The intervention or mediation of others in conflicts takes many forms, from the 'Blue Berets' to the quieter, low profile work of Italian priests in Mozambique IIRC and the Scandinavians elsewhere.True.

Thanks.

[JMA]

You have failed to convince me as to why your suggested COA should be followed. :wry:

I promise I have no intention of attempting to convince you or anyone else to accept my belief that to target the cause of the problem as early as possible is the quickest/best/most cost effective manner of resolving many of the conflicts we face today or have faced in the past. Take it or leave it.


I see your suggested COA as conflating the Law of War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laws_of_war) with the Rule of Law (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_law), while tripping over the golden rule (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Golden_Rule).

Now you betray that you really don't have an argument against "striking at the head of the snake with the first blows". Posting links of no relevance does not prove anything.


You did not mention it, but COL G's military rank throws an interesting technical curve ball. As far as free press reporting goes, however, it would seem that COL G is not leading the troops from the front and is instead acting as a head of state.

That is a technical curved ball for whom? A country with a stupid/ridiculous law that you can't target a head of state? That I assure you is only a curved ball for the US. A self inflicted wound if you like.

To the French for example he is not the head of state as they have recognised the opposition. So ask the French to do the business. Or you too can recognise the opposition and maybe that bypasses that legal limitation?

Once again I need to draw your attention to that you seem to look at this situation through the narrow single lens of a US point of view. You are missing the other 359 degrees which diminishes your options significantly.


My position is unchanged; Heads of State are out of bounds for reasonable legal and moral reasons.

This is complete nonsense. In the case of Gaddafi how the leader of a coup was ever recognised as a head of state merely exposes the weakness of the international diplomacy system and plays into the hands of thugs and military commanders who will seize power by any means and hold on to it by same. Political history of the world over the last 50 odd years bears testament to this.

I don't share you definition of morals (maybe because I don't come from a "everything is negotiable" society). That a thug/murderer and insane to boot person may be masquerading as a Head of State should confer no special protection on him. In fact quite the opposite. Again you are allowing your moral and world view to be shaped by a stupid law of merely one country of the world.


As I have previously mentioned, US national interests trump JMA's interests.

I don't have interests, I merely offer opinions. As for the US interests what exactly are these? Here I read many variations by people who (arrogantly) write as if they and they alone speak on behalf of the US people and not to mention an even wider variation to be found out there in the media.

I would suggest to you then that part of the problem is that the US itself does not have any agreement over what is in its best interests.


Regarding my two paragraphs which you refer to, they are a simplification of the concept of DIME - Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic.

Let’s explore it further.

Don't bother. It was nonsense then and you can't improve on that now.

[snip]


IMHO, whether COL G is bought off and retires somewhere or dies, the international community will still have a significant problem in Libya. As I have previously mentioned Libya’s Civil Institutions (free markets/private enterprise, free press, mosques/churches, universities, guilds, and associations) appear to have been significantly weakened by a parasitic, kleptocratic, and centralized government. It should be noted that the reported per capita GDP in Libya is high, $16,210 USD (per The Economist’s 2011 Pocket World in Figures for reference Egypt’s was $5,430 USD) and so expectations within Libya will be high with respect to any follow on government. I have not seen any free press BDA on the Libyan oil and gas facilities which will be needed to reconstruct/restore/fund efforts so this, as well as the potential renegotiation of production contracts remain a wild card.

That's not the point.

The point is that unless Gaddafi is "moved on" there are no options for Libya.

...and the beauty about Libya is that they can pay for it all themselves through their oil revenues and the currently blocked funds overseas and the billions more they will be able to uncover once they have a new government in place.

Now had the UN moved faster in this matter there would have been less costs relating to humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. Maybe the US should pay due to the incompetence of the Obama/Clinton tag-team?


IMHO an East/West stalemate will also be problematic for the international community for many of the same reasons I have outlined in the departure COA above. The stalemate will also require training and arming of an Army for the Eastern portion of Libya as well as a technocratic training and equipping push for basic governance skills. Figuring out how to split the Nation’s oil and gas proceeds will most likely be painful and reminiscent in some way of the UN Oil for Food program we saw in Iraq.

So are you suggesting Gaddafi should be left in place? Should Saddam have been left in power? I must say that this is not sounding like a very intelligent argument right now.


The impact upon the international community surrounding and external to Libya is not a trivial calculation and will take some more time…I’ll think about it, but life is busy and so I may or may not post about what I think

There is always a plan. The US is a super power and it runs 24/7.

Sure it runs 24/7 but it is becoming increasingly obvious that the clowns are running the circus. It is also becoming increasingly clear that the US is not being well served by monoliths like the State Department and the CIA which are repeatedly being exposed has being hopelessly incompetent. Little wonder that the US as a super power is on the wane.


IMHO the more appropriate question to ask is: Is the current plan a good plan? I suspect that quote attributed to PM Churchill applies here: “You can always count on Americans to do the right thing—after they've tried everything else”

There is a plan?

[Ken White]

Bob's World:
Personally and professionally, I don't think the US needs to apologize to anyone. Where we stepped on toes, others stomped on balls. It hasn't been all goodness and light, but in the big scheme of things (realizing that I cannot help but be biased) think the world could have done a whole lot worse.That I can and do agree with. Let me suggest that you often come across as one of those American apologists -- a genre that I believe has done us far more harm than good and for whom I have no respect. In any event, that apparent contradiction in your deliveries creates confusion in the minds of us old and addled folks. Thus my "can't have it both ways comment."

As an aside, every dirty trick that the Dulles brothers and Eisenhower employed they learned from the master, FDR. He still, with the possible exception of Jefferson was the most devious , outwardly nice and inwardly evil (or at least willing to employ it for his own ends...) of all the Presidents.
9/11 was a wake up call. On a certain level we should have thanked bin Laden for the cold slap in the face, kicked his ass and changed our ways. Instead we dug in deeper. No one was going to make us change! Classic addict behavior. Anger, denial, self-destructive behavior. We had all the classic signs.True. I'll also reiterate that the armed forces were -- and are -- a significant contributor to that addiction...
The new boss is signing up for recovery. A national 12-step program, if you will. Obviously there are strong urges within the national body to stay the course and not change. Such change is hard, and it comes with pitfalls.Pitfalls indeed. That new Boss is highly likely to walk right into a few of those. Somehow, I get the impression that things are awry up there. Hopefully he will not replace the hard stuff with Methadone...
We have an opportunity here. My opinion. Also my opinion that we are playing this about right. As we debate Libya on the Small Wars Journal, government leaders and resistance group leaders are meeting (separately, for obvious reasons) in countries across the region and they are discussing this too. We need to remember that, as they are the critical audience for this message.I agree in part but have two reservations; one small -- that we will blow the opportunity as we have others in the last 50 (almost precisely to the month) years (that number has significance for idealistic governance...). Let me again remind you, "All you strategerists should really learn to think tactically -- worst case everything and backward plan...

The second reservation is perhaps more important. My perception is that the message those in countries across the region think they are receiving is almost certainly not the one you and others seem to think we are sending...:wry:
I predict we see a spike in arrests in many countries, as revolutionary minded citizens break cover in attempts to get better organized; and as governments crank up their efforts to avoid being next. But this is inevitable. It will spread, and there will be more, and it will happen in places that affect our security and economy directly. Count on it.Oh, I've been counting on it for about eight or nine years as I realized what G. W. Bush was putting in motion in the way of tying his successor's hands. Probably several successors... :D

M-A LaGrange:
Once again Ken, it really depend on which side you are... For many in the US, probably not.I'm not communicating my thoughts well, my apologies. To me for it to be a "net gain" most parties involved would have to realize benefits and those benefits would remain for some years. In the case of Lebanon, I do not seem any long term benefits for anyone, really -- not even Syria other than briefly. For most in the US, I doubt the issue reached their consciousness and thus few saw it as either a benefit or not.
As I said previously, this intervention is aimed to equilibrate the conflict and if possible kick G out of power. This does not mean his government would disapear. As David just said, it's rather a way to force negociations. But I would be less confident in the long term benefits. Zim has proven (for many other reasons) that it was agueable.I agree with your last point, I doubt any meaningful or lasting negotiations will result. Whether Gaddafi stays or goes will make little difference, I suspect.

I agree with the rest of your post -- actually, I agree with all of it, just wanted to make those comments on the first portion... :cool:

[JMA]

I saw an interview with GEN Ham last night on ABC and he said (paraphrased)if you're intervening based on humanitarian reasons (to stop the killing), then you have to intervene relatively fast or what's the point? That means we may have to commit forces to stop the killing before we have a military end state figured out.

If you wait until you have all your ducks in a row then the intervention will be too late as the humanitarian crisis will be over - for that read the killing will be complete like in Rwanda.

[snip]


If we are authorized to employ all means to stop the murder of Libyan civilians by their Government, then it would seem to me that the person ordering their murder would be a legitimate target? Why not? The longer the coalition waits to kill him the more of hero he will become because he is defying the West. We need to kill him now before he reaches folk hero status. We made this mistake with Sadr in Iraq, so here we go again.

Why not? I am led to believe that there is a law in the US which prevents a "head of state" being targeted. Seems pretty silly to me.


Once again we're seeing the limits of air power. First off the Libyan Air Force was not the main military element killing civilians, it was their ground forces, and their ground forces now are reportly putting on civilian clothes and moving into areas to kill civilians who may be counter government.

That is another good reason why the head of the snake should be targeted. Once gone he will no longer be a rallying point and paymaster of these assassination squads.


GEN Ham's point above is right as far as it goes, but it is also true if you leap before thinking it through then you'll generally end up in a quagmire. Since we leapt and are currently in ankle knee deep mud this is no time to be paralyzed by indecision. Once we're in mud up to our mid thighs it will be too late to exit with honor and actually accomplish something.

I would suggest that there will be a number of senior officers who know exactly what is required to bring peace to Libya. They are not the problem. The clowns in the WH and at State are the problem.

[Ken White]

Acerbic responses are okay, those that dip into condescension and dismissiveness are approaching a degree of incivility that is not necessary. You are a valuable contributor and have proven you can be civil and not scathingly caustic. The "(snip)" bit is unnecessary, just don't comment -- but then, you know all that...
That is a technical curved ball for whom? A country with a stupid/ridiculous law that you can't target a head of state? That I assure you is only a curved ball for the US. A self inflicted wound if you like.To clarify, the US law is that a head of state cannot be targeted outside his own country. (LINK .pdf (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf) -- see .pdf page 40, document page 35) In event of a condition of war and if he or she is in that country, they are just another target and are fair game. There is some ambiguity as is usually the case. The Executive order that pertains to assassination (a different thing than targeting...) can be dismissed by the originator or by any other President. That order was promulgated as a result of specific incidents and to buy Congressional favor for other things. It was, in the opinion of many, not well thought out.

The issue is in conditions less than a state of war -- which applies to the Libyan operation -- there are moral constraints. As morals are an individual construct, what anyone of us thinks is our business. What the President of the US thinks is his business. Unlike the rest of us, he can impose his morals to an extent.

Heads of state are fair game but there are minor rules. Governments are bureaucracies, after all. We may be dumb in spots but we are not stupid and in an existential case, rules go by the wayside. Essentially, the effect must be worth the cost. I'd also note that France (among others) can for a variety of reasons do things the US tends to catch an excessive amount of often ignorant flack for doing... :wry:

[jmm99]

Comparison of Rasmussen with another usually trustworthy poll (Gallup) seemed in order.

Here is Rasmussen, 45% Support U.S. Military Action in Libya, 34% Oppose, 21% Undecided (http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/march_2011/45_support_u_s_military_action_in_libya_34_oppose_ 21_undecided).

Here is Gallup, Americans Approve of Military Action Against Libya, 47% to 37% (http://www.gallup.com/poll/146738/Americans-Approve-Military-Action-Against-Libya.aspx) (16% Undecided).

The two polls are in remarkable agreement.

Gallup also provides a comparison with initial pollings in other US military interventions:

http://sas-origin.onstreammedia.com/origin/gallupinc/GallupSpaces/Production/Cms/POLL/ylyl-nkftegtay5fyfkzpq.gif

Thus, 2011 Libya ranks with Grenada, Haiti and Kosovo - all with initial approval ca. 50%.

Since 2011 Libya resembles 1950 Korea (in that the Obama administration has bypassed Congress in favor of the UNSC - as Harry Truman did then), we can look to Gallup historical poles, War Through Partisan Lenses (http://www.gallup.com/poll/19924/War-Through-Partisan-Lenses.aspx).

Gallup's initial polling for Korea in August 1950 (before Inchon, when we were fighting along the Naktong) showed a majority in support. But, by Feb 1951 (after Inchon to Yalu, ChiCom intervention and our retreat below the 38th Parallel), the poll flipped:

http://media.gallup.com/GPTB/goverPubli/20051115b_3.gif

and by March 1952 got even worse for Harry Truman (see next chart in Gallup article).

A lesson learned is that unfavored military operations don't improve with age.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

Before everyone goes off half-cocked, read Hays Parks' 1989 Memo (attached in full as pdf).

BLUF:


In a Memorandum of Law originally dated November 2, 1989, W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant for Law of War Matters to The Judge Advocate General of the Army, examined national and international legal interpretations of assassination in order to provide guidance in revising a U.S. Army Law of War Manual. The memo is not a statement of policy, but rather a discussion of the definition of assassination and legal issues to consider in its application, including levels of conflict and the distinction between assassination in wartime and peacetime. It explores the meaning and possible application of assassination—which is prohibited as a matter of national policy by Executive Order 12333—in conventional, counterinsurgency, and counter-terrorist operations. The memo concludes that the use of military force against legitimate targets that threaten U.S. citizens or national security as determined by the President does not constitute assassination and would therefore not be prohibited by Executive Order 12333 or by international law.

Still definitive (IMO, humble or otherwise) - esp. as to enemy leaders:


12. While a civilian head of state who serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces may be a lawful target (and his or her attack therefore would not constitute an act of assassination), as a matter of comity such attacks generally have been limited. As previously stated, the death of an individual incidental to the attack of a military objective would not constitute assassination.

Note that, if Libya is not a war or armed conflict, a targeted killing might well be questionable. As COL Parks (then on loan from the Marines to the Army ;)) wrote:


Assassination in peacetime.

In peacetime, the citizens of a nation – whether private individuals or public figures – are entitled to immunity from intentional acts of violence by citizens, agents, or military forces of another nation. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations provides that all Member States “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations.”

Peacetime assassination, then, would seem to encompass the murder of a private individual or public figure for political purposes, and in some cases (as cited above) also require that the act constitute a covert activity, particularly when the individual is a private citizen. Assassination is unlawful killing, and would be prohibited by international law even if there was no executive order proscribing it.

That is one reason why I have a problem with the Bob's World argument based on the assertion that we must consider ourselves in a state of peace. A state of armed conflict (even though very constrained by ROEs or otherwise) is necessary for most all legal direct actions.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Acerbic responses are okay, those that dip into condescension and dismissiveness are approaching a degree of incivility that is not necessary. You are a valuable contributor and have proven you can be civil and not scathingly caustic. The "(snip)" bit is unnecessary, just don't comment -- but then, you know all that...

I'll tell you what I have learned around here and that is just how thin skinned this selection of Americans are. Very strange in a predominantly military group. The use of "snip" is generally used out here on the internet to reduce repeats of long passages in quoted pieces. Also if you wish only to reply to or comment on a specific section of a post. Thin skinned people may take the action as a slight but mature and emotionally balanced people don't. If I ever want to be rude I will be in-your-face rude, I promise.


To clarify, the US law is that a head of state cannot be targeted outside his own country. (LINK .pdf (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf) -- see .pdf page 40, document page 35)

[shortened... rather than snipped]

Heads of state are fair game but there are minor rules. Governments are bureaucracies, after all. We may be dumb in spots but we are not stupid and in an existential case, rules go by the wayside. Essentially, the effect must be worth the cost. I'd also note that France (among others) can for a variety of reasons do things the US tends to catch an excessive amount of often ignorant flack for doing... :wry:

Is Gaddafi outside Libya right now? Is Gbagbo still considered the Head of State?

OK so pass the message under the table to the French that their leadership in this matter (Gaddafi and Gbagbo) would be appreciated, yes?

[M-A Lagrange]

About taking head of state out of the equasion, an old adage I learned was: never kill the opposing party chief: you never know what would come after.
This is old grand'pa wishdom but does that apply in the case of G.

I would just remind that he likes to say I am not the head of Lybian state just the gardian of the revolution...
Without playing with words, as him, the real question is taking him out of the board means you have someone to replace him.
The problematic is not philosophical but practical: states (US, France, UK...) need someone to talk to.

For the Lybian rebellion: mission accomplished, at least for the french. A letter from the head of the rebellion council has arrived in Paris. (http://fr.news.yahoo.com/73/20110325/twl-le-chef-de-file-de-l-opposition-liby-d79e08a.html) sorry in french

But for the G government? There a special special ops is probably needed.

Anyways, seems G is in trouble: Ajdabiya felt during the night (for me):cool::cool:

[davidbfpo]

Opens with, citing an Italian newspaper story;
Mr al-Hasidi admitted that he had recruited "around 25" men from the Derna area in eastern Libya to fight against coalition troops in Iraq. Some of them, he said, are "today are on the front lines in Adjabiya".....Mr al-Hasidi admitted he had earlier fought against "the foreign invasion" in Afghanistan, before being "captured in 2002 in Peshwar, in Pakistan". He was later handed over to the US, and then held in Libya before being released in 2008.....Mr al-Hasidi was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, or LIFG..

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8407047/Libyan-rebel-commander-admits-his-fighters-have-al-Qaeda-links.html

Note this man is not the current rebel commander, rather a small group of fighters were recruited by him.

[JMA]

Opens with, citing an Italian newspaper story;

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8407047/Libyan-rebel-commander-admits-his-fighters-have-al-Qaeda-links.html

Note this man is not the current rebel commander, rather a small group of fighters were recruited by him.

I quote from that article:


...al-Qaeda had managed to pillage military arsenals in the Libyan rebel zone and acquired arms, "including surface-to-air missiles, which were then smuggled into their sanctuaries".

The cost of dithering.

[JMA]

About taking head of state out of the equasion, an old adage I learned was: never kill the opposing party chief: you never know what would come after.
This is old grand'pa wishdom but does that apply in the case of G.

One way or another Gaddafi has to go. So someone is going to replace him. Any reason not to take him out would indicate that his remaining in charge is an option. Do you really think it is?

[Ken White]

I'll tell you what I have learned around here and that is just how thin skinned this selection of Americans are. Very strange in a predominantly military group.Fuchs who also tends to caustic comments has noted the same thing. Could be a difference in national posting cultures -- more likely it is a reflection that this particular forum maintains a generally professional and respectful approach to posting, discouraging both profanity and incivility. There are numerous US forums, military and other, that do not attempt to do that and if one wants to engage in virtual rough and tumble, no holds barred arguments, those are available.
The use of "snip" is generally used out here on the internet to reduce repeats of long passages in quoted pieces. Also if you wish only to reply to or comment on a specific section of a post.I'm also aware that you push the limits deliberately in an attempt to be provocative and that you seem to calculate your use of the snip effect to further that.
Thin skinned people may take the action as a slight but mature and emotionally balanced people don't.I disagree. The snip action is ordinarily not a slight and generally no one takes it as that. However, your selective and inconsistent use of it often appears calculated and taken with the tone of specific posts that leads one to suspect deliberate provocative or derisory intent.

Calculated slights, excessively caustic comments and general incivility are not used by mature and emotionally balanced people who have no need to resort to innuendo and minor insults to make a point.
If I ever want to be rude I will be in-your-face rude, I promise.I'm sure you could do that, as could I -- that isn't the issue, nor is metaphorically beating ones chest on a textual discussion board particularly beneficial or impressive.

You have been warned by others and twice before by me to restrain from potentially provocative rhetoric that pushes the bounds of civility as desired on this board. You have been and can be a valuable contributor -- that fact has caused several of us to make allowances for your excessively acerbic style on occasion. It's getting tiresome. Show some of that maturity and less of the thin skin you mentioned.

[tequila]

More Gaddafi propaganda own-goals (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/world/middleeast/27tripoli.html?hp) - a woman breaks into the Tripoli hotel where foreign journalists are staying and tries to tell how she was raped and abused by pro-Gaddafi militia. Gaddafi loyalists prove her point by dragging her away after scuffling with journalists trying to protect her.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

http://washingtonexaminer.com/blogs/beltway-confidential/2011/03/jihadis-who-fought-us-iraq-afghanistan-now-enjoy-american-support


Evidence is emerging that United States forces are waging war in Libya on behalf of rebels whose ranks include jihadis who fought against the U.S. in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.

KaDaffy is a Bad Guy, but the people fighting against him are not necessarily Good Guys.

[Bill Moore]

Evidence is emerging that United States forces are waging war in Libya on behalf of rebels whose ranks include jihadis who fought against the U.S. in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.

There may be evidence somewhere, but it wasn't in the article referenced.

[Bob's World]

Of course these guys have AQ links.

Libya was then #2 in total numbers and the #1 in per capita in terms of providing foreign fighters to AQ in Iraq.

AQ is conducting UW across this region, just because some one takes the support of AQ or helps AQ out it does not make them AQ, it just means they needed help to achieve liberty and AQ was the only one offering.

Kind of like the American Colonies taking help from France didn't make us French.

As sailors say, "any port in a storm"; for nationalist insurgents it is typically more a matter of any UW source of support is better than none.

The intel guys and ideologues (most who truly know very little about insurgency or UW) will attempt to twist this into us supporting terrorists. Those with an anti-President Obama agenda will lead this assault.

If we do this right we will go a long ways toward disempowering AQ in this region and rendering them largely moot. These people want liberty, not to go from one form of oppressive slavery under Qaddafi to another form under AQ.

DOL,

Bob

[Ken White]

Not that it stops many from trying. I think the shrinks sometimes call that projection... :eek:
Libya was then #2 in total numbers and the #1 in per capita in terms of providing foreign fighters to AQ in Iraq.They also trained or hosted the training of a lot of other folks, including a slew of Somalis... :D
Kind of like the American Colonies taking help from France didn't make us French.Hmm. Basically correct but given the attitude of many Americans, perhaps not totally so.:wry:
The intel guys and ideologues (most who truly know very little about insurgency or UW) will attempt to twist this into us supporting terrorists. Those with an anti-President Obama agenda will lead this assault.Oh? What about those who voted for and totally support the President but who are concerned the issue is not supporting terrorists but aiding a group (not further defined) who will be as oppressive or more so than Gadaffi? What about those who are absolutely neutral on the President but are convinced that more secular governments in the region are needed and that any leaning toward religious fundamentalism should be deterred? Or those, either anti or pro the President who wish to support a faction that is in opposition those seeking or accepting AQ support?

There are many valid reasons for many things that do not entail a domestic political agenda and it is entirely possible to take a position out of true belief in the rightness of that stance without necessarily allowing ones attitude toward one or more people to affect decisions. That BTW is not nearly as rare as many seem to believe...
If we do this right we will go a long ways toward disempowering AQ in this region and rendering them largely moot.Please explain what doing it right entails, what should be done.
DOL,According to my texting kids, DOL is the brevity code for 'Dying of Laughter.' That's okay, I guess... :confused:

[Cannoneer No. 4]

Few of those people know what liberty is. The closest thing to "liberty" any living Libyan can remember is the "liberty" of being a subject of King Idris, or the "liberty" of the Bedouin raider.

