The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[Fabius Maximus]

Moderator's Note

Prompted by the SWJ Blog article 'Meet An Urban Planner For Cities That Don't Yet Exist' and link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mee...dont-yet-exist I found that two hundred threads contain Kilcullen and nine threads specifically contain his name in the title, so before I merge them to this 'Collection' thread they were:

1. In 2008 'Killcullen Briefing' a link to another website
2. In 2008 after his book was published 'Kilcullen article' on defeating the Taliban
3. In 2009 announcing a speaking slot 'David Kilcullen at the Pritzker Military Library'
4. In 2009 a link to an Australian TV debate 'Kilcullen debates the ethics and tactics of contemporary warfare'
5. In 2009 a thread after 'Accidental insurgent' was published 'Recovering David Kilcullen'
6. In 2006 'Kilcullen -- New Theories for a New Way of War'
7. In 2010 'Deconstructing Kilcullen's Counterinsurgency'
8. In 2010 seeking questions for a meeting 'Questions for Dr. David Kilcullen'
9. In 2011 'Kilcullen on Libya: U.S. Should be ‘Air Referee’

In January 2015 four other threads were merged into this one.(ends)


Kilcullen's work has been discussed elsewhere on SWC, including the thread on his "28 articles". (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=659) But given the high-level attention it has received, a dedicated thread seems appropriate.

Lt. Col in the Australian Army, Ph.D. in anthropology, Chief Strategist in the Office of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, recently awarded the Medal for Exceptional Public Service, and subject of a glowing review in the New Yorker article quoted above.

Here are his major works:

Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency (http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf)

Complex Warfighting (http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/Publications/complex_warfighting.pdf), April 7, 2004


Counterinsurgency Redux (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf), Survival -- IISS, Winter, 2006

Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency (http://www.usgcoin.org/docs1/3PillarsOfCounterinsurgency.pdf), Dr David J. Kilcullen*, Remarks delivered at the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington D.C., 28 September 2006

[Fabius Maximus]

"28 articles" was written for a Coalition Company Commander just warned for deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan. With admirable clarity, at the opening he defines his subject.


(Counterinsurgency) is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population.

Right from the start … guaranteed failure. This definition is true when fighting a domestic insurgency, or if we are seeking to create or maintain a colony. Neither is true – yet – for America. Certainly not in Iraq.

The Iraq government must win the hearts and minds of its people for the Iraq State. A US company commander can only help, as a secondary player in this game.

[Fabius Maximus]

The number of votes for "brilliant, useful" suggests that America is doomed. I recommend that we all get dual citizenship with some refuge nation, perhaps an isolated communist State up in the hills. Like Albania, or Berkeley.

Perhaps more evidence will help....

Kilcullen then gives 28 steps to victory. Let's start at the top.


1. Know your turf.

Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district.

At this point a savvy Captain might toss this in the trash.

This advice is either banal (“know your turf”) or impossible.

The world expert on “your” district already lives there. What Kilcullen describes is called the home court advantage – and they have it, not us. US company commanders on a six to twelve month rotations cannot develop anything remotely like this knowledge about so foreign a place.

It might not be possible for then to do so in Watts or Harlem.

This does however, show the power of Kilcullen's work.

First, Kilcullen has written a useful field manual. Unfortunately, it works only for insurgents -- not us. See #1 above.

Second, he (unknowingly) shows why overseas expeditions do not work in a 4GW world. The "home court advantage" has the advantage when (like now) defensive strategies are dominant.

[Fabius Maximus]

As usual with the US military, deus ex machina saves the day!


... a “ruggedized” laptop computer, loaded with data from social-science research conducted in Iraq — such as, McFate said, “an analysis of the eighty-eight tribes and subtribes in a particular province.” Now the project is recruiting social scientists around the country to join five-person “human terrain” teams that would go to Iraq and Afghanistan with combat brigades and serve as cultural advisers on six-to-nine-month tours.

Since there are so few Arabic-speaking, Iraq-expert social scientists in the US (even fewer for Afghanistan), the data for these laptops’ will mostly come from the locals. That is, our maps of the social terrain will be that of various partisans in the Iraq civil war. (there are no neutrals in a civil war)

It's a high-tech way of making their enemies, our enemies.

Good idea, just the wrong time and place.

Also this illustrates our confusion between "data" and "knowledge." Even if the data is correct, most of our company commanders will lack the contextual understanding -- the wider view of Iraq/Afghanistan society -- needed to successfully apply it.

[slapout9]

Fabius, I take you don't believe much in Kilcullen? Who would you recommend?

[Fabius Maximus]

The usual suspects ... Lind, Richards, van Creveld ... and the other folks you see published on www.d-n-i.net (DNI)

Unfortunately we are in the early stages of developing strategies effective in the age of 4GW. Early days yet. Yet the wealth of writing of the subject, from both in and outside the services, suggests that we'll have results eventually.

Implementing them might be a more difficult problem. I consider this the critical step, about which I've seen nothing of interest. Perhaps we must learn to wage 4GW on our own military institutions.

The sage who I believe has produced the first keys to winning 4GW is MAJ Don Vandergriff (The Path to Victory). In the end, our people are our greatest strength. Nothing is more important than getting the right system to attract, retain, and promote in the armed services.

Among my articles, the most operational is, I believe:

"Militia: the dominant defensive force in 21st Century 4GW?"
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/fabius_maximus_militia-1.pdf

[slapout9]

Fabius, that's some article. I am not sure about Militias for some of the reasons you mentioned. One thing I do agree with is the defense is vastly underestimated. One of the hardest things I had to learn as a Cop was how to make the criminal come to you! It sounds so odd but it is an enormous advantage when you set up sting operations,or undercover operations and they catch far more criminals then just riding around in a marked patrol car. I will have to pay more attention to the DNI page.

[Fabius Maximus]

The below link goes to a favorable mention of "Counterinsurgency Redux" by T. X. Hammes. Hammes is on the A-team of 4GW experts. His opinion deserves attention.

http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/november-2006/the-way-to-win-a-guerrilla-war

[slapout9]

Fabius, I like TX Hammes and try to read his articles, have not read his book yet, but I will. The last article I read of his was in Military Review (I think) about doing network analysis in order to make the enemy visible. Law Enforcement has been doing this for years since criminals don't walk around with a sign on their head that says Criminal. Glad he is on our side.

[carl]

I am a bit surprised at the sharp tone of FM's criticism. Most of Mr. Kilcullen's statements seem to be plain common sense well put. The crux of FM's complaint seems to be that something less than perfect is useless.

1.

In his little area, the Company Commander is indeed in a competition as stated by Mr. Kilcullen. And, as as been demonstrated in Vietnam, Malaya and Iraq, it is possible to win that competition in his small area of responsibility.

Of course, the government of Iraq will be the entity that ultimately wins the war in the country as a whole. The Captain "can only help, as a secondary player in this game." But that secondary role can be a vital one.

2.

The Captain might well never know the turf as well as the guy who was born and lives there. But FM seems to imply that because he will never equal that knowledge the advice is meritless; if perfection can't be achieved, why bother trying for good enough.

It seems to me that the advantages the Captain brings, around 100 well trained and organized soldiers, good communications, superior fighting power, good transport, reliable supply, money to spend (hopefully) can make what less than perfect knowledge he can, through hard work, acquire, good enough to win a local victory.

[Bill Moore]

Fabius I have to agree with Carl for the most part. I have yet to read all your posted links (except for the first post), but a Company of professional soldiers brings many things to their area of operations that probably didn't exist previously, such as a viable, non-bias security force. I have seen companies reenergize existing systems such as the local medical, sewage, education, banking, etc. If something isn't working, they go out and see what the problem is, and get the appropriate powers to be to fix the problem. We're generally there because the problem set was greater than the HN government could manage on its own, so to assume we bring no goodness is quite simply wrong. To state we're at a disadvantage because we're not on home turf is obviously a truism, but always has been, and it has not prevented us (and others) from winning in these types of conflicts previously.

As for Killcullen being a genius or a dreamer, I have to side closer to genius. You need to remember that he works for our Dept of State, so he can only go so far with his public statements. If you want to see if he understands where the differences between traditional COIN fits and modern 4GW I recommend reading the article titled "Knowing the Enemy" by George Packer in the NY Times. (See link below, note this was posted elsewhere in in the counsel, and surprisingly received little comment, it was the best articles I have read lately).

On the other hand I agree with you that a traditional COIN approach will not work in some cases, and OIF is one of them. More later, I need to read to your posts.

http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/061218fa_fact2

Bill

[Fabius Maximus]

(a quickly written note, apologize for typos)

From the perspective of company commanders, this is just another set of advice, to be skimmed for a few insights. "#1 Know your turf ... tell me something I don't already know."

It's banal in the sense of commonplace, almost trivial.

(side note: For every members of Al Qaeda there must be hundred+ manuals on how to fight him, many of which are hundreds of pages long ... Perhaps we should conduct counterinsurgency by smothering our enemies with manuals.)

From a larger perspective this -- boiling his work down to commonplaces -- misses the key to Kilcullen's views. He's a brilliant PhD anthropologist - Lt Col in the Aussie Army.

I'll bet that he means this stuff, in its full glory as I described above. As do the senior DoD and State folks -- uniformed and not -- who promote his work.

The "excesses" (my word, not yours) that you throw away ("be the world expert on your district") are his key insights. Delusional as they might be.

This illustrates some key larger points as to why we lose these wars. Hence deserves attention!

[Fabius Maximus]

Bill, how can you say I am too harsh on Kilcullen before reading my analysis? Perhaps I am too gentle. (I vote for option B, too nice too often to too many).

Since I quoted from this New Yorker article, I probably read it!

These "genius new CI experts" and "innovative new Army commander" articles in the general media are a staple of 4G wars. They appear all the way from the confident entry to the defeat and withdrawal at the end.

They deserve close attention, as they illustrate why we lose.

[jcustis]

FB,

I try to live by the adage that arguing over the Internet is like competing in the Special Olympics because even if you win, you're still retarded.

That said, I offer that you have misread the 28 Articles:


Kilcullen then gives 28 steps to victory. Let's start at the top.

As a former company commander who actually served in Iraq, my read of the work tells me it was not intended to be a presciption for victory, but rather a memory jogger so that the mobilized company commander could frame his thoughts, work, and shape his staff. He wants the guy on the ground to contribute to victory, not be the end all.

Kilcullen also wants the commander to avoid being part of the problem, like the hammer in search of a nail. If you think his work is only good for the insurgents, then I believe that you have misread and missed his point.

[SWJED]

FB,

I try to live by the adage that arguing over the Internet is like competing in the Special Olympics because even if you win, you're still retarded.

That said, I offer that you have misread the 28 Articles:

As a former company commander who actually served in Iraq, my read of the work tells me it was not intended to be a presciption for victory, but rather a memory jogger so that the mobilized company commander could frame his thoughts, work, and shape his staff. He wants the guy on the ground to contribute to victory, not be the end all.

Kilcullen also wants the commander to avoid being part of the problem, like the hammer in search of a nail. If you think his work is only good for the insurgents, then I believe that you have misread and missed his point.

I started to post something along this line last night but got overwhelmed with the SWJ updates...

Again, spot on and well said.

[zenpundit]

While I heartily endorse FM's call to look at the writings of Chet Richards, T.X. Hammes, William Lind and DNI generally ( I'd throw in John Robb too) I don't agree with his assessment of Colonel Kilcullen who comes with some good COIN experiences in Indonesia ( how many of us are familiar with the enormous constellation of hinterland militias there ? Talk to anyone from Besi Merah Putih lately ? From even the little I know about Indonesia, I can say it is as easily as complex a situation as Iraq in terms of ethnic, religious and political dynamics but with ten times the population and thousands of islands. Getting a handle on that requires some real brains).

Kilcullen is giving general advice, not an operational plan (I doubt the DoD is listening anyway).

[Merv Benson]

I thought his comments on the enemy's tying of its tactics to his PR campaign was very insightful. I will let others argue over the effect of his works on the local level. One of the biggest failures we have had in this war is in the media battle space, While the man at least recognizes the problem, we still have put no one in charge of fighting in thsi battle space.

[slapout9]

Fabius, I read the article by TX at the link you posted, and thanks for posting as I said I like TX and enjoy reading his work, and I will get his book shortly. Maybe I can give you something to review. In the article he recommends several movies if you don't like to read- Lawrence of Arabia, Battle of Algiers,etc. I would suggest "Next of Kin" with Patrick Swazye. Sometimes it is a little goofy in places but it is closer to truth then you might think with reference to Family Tribes. There are some lessons to be learned for Iraq to. Blood is thicker than water or an idea. If you get a chance watch it, let me know what you think. I would also recommend it for the SWC, maybe a topic for future discussion. "Remember Kin is Kin and thats the way it is!!!!" Great line from some part of the movie. Later.

[RTK]

FB,

I try to live by the adage that arguing over the Internet is like competing in the Special Olympics because even if you win, you're still retarded.

That said, I offer that you have misread the 28 Articles:



As a former company commander who actually served in Iraq, my read of the work tells me it was not intended to be a presciption for victory, but rather a memory jogger so that the mobilized company commander could frame his thoughts, work, and shape his staff. He wants the guy on the ground to contribute to victory, not be the end all.

Kilcullen also wants the commander to avoid being part of the problem, like the hammer in search of a nail. If you think his work is only good for the insurgents, then I believe that you have misread and missed his point.

To echo jcustis as another former Troop commander who has been to Iraq for two years, LTC (Dr.) Kilcullen's pieces are Cliff Notes for those who haven't been there yet. True, most of what he's written becomes second nature to someone with experience in the arena. I had taken for granted the importance of some of his points (I first read his 28 points article after my second year in Iraq) though, in retrospect, I found myself using his article as a report card for performance.

In addition, I saw Dave Kilcullen present on his 28 Points article about 2 months ago. he presented the 28 points as a pre, during, and post operation PMCS of sorts. Most of his points can be addressed at the company level during an abreviated MDMP or mission planning process.

Also, it's interesting to me that Dave Kilcullen, TX Hammes, and John Nagl are all good friends and seem to quote each other regularly. I take it for what it's worth; a triad of guys who are pretty smart on the subject. Mixing their knowledge with what I've learned in over two years of COIN gives me, in my opinion, a pretty good handle on the COIN business.

$0.02

[Fabius Maximus]

Folks, we're all stumbling around here. If you want good answers, call Martin van Creveld. It's long distance, but worth it.

Meanwhile, back in the weeds, it does not help me when you say that I'm wrong (btw, you're pussycats compared to the DNI editorial cabal).

Or that I've mis-read Kilcullen (ditto).

I've given a close analysis of his text. Please give specifics as to my errors.

Zenpundit, Merv, and others have raised some great and specific points, which I will attempt to grapple with later. Now on to the central question ...

[Fabius Maximus]

I've not communicated this clearly. Just to get together on the same page, let's start at the beginning.

For the past 100 years or so, western nations have lost almost every war like Iraq (fighting as aliens in a less developed state). You can call them colonial wars, low intensity conflicts, guerilla wars, insurgencies, or 4GW’s. There have been a few exceptions, either long ago (Philippines) or probably fictional (Malaysia).

Worse, 4GW’s might become the primary form of war in the 21st century. And as Iraq has shown, we do not know how to win such conflicts. In fact, we’re losing both wars in the Middle East theater.

One of our primary strengths is our free, competitive intellectual climate. Formally it is called the Delphi method. People write up proposals, which are circulated and intensely criticized. Eventually we find a solution. I doubt al-Qaeda has anything like this.

Kilcullen has written up a solution, in his various papers, for winning 4GW’s. The *proposal* might prove ineffective, but the *process* is of the highest importance.

This guy is a PhD anthropologist. If he wanted to write “cliff notes” – the basic stuff told to captains for generations or centuries (“know your turf”), he’d have done so in a fraction of the time and length.

The “cliff notes” version – boiling it down so that it only tells us what we already know – is just a recipe for defeat. Tried and failed.

Kilcullen is more ambitious, reaching far in search of a successful tactical formula for victory. Let’s not throw out the strange and new elements he suggests, but discuss what he actually said.

Even failed ideas move us forward, showing us another path that does not work.

[Fabius Maximus]

What is new in Kilcullen's discussion of PR & propaganda?

John Adam’s defense of the Redcoats following the Boston Massacre was – and was seen at the time – as a masterstroke of PR, gaining British sympathy for the colonies’ struggle against the Crown.

Ditto in the Civil War (aka, for you southerners, the War Between the States), where the PR war in Britain had a decisive effect on the outcome.

Ditto in WWI (e.g. the Zimmerman telegram).

That we’re doing so poorly in the information war for both Iraq and Afghanistan probably reflects the small number of Americans with the necessary knowledge of their cultures. Don’t hold your breath for this to change.


Re: Kilcullen’s discussion of the Indonesian insurrection

He misses, in my opinion, the primary difference between that and our wars in the ME. As do most who reference Lawrence. And often those looking for tips to win from the Malaysian Insurrection.

All were wars waged and won by the locals. We are aliens in a strange land. What works for the locals might be impossible for us.

[slapout9]

Fabius,one point that I think people over look when they refer to our successes (Philippines,Malaysia,Dominican Republic) is they were islands! Directly or indirectly we could quarantine the entire country not just a portion of it. In COIN ops I think you have to think about the whole country! if you don't what is to stop him from running to the hills? If he is in the hills what stops him from running to the city? If it is not an Island what stops him from running to another country?

PS It was the Invasion of the Damn Yankees not the war between the states!

[SWJED]

FM – I’ve followed this thread since you posted it and have to say I believe the “misunderstanding” of the replies lies in your quarter. The replies from seasoned COIN veterans in defense of Kilcullen are merely relating that his words of advice are appropriate and work in the world they operate in.

Those of the “theorist camp" have the luxury of endless debate on the “grand strategic themes” of 4GW, COIN, IW, etal. Your views are better served directed at members of the National Command Authority and not Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders, Squad Leaders and Team Leaders.

The operators do not have the luxury of picking and choosing the operational environment they are ordered to. What they do is adjust and make do with the best available information at their disposal. As Tom Ricks related in his recent book Fiasco – one third of our officers get it, one third are trying to get it and one third just want the hammer as their only tool in the box.

Kilcullen offers practical advice to the first two thirds and from what I gathered the majority of our operators appreciate his efforts. Again, these guys on the ground are not tasked with bringing world peace in our time. They are tasked with a difficult mission – a fuzzy end-state - and look to his words as a way to be part of the solution – not part of the problem. I take exception to anyone who imposes a top-down world view to those on the point of the spear.

Moreover, to those who say that advice such as this from Kilcullen and warrior-scholars such as Zinni, Petraeus and Mattis are just a blinding flash of the obvious, I submit we are not "real good" at lessons learned and often our best and brightest find themselves under the thumb of the last third mentioned above. Doses of reality from guys like Kilcullen, Zinni, Petraeus and Mattis should be written in stone so we don't need the next COIN guru to remind us of what we already know.

[jcustis]

End of story, 'nuff said, end of discussion. Thanks for being the eloquent verbal sword SWJED.

Nothing more to see here folks, you can continue to mill about smartly. :D

Oh, and FM, in response to:
The “cliff notes” version – boiling it down so that it only tells us what we already know – is just a recipe for defeat. Tried and failed., all I can say is that you would be surprised what people know, what they choose to ignore, and what they have to consciously suppress. This is sort of a walk a mile in my shoes moment, but I think you can understand...

[Fabius Maximus]

We're losing, but I guess that's not a problem. Ok, let's try again.


#2 -- Diagnose the problem.

Once you know your area and its people, you can begin to diagnose the problem. Who are the insurgents? What drives them? What makes local leaders tick?

Having “strategic corporals” was insufficient. Now we need “doctorate captains.” This is not a task for company commanders, with already complex and heavy load of leadership and managerial tasks.

Worse, Kilcullen’s work persistently ignores this advice. There is little consideration given to the locals’ motivations, or al Qaeda’s. How does this struggle look to them?

Also, this advice highlights the difference between the UK “victory” in Malaysia and our current expeditions to the Middle East. The UK had over a century’s experience governing Malaysia, local knowledge that we lack and cannot quickly develop.



#3 -- Organize for intelligence.

In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is often nearly impossible. Intelligence and operations are complementary. Your operations will be intelligence driven, but intelligence will come mostly from your own operations, not as a “product” prepared and served up by higher headquarters. So you must organize for intelligence. You will need a company S2 and intelligence section.

Kilcullen is moving regimental/battalion level functions onto combat companies, who are neither staffed nor trained for this level of complex and technical operations.

Training for this level of intelligence works takes at least two years, and the US State and Defense departments have far too such people for this to be realistic.

Wishing for what we lack is not a tactical doctrine; or rather it is a doomed one. Why not just ask for ten divisions of multi-lingual MP’s and be done with it?

We have fielded an army of the best educated and trained company commanders the world has ever seen. We can ask much of them, but not anything of them. Putting our Captains on a runway does not make them airplanes.

Increasing their responsibilities should not substitute for the military’s lack of effective doctrine and operational intelligence.

Simplifying their job might produce better results than making it more complex. Certainly the insurgents’ operational doctrines do not require leaders with a college degree, let alone graduate studies. Perhaps we can learn something from them in this respect.

[jcustis]

and with your last post FB, you've talked in such a circle that my head is about to explode.


Kilcullen is moving regimental/battalion level functions onto combat companies, who are neither staffed nor trained for this level of complex and technical operations.

We all know that a company isn't fully staffed to do complete intel analysis and product generation, but we (USMC and Army) identified the need for an intelligence cell, at the coy level, in this fight before Kilcullen came around. Does his advice restate what we already know? In this case, yes, but you're still missing the point that the 28 articles are a framework for action as a unit prepares itself and then goes into the breech.

When Kilcullen is telling us to know what makes the local leaders tick, I think he is doing exactly what you think he has failed to do: get us to delve into the motivations of the locals. How you can miss that connection is beyond me, frankly.

Please don't throw the "strategic corporal" term around loosely. Have you ever shared a cigarette with one?

Do you know what a company intel section typically does? It is not a lot of analysis, but rather compilation, aggregation, and focused tasking to support collection. They do not mirror a S-2 section at the Bn level.

[slapout9]

Hi Fabius.....it's me again.....guess you didn't like my Island theory...Oh well.


You make two good points.
One what is their motivation? As an ex cop I have always thought it was the key to the whole situation. Even crazy people have a reason for fighting and I don't think we know enough about their's and we need to find out. We may not like the answer but we need to know and deal with it.

Two I agree about the education requirements. In a strange way I think college "degreeism" is the problem. Instead of reasoning out the problem everybody has to go back to school for a masters and when that doesn't work go back and get a PhD. Mean while we are being beaten by a semi-literate population? I think President Johnson had a famous quote about all the college boys getting us into Vietnam. Although Kilcullen may be talking about this when he speaks about looking for talent not rank. Anyway those are my opinions.

[Bill Moore]

Fabius please reread the posts from the view of a soldier on the ground trying to make sense of his tactical/operational environment. Kilcullen does provide a framework for operating in chaos, especially when higher doesn't have a clue. Although there is little new, it is compiled in a useful framework (like the Ranger handbook), and I sure wish I had it when I was in OIF.

Obviously this isn't a strategy for winning the war. If CPT Jones follows the 28 steps it may very well lead to positive attitudes towards the U.S. and neutralization of the embedded threats (not the transient ones), but it won't solve the overaching strategic issues of ethnic strife, unemployment, poor infrastructure, insecure borders, transnational actors, and a lack of nationalism (what is the Iraqi military fighting for?).

As jcustis stated above, I think you would be very surprised at what our guys understand at the Bn level and below, as they are living it, but there is only so much they can say. Remember we're soldiers not warriors, and there is a difference.

All that said I agree with many of your comments, and frequently refer to them while studying 4G and 5G concepts. I'm not pointing fingers, but I have yet to see a real strategy for countering 4GW. The strategies I have seen lack substance, and are based on a future force that doesn't exist.

I hardly consider myself old school, but I do believe the military should focus on the militarily achievable, and only get involved in a Somalia, Iraq, etc. if it is absolutely in our national interest. Iraq was a war of choice. Afghanistan was not a war of choice, but we did choose to stay instead of simply defeat the Taliban and leave (defeat as far as the Pakistan border). I know the arguments for staying, but I'm simply staying there was also the option of dropping the hammer, then leaving. We could revisit it later if need be.

Now assuming we only get involved (in the future) if it represents real national interests (vice the CNN pull effect), then one could assume we would take the measures necessary to stop support from places like Syria, Pakistan and Iran? I'm not convinced we (the military) don't know how to win this type of fight, but we can't do it fighting a politically correct war.


one point that I think people over look when they refer to our successes (Philippines,Malaysia,Dominican Republic) is they were islands! Directly or indirectly we could quarantine the entire country not just a portion of it. In COIN ops I think you have to think about the whole country! if you don't what is to stop him from running to the hills? If he is in the hills what stops him from running to the city? If it is not an Island what stops him from running to another country? Slapout

Slapout, Malaysia is not just an island, it also has a pennisula, but either way it is easy to isolate. The the Philippines on the other hand have over 700 islands at high tide, more during low tide. Fishing boats, ferries, workboats, etc. are numerous (it's a water highway) and it isn't as easy as one may think to blockade an island, now add to that the several islands the insurgency existed on. However, your point is still valid, because what is unique about the Philippines (and I believe Malaysia) is that the insurgents (the ones we defeated, not present day) didn't receive outside support (they didn't want it), and they didn't have safehavens in other countries. Both of these were relatively easy insurgencies to counter compared to Vietnam. It infuriates me when some students of COIN try to compare Malaysia with Vietnam as though it was the same type of fight, far from it. It is also far from Iraq and Afghanistan in scale.

[Fabius Maximus]

I absolutely agree that there are two perspectives displayed in this thread.

To borrow your phrase, there is a "ground" level view of Kilcullen's work. Company commanders get this memo, extract what they can out of it, and move on. It is not their job to win the war - just to accomplish their missions at the lowest possible cost. The previous thread – linked in the opening comment – covered this quite well.

Then we go to SWJED’s key observation:


Those of the “theorist camp" have the luxury of endless debate on the “grand strategic themes” of 4GW, COIN, IW, etal. Your views are better served directed at members of the National Command Authority and not Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders, Squad Leaders and Team Leaders.

The senior US leaders are the audience of Kilcullen's work. We're not winning, and Kilcullen's proposals attempt to change that, as clearly seen in his work taken as a whole. He's attempting to innovate, radically. I'm attempting -- by direct quotation -- to describe his innovations, and illustrate their weaknesses.

To "translate" what he says “down” into standard doctrine is, I believe, to frustrate the purpose of his work. That's what I believe was said earlier by referring to his work as a "cliff notes."

Cliff notes are essential tools. I just doubt that was his intention in writing this. That is clear in his other works, which we might get to if we work thru his 28 articles.

Bill Moore:
... I have yet to see a real strategy for countering 4GW. The strategies I have seen lack substance, and are based on a future force that doesn't exist.

I agree.

Standard doctrine is not, I believe, working in Iraq and Afghanistan -- just as it has failed in so many similar wars. I believe Kilcullen agrees with me on this key point.

Nor have we devised anything better, yet. That's what I said in my post below, beginning "I'm not communicating clearly." Kilcullen is participating in a process to find such a strategy. Unfortunately, his solution is based on a force that does not yet exist, and which I believe will not exist in any reasonable time frame (generations).

Worse, his recommendations take us in the wrong direction. A bit of a complex discussion, probably not appropriate at this point.

