America's Asymmetric Advantage

[LawVol]

In this article (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/2009013), the author advocates airpower. Having read many of your observations in the past, I am interested in reading any responses to this.

It appears as if he is arguing for some form of "air control" policy like the Brits used between the world wars. On the other hand, he does states that we are unlikely to engage in Iraq-style nation-building, so airpower is the answer. Maybe an argument for sticking with punitive operations?

In any event, he certainly does not seem to see the utility of land-power and even states his belief of no need for an Army and a Marine Corps (which the former Marine in me finds blasphemous). Anyway, I look forward to your comments.

[Steve Blair]

I would say that this is a rehash of the standard Air Force party line. The Air Force has yet to come to terms with the fact that not every nation or national actor is going to have a military-industrial complex that can be targeted by air power. He also ignores the fact that aircraft losses are extremely expensive (at $2 billion or so a copy, how many B-2s will the Air Force really hazard?) and that losses of six or seven high-value air assets will halt an air campaign.

Air power cannot engage in nation building. It cannot block a supply line that does not depend on trucks or highly-developed roads. It failed to do so in Vietnam, and has also failed to do so in Iraq. The AF does not like situations that it can't control, so it tries to avoid them.

You cannot engage in purely punitive operations and then walk away. There is a certain moral obligation to fix what you break, or help create the end state that you desire, once you engage in such operations. Just because the AF doesn't want to do that doesn't mean that the obligation ceases to exist.

[pcmfr]

I am a huge proponent of air power -- persistant ISR, precision fires (usually guided by ground guys), give the US a strategic advantage no ememy can match. But the author -- an AF JAG (instant creditability loss in my eyes) -- conveniently overlooks numerous shortcomings of air power. He cites the killing of AMZ as a major air power success, but doesn't mention (or realize) that that op never would have happened had it not been for a boat load of folks on the ground who rolled up folks over a period of several months to gather the intel to put the ordnance on target.

And this:

The relative sterility of air power — which the boots-on-the-ground types oddly find distressing as somehow unmartial — nevertheless provides greater opportunity for the discreet application of force largely under the control of well-educated, commissioned officer combatants.

is just pompous BS, and discounts the fine enlisted combat controllers we have.

I do think he makes a valid point about the all volunteer force and the fact that we will probably never be able to employ the numbers of troops on the ground we had in previous wars.

[Steve Blair]

is just pompous BS, and discounts the fine enlisted combat controllers we have.



I would also say that's a pretty big swipe at the many WOs who fly Army helicopters.

I was just reading back through a paper by H.R. McMaster (Crack in the Foundation), and he makes some pretty telling and very valid points about the Air Force's almost dream-like state when it comes to the "transparent battlefield."

[LawVol]

First, thank you for the comments. Just a question or two.

Blair says: You cannot engage in purely punitive operations and then walk away. There is a certain moral obligation to fix what you break, or help create the end state that you desire, once you engage in such operations.

Please explain. Where does this obligation comes from? From the limited reading I've done, it would seem that punitive operations have been the norm for many years (e.g. the British Empire). In resorting to a moralistic argument, whose morals do we use? I'm not trying to be quarrelsome, I just want to understand the thinking. I've read a few articles advocating a desire to do away with the "you break it -you bought it" theory.

pcmfr says: the author -- an AF JAG (instant creditability loss in my eyes)

Please explain. The argument seemed well-reasoned (I'm withholding opinion, afterall that's why I sought input) and I've read many articles cited by this council from non-operators and even non-military authors.

Thanks for the input and I hope to receive more.

[RTK]

"The relative sterility of air power — which the boots-on-the-ground types oddly find distressing as somehow unmartial — nevertheless provides greater opportunity for the discreet application of force largely under the control of well-educated, commissioned officer combatants. "

I refer back to David Kilcullen's 28 Articles: Rank means nothing; talent is everything.

Additionally, David Galula would argue that it's pretty damned tough to conduct the civil-military operations that take 80% of your time in a COIN environment from 30,000 feet.

I have a hard time believing that a Major General is basing his argument off of the fact that he doesn't forsee another rebuilding effort like Iraq in the future. More proof that certain elements of leadership are completely out of touch with reality.

[slapout9]

The Air Force is scared to death that the general public will find out how bad they have been ripped off with expensive planes. It is the age of the guided missile!! From the Stinger's to an ICBM. And they should "not" be under the control of the Air force but the Army. Missiles are long range artillery, not an airplane!

It is wasteful to spend all that money on planes when it can be done with missiles. They are better,cheaper and safer. Not only that but the D3A (CARVER)targeting process is better and easier to understand then what is being passed for EBO.

I lived in Orlando,Fl. during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and It was the deployment of Army missiles all around south Florida that had as much to do with them giving in as the Naval blockade (which was a good idea). I saw what Army Missile power can do, they would have hit Cuba before the planes could have even be started. This was a very scary time. Since that time the Army has been systematically stripped of the missile artillery it needs to have to support it's land elements, defend the American homeland from air attack and protect USMC elements operating far inland if they need to.

The Army should declare war on the air force and take back the missiles, and with the help of a few good Marines (Infantry)America will be protected again.

I don't know what logo will end up on the SWC coin but we should send him one or two so he can get the education that he did not receive in college.

[Bill Moore]

My conspiracy theory is that this paper is a timely spin piece on air power not focused on the military community, but focused on Congress (dollars). It is timely in that Iraq is becoming ever more unpopular, midterm elections are looming, new and old Congressmen next Spring will have to offer alternatives to "staying the course", so unfortunately this article may sell to the intended audience for all the wrong reasons.

But looking past that, there are some merits to this article (not much). Air power is our asymmetric edge, and I don’t think that can be argued. It currently gives us battlefield dominance in almost all kinetic situations. It is best applied in conjunction with other joint forces, but it can be applied effectively unilaterally to execute punitive raids. I can’t argue that, nor can I argue that not all small wars, conflicts, etc. require us to obligate our nation to execute FID/COIN, which is not only expensive economically, it almost always is costly politically (we lose consensus and unity) and morally (we start on moral high ground, but over time our position degrades to the point where we are fighting to get back on the moral high ground as we're portrayed as occupiers and the source of all problems for that particular nation). We should never sign up for COIN lightly, because we are putting our national reputation on line in by engaging in a situation where it is very hard to effect a positive outcome. That means we still require the ability to execute punitive type strikes without buying the country and signing on for nation building as a viable option. Air power permits that at a limited cost (planes are expensive, but so is moving and sustaining a BDE of soldiers). What the article failed to mention (not surprisingly) is the use of air power alone, especially against non-state actors, is frequently perceived as a sign of weakness by our enemies. They don’t think we have the will to commit to our troops to the fight, thus if we use JDAMS unilaterally we could very well embolden our enemy. On the other hand a JDAM strike in conjunction with paratroopers dropping in, or Marines coming over the beach presents another image altogether.

