Why are we still leading missions, instead of supporting Afghans conduct them?

[Bill Moore]

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/kill-capture/j

Frontline did a special on Kill-Capture missions addressing the pro's and con's, many of which we debated endlessly on SWJ. The arguments for most sides are valid, but what jumped out at me from the coverage was the discussion between the locals (the 101st hit the wrong target due to inaccurate intelligence) and Afghan security forces accompanying the 101st. Even though they realized it was the wrong target they went ahead and searched the tribal leader's house in a pretty rough fashion, and since they found some small arms ammo (imagine that in Afghanistan) they used that as justification to detain him (he was released a few hours later). These mistakes happen all the time, because as Bing West points out we don't understand their language or customs beyond a superficial level. The ASF were put out with the Americans and their arrogance and clumsiness in handling this situation, and the locals wanted to know why the ASF let the Americans do this.

That is the million dollar question concerning Afghanistan. Why are we still leading missions, instead of supporting Afghans conduct them? They can do it their way, and their way will probably be better than ours. We are seen as occupiers and all the CMO and development in the world won't change that as long as we're conducting combat operations. I think it is long past time we take a step back and reassess. We don't need to be fighting their insurgency, we need to enable them to it their way. We may not like the results because the metrics won't be immediately observable, but over time we'll a change for the better if it is met to be.

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

Cannot view the PBS documentary here, but the key question is not the programme, but your question:
Why are we still leading missions, instead of supporting Afghans conduct them?

So I've adjusted the thread's title from 'Kill Capture Missions and Frontline' to your question.

My initial thought is the ASF overall neither have the capability or will, as the threads on the ANA & ANP have referred to before. Secondly, would the ASF really want mission command if ISAF directions and strategy were being followed? (I'm not convinced the current strategy, let alone objectives are set in concert with the Afghan state).

Now back to my armchair faraway.

[carl]

David:

Too bad you can't get that Frontline episode. It was very good and covered several critical things.

One of the things it covered was what was described as American intel's tendency to disregard the real world in deference what comes in from an antenna, whether that antenna catches a drone video feed or a cell phone intercept. The program suggests this can result in a view of the world at considerable odds with reality which can result in some very bad things. Maybe it is part of the same phenomenon Bing West observed and what Mr. Turcan meant when he said there should be more soldiers looking at people's eyes with their eyes rather than looking at computer screens.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

An excellent question; and one we probably won't like the answer to.

I don't remember a lot of details from my time as a Cadet in ROTC, but do remember with crystal clarity a conversation with our SF MSG at our detatchment. He had been an E-5 on an ODA in Vietnam and was telling us about a patrol he was on with a Vietnamese unit, and said something about putting them out front to lead the way to where they expected to make contact with the enemy. I asked why he didn't lead? (after all, we were there to learn about leadership) He looked me in the eye, with a look (and message)I will never forget, and said, "last time I checked, it was their war."

This is one of my primary reasons for harping on what may seem like an unimportant nuance to many that what one does during an intervention to support the COIN efforts of some partner is not COIN, but is FID. If I think I'm doing the same mission as the Host Nation, it is a pretty easy transition to forgeting whose war it is and getting into inappropriate roles that may be more effective in the short term, but that are incredibly damaging to achieving the longer term effects of a legitimate, competent security force supporting a government dedicated to the service of its entire populace.

Instead, we end up enabling poor governance, which makes the conditions of insurgency worse, and then in turn demands we poor in more and more resouces and units to deal with the growing insurgency.

in FID, less is more. If you make it big, it will get big. COIN tactics derived from colonial efforts didn't much worry about this. Stripping off that colonial perspective and allowing the host nation to sink or swim is hard.

Besides, sometimes the insurgent is right and the government is wrong; when we force a victory by the wrong side we may serve our interests in the near term, but the long term costs of such forced solutions selected, shaped, and executed by outsiders are coming at a growing cost in the current info tech environment.

[carl]

Besides, sometimes the insurgent is right and the government is wrong; when we force a victory by the wrong side we may serve our interests in the near term, but the long term costs of such forced solutions selected, shaped, and executed by outsiders are coming at a growing cost in the current info tech environment.

Is this one of those times where the insurgent is right and the government wrong?

[Ken White]

The answer to the 'why' is all too often simply a combination of ego and careerism. :mad:

It needs to be forcefully halted and that has to come from the top. Good luck with that...:rolleyes:

Like Bob's guy said -- "...it's their war."

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

I believe what you referenced as "careerism" is actually a structural and organizational problem inherent in major deployments.

One soldiers are on the line, and measurables are attached, on many levels, to the responsibilities to perform, accomplish, effect something, then the whole concept of "their war" goes out the window.

That core question of "strategic patience" runs contra to short tours and management by objectives.

Personally, I think it requires a huge amount of leadership skills (from the top) to avoid the inevitable---Bob has troops one the ground who are at risk, the risk continues until "X" is accomplished, Bob becomes "responsible" for "X."

[Bob's World]

Is this one of those times where the insurgent is right and the government wrong?

Carl,

We can agree that neither of us want to live in a Taliban-governed Afghanistan; but if I were a Pashtun I sure as hell would not want to live in a Northern Alliance-governed Afghanistan either.

We have, by our very presence and nature of our engagement, enabled Karzai and the Northern Alliance guys to be much more self-serving than if we had let them sort it out for themselves. There is no way they could have produced the current constitution with it's codified exclusion of anyone seen as contrary by Karzai is a deathknell for there ever being any kind of stability, as half of the populace not represented by the Northern Alliance has absolutely no alternative but to conduct illegal challenges to the current regime or live in powerless poverty.

Karzai has made his bed though, and once we jump out of it to run home I suspect he will find it hard to get a good night's sleep in it. My concern is not for Karzai and his cronies though, it is for those much lower who we have convinced to put their faith in us. The big guys will take the money and run, but the little guys will suffer hard.

Unless.

The big unless is unless we stop backing one side to the exclusion of the other and instead take a more neutral role to oversee a negotiated settlement that leads to shared governance under a new constitution. What happens after that? Who knows, but at least we will have give those who trusted us at the local level a fighting chance to avoid a vengeful backlash.

Sadly, collaborators rarely fare well from any history of any conflict I have ever read.

[Bob's World]

Historical parallel:

Following WWI the US/Wilson went to Paris and fought for 14 points. The Brits and French thought all 14 were silly idealistic drivel. But they were not above using our naive idealism to their advantage.

Point 5. "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined."

As the vultures loomed over the spoils of the destroyed Ottoman Empire, the Brits in particular argued that as big fans of Self-Determination it was essential for European powers to establish control over the Ottoman Empire in order to help them prepare for self-governance. They saw it as a guilt-free way to turn the region into colonies. Our well intended ideals were twisted and used for the selfish gains of our partners. We were suckers, and though offered our shared, declined as we did not want to commit to a large military presence in the region.

In Afghanistan we made a big deal about war lords and the decentralized nature of the government that we saw as the root of the problem. Karzai jumped on that, and in the name of "centralized government" he got a constitution produced that made him a de facto King; and got us to commit to building an Army and Police under his direct control and dedicated to the suppression of that segment of the populace excluded by his plan. Evil genius knows few bounds. Apparently nether does our ability to fall again and again for having our ideals twisted by our partners into tools of oppression.

[Ken White]

I believe what you referenced as "careerism" is actually a structural and organizational problem inherent in major deployments.While there's a degree of pure careerism in a few cases, more often it's as you say -- though I'd suggest it is not restricted to major deployments but is actually a bureaucratic imbed in the institutions that are the Armed Forces. In my observation, all four services and USSOCOM have the problem (so does most of the US government)... :(
One soldiers are on the line, and measurables are attached, on many levels, to the responsibilities to perform, accomplish, effect something, then the whole concept of "their war" goes out the window.Also true and IMO the usual result is indicative of the fact that we significantly over emphasize the use of metrics and measurables. They have a place, no question but we constantly misuse the idea. :rolleyes:
That core question of "strategic patience" runs contra to short tours and management by objectives.Very true -- and an indictment of our archaic personnel policies, still geared to 1917 from whence they came...

Those short tours are operationally deplorable and the far too brief time spent in specific assignments is a fatally flawed personnel management practice. Both lead to mediocre to poor performance all too often by too many units. The Services all owe a huge vote of thanks to the kids who make the flawed systems work better than could really be expected.
Personally, I think it requires a huge amount of leadership skills (from the top) to avoid the inevitable---Bob has troops one the ground who are at risk, the risk continues until "X" is accomplished, Bob becomes "responsible" for "X."True. That leadership is IMO too often lacking. Most often due to institutional constraints and not personal failings.

In that last paragraph, you synthesized what some in the Army refer to as "On the spot corrections" (one of the biggest leadership errors ever...) and of which others have said "I see a problem, I own it and must fix it." That gets carried forward to the old 'Pottery Barn rule' fallacy. The senior person who sees a problem where none exists or fixes a minor problem is not forcing or allowing the chain of command to work properly, is interfering with the development of subordinates and is providing a lot of entertainment for the Troops who know what is supposed to happen and see that it does not. All that usually due to the risk of being caught short (a far greater risk in the eyes of many than is combat risk...). That parenthetical was the driver for the 'careerism' tag...:wry:

[Pete]

In that last paragraph, you synthesized what some in the Army refer to as "On the spot corrections" (one of the biggest leadership errors ever...) and of which others have said "I see a problem, I own it and must fix it." That gets carried forward to the old 'Pottery Barn rule' fallacy.
Back during Shy Meyer's "Hollow Army" days we had a small pocket-sized handbook called something like the Commander's Guide for Maintenance. It had such useful indicators and tips as the following:

-- "Are the tires flat?"

-- "Does radiator coolant and oil leak out of the vehicle and make puddles on the pavement of the motor pool?"

-- "Do flames and smoke come out of the engine compartment when the engine is running?"

That's from the same U.S. Army that was 30 miles from Berlin on V-E Day in May 1945.

[Dayuhan]

The big unless is unless we stop backing one side to the exclusion of the other and instead take a more neutral role to oversee a negotiated settlement that leads to shared governance under a new constitution.

Will they negotiate a settlement and share governance, or will they fight until someone wins, with the winner taking complete control and stomping the loser?