This problem is not unique to Kilcullen. I believe it is common to those of many 4GW experts, such as Wilcox and Lind. This discussion is perhaps central to the debate about ways to fight 4gw, but unfortunately off-topic here. (Note the references below to past articles of mine that discuss this in greater detail)

[jcustis]

The answer to this has become obvious. The only way to wing fourth generation wars is to refurbish and redeploy M113 Gavins across the entire force, as they are profoundly more survivable than wheeled LAVs or Strykers, can be uparmored to withstand insurgent weapons, and can traverse 4GW battlefield terrain that other platforms cannot.:rolleyes:

[jcustis]

I’m not going to delve into the 28 Articles. I think you’ve received enough subtle verbal blows to realize that you can’t hoist an argument against that text. If you still have a beef with those simple, thoughtful lines of text, then read no further. The same pretty much goes for the remainder of Kilcullen’s work. Through my reading, not once did I get the sense that he was hoisting the writing up and saying, “Look at this all you lesser thinkers, this is the roadmap to victory.” You may wish he were doing so to make your critiques easier, but don’t hold your breath. When I return to Iraq, the 28 Articles will be prominently displayed in my hooch. I don’t have to believe that each article is achievable, as that would be akin to going hungry because I don’t like one of the buffet selections.

I’ve been trained to offer concrete solutions as well as critiques, which is something I have yet to see you do:


Kilcullen is more ambitious, reaching far in search of a successful tactical formula for victory. Let’s not throw out the strange and new elements he suggests, but discuss what he actually said.

Even failed ideas move us forward, showing us another path that does not work.

What path would you have us choose oh enlightened one? Wait, let me get my Surefire…

Simple mantras from leaders like LtGen Mattis have shaped behavior and performance in ways you cannot imagine. They are simple and apply to the entire force, but because they are not the final recipe for victory, you seem to argue that they are less valid and pointless. I am here to tell you that if your moanful strategic corporal remembers the mantras, and prevents the needless death of one civilian, or one friendly fire incident, that is a good thing. At my level, the mantra has served a purpose. Perhaps you should not try to come down to my level, because you are disappointed and abhor my lot in life.

The not so dearly departed Rumsfeld said you go to war with the force you have. Would a 100% increase in the number of SF groups in country be a better approach? Perhaps, but we do not have that, and so certain qualities must be mimicked, attempted, and utilized.

If policy missteps had not been made by certain handlers of the politico-military force, we might have scaled down our presence to a small element of advisors, and we would not be having this discussion today. If there were civil war and we were not there, it would be a wholly Iraqi problem, not embracing us. Ding, ding…We are there, so tell me what you would have my Lance Corporals do? Oh wait, where did I put that Surefire again?

Perhaps we are not even dealing with a fourth generation war within the confines of Iraq and Afghanistan? After all, in all of the briefings and operational orders I’ve attended in the past 3 ½ years, I never heard the situation read as: “Gentlemen, we are embroiled in a fourth generation war…”

I fail to see where your article “Militia: the dominant defensive force in 21st Century 4GW?” Has any bearing on the discussion of COIN. We are in the fight, so live with it. Your grand theoretical brush has little to do with my world, working as a pair of boots on the ground. You threw it out there as something operationally applicable, but I can’t grasp what you meant. Please enlighten me.


A defensive war denies foreign 4GW foes both an aggressor and the home court advantage. When attacking us, they bear the high costs and frequent mistakes typical of overseas adventures. This works well with Lind’s recommendation to de-escalate. Treat users of terrorism as criminals wherever possible, in the sense of avoiding use of soldiers unless necessary. Avoid engaging them massively and directly – unless they attack first.

In particular, this quote of yours shows a selective ignorance of several truths about the conflict we are in. This may be a great prescription for dealing with future threats (doubtful in my opinion) but we are not dealing with future threats my good man. Kilcullen seeks to set a framework for the threat we face in the here and now.

Most of your arguments in this thread smack of professional jealousy, and that's sad. If that is not the case, there’s no need to reply to this observation, as it is mine alone


Conventional/Special Operations. Capabilities that once resided exclusively in
Special Operations forces are proliferating to the combat force. Every soldier in contemporary conflict requires capabilities such as individual initiative, cultural sensitivity, linguistic competence, mastery of sophisticated weapons and sensors, and a capacity for small group independent operations – characteristics traditionally associated with Special Forces. Meanwhile, Special Operations forces are conducting conventional tasks such as screening, defence and largescale assault, and simultaneously developing more unconventional skills. Special and conventional operations are becoming increasingly integrated, occurring on the same terrain and relying upon intimate cooperation between combat forces, special operations forces and inter-agency elements. Moreover, although Combat Force tasks are different from Special Operations tasks, all soldiers require flexibility, physical and mental toughness, self-reliance and technical skills that allow them to be highly effective across a wider array of missions.

I pulled this from Kilcullen’s Complex Warfighting article, which was written for the AUS forces, not US. As you allege elsewhere in your writings, we should address weaknesses and not our strengths, in order to achieve victory in long wars. Kilcullen’s point about modern soldiers requiring a skill set for a wider array of missions, resonates with me because current and future non-state threats do not present themselves as massed formations, marching up on the Common, shoulder to shoulder. Because they may offer only a temporary target, junior leaders have to understand what they’ve seen, report it, and have the skills to engage it quickly.

What is under your saddle that makes you find fault with this? Is it the fact that such training requires a significant investment in time and resources? Is it the fact that may not see immediate returns on that investment? Are you saying that for those reasons we should not move towards a better force in these areas? Your logic is confusing along this line, because it almost sounds as though you advocate that we should throw our hands up, cry about the difficulty of the task, and then retreat to a corner with our thumb stuck in our mouth.

Look, we all know that COIN is a hard row to hoe, and there are no magic silver bullets. Many members of the SWC may actually appreciate your points, although they would not publicly admit so because of other entanglements. Perhaps you should stop looking amorously at Kilcullen and start an analysis of personnel ceilings, advisory team staffing policies, force rotation policies, and whether heavy armor has a place on the Iraqi terrain…Kilcullen is not your whipping boy.

Throughout your article, “What should we do in Iraq”, you’ve beaten the drum that likes to take grand swipes at almost everything, yet offers nothing concrete as a better way ahead. In that you appear to believe we can do our best by leaving Iraq to avoid future casualties, your views smell like the obverse of neo-conservative Malkinism. It also smells like Peters and Malkin combined because you hype things up to a crescendo, but depart with a fizzle. You’re more than welcome to ruck up. That is unless, you’re simply enticing us into a discussion with you so that you can gleam more material for a future article. Please provide appropriate citations to recognize our efforts. ;)

[Bill Moore]

Gentlemen,

As defined by Hammes we are definitely (there is no gray area) involved in a 4GW fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One aspect I haven't heard discussed much is the difficulty that a democratic country has in dealing with 4GW, vice a totalitarian one. We have certain limitations based on our laws and values that are easily exploitable. Some advocate changing the laws (the big ones in the press are torture, eavesdropping, etc.) to deal with the emergency, but the reality is these wars will last several years, so changing our laws would not a be temporary fix, such as establishing martial law in New Orleans after Katrina.

There are several aspects at the strategic level we have yet to address. In 4GW you can't win the fight on the battleground, but you can lose it there. Please read Hammes's "The Sling and the Stone" for clarification.

Bill

[jcustis]

There are several aspects at the strategic level we have yet to address.

One may be the date when we will finally break our dependence on oil from the Arabian Peninsula.

I was speaking rhetorically on the fourth generation warfare bit. I don't like how theorists try to package everything neatly, then fight over the scraps of who came up with the name first, but I agree that what we face now fits within those parameters.

[RTK]

I spent an hour and a half on this post, only to find the subject closed when I hit submit. I'm posting in the soapbox forum for my own personal gratification.

He's attempting to innovate, radically.

Quite the opposite, actually. He's summarizing the evolution of leadership in theater that began in April 2003 when we first started to fight the insurgency. While you're quite fond of starting with the first point and shredding it to pieces in rhetoric brimming with hyperbole, I could give you concrete operational examples of virtually every one of the 28 points being implemented successfully by either my troop or one of my brother troops in theater over the last 3 and a half years.

Point 1: Know your Turf- Very little difference from saying "Conduct IPB"
Point 2: Diagnose the Problem- Looks like Mission Analysis
Point 3: Organize for Intelligence- Companies don't have intelligence sections. Smart and innovative companies have developed intelligence sections that collect and analyze intelligence from the platoons. These ad-hoc sections were more often than not better suited and outperformed BN intelligence sections with actual intelligence MOS soldiers.
Point 4: Organize for Inter-Agency Operation: in your typical Mission Rehearsal Exercise, a company doesn't even touch inter-agency operations. In theater, maximizing the effectivness of inter-agency operations, particularly in the realm of CMO projects, can make or break your combat tour.
Point 5: Travel light and harden CSS- It doesn't take a Rhodes Scholar to see that CSS convoys were getting hammered right off the bat (remember PVT Lynch). We didn't do a good job in training our logisticians to fight on the roads. Conversely, for every tank or Bradley with a good load plan in theater I saw 8 gypsy wagons for tanks with all kinds of crap hanging off them that their crew would never use. Utilization of the conex for junk not used is an important PCI.
Point 6: Find a political/cultural advisor- Why did SF traditionally conduct UW and FID missions? Because being culturally astute are SF imperatives in their doctrine. We, in the conventional force, were never trained that way. Good units pulled in people who knew what they were talking about. I remember learning a great deal from Dr. Hashim. Once in theater, I got hooked into a sheiks family who brought me up to speed on the specific cultural dos and don'ts in my area. It helped place my soldiers in my troop on a higher plain of understanding than other units in theater. Our performance and results spoke to that.
Point 7: Train the Squad Leaders - then Trust them- On the high intensity battlefield, I, as a troop commander, can maneuver individual sections much easier than the COIN environment. The abilities of my junior leaders are paramountly important to everything I do. They conduct independent operations. Most of my patrols in my troop were lead by an E5 or E6. I had 3 officers in my troop. They couldn't be everywhere. I, as did my PLs, had to trust my NCOs to do the right thing constant with the commander's intent I wrote.
Point 8: Rank is nothing, Talent is everything - Goes back to the rule of thirds that Ricks talks about in Fiasco. Some are really good at COIN, some suck. Some of our best COIN operators are E5s and E4s who are out there every day. They understand how 2nd and 3rd order effects work. They see them up close and personal.
Point 9: Have a game plan- It may be surprising to you that many units go into an area without one. This ties back into Points 1-4.
Point 10: Be there- Near and dear to my heart. As a reconnaissance tactics instructor, it's my job to communicate to the force that R&S planning and operations work in COIN just like they do in HIC environments. If you're unable to place effective fires at the critical point and time (which in OCIN is 3-7 seconds) you'll lose the engagement. Developing NAIs on areas that have high IEDs and overwatching them will eliminate IEDs in given area. Again, goes back to IPB and planning
Point 11: Avoid knee jerk responses to first impressions- First reports are wrong 95% of the time. Insuregents know when RIP/TOA is happening. depending on where you are, some lay low and some hammer the new unit. Those laying low can paralyze a new unit into inaction. Going into the game with a plan and sticking to it is better than initial improvisation.
Point 12: Prepare for handover from Day 1- We reinvent the wheel on each rotation. It has been said we fought the Vietnam war for one year 11 times, rather than for 11 years. Many units get the RIP/TOA files and paperwork and never look at them again. That's a travesty. Additionally, some units are preparing to RIP/TOA with indigenous forces. that needs to be planned from Day 1.
Point 13: Build Trusted networks- May seem like common sense but many units think they can do it on their own. There are people in the community who want to help, despite great risk to themselves and their family. Taking them in and getting them to help your unit will make the unit successful. Goes back to the cultural advisor piece. If the tree branches are overt operations, the tree's roots are relationships with and in the local populace.
Point 14 and 15: Start Easy and Seek early victories- Some go in and try to take down the entire AQIZ network in Iraq in their first 48 hours. the easiest victories have very little to do with kinetic operations; SWEAT-MS victories, tribal engagments, and equipping of security forces are the easiest 3 things to focus on. The populace see this and will warm to your unit quickly.
Point 16: Practice Deterrent patrolling- Firebase concepts, which conventional units were completely against initially, lend well to this. Dominating the environment through sheer presense to deter attacks goes back to R&S planning.

To be continued

[RTK]

Point 17: Be prepared for setbacks- Things don't go perfectly, despite even the best of plans. Western logic doesn't always translate well. Despite your best effort to explain a specific COA to a sheik, he may not roll with it. If you've hinged your entire plan on the COA he's refuted, you probably needed to plan a bit better. Stuff happens. Deal with it.
Point 18: Engage the Women; Beware the Children- Iraq, despite the men's perspective, is a matriarichal society. Getting into the women's networks influences the family network and gets 14 year old Joe Jiahist grounded and beaten with a wooden stick by his mom. Aside from the pure comedic value of these types of events, the women's circles are often the untapped venues of success in this type of society. Conversely, the insurgents are more ruthless than we are. They use kids because they're impressionable and, to them, expendible. It's much easier, seemingly, to deal with the kids, but they're distractors and oftentimes scouts for insurgents.
Point 19: take stock regularly- It may seem like common sense, but after continuous operations for prolonged periods, it's tougher to do than you'd think. Determining the metrics of progress can change from week to week. But it lets us know where we are and where we need to go.
Point 20: Remember the global audience- Perception is reality, even if it's wrong. The way this war is covered, a private flashing a group of kids with the muzzle of his weapon on routine patrol can be cut and spliced into a nasty IO message for the insurgents. We are always on stage and they have the benefit of the doubt globally right now.
Point 21: Exploit single narrative- This goes right into the IO plan. It must be tailored to fit your specific area. Again, this is something we don't train regularly and we learn by doing.
Point 22: Local forces should mirror enemy, not ourselves- Further, they should mirror local operational requirements. What the use in providing the villiage doctor with an endocrinology lab that he doesn't know how to use? i don't know either, but some division surgeon thought it was a good idea. Additionally, just because we have bells and whistles for equipment doesn't mean our partnering Iraqi unit does to. We need to remember that. Often we don't.
Point 23: Practice Armed Civil Affairs- CMO can be a decisive operation depending on where you are. You must be able to transition rom CA to combat operations quickly. Additionally, the CA bubba isn't the only one doing CA work; your 19D1O is probably doing more CA in a day than the Civil Affairs officer will do in 3 days.
Point 24: Small is beautiful- Iraqis want to see results. The proliferation of small programs that work does wonders. Also, small is recoverable and cheap. They don't need to know that.
Point 25: Fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces- The strategy is the iceburg, his forces are the tip. Ask Capt Smith from the Titanic what was more important. We often look for the 10 meter target and forget what's downrange.
Point 26: Builld your own solution, attack only when he gets in the way- Combat operations doesn't win COIN For a company, since combat operations are what we've trained for, they're our comfort zone. CMO, IO, economic development, and the sustainment of security forces are all bigger moneymakers in COIN than combat operations. It's tough to get to work, but more productive once you do.
Point 27: Keep extraction plan secret: Everyone has a farewell tour with the sheiks, tribal leaders, political leaders, and others in the AO they've worked with over the year. That gets back to the insurgents. We need to watch it, but I was guilty of this too. It's where human instinct and developed relationships interfere with what is doctrinally right.
Point 28: Keep the initiative- Insurgents are used to the initiative. Hell, our battle drills are all named "react to ____." By good planning and intel development, you can kick an insurgent in the teeth by making him react. Insurgents can handle Initate ambush but aren't too good at the React to Contact game and usually die in place.


The bottom line is that every point Kilcullen makes has an operational relevance that you apparently won't acknowledge.


To "translate" what he says “down” into standard doctrine is, I believe, to frustrate the purpose of his work. That's what I believe was said earlier by referring to his work as a "cliff notes."
Since I started using that phrase, that isn't what I was inferring at all. The 28 points are a checklist for good behavior, things you should be doing. They're a compass for operations that, until recently, we really didn't train on. Will they always work? Probably not. Even Duke loses a basketball game now and then with a great coach and a great plan. But I know that even Kilcullen would tell you that these are not meant to be an end-all, be-all answer to COIN operations.

[jcustis]

RTK's points are spot on, and anyone can apply the W=RM rule to make them apply to their own organizations. Thanks for another tool. I'll be turning off my Surefire now...

[slapout9]

RTK, I read your posts twice and that is really an outstanding little piece work. Well done. Does anybody know why the thread was locked up?

[Rob Thornton]

RTK,
Good read. I'll pass it on. Regards, Rob

[Fabius Maximus]

There has been some outstanding thoughts presented here, no doubt why the number of hits is so high.

Thanks to all of you who have posted on this thread (or will do so in the future). The worst aspect of writing about 4GW is the fog -- the difficulty of seeing different theories and facts in their proper relationship to each other. With your help I'm a little clearer on Kilcullen's work, and where it stands in the 4GW debates.

Here are a few speculations, closing my participation here. These need more thought. I don't know if they are useful or interesting to you all, but they're free!

To reiterate (again) a key point: the debate is not about utility for a company commander. Whatever works, however it works, great. As cliff notes, or checklist, or source of ideas, or whatever.

1. I consider Kilcullen’s work a valuable contribution in the debate about how we can win 4gw's. That this is his intent is clear from his other works, which we should logically have reviewed in chronological order (but which would have been dry going).

The debate has more urgency, of course, for those of us who believe we're losing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

2. Kilcullen has more in common than I saw at first with both “standard” tactical doctrine and 4GW views. Perhaps he can be seen as a bridge between them. Note similarity between some of his views and those of Lind in FMFM-1A and Greg Wicox’s "Information Arrow."

3. Perhaps the major insight – which I totally missed – is that Kilcullen’s recommendations might work best for the side playing strategic defense (for example, having the home court advantage). That’s important, since, as we all know, defense is the inherently stronger mode of war (On War, book one, chapter one). And some (including me) believe that this is exceptionally true for 4GW)

Easy to see this when reading Kilcullen’s 28 articles from the perspective of an Iraq or Afgh insurgent. Works quite well. Better, I think, than for an American in Iraq – let alone in Afghanistan.

That should not surprise. We’re both fighting a 4GW, and there is a long history of enemies both contributing to development of a tactical doctrine (e.g., the development of infiltration tactics into Blitzkrieg by the Germans and the Brits). Stratfor has also seen this, as in their mention of Iraq as a “Jihadist war college.”

Again, thanks for sharing your insights and experience on this thread. Best wishes to you all for a great 2007.

[Steve Blair]

Gentlemen,

As defined by Hammes we are definitely (there is no gray area) involved in a 4GW fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One aspect I haven't heard discussed much is the difficulty that a democratic country has in dealing with 4GW, vice a totalitarian one. We have certain limitations based on our laws and values that are easily exploitable. Some advocate changing the laws (the big ones in the press are torture, eavesdropping, etc.) to deal with the emergency, but the reality is these wars will last several years, so changing our laws would not a be temporary fix, such as establishing martial law in New Orleans after Katrina.

There are several aspects at the strategic level we have yet to address. In 4GW you can't win the fight on the battleground, but you can lose it there. Please read Hammes's "The Sling and the Stone" for clarification.

Bill

I have to admit right from the start that I don't totally buy into the 4GW stuff. I just consider it a more developed (full spectrum, if you will) version of 3GW. Or an adaptation of old techniques to use new weapons and means of operations. That's my disclaimer.

That said, Bill makes a very valid point regarding the lack of serious discussion regarding the ability of an open democracy such as ours to succeed in this sort of warfare where one of the major weapons is PR. The United States has always had great difficulty in this sort of operation, precisely because of our free press and the way the press views its role with regard to government and military operations. Now I'm not advocating in any way changes to freedom of the press, but it's worth remembering that the British in their COIN-type operations (to include Northern Ireland) exercised much tighter control over the press and had more sweeping powers when it came to covert and military/police operations. Also, I would say the nature of our basic political system (with a controlled revolution every two years in the form of elections) makes it especially difficult to develop the kind of long-term, all aspect campaign plan that would be needed for this sort of conflict. Sometimes other countries have succeeded against a 3GW+ adversary because of subtle differences in their political system or the relationship their military has with the remains of a colonial police force.

From a military standpoint, we need things like what Kilcullen and Mattis have put out. Mattis has an exceptional ability to relate his thoughts to the men in the ranks, and that is something that is all too rare in our military today.

[RTK]

Again, thanks for sharing your insights and experience on this thread. Best wishes to you all for a great 2007.

Before you leave to your own devices, I'd like some response to the questions you were asked above. Additionally, what are your credentials and research methods to be able to intelligently write 20 articles over 40 months on Iraq?

I guess after 2 years in theater and an hour and a half responding to your question I expect I'm owed at least that much.

[RTK]

Before you leave to your own devices, I'd like some response to the questions you were asked above. Additionally, what are your credentials and research methods to be able to intelligently write 20 articles over 40 months on Iraq?

I guess after 2 years in theater and an hour and a half responding to your question I expect I'm owed at least that much.

Based upon the personal message responses I've received over the last hour, don't expect answers to your questions. We were rode hard and put away wet. As for credentials, don't hold your breath; he won't even address that much.

expect to see your musing in a future blog with his name on it, proclaiming all thought to be his own.

Quite the professional....

[SWCAdmin]

A spirited and heated thread. I have no visibility of what is going on in the PMs, just that there are many of those, too.

Points are strongly felt and generally professionally presented on both sides, despite the passion behind them. At risk of violating my content-agnostic personna when logged in under this identity, I have to say that I tend to support those who prop up Kilcullen. Nevertheless, I am also concerned that we are on the brink of some FM bashing. I, for one, appreciate his voice even as I disagree with it. I know the answer to cold fusion and world hunger is not on d-n-i net. It still makes me think. Plus everyone is all lathered up and writing good stuff here in reply.

My two cents -- the debate is welcome (even if one-sided), our charter is that contrarian viewpoints are welcome (even if unpopular), the tone has been largely civil, rock on. Happy god damn new year.

There's nothing that will replace a lifetime of PME. But it needs some cliff notes to get it rolling out of the mental cobwebs at the tip of the spear. Praise be to both. Kilcullen's 28 to me is sort of like the model T of COIN theory. Not perfect, available only in black, but darn good and reaching folks that weren't served before.

[Bill Moore]

Thank you for bringing us back into our charter where all voices welcome and needed in this council. I shouldn't have to remind anyone that we as a nation, or we as the West, or we as the collective against the Al Qaeda Network or AQN like threat have yet found and implemented an effective strategy to defeat this global movement (yes we hurt it, but that is far from defeating it). Fabius provides a voice contrary to many, and maybe in the end contrary is right. All the respect due to those currently in the fight (and it is a hell of a lot), winning battles (physical and perception) in your AO is critically important, and Kilcullen TTP should help, but it still won't win the conflict at the strategic level. We need to hear the ground truth from the Co Cdrs and NCOs out there now, but we also need to hear ideas from the stratosphere on grand strategy, then find ways to mesh them.

Great debate, still the best forum for professionals I have found on the net. I wish you all the best for a successful and happy New Years!

[Mike in Hilo]

1) Re: Crossborder sanctuaries for Malaya CTs: I am nitpicking--mea culpa: In fact, the then heavily forested Thai border did pose real problems for the British-led COIN effort in Malaya....Overthrow of Pibulsongram's pro-communist Thai government made a difference in Malaya. That said, no argument with the assertion that Malaya was not VN.....

2) Kilcullen's view, at least as he presents it, of the local citizen perusing the competing menus presented him by insurgents and COIN forces and judiciously selecting the best deal (one dish from the "hearts" column, a couple from the "minds" column), causes certain reservations to arise. This is not to say that there is no important role for the "carrot" in a carrot and stick approach...And of course, every place and every conflict are unique...Nevertheless, on the level of the general principle, far away and long ago, Thompson and Co. consistently drummed into our minds the concept that the Vietnamese peasant is not a free agent...(Indeed, as Fall pointed out, what freedom to choose was there between our offer to provide better hog breeding stock vs. the VC propensity to behead and disembowel with abandon?)...The Brits were so insistent on the not-a-free-agent point because of its obvious implications on application of a hearts and minds approach....They posited a corollary, viz.,: because he is not free to choose (and has, since antiquity, never been free to choose), we (i.e., COIN forces) must put him in a position where it will be physically impossible for him to provide any support to the insurgents--where he will not be subject to the pressures that would compel him to provide such support....In other words, make sure that he cannot choose the insurgent option, whether he wants to or not....Hence, the "drain the swamp/ confine the 'at risk' population in order to protect them" classical British approach....In the event, on the ground in VN, to be sure, the cogency of this argument led to a high level of adviser frustration, since the US did not hold sovereignty and loose-as-a-goose thirdworldism did not augur well for the application of air-tight controls on the movement of people and commodities. But that's another story.....

Cheers,
Mike.

[Jedburgh]

1) Re: Crossborder sanctuaries for Malaya CTs: I am nitpicking--mea culpa: In fact, the then heavily forested Thai border did pose real problems for the British-led COIN effort in Malaya....
As an aside, the current Thai government often accuses Malaysia of lending succor to the ongoing insurgency in southern Thailand (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=529). Borders troubles can work in both directions...

2) Kilcullen's view, at least as he presents it, of the local citizen perusing the competing menus presented him by insurgents and COIN forces and judiciously selecting the best deal (one dish from the "hearts" column, a couple from the "minds" column), causes certain reservations to arise. This is not to say that there is no important role for the "carrot" in a carrot and stick approach...
Anyone who doesn't believe that the indig "peruse competing menus" in order to select the path that is most beneficial to them personally is extremely naive. Of course, the fundamental "benefit" is that which permits survival. The indig understand more clearly than the average troop exactly how transient our presence really is.

The RAND pub On Other War, posted in another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1104) a while back, discusses the Hearts & Minds vs Cost/Benefit theories of COIN, and does a pretty decent job of putting them in context. In my mind, they are inextricably linked and it comes down to possessing enough knowledge of the local situation to effectively blend the two methods into a strategy that will eventually have a real strategic impact.

[Bill Moore]

Galula describes this as a battle between two camps on who will "control" the population, a battle the counterinsurgent must win, or he risks losing the war. I think it is important to take his words literally, because he specifies control, which does not necessarily equate to winning the hearts and minds. The terrorists don't control the population with carrots, they'll simply brutally them and family members if they don't comply. I would call that control. He also states that in many cases the villagers (or townsfolk, etc.) were previously under control of the insurgents overtly, and now that the counterinsurgent is there the insurgents will still most likely exert varying degrees covert control until we can root out these covert cells.

I don't see it as a competition of menus that the populace as the freedom to choose from, because we always offer the lobster and steak special, compared to the rice and stale fish menu from the other camp, but that rice and stale fish looks pretty good when some is holding a knife to your son's throat. Hell yea, they'll take our steak and lobster, but that doesn't give us control.

A technique he offered was to order the population to do certain tasks to teach them that the coalition is in charge, because our orders would give them an excuse for working with the coalition, so hopefully they would be killed by the insurgents.

Until we figure out the security and control piece, our fancy menu means very little.

[Mike in Hilo]

I don't think I disagree....My point is the obvious one that keeping your head trumps the prospect of financial gain--And, for that matter, accepting the benefits of prosperity does not necessarily mean you'll favor the side that has brought you that prosperity....You'll favor the side that you know will prevail in the end, because to do otherwise would be suicidal. (ex.:all those prosperous communities where the VC taxation rate simply increased commensurate to the ability to pay, VCI called all the shots, and from which the VC Shadow Supply System got a significant infusion of rice for their troops).

Happy New Year,
Mike.

[SWJED]

Welcome ZenPundit (http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2006/12/recommended-reading-good-time-to-push.html) readers. We encourage you to register and join the discussion.

[jcustis]

Bill, I'm not sure this came out right...curious if you meant something else.



A technique he offered was to order the population to do certain tasks to teach them that the coalition is in charge, because our orders would give them an excuse for working with the coalition, so hopefully they would be killed by the insurgents.

