View Full Version : How soldiers deal with the job of killing
davidbfpo
06-11-2011, 03:29 PM
The BBC has this week been showing some harsh, Afghan combat film, taken by the soldiers themselves in 2007, called Our War and one episode to date. This is available on:http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b011vngx/Our_War_Ambushed/
A separate programme touches on this issue of killing. The opening paragraph:
When a soldier kills someone at close quarters, how does it affect them? This most challenging and traumatic part of a soldier's job is often wholly overlooked.
Soldiers kill. It goes with the job, and they do it on our behalf.
But it's an aspect of their work which is widely ignored - even by the soldiers themselves - and this can cause them great psychological difficulty, experts say.
Link to report / summary:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13687796
The linked pod-casts are entitled more starkly IMHO 'The Kill Factor' and the sub-title is
Soldiers who have killed in war at close quarters talk about how it affects them today
Link to pod-casts:http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00gyhg8
I cannot immediately recall a thread on this theme, apologies if there is one.
I am sure many here have read combat histories and books such as John Keegan's 'The Face of Battle' so are familiar with the issues raised.
Apologies for those who cannot access due to copyright reasons some BBC sites.
jcustis
06-11-2011, 03:37 PM
Apologies for those who cannot access due to copyright reasons some BBC sites.
Any idea why that is David?
The Cuyahoga Kid
06-11-2011, 03:47 PM
Any idea why that is David?
I think its that the BBC doesn't stream online content to people outside of the UK, since only UK citizens subsidize the Beeb
EDIT: Or maybe not, this (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12018214) video streamed just fine. Weird
I think its that the BBC doesn't stream online content to people outside of the UK, since only UK citizens subsidize the Beeb
EDIT: Or maybe not, this (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12018214) video streamed just fine. Weird
Losing out on propaganda.
davidbfpo
06-11-2011, 04:36 PM
Any idea why that is David?
Team,
I've no idea. I had expected items on IPOD to be available, it does show BBC World Service and sometimes some programmes can be found, probably on BBC World. Oh and it does work both ways, with the US items not being available.
There is an explanation by the BBC:http://faq.external.bbc.co.uk/questions/bbc_online/website_changes
Which offers:
Much of our website is aimed at UK users, so we negotiate rights to include video, audio, images and other types of content for the UK only. World rights are much more expensive, but we are hoping to make more audio and visual content available to our international audiences.
There is a feedback option, please tell them! I have asked.
Found it in the iTunes store Canada. Should be there in the US too. Under podcasts, BBC, Documentary Archive. I just searched for 'The Kill Factor'.
You might also download it directly from the BBC at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/docarchive
Moderator adds - thanks!
Davidbfpo
When a soldier kills someone at close quarters, how does it affect them? This most challenging and traumatic part of a soldier's job is often wholly overlooked.
Soldiers kill. It goes with the job, and they do it on our behalf.
But it's an aspect of their work which is widely ignored - even by the soldiers themselves - and this can cause them great psychological difficulty, experts say.
I could not open the link.
However, on the quote, in close combat, speaking from experience, I don't think there is time to think.
It is a question of Kill or be Killed.
I presume Self Preservation takes over.
The psychological effect is there and it is dependant on the man and his background. One wonders in retrospect as to 'was it worth it'?! What about his family and how are they coping now, now that he has been killed. It haunts. Quite a few of us, do feel guilty, and at the same time confused, since when returned to sanity, one abhors the act and yet, for self preservation, one had to do what had to be done.
Catch 22.
Perpetual_Student
06-24-2011, 01:48 AM
That was very unfortunate to see but I can tell you that I am better for having watched it. If there is anyway that you can make all three videos available to watch either by downloading them or otherwise the rest of us we be in debt to you. Again thank you and if there is any way to get all of those videos please let me know.
I have downloaded the podcasts and have watched the Our War: Ambushed (found it on You Tube) but cant seem to get the others.
Thank You for your help.
davidbfpo
06-24-2011, 11:02 AM
Perpetual Student,
Glad you enjoyed the podcasts and one part of 'Our War'. My IT skills and being in the UK mean I cannot readily assist in locating the next two parts of 'Our War'. Perhaps others with skill can help? JMA and another often succeed.
According to a variety of comments 'Our War' will be shown on BBC One in the autumn.
Perpetual Student,
Glad you enjoyed the podcasts and one part of 'Our War'. My IT skills and being in the UK mean I cannot readily assist in locating the next two parts of 'Our War'. Perhaps others with skill can help? JMA and another often succeed.
According to a variety of comments 'Our War' will be shown on BBC One in the autumn.
As Parts 2 & 3 become available and I find them I will post the url here.
The BBC has this week been showing some harsh, Afghan combat film, taken by the soldiers themselves in 2007, called Our War and one episode to date. This is available on:http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b011vngx/Our_War_Ambushed/
David, powerful stuff. The case study here is one of how a totally raw 19 man platoon handled combat for the first time. Interesting to hear the dialog.
I would use this as a reason to promote my recommendation of having permanently deployed units where they have R&R out of Afghanistan rather than rotate the battalions through for six months every two years.
A separate programme touches on this issue of killing. The opening paragraph:
Link to report / summary:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13687796
The linked pod-casts are entitled more starkly IMHO 'The Kill Factor' and the sub-title is
Link to pod-casts:http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00gyhg8
I cannot immediately recall a thread on this theme, apologies if there is one.
I am sure many here have read combat histories and books such as John Keegan's 'The Face of Battle' so are familiar with the issues raised.
David, discussed this programme with our mutual friend across town from you and we reached the conclusion that they are trying to create a story here where no real story exists.
Two people's experiences were used and they referred to a third (a sniper who killed 10 people and now spends all his time surfing off Hawaii) which hardly is a representative sample.
Most people in my experience adjust to having killed in close combat far better than programmes like this lead us to believe. I wonder what the "disability" pension is for people claiming "issues" relating to having looked into a man's eyes and then killed him.
The "experts" interviewed in this programme seem to agree that (psychological and emotional) preparation is necessary prior to deployment on ops is vital as is the wind-down between combat and reintroduction back into the "world".
This article is worth a read: David Livingstone Smith: Psychology Of Violence (http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/15/forbes-india-david-livingstone-smith-psychology-of-violence-opinions-ideas-10-smith.html)
What in my opinion is the most important is to assess recruits and officer cadets as to the emotional and psychological stability prior to acceptance into the service. Again my experience the head-cases were generally already screwed up before they joined and then you can add the chancers who sniff a free pension ride if they ape the symptoms.
I am glad to see the following:
Lt Col Kilner who lectures at the West Point Military Academy is quoted as saying:
"We talk about destroying, engaging, dropping, bagging - you don't hear the word killing."
I agree, lets tell it like it is. I have said around here a number of times that the role of the infantry is to close with and kill the enemy(that deals with the official words "destroy" and "engage"). Troopie slang for killing varies from army to army, we used words like "pull", "slot" and "rip" meaning to shoot/kill someone. I don't think that is a psychological means to sanitize the act of killing.
I used to organise to gather the troop for a few drinks (sometimes more) at the first opportunity after combat. This allowed myself and my sergeant to observe the troopies for any observable changes.
The regular observation from me was listening to the troopies war stories it seemed that the contact they were in they killed more than double than in the contact I was in. Funny thing that.
Hesitancy to kill was seldom observed in my experience. It happened by very seldom.
The psychological effect is there and it is dependant on the man and his background.
How exactly?
Perpetual_Student
06-24-2011, 11:20 PM
Thank You JMA, I will be looking forward to the threads to the other videos.
I currently teach a class on Human Factors at the Infantry Officers Course in Quantico, VA. We base our classes mostly off of the works of Lt Col. Grossman as well as some articles that we have read. We constantly talk about the need for Officers to understand killing. They need to not only understand it but be capable of talking about it to their Marines. We also teach a follow on class called Human Factors II that deals with PTSD and combat stress. This class is based on personal experience and pulling some information from the Marine Corps reference publication.
I say all this to say that overall as a military community we do not discuss this enough. Like the podcasts talk about and it has been highlighted we often call it something different and fail to spend time understanding "killing."
I am very interested in learning more about this and developing a continuous dialogue about the topic. Thank You.
Has anyone every read the book mentioned in the podcast "An Intimate History of Killing"? Just wondering if it is a good read.
How exactly?
My comments are based on the Indian context.
The urban educated and being used to creature comfort are cautious and careful. He is slower (fractionally) to react with an intent to kill when confronted by an enemy soldier who is about to kill him. Just fractionally since Self Preservation is a powerful motivator.
The rural, rough and tumble types who have faced the real rigours of survival in an unequal society is mentally strong to accept the fact that he has to kill or be killed and hence he has less of a hesitation to shoot in close quarter battle.
Then there are those who have martial traditions. Though the marital background and 'honour at all costs' phenomenon of certain tribes and communities are fading, yet there are those who still possess an iota of that. They have no hesitation to kill if the need arises for the honour of their community (and hence the Nation) and for their Regiment and unit (being composed of the same tribe/ community).
My comments are based on the Indian context.
I ask because I am interested to learn about the Indian context. I look for threads of commonality in this regard across nations/cultures/classes/ethnicities/races. It educates me.
I ask because I am interested to learn about the Indian context. I look for threads of commonality in this regard across nations/cultures/classes/ethnicities/races. It educates me.
I clarified that my comments were based on the Indian context, since no culture or environment is similar.
It would hence be contextual to my comments.
Thank You JMA, I will be looking forward to the threads to the other videos.
I currently teach a class on Human Factors at the Infantry Officers Course in Quantico, VA. We base our classes mostly off of the works of Lt Col. Grossman as well as some articles that we have read. We constantly talk about the need for Officers to understand killing. They need to not only understand it but be capable of talking about it to their Marines. We also teach a follow on class called Human Factors II that deals with PTSD and combat stress. This class is based on personal experience and pulling some information from the Marine Corps reference publication.
I say all this to say that overall as a military community we do not discuss this enough. Like the podcasts talk about and it has been highlighted we often call it something different and fail to spend time understanding "killing."
I am very interested in learning more about this and developing a continuous dialogue about the topic. Thank You.
Has anyone every read the book mentioned in the podcast "An Intimate History of Killing"? Just wondering if it is a good read.
While I am happy that close quarter killing is being studied for all the reasons Grossman states (I have his book on Kindle but have not studied it in detail yet) I await eagerly for such a study by someone who has actually killed themselves. He says that he and other writers on this subject Keegan, Holmes, Griffiths and I suspect neither Joanna Bourke (author of "An Intimate History of Killing" which you mentioned) have not killed in close combat. While I agree with training and preparation (with the rationale and emotional elements included) for killing at recruit and officer cadet levels followed by again a post "action" follow-up I tend to believe this issue is somewhat overblown.
By this I mean that I don't believe that for the majority the act of killing at close quarters (looking him in the eye and then shooting him) is as psychologically damaging as one is led to believe. If I had ten years I would wish to cooperate with combat experienced psychologists to attempt to establish how to test individuals as to who are likely to be affected by having personally killed to the extent that they at some point thereafter develop psychological "problems". This for selection and screening purposes. Those with a predisposition for developing "issues" should not be accepted in the military or at least not in the infantry (and maybe the armour - I don't know much about how their type of killing affects them when they get up close and personal).
There is a documentary that is fascinating and covers how and why (in their own words) why soldiers went beyond the accepted bounds in killing prisoners and wounded, mutilating bodies and regarding civilians as fair game when keeping the risk to themselves down. Hell in the Pacific (http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/hell-pacific/) is worth watching and probably can be turned into a teaching tool if presented with a prepared script to explain and expand upon the issues as they are raised. The full 4 part series is available on Youtube in about 10 minute segments. It is a mix of US and Brit experiences and includes some POW stuff. This documentary not to be confused with the Lee Marvin movie of the same name.
Having read only the reviews of "An Intimate History of Killing" I accept that there are those who enjoy killing (who when unchecked can get involved in some pretty bad stuff) but agree with critics that it is a small percentage but probably more than the 2% some suggest (I suggest around 5% from my experience). What do you suggest the % of those who feel nothing is? That is to kill without hesitation but with no enjoyment.
It is often the behaviour of the enemy that draws you in and tempts you to cross the line. For example the outrages carried out by the Japanese against POWs and civilians. Also take WW2 - Normandy where in the first days of the invasion 187 Canadians are said to have been executed by 12 SS. Little surprise then that certainly the Canadians (and other allies) responded with the "well if that's the way you want to play it" and they too entered the atrocity spiral - (D-Day by Antony Beevor). Beevor's book is a must read as are his Berlin and Stalingrad books.
In Beevor's book he deals with combat fatigue and makes mention of a neuro-psychiatrist, Major David Weintrob, who pioneered combat stress treatment there and also improved the manner in which "replacements" were introduced into front line units. You may have access to more records on Weintrob's work with Gen Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division in Normandy.
Interestingly the comment is made that both Brit and US psychiatrists were struck by the few cases of psychoneurosis' among German POWs. This is an area which needs to be studied I suggest.
The officers role in preventing atrocities seems important and in both Hell in the Pacific and Beevor's book reference is made of officers stepping in to bring troops "under control" with pistols drawn. (Beevor reports an officer from The Canadian Regiment de la Chaudiere that after they had got to grips with 12 SS at Carpiquet that "no prisoners were taken this day on either side". Fascinating and horrifying stuff. How does one prepare young officers to exert the authority to bring matters back under control when they boil over (which they will and his sergeant is out there slitting throats and cutting ears off with the rest of them)?
Your subject seems to have more questions than answers. It seems that our job in this regard (30 years ago) was so much easier when we knew what was right and what was wrong (as taught by our mothers and not some military instruction) and did not have the type of politically imposed RoE soldiers have to live with today.