Given recent history and the prevailing political culture, which is more likely?

[Bill Moore]

How we got to the point of taking the lead in this fight is understandable, but the fact that this many years later we're still in the lead is a failure to face the reality that we can't force the Afghan people to play by our rules without using a degree of force/oppression that is not only illegal but unethical by our standards. Nor can we can't bribe the Afghan people by throwing money at them (nation building and CMO). While they may accept the money and even say thank you, their views of the world and the occupying forces will remain the same. You can buy sex, but you can't buy love.

The only answer is to allow the Afghans to settle it their way, and unfortunately it will probably be ugly unless we can find an intelligent means to disengage from the lead in their internal affairs while still providing support to the right people (another million dollar question, who are the right people?). As Bob stated, less is more if we transition our effort to FID, but this FID mission (if it actually becomes one) will most likely differ from the norm. We can't blindly accept and reinforce the Karzai regime, so how do we transition to FID effectively? Is it is even possible?

While it sounds counter intuitive we have more leverage when we have less troops on the ground fighting. When we shift to a supporting role (and that support can include limited combat operations when needed) the Afghan government and security forces are more dependent on us than they are now, and if they don't reform we can threaten to cut off the aid. We had to threaten to do this in El Salvador to compel the government there to clean up its act and respect the rule of law.

However, since we're the ones fighting, I'm not convinced we have any leverage over the Afghans. They probably see it as our fight. While hotly debated (mainly for political gain) I think the President was right to set a dead line for starting the withdraw of troops, it actually compelled the Afghan government to take their responsibility more seriously. The status quo (U.S. in the lead) will only further alienate us from the Afghan people and continue to inhibit the growth of the needed Afghan institutions. The change in posture from us leading the COIN effort to FID will not be easy, and there will be some bloodshed (regardless if we do it now or later). In the long run though, I suspect the sooner we start the better it will be for the Afghan people.

[Infanteer]

The answer to this question reminds me of an anecdote from my tour.

The ANA Platoon Commander I shared my AO and base with was a young Pashtun man named U. A Sergeant, he took command when the officer was killed in an insurgent ambush. U spoke Pashtun, Dari and fairly good English and was the son of a mid-to-high level bureaucrat in the Defence Ministry in Kabul. He may not have been a full elite, but the fact that he was smart, fluent and literate in the key languages and knew and worked within the Pashtun socio-political system meant locals respected and listed to him.

U quickly impressed me with his abilities. Despite being conditioned to believe the ANA were like children that you had tagging along to legitimize your mission, the partnership between him and I was 50/50. We planned all our patrols together, I got the resources he needed for him and his men and he quickly developed a rapport with the locals to get us the intelligence needed to understand the environment we were operating in (and the enemy who was trying to kill us). We made much progress in a month. I called him the “godfather” because of the way he worked his cellphone and I called myself his consigliere.

Unfortunately, U dissapeared for reasons I will not go into here. As a replacement, I received Sgt H. Sgt H was a Hazara. Also a veteran of many years of combat in the ANA, he despised the locals and said that all Kanadaharis were insurgents. He refused to make contact with the locals and would go on patrols only when prompted by myself. Although I got him into a busy and aggressive patrolling rhythm, he wouldn't provide any input at all – he only went along because his company commander (who was really good) ordered him to support the Canadians. At one point, Sgt H sent his subordinates to deal with a neighbouring farmer who he was having issues with; the soldiers started to beat the man with their rifles until one of my sentries intervened by firing a flare into the air. This is simply not something that would have happened with Sgt U.

The good news was that at the end of my tour, U ended up back with us and I saw him one last time before I left the country. When I left him, he was leading his platoon on patrols in a dusty corner of Panjwayi district as he had for the previous few years. A true veteran, my "tour" was his "life".

This experience convinced me that the line between success and failure is more U's and less H's. When I read Mark Moyar's A Question of Command I felt drawn to his incomplete, but (I believe), correct theory on COIN. We are still leading operations because we don't have enough Sgt U's.

[Bill Moore]

Infanteer, that is a great story and I am glad you shared it. I agree life will be easier if there are more Sgt U's and less Sgt H's, but I still argue that isn't the reason we are in the lead. I can't think of any country that I conducted FID where there weren't the equivalent of SGT U's and H's in their ranks. There are also SGT U's and SGT H's in our ranks. If the Sgt H's fail, and they will if we're not in the lead to protect them they'll disappear over time due to their failure or death. Sgt U's will perpetuate if the Afghan Gov is serious, if they're not then we're in a guagmire and staying longer (only talking COIN, not CT) will not solve the underlying issues. Right now we are the underlying the issue that is preventing self corrective actions. We need to step back and let the SGT U's and SGT H's determine the course of Afghanistan. Just because SGT H is corrupt and more doesn't mean we should lead the fight.

[carl]

Infanteer & Bill M.:

As Bill said there are SGT Hs in our ranks. If instead of Infanteer having been there, a Canadian equivalent of SGT H had been there then it would not have made any difference if the Afghan SGT U was good. His proficiency would not have come to fore because the Canadian equivalent of SGT H would have vitiated it.

Not only the Afghan gov has to be serious about developing SGT U's, our side has to be also. I have no idea what the social dynamics of the respective groups in the Frontline report were, but if the 101st contingent was led by a SGT H, the Afghans would have been repressed even if they had been led by SGT U.

And so an obvious point is elaborated upon by me the civilian.

[Bob's World]

Will they negotiate a settlement and share governance, or will they fight until someone wins, with the winner taking complete control and stomping the loser?

Given recent history and the prevailing political culture, which is more likely?

I don't know. I just know what will happen if we only support one side enough to create an unsustainable "decent interval" and then leave.

Better to try what might not work but creates a chance at an enduring stability than to try what we know is unlikely to create an enduring stability but that might create a narrow window of "success" that we can withdraw through.

[jcustis]

They can do it their way, and their way will probably be better than ours.

In my humble opinion, their way may have its own unique effect, but it is not better, when framed against our impatience, the context of national policy timelines, and our overall work ethic.

To second a little bit on what I think Ken is saying, along the careerism vein, getting the ANSF out there in the lead requires substantial investments in utilizing the right leadership to get the job done. Sacrificing a rock star(s) to leave a command to do the job forces a commander to run the risk of his own command not performing as well during the deployment.

You could attribute that to a commander simply wanting to complete the mission and do it well, but we are not even effectively accomplishing any mission over there right now, IMO. We are simply holding the various threads together until the next team can come in and take hold...and they then do the same until their rotation comes to a close. The metrics for success shift, morph, and change between unit rotations not so much from a calculated process of analyzing the problem set and establishing good measures of effectiveness and performance, but too often from pet peeves, parochialism, and our own cultural hang-ups. The larger problem anyway is that we have not established MOE/MOP for ANSF that make any sense, in the context of the policies of GIRoA or the MOD. Put another way, even if we are screwed up for not structuring our fight properly, it doesn't matter because the attention should not be on us, as has been brought up here.

Mission success, put another way, is just so arbitrary that it's hard to lay a bulk of blame on careerism. I think the larger culprit is our collective impatience. I don't think it's wrong to be impatient, and although the MOEs/MOPs tend to be shewed and not reflect any sensible way forward, we as Americans expect to see results...something...anything. The ANSF move at a decidedly different pace that even drove me up the wall at times

This sort of impatient rears its ugly head when you sit back and take a look at the cycle of new programs and initiatives that are paraded out by the RCs. It can be dizzying at times to try to keep up with it, and lays bare the fact that unless there is a cohesive plan at the highest levels, small unit commanders who own the battlespace and do the row hoeing waste a ton of time trying to grasp what the next greatest idea is to come down the chute (and one that often doesn't reflect their tactical reality).

Internal to the ANSF, nepotism, graft, and corruption are rampant, at least according to the context that I viewed it. Some may say, well, that is THEIR way, and I agree that it is important to be able to step back and look at it all with bit of patience, cultural understanding, etc., but when you have a private in a platoon of Afghan Border Police who (by virtue of his family connections) effectively runs the platoon over the sergeant who is already there (because the officer is not there, BTW) and directs the post-standing rotation to where his tribe mates rarely leave the COP while other soldiers spend all the time down at the TCP, there's a problem. It's their way, but that way grinds and tears at any fabric of military efficiency that is to be had. Add in a dose of angst over lack of pay, or the graft that comes along with it when the commander takes his cut of the food stipend, and we get the understandable desertion rates and ghost solider problems that we face. Someone still has to get outside the wire tomorrow and patrol, and our boys are there anyway, so they saddle up and get 'er done.

We haven't been at this for all that long, in terms of ANSF development. Granted, we have been mentoring and employing militias for a long time, wearing shemaghs and long beards, and have worked our SOF elements into the mix with a variety efforts, but we have not been at the business of establishing cohesive armed formations, capable of employing C2, that can be integrated into the large coalition effort, as long as we had by the time the OIF surge took hold. The ISF had a military tradition and framework that was light years ahead of Afghanistan, so I only put the Iraqis out there because I think it is too easy to measure our success there and get easily frustrated when it doesn't work in OEF.

[Demon Fox]

I'm currently working as an S2 mentor for an ANA Commando battalion. I see this problem starkly with the SpecOps unit currently assigned as their FID partners. Their OPSEC measures are so restrictive, that the Commando leadership has very little input on operations and planning - much less know where they're going when they get on the helo. Dislosure is limited to the ground tactical plan. They get to see imagery of the target village, but are never told where the village is located or the HVT names.

I understand their concerns due to the rash of FID partners turning on their trainers. They even had an incident of their own recently, but they must take that leap of faith and allow them to plan and run their own missions and be given the information and resources to do it.

The problem extends into equipment employment as well. For example, the Commandos have a slew of Etrex GPSs sitting in their arms room as part of their Tashkil (MTOE). As far as I've been able to assess, the Commandos have received no training on this equipment (as well as simple map and compass) and their US FID partners do not allow it for fear they will plot their coordinates on the objective and discover their location. This is not how to do FID, folks.

My team did it plenty in Iraq and we never had OPSEC issues. Our FID partners were thankful to us that they were finally given a measure of trust to be equal participants in operations.