Finally, I think the killing of AMZ could have been executed by any infantry platoon, but why give him the opportunity to kill a soldier and sign off with an IO victory? On the other hand, air power alone never could have found him.

Overall the article is laughable, but if it works we’ll see new work shortly on Air Force Golf Courses and O-Clubs, while the Army and Marines carry the bulk of the fight underfunded.

[Uboat509]

I can't decide if this is bald-faced blind parochialism or one of the most cynical things I have ever read. Did I read this wrong or did he actually marginalize the value winning the hearts and minds the populace and gaining intelligence on the ground? Either he knows absolutely nothing about COIN or he is hoping that his intended audience doesn't. It also it appears that he has drawn the wring conclusions from the Israeli experience in Lebanon. He appears to believe that Israeli reliance on a pure air response early on in the fight was a success despite all the evidence to the contrary. I expect this kind of thing from a fighter jock. I have no idea what his intent was.

SFC W

[Steve Blair]

First, thank you for the comments. Just a question or two.

Blair says: You cannot engage in purely punitive operations and then walk away. There is a certain moral obligation to fix what you break, or help create the end state that you desire, once you engage in such operations.

Please explain. Where does this obligation comes from? From the limited reading I've done, it would seem that punitive operations have been the norm for many years (e.g. the British Empire). In resorting to a moralistic argument, whose morals do we use? I'm not trying to be quarrelsome, I just want to understand the thinking. I've read a few articles advocating a desire to do away with the "you break it -you bought it" theory.


Thanks for the input and I hope to receive more.

I understand your question, and don't find it at all quarrelsome.

If you look around the world, many of the failed states (in my opinion, anyhow) come from a mix of the old Imperial borders and failed punitive operations (Africa provides many good examples of this...consider the many French operations that have ended up prolonging some conflicts - Chad springs to mind here). Thus I think it can be argued that punitive operations do little to build stability (which is one of our stated goals) and instead work against such stability in many cases. From the moral standpoint, the standard "public line" of the US has been (and will most likely remain) that we can provide a better way of government and/or life for many in the world. If we're going to make the exportation of democracy one of our foreign policy cornerstones, that does bring with it a certain obligation to see our efforts through.

I would also like to comment on the author's lack of credibility. Any time the AF feels threatened in the budgetary sphere, articles like this start appearing. For historical evidence, take a look at "Setup" by Tilford (link is http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/Tilford/Setup.pdf). Within the AF culture you stumble upon "true believers" such as this JAG general from time to time. They can be very disturbing, and do a great deal to divert AF internal attention from questions like strategic airlift, nation building, and other real world concerns and focus them on things like the F-22, "Airpower will win the war," and other matters.

[Steve Blair]

I can't decide if this is bald-faced blind parochialism or one of the most cynical things I have ever read. Did I read this wrong or did he actually marginalize the value winning the hearts and minds the populace and gaining intelligence on the ground? Either he knows absolutely nothing about COIN or he is hoping that his intended audience doesn't. It also it appears that he has drawn the wring conclusions from the Israeli experience in Lebanon. He appears to believe that Israeli reliance on a pure air response early on in the fight was a success despite all the evidence to the contrary. I expect this kind of thing from a fighter jock. I have no idea what his intent was.

SFC W

The AF doesn't really deal with COIN outside of some small communities, so it's a good bet that he DOESN'T know anything about COIN. A RAND report for the AF was referenced in another thread, and so much of it is concerned with the basics of COIN and LIC that you can tell that most of the AF leadership is clueless.

[marct]

You know, I don't think I have come across a better example of rhetoric in the face (or absence) of reason in years! I have to make this mandatory reading for my students. The imagery! The classic use of atrocity tales and wonder tales! What artistry!!!!

Bill, you mentioned that you thought this was a sales pitch and I really have to agree. It is pure political rhetoric aimed solely at providing a cleaner, safer (Greener?) alternative to those nasty bow-togs :p .

Lawvol, you asked an interesting question.


Blair says: You cannot engage in purely punitive operations and then walk away. There is a certain moral obligation to fix what you break, or help create the end state that you desire, once you engage in such operations.

Please explain. Where does this obligation comes from? From the limited reading I've done, it would seem that punitive operations have been the norm for many years (e.g. the British Empire). In resorting to a moralistic argument, whose morals do we use? I'm not trying to be quarrelsome, I just want to understand the thinking. I've read a few articles advocating a desire to do away with the "you break it -you bought it" theory.

Personally, I wouldn't have argued that it is a "moral" obligation but, rather, an ethical one where ethics is defined as "right action" (I tend to use a Buddhist definition). I would put the emphasis on the successfull achievement of a desired end state, rather than on an obligation to fix what you break.

You mentioned the British Empire and the use of punitive strikes. Sure, they have been one tool in the general arsenal of force options ever since the first cities started to develope. The problem with that is that they are not the only tool and they may not be the right tool to achieve a specific end.

What, after all, is the goal behind the application of force? It could be a fairly simple "raid" mentality - "kill the men, grab the women and sheep". It could be a goal of extermination - "kill them all, God will know his own" (God, I love that quote!). It could also be a shear statement of power - "F*$k with us and this is what you'll get." All of these are "punitive" goals designed to produce different results - loot, annihilation, and a "warning" respectively.

Are those the goals we are trying to achieve in, say, Afghanistan? Nope, so we have to change the tool to achieve the desired result. This isn't a morlalistic argument, this is a utilitarian agrument. In this case, "moral arguments" and moral standings are actually part of the tool kit, and rhetoric is as important as artillery.