Ken White
06-26-2011, 09:42 PM
Fascinating and horrifying stuff. How does one prepare young officers to exert the authority to bring matters back under control when they boil over (which they will and his sergeant is out there slitting throats and cutting ears off with the rest of them)?Rank is generally a stabilizer but not always. There are also examples of Officers ordering, suggesting or implying such actions are acceptable. Or recall the notorious example of young LT Calley at My Lai in Viet Nam who participated in the shootings and whose Platoon Sergeant tried unsuccessfully to stop him and the men (personally, I'd have buttstroked the LT but that's just me... :D)...
...It seems that our job in this regard (30 years ago) was so much easier when we knew what was right and what was wrong (as taught by our mothers and not some military instruction) and did not have the type of politically imposed RoE soldiers have to live with today.Quite true...
I agree BTW, with your 5% and think the percentage who can kill without hesitation and no enjoyment is really about 80 and of those at least 50%, probably most, will suffer little to no remorse or psychological damage. I suspect the total of those severely traumatized by actually killing is smaller than the number traumatized by seeing death and destruction but who have not killed or had to do so as I believe that action seems to perform a balancing act of sorts on the old psyche. I also believe both numbers combined will in truth average less than 10% of troops committed (METT-TC dependent, as always, obviously intensity of combat and / or length of time committed will have an effect... :wry:).
I'd like, BTW, to know how much of that 'psychological damage' is induced by those who think there just must be some there and keep probing or pushing until some erupts... :confused:
(Those guesstimates are applicable to a generation now past, in or approaching their 60s but I suspect that the numbers are valid for the current generations as well.)
Chris jM
06-27-2011, 05:22 AM
Has anyone every read the book mentioned in the podcast "An Intimate History of Killing"? Just wondering if it is a good read.
I read Joanna Bourke's book (http://www.amazon.com/Intimate-History-Killing-Face-Face/dp/0465007384/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1309151474&sr=8-3) a while back, when I was a rather unimpressive and clueless cadet (in saying that, not much has changed...). I had read Grossman's On Killing immediately prior, and wanted more. My memory might be playing tricks on me, but I wouldn't bother reading it again. It had it some interest value but was very academic in argument and writing - it was very heavy on the old footnotes. If you can get yourself a copy easily a few hours scanning the book would do it justice. Some chapters might jump out, but a cover-to-cover read probably wouldn't be required.
One alternative I would suggest is J Glenn Gray's The Warrior - Reflections of Men in Battle (http://www.amazon.com/Warriors-Reflections-Men-Battle/dp/0803270763/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1309151855&sr=1-1). It's more an autobiography than a Grossman-like article (which is a good thing, IMHO) and thus is simply one man's perspective. It has some great sections you could use as discussion points or as quotes in lectures.
Ardent du Picq's work is supposed to be an interesting addition to the subject, too - I've had it on my kindle for a while now but haven't gotten round to reading it. I got my cope as a free e-book download (not linking here as I'm not sure about copyright rules - a google search will get it for you, though).
Rank is generally a stabilizer but not always. There are also examples of Officers ordering, suggesting or implying such actions are acceptable. Or recall the notorious example of young LT Calley at My Lai in Viet Nam who participated in the shootings and whose Platoon Sergeant tried unsuccessfully to stop him and the men (personally, I'd have buttstroked the LT but that's just me... :D)
I suggest just as officer training should cater for a worst case scenario so should (senior) NCO training cater for a situation when the officer loses it.
Buttstroke seems like the correct response under those circumstances to me. But that is when he has already crossed the line, you want to jerk his chain before he does though. I suggest the trick is to know when things are starting to come to the boil and defuse it then. I am reminded of the classic sergeant comment of "leave this to me Sir, I'll take it from here... while you report in by radio".
My experience tells me that a fatal combination is created when you end up with captures/wounded in a contact where you have taken casualties. A should have known better (for the officer and the sergeant) example was own forces took a casualty who was CASEVACED and a capture was put with the call-sign who had taken the casualty for the ride home as they had a spare seat now. Comes over the radio that the troopie did not make it. According to the corporal shortly thereafter the capture attempted to escape from the chopper flying at 80 knots at tree top level and disappeared into the trees.
Also the two recent courts-marshall of the Brits reported in the press relating to "assualt" of prisoners involved these prisoners being guarded by troopies from the contact (or being accessible to them) in which he was taken captive when recovered to base. The moral of that story is that even if you get a cook to guard him you need to put some distance between the capture and the troopies who bagged him. Officers and sergeants should be taught this stuff.
Here's a "what would you do" question for an officers or Snr NCOs course:
"Your platoon responds to support a call-sign reporting a contact. They report they have pulled back but can't account for one troopie. With the arrival of the choppers the enemy breaks contact and your platoon sweeps forward to locate the missing troopie. You find the body stripped of kit and mutilated (genitals removed) and with the amount of blood from the wound it was probably done when he was still alive. One of your troopies recognises the dead troopie as a friend from school days who he grew up with. At the same time your flank section/squad reports successful contact with enemy with a mix of enemy kills and captures."
What must you as platoon commander/platoon sergeant anticipate in terms of possible reprisal actions and how would you act to prevent the situation getting out of control?
Note: actual situation, mutilation post mortem (due to lack of bleeding), the company despite numerous contacts produced no captured enemy (on that day nor) for about the next month.
I agree BTW, with your 5% and think the percentage who can kill without hesitation and no enjoyment is really about 80 and of those at least 50%, probably most, will suffer little to no remorse or psychological damage. I suspect the total of those severely traumatized by actually killing is smaller than the number traumatized by seeing death and destruction but who have not killed or had to do so as I believe that action seems to perform a balancing act of sorts on the old psyche. I also believe both numbers combined will in truth average less than 10% of troops committed (METT-TC dependent, as always, obviously intensity of combat and / or length of time committed will have an effect... :wry:).
Good, we agree on the 5% and I guess the give-a-way is their "eyes". You can see it in their eyes.
Again among this 5% there are there is a scale (from 1-10) from the nut case psychopath through to those who get a mild buzz from killing. The "mild buzz" troopies can be tolerated.
Yes, know of a doctor (Brit) who had to deal with a flood of very badly wounded soldiers and has never quite got over it. Then there was the pilot who arrived to carry out a BDA (bomb damage assessment) and just could not handle seeing the bits and pieces (bodyparts) lying around. The (18-19 year old) troopies seemed to take it in their stride.
A total of those who are traumatised by killing or witnessing the destruction and those who enjoy it being under 10%, I agree.
My war was a series of skirmishes rather than one or two really heavy set piece battles. "Throwing the dice" almost daily for months on end kind of wore one down but nowhere as traumatic as a Stalingrad or Okinawa. Maybe that's why the vast majority came through unscathed psychologically.
I'd like, BTW, to know how much of that 'psychological damage' is induced by those who think there just must be some there and keep probing or pushing until some erupts... :confused:
Yes, there seems to be an increasing assumption that if you have been in combat you must be screwed up to some extent. I'll agree with them only when they start to dish out healthy disability payments and pensions ;)
(Those guesstimates are applicable to a generation now past, in or approaching their 60s but I suspect that the numbers are valid for the current generations as well.)
Agreed
Yesterday's part (2 of 3) Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand by Mark Urban was aired on BBC2.
Can be found here in three segments:
1 of 3 (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=ec1_1309395808)
2 of 3 (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=bbb_1309397246)
3 of 3 (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=685_1309398015)
enjoy
Here are the other two in the Our War series:
Our War : The Invisible Enemy (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nzzhQYGHkmA)
This clown (who filmed this) gives officers a bad name.
Our War: Caught in the Crossfire (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JvwfI7IUicE)
Interesting comments on RoE
Finally got around to Section 1 of Grossman's book.
Grossman completes the first section as follows:
There can be no doubt that this resistance to killing one’s fellow man is there and that it exists as a result of a powerful combination of instinctive, rational, environmental, hereditary, cultural, and social factors.
Well yes, but does this resistance actually translate into refusing to kill under any circumstances?
There is surely a scale into which all people fall in this regard?
Say from a '10' where he will actively seek out opportunities to kill (the psychopath) to the '0' who will rather die himself than kill a human.
Its (IMHO) a bit like sex where the first attempt is hesitant/tentative/uncertain but it gets easier with experience.
So the statement in Grossman's book is meaningless other than to record that there will be a small percentage of soldiers who resist killing to the extent that they place their own life and those of their comrades at risk. I suggest that the majority of these will find a way to get themselves out of a combat role and thus avoid such a scenario developing.
There are of course a number of "inputs" which help to reduce this resistance to kill. For example the demonisation of the enemy through race/tribal/religious based propaganda and/or through the actions of the enemy (typically atrocities) to the extent where soldiers begin to believe that to kill them would be doing a service to humanity.
I will skip the non-firer aspect as this has been tainted by the SLA Marshall controversy.
jmm99
07-28-2011, 09:03 PM
You might want to take a look at Lonnie Athens (Wiki - brief and incomplete outline of his theory of violence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lonnie_Athens#The_Process_of_Violentization)) - focused first on his research of violent criminals in American prisons. His general conclusion is that, to understand violence, experience is a more important factor than logic, ideology or genetics.
Athens' theory has been considered by Richard Rhodes - generally in Why They Kill: The Discoveries of a Maverick Criminologist (http://www.csudh.edu/dearhabermas/tchessay64.htm) (a brief review of Rhodes' book - but explaining Athens' four stages in a nutshell); and specifically with respect to the SS Einsatzgruppen (in one chapter of Masters of Death (http://www.amazon.com/Masters-Death-SS-Einsatzgruppen-Invention-Holocaust/dp/0375409009)).
In both books, Rhodes concludes:
"He now firmly resolves to attack people physically with the serious intention of gravely harming or even killing them for the slightest or no provocation whatsoever. . . . He has suddenly been emboldened and made venomous at the same time. . . . The subject is ready to attack people physically with the serious intention of gravely harming or killing them with minimal or less than minimal provocation on their part." Says Rhodes, "that is, he is ready to become an ultraviolent criminal."
That is a valid comment re: genocides, serial killers, multiple killers and the "mind of the murderer" in general. As to genocides and Athens' theory, see Dimensions of Genocide: The Circumplex Model Meets Violentization Theory (http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/winton.pdf), by Mark A. Winton (2008, case study of Rwanda).
The bottom line is that Athens' theory generally holds up (although as Winton points out, it is non-exclusive and ties in with other approaches - including some of Grossman ) with respect to "bad guys".
However, if it is truly a "general theory", it should also hold up for "good guys" - with adjustments in terminology. Athens gets into that in Violent Encounters: Violent Engagements, Skirmishes, and Tiffs (http://www.pineforge.com/newmanbriefstudy/articles/02/Athens.pdf) (Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 2005), in his Conclusion:
CONCLUSION
The interaction between perpetrators and victims when violent crimes are either attempted or completed can be best understood if it is seen as arising during social acts—activities that require the voluntary or involuntary participation of at least two parties for their completion. With the obvious exception of suicide, all violent crimes constitute social acts because there must be at least two parties for them to be committed—a perpetrator and a victim. Lawful violent acts constitute social acts just as much as unlawful violent acts do. In the cases of excused and justifiable homicides, as well as excused and justifiable batteries, there must also be at least two parties—a perpetrator and a victim. The same is also true in intergroup violent criminal and noncriminal violent action, except that in this case, the victims and perpetrators are collectivities rather than individuals. In collective social acts, it is groups rather than individuals who perform the separate roles, communicate through their spokespersons, assume each others’ attitudes, and try to work out a congruent social object or plan of action for carrying out the larger social act in which they are the acting agents (Blumer 1966, 540; 1969, 52, 55-56; 1981, 148).
As in the case of individual social acts, there are two kinds of collective social acts: cooperative and conflictive. Unlike in cooperative social acts, in conflictive ones, the acting agents, no matter whether they are individuals or groups, cannot form a congruent social object or plan of action because they cannot agree on who should perform the superordinate and subordinate roles in carrying out the social act. Unsurprisingly, violent encounters do not arise during individual or collective cooperative social acts but instead during conflictive ones. It may be speculated that the violent encounters that emerge during either individual or collective conflictive social acts fall into the same three basic subtypes that differ in terms of the number of the five stages of a violence encounter that are completed: (1) role claiming, (2) role rejection, (3) role sparring, (4) role enforcement, and (5) role determination. During a violence engagement, all five stages must be completed; during violent skirmishes, only the first four of these stages must be completed; and during violent tiffs, only the first three must be completed. Thus, despite the differences in legal status between lawful and unlawful violence and between individual and collective acting units, the grounded theory of violent criminal social acts that individuals perpetrate described here could be potentially applied to violent social acts that are both lawful and unlawful and that both groups and individuals perpetrate and, thereby, to all violent social action.
Before this extrapolation can be safely made, however, appropriate amendments would undoubtedly have to be made to the theory. Any general theory of violent social actswould have to take into account the added complexity that an increase in scale in the social act’s acting units would introduce into the proposed explanation (Blumer 1981, 148-149). Undoubtedly, the nature and size of the groups involved in a dominance encounter could significantly affect the actual social practices at work during the different stages.
As Blumer (1959, 129-30) pointedly observes, large and small groups must utilize different social mechanisms to perform their roles or “mobilize for action” in social acts:
“A. . . reflection of the collective factor in the case of large groups is the organization on which they must rely when mobilizing for action. A small group uses confined, simple and direct machinery. Corporate action in a large group requires the articulation of more units which are also likely to be more diverse, more removed from each other, and related through bridging links. . . . The mobilization of this extended, diversified, and indirectly connected organization requires forms of leadership, coordination, and control which again differ from those in small groups.”
Of course, a general theory of violent social action also could not ignore the state’s approval or disapproval of the use of violence. Obviously, this is a factor that could also significantly affect both individual and collective acting units’ performance of their roles in violent social acts. Thus, future research would be needed to determine the exact nature of the amendments that would need to be made in each of the stages through which violent engagements, skirmishes, and tiffs pass to accommodate all violent social acts rather than only the criminal ones that individuals commit.