Both you and Mike are on the same vein that I've been before in trying to make peers understand part of the problem with civilian compliance/support. There are parts of Iraq that are like Little Italy. The residents know that the police cannot be everywhere and at all times, so they are not going to go against the mob and provide information.

Hence the sharp rise of powerful militias to protect neighborhoods (and whichonly require the right trigger to become sectarian thugs). Our inability to provide a security blanket, through whatever policy failure you want to pick, perhaps gave rise to the militias for two reasons.

1) There was an identified need for militia protection NOW and potentially for the future.

2) There was a forecasted need for militia protection as the coalition eventually reduced its footprint.

Anyone have a data source for the size and number of militias, and any recorded increases in the 2002-present time frame?

[Rob Thornton]

I was going to post this as an RFI, but jcustis' post convinced me the wheels ae already turning here
There are parts of Iraq that are like Little Italy. The sheikhs up here are a little like mafia dons, not exactly like the Gottis (but that is about as close as any US example (didn't Slapout mention a Patrick Swayze movie that might fit too?), but maybe closer to the ones you read about in Sicily.

I've been emailing back and forth between marct and a freind of his he introduced me to who works networks about trying to piece together how things are working up here. The sheikhs seemed linked to just abut everything. Example as in the "How to win in Al Anbar" cartoon, the sheikhs own all the good stuff (factories, mills, etc.); they are also tied to allot of bad things (corruption, AIF, crime, etc.); they have most of the real influence (muktars, government, people, mosques, foreign monies, etc.). Because they are somewhat low key to the Americans who only spend a year here, most of us don't really understand their role or influence. They sort of come across as the "wealthy uncle" because the Americans here mostly interact with the layers in between. We generally look for those people in roles we understand, and feel comfortable interacting with. The further west you from here, the less likely I think a person can make an association that makes sense.

They are the 4000 year old tradition behind the scenes who make phone calls and get things done, but they are also a kind of cultural icon; so much so that many officials wish they were sheikhs - kind of a strange 70s rock star idolation. The sheikhs are ancient compared to Ba'athism, but I think they more or less defined (or redefined) that political ideology to suit their needs.

To complicate matters in 2003 it seems we had a kind of 52 card pick up where all the cards got jumbled up. The sheikhs were the only face cards left after Saddam and crew were removed, and they more or less were left face up ( I mean we know who the sheikhs are). However allot of the sheikhs' men/buisness associates/friends of the family were put into positions of authority in the new government (includes the military and police). Now we have people who are in positions of authority where their loyalties should be to the government, but instead have interests more closely aligned to a sheikh or a group of sheikhs.

I think the IA (at least at the BN and BDE levels) should not be making deals with the sheikhs, maybe not even asking favors - here, deals and favors are two ways - (..and one day I'm going to need a favor from you...), and this would put the IA CDR with conflicitng loyalties and more then one master. However, the mayor/governor could probably pull it off, after all in a way - they are all politicians anyway, and all politicians are....well universal.

When it gets right down to it up here in Ninewa, it seems to be mostly about the flus (pronounced "floose" but meaning money) and influence and less about political ideaology and religion, those seem to be more tools to manipulate the populace. Make no mistake, they have their place, but it my observation that "cultural economics" drives the train here in Mosul.

So anybody out there got any thoughts on the sheikhs? Does it work this way in the other provinces?

The BN CDR for the IA BN I'm with told me one day, "you know Saddam either bought off the sheikhs or replaced them (those often referred to here as the 1990 sheikhs) in order to gain their influence; if the new government could get the sheikhs to go along, we could fix most of the problems." I'm not trying to minimize the influence of the big time clerics ( a kind of sheikh in their own right when it comes to influence), but after some of the stuff I've seen I'm inclined to agree.

Where does this tie in with Kilcllen? Maybe I'm paraphrasing way out there, but his work (and the body of work it has generated) has been useful to me in helping me see problems for what they are/might be vs. what I'd prefer them to be.

Best regards, Rob

[Jedburgh]

...I think the IA (at least at the BN and BDE levels) should not be making deals with the sheikhs, maybe not even asking favors - here, deals and favors are two ways - (..and one day I'm going to need a favor from you...), and this would put the IA CDR with conflicitng loyalties and more then one master. However, the mayor/governor could probably pull it off, after all in a way - they are all politicians anyway, and all politicians are....well universal....
Rob,

If you have the time, there are three books that talk in depth about the three primary sectors of Iraqi society (Sunni & Shi'a Arabs, and the Kurds) in the context that you are looking for.

The broadest (if you can only read one, this is the one) is A History of Iraq, by Charles Tripp. He takes a unique look at Iraqi history, by putting it in the context of the development of power bases, and the manipulation of support. If you are really pressed for time, get a hold of a copy and just read from Chapter 6 on - that covers the period under Saddam.

The other two are more narrowly focused: Agha, Sheikh and State, by Martin van Bruinessen, focuses on Iraqi Kurdish social structures. ("Sheikh" has a different meaning and context to the Kurds than it does to the Arabs.) If you work with the Kurds at all, I strongly recommend reading this one in its entirety.

The third and final volume is The Shi'is of Iraq, by Yitzhak Nakash. This is a very readable book with a tremendous amount of detail on Arab Shi'a history, culture and tradition. However, its over 200 pages of small print, so if you're not working with the Shi'a, it may not be worth the time invested...

Ted

[Bill Moore]

Paraphrasing is dangerous, so I'll quote directly (but still there is the danger of missing the context if you don't read the entire chapter).

Counterinsurgency Warfare "theory and practice", David Galula, Prageger, 1964, reprinted 2005.

p. 116 (selected sentences) (Ops he used the word power over, instead of control).

Quote 1. Contact with the population. is actually the first confrontation between the two camps for power over the population. The future attitude of the population, hence the probable outcome of the war, is at stake. The counterinsurgent cannot afford to lose this battle.

even if there is every reason to believe that a majority is sympathetic to the counterinsurgent. The inhabitants will usually avoid any contact with him. there is a barrier between them and the counterinsurgent that has to be broken and can be broken only by force. Whatever the counterinsurgent wants the population to do will have to be imposed. Yet the population must not be treated as the enemy.

The solution is first to request, and next order, the population to perform a certain number of collective and individual tasks that will be paid for. By giving orders, the counterinsurgent provides the alibi that the population needs vis-a-vis the insurgent. A terrible error would be, to issue orders and be unable to enforce them; the counterinsurgent must be careful to issue orders sparingly and only after making sure that the population can humanly comply with them.

Starting with tasks directly benefiting the population- such as cleaning the village or repairing the streets - the counterinsurgent leads the inhabitants gradually, if only in a passive way, to participatein the fight against the insurgent by such work as building roads of military interest, helping construct the village's defense positions................... END QUOTE

What seems so clear now, obviously wasn't so clear during the planning phase for this war. As much effort should have been dedicated to making contact with the population (defined above) as with defeating Saddam's military. We dug a hole that we can probably get out of with a lot of effort, and a well thought out strategy, but it will be a lot tougher than it should have been.

I have some experience working with Sheiks, and while I felt I was the cat's meow while doing it, after looking back on it now (a few years later) I wonder who was playing who. It was obvious we were playing each other, each getting consessions, but he was playing long term, I was trying to achieve realitively short term tactical (for lack of a better word) objectives such as cooperation, stability, etc. I couldn't tie my actions into an overarching strategy, because we didn't have one in 03; however, now that hopefully has changed, but I would think we would want the Iraqi government representatives to make the contact and make the deals with the various sheiks, and if they can't, do we really have an Iraqi government? I think that is the $100.00 question, because if we don't we need to go back to the drawing board concerning our strategy.

[slapout9]

Rob, I will try and run down a few things that may help that came up in your posts. I am not all the way awake yet so excuse the spelling and police language that may come out.

1-Next of Kin with Patrick Swayze is about a low tech southern tribe that gets some payback against a rich hi tech type mafia gang. It is a flaky movie in some places, you have the usual handgun that shoots 56 times before he has to reload type stuff, but it makes some good points about family tribes. Watch how the network works, low tech and cat dirt mean and very effective.

2-About 3 works ago the head of the Sicilian Mafia was arrested after a 50 year search??. He was at his goat farm. Note he never used a cell phone, land line, computer DVD,CD or BVD's or any other high tech ####. He used 3X5 cards and messengers.

3-I wrote a post awhile back called the Hatfield's vs. McCoys and I said alot of what goes on in Iraq was more like family feuds than classic insurgency. Tribal,Family, criminal gangs can be a real bitch because the population is flat out too intimidated to cooperate or they will be dead, their house burned, eat their chickens and go after their whole family, until they leave or pay tribute or agree to work in high risk sub-contractor like roles.

4-I also wrote a post on the 3F's (family,Friends and Finances)or how to analyze criminal gangs. Crime Networks are all about who is related to who,who knows who,who pays who. That is the system! That is the Network to watch! The small unit leaders handbook for COIN by USMC has an example of how to draw the family network (don't need a computer) I highly recommend this. It is how I learned years ago! I also added a 4Th F called who is ####ing who. A sexual relationship is a very exploitable situation especially outside marriage. I Iraq the 4Th may be Faith (Sunni,Shia, Etc.).

5-I don't know how familiar you are with Jedburgh but if I were you and he recommended reading something, I would be on it stink on ####.

6-And now for listening pleasure and cultural inspiration. Pump up the volume! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-5T3-bnaGA

7-I any of this helps I can try and think of more. Later

[Steve Blair]

Next of Kin was a pretty interesting "bad" movie. I remember seeing it on HBO or someplace a few years back and found the way they handled the family network very interesting.

Your point on the Mafia don who uses 3x5 cards is well-taken. High tech can only really defeat someone who chooses to meet you on those terms. If they avoid engagement there, you have problems. One example that folks tend to forget is operations against the Ho Chi Minh trail. The most successful ones were directed or initiated by SOG teams on the ground. The least successful relied on high-tech AF gear that could be fooled or tricked (although this also played into the AF reliance on numbers to quantify their Trail operations...the book "Setup" by Tilford goes into some interesting details about this).

[Rob Thornton]

Gents,
I really appreciate the quick turn and the thoughts. Jedburgh, thanks for the titles - I was hoping to get something along those lines. Slapout - I like the 4th F - in terms of who is working against who. I'd not considered that as an angle, although I'm more aware of it within the ISF then outside (mostly that is based on who I'm exposed to more). Ref. the low tech - here its primarily cell phones and visits - but, its indirect - ex. someone makes physical contact and has some one else tell someone else to call this guy and tell so & so to have him release the brother of the first guy. They have gotten good at getting their point across while having to say very little at all. It makes my head hurt most of the time:o . Thanks again, I really appreciate the help.
P.S. - low key day here. CF kept a low profile, IA & IP did their thing though. First day I remember in awhile where I could not hear multiple IEDs going off on the MSRs. Could be the feast has something to do with it, could be several things- hopefully tomorrow will be the same, the Iraqis around here could use a break - its mostly the civilians who get wounded these days.

Best Regards, Rob

[Mike in Hilo]

Appreciate the link to RAND's "On 'Other War,' " and your pointing out the section on cost/benefit...Worth highlighting (again) the cautionary note on p.25 of the study with regard to a widely accepted "truism":

"[RAND analyst] Wolf further attacked the argument that increasing the standard of living through development would reduce insurgency"

Wolf was right on VN. Others may judge the value of Wolf's point in the current conflicts...

The logistical underpinnings of the SE Asian insurgency included an important, symbiotic component--put simply, the more materials became available to the economy, the more they were siphoned off to be used by the enemy. We even had a name for the well developed organizational network tasked with "diversion/local procurement" for the enemy, the "Shadow Supply System," which was an important VCI function. Without question, breaking the "System" was the CORDS advisorial priority in our border Province of Tay Ninh, hub of the System, during the last couple of years of CORDS's existence (and incidentally, one at which we failed miserably).

Cheers,
M.

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

This ties into my previous comments elsewhere that the carrot isn't a strategy, at least not without a stick in the other hand. We have been winning hearts and minds for years, but unfortunately that hasn't correlated with winning wars. When I use the phrase political correct war, this is definitely part of what PC war involves. The American population (and political body) expects to see its military handing out rations, building schools, building roads, etc. to demonstrate our good will, and while it plays nicely to the international audience (sometimes) and definitely to the home audience, it has resulted (in my opinion) that we just do these things without any real thought behind them except for a Kodac moment showing we're winning hearts and minds, but in reality we're only getting temporary positive press coverage, and no real effect on the local population. We simply can't stop doing this cold turkey without first educating our population and political leaders that these seemingly nice acts are frequently counterproductive.

I would love to hear some ideas/recommendations from the council on ways to get a quid pro quo from the local populace in return for our good deeds? I heard one from my boss recently where he recommends encouraging an amnesty program, but an insurgent/terrorist can't get amnesty without turning in at least one other insurgent. This betrayal tactic prevents him going back to the insurgency, so he has a vested interest in seeing the government win (this closes the revolving door, and really goes back to you either with us or against us). However, amnesty isn't a carrot like building a well, so what do we reasonably demand in exchange for digging a well, building a road, etc.? How do we enforce it? I know it is situation specific, but any ideas will generate further ideas that will our guys deployed.

[marct]

Hi Bill,

I think you've got a really good point here.


I would love to hear some ideas/recommendations from the council on ways to get a quid pro quo from the local populace in return for our good deeds? I heard one from my boss recently where he recommends encouraging an amnesty program, but an insurgent/terrorist can't get amnesty without turning in at least one other insurgent. This betrayal tactic prevents him going back to the insurgency, so he has a vested interest in seeing the government win (this closes the revolving door, and really goes back to you either with us or against us). However, amnesty isn't a carrot like building a well, so what do we reasonably demand in exchange for digging a well, building a road, etc.? How do we enforce it? I know it is situation specific, but any ideas will generate further ideas that will our guys deployed.

On the amnesty program, I really think it would be counter-productive in that form. Make them take an oath on the Quran (get a local Imam to do the exact wording). It seems that a lot of the local AIF people are fighting in kinship groups, and most kin groups will be happy to have people in both camps (maximizes overall survival chances). Requiring a "betrayal", however, goes against honour.

On the quid pro quo for wells etc., why do you need one? The ideal QPQ is in the form of IO ops. I'll admit that this hasn't been done that wel so far, but that is because there have been serious problems in developing coherent, theatre wide IO campaigns. For example, put verses of the Quran on wells and schools and, if the insurgents blow them up, start rumour campaigns about heresy (NB: in Islam, you are not allowed to deface or destroy a Quaranic quotation).

Marc

[Mike in Hilo]

Bill, I've not been to Iraq. My COIN experience is VN-specific--in the Middle East I was just another embassy bureaucrat...So--at the expense of sounding facile, I'll touch on what was done in VN, where local participation in self defence was the quid pro quo:

Pacification was a package designed to tie the villagers to the government...A community that was reclaimed from the communists for the GVN got its "pacification projects" all right, schools, wells, access roads, etc....But the emphasis was on people-participatory activities that had a security component (As John Vann, who more than any other individual made CORDS work, was fond of saying, "Security may be 10% of the problem, or it may be 90%. But it's always the FIRST 10%, or the first 90%."). So in the newly pacified village, teenagers too young to be drafted and the elderly were immediately organized into the village-based People's Self Defense Force under the village chief. This was a political concept designed to tie the people to the government through this "act of commitment" rather than to provide real defense from enemy attack. (I found that organizing villagers to participate in GVN DEVELOPMENT activities did NOT constitute a similar "act of commitment" on the part of the villagers, mainly because both VC and villagers saw such activities as harmless to the VC.) At the same time, of course, draft age males were inducted into the RF/PF (territorial forces). Did this entail a risk of the ranks being infiltrated by VC?--definitely--and this did happen. However, the key to making this work was supervision/leadership. The RF officers were ARVN officers--vetted outsiders presumably loyal to the GVN. And paramilitary RD Cadre, the same guys who organized the villagers for community development projects, were outsiders tasked with keeping an eye on the village authorities to minimize accommodation with the enemy. (These guys weren't too good--good concept on paper, but falls apart if you've not got top notch people.) Village autonomy was a much vaunted concept in CORDS, but in my experience, having good CENTRAL government officers right there on the ground to provide both leadership and close supervision was a sine qua non to successful "pacification" and to avoiding wholesale local "deal-making" with the enemy. (Excessive local autonomy in a country ripped apart by centrifugal forces only exacerbates the problem--this was one case where the Vietnamese saw it correctly even though the US did not.). And how much better when we could afford to have a small US contingent embedded with the local forces living right there in the hamlet--I mean the USMC CAP effort in I-Corps! In French Algeria, of course, the locally organized village self-defense contingents had French officers.

Now another way of looking at the quid pro quo issue is found in a component of the Malaya model, where the inhabitants of the New Villages lived under seriously constrained movement. There, an uptick in villager-provided, actionable intel led to loosening of those constraints. For example, curfew hours would be shortened. More drastically, food was doled out by the authorities: village recalcitrance led to an immediate decrease in each family's food ration; local cooperation (e.g., good intel, decrease in terrorist incidents) led to an immediate increase in the food ration. Is the Iraqi economy still socialized to the degree that food is government provided? If so, this may be one angle (though I'd shudder at the thought of our politically correct press fastening upon such "collective punishment").

To all y'all, A Happy New Year.
M.

[Bill Moore]

Marc, I like your IO approach, and I don't see why our PC crowd would preempt us using it, as a matter of fact the PC crowd would probably embrace it. Responding to your why questions:

If we don't require an insurgent to turn someone in, then it is too easy to go back and forth between the two sides. We don't want a guy accepting amnesty to get a couple of hot meals and a cot to sleep on, then go back and fight for whomever. If we do, we simply establish a revolving door where they wear a coalition uniform one day, and black pajamas the next. BTW both sides of the revolving door are now infiltrated. However, the oath you suggested taken in a semi-public location in front of a respected local leader does seem more realistic. It is possible for highly educated professionals such as yourself to influence knuckle draggers like me, and it should happen more often. I know there are hundreds of soldiers out there who would be eager to send you questions in order to get your ideas. I am very supportive of forming centers of excellence that DoD members can access from the field, even if the field on this particular day happens to be my home office (lol).

On to the harder issue, why would I want to tie a civil military project such as digging a well to behavior concessions from the local village, neighborhood, etc.? First, we don't have to tie all actions to concessions, because there is merit for doing good (don't forget the international and home audiences); however, I am assuming we want to defeat an insurgency, and that definitely requires the host nation government to effectively assert control over its population, and these projects are a tool for achieving that goal. In a COIN scenario I look at building a well as a tool to persuade the population to separate themselves from the insurgents, but if we don't spell that out and mandate certain actions in return, well we simply dug a well, so now the insurgents have a ready source of clean drinking water.

This is an overly simplistic explanation, but I think the jest of it is clear.


Mike, great thoughts, and I appreciate the relevant history. I want to read the RAND paper all the way through before I comment.

I wish all a Happy New Years!

Bill

[marct]

Hi Bill,


Marc, I like your IO approach, and I don't see why our PC crowd would preempt us using it, as a matter of fact the PC crowd would probably embrace it.

Maybe I am getting jaded from my environment, but they might claim that it is a cynical manipulation of religion. Regardless, I'd love to see the same PC crowd out on the sharp end <evil grin>.


Responding to your why questions: If we don't require an insurgent to turn someone in, then it is too easy to go back and forth between the two sides.... However, the oath you suggested taken in a semi-public location in front of a respected local leader does seem more realistic.

I do agree that having a revolving door is pretty useless <wry grin>. I don't know if the oath idea would work, although I think it may be worth trying. What I am trying to find, and any and all suggestions are welcome!, is a way to get kin groups to accept a person shifting from active opposition to a neutral position with their honour intact. That's step one.

Step two, is to place the burden for any potential loss of honour on to the insurgents, hence suggestions about placing Quranic verses on wells and schools. Step three, although it should have been there at the start <sigh>, is the idea of a theatre wide IO campaign spelled out in the simplest possible terms that are acceptable to the specific local populations and the international community.


It is possible for highly educated professionals such as yourself to influence knuckle draggers like me, and it should happen more often. I know there are hundreds of soldiers out there who would be eager to send you questions in order to get your ideas. I am very supportive of forming centers of excellence that DoD members can access from the field, even if the field on this particular day happens to be my home office (lol).

LOL. Well, they could always post here:D . Hey, speaking as a long-haired, ivory tower inhabiting refugee from the '60's (that's 1660's:cool: ), I really appreciate being influenced by "knuckle draggers like" you :D .

On a slightly more serious note, that is already happening a bit. I think the idea of a centre of excellence would be a good idea and I would be happy to be involved in one. If you can get one started, let me know:) .


On to the harder issue, why would I want to tie a civil military project such as digging a well to behavior concessions from the local village, neighborhood, etc.? First, we don't have to tie all actions to concessions, because there is merit for doing good (don't forget the international and home audiences); however, I am assuming we want to defeat an insurgency, and that definitely requires the host nation government to effectively assert control over its population, and these projects are a tool for achieving that goal. In a COIN scenario I look at building a well as a tool to persuade the population to separate themselves from the insurgents, but if we don't spell that out and mandate certain actions in return, well we simply dug a well, so now the insurgents have a ready source of clean drinking water.

This is an overly simplistic explanation, but I think the jest of it is clear.

Yup. Honestly, I do understand the reasoning behind it. I think I am just being a touch contrary because I think it's important to bring out our assumptions. There has been some discussion (can't remember he thread) about how this worked in Malaysia, and Mike has certainly brought out the VN examples. The problem I see is that we are operating in a different battlespace; one that is much more media controlled.

If Vietnam was the first war we could see in our homes at dinner, Iraq and Afghanistan are the first wars that both we and our opponents can interact with vicariously. That has been one of the Islamists most important weapons - they can mobilize an international hinterland not just for psyops (e.g. the anti-War movement against Vietnam), but for overt financial, material, intelligence and political support.

This is one of the reasons why I like Kicullen's work so much - he is thinking in terms of "glocalization" ("think globally, act locally). I think that this is the biggest flaw in most of our (i.e. Western nations) thinking about this "war". In terms of a "long war" scenario, we are actually fighting an ideological or symbolic war: the Islamists, spearheaded by the Muslim Brotherhood realize this and the Western nations don't.

So, back to buy in <grin>. Why I agree that "in a COIN scenario I look at building a well as a tool to persuade the population to separate themselves from the insurgents", we also have to ask "what are we asking that they attach themselves to"? If the "government" is viewed as "enemies" by the locals and we separate them from a larger insurgency (e.g. AQ), we will just end up with either local militias or a quasi "criminal" organization (which is certainly what Rob has been seeing in Mosul). These local groupings, in tern will, inevitably form alliances with other local groupings in an effort to maximize their power and survivability. How are we going to convince them that their best bet for maximizing survivablity is with the "government"? It's this type of question that I was trying to answer with the idea of a theatre wide IO campaign.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Marc, you're spot on regarding the symbolic level of this conflict. That's why the oaths you were talking about are so important. We have to embrace that aspect of the conflict (something that as near as I can tell has been missed by some of the high-speed 4GW arguments) and find ways to get it to work for us.

Mike's points regarding COIN in VN are also very relevant to the discussion. In VN we faced a situation where the legacy of central government was (at best) mixed and tainted. Things from that standpoint had always been looser in the South than they were in the North, and we didn't recognized that (if we ever did at a policy level) until it was too late. Iraq, IMO, is somewhat different, but you're still dealing with a region that has reasons to doubt a central government. That makes things interesting, to say the least!

I like the idea of an Imam-developed oath for ralliers to take, and suspect it could be expanded to others in positions of local leadership as well. The problem here is the same one we faced in SVN: insurgents would then target oath-takers and kill them. Provided you have reasonable local security, and can develop more, it's a great idea.

Bill, as far as quid pro quo for wells and such, I think what we may see is a sort of "horse trading" level of operations. Something like "if we don't get hit with IEDs in X area for Y days, you'll get your well." Simplistic as well, I know, and possibly not the best example, but I strongly suspect that this is what it will come to if we go that route. One thing VN showed is that if you do civic projects and then walk away, the insurgents end up benefiting from them (or at least positioning themselves to take credit for them, which is the same thing in this sort of warfare).

On the Frontier, the Army (during the brief periods when they had control of the reservation system) used to threaten to withhold rations and (more importantly) weapons and ammunition from tribes if there was a problem with raiding from the reservation. This could be reasonably successful, even given the weak central leadership structure of the tribes. This may be the sort of thing (or a modified version of same) that we end up going back to.

[marct]

Hi Steve,


Marc, you're spot on regarding the symbolic level of this conflict. That's why the oaths you were talking about are so important. We have to embrace that aspect of the conflict (something that as near as I can tell has been missed by some of the high-speed 4GW arguments) and find ways to get it to work for us.

It's a corollary of 4GW that is implicit in the shift to the Information Age <shrug>. In a lot of ways, it really stems from the question of "how do I [read any individual] get meaning in the current economic system?" We don't get it from working on farms or in factories any more, and they produce far more in the way of tangible goods than can ever be used, so we have to look for "meaning" in other directions, and fundamentalist style religions are one of the ways people have gone.


Mike's points regarding COIN in VN are also very relevant to the discussion. ... Iraq, IMO, is somewhat different, but you're still dealing with a region that has reasons to doubt a central government. That makes things interesting, to say the least!

Too true! That's why the politics is so crucial as is a theatre wide IO effort that accurately reflects the political decisions.


I like the idea of an Imam-developed oath for ralliers to take, and suspect it could be expanded to others in positions of local leadership as well. The problem here is the same one we faced in SVN: insurgents would then target oath-takers and kill them. Provided you have reasonable local security, and can develop more, it's a great idea.

Yup, it all comes down to that. Still and all, some of them will end up dying as the ISF and IA people are dying. If they can die with their honour intact and their lineages honour intact that is better than the alternative. Besides that, if they are killed by insurgents, then the insurgents may end up starting a blood feud by their dishonourable actions.

I think the trick with the oaths would be to allow anyone who takes it the right to oppose government actions as long as that opposition does not take a kinetic form. In the West, we would call this Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Association - so, let's construct that as a value that we respect, even if "they" say things "we" don't like.;)

Marc

[Bill Moore]

Marc,

I don't think we should use Iraq as "the" example, because the conflict there is far beyond a simple, or even complex insurgency. By the DoD definition I guess it falls under the category of lawlessness, so we're doing COIN, but the country is in such disaray that traditional COIN approaches are too little, too late. My biggest concern isn't Iraq, but rather that we draw the wrong lessons from Iraq when we get involved in COIN missions in the future. I'm concerned we'll hear, oh we can't do that, we tried it in Iraq and it didn't work. The fact is we tried it after we lost the high moral ground, so of course it didn't work. Our national leadership didn't understand the nature of the war they getting in, and now we're trying to play catch up, and the reality is a lot of these tactics won't work once you're past the credibility tipping point.

Iraq was complex to begin with (although that seemed to be a conveniently disreguarded fact during planning). Some of the larger issues is the ethnic make up, the uncooperative neighbors (that's putting it politely), the multiple insurgencies, multiple criminal gangs, ineffective economy, massive unemployment, civil war, transnationals, limitless munitions, all topped off with a cherry on top known to us as the Iraqi government, but I doubt many in Iraq see it that way. We walked in to this with our eyes wide open, there are none so blind as those who refuse to see.

Quite simply, war doesn't have to be the way in the future. Iraq could have looked much different if we engaged our brains first before committing our military. I think there is a timing or phasing issue with COIN TTP that we haven't discussed much, but if we started this war focused on the Iraqi people from day one, and fought to maintain the moral high ground instead of just taking ground, we may have been able to pull this one off.

I think our COIN doctrine has merit, and would work if applied correctly from day one in numerous countries inflected with insurgencies. I think we have to pull the population away from the insurgency to the government, and if you can't do that you can't win.