Let's get back to the question of goals. What was the goal in attacking Afghanistan? (BTW, I *really* don't want to deal with goals in attacking Iraq so let's stick with Afghanistan :cool: ). The first goal was to topple the Taliban regime as a punitive example of what happens when a nation supports actions that the rest of the world considers to be "illegal". It certainly wasn't out of caring about the Afghan people or the Northern Alliance. This was a punitive raid at the state level with, pretty much, full international support.

As such, in order to "send the message", it had to not only topple the regime, it had to replace that regime with another that would be acceptable to the world community and would agree to play by the international rules of the game. In order to achieve this, the "new" regime has to have enough social stability to show its own people that it can a) protect them and b) offer a better chance of achieving "success" however success is culturally defined - that could be a greater income, it could be more sheep, it could be better education and, given human variation, it could be pretty much anything.

We, and by "we" I mean the international community, pretty much went into Afghanistan realizing this even if we didn't know exactly how to achieve it. Sure, we, and now I'm talking about Canadians, used a lot of moral rhetoric about helping the poor oppressed people of Afghanistan, but that was a secord or third order cause (i.e. justification) for popular consumption. The reality was that we wanted a massive regime change and we wanted to send a clear message to any other state that was sponsoring global terrorism. Most of the people involved on the Canadian side didn't really have any axes to grind about what form the government should take, although a number of us hoped for a restoration of the monarchy, mainly because a lot of us believed it would be the most stable form of regime given its 100+ years of history.

So, back to your initial question, Lawvol.


"Where does this obligation comes from? From the limited reading I've done, it would seem that punitive operations have been the norm for many years (e.g. the British Empire). In resorting to a moralistic argument, whose morals do we use?"

The obligation is to ourselves from a purely utilitarian standpoint. The obligation arose because while we were engaged in a punitive strike, the very nature of that strike demanded certain outcomes. This type of punitive strike is, actually, in the best traditions of the British Empire (take a look at the consolidation period in Indian history, say 1850-1890 and, also, the Zulu and Boer wars). The Brits were always quite good at this type of opperation, well, at least until the FO started to get involved :cool: . BTW, this specific type of "regime change", and the absolute demographic needs of the British Empire to use it, were behind the founding of British Social Anthropology (but that's another story...).

The moral arguments are secondary or tertiary arguments which, while very important, are not in and of themselves the reasons behind the goals. As to whose morality we use (and that really is a *very* good question), the answer is surprisingly simple - we use the morality of the group that will be most effective to the selected target. Thus we use Western, Christian based morality on the home fronts and we use Afghan, Islamic based morality in the Afghan front. When I said earlier that rhetoric is as important as artillery, I really meant it, and that means choosing the right round for each particular target :).

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Good point, Marc. I used moral instead of ethical, which was poor word selection on my part. "What the general really meant to say was ethical....";)

And if you need more examples of this sort of writing, take a look at a fair amount of what the AF produces for public consumption. Not the Air University stuff, since a fair amount of it is actually good and balanced, but the Air Force magazine stuff and policy-type pieces. They also tend to aim their stuff at political audiences, since the AF was really created by politics. Interesting stuff, in a way.

[marct]

Thanks, Steve, I will take a look at the AF magazine material. I'm always on the lookout for good examples of rhetoric and myths in action :).

Marc

[marct]

Good point, Marc. I used moral instead of ethical, which was poor word selection on my part. "What the general really meant to say was ethical....";)

Some days, I think I should slap myself in the head :). I'm afraid I got too "technical" in my post. You were quite right to use "morals", at least in the sense that we have to live up to our own moral codes otherwise we will just end up feeling that we are immoral and full off guilt.

Marc

[Merv Benson]

I am a strong believer in the combined arms operation and believe that operations that rely on a single type of attack have inherent weakness. I would also point out, however, that the enemy we fight now has been very ineffective in dealing with our air power. It has not been able to acquire or use effectively Stinger type missiles on any consistent basis.

The problem I see with punitive attacks, is that the enemy we fight now anticipates them and hunkers down to ride out the storm before resurfacing. That is what Saddam expected to do in Iraq and what Osama and the Taliban expected to do in Afghanistan.

While the post Soviet Afghanistan was not the result of a successful air campaign, it is instructive of what can happen when there is no effort to direct the vacumn that results when a government is destroyed.

I do think that an air campaign can be effective at destroying the machinery of warfare of a state like Iran. Iran's ability to make conventional war can be destroyed in a sustained air campaign, that would take weeks and not days. What would come next is an open question. The religious bigots who run Iran would probably stay in power and continue their covert war against the US. They would still have to be dealt with. Their ability to make mischief would have to take a different form though.

[slapout9]

President Jimmy Carter first exposed the great air force scam when he canceled the B-1 bomber program and wanted to put air launched cruise missiles on rotary launchers inside 747's. Once you have a guided missile that can get to the target the "launch platform air,land or sea doesn't matter"!!!

It is the weapon that must get to the target, not the transportation vehicle. Why do you want to penetrate hostile air space with a manned aircraft to drop a bomb when you can launch a guided missile from a protected area and still do the same amount of damage.

[Steve Blair]

Air campaigns can be effective, just like any campaign, but the AF gets carried away when they believe that the air campaign can win in ANY situation. And there are some out there who DO believe that.

The AF has never really studied LIC/MOOTW at a higher formal level unless required by an outside agency. This goes back to the roots of AF doctrine (strategic bombing) and a reflex action on their part to attack anyone who disagrees with their basic belief system. In ways it's almost a hyper-religious reaction, and can be interesting to watch. But it does hamper them when it comes to considering situations that fall outside full-blown warfare.

Our current foes may have trouble dealing with air power, but it's also worth remembering that air power isn't their main objective.

[marct]

The AF has never really studied LIC/MOOTW at a higher formal level unless required by an outside agency. This goes back to the roots of AF doctrine (strategic bombing) and a reflex action on their part to attack anyone who disagrees with their basic belief system. In ways it's almost a hyper-religious reaction, and can be interesting to watch.

Not that I would disagree, but it might be humourous at some time to analyze the AF rhetoric using a basis in Eric Hoffer's True Believers (http://skepdic.com/truebeliever.html).