I found it interesting the day after the news broke about us killing bin Laden, several of the Commandos stated "the next you invade Pakistan, we want to go with you!" They were serious. They KNOW who the real enemy is here.

v/r

DF

[TDB]

I too was unable to watch the documentary, might have to find an illicit way of downloading it. I did however read an article linked on the SWJ main site, as someone has posted above, the rejection of local/human intel is quite alarming. Not to mention that human geography seems to be almost ignored, not exactly big news as everything I seem to be reading is pointing to the U.S trying to apply a fairly rigid COIN strategy throughout the country with little consideration for the situation on the ground. Evens in Nuristan (Pech valley) and Kunar (Korengal) have shown this, I wonder if people have been aware that the populations in these area (or anywhere across this part of the border with Pakistan) have rejected any form of central government for centuries if they'd even have bothered. Not that i'm saying that trying to conduct state building in these areas in a fulorn hope, i'm saying that going about the way the U.S/ISAF have hasn't worked and only result in a withdrawal (from the areas noted above, or at least as far as I'm aware).

[davidbfpo]

This SWJ article helps to explain and at the end there is some positive nes on the ANA:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/776-doan.pdf

Elsewhere, probably in several threads, we have debated the length of a tour (6-15 months), the lessons learnt in the Imperial era in NWFP (political agents, locally recruited units with long service British officers etc) and the cultural divide.

I still maintain, yes from my "armchair", that only when Afghans serve alongside all allied soldiers / marines will progress be made - at an individual and unit level. 'Advise & Assist' may work and I know claims were made that in recent operations in Helmand Province the ANA took the lead. I simply don't think either side at the lowest levels, assuming it is a simple 'black & white' situation, have accepted joint working 24/7. Murders of ISAF clearly do not help and cast doubt on "jointness".

[TDB]

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/27/a_one_man_insurgency

I think this article nicely sums up the complexity of the situation when it comes to ANSF.

[JMA]

This SWJ article helps to explain and at the end there is some positive nes on the ANA:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/776-doan.pdf

Elsewhere, probably in several threads, we have debated the length of a tour (6-15 months), the lessons learnt in the Imperial era in NWFP (political agents, locally recruited units with long service British officers etc) and the cultural divide.

I still maintain, yes from my "armchair", that only when Afghans serve alongside all allied soldiers / marines will progress be made - at an individual and unit level. 'Advise & Assist' may work and I know claims were made that in recent operations in Helmand Province the ANA took the lead. I simply don't think either side at the lowest levels, assuming it is a simple 'black & white' situation, have accepted joint working 24/7. Murders of ISAF clearly do not help and cast doubt on "jointness".

David, sadly it is a case of... "Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it."

The Brits have enough experience from across their empire to draw on so they really don't have any excuses.

Certainly in this neck of the colonies the model of the Kings African Rifles was good and worked... with I suppose the best example being the refined model of the Rhodesian African Rifles which was superb in so many ways.

I suggest that Ray with his sub-continent experience will have important and valuable input into how given the Indian experience of forming colonial units from scratch what the most efficient way to have created/formed/built the ANA would have been.

To me the start point that everyone gets paid and seems to go to the highest bidder is a game changer. Even the insurgents (Taliban) get paid. Interesting.

Then we see out of Somalia troops trained and armed by the EU (including most bizarrely a Finnish contingent) defect to Al-Qaida and/or Al-Shabaab on becoming operational. One wonders how they were selected?

Clearly not enough experience is there nor enough thought given to forming/establishing/building indigenous forces in Afghanistan. The prognosis is poor.

We did discuss this matter somewhere here before. And I say again that both the Brits and the yanks got there act together in terms of tour lengths and training the Afghans right from 2006 it would be a different story now. Too late she cried.

[Ray]

I would go along with davidbfpo when he states -
I still maintain, yes from my "armchair", that only when Afghans serve alongside all allied soldiers / marines will progress be made - at an individual and unit level.

It is all a question of each race's psychology.

I can give an example of the Indian Army.

We have a mix of all types of Regiments with different classes (tribes/ races, if you like). Handling each is a totally new experience.

We all have the same doctrine and training and yet handling each is a totally different experience.

The Sikhs are noisy and gung ho (even without reason or rhyme!). They can never stop jabbering or shifting unnecessarily even when they are close to the enemy lines. Very fidgety chaps.

The Gorkha is silent and inscrutable. You will never know what they are up to. In fact the story goes that a Gorkha broke the line on a route march, went into a village, did his whatever with a woman, paid well, return to the line of march and none knew! They are also very obstinate. And if you give a Gorkha an order, you must check back he has understood.

My chaps, the Mahars, are laid back and can go without food for days without complaints. As officers, one had to go an extra mile.

And so on.

The Afghan, I presume, is not much of a fighter in structured battles. But will be dangerous as special forces. They have an independent streak and tend to be individualistic. (My uncle commanded Pathans and so this is what he told me). He also said they are great ones and brutal so long as they are winning. If they smell defeat, it is another story!

Therefore, I would be surprised if the Afghans would synchronise with the American concept of warfare application! I presume, it will take time.........a very long time!

Therefore, Afghans will have to operate with the Americans if they are to adapt to the American minor tactics format and also get a hang of the American psychology that makes a success of the American tactics.

The Vietnamese experiment of 'Advisers' with Afghan troops may not work.

And the biggest handicap is that the American, appear to us, as very impatient and want instant results.

Another oddity we find is that a US officer after giving instructions say 'It is an order'. In the subcontinent, if your superior officer says something, then it is automatically taken for granted it is an order. This can lead to loss of authority that is automatically built in in a superior officer since, out here, if you say 'it is an order', it appears that the superior officer is not confident and he has a doubt if the chap will obey it or not.

In our part of the world, that just does not happen.

Just my thought.

[tequila]

Another oddity we find is that a US officer after giving instructions say 'It is an order'.

In my own personal experience, I've never heard a Marine officer say this. I've never been in a long-term operational context with other U.S. branches' officers, but this sounds odd to me as an American.

Ray - is the concept of 'martial races' still in vogue in subcontinental army circles?

[Ken White]

In my own personal experience, I've never heard a Marine officer say this. I've never been in a long-term operational context with other U.S. branches' officers, but this sounds odd to me as an American.I certainly won't say it never happened but in over 40 years, Marine and Army -- and working with the Navy and AF, I never heard anything even near it said by an Officer.

I did hear an NCO say something along that line once; asked a young Troop if he understood that the Jump Command "Go" was in fact a lawful order. That was just before, not awaiting a reply, he hung on the Anchor Line cable with both hands and and booted the the Troopie out the door with two feet on the backpack...

[Ray]

In my own personal experience, I've never heard a Marine officer say this. I've never been in a long-term operational context with other U.S. branches' officers, but this sounds odd to me as an American.

Ray - is the concept of 'martial races' still in vogue in subcontinental army circles?

OK. Maybe I am mistaken about the 'It is an order'. I am glad I raised it. The long held misconception of mine has been clarified. Maybe, I had that idea because of Hollywood movies?

The concept of martial races officially is not there.

However, the older Regiments are still on the Class composition. The new Regiments are being organised on an all India basis.

Because of modernity coming into villages, the breakdown of joint family system and the cohesive bond of being from 'A' or 'B' community diminishing, the old 'fire' seems to have gone! Being from a military family, I have experienced this fading as I went along in life from a child in a military environment to when I retired. To be a soldier is no longer 'a calling'. It has become a career; and even though not well paying, at least respectable to some extent.

I was commissioned in a one class unit, but I commanded an all India mix (though of the same Regiment). It took time for me to get used to the new 'class' of people when I took over command. It took me a year to get used to their ways, but I presume things worked out faster for me since we were in active (live) operations for about 9 months.

One thing I must state is, notwithstanding the 'fire' of the community bond and the 'honour-of-the-community-must-be-upheld-at-all-cost' psyche not being what it was, there is no consuming concern about 'bodybags'. Death is taken as a part of the risks that a career in the Forces demands.

The respect for the soldier here in India is only during wars. It fades out very fast after the war. I believe in the UK there is still respect for soldiers and war veterans if what Lt Gen MM Lakhera of the Indian Army wrote about the VE day Celebrations is correct. He wrote that Mr Haseltine, the Deputy Prime Minister, on seeing an Indian VC (Victoria Cross) veteran waiting to cross the road, stopped the traffic, shook hands with the VC, and ensured that the General and the VC could cross the road!! When asked by the General, why he had stopped, Mr Haseltine is said to have said, "Sir, it would have been a great disservice if on seeing a VC, I did not get down and thank him for his service to my country". A very fine gesture indeed! No wonder they ruled us for so long with so few! :D

One of the best book I have read on the Indian Army's history and its evolution through the ages (British times) is Philip Mason's 'A Matter of Honour'. It includes how the caste and class system of Regiments came about. Interestingly, he mentions that this class and caste divisions were basically used for North Indian Regiments, and not to that extent, for the Regiments coming from the South!

It is a very balanced book that looks at the British times, not with a colonialist bias, but with an eye on actualities.

[carl]

I second Ray's endorsement, A Matter of Honour is a great book.

[JMA]

I second Ray's endorsement, A Matter of Honour is a great book.

Carl, maybe both you and Ray should contribute with reviews on amazon. Maybe you on .com and Ray on .co.uk? IMHO it is important good books are promoted and as a result get read.

David, here is a plan. I buy the book and get it delivered to you. You read it for the price of mailing it to me out here in the colonies when you are finished? Sound good? PM

[TDB]

David, sadly it is a case of... "Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it."

The Brits have enough experience from across their empire to draw on so they really don't have any excuses.

Certainly in this neck of the colonies the model of the Kings African Rifles was good and worked... with I suppose the best example being the refined model of the Rhodesian African Rifles which was superb in so many ways.

I suggest that Ray with his sub-continent experience will have important and valuable input into how given the Indian experience of forming colonial units from scratch what the most efficient way to have created/formed/built the ANA would have been.

To me the start point that everyone gets paid and seems to go to the highest bidder is a game changer. Even the insurgents (Taliban) get paid. Interesting.