--------------------------
I've read both of Grossman's books (On Combat and On Killing) - many parts of them more than once, since they obviously relate to actions that are in some cases "war crimes" and in other cases not. I believe Athens' theory is consistent with much of Gerossman's factual material - and also ties in with current training theories and practices for military and police.
Regards
Mike
You might want to take a look at Lonnie Athens (Wiki - brief and incomplete outline of his theory of violence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lonnie_Athens#The_Process_of_Violentization)) - focused first on his research of violent criminals in American prisons. His general conclusion is that, to understand violence, experience is a more important factor than logic, ideology or genetics.
Athens' theory has been considered by Richard Rhodes - generally in Why They Kill: The Discoveries of a Maverick Criminologist (http://www.csudh.edu/dearhabermas/tchessay64.htm) (a brief review of Rhodes' book - but explaining Athens' four stages in a nutshell); and specifically with respect to the SS Einsatzgruppen (in one chapter of Masters of Death (http://www.amazon.com/Masters-Death-SS-Einsatzgruppen-Invention-Holocaust/dp/0375409009)).
In both books, Rhodes concludes:
That is a valid comment re: genocides, serial killers, multiple killers and the "mind of the murderer" in general. As to genocides and Athens' theory, see Dimensions of Genocide: The Circumplex Model Meets Violentization Theory (http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/winton.pdf), by Mark A. Winton (2008, case study of Rwanda).
The bottom line is that Athens' theory generally holds up (although as Winton points out, it is non-exclusive and ties in with other approaches - including some of Grossman ) with respect to "bad guys".
However, if it is truly a "general theory", it should also hold up for "good guys" - with adjustments in terminology. Athens gets into that in Violent Encounters: Violent Engagements, Skirmishes, and Tiffs (http://www.pineforge.com/newmanbriefstudy/articles/02/Athens.pdf) (Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 2005), in his Conclusion:
--------------------------
I've read both of Grossman's books (On Combat and On Killing) - many parts of them more than once, since they obviously relate to actions that are in some cases "war crimes" and in other cases not. I believe Athens' theory is consistent with much of Gerossman's factual material - and also ties in with current training theories and practices for military and police.
Regards
Mike
Thanks for posting that as I had not looked at the matter from that direction before. That being from the direction of those entering the service having already killed or needing little provocation to unleash vicious violence (and here I speak of gang members and the like). In a war time situation these people may in fact be drawn to the military in the hope of finding themselves in a position to kill (this would include your average psychopath). These people tend to gravitate towards each other and when they achieve critical mass it is perhaps when the atrocities and massacres happen. (Grossman believes they tend to gravitate to Special Forces).
It would be helpful if these people could be identified in advance (during recruit training) and either got rid of or consciously keep separate. (I must speak to those I served with who were involved with recruit training in this regard).
My approach had been from the point of departure of a middle class boy who grew up in a very non-violent environment and assumed that the vast majority would need some conditioning and motivation to kill in combat. I am correct in that but ignored the dangerous minority who need very little if any provocation to kill. So thank you or adding another dimension to my thinking on this.
Back to Grossman and Section One of his book.
I remain in disagreement with his position that the majority of soldiers will either be non-firers in combat and/or refuse to kill the enemy and as such do not believe that this should be taught as the default position to officer cadets.
I said in post earlier post that killing becomes easier with repetition and notice the following in your Athen's source:
"Prisoner Jean-Baptiste described his first kill.
The crowd had grown. I seized the machete, I struck a first blow. When I
saw the blood bubble up, I jumped back a step. Someone blocked me from
behind and shoved me forward by both elbows. I closed my eyes in the
brouhaha and I delivered a second blow like the first. It was done, people
approved, they were satisfied and moved away. I drew back…Later on we
got used to killing without so much dodging around. (Hatzfeld, 2003, p.
23)"
and
" The killers described becoming crueler with time. They also described that
there were no negative consequences for killing and that there might be
negative consequences for failing to kill."
It is the second part that worries me. I noted the clinical lack of emotion in the killing process among the troopies (some 18-19 year olds) with the repetition. Scary... the more I think about it.
jmm99
07-29-2011, 02:41 PM
that ties in more with the separate Grossman-Athens, etc., discussion (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=124050&postcount=27):
from JMA
Well this would bring us onto another point and that is the apparent requirement a nation and its military has to have a military which is cerebral and socially well-behaved yet can be unleashed at a moments notice to inflict unspeakable violence on an enemy and immediately thereafter return to the default position as if nothing has happened.
From a conversation with Cavguy (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=65739&postcount=35) a couple of years ago (in response to my question, which was generated by a comment from Ken White on shifting violence levels ):
from Cavguy
Originally Posted by jmm99
Whether a soldier doing COIN for a year has less killer instinct than one doing CONV for a year is outside my experience. I'm being observational of possible issues and disconnects - not judgmental.
I would argue that there is no loss of "killer instinct" from performing COIN missions based off of my personal experiences and observations.
My unit in OIF 1 spent a year in an area of virtually no contact in SE Baghdad. On April 4, 2004, the Sadr uprising began, and overnight formerly peaceful Shia areas became free-fire zones. My Armor BN (and many others) were thrown into instant high intensity urban combat. For an overview of what happened in Sadr City that day, you can read Martha Radditz's account here (http://www.amazon.com/Long-Road-Home-Story-Family/dp/B0016493S4/ref=pd_bbs_sr_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233465221&sr=8-2). The company commander's account of the assault into Sadr City and my BN CDR's account of the following two months in Najaf are in the ARMOR COIN issue (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/Armor_COIN_Selected_Works.pdf). (Sadr City: The Armor Pure Assault in Urban Terrain by Captain John C. Moore & Task Force Iron Dukes Campaign for Najaf by Lieutenant Colonel Pat White)
The men instantly "flipped switches". No retraining on the "killer instinct" was needed. It doesn't take much of a switch to shoot back at those shooting at you.
Same observation over 15 months in the second tour. I have never seen anyone need retraining on "killer instinct" in today's military. The reverse, however, is not true to the same level. Learning to switch it on and off is the challenge when you have to return to "soft".
Tactical proficiency between HIC and COIN missions is a different matter, but I haven't sensed a psychological one.
-----------------------
Ken's original comment (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=65734&postcount=33) related more to training for low intensity vs high intensity - so, any "disconnect" between what Niel said above and what Ken said, may be more apparent than real:
from Ken
The downshift to COIN will come with excess violence in the COIN role but it can be done quickly with good well trained leadership who know the basics so that excess violence need not last nearly as long as it did in the downshift in Iraq in some units -- the good ones adapted fairly rapidly. I'd also point out we are and have long been remiss in the basics, so the leadership gets an Attaboy for doing good job qith less than ideal material.
Upshifting, on the other hand requires developing the habit of violence which takes a bit -- it can be done, just takes longer. Thus, to me adapting (nominally at the leader and commander levels) is only part of the problem. Training and inculcating the killer instinct in all the troops is a necessary change and it is more than an adaptation, it is a philosophical and practical change of significant impact and importance. Required also almost always will be a tedious refresher in critical combat skill not require or used in COIN efforts.
and Ken's response to Cavguy's comment (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=65743&postcount=37):
People who need people...
Originally Posted by Cavguy
...The reverse, however, is not true to the same level. Learning to switch it on and off is the challenge when you have to return to "soft".
My observation is that varies with people. The "Kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out" types will use any excuse to pop a cap... :D
There is a gear down pause and hiccup, no question but firm leadership can usually handle it. However, my observation has also been -- and folks who are out there now confirm it's still a big problem -- that the small arms fire discipline in the US Army (and the Marines) is, uh, less than stellar. That contributes to shifting problems both ways. It's because we don't train 'em well in IET.
Though that may be changing, the use of Outcome Based Training in Basic and at OSUT is producing better trained, more capable and disciplined shooters so we may get rid of a problem that's been around in US forces since WW II.
Leaving aside psychopaths, sociopaths and the "kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" group, what is the nature of the "switch" that allows folks (normally of a non-virulent disposition) to engage in a high level of violence, but under both constraints and restraints so that their violence is defined within limits and can be switched off ?
These "normal" folks have to be able to operate (at the least) at as high a level of violence as the psychopaths, sociopaths and the "kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" group - since they have to expect the latter will make up the OPFOR in at least some situations.
Regards
Mike
jmm99
07-29-2011, 03:44 PM
from JMA
My approach had been from the point of departure of a middle class boy who grew up in a very non-violent environment and assumed that the vast majority would need some conditioning and motivation to kill in combat. I am correct in that but ignored the dangerous minority who need very little if any provocation to kill. So thank you for adding another dimension to my thinking on this.
I'd like the dimension (of Athens-Grossman) to be expanded so as to consider not only the psychopaths, sociopaths and the "kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" group, but also the "normal kid" who becomes capable of the same or even higher level of violence than the folks who commit "war crimes" (tying into this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=124058&postcount=8)).
In connection with that, Grossman, in "On Combat", has some interesting factual material in Section Three, Chapter One (starting at p.125) "Killing Machines: The Impact of a Handful of True Warriors". He starts with "Commando" Kelly and includes Audie Murphy; but the statistics for Allied and German fighter pilots show much more quantitatively that a relatively small percentage of pilots racked up a very large number of kills.
I'd not be surprised at that result if we were talking about hunting. In any decent sample of hunters, one or more will stand out on a consistent basis for a larger percentage of kills than the others. As to combat, I've no experience to judge. I'd suspect that the "normal kid" (who becomes an "Audie Murphy") has learned somewhere along the line to reject a subordinate role and to achieve a superordinate role by taking on the "playground bully" - reaching at least Athens' third stage in violence development.
Athens gets into that (where the "victim" reacts with dominating violence), to some extent, in Violent Encounters: Violent Engagements, Skirmishes, and Tiffs (http://www.pineforge.com/newmanbriefstudy/articles/02/Athens.pdf) (Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 2005) (pdf pp.19-40 spell out Athens' construct).
If so, that "normal kid" could become one of Grossman's "sheepdogs", who has to be able to take on wolves; and is a "killing machine", but for societally-acceptable reasons and within societally-acceptable limits.
Regards
Mike
Steve Blair
07-29-2011, 09:54 PM
In connection with that, Grossman, in "On Combat", has some interesting factual material in Section Three, Chapter One (starting at p.125) "Killing Machines: The Impact of a Handful of True Warriors". He starts with "Commando" Kelly and includes Audie Murphy; but the statistics for Allied and German fighter pilots show much more quantitatively that a relatively small percentage of pilots racked up a very large number of kills.
Of course one must also understand that in many cases fighter pilot tactics were designed to effectively "feed" targets to those superior performers. In this I'm referring to the US practice of having wingmen mainly concerned with keeping lead's backside clear. German tactics were slightly different, but still scaled toward protecting the lead pilot.
jmm99
07-29-2011, 11:34 PM
that's well outside of any expertise I have.
Grossman, in "On Killing" (p.182), offers this "tease bit" - the context is his discussion of the statistic (apparently from Gwynne Dyer) that 1% of Army Air Corps fighter pilots had 40% of the kills:
Several senior U.S. Air Force officers have told me that when the U.S. Air Force tried to preselect fighter pilots after World War II, the only common denominator they could find among their World War II aces was that they had been involved in a lot of fights as children.
That piece of hearsay upon hearsay is, of course, consistent with Athens' construct in Violent Encounters (http://www.pineforge.com/newmanbriefstudy/articles/02/Athens.pdf). I looked briefly for an AF source, but came up empty.
BTW: Accepting what you say as fact ("feeding" the enemy to selected pilots), two questions: (1) what % of kills came from "feeding" vs individual hunting; and (2) the selected shooters were selected by what criteria ?
More broadly, is the same phenom observed in infantry combat ?
Regards
Mike
ganulv
07-30-2011, 01:45 AM
Would any light be thrown on the issues under discussion here by looking at HRT (http://www.fbijobs.gov/116.asp)-type units and the individuals working within them? Correct me if I am wrong, but I assume that the mix of ability and willingness to unblinkingly kill in the context of a situation where the very purpose is to save the lives of most of the individuals involved must bring certain things to the fore in a pronounced if not necessarily unique fashion.
Would any light be thrown on the issues under discussion here by looking at HRT (http://www.fbijobs.gov/116.asp)-type units and the individuals working within them? Correct me if I am wrong, but I assume that the mix of ability and willingness to unblinkingly kill in the context of a situation where the very purpose is to save the lives of most of the individuals involved must bring certain things to the fore in a pronounced if not necessarily unique fashion.
IMHO these guys have a more difficult juggling act (meaning switching on and off) than most soldiers have who go off to war for a period then come back home. These guys do it on an almost daily basis.
In addition their actions need to be more controlled and selective to avoid collateral damage. Adds to the level of stress I'm sure. I couldn't do that stuff. In my war you didn't want to get caught in front of an RLI or SAS assault line (sweep line as we called it) as if anything moved it got "smoked" (don't you just love that American expression).
Why I say this because is because when contact is made that tight spring gets to unwind (for soldiers) but for the police and SWAT etc they can virtually never just "let rip". Their coiled spring remain tight all the time (until they put their weapons back in the armoury).
So these guys have to go home in the evening after a "busy day at the office" and switch off and revert to husband and daddy mode most often without time to "chill out" (as they call it nowdays).
I wonder what the divorce rate in these units is?
Israeli snipers in the Al-Aqsa intifada:
killing, humanity and lived experience
NETA BAR & EYAL BEN-ARI
This article is an analysis of Israeli military snipers who served
during the Al-Aqsa intifada. It takes issue with the scholarly consensus that, for
such acts to take place, perpetrators have to somehow dehumanise their
enemies. Based on interviews with 30 individuals, it shows that snipers do not
always need to dehumanise their targets and that they experience killing in
conflicting ways, both as pleasurable and as disturbing. The snipers
simultaneously deploy distancing mechanisms aimed at dehumanising enemies
and constantly recognise their basic humanity. The article ends on a cautionary
note: violence should not be seen as only belonging to the realm of the
pathological. Rather we must be aware of rules of legitimate violence, the
culturally specific ideology of violence at work in specific cases. This kind of
ideology may ‘humanse’ enemies but still classify them as opponents against
which violence may be legitimately used.
http://lib.ruppin.ac.il/multimedia/PDF/25258.pdf
Israeli snipers in the Al-Aqsa intifada:
killing, humanity and lived experience
NETA BAR & EYAL BEN-ARI
http://lib.ruppin.ac.il/multimedia/PDF/25258.pdf
This is an important contribution, thank you for posting it.