Marc

[slapout9]

Below are listed two sites on army missiles that were both given away in treaties with the soviet union. In other words how we really won the cold war. Notice the dates and the range and precision that was established in the 60's,70's. The Sprint missile travels so fast it cannot be seen by the naked eye. The Pershing II besides having incredible range and accuracy can be carried and launched from a semi-tractor trailer.


http://www.wsmr-history.org/SprintAction.htm

http://www.wsmr-history.org/PershingII.htm

[aktarian]

Can you say Doughet? :rolleyes:

I find this paragraph interesting.


This illustrates another salient feature of air power: its ability to temper the malevolent tendencies of societies accustomed to the rewards of modernity. Given air power's ability to strike war-supporting infrastructure, the powerful impulse of economic self-interest complicates the ability of despots to pursue malicious agendas. American air power can rapidly educate cultured and sophisticated societies about the costs of war and the futility of pursuing it. This is much the reason why air power alone delivered victory in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999, without the need to put a single U.S. soldier at risk on the ground.

It took NATO air forces 78 days to have what was essentially third world country throw in the towel. And couple of things to consider about OAF:
-USAF made serious deviations from it's aproach (IADS was still being hit late in campaign instead of being destroyed first and quickly
-B-2s never went in alone but were escorted by EW planes (and, as said before, against third world country)
-FRY AF kept numbers of planes operational (MiG-21s and light attack mostly)
-NATO destroyed very few AFVs (around 10 IIRC), which makes one wonder what would happen if ground war would be fought

I agree that air force alone can be effective, provied it has clearly defined goals that are within it's capabilities. Which is basically blowing stuff up. "El Dorado Canyon" was such case. "Desert Fox". 1992 (?) strikes against Iraqi intel service HQ as a response to Iraqi plot to kill Bush I in Kuwait. "Accountability" and "Grapes of Wrath" (not purely AF missions but close enough) were less clear as goals were less clear.

So if your goal is just to make a point or punish somebody by damaging his infrastructure then air force (cmbined, if needed, by navy cruise missiles) is a way to go. If your goals are wider than you need ground troops.


So what explains the rapid collapse of the Taliban and al-Qaida in 2001? Modern air power. More specifically, the marriage of precision weapons with precise targeting by tiny numbers of Special Forces troops on the ground. The results were stunning. Putatively invulnerable positions the Taliban had occupied for years literally disappeared in a rain of satellite-directed bombs from B-1s and B-52s flying so high they could be neither seen nor heard.

I guess he didn't hear about certain force called Northern Alliance :rolleyes:

[Bill Moore]

There were several comments on the Air Force's ability to grasp FID/COIN and nation building doctrine, yet that doctrine has left our nation with the short straw more often than not. Even most of the victories we acheived such as our efforts in the Philippines and Haiti were short lived, these nations rapidly converted back into a state of corruption, abject poverty and violence. (Admitedly the Philippines has economic zones of success, but they are very limited).

One could make arguments we failed to follow our own doctrine, or agencies outside the military didn't do their jobs, etc.. We already know the reality of what our other government agencies can achieve, and they should be listed under limitations when we do our planning. If State and other agencies can't execute the tasks in the doctrine, then the doctrine is non-functional. Another limitation that must be considered is the culture we're dealing with. You can't change cultures with COIN, and when we attempt to interject a foreign system or systems(democracy) it will almost always fail. Where have we done it successfully?

Perhaps that explains why one of our most successful COIN operations was in Greece. They obviously had a long...... history of democracy and shared other similiar values with us. Our doctrine fitted that situation like a round peg in a round hole. We were successful with nation building in Western Europe and Japan for the same reasons. Although Japan has a unique culture, they were looking west long before WWII, and were the best capitalists in Asia at the time (I think China is neck and neck with them now). In summary our COIN doctrine works if we have an achievable end state, and if we have an idealistic end state it doesn't.

Punitive raids do work in some situations, such as they have against Iraq and Libya. We have to accept the reality that we have go there every five years or so and lump them up to put them in their place. This is much, much cheaper, than attempting a regieme over throw and subsequently attempting to put a democratic government in place. Punitive raids on the other hand do not work (I can't recall any historic examples) against non-state actors.

I know many don't concur with the 4GW concept, but I tend to lean towards we're dealing with something that our legacy doctrine doesn't address. Air power is only one tool in this fight, and a limited tool at that. However, our COIN doctrine hasn't proved overly useful to date either.

[Steve Blair]

The argument with the AF and COIN isn't so much about our COIN doctrine, which as Bill points out has some issues, but the fact that the AF doesn't even really acknowledge the existence of any other sort of war aside from all-out war. They have historically chafed under any sort of restrictions and seem to forget that it is the politicians who set the objectives and control the means, not the AF leadership. Evidence of this mindset is found throughout AF writing, especially when they turn their attention to Vietnam. AF education about MOOTW and other such scenarios is woefully lacking at even the most basic level.

There are, in my opinion, a number of institutional reasons for this, most of which lie outside the SW discussion realm. But it needs to be remembered that one of the largest consumers of the defense budget isn't really in the mental place it needs to be in order to deal with SW issues.

[LawVol]

Thank you all for the comments. From my limited reading, it would seem that the notion that the AF just doesn't have a COIN doctrine nor particularly care about COIN is correct. Asside from Corum and Johnson's book "Air power in Small Wars," I haven't found anything on it. Anyone know of anything or perhaps have suggestions on the effective use of airpower in small wars.

For my own thoughts, I think airlift is the best assest. I would think that using airlift to transport troops to the action and support smaller units among the population (i.e. CAP) would be preferred to mega-FOBs like in Iraq. Also, airlift combined with a security force and AF BEAR base and other construction assets could be used to address civil-humanitarian needs. I'm reading "Fiasco" now and it, along with some other critiques, indicated that we missed the boat in addressing the population's needs vis-a-vis basic infrastructure and needs. People tend to care more about whether their electricity is working and if they can buy food at the supermarket before they care about new constitutions and the like. Perhaps airpower can assist with this?

I appreciate the comments for this neophyte in training. Although I'm still wondering why being a JAG is an instant credibility loss for Dunlap. Are you out there pcmfr?

[RTK]

Although I'm still wondering why being a JAG is an instant credibility loss for Dunlap. Are you out there pcmfr?