"We" are unlikely to do this right. We have been wrong so long its is probably too late for the AC-130U gunships to make it right tonight.

Days, not weeks.

[Bob's World]

Few of those people know what liberty is. The closest thing to "liberty" any living Libyan can remember is the "liberty" of being a subject of King Idris, or the "liberty" of the Bedouin raider.

"We" are unlikely to do this right. We have been wrong so long its is probably too late for the AC-130U gunships to make it right tonight.

Days, not weeks.

Probably not the first time someone from Georgia observerd that "those people don't know what liberty is....
..
They will define it in their terms, and they will do just fine.

[Bob's World]

Ken,

I am fully aware that many are concerned about who we support in Libya. Fair concerns, as you full know these type of upheavals tend to attract all manner of men with all manner of motivations. There is no avoiding that.

Also those that are concerned we are supporting AQ in Libya and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will certainly come in all political flavors. The misinformation and misunderstanding on the nature of the conflict we face since 9/11 is not restricted to any side of the political aisle. I only said that the President's enemies will lead that parade, not that they will be alone.

As to how we do this right? That is the question. I don't know, but I think some things are important:

1. Remain as neutral as possible. We are here to referee the fight, not help one fighter beat up the other..

2. Stay focused on the big picture, and that is the Arabian Peninsula. All operations in Libya must set a precedent for how we will act elsewhere, and must be designed to send messages to governmental leaders, resistance leaders, and the general populace.

3. Shape a new message for Western audiences as well. GWOT is far more about people seeking liberty and governance of their own design than about Caliphates and radical concepts on Islam. Helping facilitate evolutions of governance across the Middle East is far more conducive to making Americans save than going about changing regimes we dislike and propping up those we do.

4. The war is over and has been for years. Yes we have men in combat, more than need to be. We have gotten sucked into immaterial close fights elsewhere, and will guard against that happening here. Meanwhile we will remain committed to the pursuit of AQ proper, but we will cease in the ridiculous branding of every nationalist insurgent who accepts AQ help as somehow becoming AQ or standing for what AQ stands for.

We have an opportunity to get onto the right track, if we dare to take it.

Oh, and "De Oppresso Liber," but then I know you knew that.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

Probably not the first time someone from Georgia observerd that "those people don't know what liberty is....

Rather than bolster my confidence and that of any lurkers that the anti-KaDaffy forces really are Good Guys, you attempt to kill my message because I am presently living in Georgia?

Lame, especially from a Floridian. You get a No Go at this station.

[Dayuhan]

Of course these guys have AQ links.

Libya was then #2 in total numbers and the #1 in per capita in terms of providing foreign fighters to AQ in Iraq.

AQ is conducting UW across this region, just because some one takes the support of AQ or helps AQ out it does not make them AQ, it just means they needed help to achieve liberty and AQ was the only one offering.

Kind of like the American Colonies taking help from France didn't make us French.

As sailors say, "any port in a storm"; for nationalist insurgents it is typically more a matter of any UW source of support is better than none.

If we do this right we will go a long ways toward disempowering AQ in this region and rendering them largely moot. These people want liberty, not to go from one form of oppressive slavery under Qaddafi to another form under AQ.


How does AQ's ability to recruit a few hundred Libyans to fight in Iraq suggest that the current rebels, a group that did not even exist then, are linked to AQ?

Who ever said that the Libyans who fought in Iraq were "nationalist insurgents" at home, and how would fighting in Iraq do anything to advance nationalist insurgency in Libya? It's not as if driving America out of Iraq would break the American support that was sustaining Gadhafi in power, because America wasn't giving Gadhafi any support. We'd taken him off the pariah list, but we weren't supporting him.


If we do this right we will go a long ways toward disempowering AQ in this region and rendering them largely moot. These people want liberty, not to go from one form of oppressive slavery under Qaddafi to another form under AQ.

There seems to be a lot of talk around these days about "getting it right" and "doing it right". How exactly do you want us to "do it right" in Libya? What would "doing it right" look like?

We don't know what "these people" want. We don't know that they all want the same thing, beyond getting rid of Gadhafi. Some may want liberty. Others may want to take Gadhafi's place.

I would guess that liberty and good governance are among the least likely outcomes of all this, in anything but a very extended time frame, and that with the resources we're willing (or, realistically, able) to commit there's little or nothing we can do to produce liberty and good governance.

We went into this essentially for emotional reasons. Gadhafi is loathsome and nobody wanted to see Benghazi sacked. Realistically, though, there's no desirable end state that the US has the power to bring about with the level of force that we are willing (or, realistically, able) to commit. Even if we or the rebels removed Gadhafi, that wouldn't make the rebels able to rule, and continued civil war, or a weak government beset by constant insurgency, or a Somali-style collapse remain more likely than liberty and good governance.

If we're going to be held responsible for the consequences of our actions, by ourselves and others, we should be very careful what actions we take, because most of the likely consequences suck.

[Dayuhan]

So I'll add...



1. Remain as neutral as possible. We are here to referee the fight, not help one fighter beat up the other..

2. Stay focused on the big picture, and that is the Arabian Peninsula. All operations in Libya must set a precedent for how we will act elsewhere, and must be designed to send messages to governmental leaders, resistance leaders, and the general populace.

3. Shape a new message for Western audiences as well. GWOT is far more about people seeking liberty and governance of their own design than about Caliphates and radical concepts on Islam. Helping facilitate evolutions of governance across the Middle East is far more conducive to making Americans save than going about changing regimes we dislike and propping up those we do.

I realize that the intentions here are all good, but I suspect that the outcomes will not be. Appointing ourselves to referee other people's fights and appointing ourselves to facilitate changes in other people's governments is not going to win us friends and admirers, anywhere. It is not going to be perceived as support for a populace, no matter what our intentions are. It's going to be perceived as gratuitous self-interested meddling. That doesn't disempower our enemies, it empowers them. Any time we meddle in the Middle East it gets spun as self interested pursuit of oil. Whether that's true or not is irrelevant, it is believed.

Unless we are specifically asked to referee or facilitate by people with a credible claim to represent a populace, we need to stay out. The solution to problems created by bad meddling is not good meddling, it's less meddling. I'm not sure there is such a thing as good meddling: meddling may on very rare occasions be necessary, but it's never good or desirable.

[Cole]

So I'll add...

I realize that the intentions here are all good, but I suspect that the outcomes will not be.But at least one outcome will be virtually no Libyan aircraft or air defenses and far fewer armored vehicles for WHOEVER takes over to use elsewhere or on their own people.


Appointing ourselves to referee other people's fights and appointing ourselves to facilitate changes in other people's governments is not going to win us friends and admirers, anywhere. It is not going to be perceived as support for a populace, no matter what our intentions are. It's going to be perceived as gratuitous self-interested meddling. That doesn't disempower our enemies, it empowers them. Any time we meddle in the Middle East it gets spun as self interested pursuit of oil. Whether that's true or not is irrelevant, it is believed.If they are going to believe that anyway...in addition to their belief that we support Israel and therefore we are bad...we are screwed anyway you look at it. After all, we helped Islamic people in Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. What did it get us a few years later?

So even if some Libyan rebels are jihadists, doesn't this give them a different pursuit outside Iraq and Afghanistan? Methinks it is better to have insurgents fighting their own government than fighting the U.S. and Afghani/Iraqi Soldiers.


Unless we are specifically asked to referee or facilitate by people with a credible claim to represent a populace, we need to stay out. The solution to problems created by bad meddling is not good meddling, it's less meddling. I'm not sure there is such a thing as good meddling: meddling may on very rare occasions be necessary, but it's never good or desirable.Seem to recall the Arab League and UN did ask us? I'm staying out of this second-guessing because it is a tricky situation and anyone claiming to know the answer is probably deluding themselves.

But you gotta admit it makes a great argument for serial rather than parallel destruction of our adversary. Things change, and new things come to light as conflicts evolve.

[carl]

It might be well to recognize the limitations of the study of the origins of the foreign jihadi types who went to Iraq. The authors were careful to note the limits of the data they had and cautioned about making definitive conclusions based upon it.

[Bob's World]

Rather than bolster my confidence and that of any lurkers that the anti-KaDaffy forces really are Good Guys, you attempt to kill my message because I am presently living in Georgia?

Lame, especially from a Floridian. You get a No Go at this station.

Cannoneer,

Easy big guy, not calling you racist, rather just pointing out that your observation is one that is commonly made of certain groups based upon the perceptions those outside the group in question. While a satisfactory brand of "liberty" for an average Libyan is likely quite different than for the average American the critical issue is that there is a universal quest in alll mankind for whatever it is they see as meeting that mark.

It is no less arrogant and condescending to assume that an Arab doesn't understand what liberty is today than it was for some southerner to assume that African Americans wouldn't know what to do if they were freed from slavery.

But yeah, I do want to "kill you message" if your message is that Libyans wouldn't know what to do with liberty if they had it. One has to assume that the current rebels come from a cross-section of the populace. Some are looking for loot, some for power, most simply to achieve what they have no legal peaceful means the achieve. One should also assume that there are agents representing Islamist groups seeking to gain an advantage. I would assume there are a variety of national agents at work as well. All seeking to advance the interests of their respective organizations.

But to this I say "so what"? This is always the case. This is what happens in revoultions. It is not justification not to act, but rather justification to ensure that our own engagement is designed to compete with those factions that we would perfer did not gain the greatest influence. That can't be done from 30,000' with the afterburners on. If all we do is fly by and blow the door open, we have no idea who will run through that door or who will be leading them.

[SWJ Blog]

The Battle for Libya (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/the-battle-for-libya/)

Entry Excerpt:

Over at the The New York Review of Books (http://www.nybooks.com/), Nicolas Pelham offers another look into defining and describing the motivations and interest of those rebelling in Libya in his article "The Battle for Libya (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/apr/07/battle-libya/?pagination=false)."

BLUF Tucked between the Mediterranean and the Sahara, the Libyan town of Brega was a rather somnolent back-of-the-beyond place on the Gulf of Sidra in the north of the country. Oil workers went there for its high wages and decent schools—an engineer at the Sirte Oil Company earned ten times more than his counterpart in the armed forces.

No longer. Brega, which sits on an oil lake, has become a battlefield in the fight against the government of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. Bombs drop among oil depots filled with hundreds of thousands of barrels, and in the past two weeks, the company managers have had to deal with four changes of regime. To hedge bets they keep in touch with both the rebels in Benghazi, to the east, and the Qaddafi regime in Tripoli, to the west.

The battle for Brega and a nearby but larger terminal, Ras Lanuf, has significantly upped the stakes in Libya’s conflict. It is being fought halfway between Colonel Qaddafi’s tribal heartland of Sirte and the rebel base in Benghazi, a city of 800,000, and has drawn traditional desert tribes into the revolution, including the large Maghraba and Zawiya clans, on whose coastal scrubland Brega lies. It also threatens to draw in an outside world jittery that southern Europe’s nearest oil supplies are now jeopardized.

Much more at The New York Review of Books (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/apr/07/battle-libya/?pagination=false)



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/the-battle-for-libya/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Bob's World]

http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-World-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Libyan-Islamic-Fighting-Group-LIFG-Libya.html

This short summary from Jane's is as good as any.

BLUF is that the LIFG has been running a nationalist insurgency for years, and they do employ an Islamist ideology (smart, given their target audience and the nature of the government they seek to take down); and they do affiliate with AQ and provided foreign fighters to go to Iraq to help AQ there.

It's not all about the US, there are many Western countries that are perceived as contributing to the current batch of despots that hold sway across the Middle East. One has to get past the rhetoric and brands and focus on the basic dynamics at work.

LIFG has not been mentioned much in reporting on recent events in Libya. I would assume that is more intentional than accidental given their past affiliations, espoused ideologies, and the fact that we have been carrying them as a Terrorist organization on our books for several years now, and since 2007 have been working with Qaddafi to help suppress them in the name of GWOT. This is a second order problem from us letting the Intel bubbas slap big "Terrorist" and "Al Qaeda" labels on every group that is forced to resort to illegal means to affect change of government, or every such group that is engaged by AQ. LIFG is both. It traps us into not being able to work with the people who can help us most. This was true with the Nazis in post WWII Germany, that Baathists in Iraq, the Taliban currently in Afghanistan, and now likely the LIFG in Libya. When one gets too focused on the "threat" or "enemy" they limit themselves in their ability to deal with the "problem"

It is safe to assume that LIFG is perhaps the most organized aspect of the current movement and that AQ is doing their best to strengthen their ties and spin current events as something that they have brought about.

Once liberty is attained though, often the ideologies employed to motivate the masses, and the leaders and organizations that carried much of the fight fade away, as their sole purpose for existing is no longer there. If one slapped a bell curve on the Libyan populace one would probably find hardcore Qaddafi people on one tail, and hard core Islamists on the other. The vast center is that moderate majority that just wants reasonable liberty, rights, and the ability to live their lives to the best of their abilities in freedom and peace. The evil, the greedy, and those who lust for power will all show up to exploit to their ends.

From Chaos comes opportunity. From great Chaos come great Opportunity. Our challenge is to shape and mitigate the chaos. Effects in Libya must be secondary to how we employ this operation as a Stratcom to the Arabian Peninsula.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

Cannoneer,

Easy big guy, not calling you racist, rather just pointing out that your observation is one that is commonly made of certain groups based upon the perceptions those outside the group in question. While a satisfactory brand of "liberty" for an average Libyan is likely quite different than for the average American the critical issue is that there is a universal quest in alll mankind for whatever it is they see as meeting that mark.

It is the unsatisfactory brand of liberty they have a nasty habit of taking that concerns me.


It is no less arrogant and condescending to assume that an Arab doesn't understand what liberty is today than it was for some southerner to assume that African Americans wouldn't know what to do if they were freed from slavery.

Not going there. Google "Reconstruction"


But yeah, I do want to "kill you message" if your message is that Libyans wouldn't know what to do with liberty if they had it. One has to assume that the current rebels come from a cross-section of the populace. Some are looking for loot, some for power, most simply to achieve what they have no legal peaceful means the achieve. One should also assume that there are agents representing Islamist groups seeking to gain an advantage. I would assume there are a variety of national agents at work as well. All seeking to advance the interests of their respective organizations..

My message is that the anti-KaDaffy forces are not necessarily Good Guys. One does NOT have to assume that the current rebels come from a cross-section of the populace. Didn't they tell you what happens when you assume? The rebels are more deeply aggrieved, more actively hostile, more violent than the fence-sitters. Some of them were trying to kill me in Iraq four years ago.

Have we identified those factions that we would prefer did not gain the greatest influence, or do we provide close air support for whoever is fixing to get whipped? Does the whole coalition support and blacklist the same factions? How does a faction get off the excrement list and become eligible for CAS & air drops & all the material benefits of being a valued tool of the Great Satan?

[Dayuhan]

LIFG has not been mentioned much in reporting on recent events in Libya. I would assume that is more intentional than accidental given their past affiliations, espoused ideologies, and the fact that we have been carrying them as a Terrorist organization on our books for several years now, and since 2007 have been working with Qaddafi to help suppress them in the name of GWOT.

Exactly how have we been "working with Qaddafi to suppress them"? That seems a quite dramatic overstatement.

Do we have any real evidence that LIFG is a significant player in the current rebel movement?


It is safe to assume that LIFG is perhaps the most organized aspect of the current movement and that AQ is doing their best to strengthen their ties and spin current events as something that they have brought about.

I'm not sure it's ever safe to assume. Unless there's tangible evidence, best to leave such questions open. "We don't know yet" is a lot more honest and a lot less dangerous than "it is safe to assume". Once we assume that it's safe to assume we get committed to our assumption, and that can make it more difficult to adapt down the line if our assumptions prove invalid.

I'm not sure the model of nationalist insurgencies accepting help from AQ because they need help from anywhere they can get it is necessarily valid. What has AQ actually done to help these insurgencies? In many cases (not necessarily in Libya) the affiliated movements are the ones supporting AQ, not the other way round.


Once liberty is attained though, often the ideologies employed to motivate the masses, and the leaders and organizations that carried much of the fight fade away, as their sole purpose for existing is no longer there.

Are you assuming that LIFG is essentially a nationalist insurgency that is simply using Islamist ideology as a tool? If so, on what evidence is that assumption based?

How are you defining "liberty" when you say "once liberty is attained"? It's a relevant question, because the fall of a despot often does not mark the arrival of "liberty".

Why would you assume that the ideology will fade away once the despot falls and the revolutionaries take over (let's not pretend that this has any intrinsic relationship to "liberty")? Did the Taliban's ideology fade when they gained power? We've a limited data set for Islamist revolutionaries, but if we look at communist revolutions, the ideology didn't necessarily fade when the revolutionaries won. Did the ideology fade in Cuba or North Korea? Sometimes it faded down the line, or was overthrown, but there was often a wee mess in the interval. Ask a Cambodian about that... or a Russian, or a Chinese.


If one slapped a bell curve on the Libyan populace one would probably find hardcore Qaddafi people on one tail, and hard core Islamists on the other. The vast center is that moderate majority that just wants reasonable liberty, rights, and the ability to live their lives to the best of their abilities in freedom and peace. The evil, the greedy, and those who lust for power will all show up to exploit to their ends.

Is that assumption based on specific evidence emerging from Libya, or is it based on an abstract model?


From Chaos comes opportunity. From great Chaos come great Opportunity. Our challenge is to shape and mitigate the chaos. Effects in Libya must be secondary to how we employ this operation as a Stratcom to the Arabian Peninsula.

How exactly do you propose to "employ this operation as a Stratcom to the Arabian Peninsula"? What exactly do you propose that we do in Libya, and how do you propose to leverage that action as "Stratcom to the Arabian Peninsula".

My concern in Libya is that there are major limits to the end-state goals that we can realistically hope to achieve with the level of force we are willing (and, realistically, able) to commit. We prevented the sack of Benghazi; that's done. We might be able to remove MG or enable the rebels to remove him. We absolutely cannot assure liberty or good governance, and it would be folly to establish those as goals when we know we cannot achieve them.

Our folly in Iraq and Afghanistan was that once we'd done what we had the capacity to do (remove governments) we attempted what we did not have the capacity to do (replace them with governments that would govern the way we would like to see these countries governed). Gotta hope we don't fall into that trap in Libya.

[jmm99]

on one hand, U.S. finds no organized Al Qaeda presence in Libya opposition, officials say (http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/23/world/la-fg-libya-rebels-intel-20110324/2) (on p.1):


Eastern Libya, the rebels' base, has a history as a breeding ground for Islamic militants, but an intelligence-gathering effort has not uncovered a significant number of extremists, officials say.

March 23, 2011
By Ken Dilanian, Los Angeles Times

Despite fears that Islamic extremists may be playing a hidden role in the rebellion against Moammar Kadafi, the U.S. intelligence community has found no organized presence of Al Qaeda or its allies among the Libyan opposition, American officials say.

A U.S. intelligence-gathering effort that began shortly after anti-Kadafi forces started seizing towns in eastern Libya last month has not uncovered a significant presence of Islamic militants among the insurgents.

"We're keeping an eye out for extremist activity in Libya, but we haven't seen much, if any, to date," said a U.S. counter-terrorism official. A Defense official added that the U.S. had not seen a direct link between the opposition and extremists. ...

But, on the other hand (on p.2):


Charles Faddis, who led a CIA team in northern Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and who retired in 2008, questioned whether the U.S. intelligence community really understands who the rebels are.

"Everyone wants to believe the opposition consists of individuals dedicated to a democratic revolution," Faddis said. "Is that true?"

"Is this a political movement or a tribal one? What we need is solid intelligence on the nature of the opposition, who the key figures are, who is going to emerge on top. I suspect we do not have that, because our collection inside Libya, a denied area, has probably been very weak for a very long time."

Since his retirement, Faddis (http://www.amazon.com/Charles-Faddis/e/B001JP3Y26/ref=ntt_dp_epwbk_0) has written several interesting books: Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1599218887/ref=pd_lpo_k2_dp_sr_2?pf_rd_p=486539851&pf_rd_s=lpo-top-stripe-1&pf_rd_t=201&pf_rd_i=1599218518&pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_r=0H0GDZBEW50PFHTCDZTJ); Willful Neglect: The Dangerous Illusion of Homeland Security (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1599219069/ref=pd_lpo_k2_dp_sr_1?pf_rd_p=486539851&pf_rd_s=lpo-top-stripe-1&pf_rd_t=201&pf_rd_i=1599218518&pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_r=0H0GDZBEW50PFHTCDZTJ); and Beyond Repair: The Decline and Fall of the CIA (http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Repair-Decline-Fall-CIA/dp/1599218518).

If you search SWC for "Faddis", you will find about a dozen posts that mention him: military background, legal background (as a death penalty prosecutor) and CIA Operations.

All in all, the verdict is far from definitive as to what the Libyan rebels actually are, now - much less as to what their revolt will become if a "success".

"Regime removal" is different from "regime change" - as Steve correctly points out:


from Dayuhan
My concern in Libya is that there are major limits to the end-state goals that we can realistically hope to achieve with the level of force we are willing (and, realistically, able) to commit. We prevented the sack of Benghazi; that's done. We might be able to remove MG or enable the rebels to remove him. We absolutely cannot assure liberty or good governance, and it would be folly to establish those as goals when we know we cannot achieve them.

Our folly in Iraq and Afghanistan was that once we'd done what we had the capacity to do (remove governments) we attempted what we did not have the capacity to do (replace them with governments that would govern the way we would like to see these countries governed). Gotta hope we don't fall into that trap in Libya.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

This makes sense:


Charles Faddis, who led a CIA team in northern Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and who retired in 2008, questioned whether the U.S. intelligence community really understands who the rebels are.

"Everyone wants to believe the opposition consists of individuals dedicated to a democratic revolution," Faddis said. "Is that true?"

"Is this a political movement or a tribal one? What we need is solid intelligence on the nature of the opposition, who the key figures are, who is going to emerge on top. I suspect we do not have that, because our collection inside Libya, a denied area, has probably been very weak for a very long time."

I would add, though, that just because the Libyan rebels are not necessarily a united movement for democracy and/or liberty does not necessarily mean that they are influenced or dominated by AQ. There are lots of other things they could be, and given the sudden nature of the outburst it's likely that they haven't even figured it out yet. They know they don't want MG, but what they do want remains unclear and probably varies a great deal among those who constitute the rebellion.

I think it's unwise to assume a unitary Libyan populace and impose a bell-shaped curve ranging between political extremes, with a moderate majority in the center. Populaces don't necessarily fracture that way, and it this case you have the historic Tripolitania/Cyrenaica divide and a wide range of tribal lines as well. Each of these sub-populaces is likely to have its own distribution of opinion and desired end state, with the end state of "us over them" likely to be a consistent factor.

