Popular rebellion, state response and our failure to date: a debate

[davidbfpo]

Adapted from M-A Lagrange's post on the Libyan thread (No.682).

What struck me in the Libyan story is the incapacity of the modern state to deal with popular uprising(s). It is clear now that we just do not know, want or can deal with non-state actors, even if it's a population and not an armed group.

Basically we have not evolved, what ever we say, since the 'Cold War'. Tactics and technical factors have evolved, but states are still limited by their obligations to deal with a state, whether it is legitimate or not.

I really think that we - the SWJ community - have to start thinking in depth on this.

Quick scan of the headings here found nothing similar, although we may have touched upon the failure to adapt of the modern, western state elsewhere.

[Dayuhan]

Basically we have not evolved, what ever we say, since the 'Cold War'. Tactics and technical factors have evolved, but states are still limited by their obligations to deal with a state, whether it is legitimate or not.

Are states really obligated to deal with a state? During the Cold War states dealt with non-state actors on a regular basis: supporting rebels fighting against governments allied to your rival was a standard Cold War tactic.

Is it possible that what we're seeing now is less inability to deal with non-state actors than a (not unreasonable) uncertainty over the extent to which it is in the interest of any given state to commit itself to a relationship with a non-state actor in a time when there isn't the motivation of trying to undermine a great-power rival.

Is there a failure in Libya? If so, a failure to accomplish what? If there is a "failure", is it because the West doesn't have the capacity to work with a non-state actor or because the west isn't sure of the extent to which it wants to work with a non-state actor?

[M-A Lagrange]

First of all, thanks David for creating that new threat.

Dayuhan,

My point was rather on the fact that in Lybia, according to the media, Western powers are asking to the population to get organised, basically to have a "State like" structre we can deal with.

For non state actors, as rebel groups, you always have a hierarchy that you deal with. But in the case of Lybia, what really seems to be the limit for me is the fact that there was no organised government or para-state organisation. Which opened the door to many suputation: are they AQ... Basically: what are you people?

This striked me as Kilcullen was making almost the same reflection about USSR, saying that we did not see its end coming as we were focussed on the State apparatus and not the people.
In Lybia, it seems to be the same, we did/do not know what to do with that population that is not organised in a structure we (States) can apprehend and formally deal with. So it leaves an open door to negociations with a structure we know, in that case Gaddafi.
It seems that we are embarrassed with dealing with organisations which are not similar with Webberian States and even more with populations. And it is incontradiction with most of the discours of R2P and hearts and minds.

My point is: how can we deal with such "pure non state actor" or, to go in Bob's world direction, with the roots/core group of a State: the people.
It seems that if some components of the Clausewitz trilogy are missing (either land or army) we do not know what to do.
While we legitimate our position by the fact that our governements are by the people for the people and the spread of "democracy" is made for the people in the name of the people.
Actually, the people, who are the main actors of the trilogy, seems to be the most problematic to deal with.

But I do not want to limit the reflection on that by, for, in the name of the people aspect. I think that we need to look in depth to our ability to apprehend such event, especially population uprising. What is our role, what can we or cannot, do or do not want to do...
To use Dayuhan question: is west capable to work with populace/population/people?

[davidbfpo]

There is a similar thread 'Threat or Opportunity: non-violent protest?':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=12546

How do external states, for the SWJ community often not regional states, respond to a 'popular rebellion' in the early stages? For a moment ignore recent events in some Arab states. How about South Africa, post-Sharpeville or Rhodesia post-UDI? More recently Iran, Poland, Ukraine and many more.

Western diplomats have claimed their pre-regime change establishment of relations with internal and external opposition in South Africa was important in facilitating change. There was little or none in Iran and in Poland there was an attempt to over considerable support to Solidarity.

In an earlier thread on 'kith & kin' we debated that factor, prompted by the situation in Haiti: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8829

How legitimate can a Western state response be to a 'popular rebellion'? Legitimate to us, probably a few within the rebellion, not at all for the state concerned and quite possibly for many in the affected state.