I'll answer this one from my perspective: If he was an Air Force pilot, I'd still dismiss him as not knowing what he's talking about. As an Air Force lawyer his abilities to enter COIN at the pointy tip of the spear, especially as a Major General, are non-existant. He simply has no frame of reference to base his claims on.

[Merv Benson]

Air assets are important to recon, such as the Predator drone which acts as a force multiplier by allowing eyes on more of the country with fewer troops. Precision munitions also make air power effective at attacking enemy strong points with minimum collateral damage. Air lift just gets troops to the theater and civilian airlines can do that too. Once in the theater air assets can do some logistic work which thwarts the enemy's efforts against resupply.

The enemy in Iraq concentrates against weakness. That makes combat troops his lowest priority when it comes to attacks. While his primary targets have been non combatants, he has also attacked infrastructure targets and supply convoys. Engagement with combat troops are almost always defensive when our forces are attacking his sanctuaries and safe houses. Non combatant targets include foreign workers trying to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure and reporters covering the war, as well as Iraqi civilians. Until the last year most of these civilian targets have been Shia.

In terms of an "Air Force COIN strategy" I agree with Steve, that there probably is not one as such, but the emphasis on jointness has probably pulled them into the current Centcom strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the best air assets in Afghanistan may be the A-10 which can do serious damage to the Taliban light infantry and is not as vulnerable as attack helicopters in the same roll. Air assets in COIN operations also tend to be reactionary when friendly units come under fire.

[pcmfr]

I'll answer this one from my perspective: If he was an Air Force pilot, I'd still dismiss him as not knowing what he's talking about. As an Air Force lawyer his abilities to enter COIN at the pointy tip of the spear, especially as a Major General, are non-existant. He simply has no frame of reference to base his claims on.

This pretty much nails it for me. Along with some personal bias I have based on JAGs providing worthless advice in a combat zone.

[selil]

When the original aspects of transformation started I watched in terror as once again the disbanding of the Marines was discussed. What I don't understand is why the Air Force exists. I know it is likely a result of the successes of World War 2, and that there was a consistent theme of air, sea, land to re-create the services. I was reminded recently that it takes an officer to drive a jet and a private to shoot a stinger. Cost effectiveness is definitely not balanced.

[Steve Blair]

The existence of the AF is wrapped up pretty tightly in politics, which explains why they are to this day the most political of the branches. The roots do back to World War II, and even the interwar period, but the main thrust came after World War II and the dawn of the atomic era. Many factors went into it, including the perceived cost of maintaining a large standing army as opposed to the "cost savings" of an airborne atomic deterrent.

And as yet another aside, the concept of officers only flying is something of an American aviation deal. Both the Germans and the British had flying sergeants in both World Wars, and the Marines did the same up until the first part of World War II. One could also argue that the high concentrations of officers in the AF has created its own problems (among them an NCO corps that is fairly weak when compared to those of the other branches), but this is way major tangent time...:)

In any case, it's high time someone made the AF look at MOOTW/COIN in a serious way. NK bomb tests aside, it's really what we will be doing for the foreseeable future.

[LawVol]

What about using air mobility for resupply rather than convoys? In attempting to win hearts and minds, the hard hand some take in getting convoys to their destinations probably doesn't help. While it would probably be more expensive, it could potentially result in less casualties and less of a negative effect on the population we're trying to win over.

I appreciate the responses and hope you don't mind the questions.

Also, since COIN seems to be a multi-disciplinary endeavor, perhaps the JAG (with some small wars learning) could prove valuable, especially in light of the growing number of legal issues encountered in COIN.

[Uboat509]

It would be extremely expensive and we simply do not have anywhere near enough helicopters to replace trucks as logistics haulers.

SFC W

[Jones_RE]

A JAG officer, perhaps especially an air force JAG, would have a lot of important input as to the legal ramifications of COIN and Small Wars. Unfortunately, the author of the piece hasn't offered a legal opinion at all! Instead, he's talking grand strategy - and it's one we've heard before.

Air power has an important role to play in all wars. Manned fighters and bombers will probably have their place no matter how advanced their robot counterparts become. But I don't think it's wise to believe that it can win wars all by itself. It's a nice bonus if it does, but it's foolish to count on that.

This may be preaching to the converted here, but consider the following question: what happens when we run into an enemy against whom we cannot achieve air superiority? Or who has air superiority versus the US? Do the Spartans still have the world's great land forces?

[Steve Blair]

It would be extremely expensive and we simply do not have anywhere near enough helicopters to replace trucks as logistics haulers.

SFC W

It's also a question of how much cargo can be carried and for what cost. It is possible to use helicopters to sustain combat units exclusively (it was done in Vietnam with the 1st Cavalry Division in 1965), but it requires a huge number of sorties and it's not practical in the long term. Some cargoes like fuel are simply easier to move via truck. There's also, as Uboat509 mentioned, the cost factor. It's much less expensive to run trucks than it is to get helicopters in the air. Doing solid airlift would also increase the logistics tail of the support element by a major amount.

[aktarian]

It's also a question of how much cargo can be carried and for what cost. It is possible to use helicopters to sustain combat units exclusively (it was done in Vietnam with the 1st Cavalry Division in 1965), but it requires a huge number of sorties and it's not practical in the long term. Some cargoes like fuel are simply easier to move via truck. There's also, as Uboat509 mentioned, the cost factor. It's much less expensive to run trucks than it is to get helicopters in the air. Doing solid airlift would also increase the logistics tail of the support element by a major amount.

IMO relying exclusively on air transport would also increase vulnerability during critical phases (landing, taking off, while exposed on the ground). Helicopters are more vulnerable to fire than trucks and disabling one wouldn't be that hard for determined enemy. Even if it's not destroyed it would take time to repair it, not to mention that you might need spares that can't be flown in by helicopter or would have to be flown in by sling load (thus again increaisng vulnerability).

[Ray Levesque]

His argument is just a rehash of the supporters of the 1990s "revolution in military affairs" that led many to believe that high tech weaponry (and Info Tech) would allow the US to fight any kind of war and win, at a much reduced cost. The only type of strategy his thinking supports is that of “decisive battle.” The problem with “decisive battle” is that whether a battle or war is decisive requires the enemy to accept the result. If he doesn’t accept a battle’s outcome, the war drags on.