Then we see out of Somalia troops trained and armed by the EU (including most bizarrely a Finnish contingent) defect to Al-Qaida and/or Al-Shabaab on becoming operational. One wonders how they were selected?

Clearly not enough experience is there nor enough thought given to forming/establishing/building indigenous forces in Afghanistan. The prognosis is poor.

We did discuss this matter somewhere here before. And I say again that both the Brits and the yanks got there act together in terms of tour lengths and training the Afghans right from 2006 it would be a different story now. Too late she cried.

The British colonial method does have a lot to say for itself, if you look at any former British colony you see that the style policing and of organising a military have been retained. In Pakistan the military is probably the only institution that works, albeit in unnerving way. The problem in Afghanistan is that after decades of unrest and warfare they have reverted to old forms of social organisations. If you looked at Afghanistan before the soviet invasion, or before the communist coup, you saw a country that was becoming increasingly westernised. After war and in an absence of government people defer to old forms of governing. In Afghanistan this was centred around tribal structures, strongmen emerged and tribal rivalries were reinvigorated. After the invasion the country was in an even sorrier state and the Americans chose crazy Karzai to lead, because he happened to Pashtun, didn't like the Taliban, so the people would love him. Trouble was that there wasn't an Afghan nation, it was more split than the archetypal strawberry flavoured lollipop, the different ethnicities didn't trust each other and the different tribes didn't either, then the various sub tribe groups had beef as well to make things worse! What I’m trying to get at is that creating an Afghan NATIONAL Army is a tough thing to do, there has never really been an Afghan national, just borders created by a British cartographer. Tajiks operation in the south are met with contempt. Then the Pashtun in minority in the north side with the Taliban. The ethnic schism is a huge issue. That is why I call what is going in Afghanistan state building not national building because there will never be an Afghan nation. It will take at least another generation of educated Afghans to sort this mess out, with or without the Taliban because the problems in Afghanistan won't end then. We'll see an Afghan version of the Good Friday Agreement by 2014 with the "moderate" Taliban co-opted into te government which will make lovely headlines in all the red tops. though chances are there'll be a more interesting story about Cheryl bloody Cole. I digress. We are relying on the ANSF when they receive little training, limited pay and little motivation. I've read several articles saying that when it comes to the ANP families often have one son in the ANP and one in the Taliban, just to hedge their bets. Says it all.

So end the wall of text.

[davidbfpo]

Maybe a digression, but we are swerving (again) to the lessons of the Imperial era and the British-Indian Army (not to ignore the navy & air force).

A friend who researches and writes on the contribution of the Indian Army in both World Wars, originally from what is now Pakistan (more in another thread), came across the story of Kamal Ram, a nineteen year old Sepoy:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamal_Ram

What is even more amazing and reflects Philip Mason's writings on honour (my emphasis) is this YouTube clip when the King presented his medal, with the King and assorted generals saluting the Sepoy:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iLdZI8i6iVE

[TDB]

Maybe a digression, but we are swerving (again) to the lessons of the Imperial era and the British-Indian Army (not to ignore the navy & air force).

A friend who researches and writes on the contribution of the Indian Army in both World Wars, originally from what is now Pakistan (more in another thread), came across the story of Kamal Ram, a nineteen year old Sepoy:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamal_Ram

What is even more amazing and reflects Philip Mason's writings on honour (my emphasis) is this YouTube clip when the King presented his medal, with the King and assorted generals saluting the Sepoy:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iLdZI8i6iVE

I love reading citations for medals like the VC, I'm always amazing by what people can do. I understand what you're getting at, an Indian soldier fighting in Italy in a white-European war. If trained well people will do things without question and with vigor. The average six weeks training an ANA soldier gets is not adequate.

[Bob's World]

There are important metrics in this:

Where are ANSF recruited from?

Why do people join or leave (legally or otherwise) the ANSF?

Why is it that ANA still cannot conduct independent operations at ANY level (people would not believe the political s%$t-storm when MG Carter proposed shifting Coalition forces from the rural regions of Zabul province, leaving several remote posts in Afghan hands. Bottom line they will not and cannot go, operate, or sustain anywhere they do not have Coalition logistics, intel and fire support).

Do the Taliban require such support? (no)

Do the Taliban require constant mentoring? (no).

People fight for what they believe in. When our guys came in initially to work with the Northern Alliance the biggest challenge was holding them back, not driving them forward. They believed in that fight. I believe that without the coalition presence the situation in Afghanistan would have resolved to some informal degree of reasonable stability and distribution of power. Afghan interests and Pakistan interests, same for those of the major regional and ethnic groups, would have been resolved. What drives this conflict onward are US interests (as we have defined them, and frankly I find them to be grossly overstated). Even Americans are losing their zeal to continue to fight to promotes those interests in this place. European allies lost that a few years ago, Northern Alliance shortly after they initially prevailed.

The reason we can't get the answer we want to the question we ask is that we have asked the wrong questions and have identified the wrong problems. We need to reassess the problem and ask different questions. We need to stop making this all about US.

[jcustis]

The reason we can't get the answer we want to the question we ask is that we have asked the wrong questions and have identified the wrong problems. We need to reassess the problem and ask different questions. We need to stop making this all about US.

If we did successfully reorient as you recommend sir, I think we'd find that we should have left some five to six years ago.

We don't want warlords in the fight, but that's precisely who were up against the Taliban in the vein of the Northern Alliance. ANSF is not, as you well know, the Northern Alliance reincarnate, despite the injection of the various soldiers from the tribes that dominated the Northern Alliance.

Looking at the wiki about the NA, I found these quotes from Massoud interesting to note:


Ahmad Shah Massoud remained the only leader of the United Front in Afghanistan. The Taliban repeatedly offered Massoud a position of power to make him stop his resistance. Massoud declined. He explained in one interview:

"The Taliban say: “Come and accept the post of prime minister and be with us”, and they would keep the highest office in the country, the presidentship. But for what price?! The difference between us concerns mainly our way of thinking about the very principles of the society and the state. We can not accept their conditions of compromise, or else we would have to give up the principles of modern democracy. We are fundamentally against the system called “the Emirate of Afghanistan”."[20]

"There should be an Afghanistan where every Afghan finds himself or herself happy. And I think that can only be assured by democracy based on consensus."[21]

Massoud wanted to convince the Taliban to join a political process leading towards democratic elections in a foreseeable future.[20][22] He also stated:
"The Taliban are not a force to be considered invincible. They are distanced from the people now. They are weaker than in the past. There is only the assistance given by Pakistan, Osama bin Laden and other extremist groups that keep the Taliban on their feet. With a halt to that assistance, it is extremely difficult to survive."[21]

In early 2001 the United Front employed a new strategy of local military pressure and global political appeals.[23] Resentment was increasingly gathering against Taliban rule from the bottom of Afghan society including the Pashtun areas.[23] In total, estimates range up to one million people fleeing the Taliban.[24] Many civilians fled to the area of Ahmad Shah Massoud.[12][25] National Geographic concluded in its documentary "Inside the Taliban": "The only thing standing in the way of future Taliban massacres is Ahmad Shah Massoud."[12] In the areas under his control Massoud set up democratic institutions and signed the Women's Rights Declaration.[8] At the same time he was very wary not to revive the failed Kabul government of the early 1990s.[23] Already in 1999 the United Front leadership ordered the training of police forces specifically to keep order and protect the civilian population in case the United Front would be successful.[8] In early 2001 Ahmad Shah Massoud addressed the European Parliament in Brussels asking the international community to provide humanitarian help to the people of Afghanistan.[24] He stated that the Taliban and Al Qaeda had introduced "a very wrong perception of Islam" and that without the support of Pakistan and Bin Laden the Taliban would not be able to sustain their military campaign for up to a year.[24] On this visit to Europe he also warned that his intelligence had gathered information about a large-scale attack on U.S. soil being imminent.[26]

I've always played the alternate ending mental game and wondered what would be going on in Afghanistan if he hadn't been assassinated.

[Bob's World]

This thinking is WHY Massoud was assassinated. Such men scare the holy crap out of self-serving despots, as they cannot be bought, and will not submit. They either prevail or die trying.

"Live free or die: Death is not the worst of evils." (toast written by General John Stark on July 31, 1809)

Perhaps Karzai could be a "lite" version of such a man if not corrupted by the power of our protection. We should indeed leave and find out.

[JMA]

I would go along with davidbfpo when he states -

It is all a question of each race's psychology.

I can give an example of the Indian Army.

We have a mix of all types of Regiments with different classes (tribes/ races, if you like). Handling each is a totally new experience.

We all have the same doctrine and training and yet handling each is a totally different experience.

The Sikhs are noisy and gung ho (even without reason or rhyme!). They can never stop jabbering or shifting unnecessarily even when they are close to the enemy lines. Very fidgety chaps.

The Gorkha is silent and inscrutable. You will never know what they are up to. In fact the story goes that a Gorkha broke the line on a route march, went into a village, did his whatever with a woman, paid well, return to the line of march and none knew! They are also very obstinate. And if you give a Gorkha an order, you must check back he has understood.

My chaps, the Mahars, are laid back and can go without food for days without complaints. As officers, one had to go an extra mile.

And so on.

The Afghan, I presume, is not much of a fighter in structured battles. But will be dangerous as special forces. They have an independent streak and tend to be individualistic. (My uncle commanded Pathans and so this is what he told me). He also said they are great ones and brutal so long as they are winning. If they smell defeat, it is another story!

Therefore, I would be surprised if the Afghans would synchronise with the American concept of warfare application! I presume, it will take time.........a very long time!

Therefore, Afghans will have to operate with the Americans if they are to adapt to the American minor tactics format and also get a hang of the American psychology that makes a success of the American tactics.

The Vietnamese experiment of 'Advisers' with Afghan troops may not work.

And the biggest handicap is that the American, appear to us, as very impatient and want instant results.

Another oddity we find is that a US officer after giving instructions say 'It is an order'. In the subcontinent, if your superior officer says something, then it is automatically taken for granted it is an order. This can lead to loss of authority that is automatically built in in a superior officer since, out here, if you say 'it is an order', it appears that the superior officer is not confident and he has a doubt if the chap will obey it or not.

In our part of the world, that just does not happen.

Just my thought.