[Marc]

How do external states, for the SWJ community often not regional states, respond to a 'popular rebellion' in the early stages?

To answer this question, it is necessary to understand the essence of popular rebellion. Popular rebellions revolve around mobilisation power. American sociologist Talcott Parsons likened uprisings to "A Run on the Power Bank". Popular rebellion succeeds if a defiant mass swamps a regime's instruments of repression. Regimes only have so many police officers, prison cells, torture chambers etc. When the masses keep crowding the streets despite of repression, the regime collapses.

This means that our attention should not focus on the crowds, but on the organizations that mobilize and sustain them. Raising a crowd of a hundred thousand people and maintaining its presence on a city square is an exercise in communication, transportation, finance, and logistics. The organization that leads this undertaking will almost invariably take the forefront when the regime crumbles.

Take Iran, though all factions of the population participated in the 1978 revolution (Liberals, Socialists and the Shi'i clergy), the clergy took the forefront because of their organizational infrastructure (mosques where they could adress groups of people, charitable branches that could manage distribution of food and water, financial reserves from religious fundraising, etc.) A similar thing happened in Iraq in the wake of OIF. In 2003, Moqtada al-Sadr took control of the remains of the organization that organized the (failed) 1991 Shi'i uprising. This organization allowed him to organize the first free Shi'i pilgrimage in southern Iraq, mobilising half a million people. Similarly, the 1987 Intifada put the organization that was able to sustain it logistically (the Muslim Brotherhood, which evolved later into Hamas) to the forefront.

In summary, for an effective response to a 'popular rebellion' in the early stages, we should NOT focus on the rebellion, but on the organization that SUSTAINS it.

[Fuchs]

A) States can choose to recognise a rebel government as the legitimate government, as France did with the Libyan rebels iirc.

B) There's non need to get involved in others' internal affairs in most cases. Whatever problem our governments have in dealing with foreign rebels in distant places, it's probably not important.

[Dayuhan]

My point was rather on the fact that in Lybia, according to the media, Western powers are asking to the population to get organised, basically to have a "State like" structre we can deal with.

Are we "asking them to organize" (assuming that we are; media reports aren't always accurate) because we can't deal with them unless they have a state-like structure? Or are we asking them to organize because they can't possibly win - or govern if they do win - if they don't organize?

Rebellions may start as disorganized mass movements, but if they want to succeed they sooner or later have to organize. If the government opposing them is strong enough to resists they will have to organize to defeat the government. If the government falls while the movement is still disorganized, there still has to be an organization process if the rebels are to take advantage.

[Fuchs]

Mao made this point, too. He wrote that uprisings rebel, then organise (plan). Political (ideological) movements plan (organise), then rebel.

[M-A Lagrange]

Mao made this point, too. He wrote that uprisings rebel, then organise (plan). Political (ideological) movements plan (organise), then rebel.

This is exactly my point. Mao is a figure of the post WW2 and Cold War. What about a rebellion that is not politically organised (many parties, civilian will...) not planed (population get fed up or react to a desperate act as in Tunisia or to repression).
Cause this is what West has been encouraging (non organised popular movement) and now may have to face/support. In the case of Lybia, the first move was to say: you are not organised that means we do not trust you cause you might be a easy catch for AQ.

[Fuchs]

The AQ fixation in Western politics (debates) is a domestic sickness. It's not even about foreign policy, but about a psychological condition.



I was likely too subtle on my main point:
There's no need for being able to deal with rebels in distant countries.
It's a nice-to-have for foreign policy and a feel-good bonus for the news cycle, but utterly irrelevant as a need for defence policy.


Good security policy is isolationist in the framework of a defensive alliance, everything that goes beyond is petty foreign policy gaming. IMO.

