Future Naval Air contribution to "small wars"

[pvebber]

The CV is once again obsolete, "long live the CV!".

Or should it?

Aircraft were going to make surface ships obsolete, or so Billy Mitchell argued. Tac nukes made fleets obsolete in the late 60s and early 70s. Backfire bombers and conventional cruise missiles killed them off again in the late 70s early 80s. In the late 80s, and 90s wake homing torpedoes did them in. Now its antiship ballistic missiles.

We have been through multiple periods when ships, CVs in particular were "sitting ducks" - yet we have dropped a whole lot of warheads on foreheads with a perrenially obsolete platform.

Gazing into your crystal balls, is this "it" and finally the stake is about to be put into the heart of supercarriers? To surface ships in general? Is the risk to them to great for the role they have played delievering ordnance from 5 acres of soverign US territory placed where we want it?

If we slashed our CV force, would that significantly affect our success in future small wars? Would any of you pointy end of the spear types know they were gone? Can we provide striking power in support of land operations with missiles from small ships and intercontinental land-based air?

[Ken White]

No. No.

Yes. Yes. Not nearly as effectively (and, in this era of excessive compassion and concern, as accurately and / or measured).


Suggested added questions:

Can anything else 'show the flag' as effectively? Can we get by with two or three fewer CVNs?


No. Probably, accepting slight risk.

[Steve Blair]

Simple answer to your last two points (intercontinental air and sea-based missiles) is that they can't replace the capability provided by CVs. Neither option is especially responsive to immediate demands or requirements, and both lack the visible deterrent factor that naval air can provide (although the B-52 has a similar capability, you still have the response time issue).

There has always been talk of the "risk to surface ships," but I've yet to seriously see it appear outside of the writings of theorists and those with various axes to grind. And as overseas bases continue to disappear, the CV gives us a capability that can't easily be replaced or replicated.

Just my $.02.

[Sergeant T]

Good piece along these lines in the May issue of Proceedings (http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-05/twilight-uperfluous-carrier). Also a good analysis, as always, by Galrahn. (http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/05/on-uperflous-carrier.html) From a sheer dollar standpoint, the price tag per unit doesn't look sustainable.

[Entropy]

As a guy who cut his teeth supporting naval air, I do have a fondness for carriers. The reality is, though, that we don't know how they'd perform in a real war. They were never tested against tac nukes, wake homers, Backfires, etc. It may be that they will be proved obsolete in a real naval war. I hope we don't find out.

That said, I think they are extremely useful and flexible platform. I don't think, though, they have much utility for small wars so I don't think cuts to the CV force would affect those wars much.

[pvebber]

Thanks for the replies!

Effectiveness vs efficiency is one of the issues with our current fleet design - and the CVs in particular as Ken points out. Supercarriers are very efficient, and have demonstrated effectiveness, but at a potential catastrophic risk that leads to questioning their ultimate effectiveness.

The question one is left with after the proceeedings article (as galrahn points out) is if big carriers are sitting ducks, then small ones are - and what does that mean for the vulnerability of airbases ashore?

The problem comes down to risk - is a lot eggs efficiently placed in a few baskets - at high risk, but with a low probability of that risk materializing better than a few more baskets? a LOT more baskets?

Is the even higher cost of moving some capability undersea in SSGNs worth the expense agianst the liklihood of that risk?

Or do you pay to increase range and speed so you can stand off farther?

Our current plans seem to be a desire to hedge all bets, but the result will be a VERY limited capacity for each.

The submarine force is lobbying for two additional VA Class subs, and starting in about 2020 putting a 4 SSGN tube "plug" in them to help recoup the payload space lost when the SSGNs end their service life in the middle 2020s.

Capt Wayne Hughes proposed a bimodal "high-low" fleet mix in this paper:

New Navy Fighting machine (https://docs.google.com/fileview?id=0B8Rk_52AMEzwM2U4OGEyMWEtZTJjNi00OTQwL ThjMzItYmRhM2EzNDk2Mzgy&hl=en)

Others have proposed a trimodal Navy adding a "Stealthy, highly survivable" piece.