[jmm99]

State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh gave this Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya (http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/159201.htm):


Remarks
Harold Hongju Koh
Legal Advisor U.S. Department of State
American Society of International Law Annual Meeting
Washington, DC
March 26, 2011

The crux of the statement on I Law is contained in this paragraph:


These United States military actions rest on ample international legal authority. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter grants authority to the Security Council to decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security where it determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression (Article 39). Articles 41 and 42 further specify that the Security Council may take such action by air, sea and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Acting under Chapter VII, in Resolution 1973, the Security Council determined that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes a threat to international peace and security (PP21), and : (1) in operative paragraphs 6 to 8 of the resolution imposed a No-Fly Zone in the air space of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians, and authorized states to take “all necessary measures” to enforce that No-Fly Zone in accordance with the Resolution, (2) in operative paragraph 4 authorized Member States to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory; and (3) in operative paragraph 13 authorized Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out inspections aimed at the enforcement of the arms embargo. Under the Security Council authorizations, Member States may also work through regional organizations or arrangements and with local partners who share the goal of preventing attacks on civilians or civilian populated areas.

So far as I Law is concerned, this statement is unexceptionable. According to its Charter, the UN had and has very broad authority to mandate "peace enforcement". Whether that mandate was or was not wise in this case - e.g., how far do "all necessary measures" go ? - is another question (not of law, but of policy). Whether the US should or should not belong to the UN, NATO or any other multi-national organization are also political questions.

As to US domestic (constitutional) law, I find L.A. Koh's statement problematic:


The President directed these actions, which are in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, pursuant to his constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. The President has well-recognized authority to authorize a mission of this kind, which as he explained, will be time-limited, well-defined, discrete, and aimed at preventing an imminent humanitarian catastrophe that directly implicates the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. The Administration has been closely consulting Congress regarding the situation in Libya, including in a session with the bipartisan leadership that the President conducted before his announcement. Before Resolution 1973 was adopted, on March 1, 2011 the Senate adopted its own resolution by unanimous consent (S. Res. 85) calling for a No-Fly zone. The President has acted consistently with the reporting requirements in the War Powers Resolution, and has furthermore indicated that he is committed to ongoing, close consultations with Congress as the situation develops.

What was and what was not done here by Pres. Obama parallels that done by Presidents Truman (Korea) and Clinton (Kosovo), which I felt and still feel were unconstitutional - and also unwise because they failed to enlist the affirmative support of the other elected branch of government.

But, the sin of unconstitutionality in this type of case is a "political question" (not one to be decided by the courts). And, the remedy under the Constitution would be impeachment of the President by Congress - which is not about to happen. It is up to Congress to declare the President's actions illegal. In the absence of such congressional action, the President's actions stand legally.

I find it interesting that Mr Koh's position is not that far removed from Mr Yoo's.

Regards

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

The rebels just announced they took Syrthe. If proven true, this would be a major shift.

Personnaly, I need explanation on the declarations of Mr Gate who said operation could take months. Must be motivated by domestic politic but does not reflect, even partialy, reality on the ground.

About the rebels:as in all civilian uprising or rebellion, the ones who have military/weaponery knowledge are not Mr and Mrs smith. For the recall, during WW2, allied forces used italian and corsica mafia (not really good guys). The question is rather can the west establish strong enough contacts with guys who are muslims, nationalist and also shaped by their cultural environment to become the next government? You cannot blame people because they did fight the US in Irak. You can blame them if they intend to set a fascist calliphat in Libya.

[slapout9]

Link to interview of F.W.Engdahl on "The Coalition Of The Unwilling"


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jagotqno6e0&feature=player_embedded#at=141

[CWOT]

My assumption is that AQ will try to take credit and take advantage of the Libyan uprising. I think AQ-LIFG linkages with the rebels have been overstated thus far. But, I don't think we should be naive about AQ types trying to influence key jihadi leaders in Darnah.

Here's six things I think we (US) should begin doing now to offset AQ ambitions. Would enjoy any further thoughts on what the U.S. should be considering. What else should we be doing?



1. End the Gaddafi regime immediately- Opposition to Gaddafi links rebels generally amenable to the West with jihadi's affiliated with LIFG-AQ types. The longer LIFG-AQ types remain embedded with other Libyan opposition groups, the stronger the bonds will be between them. Eliminating the Gaddafi regime will allow for more moderate rebel groups to emerge and repel AQ aggression.

2. Push moderate rebel leaders to the forefront- The West should move to place a face on the Libyan opposition. Strategic communications should be implemented quickly to demonstrate to the world that the Libyan opposition is clearly not the result of AQ inspiration. This could be accomplished through publicized communication with select opposition leaders and widely broadcast television interviews with key rebel partners allied against Gaddafi and LIFG-AQ linked groups. Current amorphous descriptions of the Libyan opposition create ambiguity allowing for biased interpretation; ambiguity easily capitalized on by AQ elements taking credit for a revolution they missed.

3. Don’t waste an opportunity-The U.S. wanted to counter jihadi elements in Darnah three years ago. The NFZ and the vacuum created by the crumbling Gaddafi regime should not be wasted. If AQ moves to bolster their position in Libya, the West should be prepared early to use soft and hard power options directly and through surrogates.

4. Isolate Darnah if necessary- LIFG-AQ support and presence in Darnah has existed for a long time. The West should move aggressively to monitor and isolate Darnah if it goes the way of AQ. Own the border crossing from Egypt. Monitor desert crossings with aerial surveillance. Control the coast through the Navy. Darnah is one of the few places AQ might reside where the West retains distinct capabilities to monitor the region from land, sea and air.

5. Engage the EU reference an AQ Libyan safe haven - Should AQ gain a safe haven in Libya, the greatest threat will initially be to Europe. The U.S. has proceeded responsibly by letting NATO take the reins of the NFZ. EU countries need to step up in the CT effort in Libya. Italy, France and the UK all have reason to get engaged.

6. Prepare for something other than democracy in Libya - I hope lessons learned from trying to institute democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan reasonably moderate the West’s vision of Libya’s political future. Freedom comes in many forms and often time incrementally. Libya remains a tribal, oil dependent country. Constructing a unified democracy without occupation is likely impossible. Libya may find renewed political stability and economic vitality quicker if it pursued an emirate type structure; a form closer to the original Barbary states or similar to the UAE. Can the West accept this? Can they help this happen? This will be tough. Bottom line: a weak democracy is more beneficial to AQ while stronger sub-states can be a useful counter against AQ aggression.

From:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=187

[SWJ Blog]

Lessons for Libya? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/lessons-for-libya/)

Entry Excerpt:

Lessons for Libya?
Flawed Policy and the Inevitability of Military Failure: The Anglo-French Suez Expedition of 1956
by Brian C. Collins

Download The Full Article: Lessons for Libya? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/719-collins.pdf)

Thesis: The disastrous outcome of the Anglo-French expedition of 1956 was not the result of tactical incompetence, but rather a consequence of flawed policy.

Discussion: It is critical for policy-makers to not only understand the difficulties of armed intervention, but also the commitment of will required. If policy limitations preclude waging the type of war necessary to achieve strategic objectives, the pursuit of other options becomes imperative. Professional military members expend a great deal of energy to understand the relationship between politics and war. It would be wise for policy-makers to do the same so as to avoid the pitfalls experienced by the British and French in 1956. Tactically, the British and French - in concert with the Israelis - mobilized, deployed, and employed a diverse military force to compel the fall of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egyptian government. Operationally, the campaign required a degree of coordination between not only national entities, but branches within the armed forces as well which had yet to be exhibited in an operation of such limited size and scope in the twentieth century. Strategically, geo-political influences and factors forced the withdrawal of British and French forces before ever achieving the purpose for which the military campaign was intended – the removal of the Nasser. This paper examines the Anglo-French expedition to identify the root causes which lead to this tremendous failure in order to provide lessons for the national leadership of today.

Conclusion: The failure of the Anglo-French expedition of 1956 was clearly the result of flawed policy, not tactical incompetence. The political establishment’s failure to anticipate reaction in the context of Cold War balance of power politics, their discount of options other than military action, and insistence upon planning to obtain limited objectives, all contributed directly to the ignominy which would follow.

Download The Full Article: Lessons for Libya? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/719-collins.pdf)

Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Collins, USMC is the Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor at Headquarters, US Special Operations Command. The views expressed herein are his own.



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/lessons-for-libya/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

You cannot blame people because they did fight the US in Irak. You can blame them if they intend to set a fascist calliphat in Libya.

I can withhold my support for this war of choice that SECDEF himself doesn’t think is a vital interest for the United States and I can persuade, change and influence as many American voters as I can to do the same.

Whoever is in charge of strategically communicating to me and managing my perception that the consumers of Libyan oil, the Libyan people, and the anti-Kadaffy rebels are worthy of the American treasure (and, inevitably, blood) expended on their behalf has his work cut out for him.

[Bob's World]

In a slightly different take, I don't think we need to counter AQ in Libya. I think we need to out compete AQ in Libya for the trust of the populace (I almost wrote "support," but we don't need the support of the Libyan populace, their reforming/emerging government does, we "merely" need to earn their trust.

Part of earning that trust will be in how we treat those who have affiliated with the LIFG. While this has been the most active, most closely tied with AQ, tip of the iceberg of the dissatisfied populace of Libya, they are part of that populace. Instead of isolating, I would move now to take them off of the terror list and ensure that they have an appropriate voice in what happens next.

To ignore those who have committed their lives to staying and fighting for freedom for years because we disagree with the ideologies they have adopted, or who they had to turn to for assistance now that they are on the cusp of achieving their Ends is the classic mistake we always make. We overlook the rough, dirty fighters and become enamored with some smooth expat opportunist who is less offensive to our sensibilities and throw our lot in with such, and elevate them into power as the new dictator that now owes allegiance to the US and our interests. It's time to break that model. It sure as hell isn't working for us in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan we elevated such "moderates" and attempted to "isolate" those who we felt were too close to AQ. In so doing we crafted a situation that ensured the current insurgency there and us being stuck once again (as in Vietnam, as in Iraq, etc) battling to sustain what we have created against resistance from the populace we have foisted such governance upon.

Less is more. I think we need to beware the Johnny come lately "moderates," and we need to keep an open mind in regard to those who we have struggled with in the past. To exclude the LIFG is to ensure that most active segment stays in the AQ camp and continues to wage international terror on their behalf. We need to let Libyans decide what the fate of the LIFG is, and also allow them to decide who they think should lead them.

[M-A Lagrange]

I can withhold my support for this war of choice that SECDEF himself doesn’t think is a vital interest for the United States and I can persuade, change and influence as many American voters as I can to do the same.

Whoever is in charge of strategically communicating to me and managing my perception that the consumers of Libyan oil, the Libyan people, and the anti-Kadaffy rebels are worthy of the American treasure (and, inevitably, blood) expended on their behalf has his work cut out for him.

Then you better change your mind as the US flotte in the Mediterrane buys oil from the Italian who bouht it from the Libyans. Then it's quite in your interrest to get involved and make sure that you have friends in Libya rather than ennemies. :D

[SWJ Blog]

Forging a Libya Strategy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/forging-a-libya-strategy/)

Entry Excerpt:

Forging a Libya Strategy: Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration (http://www.cnas.org/node/6060) by Andrew Exum (http://www.cnas.org/node/737) and Zachary Hosford (http://www.cnas.org/node/79), Center for a New American Security Policy Brief.

While the situation in Libya continues to change rapidly, the most prudent course of action for the United States is to execute a strategy that would minimize the U.S. commitment to Libya and protect the United States from a potentially protracted and resource-intensive conflict, according to this policy brief by Center for a New American Security (CNAS) experts Andrew Exum and Zachary Hosford.

In Forging a Libya Strategy: Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration (http://www.cnas.org/node/6060), authors Exum and Hosford argue that U.S. interests in Libya, which include the protection of civilians and providing momentum to the revolutionary fervor sweeping the region, come at a potentially high cost to the United States. In addition, continued engagement may detract focus and resources away from other critical issues in the region and globally. Exum and Hosford offer four policy recommendations for the United States that limit the U.S. expenditure of blood or treasure:


Use Positive and Negative Incentives to Force Moammar Gadhafi from Power. The United States and its allies should continue to use international financial sanctions to help force Gadhafi from power. The United States should also press an African or Arab nation to accept Moammar Gadhafi and his family into exile. While that means Gadhafi could depart Libya as a free man, it would help end what promises to be a protracted and bloody civil war.
Halt Direct Military Operations. Now that the U.S.-led naval attacks and air strikes have prevented a humanitarian crisis, the United States should refrain from further direct military operations in Libya and only contribute military assets that fill capability gaps in coalition forces conducting operations related to the enforcement of the no-fly zone or arms embargo.
Help Build a Coalition To Provide Non-Military Support. The administration should work to build support among the nations of Africa, Europe and the Arabic-speaking world to provide aid to the people of Libya – to include police trainers, rule-of-law specialists and all the other means necessary for successful stabilization operations.
Be Willing to Accept the Status Quo Ante Bellum. Should the allied intervention end with Gadhafi still in power, and he again threatens military action against anti-government rebels and civilians, the United States should not re-engage militarily. The Obama Administration, meanwhile, will have plenty of other opportunities – in Syria, Egypt, Bahrain and elsewhere – to support the popular revolutions and demonstrations in the Arabic-speaking world.Forging a Libya Strategy: Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration (http://www.cnas.org/node/6060)



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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

My assumption is that AQ will try to take credit and take advantage of the Libyan uprising.

I find it difficult today from my armchair to see how AQ, more particularly LIFG & AQIM, can claim 'credit' when it is a local rebellion that has survived and made gains to date due to Western air power. A rebellion in which the Jihadists are a minority, yes, I know so were the Bolsheviks in 1917 Russia. Plus the reported acclaim by those in eastern Libya for the Western action and responses of civilians to the downed US pilots.

If anything AQ has been singularly quiet on its contribution in Tunisia, Egypt and now Libya.

[davidbfpo]

Full of adjectives and I've no idea who the author is, but it is ......
THE grotesque competition between Britain, France and the US to see who can fire the most missiles at Libya confirms the emergence of a new form of Western militarism.

Link:http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/wests-vain-libyan-venture-must-end/story-e6frg6ux-1226026968542

[Ken White]

LINK (http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/2008/jun/03/brendanoneill).

[Cannoneer No. 4]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us_deploys_low_flying_attack_planes_in_libya/2011/03/26/AF9grPqB_story.html?wprss=rss_homepage

Not surprised. FMCNL (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=12780) told me when they left England.

The C-in-C could use some dramatic gun camera video of kinetically disassembling Kadaffy's tanks to sell this war. Love watching Air Force gun bunnies feed that 105mm.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

http://www.wsbradio.com/weblogs/jamie-dupree/2011/mar/28/obama-libya-speech/

[CWOT]

Instead of isolating, I would move now to take them off of the terror list and ensure that they have an appropriate voice in what happens next.

Yes, I'm all for engagement, I was focusing more on isolating if they begin to pursue the jihadi route and start talking caliphate. It would be excellent if we aligned and engaged with LIFG remnants before AQ attempts to reinforce.


We overlook the rough, dirty fighters and become enamored with some smooth expat opportunist who is less offensive to our sensibilities and throw our lot in with such, and elevate them into power as the new dictator that now owes allegiance to the US and our interests.

Yes, I wrote about this reference Egypt and AlBaradei. (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=145) It felt really Chalabi like, and I hope we don't try that in Libya.


To exclude the LIFG is to ensure that most active segment stays in the AQ camp and continues to wage international terror on their behalf. We need to let Libyans decide what the fate of the LIFG is, and also allow them to decide who they think should lead them.

The U.S. needs to reevaluate all its so called enemies in North Africa and the Middle East. I'm waiting to see how the Muslim Brotherhood turns out in Egypt. They are in the driver's seat for the government's future in Egypt. The U.S. has to engage with them, and the Muslim Brotherhood is too big in Egypt not to have a seat at the table.

[SWJ Blog]

President Obama on Operations in Libya, 28 March 2011 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/president-obama-on-operations/)

Entry Excerpt:







--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/president-obama-on-operations/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[CWOT]

AQ completely missed out on these uprisings and it really hurts their credibility. That's why I think AQ has to get active in the next few months. If they can't begin meddling in these revolutions then their era is over. It's been ten years, they've missed the fall of all their so called "Apostate regimes" they have argued against. That's why I'm interested in Libya. I think there are only a handful actively aligned with AQ currently residing in Libya. But, there are another handful waiting in other AQ campaigns that I imagine will want to relocate back home.

[JMA]

For a ditherer he presents himself (and the American people) as a reluctant hero:


To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and – more profoundly – our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different. And as President, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.

So far so good - even if he had to be shamed into taking this noble position. He then goes and spoils it all with this:


It is true that America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests against the need for action. But that cannot be an argument for never acting on behalf of what’s right. In this particular country – Libya; at this particular moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale.

This is of course code to let the Tibetans and the Georgians (among others) know that they are on their own whatever happens (like the Hungarians in 1956).

I'm left wondering why most Americans can't understand how the actions of successive governments are not seen "liberating" but rather than of the school yard bully. Until the US can demonstrate its ability to stand up to the big boys the world view of the US will remain the same.

The American people deserve better... leadership that is.

Oh yes... and now we have heard it chapter and verse from the US President himself can we assume this is the "official" US position representing an action taken in the US interests... or are we going to have a number of posts with the use of "we" as posters claim to speak on behalf of the American people?

[Dayuhan]

I can't see how the need to balance ends with means and costs with benefits is a sign of bad leadership. Seems to me something we could use a good deal more of. Anyone with limited means - and that's everyone - needs to choose their battles wisely, and choosing battles unwisely has left American means more stretched than ever. Obviously the US is not going to square off with the Russians over Georgia or with the Chinese over Tibet, that would be idiocy of the highest order. We are neither global policeman not guarantor of the world's freedoms. We've no desire or capacity to serve those functions and the world has never asked us to serve those functions.

The opinions of a President have consequences, those of a backseat driver do not. That means that the opinions, let alone the actions, of a President need a great deal more consideration and restraint than those of a backseat driver. If some would see that as dithering, so be it. The current US President made it quite clear throughout his campaign that he would treat military intervention as a course of last resort and would pursue it through multilateral venues unless American interests absolutely required otherwise. Like that position or not, it's what the American people voted for.

[Presley Cannady]

I can't see how the need to balance ends with means and costs with benefits is a sign of bad leadership.

Probably because balancing ends with means and costs has nothing to do with an arbitrarily instigated and calibrated reaction "in this particular country...in this particular moment."


Seems to me something we could use a good deal more of. Anyone with limited means - and that's everyone - needs to choose their battles wisely, and choosing battles unwisely has left American means more stretched than ever.

This is a particularly pernicious tautology as far as truisms go, in that the realization of risk is ultimately caused by acting unwisely.


Obviously the US is not going to square off with the Russians over Georgia or with the Chinese over Tibet, that would be idiocy of the highest order.

And yet the US did square off with the Russians over Afghanistan, to great material (and consequently measurable) benefit: the destruction of the Red Army as an expeditionary force for the cost of a shuttle launch per year. And yet where it concerns the same family of intangible qualitatives Obama reaches for when weighing the risks and gain of the Libya operation, America is widely perceived as rolling snake-eyes.


We are neither global policeman not guarantor of the world's freedoms. We've no desire or capacity to serve those functions and the world has never asked us to serve those functions.

Then don't. And don't pretend that the world will view this operation as anything less than unreliably assuming the role of a cop--and only under the most expedient, transient conditions.

But if you do, then do not be surprised when--not if--events conspire against the "limited" universe of outcomes you aspire to realize and the world moves on from "hey, Obama saved Benghazi for one week in March" to "why is Gaddafi still in power?" or "where the hell where the Americans when Tripoli turned into rivers of blood?"

[SWJ Blog]

On Libya, Obama avoids George W., but becomes George H.W. (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/on-libya-obama-avoids-george-w/)

Entry Excerpt:

In his speech (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya) last evening at the National Defense University, President Obama explained the humanitarian impulse and the defense of America’s values and interests that led him to intervene in Libya’s civil war. Obama gave a passionate explanation of why he acted in Libya. But he failed to convincingly explain how his Libya policy will work in the future and why it will achieve success. Obama explicitly promised that his Libya policy will not turn into President George W. Bush’s policy for Iraq. Instead, Obama’s Libya policy is mimicking almost step-for-step the other Bush policy for Iraq, that of George H.W. Bush.

In my March 4, 2011 column (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/04/this_week_at_war_the_jawbreaker_option) at Foreign Policy, I first drew the comparison between the Obama administration’s handling of Libya and the situation in Iraq 20 years ago, just after Kuwait’s liberation from Saddam Hussein’s forces. Events in Libya since then and Obama’s speech last night have only reinforced the comparison.

Click below to read more ...



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/on-libya-obama-avoids-george-w/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[slapout9]

Link to article on "The Crony Attack: Strategic Attacks Silver Bullet."


http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA462291&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

[Dayuhan]

Probably because balancing ends with means and costs has nothing to do with an arbitrarily instigated and calibrated reaction "in this particular country...in this particular moment."

Au contraire. The political cost of allowing the sack of Benghazi was calculated to exceed the political cost of limited intervention. That of course creates the subsequent problem of how to keep the intervention limited. Insisting that the British and French initiate intervention and turning over to NATO command are steps in that direction. Whether the limitation is sufficient remains, and whether disengagement can be accomplished effectively, remain to be seen. Whether the initial calculation was accurate remains to be seen.

SWe have the ability, with forces we are willing to commit, to prevent the rebels from being crushed, We do not have the ability, with forces we are willing to commit, to assure a rebel victory or to dictate an end state. The problem was how to accomplish the former without committing to the latter. The administration thinks they found a way. Maybe they're right. Maybe they're not. We'll see.


This is a particularly pernicious tautology as far as truisms go, in that the realization of risk is ultimately caused by acting unwisely.

Risk can be anticipated, within reason. You don't have to step in front of an oncoming train to realize that risk.


And yet the US did square off with the Russians over Afghanistan, to great material (and consequently measurable) benefit: the destruction of the Red Army as an expeditionary force for the cost of a shuttle launch per year.

Common sense, please. Georgia is not Afghanistan, and Russia is not the Soviet Union. We're not in a cold war with Russia and we had nothing to gain from letting the Georgian government bait us into a confrontation with the Russians to advance their own objectives.


And yet where it concerns the same family of intangible qualitatives Obama reaches for when weighing the risks and gain of the Libya operation, America is widely perceived as rolling snake-eyes.

I'm not sure what that's supposed to mean.


And don't pretend that the world will view this operation as anything less than unreliably assuming the role of a cop--and only under the most expedient, transient conditions.

So what? The last thing we want is to have anyone seeing us as a reliable (read predictable) cop: that just gives others an incentive to others to bait us into intervention on their behalf. Why should we pretend that we would want to be involved in any activity that is not in our interests (not expedient) or that would drag us into a quagmire (not transient).


But if you do, then do not be surprised when--not if--events conspire against the "limited" universe of outcomes you aspire to realize and the world moves on from "hey, Obama saved Benghazi for one week in March" to "why is Gaddafi still in power?" or "where the hell where the Americans when Tripoli turned into rivers of blood?"

here were the Americans? Hopefully not in the middle of it, trying to clean up somebody else's mess. Certainly there's a risk that we'll be stuck in the middle of it, but those who lead judged it worth the taking. I remain unconvinced, though I think if they're clever they may pull it off. My opinion, of course, means exactly nothing.

[JMA]

Link to article on "The Crony Attack: Strategic Attacks Silver Bullet."


http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA462291&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Interesting read.

But why go after the cronies to the exclusion of Mister Big himself?

