View Full Version : Crowdsourcing on AQ and Analysis (new title)
So I've been blogging about whether Usama Bin Laden still matters to the global jihadi movement. Essentially, if UBL was captured or killed tomorrow, would it mattter? And, if it does matter, what would be the outcome?
Here is a survey I posted and had some good participation on it, mostly from academics. I throw it up here as I'd like to get the perspective of those that have been deployed to AFG/IZ and other CT assignments. Here are the three questions I posted and would enjoy any and all thoughts on this topic.
Here's the poll:
Overall theme of the poll:
If Usama Bin Laden were killed in 2011, would it matter to the global jihadi movement?
Question #1:
What will be the chief consequence of Usama Bin Laden’s death to the global jihadi movement? (Only pick One!)
-Status Quo- No substantial change in AQ activity
-AQ Central directed plots against U.S. and its Allies decrease substantially
-AQAP becomes new AQ Central
-Some other AQ member in AF/PAK becomes leader of AQ Central
-AQ Central loses its chief sponsor, the Haqqani network
-AQ fundraising increases substantially
-AQ fundraising diminishes substantially
-Taliban more reluctant to make peace with Karzai
-AQ-inspired recruitment slows substantially
-AQ-inspired recruitment accelerates substantially
-AQ Central directed plots against U.S. and its Allies increase substantially
-Taliban pursue a peace settlement with Karzai
-AQ Central shifts focus to pursue guerilla warfare in Central Asia
Question #2:
What will be the chief consequence of UBL’s death for the U.S. and its Western allies? (Only pick One!)
Public pressure forces early withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.
Public pressure forces a refocus on counterterrorism operations (Biden Plan).
Status Quo- No substantial change in U.S. and Western operations.
Question #3:
Would UBL’s death result in more or less AQ-inspired attacks over the next five years? (2011- 2016) (Only pick One!)
-More
-Less
-No Change in the pace of attacks.
Thanks,
Clint
www.selectedwisdom.com (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=110)
Bob's World
01-09-2011, 01:04 PM
A couple of thoughts:
1. Killing senior leadership is a slow road to victory (Except in a case where some guy with legal power over people is forcing them to do things against their will. UBL's power is the power of the conditions he exploits, the power of his cause, and his supporters are all volunteers.) Killing him will not weaken the cause, but could make it stronger.
2. Capturing him and attempting a civilian trial under US, or even international, standards would be an IO disaster for the west.
3. He will be replaced. Take out UBL, and AQ gains a new leader who may actually be more effective than the current one. Take out AQ and a new organization will form that may well be more effective than AQ. Success lies in addressing the causes, and so long as the majority of senior leaders believe it is a mix of "malign actors" and "radical Islam" we will continue to chase our tails on this. (both of those are necessary aspects of how the causation is exploited, but are not causal in of themselves).
4. Should we kill him? Definitely. Quietly, relentlessly pursue him and his core followers to the corners of the earth and terminate them where we find them. They have earned that. But that is a handful of guys, and should not be confused with the nationalist insurgents across the globe that respond to the UW efforts of AQ. But as to the causation they exploit, as to the conditions of insurgency in so many countries that they exploit, as to the sympathetic supporters in western communities that either empathize with the people in oppressed lands, or feel strongly that their government at home is an oppressor (or at least an enabler of oppressors); that will all still be in place, and that is the real problem that must be addressed, and killing UBL will have no positive effect on that. That will require an evolution of US foreign policy and will also require evolution of many domestic policies in the nations where this causation is the stongest as well.
slapout9
01-09-2011, 07:13 PM
Of course it matters. He killed Americans and destroyed our property. Will it stop terrorist attacks no, but it will bear on the mind of future attackers that when we find you, you will be DRT(dead right there).
1. Killing senior leadership is a slow road to victory (Except in a case where some guy with legal power over people is forcing them to do things against their will. UBL's power is the power of the conditions he exploits, the power of his cause, and his supporters are all volunteers.) Killing him will not weaken the cause, but could make it stronger.
I agree in the case of a persistent COIN or CT campaign. I see it differently with UBL. His death would create an immediate shift in how the West chooses to counter AQ. He's a big symbolic target for the U.S. and one of the main justifications for being in Afghanistan. I don't think it would make AQ stronger either, but do think the result would be more attacks as followers compete to emerge the new leader.
2. Capturing him and attempting a civilian trial under US, or even international, standards would be an IO disaster for the west.
Agree, I sure hope they wouldn't take him alive.
3. He will be replaced. Take out UBL, and AQ gains a new leader who may actually be more effective than the current one. Take out AQ and a new organization will form that may well be more effective than AQ.
Really good point, I am curious how this will play out. I expect it will happen eventually, and maybe even soon.
Fuchs
01-09-2011, 08:56 PM
Of course it matters. He killed Americans and destroyed our property. Will it stop terrorist attacks no, but it will bear on the mind of future attackers that when we find you, you will be DRT(dead right there).
I know 19 guys who wouldn't have given a damn.
slapout9
01-09-2011, 11:48 PM
I know 19 guys who wouldn't have given a damn.
Yea,cause they are dead!
Fuchs
01-09-2011, 11:59 PM
"wouldn't have given" referred to the time when they made their final decision.
I don't think the fear of being hunted will keep AQ attacks from occurring. They are seeking death as a way of fulfilling their ideology.
Persistent pursuit does alter AQ's operations and their security. Continued attacking of AQ's leadership shapes their ability to conduct further operations.
Bob's World
01-10-2011, 11:09 AM
I don't think the fear of being hunted will keep AQ attacks from occurring. They are seeking death as a way of fulfilling their ideology.
Persistent pursuit does alter AQ's operations and their security. Continued attacking of AQ's leadership shapes their ability to conduct further operations.
OK, quotes on "Lie" because I don't think either was a conscious lie to defraud the American people; but rather that the idea that AQ is about ideology is even more flawed than the idea that going into Iraq was about WMD. Or more analogous, that Soviet efforts to expand their influence during the Cold War were about Communism; or that U.S. efforts to expand its influence are about Democracy. We need to learn to be better at separating Causation from Motivation; and Material Facts from Relevant Facts.
AQ and Bin Laden are an organization and man for their times; much as the Nazi party and Hitler were for theirs. Different times in a different place, they don't occur. Given the time and place, if they did not exist some similar organization and leadership would have eventually emerged in response.
The seeds for WWII were planted at Versailles; or at least were not eradicated and were well fertilized there by the victors of WWI. Similarly the seeds for GWOT have been planted and nurtured over hundreds of years of Western Colonial and Post-Colonial manipulation of the politics and populaces of the Middle East. With the end of the Cold War rationale for such manipulations and the advent of the tools of globalization AQ and Bin Laden were inevitable.
The question is not what happens if we kill Bin Laden. Answer that and get a C+. The real question is what happens if we do not address Western foreign policies toward the Middle East? What happens if the West continues to enable some of the most despotic regimes on the planet to both remain in power and treat their own populaces with impunity? Kill bin Laden, but that is just step 1 in a 100-step process. Personal opinion? We've been way too focused on step 1, and it is distracting us from the hard policy work that is yet to be done on the other 99.
Dayuhan
01-11-2011, 01:22 AM
The real question is what happens if we do not address Western foreign policies toward the Middle East? What happens if the West continues to enable some of the most despotic regimes on the planet to both remain in power and treat their own populaces with impunity? Kill bin Laden, but that is just step 1 in a 100-step process.
I've asked this before, I know, but since I've yet to get an answer I'll ask again: where exactly do we "enable some of the most despotic regimes on the planet to both remain in power and treat their own populaces with impunity"? We arguably keep the governments of Iraq and Yemen in power, but these governments are less despotic than ineffectual. We pay the government of Egypt not to mix it up with the Israelis (a good deal for them, since they don't want to mix it up with the Israelis anyway), but we don't enable them to stay in power and we don't enable them to oppress their populace: they could and would do both quite well without us.
We don't enable the governments of Saudi Arabia or the Gulf States at all, except perhaps indirectly through our insatiable appetite for oil. They don't need us to stay in power, and they certainly don't need our help or approval to oppress their populaces. Neither do their populaces, even when they dislike their governments, want us interfering in their domestic affairs.
The idea that we somehow enable these governments to stay in power and oppress their people suggests that we have the capacity to remove them from power, or to change the way they relate to their people, if only we cease to enable. We do not actually have that capacity or that influence, and there are few things more dangerous than assuming a capacity that you do not actually have.
We cannot impose the Cold War paradigm where it does not fit. During the Cold War we openly installed dictators, encouraged coups d'etat, kept dictators in power with aid and force. Those dictators depended on us and we did have influence over them (though it was often diluted by our mistaken belief that we needed them to obstruct the commies). This situation does not prevail in the Gulf. There are despots, yes, but we didn't put them in power, we don't keep them in power, and they don't need us. We don't have the influence to change them, any more than we have the influence to change the regimes in China or Uzbekistan. We deal with all of them, because they exist and we have to, but they are not "our bastards".
Personal opinion? We've been way too focused on step 1, and it is distracting us from the hard policy work that is yet to be done on the other 99.
What policy changes, exactly, would you like to see?
Does bin Laden matter? To AQ, probably not that much. To the US, certainly he does. Killing bin Laden would provide a certain amount of closure an an era that we'd do well to close. It would allow us to put the counterproductive "GWOT" construct behind us and develop a more realistic presentation of the challenge. it would make an Afghanistan exit strategy more palatable.