Well the Indian experience together with that of the Brits of old would allow for the best formula for the training of an Afghan army.

Scratch units formed quickly seldom work other than for a short period where they by chance have the correct leadership in place. Take that leadership away and it all falls apart.

Yes patience is not an American characteristic. But that will not stop them attempting to cobble together units and an army in a few years. Obviously such efforts are destined to fail, that is a certainty.

The other ludicrous approach is to ignore a 1,000 years of history and try to put multi-ethnic units together. This later made worse by deploying troops from another ethnicity to police another's area. Never going to work.

So one really needs to structure any Afghan army around what they need to deal with regional threats (and internal threats) and not on some NATO organizational structure where the logistic challenges will prove insurmountable. The Taliban structure when the government would be useful as would Masood's structure which allowed him to defend the Panjshir Valley against both the Soviets and later the Taliban.

The problem I see is recruiting the right people who are committed to the cause and not there to receive the US$ at the month end. Personally I believe they are on a hiding to nothing by supporting the Karzai government but as an academic exercise it would be interesting to discuss how best to facilitate the establishment and development of a national army (if that is what is required).

[JMA]

Training of indigenous troops in another culturally remote country is a skill few countries have while even fewer are willing to commit to the long term input required.

A three part series from Stars and Stripes:

Part 1: Trainees try to be a force that can overcome child-abducting rebels – and their own horrific past (http://www.stripes.com/trainees-try-to-be-a-force-that-can-overcome-child-abducting-rebels-and-their-own-horrific-past-1.144366)

Part 2: Congolese battalion trained with purpose, but armed mostly with promises (http://www.stripes.com/congolese-battalion-trained-with-purpose-but-armed-mostly-with-promises-1.144478)

Part 3: Congo’s challenge: Feeding troops consistently (http://www.stripes.com/congo-s-challenge-feeding-troops-consistently-1.144558)

A classic quote from Part 2:


Lt. Col. John Pierre Molengo, the commander of the Kisangani camp, downplayed the significance of the food and salary problems, instead blaming U.S. troops who introduced a standard that is difficult to match.

“We were spoiled by eating like Americans,” he said. “The soldiers’ normal way of eating changed.”

So where does the problem lie?

[Bill Moore]

JMA, I couldn't agree more with your last post. In SF we used to eat the local foods, or for larger events we may have deployed our own cooks for our troops, but not for the local troops we were training. This is just one of many examples where we attempt to introduce unaffordable standards of living, equipment, training, C2 procedures, etc., and we wonder why our training efforts have no long term effect? I noticed this shift in the 90s when former SECDEF Chenney started pushing Brown and Root support to the forces resulting in a decrease of our own internal capacity to sustain ourselves. B&R provided great support, and while many may disagree I think they provided too much support that over time had a negative effect on the way we fight, how we interact with others when deployed, etc. Want to make developing nation people hate you, all you have to do is invite them to dine at one of our outstanding dining facilities in a combat zone so they can see how we're living compared to the average citizen in that country. This creates the false perception of what the standard should be, and perhaps contributes to our naive belief that the locals are not good enough. I suspect if we were working with the Taliban, we would claim they weren't ready to fight on their own yet either. We could save millions of dollars and be more effective at the same time if kept striving to make war a four star hotel, and focused on what needed to be done.

[Ray]

I think JMA's and Bill's point is worth serious consideration.

Training locals and getting their administration to high US standards and standard of living appears fair but it makes them 'soft' (in terms of how they would have fought had they been fighting on their own, supposing they were doing so before the ISAF came).

While one concedes that one cannot fight modern battle solely on 'old' ways, yet the modernisation must be compatible to the local combat and social parameters.

For instance, over dependence on motor transport or helicopter lifts for people who are used to movement on foot for long distance without tiring, slowly downgrades their psychological, mental and physical endurance (while it does not do the same to the Taliban who do not have such 'modern' facilities) and their natural fighting capabilities that would be best for use against the Taliban.

An Indian example - For instance, the MRE or what we call composite rations and survival rations that the IA used were the same as what was issued during WW II. Much of it was wasted since the troops did not eat most of the stuff as it was not to 'Indian' tastes/ food habits. Nowadays, it is on an Indian menu and has been, as per reports, well received. Thereby, loss to the exchequer is less and tonnage hauled has been put to productive use.

[carl]

Bill Moore: At the risk of being blown out of the water, I think you missed the point of the references to feeding the Congolese troops. The 3 meals a day were provided so they would have enough energy and attention to be trained at all, not because of extravagant American habits. The Congolese way of 1 meal a day is not because the troops can function on that, the record of the FARDC proves that. The food money gets stolen before it gets to the troops. That Congolese colonel is just covering his thieving from his soldiers. The object of that mission is to get some troops trained. If they weren't fed properly they wouldn't have paid attention, couldn't have paid attention and wouldn't have listened because they would have been to busy figuring how to acquire or steal their next meal.

[Bill Moore]

Carl,

thanks for the clarification. I'm not launching any torpedos, but will leave my rant in place, because it still addresses part of the whole on why we don't do capacity building well.

[JarodParker]

Lt Gen Caldwell gave a presentation today at Brookings (shown on CSPAN) regarding the training of Afghan forces. He stated that they should be able to take charge in Dec 2014. Currently, only 1 of 84 infantry battalions is ready to operate independently (no advisers, etc). He added that there's another larger group (presumably several battalions) right behind them in the pipeline.
Link (http://www.c-span.org/Events/A-Look-at-Afghanistan-and-Libya/10737422042-2/)

[TDB]

I thought I'd post this in here as it seems to be one of the more active threads within this catergory.
Dispatches: America's Secret Killers
http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/4od#3197175

Pretty damning thought nothing new. The negative effect such operations are having on COIN seems blatant yet it continues. Is this a case of Patraeus learning from his experiences in Iraq while dealing with AQI or him having little or no control over JSOC which operates outside of NATO command. I think that his appointment as the new head of the CIA is ever more interesting in light of such operations in Afghanistan.

Perhaps more on topic, it seems that there is a massive clash of cultures between the ANA and US shown in this documentary, I can only assume that the operations are in Pashtun areas and this idea of honour and respect is held pretty high up. "Bad Intel" can have a far reaching impact much more that egg on the faces of those who supplied it.

[Fuchs]

Let me throw a general observation/opinion into the ring in regard to allowing indigenous forces to take over:


Loyalty and other motivational problems can often be overcome by setting the right environment.

To declare training complete and sit back is obviously not the way to go.
I personally wouldn't mind the tactical and technical proficiency much either. Forget inspections, TO&E and milestones.

The time for the switch should rather be when the indigenous force has developed some kind of pride and determination.
A bit of battalion esprit de corps, for example.
A wrestling match tournament against civilians (civilians lose), horseman games probably, a battalion-typical accessory to the uniform, a few charismatic company leaders, some quick success in super-easy yet still impressive-looking early missions, timely pay, an evening education program that turns them all into literates and gives them a professional qualification goal to achieve in 2 years (instead of just a few weeks, such as deserting after 1st pay) ... once you got them motivated you can add whatever proficiency wasn't acquired so far.

The loyalty has to override whatever loyalty they had previously (except to parents and siblings) or else they'll stay a paper tiger.

[jcustis]

I sat in on a briefing given by the captain in charge of our police mentor tesm once, and immediately keyed in on the lone Afghan who was scribbling notes into a tiny notebook. I thought to myself, praise Allah, we've got a smart one. I don't know how long he had been posted to the DC with the rest of the police, but I don't think any of our guys had keyed on his ability until I sat behind the collective group of blue-uniformed guys and watched the brief.

It's not necessarily a hard prerequisite, and you have to work with what you've got, but getting the troops to some semblance of literacy is a good goal. I think that the learning model (adult vs. child) needs to be looked at, because we cannot assume that they will learn in the fashion an adult should, just because they are an adult.

When we think of rag-tag armies and whipping them into shape, does anyone else drift to thoughts of Von Steuben, or is it just me? Worked for them eh? :D

[JarodParker]

90% illiteracy rate for new recruits… most can’t even count.
2600 Afghan teachers are being employed by ISAF to teach literacy.
32,000 trainees getting 2hrs of literacy training every day.
90,000 trainees have reached basic literacy at a cost of $30/trainee. Upon completion of the program, they are awarded a pin to wear on their uniform. Some ME country has pledged $10million to fund future training.
100% of uniforms including boots are produced by Afghans (They took our production jobs! :mad:).

[Fuchs]

It's not necessary to have a more educated or more trained force than your enemy, though - especially when you have obvious numerical superiority.

You need to motivate them.

[JMA]

It's not necessary to have a more educated or more trained force than your enemy, though - especially when you have obvious numerical superiority.

You need to motivate them.

This is the key.

It appears that the whole Afghan situation is built around guns for hire out of which it seems the Taliban have the edge in some at least being prepared to fight and die while none (except a few foreign zealots) are prepared to fight for nothing. If the motivation to join the ANA is the pay and not the cause (who would want to fight and die for a corrupt regime) the prognosis is not good.

[jmm99]

From David's post, Spring up north (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=122249&postcount=11) (in another thread), we find in the linked FP article, The Lost Villages - Saying goodbye to a once-friendly land, now taken without a fight by the Taliban (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/03/the_lost_villages?page=0,1):


Mazar-e-Sharif itself has the feel of a city besieged. Since a suicide bomber last Saturday killed the venerated police commander of nine northern provinces, Gen. Daoud Daoud, an eerie hush has descended upon the city's low sprawl.

With the demise of Gen. Daoud Daoud (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Daud_Daud), the Talibs can cross one off of their HVT list.

Regards

[Ray]

I recently met a person from Afghanistan.

He also echoes what JMA has stated -


It appears that the whole Afghan situation is built around guns for hire

and add easy money - poppy and foreign Aid.

[Fuchs]

Few things fit together when it comes to characterising the Taliban or the conflict in Afghanistan.

# Reports about captured/arrested Taliban claim that up to a third of them were Taliban "leaders" - the definition of leader seems to be stretched below fire team leader in AFG

# Taliban in AFG are decentralised groups of platoon to company strength in terms of active fighters, but still able to focus "offensives" on certain regions?