In the early stages of the invasion of Iraq - 2003 there was a plan to target 50 odd of Saddam's leading cronies. Cancelled because of intel that Saddam was at a certain place which was bombed instead, with no one home, one is not able to see how going for key people rather than stuff would have worked out in a larger war setting.

I say this because I believe targeting specific people, Mister Big and his cronies, early enough has a better chance of preventing all out war starting or shortening the war than bombing stuff and infrastructure. (We can already see that the bombing of stuff in Libya is not bringing Gaddafi any closer to throwing his hands in the air.)

It is important you show the people of that country who you see as the enemy and destroy the enemy's leadership and not inflict casualties on them or upset their quality of life by destroying the local infrastructure.

[JMA]

Interesting development. Obviously the Russia criticism of the strikes against Gaddafi forces scared the hell out of the US and the Brits and French and brought the bombing of Gaddafi forces (everywhere?) to a halt.

Gaddafi's forces use the lull in air strikes to renew attacks against the rebels and the urban areas of Misurata and Zintan.

What is clear now is that he people of Misurata and Zintan are not being protected by the forces involved in implementing Res: 1973. This is a significant failure.

[Dayuhan]

Interesting development. Obviously the Russia criticism of the strikes against Gaddafi forces scared the hell out of the US and the Brits and French and brought the bombing of Gaddafi forces (everywhere?) to a halt.

What's that conclusion based on?

Reports I'm seeing say 115 attack sorties were flown against ground targets yesterday, up from 107 the day before, and 22 Tomahawks were fired. When did the alleged lull start?

It seems rebel forces withdrew after coming under fire from heavy weapons based in Sirte... the Libyan forces may have learned to place their assets in urban areas where air attack is likely to result in heavy collateral damage. That of course is predictable, you can't expect them to keep rollling convoys down highways given recent experience.

It's obviously going to get a lot more difficult to employ air strikes effectively if the fighting is within urban areas. The limitations of the mandate obviously impose limitations on the ability to protect civilians.

May be looking at an evolving stalemate, where air strikes can keep government forces out of the east but cannot enable rebel forces to establish control in the west, particularly in urban areas. There may or may not be a plan in place for that situation; it's a fluid situation and plans will be evolving with circumstances. We'll see.

[tequila]

The new urban environment is likely why AC-130s are being ordered up. Hard to think of a better platform for whack-a-mole inside a city.

[Dayuhan]

The new urban environment is likely why AC-130s are being ordered up. Hard to think of a better platform for whack-a-mole inside a city.

Wouldn't there be a real MAPADS threat to an AC130 playing that game over an enemy-held urban environment? I'd defer to expertise there, but I'd imagine it would be a concern.

Urban whack-a-mole is not a pretty game played from any platform, and I'd expect to see a fair bit of effort going into trying to convince the inner circle to toss MG and negotiate before committing to it. No assurance of success, of course, but worth a try.

[Presley Cannady]

Au contraire. The political cost of allowing the sack of Benghazi was calculated to exceed the political cost of limited intervention. That of course creates the subsequent problem of how to keep the intervention limited. Insisting that the British and French initiate intervention and turning over to NATO command are steps in that direction. Whether the limitation is sufficient remains, and whether disengagement can be accomplished effectively, remain to be seen. Whether the initial calculation was accurate remains to be seen.

Let's skip the dubious redefinition of the word "calculate" for now. People generally weigh the risk of a train derailing against some other bad outcome; said train hurtling over the edge of an unfinished bridge, for example. You don't usually care about the cost of throwing the railroad switch. As it concerns the Arab revolts, and Libya's in particular, there is damned little reason to believe beyond whistling in the dark that the current course of operations will result in any tolerable outcome--Benghazi free or not. That's setting aside the none to trivial universe of outcomes where Benghazi still burns, sooner rather than later.


We have the ability, with forces we are willing to commit, to prevent the rebels from being crushed, We do not have the ability, with forces we are willing to commit, to assure a rebel victory or to dictate an end state. problem was how to accomplish the former without committing to the latter. The administration thinks they found a way. Maybe they're right. Maybe they're not. We'll see.

The first point is debatable, and the second observes that the Administration either doesn't fathom or doesn't care about the war's impact on American interests.


Risk can be anticipated, within reason. You don't have to step in front of an oncoming train to realize that risk.

And yet you've put forward a maxim reduces evaluation of risk to the choice of stepping or not stepping in front of a train. If it turns out badly, must've been one of those guys who thought he could stop a 100-ton engine with his mind.


Common sense, please. Georgia is not Afghanistan, and Russia is not the Soviet Union. We're not in a cold war with Russia and we had nothing to gain from letting the Georgian government bait us into a confrontation with the Russians to advance their own objectives.

You missed the point again, which is there's nothing particularly novel about your observation that countries, soldiers and girl scouts try and reserve what have to do what they can, when they can, where they can. Once you get past this huge non-sequitur, we can move on to the real debate: whether or not the intervention realizes any opportunity or staves off any disaster of any interest to Americans.


I'm not sure what that's supposed to mean.

It means Obama can't even convince even a majority of Americans that his ill-conceived adventure achieves anything of value. Half of that 47 percent back him because they're his biggest fans. The other half back him because there is still a segment of the population that understands that there are very real first and second order costs to American defeat on the battlefield.


So what? The last thing we want is to have anyone seeing us as a reliable (read predictable) cop: that just gives others an incentive to others to bait us into intervention on their behalf.

Who said anything about "on their behalf?" The US has two centuries worth of experience playing the fifth wheel in foreigners' civil strife


Why should we pretend that we would want to be involved in any activity that is not in our interests (not expedient) or that would drag us into a quagmire (not transient).

Then what's your reason for backing the Administration's play?


Where were the Americans? Hopefully not in the middle of it, trying to clean up somebody else's mess. Certainly there's a risk that we'll be stuck in the middle of it, but those who lead judged it worth the taking. I remain unconvinced, though I think if they're clever they may pull it off. My opinion, of course, means exactly nothing.

For all this talk about "cleverness" and "pulling thing off," I'm still waiting to read exactly what you makes you think there's anything cute about the course of operations thus far or exactly what the Administration aims to pull off.

[Presley Cannady]

on one hand, U.S. finds no organized Al Qaeda presence in Libya opposition, officials say (http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/23/world/la-fg-libya-rebels-intel-20110324/2) (on p.1):



But, on the other hand (on p.2):

How would anyone know? It took a year or two for the Coalitions to take anything approaching a full measure of the enemy's irregular strength in pre-insurgent Iraq. The Arab "republics" in generally are notoriously poor at tracking even basic crime statistics; something tells me that Libya's peculiar form of government is even worse than Egypt's. Counting irregulars, gangbangers and Trekkies is a hard problem; they don't line up like tanks, they do without a small army of meticulous book-keepers, and they lie--a lot, and especially to one another. I'd be surprised if intelligence analysts had any better means of estimation than the police or paparazzi--you extrapolate based on a small samples of the bastards congregating. Usually in detainee holds, or prisons, or convention centers.

[slapout9]

Interesting read.

But why go after the cronies to the exclusion of Mister Big himself?



Your right, but think of it more like a back up plan IF you can't get to Mr. Big.
And also you want to focus on their PRIVATE property as you point out you want to avoid attacking the public, and public infrastructure. And yes you should show it on TV. Let the people no your are attacking the thugs!! not the people as a whole.

[davidbfpo]

Mary Kaldor has long argued for a better strategy to advance human security and the mismatch between conventional Western military capabilities.

Sub-titled:
In the end the prospects for democracy depend on whether the rebels can mobilise support politically throughout Libya. The problem with the military approach is that it entrenches division. Our preoccupation with classic military means is undermining our capacity to address growing insecurity.

I can follow the argument, but it does jar when she writes;
..quite apart from the cost of such equipment, time and again our knee jerk reaction to crisis is air strikes because that is what we have the capability to do.

As for 'safe havens' in Libya, I cannot see anyone wanting to place 'boots on the ground'.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/mary-kaldor/libya-war-or-humanitarian-intervention

[JMA]

Your right, but think of it more like a back up plan IF you can't get to Mr. Big.
And also you want to focus on their PRIVATE property as you point out you want to avoid attacking the public, and public infrastructure. And yes you should show it on TV. Let the people no your are attacking the thugs!! not the people as a whole.

Yes I think this is a good approach, certainly likely to have a greater effect on the regime concerned than to merely bomb troops and their stuff and the infrastructure. Make it personal and let the cost of supporting Mister Big be very high.

[Wargames Mark]

Is it me, or is there something missing from the meaning of the word covert (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSZYsyrP3Co)here?

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/picture.php?albumid=36&pictureid=185

[JMA]

Interesting development. Obviously the Russia criticism of the strikes against Gaddafi forces scared the hell out of the US and the Brits and French and brought the bombing of Gaddafi forces (everywhere?) to a halt.

Gaddafi's forces use the lull in air strikes to renew attacks against the rebels and the urban areas of Misurata and Zintan.

What is clear now is that he people of Misurata and Zintan are not being protected by the forces involved in implementing Res: 1973. This is a significant failure.

It is increasingly evident that after recent comments made by the Russians US politicians were left standing in a pool of their own urine.

We know that the military air activities carried out initially in terms of enforcing a no-fly-zone and protecting civilians were effective (while seemingly abandoning the people of Misurata and Zintan to their fate at the hands of Gaddafi's forces). I would give the military the benefit of the doubt at this moment that the betrayal of the people of Misurata and Zintan is rather as a result of a political decision or directive rather than military incompetence.

However, the recent advances by Gaddafi forces have entailed their movement over large distances of open desert on a open road as they advance to take over towns where the people are apparently anti-Gaddafi and thereby at risk from Gaddafi's forces.

How was (an is) this movement over open ground and away from civilian population groups possible? Simple, it was allowed. Why would the military allow this movement? Ineptitude or acting under orders? I go with the latter.

[jmm99]

the Fox report and the 1000s of others like this one, CIA Deploys to Libya as White House Authorizes Direct Assistance to Rebels (http://www.nationaljournal.com/cia-deploys-to-libya-as-white-house-authorizes-direct-assistance-to-rebels-20110330), are simply evidence of the new "covert transparency" and its companion "humanitarian imperialism".

Regards

Mike

[J Wolfsberger]

How was (an is) this movement over open ground and away from civilian population groups possible? Simple, it was allowed. Why would the military allow this movement? Ineptitude or acting under orders? I go with the latter.

The military may have allowed it because they were ordered to, but I vote for political ineptitude at the top as the root cause.

[SWJ Blog]

Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/libya-unrest-and-us-policy/)

Entry Excerpt:

Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/doc/CRSLibyaUnrestandUSPolicy.pdf)
By Christopher M. Blanchard
Acting Section Research Manager
Congressional Research Service
March 29, 2011

Summary:


Over forty years ago, Muammar al Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades. The Libyan government’s use of force against civilians and opposition forces seeking Qadhafi’s overthrow sparked an international outcry in February and early March 2011, and a stalemate began to break in favor of the Qadhafi government, threatening civilians in opposition-held areas. The United States and other European and Arab states are now carrying out military operations in Libya to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which was adopted on March 17 and authorizes “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians. Qadhafi and his supporters have described the uprising as a foreign and Islamist conspiracy and are attempting to outlast their opponents. Qadhafi remains defiant amid the dismantling of his military by coalition air strikes. His supporters threatened to respond to attacks by striking civilian and military targets in the Mediterranean region.
Resolution 1973 calls for an immediate cease-fire and dialogue, declares a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, and authorizes robust enforcement measures for the arms embargo on Libya established by Resolution 1970 of February 26, “while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.” As of March 28, U.S. military officials reported that U.S. and coalition strikes on Libyan air defenses, air forces, and ground forces had neutralized the ability of Muammar al Qadhafi’s military to control the country’s airspace and were increasingly focused on targeting pro-Qadhafi ground forces found to be continuing to violate Resolution 1973 through attacks on Libyan civilians. President Obama has said the United States will not introduce ground forces and has called for Qadhafi to step down. The no-fly zone called for in Resolution 1973 is in place and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is assuming command of coalition operations. The United States and international partners are providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons in temporary camps in Tunisia and Egypt.
Until recently, the United States government was pursuing a policy of reengagement toward Qadhafi after decades of confrontation, sanctions, and Libyan isolation. President Obama now has joined some leaders in asserting that Muammar al Qadhafi must ultimately give up power, although that outcome is not called for explicitly in Resolution 1973. Obama Administration officials highlight a number of non-military steps the U.S. government has taken to achieve that objective, while military operations to protect Libyan civilians continue. U.S. steps include new targeted sanctions established in Executive Order 13566. Some Members of Congress expressed support for U.S. military intervention prior to the adoption of Resolution 1973, while others disagreed or called for the President to seek explicit congressional authorization prior to any use of force. Some executive-legislative consultation occurred prior to the start of U.S. military operations, and, on March 21, President Obama sent a letter to Congress outlining U.S. military objectives and operations, but not explicitly seeking congressional authorization.
Many observers believe that Libya’s weak government institutions, potentially divisive political dynamics, and current conflict suggest that security challenges could follow the current uprising, regardless of its outcome. Some opposition figures have formed an Interim Transitional National Council which claims to represent all areas of the country and is seeking recognition and material support. In evaluating U.S. policy options, Congress may seek to better understand the roots and nature of the conflict in Libya, the views and interests of key players, and the potential consequences of the military action under way and other policy proposals under consideration.
<a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/doc/CRSLibyaUnrestandUSPolicy.pdf">Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy

[JMA]

It may not be common knowledge to the average US citizen but the one organisation that is universally loathed and distrusted is the CIA.

To introduce the CIA into Libya after spending so much time and effort to sell the line that the US was reluctantly being dragged into action in Libya and then only on humanitarian grounds is pure insanity.

What's next? Military "advisors"?

Where did you find this guy?

[JMA]

It is all good and well to maintain the threat of arming the rebels as a means of applying pressure on the Gaddafi regime but to actually consider doing it is pure insanity.

There was a ex-CIA man (Bob Baer?) on CNN the other night and he, having apparently having worked with Libyans before, said:


They take your money, they take your weapons, then they go and shoot who they want. The Libyans are very difficult to manage...

I suggest that you don't want to give them any weapons that can be turned on unintended targets in the future and importantly you don't want these people to become combat experienced and proficient.

So what to do? Take out the Gaddafi forces and destroy as much military ordinance in the process.

Let the rebels remain the delightfully entertaining Keystone Cops operation that they are. Don't do anything that will change them into anything more in military terms.

[Stan]

It may not be common knowledge to the average US citizen but the one organisation that is universally loathed and distrusted is the CIA.


The CIA's efforts represent a belated attempt (http://www.hindustantimes.com/CIA-to-investigate-Libyan-rebels/Article1-679900.aspx) to acquire basic information about rebel forces that had barely surfaced on the radar of US spy agencies before the uprisings in North Africa.

Among the CIA's tasks is to assess whether rebel leaders could be reliable partners if the administration opts to begin funneling in money or arms.

Sure hope they don't use any of those folks that I had to work with a while back !


What's next? Military "advisors"?

Nope...


Although the administration has pledged that no US ground troops will be deployed to Libya ... to be continued :D

[Dayuhan]

Let's skip the dubious redefinition of the word "calculate" for now.

As in "to make a judgment about what is likely to happen or likely to be true using the available information". Generally accepted.


As it concerns the Arab revolts, and Libya's in particular, there is damned little reason to believe beyond whistling in the dark that the current course of operations will result in any tolerable outcome--Benghazi free or not.

We're not in a position to say what outcomes we will or will not tolerate. The revolts are happening, whether we like it or not. Our capacity to influence the outcomes is highly constrained, and we'd be fools to talk about what we will "tolerate" if we aren't willing to act. In any given case the US position is less about the outcome of that revolt than about percveption management: where do we want to be seen standing on the incident, not what we want the outcome to be.


That's setting aside the none to trivial universe of outcomes where Benghazi still burns, sooner rather than later.

That possibility exists. It's no longer a certainty.

For what little it's worth, I thought the recent speech went well over the top with all the "could not allow this to happen stuff", words that can come back and bite later on and elsewhere. Should have been more along the lines of "will help to the extent that we can within the limits of numerous restrictions" stuff.


The first point is debatable, and the second observes that the Administration either doesn't fathom or doesn't care about the war's impact on American interests.

The impact on American interests has yet to be determined. The impact of any alternative action or inaction could easily have been as bad, or worse. Always easy for backseat drivers to rant about how it al would have come out right if y'all had just dunnit my way; we see plenty of that here.


You missed the point again, which is there's nothing particularly novel about your observation that countries, soldiers and girl scouts try and reserve what have to do what they can, when they can, where they can. Once you get past this huge non-sequitur, we can move on to the real debate: whether or not the intervention realizes any opportunity or staves off any disaster of any interest to Americans.

I never said it foes, nor do I think it does. As above, I think it's less about influencing Libya's future than about influencing perceptions of the US approach to intervention.


The other half back him because there is still a segment of the population that understands that there are very real first and second order costs to American defeat on the battlefield.

Who said anything about "American defeat on the battlefield"? If the rebels lose that's not an American defeat on the battlefield.


Then what's your reason for backing the Administration's play?

I didn't say I back it. I have major reservations about it. It's probably one very small step better than doing absolutely nothing, and it's certainly better than charging in with a full bore effort to defeat and remove MG, but it's by no means a good place to be.


For all this talk about "cleverness" and "pulling thing off," I'm still waiting to read exactly what you makes you think there's anything cute about the course of operations thus far or exactly what the Administration aims to pull off.

Never said it was cute. What they may pull off if they're clever is backing off and getting out before it goes all to $#!t and blows up in our faces.

[Dayuhan]

It is increasingly evident that after recent comments made by the Russians US politicians were left standing in a pool of their own urine.

I don't see any indication that anything the Russians did or said had any impact on the situation at all.

MG's people have wised up a bit: they're placing the heavy weapons in urban areas with high potential for collateral damage, moving in civilian vehicles, and not moving in groups. They're not presenting the kind of discrete targets that they did in the early days.

Recent events also suggest that the rebels are not capable of taking ground that the government is willing to defend and that the rebels are not likely to defend ground under serious attack.

There are limitations to the utility of air power in these circumstances. Do we want to declare a "no drive zone" and start attacking any vehicle on the highway? Sooner or later you'll kill a bunch of civilians, and you'll be accused of it sooner, not later. And how do you protect civilians with air strikes when fighting is house-to-house?

It was never going to be realistically possible to protect all civilians, all the time under the constraints of the operation, especially given the very limited capacity of the force on the ground.

[Pete]

From the time this intervention began I've had a very ambivalent feeling about it. I thought we wanted to get out of our entanglements in the Islamic world, not get involved in more of them. For those who have posted in this thread during the past three days, don't ask me for an answer to what you might have said said because I probably haven't read whatever it was. The subject of Libya makes me very very weary. I'll let the rest of you be the news junkies -- like the Vietnam veterans used to say, "It don't mean nuthin'."

[Ken White]

Nor am I happy to say 'I told you so...' :rolleyes:

[JMA]

The military may have allowed it because they were ordered to, but I vote for political ineptitude at the top as the root cause.

Now sadly Mullen seems to be running interference to protect the politicians by trying to sell a croc about the weather. Of course this introduces the possibility that there is indeed a measure of military ineptitude here especially in relation to (close) air support to civilian populations under attack or at least in the cross fire of two armed groups (still unable to feel comfortable using the word "forces" for the armed shower the various combatants make up).

Weather hampers air strikes in Libya: US admiral (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hXum4EYWlySFtIyiFRmg7G6rzhEw?docId=CNG.583ef 7d6a1392216410f7979124fc957.a71)

Mullen is talking crap.

...but maybe this statement indicates that the US military have realised that taking the foot off the gas pedal was a mistake and it is time to push Gaddafi's mob back down the road again. Pity people are dying in the meantime.

PS: who are these US pilots in this case? Navy off the carrier? Their training on taking on CAS type ground targets not so good perhaps?

[Entropy]

JMA,

Technically we're not doing CAS in Libya, but air interdiction. There is not, as far as we know, a ground element to identify targets and coordinate strikes (unless you count the grids I see coming in over twitter from anonymous Libyans, which I don't) so there is no CAS.

Also, with no ground element, the air forces have to obtain targeting intelligence via other means - typically ISR aircraft and various other intel systems and sources. These are all quite good at finding armored formations and the other "stuff" that most modern military forces use and this effectiveness has already been demonstrated in Libya and Iraq. However, as the cliche' goes, the enemy gets a vote, and finding targets is complicated by the fact that the Libyans are now using tactics specifically designed to counter our targeting efforts (ie. using civilian vehicles, civilian clothes, etc. - all of which have been widely reported). Weather is a huge factor when it's dumped on top of these existing limitations - much more than it would be by itself. With a ground force, targeting information, positive ID (PID), etc. comes from units on the ground - weather doesn't matter as much as long as the ground force is able to ID targets and pass grids. Similarly, ground forces are much better able to figure out if the pickup truck full of guys with AK's is friendly or not.

None of this is at all a surprise - or at least it shouldn't be. All these factors were in play in Kosovo (IIRC, operations slowed for about two weeks because of weather) and I think it was Mr. Haddick (one of the proprietors here) who wrote a post a week or two ago explaining how how the Libyan government forces would adapt to the coalition air campaign.

[91bravojoe]

Setting to rest all the confusion about the CIA's role:

http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_theenvoy/20110331/ts_yblog_theenvoy/questions-loom-about-cia-role-in-libya

They courageously sought to fill the gaps created by the reticence of all the rest of the War Department apparatus to do anything. Hearty congrats to Panetta for staking out this highest of grounds.

Forward observing can be fun if you manage to eliminate the air bursts from "those clowns".

[M-A Lagrange]

Libya: suspect funds movements on a Belgian bank account


Libye: des mouvements de fonds suspects sur un compte belge
http://www.24heures.ch/libye-mouvements-fonds-suspects-compte-belge-2011-03-31
Sorry in French

The rebels filed complain on a suspected Gaddafy bank movement in Belgium. Through their lawyer Georges-Henri Beauthier, rebels say they are convinced that Gaddafy transfered money to Chad and Sudan just after his bank accounts were frozzen.

[Presley Cannady]

JMA,

Technically we're not doing CAS in Libya, but air interdiction.

The difference being "don't call us...we'll call you..."

[J Wolfsberger]

We, the United States and NATO, are now engaged in an undeclared war against one party (or both parties, depending on what day it is) where the casus belli is a doctrine entitled Responsibility To Protect. Is anyone else concerned at what this precedent might lead to?

[M-A Lagrange]

We, the United States and NATO, are now engaged in an undeclared war against one party (or both parties, depending on what day it is) where the casus belli is a doctrine entitled Responsibility To Protect. Is anyone else concerned at what this precedent might lead to?

The answer is simple: a military facism blessed by the Just Cause of the mightiest.

WHY? :D
Is that a problem? ;)

[AdamG]

Since it's worthy of it's own thread.


Rebel fighters aren't waiting around as an international coalition debates whether to do more to arm and train them in battling Col. Moammar Gadhafi's troops. They've ramped up a crash training course for volunteers in hopes of better organizing the improvised army that is struggling to make sustained military gains against the autocratic regime.