His thinking represents tactical thought, not strategic – in the end the types of war in which we’re involved in Iraq and Afghanistan are won at the strategic level, not the tactical. Targeting is not strategy and never will be. Airpower cannot be the only tool in the strategic toolbox – not all problems require the same tool.

The reality is that our problems in Iraq are derived from poor strategic decision-making and not from a lack of airpower. Insurgencies are won or lost at the strategic level – we can always win at the tactical-level.

Dunlap’s argument reflects parochialism at its worse, and his article is more suited for a group of cheerleaders.

[pcmfr]

This may be preaching to the converted here, but consider the following question: what happens when we run into an enemy against whom we cannot achieve air superiority? Or who has air superiority versus the US? Do the Spartans still have the world's great land forces?

If/when that happens, then the US will no longer remain the world's dominant power. Ditto for maritime supremacy. I agree with everyone here who says that air power alone doesn't win wars, but when we don't have it, we will certainly lose.

[Steve Blair]

If/when that happens, then the US will no longer remain the world's dominant power. Ditto for maritime supremacy. I agree with everyone here who says that air power alone doesn't win wars, but when we don't have it, we will certainly lose.

I don't think anyone here is arguing that we don't need air power. But there is a certain faction within AF higher leadership that feels airpower can "go it alone" and do whatever is needed. This "true believer" faction tends to boil most problems down to target selection and weapons delivery, and also blurs the tactical and strategic areas into one lump that can be solved by proper ordnance delivery. They tend to avoid tactical considerations when possible because that may lead to a discussion of CAS; something the AF has been historically averse to under most circumstances.

[pcmfr]

They tend to avoid tactical considerations when possible because that may lead to a discussion of CAS; something the AF has been historically averse to under most circumstances.

I'm not sure that is true anymore, since we have proven that with PGMs, CAS can be successfully (and safely) executed from 25K+ feet.

[Steve Blair]

It is possible to do CAS at that range, but that isn't the same thing as the AF leadership wanting to make those resources available. Being able to do the mission and wanting to do the mission are two separate things. The AF historically has never been especially into CAS, since it distracts from what they feel are their main strategic missions (strategic bombing and space operations, although other missions do crop up from time to time).

[Merv Benson]

Air power is transitory. There is a reason why attacks were called air raids. An air raid has the ability to degrade and inconvenance, but by its nature it cannot last more the moment of impact and detonation. To have combat persisting power you have to have troops and equipment that can occupy and dominate an area.

Mao's theory of revolutionary warfare which relied on a raiding strategy still called for a point where there would be a general uprising that overwhelmed the enemy and allowed his forces to dominate an area.

The US effort in Afghanistan in concert with the Northern Alliance was actually and accelerated application of the revolutionary warfare theory.

It is the transitory nature of air power that makes it unable to cut lines of communication or control ground battle space. Combined arms operations are going to continue to be the most effective way to dominate and control a battle space.

[jcustis]

My senior thesis in Political Science dealt the B-2 bomber, and the Air Force's history of parochialism in spite of other options. This type of blind lunacy can be seen in their fighter programs, ICBM development in the 50s and 60s, and manned bomber exploits.

The fact that the Armed Forces Journal's editors didn't say, "thanks but no thanks," is almost unbelievable.

The Air Force does have good chow though. :rolleyes:

Edited to add: The only enemy air attack Marines or Soldiers have suffered in the last 50 yrs might arguably have been at the hands of their sister service.

[pcmfr]

Air power is transitory... It is the transitory nature of air power that makes it unable to cut lines of communication or control ground battle space. Combined arms operations are going to continue to be the most effective way to dominate and control a battle space.

For the most part, I agree with you. However, I'd say with persistent armed UAVs, this paradigm is shifting. At the very least, they enable us to leverage a much smaller ground force -- say an SR team with a laser designator on a ridge overlooking a valley -- to dominate a much larger battle space.

[SWJED]

Just saw this on the Secrecy News (http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2006/10/new_military_doctrine.html) Blog:


"Counterland Operations" (http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2-1-3.pdf)(pdf), Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3, 11 September 2006, refers to the use of U.S. air and space assets against enemy land-based forces.

[Steve Blair]

Just saw this on the Secrecy News (http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2006/10/new_military_doctrine.html) Blog:

This also surfaced a couple of weeks or so ago on the Joint Electronic Library site. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/service_publications_usairforce_pubs.htm

One of the few sites they haven't locked down for .edu domains yet, and a wealth of interesting stuff.

[Bill Moore]

Please see Jedburgh's post under the Deuce Shop, Hezbollah TTP, post 16. There are two excellent articles on Israeli Air Force's performance during their fiasco in Lebanon. It is telling and very relevant to this discussion. Air strikes against non-state entities, especially well established ones such as the Hezbollah have minimum positive impact, and maximum negative impact. I would enjoy hearing one our Air Force members comment on these articles.

[SWJED]

Please see Jedburgh's post under the Deuce Shop, Hezbollah TTP, post 16. There are two excellent articles on Israeli Air Force's performance during their fiasco in Lebanon. It is telling and very relevant to this discussion. Air strikes against non-state entities, especially well established ones such as the Hezbollah have minimum positive impact, and maximum negative impact. I would enjoy hearing one our Air Force members comment on these articles.

Reposted here:


Here's the first two parts of a three-part series being published in the Asia Times:

12 Oct 06: Part 1: Winning the Intelligence War (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ12Ak01.html)


...Our overall conclusion contradicts the current point of view being retailed by some White House and Israeli officials: that Israel's offensive in Lebanon significantly damaged Hezbollah's ability to wage war, that Israel successfully degraded Hezbollah's military ability to prevail in a future conflict, and that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), once deployed in large numbers in southern Lebanon, were able to prevail over their foes and dictate a settlement favorable to the Israeli political establishment.

Just the opposite is true. From the onset of the conflict to its last operations, Hezbollah commanders successfully penetrated Israel's strategic and tactical decision-making cycle across a spectrum of intelligence, military and political operations, with the result that Hezbollah scored a decisive and complete victory in its war with Israel...