# Drug business is supposedly a major if not THE income source of TB, but maps show that TB activity/influence, AFG population as a whole and poppy harvesting areas don't really match - not even two at once.

# Lots of "Taliban in army clothes" opened fire on or bombed foreign forces. Turned out that these "Taliban in army clothes" were apparently usually army soldiers indeed, not just disguised as implied in ISAF reports.

# How can it be explained that on the one hand the TB are elusive, part of the people - but then they are supposedly flushed out of regions by army sweeps?

# How exactly can TB monitor foreign forces movement using shadowing unarmed motorcycle drivers with mobile phones or radios when said foreign forces should easily be able to jam any such communication and should be able to let loose accompanying ANP to simply catch and arrest those scouts?

# Why is it that even reports about major and supposedly elaborate ambushes report a marginal lethality of the same and about positioning of ambush forces below the level of basic infantry manual quality ambush tactics?

# How comes that the TB supposedly pay more $$$ per month to their mercenaries than the ANA and ANP pay to soldiers, and what does this tell about the motivation and nature of the insurgency? Doesn't this all sound much more like a mafia than like a political-religious-cultural civil war?

# Why exactly are - after 10 years- still almost no indigenous state forces fully combat ready without foreign assistance, while their opponents seem to build up their forces in a few weeks or months every spring?

# Why exactly are TB supposedly conquering undefended terrain if the area is supposed to be composed of warlike tribal communities?

# Why does the old domino principle (TB arrive in force, pressure local representatives, community joins them and agrees to observer their laws, respect their courts, pay taxes and donate volunteer troops) that pushed the TB to power in the late 90's still work? Wasn't it supposed to help only those who are obviously winning and superior (which worked against the TB and for the Northern Alliance in late 2001)?

# Why are foreigners focusing so much on the indigenous state forces ANA and ANP. Isn't a loyal and competent bureaucracy the real arm of a government, with armed services being merely the brass knuckles?
What are army and police worth without an effective bureaucracy?

[jcustis]

# Drug business is supposedly a major if not THE income source of TB, but maps show that TB activity/influence, AFG population as a whole and poppy harvesting areas don't really match - not even two at once.

If we were in the business of eradicating the crops wholesale, their presence would certainly spike, although perhaps not so much directly in attacks aimed at the forces conducting the eradication. It would spike along lines of communication, soft targets (why attack strength), and fixed locations.


# How exactly can TB monitor foreign forces movement using shadowing unarmed motorcycle drivers with mobile phones or radios when said foreign forces should easily be able to jam any such communication and should be able to let loose accompanying ANP to simply catch and arrest those scouts?

It's absolutely easy, but then again doing so would be like employing the proverbial hammer to kill a fly. The remainder of the reasons "why" fall into the realm of OPSEC, however, and there are any of them.


# Why are foreigners focusing so much on the indigenous state forces ANA and ANP. Isn't a loyal and competent bureaucracy the real arm of a government, with armed services being merely the brass knuckles?
What are army and police worth without an effective bureaucracy?

You are absolutely spot on. The answers are wrapped up in the perils and evils of a bureaucracy, however.


# How can it be explained that on the one hand the TB are elusive, part of the people - but then they are supposedly flushed out of regions by army sweeps?

Uh...ever hear of public relations and marketing? :D


# Why exactly are - after 10 years- still almost no indigenous state forces fully combat ready without foreign assistance, while their opponents seem to build up their forces in a few weeks or months every spring?

"Build up" is an erroneous expression. They tend to go dormant, like a bear in hibernation, to some extent. The proverbial school of fish that they swim amongst starts to swim slower in the winter as well, so everyone is idling a little. They lie a little low during portions of the summer as well.


# Why exactly are TB supposedly conquering undefended terrain if the area is supposed to be composed of warlike tribal communities?

An Army lieutenant told an interesting story once at a COIN academy class, where residents of a particular neighbor in Kabul were getting the blues because development of the neighborhood was progressing at a crawl. What would you know, but instability all of a sudden set in with reports of Taliban afoot, stirring up trouble and intimidating the neighbors. What do you think the coalition response to the threat of Taliban encroachment was? Is your first guess a development project? Ding...ding.

Undefended terrain always fosters reports that inflate the true situation at hand.


# Why does the old domino principle (TB arrive in force, pressure local representatives, community joins them and agrees to observer their laws, respect their courts, pay taxes and donate volunteer troops) that pushed the TB to power in the late 90's still work? Wasn't it supposed to help only those who are obviously winning and superior (which worked against the TB and for the Northern Alliance in late 2001)?

That's a matter of context, degrees, and location, relative to the central government. The shadow governor in the district I was deployed to wasn't forced to go underground until early 2009.

"The pessimism is strong in this one."

[Bob's World]

# Why are foreigners focusing so much on the indigenous state forces ANA and ANP. Isn't a loyal and competent bureaucracy the real arm of a government, with armed services being merely the brass knuckles?
What are army and police worth without an effective bureaucracy?

When we define insurgency as "war" we punt the problem to the military.

When the military is given a "war" they set out to "win" it.

To win a war one must "defeat" the threat.

To defeat an insurgency threat is "complex" so we determine that we need a range of tools, from development to CT, to defeat it, and a host nation security force is a critical tool.

US military do not see politics as their business, so while they may well recognize the political component of a comprehensive COIN campaign, they leave that to "the politicians." Our politicians have already left the whole thing to "the military." So the only politicians worrying about the political aspects that are at the heart of the insurgency are the leadership of the Karzai/Northern Alliance GiROA and multi-headed Taliban leadership in Pakistan. For some reason, those two groups can't seem to agree on their own.

The Northern Alliance, protected and ignored by ISAF, is hard-set that they will not compromise and surrender any of their exclusive monopoly on political and economic power. The Taliban is equally hard-set that they will not tolerate being legally excluded from economic and political opportunity in their own homeland. So they wage a revolution against GiROA.

Back to the US military: As the "Threat" from this revolutionary insurgency based in Pakistan grows and becomes more violent, clearly more effort is needed to defeat it and win. So we slowly at first, and then more rapidly with a surge, bring in more and more and more foreign presence and push to make the GiROA security forces (made up also of the Northern Alliance) larger and larger to go out and suppress the resistance insurgency that grows in response to our own growth to suppress them.

It is a vicious circle. This is why Galula pointed out that COIN should be led by civilians. Insurgency is an illegal, often violent, political problem. The critical aspects of the solution lie in government. No US general is going to make fixing the government of Afghanistan his main effort, even if he privately recognizes that it is the main problem. So we do what militaries do in these situations and we apply a mix of hugs and punches to the populace in an effort to make them stop complaining about the political situation that we refuse to address. In Vietnam we said "We had to destroy the village to save the village" as Diem and his equally illegitimate successors sat protected by us in Saigon. In Afghanistan we say "We have to Clear the District in order to Build the District." Same-same. This never works for long, if at all.

Withdrawing foreign troops will increase stability as it will decrease the reason why the resistance resists. GiROA will still likely fall though, as the Revolution, having been unaddressed will sweep in and take them down. Now, if GiROA would get serious about reconciliation and then sit down to craft a new constitution that can build trust and teamwork between ALL Afghans, they could survive in relative stability for years.

This is not hard, but we make it very "complex" and difficult.

[Fuchs]

"Build up" is an erroneous expression. They tend to go dormant, like a bear in hibernation, to some extent. The proverbial school of fish that they swim amongst starts to swim slower in the winter as well, so everyone is idling a little. They lie a little low during portions of the summer as well.

They come back every year at greater force 8at least greater quantity of incidents and casualties) after sustaining casualties in the previous year.
This increase does likely not happen in the "dormant" phase, so I conclude that they increase (build up) their strength mostly in spring.

[jcustis]

They come back every year at greater force 8at least greater quantity of incidents and casualties) after sustaining casualties in the previous year.
This increase does likely not happen in the "dormant" phase, so I conclude that they increase (build up) their strength mostly in spring.

I don't know what to say then. Sound like you've already drawn your conclusions and have your answer.

[Fuchs]

Well, all my conclusions are preliminary. It takes some new argument to push them of course, though.

[82redleg]

They come back every year at greater force 8at least greater quantity of incidents and casualties) after sustaining casualties in the previous year.
This increase does likely not happen in the "dormant" phase, so I conclude that they increase (build up) their strength mostly in spring.

Why don't you think that the Taliban leadership isn't recruiting during the "dormant" winter months? Just because the weather is not conducive to fighting doesn't mean that the mullahs aren't preaching sermons and that jihadis aren't circulating among the villages.

[Fuchs]

It wouldn't change the basic statement much; the TB appear to recruit and ready up many fighters in a matter of months, not years.

I've read only a few days ago about how some General asserted that we would need another six years to finish training the ANA. That would be 16 years to build an army. That's certainly a record.

[JarodParker]

I think the distinction is that the insurgents are recruiting fighters while the coalition is building a professional army. One can just shove an AK into the hands of a teenager and turn him into a fighter fairly quickly. But building a professional army which respects the law and civilian authority as well as handle it's own logistics, etc is something different.

Also every Taliban is not some super bad ass warrior. The fighters featured in the "Frontline: Inside the Taliban" documentary were more like keystone cops.
...Just my two cents

[Fuchs]

The ANA troops are no super fighters either, they do not need to handle more logistics than the Taliban (unless luxury requirements are added), they're not particularly lawful or loyal and rather less than more professional in the original meaning of the word.

Still, their recruitment and training appears to be much, much slower.

[Bob's World]

Taliban fight to remove an unwanted presence and influence from their homeland. The cause is more important to them than life. The ANA are recruited from among the Northern Alliance and then deployed far from home to fight for a cause that many do not believe in.

This is an important metric regarding the validity of US strategy in the region.

Another metric of the validity and legitimacy of the government of a country is how large of a centralized security force is necessary to suppress those elements of the populace who are willing to fight to challenge the same?

Is the answer to make the ANA and ANP bigger, or to make GiROA less offensive to the vast segment of the Afghan populace that the Taliban emerge from? Good COIN addresses both of those factors at the same time. Critical to this is appreciating that we are not talking about development projects (there has never been development in Afghanistan), but the very nature of the government itself. A few simple fixes would have more impact than throwing another 2-3 US divisions into the fight, let alone Afghan divisions.