In a sprawling cement lot of a military base in the rebels' stronghold of Benghazi, two teenagers practice setting up the heavy tripod barrel and base of a mortar system as a trainer watches carefully.

One of the new rebel recruits undergoing training is 32-year-old academic Anas Abu Buker, a communications engineer from the small city of Baida, two hours from Benghazi. Abu Buker was set to enter a doctoral program at Washington State University until the revolution of Feb. 17 radically changed his plans.

"Two weeks ago, I was lecturer at university," he says. "Right now I should be in the U.S. doing my Ph.D."

http://www.npr.org/2011/04/01/135023821/for-libyan-rebels-a-battle-against-time-to-organize



And what, one may ask, has happened to the members of the Libyan military forces who, it was claimed, had defected to the revolution in droves? They, especially the officers, are increasingly scarce on the front line. The Shabaab claims that former soldiers were too slow in moving forwards, while the defectors in turn accuse the volunteer fighters of lack of discipline.

The rebels' operations are further undermined by an absence of command and control. On Monday two men standing within a hundred yards of each other, "Captain" Jalal Idrisi and "Major" Adil Hassi, claimed to be in charge of the fighters who were meant to be attacking Ajdabiya. A brief advance soon turned into a chaotic retreat. Major Hassi then claimed that the misjudgement in going forward had been Captain Idris's idea. But why didn't they liaise? "We haven't got communications equipment" he responded. But the Captain is standing just over there, journalists pointed out. "I don't talk to him," said Major Hassi.

http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/kim-sengupta-the-resistance-has-foundered-on-its-own-indiscipline-and-farcical-ineptitude-2251298.html

[Ken White]

I doubt that all the causes are indeed just. In fact, like you, I know that many are not...:(

The cost:benefit ratio is poor and we devote excessive energy to things that we not only cannot really fix but generally tend to make slightly worse and therefor devote inadequate energy to fixing our own shortfalls. So, yes, it's a problem and like J Wolfsberger, I'm concerned about it...

I have no problem with the use of force or with interventions but I don't think it's too much to ask that we do all that wisely instead of foolishly.:rolleyes:

Or maybe it is... :wry:

[JMA]

We, the United States and NATO, are now engaged in an undeclared war against one party (or both parties, depending on what day it is) where the casus belli is a doctrine entitled Responsibility To Protect. Is anyone else concerned at what this precedent might lead to?

I think you are being altogether too kind to the Obama Administration. I think they are flying this thing by the seat of their pants. In other words they haven't got the foggiest idea of what they are doing or what to do.

As of yesterday (I note sudden increased air activity today) the US/NATO were losing the war (as you call it). Seem to have put half a billion into taking out anti-aircraft and other ground targets while failing spectacularly to lift the siege of Misurata and have allowed the liberated towns/villages all the way back to Brega to be retaken by Gaddafi's forces. This represents an absolute failure to implement UNSC Resolution 1973. Very disappointing.

Noted that the US has finally accepted the Russian demand for a ceasefire and are attempting to find a way to implement this without losing face.

[JMA]

... we devote excessive energy to things that we not only cannot really fix but generally tend to make slightly worse and therefor devote inadequate energy to fixing our own shortfalls. ...

Ken, in my book FWIW the US gets an A for effort. The failure to "fix" things is because idiots seem to make the plans for the military to carry out to the extent that the confidence of the military to sort out even a minor matter like Libya is shot to hell.

Of course sometimes the military screw up (like in Somalia) so the cancer has spread to the military as well.

How you fix this, I don't know.

[Pete]

After 9/11 there was a lot of talk about "draining the swamp" that breeds terrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia. In that sense the recent uprisings in Libya and other Islamic countries present unique "opportunities." However, during the last 10 years we've gotten bogged down in costly wars and nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now this Libyan intervention comes along. Rather than being the world's international policeman I think the U.S. should save its military power and money for situations in which vital American interests are at stake, and until such time as that happens we should keep our saber in its scabbard. That's my humble opinion.

[davidbfpo]

Why Libya is really two provinces, OK way back in Classical times and only joined by the Italians in 1911:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/6808848/ancient-and-modern-the-two-libyas.thtml

On KoW another historical piece and this struck me:
..the need to consider the psychological effects of having NATO warplanes bomb yet another Muslim country...what are the likely psychological effects of the fact that this intervention marks the 100th anniversary of the first-ever instance of aerial bombardment, carried out by Italy in Libya in 1911, and resulting (much as today) in apparent ‘collateral damage’ (then called ‘frightfulness’)

Link:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/03/longue-duree-libya-history/

Makes one wonder if the Italians recalled this history and tried to keep out of the coalition.

[AdamG]

BREGA, Libya -- Libyan rebels with military training began on Friday turning away inexperienced volunteers from the front lines here in an effort to salvage their battle against Moammar Gadhafi's better trained forces.
The effort came as Mustafa Abdel Jalil, the leader of the rebel council, announced that the rebels would consider negotiating with Gadhafi if the Libyan leader withdraws his forces from eastern cities and allows peaceful protests. It was the most specific proposition for talks that the rebels have offered since the revolt began in February.
The decision to separate the untrained and ill-equipped volunteers from the rebels' "special forces" is the first concrete sign that the rebel leadership is taking steps to bring some kind of organization to the anti-Gadhafi military effort, which to date has looked more like a weekend road rally than a battlefield operation. At the first sign of gunfire, most of the rebel forces dash to their waiting vehicles and race away from the battlefield.
"It's a strategy. We have to do this," said a 32-year-old rebel who asked to be identified by only his first name, Jamal, as he waited at a checkpoint 20 miles behind the front line, where only fighters with heavy weapons were allowed to go forward. "The further you go (toward the front line), the more confusing it gets."


Read more: http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/04/01/2146279/routed-from-key-towns-libyan-rebels.html#ixzz1IKeZw6gu

[91bravojoe]

By God, we are a generous people.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-31/libya-owned-arab-banking-corp-drew-at-least-5-billion-from-fed-in-crisis.html

All it took was the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the Libyan financial infrastructure became the primary OJT of Chairman Ben.

[Steve the Planner]

David:

My guess, from a dumbass demographic, political, admin perspective is that eliminating Q just opens the next level of problems. What to do next about an otherwise divided country for which a dictator could gain and hold control for four decades.

My guess is partition, but, that is an issue for Libyans, after internal post-Q deal making settles. Right now, partition is defacto, but they are arguing out the final boundaries (and underlying oil assets)-trying to take the pennies off Qadhafi's eyes before he is even dead.

Much is still in play, but not our game.

[JMA]

David:

My guess, from a dumbass demographic, political, admin perspective is that eliminating Q just opens the next level of problems. What to do next about an otherwise divided country for which a dictator could gain and hold control for four decades.

My guess is partition, but, that is an issue for Libyans, after internal post-Q deal making settles. Right now, partition is defacto, but they are arguing out the final boundaries (and underlying oil assets)-trying to take the pennies off Qadhafi's eyes before he is even dead.

Much is still in play, but not our game.

Does the same concern hold true for Syria? So what to do? Leave Gaddafi and Assad in power because of that? I suggest a more mature and less paternalistic approach to these countries should be adopted.

As to partition. Yes the colonial boundaries distorted the reality on the ground in many instances. Only been fixed in Eritrea and Sudan so far (I recall). Nothing wrong with a return to reality to take the cause for much of the tension... but let them decide that for themselves.

[JMA]

JMA,

Technically we're not doing CAS in Libya, but air interdiction. There is not, as far as we know, a ground element to identify targets and coordinate strikes (unless you count the grids I see coming in over twitter from anonymous Libyans, which I don't) so there is no CAS.

That is why I said CAS type ground targets to differentiate between what is needed to protect civilians in places like Misrata and Zintan and the destruction of aircraft on the ground and radar installations etc etc.

Clearly to comply with UNSC Resolution 1973 one needs to go beyond interdiction strikes. The failure to strike tactical ground targets (tanks, vehicles, troop concentrations etc etc) decisively in the early stages has allowed the Gaddafi forces to rapidly adapt to a highly mobile insurgent/guerrilla style of operations. The cost of this failure and the inability to protect Libyan civilians through tactical air strikes is depicted in the rising civilian body count.

It now seems that by removing/reducing the air effort ahead of the advancing rebels and thereby allowing Gaddafi to counter attack was a cynical move to prove to the rebels that they need US/NATO aid and to get it they need to subordinate themselves and take orders and accept command from the US/NATO.

To avoid the OPSEC Nazis it needs to be said that the SAS operations in Libya have been reported on in the media. I saw on CBS two ex-military types stating with absolute certainty that the same holds good for US special forces. So instead of looking for tanks hidden under bushes they should possibly be getting a little closer to the action in Misrata and Zintan, yes?

This whole Libyan exercise is turning into a box-of-frogs and will result in another embarrassment for the US military unless someone takes the situation by the scruff of the neck and focuses on the mission.

Someone should form up that smooth taking Admiral in charge of NATO and give him 48 hours to relieve Misrata and Zintan or he is on the next flight home. Now if there is no one in the top military echelons or the WH with enough balls to do this... get Donald Trump to do it.

[M-A Lagrange]

I doubt that all the causes are indeed just. In fact, like you, I know that many are not...:(

The cost:benefit ratio is poor and we devote excessive energy to things that we not only cannot really fix but generally tend to make slightly worse and therefor devote inadequate energy to fixing our own shortfalls. So, yes, it's a problem and like J Wolfsberger, I'm concerned about it...

I have no problem with the use of force or with interventions but I don't think it's too much to ask that we do all that wisely instead of foolishly.:rolleyes:

Or maybe it is... :wry:

Ken,

I believe we agree, my post was a joke.
What J Wolfsberger describes is exactly what Carl Schmitt warned about in his critic of the Just War doctrine and I pushed it to its extrem.

I do believe in R2P and the obligations for the international community to interviene to protect civilian populations against crazzy guys. But the way J Wolfsberger resumes it is quite frightening. And it's an open door to barbarism in the name of "Just" (Latin definition in legal language) and not a step to better wealth of mankind.
I believe JMM could enlight us on that particular issue of how you turn a good positive rights (Droit positif) ideas into a crazy repressive system that set a norm which is applied by force to any deviant.

Saying this, we are talking star wars and galactic empire stuff as for the moment we are in the very first expression of it in the realm of reality.
What has to be done now is effectively to take the time to sit, look at how things went and how not to fall in the pit of either "no action" either "bomb everything we do not like".

Let see what future brings in Lybia. Taking Daffy out is just the door step of a long journey.

[jmm99]

from JW
We, the United States and NATO, are now engaged in an undeclared war against one party (or both parties, depending on what day it is) where the casus belli is a doctrine entitled Responsibility To Protect. Is anyone else concerned at what this precedent might lead to?

Yes.


from MAL
The answer is simple: a military facism blessed by the Just Cause of the mightiest.

I wouldn't use "facism" ("democratic humanitarianism" can be equally doctrinaire and devastating). And, I'd put "Just Cause" in quotes - it may or may not be "just", with strong views on both sides. E.g., the stance of the liberal and more to left UN members re: Rhodesia and South Africa (as to which, JMA need not respond).


from MAL
I do believe in R2P and the obligations for the international community to interviene to protect civilian populations against crazzy guys. But the way J Wolfsberger resumes it is quite frightening. And it's an open door to barbarism in the name of "Just" (Latin definition in legal language) and not a step to better wealth of mankind. I believe JMM could enlight us on that particular issue of how you turn a good positive rights (Droit positif) ideas into a crazy repressive system that set a norm which is applied by force to any deviant.

The remainder of this discussion is probably best conducted privately over more than one bottle of Maccarthy-Moula (http://www.pages-pourpres.com/vin/bordeau/medoc/estephe/mac-carthy-moula.htm) (not the best of clarets, despite its noble name ;)).

http://www.pages-pourpres.com/vin/bordeau/medoc/estephe/images/maccarty-moula-81.jpg

Regards

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

Did not know that particular "cru" and "chateau". Bt i'll have to taste it cause it's difficult for a reasonable person to refuse a Haut-Medoc.

Thanks Mike

M-A

[jmm99]

You will find much current history under Chateau Haut-Marbuzet (http://www.thewinedoctor.com/bordeaux/hautmarbuzet.shtml) (the grand vin; Chateau MacCarthy is the second wine). Here's a very little bit on these Wild Geese MacCarthy-Reagh cousins (from the Wine Doctor):


In 1825, however, these vineyards came to the MacCarthys, a family of Irish immigrants that included amongst their number wine merchants and the chairman of the Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce. It was the MacCarthy estate that would give rise to Haut-Marbuzet, but not until the middle of the 19th Century. The new Napoleonic laws decreed that estates must be divided upon their inheritance, and so it was that in 1854 the MacCarthy vineyard was partitioned into 17 separate parcels. It was one of these parcels that would become the Haut-Marbuzet of today.
.....
Within a few years [of 1953], he [Hervé Duboscq] was gathering together the original MacCarthy estate, slowly acquiring one by one a good number of the seventeen portions that had been created over a century before, including Chambert-Marbuzet, Tour de Marbuzet and eventually purchasing the original Chateau MacCarthy itself in 1987.
.....
The grand vin is Chateau Haut-Marbuzet, the second wine Chateau MacCarthy, and the Duboscq trio also bottle the wines of the other estates accrued by the family over the years as Chateau Chambert-Marbuzet and Tour de Marbuzet.

The roots of these Bordeaux MacCarthy-Reagh in St.-Estèphe (Médoc) appear to go back the late 1700s (Dermod ou Denis), although the business was later developed by the issue of his brother Thomas:


XIX/ Donal Mac Carthy (né vers 1680 ou 1690 dans le comté de Kilkenny), dit “ de clan Dermod ” [XIX Donal = petit-fils de XVII Dermod MacCarthy-Reagh, né vers 1605 + après 1649], écuyer, Marié vers 1715 à Limerick à Honora Long, fille d’Edmund Long, écuyer, de la ville et comté de Limerick ; D’où :

1) Thomas MAC CARTHY, qui suit ;

2) Dermod (ou Denis) Mac Carthy (13 avril 1719; Limerick + 18 juin 1796, Bordeaux), écuyer, seigneur de BEAUGE et de FONVIDAL. Marié Naturalisé français, maintenu noble d’extraction (1785), quatrième consul (1766-1767), puis premier consul de Bordeaux (1767-1768) et l’un des directeurs de la chambre de commerce (1767). Il siégea avec la noblesse (1789). Marié à Jeanne (de) Fitz-Gerald (v1730 + Bordeaux, 14 décembre 1780); sans postérité. C’est probablement Denis qui acquit le vignoble de “ château Mac Carthy ”, à Saint Estèphe (Médoc).

Many of this and other MacCarthy-Reagh branches (http://fr.geneawiki.com/index.php/Famille_Mac_Carthy-Reagh) served in the régiment MacCarthy-Reagh (French Army infantry), and others in the French Navy and Marines.

Regards

Mike

[AdamG]

Rebel source tells Al Jazeera about training offered by US and Egyptian special forces in eastern Libya.

US and Egyptian special forces have reportedly been providing covert training to rebel fighters in the battle for Libya, Al Jazeera has been told.

An unnamed rebel source related how he had undergone training in military techniques at a "secret facility" in eastern Libya.

He told our correspondent Laurence Lee, reporting from the rebel-stronghold of Benghazi, that he was sent to fire Katyusha rockets but was given a simple, unguided version of the rocket instead.

"He told us that on Thursday night a new shipment of Katyusha rockets had been sent into eastern Libya from Egypt. He didn't say they were sourced from Egypt, but that was their route through," our correspondent said.

"He said these were state-of-the-art, heat-seeking rockets and that they needed to be trained on how to use them, which was one of the things the American and Egyptian special forces were there to do."

The intriguing development raises several questions, about Egypt's private involvement and what the arms embargo exactly means, said our correspondent.

"There is also the question of whether or not the outside world should arm the rebels, when in fact they [rebels] are already being armed covertly."

Our correspondent added that since the rebels appear to be receiving covert support in terms of weaponry and training, it is not surprising that they are not inclined to criticise NATO openly.

Video here
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/04/201142172443133798.html

[Oiten the Viking]

I still have to wonder. Now that we are involved and all the sudden there is a cease-fire talk in the works. Is this the equivelant of Desert Storm and we have to come back in 10-15 years? Did we just make a move that dusted off old enemies? I think that if it were only people looking for democracy, then great! But there are too many coincedences for me to overlook and say everything is innocent and just for freedom.

Two things, in my mind, will happen this year.

1. Muslim Brotherhood will show their true colors when these states in chaos choose new leadership.

2. Israel will suffer a major attack from the results of the new leadership changes.

Let's see.

[Graycap]

Makes one wonder if the Italians recalled this history and tried to keep out of the coalition.

Absolutely David. The signing of the Bengasi (history is always joking!) agreement between Italy and Libya in 2008 has been followed by some kind of a flow of historical pubblications in MSM to back the rationale of that agreement. Actually the most cruel actions were not those of the 1911 war but those carried out in the "small war" at the end of the 20's till the mid 30's in a sort of pacificaton. That pacification operation involved the use of gas bombs and shells too.

The real problem is that the pacification in the 30's regarded the Cirenaica where this rebellion is taking place. This is ons of the biggest problem between Italy and this new leadership.

Italy was not in the political position to take any kind of leadership position in a coalition that seemed to have the use of force as is main instrument.

[davidbfpo]

An odd story IMO, which cites Algerian sources, that Libyan arsenals have been emptied and taken by convoy - eight Toyota pick-up trucks - across the desert to stores in Northern Mali:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8427540/Libya-al-Qaeda-receive-looted-Libyan-weapons.html

So AQ's reputation in Eastern Libya will not locally be affected by such a move, taking weapons away from the front line into the deserts to the far south?:wry: Then there's geography, distances and logistics for such a journey.:confused: Eight pick-ups fully laden will make that much difference in Northern Mali?:rolleyes:

[M-A Lagrange]

I might be naive but the article says it happened several times, that they cross Chad and Niger... All that without being noticed?

I mean, it's not like if there was no one in those places.

[Bob's World]

An odd story IMO, which cites Algerian sources, that Libyan arsenals have been emptied and taken by convoy - eight Toyota pick-up trucks - across the desert to stores in Northern Mali:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8427540/Libya-al-Qaeda-receive-looted-Libyan-weapons.html

So AQ's reputation in Eastern Libya will not locally be affected by such a move, taking weapons away from the front line into the deserts to the far south?:wry: Then there's geography, distances and logistics for such a journey.:confused: Eight pick-ups fully laden will make that much difference in Northern Mali?:rolleyes:

AQ is a very small UW headquarters led by bin Laden. Certainly they have been active conducting UW in Libya these past several years, and in Mali and Chad and other surrounding places as well.

Our Intel community is far too quick, with the media in tow, to slap AQ stickers on the nationalist insurgent movements that have turned to AQ for the support that their networked UW operations provide.

Based on no more information than what this article provides, this to me sounds like a handful of the nationalist insurgents from down in Mali are taking advantage of the situation in Libya to pickup some military gear from the Libyan army as it becomes available and transport it south for their own nationalist operations at home.

AQ in this is probably much like a Special Forces A-Team, and is executing the same mission. There are probably 1-2 AQ operatives for every 50-100 insurgents providing guidance, advice, whatever support they can, and generally working to shape events to best suit the interests of AQ in the process.

If I was in a Mali insurgent group, I would be up in Libya looking for supplies. Similarly, If were running the AQ "SF operations" in North Africa I would be using the chaos of Libya to both motivate my insurgent groups in other areas, and to leverage my own mojo in the region by helping them to attain weapons, ammo and other helpful kit from liberated Libyan military sources.

On the other hand, if I were a US CT guy, I would have my eyes and ears open, as people are breaking cover to take advantage of current events for their own ends. I would direct my guys to very carefully seek to separate the insurgents from the UW guys, and to go after the UW guys to the degree possible, while leaving the insurgents alone. If I were a US UW guy, I would be attempting to get my own guys onto the ground to fill that vacuum and out-compete AQ for this role with the people of the region. I would then work to steer these groups toward non-violent insurgent tactics while the State Department got serious with engaging the various affected governments on reasonable reforms.

I'm none of those guys though, so I will watch and speculate with the rest of the SWJ community... There are opportunities to be had though, I suspect we are not making the most of them.

[Tukhachevskii]

You know I was watching some footage of the "rebel" fighters and that article by WILF sprang to mind, you remember, "The Toyota Horde". Toyota's don't seem to be doing the "rebels" much good:rolleyes: (yes,I know WILF's argument was framed in a different context). Maybe we could supply them with Land Rovers? (Would that fall into the "arming" the "rebels" box or transporting the "rebels" box?):D

[SWJ Blog]

Lost in Libya: The U.K. Does Not Understand Strategy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/04/lost-in-libya-the-uk-does-not/)

Entry Excerpt:

Lost in Libya: The U.K. Does Not Understand Strategy (http://www.infinityjournal.com/article/15/Lost_in_Libya_The_UK_does_not_understand_strategy) by Dr. Patrick Porter, Infinity Journal (free registration required). BLUF: "The limited war of 2011 would refuse to be quarantined. After all other options were exhausted, it could culminate in a land war against Tripoli. Distressingly, we would shoulder the burden of invading, pacifying and administering this country. Occupation would probably lead to resistance – and Libya propelled more foreign-born jihadi volunteers into Iraq than any other nation. A new front in the War on Terror would open up. Idealists now calling for humanitarian rescue would discover that all along they opposed Western imperial hubris."



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[SWJ Blog]

Boots on the Ground in Libya (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/04/boots-on-the-ground-in-libya/)

Entry Excerpt:

U.S. Army Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik (http://www.understandingwar.org/user/jdubik) (Ret.), a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War (http://www.understandingwar.org/), argues that "the Obama administration should prepare for the inevitable in Libya. To win this fight and prevent a coming anarchy, it's going to take a lot more than a no-fly zone." See his latest article, Boots on the Ground (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/05/boots_on_the_ground), at Foreign Policy.



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[Kiwigrunt]

You know I was watching some footage of the "rebel" fighters and that article by WILF sprang to mind, you remember, "The Toyota Horde". Toyota's don't seem to be doing the "rebels" much good:rolleyes: (yes,I know WILF's argument was framed in a different context). Maybe we could supply them with Land Rovers? (Would that fall into the "arming" the "rebels" box or transporting the "rebels" box?):D

It would not be very politically correct to supply them with vehicles that we ourselves no longer use in the sandbox because they 'make like the sand' too easily. No, we MUST supply them with MRAPs. And body armour.:wry:

[J Wolfsberger]

It would not be very politically correct to supply them with vehicles that we ourselves no longer use in the sandbox because they 'make like the sand' too easily. No, we MUST supply them with MRAPs. And body armour.:wry:

How about giving them vintage Land Rovers? With vintage Lucas electrical systems? ;)

[davidbfpo]

An intriguing FP article on the Libyan rebels, such as this, regarding the Toyota TV elements:
These fighters are a ragtag bunch of men of all ages and degrees of military training riding pickup trucks around the eastern coastal desert.... What you may not have realized.... is that the vast majority of these fighters have never actually arrived at the front and are not contributing to the rebels' effective fighting strength.

Better still:
The units with the highest degree of organization are former Libyan army battalions that were stationed in eastern Libya, also known as Cyrenaica. These units, including those led by former Interior Minister Abdul Fattah Younis al-Abidi, defected en masse in mid-February, retaining their organizational structure. Bizarrely, these units are largely absent from the current fighting. It is unclear why.