While we haven't disabled AQ, it would be a mistake to say things have gone well for them. In SE Asia, which some analysts were once calling the "swing state" for the global jihad, they've fallen flat, not because of anything we did, but they have. The end of the oil glut and the consequent huge inflow of money to the Gulf has largely dismantled the 90s narrative of aggressive self-pity and greatly diminished AQ's traction in the Arab heartland. In other places it's been up and down, but you'd be hard pressed to claim realistically that they're ascendant anywhere. Oddly, they've probably seen the greatest expansion of influence in Western Europe, largely due to economic stress.
Certainly there are policy changes we could usefully make, but messing in the internal affairs of Muslim countries is not going to get us anywhere. I'd like to see us continue the withdrawal from Iraq: certainly they'll have issues, but we don't need to make those our issues. I'd like to see Iraqi oil contracts go to the Chinese and Europeans. That would be a minor setback for some US companies but no strategic problem at all for the US, and it would directly challenge the claim that the US is trying to control Iraqi oil.
Changing our rhetoric toward Israel would also help a lot, though in fact our influence there is much lower than it once was.
In short, there are things we can do to undermine AQs narrative, and we should do them. Trying to do what we can't do is only going to snap back in our faces.
Ken White
01-11-2011, 02:57 AM
...the idea that AQ is about ideology is even more flawed than the idea that going into Iraq was about WMD.While I'm fully aware that's what the then and now governments of the US said, I'm quite sure that neither of those 'motives' is or was of any real concern to any real decision makers now or then. I think to base much theorizing on the belief that those things were or are deemed important and truly cause for war would be to begin planning from false premises...
...We need to learn to be better at separating Causation from Motivation; and Material Facts from Relevant Facts.Umm, yes, I think so. We also probably need to not say 'A' while being actually motivated by 'R' through 'BL.' Seems to confuse people. :D
Similarly the seeds for GWOT have been planted and nurtured over hundreds of years of Western Colonial and Post-Colonial manipulation of the politics and populaces of the Middle East. With the end of the Cold War rationale for such manipulations and the advent of the tools of globalization AQ and Bin Laden were inevitable.Probably true but there's also been a whole lot more fertilizer spread by many aside from the US. You can prescribe for the US but I doubt you'll get it past the US public or Congress -- and I really doubt you can affect the mores and attitudes of many other nations, nominal friends but a good many of whom have in the past worked and will in future work diligently behind the scenes to insure we stay the big bad, disliked Gorilla...
The question is not what happens if we kill Bin Laden. Answer that and get a C+.I wouldn't even give it a 'C.' It won't make much difference either way.
What happens if the West continues to enable some of the most despotic regimes on the planet to both remain in power and treat their own populaces with impunity?Define 'enable.' Please provide examples, I'm old and slow...
Also, what is your suggestion to remediate that shortfall you perceive?
* or if not, might as well be, he's broadly irrelevant. That I can agree with... ;)
I don't think the fear of being hunted will keep AQ attacks from occurring. They are seeking death as a way of fulfilling their ideology.
They are seeking death while successfully accomplishing their missions. If they are killed and captured often enough before they have a chance to accomplish their missions, that might have a dissuasive effect as time passes. If you can never get on base, most people might tend to give up the game.
Bob's World
01-11-2011, 07:26 PM
A paper I have coming out soon will explore this in greater detail, but here is a snapshot side-by-side comparison of what we've been doing for 60+ years in "Containment" with what I propose is more appropriate for the emerging world with "Empowerment."
Empowerment is a word the President uses a great deal. It's in his intro to the National Security Strategy. But that is all it is, a word. A bold, encouraging word, with little to flesh out what he really means, what is his specific guidance to the government in this regard, how do we operationalize it, etc.
I don't know if this is the answer, but it is something I've been playing with at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies. This is just a snapshot, so may well spark more questions than answers, but any comments, pro or con are always welcome from my august peers here at the SWJ.
Dayuhan
01-11-2011, 10:31 PM
A paper I have coming out soon will explore this in greater detail, but here is a snapshot side-by-side comparison of what we've been doing for 60+ years in "Containment" with what I propose is more appropriate for the emerging world with "Empowerment."
Empowerment is a word the President uses a great deal. It's in his intro to the National Security Strategy. But that is all it is, a word. A bold, encouraging word, with little to flesh out what he really means, what is his specific guidance to the government in this regard, how do we operationalize it, etc.
I don't know if this is the answer, but it is something I've been playing with at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies. This is just a snapshot, so may well spark more questions than answers, but any comments, pro or con are always welcome from my august peers here at the SWJ.
I agree on containment... silly idea when the antagonist has no specific geographic boundaries within which they can be contained. I don't think you'll find anyone willing to argue against "empowerment" per se... it's a lovely word and very much the mot du jour. There's a reason why it stays mostly in the rhetorical realm, though: it's easy to say and difficult to do. We've a rather indifferent record at empowering our own disempowered citizens, and the complexities multiply when the people we propose to empower are citizens of other nations with their own sovereign prerogatives. How do we "empower" people in other countries, especially those in which our interference in internal affairs is generally highly unwelcome even among those we propose to empower?
Whom do you propose to empower, and how? As always, the devil is in the details...
Ken White
01-11-2011, 11:02 PM
A paper I have coming out soon will explore this in greater detail, but here is a snapshot side-by-side comparison of what we've been doing for 60+ years in "Containment" with what I propose is more appropriate for the emerging world with "Empowerment."However, letting that alone for now, I have some questions on your "empowerment" column:
- Who or what establishes -- and enforces (as 'limits' implies constraint of some sort) -- those "clear limits" for 'empowerment?'
- Avoiding excessive partiality and excessive dislike are noble ideals. My suspicion is that US Policy makers may not themselves be idealist enough to adhere to the mantra but of more concern to me are those nations that will not reciprocate that ideal attitude and will endeavor to manipulate it. How do you propose to avoid the first cited possibility and obviate the second?
- Who or what establishes the "clear" limits on freedom and competition? Do we have a 'right' to establish such "limits" while still following our "core principles? If we do, who or what will insure they are followed?
- How do we promote self determination and principles, deny (or did you mean to not deny them...) unalienable rights while at the same time allowing freedom and competition?
- Will the encouragement of "positive behavior" entail bribes as to Egypt, Israel and many other nations over the last half century?
- Who determines what are in fact, not in hopes or personal opinions, "core U.S. principles?" How will we embed the accepted and agreed principles to the extent that political ideologies involved in changes of Administrations will not entail a major policy shift?
I'll also note in passing that yet again you evade a direct response. You wrote:
What happens if the West continues to enable some of the most despotic regimes on the planet to both remain in power and treat their own populaces with impunity?I then asked:
"Define 'enable.' Please provide examples, I'm old and slow..."
"Also, what is your suggestion to remediate that shortfall you perceive?"
If you meant your Chart as partial answer to my requests, I can accept that as your ideas on remediation (subject to my specific queries herein on that Chart ;) ). However, I really would like to know who in the West is enabling and how they are doing that.
As Dayuhan noted, those little details have to be considered... :wry:
Chris jM
01-11-2011, 11:10 PM
I look forward to the article, but I don't see the two concepts being mutually exclusive in practice.
Empowering South Korea has the effect in containing North Korea, for example.
As I see it, the issue is one of perspective. Some people see whatever policy or strategy is in question as empowering group A, others will see it as containing group B.
Unfortunately I would point to your quote a few posts earlier - that is all it is, a word - and suggest that the same damnation applies to empowerment as it does containment.
I would like to be proved wrong, however.
Bob's World
01-12-2011, 04:25 PM
Just providing food for thought, and it is good to see that the sharks are feeding.
No time now for a long reply, but some quick inputs:
As to example states? Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt and Afghanistan to name but four. Each is unique in approach due to the unique relationships. Some are rich but weak, so we protect them from external threats. Some we protect from internal threats. In all we look the other way when they suppress the dissent of their own internal populaces, these nationalist insurgent movements, and bundle it under the auspice of "counterterrorism." Some we do so to ensure access to resources, some to ensure critical sea lanes remain open, some because we mistakenly believe that sanctuary comes from a "space" rather than a mix of more intangible factors. All are held up as friends and allies though all also routinely violate in their treatment of their own populaces core principles that hold out as our trademark and routinely demand of, or condemn other states for not subscribing to.
As to where our "core principles" are defined? Primarily from three documents, enshrined side by side in the National Archives: The Declaration of Independence, The Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. Many of these core principles are assessed differently over time, and those assessments are "values," a principle with judgment applied to it. We need to hold true to our own stated values, but we need to not demand them of others. Our core principles are fewer, and much more universal in application, such as a general concept that "all men are created equal," though in reality we understand the value assessed to that principle varies widely. Rights to life, liberty, pursuits of happiness. These too many different things in different cultures, or even within a single culture over time. These differences are values.
As to the common argument for never doing something new, even though most can agree that the current course is in need of change is "that would be hard, how would you do that." I am sure they asked the same thing of Mr. Kennan upon reading his long telegram, but they did not expect him to spell that all out for them. We realize that some things have to be given to the executors as a mission statement, and then figured out within those respective lanes. But this is just a summary slide from a deck of slides that summarize a paper, that in turn summarizes a concept.
Anything worth doing is likely to be difficult. Anything new is likely to be incomplete. For most of us, it is the challenges of new and difficult things that get us out of bed in the morning.
Ken White
01-12-2011, 05:34 PM
Just providing food for thought, and it is good to see that the sharks are feeding.Nibbles, no feeding frenzy...
Re: your cited States:
In all we look the other way when they suppress the dissent of their own internal populaces...How do you propose we correct their tendency to do things of which you and some others disapprove? (emphasis purposefully added...)