13 Oct 06: Part 2: Winning the Ground War (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ13Ak01.html)


...Moreover, and more significant, Hezbollah's fighters proved to be dedicated and disciplined. Using intelligence assets to pinpoint Israeli infantry penetrations, they proved the equal of Israel's best fighting units. In some cases, Israeli units were defeated on the field of battle, forced into sudden retreats or forced to rely on air cover to save elements from being overrun. Even toward the end of the war, on August 9, the IDF announced that 15 of its reserve soldiers were killed and 40 wounded in fighting in the villages of Marjayoun, Khiam and Kila - a stunning casualty rate for a marginal piece of real estate...

[jonSlack]

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2101598


Professor Collins' spirited defense of the ground perspective (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2088164) is exactly the kind of discussion I hoped my article would catalyze. His views are predictable, and not just because he is a retired career Army officer. Beginning in 2001, he served as a special assistant to former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz for, of all things, "stability operations." During his watch, the Pentagon made decisions that produced the "stability" issues we have in Iraq today. I evaluate Collins' assessments of the future in that context. Regardless, he is a respected pundit who provides much worth considering.


Collins makes the weird claim that "colossal" boots-on-the-ground efforts are "likely" in the next decade. Yikes! Is that the "likely" scenario they are teaching at the National War College? If so, here's a reality check: Given Iraq and the budget, it is abundantly clear that neither the American people nor their elected leadership are "likely" to green-light a "colossal" deployment of American troops abroad, especially in the near term.

The Air Force is support. Part of the support provided is similar to the indirect fire provided by Field Artillery. However, the planes only major advantage over the field artillery pieces is mobility. Another part of the support provided by the Air Force is airlift capability. Another part of the support is the capability that UAVs and other ISR assets contribute. Finally, the Air Force provides specialized personnel such as Combat Controllers and JTACs, PJs, meteorological specialists, and other low density skills that directly and indirectly support the Soldiers and Marines (and Sailors and other Airmen) on the ground. Yes, they provide valuable support, but they are still just support.

COIN/Small Wars require boots on the ground interaction, lethal and non-lethal. Cops cannot do effective police work without leaving the squad car and the military cannot accomplish COIN/Small Wars without being on the ground.

Concerning the writing of the piece, I do not like the disrespectful tone. Words like "yikes!" and "weird" to describe the points raised by Collins and the use of the pejorative label "pundit" to describe him take away from the article. Mr. Collins is a professor and a retired officer, the author should treat him with the respect he deserves.

[marct]

Concerning the writing of the piece, I do not like the disrespectful tone. Words like "yikes!" and "weird" to describe the points raised by Collins and the use of the pejorative label "pundit" to describe him take away from the article. Mr. Collins is a professor and a retired officer, the author should treat him with the respect he deserves.

I would second that point. Personally, I thought Gen. Dunlap's final paragraph


All of this said, Collins very ably represents a valuable perspective on America's security needs. We need more such lively exchanges!

was one of the most lovable ways of translating "and would you like cyanide with that port?". Honestly! I read Gen. Dulap's original article and wasn't impressed with it at all - his "rejoinder" has all of the gentility of a politician being asked to step away from the trough. In the words of my grandmother - "A pox on his house!".:mad:

Back to professor Collins' article for a bit. One point he makes stands out


The U.S. should continue to transform all of the armed forces for a complex future that might include war at any point on the conflict spectrum. The top priorities should be the development of a balanced force, mastery of joint and combined operations, networking the force, improving our understanding of foreign cultures and educating our young officers to see war in all of its many guises.

This resonates with a thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=4112#post4112) on this board a couple of months back about rebuilding along the lines of the Roman Legions. The problem, of course, is political will and the consequent cost.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

This dismissive tone is common with the Air Force when they send someone out to shoot down a message they don't like or conflicts with their perception of reality. This little bit
Unfortunately, many former armor and infantry officers such as Collins mistakenly read "air power" as exclusively "Air Force." That is a huge mistake. Actually, it is the tremendous air and missile arms of the Army, Navy, Marines and Coast Guard — along with the Air Force — that together form America's air power capability. Air power is, in fact, not just the most versatile war-fighting tool in the U.S. military, it is also the most joint. Trying to turn the air power debate into an interservice rivalry simply will not — pardon the expression — fly. is a very common retort the Air Force uses, ignoring the fact that Marine air is joint by nature, and through no effort or cooperation on the part of the Air Force. And laying claim to the Army's assets (which the AF fought kicking and screaming every step of the way) under the blanket generalization of "air power" is for me the biggest lump of horse you know what in the entire article.:mad: The AF has for many years been claiming to be the most "Joint" of all the services. In fact, a recent book by the Air Force History Project "Air Force Roles and Missions: A History" (https://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/AirForceRoles&Missions.pdf) has this as one of its most basic "points."

On Collins' article, I found this part quite interesting:


General Dunlap's central conclusion that land forces "will be of little strategic import in the next war — the one we ought to be thinking about and planning for now" is questionable for three reasons:

First, we have a poor track record of predicting the locale and character of the next war. Some examples: Because of the atomic bomb, we were convinced that ground forces and surface navies were outmoded in 1949. The Korean War (for which we had no plans) proved otherwise. The force that did so well in Desert Storm was designed to meet an enemy on the plains of Europe. Afghanistan was the last place on earth that the Pentagon thought we might have to fight. Sadly, our advances in technical intelligence have not improved our ability to predict any specific war.

Accordingly, we ought not prepare our forces for a single war scenario — neither "the one" in East Asia, as Dunlap would prefer, or the global war on terrorism, as some single-focus, ground-force advocates would advocate. Rather, we must be prepared to fight whatever war is deemed by the president and the Congress to be in our national interest. We must have a full-spectrum military for a full-spectrum world.

Second, Dunlap's misunderstands what ground forces are supposed to do. He believes ground operations should be adjuncts to air operations, but the opposite has been the more usual case. Even in the 21st century, the seizure of territory and its occupation will be essential in wars of various stripes, even if it increases our casualties and opens us up to the possibility of the abuses attendant to close combat.

Third, counterinsurgency and stability operations will likely be a significant part of many future conflict scenarios. Post-Desert Storm, we marched into the 1990s content with our conventional general-purpose forces, only to find that peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and stability operations were the dominant items on our agenda. Nearly 15 years later, that trend shows no sign of letting up.