Given what we have seen in Libya, the realty of the political limits on the decisive use of airpower in the Warden model may require "low end" sources of airpower (like the opening use of Harriers from an LHD). I think its argueable that Libya isn't a true "small war".

While CV strike aircraft may not be as important to more tradtional COIN-based small wars, will the need for airborne ISR-T assets (some with reaper like strike capability) potentially require naval air assets to perform those functions, or will those tend to be more organic to ground units in the future?

[Steve Blair]

Obviously airbases on shore are outstanding targets, if for no other reason than they're fixed. They can be defended, but how many people do you tie up in that operation? And there's always the question of overflight rights or being able to launch missions from locations outside the US into other areas. Add in being able to supply overseas bases and the picture gets even more complex.

[davidbfpo]

The UK is effectively giving up aircraft carriers (although we will have a carrier without aircraft:eek:).

My response is that in future 'Small Wars' the USA may undertake a mission which is far from the sea, e.g. like Darfur, does not warrant a CVN's commitment e.g. like El Salvador and does not require that level of coercive capability, e.g. chasing the LRA.

The CVN provides IMHO for Small Wars an expeditionary / intervention capability and surely the USA after recent experiences will want to avoid such high-level commitments? It may affect the USN's budget and other factors not being able to deploy its gold standard coercive option - live with it and adapt. Yes, that may mean fewer CVNs.

[slapout9]

It's not so much that they are vulnerable, it is that they are obsolete!
What is the purpose of an Aircraft Carrier? Why were they ever developed? Because we did not not have Aircraft that could travel the required distance to strike the target. We don't need to do that anymore.

[Steve Blair]

Slap, I disagree. CVs allow you to circumvent some of the limitations of land-based platforms and missiles (and unmanned platforms). They also provide presence...something that you can't do with stealth aircraft or missiles.

[slapout9]

Slap, I disagree. CVs allow you to circumvent some of the limitations of land-based platforms and missiles (and unmanned platforms). They also provide presence...something that you can't do with stealth aircraft or missiles.

But if you have presence you have greater vulnerability. Also CV's have to have alot resources committed to defense just like a land base. Also presence is often one of our main problems...it provokes as much as it it prevents.

[Steve Blair]

But if you have presence you have greater vulnerability. Also CV's have to have alot resources committed to defense just like a land base. Also presence is often one of our main problems...it provokes as much as it it prevents.

I still don't consider that convincing evidence that they are obsolete. And our use of unmanned vehicles (including cruise missiles) to attack targets is just a provoking. I'd argue that in some ways it's more provoking, as it's "easier" to launch unmanned vehicles and standoff ordnance at targets. The easier it is to use, the more likely (it seems) the political leadership is to use said systems, creating more provocation.

[pvebber]

It's not so much that they are vulnerable, it is that they are obsolete!

Since most consider them obsolete becasue of their vulnerability, i take it you think that hte idea of a mobile airfiled (which is what a CV is) is what is obsolete? Is it the mobility is no longer of value? Or is it the idea Forward (inside an adversary strike envelope) airbases now replaced by distant ones? Would a unseen SSGN not be obsolete because it is unseen and less provacative?

Is the time constraint associated with great distance not as important as it once was?

Trying to understand what you mean seperating vulnerability and obsolesence? I know you can't mean the airplanes are obsolete ;)

[slapout9]

Since most consider them obsolete becasue of their vulnerability, i take it you think that hte idea of a mobile airfiled (which is what a CV is) is what is obsolete? Is it the mobility is no longer of value? Or is it the idea Forward (inside an adversary strike envelope) airbases now replaced by distant ones? Would a unseen SSGN not be obsolete because it is unseen and less provocative?

Is the time constraint associated with great distance not as important as it once was?