Does not such corrective action interfere with your stated intent:
We need to hold true to our own stated values, but we need to not demand them of others.Dichotomy there, you seem to want to have it both ways. You've never really addressed that issue even though many surface it occasionally. Some of us seem to think it important to your hypothesis...
As several of us -- not just ol' moi -- have mentioned, you cannot correct their attitudes and 'not interfere' at the same time. You occasionally suggest that if we just talk to them, they'll fix it. Lot of skepticism about that...
I'm pretty well aware of what our core principles are supposed to be and from whence they spring. Tthat's not an issue, this is:
...Many of these core principles are assessed differently over time, and those assessments are "values," a principle with judgment applied to it.Exactly. The issue is how you persuade the American public, the Administration and Congress of the day to hew to those values. To say we should do so is easy. It is likely also futile UNLESS you can show a benefit to us for doing so and, thus far, you have failed to do that IMO.
As to the common argument for never doing something new, even though most can agree that the current course is in need of change is "that would be hard, how would you do that."I'm all for doing something new and have long had gripes with what we are doing -- but the issue isn't avoiding change, it is how to bring that change about. I agree with where you want to go and have long -- along with several others -- suggested that your goal is good -- what's your strategery to get there? :wry:
But this is just a summary slide from a deck of slides that summarize a paper, that in turn summarizes a concept.And my questions above were just a summary of the many more questions that slide raises.
Recall the old staffers dictum -- answer the question, answer the question that should have been asked and answer the questions your answer will generate...:cool:
Anything worth doing is likely to be difficult. Anything new is likely to be incomplete. For most of us, it is the challenges of new and difficult things that get us out of bed in the morning.Yeah. Howsomeever, it's been my observation that it is far less difficult if one provides consensually viable steps instead of just telling the boss he's stupid...;)
Bob's World
01-12-2011, 05:52 PM
Well, it is the boss that says do "Empowerment." The President put it in his comments in the NSS, and uses it in virtually every forum. By sitting down and considering what he means by that and coming back with a proposal for how that concept might be employed in a new grand strategy/focus to foreign policy, I believe I am merely doing due diligence.
I know for a fact that within the Chairman's strategy team they are drilling into very similar concepts.
No one's calling anyone stupid, but I do sometimes question the motivations of those who ignore specified and implied tasks given to them by their boss if favor of continuing to do what they are comfortable doing. Particularly when it is fairly clear that what they are doing is not working very well.
As to the Realist/Idealist I put that in to make people stop and think. "Containment" has a very "realist" name; but in execution, every since 1950 it has been focused on the containment of ideologies we disagree with. Communism, Islamism. Very Idealistic. "Empowerment" on the other hand has a very Idealistic name, but as I envision it (there is no doctrine or historic experience) it is implemented in a very realist way. Only applying it where national interests exist; and then building coalition and identifying competitors on any given issue by the relative shared and conflicting interests of other parties in regards to that issue.
As an example, the US may only have 20% match on national interests with Iran, but as applied to stability in Afghanistan we may well have an 80% match. A NATO ally such as Germany may have an 80% match with the US in general, but only a 20% match in regards to this issue of Afghan stability. Logic then dictates that the more effective partner for this issue is Iran. This is in concert with Washington's caution on enduring friends and enemies. Containment demands enduring enemies and friends alike. Not very realistic. Empowerment realistically realizes that such issues vary by issue.
As one British leader once said "Britain has no enduring allies, only enduring interests." (or words to that effect).
Thanks for everyone's posts here. I've been analyzing a poll that I put together and this discussion helped my put some things together.
I understand the larger concerns about improving Middle East policy, etc. However, I'm not optimistic that this is really even an option. So, I'm trying to dissect the slow incremental developments which might contribute to a longer run strategy. Overall, I don't think Bin Laden really matters anymore and question whether the Afghan campaign needs to be what it is. I'm really interested in what it should be after the summer of 2011. Hence the question, "Does Bin Laden Matter?" and I think the answer helps us come to a solution for the end of this year.
http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=116
CWOT
Here are some of my thoughts on a post Bin Laden AQ based on the poll I put together in this original post.
“Other AQ member in AF/Pak becomes new leader of AQ Central” ended up being my selection. This was a tough decision but here was my logic in relation to the other choices. (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=125)
1. Zawahiri is 'no fun'
Zawahiri might make a good “#2”, but I’m not sure other AQ members, the Taliban or the Haqqani network will let him ascend. I’m uncertain why exactly. However, I get the feeling that Zawahiri is always trying to outshine Bin Laden, lacks Bin Laden's charisma, and finds it hard to make friends amongst other AQ members. Zawahiri is also from the North African (EIJ) strain of AQ. Despite his legacy with the group, I think AQ Central will turn to someone from the Gulf or Central/South Asia to take the reins. Zawahiri may be talented from a terrorist sense but he has a 1990’s Al Gore feel to him and thus I believe will never rise above #2. This poses another question, if Zawahiri were not to assume the top job post-Bin Laden, would this fracture AQ’s base of North African support? Would there be damaged relations between AQIM and AQ Central? Would love to hear opinions in this!
2. Haqqani protection won't extend forever to Zawahiri
My guess is the Haqqani network will not provide protection for a Zawahiri-led AQ post-Bin Laden. While the Pashtunwali code for protecting guests has served Bin Laden well, I suspect that his death will bring the end of what has been an amazing level of Haqqani support. I also estimate that the Haqqani’s would not like to see Zawahiri emerge as the new leader of AQ Central, instead preferring someone with local interests (AF/PAK) of equal or greater priority than global jihad. Will the Haqqani’s support an AQ led by Zawahiri? Would love to hear opinions on this!
3. New AQ leader needs to be AF/PAK capable
To maintain safe haven in Pakistan, AQ Central must maintain Haqqani support, placate ISI members, retain AQ group initiative, and sustain global funding. To accomplish these four things, a current AQ member from AF/PAK other than Zawahiri will emerge to lead AQ Central. I do not believe Zawahiri will be able to do these four things post-Bin Laden. A Gulf Arab or South Asian AQ leader will have an easier time gaining local support, sustaining resource flows from donors and illicit networks, and cooperating with the ISI.
4. AQ Central shifts focus
Sustaining local support for AQ in AF/PAK will require AQ Central to focus on ‘near enemies’ as much as ‘far enemies’. Bin Laden’s death and the emergence of an AF/PAK centric AQ leader will bring renewed focus on central/south Asian insurgencies. AQ Central will not forget the need to attack the far enemy, but their base of popular support and wealth of recruits post-Bin Laden will come from countries in the larger AF/PAK region more than abroad.
What am I missing?
CWOT
slapout9
01-14-2011, 02:05 PM
CWOT, IMO your missing it because you are looking at AQ as some type of business organization as opposed to looking at it as a family organization that does business. When you begin to focus on the Blood Lines and apply pressure there I think you will find out that they are not the Big Bad Wolves we think they are. Until we do that it will just be endless wack a mole.
Fuchs
01-14-2011, 03:05 PM
CWOT, IMO your missing it because you are looking at AQ as some type of business organization as opposed to looking at it as a family organization that does business.
keiretsu (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keireitsu) ?
Bob's World
01-15-2011, 12:55 PM
AFPAK is moot to AQ's operations and mission. Much like Iraq, it is merely the ring in the bull's nose that allows a much smaller, weaker creature to exert influence over a much more powerful one.
"terrain means nothing" is one of those insurgency 101 lessons that always gets set aside, typically when a frustrated counterinsurgent is reduced to only measuring success in terms of body count and terrain held.
AQ's mission and organization cannot be "contained" in some location. Nor can it be "defeated" by denying it some location. The conditions AQ feeds upon lay within the conditions of insurgency that simmer in so many nations across the greater Middle East. None of these conditions are being addressed by operations in AFPAK, nor are they being addressed by security force capacity building operations in any of those afore mentioned nations. Security forces merely manage the manifestations of these conditions.
Unlike the bull, it is within our power to simply reach up and remove the ring from our nose. But then where would the bull go? What would the bull do? At least the bull knows where to stand when held by the nose.
keiretsu (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keireitsu) ?
keiretsu ?
This is a really cool word. I'm going to start using this term liberally and inappropriately now that I know what it is. I'll be like all the Army officers using the word "existential" around the Pentagon from 2004-2006.
This might make sense in a weird sort of way.
CWOT, IMO your missing it because you are looking at AQ as some type of business organization as opposed to looking at it as a family organization that does business.
I don't think so. I agree that it is ideology that binds these folks together. But, ideology binds better when there is money coming from the top. Bin Laden was successful because he disbursed funds to his underlings. Some will be devout until the end simply due to ideology. When Bin Laden ties, resources will get tight, ambition will breed discontent, and the family organization will have to adjust to stay alive. Ideology and shared suffering will keep the inner circle of AQ together. Beyond that, I'm not sure. Zawahiri doesn't have the same gravity as UBL and I'm uncertain how the Haqqani network will respond to a Zawhiri led AQ. I don't think the family will run the same. UBL rose to power because he didn't follow the family's wishes, especially the preferences of Azzam. What's to say another underling won't seek a new direction once Bin Laden dies?
slapout9
01-17-2011, 12:20 AM
I don't think so. I agree that it is ideology that binds these folks together. But, ideology binds better when there is money coming from the top. Bin Laden was successful because he disbursed funds to his underlings. Some will be devout until the end simply due to ideology. When Bin Laden ties, resources will get tight, ambition will breed discontent, and the family organization will have to adjust to stay alive.