[marct]

Hi Bill,

I've got to agree with most of what you have said. In many ways, Iraq isn't the real issue or a good test of current doctrines. You are quite right that the por initial planning has led to a SNAFU situation <sigh>. Right now, in a lot of ways, I would almost prefer to concentrate on Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa as places where we can still win and win well.

Marc

[zenpundit]

Dr. Marc wrote:


"It's a corollary of 4GW that is implicit in the shift to the Information Age <shrug>. In a lot of ways, it really stems from the question of "how do I [read any individual] get meaning in the current economic system?" We don't get it from working on farms or in factories any more, and they produce far more in the way of tangible goods than can ever be used, so we have to look for "meaning" in other directions, and fundamentalist style religions are one of the ways people have gone."

Issues of psychological identity and the political legitimacy of entities competing for allegience. The ability to provide for material needs figures in ( say -Hezbollah among rural Lebanese Shiites) but it is only part of the package for cultivating primary loyalties. The slow speed of the modern state is becoming a significant disadvantage ( ex. Katrina) vis-a-vis highly motivated, nimble, non-state rivals.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.smithsonianmagazine.com/issues/2006/december/philippines.php?page=1


Today, a crucial but little-known battle in the expanding war on terror is under way on Jolo Island. Designed to "wage peace," as Linder says, it's an innovative, decidedly nonviolent approach by which U.S. military personnel—working with aid agencies, private groups and Philippine armed forces—are trying to curtail terrorist recruitment by building roads and providing other services in impoverished rural communities. The effort, known to experts as "the Philippines model," draws on a "victory" on the Philippine island of Basilan, where U.S. forces in 2002 ended the dominance of Abu Sayyaf without firing so much as a single shot. "It's not about how many people we shoot in the face," Linder said. "It's about how many people we get off the battlefield."

On Jolo, U.S. military engineers have dug wells and constructed roads that allow rural farmers for the first time to transport their produce to markets. This past June, the Mercy, a U.S. Navy hospital ship, visited Jolo and other islands to provide medical and dental care to 25,000 people, many of whom had never seen a doctor. American military medical and veterinary teams have held mobile clinics, where Special Forces, speaking native Tausug and Tagalog, gathered information from local residents as they consulted on agriculture and engineering projects. American soldiers are even distributing a comic book designed for ethnic Tausug teenage boys thought to be at risk of being recruited by Abu Sayyaf. The story, Barbangsa: Blood of the Honorable, tells of a fictional young sailor named Ameer who defeats pimply-faced terrorists threatening his Philippine homeland.

We can do it when we maintain the moral high ground with the right people, the right strategy, and patience. There isn't a whole of sexy stuff taking place here, but the focus is on the people, and it is working ever so slowly.

[jcustis]

I think our COIN doctrine has merit, and would work if applied correctly from day one in numerous countries inflected with insurgencies. I think we have to pull the population away from the insurgency to the government, and if you can't do that you can't win.

I like this point Bill, but I'm afraid we cannot pull the population away from the insurgency for a simple reason, and that is the fact that we do not control the ground.

We need an infusion of boots on the ground, to put more eyes on the population (i.e. owning every street corner). The top generals are likely right, and any upsurge in troop levels is irrelevant if we cannot keep our mind on the mission after we have defined their purpose.

Everytime I see an Iraqi on the street interviewed on the MSM, their central concern is security, security, security. To many average Iraqis, we must seem terribly impotent because the IEDs and SVBIEDs continue to kill and maim. I can't blame any Iraqi for not hearing us out on our IO message, because the most powerful message are the bodies turning up in morgues and IP recruiting center explosions.

I too think we are past the point of using civil affairs projects as carrots. We are in the middle of a terrible Catch-22 right now. If force levels don't increase, we cannot afford to bolster Baghdad at the expense of outlying areas, because the bad guys will simply leak out to lesser secured areas and continue their program of death. We need to start smothering that place like a blanket.

As for turning terrs, I don't think there can be any success unless we achieve significant religious cooperation. We need to "un-indoctrinate" these detained/captured knuckle-heads that the bloodshed goes against the Quran (are there references to that fact?). When you have guys willing to drive an explosive-laden car into the midst of a busy farmers market, I think that you've got to reverse that bad seed through religion.

Are we attacking the root of the problem from the wrong angle?

[Jedburgh]

...Everytime I see an Iraqi on the street interviewed on the MSM, their central concern is security, security, security. To many average Iraqis, we must seem terribly impotent because the IEDs and SVBIEDs continue to kill and maim. I can't blame any Iraqi for not hearing us out on our IO message, because the most powerful message are the bodies turning up in morgues and IP recruiting center explosions...
That's been their central concern from the beginning. I interviewed dozens of Iraqis in throughout '03 and '04 - and they were all frustrated (to put it very mildly) at our abject failure to impose basic physical security in their nation's capital. At the time, they were dealing with a massive upsurge in rapes, murders, kidnappings, and plain ol' property crimes. Many, adhering to the usual Middle Eastern penchant for conspiracy theories, were struggling to figure out a reason why we were purposefully allowing it to go on. It ain't too hard to figure out the general trend in public opinion as the violence in Baghdad has not only continued, but significantly ratchets up in brutality.

...I too think we are past the point of using civil affairs projects as carrots. We are in the middle of a terrible Catch-22 right now. If force levels don't increase, we cannot afford to bolster Baghdad at the expense of outlying areas, because the bad guys will simply leak out to lesser secured areas and continue their program of death. We need to start smothering that place like a blanket.

As for turning terrs, I don't think there can be any success unless we achieve significant religious cooperation. We need to "un-indoctrinate" these detained/captured knuckle-heads that the bloodshed goes against the Quran (are there references to that fact?). When you have guys willing to drive an explosive-laden car into the midst of a busy farmers market, I think that you've got to reverse that bad seed through religion.

Are we attacking the root of the problem from the wrong angle?
JC, this deserves a much lengthier and well-thought out response; it being late, I'm not going to try right now. I know we've gone around this one a few times on SWC, but I definitely want to talk more to this topic later...

[Bill Moore]

I would add there also needs to be a government in place to pull the people towards.

The RAND study Jedburgh posted stated that many insurgencies are due to the gap created by modernization, where a number of folks are left out of the new emerging economic models, so the objectives are to provide security for the people and to convince the people that the government is working in their interest.

When you do a regime change, you create an entirely different set of problems. First, we stood up a government (yes it was elected, and yes it was a miracle that we could pull that off), but it a foreign form of government (democracy) in a land where there is little trust, and BTW it is still at war. Talk about a gap!

As you stated we first have to provide security, an incredibly tough task in its own right. Then we have to sell this government, and after the recent fiasco with Saddam's hanging I wonder if that will be possible. If it isn't, then where do we take it from here? Another regime change? Stay the course?

[jcustis]

Then we have to sell this government, and after the recent fiasco with Saddam's hanging I wonder if that will be possible.

Oh yes, talk about an IO nightmare. Think anyone got fired over the decision to step aside and allow the IZ govt. to "handle" the execution?

I have to agree with FM's point about analyzing our weaknesses across the warfighting functions and political-military efforts, because I fear the bad guys are going to start attacking them with greater fervor.

[marct]

I would add there also needs to be a government in place to pull the people towards.

I think that this is a key problem that has to be kept in mind for any future operations. I would add in one other characteristic: the "government" must also be "worthy" of loyalty (i.e. be more likely to create a pull factor than a push factor). This doesn't mean that it has to be a "democracy", however that may be construed. France, Germany, the US, Canada and Sibgapore are all "democracies" and they all have quite different forms.


The RAND study Jedburgh posted stated that many insurgencies are due to the gap created by modernization, where a number of folks are left out of the new emerging economic models, so the objectives are to provide security for the people and to convince the people that the government is working in their interest.

I think that this has to be a consideration, but it also has to be kept in focus. Given current manufacturing capabilities, "modernization" is an interesting problem. I'm not convinced that the gap is based around emerging economic models so much as it is based around emerging models of individual livelihood; and no, they are not the same thing :) .


When you do a regime change, you create an entirely different set of problems. First, we stood up a government (yes it was elected, and yes it was a miracle that we could pull that off), but it a foreign form of government (democracy) in a land where there is little trust, and BTW it is still at war. Talk about a gap!

Yup. And it is a very different case from most of the "classic" COIN situations. My question, and it can only be really answered after 10-20 years, is what type of government will it become?


As you stated we first have to provide security, an incredibly tough task in its own right. Then we have to sell this government, and after the recent fiasco with Saddam's hanging I wonder if that will be possible. If it isn't, then where do we take it from here? Another regime change? Stay the course?

That is the $64,000 question <wry grin>. As far as international politics is concerned, the US just doesn't have the political capital to do another regime change, at least openly. "Sell" the government? Getting harder to do as a result of the way the hanging was carried out. "Provide security"? I doubt it could be done unless there was another 100k people on the ground.

I think that the most workable, not necessarily the "best" under any definition of that term, option would be to stabilize local areas and sell local governments and the broader ideology of "civilized discourse" vs. "civil war by despotic whim". Ultimately, the legitimacy of any Iraqi regime depends on the people of Iraq.

Marc

[jcustis]

As far as international politics is concerned, the US just doesn't have the political capital to do another regime change, at least openly. "Sell" the government?

We need to start scraping together our small change quick, because even if it's not instigated by us, I can imagine that we'll have to figure a way to sell it after the government has fallen. Better to have spin doctors working on that gloomy prospect right now, because it will happen (get back with me on Jan 1 2008) within the year.

The same spin needs to be figured out on the Al-Sadr thing. Unless he is assasinated by Sunni or AQ elements, he will continue to be the pre-eminent Robin Hood guy around, drawing moderates closer to his sphere. And to any US policymaker who asserts that we need to remove Sadr from the equation, I say that they need to remove the crack pipe from their lips. Any unfortunate demise of Sadr = open and instant civil war. I think it's quite remarkable that we were focused on Ba'athists within government in early 2003, but didn't have a coherent plan to get Sistani to the fore. Then again, I haven't read Ricks' work yet, so if there is evidence to the contrary I'll get to it in a month or two.

Perhaps if we were in the 19th Century, we'd be harvesting the opium crop out of Afghanistan and pushing it into the IZ market to give get the criminals/terrorists to simmer down.

Has Kilcullen been prescriptive on handling the influence of religion, other than getting buy-in from the clerics? I'm curious on his thoughts of how the Sadr/Sistani issue was played.

[marct]

We need to start scraping together our small change quick, because even if it's not instigated by us, I can imagine that we'll have to figure a way to sell it after the government has fallen. Better to have spin doctors working on that gloomy prospect right now, because it will happen (get back with me on Jan 1 2008) within the year.

Probably <sigh>. Best spin around would be aimed at the local - local security, local support, etc. - tied in with a strong message of Iraq needs to decide its own future. Maybe float the idea of plebiscites...


The same spin needs to be figured out on the Al-Sadr thing. Unless he is assasinated by Sunni or AQ elements, he will continue to be the pre-eminent Robin Hood guy around, drawing moderates closer to his sphere. And to any US policymaker who asserts that we need to remove Sadr from the equation, I say that they need to remove the crack pipe from their lips. Any unfortunate demise of Sadr = open and instant civil war.

Too true! And, like Guevera, I have to wonder how long he would last/will last after Iraq falls apart and the Iranians move into the south.

Marc

[jcustis]

tied in with a strong message of Iraq needs to decide its own future. Maybe float the idea of plebiscites...

I think we've done all we can to advance this idea marct...the walls we are banging our head against is the fact the the various parties aren't buying what we are selling. For the Kurds, the future of Iraq remains semi-autonomous rule in the north. For the Shi'a, the future is an ascendency of power aligned with Sadr in Baghdad, and Sistani in the south, with a bit of help from Iran where necessary. For the Sunni of Al Anbar, they probably see their best future as an Anbar operating in a semi-autonomous realm as well.

As I've said here before, the oil is great, but we can't discount the importance of the highway corridor to Jordan and Syria, nor the potential of hydro-electricity flowing from Haditha Dam. I do not think any man on the street can really envision a strong central government that governs through true democratic principles.

[marct]

I think we've done all we can to advance this idea marct...the walls we are banging our head against is the fact the the various parties aren't buying what we are selling. For the Kurds, the future of Iraq remains semi-autonomous rule in the north. For the Shi'a, the future is an ascendency of power aligned with Sadr in Baghdad, and Sistani in the south, with a bit of help from Iran where necessary. For the Sunni of Al Anbar, they probably see their best future as an Anbar operating in a semi-autonomous realm as well.

I hate to say it, but I suspect you are right or, at least, I'd lay 3:2 in favour of it. If that happens, though, then it will probably become increasingly important to retain some type of a presence in the Kurdish north. I'd be interested in Jed's comments on that idea...

If that is going to happen, however, we will probably be dealing with one of the 3 region variants with the variation in how much "local autonomy" resides in each region.

Marc

[Fabius Maximus]

By the kind invitation from the SWC Moderators, here is the final version of my paper on Kilcullen:

Why We Lose: Part four of a series about the US expedition to the Middle East
January 4, 2007
4,100 words

URL:
http://www.defense-and-society.org/fcs/fabius_iraq_series_2006_part_IV.htm


Comments are welcome and appreciated. First, here are a few important points about this paper.

1. This paper looks at Kilcullen’s "28 articles" from the perspective of 4GW theory, mining his recommended tactics for insights as to what strategy might work best in such wars. That is, this article discusses 4GW strategy. As we all know, strategy should drive tactics.

2. This paper does not consider or evaluate the utility of his advice to company commanders.

3. This is just a sketch (only 4 thousand words), and cannot do justice to the breath and depth of Kilcullen’s large and subtle body of work (4 major papers on counterinsurgency, many on related topics).

4. This article is in effect a chapter of a book. Like folks originally read Dickens (or Dick Tracy comics), this is a larger work published in serial form. Many logical and natural question when reading this are dealt with elsewhere, esp. in my analysis of Lind’s FMFM-1A and my “Militia” article (links to previous articles appear at the end).

5. Two comments from Kilcullen’s works I believe apply to all of us writing about 4GW:

From “Countering Global Insurgency”:


This appendix IS NOT A BLUEPRINT FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY IN IRAQ. As described in the main paper, such a template does not exist, and in any case the situation is rapidly changing requiring constant innovation.


From “3 Pillars of Counterinsurgency”:


These thoughts are tentative; they need a large amount of work. The “three pillars” model is clearly incorrect — all models are, in that they are systematic oversimplifications of reality. But this, or something like it, might be a basis for further development.

And time is of the essence: regardless of the outcome of current campaigns, our enemies will keep applying these methods until we show we can defeat them. Thus, this is one of the most important efforts that our generation of national security professionals is likely to attempt. Our friends and colleagues’ lives, the security of our nation and its allies, and our long-term prospect of victory in the War on Terrorism may, in part, depend on it.


6. Last, here is an acknowledgement from the end of this paper:


Also, my thanks to the participants of the Small Wars Council, whose criticisms were so helpful in refining this article. This site deserves attention by anyone seeking information or discussion about the small wars that dominate today’s military scene.

[SWCAdmin]

The following reply fm Dave Kilcullen to Fabius Maximus's courtesy e-mail (ref the "heads up" below) re FM's new article (see prior post this thread). Posted here per permission in text. We think the added analysis and context from Dave is valuable and hugely appropriate for this forum. See also this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=659). And FM's original post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=6999&postcount=1) links to the other works cited.

-------------
"Fabius",

Thanks for the heads-up, I actually spotted your article and also the discussion at SWJ that preceded it. I'm flattered and honored that you guys expended so much energy discussing my stuff, and very much appreciated everyone's comments in the discussion, from which I learned a great deal. You'll notice I've cc'd Dave Dilegge and Bill Nagle over at SWJ on this response. (Bill, Dave -- please feel free to post this if you think it's appropriate but the decision is yours).

"Fabius", I'd be very happy to engage with you in a more detailed discussion of my ideas, of which "28 articles" is actually not a particularly representative sample: I wrote it in response to specific requests from several deployed company commanders when I was in Iraq in January-March 2006, and as I write at the start of it (bottom of page 1 on the internet version (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/kilcullen_28_articles.pdf)) "there are no universal answers...what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before you learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically."

In other words, in 28 articles I'm not expressing my latest "experimental" or strategic thinking, but rather trying to provide a quick compilation of ready-reference tactical ideas based on extant "classical" COIN thinking, and where possible drawn from proven experience from the field. I'm fundamentally a practitioner rather than a theorist, and my aim was mainly to meet an immediate need from colleagues in the field.

I do have other thoughts on these issues; "Counterinsurgency Redux" and "Complex Warfighting", as well as the long (internet) version of "Countering Global Insurgency" are the things I have written that come closest to expressing those other thoughts.

But I am extremely cautious about claiming to have any particular answers here. I don't believe I do have the answer, and as I write in those other papers, although COIN theory is a better fit for current problems in the WOT than is CT theory, it's not a perfect fit. Indeed, I would argue that this set of conflicts we are in actually breaks all our existing paradigms so that we need a fundamental re-think. (BTW, I'm including 4GW in the subset of existing paradigms that need to be re-thought: I don't support the ad hominem criticisms that anti-4GW people mount, and I think there is much extremely valuable and insightful material in the 4GW corpus of writing, but I'm still yet to be convinced that 4GW as currently expressed, or indeed any other paradigm including COIN, contains all the answers we seek for the present round of conflicts.)

But I don't claim to have the answer. I sometimes feel as if a new paradigm is on the tip of my tongue, and I have a strong feeling that the solution (if there is one) is about a strategic form of armed propaganda that goes well beyond our current concept of IO into a type of semi-kinetic "influence operations". But I'm still working through all of this, and others smarter and better equipped than I are also working through it. The search for a solution is way bigger and much more important than any one individual or ego.

Also, as I just hinted, I often doubt that there is a single universal set of "answers" out there, except in the sense that we must always study each problem in its own terms and in the greatest level of detail we can muster in the time available, and then diagnose a tailored and situation-specific approach, consistent with sound principles, to deal with it. But that's simply to state the obvious -- as I say in pretty much everything I have written, I don't believe there is any single, fixed, templated or "silver bullet" solution here.

I have to say, however, that as a practitioner I don't believe any of these discussions are ready for prime time. What the guys need in the field are workable frameworks and basic assumptions that help them in their day-to-day. So (especially in "28 articles") I have tried to help where I can without claiming COIN as the silver bullet solution to problems that are actually far more complex. I try to keep the speculative stuff for forums where it won't confuse guys whose average day is way more complicated and dangerous than mine.

Do I believe that the admonitions I make in the paper can be carried out by the average company commander? Actually I have huge confidence in the adaptability and agility of the guys in the field and have been impressed, again and again, as I have served with them in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. But even if the advice is not strictly achievable, I still think it's worth giving since it helps turn the "ship of state" in the right direction.

If you articulate a position ten steps to the left and the organization only takes two steps in that direction, that's a good result in my view-- if you articulate a position too close to the status quo, the result is no change at all. Some of the advice in "28 articles" is given knowing that it cannot be carried out to the letter, but in the hope that it will act as a memory-jogger to influence people's behavior in the field. That's the didactic purpose of all doctrine, in my view -- not as a descriptive depiction of how operations will actually be carried out, but as a tool to encourage and shape organizational adaptation.

I would also make the comment that I don't believe "28 articles" is of as much use to insurgents as you think. I have had some field experience leading irregular non-state forces against a conventional army in a guerrilla fight, and my personal experience of doing this was that actually the nature of being an insurgent, and the nature of countering insurgency are so fundamentally different that knowledge of one set of techniques is little help in mastering the other. I learned and applied UW techniques on operations (my army calls it "Guerrilla Warfare" or GW rather than UW, which I personally find a better descriptor) before learning COIN in subsequent ops and during my PhD, and while some skills were applicable to both I found the two disciplines to be complementary in some ways but radically different in others. Most of my brethren with similar experience seem to have found the same.

I do agree (and have written in a couple of places) that there's a fundamental difference between doing COIN in your own country and doing COIN in someone else's -- hence Northern Ireland, Malaya, and several other "classical" COIN examples have extremely limited utility in places like Iraq and Afghanistan (where the insurgency is only a limited part of the problem anyway).

Finally (and you'll note I'm cc'ing my friends John Nagl and TX Hammes on this), I'd be very happy to meet in person to discuss this, or engage in a discussion online, on one condition -- you know who I am, my background, my views in detail; I don't even know your name. I don't "do" pseudonyms, I'm afraid.

If you want to have a discussion in print, we need to either meet or exchange enough personal detail to establish legitimate bona fides. There is too much urgent practical work to be done for us to engage in empty disputation, so I'm not prepared to get into a theoretical discussion without some prospect of a positive practical result for the guys on the ground. My personal preference would be for a private, in-confidence, face to face discussion rather than a public debate -- which has the potential to de-stabilize some of the very people we are trying to help.

Anyhow, no pressure -- think it over and let me know what you decide. And thanks for your contribution: there is nothing better than a spirited discussion with someone intelligent and well-informed who also violently disagrees with you; it's a rare and precious thing when you find someone like that and I appreciate the dialectic.

best wishes

Dave Kilcullen

[jcustis]

Errr....just...errrr.

[marct]

Errr....just...errrr.

LOLOL. Well, all I can say is that this would be a great podcast :D . Barring that, I'd definitely agree to buy a couple of rounds to hear that discussion!

Marc

[Bill Moore]

I just finished Fabius's article, not bad, although I don't agree with much of it, I do understand his position now.

Fabius states the obvious, which is that the home team has the advantage. This has always been true in every war we fought, so it is illogical to assume to this advantage always equates to victory. The fact is that it is not always possible to find indigenous personnel to do your dirty work (surrogate or unconventional warfare), and even when it is possible, it isn’t always desirable. We were doing a regime change, and while the Kurds and Shi’a supported seeing Saddam disposed, only the Kurds were willing to work with the U.S.. The Kurds are great warriors, but they are also a political liability, so their utility was limited. Non Kurds didn’t like seeing armed Kurds in their neighborhood. If our objective is a unified Iraq, then the perception we’re siding with one ethnic group has more disadvantages than advantages. The same can be said about using the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. We simply flipped the coin (NA on top, Taliban on the bottom); we didn’t really change the underlying conflict conditions. In my opinion we have lofty ideals that are not achievable (e.g. “imposing” democracy on a society that clearly isn’t ready for it), but that doesn’t mean our military strategy is flawed, it means our political strategy is. Yes they go hand in hand, but they are two different hands, and in this case the left hand is dysfunctional, because it doesn’t understand the limitations of the right hand.

Another point on so called home turf advantage is that it is very much localized, as there are cultural sub-states within most nations. I don’t fit in well in Latino or Black neighborhoods, and nor do I fit in well in a fundamentalist Baptist town in Alabama. You can be a foreigner within your own nation, so achieving true home turf advantage using an indigenous army is normally a bridge too far.

Furthermore, we're not losing in Iraq because we don't have home turf advantage, we're losing because we had no plan to transition from combat operations to stability operations (it was supposed to happen magically according to Wolfowitz), so we created a big gap where there was little or no control (remember we liberated Kuwait, we didn’t liberate Iraq, the difference is crucial), and that gap allowed chaos to grow to the tipping point. Several actors emerged in this gap quickly pushing the situation into a state of anarchy in many regions.

This wasn’t a preplanned insurgency, because the regime didn’t plan on losing, and many Iraqi Military leaders were waiting to join the coalition (as promised), so this was an emerging crisis that could have been mitigated with martial law, enforced by the U.S. military in parallel with the Iraqi Army (which was the original plan, until Bremer made the biggest strategic mistake in U.S. history when he disbanded them). Then to add fuel to our incompetence fire, we denied the nature of the conflict (we don’t have an insurgency), and we didn’t have enough troops to react with.

The reason I'm revisiting all of this is to point out that even if our COIN doctrine fails us in Iraq at “this time”, it isn't because our doctrine isn't valid (it may or may not be), but rather that we applied it too late. We're in a different type of conflict now, and more U.S. troops, more advisors, and more jobs more jobs may help (they definitely would have helped in 2003), it may also be too late for this approach, since Humpty Dumpty already fell off the wall.

We failed originally because we refused to recognize the insurgency, now we’re failing to recognize the Civil War, so we still seem to be behind the power curve. Will our COIN doctrine work in the midst of a Civil War, I don't think it will. What we need now is a peace enforcement strategy with zones of separation, agreements between the belligerents, and then strive for political agreement (compromise, so hard to come by in the ME). It is a complex playing field with tribes, religion wars, freedom fighters (those trying to eject the coalition), organized criminals, transnational terrorists, foreign players (Iran, Syria, Turkey, others), etc. We need our best minds at the strategic level (realists, not idealists) to come up with workable solutions.

Fabius from my perspective as a participant in 2003, I would argue that if every Company Commander and his Bn and BDE Cdrs had Kilcullen's 28 articles (and understood the intent) we would have created some breathing space, perhaps enough to allow for a functional political strategy to develop. You look at other divisions compared to the 101st in Mosul at that time, you can see the disparity. The 101st applied COIN doctrine and achieved a remarkable degree of stability (it was still a tough fight), while others simply made the situation much worse. Operations at the tactical level have strategic impact.

What you're saying is true now because we failed to follow our doctrine, not because of our doctrine.

Bill

[Merv Benson]

Can we get links to the Kilcullen articles mentioned in his reply to Fabius?

BTW: Thanks to the SWJ crew for setting up this dialog. I would like to see these guys meet and work the problem together.

[jcustis]

The majority are in the first post of this thread. Not certain about Countering Global Insurgency. I probably have it on my work maching.

[Fabius Maximus]

Here is the "official" citation for ‘Countering Global Insurgency’:

The Journal of Strategic Studies
Vol. 28, No. 4, August 2005, p. 608.
(Subscription only site)

There are articles by him with this title around the web. Not sure if they are identical to the above.

Here is the version I used,from this site (no details as to source or date).

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf

Kilcullen has also written some excellent articles in the Australian Army Journal. Easy to find via google (citations available via Google).

[Fabius Maximus]

Fabius states the obvious, which is that the home team has the advantage. This has always been true in every war we fought, so it is illogical to assume to this advantage always equates to victory. ... Furthermore, we're not losing in Iraq because we don't have home turf advantage, we're losing because we had no plan to transition from combat operations to stability operations (it was supposed to happen magically according to Wolfowitz), so we created a big gap where there was little or no control (remember we liberated Kuwait, we didn’t liberate Iraq, the difference is crucial), and that gap allowed chaos to grow to the tipping point.

Bill goes directly to what are, I suspect, the two key points in this debate.

First, the strategic question about "home court advantages." I will discuss this at some length (as usual, probably too great length!) in my next article. Briefly, this concerns the degree of advantage in 4GW of defense over offense.

There is little agreement in military theory on the superiority of defense over offense, or even if these are useful terms. I believe that they are useful, if imprecise, and that in 4GW defense is decisive.

Second, was our defeat in Iraq inevitable (assuming we do "lose")? Lind and van Creveld, among others, said yes to this -- before our invasion. I agree, and in a dozen articles have explained why I believe so. In my article under discussion I give 1950 as a "red line" date after which 4GW is decisive over previous forms of warfare.

Needless, it is an important question to resolve, essential before we craft a new geo-pol strategy for America.

As Kilcullen and I both say earlier in this thread, the current state of the art only allows us to guess at such things -- and (as we both do) state them clearly to facilitate debate.

Answers will only come with time.

[marct]

BTW: Thanks to the SWJ crew for setting up this dialog. I would like to see these guys meet and work the problem together.

I'll second that. Personally, I'd love to be at that meeting since I think that there are some similar thoughts floating on the horizon.

Marc

[SWJED]

... but not here - so go here - Strategy wars: Lots of discussion of Kilcullen (http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/2007/01/strategy_wars_l.html).