I agree that snipers are a special category. I have noted that they tend to relate more to how their 'kills' are made rather than the mere number. (This seems to differ from the old days when snipers (in the main) used to go after specific individuals.)
One hears of the weapon used, what ammo, what range, (very important to snipers) wind and light conditions etc etc. Then of course a 'Quigley' is really something to brag about. Who gets killed in the end is less of an issue.
But, yes, all their kills are deliberate in the cross-hairs shots. I assume that must have some psychological impact (as in the case study would the crying and wailing of mothers/wives/children as they recover the body).
How does one explain the cognitive dissonance?
Partly because it is normal to have some of that. Despite what was going on inside in my day (30 odd years ago) it was manly to say things like 'the only pain I feel is the recoil of the weapon in my shoulder'. Internally perhaps many had some conflicts (which few if any would admit too).
Also because it is now expected that soldiers should not express any pleasure in killing. It is expected soldiers should be expected to express regret at having to kill another human being. So perhaps these interviews should be very carefully structured (and I am not saying these weren't) to try to filter out when soldiers say what they think they need to say (rather than what they may really feel.
But how to keep the snipers focussed?
The danger is (like with other soldiers) that they may become a little fatigued (by repetition) and maybe pass on a potential kill or aim to wound rather than kill etc etc.
I glean from the study that acts of terrorism that may be prevented through killing these armed men is a motivation. Good to issue them with notebooks with graphic photos of bombed Israeli buses on the inside covers.
In my day the enemy provided a regular supply of such motivation. See the Elim Massacre article in Time magazine of 1978 (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946814-1,00.html) and from the Rhodesian Ministry of Information (http://www.rhodesia.nl/mission.htm) during which both the 5 and 4 year old girls were also raped before being murdered.
Show me this photo (and others of that massacre) any day and even now I tend to have an significant emotional response:
http://www.rhodesia.nl/mission.jpg
Once you understand what is going on in the minds of (in this case) your snipers you are able to 'manage' them better and perhaps even improve your selection criteria.
I wonder how much time is spent on 'motivation' of snipers? Seems to me they more than most soldiers need their batteries charged every so often.
SWJ Blog
01-14-2012, 11:12 AM
Killing for their Country: A New Look at “Killology” (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/killing-for-their-country-a-new-look-at-%E2%80%9Ckillology%E2%80%9D)
Entry Excerpt:
--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/killing-for-their-country-a-new-look-at-%E2%80%9Ckillology%E2%80%9D) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
I read Joanna Bourke's book (http://www.amazon.com/Intimate-History-Killing-Face-Face/dp/0465007384/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1309151474&sr=8-3) a while back, when I was a rather unimpressive and clueless cadet (in saying that, not much has changed...). I had read Grossman's On Killing immediately prior, and wanted more. My memory might be playing tricks on me, but I wouldn't bother reading it again. It had it some interest value but was very academic in argument and writing - it was very heavy on the old footnotes. If you can get yourself a copy easily a few hours scanning the book would do it justice. Some chapters might jump out, but a cover-to-cover read probably wouldn't be required.
One alternative I would suggest is J Glenn Gray's The Warrior - Reflections of Men in Battle (http://www.amazon.com/Warriors-Reflections-Men-Battle/dp/0803270763/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1309151855&sr=1-1). It's more an autobiography than a Grossman-like article (which is a good thing, IMHO) and thus is simply one man's perspective. It has some great sections you could use as discussion points or as quotes in lectures.
Ardent du Picq's work is supposed to be an interesting addition to the subject, too - I've had it on my kindle for a while now but haven't gotten round to reading it. I got my cope as a free e-book download (not linking here as I'm not sure about copyright rules - a google search will get it for you, though).
It is noted that Chris jM sometime after this post found a peach of a Kiwi document. This from a post on the blog.
After SLAM released his controversial findings, one of NZ's Brigadiers from North Africa and Italy, Howard Kippenberger, conducted a review using the resources available to him as one of the head-sheds of the War History Branch. The resulting document, which I'll link to below, didn't substantiate SLAMs or subsequently Grossman's theory of combat reluctance.
Link: http://www.scribd.com/doc/26351328/Document-50
This was also discussed on SWC a while back: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9589&highlight=Kippenberger&page=2
This is certainly the best document on this matter I have read and was produced (in 1949) before verbose authors and pseudo-intellectual wannabe academics (without combat experience) got hold of the subject and turned it into a circus. Good on the Kiwis!
I would quote two passages from this excellent document as follows:
The infantryman must therefore be taught from the start that his job is to kill, and must be encouraged to develop confidence in himself and his weapon to that end. His collective training must be made as realistic as possible, so that he will be prepared for the noises and mental strains of battle, and will go on with his job of killing when he meets enemy fire. Provided that such training is properly planned by officers who understand these human factors and take account of the national temperament, individual treatment should not be necessary. (In battle, individual treatment will frequently be required.) The infantryman, having been given every opportunity to anticipate and overcome his own mental reactions in battle must be taught to regard the enemy as his human, personal enemy, and to act aggressively to exterminate him.
‘We left good evidence of no hesitation to kill on the field at the Minq'ar Qaim breakthrough.’
and...
It is also fair to say that at the war's end the infantry soldier who played his full part emerged strengthened and enlivened by the experience of battle. Above all, he knew the true meaning and true value of comradeship. Fostered by unity of purpose, the team spirit of the New Zealand battalions was a force of great power, rarely encountered in other walks of life. The sense of comradeship and mutual reliance was new in degree to those who found themselves in the team, and in itself was enough to submerge much of the uncertainty and unpleasantness of war.
In addition the recent book by Karl Marlantes (Matterhorn) 'What it is like to go to war' at last provides a view on all these combat subjects - killing, violence, loyalty, heroism - from a man who has seen combat is a welcome counter balance to the gigabytes of speculative stuff produced by non-combatants and academics.
The down sides being the section on the almost uniquely American post (any) war 'guilt-tripping' and his slide into substance abuse and mental issues (the former probably leading to the latter rather than as a result of one tour in Vietnam).
In addition the recent book by Karl Marlantes (Matterhorn) 'What it is like to go to war' at last provides a view on all these combat subjects - killing, violence, loyalty, heroism - from a man who has seen combat is a welcome counter balance to the gigabytes of speculative stuff produced by non-combatants and academics.
Marlantes: 'What it is like to go to war', Chapter 2: Killing
His opening statement is:
Killing someone without splitting oneself from the feelings that the act engenders requires an effort of supreme consciousness that, quite frankly, is beyond most humans.
Not quite. He does not explain 'splitting' nor provides no definition of these 'feelings' nor the data to support the 'most'.
I have no personal feelings nor have I heard anyone I know express difficulty in dealing with having killed an enemy in a clean kill during a face to face engagement. (By clean kill I exclude the execution of a wounded enemy or prisoners - which I am prepared to accept could lead to pangs of conscience or worse.)
I have no scientifically collected data either but I suggest that as there are many thousands of soldiers and marines who have been exposed to close combat in both Iraq and Afghanistan from whom the definitive data can be collected. The first question they should be asked is whether they have read Grossman.
The Kiwi doc of 1949 states:
The average New Zealander on entering the Army has an aversion to killing a fellow man. This aversion will be partially overcome during the training period when he learns to fire automatically at enemy figure targets, and to use his longer range weapons with technical accuracy. This the aversion will survive into battle. Once he comes under fire, however, and especially when he has seen his comrades wounded or killed by enemy fire, it will be submerged by a desire to kill the enemy, if only to save himself. In hot blood, the average infantryman will kill without hesitation and without subsequent misgivings.
I have asked Chris jM if he can find the supporting data of this report to see how they arrived at this. I hope he can find it.
Back to Marlantes.
He has flashbacks and nightmares over a NVA soldier into whose eyes he looked before the NVA soldier was killed either by him or his radio operator - he is not sure. OK so he is having problems over the death of an enemy soldier he is not certain he killed. This is IMHO a little weird.
I wonder what sort of (if any) psychological testing formed part of the selection process Marlantes passed through en route to becoming a Marine officer. My gut feel tells me that the problem is personal and maybe ... just maybe ... he is projecting his 'issues' onto to 'most humans' because after-all he is a normal person right?
Bill Moore
01-28-2012, 06:47 PM
You won't find the answer in a book, each individual and each situation can be a bit different. I have been disturbed, disinterested and excited depending on the mood and the context of the fight. I have seen others rejoice in it, and knew one soldier so disturbed by killing someone he eventually killed himself. I think the situation in a COIN/Stability situation is more complex than when you're involved in a battle, based on your interaction with the local community. When innocents you're trying protect are killed in a firefight with hostiles you're trying to kill, that can have a negative effect emotionally. Maybe that isn't what we're talking about here, but it is something that needs to be considered.
There is probably a sociological aspect to killing in combat that may point to norms, but ultimately it comes down to each individual's psychological make up, and how he judges each situation. I recall reading an article about a SF team Sergeant a few years back discussing the incident where he killed an insurgent in hand to hand combat and he was very concerned that his son would find out what he did. I can't speak for how he felt, but obviously he was a mature and moral individual who strived to teach and model values for his son, while in the same situation a 19 marine may rejoice and post pictures on the internet if he had them. It just depends on the person. I am happy to see some of the academic studies criticized, because they sure as heck didn't match up with my experiences.
davidbfpo
01-28-2012, 07:19 PM
JMA posted a week ago this short paragraph:
In addition the recent book by Karl Marlantes (Matterhorn) 'What it is like to go to war' at last provides a view on all these combat subjects - killing, violence, loyalty, heroism - from a man who has seen combat is a welcome counter balance to the gigabytes of speculative stuff produced by non-combatants and academics.
Link to Amazon UK, with four reviews:http://www.amazon.co.uk/What-Like-War-Karl-Marlantes/dp/0857893777/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1327777808&sr=1-1
Link to Amazon.com, with 108 reviews:http://www.amazon.com/What-Like-Go-War-Hardcover/dp/0857893777/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top
Moderator's Note
If the discussion on the book accelerates I shall create a new thread.
Ken White
01-28-2012, 09:59 PM
You won't find the answer in a book, each individual and each situation can be a bit different ... I am happy to see some of the academic studies criticized, because they sure as heck didn't match up with my experiences.People differ. Armies should hire fewer sensitive souls and more minor sociopaths. It really isn't at all hard to spot those that will work out versus those that won't with 90% or better assurance. :wry:
As an aside on the subject of combat related books, there are of course exceptions but generally sensitive souls write and exorcise, sociopaths don't need to do so thus rarely bother. ;)
Recall though that for small wars (or Armies...), while such selectivity can be employed, in larger ones the press for more people dictates mass hiring practices engendering an obvious loss of selectivity and thus the acquisition of more rather than fewer sensitive souls -- most of whom will go forth, do their job and be okay afterwards. Some will write books, a few good, some mediocre and some poor. :cool:
Bill Moore
01-28-2012, 11:33 PM
Posted by Ken,
Armies should hire fewer sensitive souls and more minor sociopaths.
I think the Army had that ratio about right when I entered. We probably had quite a few minor and not so minor sociopaths (I probably fell in that category myself at that time). These same individuals not only worked hard, they played hard and that was viewed as politically incorrect, so there was an asserted effort to reform the military and make it more politically correct.
The leaders pushed to have a greater percent of our soldiers married, and then they pushed Christian values on the force to the extreme, and after the Cold War the Army assumed the role of social engineer, and equally important when you add it all up we did everything possible minimize risk and started 15-6 investigations for every relatively minor incident.
Is it any wonder we're attracting more sensitive types?
The Army's core purpose is to win our country's land battles, or in more simple terms to be successful in combat. Everything else must secondary, and we risk an identity crisis if that isn't the case. Not every problem can be resolved with combat operations, but the Army's contribution is primarily combat, security operations, or helping others with that role.
If you recall the Army was considering giving an award for not shooting in OIF, fortunately that idea died. The intent was understandable, but good training and experience will enable soldiers to determine when to shoot and not shoot. Good training is the answer to 85% of our problems, it will also weed out those who aren't suitable.
Ken White
01-29-2012, 12:03 AM
The Army's core purpose is to win our country's land battles, or in more simple terms to be successful in combat. Everything else must secondary, and we risk an identity crisis if that isn't the case...True. I think -- am terribly afraid -- we're there... :o
Good training is the answer to 85% of our problems, it will also weed out those who aren't suitable.That's three yesses in a row.
That's it for you today, Bill Moore... ;)
:cool: :D
As an aside on the subject of combat related books, there are of course exceptions but generally sensitive souls write and exorcise, sociopaths don't need to do so thus rarely bother. ;)
Darn you Ken. I was going through this thread and thought of something to say that something Paul Fussell wrote got me to thinking of. Then you went and said it first.:mad:
JMM99 mentioned something about fighter aces and the whys of their success somewhere in a post above. I read an article years ago that suggested it was far more useful to look at units rather than individuals when looking for the whys of success. That made a lot of sense to me at the time and I stopped thinking about the whys of acedom. I haven't researched lately but I seem to remember that aces weren't evenly distributed throughout fighter forces but were mostly in good units. The whys of successful units are very well known to guys like Ken, Bill, JMA etc. and they differ not at all between ground and air units. The general public loves aces though.