CWOT,I mean literal family ties,not a pseudo family organization, more like the Old Mafia. IMO AQ is a collection of family members, some that were supported for generations by Arab wealth and they provide loyalty and support so long as it advances the main Arab families tribal power. The family wealth is very much the key IMO. Yes perhaps many of the low level guerrillas are just street thugs fighting for money but the ideology is more of a cover story IMO, but largely elite Arab Families benefit from AQ and the WOT/GWOT/LWOT or whatever we are calling it now days.
Remember the old 3 rings of power concept from Italy? I bet there is not a whole lot of difference in how the AQ and AQ types organizations work.
Presley Cannady
03-19-2011, 03:53 PM
A paper I have coming out soon will explore this in greater detail, but here is a snapshot side-by-side comparison of what we've been doing for 60+ years in "Containment" with what I propose is more appropriate for the emerging world with "Empowerment."
I imagine there's a great deal more to this than the table provided, but I'll note this. The containment column consists entirely of language that is either neutrally descriptive or plainly critical. "Empowerment," setting aside the obvious positive connotations behind the name alone, is described in terms that are to a point laudatory.
Presley Cannady
03-19-2011, 04:04 PM
This is a really cool word. I'm going to start using this term liberally and inappropriately now that I know what it is. I'll be like all the Army officers using the word "existential" around the Pentagon from 2004-2006.
This might make sense in a weird sort of way.
On the other hand, you'll sound like a Forbes throwback to the early 1990s. The term itself was not natively coined and held meaning largely for Japanese and foreign business journalists attempting to discuss arrangement of the financial industry in Japan. It lacks the hard and fast tangibility of its antecedent term--zaibatsu--and like its father the word has become increasingly dated.
On the other hand, we have lots of colloquial English that works just fine to describe al Qaeda's structure: "gang," "clique," "syndicate," "fraternity," etc.
What one is probably missing is that one is analysing the issue from a western standpoint i.e. on a business matrix.
The important aspect is - religion; and that too a religion that assumes that it is the only religion that is ideal for mankind and connected is the fact is that this religion, rightly or wrongly, feels that it has not got its rightful place, owing to a joint conspiracy of all other religions in the world.
This feeling is not of recent history. It has been festering ever since the collapse of the great Islamic Empire with immense intellectual achievements that stretched from Spain in the West to most countries in the East and also the disintegration of the Caliphate.
Closure to time, the creation of Israel, right under the nose of the Muslims, then bolstering it and finally the humiliation of the drubbing the united Muslim countries repeatedly experienced at the hands of tiny Israel, which true to the mindset, blamed it on a western conspiracy. The failure to wrest Kashmir from India, inspite of western support at the UN, added insult to injury to the mindset.
However, given the US strategic requirement and hence assistance, the overthrow of the Soviets in Afghanistan by Islamic 'warriors', rejuvenated dreams of the Caliphate and the glorious past of the Islamic Empire and that the Islamists were on the ascendancy.
While all what happened in Afghanistan was because of the efforts of the Mujahideens, they were nevertheless a fragmented lot without any real united command. Each of the fragments jockeyed to be supreme to no avail.
Hence, there was no real and cognisable victory of Islam over the rest.
AQ and OBL provided the illusory leadership of the Islamic world at war. Not because of any spectacular victory in the local arena, but because of 9/11 where the Great White Satan - the fountainhead of all conspiracy against Islam was brought to its knees by OBL. Hence, he became a rallying point.
However, true to islam, temporal power overtook the spiritual. While OBL reigned supreme as the messiah, his and his organisation's power and achievements got diluted as the other factions jockey for power and because of relentless pressure of the US, wherein the open support of certain governments got pushed to the background and even coerced into attacking OBL and his organisation.
Thus, while OBL has become somewhat irrelevant, yet one does not know what is the residual influence his organisation has as of now.
Notwithstanding OBL and his organisation, other factions have come to the forefront and are effective.
Therefore, it is moot point, if these factions, having tasted blood and power, will abdicate these to OBL's organisation without a quid pro quo.
Hence, maybe the focus of the WOT should not only focus on the AQ, but also on the various other factions that are operating and the synergy that they created in tandem with the AQ operating in the background.
And the effect of Islam and the desire to return to the glorious days should be also cranked in, in any analysis.
The fact that the Pakistani Army and the ISI are half hearted in their effort on the WOT is an indicator that Islam continues to be a paramount factor since they willingly accept the chaos and mayhem and assassination of their Governors and Ministers and leaders, apart from the near daily bombings, in their country caused by the fundamentalist flag bearers of Islam.
jmm99
04-07-2011, 04:44 AM
Hi Ray,
Nice to see that you have resumed posting - providing us with content shaped by your Indian Army career.
As to your comment:
from Ray
Hence, maybe the focus of the WOT should not only focus on the AQ, but also on the various other factions that are operating and the synergy that they created in tandem with the AQ operating in the background.
you are in good company. Our domestic legal mandate to use armed force against AQ is flexible enough to cover associated groups - as well as nations and persons.
The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf) (AUMF), passed by Congress and signed by President Bush, provides in most pertinent part:
...That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
At times, our focus has strayed from the AUMF.
We also have some times overemphased aspects of the ideology involved (Islam), and other times have underemphased that ideology. One might also question whether we have overemphasized some AQ associates (or alleged AQ associates) at the cost of underemphasing other groups.
Regards
Mike
jmm99
04-09-2011, 01:00 AM
Judge Silberman's brief comment in Esmail v Obama (http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/2011-04-08-Esmail-opinion.pdf) (see Another brick in the wall (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=118992&postcount=560) for the entire court's findings) reinforces the suggestions made above by Ray and me;
SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring:
......
First, to note that the government at oral argument agreed that even if petitioner could show he resolutely declined to “join” al Qaeda or the Taliban, and thus could not be said to be a part of either, so long as evidence showed he fought along side of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or with associated forces he would be covered by the Authorization for Use of Military Force. District courts, in that sort of case, need not strain to find a petitioner is “a part of al Qaeda.” See Hatim v. Gates, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 553273, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 9 n.1 (D.C Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 2010). [1]
[1] Of course, “the purely independent conduct of a freelancer” – one who does not fight alongside of, or actively support, al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force – “is not enough” to justify detention. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
While this is "dicta" in this particular case, it does provide guidance for a plausible argument in a case where a loosely associated group is involved.
Regards
Mike
I think the summer of 2011 through the end of 2012 will be the most important period for al Qaeda (AQ) and Western Counterterrorism (CT) (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=218)efforts since 2002-2003.
I've been working on analysis for what AQ might do over the next year and been examining crowdsourcing as an alternative for anticipating terrorist group strategies. I've been a huge fan of Small Wars over the past few years since I started writing short articles here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/12/can-the-anbar-strategy-work-in/) and I really appreciate the feedback and insights I get from readers. I'm trying to figure out a way to use these feedback systems to narrow down on key terrorism questions. If I am certain of anything, it's that I alone will not be able to anticipate all of AQ's actions correctly. So I ask for your help! I'd truly like to capture the perspective of those that read and visit Small Wars.
This week, I set up a crowdsourcing poll trying to answer the following question:
“What will be al Qaeda’s strategy from the summer of 2011 through the end of 2012?”
I set up a poll of 11 questions which I think will take less than 3 minutes to answer. If you can spare the time to vote, I would appreciate any and all insights.
Here is the link to the poll:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/selectedwisdomAQstrategy
And if you think the poll is a worthwhile effort, please forward to any and all that might be interested. Crowdsourcing takes a crowd, so all are welcome.
I'll hopefully start publishing the results in about ten days when I aggregate the data. And I'll make sure to post the results here as well. Goal is everyone gets the collective insights from the collective efforts of voters. Thanks in advance to those that take the time to vote and please let me know here if you think I can improve the survey/process in any way.
BTW, nothing in it for me. No money, hidden agenda, etc. My wife calls my poll the "Household Chore Avoidance Project", which is probably true and thus worth the effort.
Thanks.
CWOT
Folks, thanks for the feedback on this initial thread.
I've used it to help set up a crowdsourcing experiment on AQ's future strategy and just started a new thread on that concept in this folder called.
"Crowdsourcing AQ's Strategy 2011-2012"
Would like to get your feedback and thanks in advance for any and all thoughts.
SWC is an amazing thing. Had a great response rate over night. Thanks to those that contributed to the AQ Strategy poll.
All,
Thanks for your support on recent discussions with regards to Bin Laden.
In light of today's events, I'm returning to the questions. I asked here back in January (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=12228).
What will be the consequences of Usama Bin Laden's death?
I've launched an automated survey and would very much enjoy any and all opinions. Here is the link to the survey:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/aqafterbinladen
Thanks in advance for any and all responses and I will make sure to cross post the polling results here in about a week.
RLTW,
Clint
Here's a preview of the first question on the poll:
Overall theme of the poll:
If Usama Bin Laden were killed in 2011, would it matter to the global jihadi movement?
Question #1:
What will be the chief consequence of Usama Bin Laden’s death to the global jihadi movement? (Only pick One!)
-Status Quo- No substantial change in AQ activity
-AQ Central directed plots against U.S. and its Allies decrease substantially
-AQAP becomes new AQ Central
-Some other AQ member in AF/PAK becomes leader of AQ Central
-AQ Central loses its chief sponsor, the Haqqani network
-AQ fundraising increases substantially
-AQ fundraising diminishes substantially
-Taliban more reluctant to make peace with Karzai
-AQ-inspired recruitment slows substantially
-AQ-inspired recruitment accelerates substantially
-AQ Central directed plots against U.S. and its Allies increase substantially
-Taliban pursue a peace settlement with Karzai
-AQ Central shifts focus to pursue guerilla warfare in Central Asia
Here's more background on the first version of this poll.