[Ken White]

The AQ fixation in Western politics (debates) is a domestic sickness. It's not even about foreign policy, but about a psychological condition.I think that's very true -- and I have great difficulty understanding the 'why.'
I was likely too subtle on my main point:
There's no need for being able to deal with rebels in distant countries.
It's a nice-to-have for foreign policy and a feel-good bonus for the news cycle, but utterly irrelevant as a need for defence policy.I'm not even sure it's really all that "nice to have" -- perhaps in a few cases. In most, I think it delusional.
Good security policy is isolationist in the framework of a defensive alliance, everything that goes beyond is petty foreign policy gaming. IMO.True and that gaming is most often expensive and counterproductive, doing more harm than good. It also is distracting from truly necessary defense and foreign policy issues as well as to the domestic polity.

Which is probably why the practice exists in spite of its obvious flaws...

[Fuchs]

I need a new signature and it's all your fault!

[Ken White]

LINK (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VxaRd8nvtn4). ;)

[TheCurmudgeon]

In summary, for an effective response to a 'popular rebellion' in the early stages, we should NOT focus on the rebellion, but on the organization that SUSTAINS it. I respectfully disagree. I think, since the end of WWII we have entered into an era where popular rebellions can be (or have been) sustained by ideas, not organizations. Ideas have no structure. The right idea at the right time is like a match in a field of dry grass, it rapidly can turn into a wildfire if not suppressed early. "An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come" Victor Hugo. In my mind the change has occurred for three reasons. First, communications is so much faster now than it had been in the past. Second, the mechanisms of state repression so popular prior to WWII are no longer viable in the international community. The third has to do with why the popular uprising happens, that is an entirely different theory.


I also think that it is human nature to want to put a face with a name (or in this case, a revolution). Even with faceless ones, we tend to put an person, in an iconic image, at the center of the storm. A man standing in front of a tank. Otherwise it is just too confusing, to hard to gauge who to trust. Plus, since so much of modern politics is business, too hard to figure out who is going to sell me the oil.

I don't know the answer. There was a time when a foreign power would send in military envoys to determine the likelihood of a revolution's success. Perhaps that is an idea whose time has come again.

[Fuchs]

I respectfully disagree. I think, since the end of WWII we have entered into an era where popular rebellions can be (or have been) sustained by ideas, not organizations.

Europe has a history of hundreds of years of rebellions based on ideas (even as simple as the idea that you have hunger), not organisations. We certainly didn't enter anything like that.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Europe has a history of hundreds of years of rebellions based on ideas (even as simple as the idea that you have hunger), not organisations. We certainly didn't enter anything like that.

At the risk of discussing areas of agreement, I agree that Europe, in particular, has a longer history of ideas being central to rebellions and revolutions (although to me, hunger is a lot more than an idea, or at least it is an idea with a much higher likelihood to motivate people to take risks to satiate it). However, in the good old days the king of England was probably not going to call for the ouster of the King of France because he decided to torture, kill off or banish all the Huguenots. Today, with the idea that legitimacy comes from the people it has become harder (although certainly not impossible) for a dictator to take repressive action against his people to suppress an idea.

[Fuchs]

The religious wars of the 16th and 17th century delegitimised the princes as well - in the eyes of those who chose the other faith. The whole 30 years war was about princes waging war against each other in denial of the other's attempt to set the faith for his realm.

China also has a huge history of rebellions that did not necessarily rest on organisations.

Decolonialisation rebellions were also often rather based on the idea of sovereignty than on organisations.


It was never easily tolerated when rulers killed off troves of dissenters. That's now a new thing. Today we bother more about it because of the media (nobody cared about Japanese imprisoning Koreans in 1920, but now we care about the gulags of the North Korean regime).
The people in the country themselves don't need mass media to learn about what happens with their neighbours, of course.


In the end, rebellions succeed when a regime is ripe for failure. I'm not even sure organisations are helpful against such regimes because organisations are usually badly infiltrated and can be destroyed much more easily than ideas.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Yeah, but you didn't see this kind of thing happening during the 30 year war.

Libya: ICC prosecutor seeks warrant for Gaddafi
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13408931

It just aint as easy to treat your population like subjects instead of citizens as it used to be...

