View Full Version : What will become of the CD&E mission of JFCOM?

04-08-2011, 07:20 PM
Does it matter???

Link to CSBA (http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/2011.03.31-Joint-Concept-Development-Experimentation1.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=CSBA+E-Newsletter+Issue+175&utm_content=CSBA+E-Newsletter+Issue+175+CID_9af8df10f0a8abffc492c6582 1077e32&utm_source=Email+Campaign)

Andrew Krepinevich provides testimony to Congress regarding what was envisoned (by him at least back when JFCOM was being invented) to be JFCOMs primary mission: to worry about the capabilities "COCOM's after next" 5-10 years down the line) would need and how they would use them. Krepinevich argues this 'futures' mission was progressively marginalized the the "Velcro Command" accreted duties and missions from every quarter.

Some of his key points and observations include:

...the Defense Department's rhetoric asserting the need for concept development and experimentation has yet to be matched by any great sense of urgency or any substantial resource support.

As in the interwar era, rapidly progressing (and diffusing) technologies have emerged, laying the groundwork for disruptive changes in the military competition and the way in which military operations are conducted. But as with naval aviation and mechanized ground operations seventy years ago, it is not yet clear how the future will play out.

Well-designed and executed wargames and simulations can provide an invaluable service to those charged with the "futures" mission of concept development and experimentation.

and this wonderful case of "speaking truth to power":

There is a possible explanation for why we have, thus far, seen so little in the way of specifics when it comes to concepts of operation. First, presenting detailed operational concepts for dealing with the anti-access/area-denial threat and other challenges would inevitably lead to a significantly different force structure and systems requirement mix- i.e., significant changes in the Services' current program of record. By identifying "losers" within its own projected force, a Service runs the risk of having these programs attacked by other Services competing for limited resources.

It also may encounter opposition from its own subcultures that stand to see their relative stature within the Service decline. The absence of specificity and alternatives with respect to current Service concepts of operation is reflected in the absence of a healthy competition among the Services to determining the new force structure, system and program changes required to adapt the U.S. military to address emerging challenges. This is regrettable, as inter-Service competition along these lines could provide a strong impetus for generating the innovation required to enable transformation.

Interested in the collective wisdom on whether this "futures" mission is something that should be centralized in a JFCOM like organization (a joint version of Army TRADOC? or Navy Fleet Forces Command) or semi-distributed to the War Colleges and Naval Postgraduate School? Pushed to the technologists at the various labs and Warfare Centers? or more fully distributed into the COCOM's? Or is it just a natural offshoot of doctrine and training development? All of the above? none of the above?

How do you balance and harmonize the back and forth between operational community tossing capability desires to the technical community and techies tossing technology prospects back? This takes on much of the flavoe of the J 3/5 guys asking the J2 guys "what information do you have", and the J2 resonding "what are you trying to do"?

Is that best done in a centralized fashion, or in distributive co-evolutionary teams?