Does Bin Laden Matter? (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=110)
By Clint Watts on January 2, 2011
bourbon
05-02-2011, 10:48 PM
1. After Usama Bin Laden's death, what should be the primary focus of U.S. counterterrorism operations and policy?
Goldman Sachs
selil
05-02-2011, 11:37 PM
I think the following will occur to AQ.
There will be a significant power struggle as the agreed upon leadership transition process falters upon the will of others who don't know about it. (always an issue in a cell structure). This power struggle between new and old leadership will result in internal conflict that will be hard for us to see, and rampant exterior conflict with outsiders. The mitigating and maturing influence of Bin Laden (a taciturn and mature conservative) will be undone for some amount of time. He liked big splash low volume work for shock effect. Every youngster with a "plan" will move forward now that the calming/restraining influence has been lifted. In other words the wheels come off until the internal power struggle normalizes for AQ.
Hey like intelligence it is a guess.
Every youngster with a "plan" will move forward now that the calming/restraining influence has been lifted. In other words the wheels come off until the internal power struggle normalizes for AQ
Yes, in the immediate aftermath, chaos will breed some unfocused violence. My guess is there will be an initial spike in weak random attacks by wannabe's or affiliates trying to make their mark. But, unless AQAP can pull off a big attack in the next year or so, I think there will be a general decline over the next 2-5 years.
I put a question in the last week's poll essentially asking, when will upstart terror groups cease to re-brand as AQ affiliates? (https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/selectedwisdomAQstrategy) I think this is when we will know we have won against AQ's social movement.
M-A Lagrange
05-03-2011, 06:09 AM
AQMI seems to be a good model to look to what will happen to AQ after UBL death as it's more or less an offshoot of the algerian islamist terror group after their defeat.
This is just a personal opinion and guess.
Valin
05-03-2011, 10:04 AM
What will terrorism be post Bin Laden?
S.S.D.D.
(Same Stuff Different Day)
S.S.D.D.
Really, I think things will be different. I think the biggest changes will be in recruitment and money for AQ. Still wading through it all, but I definitely think things will be different.
Thanks to all those at Small Wars Journal that voted on this poll. I've had a great response rate and will begin compiling in a couple days.
For those that still want to vote on:
"What will terrorism be post Bin Laden?"
This link will be active for about 72 more hours.
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/aqafterbinladen
Immediately following 9/11/2001, hopes were high that Bin Laden and his gang would quickly be caught. In early 2002, Bin Laden escaped the Tora Bora cave network slipping into Pakistan beginning the longest, most expensive and most exhaustive man hunt in world history.
In 2003, the Bin Laden mission lost focus; distracted by Iraq and the hunt for new villains. By 2004, the American public narrative changed and repeatedly stated that Bin Laden was hiding in a cave, sickened, weak, and irrelevant. By 2006-2007, this speculation was cemented into the minds of Western analysts, media pundits and the general public.
Looking back, this narrative hindered my analysis and I imagine the analysis of many others seeking the demise of Bin Laden. Analysts were seeking to confirm a narrative constructed on two brief periods in Bin Laden's Afghan existence: a hiding period in the so-called "Lion's Den" during the mid-1980's and the 2002 Tora Bora siege. This narrative, derived from an appealing perceived pattern of Bin Laden's behavior, drove many to look for things that weren't there: guys in a cave, living on bread and water, coordinating through sophisticated electronic communication. Instead, he was killed in a compound similar to others he resided in, surrounded by family and communicating by courier.
Resources were poured into detecting a pattern that suited our narrative more than the realities described throughout Bin Laden's life (See Patternicity for more on this) (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=140). During the 1980's, he founded AQ in Peshawar guesthouses. In the 1990's, he occupied a Khartoum estate and later lived fairly openly in several different Afghan camps. This pattern of life, rather than the cave narrative we created, turned out to be consistent with where Bin Laden was discovered. His Khartoum residence looks strikingly similar to his Pakistani hideout. (See below)
In hindsight, Bin Laden hid not in caves but within people-social networks of loyalty sealed by ideology, bought with Gulf donations and maneuvered through political brokering. Bin Laden lasted ten years because he leveraged his financial pull to sustain operations, his political value to engender Pakistani supporters, and his ideological credibility to garner protection from the Haqqani network. People hid Bin Laden, not caves.
How was he identified and killed? Through the persistent work of dedicated analysts, investigators, military operatives and intelligence officers using human skills to turn interview results into a victory. In the end, it was pursuing good analysis on Bin Laden's human network, not adhering to narratives that brought mission completion.
Thank you to those analysts, investigators and officers that fought so long and hard to bring Bin Laden's demise. And, thanks to Small Wars for providing such a great platform to assist in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency over the years; helping to move past narratives and onto real analysis.
Clint Watts (http://selectedwisdom.com/)
davidbfpo
05-04-2011, 05:06 PM
Clint,
Thanks for that commentary and the recommended TED talk.
Whilst those questions may now be asked outside and inside government / intelligence agencies; was there any inside use of 'Red Teaming' and regular reviews of the fugitive hunt? From an outsider it appears not - until a politically-inspired direction.
slapout9
05-04-2011, 06:32 PM
Like I said so long ago it would be his Family,Friends and Finances that would lead us to him and the best way to do that is "Boots on the ground,Eyes on the people, Mind on the mission."
I think there were probably considerable Red Teams and all sorts of analysis done. I am certain that some segments of the Intel Community never lost focus.
In general though, I think the common political narratives thrown about in the media hampered how analysis was done; whether it be WMD in Iraq, Bin Laden in a Cave, or if you are in the U.S. the famous "DC Sniper might be in a White Box Truck". In these cases, narratives designed to give the populace comfort result in analysis being skewed to find that which has been declared rather than sticking to structured analytical approaches and hard data.
I was just thinking about it last night, the perceptions placed in my mind and others and how that can really hinder long run objectives.
Bill Moore
05-05-2011, 06:02 AM
CWOT,
Excellent post and I highly recommend the video link to a much wider audience than the intelligence community. I think it reinforces my view (my pre-conceived pattern) of why psychology should be a mandatory part of professional military education. I can see the pre-conceived patterns (an old concept) in numerous discussions throughout SWJ. We have some dogmatic individuals who embrace the anti-COIN arguments, the pro-COIN argument, and the government is always at fault. It is clear when they look at a picture with no pattern they'll find one that fits their assumption.
I think there are two take aways from this. First is need to be much more self critical of ourselves (recognize we all suffer from the shortfall of being human), and encourage ideas that rub against the accepted grain. Second, in my view this justifies the pursuit for ever greater analytical/knowledge based technology that can analyze MBs of data to identify potential patterns without the bias that an analyst would bring. The human will always make the ultimate decision (at least for the forseeable future), but this type of technology will help the analyst avoid getting stuck in ruts. An analyst when sort through tons of data has no choice but to form a hypothesis and then search for data that confirms or supports it. He or she can't randomly sort through volumes and volumes of data and randomly create links.
Thanks Bill, I appreciate the compliment.
I watched the TED video on Patternicity as a complete coincidence while riding on the train. The entire time he was talking about looking for things that are not there, I was thinking," I've done that before."
I agree that we should have a better process for accepting alternative views within our analysis. I have seen the red team crews before and the idea is good. But, I don't know, it just never seems to come up with something plausible and different. That's part of the reason I started the Bin Laden poll (https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/aqafterbinladen) this week. I wanted to see how perspectives differed between groups of people and the results thus far are really striking. I have the poll running through the end of this week and will start cross posting the results here for those that are interested.
slapout9
05-05-2011, 04:44 PM
Maybe we should teach to stop looking for patterns and teach what they teach Cops......follow the evidence. B.F. Skinner was a big believer in Systems Thinking and I have real issues of how his pigeon experiments were portrayed. Skinner developed the idea of "Hunting Behavior" from those experiments not patternicity(spelling).
jmm99
05-05-2011, 05:52 PM
based on what works and has worked for me and others I've observed over the years (lawyers, cops and investigators) - follow the evidence, recognize systems and use fuzzy (not cast in concrete) patterns.
A quick graphic down and dirty. The Deep and Narrow, and the Broad and Shallow, are recipes for disasters. So, use the more difficult "Evidence Tree" which is a compromise (time is not infinite - "better" leads have to be chosen):
1460
Have to do some of my Real World stuff.
Regards
Mike
PS: A couple of years ago, Slap and I had a conversation re: systems. I said I was dumb on systems - I was thinking about all the academic stuff (Bravo Sierra in Stanian terms) on systems. Slap said: No, you use systems every day. So, I looked about and concluded he was right. I use them, have used them before I was a lawyer; but just haven't called them that. E.g., you can start with the justice system and find many systems in and linking to that more generalized system. Thus, HT to Slap.
Backwards Observer
05-05-2011, 06:21 PM
Here are some examples of a system commonly used among a number of peoples in Asia.
Dependent Origination:
Dependent origination or dependent arising (from Sanskrit: प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद, pratītyasamutpāda; Pali: paticcasamuppāda; Tibetan: rten.cing.'brel.bar.'byung.ba; Chinese: 緣起) is a cardinal doctrine in Buddhism. It describes the causal relations between the psychophysical phenomena that sustain dukkha (dissatisfaction) in worldly experience. It is variously rendered into English as "dependent origination", "dependent arising", "conditioned genesis", "dependent co-arising", and "interdependent arising" and is an elaboration of the second Noble Truth.