.. although, not impossible (ala Saudi Arabia and Bahrain).

Interesting to see the rift begin to form between the new Arab "republics" and the old Arab monarchies.

[JMA]

... Second, the mechanisms of state repression so popular prior to WWII are no longer viable in the international community. ...

This is the key.

... and knowing this the US has introduced through the "pop-centric" approach to counter insurgency the alternative of throwing massive amounts of money at the problem. Doesn't work.

This is the problem Syria faces as there is no doubt that had they clamped down on the unrest on the scale Assad senior had done in 1982 with the Hama massacre (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hama_massacre) where tens of thousands of people were killed in a short time it would be all quiet now.

[Fuchs]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Rebellion_of_1857

[TheCurmudgeon]

Moving back to the original question:

What struck me in the Libyan story is the incapacity of the modern state to deal with popular uprising(s). It is clear now that we just do not know, want or can deal with non-state actors, even if it's a population and not an armed group.

Basically we have not evolved, what ever we say, since the 'Cold War'. Tactics and technical factors have evolved, but states are still limited by their obligations to deal with a state, whether it is legitimate or not.


I think that the modern nation-state can and does deal with non-state actors, like corporations and NGOs, as long as they have an organizational structure. The question becomes more, how do you deal with a mob? I am not sure that an outside element can until that amorphous blob coagulates into some organizational entity. I think you can send in envoys but you must be realistic about what you believe they can achieve.

I suppose you could send in a demagogue, someone trained at swaying a mobs opinions ... maybe George Clooney.

[Fuchs]

The question becomes more, how do you deal with a mob?

You step on a balcony and hold a speech.

This works fine (unless you're a delusional moron as was Ceaucescu).

[davidbfpo]

Moderator adds:

We appear to be in historical mode with FDR and Empire's dissolution. Later today I will start a new thread on that theme, in the history arena; meantime please keep Empire matters on hold.

Update

New thread started 'End of Empires: who was responsible?' (post WW2) and a few posts relocated. See:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13335

[outletclock]

This post from the The Monkey Cage, entitled "Cracking Down," might be of interest.

http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2011/03/29/cracking_down/#more

Some choice lines:


There are two basic strategies states use to combat urban uprisings: urban annihilation and coercive governance...Leaving aside the important question of the origins, cohesion, and organization of the opposition, it pays to focus on the political interests of state elites, not just their capacity, and in particular the interests of militaries.

First... it’s not necessarily how much state capacity you have, but instead what you do with it. The creation and deployment of state power are often endogenous to political interests and strategies...

Second, militaries are especially crucial because they are best able to carry out full-bore urban annihilation strategies. When the police falter, the internal paramilitaries break, and the party workers go home, regimes look to serried ranks of tanks and bayonets...

Research on the politics of crackdowns and military politics can help us make some sense of the daily headlines.

Regards,
OC

[motorfirebox]

As others have said, we really can't--and shouldn't--be trying to deal with mobs. The mob in Libya seems about as organized as a herd of schizoid cats; we're only trying to deal with them because we don't like Gaddafi.

[TheCurmudgeon]

As others have said, we really can't--and shouldn't--be trying to deal with mobs. The mob in Libya seems about as organized as a herd of schizoid cats; we're only trying to deal with them because we don't like Gaddafi.

But therein lies the problem.

First, our interests are aligned, so we have a reason to want to see them defeat Gaddafi. Second, they are a mob, so what do you do? At this point it becomes a bifurcated issue. First, there is the military side of the house, how do we help them win. We used to have people trained for that. Second, there is the political side of the house. That is much more complicated but no less important (unless the ultimate plan is simply to install a military dictator, in which case prong one handles everything). Seems to me that, the sooner we get on the ground the more likely we are to both make friends and influence people (or, more correctly, influence their future foreign policy towards us). I think the question is still valid - how do we do this?

Finally, there is the issue of who else is trying to influence the outcome of the rebellion and what are their interests versus ours? I am sure China would love to have access to the oil. What are the likely consequences of inaction?