Equally curious, is that in a land where the threat faced today is one that frustrated both the Soviet and the US military, that we would attempt to build a mini-me version of that force among the Afghans to deal with the same threat. How is that supposed to be more successful????

[jcustis]

Sir, you've worked the upper echelons of the "action guys" and I think some policy-makers responsible for our efforts.

Why does it seem like they can't buy a clue?

[JarodParker]

The ANA troops are no super fighters either
Never said they were. I'm sure both sides could teach basic fighting skills to a recruit in the same amount of time. But ISAF has the added responsibility of building "an army".


they do not need to handle more logistics than the Taliban (unless luxury requirements are added)
A group of insurgents who farm by day and fight by night or those who join the campaign after the harvest, etc will have a very different (informal and decentralized) logistics process when compared to a full-time/professional soldier who doesn't have his own farm, grain stores, family, house in the immediate vicinity. The soldier requires things like regular pay, uniform (including all the esprit de corps fostering insignias you mentioned earlier), housing (I don't think the locals would go for billeting), etc. So this brings with it a lot of baggage which the average TB weekend-warrior might not have to deal with.


they're not particularly lawful or loyal and rather less than more professional in the original meaning of the word.
No disagree here. And we'll be lucky if we can get this accomplished in 50 years. Look at countries like Egypt who've had a strong/competent military for decades but are still muddling around in this department. The western way of soldiering didn't happen over night, so we shouldn't expecting the Afghans to get there in just a few years. This will take a lot of follow-on training and some trial and error.

I'm not saying I'm sold on how ISAF is approaching the training/or the overall mission (not that it matters)... All I'm saying is that you're comparing apples and oranges. Anyway, I think we're getting off track. This thread was supposed to be about ANA units operating independently. And I think the consensus on that seems to be lack of motivation and leadership.

[Bob's World]

Sir, you've worked the upper echelons of the "action guys" and I think some policy-makers responsible for our efforts.

Why does it seem like they can't buy a clue?

This may surprise you (it surprised me as well) Policy makers don't understand this stuff. They have no background or experience in this, and frankly the military community has enabled them to see this as a military problem rather than as a political/policy problem. They wait for us to finish the dirty work so that they can get on with what they do. We have told them over and over that one must create security first. We are wrong. Get the political/policy aspect on track first, and then security will emerge over time.

Congress is only as informed as the general populace, they go off of what is in the media and carefully crafted official statements from DoD that are fed to them. They worry about their electoral bases first and foremost.

We have been saying for years that we are at war and that their are vital national interests at stake. Congressional response is "Now you want me to tell my people that we are not at war, and that these interests have been mis-stated or exaggerated?" "How can we do that (and not lose credibility and the next election)?"

Our government is wonderfully inefficient. I love that fact, because it is by design to prevent insurgency at home. It does make it hard to get to a logical approach to dealing with insurgency abroad, however....

[TDB]

This may surprise you (it surprised me as well) Policy makers don't understand this stuff. They have no background or experience in this, and frankly the military community has enabled them to see this as a military problem rather than as a political/policy problem. They wait for us to finish the dirty work so that they can get on with what they do. We have told them over and over that one must create security first. We are wrong. Get the political/policy aspect on track first, and then security will emerge over time.

Congress is only as informed as the general populace, they go off of what is in the media and carefully crafted official statements from DoD that are fed to them. They worry about their electoral bases first and foremost.

We have been saying for years that we are at war and that their are vital national interests at stake. Congressional response is "Now you want me to tell my people that we are not at war, and that these interests have been mis-stated or exaggerated?" "How can we do that (and not lose credibility and the next election)?"

Our government is wonderfully inefficient. I love that fact, because it is by design to prevent insurgency at home. It does make it hard to get to a logical approach to dealing with insurgency abroad, however....

I think this sums up a massive problem with any foreign policy venture, the people making the decisions have very little understand of the subject. I would be interested to know who is informing David Cameron, for example, on Afghanistan. Is it simply some civil servant paying lip service and dumbing it down for him, or is there a group of people knowledgeable on the country itself and on the nature of COIN thus helping him to develop his policy. I'd hazard a guess and say it was the former rather than the latter.

Because I often wonder when politicians make speaches, where are they getting in information from. Civil servants the Cabinet Office, that much is obvious but just how informed are these people. People are passed around the civil service for the first few years of their time there, this is sensible. I digress, but my point is how are policy makers, strategy designers informed, and the impact of those gathered together to inform policy and strategy makers. I'm thinking of Petraeus, Kilcullen etc in Iraq and then Afghanistan.

[jcustis]

This may surprise you (it surprised me as well) Policy makers don't understand this stuff. They have no background or experience in this, and frankly the military community has enabled them to see this as a military problem rather than as a political/policy problem. They wait for us to finish the dirty work so that they can get on with what they do. We have told them over and over that one must create security first. We are wrong. Get the political/policy aspect on track first, and then security will emerge over time.

Congress is only as informed as the general populace, they go off of what is in the media and carefully crafted official statements from DoD that are fed to them. They worry about their electoral bases first and foremost.

We have been saying for years that we are at war and that their are vital national interests at stake. Congressional response is "Now you want me to tell my people that we are not at war, and that these interests have been mis-stated or exaggerated?" "How can we do that (and not lose credibility and the next election)?"

Our government is wonderfully inefficient. I love that fact, because it is by design to prevent insurgency at home. It does make it hard to get to a logical approach to dealing with insurgency abroad, however....

I'm not completely surprised, after getting a glimpse at the disconnect between the RC commander and the lead of the PRT during my last deploy, over who was really doing what regarding the various Lines of Operation. It seemed as if he had to repeatedly fight off misperceptions by reinforcing that he was there to focus on security, in order to support the other LOOs, and not be looked at as the lead on governance and development. It routinely blew my mind that there was even a single question over it.

The difficulty that relationship caused, even down in my backwater corner of my AO, still pisses me off to this day.

[Ken White]

This may surprise you (it surprised me as well) Policy makers don't understand this stuff...

...Congress is only as informed as the general populace, they go off of what is in the media and carefully crafted official statements from DoD that are fed to them. They worry about their electoral bases first and foremost...

Our government is wonderfully inefficient. I love that fact, because it is by design to prevent insurgency at home. It does make it hard to get to a logical approach to dealing with insurgency abroad, however....Yep -- and that's a feature, not a bug. It was purposely designed to be inefficient and to concentrate on the People it served to the detriment of foreign affairs, issues and involvement. We do not do the foreign adventure bit at all well; not group psychologically properly inclined. (Boy, is that an unwieldy phrase :D ).

We prosper mightily when we concentrate on our navel and avoid foreign entanglements (not commerce; entanglements) -- we have gone steadily downhill since we 'forgot' to do that...

You'd think the fools in Washington (Uniformed and not; the uniformed are a part of the problem) would realize that.

[jcustis]

I think some (maybe even many) do have a bit of a clue. They are hampered, however, by the notion they hold that the problem is too massive for them to solve as a lone individual, and they invariable butt up against the oppressive bureaucratic straight jacket imposed by the rest of the club, who are indeed staring at their navels.

[Ken White]

Conformity, uniformity, 'standards' and unity of effort (as opposed to unity of command) are all vastly over rated. :rolleyes:
:wry:

[davidbfpo]

Originally posted on the ANA thread and then found this - so initial comment edited away.

Following the NYT article on Gen. Odierno's guidance in the comments I found this by 'Ker':
As a former embedded trainer with an Afghan Army infantry battalion, I find it troubling that military leaders still use the terms "adviser" and "trainer" when referring to the soldiers who will be embedded with Afghan units. When our Afghan Army unit was sent to a hotspot in Kandahar or Helmand provinces, we the "trainers/advisers" did all of the fighting. It was not a comforting feeling knowing that the only people who had our back were Afghan Army soldiers. It was also not a good feeling knowing that we had to worry not only about the Taliban, but also whether any of the Afghan soldiers would attack us.

The role of the "trainer/adviser" is much more difficult and dangerous than the terms "trainer" and "adviser" connote.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/world/asia/us-plans-afghan-shift-to-lessen-nato-combat-role.html?_r=2&ref=world

[Bill Moore]

I suspect/hope that once we right size in Afghanistan the advisors will be forced to act as advisors instead of leading operations. If it is trulygoing to be Afghan run, that means Afghans will determine what missions they execute, when they execute them, and how they execute them instead of being a surrogate force for ISAF. It will require a mental shift for many of our aggressive advisors who I suspect are inherently Type A personalities. They'll have to pretend to be Type B personalities (its role playing) to be effective, and that isn't easy, but it can be done. You have to learn to transition between roles rapidly, and I think all our guys and gals are capable of doing so, they just need to be told that is the expectation (and it needs to be the expectation). If the intent is to continue to push our strategy, our ends, our means, and our ways then I think we'll continue to have challenges.

[Steve the Planner]

David:

Really good and topical.

The central idea framed by the quoted article is profoundly important.

The organizational structure and culture of trainer/advisors and training advising missions is so so easily overwhelmed by the big organization from which we originate, whether on the military or civilian side.

Small Wars, in order to stay effective Small Wars, must be built on the leveraging and partnerships, plus targeted specialty activities.

Once we become the actor, a new script is needed.

[davidbfpo]

I also wonder if external, foreign political pressure to reduce force levels will mean advisor teams will be affected. Notably will contractors (PMC) arrive; assuming that Kabul / GIRoA agrees? Secondly will non-US teams be deployed? Anecdote suggests some nations have kept well away from this role.

To back-up the original quotation a recent UK TV series, by Ross Kemp, devoted one hour long programme to an ANA Kandak in Helmand, with a UK advisory team. Some of the issues illustrated were local, others more profound and suggested to me there is a long road ahead.

[Steve the Planner]

Same with the Iraqi police training missions.

Why not hire or deploy 300 Nepalese or Brazilian police trainers if the complexity and security needed to deploy US ones became so unbearably expensive/complex after our departure?

In a conflict/post-conflict environment, "training" and advisory missions create whole constellations of new issues and complexities of impediments to successful implementation.