Council member ZenPundit also addresses this thread here - Debating Counterinsurgency (http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2007/01/debating-counterinsurgency-recently.html).

On Edit - Robb takes more than a few liberties in "claiming" intellectual property rights on COIN related issues. Looks like a hurt ego is the crux of his post. Kilcullen on the other hand has a genuine interest in our "boots on the ground".

[slapout9]

I would like to mention two points that have bearing but are overlooked often.

1-We are "not" a democracy we are a Constitutional Republic. If we were a democracy "Al Gore" would have been president (he had the most votes). Then we go public and invade a country to give them democracy which we don't even have in this country. I went all the way through school and not once did I ever pledge allegiance to the democracy for which it stands! But to the Republic for which it stands! Don't you think the rest of the world sees the hypocrisy of this? We have lost the moral high ground through our own stupidity.

2-The types of enemies we are fighting are very different. Rob Thornton of SWC has talked about Mosul and the fact that generations of children have been raised in war, that is all they know. That is very different than a traditional insurgent or even gang motives. It is closer to tribal conditioned serial murders and that is a poor description. When the FBI originally began to profile what we now call serial killers they wanted to call them "Recreational Killers" they did it because they liked it or had simply grown used to it. The name was changed because it was not PC but it is more descriptive. What does this forecast? You are not going to win the hearts and minds of these groups they will take at a sign of weakness and just become more ruthless and brutal. Your only options are to kill them or imprison them for life.

Fabius may be right when he says we should concentrate on the defense because it is surely lacking in our country.

[Fabius Maximus]

I agree with many of the points you raise. For example, those observations about the current state of counterinsurgency theory and practice.



I'm still yet to be convinced that 4GW as currently expressed, or indeed any other paradigm including COIN, contains all the answers we seek for the present round of conflicts.

Similar comments from the "Conclusions" of Countering Global Insurgency and Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency expressed this so well I will use them prominently in my next article.

I disagree with you regarding a few points.



I'm fundamentally a practitioner rather than a theorist ...

You are obviously both. Anybody reading all 72 pages of Countering Global Insurgency – esp. Appendix C, CASE STUDY – SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT OF INSURGENCY IN IRAQ -- will mark you as a theoretician of the first water.

Likewise I believe you are too modest regarding the conceptual foundation of “28 articles. My first draft examined the recommendations of 28 articles as expressions of your longer works, which would have been conceptually a stronger paper. Unfortunately the readers of DNI do not, I believe, respond as well to long, complex works as well as that of the professional journals which publish your work. It’s a disadvantage of writing for a wide audience. With 28 articles you appear to have had the best of both worlds, as it brought the thinking from your greater works to a general audience.

This quote goes directly to the heart of the debate:



I have huge confidence in the adaptability and agility of the guys in the field and have been impressed, again and again, as I have served with them in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. But even if the advice is not strictly achievable, I still think it's worth giving since it helps turn the "ship of state" in the right direction.

I agree totally with the first sentence, and disagree absolutely with the second. The article was an attempt to highlight this point, expanding on similar views expressed in my previous articles. Our troops might be doing things right, but are we strategically doing the right thing? As you know, getting this wrong is an easy and oft-traveled road to defeat.

Equally important, I agree with the following:



I would argue that this set of conflicts we are in actually breaks all our existing paradigms so that we need a fundamental re-think.

The conundrum of 21st century warfare is exactly a “paradigm crisis” as described by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
History suggests that these complex debates are resolved through exchange of papers. That is, exchange of articles and correspondence, with new ideas often coming from unlikely sources.

---

I'll addition to the last line of this response ... it could come from you, me, someone on the SWC, anyone. We need to have our minds open to recognise solutions when they appear.

[Steve Blair]

I would like to mention two points that have bearing but are overlooked often.

[snip]

2-The types of enemies we are fighting are very different. Rob Thornton of SWC has talked about Mosul and the fact that generations of children have been raised in war, that is all they know. That is very different than a traditional insurgent or even gang motives. It is closer to tribal conditioned serial murders and that is a poor description. When the FBI originally began to profile what we now call serial killers they wanted to call them "Recreational Killers" they did it because they liked it or had simply grown used to it. The name was changed because it was not PC but it is more descriptive. What does this forecast? You are not going to win the hearts and minds of these groups they will take at a sign of weakness and just become more ruthless and brutal. Your only options are to kill them or imprison them for life.

Fabius may be right when he says we should concentrate on the defense because it is surely lacking in our country.

What we're seeing is a classic terrorist group generational spiral. I did some research on this kind of stuff in the 1980s, and it was often discussed then. The first generation of a terr group tends to be more idealistic/ideological, and then as each generation is killed off or arrested and replaced with new members, the spiral into killing for the sake of killing becomes more marked. Ideology remained, but with each new "generation" it becomes more and more vague; distinguished by the fact that it is most likely unattainable. It's a justification and no longer a goal.

What is different now is the scale.

[slapout9]

Steve, I would buy that. Especially the scale of it, which is only going to increase if we don't figure out how to stop it. The justification becomes their purpose in life, very deadly. Remember the 120mm post on what color is your AK? I think Jed posted picture of an AK that was highly decorated. When people start doing things like that, violence is becoming part of their very basis for being and they usually don't want to talk about building a great country or how can I be a good citizen.

[SWJED]

From the John Robb - "Global Guerrillas Chimes In" post earlier...


... but not here - so go here - Strategy wars: Lots of discussion of Kilcullen (http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/2007/01/strategy_wars_l.html).

Council member ZenPundit also addresses this thread here - Debating Counterinsurgency (http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2007/01/debating-counterinsurgency-recently.html).

Robb takes more than a few liberties in claiming intellectual property rights on COIN related issues. Looks like a hurt ego is the crux of his post. Kilcullen on the other hand has a genuine interest in our "boots on the ground".

You be the judge on what Robb has to say in his blog entry (http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/2007/01/strategy_wars_l.html).


...it's interesting to see how Kilcullen is drawing from the pool of theory very similar to global guerrillas.

<snip>

Anyway, its flattering that this guy is repurposing ideas I've already explored (he is not a plagiarist by any measure!). The only problem is that since he is merely repackaging it, he seems to lack the intuitive grasp necessary to translate it into viable strategy. As a result, his counter-insurgency recommendations are bland gruel of little import.

As an endnote - Robb has this to say about FM's continuing fixation on Dave's works:


Fab, you did a great job kicking the crap out of the 28 articles. Bravo.

Once again our theorists know better than our guys who are living and breathing this stuff. I would not take so much exception to Robb - except - well - he seems to be wrapped up into himself and not a player when push comes to shove.

I am one "knuckle-dragger" that would go to war with Kilcullen.

[slapout9]

Dave,

I don't know why John Robb is talking about plagiarism since most of his whole theory comes "Airpower and Infrastructure: Lord of the Rings" by Lt. Col. Edward J. Felker USAF.

The paper itself is combination of Chaos theory and Warden's 5 Rings, with ring #3 Infrastructure being the most important. The paper is on the INTERNET somewhere if I can still find it I will post it. Point being he does not have any original ideas, dosen't even understand a lot of his own from what I have read. Notice he is following the Mexico situation very closely now. Gee where did that come from?

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Maxwell_Papers/Text/mp14.pdf

[jcustis]

As I just finished watching M. Night Shyamalan's Lady in the Water, I am struck by the sentiment from SWJED's statement:


I am one "knuckle-dragger" that would go to war with Kilcullen.

I think many who have lost some of their brethren in this fight would agree with me that we find hope in Kilcullen's works... It is that hope that is important for us, because it is born from deeds of valiant men and women who are the so called two-thirds who either get it or are trying to get it. This is a matter of life and death for us, and them. Sometimes that allows one a peculiar ability to judge character. Kilcullen's character is that he can write (and most likely speak) concisely in an Al Gray or J. M. Mattis sort of way. He was not part of the apparatus that sent us to war, but because he speaks with a voice of positive hope, he seems to be the "king of the hill" that others are trying to tear down.

If there was an easy button for this long war, we would have hit it long ago.
------
P.S. At the end of the day, I suppose none of this will matter, because the course of this fight will be charted by so many others who have never had to walk outside the wire.

[Fabius Maximus]

What we're seeing is a classic terrorist group generational spiral. ... The first generation of a terr group tends to be more idealistic/ideological, and then as each generation is killed off or arrested and replaced with new members, the spiral into killing for the sake of killing becomes more marked. Ideology remained, but with each new "generation" it becomes more and more vague; distinguished by the fact that it is most likely unattainable. It's a justification and no longer a goal. What is different now is the scale.

That's a powerful observation, an application of the general effect where a war's increasing death toll requires escalation of the goals -- to justify cost in blood beyond what we originally expected. WWI starts as a battle in some rim states, escalates to a war "to end wars."

On this level it applies to us as well. We go into Iraq to find WMD's, and eventually our goals morph to bringing democracy to the Middle East.

Even more relevant, we're seeing what I call a Darwinian “ratchet”:


... in which the security forces (in effect) power the insurgency. The security services cull the pack of insurgents. They eliminate the slow and stupid, clearing space for the “best” to rise in authority. That is, those most able to survive, recruit, and train new ranks of more effective insurgents. The more severe our efforts at exterminating the insurrection, the more ruthless the survivors.

Hence the familiar activity pattern of a rising sine wave, seen in Palestine, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, and a dozen other places: successes by the security forces, a pause in activity, followed by another wave of activity – but bigger and more effective.

From: http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_forecast_7-2006_part1.htm (More Forecasts, July 2006)

Both of these dynamics tend to make insurgencies difficult to defeat.

[marct]

Hi JC,


I think many who have lost some of their brethren in this fight would agree with me that we find hope in Kilcullen's works... It is that hope that is important for us, because it is born from deeds of valiant men and women who are the so called two-thirds who either get it or are trying to get it. This is a matter of life and death for us, and them. Sometimes that allows one a peculiar ability to judge character. Kilcullen's character is that he can write (and most likely speak) concisely in an Al Gray or J. M. Mattis sort of way. He was not part of the apparatus that sent us to war, but because he speaks with a voice of positive hope, he seems to be the "king of the hill" that others are trying to tear down.

I think that this observation is actually crucial. I've been arguing on a number of threads that this is a symbolic war and, if we strip away all the verbiage, what that comes down to is "this is what we believe, this is what we have to offer, and this is why it is better than what the insurgents offer." I haven't seen that coming from many of the political leaders, but I have seen it coming from the people on he ground.


P.S. At the end of the day, I suppose none of this will matter, because the course of this fight will be charted by so many others who have never had to walk outside the wire.

Quite true about who will end up charting the course, but why say that it doesn't matter? JC, as a suggestion, if you read through Kilcullen's Countering Global Insurgency (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf), esp. sections 3 and 4, but change the focus from the Islamists to the West, what do you find? His suggested strategy of disaggregation is already being used against us by the Islamists. One of the reasons why I really like the SWC is that it is, whether it was intended or not, using a strategy of re-aggregation.

On the pragmatics of some of this, however, I'm moving over to the cell phone thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=7595#post7595).

Marc

[Steve Blair]

I don't know that you can restrict input to "only those who've been there" any more than some can claim "those who've been there are too close to it." It is possible for a theorist (provided he or she is properly versed in historical method and has the background and knowledge to deal intelligently with his or her subject) to have very valid input on Small Wars. By the same token, a person with an agenda and "academic credentials" can do much damage. But the same also goes for those who've been there. I've seen any number of military talking heads who need to just shut up (remember the AF JAG general's article in AFJ, for example); just like their civilian counterparts. Not everyone who's "been there" necessarily "gets it."

The last thing we want to do is turn the exchange into an "us" (whoever "us" is) versus "them" (again, whoever "they" are) argument. The concept of Small Wars is too important for that.

[Merv Benson]

I think there is a correlation between the spiral of terror that Steve talks about and the similar spiral in Islamist extremism. There is a belief that they are not being successful because they are not Islamist enough so they ratchet up their religious requirements. That explains the Taliban effect of certain of the movements and al Qaeda especially. The same thing happens in their fighting where the violence is also ratcheted up. Think of it in terms of corporal punishment of the incorrigible. You keep trying to inflict pain until you get the results you want. The enemy's hearts and minds campaign seems to be based on a theory Chuck Colson espoused during Vietnam--"When you have them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow."

In both the religious and fighting aspects, the spiral is based on their failure not the success of their operations. When your goal is intimidation and you are failing, the enemy's answer is to be more intimidating. Hey, it kept Saddam in power for a long time.

[max161]

This has been a great discussion. Although we may have reached culmination of this thread I offer an excerpt of and link to Dr. Echevarria's lastest writing on trnsformation which I think provides an interesting alternative view for all the "transformers" and "futurists" out there.

Challenging Transformation's Clichés (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB746.pdf)


Much of the dialogue concerning military transformation in the United States employs a number of popular, but hitherto unchallenged clichés. Clichés and catchwords are merely handy ways of capturing and conveying truths. Unsubstantiated clichés, however, can masquerade as truths and, unless exposed in time, ultimately prove costly and harmful to policy. This monograph examines five of the more popular clichés, or myths, found in transformation literature today. The fact that they continue to gain currency in the dialogue suggests that we need to examine our accepted truths more regularly.

The first cliché is that military transformation is about changing to be better prepared for the future, as if we could somehow separate the future from our current agendas, and as if we had only one future for which to prepare. In fact, transformation is more about the present than the future. Our views of the future are just as distorted by our biases and perspectives as are our views of the past or present. If forecasting the future is always affected by the present, the influences of the present are not always bad. Without biases, much of the information we receive would remain unintelligible. What we need, then, are the means and the willingness to recognize our biases, and to test them—to filter our filters.

The second cliché is that strategic uncertainty is greater today than it was during the Cold War. Unfortunately, this view overstates the amount of certainty that existed then and exaggerates the level of uncertainty in evidence today. We should not forget the amount of uncertainty that clouded conflicts in Korea, Indochina, the Middle East, and northern Africa, as well as the invasion of Hungary in 1956, the Cuban missile crisis of 1963, the Munich crisis of 1972, the Suez crisis of 1973, and the many tense moments that attended the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today’s uncertainty may be qualitatively different, but it is hardly greater than that which obtained during the Cold War. Moreover, we actually know a great deal about today’s threats, especially that of transnational terrorism; many recent works have added, and continue to add, to our wealth of knowledge about terrorism and specific terrorist groups. We know the demographics of these groups; their pathologies; the values they hold; their goals; the conditions they need for success; their sources of support; their methods, even though they continue to change; and in many cases, their structures and innerworkings, even though the experts themselves do not always agree.

The third cliché is that mental transformation is the most difficult part of any effort to change. Actually, the most difficult part of transformation is the complex task of managing the change itself. The ideas behind Gustavus Adolphus’ reform of the Swedish military during the 17th century—which included mobile artillery and greater use of musketry—were not hard to grasp. Likewise, Napoleon’s tactical and operational innovations—which involved combining mass and firepower with self-sufficient army organizations called corps—were not difficult to understand. In fact, the truly hard part about change is managing the change. That requires backing up vague visions and lofty goals with concrete programs that can provide meaningful resources for new roles and functions, and offering incentives or compensation packages capable of appeasing institutional interests, especially the specific interests of those groups or communities most threatened by change.

The fourth cliché is that imagination and creative thinking are critical for any successful transformation. While these qualities certainly are important, they are only vital when the effort is open-ended, or in its early stages. Once the transformation effort gains momentum, a new orthodoxy replaces the old one, and creative thinking, unless it remains “in the box,” becomes inconvenient. To be sure, creative thinking can generate a wealth of potential solutions to the practical problems and the incidental friction that come with implementing change. However, the next step, the critical analysis of those solutions, is essential to moving forward. In short, the only truly essential key to transforming successfully is the capacity for critical analysis, which enables us to challenge clichés and assumptions, to expose vacuous theories and seductive jargon, and, in theory at least, to assess the results of war games and other exercises impartially.

Finally, the last cliché is that militaries tend to transform slowly, or not at all, because they like to “refight the last war,” rather than preparing for the next one. While militaries tend to rely on historical models almost to a fault, organizations need to learn from their experiences. An organization that cannot, or will not, learn from its past is not likely to prepare itself very well for the future either, except by chance. Assessing what worked and what did not from historical data is integral to critical analysis. Learning from the past and preparing for the future require an ability to evaluate events as rigorously and objectively as possible.

[SWCAdmin]

For related discussions, see also

...continue to develop the Fundamentals of Company Level Insurgency (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=659) thread, or talk to the COIN Redux (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1235) thread, which never really garnered the discussion it deserved...

[Fabius Maximus]

Thanks, Max161, for posting about Echevarria's article. One of the best I've seen in a long time; well worth reading.

[Menning]

This article was published back in December. Until more recently I couldn't find it online. George Packer writes a great article featuring David Kilcullen and the role of social sciences in GWOT. This is even more germane as Kilcullen is a member of Petraeus' "brain trust." I highly recommend looking at this piece.

Here's the link: http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/061218fa_fact2

[Tom Odom]

Thanks mate

I have Packer's Assassins Gate. And I actually read it.

I will look at this. I have a fondness for New Yorker because they sent Phil Gourevich to Rwanda

Tom

[Mark O'Neill]

Having just (quite late obviously) come across this thread, I have to agree with David's earlier post in response to Maximus' various critiques.

There is little utility in it for any public figure getting into deep debates with anonymous pundits.

Regarding 'precious' claims about ideas and plagarism (as our international man of mystery FM seems to imply that folks are copying him) , in my experience there is actually little 'new' under the sun. This (to me anyway) implies that it is highly likely that any number of informed people might think the same thing.

As we say here in Oz "harden up cupcake".

And if you are as good as you seem to think you are - come out and tell folks who you are. (Even as I write this I kind of expect some claim to privacy or security to be made in defence of anonymity. In my experience the people who make such claims are actually the last people to need them).


I have known DK for a while , and I have never heard him claim that he has all the answers. I do not necessarily agree with all that he writes. What is worthy (in my opinion) of admiration is that he is at least out there dreaming up stuff and trying to be creative - and owning up to it, good or bad, not hiding behind a psuedonym. In the current environment, that is gutsy. He stands by his stuff, right or wrong, and cannot hide.

Simple really. One can be Walter Mitty or one can 'own up'.

Send, over.

Mark

[SWJED]

12 April The Spectrum commentary - Kilcullen Leads Counterinsurgency (http://www.thespectrum.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070412/OPINION/704120329) by Tad Trueblood.


God bless the Australians. Through almost five and a half years of war now, they have been a steady, stalwart ally while others have wavered. The Australian armed forces are small but very effective in what they do, and they do it with little fuss and lots of professionalism.

One of Australia's quiet professionals has had a big impact on United States counterinsurgency strategy. He is Lt. Col. David Kilcullen, who through various turns of fate is now a part of Gen. Petreaus' "brain trust" in Iraq. Kilcullen served 21 years as an Australian Army infantry officer and still maintains his reserve. He led counterinsurgency operations in East Timor, advised Indonesian Special Forces, taught the British Army, advised the U.S. State Department, and earned a PhD in anthropology along the way.

As our military has struggled to learn (or relearn) the principles for successfully fighting a counterinsurgency war, Kilcullen's ideas have gained currency in the right circles - particularly among U.S. Army and Marine officers formulating a new manual for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In March of 2006, Kilcullen authored an 11-page memo in which he outlined his lessons learned and counterinsurgency best practices. It has become known as "Kilcullen's 28 points," and you can find it on the web with a quick Google search on that phrase...

[marct]

12 April The Spectrum commentary - Kilcullen Leads Counterinsurgency (http://www.thespectrum.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070412/OPINION/704120329) by Tad Trueblood.

Also interesting to note that the information box in that story provides only one link for information on counter-insurgency: here.

Marc

[SWJED]

Also interesting to note that the information box in that story provides only one link for information on counter-insurgency: here.

Marc

That link was not up this morning - or my coffee hadn't kicked in yet - appreciate you pointing that out.

[SWJED]

From today's Weekly Standard - Kilcullen Blogger Call (http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2007/05/kilcullen_blogger_call.asp) by Michael Goldfarb.


Dr. David Kilcullen, who currently serves as senior counter-insurgency adviser to Gen. Petraeus and Multi-National Force Iraq, participated in a conference call with bloggers and reporters this morning.

Kilcullen has a distinguished record, having served as chief counter-terrorism strategist for the U.S. State Department, senior analyst in Australia's Office of National Assessments, and special adviser to the Pentagon for counter-terrorism during the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. He also blogs at the Small Wars Journal (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/authors/dave-kilcullen/).

The call lasted nearly 45 minutes, so I won't try and cover everything that was discussed, but there will be a complete transcript and audio file posted here (http://www.defendamerica.mil/) sometime today.

So, a few highlights...

Much more at the link...

[SWJED]

From today's Blackfive - COIN: Dr. Kilcullen in Blogger Roundtable (http://www.blackfive.net/main/2007/05/coin_david_kilc.html).


Dr. David Kilcullen, well known to readers of this page (see especially here), was the guest in the DefendAmerica.mil Blogger's Roundtable this morning. Audio and a transcript will be (but as of this writing are not yet) available here.

I was invited to participate in the Roundtable (which, I found out when I got there, is being run by an old friend of mine -- a military contractor named Tim Killbride, who has recently done some writing of his own on the topic)...

Much more at the link...

[SWJED]

9 July issue of the Weekly Standard - Richard Lugar, Meet David Kilcullen (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/817qwrec.asp) by William Kristol.


... Contrast Lugar's speech with an assessment of the situation in Iraq posted the very next day on the Small Wars Journal website. David Kilcullen, a former Australian military officer, is one of the world's leading experts on counterinsurgency warfare. A sharp critic of the previous U.S. strategy in Iraq, he was asked by General Petraeus to serve as an adviser during the development and early execution of the new strategy. Now finishing up his tour of duty, Kilcullen offered "personal views" of "what's happening, right now." It's worth reproducing much of Kilcullen's report, "Understanding Current Operations in Iraq"...

[Rob Thornton]

As a soldier how do you react to the different positions taken by politicians (in general)? You prefer to believe (at least I do) that these elected officials are trying to represent the interests of the United States, their constituents at home, and the soldier abroad, but it sometimes contrasts with your own emotions and perspective.

There seems to be a self defeating air of mistrust and self deception we must overcome in D.C, in the U.S. and abroad. People often compare (wrong for many reasons I think) the Iraq War and the Vietnam War. What people fail to do well is place Iraq in the context of the stated AQ (and their spawn) strategy. I'm not sure we can afford to fail in Iraq. We've hear the various withdrawal with _____________ options, but I think they miss the point.

You cannot reason with someone that is anathema to your core beliefs, one of you must cease to believe or exist.

We mirror image our process of rationalization into AQ and Iran to try and understand them and their motivations, but when we do so we deceive ourselves. Some of us have seen some of these hard core types up close - not the ones who look deflated on capture, but the ones who through their eyes look like serial killers, the ones with contempt for life regardless of age, sex, or anything else human beings might raise moral issues with. These animals are not confined to Islam or the Middle East, but they do seem to be attracted to the fringes of religious movements where extremism coincides with their cruelty.

While many of the people we encounter in Iraq are just trying to put food on the table, or regain honor and dignity, the hard core of the bunch murder because it feeds them - they are every bit as evil as Jack the Ripper. While many insurgents in Iraq can be brought back into their society (and in fact are being), these few Irhabs will not be - the idea of society is totally, 180 deg. at odds to the self interests of these few. These animals will murder until they die, even if locked up they will murder in their hearts until given the chance to do so again.

I believe that if we remove ourselves from Iraq before there is a functioning government that can provide security and work towards stability, the Irhab will gain empowerment. In an environment where we chose to leave a vacuum, the Irhab will prosecute Hirabah against any of those Iraqis and foreigners who they can justify exterminating. It will devolve into a Taliban like state where destroying anything and anyone (Christian, Yizidi, even Muslims) not acquiescing to this severely perverted form is encouraged. They will re-write the history of Mesopotamia through annihilation and erasure.

If left unchecked it will spread. It will be exported at first, infecting areas through information and money - like tiny tumors throughout the body. It will be impossible through our political paralysis to know if they are benign or malignant until after they gain enough strength to resist less intrusive treatments - this is part of a published AQ strategy. They will seek to challenge us in our homes in our own countries, because they cannot stand even the slightest challenge to their views. For them our continued existence is intolerable.

For these animals pluralism anywhere cannot be tolerated - for them its just a question of having the resources to destroy it. They are clever and will cultivate the outward appearance of confining their goals in the name of their right to exist, after all who are we to export freedom, or Christianity or anything regardless of the level of oppression others face? In the Irhab view they have no moral obligation to be honest to the apostates of the world (meaning anyone that disagrees with them), lying is justified and encouraged. If America can be duped into believing they will stop, then they should be encouraged to do so. However, eventually they see themselves as gaining the resources – it is written plainly in the AQ strategy - they see it as prophesized and communicate it as future, present and past tense.

What happens in Iraq right now matters to our future survival. We must succeed there, or we will go back in a much shorter period of time then we think. The next time all the moderates, and anyone who befriended us there will be dead, murdered along with their families and any hint they ever existed as anything but apostates. Iraq is not Afghanistan either, and anyone who thinks OBL & AQ did not learn from the last 5 years is at the pinnacle of ignorance – they are already making plans on how to consolidate and protect the gains they see as inevitable. Failure and withdrawal under any terms less then those that leave a secure and stable Iraq that tolerates the pluralism of its inhabitants (yea - that would equate to a representative system of some flavor) only sets us up for eventually going back. You can say it will never happen, but it will. The AQs of the world don't see it like we do, for them history is already written and they won, all they have to do is wage the global jihad.

[Old Eagle]

The job of newspapers (media) is to sell newspapers.

The job of politicians is to get elected.

If you accept those two reality points, you won't get so worked up about otherwise intelligent ? politicians doing/saying idiotic things, or newspapers/media consumed by such things as Paris Hilton (she's out of jail) and Anna Nicole Smith (she's still dead).

All politics is local.

That said, I am amazed at the resiliency of Joe Liebermann in the face of true adversity. Whoda thunkit?

[Rob Thornton]

Hey OE,


The job of politicians is to get elected.

Is it? Or is that just job #1?

I don't have much of a problem with all politics being local if that means they are represenative of those who elected them. It starts to get fuzzy when talking the T-TH in D.C. and the F-M at home raising $$$ for the next campaign.

I can't help getting worked up, in fact I'd say more people should. Of course its my opinnion, but I believe there is more at stake here then just Iraq. Liebermann has done what few others have, he's demonstrated leadership and candor.

Regards, Rob

[T. Jefferson]

But too many of our politicians are not serious. As retired General Jack Keane told the New York Sun last week, "The tragedy of these efforts is we are on the cusp of potentially being successful in the next year in a way that we have failed in the three-plus preceding years, but because of this political pressure, it looks like we intend to pull out the rug from underneath that potential success." I would only qualify Keane's statement in this way: Such a frivolous and thoughtless betrayal of our fighting men would be too contemptible to be called tragedy.

I for one, really do not want to see another liberation of Saigon. Politicians as a group never seem to learn from history, especially military history.

[T. Jefferson]

Rob:

The AQ strategy sure seems reminiscent of Marx and his "historical inevitability.”

If we bail, I would expect to see a massive growth in Shia militias and a return to out and out Sunni vs. Shia civil war.

[carl]

Rob:

Very well said. I get worked up too when I think of maybe two wars lost and two peoples betrayed in my lifetime; both because of the fecklessness and lack of moral character of our high leaders.

I just wish I could state it as well as you.

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Rob:

Very well said. I get worked up too when I think of maybe two wars lost and two peoples betrayed in my lifetime; both because of the fecklessness and lack of moral character of our high leaders.