Dunlap is, in spite of his protests to the contrary, a spokesman (perhaps a willing, unconscious one rather than a deliberate one) for the standard Air Force line. You could take many of his assertions, print them in an Air Force magazine from the 1950s or 1960s, and never notice the difference.

[Steve Blair]

And in what seems like an interesting counterpoint to Dunlap's article we find this (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2088134) in the same issue.

One paragraph that stood out for me was

Experience over theory

It should be clear, then, that the big-war mind-set of the ACTS interwar theorists led to far more interest in theories espousing attacks of a strategic nature than in the practical application of air power during this period. Kennett accurately assessed that "the United States learned no clear and indisputable lessons on air support from the limited wars of the late thirties." To be fair, however, some airmen in the Army Air Corps were skeptical, choosing to err on the side of experience. For example, Gen. Orvel Cook explained that, as a student at ACTS in 1937-38, "some of us had more experience than some of the instructors and, consequently, we took a lot of this instruction with a large grain of salt, and we more or less made up our minds, ... no matter how dogmatic the instructor might be." In a 1936 letter, Lt. Col. M.F. Harmon and Maj. Oliver Gothlin expressed concern about an ACTS theory that lacked supporting evidence: "This has never been done. ... A note of caution should be sounded against the too ardent adoption of peace time [sic] theories and hypothesis when they are not supported by actually demonstrated facts nor by the experiences of war in the only war in which aviation was employed." In making one good observation, however, these two officers missed another point that is arguably more important: Air power had, in fact, been employed many times since World War I, the "only war" they chose to recognize. It was this type of omission that led to an interwar theory, uninformed by interwar experience, that would ultimately dictate the U.S. approach during World War II and lay the foundation for air doctrine in the decades that followed.

The author is also a student at the Marine Corps War College.

[120mm]

I would say that the US Air Force is, indeed, an important asset in the GWOT...For the terrorists. I would say that unlike the author, air power is one of the LEAST versatile weapons... The man on the ground is so much more versatile. Aircraft can bomb or not bomb... period. The man on the ground can actually DO SOMETHING other than kill/destroy. And infantry remains the most Precision-guided Munition known to man.

Frankly, even the most "precise" PGM results in exploitable "collateral damage" which is used by the terrorists/insurgents/whomever to drum up anti-US sentiment.

Secondly, the dependence on airpower and PGMs is seen as weakness and cowardice by the islamic extremists we currently face - which they use to drum-up anti-US sentiment.

We need airpower for national defense, and as a sort of super-mobile artillery, but c'mon.... I for one am all for paying our infantry more than pilots....

[Mondor]

I would agree that the misapplication of any weapons system is wasteful and can cause more harm than good to the war effort. However to classify air power assets as counterproductive is going too far. The current application of air power may be flawed, I for one have trouble understanding how sending in a PGM to a residential area for a “surgical” strike can be considered a good idea, but to dismiss air power as irrelevant to modern war just puts one in the same camp, though on the opposite side of the camp, as the adherents of the Douhet Model. They believed, some still do, in the flawed assumption that modern air power made ground combat forces irrelevant. To dismiss virtually all air delivered munitions as strategically irrelevant is an equally flawed position. Air power is just as versatile as a rifle. Remember the old saying about rifle fire accuracy, it is not the dope on the rifle, but the dope behind that is the problem.

While the enemy keeps on talking about how unmanly air strikes are, they fear them. Air strikes alone will not win any conventional or COIN conflict. But as part of a combined arms approach they are very helpful. The challenge is to think of air power in its combined arms role in a non-traditional way that benefits the guys on the ground.

A SF team in Afghanistan was having a disagreement with a group of armed men, who said they were Pakistani para-military border guards. The disagreement was that the border guards were about 500 meters west of where the border was the day before and they were pointing their weapons at our guys and telling them to leave or they would open fire.

The combat air controller put out a call to find out if there were any friendly aircraft in the area and found a B-52. The B-52 went into a holding pattern over the area. All our guys had to do then was to ask the self proclaimed border guards to go home for the day and then look up in the sky. The border guards looked up, saw the little spot in the sky that was the B-52, and decided that the border was about 500 meters to the east and that it was indeed time to call it a day. Interestingly, the folks on the Pakistani side of the border no longer pointed their weapons at US and Afghan forces, and there was no more confusion as to where the border was in that area

[Merv Benson]

Air power is by its very nature transitory. That is why air power attacks used to be called raids. However in a combined action approach it is extremely valuable in this war. It has been devastating the Taliban in Afghanistan where the Taliban units have been "fixed" by troops on the ground. It would not surprise me that a considerable number of the Taliban losses in the last year were from air strikes after the Taliban unit made contact with ground forces.

[Paralus76]

Upon reading this, I kept seeing RAF bi-planes "patrolling" vast stretches of the Indian Sub-Contentinent during the 1920's being replaced with F22s and JDAMs in the 21st Century. Somehow I think large numbers of smaller, inexpensive COTS planes flying COIN missions rather than silver-bullet F22s would give the general fits.

I must admit, though, the General has done an excellent job at co-opting the term "asymmetric".

[Tom Odom]

Frankly, even the most "precise" PGM results in exploitable "collateral damage" which is used by the terrorists/insurgents/whomever to drum up anti-US sentiment.


Good point 120mm. Also there has been much intellectual drift on the subject of PGMs as they were designed and as they are now used, or at least advertised.

The drive to develop PGMs was as much based on efficiency in costs and lives as anything else. That is to say how many missions and how many aircrew lives did it take to destroy a target. As the accuracy increased, the standard language of "surgical" strikes racheted up, tied to the idea of limiting collateral damage and thereby making the use of PGMs more acceptable, especially when advocating or defending their use.

But when it is all said and done, a precision guided 1000 pound bomb has the blast radius of a 1000 pound bomb just as a rifle grenade has the blast radius (roughly) of a grenade. Inside that blast radius, there is no such thing as precision. Yet we continually hear that advanced aircraft with PGMs can put a bomb through a window, suggesting that such a strike is "precise" because it may indeed go through the window. It is precise in that it only took one bomb to destroy the target; it is not precise as in "surgical" if civilians or friendly forces are within the blast area.

All of this assumes as well that PGM guidance systems are unerring in their accuracy; they are better but they like any mechanical-electronic system do fail, partially or totally.

Best

Tom