Ken White
01-29-2012, 03:58 AM
I read an article years ago that suggested it was far more useful to look at units rather than individuals when looking for the whys of success. That made a lot of sense to me at the time and I stopped thinking about the whys of acedom. I haven't researched lately but I seem to remember that aces weren't evenly distributed throughout fighter forces but were mostly in good units. The whys of successful units are very well known to guys like Ken, Bill, JMA etc. and they differ not at all between ground and air units. The general public loves aces though.All true and is so whether we're talking ODAs (they are not all superb...), SEAL Teams (Squadrons...), Tank Battalions, Rifle Companies, Artillery Batteries or Supply and Service Companies. Good units make the difference. A really good person in a mediocre unit gets lost in the crush more often than not... :o
It's hard to soar like an Eagle when one is surrounded by Turkeys. :wry:
OTOH it is even more difficult to be a Turkey when you're surrounded by Eagles. :cool:
People differ. Armies should hire fewer sensitive souls and more minor sociopaths. It really isn't at all hard to spot those that will work out versus those that won't with 90% or better assurance. :wry:
As an aside on the subject of combat related books, there are of course exceptions but generally sensitive souls write and exorcise, sociopaths don't need to do so thus rarely bother. ;)
Recall though that for small wars (or Armies...), while such selectivity can be employed, in larger ones the press for more people dictates mass hiring practices engendering an obvious loss of selectivity and thus the acquisition of more rather than fewer sensitive souls -- most of whom will go forth, do their job and be okay afterwards. Some will write books, a few good, some mediocre and some poor. :cool:
I believe I understand where you are coming from but would not use the word sociopath because of the potential for misunderstanding. ( See here (http://www.sociopathicstyle.com/traits/classic.htm) )
Yes, when you add conscripts to the mix it gets massively more complicated unless there is an over-riding 'cause' which provides a strong unity of purpose.
See Kiwi doc again:
The New Zealand soldier will readily accept the sacrifice of war provided that he feels the national cause to be just. Belief in the cause may be largely inarticulate, perhaps achieved without a definite process of reasoning but it will underlie the actions of the average soldier and sustain his sense of purpose for the duration of the war. Belief in a common cause provides the initial cohesion among the individuals assembled to form a national army, and grows in time into the team spirit that I indispensable to really first class infantry formations and units.
This may well have been a factor in relation to Vietnam (for some during - "what are we doing here" - and after on return home being shunned by large sections of US citizens and collectively called 'baby killers'). Hard to cope if your support mechanism is not there (as it was for those returning to a heroes welcome from WW2).
In my war then we had little problem with conscripts especially in my unit (RLI) where they had taken a step up and volunteered for service in a unit which promised relentless action.
I would add that there was also a difference between the regular soldiers who had signed up before the war escalated and those who signed up because a nice little shooting war had developed. (Here I would discount those who had become ... shall we say 'fatigued' over time and needed a break.
To make things more complex insurgencies (where the war is generally conducted by small units) require higher levels of initiative and combat leadership skills at lower ranks levels than in more conventional settings were formations are the basic unit (other than special recce of course). By implication the individual skill of each soldier counts. In my war where we used 4-man 'sticks' across the board we could carry a 'passenger' as the 'fourth' man (a buckshee troopie) but in my unit it was rather a new troopie rather than a true 'passenger' who would be blooded in a short timeframe and move up to the position of gunner or stick medic and be replaced by another new troopie (and so on).
I would suggest that your problems in a platoon would be from those who joined the army as employment of last resort. What's that they say about 95% of the problems being caused by 5% of the troopies?
About 'sensitive souls'. In his wonderful book '18 Platoon' Sydney Jary about his time as a platoon commander in WW2 (as quoted here by Chris jM (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=92362&postcount=23)) states:
There is a mathematical formlua: aggression increases the further one goes behind the lines. Opposing infantry, with a few exceptions like the SS, are joined by a bond of mutual compassion which but few of the battlefield aristocracy can understand... Had I been asked at any time before August 1944 to list the personal characteristics which go to make a good infantry soldier, my reply would indeed have been wide of the mark.
Like most I would have suggested only masculine ones like aggression, physical stamina, a hunting instinct and a competitive nature. How wrong I would have been. I would now suggest the following. Firstly sufferance, without which one could not survive. Secondly, a quiet mind which enables a soldier to live in harmony with his fellows through all sorts of difficulties and sometimes under dreadful conditions. As in a closed monastic existence, there is no room for the assertive or acrimonious. Thirdly, but no less important, a sense of the ridiculous which helps a soldier surmount the unacceptable. Add to these a reasonable standard of fitness and a dedicated professional competence, and you have a soldier for all seasons. None of the NCOs or soldiers who made 18 Platoon what it was resembled the characters portrayed in most books and films about war. All were quiet, sensible and unassuming men and some, by any standard, were heroes.
If I now had to select a team for a dangerous mission and my choice was restricted to stars of the sportsfield or poets, I would unhesitatingly recruit from the latter.
These were conscripts and the experience was from D-Day to the end and I suppose they all wanted to survive the WW2.
Of course in a long war where the same soldiers are in it all the time most of your hard chargers would have a pretty restricted life expectancy. (Unlike these days where the Brits say "You pop over to Afghanistan for six months then its home for tea and medals".)
As Desiderata warns us:
"Avoid loud and aggressive persons, they are vexations to the spirit."
This, I have on good authority, is why they have only one sergeant major per infantry company ;)
jmm99
01-29-2012, 06:48 AM
The reference (here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=124070&postcount=31)) was to the common denominator being that they (fighter aces) got into more fights when they were kids relative to the other pilots. Which gets us to "minor psychopaths" (or "minor sociopaths", whatever).
It strikes me (talking just about kids) that "minor psychopaths" are not all the same qualitatively. Let's take the "bully" first; but I'd put him on the shelf real quick because he won't take on anyone he thinks is equal or stronger. He'd make a lousy soldier (IMO), but he's one kind of "minor psychopath".
Then, there's the "defensive" kind who won't fight unless provoked - perhaps by a bully type, but also by one of the two "offensive" kinds of "minor psychopaths".
One of those is the kind who pushes other "minor psychopaths" who are within his capabilities just for the sake of seeing who comes out on top.
The other of those two is the kind who also pushes other "minor psychopaths" and doesn't care how far beyond his capabilities they are. A little nutsy that kind (but some booze also helped).
Those are my observations based on "minor psychopathic" kids I grew up with who saw a bit of violence as being a normal part of life.
Actually, the only kind I regard as being a "minor psychopath" is the bully. The others are simply your normal kids who won't take $hit. "Normal" for the Copper Country, but Carl can be a reality check on that. :)
And, covering Dropkick Murphys (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dropkick_Murphys), while we sure weren't Vegan and definitely not Swedish, we were a bunch of sensitive guys - no need for us to take sensitivity training - honest. :D
Your thoughts ?
Regards
Mike
I think the Army had that ratio about right when I entered. We probably had quite a few minor and not so minor sociopaths (I probably fell in that category myself at that time). These same individuals not only worked hard, they played hard and that was viewed as politically incorrect, so there was an asserted effort to reform the military and make it more politically correct.
The leaders pushed to have a greater percent of our soldiers married, and then they pushed Christian values on the force to the extreme, and after the Cold War the Army assumed the role of social engineer, and equally important when you add it all up we did everything possible minimize risk and started 15-6 investigations for every relatively minor incident.
Is it any wonder we're attracting more sensitive types?
The Army's core purpose is to win our country's land battles, or in more simple terms to be successful in combat. Everything else must secondary, and we risk an identity crisis if that isn't the case. Not every problem can be resolved with combat operations, but the Army's contribution is primarily combat, security operations, or helping others with that role.
If you recall the Army was considering giving an award for not shooting in OIF, fortunately that idea died. The intent was understandable, but good training and experience will enable soldiers to determine when to shoot and not shoot. Good training is the answer to 85% of our problems, it will also weed out those who aren't suitable.
Your points are good Bill.
I tire of all this political correctness which seems to distract US, Brit and European armies while seldom affecting any of the recent enemies. It wastes too much time and distracts from purpose over insignificant detail.
Take the case of dear-old Prince Charlie. In the 80s Charlie,who BTW has no risk of PTSD, decided to go public with his deep concern about the Brigade of Guards having no black faces on parade. ( see here (http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2194&dat=19860617&id=r6QyAAAAIBAJ&sjid=m-8FAAAAIBAJ&pg=1294,3279002) )
In good old British fashion all British subjects - especially the senior officers in the military - fell over themselves to address this Royal concern. A spokesman for the prince indicated that he himself employed 'one or two' blacks. But the spokesman failed to indicate how many gays, lesbians and transgender people the good prince had on his staff.
Which raises the issue (which I am currently addressing elsewhere) of whether the military must mirror society. It seems it doesn't matter who actually wants to be a soldier, all that matters is whether the military reflects the demographics of the nation.
The military probably has a defined role in terms of the constitution and/or statute ... they should be able to comply without micromanagement from politicians. Not going to happen so get used to it.
Ah... courageous restraint, I wonder who thought that one up. We (being the old and the bold from my war) have discussed this at some length and are glad we are beyond the reach of this insanity.
Ken White
01-29-2012, 03:52 PM
Quoth JMA:
would not use the word sociopath because of the potential for misunderstanding.Little hyperbole on my part. Actually, most of the people I'm referring to with that bit of shorthand are those described by jmm99, as always bringing some sense to some of the dumber things I write:
...the only kind I regard as being a "minor psychopath" is the bully. The others are simply your normal kids who won't take $hit.Yes. Fortunately, there are really a lot of those around but they are often eclipsed today by a few who have been over exposed to this foolishness properly slammed by JMA:
...all this political correctness which seems to distract US, Brit and European armies while seldom affecting any of the recent enemies. It wastes too much time and distracts from purpose over insignificant detail.Totally true and as Bill Moore noted, that creates a major problem:
... we risk an identity crisis if that isn't the case. Not every problem can be resolved with combat operations, but the Army's contribution is primarily combat, security operations, or helping others with that role.Need a little pressure not currently available to dispel that crisis, return to reality and dispel the superfluous and the excessive and "insignificant detail." Hopefully, this is just a cycle we're in an we'll wake up as if from a bad dream. In the meantime, I console myself by strongly identifying with this from JMA:
...We (being the old and the bold from my war) have discussed this at some length and are glad we are beyond the reach of this insanity.Yea, verily. Me, too -- and for which I'm very, very thankful. Man, am I ever... :wry:
(Still in Chapter 2: Killing)
He talks of seeing 'Crispy Critters' all over the hill. (We had that nape stuff too, man was it ever a game changer.)
Psychologically I had become identified with the threatened [and surrounded US recce team] and the advancing enemy was no longer human. I didn't kill people, sons, brothers, fathers. I killed 'Crispy Critters.' It could have been krauts, nips, huns, boche, gooks, infidels, towel heads, imperialist pigs, yankee pigs, male chauvinist pigs... the list is as varied as human experience. This dissociation of one's enemy from humanity is a kind of pseudospeciation. You make a false species out of the other human and therefore make it easier to kill him.
Richard Holmes in 'Acts of War' also covers this (pg 365-75) and has more to say on the matter. In addition he reminds readers that soldiers tend to create and unofficial name for everything. So if every item of equipment is given a new name does it really come as any surprise that this also happens to the enemy?
ganulv
01-30-2012, 01:03 AM
Richard Holmes in 'Acts of War' also covers this (pg 365-75) and has more to say on the matter. In addition he reminds readers that soldiers tend to create and unofficial name for everything. So if every item of equipment is given a new name does it really come as any surprise that this also happens to the enemy?
Paramedics enjoy throwing around these sorts of terms. Particularly when they’re having lunch with non-paramedics.
Bill Moore
01-30-2012, 06:31 AM
So far our focus is focused on Anglophone soldiers that generally hail from similiar cultures. After a few hours of reading today about Japanese soldiers during the early days of WWII it is clear that they not only didn't hesitate to kill, but relished in torturing innocents and participating in mass rape long after the excitement of any combat. The German SS were also capable of visiting exceptional cruelity, as a number of others throughout history. As Anglophones we do surprisingly well at killing considering the values accepted as norms in our society, but there are others in the world who seem to be completely unhindered by what we would consider moral norms.
What enabled the Germans and especially the Japanese to participate in mass murder and torture? Their culture? Lower level of social development? Superior social development? Is it undefinable? When did we become relatively moral compared to our enemies? Was there a turning point in history?
What enabled the Germans and especially the Japanese to participate in mass murder and torture? Their culture? Lower level of social development? Superior social development? Is it undefinable? When did we become relatively moral compared to our enemies? Was there a turning point in history?
This is from a guy who hasn't seen nearly what you guys have.
I think that capability exists in almost all of us, and it exists very close to the surface. In young men it is even closer to the surface. What holds it in check is the process of acculturation and learning that parents do from just a little after the day of birth. The results of that process are reinforced and held in place by a social structure. If you remove that social structure, all that learning and nodding your head yes when your mother tells you not to pull the wings off flies can be forgotten in a extremely short time, almost as if was never there.
To me the most important part of the that social structure that keeps us from savagery is the "legitimate authority figure". I put that in quotes because that can vary with circumstance, but if the authority figure says it's ok to (name your atrocity), those "good boys (or men or women)" will do it and have fun doing it and brag about it. There are some saints out who won't, God bless them, but they will tend to get washed away with the tide if they aren't backed by authority figures.
That is one reason I get so upset when people want to give a pass on things like hazing or desecrating bodies. It is chipping away at the dike holding back that tide of savagery and that dike is always under severe strains. Even minor cracks can develop into catastrophic breaks unless they are fixed immediately.
An example of that is Capt. Medina's company. He set that company up for that crime for months by, IIRC, telling them that it was ok to act on their savage impulses. The legitimate authority figure gave them permission so they did it.
A more extreme but perhaps more illuminating example is the child soldier of Africa. These kids are removed from their social support world and given a new authority figure who is then able to create a sweet faced monster in just a few days. This is independent of continent or race. You can take most any 12 year, 14 or 16 year old anywhere and if you handle him right, you will have a stone cold but giggly killer of his own parents in 3 weeks or less. (Peter Singer's book Child Soldiers is great on this.)