I just wish I could state it as well as you.

Rob,
About politicians, it all matter about sociology and the making of the ruling elite, in my own opinion and from personal knowledge acquired on the field.

Further readings of authors such as Gaetano Mosca (The Rulling Class), Vilfredo Pareto (The Mind of Society), George Sorel (varied works), James Burnham (The Machiavellians), Frederick the Great, and Nicolo Machiavelli, of course, provide further enlightenments.

About the courage, reliability and trustworthiness of politicians the dominant and basic parameter I personally consider is whether the personality of a given politician seem fit this of the “lion model,” or the “fox model.”

The way the making of the ruling elite is done from country to country is a variable of tremendous importance. In some instances corruption or past events in life likely to give hand to blackmail is a prerequisite since a highly empowered person who is not corruptible or has no such record is hard to get rid of if ever he crosses the political line on the basis of which he has been selected (yes, I didn’t say elected). Things are different in more democratic countries such as the United States, of course.

Sometimes ago I did write something more explicit and nearly exhaustive under the form of a comment, about this question. It is entirely based upon the reading of the above mentioned author. Just in case, you can access it at the following link and in looking for my name:

http://neveryetmelted.com/?p=1807

[Granite_State]

The job of newspapers (media) is to sell newspapers.

The job of politicians is to get elected.



Not really the issue with Lugar though. Don't necessarily agree with him, but he was just reelected, and I would think his seat is very safe. Wouldn't cite his own reelection as an issue here.

[jlechelt]

Kristol calling for reasoned debate is like President Clinton calling for faithfulness in marriage, or President Bush calling for honesty in war leadership. Bill Kristol should have been demanding - and offering - reasoned debate BEFORE the Iraq War began. Instead, he sounded the trumpets and challenged the integrity of anyone who questioned the wisdom of going into Iraq. Shame on him. Kilcullen's explanation of the current US effort in Iraq is fantastic. Why hasn't the President of the United States been so direct and honest with us?

[120mm]

I know it isn't popular to say so, but perhaps the President IS being as honest as he is capable of being. Perhaps it is more an issue of capability, not intent. If nothing else, this Presidency has been marked with an inability to communicate clearly, whether that be because Bush cannot speak well, or that there is no central theme to speak to, or that media filters are on "full".

For sure, the assertion that "Bush Lied" has reached "Big Lie" status for those among his opposition. I mean, it's been said so often, it must be true, right? On a related issue, the Presidency has been under continuous investigation since Reagan. Investigating the President has become a tactic, now. And, except for in former President Clinton's case, the investigations have turned up nothing of substance.

[Abu Buckwheat]

What happens in Iraq right now matters to our future survival. The AQs of the world don't see it like we do, for them history is already written and they won, all they have to do is wage the global jihad.


There is no arguing that an unstable and failed state of Iraq will give refuge to some future terrorists but we have to face some simple facts before we can stipulate your argument. I have been working there for four years, lost dozens of friends and eeked out a book on how and why they fight. The facts on the ground are this ... Al Qaeda in iraq and all of its associated foreign fighter personnel make up less than 2-5% of the insurgency. We have managed to incorrectly place the initials "AQI" next to everyone fighting us -particularly Iraqis fighting us. This is wrong and our group think-prone mindset is to belive our own political propaganda. In this instance this is what is blinding us to how AQI could be everywhere at all times and so effective day and night in Iraq. In fact, they aren't.

We are fighting 4 entirely different resistance organizations in Iraq ... three of them are Sunni. However everywhere I go I keep hearing the boots on the ground carrying out operations against AQI or AQI supporters ... I will say this once again. No one seems to fight the Iraqi resistance ... just AQI. All Iraqiscaptured are AQI. All supporters aare AQI. This is flat out wrong.

We are fighting an 98,000 man force made up mainly of former intelligence officers, police, soldiers, commandos and their children above the age of 16. The Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) are the heart of the insurgency and their goals are entirely different from those of AQI. AQI is just a convient foil that allows the FRLs to operate with impunity while AQI gets almost all of our resources and missions. It is in the interest of the FRLs and the Iraqi religious extremists as well as the Mahdi militia to keep us bug hunting for the AQI SVBIED cells while the day to day grind of IEDs and Ambushes kills two to five of our men and women everyday ... these attacks come from the 98% of the insurgency we seem to take pleasure in ignoring.

I have worked the AQ mission since 1993 and a few other facts need to be said. AQI didn't exist until we set the ground and battlefield for them. OK, its done; a phenomenal screw-up of ungodly but biblical proportions. Now lets move on and unscrew it. AQI operates separately as a covert entity within Iraqi society simply to carry out SVBIED/SPBIED missions (and some armed attacks for training purposes). They are a one trick pony, however it is an effective trick. Yet they cannot even start to operate in Iraq without the people who brought them there a few weeks before the invasion ... the former regime forces -specifically, the Saddam Fedayeen. The FRLs and Neo-Baathists dominate AQ ops areas areas and supply many of the AQI operations with logistical support - from Damascus to the SVBIED crashing through the gate AQI has to kiss the ring of the FRLs. AQI may be just 1,300-1,500 men operating in a country of 25 million but we still keep referring to the insurgency as AQI driven, planned and operated. Its fundamentally wrong and has bitten us in the rear several times already.

Now about AQ terrorists - You may be right Rob, but in my experience (26 years of operations in the Middle East and Africa) the men who chooses the jihadist path comes from all cross sections of Moslem (and even American) life. However I have seen men one would never suspect of hurting a kitten become hard core fighters and believe me when they find in their hearts some facet of hope that makes them truely belive they are carrying out God's mission then they do it with courage, convition and steeliness we could all admire. Few of these men are crazy murderers or serial killers just as the Marines are not typified but the few mass murders we KNOW have been carried out by men in prison now. Jihadis and the nationalist resistance are just committed and motivated soldiers in their own way. We have many of the same type who, once bloodied, will fight and kill in a league of their own. We call them warriors, or Soldier of the Month ... they call them "Mujihad Brothers" "Princes of Battle," "Lions of Allah," or liken them to any number of Islamic and pre-Islamic heros (Antar, Sindbd, et al.). In Fallujah they were the hardest of the hard but they can be made, just as we make Marines, SF and others. Its a calling, they call it a "calling" and to lessen them into murderers is a cast that may work in Information Operations but not in assessing our enemy honestly. Thats our biggest problem... we make them into cartoon characters and they suprise the hell out of us by standing up and fighting us as men with a mission. The mischaraterization and the effectivness of their operations sows confusion in our assessments of who we are fighting ... we assume its a blip and do it again. Its been going on wrong for four years.

I agree we must stay until there is a functioning government with a security force capable of handling this mission that we can barely do but how long can we hold on when America is not committed to this war. The American people are speaking so we'd better come up with a Plan B, C, D-Z and pretty damn quick.


the Irhab will prosecute Hirabah against any of those Iraqis and foreigners who they can justify exterminating ... They will re-write the history of Mesopotamia through annihilation and erasure.

... and here is where I think you are mistaken. The goal of the Sunni Moslem community is simple ... get hope for their children. When the appropriate time and the right amount of money and resources comes into their community (from their own efforts or enterprise) comes they will obliterate the AQI because they will have served their purpose. There is no future for AQI in Western Iraq ... few to none are Iraqis and Bin Laden's Global Jihad has nothing to do with their present fight or their quest for 24 hour a day air conditioning ... its going to end up about what cut of the profits of future oil revenue gets routed to them and gives their children a future. Right now its 0% so they support AQI damaging/destablizing/deligitimizing the Shiite government and us as much as possible... they give them VBIEDs/PBIEDs, targets and logistical support ... they create the plan and path to hit us and we immediately comply and hunt just the Jihadis ... not the Sunni insurgents. This former government played the Iraqi people for decades and neither UBL or Zarqawi or anyone else can defeat them politically or militarily on their own home turf. They prepared for this resistance and they are using all the tools at their disposal. AQI is one of those tools.

I like to think we can buy the FRL insurgency with the right political and military concessions and maybe we can, but first we have to recalibrate who we are really fighting day to day and who is really causing the most casualties... here's a hint, it isn't AQI.

[Abu Buckwheat]

For sure, the assertion that "Bush Lied" has reached "Big Lie" status for those among his opposition. I mean, it's been said so often, it must be true, right? On a related issue, the Presidency has been under continuous investigation since Reagan. Investigating the President has become a tactic, now. And, except for in former President Clinton's case, the investigations have turned up nothing of substance.

Well lets check the books since WWII.

Truman (D) - No crimes to speak of.
Ike (R)- Same ... warned against the military industrial complex.
Kennedy (D)- Sex with Marilyn Monroe in White house.
Johnson (D) - Got us into Vietnam and quit when he went below 50% popularity.
Nixon (R)- Investigated by his own DOJ and found numerous acts of criminal conduct in office. Ordered burglaries, wiretapping and thefts. His own party turned on him and impeachment was a sure thing. Additionally he secretly (to the American public) and illegally bombed two other nations not at war with us ... this ultimately led to Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge winning Cambodia and murdering a million people. Numerous members of his cabinet went to prison until pardoned by President Ford or until sentences were completed.

Carter (D)- Not the best president but did nothing illegal or improper. Later won Nobel Peace prize for bringing Israel and Egypt together.

Reagan (R)- Sold US stocks of I-HAWK and I-TOW Missiles and spare parts to Iran (via Israel and the CIA). Since it was a secret sale the conspirators decided to secretly funnel the HUGE profits of those missile sales to a secret slush fund to arm the Nicaraguan Contras - all against the laws passed by Congress to NOT give them any US money (see it was Iranian and terrorist money so it was OK!). Oh yes, Iran was under a US arms ban and the weapons were direct bribes to Iran so they could tell their terrorist arm, Hezbollah in Lebanon, to free US hostages (that they ordered kidnapped) in direct exchange for specified numbers of I-HAWKs/I-TOWs. Numerous members went to prison for lying and obstruction of justice until pardoned by G.H.W. Bush. Several work in the present White House.

Clinton (D) - Dozens of investigations reveal he had oral sex and bad taste in bimbos but was not convicted of it. No one convicted or pardoned in his cabinet of anything despite dozens of investigations (look it up, its all true, except Henry Cisneros's misdemeanor count of obstruction about how much money he gave his girlfriend).

GW Bush (R) - He's getting off very light so far. Only two big investigations really underway - Firing of US Attorneys and Warrantless Wiretapping ... I can't tell you were others will begin or end but I personally believe there is allot of smoke and its not from Cigars and interns. I do know this ... even Bush admitted on TV he ordered wiretaps of US citizens without a warrant contrary to the fourth amendment of the Constitution. This is illegal. Incompetence pre-9/11? Incompetence in Iraq? Incompetence in Hurricane Katrina? Take a number ... its going to be a long summer and quite frankly I am of the belief they deserve some checks and balances. Let the chips fall where they may because my beloved Consitution is more important to me than a few politcal hacks.

[Mark O'Neill]

Well lets check the books since WWII.

Kennedy (D)- Sex with Marilyn Monroe in White house.
Johnson (D) - Got us into Vietnam and quit when he went below 50% popularity.
.

Sorry, who got you into Vietnam???:confused:

Hint: it is one of those two presidents , and not the one you nominated.

[SWJED]

Sorry, who got you into Vietnam???:confused:

Hint: it is one of those two presidents , and not the one you nominated.

One could argue Eisenhower...

The Eisenhower Center:



...The last 2 or 3 years of the Eisenhower Administration might be termed a third phase. The situation in South Vietnam appeared on the surface to be relatively quite but the situation was seething. North Vietnam decided to increase subversive activities in the south and violent incidents increased such as one in July 1959 in which 2 Americans were killed. One report in April 1960 called for at least three years of hard work and active fighting to curb Communist terrorism in South Vietnam. Meanwhile reports were indicating that the Diem regime was becoming increasingly out of touch with the people. So signs of trouble in South Vietnam were appearing. But it was in Laos where the Eisenhower Administration seemed to focus its attention as fears of a communist take over in that country increased. The Eisenhower Administration increased aid, consulted with its European Allies but also conducted paramilitary operations in an effort to stabilize the situation there. At the end of December 1960 as he prepared to turn over the Presidency to President-elect John F. Kennedy, President Eisenhower concluded a high level meeting on Laos by stating that “we must not allow Laos to fall to the Communists, even if it involves war in which the U.S. acts with allies or unilaterally. The Eisenhower Administration ended on January 20, 1961 with the crisis in Laos hanging ominously in the air.

According to one writer, while the actions of the Eisenhower Administration did not make the expansion of United States involvement under President Kennedy and the massive intervention under President Johnson inevitable, nevertheless, the years of the Eisenhower Administration certainly expanded the United States commitment to South Vietnam and laid the foundation for the subsequent decisions to intervene.

[Mark O'Neill]

One could argue Eisenhower...

The Eisenhower Center:


I would concede that as a fair point as far as shaping policy, but it was JFK who committed American troops.

[Abu Buckwheat]

Sorry, who got you into Vietnam???:confused:

Hint: it is one of those two presidents , and not the one you nominated.


I meant into Vietnam in a BIG way ... Ike started it with those Dien Bien Phu advisors right?

[SteveMetz]

Well lets check the books since WWII.

Clinton (D) - Dozens of investigations reveal he had oral sex and bad taste in bimbos but was not convicted of it. No one convicted or pardoned in his cabinet of anything despite dozens of investigations (look it up, its all true, except Henry Cisneros's misdemeanor count of obstruction about how much money he gave his girlfriend).



You did kind of omit that little item of being the second president to be impeached

[Steve Blair]

Eisenhower was also very heavy into Laos, and he got Kennedy fixated on Southeast Asia in general. It could also be argued that JFK's relationship with Diem accelerated the process.

[Abu Buckwheat]

You did kind of omit that little item of being the second president to be impeached

That wasn't the point of the comment. That impeachment was clearly political since it was so ridiculous ... however the present issues are SERIOUS breaches of the Constitution and we are well into Nixon country ...

Back to the topic at hand with Rob Thorton's excellent and heartfelt cry to watch out for AQ. We have a chance to salvage Iraq and destroy AQI as well as AQ Corporate but the administration has been so inept, so political, so incompetent that we are well on the way to becoming UBLs puppet. We have to finish Iraq... we all know that but Lugar, Hagel, Warner and the Democrats are right ... America is 70% against the war and 45% for immediate pull-out. Are we not a Democracy? We have a will of the people to contend with and the insurgents, all of them quickly learned where the center of gravity for America lies. A truely strong President who had been honest from the beginning and who did not use the war principally as a political tool to bash his political enemies and who could ask for and get the sacrifice necessary from the people through constant open scrutiny of the policy and who had a plan. This isn't Rhodesia where the enemy is part of our nation (or the UK for that matter) we are a far enemy and this will be a far war over time but we have to hit the reset button, I am afraid. :rolleyes:

[Merv Benson]

Does anyone seriously argue that President Lincoln needed warrants before allowing taps into Confederate telegraph communications?

There are several cases on the books that hold that the President has the inherent right to intercept enemy communications. The suggestion that the President should have to jump through hoops and miss al Qaeda contacts with its agents in the US is absurd. The whole FISA system is of questionable constitutionality and it clearly does not apply in a time of war.

It is also ridiculous to suggest that there is something improper about firing people who serve at the pleasure of the President. While some are huffing and puffing about the issue they cannot point to anything illegal or unethical about firing people. I think the case can be made that several other people should have been fired.

[VinceC]

Does anyone seriously argue that President Lincoln needed warrants before allowing taps into Confederate telegraph communications?


However, Lincoln tapped telegraph lines 115 years before the passage of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which requires the Executive Branch to notify the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to seek a warrant within 72 hours after initiating electronic surveillance.

Telegraph lines in the Confederate States of America were in a discrete, specific geographic jurisdiction that had declared itself to be outside the jurisdiction of the United States.

Lincoln acted during a constitutionally declared war.

Telegraph lines were not private, individual communication. They were commercial and/or government information carriers. Only in rare and unique circumstances were private homes wired with a personal telegraph key. Messages were relayed by telegraph operators, via specialized offices, so there was a different level of privacy involved. So the constitutional issues of search and seizure were different.

[Rob Thornton]

Up North in Mosul a reasonable ammount of the real bad guys we (really 1/2/2 IA) caught were linked to AQ somehow. Some were linked for the name, some were linked for the money. Some were foreign (in some cases visibly so). Some came right out and said it, others were linked tenuously through propaganda, or cell phone links. It was damn confusing sorting that stuff out as proving someting like that - even when a guy says its so is not always easy.

Part of the confusion was based on how AIF constructs their groups - up North (2006/2007) it was more like organized crime in terms of how the money flowed - with sheiks often involved as pseudo crime boss like figures. Groups often allied themselves or employed criminals for hits, emplacements, couriers, graft or information collection. It was a business - and there was not much of the threat of shia'aism up there (but there was an ethnic difference posed between Sunni Kurd and Sunni Arab).

However, we do tend to put an AQ face on lots of things - probably because AQIZ is hard to distinguish from other Sunni groups - they often seem intermingled in lineage.

I think CF, ISF and Iraqi tribes have done a great job over the last 2-3 years curtailing AQ. The IA in Mosul remember 11/11/04 very well. Guys from 1-24 and the ISF will tell you point blank the numbers of foreign fighters that were there in Nov 2004.

An unsecure and unstable Iraq is bad no matter which non-state actor (AQ & AQ like) we're talking about or even an Iraq influenced heavily by Iran. I certainly believe in the areas I was in that the people who I built relationships with crossed some bridges they can't come back across. I lost allot of Iraqi soldier buddies to assasination as they came and went on leave. One friend, the BN S-4 had his father killed, then a brother, and recently I got word that he'd been assassinated as well. This IA unit had pissed off allot of people in order to do the right thing - like rolling some IED cells and not releasing known bad guys at the request of politically powerful sheiks, or other regional VIPs. At a time when some of the ISF CDRs were foot dragging or colluding with AIF, these guys were pretty much in line with CF efforts - and straight kicking ass -since I was there I know. Consider the interpreters, and many others who assist us. The people who now give tips, the people who dare to keep their businesses open on days where AIF has told them to close up shop. Consider all those folks. If we bail - those folks and their families will pay the price.

I've lost my fair share of American buddies as well, it always surprises me for some reason - I guess I figured it would not happen to them.

[jlechelt]

For sure, the assertion that "Bush Lied" has reached "Big Lie" status for those among his opposition. I mean, it's been said so often, it must be true, right? On a related issue, the Presidency has been under continuous investigation since Reagan. Investigating the President has become a tactic, now. And, except for in former President Clinton's case, the investigations have turned up nothing of substance.

Answers to the question of whether or not President Bush has lied can rest solely on the words of President Bush:
1) When asked before the 2006 elections whether or not he planned to keep Rumsfeld, he said he did. A day after the election, Rumsfeld was fired. (The right move, BTW).
2) Just before the 2006 election, when asked if the US was winning the war in Iraq, the President said, "Absolutely we're winning." Shorlty after the election, he said, "We're not winning. We're not losing."
Out of those two different positions on two different issues, we can all make arguments for which presidential answer is the right one, but they are clearly contradictory answers. Maybe you can even justify the lack of honesty. But justifying a lie does not make it less of a lie. I don't mean to harp that these examples mean that dishonesty is the crux of who President Bush is. Heck, every president has lied at some point. I only want to address the silliness of claiming that people believe Bush has lied because many people have claimed that he has lied. Rather, we can claim that President Bush has lied because he has lied.

Investigations into Iran-Contra found a LOT of subsantive stuff. Helping terrorists get weapons is a heck of a lot worse than messing around with interns.
Bottom line: to say that only President Clinton's investigations turned up substantive wrong-doing points to a speaker's partisanship and not to any understanding of history. Wrong-doing is not a Republican or Democratic problem, it is a political problem. William Jefferson and the Dukester help us understand the bipartisan reality of problematic politicians.

[120mm]

Answers to the question of whether or not President Bush has lied can rest solely on the words of President Bush:
1) When asked before the 2006 elections whether or not he planned to keep Rumsfeld, he said he did. A day after the election, Rumsfeld was fired. (The right move, BTW).
2) Just before the 2006 election, when asked if the US was winning the war in Iraq, the President said, "Absolutely we're winning." Shorlty after the election, he said, "We're not winning. We're not losing."
Out of those two different positions on two different issues, we can all make arguments for which presidential answer is the right one, but they are clearly contradictory answers. Maybe you can even justify the lack of honesty. But justifying a lie does not make it less of a lie. I don't mean to harp that these examples mean that dishonesty is the crux of who President Bush is. Heck, every president has lied at some point. I only want to address the silliness of claiming that people believe Bush has lied because many people have claimed that he has lied. Rather, we can claim that President Bush has lied because he has lied.

You are pole-vaulting over mouse turds, here. This is a fact of political life, and all politicians are guilty of it. Each and every one.

Investigations into Iran-Contra found a LOT of subsantive stuff. Helping terrorists get weapons is a heck of a lot worse than messing around with interns.
What if the American people WANT an underhanded bastard who will go to bat for other Americans, despite idiotic and naive limitations on the Executive Branch imposed by politically incompetent idiots?
Bottom line: to say that only President Clinton's investigations turned up substantive wrong-doing points to a speaker's partisanship and not to any understanding of history. Wrong-doing is not a Republican or Democratic problem, it is a political problem. William Jefferson and the Dukester help us understand the bipartisan reality of problematic politicians.

Not really. Bill Clinton Lied Under Oath, which is a crime. A demonstrably criminal act. Something that umpteen politically-motivated investigations into this current White House has STILL failed to produce.

As much as I like Abu Buckwheat, he disregards the fact that since the 2000 election, the opposition has made the "smoke" he refers to. Continuously and in large amounts. And sometimes, smoke is just smoke. I bet anyone here can be made to look guilty of something, if they were accused of enough.

I find it odd that you insinuate partisanship in this post, especially since your previous post was so filled with venomous innuendo. So, in your eyes, does calling venomous innuendo what it is constitute partisanship?

Perhaps you should take a breath, read a little more, and not make assumptions as per the political motivations of a poster. There is a lamentable tendency, imo, to demonify Bush, when his failures and he's had some doozies can ALSO be attributed to incompetence, lack of communication, propaganda by political enemies, and even (gasp) the fact that he had very little time to set up his presidency because of the 2000 election fiasco.

Of course, there is also a lamentable tendency for those of the military and political persuasion to use Bush's unpopularity to excuse their own incompetence and/or malfeasance. Or to make their chops, a la Shinseki.

[Abu Buckwheat]

Part of the confusion was based on how AIF constructs their groups - up North (2006/2007) it was more like organized crime in terms of how the money flowed - with sheiks often involved as pseudo crime boss like figures. Groups often allied themselves or employed criminals for hits, emplacements, couriers, graft or information collection. It was a business - and there was not much of the threat of shia'aism up there (but there was an ethnic difference posed between Sunni Kurd and Sunni Arab).

Like organized crime ... thats brilliant. I have to tell you the north is REALLY a tough nut area because some much interaction between the varying orgs. Good call! Now all we need is a RICO act that carries a Hellfire! :D

[120mm]

Lincoln acted during a constitutionally declared war.

It seems to me, that the Supremes have already decided that this is, in fact, a constitutionally declared war. I lack the Google-fu to find a good link to this, however.

[SWJED]

3 July BBC - Iraq: Debate on the Baghdad Surge (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6262292.stm) by Paul Reynolds.


A debate is raging in Washington about whether the so-called surge of US forces in Iraq is likely to work.

Tension is growing between the political pressure to get results and the military imperative to give the plan time.

The critics include not only Democrats but Republican Senator Richard Lugar, who said in a speech on 25 June that the prospects that the surge strategy would succeed in the way envisaged by President Bush were "very limited"...

On the other side are proponents like commentator Frederick W Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute, one of those who first proposed the plan.

He has written in the Weekly Standard magazine that Operation Phantom Thunder, as the operational phase of the surge is known, "is so far proceeding very well"...

Informing the debate is a key article in the Small Wars Journal, a discussion forum founded by former members of the US Marine Corps.

On the site's weblog, the Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser in Iraq, David Kilcullen, an Australian expert, has written about how the plan is supposed to work. He withholds judgment on whether it is succeeding or will do so. On that, he simply observes: "Time will tell."

He points out that major operations in Baghdad and the surrounding provinces started only on 15 June. "This is the end of the beginning: we are now starting to put things onto a viable long-term footing," he said...

[jlechelt]

Not really. Bill Clinton Lied Under Oath, which is a crime. A demonstrably criminal act. Something that umpteen politically-motivated investigations into this current White House has STILL failed to produce.

Clinton did lie under oath. The fact that he lied about a personal affair is undeniable. Though I hate to have to make this kind of choice, but I would take Clinton's misdeeds regarding his personal life over the deadly misdeeds of this administration. Ultimately, I long for an administration where we don't have to deal with either. Besides, I think a closer look at the Bush Administration would find a number of criminal issues (Libby first and foremost, Claude Allen, DOJ, etc.). And make no mistake, an investigation into a sitting administration is inherently politically motivated. Whether it is done against a Democrat or Republican.


I find it odd that you insinuate partisanship in this post, especially since your previous post was so filled with venomous innuendo. So, in your eyes, does calling venomous innuendo what it is constitute partisanship?

I insinuate partisanship in your post because your post is laced with partisanship. Venomous innuendo is venomous innuendo.


Perhaps you should take a breath, read a little more, and not make assumptions as per the political motivations of a poster.

Take a breath? Why would I be out of breath from typing? And because I don't agree with you, that means I don't read? Really? Your quiver is so empty you must make that claim?

[SWJED]

... thanks.

[Merv Benson]

One of the things that has made the debate on the war so ridiculous is the misuse of the term lie.

For example a mistake is not a lie. If you believe something to be true, such as Saddam having WMD, and you can't find the WMD. that does not mean you lied when you repeated intelligence you were given by the CIA or the UN weapons inspectors.

Changing ones mind is also not a lie. A statement of present intentions is just that and if you change your mind, your original statement was still not a lie.

Perhaps it is because I have prosecuted fraud cases and other cases involving false statements, that these kind of arguments bother me so much. But, they really distract from the substance of the debate we should be having on policy.

BTW, Bill Clinton's intentionally false statements were not just about a personal matter. They were about an attempt to deny a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case a fair trial. Defendants in cases are not allowed to lie to avoid responsibility for their conduct. That is why the court held him in contempt.

[Abu Buckwheat]

It seems to me, that the Supremes have already decided that this is, in fact, a constitutionally declared war. I lack the Google-fu to find a good link to this, however.


This is NOT a declared war. The last declared war was WWII. It is an "authorization for the use of force" ...

[VinceC]

I was mistaken in an earlier post ... the U.S. Civil War was not a declared war under the Constitution. Rather, it involved the Executive Branch as commander in chief and Legislative Branch with its Constitutional power to "suppress insurrections." The Federal position was that the Confederate states did not have the legal right to secede and so were not a state entity.

Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution:
http://www.archives.gov/national-archives-experience/charters/constitution_transcript.html


The Congress shall have Power:
... To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;


The fact that informed and intelligent people, on this forum and elsewhere, are uncertain whether a state of declared war exists is in itself fascinating. Of the many uncertainties in life, it has usually not been nebulous to know whether Congress has formally declared war.


Alberto Gonzales in Congressional testimony -- February 6, 2006:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/06/AR2006020601359.html

GONZALES: There was not a war declaration, either in connection with Al Qaida or in Iraq. It was an authorization to use military force.

I only want to clarify that, because there are implications. Obviously, when you talk about a war declaration, you're possibly talking about affecting treaties, diplomatic relations. And so there is a distinction in law and in practice. And we're not talking about a war declaration. This is an authorization only to use military force.