Pratītyasamutpāda - Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratītyasamutpāda)
Backwards Observer
05-06-2011, 06:29 AM
I agree that we should have a better process for accepting alternative views within our analysis.
Are there adaptive constraints involved with legacy systems that prioritise doctrinal conformity over independent situational and contextual observation? Is the system feedback loop tuned to legacy survivability over adaptive potential? If so, is legacy survivability viewed as the key to foundational strength?
To be honest, I have no idea what I'm talking about.
Entropy
05-06-2011, 05:11 PM
I agree that we should have a better process for accepting alternative views within our analysis. I have seen the red team crews before and the idea is good. But, I don't know, it just never seems to come up with something plausible and different. That's part of the reason I started the Bin Laden poll (https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/aqafterbinladen) this week. I wanted to see how perspectives differed between groups of people and the results thus far are really striking. I have the poll running through the end of this week and will start cross posting the results here for those that are interested.
As an intel guy, this kind of thing is near and dear to my heart.
Red-teaming can be useful, but it's best when composed of outsiders who are less likely to share organizational mindsets. Structured analytical techniques are another option (ACH being the most famous) that can help people break out of their mindset and consider alternatives. The intel community uses a variety of methods, but of course it can't do that for everything given time and resource constraints. Training and experience count for a lot IMO as does a decent level of introspection.
It's an enduring problem to be sure and there are no easy or certain solutions.
Red-teaming can be useful, but it's best when composed of outsiders who are less likely to share organizational mindsets.
I worked for many years trying to bring in outside academics for different perspectives and the results were really mixed. Sometimes it was the government folks that just couldn't get in the mindset to collaborate. Other times, it was the reverse, the academic folks couldn't provide something useful for policy/actions. When it went well, it was great. Achieving the right mix was very challenging though.
Thanks for the great response Small Wars. I'll close polling in 24 hours and am still taking any and all votes. Thanks to everyone that participated and I'll post a note here when I get the data aggregated.
Thanks to all the Small Wars Journal Readers that participating in the AQ Strategy 2011-2012 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13174) and Post Bin Laden Polls (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13218) over the past two weeks. I'm just now posting the first results of these polls.
For the results from each of the questions, I'll post an update on this thread.
Here's the first result from the Post-UBL poll--------
Of 147 participants in the Post-UBL poll, 121 respondents answered the following question:
“Now that Bin Laden is dead, how long until U.S. counterterrorism forces eliminate Ayman al-Zawahiri?”
The majority of respondents selected “Within the next 2 years.” This result surprised me as I thought most would estimate an earlier demise of Zawahiri. Additionally, respondents across all major professional categories selected their choices in remarkably similar distributions across the five answer choices.
For the charts see
"Voters say Zawahiri 1 to 2 years from capture: Poll Results #1" (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=253)
The first question asked during the Post UBL Poll (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13218)was:
What will be the chief consequence of Usama Bin Laden’s death?
The largest group of respondents believes Bin Laden’s death will create no significant change to AQ operations. However, large subsets of respondents believe that:
1- Zawahiri will take charge of AQ’s strategic leadership and direction
2- AQAP based in Yemen will become the new head of AQ globally
For graphs and tables showing the results of this question, see this link (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=262).
Thanks to all of you for voted!
Again, thanks for voting on the Post UBL and AQ Strategy Polls the past few weeks.
Here are the latest results:
"Voters responded to two different polls pertaining to the question of AQ’s future leadership. (one the week before UBL’s death and one the week after UBL’s death)
From the Post UBL Poll. The question was:
Assuming that Usama Bin Laden can be replaced, which al Qaeda (AQ) member has the necessary attributes to become AQ’s global leader?
I found the following results from this question interesting:
'Government’ voters were the least likely of the larger groups to pick Zawahiri.
No voters from ‘Academia’ picked Sayf al-Adl
‘Private Sector’ respondents picked Awlaki at a higher rate than any other group.
Voters responded to a similar question the week prior to UBL’s death during the AQ Strategy Poll 2011-2012. Of 325 respondents to this poll, 302 voters responded to the following question.
Over the next five years, who will be the most influential ideologue for AQ’s strategic direction?
I’ll write more on this later in the week but here are some interesting points:
Prior to UBL’s death,
‘Government’ respondents believed Zawahiri would be the most influential over the next 5 years. However, in a poll right after UBL’s death, they selected Zawahiri as the next leader at much lower rates than other groups.
‘Academia’ thought Libi was as important over the next 5 years as Awlaki.
Again, ‘Private Sector’ respondents selected Awlaki at much higher rates than other groups.
For Charts and Graphs depicting the results of these questions, visit the following link:
http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=277
Bin Laden's death has many implications for al Qaeda terrorism and Western counterterrorism operations. I think the greatest impact of Bin Laden's death will be a sharp decrease in Gulf donor support to AQ Central. (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=287) The media’s portrayal of AQ terrorism as an inexpensive undertaking are greatly exaggerated. While individual attacks, like AQAP’s “Printer Cartridge” plot, may only cost a few thousand dollars in supplies, annual AQ operational costs require millions of dollars. For AQ Central hiding in Pakistan, there are significant expenses in paying group members and supporting their families, arming and outfitting terrorists, securing communications and safe havens and then conducting operations.
Here’s my logic for why I think a ‘decrease in AQ fundraising (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=287)’ will be the chief consequence of Bin Laden's death:
* AQ’s financial support arrives in three forms: donor support from the Gulf, illicit revenue from criminal enterprises, and sometimes earnings from legal businesses.
* UBL’s ability to secure donor revenue, more than any other reason, allowed him to initiate, propel and sustain AQ. Many other terrorist leaders have professed an extremist ideology and planned attacks on the U.S. However, no other terrorist brought in resources like UBL.
* AQ Central led by UBL relied heavily on donor support from the Gulf to sustain a Pakistani safe haven. While a common ideology helped bind AQ and certain tribes, money was critical to cementing a comprehensive alliance with the Taliban. Without Gulf donations being passed on to Taliban protectors, I believe the ideological bounds between AQ and the Taliban will erode.
* Donor support is infinitely better for terrorist groups than illicit financing. Illicit financing is time consuming; requiring terrorist groups to divide their efforts between securing resources and terror plot planning/recruiting/training. Additionally, the bartering and bickering involved with illicit financing usually results in ideological compromises that undermine AQ’s foundation. (AQIM is a good example. (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=117)) Lastly, pursuit of illicit funding streams weakens AQ’s operational security creating vulnerabilities more easily exploited by Western CT efforts.
* Securing future donor support for AQ Central will require a capable AQ leader with roots in the Arabian peninsula. I’m uncertain Zawahiri and the North African AQ members will receive equal donor commitment. Thus, AQ Central in Pakistan will either 1) move to a more junior Saudi/Yemeni leader that can secure Gulf donor support, 2) fracture into an AQ affiliate led by a Pakistani/Afghan leader more able to secure resources via Taliban groups & illicit financing (this will likely lead to AQ Central shifting focus to guerrilla warfare in South & Central Asia) or 3) remain in the hands of AQ’s old guard (Zawahiri) and eventually be starved into irrelevance.
* In the future, Gulf donors supporting Islamist/Salafist causes will have to decide where best to invest their money.
1. Continue supporting AQ Central in Pakistan- Donors must wonder if AQ Central is worth the investment. With UBL dead, the Pakistani government under pressure to produce, and AQ on the run, what can a donation ultimately achieve?
2. Shift their donation to AQAP in Yemen- AQAP has steadily increased its recruitment, capability and attacks on the West. Led by Saudis and Yemenis, embedded in a Yemeni safe haven and close to the Gulf, why would a donor continue supporting an AQ Central on the decline rather than an AQAP on the rise?
3. Move their donations to Islamist groups competing for political power amongst current uprisings- One of AQ’s long time ideological goals was the overthrow of apostate regimes (near enemy). AQ never achieved this, but many other Islamist groups currently compete for national power in the wake of Middle Eastern and North African uprisings. Why donate to an AQ affiliate on the run, when a dollar donated to an Islamist group might result in an Arab regime more in line with Islamist principles?
What are some other dynamics to AQ donor support that I have overlooked?
davidbfpo
05-24-2011, 09:21 AM
A detailed summary CWOT and finally you asked
What are some other dynamics to AQ donor support that I have overlooked?
At times you infer Gulf donors act as investors in the Global Jihad cause, via AQ Central. That is a good model to follow in part.
The AQ Central prospectus is quite clear: we are engaged in a relentless struggle, attempting to mount "spectacular" attacks - with allies / partners and have a long term strategy of antagonising our enemies into action.
Revenge IMHO is a particularly strong factor for those whose participation is only as an investor. All too often we forget terrorism is armed propaganda. AQ Central appear to have a more effective global PR appeal and infrastructure than the others.
AQAP gain much from the US focus and fear of them (that is another matter).
Donors appear to trust AQ Central, after all the relationship is far older and may date back to the 1980's. Once committed as donor how do you stop? Plus I would expect AQ Central has to endorse other groups before investments are made.
The scale of the donations is quite small and somewhere I recall reading a few years ago US$30m was the annual estimated amount AQ Central needed.
Finally fear of discovery for the donors by their own governments, who take action, not issue "coded warnings" and publicity. Given the apparent ease of making donations for many years without discovery and publicity I have a low expectation that donors are concerned with Western attention.
I should probably parse out what donor support would consist of. I think there are a few different categories.