The Germans and Japanese did those things because their leaders told them it was ok. If our leaders tell us it is ok, we will do the same thing. We already have on a minor scale, "enhanced interrogation." We can revert to savagery in a very short time if we don't constantly tell each other "We're Americans. We don't do that ####." (Thank you Brandon Friedman.)
Of course that begs the question, when do leaders on a big scale, say that #### is ok? Maybe it is a millenniumist (sic) ideology, Nazi for the Germans, that contrived bushido emporer nonsense for the Japanese, and you can add communism for any number of countries. All totalitarian ideologies that subordinated everything to the ideology.
Actually, the only kind I regard as being a "minor psychopath" is the bully. The others are simply your normal kids who won't take $hit. "Normal" for the Copper Country, but Carl can be a reality check on that. :)
Copy on Copper Country people. One of the reasons I really like the UP is because the people are so mostly old fashioned sensible in all things. Not a lot of posturing up there.
This comes from a forever a civilian regarding your asking for thoughts.
I think what Sydney Jary said is true, especially because you maybe aren't looking for exceptional individuals, you are looking for individuals who can be formed, and are willing to be formed, into an exceptional group. This is just a civilian's guess but the exceptional individual fighters may just sort of show up within a group that is selected for the qualities Jary mentioned.
Something else that goes with that is something else that I read long ago but forgot where. When you are selecting for a good military unit, you are selecting for the same things that you would select for if you were hiring for a business. You look for honesty, maturity, ability to get along, work ethic, punctuality, stick-to-itiveness etc. The only thing different for a military is perhaps physical fitness.
The above is one reason I was so optimistic about the chances the Libyan rebels had to win their fight, so many of them seemed to be small businessmen, teachers, university students etc; Copper Country guys who decided they had had enough. If the heavy weapons could be kept at bay for a while, I didn't think those guys could lose.
Paramedics enjoy throwing around these sorts of terms. Particularly when they’re having lunch with non-paramedics.
Yes most certainly happens outside the military. Need some input from someone with Psych qualification.
Starts with boys and their tree-house. Members only and no girls allowed.
Not just anyone can become a member. There has to be some initiation/selection/hazing. Some sort of (blood) oath or swearing of allegiance etc etc. Then there are codes and customised slang only members will understand... and so on.
Look at gangs... look at university fraternities... look everywhere men group and realise that the military will be (can't be otherwise) no different.
Its just that in the military 'looking after our own' means just that and the level of trust and belief in their mates is essential to their very existence.
When you shout 'cover me' to your buddy it means you are putting your life in his hands. That's special. That's why 30 years after my Regiment - a single almost always under strength battalion - was disbanded we still gather together in hundreds to share a little time with people we shared moments in combat with (300 odd in South Africa and 200 odd in the UK last year).
Civilians don't get near creating this non-sexual bond between men. They will never understand ... and as we soldiers say:
You have never lived until you have almost died. For those who have fought for it, life has a special flavor the protected will never know.
So f**k them.
Let us learn to understand ourselves and the psychological dynamics of what we are expected to do so we can prepare those who choose the profession of arms in our footsteps.
We know that to be able to just walk up to random guy the politicians line us up against and blow him away would require an army of psychopaths so we need a little help. Calling the enemy a kraut, nip, gook or rag-head makes it a little easier (as no doubt the names they use for us makes it for them) and when they commit atrocities like the Japanese and the Germans did and like in the photo up this thread killing them is made a whole lot easier.
So Backwards Observer the use of the word 'gook' is more of a necessary crutch for us soldiers than a racial slur directed at all people of East Asian origin... try to understand that.
I remember going through the pockets of a dead guy once and found a handkerchief which had been crudely (but lovingly) embroidered with some words and a heart. I looked at him and realised that someone out there loved this 'gook' and would never see him again nor probably hear what had happened to him. I was sad for her. I still have that handkerchief somewhere.
Look at the kid in the photo. Lucky if he is 18. Been around or he would not be carrying a machine gun. Saw a lot of $hit in his time in the RLI and slayed a lot of bad guys. Wonder what's going through his mind - still dirty from being out on an op. Time for the civvies to start cutting our young soldiers some slack ... and if they don't its up to us who have nothing to lose to dish out a few slaps... (verbally of course ;) )
http://farm8.staticflickr.com/7156/6780014075_ea667c191f.jpg
Backwards Observer
01-30-2012, 09:37 AM
So Backwards Observer the use of the word 'gook' is more of a necessary crutch for us soldiers than a racial slur directed at all people of East Asian origin... try to understand that.
No sweat, JMA. A thoughtful post.
Fuchs
01-30-2012, 09:56 AM
The Germans and Japanese did those things because their leaders told them it was ok. If our leaders tell us it is ok, we will do the same thing. We already have on a minor scale, "enhanced interrogation." We can revert to savagery in a very short time if we don't constantly tell each other "We're Americans. We don't do that ####." (Thank you Brandon Friedman.
Not sure this is how it works. A widespread remark was "Wenn der Fuehrer das wuesste!" (~ "If only Hitler knew about it!")
They often KNEW it was wrong and they often ASSUMED that top leadership was not intently tolerating it. That was usually an illusion, of course.
The reason for bystanding passively was probably more the feeling of being but a tiny wheel in a huge, unstoppable machinery.
The ones who actually committed (war) crimes (and there's no war, no active war party without some!) probably did it for the reasons illuminated in the Stanford Prison Experiment (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_prison_experiment).
PS: Since when does the forum delete Umlaute?
What goes on in the mind of a sniper?
25 January 2012
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16544490
Fuchs:
I think we are thinking about approximately the same thing. That entry on the Stanford experiment contained this quote "In other words, it seemed the situation caused the participants' behavior, rather than anything inherent in their individual personalities." The most important part of the situation i think being the immediate authority figures explicitly saying it is ok or tacitly approving things by not stopping them. The Milford experiment, mentioned in that entry showed the same thing.
One thing I should have mentioned is that young males in groups without supervision are inventively cruel almost by nature. If they aren't stopped they take that as approval and get worse and worse.
jmm99
01-30-2012, 05:37 PM
Fuchs:
PS: Since when does the forum delete Umlaute?
With the changeover to the new server, the associated editor doesn't do "umlauts" (whether German, French or Finnish) with any consistency. Notice of problem in Nov 2011 by JMM99 and Stan (1 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=129312&postcount=13), 2 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=129336&postcount=14), 3 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=129342&postcount=15), 4 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=129346&postcount=16)).
My BLUF:
... that good result [umlauts] occurs only if I use the basic Edit. If I Go Advanced, the umlauts are wiped out again.
I won't make jokes about bears being near-sighted. I won't makes jokes about bears being near-sighted ... (repeat 100 times). :)
Umlaut - Advanced:
Umlaut - Basic (Edit button): ä
Regards (really)
Mike
jcustis
01-30-2012, 06:04 PM
The reference (here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=124070&postcount=31)) was to the common denominator being that they (fighter aces) got into more fights when they were kids relative to the other pilots. Which gets us to "minor psychopaths" (or "minor sociopaths", whatever).
It strikes me (talking just about kids) that "minor psychopaths" are not all the same qualitatively. Let's take the "bully" first; but I'd put him on the shelf real quick because he won't take on anyone he thinks is equal or stronger. He'd make a lousy soldier (IMO), but he's one kind of "minor psychopath".
Then, there's the "defensive" kind who won't fight unless provoked - perhaps by a bully type, but also by one of the two "offensive" kinds of "minor psychopaths".
One of those is the kind who pushes other "minor psychopaths" who are within his capabilities just for the sake of seeing who comes out on top.
The other of those two is the kind who also pushes other "minor psychopaths" and doesn't care how far beyond his capabilities they are. A little nutsy that kind (but some booze also helped).
Those are my observations based on "minor psychopathic" kids I grew up with who saw a bit of violence as being a normal part of life.
Actually, the only kind I regard as being a "minor psychopath" is the bully. The others are simply your normal kids who won't take $hit. "Normal" for the Copper Country, but Carl can be a reality check on that. :)
And, covering Dropkick Murphys (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dropkick_Murphys), while we sure weren't Vegan and definitely not Swedish, we were a bunch of sensitive guys - no need for us to take sensitivity training - honest. :D
Your thoughts ?
Regards
Mike
I love this clip:
http://youtu.be/isfn4OxCPQs
ganulv
01-30-2012, 06:07 PM
So far our focus is focused on Anglophone soldiers that generally hail from similiar cultures. After a few hours of reading today about Japanese soldiers during the early days of WWII it is clear that they not only didn't hesitate to kill, but relished in torturing innocents and participating in mass rape long after the excitement of any combat. The German SS were also capable of visiting exceptional cruelity, as a number of others throughout history. As Anglophones we do surprisingly well at killing considering the values accepted as norms in our society, but there are others in the world who seem to be completely unhindered by what we would consider moral norms.
What enabled the Germans and especially the Japanese to participate in mass murder and torture? Their culture? Lower level of social development? Superior social development? Is it undefinable? When did we become relatively moral compared to our enemies? Was there a turning point in history?
I know less about the Japanese case than the German. The standard published point of departure is John Dower’s War without mercy (http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/13064585). There certainly did seem to be some important differences—I’ll call them cultural and/or social, though some would haggle over whether either is the appropriate term—between the Japanese and U.S. troops. To put it roughly, I think it fair to say that by and large the Japanese saw Americans’ willingness to surrender and Americans saw Japanese willingness to engage in banzai charges and kamikaze attacks (a favorite scholar of mine, Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney (http://www.anthropology.wisc.edu/Ohnuki-Tierney/index.html), has published one book (http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/48892404) and a collection of edited primary documents (http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62533869) related to the latter; here’s an article (http://www.anthropology.wisc.edu/Ohnuki-Tierney/files/2004-betrayal.pdf)stemming from her work on them) as things done by animals.
As for the SS and particularly the Einsatzgruppen, they were fighting international Bolshevism. There were other things in the mix beyond a hatred and fear of Marxism (Omer Bartov (http://www.brown.edu/Departments/German_Studies/people/facultypage.php?id=1106970215)’s work is once place to look) but the perpetrators saw themselves as enmeshed in an existential conflict. That may completely implausible motivation seven decades on, but I suspect future generations are going to have a hard time buying contemporary motivations for the Global War on Terror (before anyone suggests otherwise, I am not equating the Holocaust and the Global War on Terror), as well.
American troops have never perpetrated anything of the scale that Japanese and German forces did during World War Two. But I don’t think any American should kid themselves about some sort of inherent American decency. The Philippine-American War is an example too often overlooked in our country’s military history. During World War Two American soldiers and Marines are well known to have collected Japanese skulls as trophies (I understand perfectly well how the conditions they were under could have lead them to find that to be acceptable behavior, I’m just pointing out that being American didn’t stop them from being capable of it). And we can be quite inhumane to our own. Look at our country’s history of lynchings and the fact that something like 1% of our adults are imprisoned on any given day and 600 or so of them are sexually assaulted on that day and the public at large doesn’t really seem too concerned about it (http://www.economist.com/node/18651484).
jmm99
01-30-2012, 06:36 PM
My computer network isn't set up for Internet video. Yeah, I know, three months of real retired time - and still no CAT-5 run in the basement. That's not even a good reason. :)
However, I get the general drift from the comments. Yes, there is satisfaction from confronting the bully - esp. if he is a couple of years older and ends up bawling and wetting his pants. Violence can be used for good and for bad ends.
Regards
Mike
jcustis
01-30-2012, 06:46 PM
Mike,
It's the video of the Australian gentle giant kid (and older at 16), pile-driving the younger (at 12) kid who is clearly the aggressor in the video. Both had their own separate interviews afterwards, and to hear the 12-yr old punk tell it, he's an angel who was "abused" first.
tequila
01-30-2012, 06:52 PM
One point that comes out in George Feifer's excellent work on the Battle of Okinawa - Tennozan (http://www.amazon.com/Tennozan-Battle-Okinawa-Atomic-Bomb/dp/0395599245) - is that IJA basic training emphasized systematic physical abuse of its recruits to instill hardiness and obedience. Beatings were brutal and routine, being inflicted by both NCOs and officers for the smallest infraction.
Edward J. Drea's Japan's Imperial Army (http://www.amazon.com/Japans-Imperial-Army-1853-1945-Studies/dp/0700616632/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&qid=1327948990&sr=8-3)emphasizes that this sort of training was seen by the officer corps as required to mold peasant recruits into the sort of disciplined soldiers capable of defeating samurai rebels in the civil wars of the Meiji era. Reading Drea is instructive as to differences in the behavior of Japanese troops in wars leading up to WWII - Japanese treatment of civilians and POWs was exemplary during the Boxer Rebellion (where Japanese forces avoided massacres of civilians, unlike British, French, German, and Russian troops), and also during the Russo-Japanese war (despite gruesome casualties inflicted on them by Russian forces in fixed defenses).
However the IJA's behavior during its conquest and 'pacification' of Korea and Manchuria was markedly different, more reminiscent of European behavior in Africa and Asia on a larger scale (punitive expeditions, decimation, etc.).
jmm99
01-30-2012, 07:22 PM
kind of an odd matchup - that Aussie one.
My bully was more traditional - 8th grader; I was in 5th. But, I'd gone back to school the year before in 4th (a year behind my age group), after 4 years in a body cast. So, our age difference was a couple of years. He was larger than I, but "soft". The only way you get around in a body cast is to use your arms - hundreds of "push ups" and dozens of "pull ups" per day, in effect.
As it turned out, I had a couple of other advantages. My left hip and right wrist had been fused because of the bone-eating bacteria - the fused hip turned out to be a natural for a hip throw; the fused wrist turned my right arm into a pretty good club (you can't break your hand cuz it's solid bone :D).