[Steve the Planner]

David:

Musings on Iraq has an article today on Iraq's rejection of NATO trainers:

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/

[Dayuhan]

Looking at the initial question...


Why are we still leading missions, instead of supporting Afghans conduct them?

... the first question that came to my mind was "whose missions are they?"

Are we expecting Afghans to lead missions where the mission objectives and parameters are set by Americans in support of American strategic and policy objectives?

If Afghans are assigning objectives and parameters in support of their own policy objectives, it certainly makes sense to expect Afghans to provide the leadership. If we're the ones setting up the missions, expecting Afghans to lead is just asking them to do our work for us.

Unless, of course, we assume that our objectives and goals are the same as those of Afghans, but I'm not sure that assumption would be well founded.

[davidbfpo]

Dayuhan,

Thanks for the reminder:
whose missions are they?

I wonder how ISAF and their politicians will react when the GIRoA decides that 'X' is no longer is a mission too far? For sometime I have thought Helmand Province is peripheral to GIRoA's national interest when the "crunch" comes; there are far more vital places, roads and population centres.

When GIRoA decides, the ANSF obey and the advisers go along. I think not, the advisers, especially any non-US, will quietly exit.

[Bill Moore]

If the intent is to continue to push our strategy, our ends, our means, and our ways then I think we'll continue to have challenges.

That was the intent of this sentence on my previous post. There is a major difference in my view between using HN and other forces as force multipliers or surrogates, and advising a nation on how to respond to "their" security problems.

Both missions have their value, the Brits, French, U.S. and other have used surrogates for decades, but we need to recognize the difference between a simple force multiplier approach to pursue "our" strategy and providing advice to assist a nation with "their" strategy.

There is no logical reason that an organization will or should pursue our objectives after we leave, unless they embrace the same strategy and objectives. This is where the simplistic of "through, by, and with" is misleading, and why I recommend we purge it from our lexicon.

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

Exactly right.

Witness the US's version of the Iran threat to Iraq.

Our view: Desperate "existential" threat of some kind of imminent Iranian invasion (or cooptation) of Iraq. Underscored by our (not their) concern about Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Their view: Iraqis hate outside domination. Iraqis will allow much from Iranians (especially tourism), trade heavily with Turkey and Asia, and believe that their oil is their oil. Either pro-Iranian Maliki will deliver on prosperity or he will be out; to close to Iran and he will be out.

Their strategy: Let Iran help wherever it can, take the money from the 20,000 or so daily visitors to Najaf (including many Iranian Shia's). When Iran's chief religious/political officer, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, wants to open an office in Najaf, he is simply given the cold shoulder, and word is sent out that the quietist Sistani does not approve.


“Do you know who in Iraq hates Iran more than anyone? It is Najaf,” said Neama al-Ebadi, director of the Najaf-based Iraq Center for Research and Studies, echoing a view widely expressed on the streets of the city.

“The Shiites of Iran are Iranian first. They think they’re superior to Arabs. But Najafis believe they are the original Shiites and the Iranians are just copies.”

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqs-shiites-in-no-mood-to-embrace-iran/2011/12/14/gIQANYRUuO_story.html

Or Joost Hillerman's assessment:


"The Turks are very clever — they are using soft diplomacy and economic power to extend their influence against the Iranians — even though they wouldn't put it that way," says Joost Hiltermann, an Iraq analyst with the International Crisis Group.

"The Iranians don't have anything comparable to offer to Iraq. It doesn't have the same quality of goods, the same kinds of investments. And so Turkey can beat Iran at that game. As long as it's a peaceful rivalry, a peaceful competition, the Iraqis can balance one against the other, and meanwhile can develop themselves. They are not under anyone's direct control," he says.

Once the economic "sucking sound" of US departure is heard, and Iraqis become confident that our diplomatic objectives are no more than the routine meddling of all foreigners, then they will want more trade and business with US firms:

http://articles.cnn.com/2011-12-13/us/us_maliki-iraq-businesss_1_al-maliki-iraqi-economy-iraqi-prime-minister-nouri?_s=PM:US

Certainly, there are places like Falluja where US baggage is heavy, but, believe it or not, as rough tourism begins in the North at even a fraction of the Najaf volumes, we become more welcome, just as Iranians are.

The sooner the complete military/diplo change, the sooner we can accept each other on even terms. Then, we can start a new relationship.

[G Martin]

Dayuhan got it right: whose missions are they? Until the MoD and MoI come up with their own campaign plans based on their own assessment of the threat- even with 100% capable ANSF- we won't get them "in the lead"- and that shouldn't surprise anyone. Of course, as others have mentioned, when they write their own threat assessment and campaign plans (and ones not done under the "duress" of continued U.S. funding/equipping), I bet they won't match the ones that back our interests...

[Ken White]

...when they write their own threat assessment and campaign plans ... I bet they won't match the ones that back our interests...Nor should they.

If we could park our egos and our control fetish -- both overweening -- they'd probably get on with it. Our 'interests' there are for the most part fantasies in any event.

Imitation is flattery and that is a form of pandering -- it does no one any favors. We're making precisely the same mistakes we made with the Koreans and with the Viet Namese. Dumbbb. Of course, a cynic might say "but we don't know any better..." :rolleyes:

We diligently ignore the fact our 'experience' shows us that trying to change other nations to our models of anything just simply does not work. This cynic says we know better but are afraid to embrace the changes required because that might be seen as an acknowledgement that we've, collectively, gotten a lot of things wrong and given the added fact that change is hard work, it's just easier to do what we've been doing. :(

No matter how wrong it is.

[G Martin]

Nor should they.

Agree- but I think that explains at least part of the reason we have been slow to put them "in the lead"...

[Ken White]

Agree- but I think that explains at least part of the reason we have been slow to put them "in the lead"...No question and almost certainly the main part -- that was the same mistake we made elsewhere and earlier... :mad:

That and egos... :wry:

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Ken,


We diligently ignore the fact our 'experience' shows us that trying to change other nations to our models of anything just simply does not work. This cynic says we know better but are afraid to embrace the changes required because that might be seen as an acknowledgement that we've, collectively, gotten a lot of things wrong and given the added fact that change is hard work, it's just easier to do what we've been doing.

I used to think we knew better, at least many of the older SF vets did in the late 70s and early 80s, but then we were coerced to start training foreign armies using U.S. Army Infantry doctrine, and it didn't work in most cases, because most of these foreign armies didn't have an effective NCO Corp. Being a life long iconoclast I asked why we were teaching inappropriate tactics based on the host nation's capabilities, and the response was what else can we teach other than U.S. doctrine? I suggested we study the way they do their operations now, and then recommend tweaks and improve their basic combat skills (primarily marksmenship), combat medicine, comms, etc. That was frowned upon, because obviously some bored U.S. General would show up in the middle of no where and ask why were teaching non-standard tactics, and that would destroy everyone's career from the team leader to the Bn Cdr, so just shut up and teach U.S. doctrine.

The answer really wouldn't have been that hard, based on their culture, they don't operate the way we do, so we conducted studies prior to coming on how their Army was organized, how they fight, and where their shortfalls were (especially if they were in a conflict and we could analyze their combat performance) and then suggest some changes for improving that were easy for them to adapt (and to internalize, so they would use them after we left), instead of trying to reform their Army into a mirror image of the U.S.. What General wouldn't understand that? Too many I suspect :(, but if SF leaders don't get this (hopefully there are still some who do, especially after a decade of pounding our heads against the wall), I sure as heck don't expect the GPF to get it. The good news is SF has produced some very capable SF and commando counter parts that are very capable in their niche missions, but we need an equally effective effort with their non-specialized security forces.

[Ken White]

That was frowned upon, because obviously some bored U.S. General would show up in the middle of no where and ask why were teaching non-standard tactics, and that would destroy everyone's career from the team leader to the Bn Cdr, so just shut up and teach U.S. doctrine.Conformity kills...
The answer really wouldn't have been that hard, based on their culture, ... What General wouldn't understand that? Too many I suspect :(Sadly so
I sure as heck don't expect the GPF to get it.Not so. They get it -- in my observation usually as well as and often better than nearby SOF elements who can also be hidebound or far less than superbly competent.

As you know, "getting it" and competence are 'people' things and good people are in both types of units -- as are less than good people. I've known people in SF, Ranger, CAG, SEAL and other elements that had no business being in those jobs -- so have you. The selection process helps winnow out some and the independent duty bit gets a few more but some will always slip through. The GPF just must be less selective, they don't have the RTU hammer...

In any event, the issue is not the type of unit or even the people aspect, it is the culture. Conformity, uniformity and risk aversion are the culprits. That culture applies to both SOF and to the GPF. The latter just has more visibility to more Generals and marginal but loyal CSMs who are the supreme conformists and who want no deviation from the party line. The SF guys just get less direct 'supervision.' :wry:

I'll also point out that such interpolation was far less an issue in either force before the McNamara introduced military as management fetish and the slightly later terribly debilitating BTMS Task, Conditions and Standard straitjacket. We've simply lost our way due to those two factors. We better get our head out of our second point of contact (or fourth if one is a conformist...) and dump both those things or someone is going to go in and slice that head out to hand it to us on a plate...:mad:

[Bob's World]

When ISAF Generals start taking orders from Afghan Generals we will know we have turned the corner. I worked for a Brit General who I admire and respect tremendously, but many a time sitting in a Command and Staff meeting getting the stern lecture about the need for more effective partnering I would have to think "don't say it" as I looked around the room absent of a single Afghan.

I was less successful at biting my tongue when lectured routinely by the US 1-star about how the SOTF was not partnering properly by having only a single ODA working with an Afghan Battalion, with the Afghans planning, rehearsing and leading their own operations because we were not achieving the 1-1 standard of US to Afghan partnering being adopted by the conventional forces (hold my hand and follow me). I don't know, he got his second star so maybe he was right...

[Infanteer]

"Partnering" was the crack cocaine of ISAF for a few years, even though it pushed things in the absolutely wrong direction. Whereas before, Afghan units could only rely on small, 10-20 man mentoring teams (meaning they had to do a lot themselves) partnering allowed them to fall under the care and supervision of an entire battalion. I saw this first hand when we an OMLT disengaged and I became a de facto LO to a Kandak CO for a short spell.