1- Money donated directly to AQ- this would, I imagine move through a hawala route directly to AQ financing POC. There's a fairly good discussion of this in the Ron Suskind book "The Way of the World" (I think, it could be the "one Percent Doctrine" can't remember)
2- Money given directly to Taliban tribes- Some of the donations go directly to Taliban tribes that provide protection for AQ and sustain the insurgency in Afghanistan. This has been going on since the 1980's and continues today. I'm trying to find the article but can't track it down. But there's a great quote where a Taliban leader in Pakistan says to the troops and some fellow commanders something to the sort of "Everyone needs to relax, things aren't that bad, you're still taking trips to Dubai"
3- Money pushed through the Madrassa system- Another route for donations is through the madrassa system; some of the money goes in through this route and gets spun off in different directions.
I think each one of these layers is essential to keeping AQ covered in Pakistan.
The scale of the donations is quite small and somewhere I recall reading a few years ago US$30m was the annual estimated amount AQ Central needed.
I don't know that I agree that $30M is small. And I think that is probably a decent estimate for that which AQ Central receives directly. But I think there is another large sum transferred to the TTP in Pakistan. I've seen estimates well into the $100's Millions to keep Taliban operations going. Only a portion of this would be from donors, but there is still several million.
Given the apparent ease of making donations for many years without discovery and publicity I have a low expectation that donors are concerned with Western attention.
You are right, I don't think they are worried about discovery either. I think their issue is more about 'Return on Investment', I imagine they'll keep donating, the question I'm more interested in is where will they donate, now that they have other options available?
For those interested in this thread, here are some results from the poll I ran that are particularly relevant to AQ financing.
"
While poll results #1, #2, and #3 (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=290) were all interesting in their own way, I believe the results of the AQ donor support question are the most interesting so far. Due to the fortunate timing of UBL's demise, I was able to run the same poll question the week prior and the week after UBL's death.
The first poll, AQ Strategy 2011-2012, initiated the crowdsourcing experiment on 27 April and 272 respondents tallied their votes for the following question:
Over the next two years, the largest portion of Gulf donor contributions to extremism will: (You can choose only one)
The second poll, Post UBL Poll, began on the morning of May 2nd and 132 respondents cast their votes to roughly the same question with the same response choices. (Many voters from the first poll also voted in the second poll)
After UBL's death, the largest portion of Gulf donor contributions to extremism will: (You can choose only one)
The before and after results from this question, I believe, illustrate Bin Laden's significance to AQ Central operations. It also suggests that UBL's death may significantly help AQAP's rise in Yemen.
Interesting results across the board. Here are a few that I picked out.
-Votes for "Shift to AQAP" increased dramatically after UBL's death.
-Votes for "Remain supporting AQ & Taliban in AFPAK" decreased sharply after UBL's death.
-10% of 'Academia' and 'Private Sector' voters moved away from "Shift to Islamist groups in North African uprisings".
In terms of volatility, 'Academia' had the highest volatility in their opinion before and after UBL's death. I found this particularly interesting as the 'Academia' crowd was the group most likely to select "Status Quo - No Significant Change" as the "Chief Consequence of UBL's death" in Poll Results #2. Based on their voting shift after UBL's death, I would have expected the 'Academia' group to have selected "AQ fundraising decreases" or "AQAP becomes new AQ Central".
For graphs, tables and additional analysis to what has been the most interesting poll result thus far, see
http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=290"
While poll results #1, #2, and #3 (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=290) were all interesting in their own way, I believe the results of the AQ donor support question are the most interesting so far. Due to the fortunate timing of UBL's demise, I was able to run the same poll question the week prior and the week after UBL's death.
The first poll, AQ Strategy 2011-2012, initiated the crowdsourcing experiment on 27 April and 272 respondents tallied their votes for the following question:
Over the next two years, the largest portion of Gulf donor contributions to extremism will: (You can choose only one)
The second poll, Post UBL Poll, began on the morning of May 2nd and 132 respondents cast their votes to roughly the same question with the same response choices. (Many voters from the first poll also voted in the second poll)
After UBL's death, the largest portion of Gulf donor contributions to extremism will: (You can choose only one)
The before and after results from this question, I believe, illustrate Bin Laden's significance to AQ Central operations. It also suggests that UBL's death may significantly help AQAP's rise in Yemen.
Interesting results across the board. Here are a few that I picked out.
-Votes for "Shift to AQAP" increased dramatically after UBL's death.
-Votes for "Remain supporting AQ & Taliban in AFPAK" decreased sharply after UBL's death.
-10% of 'Academia' and 'Private Sector' voters moved away from "Shift to Islamist groups in North African uprisings".
In terms of volatility, 'Academia' had the highest volatility in their opinion before and after UBL's death. I found this particularly interesting as the 'Academia' crowd was the group most likely to select "Status Quo - No Significant Change" as the "Chief Consequence of UBL's death" in Poll Results #2. Based on their voting shift after UBL's death, I would have expected the 'Academia' group to have selected "AQ fundraising decreases" or "AQAP becomes new AQ Central".
For graphs, tables and additional analysis to what has been the most interesting poll result thus far, see
http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=290
Here is a related news story at al Jazeera english that I thought was particularly relevant.
Leaked cable: Gulf states 'funded extremism'
Leaked US diplomatic cable alleges Saudi Arabia and UAE sent $100m annually to radical Islamic schools in Pakistan. (Leaked cable: Gulf states 'funded extremism' Leaked US diplomatic cable alleges Saudi Arabia and UAE sent $100m annually to radical Islamic schools in Pakistan.)
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/05/2011522154717683995.html
Here's a key quote:
Donors in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are estimated to have been sending up to $100 million annually to radical Islamic schools in Pakistan that back extremist groups, according to a leaked US diplomatic cable.
The cable alleged that financial aid for a "sophisticated jihadi recruitment network" was coming from "missionary" and "Islamic charitable" organisations in the Gulf, ostensibly with the direct support of the Saudi and UAE governments.
The Post UBL Poll asked the following question during the week immediately following UBL’s death:
What will be the chief consequence of UBL’s death for the U.S. and its Western allies?
140 respondents answered this question with surprisingly uniform distribution of votes across all professional categories and question responses.
-Most voters (44%) thought UBL’s death would result in no significant change in U.S. & NATO operations
-Many (36%) thought public pressure would force the withdrawal of Western partners from Afghanistan
-Few (20%) thought UBL’s death would shift the strategy from counterinsurgency (COIN) focus in Afghanistan to a regional counterterrorism (CT) focus in AFPAK.
Military voters were the only sub-group that thought somewhat differently than the overall crowd. Most military voters believe UBL’s death will lead to the exit of their NATO partners. (47% for Military compared to 37% for the crowd as a whole)
For graphs and additional analysis, see this link: http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=303
This week’s poll results focus on AQ affiliates. Specifically, which AQ affiliate will lead AQ’s next chapter. I asked several questions in the AQ Strategy Poll and the Post UBL Poll addressing this issue. This week, I’ll release several results from the AQ Strategy Poll but will begin today with the results of the Post UBL Poll question:
With respect to UBL’s death, which AQ affiliate will be the primary node of AQ over the next 2 years?
133 respondents answered this question the week after UBL’s death revealing some interesting insights:
-More than half (50%) of all voters identified AQAP in Yemen as the key affiliate for AQ globally.
-‘Academia’ respondents selected “AQAP in Yemen” at a far higher rate than other professional groups and “AQ Central in AFPAK” at a far lower rate than other professional groups.
-‘Academia’ and ‘Government’ voters were less concerned by an emerging “AQ affiliate amongst North African uprisings” than ‘Students’ and ‘Private Sector’ voters.
For more analysis and charts, see the following link: http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=300
Following up on Monday's Post UBL Poll results on AQ's affiliates after UBL, I returned to the AQ Strategy 2011-2012 poll conducted the week prior to UBL's death.
The first question asked pertaining to AQ affiliates was:
Which AQ affiliate has the greatest technological and operational ability to conduct a terror attack against the West?
Out of 295 respondents, I found the following to be of particular interest:
-The majority of all voters identified 'AQAP in Yemen' as having the greatest capability prior to UBL's death with 'AQ Central in AFPAK' coming in second.
-After AQAP & AQ Central, an 'Emerging AQ Affiliate amongst North African uprisings' received the third largest set of votes despite there being no clear picture of what that organization might be.
-The fourth highest vote getter was 'Other'. Amongst those 22 responses selecting 'Other', 10 voters cited AQ cells in Europe as the most capable and 6 cited homegrown recruits in the U.S. or the West as most capable.
-Prior to UBL's death, 'Academia' and 'Students' were the most bullish on AQAP while "Private Sector' voters were the most likely to select AQ Central.
-For charts on this question, see http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=310
During the AQ Strategy 2011-2012 (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=222) poll, voters were asked the following question:
Which AQ affiliate is most dedicated to attacking the ‘far enemy’ and least distracted with ‘near enemy’ battles?
296 respondents answered this survey question. Here are the results I found particularly interesting:
- The majority of voters found ‘AQ Central in AFPAK’ the most dedicated to attacking the U.S. and least distracted by ‘near enemy’ battles. I found this surprising considering the persistent drone attacks and other pressures present in AFPAK.
- ‘Media’ respondents (a small group of voters) selected AQAP in Yemen more than any other group. I was not surprised by this since the media appears obsessed with Awlaki.
-‘AQ in East Africa’ received the third highest vote count overall.
For charts and graphs breaking down voting groups, visit:
http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=314
As always, thanks to those that voted!
The first question of the AQ Strategy Poll 2011-2012 asked 268 respondents the following question the week prior to Bin Laden’s death
Assuming 1) AQ’s Senior Leaders (UBL and Zawahiri) still have some directional authority over AQ affiliates and, 2) AQ is designing a strategy to survive and flourish based on recent events, what will be the primary focus of AQ’s strategy from the summer of 2011 through the end of 2012? (You can only pick one)
This goal of this question was to anticipate what al Qa’ida’s main effort would be through 2012. Reminder, respondents voted on this question the week prior to Bin Laden’s death.