Anyway this knucklehead (upon whom someone had wasted a good a$$hole by putting teeth in it) had a penchant for bullying 5th graders. One day he went after me - hit on the 5th grade cripple for some sport, I suppose. He shoved. I got him in a headlock; grounded him in a choke hold and pounded him a couple of dozen times in the face.
The net result was that thereafter he avoided me - and also my classmates. A moment of clarity some 58 years ago, which I still relish.
Regards
Mike
kind of an odd matchup - that Aussie one.
That that kind of matchup existed indicates the hell that fat kid must have been going through. In one of the interviews with the body slammer he said this has been going on for years and I believe he said that he was the target of many. Getting picked on by somebody so much younger, smaller and weaker further indicates that there was a whole group tormenting that kid. The body slammee would not have gone through with such a mismatch if he didn't think he had a lot of backup.
That that kind of matchup existed indicates the hell that fat kid must have been going through. In one of the interviews with the body slammer he said this has been going on for years and I believe he said that he was the target of many. Getting picked on by somebody so much younger, smaller and weaker further indicates that there was a whole group tormenting that kid. The body slammee would not have gone through with such a mismatch if he didn't think he had a lot of backup.
It seems that way from the video. I think it was another cruel twist in a long and sad story - just look how the other persons react in that video.
I think that in general we humans are very good at coming up with arguments to support our reactions and the one of the group. Some of them hold water, others not so much, some are rather objective others rely on perceptions and some apply just for 'our' good side and not for the bad others.
(From Wikipeda, on the 'Indian mutiny')
In terms of sheer numbers, the casualties were much higher on the Indian side. A letter published after the fall of Delhi in the "Bombay Telegraph" and reproduced in the British press testified to the scale of the Indian casualties:
.... All the city's people found within the walls of the city of Delhi when our troops entered were bayoneted on the spot, and the number was considerable, as you may suppose, when I tell you that in some houses forty and fifty people were hiding. These were not mutineers but residents of the city, who trusted to our well-known mild rule for pardon. I am glad to say they were disappointed.[117]
Edward Vibart, a 19-year-old officer, recorded his experience:
It was literally murder... I have seen many bloody and awful sights lately but such a one as I witnessed yesterday I pray I never see again. The women were all spared but their screams on seeing their husbands and sons butchered, were most painful... Heaven knows I feel no pity, but when some old grey bearded man is brought and shot before your very eyes, hard must be that man's heart I think who can look on with indifference...
Being 'soft' against the enemy has been of course in general seen as a bigger weakness then being hard and tough. You don't want to be the weak guy and you want a brother in arm which is aggressive on the battlefield against the enemy.
Note that in the first case civilians among them women were killed, while in the second 'only' male civilians were murdered, showing that it depended also on the circumstances, the unit and the leadership. Revenge seemed to have been a strong motivator. The first is glad that they did not give any quarter, while the second says he feels no pity, but that some of the killings were hard on him.
Such actions seem to have partly justified by such reports, similar to the one, horrific murder, posted earlier by JMA.
The incidents of rape committed by Indian rebels against European women and girls appalled the British public. These atrocities were often used to justify the British reaction to the rebellion. British newspapers printed various eyewitness accounts of the rape of English women and girls. One such account published by The Times, regarding an incident where 48 English girls as young as 10 had been raped by Indian rebels in Delhi. Karl Marx later claimed that this was propaganda stating that the account was written by a clergyman in Bangalore, far from the events of the rebellion, though he produced no evidence to support this.[121]
Even when I today read the stories I feel the emotions.
Even when I today read the stories I feel the emotions.
That was 1857. Things were a little different for the Brits then.
But then fast forward to the 1980s and zimbabwe to the Gukurahundi (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gukurahundi) genocide.
That great African liberator and darling of the political left Robert Mugabe committed a genocide in zimbabwe where men, women and children were massacred amongst the Ndebele people of that country. (20,000 confirmed but likely to have been much more.)
Not too much was heard out of North American and European universities over this of course.
Some light at the end of the tunnel though...Gukurahundi perpetrators face prosecution (http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2012-01-30-gukurahundi-perpetrators-face-prosecution/)
Is it going to happen? Nah... no oil in zimbabwe you see and no balls in the West to address this genocide.
ganulv
01-31-2012, 07:36 PM
That great African liberator and darling of the political left Robert Mugabe committed a genocide in zimbabwe where men, women and children were massacred amongst the Ndebele people of that country. (20,000 confirmed but likely to have been much more.)
Not too much was heard out of North American and European universities over this of course.
Some light at the end of the tunnel though...Gukurahundi perpetrators face prosecution (http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2012-01-30-gukurahundi-perpetrators-face-prosecution/)
Is it going to happen? Nah... no oil in zimbabwe you see and no balls in the West to address this genocide.
On the other hand, in Central America one of the real bastards of recent history is having some of his dirty laundry aired for the world to see (http://www.npr.org/2012/01/30/146099709/guatemalas-former-dictator-faces-trial)—his countrymen are well aware of who he is and what he’s done—before his time on earth is done.
On the other hand, in Central America one of the real bastards of recent history is having some of his dirty laundry aired for the world to see (http://www.npr.org/2012/01/30/146099709/guatemalas-former-dictator-faces-trial)—his countrymen are well aware of who he is and what he’s done—before his time on earth is done.
They should nail him too, no question.
ganulv
01-31-2012, 09:22 PM
They should nail him too, no question.
I would put decent money down that within a couple of weeks Efraín is going to be diagnosed with that incapacitating disease that former strongmen tend to suffer from after the indictment is read. :rolleyes:
I would put decent money down that within a couple of weeks Efran is going to be diagnosed with that incapacitating disease that former strongmen tend to suffer from after the indictment is read. :rolleyes:
Doesn't matter whether its a left wing thug or a right wing right thug they must all go down.
Sigaba
02-10-2012, 10:57 AM
I know less about the Japanese case than the German. The standard published point of departure is John Dower’s War without mercy (http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/13064585).While I was and remain impressed with Dower's work, I also agree with John Shy's assessment that:
the actual links between thought and action are more often assumed in [Dower's] book than explored.
Citation from: John Shy, "The Cultural Approach to the History of War," Proceedings of the Symposium on "The History of War as Part of General History", 12-13 March 1993, The Journal of Military History, 57:5 (special issue) (October 1993): 15. Shy recommends the book that was published after his presentation Craig Cameron, American Samurai: Myth and Imagination in the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division 1941-1951 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). I have not yet gotten around to reading this book--which I may or may not own.:rolleyes:
There certainly did seem to be some important differences—I’ll call them cultural and/or social, though some would haggle over whether either is the appropriate term—between the Japanese and U.S. troops.With respect, I think you're taking lightly the debate that has caused an extraordinary degree of intellectual, political, and personal conflict among professional academic historians over the past two decades. While some historians are comfortable with a formulation in which the relationship between the 'base' and the 'superstructure' is much more dynamic than initially thought, American social and cultural historians are still slugging it out--to the unending sorrow of those who don't have tenure, to say nothing of a tenure-track job, in the Ivory Tower.
As for the SS and particularly the Einsatzgruppen, they were fighting international Bolshevism. There were other things in the mix beyond a hatred and fear of Marxism (Omer Bartov (http://www.brown.edu/Departments/German_Studies/people/facultypage.php?id=1106970215)’s work is once place to look) but the perpetrators saw themselves as enmeshed in an existential conflict. That may completely implausible motivation seven decades on, but I suspect future generations are going to have a hard time buying contemporary motivations for the Global War on Terror (before anyone suggests otherwise, I am not equating the Holocaust and the Global War on Terror), as well. IMO, the historiographical debate is much more nuanced than you present in this summary. Yes, the Nazis viewed the conflict with Bolshevism as existential. However, this mortal struggle contained a racial component that was unrecoverable. Moreover, a number of historians including Peter Fritzsche, Peter Longerich, Wolfram Wette, Alan E. Steinweis, and Stephen G. Fritz (who has sparred with Bartov over an unfavorable review) have provided compelling arguments that rank and file Germans (both civilians and soldiers) had a higher level of 'buy in' to this component of Nazi ideology than previously thought.
American troops have never perpetrated anything of the scale that Japanese and German forces did during World War Two. But I don’t think any American should kid themselves about some sort of inherent American decency. The Philippine-American War is an example too often overlooked in our country’s military history. During World War Two American soldiers and Marines are well known to have collected Japanese skulls as trophies (I understand perfectly well how the conditions they were under could have lead them to find that to be acceptable behavior, I’m just pointing out that being American didn’t stop them from being capable of it). And we can be quite inhumane to our own. Look at our country’s history of lynchings and the fact that something like 1% of our adults are imprisoned on any given day and 600 or so of them are sexually assaulted on that day and the public at large doesn’t really seem too concerned about it (http://www.economist.com/node/18651484).Here, you present an interesting linkage between the American soldier (broadly conceived) and his/her former life as a civilian. If your interpretation is correct, what does it say of the efficacy of the training and indoctrination of American servicemen? Are they provided the technical expertise to kill while relying more on their social and cultural upbringing rather than the ethos of professional soldiers? If such is the case, can the "warrior spirit" be learned (much less taught)? Or, as many of the QPs at PS.COM aver, are warriors born and not made--and thus individual differences trump social and cultural backgrounds?
ganulv
02-10-2012, 01:46 PM
With respect, I think you're taking lightly the debate that has caused an extraordinary degree of intellectual, political, and personal conflict among professional academic historians over the past two decades. While some historians are comfortable with a formulation in which the relationship between the 'base' and the 'superstructure' is much more dynamic than initially thought, American social and cultural historians are still slugging it out--to the unending sorrow of those who don't have tenure, to say nothing of a tenure-track job, in the Ivory Tower.
IMO, the historiographical debate is much more nuanced than you present in this summary. Yes, the Nazis viewed the conflict with Bolshevism as existential. However, this mortal struggle contained a racial component that was unrecoverable. Moreover, a number of historians including Peter Fritzsche, Peter Longerich, Wolfram Wette, Alan E. Steinweis, and Stephen G. Fritz (who has sparred with Bartov over an unfavorable review) have provided compelling arguments that rank and file Germans (both civilians and soldiers) had a higher level of 'buy in' to this component of Nazi ideology than previously thought.
The tenure process keeps a lot of debates alive. Publish–or–perish, even if everyone on the tenure committee knows its a make–work publication. (While on an above department level tenure review committee my advisor went to the mat for a guy who had edited a collection of primary documents which no one else on the committee wanted to count toward his publication record. My advisor asked them which would count more in a couple of decades, a couple of deprecated journal articles or easy access to what would have otherwise been practically inaccessible documents? “They never thought of it that way.” Sigh.)
As for ideological buy–in, for me its as much a question of method as anything. I am dubious we can really get into a person’s head when we are sitting in the room with him or her, much less decades on. Others disagree, of course.
Here, you present an interesting linkage between the American soldier (broadly conceived) and his/her former life as a civilian. If your interpretation is correct, what does it say of the efficacy of the training and indoctrination of American servicemen? Are they provided the technical expertise to kill while relying more on their social and cultural upbringing rather than the ethos of professional soldiers? If such is the case, can the "warrior spirit" be learned (much less taught)? Or, as many of the QPs at PS.COM aver, are warriors born and not made--and thus individual differences trump social and cultural backgrounds?
That wasn’t really my intent. I was implying that Westerners often like to pat themselves on the back about their relative degree of civilization (civilizedness?) and suggest that they really shouldn’t.
In Chapter 2 he states:
The ideal response to killing in war should be one similar to a mercy killing, sadness mingled with respect.
The ideal response?
Not sure about that.
What feelings should I (or the gunship crew) have when I see a video on Youtube where a gunship kills some Afghans in the process of laying an IED?
All killing is not equal.
Is killing an enemy in war the same as that of a drive-by shooting? The killings perpetrated by a deranged serial killer?
So if soldiers select another word for killing -destroy/annihilate/dispatch/eradicate/erase/neutralize/obliterate/slay/waste/wipe out/zap - it has more to do with differentiating the act of killing which they get involved on with that of criminal murderers than mask their own actions. Of course much of the motivation behind the replacement words chosen for killing has no subliminal psychological basis at all.
motorfirebox
02-11-2012, 05:34 AM
In Chapter 2 he states:
The ideal response?
Not sure about that.
What feelings should I (or the gunship crew) have when I see a video on Youtube where a gunship kills some Afghans in the process of laying an IED?
All killing is not equal.
Is killing an enemy in war the same as that of a drive-by shooting? The killings perpetrated by a deranged serial killer?
So if soldiers select another word for killing -destroy/annihilate/dispatch/eradicate/erase/neutralize/obliterate/slay/waste/wipe out/zap - it has more to do with differentiating the act of killing which they get involved on with that of criminal murderers than mask their own actions. Of course much of the motivation behind the replacement words chosen for killing has no subliminal psychological basis at all.
Yeah, that doesn't seem like an ideal response at all. I mean, ideal for whom? The soldier, who is likely to either get himself killed out on the battlefield because he's distracted by all that sadness and respect, or have serious issues back home when the weight of all that sadness and respect comes down on him? The nation employing the soldier, who has to deal with a bunch more dead and damaged soldiers? Seems like the only party for whom that would be an ideal response is the guys the soldier is shooting at.
I get that what's supposed to happen is that the soldier's trigger finger will be more discerning if he empathizes with everyone he shoots at, but emotion as a mechanism for shoot/don't shoot differentiation seems like a terrible idea from the ground up.
Yeah, that doesn't seem like an ideal response at all. I mean, ideal for whom? The soldier, who is likely to either get himself killed out on the battlefield because he's distracted by all that sadness and respect, or have serious issues back home when the weight of all that sadness and respect comes down on him? The nation employing the soldier, who has to deal with a bunch more dead and damaged soldiers? Seems like the only party for whom that would be an ideal response is the guys the soldier is shooting at.
I get that what's supposed to happen is that the soldier's trigger finger will be more discerning if he empathizes with everyone he shoots at, but emotion as a mechanism for shoot/don't shoot differentiation seems like a terrible idea from the ground up.