[jlechelt]

misuse of the term lie. ... For example a mistake is not a lie. ... Changing ones mind is also not a lie. A statement of present intentions is just that and if you change your mind, your original statement was still not a lie.

Agreed. There is much misuse of the term lie. Also, mistakes and the changing of minds are not lies. However, the two points I made regarding President Bush were not examples of mistakes and mind-changing.
First, President Bush was already considering changing his Secretary of Defense when he stated clearly that he had no intention of changing his Secretary of Defense. Read the transcript of President Bush's post-election press conference: he even explained why he said he was going to keep him when he knew he wasn't going to.
Second, when he stated just before the election "absolutely we're winning," and then flip-flopped immediately after the election and stated that "we aren't winning, we aren't losing," there was no real-world event that hit the US war effort in such a way that would have magically brought about a changing of the presidential mind. The US situation in Iraq was the same when he made both statements.
Perhaps you can offer an explanation for why he lied. Maybe you think the lies were justifiable. Elections are important events, and I'm sure he felt the nation was better served with the GOP still in control of Congress. And so, towards those ends, he felt the lies were justifiable. But none of those factors make the lies he told anything other than lies; a reasonable person cannot claim that both examples were not lies.
I don't want to harp on these points. The lies were not the worst things that ever happened. And all reasonable people can agree that all presidents and political leaders have lied at some point. (Who among us would claim he or she never told a lie?) However, it amazes me that people have a tough time admitting this simple fact. So lets get back to the mind-changing experiences and mistakes at hand.



Perhaps it is because I have prosecuted fraud cases and other cases involving false statements, that these kind of arguments bother me so much. But, they really distract from the substance of the debate we should be having on policy.
Indeed these arguments distract from the larger discussions of the mistakes made in this war. So admit to reality and let's move on.


BTW, Bill Clinton's intentionally false statements were not just about a personal matter. They were about an attempt to deny a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case a fair trial. Defendants in cases are not allowed to lie to avoid responsibility for their conduct. That is why the court held him in contempt.
Bill Clinton's intentionally false statements were indeed about a personal matter. That personal matter ALSO had to do with accusations of sexual harassment. Charges of sexual harassment, mind you, that were never proven. That doesn't justify lying under oath, but it's a far cry from the problems we now encounter in the world.

[Steve Blair]

Politicians lie. It's what they do. The level this is "exposed" has more to do with political affiliation than it does facts or at times the good of the nation. However, everyone here is expected to keep the discussion civil. That includes avoiding "my lying politician is better than your lying politician" polemics.:)

[jlechelt]

... thanks.
Agreed. Hopefully my posts do not convey unintended harshness. I only hope to be direct. Everything I write comes with a large dose of respect for all views, whether they are in line with my own, or not. I enjoy the give and take here and I learn much from the diverse assortment of ideas, opinions, and experiences.

Looking over what I have written, I see nothing that could be taken as un-civil, though many people here may disagree with my opinions. Hopefully those desiring civility do not define civility based on the positions held on issues. Definitions of civility should solely be based on the tone used. And in that regard, I wholly respect everyone here. In dealing with issues like honesty, wars, political parties, and presidents, passionate responses are often exchanged. Hopefully everyone here can recognize passion and not mistake it for a lack of civility.

Thanks to all.

[120mm]

Clinton did lie under oath. The fact that he lied about a personal affair is undeniable. Though I hate to have to make this kind of choice, but I would take Clinton's misdeeds regarding his personal life over the deadly misdeeds of this administration. Ultimately, I long for an administration where we don't have to deal with either. Besides, I think a closer look at the Bush Administration would find a number of criminal issues (Libby first and foremost, Claude Allen, DOJ, etc.). And make no mistake, an investigation into a sitting administration is inherently politically motivated. Whether it is done against a Democrat or Republican.

I insinuate partisanship in your post because your post is laced with partisanship. Venomous innuendo is venomous innuendo.

Take a breath? Why would I be out of breath from typing? And because I don't agree with you, that means I don't read? Really? Your quiver is so empty you must make that claim?

I deny emphatically that I am being partisan. In fact, I think Pres. Clinton would be a much better "long-war" leader than the current guy (in my estimation, Bush is the Republican's version of Jimmy Carter - idealism and incompetence, all wrapped up in a ball.) Clinton was a much better politician, and would've found at least a national IO theme by now that "worked."

The point I was trying to make, was that it is waaaay too convenient to "Trotsky" Bush and Company for our failures in the current conflict. There are lots of other institutions and individuals who screwed the pooch, and are leading the charge against the White House for their own reasons.

I don't know if you intended it as so, but your take on venomous innuendo is hilarious. Welcome to the forum!

[jlechelt]

I deny emphatically that I am being partisan. In fact, I think Pres. Clinton would be a much better "long-war" leader than the current guy (in my estimation, Bush is the Republican's version of Jimmy Carter - idealism and incompetence, all wrapped up in a ball.) Clinton was a much better politician, and would've found at least a national IO theme by now that "worked."

The point I was trying to make, was that it is waaaay too convenient to "Trotsky" Bush and Company for our failures in the current conflict. There are lots of other institutions and individuals who screwed the pooch, and are leading the charge against the White House for their own reasons.

I don't know if you intended it as so, but your take on venomous innuendo is hilarious. Welcome to the forum!

120: Gracias. I agree. A war is lost - or hindered greatly - by people far beyond any given White House.

[Shivan]

Dear Sir,

I'm currently writing on the Taliban, tentatively titled, "Cultural Intelligence: The Taliban, Pashtuns and Counter-Insurgency". Your answer, if possible, would aid my work. You wrote:


One of AQ’s standard techniques. . .is to marry leaders and key operatives to women from prominent tribal families. . .(Last year, while working in the tribal agencies along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier, a Khyber Rifles officer told me “we Punjabis are the foreigners here: al Qa’ida have been here 25 years and have married into the Pashtun hill-tribes to the point where it’s hard to tell the terrorists from everyone else.”)

Why was there not, if you know, a similar reaction among Pashtuns, to non-Pashtuns, say, Chechens, Arabs, Uzbeks, marrying Pashtun women? Or if there were reactions, how were they resolved?

Thanks,

Shivan

[SWJED]

Video: Charlie Rose: An Hour with Dave Kilcullen (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/10/charlie-rose-an-hour-with-dave/) - Friday's interview with Dave Kilcullen.

[SWJED]

Road-Building in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/04/political-maneuver-in-counteri/)
Part 1 of a Series on Political Maneuver in Counterinsurgency

By Dr. David Kilcullen at SWJ Blog


As a tactics instructor in the mid-1990s, teaching British platoon commanders at the School of Infantry, I spent many weeks on extended field exercises in the wilds of south Wales and on windswept Salisbury Plain. Both landscapes are studded with Roman military antiquities, relics of ancient counterinsurgency campaigns – mile-castles, military roads, legion encampments – as well as the Iron Age hill-forts of the Romans’ insurgent adversaries. Teaching ambushing, I often found that ambush sites I chose from a map, even on the remotest hillsides, would turn out (once I dragged my weary, rucksack-carrying ass to the actual spot) to have Roman or Celtic ruins on them, and often a Roman military road nearby: call me lacking in self-assurance, but I often found this a comforting vote of confidence in my tactical judgment from the collective wisdom of the ancestors.

Like the Romans, counterinsurgents through history have engaged in road-building as a tool for projecting military force, extending governance and the rule of law, enhancing political communication and bringing economic development, health and education to the population. Clearly, roads that are patrolled by friendly forces or secured by local allies also have the tactical benefit of channeling and restricting insurgent movement and compartmenting terrain across which guerrillas could otherwise move freely. But the political impact of road-building is even more striking than its tactical effect.

This is my first Small Wars Journal post for several months; since leaving Iraq last year I have been working mainly on Afghanistan, in the field and in various coalition capitals. This brief essay (brief by my risibly low standards, anyhow!) describes recent road-building efforts in Afghanistan. A follow-on piece will explore the broader notion of political maneuver in counterinsurgency, using road-building as one of several examples...

[Ron Humphrey]

Road-Building in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/04/political-maneuver-in-counteri/)
Part 1 of a Series on Political Maneuver in Counterinsurgency

By Dr. David Kilcullen at SWJ Blog

It really helps some of us when it broken down in laymans terms.

Keep up the good work Doc

[Eden]

There is an interesting synergy going on here. I worked with CJTF-76 planners quite a bit in 2006, and the bright young majors in the cell there were all enthusiastic readers of Kilcullen. Now he is going back and seeing (and learning from, one supposes) his own theories more or less brought to life. Luckily for us, he then turns this experience into more thoughtful prose. I still have reservations over the operational decisions made in Afghanistan - the resources spent in the Korengal valley would have been better allocated elsewhere - but at the tactical level we are making great progress.

[John T. Fishel]

Dave Kilcullen's post is a reminder of lessons learned long ago in the development world. Over 40 years ago, anthropologist Carlton Beals remarked that it had been his experience that one road was worth more than a dozen schools and 100 administrators. My doctoral research in the Peruvian Andes took a somewhat different perspective. I found that the key factor in development was leadership in the locality - whether it was from someone born there or an outsider such as a teacher assigned there who identified with the community. I did note that if the locality did not have a road, the first goal of the local leaders was to acquire one.;)

Hence, my experience supports fully Kilcullen's report. A road ain't just a road but rather a vehicle for achieving political goals and objectives.

Cheers

JohnT

[slapout9]

In the March-April edition of Military Review there is an article on applied Systems Thinking by none other than the 82ND Airborne(some guy wrote it) about how linking stuff togather (roads!) is key to COIN Ops. Don't have time to find the link but it is a good one. It has drawings and diagrams that help explain the concept.

[Ken White]

anyone. Aside from the Philippines, WW II, Korea, Viet Nam, all the roads we built in Central America in the 80s and 90s... :o

[tequila]

Would be remiss to avoid posting Joshua Foust's spirited objection to Kilcullen here: The Strange Benefits of Paving Afghanistan (http://www.registan.net/index.php/2008/04/25/the-strange-benefits-of-paving-afghanistan).

Basically he accuses Kilcullen of overselling the security benefits of road-building when what is likely need (in security terms) are more troops to adequately cover and control areas which are not amenable to roads.

[Ken White]

what then? One should always have a Plan B...

Theorizers theorize, reality bites.

[tequila]

But a road without troops to patrol it only lends mobility to the enemy. As Foust points out, the Romans learned this to their chagrin.

[Ken White]

But a road without troops to patrol it only lends mobility to the enemy. As Foust points out, the Romans learned this to their chagrin.There are no absolutes other than getting killed if you screw up too badly. Every action seeks an equal and opposite counter reaction; the key is to anticipate that, plan accordingly and be prepared to adapt.

None of which negates the fact that one most usually does not have all the troops available one would like -- that's always been generally true and is unlikely to change -- and thus, one must have alternatives.

As for the Romans, to include the Kilcullen and Foust citations, there's always only so much one can do with troop constraints -- and, far more immutably, the terrain and people of a place.

[wm]

But a road without troops to patrol it only lends mobility to the enemy. As Foust points out, the Romans learned this to their chagrin.


Roman roads were a significant part of what we would nowadays call a kinetic solution to their problem of border security. Perhaps had the Romans chosen to explore and employ other, non-kinetic solutions to the problem besides maintaining a mobile army that could react quickly to threats because of interior lines, they might not have been hoisted by their own petard (or is that run over on their own roads?). If the people view the maintenance of a road network as important enough to their way of life, they will ensure it is taken care of and used for the right reasons.

[Surferbeetle]

Roman roads were a significant part of what we would nowadays call a kinetic solution to their problem of border security. Perhaps had the Romans chosen to explore and employ other, non-kinetic solutions to the problem besides maintaining a mobile army that could react quickly to threats because of interior lines, they might not have been hoisted by their own petard (or is that run over on their own roads?). If the people view the maintenance of a road network as important enough to their way of life, they will ensure it is taken care of and used for the right reasons.


The Assyrians (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_the_Assyrian_Empire#Transporta tion_and_Communication) were using roads for military and economic purposes around 1 BC:


The Assyrians were the first to institute, control and maintain a system of roads throughout their empire. Pony expresses with regular way stations for messengers to rest and/or exchange horses were established. Later, these would form the basis for the Persians to expand this system to their own empire.


Rome used their roads for much than just military warfare. The economic benefits to the Roman Empire were many. Roman GDP Estimate (http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=108&subsecID=900003&contentID=252325):


The first writer to complain about trade deficits seems to have been Pliny the Elder, in about 75 AD. Gloomily cataloguing luxury imports -- Persian perfumery, Chinese silks, Indian diamonds, Arabian incense and pearls -- he blamed Roman women for costing the Empire 100 million sesterces a year. (Pliny, apparently a bit of a kill-joy, considered silk immoral -- "we seek this material from the end of the earth, so Roman ladies can show off their see-through clothes in public" -- and called perfume "the most pointless of all luxuries.") He seems to have been unduly worried, at least on economic grounds: the Empire ultimately did fall, but not until 400 years later, and not because of balance-of-payments problems.

Some modern analysts calculate 100 million sesterces to be about 2 percent of Roman GDP.


China (http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2007/07/chinafrica.cfm) is working the roads issue in Africa...


According to Akwe Amosu, an Africa expert for the Open Society Institute, "over 800 Chinese companies, the vast majority of them state-owned, are operating in 49 African countries." They are drilling for oil, extracting minerals, and building roads, railways, hotels, and factories.

China's willingness to support some of Africa's worst regimes in exchange for special access to African resources raises a number of serious worries, such as those laid out last year by Joshua Kurlantzick in The New Republic.

[wm]

T
Rome used their roads for much than just military warfare. The economic benefits to the Roman Empire were many.

Important parts of the Roman Imperial road network are still operative today (or at least the routes those Roman roads first followed). This re-emphasizes my point that if the road network is important enough to the economy/economic well being of the people, they will do a lot to defend/maintain it on their own.

[Surferbeetle]

Important parts of the Roman Imperial road network are still operative today (or at least the routes those Roman roads first followed).

Wm,

Too true, the Appian Way (http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/06/europe/appian.php?page=1) is still going strong (although maintenance funds are short as usual). Vicenza (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vicenza) has some beautiful examples of Roman Construction (to include roads - the trainstation there has a nice example). Mosul/Ninevah Iraq (http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=6237) has some amazing examples of Assyrian Construction.

A fun non-mathematical read is 'Roman Roads and Aqueducts' by Don Nardo (ISBN 1-56006-721-7) one in the 'Building History Series' books by Lucent. Mr. Nardo touches upon Assyrian Aqueducts (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aqueduct) in this book as well. The Dioptra (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dioptra) is certainly not a GPS or Total Station (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_station) but those old surveyors and engineers did some amazing things with them.

Regards,

Steve

[Entropy]

Found this today (http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2008/05/david-killculle.html) on Col. Pat Lang's site.

[SteveMetz]

Found this today (http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2008/05/david-killculle.html) on Col. Pat Lang's site.


Well, since I was sitting about five feet from Dave when he gave that, it's a bit of a stretch to refer to the event as "trendy." (Apparently I'm sort of the Forrest Gump of the counterinsurgency world). The briefing is also on the Consortium for Complex Operations portal (http://www.ccoportal.org/)for those of you who use it.

(I sure wish I knew where I could find a good copper Chinese sink about now)

[Entropy]

I get the sense that Col. Lang is critical of COIN "trendiness" from that and other posts, but he hasn't fleshed-out any detailed criticism yet - at least that I can find - so it's hard to say for sure.

[SteveMetz]

I get the sense that Col. Lang is critical of COIN "trendiness" from that and other posts, but he hasn't fleshed-out any detailed criticism yet - at least that I can find - so it's hard to say for sure.

Well, I'm a big fan of Dave's and thought the briefing was quite good.

Looking at my notebook, here are a few of the points I made during my commentary on it:

--If we accept the idea that counterinsurgency operations can actually speed or facilitate the evolution of insurgencies by "weeding out" the less adaptable ones, what can we do with that information? In other words, it is possible to design a counterinsurgency campaign that does NOT speed or facilitate insurgency evolution, perhaps by pulsing and rapidly shifting methods rather than sticking with one thing until it becomes ineffective?
--Is there some other way to inject a pathology into the insurgent adapation process?
--In Iraq today, are we so concentrated on operational success that we're setting ourselves up for strategic failure by empowering local security forces?

[Bill Moore]

Steve,

Great point on mitigating the effects of co-evolution. This area should definitely be studied. Injecting the pathology may have to be based on managing their perceptions on how effective they are. It will be a challenge, but definitely worth pursuing.

As for empowering the local security forces, I tend to agree. On one hand the local security forces are essential (we can't succeed without them in my opinion), but on the other hand if they are mobilized, led and supported by the HN government, then they aren't security forces, they're something else that we will have to deal with later.

Bill

[Ken White]

...On one hand the local security forces are essential (we can't succeed without them in my opinion), but on the other hand if they are mobilized, led and supported by the HN government, then they aren't security forces, they're something else that we will have to deal with later.Aren't or are? :confused:

[J Wolfsberger]

... if they are mobilized, led and supported by the HN government, then they aren't security forces, they're something else that we will have to deal with later.


I'm not sure I understand the point you're driving at. Isn't the goal of successful COIN standing up local security forces that can hold their own without our help? Shouldn't their principal loyalty be to the HN government?

In particular, the idea Bill is driving at escapes me. I don't understand what the "something else" might be.

[Hacksaw]

I think Bill is hinting at the following:

If HN Security Forces become too proficient, perhaps they begin to focus outside their borders... ergo become destabilizing; or

If their culture doesn't have a strong culture of civilian control, the HN Forces could become the basis of a coup.

Of course these are just assumptions, and I think the least of our concerns at this point.

[Bill Moore]

Ken, I meant aren't, funny what a major difference a little n't can make :-)

I think Kilcullen was refering to citizen security forces when he refered to local security forces, e.g. the Anbar Awakening, local home guards, etc., not professional Soldiers and Police. These forces are generally needed in some capacity to help secure the populace, but if they are not mobilized, led and supported by the HN government then what are they? They're a semi-independent 'force' that has the option of supporting, being indifferent, or turning against the government.

Here is a quick notional example. We clear the insurgents out of town X, but there isn't enough police to hold the town, so we (the U.S. military) mobilize local citizens to form security groups to protect themselves. We may even pay them to do so. Down the road, we reach a point where we want to demobilize them, but now instead of being a security force, these home guards have evolved into gangs or organized criminal elements, and there is no incentive to give up their weapons. That is the something else I was referring to. On the other hand, if they were mobilized and recruited by the HN government to "augment their security forces" and there was a contract in place that included the demobilization process (thus no surprise), and they remained weaker than the police chief or Army officer they worked for, then it would be easier to dissolve them later (maybe).

While the Anbar Awakening was/is successful, what is the end game? Is this facilitating Iraqi unity? We defeated the five meter target in some areas (AQI), but in the process did we create a bigger problem that will counter achieving our strategic end state?

Just thoughts.

[Ken White]

Agree also on what it appears Kilcullen was referring to and that non-HN paramilitary elements can be a benefit but far more importantly, you're correct IMO in that they require very careful planning and handling to preclude a much larger later problem.

On your last para, agree and we can only hope the guys on the ground are working through that... :(

[Old Eagle]

Local forces MUST eventually be incorporated into the legitimate HN security forces or, as others have pointed out, disbanded. Incorporation, in turn, requires a formal and effective process. It's not good enough to change uniforms and wave a magic wand. The challenge is huge (but not insurmountable.)

[Ron Humphrey]

But the one thing that always comes to mind is the question of where exactly one would expect the LOCAL police, fire, paramedics, in otherwords general different parts of any vibrant communities local governance to come from if not from those same forces we are talking about.

It is up in the air about how to make it happen but wouldn't it seem like it has to happen if the actual circumstances for those areas are changing.
In otherwords plan for successful conclusions and react when necessary to changes in the local dynamics.

If 20% go to the IA/IP then how many of the other 80 would be able to transition into the health,construction, sewage, education, etc as anything from doctors and teachers to maintenance and physical labor. These are all areas where the government would find beneficial their integration as it both gets them out of the was security now unemployed category and puts them in the helping to make the local populace more comfortable and thus less likely to cause problems one. Also consider that as long as the upcoming elections do allow more representation into the existing governmental structures there will be more pressure to ensure the funds do make it to the provinces.

It also helps in that the local leaders get to have those they know to hold accountable for what comes from HN gov and the HN Gov has the same benefit the other direction. In a society where bartering takes on whole new meanings this would seem the ultimate way of approaching it.

As for what Maliki and his group choose to do in this regard it is true that anything can be screwed up more easily than it can be fixed. I would think however that they have even more invested in succeeding here now then many may know.

Guess we'll see

Beside's I doubt if the neighborhood watch goes away no matter what their jobs end up being. At least for another gen or so ain't nobody gonna be super trusting

[Rank amateur]

Is there anyone here who can tell me what the Metz effect is?;)

I'm guessing the counterinsurgent needs to show results or political support for COIN will drop.

[wm]

Local forces MUST eventually be incorporated into the legitimate HN security forces or, as others have pointed out, disbanded. Incorporation, in turn, requires a formal and effective process. It's not good enough to change uniforms and wave a magic wand. The challenge is huge (but not insurmountable.)

The important point to reflect on in this post is how to incorporate those local forces. Perhaps in this regard it might be a worthwhile endeavor to understand how the US has managed to strike the right sort of balance between its various local forces (AKA state militias and National
Guard forces) and the national defense establishment. I suspect that the circle out to be drawn some what wider to include the law enforcement community from the local town sheriff/marshall/police through the various forms of state police organizations up to the FBI/US Marshalls.

My quick rumination suggests that, in America at least, the glue that binds the locals' allegience to the national cause is funding. By this I mean that the local militia/police force is tied to national goals and control mechanisms by budget support, such things as Federal grants, and other forms of financial aid. It is an example of the golden rule--"whoever has the gold, rules." Money talks much more loudly than high flown rhetoric about truth, justice, and national/regional (tribal?) pride.

Not being an expert on mid-Eastern cultural values, I cannot say that this same dynamic would apply in the AOR. However, I suspect that having the national government pass out (or take away) cool uniforms, shiny weapons and other prized pieces of equipment, as well as nifty badges and other symbols of office might have a pretty strong impact on efforts to control the actions of the local militia forces.

[SteveMetz]

Is there anyone here who can tell me what the Metz effect is?;)

I'm guessing the counterinsurgent needs to show results or political support for COIN will drop.


Either that or its the after effect of a burrito grande.

The idea is that the U.S. has about three years of major involvement in counterinsurgency support before public and congressional support starts slipping, irrespective of the national interests at stake. I used this to justify have a serious, whole-of-government surge capacity. If you only have three years, you don't want to spend two of them getting your act together (or, in the case of Iraq, four of them).

[Entropy]

Getting back to the briefing for a minute, I guess it was OK. The problem, of course, is that I didn't have the benefit of hearing the actual presentation like Steve Metz did, so my take on the slides is very different without the context added by seeing the actual briefing. I'm enough of a powerpoint ranger to know that the slides are probably less than 50% of the content, if that (at least that's been my experience). Hence I'm inherently dubious about taking PPT presentations at face value unless there is detailed information or the text of the briefing is on the notes pages - something that is all too rare. To be honest, I really wish people wouldn't release slide presentations without the other content included in some form. Tufte's pamphlet/book on powerpoint ably demonstrates the dangers.

[Rank amateur]

Either that or its the after effect of a burrito grande.

The idea is that the U.S. has about three years of major involvement in counterinsurgency support before public and congressional support starts slipping, irrespective of the national interests at stake. I used this to justify have a serious, whole-of-government surge capacity. If you only have three years, you don't want to spend two of them getting your act together (or, in the case of Iraq, four of them).

Makes sense, but isn't support at least as much a function of casualties suffered as any thing else? (As McCain likes to mention, we've been in Germany since 45.)

[Ken White]

...The idea is that the U.S. has about three years of major involvement in counterinsurgency support before public and congressional support starts slipping, irrespective of the national interests at stake. I used this to justify have a serious, whole-of-government surge capacity. If you only have three years, you don't want to spend two of them getting your act together (or, in the case of Iraq, four of them).Though I suspect that the effect starts developing in Year Two and therefor we should aim at preempting it about then.

Kilcullen says future studies should include "Options to extend the time available before the “Metz threshold” (Slide 53)."

Good luck with that; as Steve correctly notes that figure is historically derived and if it changes is more likely to go down rather than up. Future study should be aimed at beating the time, not extending it. Some will say that's not possible because "Insurgencies take ten years, etc." I disagree -- preparedness to and speed in adapting can cut that immeasurably.

On an allied note, Kilcullen also said: "Counterintuitive result: sniper risk up, IED risk up. (82d Abn and 10th Mtn casualties)

Emergency field intervention – discovered foot patrol skills had atrophied, instituted crash re-training (AWG). IED and sniper cas immediately dropped and kept dropping, patrol situational awareness and rapport improved.
(Slide 38)"

I suggest that an Army that discovers "foot patrol skills had atrophied" is terribly remiss at high and local levels, that 'crash' retraining should almost never be called for and that training must be ongoing even while in combat. Yes, I know the troops hate it -- but they understand the need and know it helps keep more of them alive even while they're bitching about it.

This Iraq thing has not been the US Army's finest hour. It probably doesn't need to be repeated and if history since 1945 has proven nothing else it has proven that the Army, regardless of many flawed attempts to affect political decisions, does not get to choose who and when it fights.

It does get to pick how it fights and we could be smarter about that...

[Ken White]

Makes sense, but isn't support at least as much a function of casualties suffered as any thing else? (As McCain likes to mention, we've been in Germany since 45.)That will unquestionably apply to some Americans; most though really expect a war to produce casualties -- but they want payback for that loss in the form of results and due to our short attention spans, they want those results pretty quickly. The 1/3 rule applies.

[SteveMetz]

That will unquestionably apply to some Americans; most though really expect a war to produce casualties -- but they want payback for that loss in the form of results and due to our short attention spans, they want those results pretty quickly. The 1/3 rule applies.

But Germany isn't counterinsurgency.

[Rank amateur]

But Germany isn't counterinsurgency.

Knew you were going to say that. How about Somalia? The public was supportive until the bodies showed up on TV. (Yes you can say Clinton was a wimp - that word is for Ken - but he was responding to the Metz effect.)



--In Iraq today, are we so concentrated on operational success that we're setting ourselves up for strategic failure by empowering local security forces?

I'm still working my way through the presentation - and this is a bit simplistic - but it seems to me that end result of a successful COIN effort is always a political deal where everyone gets most of what they want except for the foreign counter insurgent. So I'd say the answer depends on whether you consider that a strategic success or strategic failure for us.

[SteveMetz]

Knew you were going to say that. How about Somalia? The public was supportive until the bodies showed up on TV. (Yes you can say Clinton was a wimp - that word is for Ken - but he was responding to the Metz effect.)



I'm still working my way through the presentation - and this is a bit simplistic - but it seems to me that end result of a successful COIN effort is always a political deal where everyone gets most of what they want except for the foreign counter insurgent. So I'd say the answer depends on whether you consider that a strategic success or strategic failure for us.

In Somalia we didn't even get the three years because it was sold as peacekeeping rather than counterinsurgency.

[Ken White]

But Germany isn't counterinsurgency.what that has to do with what I said? Sorry...

[Ken White]

Knew you were going to say that. How about Somalia? The public was supportive until the bodies showed up on TV. (Yes you can say Clinton was a wimp - that word is for Ken - but he was responding to the Metz effect.)to you instead of Steve... :confused: Oh, never mind... ;)

Anyway... Bodies on TV always arouse SOME in the public; others -- most, I'm pretty sure -- not so much. Clinton was not a wimp (not BTW my sensibilities, which I'd think are obviously inured to far worse, but the Board's reputation as professional instead of being another internet cesspool. If that's too much to ask, don't worry about it), he truly did feel everyone's pain and he reacted to the TV as one of those who was truly affected by the sight. Like most politicians and some others, he thought everyone felt, believed and wanted the same things he did. They didn't -- and don't. IOW, he reacted as he thought the public did -- while some felt that way, most reacted differently, the vast majority of the great unwashed just got angry and wanted Somali blood...