Here are the findings I found most interesting:
-‘Attacks in Pakistan’ received the most votes followed closely behind by ‘Multiple attacks in the West’, ‘Strengthen AQAP in Yemen’ and ‘Repaint AQ’s role in the Arab Spring’. Overall, there was no strong preference for any one option.
-All professional groups voted in remarkably similar distributions across all responses. This is one of the only questions where groups did not significantly diverge in preference.
-‘Academic’ and ‘Government’ voters diverged in their preferences on almost all of the survey questions analyzed up to this point. However, in this question, ‘Academic’ and ‘Government’ voters were normally within 5% of each other for every response.
-‘Government’ respondents were the most likely group to pick ‘Strengthen AQAP in Yemen’. I wonder if all groups would pick this choice in larger numbers had the question been asked the week after Bin Laden’s death.
For Charts and Graphs see this link:
http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=391
The tenth anniversary of 9/11 initiated many interesting articles on al Qaeda. The Wall Street Journal published "Shadowy Figure: al Qaeda's size is hard to measure". Following this lead, I launched a crowdsourcing effort a month ago to determine al Qaeda's size based on the estimates provided by those visiting this blog. This question, unlike my past surveys, should have been well suited for crowdsourcing (I'll explain why I believe this in a separate post in the coming weeks.)
In total 54 respondents answered the question "How many people in the entire world are members of al Qaeda?" and collectively arrived at the following estimates for the number of al Qaeda members globally.
--3,448 people are in al Qaeda - according to the average of all responses.
or
--1,300 people are in al Qaeda - according to the median response of all responses.
and
--5,000 people are in al Qaeda - was the most common response - the mode.
Personally, I thought some outlying responses made the average too high and the median (middle response of all responses) a bit more realistic. The mode response of 5,000 didn't surprise me as I've commonly heard the numbers 1,000, 5,000 and 10,000 thrown out in news stories related to al Qaeda.
Overall, the highest estimate was 100,000,000 (an outlier I removed since it skewed all the results). The second highest estimate was 25,000 and cast by a 'Private Sector' voter. The lowest estimate was 100 and cast by a 'Other' category voter. Here is the breakdown for each professional group's average estimate of the size of al Qaeda.
Military (including defense contractors) = 5,306
Government (Non-military) = 912
Private Sector = 6738
Academia = 2830
Other Voters = 1413
While I don't know this, I wonder if 'Private Sector' voters estimate higher because they watch more television news on al Qaeda? I've always felt news coverage made al Qaeda feel bigger than they are in reality.
I'm most interested in the 'Government - Non Military' voters. The estimate of the nine voters selecting this professional category is substantially lower than the other groups.
For more analysis see here (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=459).
And for related surveys see here. (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=435)
All.
Again, thank you for the support last year with the al Qaeda Strategy 2011-2012 survey and the Post-Bin Laden Survey. Prompted by the recent announcement of al Qaeda and al Shabaab, I finally compiled and analyzed the survey responses to the last question of the AQ Strategy Survey (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=553).
The last question analyzed from the survey asked 268 people the following question with regards to al Qaeda.
In two years, will regional insurgent groups and local, upstart terror groups continue to brand themselves as AQ affiliates?
(Example: GSPC changing its name to AQ in the Islamic Maghreb or al Shabaab calling itself AQ in the Horn of Africa.)
Here were the answer choices.
-No, AQ Senior Leadership will deny independent extremist groups branding as AQ affiliates because this weakens AQ's operational control and undermines AQ's global credibility.
-No, groups will not brand as an AQ affiliate as AQ's image has tarnished due to inactivity and internal fracturing.
-Yes, groups will continue to brand as an AQ affiliate in order to receive ideological guidance, operational direction, and financial/technological resources.
-Yes, groups will still consider AQ a powerful symbol and will brand as AQ affiliates. However, new groups will not have direct ties to AQ's senior leadership or resources.
I'll first discuss the results from April 2011 and then compare it to what has happened over the past 10 months with regards to name changes.
Below are two charts. (Click this link for the charts (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=553)) The first shows the raw vote totals for the four answer choices by combining the votes of all five major professional categories. The second chart shows the percentage of people in each professional category choosing each of the four options. Note, there were only 12 'Media' voters in total so their voting in chart 2 appears more extreme than it actually is. Here are the findings I found particularly interesting.
-Votes overwhelming selected "Yes, groups will re-brand but have no direct connection with AQ".
-The notion that groups would re-brand to receive additional resources and guidance finished third out of four choices, but many analysts are currently citing this as the reason behind Shabaab's recent merger. Only the smallest voting group, 'Media', selected this more than other groups.
-The lowest vote getter was "No, AQ will deny new groups from branding as AQ." 'Academia' selected it the most, but even then, only a little over 10% selected it. I also find this surprising as it appears Bin Laden and Fazul both denied Shabaab the title of an AQ affiliate prior to their deaths.
For additional analysis on this question, you can visit this post at this link: Al Qaeda's Name: Stronger or Weaker? (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=553)
Also, thanks to your contributions to the survey, I've been able to compare the results of the survey with current events with regards to al Qaeda's ups and downs. For those interested in how your survey results can be used, here is a link to some recent news regarding al Qaeda's financing and foreign fighters. Al Qaeda Where's the Money? Not Dead, but Dying, Part 2 (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=514).
Again, thanks for your support answering the survey!
SWJ members:
Good morning,
One year ago, U.S. forces killed Usama Bin Laden in Pakistan. On the morning of May 2, 2011, I posted a survey, which asked your opinions on what would happen to al Qaeda and terrorism after the death of Bin Laden. Your votes created more than 500 responses generating a dozen or more collective forecasts about what will happen to al Qaeda after Bin Laden's death - forecasts which I now ask you to assess one year later.
If you have the time and interest, I ask you to take a short follow up survey that seeks to identify what has changed with regards to al Qaeda and terrorism since Bin Laden's death.
Here is the link:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/UBLayearlater
This survey asks respondents what has changed in the world of terrorism since the demise of al Qaeda's founder. Unlike last year's survey which attempted to gain a collective judgment on the future of al Qaeda, this survey now seeks to assess the results of the survey conducted last year.
With that purpose, this survey is much quicker to answer and is designed to take about 3-5 minutes. The questions are directly tied to last year's questions. Like last year, all are welcome to participate - no base level of experience, knowledge or skill is required. There is no requirement to have participated in last year's survey either. The more responses - the better so please feel free to forward this link to anyone that you think might be interested in the topic.
Starting in approximately two weeks, I'll take the results of this assessment survey and compare it to the results of our forecasting survey from last year. As with last year's survey results, I'll post this survey's results and comparisons to last year's results at www.selectedwisdom.com and here at this thread on the SWJ discussion board.
Thanks again for participating in last year's Post Bin Laden survey and thanks in advance for your contributions to this year's survey.
Clint
Here's a sample question:
"Since Usama Bin Laden's death, is al Qaeda 'stronger' or 'weaker'?"
(Use an definition of 'stronger' or 'weaker' that you prefer)
Thanks to all those that have voted thus far!
The survey is still open and available at this link:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/UBLayearlater (https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/UBLayearlater)
davidbfpo
06-28-2012, 12:04 PM
I struggled with a title; the author IMO is a 'disruptive thinker', a theme that appears on SWJ in particular and using his own, long title would be wrong.
CWOT's interesting short article on this difficult topic, which often appears here and more widely in intelligence studies. It starts with a German (Prussian IIRC) quote pre-WW1:
In war you will generally find that the enemy has at any time three courses of action open to him. Of those three, he will invariably choose the fourth.
—Helmuth Von Moltke
With that quip, Von Moltke may have launched a spirited debate within his intelligence staff. The modern version of the debate can be said to exist in
the cottage industry that has been built on the examination and explanation of intelligence failures, surprises, omissions, and shortcomings.
The contributions of notable scholars to the discussion span multiple analytic generations, and each expresses points with equal measures of regret, fervor, and hope. Their diagnoses and their prescriptions are sadly similar, however, suggesting that the lessons of the past are lost on each succeeding generation of analysts and managers or that the processes and culture of intelligence analysis are incapable of evolution. It is with the same regret, fervor, and hope that we offer our own observations on avoiding intelligence omissions and surprise. Our intent is to explore the ingrained bias against outliers, the potential utility of outliers, and strategies for deliberately
considering them.
Link:https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-4/pdfs-vol.-55-no.-4/Brennan-Reflections%20on%20Outliers-13Jan.pdf
CWOT cites several crowd sourcing surveys, which have appeared here and draws on those.
davidbfpo
06-28-2012, 12:07 PM
I have merged into this thread eight of CWOT's crowd sourcing threads. They were: Does Bin Laden Matter?, Crowdsourcing AQ's Strategy 2011-2012, Vote Now - 1 Year After Bin Laden: What has happened?, Results of the Post Bin Laden & AQ Strategy Poll, Results "How big is al Qaeda?", Vote: What will terrorism be post Bin Laden? and Financial Implications of Bin Laden's death.
I have also renamed the thread's title, it was How Bin Laden Narratives Hindered Analysis.
David,
thanks for consolidating.
And for those interested in my latest crowdsourcing experiment, here's a 1-question survey I'm running.
Should the U.S. and Europe openly support the resistance in Syria?
Vote at this link if interested:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/ZRS5JDG
I'll post the results here at the end of the week.
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