Trying to understand what you mean separating vulnerability and obsolescence? I know you can't mean the airplanes are obsolete ;)

It is the "function" that is obsolete...carrying the "Strike" aircraft... that can fly anywhere in the world on it's own.

[Ken White]

It is the "function" that is obsolete...carrying the "Strike" aircraft... that can fly anywhere in the world on it's own. (emphaisis added / kw)However, I don't think we're there yet -- nor will we be for another ten years or more, probably about two to three times that period. So, in the meantime...

[Entropy]

It is the "function" that is obsolete...carrying the "Strike" aircraft... that can fly anywhere in the world on it's own.

That has been true for many decades though - since the 1950's if not before.

The problem with long-range strike aircraft, though, is flight time. A long flight time works ok for static targets (fixed facilities), but becomes problematic for moving targets. Secondly, a long flight time means there is a decreased response time. Third, a long flight time means you need more aircraft to generate an equivalent number of sorties.

Finally, you still need other aircraft besides strike aircraft and many of those are, by necessity, short range.

Added: The range/response problem is why conventionally-armed ICBM's (called "prompt global strike") were considered for a time - of course those come with a lot of baggage :)

[Steve Blair]

Agree with Entropy's response. Just look at the planning issues generated by one B-2 strike and you see how complicated that "strike aircraft ranging across the globe" model actually is...and how unresponsive it can be.

[Fuchs]

Rule of thumb:

If you want to fight a war beyond the range of strike aircraft based on your or allied soil, DON'T.

[slapout9]

Added: The range/response problem is why conventionally-armed ICBM's (called "prompt global strike") were considered for a time - of course those come with a lot of baggage :)

No baggage just vested interest......but of all people it was Jimmie Carter that spoke the truth "All you need is a platfrom to launch a missile." 747's with a rotary launcher would do the air platform part. Do not send/risk any high cost platform when all you need to do is get the "Warhead" to the target. The Pershing II won the cold war and Pershing I caused Russia to blink during the Cuban Missile crisis along with all the Army anti-aircraft missiles we used to have:(

[slapout9]

All the big aircraft carriers should be converted to Marine Force Carriers....weld a couple of them together and amke really big platforms and protect them with guided missile destroyers. Parallel Amphibious operations carried out simultaneously all around the world, all at once is going to become more important not less important.

[Entropy]

Rule of thumb:

If you want to fight a war beyond the range of strike aircraft based on your or allied soil, DON'T.


That ROT doesn't make a lot of sense.


Slap,


No baggage just vested interest......but of all people it was Jimmie Carter that spoke the truth "All you need is a platfrom to launch a missile."

That's just not true except for fixed targets. What is your target? Is your target going to move in the 5-10 minutes it takes the weapon to reach the target? If your target does move then what? What if the target needs to be destroyed in 2 minutes?

Standoff weapons have their uses, but they can't do everything. There are always tradeoffs.

[Entropy]

All the big aircraft carriers should be converted to Marine Force Carriers....weld a couple of them together and amke really big platforms and protect them with guided missile destroyers. Parallel Amphibious operations carried out simultaneously all around the world, all at once is going to become more important not less important.

How are you going to carry out those amphibious operations without any air defense? Something has got to protect the helos and landing craft and then something has to provide fire support and interdiction once the force is on land. Something else to consider is that we haven't seen a lot of amphib ops over the past several decades. Why should we increase a capability that doesn't get used much?

[Steve Blair]

That ROT doesn't make a lot of sense.


Slap,



That's just not true except for fixed targets. What is your target? Is your target going to move in the 5-10 minutes it takes the weapon to reach the target? If your target does move then what? What if the target needs to be destroyed in 2 minutes?

Standoff weapons have their uses, but they can't do everything. There are always tradeoffs.

Good points, Entropy. Missiles seem to hold a certain fascination without acknowledgement of their limitations, military and otherwise. How quickly people forget mocking Clinton for "lobbing cruise missiles."