The real fighters are:
The most prevalent form of unit organization is ad hoc: a few brothers or friends sharing gas money, a few rifles, a rebel flag, and a pickup truck. Occasionally, whole villages or subsections of tribes have joined the rebels as a semicoherent unit.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/05/the_two_faces_of_libyas_rebels?page=0,0

There is more detail within, including the Islamists (LIFG).

[Ken White]

How about giving them vintage Land Rovers? With vintage Lucas electrical systems? ;)Did you buy that MG I traded in for the Stag, the one that never fully charged the battery (if it charged it at all) -- or the Stag I traded for a plain vanilla Ford that did not need to have the timing set twice a week on a Lucas distributor... :wry:

[Pete]

That sounds like my Mitsubishi. If anyone wants a good deal I've got a car for you.

(From those great guys who brought us Pearl Harbor.)

[AdamG]

At the training ground inside a former Gaddafi military base on the edge of Benghazi on Thursday more than 1,000 young men were gathered for instruction in the use of Kalashnikovs, mortars and rockets.

Some of the recruits put on a show of bravado. They claimed to be on the march to Tripoli to topple Gaddafi. But there was a more sober feeling among the bulk of volunteers, and the men showing them how to shoot, not flee.

A few weeks' training only goes so far against a more experienced and better disciplined force. The volunteers know that mostly they are at the camp to learn how to defend their homes if Gaddafi's troops make a push toward Benghazi.


Britain is hatching a plan to send experienced soldiers, such as former members of the SAS, to train the rebel army under the cover of private security companies paid for by Arab states. The revolutionary council's line on the prospect of foreign trainers is diplomatic.

"We will appreciate any friendly nation training our fighters," said Mustafa Gheriani, a council spokesman. "Our preference is for trainers of Arab origin but we appreciate the help from wherever it comes."

But at the training base there is suspicion.

"Why do they want to send trainers?" asked Bejou. "If they are talking about just a few weeks' training what's the point? We are doing that. If they are talking about long-term training they are talking about a long war and more people dying. That could turn this into a civil war. We don't want a long war. If Nato, the allies, want us to be in Tripoli we could be there in seven hours."

The talk of training for a longer war only fuels growing suspicion in Benghazi that Nato is abandoning the west's commitment to use air power to protect civilians. It was interpreted by the rebels as meaning western powers would destroy Gaddafi's army and clear the way for them to march into Tripoli.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/07/benghazi-rebel-boot-camp-training

[tequila]

Gotta wonder if this:


The units with the highest degree of organization are former Libyan army battalions that were stationed in eastern Libya, also known as Cyrenaica. These units, including those led by former Interior Minister Abdul Fattah Younis al-Abidi, defected en masse in mid-February, retaining their organizational structure. Bizarrely, these units are largely absent from the current fighting. It is unclear why.


... has something to do with this (http://www.npr.org/2011/03/31/135005728/cia-operatives-gathering-intelligence-in-libya):


"The CIA team is there to train them how to shoot, how to fight, how to have military discipline," NPR's Deborah Amos reported from Cairo. "They are joining a team of former Libyan military officers who are now training about 30,000 young Libyans in the rebel stronghold to also improve discipline, improve communications and make it into a more coherent fighting force."

[JMA]

Having watched Rear Admiral Russel Harding's press conference (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td7IkE5CzkI) today I must admit to being totally gobsmacked.

Appalling arrogance of the little man to stand there and ignore the fact that the US led force before and the NATO forces now have failed totally and absolutely to protect the people Misrata and get testy refusing to offer an apology or even a regret over a strike on rebel tanks (apparently) out in the middle of nowhere.

An interesting fact to come out of the briefing was that "the alliance's jets had carried out 318 sorties and struck 23 targets across Libya in the past 48 hours".

23 strikes in 48 hours? Little wonder Gaddafi's forces are becoming more bold in their actions. It would be interesting which nations are carrying out the strikes and which are just going through the motions and flying high over Libya under instructions not not to get below 30,000 feet under any circumstances.

This NATO exercise is turning into a pathetic joke made all the worse by the US standing back and making the point that without their active involvement NATO is impotent.

Where is Wikileaks when you need them. There is no chance that NATO will tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Tired of being treated like a mushroom.

[Dayuhan]

"23 strikes in 48 hours" says less than "23 strikes in 318 sorties". Looks like there's a target deficit, and that MG's people are learning to do what they want to do without exposing themselves.

There are limits to what can be done from the air without an effective force on the ground. You're not going to stop house-to-house fighting in Misrata with air strikes, at least not without way more collateral damage than anyone will accept.

Unless the rebel force can gain competence (unlikely in the immediate future) or NATO is willing to put ground troops in (also unlikely, and extremely undesirable) there's going to be a stalemate, and during that stalemate some very unpleasant stuff is going to happen. That's not incompetence, it's coming up against the basic limitations of the approved level of intervention. NATO is there to help, not to settle the matter on their own. There's a limit to what help can do if the party being helped hasn't got the ability to pitch in and do their part.

[jmm99]

Broken policy = broken strategy = broken tactics.

Not to parrot CvC, but ....

Now going back into my non-interventionist shell re: this armed conflict; except to note the BLUF supplied by the WH's OLC that it ain't a "war" - OLCM 1 Apr 2011 (http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf) (great dating):


We conclude, therefore, that the use of military force in Libya was supported by sufficiently important national interests to fall within the President’s constitutional power. At the same time, turning to the second element of the analysis, we do not believe that anticipated United States operations in Libya amounted to a “war” in the constitutional sense necessitating congressional approval under the Declaration of War Clause. This inquiry, as noted, is highly fact-specific and turns on no single factor. See Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 334 (reaching conclusion based on specific “circumstances”); Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 178 (same). Here, considering all the relevant circumstances, we believe applicable historical precedents demonstrate that the limited military operations the President anticipated directing were not a “war” for constitutional purposes.

Thus, War is Peace; Peace is War; and Ev'r May the Twain Meet (at least in Humanitarian Operations).

So, JMA, does this and the rest of this policy-legal statement pluck your heart strings ? :( Perhaps as much as a few UNSC Resolutions from 1965 (you know the ones).

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Having watched Rear Admiral Russel Harding's press conference (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td7IkE5CzkI) today I must admit to being totally gobsmacked.

Appalling arrogance of the little man to stand there and ignore the fact that the US led force before and the NATO forces now have failed totally and absolutely to protect the people Misrata and get testy refusing to offer an apology or even a regret over a strike on rebel tanks (apparently) out in the middle of nowhere.[snip]

Note that Nato Chief 'Regrets' Friendly Fire Deaths (http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Libya-Nato-Admits-Air-Strikes-May-Have-Caused-Deaths-Of-Rebels-In-Brega/Article/201104115967763?lpos=World_News_Top_Stories_Header _3&lid=ARTICLE_15967763_Libya%3A_Nato_Admits_Air_Stri kes_May_Have_Caused_Deaths_Of_Rebels_In_Brega) which shows sanity has prevailed. Now the next logical step is to put that arrogant little man (Russel Harding) on a plane home.

This should be followed by the yank admiral on the next plane for failing to lift the siege of Misrata. Let NATO give the Air Force a chance at command next and if that does not work in a week send them packing as well and let the grunts get on with the business.

[JMA]

Special Forces scandal as officers are held 'for trying to leak secrets' (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1375048/SAS-officers-held-trying-leak-secrets-Libya-Afghanistan.html)


Two senior Special Forces officers suspected of leaking details of highly sensitive covert operations have been arrested under the Official Secrets Act, ...

Oh boy...

[JMA]

Broken policy = broken strategy = broken tactics.

Not to parrot CvC, but ....

Now going back into my non-interventionist shell re: this armed conflict; except to note the BLUF supplied by the WH's OLC that it ain't a "war" - OLCM 1 Apr 2011 (http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf) (great dating):



Thus, War is Peace; Peace is War; and Ev'r May the Twain Meet (at least in Humanitarian Operations).

So, JMA, does this and the rest of this policy-legal statement pluck your heart strings ? :( Perhaps as much as a few UNSC Resolutions from 1965 (you know the ones).

Regards

Mike

I note with disappointment that when discussing the intervention in Libya seldom is the small scale of the exercise mentioned and it is often presented as a potential Iraq or Afghanistan. (not you Mike)

I maintain my position "that a stitch in time saves nine." Early aggressive action if correctly targeted will often keep the lid on a volatile situation.

You allude to (the then) Southern Rhodesia. Yes there to. The Brits could have brought that little "revolt" to an end pretty quickly (if they had wanted to and public opinion at the time allowed such action). Same principle applies.

Thanks for the reminder of the 1965 UNSC resolutions.

Loved being reminded how the following great bastions of democracy and human rights were invited to debate what to do about the dastardly Southern Rhodesia rebel regime:


Algeria, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia.

Also resolution 202 speaks of:


(a) The release of all political prisoners, detainees, restrictees,

(b) The repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation...

(c) The removal of restrictions of political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights.

Hilarious example of pot, kettle, black and standard UN hypocrisy.

But seriously, Mike, can you see the UNSC with Russia, China, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Lebanon, Gabon and Nigeria currently sitting passing such a resolution against any of those mentioned or more than half the world's nations (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=546&year=2010)?

So as the US moves towards drawing back into its isolationist shell the first action required is to give the UN notice to find a new country to parasite off.

[Dayuhan]

I maintain my position "that a stitch in time saves nine." Early aggressive action if correctly targeted will often keep the lid on a volatile situation.

Early aggressive action by who? Who do you think should be appointed to this job of running around the world slapping lids on every volatile situation that threatens to emerge? Sounds like a nasty thankless expensive job, and whoever it is would be very busy: the world is a pretty volatile place.

Whoever it is, I'm glad it's not the US.

[JMA]

Early aggressive action by who? Who do you think should be appointed to this job of running around the world slapping lids on every volatile situation that threatens to emerge? Sounds like a nasty thankless expensive job, and whoever it is would be very busy: the world is a pretty volatile place.

Whoever it is, I'm glad it's not the US.

You are absolutely correct. Given the US performance in Libya it conforms the US (politically and psychologically) is a spent force. Lets wait and see who steps up into the void.

[davidbfpo]

Special Forces scandal as officers are held 'for trying to leak secrets' (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1375048/SAS-officers-held-trying-leak-secrets-Libya-Afghanistan.html)
Oh boy...

JMA,

Whatever happened is clearly not in the public domain, rightly so for numerous reasons. Why then has someone leaked this reported information now? Instead of clarity we have "smoke & mirrors".

Clearly upon arrest there was not enough evidence to prefer a charge, although my recollection is that an Official Secrets Act charge requires high-level authority (DPP?). That could account for the bail till May.

[motorfirebox]

You are absolutely correct. Given the US performance in Libya it conforms the US (politically and psychologically) is a spent force. Lets wait and see who steps up into the void.
Given Libya and Cote d'Ivoire, it seems like Sarkozy may be trying to push France into that position.

Does anyone think that victory for the rebels is possible without the support of foreign (i.e., NATO) ground troops?

[Dayuhan]

You are absolutely correct. Given the US performance in Libya it conforms the US (politically and psychologically) is a spent force. Lets wait and see who steps up into the void.

The US will certainly be a spent force, and soon, if it doesn't reduce the number and scale of it's interventions abroad. There's no quicker way to become a spent force than to spend your force on fights you don't need to be in and staying in fights long after you need to be there. The US has done way too much of that recently, and paid a high price. Many Americans would argue that any involvement in Libya was too much, and from a purely pragmatic standpoint they have excellent arguments, but keeping the involvement limited and stepping back to a supporting role as soon as possible are steps in the right direction. A lot more great powers and empires have fallen from overreach and overextension abroad than from failure to assert themselves abroad


Given Libya and Cote d'Ivoire, it seems like Sarkozy may be trying to push France into that position.

I wish them luck, but I wouldn't expect them to have much of it. It really isn't a position that serves anyone's interests. Trying to settle other people's fights costs a lot and gains little. You make no friends and lots of enemies, get no thanks and lots of blame, get subverted by many and helped by few, if any.


Does anyone think that victory for the rebels is possible without the support of foreign (i.e., NATO) ground troops?

Has anyone adopted a rebel victory as an irreducible policy goal? That would be a mistake, IMO. Can't see anyone wanting to put ground forces in. Not that the MG forces would be that difficult to defeat, but what do you do after? "Install" a democracy? Whoever goes in and removes MG is going to be stuck with responsibility for what comes after. Ain't nobody wants to be left holding that hot potato.

[JMA]

JMA,

Whatever happened is clearly not in the public domain, rightly so for numerous reasons. Why then has someone leaked this reported information now? Instead of clarity we have "smoke & mirrors".

Clearly upon arrest there was not enough evidence to prefer a charge, although my recollection is that an Official Secrets Act charge requires high-level authority (DPP?). That could account for the bail till May.

I would be interested to hear what the offer is for the information that these "senior officers" are prepared to risk their careers (and possibly their freedom) for. And who made the first approach.

[JMA]

Given Libya and Cote d'Ivoire, it seems like Sarkozy may be trying to push France into that position.

France seems to one of the very few who seem to be willing and able.

This article offers a possible explanation: Why France moved forcefully on Ivory Coast, Libya (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/0407/Why-France-moved-forcefully-on-Ivory-Coast-Libya/(page)/2) - (would be interested in M-A's comment on this)

Also this from NPR: Why France's Military Is Stepping Up To The World (http://www.npr.org/player/v2/mediaPlayer.html?action=1&t=1&islist=false&id=135266055&m=135266104)

Personally I don't care what the French motives are, the facts are as it states in the article the French are saving lives.


Does anyone think that victory for the rebels is possible without the support of foreign (i.e., NATO) ground troops?

In keeping with my view on intervention in the Ivory Coast the effort should have been carried out by the US/French/British/now NATO so as not to allow an unarmed uprising to grow into a full blown armed rebellion with the potential for a civil war and any number of armed after shocks in the future.

Don't allow them to learn to wage war and resort to violence to solve problems as it is a habit that is difficult to unlearn.

That means Gaddafi's forces need to receive special treatment. Don't spend 500m of sending missiles to take out stuff (what the hell were the Americans thinking?) but focus on the the people who use those things. And perhaps its time for the dogs-of-war (mercenaries) to be shown just how dangerous their trade has become by singling them out for special treatment.

So the effort should be now (or should have been) to break the back of the Gaddafi's armed/military command and control people and the trained soldiers/militias in the first phase and then to supply (on request of the new rebel government) a force to control any Gaddafi loyalists who may still and weapons and mischief in mind.

No the rebels can't win on their own nor should anyone help them to with training or supplying weapons.

[JMA]

The US will certainly be a spent force, and soon, if it doesn't reduce the number and scale of it's interventions abroad. There's no quicker way to become a spent force than to spend your force on fights you don't need to be in and staying in fights long after you need to be there. The US has done way too much of that recently, and paid a high price. Many Americans would argue that any involvement in Libya was too much, and from a purely pragmatic standpoint they have excellent arguments, but keeping the involvement limited and stepping back to a supporting role as soon as possible are steps in the right direction. A lot more great powers and empires have fallen from overreach and overextension abroad than from failure to assert themselves abroad


Wrong again.

The US problem has been that it continues to apply the brute force with ignorance approach to such interventions.

Direct involvement in Afghanistan should have terminated when the Taliban government folded.

The Libyan involvement seems to have been passed to NATO. Even the $500m worth of missiles was overkill and probably largely wasted.

So the approach to Libya is better in that they looked for a short sharp intervention to achieve that mission but the implementation was woeful (probably because of micro management by politicians).

But essentially you are correct in that until the US learns how to intervene in a short sharp (probably very violent) manner to achieve the aim it is better they just stay out of these conflicts as they would tend to do more harm than good.

Sadly often good intentions are spoilt by poor execution. The US military must take some responsibility for this.

[M-A Lagrange]

Despite this week end NATO success and Daffy announcemet he agrees on a cease fire, what strikes me in this Lybia story is our (modern state) incapacity to deal with popular uprising.
It is clear now that we just do not know, want or can deal with non-state actors, even if it's a population and not an armed group.
The main reproch made to the Lybian population is to not be organised as a government. Basically we have not evolved, what ever we say, since cold war. Tactics and technics have but States are still limited by their obligation to deal with a State, is it legitimate or not.
I really think that we (at least this SWJ community) have to start thinking in depth on this.

Mod's Note: a new thread 'Popular rebellion, state response and our failure to date: a debate' has been created at M-A L's suggestion:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13002

[Bob's World]

One thing I find interesting is the largely conventional approach being employed by the populace. This will evolve over time as they become more organized (who helps to shape that organizing will have an upper hand in post conflict relationships...).

I would expect to see a more amorphous approach, avoiding linear conflict to attack or defend objectives and transitioning to seeking widespread opportunities to create localized strength against selected targets, and taking control of the tempo and putting the government into the reactionary, defensive mode. Cease Fires are always a good time to get better organized.

[JMA]

One thing I find interesting is the largely conventional approach being employed by the populace. This will evolve over time as they become more organized (who helps to shape that organizing will have an upper hand in post conflict relationships...)

I suggest that the strategy should have been to bring the end to the Gaddafi regime without the population getting militarised and gaining war experience in the process. This apart from the future best interests of Libya itself but also in case a western coalition has to return one day it would be better to face the current stumble-bum Keystone Cops than some switched-on and experienced militia or army.

Don't arm or train the rebels... just concentrate on taking Gaddafi out (within the constraints of the UNSC resolutions of course ;)

[Bob's World]

I suggest that the strategy should have been to bring the end to the Gaddafi regime without the population getting militarised and gaining war experience in the process. This apart from the future best interests of Libya itself but also in case a western coalition has to return one day it would be better to face the current stumble-bum Keystone Cops than some switched-on and experienced militia or army.

Don't arm or train the rebels... just concentrate on taking Gaddafi out (within the constraints of the UNSC resolutions of course ;)

I'm not questioning our strategy, or even AQ's strategy. Both are fuzzy and separate issues from this.

What I am intrigued by are the tactics of this unorganized revolution. The lack of leadership, lack of a planned and timed operation, the realities of the terrain and environment in general all combine to make this approach to just go out and grapple in efforts to secure key physical terrain is not surprising; it will be the siezure of key political terrain, foreign and domestic, however that will carry the day.

Good lessons learned for our UW guys as to what we need to be prepared to do when such events erupt, and there will be plenty more of these over the next couple of years. Organizing will have better pay off than mere arming or training.

[Dayuhan]

Wrong again.

I'm not sure a difference of opinion makes anybody wrong.


Direct involvement in Afghanistan should have terminated when the Taliban government folded.

Agreed, though it might have been worth extending slightly if there was a realistic possibility of killing or capturing OBL or other senior AQ figures.


But essentially you are correct in that until the US learns how to intervene in a short sharp (probably very violent) manner to achieve the aim it is better they just stay out of these conflicts as they would tend to do more harm than good.

Sadly often good intentions are spoilt by poor execution. The US military must take some responsibility for this.

Before you can achieve the aim, you have to know what it is. Other than preventing the sack of Benghazi, I'm not sure that the aim was ever very clear. The US of course doesn't want to commit itself to the removal of MG, lest they be held responsible for what comes after. They also don't want to see the rebels wiped out. Knowing what you don't want, though, is not the same as knowing what you do want, and I haven't seen anyone clearly articulate what the actual goal of all this is... other than to hand it over to NATO and back out as soon as possible, which I think is a very excellent course to pursue: wherever this is going, it's not a good idea for the US to be there.

To understand the US perspective it's also essential to place it in context. What happens in Libya is less important to the US than the larger need to reverse the Bush-era perception as an aggressive, eager interventionist power willing to push itself into the affairs of other countries at the slightest excuse, especially when those countries have oil and/or are Muslim. The last thing the US wants to do at this point is intervene preemptively or unilaterally anywhere. This administration campaigned on a platform of prioritizing multilateral action and taking a much more reticent approach to intervention, and it needs to act in ways that are consistent with that stated policy. Jumping into Libya early with aggressive force might have been the fastest way to resolve the Libyan situation, but it would not have served US interests at all.

[JMA]

I'm not questioning our strategy, or even AQ's strategy. Both are fuzzy and separate issues from this.

What I am intrigued by are the tactics of this unorganized revolution. The lack of leadership, lack of a planned and timed operation, the realities of the terrain and environment in general all combine to make this approach to just go out and grapple in efforts to secure key physical terrain is not surprising; it will be the siezure of key political terrain, foreign and domestic, however that will carry the day.

Good lessons learned for our UW guys as to what we need to be prepared to do when such events erupt, and there will be plenty more of these over the next couple of years. Organizing will have better pay off than mere arming or training.

Nothing special or surprising there Bob I can assure you.

Without training they will fall back on what they saw in the Mad Max movies, Schwarzenegger, Rambo and the like. A lot of posing and firing into the air (a very Arab thing). South of the Sahara they are at their best with a machete doing the business on defenceless civilians.

With both groups the common denominator is that they will run at the first sign of danger. With training they seem only to get marginally better.

You watch them advance adorned with machine gun belts and full of bravado until the first shots are fired... What they don't do is let the other side get in close before opening fire for maximum effect (too risky)... but they sure like to make a noise. So in true Keystone Cops style they will keep moving back and forth for weeks until one side runs out of ammo.

Now knowing your enemy it allows you to plan an intervention against these people to the maximum effect. You know what is so sad? All this information is freely available not from foreigners but from (at least a few) State Department/CIA/military people who operated in Africa with their eyes and ears open. Use it or lose it.

Your UW guys would be best advised to find people like Stan who understand this stuff and learn from them. You have the people with the experience and knowledge in these matters, all you have to do is ask them.

[Ken White]

Your UW guys would be best advised to find people like Stan who understand this stuff and learn from them. You have the people with the experience and knowledge in these matters, all you have to do is ask them.They are asked -- and those knowledgeable people also volunteer their knowledges and skills to the all-knowing. Unfortunately, the all-knowing seem to really believe they are that. Egos do not like to accept greater knowledge from perceived lesser beings. The more senior the all-knowing, the more overweening the ego...:rolleyes:

We have had adequate but not great on the ground knowledge available in every war we've been in since 1950 -- and have diligently ignored most of it. My British, Canadian and Korean friends, French, Iranian and Russian acquaintances tell me they have the same problem. The Germans do seem to do a bit better -- they also seem to be the only ones... :wry:

I don't know how you fix that. :mad:

[Dayuhan]

Now knowing your enemy it allows you to plan an intervention against these people to the maximum effect.

Maximum effect on who?

When western democracies plan interventions (or avoid them), their first consideration is the effect on their domestic political situation, the second is the impact on political perceptions in other counties. The impact on the country being intervened in comes in a distant third.

If you only look at 1/3 of the picture it doesn't seem to make much sense, but that's often the case when you're only looking at part of the picture.

[Presley Cannady]

The US problem has been that it continues to apply the brute force with ignorance approach to such interventions.

Would you mind explaining concretely--in terms of actual events and actions taken--what and what doesn't qualify as "brute force with ignorance?"


Direct involvement in Afghanistan should have terminated when the Taliban government folded.

The Taliban government folded? When?