[slapout9]

From the Corbett report. Some video clips and comments with an around the world view of various protests and uprisings.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yxcOyXnnN8s&feature=player_embedded#at=60

[davidbfpo]

A short essay by two American authors, one an academic, the other with the intelligence community, which appeared on Lawfare; the main article is behind a paywall:http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/the-foreign-policy-essay-the-rising-threat-of-revolt-in-autocracies/

The Editor's introduction:
People power” has long captured the hearts of Western publics, with images of brave protesters standing up to tyrants renewing our faith in how extraordinary ordinary people can be. Yet elite coups, not popular protest, have long been the biggest danger to dictators. However, the Arab Spring brought renewed attention to popular protests as a form of regime change, as autocrat after autocrat fell or appeared near collapse. Andrea Kendall-Taylor, who serves in the U.S. intelligence community, and Erica Frantz, a professor at Bridgewater State University, contend that the Arab Spring is not an anomaly: popular protest is indeed on the rise as a form of regime change and that this trend, if nurtured properly, could make the spread of democracy more likely.


Authors’ Note: This essay draws on a recent article in which we argue that today’s dictators should be more concerned with popular protests than they have in the past.

Somewhat surprised they end on an optimistic note.

[AmericanPride]

A short essay by two American authors, one an academic, the other with the intelligence community, which appeared on Lawfare; the main article is behind a paywall:http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/the-foreign-policy-essay-the-rising-threat-of-revolt-in-autocracies/

The Editor's introduction:



Somewhat surprised they end on an optimistic note.

David,

How many sustainable democracies have emerged from "popular revolt"? The radicalization process inherent in revolutionary activity would seem to suggest a tendency towards authoritarianism at the completion of the revolutionary cycle.

[Firn]

Eastern Europe has for the most part been a smashing success, I would say. Possibly one could include India and the US as well although it is often difficult to difference between a popular revolt and an elitist one.

In any case it is important to keep basic logic in mind. Lots of things have to work out in the right way to have a sutainable democracy. If you have ten different popular revolutions in ten different countries with ten different regimes it is rather unlikely to have the same outcome in the short and long run....

[AmericanPride]

Eastern Europe has for the most part been a smashing success, I would say. Possibly one could include India and the US as well although it is often difficult to difference between a popular revolt and an elitist one.

In any case it is important to keep basic logic in mind. Lots of things have to work out in the right way to have a sutainable democracy. If you have ten different popular revolutions in ten different countries with ten different regimes it is rather unlikely to have the same outcome in the short and long run....

I suppose it also depends in how we define 'popular revolt' and the distinction between that (which is active) and, say, regime collapse (which would be passive).

[TheCurmudgeon]

Eastern Europe has for the most part been a smashing success, I would say. Possibly one could include India and the US as well although it is often difficult to difference between a popular revolt and an elitist one.

In any case it is important to keep basic logic in mind. Lots of things have to work out in the right way to have a sutainable democracy. If you have ten different popular revolutions in ten different countries with ten different regimes it is rather unlikely to have the same outcome in the short and long run....

They have a popular revolt in Thailand every few years until the Army got tired of them and held a coup.

As you note, the term "popular revolt" is somewhat misleading.


Simultaneously, the rise of communication technologies and social media has almost certainly fueled a rise in revolts. Revolts capable of bringing down a dictator are notoriously difficult to orchestrate. While coups require only a handful of individuals, revolts entail the mobilization of tens of thousands of citizens. Social media technologies reduce coordination costs, enable more citizens to make anti-regime preferences public, and widely publicize regime abuses that can serve as triggering events for widespread protest.

In most countries, tens of thousands of citizens is still far less than one percent of the population. Therefore, to try to equate a popular revolt with a revolt by the masses, is not only a stretch, it is an outright misrepresentation.

So while there may be popular revolts, in many places the real fight only starts when the social constructs that held historic hatreds in check are removed. Then all hell brakes loose.