[slapout9]

not true except for fixed targets. What is your target? Is your target going to move in the 5-10 minutes it takes the weapon to reach the target? If your target does move then what? What if the target needs to be destroyed in 2 minutes?



If it is only true for fixed targets then how does an anti-aircraft missile work? Isn't the target moving? Dosen't the missile HOE(Home On Energy) or home on Radar. Things will go wrong it is not a perfect system but pretty good.

[slapout9]

Good points, Entropy. Missiles seem to hold a certain fascination without acknowledgement of their limitations, military and otherwise. How quickly people forget mocking Clinton for "lobbing cruise missiles."

It was "lobbing cruise missiles" at empty targets. Bill Clinton also thought we had special Ninja forces in the Military to.

[slapout9]

How are you going to carry out those amphibious operations without any air defense? Something has got to protect the helos and landing craft and then something has to provide fire support and interdiction once the force is on land. Something else to consider is that we haven't seen a lot of amphib ops over the past several decades. Why should we increase a capability that doesn't get used much?

1-I thought the Marines had their own F-18 Air Defense Aircraft that deployed with them? The Navy should be supplying the Fire Support.

2-Offshore Raiding and Rescues is a mission the Marines do well. With the budget cutbacks Offshore basing and amphibious attacks/operations are likely to be in demand in a lot of places and not just one at a time but maybe several at once.

[Steve Blair]

1-I thought the Marines had their own F-18 Air Defense Aircraft that deployed with them? The Navy should be supplying the Fire Support.

2-Offshore Raiding and Rescues is a mission the Marines do well. With the budget cutbacks Offshore basing and amphibious attacks/operations are likely to be in demand in a lot of places and not just one at a time but maybe several at once.

Slap...most of those Marine F-18s launch from carriers. So you have to have the carriers to deliver the air support.

[pvebber]

If it is only true for fixed targets then how does an anti-aircraft missile work? Isn't the target moving? Dosen't the missile HOE(Home On Energy) or home on Radar. Things will go wrong it is not a perfect system but pretty good.

Aircraft are unique signatures against an uncluttered background.

Mobile ground targets, as we are finding in Libya look pretty much alike signature wise makig them needle in a haystack problems. Technology to sort the ground picture out is improving, but go to a major city and look up at the planes coming into the airport and shoot the one down you want.

Now look at the interstate and try to pick out the one semi-truck you want to hit.

See the difference?

The problem of the future of CVs is wrapped up to a large degree in the issue of what sortie generation capability can they provide in places they are acceptably vulnerable, and what constitutes circumstances when they are too vulnerable.

The arguement of some critics is that it doesn't matte rif they have effectivenes in low threat environments if they are not effective in AL threat environments. That logic, applied to every military system we have, would result in them al lbeing considered "obsolete" because there are situations they are not survivable.

The problem is one of resource allocation to get capability across the largest par of the risk spectrum, at acceptable risk and investment cost.

Apprciate the perspectives shared here. Keep em coming!

[Steve Blair]

If it is only true for fixed targets then how does an anti-aircraft missile work? Isn't the target moving? Dosen't the missile HOE(Home On Energy) or home on Radar. Things will go wrong it is not a perfect system but pretty good.

Pretty good isn't really acceptable these days, what with the level of media coverage (traditional and web-based). The pure missile age isn't upon us yet, and until it is you really need the flexibility that CVs provide.

[gute]

Here are some thoughts and ideas from William Lind:

http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CDI_AmericasDefenseMeltdown.pdf

If the link does not take you to Chapter 6, then go to page 144 of 271.

[Steve Blair]

Lind seems to have imbibed heavily of John Keegan's submarine Kool-Aide (which he first trotted out in "The Price of Admiralty"). Submarines are indeed an important part of naval warfare, but contending that they are THE capital ship is...interesting.