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

What was Rory Stewart's quote about being consulted on Afghan Policy? Something about asking whether we should or should not wear seat belts when we drive over that cliff...

Dayuhan:

The lessons of Empire...

My Dad was one of those British Hope and Glory kids, always raised to be ready to run an empire that, by the time he joined the RN for the Great White Fleet victory tour, the places they went (india, etc...) would soon no longer be Empire.

The Sun may not have set on that British Empire, but the curtain went down anyway.

There is a limit to Empire.

Quite frankly, I would be as happy in post Empire USA as UK. Empire does not equal quality of life or prosperity status of the people. May be the opposite.

[Ray]

That is why I said CAS type ground targets to differentiate between what is needed to protect civilians in places like Misrata and Zintan and the destruction of aircraft on the ground and radar installations etc etc.

Clearly to comply with UNSC Resolution 1973 one needs to go beyond interdiction strikes. The failure to strike tactical ground targets (tanks, vehicles, troop concentrations etc etc) decisively in the early stages has allowed the Gaddafi forces to rapidly adapt to a highly mobile insurgent/guerrilla style of operations. The cost of this failure and the inability to protect Libyan civilians through tactical air strikes is depicted in the rising civilian body count.

It now seems that by removing/reducing the air effort ahead of the advancing rebels and thereby allowing Gaddafi to counter attack was a cynical move to prove to the rebels that they need US/NATO aid and to get it they need to subordinate themselves and take orders and accept command from the US/NATO.

To avoid the OPSEC Nazis it needs to be said that the SAS operations in Libya have been reported on in the media. I saw on CBS two ex-military types stating with absolute certainty that the same holds good for US special forces. So instead of looking for tanks hidden under bushes they should possibly be getting a little closer to the action in Misrata and Zintan, yes?

This whole Libyan exercise is turning into a box-of-frogs and will result in another embarrassment for the US military unless someone takes the situation by the scruff of the neck and focuses on the mission.

Someone should form up that smooth taking Admiral in charge of NATO and give him 48 hours to relieve Misrata and Zintan or he is on the next flight home. Now if there is no one in the top military echelons or the WH with enough balls to do this... get Donald Trump to do it.

One can criticise the US action from the military standpoint. However, waiting for the Arab League to 'plead' for US intervention, notwithstanding the UN go ahead, was a diplomatic coup and was well waiting for, even though it allowed Gaddaffi to advance causing civilian casualties.

I agree that it appear heartless, but then realpolitik is heartless and is only focussed to further the national interests.

By waiting and then acting because of 'requests' and then handing over the ops to NATO, none can complain and whine about 'US imperialism'. The fact that there is no ground troops also goes well that the US is not doing another Iraq and instead is only ensuring that civilians are not killed en masse. And another aspect that goes in favour, having been proved by the delayed action by the US, is that Gaddafi is killing his own people!!

It was essential to indicate to the Islamic world that the US is not on a drive against Islam, as is popularly believed in the Islamic world, and instead was constrained to act to save the mindless slaughter of own civilians by Gaddafi! Another coup of sorts!

Just a thought.

[JMA]

They are asked -- and those knowledgeable people also volunteer their knowledges and skills to the all-knowing. Unfortunately, the all-knowing seem to really believe they are that. Egos do not like to accept greater knowledge from perceived lesser beings. The more senior the all-knowing, the more overweening the ego...:rolleyes:

We have had adequate but not great on the ground knowledge available in every war we've been in since 1950 -- and have diligently ignored most of it. My British, Canadian and Korean friends, French, Iranian and Russian acquaintances tell me they have the same problem. The Germans do seem to do a bit better -- they also seem to be the only ones... :wry:

I don't know how you fix that. :mad:

The Boer Wars in South Africa are a great platform for learning about the difficulties of Empire when the military is required to flit from continent to continent to put out fires. In the process they seemed not to learn a damned thing. For example they had the Zulu wars - where they won the last battle which is always important - then the 1st Boer War in 1880-1881 then took of only to return after their fight in the Sudan in 1899 for the 2nd Boer War. At least they came the second time around in Khaki jackets and not the red ones from the first time - which were a real marksman's delight on the brown veldt of South Africa - but apart from that they had forgotten everything from the first war 20 years before. To be fair they did learn something the second time around.

When they arrived in country there were a number of loyal colonials from the Cape and Natal who knew the country and the Boers but as you would expect their input and advice was largely laughed off by the arriving generals. Arrogant to the end with their know all approach. The rest is history.

Sad that the same criminal folly has taken hold in the US military.

I was taught and did so and later taught it that intel is king. Get all the intel one can from all the available sources before deploying operationally in a new area of operations. Make no across the board assumptions about enemy and terrain and exhaust all options for recce. Those are the basics.

So really no one is telling these mighty generals how to fight the battle but are merely providing the generals with vital intel on which to plan their battles. I personally can't see where the resistance comes in.

One thing that stuck in my mind from the Six-Day-War from 1967 when I was a school boy was the photos of senior Egyptian officers being cashiered as a result of the defeat. Can't think why that has stuck in my mind but I think there is a message there somewhere.

Relieving an officer after operational failure or incompetence is one thing but perhaps the next step should be considered to drive the message home.

[JMA]

One can criticise the US action from the military standpoint. However, waiting for the Arab League to 'plead' for US intervention, notwithstanding the UN go ahead, was a diplomatic coup and was well waiting for, even though it allowed Gaddaffi to advance causing civilian casualties.

Well yes and that is what happened and the military action as it played out thereafter has not been affected by the delay. In fact where the situation stands today was just about where it was on day one with the single exception being that Gaddafi has no air force. So what exactly has the US/NATO action achieved other than to create a stalemate. Is this what the real intention was all along?


I agree that it appear heartless, but then realpolitik is heartless and is only focussed to further the national interests.

Are there national interests at play here? I thought this was a humanitarian intervention?


By waiting and then acting because of 'requests' and then handing over the ops to NATO, none can complain and whine about 'US imperialism'. The fact that there is no ground troops also goes well that the US is not doing another Iraq and instead is only ensuring that civilians are not killed en masse. And another aspect that goes in favour, having been proved by the delayed action by the US, is that Gaddafi is killing his own people!!

How does this ducking and diving of the US benefit the Libyans? The US has been so politically correct that Misrata is still under siege and Gaddafi is once again almost at the gates of Bengazi. No doubt the politicians think they have been clever but I'm not sure Libya and the Libyans have benefited that much other than a massacre in Bengazi has not taken place.

To follow the "heartless" line why not have let Gaddafi butcher the people of Bengazi then it would probably have been acceptable to target him and go for regime change? Would that not have been more in the "national interest"?


It was essential to indicate to the Islamic world that the US is not on a drive against Islam, as is popularly believed in the Islamic world, and instead was constrained to act to save the mindless slaughter of own civilians by Gaddafi! Another coup of sorts!

Just a thought.

Yes limited objectives are fine and unfortunately the way the US played it the good people of Bengazi are more grateful to the French and British than the US for the intervention (although the effort was probably 95% US and 5% the rest). And because life is a bitch the people of Misrata will probably blame the US for not saving them from Gaddafi.

US political strategy has been poor and has limited the military action to the point of emasculation. Nothing to be proud about.

[JMA]

Maximum effect on who?

When western democracies plan interventions (or avoid them), their first consideration is the effect on their domestic political situation, the second is the impact on political perceptions in other counties. The impact on the country being intervened in comes in a distant third.

If you only look at 1/3 of the picture it doesn't seem to make much sense, but that's often the case when you're only looking at part of the picture.

I suggest you are merely being argumentative.

I am not talking about the impact on the country (as you obviously know) but rather to know where the pressure points are in this case of Gaddafi's military and where to strike with maximum effect.

[JMA]

Would you mind explaining concretely--in terms of actual events and actions taken--what and what doesn't qualify as "brute force with ignorance?"

Libya. Half a billion worth of ordinance later and Gaddafi's forces are where they were on the ground on day one. Where is the smart in that?


The Taliban government folded? When?

Wow! You for real?

I suggest you start here and find that out for yourself: War in Afghanistan (2001–present) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_(2001%E2%80%93present))

[Dayuhan]

How does this ducking and diving of the US benefit the Libyans?

It's not meant to benefit the Libyans. it's meant to make sure the US is not responsible for removing MG, which would make us responsible for managing the unholy mess that will come after MG goes (whenever that is). It's also meant to avoid contributing to the perception that the US is eagerly pursuing and dominating interventions in Muslim lands, especially those with oil, which is a perception that directly empowers Al Qaeda.

Helping the Libyans is all well and good, but not to the point where we compromise our own interests and take on responsibilities we've no interest in managing.


Yes limited objectives are fine and unfortunately the way the US played it the good people of Bengazi are more grateful to the French and British than the US for the intervention (although the effort was probably 95% US and 5% the rest).

Why is that unfortunate? It's exactly what the US wanted: the perception that they, not the US, are running the show. No skin off our backside if we don't get thanked.


And because life is a bitch the people of Misrata will probably blame the US for not saving them from Gaddafi.

Probably true. We can deal with it. We're blamed for practically everything wrong with the world, and would be no matter what we do. It's not anything new.


I suggest you are merely being argumentative.

I am not talking about the impact on the country (as you obviously know) but rather to know where the pressure points are in this case of Gaddafi's military and where to strike with maximum effect.

I suggest that you're missing the point.

The effect on Gaddafi's military is not the primary consideration: the primary considerations are minimizing US involvement, managing domestic political impact, managing international perceptions of US aggressiveness, and getting out as soon as possible.

[Ray]

Well yes and that is what happened and the military action as it played out thereafter has not been affected by the delay. In fact where the situation stands today was just about where it was on day one with the single exception being that Gaddafi has no air force. So what exactly has the US/NATO action achieved other than to create a stalemate. Is this what the real intention was all along?

Gaddafi maybe a dictator in the eyes of the West, and even a tinpot one at that, but in the Muslim and African world, he is not viewed so. He commands respect and he has done much to project Islam power and African prestige. He is not a Gbagbo of Côte d'Ivoire, that he can be given a shakedown without a whimper from the international community. The UNSC voting pattern would indicate the drift.

Therefore, he has to be handled carefully and his sheen tarnished before the coup.

To believe that the West has no role to play in the rebellions around the Arab world would be naive since it would be a real coincidence that the whole Arab world suddenly is going up in flames with a new found messianic zeal for "Freedom and Democracy". Neither can one take it that the Libyan revolt is totally self generated. The Islamic world is used to authoritarian rule given the authoritarian rules of Islam and history shows that 'freedom' as is understood in the West is alien to them. Pakistan, would not be going down the chute, having inherited freedom and democracy from the British, if religion's authoritarian dictates did not have a greater impact than democracy that the British left as a legacy.

There are SF of western powers operating with the rebels, ostentatiously to ensure that western civilians are safe, when in actuality are said to be guiding the aircraft on their bombing runs and even indicating the FEBA. That there would be more or even guiding the rebels is a moot point.

The African Union is attempting to broker a peace between Gaddafi and the rebels, but one wonders how far it will succeed and how the conflict will pan out, if Gaddafi continues to resist and kill more Libyan rebels.

It is just the beginning and for once, the US is displaying a trait that was conspicuous by its absence - patience and Machiavellian astuteness!!

It appears that the US does not want to soil its hands, and rightly so, and instead allow the Libyans (with a little bit of help from friends) to sort out their internal issues.


Are there national interests at play here? I thought this was a humanitarian intervention?

Which intervention is not for 'humanitarian' reasons?

Iraq was too was a humanitarian cause! Regime change. Save the poor Iraqis from a ruthless dictator!!!!

And yet Mugabwe was allowed to run a riot massacring his people!! Obviously, such massacre was minor and did not require any 'humanitarian' intervention.

Neither did the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda warrant 'humanitarian' intervention. That too was minor!

That leads me to 'national interests'.

The national interest is OIL. In this world of global recession, oil prices going through the ceiling would be catastrophic and so the control of oil and manipulating the prices is essential. That is the national interest.

It maybe worth noting that China, which panders pious platitudes and homilies abstained in the UNSC vote. Yet, it is the first one to buy and ship out oil from the very rebels that the UNSC vote went ignored! National interest for you. Morality is not the issue.

Rwanda and Zimbabwe did not warrant a 'humanitarian' intervention since there was no Oil to upset national economies.




How does this ducking and diving of the US benefit the Libyans? The US has been so politically correct that Misrata is still under siege and Gaddafi is once again almost at the gates of Bengazi. No doubt the politicians think they have been clever but I'm not sure Libya and the Libyans have benefited that much other than a massacre in Bengazi has not taken place.


Is anyone really worried about the Libyans?


To follow the "heartless" line why not have let Gaddafi butcher the people of Bengazi then it would probably have been acceptable to target him and go for regime change? Would that not have been more in the "national interest"?

Allow genocide and then target Gaddafi?

And have the world in arms over 'US imperialism' and NATO 'neo colonialism'?


Yes limited objectives are fine and unfortunately the way the US played it the good people of Bengazi are more grateful to the French and British than the US for the intervention (although the effort was probably 95% US and 5% the rest). And because life is a bitch the people of Misrata will probably blame the US for not saving them from Gaddafi.

It is only the Americans who feel that they are not 'in the reckoning' since they are not in the forefront going with all guns blazing. That famous macho cowboy image!

No, the French, the British or anyone may appear to be in the forefront, but the world is not ignorant. They know who is behind the driver's wheel. Being a thirdworlder, I may say that the US, for once, is playing a master role, just like it did against the Soviets in Afghanistan, where without the US assistance, the Mujhaideens and the ISI would be mere damp squibs and today, the Soviets have been removed and yet, none can say it was the US which did the damage.


US political strategy has been poor and has limited the military action to the point of emasculation. Nothing to be proud about.

The world is tired of US gung ho, shoot first and talk later cowboy image. This time around, the US appears to be with the world sentiment and yet are firmly in the driver's seat. None can blame the US.

The Americans made not be proud of what the US is doing, but the world cannot and does not grudge what the US has been forced to do!

[Ken White]

Sad that the same criminal folly has taken hold in the US military...Relieving an officer after operational failure or incompetence is one thing but perhaps the next step should be considered to drive the message home.On the first, not just the US military, as I mentioned, it appears in most. On the other point, democratic nations mostly tend -- foolishly IMO -- to avoid reliefs and such as being 'unfair.' Militarily foolish but politically expedient. Sad but true and unlikely to change. Reality bites.. :(

In another Post, you say:
Are there national interests at play here? I thought this was a humanitarian intervention?You're kidding, right? :rolleyes:
US political strategy has been poor and has limited the military action to the point of emasculation. Nothing to be proud about.See my previous statement. Reality again. Poor in the eyes of many, not so in the eyes of others -- as two others mentioned in this thread. It appears the World according to JMA is not universally accepted. That, too, is reality...

Then there was this exchange:
The Taliban government folded? When? from Presley Cannady and to which you responded:

Wow! You for real?

I suggest you start here and find that out for yourself: War in Afghanistan (2001–present).Wow! You for real? :D

His point was they didn't fold, they merely went underground or out of town and are still there -- as you likely are quite aware -- thus your answer was superficial to say the least. Bad form, Old Boy, if one rouses the rabble, one receives a reasonable responsibility to respond responsibly, righteously not required. ;)

Realistically is desirable but not mandatory.

I'll credit you with refining the 'Don't bother me with facts, I brought my own' act to a science. Your ability to turn any thread into 'Everyone else is wrong. Always' is truly impressive if not terribly realistic.

[JMA]

On the first, not just the US military, as I mentioned, it appears in most. On the other point, democratic nations mostly tend -- foolishly IMO -- to avoid reliefs and such as being 'unfair.' Militarily foolish but politically expedient. Sad but true and unlikely to change. Reality bites.. :(

OK


See my previous statement. Reality again. Poor in the eyes of many, not so in the eyes of others -- as two others mentioned in this thread. It appears the World according to JMA is not universally accepted. That, too, is reality...

You mean there is someone out there who believes that the political strategy has been good (apart from Ray) and the the military intervention has been effective in protecting the civilians of Libya?


Then there was this exchange:Wow! You for real? :D

His point was they didn't fold, they merely went underground or out of town and are still there -- as you likely are quite aware -- thus your answer was superficial to say the least. Bad form, Old Boy, if one rouses the rabble, one receives a reasonable responsibility to respond responsibly, righteously not required. ;)

Come on Ken, you are joking right?

I quote from that Wikipedia entry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_(2001%E2%80%93present)):


In the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, ground forces of the Afghan United Front working with U.S. and British Special Forces and with massive U.S. air support, ousted the Taliban regime from power in Kabul and most of Afghanistan in a matter of weeks. Most of the senior Taliban leadership fled to neighboring Pakistan. The democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was established and an interim government under Hamid Karzai was created....

I stand by my terminology describing the Taliban government as having "folded".


I'll credit you with refining the 'Don't bother me with facts, I brought my own' act to a science. Your ability to turn any thread into 'Everyone else is wrong. Always' is truly impressive if not terribly realistic.

Thanks for the kind words Ken.

[Pete]

I'll credit you with refining the 'Don't bother me with facts, I brought my own' act to a science. Your ability to turn any thread into 'Everyone else is wrong. Always' is truly impressive if not terribly realistic.
It's the snap moral judgements that everyone in the U.S. or U.K. involved in any given situation must be seriously lacking in ethics, integrity and professionalism that drive me up the wall. It doesn't matter what the subject is, be it patrolling techniques in Afghanistan, the choice of caliber for rifles, or policy in Libya.

[Dayuhan]

You mean there is someone out there who believes that the political strategy has been good (apart from Ray) and the the military intervention has been effective in protecting the civilians of Libya?

The political strategy has been what it needed to be to be consistent with stated objectives of US foreign policy, to satisfy domestic political imperatives, and to avoid handing propaganda points to AQ... all of which are much more important to the US than anything that happens in Libya.

Obviously the capacity to protect civilians is limited by political constraints. We brought help, not salvation.


Thanks for the kind words Ken.

Those fond of dishing out harsh words shouldn't be surprised to see a few coming back. They're only words, and not terribly harsh ones at that.

Ray, re this:


The national interest is OIL. In this world of global recession, oil prices going through the ceiling would be catastrophic and so the control of oil and manipulating the prices is essential. That is the national interest.

If oil were the primary interest the logical US response would have been to do nothing and let MG crush the rebellion. He would have restored oil production quickly, and he'd have had no trouble finding buyers.

Of course any government that takes over Libya will need to sell oil, and Libyan production could expand significantly under a less capricious government... but if no government takes over, and Libya goes into an extended contested or anarchic period, oil production is likely to be constrained for some time. That's quite likely if MG falls to the rebels. Some Americans may still think that all we have to do is hold an election and all will be ok, but the limits of that peculiarly American delusion should be fairly clear by now.

[Ken White]

You mean there is someone out there who believes that the political strategy has been good (apart from Ray) and the the military intervention has been effective in protecting the civilians of Libya?A good many do for the first, few to none do for the second.
Come on Ken, you are joking right?I do that a lot but not in this case...:D
I quote from that Wikipedia entry:...Confucius say man who rely on Wikipedia and Wikileak have leaky Wiki. :wry:

I cannot attest to the veracity of that.
I stand by my terminology describing the Taliban government as having "folded".Of course you do, I'd expect nothing less... :D

The fact remains that the then leader of the Talibs, the Good Mullah Omar, is still apparently and nominally in charge ruling through the bulk of his then available and now ten years older and wiser power structure. Recall that the Talibs today are foremost among the several opposing forces ISAF, the US and the theoretical de jure if not de facto Afghan government deal with daily. It thus appears that such 'folding' is or was about as effective as 'humanitarian intervention.' :wry:
Thanks for the kind words Ken.They were kind. They are also IMO -- as well as in the opinion of several others -- quite true and thus were meant as a kindness. Constructive. Really. One might give them some thought. You post some great stuff and you also do things that draw words that may seem mildly unkind. We all do that occasionally, most of do not revel in so doing.

[Pete]

JMA, you have real-world combat experience when it comes to light and air-mobile infantry operations. In that regard you truly enrich the quality of discussion on the forum. Your expertise on those subjects is not only welcome, it is needed here.

It is in these discussions of current events where I'm turned off. If it involves the U.K. you want to be the PM, Foreign Secretary, Minister of Defence, DG of MI6, Commander of the British Armed Forces, and commander of every level below from Army Group to squad, all rolled together. If it's the U.S., you want to be the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, DG of the CIA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every military command level below that.

It gets a bit unreal at times, like "Toto, I don't think we're in Kansas anymore."

[JMA]

JMA, you have real-world combat experience when it comes to light and air-mobile infantry operations. In that regard you truly enrich the quality of discussion on the forum. Your expertise on those subjects is not only welcome, it is needed here.

It is in these discussions of current events where I'm turned off. If it involves the U.K. you want to be the PM, Foreign Secretary, Minister of Defence, DG of MI6, Commander of the British Armed Forces, and commander of every level below from Army Group to squad, all rolled together. If it's the U.S., you want to be the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, DG of the CIA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every military command level below that.

It gets a bit unreal at times, like "Toto, I don't think we're in Kansas anymore."

Thanks Pete.

[JMA]

A good many do for the first, few to none do for the second.I do that a lot but not in this case...:DConfucius say man who rely on Wikipedia and Wikileak have leaky Wiki. :wry:

I cannot attest to the veracity of that.Of course you do, I'd expect nothing less... :D

The fact remains that the then leader of the Talibs, the Good Mullah Omar, is still apparently and nominally in charge ruling through the bulk of his then available and now ten years older and wiser power structure. Recall that the Talibs today are foremost among the several opposing forces ISAF, the US and the theoretical de jure if not de facto Afghan government deal with daily. It thus appears that such 'folding' is or was about as effective as 'humanitarian intervention.' :wry:They were kind. They are also IMO -- as well as in the opinion of several others -- quite true and thus were meant as a kindness. Constructive. Really. One might give them some thought. You post some great stuff and you also do things that draw words that may seem mildly unkind. We all do that occasionally, most of do not revel in so doing.

Sorry not going to follow the red herring that the Taliban government never folded. Whether they are an underground alternative government or not does not relate to my comment that their government "folded" after the superbly implemented first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom.

[JMA]

The political strategy has been what it needed to be to be consistent with stated objectives of US foreign policy, to satisfy domestic political imperatives, and to avoid handing propaganda points to AQ... all of which are much more important to the US than anything that happens in Libya.

The timing of the intervention was "just in time" to prevent a massacre in Bengazi. That saves everything.

There was dithering right up to the last minute by Obama and it has been well reported how the "three women" pressed him into action.

So I for one am not going to swallow the after the fact spin being applied to turn a dithering last gasp decision into a political master stroke.

Now we see that France and Britain are calling for increased NATO efforts to protect the civilian population. Thereby stating the obvious that the US political hand is very much in control of the NATO effort. I mean who does not know that NATO is mere a surrogate of the US?

(It is noted that the French have also criticised the German efforts)

Now one wonders why the US political strategy is to limit the efforts at protecting Libyan civilians? For example the failure to lift the siege of Misrata.

[Dayuhan]

The timing of the intervention was "just in time" to prevent a massacre in Bengazi. That saves everything.

There was dithering right up to the last minute by Obama and it has been well reported how the "three women" pressed him into action.

So I for one am not going to swallow the after the fact spin being applied to turn a dithering last gasp decision into a political master stroke.