[Rank amateur]

In Somalia we didn't even get the three years because it was sold as peacekeeping rather than counterinsurgency.

Ad guy begs to differ. I believe that the image of the US soldier being dragged through the street had far more effect than any definition. (I was going to post the picture to illustrate my point, but having seen it again, I decided against it.) Anyone who doubts the emotional impact of that image, can Google it.

The reason we got so much time in Iraq has to do with Bushes stubbornness - or resolute leadership if you prefer - Kerry's wishywashiness and the spin doctors' brilliant use of the term "flip flopper." The strength of the Republican brand didn't hurt either.

[Rank amateur]

the vast majority of the great unwashed just got angry and wanted Somali blood...

It's an eye for an eye country. Something I keep meaning to start a thread about.

One of the problems with counterinsurgency is that there is no way to visually show payback in a newsclip. (One reason the Air Force keeps getting so much money is the cool targetting footage.)

There shouldn't be any doubt, however, that public opinion can be manipulated. Staying alive - and keeping your guys alive - will delay the Metz affect. It's also an attack against the enemy strategy, which is to remove public support for the COIN effort by creating casualties.

[Ron Humphrey]

I'm still working my way through the presentation - and this is a bit simplistic - but it seems to me that end result of a successful COIN effort is always a political deal where everyone gets most of what they want except for the foreign counter insurgent. So I'd say the answer depends on whether you consider that a strategic success or strategic failure for us.

Perhaps the less the foreign CI gains the less responsibility they have for what happens after they leave. In other words (and so as not to be misinterpreted) If the main premise is to successfully build everybody there and make sure they are vested and capable of keeping things good the less likely you are to have to get involved in such a manner again. EMPOWERMENT if done right can be a wonderful thing. If in word only it can actually be counter-productive

Know yourself
Do unto others
Tis better to give than to receive
Tis better to die in honor than to live in defeat
And so on

Those who came before us actually knew a lot more than we seem to sometimes about how the world really works:wry:

[Mark O'Neill]

In Somalia we didn't even get the three years because it was sold as peacekeeping rather than counterinsurgency.

as counterinsurgency -because there was not an insurgency present. One of the key ingredients required - a functioning state, did not exist in any form. What we did have was an anarchical situation with various groups picking over the body of what passed for Somali society.

In all the nightly and morning briefs I sat in - Australian, Coalition and UN, from CJTF Comd Level to Component (ARFOR and MARFOR) to Battle group, no one in the five and a bit months I was there mentioned the terms 'insurgency' or 'counterinsurgency'. There was plenty of talk about UN Chapter VII...

[Entropy]

Ad guy begs to differ. I believe that the image of the US soldier being dragged through the street had far more effect than any definition. (I was going to post the picture to illustrate my point, but having seen it again, I decided against it.) Anyone who doubts the emotional impact of that image, can Google it.


I was a civilian, fat, dumb and happy (and probably drunk too) in college when Somalia happened. I still remember my reaction, which was essentially, "WTF? We go there to feed these people and this is what they do? F' em." I think the public did not understand how the mission evolved in Somalia (I know I sure didn't at the time) and still thought of it as a humanitarian mission. When you expect a humanitarian mission and you see bodies mutilated and dragged through the streets, the result is pretty predictable.

[SteveMetz]

I was a civilian, fat, dumb and happy (and probably drunk too) in college when Somalia happened. I still remember my reaction, which was essentially, "WTF? We go there to feed these people and this is what they do? F' em." I think the public did not understand how the mission evolved in Somalia (I know I sure didn't at the time) and still thought of it as a humanitarian mission. When you expect a humanitarian mission and you see bodies mutilated and dragged through the streets, the result is pretty predictable.


Well, for what it's worth, we and our coalition partners did, in fact, save the lives of tens, maybe even hundreds of thousands of Somalis.

[Entropy]

Well, for what it's worth, we and our coalition partners did, in fact, save the lives of tens, maybe even hundreds of thousands of Somalis.

No doubt about that at all.

[Rank amateur]

I'd appreciate it if someone could explain xxx

[Ken White]

...I believe that the image of the US soldier being dragged through the street had far more effect than any definition. (I was going to post the picture to illustrate my point, but having seen it again, I decided against it.)...is a very Clintonian assessment... :D


There shouldn't be any doubt, however, that public opinion can be manipulated. Staying alive - and keeping your guys alive - will delay the Metz affect. It's also an attack against the enemy strategy, which is to remove public support for the COIN effort by creating casualties.I have no doubt about the first statement. Or the last. Agree with both.

On the one in between those two we can differ in the matter of degree. Yes, it can delay it slightly; conversely, if the media sells ad space and time, it bleeds and leads and that, too is manipulation of public opinion, inadvertant or not. That aspect can negate any manipulation the other way. The 1/3 rule applies; as you point out, the bad guys know this and can work public opinion as well or better than we can and they aim for that wavering middle third. Here's an example LINK (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,554545,00.html). Now why would they target the Germans...

Casualties are only part of the picture; for a few they are THE criteria, for most Americans results matter. More. Much more

[Ken White]

I'd appreciate it if someone could explain xxxNothing significant...

[Entropy]

A closer look at the briefing gives me some concerns one of the slides. I hope it's a "example" slide and not a "real" one with real info, if you catch my meaning.

[Ken White]

but I would strongly suggest that any other queries with the slightest potential for an OpSec concern be addressed in P.M.s and not on the open board.

[Entropy]

but I would strongly suggest that any other queries with the slightest potential for an OpSec concern be addressed in P.M.s and not on the open board.

Noted. I've amended my comment.

[Rank amateur]

Yes, it can delay it slightly; conversely, if the media sells ad space and time, it bleeds and leads and that, too is manipulation of public opinion, inadvertant or not. That aspect can negate any manipulation the other way. The 1/3 rule applies; as you point out, the bad guys know this and can work public opinion as well or better than we can and they aim for that wavering middle third. Casualties are only part of the picture; for a few they are THE criteria, for most Americans results matter. More. Much more

You may be right, but to a civilian you sound a lot like Kerry. Much better to sound like a winner: "It's the causalities stupid."


Perhaps the less the foreign CI gains the less responsibility they have for what happens after they leave.

I have little doubt that we're taking responsibility for their security, so that ultimately we won't be responsible for their security. The problem is that security is only one thing the various factions care about. It will be bartered away numerous times, between numerous factions, in a society where deals are never ending and the only permanent things are things we don't share: family, tribe, religion etc.

[Ken White]

You may be right, but to a civilian you sound a lot like Kerry. Much better to sound like a winner: "It's the causalities stupid."a lot of civilians don't agree with you, which is my point.

Then again, one could agree that the causalities are indeed the cause... :D

Which doesn't mean the casualties are the causalities by any means and could mean that those who say they are the problem may be the ones who are stupid -- or maybe they just need to widen their conversational circles. ;)

P.S.
Another PM just sent with text of first pasted

[ODB]

Interesting this came up, just had a discussion at work about this one. Some of the guys older than me (very few around these days) had some interesting insight on this from the SF point of view. Found it interesting they were doing the good "snake eater" thing in the bush until Big Army showed up and made them move into the stadium. Additionally the ODAs that were there when the whole Blackhawk Down thing went down they were not allowed to leave the wire, the ODAs were loaded up in their gun trucks ready to roll and were not allowed to. I found this quite interesting all things considered. Didn't mean to hijack the thread but thought this was important, considering intially it was being handled more along the COIN lines.

[Ken White]

Might want to check on who did what to who. Also note that the 'who went to town' issue was a 3d Ranger Bn vs others issue. The Big Army 10th Mtn QRF was stalled so Rangers could lead the way. Garrison (The SOCOM GO on the ground) not big Army, is where one needs to look...

[Ken White]

If they'll recall, they worked for SOCOM at the time, not Big Army -- and Big Army couldn't tell MG Garrison what to do...

The issue of who went to town to help was a 3d Ranger Bn vs. everyone else issue; the big Army QRF from 10th Mountain was stopped so Rangers could lead the way. Big Army goofs it up on occasion -- so does SOCOM.

[stanleywinthrop]

Found this today (http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2008/05/david-killculle.html) on Col. Pat Lang's site.

By reading the comments found on this website, i've discovered the true cause for our problems in Iraq: Powerpoint!

For example:


Power Point has given to the briefer class (those who brief but don't always think) new power.

Damn you Bill Gates! (shakes fist)

[Cavguy]

If they'll recall, they worked for SOCOM at the time, not Big Army -- and Big Army couldn't tell MG Garrison what to do...

The issue of who went to town to help was a 3d Ranger Bn vs. everyone else issue; the big Army QRF from 10th Mountain was stopped so Rangers could lead the way. Big Army goofs it up on occasion -- so does SOCOM.

Thanks for saying that. I hate it when people critcize "Big Army" as if it's some unchanging monolith, or any shotgun generalizations. We all have our strengths, roles, and weaknesses. Changes of command play very heavy in any organization's outlook.

[SWJED]

Power Point has given to the briefer class (those who brief but don't always think) new power.

Have you read Dr. Kilcullen, worked with him, heard him speak, or know him?

Do you know what words accompanied this PowerPoint briefing?

[Entropy]

Have you read Dr. Kilcullen, worked with him, heard him speak, or know him?

Do you know what words accompanied this PowerPoint briefing?

That is the point I tried to address earlier - that slides only present part of a presentation - and often not the most important part - and are therefore open to misinterpretation when divorced from the actual presentation. People these days trade and forward PP briefings all the time and I think it's wise to be cognizant of the limitations of the medium. I frankly don't like the practice yet I see it all the time.

[Ron Humphrey]

That is the point I tried to address earlier - that slides only present part of a presentation - and often not the most important part - and are therefore open to misinterpretation when divorced from the actual presentation. People these days trade and forward PP briefings all the time and I think it's wise to be cognizant of the limitations of the medium. I frankly don't like the practice yet I see it all the time.

and one that I had hoped we would see begin to be addressed through the use of newer technologies like face puppetry. The briefer would be able to give the briefing and be video taped after which the software is used to make an avatar of sorts give the brief in the different adobe or other models.

Imagine actually getting the rest of the story rather than having to wait for Paul Harvey to provide it later:wry:

It's easily doable and I agree that it might help avoid some of the selective pass on of information from such briefs by those who didn't necessarily get it in the context it was created with

[SteveMetz]

and one that I had hoped we would see begin to be addressed through the use of newer technologies like face puppetry. The briefer would be able to give the briefing and be video taped after which the software is used to make an avatar of sorts give the brief in the different adobe or other models.

Imagine actually getting the rest of the story rather than having to wait for Paul Harvey to provide it later:wry:

It's easily doable and I agree that it might help avoid some of the selective pass on of information from such briefs by those who didn't necessarily get it in the context it was created with

Heck, I'll get a sock and make a Kilcullen puppet if that would help. It might look like Lambchop, but we'll just have to work through that.

[soldiernolongeriniraq]

Well, I'm a big fan of Dave's and thought the briefing was quite good.

Looking at my notebook, here are a few of the points I made during my commentary on it:

--Is there some other way to inject a pathology into the insurgent adapation process?



Steve, in our AO (Jazeera area between Ramadi and Fallujah in 2005-06), I was tasked out to both our infantry battalion and as a combat augmentee to the MTT w/ IA 3-3. We had to face the unfortunate discovery of many hundreds of weapons (Glocks, mostly) intended for IA and IP personnel come up missing from a "secured" shipping crate.

This led to much gnashing of teeth and beating of breasts, but I argued that there might be a plus to this, one that (without violating OPSEC) I saw was taking place.

One of the means insurgent cadres can keep order is by having a monopoly on weapons and the materiel necessary to wage war. While many consider AK-47s "fungible" in Iraq, this isn't exactly so. There are only so many to go around, and they cost money that unemployed MAMs find difficult to obtain.

When many hundreds of AKs and Glocks (hand guns) all of a sudden flooded the local market, many dozens of insurgents from Ramadi to TQ had a commodity that made them independent of the larger insurgent network. They could go it alone, and they could do so with weapons (hand guns) that have a unique cultural meaning (a symbol of authority in Baathist Iraq, they were typically used for executions or maimings, giving the men who possessed them a totemic quality the AK itself didn't confer).

As was famously said about The Velvet Underground, few bought their records but everyone who bought one started his own band. So too with the Glocks and the AKs that entered the market. They gave those who possessed them the ability to strike out on their own, with their own bands of recruited MAMs also dedicated to competing in the Darwinian world of illicit fuel sales, contraband smuggling, IED emplacement, etc, etc, etc.

As the network fractured, they were under less tight control by less intelligent and sophisticated SULs. In other words, a net gain for the good guys as the attrition carried itself out to natural conclusions.

C

:eek:

[ODB]

Ken White,
Thanks for the other half of the story. I many times post these to get more than one perspective. It's always interesting to see how different the story is when looked at from multiple view points. Hence the reason for always second sourcing and never rely on the first report it is aways wrong (well 95% of the time).

Cavguy,
Wasn't throwing the blame on "Big Army", I haven't forgot that, that is where I grew my roots so to speak. If it came across as shotgun generalization it was intended to, it was a perspective from some of the guys at work.

[SteveMetz]

Steve, in our AO (Jazeera area between Ramadi and Fallujah in 2005-06), I was tasked out to both our infantry battalion and as a combat augmentee to the MTT w/ IA 3-3. We had to face the unfortunate discovery of many hundreds of weapons (Glocks, mostly) intended for IA and IP personnel come up missing from a "secured" shipping crate.

This led to much gnashing of teeth and beating of breasts, but I argued that there might be a plus to this, one that (without violating OPSEC) I saw was taking place.

One of the means insurgent cadres can keep order is by having a monopoly on weapons and the materiel necessary to wage war. While many consider AK-47s "fungible" in Iraq, this isn't exactly so. There are only so many to go around, and they cost money that unemployed MAMs find difficult to obtain.

When many hundreds of AKs and Glocks (hand guns) all of a sudden flooded the local market, many dozens of insurgents from Ramadi to TQ had a commodity that made them independent of the larger insurgent network. They could go it alone, and they could do so with weapons (hand guns) that have a unique cultural meaning (a symbol of authority in Baathist Iraq, they were typically used for executions or maimings, giving the men who possessed them a totemic quality the AK itself didn't confer).

As was famously said about The Velvet Underground, few bought their records but everyone who bought one started his own band. So too with the Glocks and the AKs that entered the market. They gave those who possessed them the ability to strike out on their own, with their own bands of recruited MAMs also dedicated to competing in the Darwinian world of illicit fuel sales, contraband smuggling, IED emplacement, etc, etc, etc.

As the network fractured, they were under less tight control by less intelligent and sophisticated SULs. In other words, a net gain for the good guys as the attrition carried itself out to natural conclusions.

C

:eek:

Excellent points! But I am hurt that you felt you had to tell me a Glock is handgun!! I carry a Model 27 (the subcompact .40)

http://pictures-i-like.com/Albums/Album9/Large/Ace_of_Clubs.jpg

[selil]

Excellent points! But I am hurt that you felt you had to tell me a Glock is handgun!! I carry a Model 27 (the subcompact .40)

http://pictures-i-like.com/Albums/Album9/Large/Ace_of_Clubs.jpg

That's not a gun THIS IS A GUN...

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/2/23/LAR_Grizzly_Patr_Portrait001.jpg/300px-LAR_Grizzly_Patr_Portrait001.jpg
Lar Grizzly (45 Winmag)

Can you believe this was the standard firearm for my first job as a indian police officer?

[Ken White]

Canon, cannon -- who's counting....

[JJackson]

They gave those who possessed them the ability to strike out on their own, with their own bands of recruited MAMs also dedicated to competing in the Darwinian world of illicit fuel sales, contraband smuggling, IED emplacement, etc, etc, etc.

As the network fractured, they were under less tight control by less intelligent and sophisticated SULs. In other words, a net gain for the good guys as the attrition carried itself out to natural conclusions.

C

:eek:

I follow the logic and see the advantage, for now, but wonder if this may just be storing up a bigger problem for later. Not so much relating to the increased weapon pool but at some point - if the US forces are to extricate themselves and go home - political agreements need to be reached with armed groups and they need to be disbanded and/or integrated into the IA/IP. At this point dealing with a limited number of groups, with the control to make their agreements stick, is going to be much easier than thousands of individuals all fighting their own private war.

[SteveMetz]

Canon, cannon -- who's counting....

I was waiting for someone to ask him what an "indian police officer" was. Transgender I understand, but transethnic?

[selil]

I was waiting for someone to ask him what an "indian police officer" was. Transgender I understand, but transethnic?

Try being a blond, blue eyed, pale skinned former Marine working on an Indian reservation. It was one of the most fun, rewarding, awesome jobs I've ever had.

[Norfolk]

I'll get a sock and make a Kilcullen puppet if that would help. It might look like Lambchop, but we'll just have to work through that.

Steve, I'm the resident sock puppet on these boards. Certain members just pull the strings on certain threads, and I respond instaneously, no act of free will on my part necessary.:wry:;)

Ron: I don't listen to Paul Harvey anymore, or his son. Back in the day he was great to listen to, but nowadays his show has just gotten strange at times.

JJackson:

I too rather wonder about that. That said, how independent or autonomous of tribal sheiks or other local leadership are these small groups, or at least how susceptible/vulnerable to persuasion/coercion are they? If these minor groups are or can be brought under the more or less sway of tribal or other local leaders, then perhaps the Hydra can be restrained, sort of, depending of course upon the circumstances of said leaders. Especially with regards to their access to, or at least freedom from, centralized political power.

[soldiernolongeriniraq]

"Excellent points! But I am hurt that you felt you had to tell me a Glock is handgun!! I carry a Model 27 (the subcompact .40)"

Sorry, Steve. When I sat next to you on the panel at Colorado Springs, I didn't notice the telltale bulge of a Model 27.

If I see you again, I'll pad you down first!

C

[120mm]

Excellent points! But I am hurt that you felt you had to tell me a Glock is handgun!! I carry a Model 27 (the subcompact .40)

http://pictures-i-like.com/Albums/Album9/Large/Ace_of_Clubs.jpg

A Glock in leather? Tres gauche!!!!

[SteveMetz]

A Glock in leather? Tres gauche!!!!

I own about a dozen holsters in every material but fighter pilot skin. I like that shoulder holster for when I'm deep in the woods flyfishing since I wear waders with a belt.

[Tom Odom]

I own about a dozen holsters in every material but fighter pilot skin. I like that shoulder holster for when I'm deep in the woods flyfishing since I wear waders with a belt.

them must be tuff flies...

wadda ya use for the fish?

[SteveMetz]

them must be tuff flies...

wadda ya use for the fish?

I prefer a dry Adams with a C4 trailer

[Shek]

In the New Yorker article written by George Packer "Knowing The Enemy", Dr. Killcullen refers to a list he made of the sources of information available to the Vietnamense villager in 1966 (10, 5 of which the government controlled) vs. the Afghan villager in 2006 (25, 5 of which the government controlled). I've looked through some of his papers and presentations and haven't come across these lists spelled out. Does anyone have these lists? Thanks.

[Onion]

I wonder if Dr. Kilcullen has read Bernard B. Fall's Street Without Joy (http://www.amazon.com/Street-Without-Joy-Bernard-Fall/dp/0811717003)

[120mm]

Important parts of the Roman Imperial road network are still operative today (or at least the routes those Roman roads first followed). This re-emphasizes my point that if the road network is important enough to the economy/economic well being of the people, they will do a lot to defend/maintain it on their own.

My wife and I spent November 2007 driving around southwest Spain, including a trip to Gibralter, where we drove on some of those roads.

Plus, our house in Germany was just north of the Limes, where there are still roads, walls and a couple of Roman fortifications still standing, or reproduced.

[J Wolfsberger]

Can We Defeat the Taliban? (http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YjQ5Nzk3YTc1NzQ0ZDQ3M2NhMzE2MTcxZTQxYjk0OGE=) from from The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.

(I didn't find any other posts referencing either the book or the article.)

[Cavguy]

Can We Defeat the Taliban? (http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YjQ5Nzk3YTc1NzQ0ZDQ3M2NhMzE2MTcxZTQxYjk0OGE=) from from The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.

(I didn't find any other posts referencing either the book or the article.)

I'm in the midst of the book. Kilcullen is as always a good writer, and unloads on the Bush administration execution of GWOT as alienating many who did not need to be alienated, at least not all at the same time.

Some good and timely insights, but my initial impression this is a book that will not stand the test of time simply because it is rooted in the specific political issues of today. I'll reserve judgment to the end though.

[William F. Owen]

Having known David back when he was a serving Lt Col, and finding him an eminently sensible young chap, I have been very worried about some of things attributed to him, and the COIN poster boy image, some built for him. However, I found this (http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2026487879554934922) which I think accurately portrays his actual contribution and the critical fact that everything we know about insurgencies we have know for a very long time.

I don't agree with all he says, but he is mostly correct, which is more than good enough and shows the benefit of studying military history and doing the research.

...and more here (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-mcmanus3-2009may03,0,7133284.column).

[davidbfpo]

Wilf,

Next week David Kilcullen is in London, talking at his book launch at IISS and I plan to be there. The more I listen and read the more I am impressed.

davidbfpo

[MCalvin]

CNAS hosted Kilcullen last month to discuss his book with David Ignatius. Video of the discussion is available here (http://www.cnas.org/node/860#).

I agree with davidbfpo. Kilcullen's explanation of the four-part cycle of an insurgency with both local and global components, along with his explanation of the "accidental guerrilla" syndrome, seem to me the most comprehensive and well-developed and relevant extension of classical counterinsurgency theory that I've come across. I've only ever studied it from an academic perspective and have never been a practitioner (so my perspective is highly limited), but his use of experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere seems to add strong support to his arguments.

I found his short discussion on lexicon in the beginning of the book valuable as well. He describes why he chooses to use the term takfiri, as opposed to salafi or others, to refer to the hard-core of ideologically driven enemies that we are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Worth the short read (pages xviii-xix (http://bit.ly/MmTrP))

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

that comes from being a little bit outside the system and the ability to say things that everybody's thinking...” from the Charlie Rose interview.

Having attended events to hear him speak on several occasions and being fortunate enough to interact with him socially, I believe that Kilcullen's greatest advantage is that he is plain spoken (mad props to someone who at a HASC hearing uses the term “kick their asses”), typically calls things the way he sees them, does not come off as a pretentious know-it-all, is careful in his proposals in that they may or may not work, and and is not protecting a career.

@ Mcalvin: totally agree, if one reads nothing more of his book, the intro alone should provide one with plenty of food for thought.

[Cavguy]

Chapter 2 on "full spectrum COIN" in Afghanistan is worth the price of the book alone, in my view.

[SWJED]

Chapter 2 on "full spectrum COIN" in Afghanistan is worth the price of the book alone, in my view.

ditto.

[goesh]

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-mcmanus3-2009may03,0,7133284.column

- mere opinion, but there always seems to be an assumption that with leadership attrition, the replacements that step up somehow bring with them talent and capability equal to the decedents, that power vacums and voids are almost instantly filled and few beats are skipped. I would say there are accidental geurrillas with capable commanders and those without. If our strategic interest is truly longitudinal, then let the drones fly.

[davidbfpo]

Kilcullen gave a very relaxed talk at IISS, with all his books being sold and this was his second talk that day (the other was at Chatham House). His comments on the strategic decisions in the GWOT were stimulating; those on five times as many accountants in the DoD that State's FSO were telling and some snippets dropped in, e.g. Arab oil is really Shia oil. Or that Denmark was one of the best performing COIN in Afghanistan, as they had no COIN "baggage". That in Pakistan the focus should not be on the army, but the police and para-military forces. Now that would IMHO be a radical change.

Many here will know he is direct. When talking to a mainly UK audience regarding (USA and or Western) intervention and conclude: we know how to do it; should we do it?; engagement is a better option and it was best to stay out. I can hear Ken cheering and others.

So I'm looking forward to reading the book.

da

[davidbfpo]

His speech at IISS has appeared and slightly adapted in the latest The Spectator: http://www.spectator.co.uk/the-magazine/features/3634478/if-we-lose-hearts-and-minds-we-will-lose-the-war.thtml

Only two pages and an easy read. Still reading his book and will return one day.

davidbfpo

[ajax622]

Last night, David Kilcullen spoke at the Pritzker Military Library in Chicago, IL. Mr Kilcullen gave an overview of his book, "The Accidental Guerilla" as well as provided some examples in his career as evidence to support the theories and recommendations presented in the book. A video of his speech and the following Q&A from the audience can be found at the following link:

http://www.pritzkermilitarylibrary.org/events/2009/06-16-david-kilcullen.jsp

[davidbfpo]

I am sure two other SWJ members attended (Major Marginal & MattC86), if you are resident in Chicago time to connect?

Thanks for the link too!

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A slightly different video clip when David Kilcullen spoke to Google, with stories not on the Chicago link or used in his talk at IISS, London e.g. IO: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/06/kilcullen-authorsgoogle.html

Half devoted to Q&A.
Found on the CNAS website and listened too tonight.

davidbfpo

[Valin]

Chapter 2 on "full spectrum COIN" in Afghanistan is worth the price of the book alone, in my view.

(Note: I loath the term "MUST READ". When someone says this my first thought is...no in fact I don't have to read this, in fact I'm now going to go out of my way to not read it.)

That being said The Accidental Guerrilla really is a MUST READ, at least for those of us amateurs with an interest in GWOT. His look at the Pashtuns in Afghanistan was a Light Bulb moment for me...(The light Bulb went on).

[UrsaMaior]

...80% of COIN ops are won. Does anybody know what is his source?

THX in advance.

[davidbfpo]

I have heard this 80% figure cited before, on a quick scan cannot find a reference in Kilcullen's book nor on Google. My recollection is that it came from a RAND study.

davidbfpo

[Klugzilla]

I will check as well, but it depends on how you define insurgency and what you want to consider as the threshold for an "ongoing" insurgency. I do remember several studies that had roughly the same criteria and reaching the same numbers.

[Valin]

I will check as well, but it depends on how you define insurgency and what you want to consider as the threshold for an "ongoing" insurgency. I do remember several studies that had roughly the same criteria and reaching the same numbers.

I look forward to it.

[Bill Moore]

I have heard this 80% figure cited before, on a quick scan cannot find a reference in Kilcullen's book nor on Google. My recollection is that it came from a RAND study.

These quotes can be alarmingly misreading without understanding the full context of the study that determined this. Some possible variations of the study may be:

- counterinsurgents supported substantially by a foreign power, or all counterinsurgencies regardless of context?

- what time frame did the study address (frequently these studies addressed cold war insurgencies)

- the hard question, what does won mean? Did the enemy capitualate? Did they quit fighting? Did the fighting reside for a few years only to flair up again?

- of the 80% defeated and the 20% of the insurgents who won, what were their characterisitics? Were they politically based (communism), identity based (religion, race, etc.), etc.?

Just for the heck of it:

-how many times have insurgents lost in Afghanistan?

-assuming that there really is such a thing as population centric and enemy centric strategies, did anyone win using a population centric strategy?

Perhaps the 80% figure is true, but I generally find these findings to be too generic to be of any use in the real world. They are to often used to justify unwise policy. It is probably true that a 200lb guy will kick the crap out of a 120lb guy 80% of the time if they engage in hand to hand combat, but if you're the 200lb guy getting your butt kicked by a 120lb guy, that bit of trivia isn't overly useful.