[slapout9]

Here are some thoughts and ideas from William Lind:

http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CDI_AmericasDefenseMeltdown.pdf

If the link does not take you to Chapter 6, then go to page 144 of 271.

That is closer to what I had in mind. But not exactly. More later want to read the chapter again.

[pvebber]

Some thoughts on Lind's chapter.

Blue water vs green/Brown water - This is a weakness of the navy and the primary impetus for the bi- and rimodel navy constructs. It is not however a "trade blue water for coastal water". You MUST maintain control of the Blue to enable control of the others. Lind seems to make this too stark a shift, rather than an "in addition too".

He nails the people issues pretty well. We train specialists and then expect then to morph into generalists when they put their eagles and stars on. although on the part about giving COs a pass on grounding ships as a consequence of "bold manuever" I can think of ZERO cases of a grounding being caused by "bold manuever"... Far more dangerous is the penchant for relieving COs for "political incirrectness" of various degrees. Some, like sexual escapes with crew members are valid, others, like "XO movie night" hijinx rate demotion vice excommunication - but unlike the enlisted ranks where "getting busted" is relativel common, I think it would be far better to do a Star Fleet and "Bust Adm. Kirk, back down to Captain" in some of these cases.

On "you should not spend a dime on fights that are not in your interest" I could not disagreemore. How many wars have been in the participants "best interests". Wolrd War 1 was impossible" becasue it was not in anybody's interest. Yet it happened. We can't rely on "rational actor" assumptions with the irrationality of war.

On Mahan vs Corbett, Corbett won by a large margin in the new Maritime Strategy debate. Particularly his ideas on limited and unlimted wars, uses of naval power, and the role of fleets to influence, not just fight. Lind could refresh himself on Corbett in his argument about carriers...

On submarines - This is something a lot of folks get wrong. Submarines are not capital ships - they are ANTI-capital ships. In the naval context, it is not always true that "he that can destroy a thing, controls a thing". Submairnes can DENY sea control, but they can't MAINTAIN it. Maintaining sea control means ensuring that you can conduct the maritime activities you want, without interferrence form the adversary. With only heavyweoght torpedoes as armament, they can do little to counter pirates, corvette and smaller craft, and control the airspace over a maritime region.

The biggest prpoblem subs have, is a very limited field of regard. They need to be cued to targets - particulalry adversary submarines. That means that even if you had a fleet of 200 subs, you could do little to safeguard your own maritime commerce, or blockade an enemy that controled the skies over the waters you are trying to blockade. That is why we won the battle of the atlantic, and why a fleet of submaires is a potent sea DENAIL force, but never a sea CONTROL force.

These are things you currently need a Carrier group to do. Far from being the tautology of "the carrier group exists to protect the carrier group" the escorts exist to protect the CV so it can project power and control the surrounding seas. The reformer vision of "task oriented" CV oadouts already exists - and as he states has been demonstrated. We have desinged the new LHA-6 AMERICA to be even more flexible. But a CVN is predominantly a sea contro platform, and since aircraft are the most effective form of sea control, they are pretty effective at that. So effective that we have taken that mission for granted and instead focused them on supporting operations ashore.

The problem with decouplin airwings from their normal airwing is a big reason the Navy is going the UCAV route. Slow, stealthy, highly manueverable, long range UCAS, not a carrier based A-10 will be the "jaeger air" of the future. Helos can treat a CV as "just another airstrip" (though the Army had a huge hissy fit about going feet wet...) Other aircraft which are not designed to land on carrieres and piloted by non-carrier expereinced aviators area huge safety problem that LInd tends to overlook.

Lind's critique is the first time I've seen someone say aircaraft carriers remain useful, but CRUDES types are obsolete. If CRUDES air defense is ineefective in coastal areas, then that means IADS in general are ineffective in coastal areas, since if anything, Aegis is more advanced than shore based IADS. If CRUDES can't defend a CV, then how can the CV stil be useful? A CV is the best defense of a CV??? How come a CV can't defend itself then??? Sorry but Lind is out of his element here and isn't nearly as well informed as his smug tone implies.