Now we see that France and Britain are calling for increased NATO efforts to protect the civilian population. Thereby stating the obvious that the US political hand is very much in control of the NATO effort. I mean who does not know that NATO is mere a surrogate of the US?

(It is noted that the French have also criticised the German efforts)

Now one wonders why the US political strategy is to limit the efforts at protecting Libyan civilians? For example the failure to lift the siege of Misrata.

What you see as "dithering" is both intentional and necessary. I don't know how many time it's necessary to point it out, but this isn't just about Libya and there are factors involved that, for the US, are much more important than Libya. The US has to portray itself as a reluctant participant, and Obama has to portray himself as reluctant to order intervention. Anything else would be spun by AQ and other Islamists as America jumping at another chance to impose itself on another oil-producing Muslim country, and that spin will be believed. Obama also has to be consistent with the foreign policy platform he ran on, which promised reduced intervention and a preference for multilateral action.

There's probably a good deal of real reluctance involved as well: the US has little incentive to be involved in Libya, and there are many possible negative outcomes and few likely positive ones. Whether reluctant or not, though, the public portrayal of reluctance is essential to maintain the foreign policy position that the US is trying to establish.

[JMA]

I do have to shake my head when I compare your current posts on Libya to your first one which started this discussion. Will the real person please stand up?


What you see as "dithering" is both intentional and necessary.

No, no, no. Lets rephrase that shall we...

What I see as dithering you see as both intentional and necessary.

Maybe you need to apply for a position as spin doctor for the Obama administration or maybe you are just blindly following their line regardless.


I don't know how many time it's necessary to point it out, ...

You can do that as many times as you like but it will never be more than your opinion.

[Entropy]

What I see as dithering you see as both intentional and necessary.

Here's a thought, maybe those two are not mutually exclusive?


Maybe you need to apply for a position as spin doctor for the Obama administration or maybe you are just blindly following their line regardless.

Your ad hominems are growing increasingly tiresome and they undercut the credibility of your arguments. Please try to make your points without impugning motives. Thanks.

[JMA]

Gaddafi maybe a dictator in the eyes of the West, and even a tinpot one at that, but in the Muslim and African world, he is not viewed so. He commands respect and he has done much to project Islam power and African prestige. He is not a Gbagbo of Côte d'Ivoire, that he can be given a shakedown without a whimper from the international community. The UNSC voting pattern would indicate the drift.

[snipped for brevity]

The Americans made not be proud of what the US is doing, but the world cannot and does not grudge what the US has been forced to do!

Hi Ray, I will attempt a broad response rather than just a point for point one.

I have always had a problem with trying to understand what exactly the Arab and African Worlds were really thinking. Mostly the views that were expressed were coming from spokesmen from the various regimes whose view was obviously prepackaged. Then given the propaganda and the way the news was/still is presented in most of these countries there would be little doubt as to how the various peoples were indoctrinated.

In summary then Gaddafi has recently got some support from a section of the Ugandan population (as reported on TV here) as a result of his building mosques around the country there and dispensing aid. Understandable. Things are slowly changing among the educated in Africa (by my observation) where the young educated can recognise an old-school idiot when they see one. Gaddafi, Mugabe etc are increasingly seen a joke and a relic of a bygone era.

Look at the Democracy Index. It is from that list that the West (IMHO) should decide how to deal with the various countries on the continent. There are only 26 full democracies in the world. Surely one should treat these nations “better” than the rats-and-mice at the bottom of the list? From #113 downwards apart from oil and some strategic minerals can’t think why they are even allowed in the UN or have diplomatic relations with the top 50 odd countries?

Why should the West be concerned what these authoritarian regimes say or care about them? So lets move onto the AU. An absolute waste of time and someone else’s money. Who did they send to Libya to negotiate? What is democracy and human rights status of these countries? They have credibility with who? Little wonder they were shown the door by the rebels in Bengazi.

The US displaying a trait of “patience and Machiavellian astuteness!!”. I would really like to hear how you arrived at that conclusion as the US clearly hasn’t had the vaguest idea of what is happening in the Arab world and what to do about it. In fact the current US administration’s utter incompetence has woken up and scared half of Europe into action… (at last).

In another reply I have stated that when the motivation for an intervention is sound but the method of the intervention is poor or unsuccessful then sadly the whole concept of humanitarian intervention gets questioned (instead of just questioning how they went about it).

Yes over time a lot of people have been let down by a lack of willingness to intervene but that does not diminish in any way the soundness of humanitarian intervention as a doctrine … (even if it upsets the Russians and the Chinese.)

Acting in one’s national interest is expected. This is why that hackneyed call “its all about oil” is so ridiculous. Of course it is and it always will be. Yes and (as we see in the US relationship with Saudi Arabia and others) there are times when one has to be pragmatic over morality and other issues.

Yes the US needs a change in style and intervention method. I agree.

I suggest that the people of the world are more ignorant than we give them credit for ;)

If no one can say the US were behind the humiliation of the Soviets in Afghanistan I suggest it proves my point that the people of the world are more ignorant than not.

All the US needs is a change in attitude and style. It is just very difficult to turn this supertanker in high seas. It’s a 50-50 call whether they can achieve this IMHO

[Ken White]

Here's a thought, maybe those two are not mutually exclusive?
...
Your ad hominems are growing increasingly tiresome and they undercut the credibility of your arguments. Please try to make your points without impugning motives. Thanks.

JMA:

Entropy said it well. You can do better, please do so.

[Surferbeetle]

From the Atlantic, The Management Myth (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/06/the-management-myth/4883/1/), By MATTHEW STEWART, June 2006 :wry:


Mayo’s work sheds light on the dark side of the “humanist” tradition in management theory. There is something undeniably creepy about a clipboard-bearing man hovering around a group of factory women, flicking the lights on and off and dishing out candy bars. All of that humanity—as anyone in my old firm could have told you—was just a more subtle form of bureaucratic control. It was a way of harnessing the workers’ sense of identity and well-being to the goals of the organization, an effort to get each worker to participate in an ever more refined form of her own enslavement.

So why is Mayo’s message constantly recycled and presented as something radically new and liberating? Why does every new management theorist seem to want to outdo Chairman Mao in calling for perpetual havoc on the old order? Very simply, because all economic organizations involve at least some degree of power, and power always pisses people off. That is the human condition. At the end of the day, it isn’t a new world order that the management theorists are after; it’s the sensation of the revolutionary moment. They long for that exhilarating instant when they’re fighting the good fight and imagining a future utopia. What happens after the revolution—civil war and Stalinism being good bets—could not be of less concern.


In the case of my old firm, incidentally, the endgame was civil war. Those who talked loudest about the ideals of the “new” organization, as it turned out, had the least love in their hearts. By a strange twist of fate, I owe the long- evity of my own consulting career to this circumstance. When I first announced my intention to withdraw from the firm in order to pursue my vocation as an unpublishable philosopher at large, my partners let me know that they would gladly regard my investment in the firm as a selfless contribution to their financial well-being. By the time I managed to extricate myself from their loving embrace, nearly three years later, the partnership had for other reasons descended into the kind of Hobbesian war of all against all from which only the lawyers emerge smiling. The firm was temporarily rescued by a dot-com company, but within a year both the savior and the saved collapsed in a richly deserved bankruptcy. Of course, your experience in a “new” organization may be different.

Professor Elton Mayo (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elton_Mayo) of the Harvard Business School

Frederick Winslow Taylor (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Winslow_Taylor), the author of The Principles of Scientific Management

[Dayuhan]

I do have to shake my head when I compare your current posts on Libya to your first one which started this discussion. Will the real person please stand up?

Just went back and looked, and it doesn't seem to me that I suggested anything other than what's been done. I didn't suggest waiting for a UN resolution, letting the French take the lead, or exiting as soon as possible, but I think all three were excellent ideas and I approve of them.


You can do that as many times as you like but it will never be more than your opinion.

Of course. Just as everything you write here will never be more than your opinion. Anything any of us writes here is nothing more than our opinion. I've cited a number of reasons why I think the policies and actions taken by the US make sense in the broader context of US interests. I've yet to see you do the same. Possibly you should tell us what you think the US should do or should have done and how those actions would advance or protect US interests.

You seem to believe that any policy or action other than those you recommend constitutes incompetence, dithering, cowardice, or a few other negative things, but I really don't see how you can expect the US to take actions that are completely inconsistent with stated policy and which would undermine US interests.

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

It seems you folks have not been able to get across to JMA the truly complex inter-relationships that the US, on a daily basis, wanders through.

Obviously, the Big Game of the Week is to convince Iraqi leaders that they really need to keep us for a few more years, even if, by saying so, their heads will be rolled down the street.

As Mr. Gates, and now even Khalilizad tread this salesman's path, Mr. Al-Maliki's concern is his Shia brethren in Bahrain. He reluctantly agreed to vote the limited action in Libya, but recognizes the profound US inconsistencies inherent in the Bahrain vs. Libya circumstances.

Similarly, an open policy of "your a dictator, your dead," might not go over well amongst some of our other Gulf allies.

Entropy's reference to strategic dithering, like democracy, produced results which are neither rapid nor optimizing.

We could, in effect, take the governor off the engine so that there is no need for civilian/international discourse and swift and certain military responses are assured (Damn the torpedoes (and unintended consequences) but SOMEBODY would have to serve as the Dictator whose divine right of decision/action/funding is unquestioned.

Not sure that notion/structure fits in any modern country.

Sorry, JMA, but it's always going to be complicated.

And that's before we even get to Beetle's type of organizational complexity, and the sheer logistics essential to keeping the tip of the spear sharpened.

Personally, I believe that our air toys are really great, but can't seize and hold ground after the flames die down, and can't effectively target without a ground component.

Our biggest gap is the failure to appreciate that success does not come from military action, but from post-conflict stabilization, and our system has routinely proved its Achilles Heel in this area.

Tell me how it ends, then reverse engineer to your proposed action plan.

[Ray]

Hi JMA,

No news, emanating from anywhere in the world is free from agendas, interests, prejudices, bias or even not aimed at serving national interests. The difference is that the degree varies. Therefore, one has to take it for what it is worth and base one’s views on that. That is an infirmity that one has to accept.

Gaddafi’s ‘charm’ extends far and wide in the Islamic world, not only in Uganda but as far as Pakistan, for ‘services’ in propagating the Islamic ‘honour’ and cause! The Islamic nations matter in international politics, whether we acknowledge it or not, or else an obscurantist, fundamentalist, autocratic, despotic regime as the House of Saud, would have been taken to task well before Saddam Hussein.

Therefore, IMHO, to ride rough shod over an icon and hero of Islam like Gaddafi remains a moot point and then have the albatross around the neck that the Great White Satan reigniting the Crusades!

The Democratic Index may have great meaning in the western world, but it has no meaning in large part of the world, especially in those parts where Democracy is merely a buzz word and where religion or money making is the paramount concern like the Islamic world (religion) and China (money). A visit to the numerous foras of these countries where the cyber warriors abound, will indicate how the common man of these countries have very little concern about ‘democracy’ when pitted against religion (Islamic countries) and China (money).

As to why they are in the UN the answer is simple. They also a part of the world. And to ensure that the voice of only the powerful is what makes the world move, inspite of the sham democratic façade of the UN, we have the UNSC. So, it is quite safe, depends on your perspective on the issue.

The fact that the US is keeping in the background is the best thing for the US. It has been buffeted too long where if they act, they are damned and if they don’t act they are damned. This time around, the US actions, on the face value, appears to indicate that they are keeping their hands off and practically telling the world to solve their problems themselves and see how difficult it is! Yet, one would be naïve to believe that US is not keeping its finger on the pulse and administering the necessary tweaks. I would shudder to believe that the US has no clue as to what is happening in the Arab world.

As I see it, the US is allowing all the Pollyannas to act – the UN, Arab League, the AU and even the NATO. It is when they will all raise their hand in desperation, maybe then the US will ‘reluctantly’ act!! That is why I felt that the US is showing ‘patience and Machiavellian astuteness’.

If you opine that ‘motivation for an intervention is sound but the method of the intervention is poor or unsuccessful , and find cause for ‘humanitarian assistance’, and also feel that one has to be pragmatic over morality, what is your blueprint/ roadmap? Go gung ho as in Iraq, be labelled ‘neo colonialist and imperialist’ and then have another lament on the hands?

Another observation I have is that if the world is so disgusted with Gaddafi, then why don’t they act unilaterally? Why must they expect the US to do their dirty work, if one calls it dirty work; and if they (US) don't do it to the satisfaction of others, then should the others then bellyache?

In so far as Afghanistan is concerned, the US does not bear the blame as much as Pakistan, their ISI and the Arab hordes do. If that means the world is ignorant, then it is to the US’ credit that they have palmed off the blame!!

[JMA]

Dayuhan:

It seems you folks have not been able to get across to JMA the truly complex inter-relationships that the US, on a daily basis, wanders through.

[snip]

Sorry, JMA, but it's always going to be complicated.

Steve I will look past your obvious condescending tone.

I am not sure I have ever said the political/military/tactical situations were not either fully complex or potentially complex.

I acknowledge too that many military commanders at various levels seem unable to see through the fog-of-war. This inability is further exasperated by interference and attempts at micro-management by politicians which also contributes to greater complexity and confusion. It seems confusion reigns in far too many "war" situations these days.

An outstanding commander and his staff will be better able to cut through the crap and focus on the essentials and comply with the Simplicity principle of war - because they know even simple plans become complex in war while complex plans become totally unworkable. Politicians don't know this.

I will also acknowledge also that complexity is a well used excuse for dithering, failure and incompetence. Some people buy it...


Tell me how it ends, then reverse engineer to your proposed action plan.

You are the planner Steve. Lets hear it from you.

[JMA]

You seem to believe that any policy or action other than those you recommend constitutes incompetence, dithering, cowardice, or a few other negative things, but I really don't see how you can expect the US to take actions that are completely inconsistent with stated policy and which would undermine US interests.

"Any" policy? Give me ten examples or so that have led you to this conclusion. Can you? Any smaller sample would be meaningless, yes?

Not too many people in the real world seem to believe that the WH and State and the CIA had the faintest idea of what has been going down in the Arab world and how to respond.

On the matter of US interests it seems only here on SWC that anyone attempts to present with any certainty exactly what these US national interests are. This while it is obvious that there is no consensus on this even in the WH.

It is quite obvious that the Obama Administration is flying this thing by the seat of their pants.

[JMA]

Hi Ray just to single out one point at this time.


If you opine that ‘motivation for an intervention is sound but the method of the intervention is poor or unsuccessful , and find cause for ‘humanitarian assistance’, and also feel that one has to be pragmatic over morality, what is your blueprint/ roadmap? Go gung ho as in Iraq, be labelled ‘neo colonialist and imperialist’ and then have another lament on the hands?

The linkage is not sound.

My first point was simply that if the intervention fails it should not throw the motivation behind the intervention itself into doubt. For example the US humanitarian intervention into Somalia was well intentioned and IMO justified and necessary. That the aim got lost and it all ended in tears should not (and does not in my mind) lead to the advisability of such humanitarian interventions being questioned thereafter. Thats it, that's all on that point.

As to the second point. Sadly it is a reality that countries dependent upon oil imports often need to compromise their integrity and trade with some very evil and unsavory states to satisfy that need. Nothing more, nothing less.

If it wasn't for oil or WMD I can't think of why the US led the "willing" into Iraq. Of Afghanistan apart from the obvious need to strike out after 9/11 can't think why they backed Karzai and are still there. All very strange.

But in terms of the law of unintended consequences what 9/11 aimed to achieve was apparently to "wake the American people up" ended up with the US bankrupting itself through its response. A self inflicted wound if there ever was one.

[tequila]

Guess Qatar didn't get the memo (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/14/libyan-rebels-supplied-weapons-qatar)on Gaddafi's Islamic charms.



Qatar (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/qatar) is supplying anti-tank weapons to Libyan rebels in Benghazi as part of its strategy of working to overthrow the Gaddafi regime, officials in Doha have confirmed.

Qatar's prime minister and foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem, has said that UN resolutions on Libya (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/libya) permitted the supply of "defensive weapons" to opposition forces struggling to fight Libyan armour.

Qatari government officials were reluctant to be drawn on the delivery of French-made Milan missiles, thought to be by sea. "We need to send the Libyans equipment so they can defend themselves and get on with their lives," a senior source said. "These are civilians who have had to become fighters because of the situation ..."

[Ken White]

...ended up with the US bankrupting itself through its response. A self inflicted wound if there ever was one.Near bankruptcy has many fathers and more than a few Mothers (of various types...) involved. However, the gross expense of Afghanistan, Iraq and all the rest since 9/11 is barely a condensation bubble on the side of the glass, about 1% of GDP (LINK) (http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CBoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fas.org%2Fsgp%2Fcrs%2Fnatsec% 2FRL33110.pdf&rct=j&q=costs%20of%20Afganistan%20and%20iraq&ei=pWSnTbq5O4K70QHHpNz5CA&usg=AFQjCNHjBPsvESRejCx5jQYT4wnzgrFYTw&cad=rja). We have nearly bankrupted ourselves but the wars were and are only a very small part of that. A profligate Congress over a good many years (over 60, both political parties) has far, far more to do with our economic problems.

[carl]

To add to Tequila's earlier post. Here is a link to a story about how the rebels set up a cell network in eastern Libya. They did with wit and a lot of equipment purchased for them by the U.A.E. and Quatar.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703841904576256512991215284.html?m od=fox_australian

I find it interesting that the civilians of Misrata are still holding out.

[Pete]

If it's the U.S., you want to be the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, DG of the CIA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every military command level below that.
If we could put an end to the separation of powers within the U.S. Government we might indeed have a more efficent foreign policy and military strategy overseas. Who knows, we might even win a few of them big time, hands down, dramatically, and for all the world to see. However, the "Ein Reich, ein Volk, und ein Fuhrer" approach tends to lead to major big-time screw-ups from time to time.

[JMA]

Near bankruptcy has many fathers and more than a few Mothers (of various types...) involved. However, the gross expense of Afghanistan, Iraq and all the rest since 9/11 is barely a condensation bubble on the side of the glass, about 1% of GDP (LINK) (http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CBoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fas.org%2Fsgp%2Fcrs%2Fnatsec% 2FRL33110.pdf&rct=j&q=costs%20of%20Afganistan%20and%20iraq&ei=pWSnTbq5O4K70QHHpNz5CA&usg=AFQjCNHjBPsvESRejCx5jQYT4wnzgrFYTw&cad=rja). We have nearly bankrupted ourselves but the wars were and are only a very small part of that. A profligate Congress over a good many years (over 60, both political parties) has far, far more to do with our economic problems.

Thanks for that Ken, it certainly makes my comment look alarmist and badly incorrect. I wonder how I was led to that impression.

I will use this reference on the next "drama queen" who dares to suggest that the US can't afford the Libyan intervention.

I consider myself duly "put straight" on the matter.

[Surferbeetle]

Quick case studies over morning coffee as to why the trend is not our friend in this instance...

Greek debt hit by restructuring fears (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/086d7be6-667b-11e0-ac4d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1JQSKCg9s), By Jennifer Hughes, Senior Markets Correspondent, Published: April 14 2011 11:55 | Last updated: April 14 2011 19:04 at the FT


Greek borrowing costs reached a euro-era high compared with those of Germany. The euro tumbled on Thursday and premiums charged on Greek debt over Germany’s hit euro-era highs after the countries’ respective finance ministers talked of Greece needing more time to attract investors and raised the prospect of debt restructuring.

George Papaconstantinou told the Financial Times that Greece needed more time to convince international investors of its commitment to reform its finances.


Yields on Greek two-year bonds jumped 0.9 of a percentage point to 17.829 per cent.

Moody’s cuts Ireland debt rating (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/362478dc-6734-11e0-9bb8-00144feab49a.html#axzz1JQSKCg9s), By Neil Dennis, Published: April 15 2011 09:40 | Last updated: April 15 2011 09:40, at the FT


Ireland’s sovereign debt rating has been cut on Friday by Moody’s Investors Service just hours ahead of the expected announcement by the government of a revised agreement with international lenders on the terms of its €67.5bn bail-out.

Moody’s reduced the rating by two notches to the lowest investment grade to reflect the country’s struggle to address its budget deficit.


Although Moody’s lowered its rating on Ireland to Baa3 from Baa1 and kept its negative outlook, an analyst with the rating agency said debt restructuring was not a “plausible scenario”. Dietmar Hornung of Moody’s told Reuters that while the downgrade reflected the unbalanced risks faced by Ireland, the country had a good record of delivering fiscal consolidation.

EU and IMF to drive Portugal bail-out terms (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b0880690-6462-11e0-a69a-00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=64b60566-61cc-11e0-88f7-00144feab49a.html#axzz1JQSKCg9s), By Peter Wise in Lisbon and Ralph Atkins in Frankfurt, Published: April 11 2011 18:45 | Last updated: April 11 2011 18:45, at the FT


European Union and International Monetary Fund officials will begin talks in Portugal on Tuesday on a programme of austerity measures and economic reforms as a condition for an €80bn ($115bn) bail-out.

“It’s not an exaggeration to call it shock therapy,” said Filipe Silva, head of public debt trading with Portugal’s Banco Carregosa. “The country has to break out of a vicious circle of debt and low growth.”

Spain backtracks on China investment claim (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/63862548-668d-11e0-ac4d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1JQSKCg9s), By Miles Johnson in Madrid, Published: April 14 2011 13:57 | Last updated: April 14 2011 13:5, at the FT


Madrid has been forced to make an embarrassing clarification after claims that Spain had secured from China up to €9bn in investment in its troubled savings banks were denied by Beijing.

Spanish officials said an “error of communication” had led to reports that China Investment Corporation – one of the country’s sovereign wealth funds – was considering a €9bn investment after José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, Spain’s prime minister, met Chinese leaders this week.

[JMA]

I find it interesting that the civilians of Misrata are still holding out.

The US/NATO failure to lift the siege of Misrata is a shocking disgrace.

The politicians and their spin-doctors have gone crazy. Everything is about appearances and going through the motions. The difficult aspects are just ignored.

[JMA]

RF concerned over abused mandate of UN resolution on Libya (http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=16152634&PageNum=0)

Yes, I know that the chirping of the Russians from the back row of the bleachers (like that US strikes were killing civilians) were diplomatic amateur-hour at its worst but... given the recent statement (by Obama, Sarcozy and Cameron) that Gaddafi must go opens the door for the Russians to make this more accurate accusation.

So what is the sad part? That once the UNSC authority to act was granted instead of getting in fast and hitting hard and then getting out the world saw burn-out after 48 hours followed by a hopelessly inept performance ever since. If anyone doubts what I say go and ask the people of Misrata.

To make matters worse given the fear of many US citizens of being sucked into another Iraq/Afghanistan swamp anyone with even basic intelligence would have gone for the short-sharp option.

[carl]

JMA:

I saw a bit of footage by a British reporter and cameraman who were in Misrata. There was a shot of a tank taken through what was in effect a peephole. They said the tank was one of the dictator's and it was sitting there in what looked to be the middle of a street basking in the sunshine. It doesn't seem as if it would be too hard to find and hit.

I did read that the Italians wanted NATO to lead rather than the French because the French would have been inclined to do something, NATO would be inclined to do nothing much.