In the Amphibous thing, I'm very surprised he did not ask the question of why we don't use joint high speed vessels in lieu of LCS for a lot of "4GW" support. LCS is 650+M$ a copy, JHSV is 170M$. It can support the operations of caostal watercraft far more effectively than LCS, or Amphibs that cost over 1B$ a copy.

To control the sea you must be able to control the air over the sea, and have situational awareness of what is going on undersea. The most efficient thing we have to do that currently is a carrier strike group. How long that will be true remains to be seen and will be a function to a large extent on how the inteplay of long range strike and long range ISR-T plays out over the next 10-15 years.

[slapout9]

The problem with decouplin airwings from their normal airwing is a big reason the Navy is going the UCAV route. Slow, stealthy, highly manueverable, long range UCAS, not a carrier based A-10 will be the "jaeger air" of the future. Helos can treat a CV as "just another airstrip" (though the Army had a huge hissy fit about going feet wet...) Other aircraft which are not designed to land on carrieres and piloted by non-carrier expereinced aviators area huge safety problem that LInd tends to overlook.




I would agree with that. UCAV's are just guided missiles, which like I said everything is a platform to launch a missile if you want to win. But I generally liked the chapter. One thing Lind did get wrong was the thing about the Falklands. 10 more Exocet Missiles and the whole war may have turned out very differently.

[pvebber]

I do need to correct myself on "heavyweight torpedoes" being the principle sub weapon. They also carry ASCMS and long range strike weapons.

They are extremely limited however in the use of these weapons because of the limited filed of regard (a sub can only organically attack what it can see with its radar (<20nm) sonar (CZ at ~30nm agianst a noisy surface ship) or ESM (maybe a little longer than sonar, out to at most 50nm if there are good surfce ducts). To use a 200nm anti ship Cruise missile requires third party targeting and submarine strike weapons are limited mostly to fixed shore targets, of things queued by UAVs tlaking back tothe sub.

With the exception of the SSGN (which will be gone in 15 years without replacement) a sub can only muster a salvo about equal to a single aircraft.

Creating a "sea control submarine" is akin to building an SSBN is is currently an option not being considered becasue of the expense - like 10+ billion with weapons and unmanned vehicles. For 2 of those you get a Carrier battlegroup. Withthe Subs you have maybe the firepwer of one War at Sea Strike from the CV, then you need to go back to port and rearm. The carrier can saddle back up and regenerate such strikes, or conduct a cyclic "conveyor belt" of ordnace for long periods.

From a small wars standpoint, the question bolis down to what is it you want aviation assets (manned nad unmanned craft and vehicles) to do for you, and with what periodicity? With that one can look at the cost vs risk of expandable (submarine-based) or regenerative (CV based) assets providing those requirements.

[slapout9]

From a small wars standpoint, the question bolis down to what is it you want aviation assets (manned nad unmanned craft and vehicles) to do for you, and with what periodicity? With that one can look at the cost vs risk of expandable (submarine-based) or regenerative (CV based) assets providing those requirements.

That is why I said weld 2 carriers together and put some of everything you have on them and then protect it as best you can. Stop thinking of it as just a moving airport but as an entire moving military base.

[pvebber]

You mean like...(see attached)

This is a grunch of oil platforms welded together to make a floating air field big enough for the Air Force to luv ;)

[pvebber]

Of course the Chinese always try to do us one better. Theirs has a port inside!

[slapout9]

Of course the Chinese always try to do us one better. Theirs has a port inside!

Exactly! A Marine base...... some air force,some navy,some infantry,some artillery,some tanks,some LCACS. A topless bar, a Bar-B-Que shack, a beer joint and a small NASCAR track.....and you would be ready to go. But remember you will lose some to missile attacks so learn to live with it.

[slapout9]

Blimps......you need Blimps that can surround the Marine base for Missile defense.