There is a problem here which may have infected the US military (and maybe other militaries as well).
I note with horror that US junior officers themselves (as opposed reading lists imposed on them) list 'On Killing, by Dave Grossman' as number 7 on their own reading list. ( What do Army junior officers actually recommend reading?: Their own top 10 (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/24/what_do_army_junior_officers_actually_recommend_re ading_their_own_top_10) )
Someone needs to carry out some serious damage control right now as these young officers heads are being filled with nonsense.
I would like to learn more about Marlantes and his post Vietnam descent into a world of 'sex, drugs and rock and roll'. There are hundreds of thousands of soldiers (probably millions) over time - say since the Great War - who experienced more violent combat than him who did not fall apart.
Grossman and the like tell soldiers that they will suffer remorse (or worse) after having killed. (He does accept that for some/many/whatever this post killing phase may be fleeting - so fleeting that I must have missed it)
So if you don't have nightmares/have visions of the person you killed/suffer from depression/seek solace in drink and drugs/ etc etc then maybe you have a more serious problem.
This crap has to stop.
Surely there are enough US servicemen who have experienced combat and have not entered a self destructive spiral who can report that they did their duty and are still A-OK? Why is it always those who have issues who get interviewed and have their experiences included in case studies?
I contend that for the vast majority of soldiers the combat experience makes them stronger people.
It is also fair to say that at the war's end the infantry soldier who played his full part emerged strengthened and enlivened by the experience of battle. Above all, he knew the true meaning and true value of comradeship. Fostered by unity of purpose, the team spirit of the New Zealand battalions was a force of great power, rarely encountered in other walks of life. The sense of comradeship and mutual reliance was new in degree to those who found themselves in the team, and in itself was enough to submerge much of the uncertainty and unpleasantness of war. – New Zealand Infantry In Battle In World War II
ganulv
02-11-2012, 04:06 PM
Why is it always those who have issues who get interviewed and have their experiences included in case studies?
You’re not the first person (http://savageminds.org/2009/09/27/wounds-of-war-and-the-dilemmas-of-stereotype/) to have asked some form of that question.
JMA & Motorfirebox: When Marlantes made his statement:
"The ideal response to killing in war should be one similar to a mercy killing, sadness mingled with respect."
Didn't that refer to how he felt the thing as a whole should be viewed decades, maybe many decades later? I don't have a copy to refer to (the library copy isn't back yet) so I may have the context wrong but what I remember is something more along the lines of being proud of professional accomplishment but a bit sad that the accomplishment involved killing a lot of people, NVA soldiers, who may not have had much choice about being there. Again I remember him saying that after decades of reflection, this is how he felt he should best view it.
That he came to that after so much time implies that Marlantes, the old man came to the conclusion that that is how old men should best view it. But what worked good for Marlantes long after the fighting stopped. For others who knows?
That viewpoint would not be so workable for soldiers during and in the immediate aftermath of fight I imagine. I read once of a B-26 crew that caught a Chinese unit in the open in the daylight and killed over 1,000, that one crew. Feeling anything but pride and happiness that those dead Chinese weren't around to kill G.I.s would have been a handicap to future missions.
I am not sure his descent into sex, drugs and rock and roll isn't anything more than a young man leaving a highly regimented world and entering the US of the late 60s and 70s (I forgot if he partied in Europe too). Sex, drugs and rock and roll was a way of life easily engaged in by a lot of people in those days. Maybe it had something to do with his combat experience but maybe it had just as much to do with being a young man in a place where it was easy.
I always thought Grossman was dead wrong too. He always talked about humans instead of culture and I never remembered reading anything about the Mongols being troubled by angst. The comments section in the Best Defense junior officer preferred reads list cited by JMA tore Grossman apart.
Not all of the writing is about guys who have problems. Most maybe because problems are inherently more dramatic than people who are well adjusted. But not all. Bob Greene wrote a very good book called "Duty" (I think). It was about his father and also about Paul Tibbets whom Greene got to know very well. IIRC Tibbets had no guilt, was proud of his unit and its accomplishment and knew that dropping the bomb ended the war sooner thereby saving many.
JMA & Motorfirebox: When Marlantes made his statement:
"The ideal response to killing in war should be one similar to a mercy killing, sadness mingled with respect."
Didn't that refer to how he felt the thing as a whole should be viewed decades, maybe many decades later? I don't have a copy to refer to (the library copy isn't back yet) so I may have the context wrong but what I remember is something more along the lines of being proud of professional accomplishment but a bit sad that the accomplishment involved killing a lot of people, NVA soldiers, who may not have had much choice about being there. Again I remember him saying that after decades of reflection, this is how he felt he should best view it.
That he came to that after so much time implies that Marlantes, the old man came to the conclusion that that is how old men should best view it. But what worked good for Marlantes long after the fighting stopped. For others who knows?
I reread the chapter just to be sure I didn't miss something.
Yes the book comprises Marlantes' reflections looking back some 40 years.
At the end of the chapter he sums it up like this:
We cannot expect normal eighteen year olds to kill someone and contain it in a healthy way. They must be helped to sort out what will be healthy grief about taking a life because it is part of the sorrow of war.
You see here we go in the direction of Grossman in the thinking that killing is somehow 'bad' and will inevitably lead to feelings of guilt and grief.
Not so. Combat killing in war is not murder, it is not a homicide, it is a justifiable killing. (I'm not talking atrocities here)
I am involved with a compilation of narratives written by individuals who served in my regiment during my little war. If there is grief it is over their mates who were KIA. Here is some 'raw data' from one account:
... Literally the minute we hit the ground the $hit hit the fan. All hell broke loose and a long and fierce fire fight took place. I experienced just about everything a soldier could expect to face in a lifetime in the army. There were airstrikes that nearly hit us, a terrorist threw and hit me with an empty AK magazine, two of my friends Kevin and Kim were seriously injured and flown out, and I had my first kill. I have never forgotten that moment….18 years old and I took another human beings life. Raised as a Catholic this had a severe impact on me. The worst was to come. At the end of the day we had to retrace our movements and collect all the bodies and drag them to a pick up point. The sight of the fatal injuries were horrific, limbs shattered, huge holes everywhere, exposed internal organs and brains oozing and falling adrift from the bodies. The yellow fat, the flies and the stench of death was gut retching. No training could have prepared me for this... "
Did this kid fall apart then or later? No, like the vast majority of others who went through that mill he just got on with his life.
That viewpoint would not be so workable for soldiers during and in the immediate aftermath of fight I imagine. I read once of a B-26 crew that caught a Chinese unit in the open in the daylight and killed over 1,000, that one crew. Feeling anything but pride and happiness that those dead Chinese weren't around to kill G.I.s would have been a handicap to future missions.
Exactly. If you have heard the 'Green Leader' (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-p1NRLFso6Q) audio from a camp attack against ZIPRA in Zambia (nah... not a refugee camp) one can hear from the cockpit transmissions this euphoria you speak of.
I am not sure his descent into sex, drugs and rock and roll isn't anything more than a young man leaving a highly regimented world and entering the US of the late 60s and 70s (I forgot if he partied in Europe too). Sex, drugs and rock and roll was a way of life easily engaged in by a lot of people in those days. Maybe it had something to do with his combat experience but maybe it had just as much to do with being a young man in a place where it was easy.
Well maybe I oversimplify his experience by using 'sex, drugs and rock and roll'. He claims to have has visions of the face of an NVA who threw a grenade at him and who he mat or may not have killed. I don't for one minute doubt his account but I do have my concerns of his mental state if that is all it took to tip him over the edge.
Perhaps for this and other reasons your man, Ken White, has stated often here that there should be some sort of psychological screening of all soldiers attempting to enter the service. (maybe he can clarify)
My experience is that those who had issues had them already when they entered the service. Combat had little to do with their later problems although 'the war' was a convenient excuse to hide behind.
I always thought Grossman was dead wrong too. He always talked about humans instead of culture and I never remembered reading anything about the Mongols being troubled by angst. The comments section in the Best Defense junior officer preferred reads list cited by JMA tore Grossman apart.
Not in the comment I read (http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2012/02/Documents/CC_0212.pdf):
7. On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society by Dave Grossman
Pete Kilner: This book opened my eyes to the psychological, physical and even moral impacts of killing another human being. As professionals of arms, we recruit, equip, train and order our Soldiers to kill. On Killing gave me a much deeper appreciation for what it’s like to kill, as well as how I can help my Soldiers prepare for and make sense of killing in war.
C.J. Douglas: I read this book with my company leadership— officers and SNCOs [senior non-commissioned officers]— prior to deploying to Iraq each time. It served as a discussion primer for the company to talk about the human factors in combat.
So please guide me to the critical comment.
What is sad is that they need to work off Grossman as a base. There should be something better available for use.
Not all of the writing is about guys who have problems. Most maybe because problems are inherently more dramatic than people who are well adjusted. But not all. Bob Greene wrote a very good book called "Duty" (I think). It was about his father and also about Paul Tibbets whom Greene got to know very well. IIRC Tibbets had no guilt, was proud of his unit and its accomplishment and knew that dropping the bomb ended the war sooner thereby saving many.
Yes but... I'll bet the book 'Black Hearts: One platoon's descent into madness in Iraq's triangle of death' will sell more copies than that book about normal, well adjusted soldiers (read boring) as opposed to a bunch of head-jobs.
davidbfpo
02-12-2012, 01:52 PM
This headline nearly put me off even reading this BBC report, it has some "gems":
Prof Jones said a study undertaken in January and February 2010, found that around 70% of troops reported high levels of unit cohesion, and this was associated with having better mental health.
The report also found that the increased risks encountered in forward operating bases and patrol bases in Afghanistan were off-set by morale and esprit de corps. Yet, psychological problems and severe stress are not unavoidable, especially for those who have been on multiple tours to the region.
The charity Combat Stress say that rates of post traumatic stress disorder in personnel who served in Iraq and Afghanistan are around 4%.
The King's College London study says this increases to 7% for UK frontline troops in Afghanistan. US forces experience higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder - 13% - due to longer tours of duty, and the use of reservists of a younger age.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-16973421
You see here we go in the direction of Grossman in the thinking that killing is somehow 'bad' and will inevitably lead to feelings of guilt and grief. .
Not so. Combat killing in war is not murder, it is not a homicide, it is a justifiable killing. (I'm not talking atrocities here).
Agreed. Perhaps Marlantes is mixing up what would be normal from a civilian peacetime standpoint and what would work in that situation, with what is in the best intests of the man in wartime and what would work in the that situation. The object of "what would work" is to help the man function normally in the months and years to come. Since the situations are so different, what would work would be different too.
Marlantes suggestion should be born in mind though, for if it proved useful to him, it may be proved useful to others. Another tool to be used if needed so to speak.
He claims to have has visions of the face of an NVA who threw a grenade at him and who he mat or may not have killed..
The father of a freind was a 20mm Oerlikon gunner on a ship in the Pacific in WWII. A natural born gunner like the man said in Twelvo O'Clock High. They were under Japanese air attack and Japanese plane flew by his gun very very close heading for a nearby ship. My freind's father swung the gun to kill the pilot, did so and splashed the plane immediately. The plane was close enought to see the pilot clearly and he always felt bad about what he did, not about splashing the plane, but about aiming for the pilot instead of the engine. It didn't matter that the quickest and surest way to down the plane was to get the pilot. He still felt bad.
So I believe that Marlantes sees that and maybe his way of looking at the thing would have helped that one particular Oerlikon gunner, then or later on.
So please guide me to the critical comment..
I didn't read the Company Commander comment. The first 4 comments to the Best Defense blog post itself tear Grossman apart. Sorry for the confused wording on my part.
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/24/what_do_army_junior_officers_actually_recommend_re ading_their_own_top_10
Yes but... I'll bet the book 'Black Hearts: One platoon's descent into madness in Iraq's triangle of death' will sell more copies than that book about normal, well adjusted soldiers (read boring) as opposed to a bunch of head-jobs.
True, Black Hearts may sell more. But a good thing to take from that as far as junior leaders reading it may be that they will learn more per page from a narritive of failures.
If you ever get a chance to read Duty, I would be interested in what you think. It is more about a son relating to his dead father though.
tequila
02-12-2012, 07:53 PM
Yes but... I'll bet the book 'Black Hearts: One platoon's descent into madness in Iraq's triangle of death' will sell more copies than that book about normal, well adjusted soldiers (read boring) as opposed to a bunch of head-jobs.
Have you read Black Hearts? I'm pretty sure the reason why it's a favorite among young officers is because it is a remarkably sharp picture of how massive leadership failures at the battalion and company level, combined with lack of forces (reflecting a much broader leadership failure), led to an almost intolerable strain on the platoon in question. That strain led directly to the lack of supervision which allowed some soldiers to commit the atrocities they did. It's one of the best books about the dynamics of one platoon throughout the entirety of their tour to come out of the Iraq war. It's a good read for platoon and company leaders, and an even better one for NCOs.
It's clear from reading the book that most of the platoon are not "head jobs" - Green, the ringleader, who is a clear "head job" and regarded as such by most of the platoon, is not the focus of the book.
Agreed. Perhaps Marlantes is mixing up what would be normal from a civilian peacetime standpoint and what would work in that situation, with what is in the best intests of the man in wartime and what would work in the that situation. The object of "what would work" is to help the man function normally in the months and years to come. Since the situations are so different, what would work would be different too.
Marlantes suggestion should be born in mind though, for if it proved useful to him, it may be proved useful to others. Another tool to be used if needed so to speak.
Yes, Marlantes obviously had to work through some stuff. Initially when he told of the incident of the NVA and the grenade he said he could not be sure whether he or hi radio op killed him. In the Chapter 'Guilt' he talks of the NVA he had killed... no longer any doubt it seems.
The issue here as I see it is when the officers have a tenuous grip on reality what chance do the troopies have? Marlantes speaks of being the second oldest in the company at 22. The oldest being the company commander at 23. This asks big questions of the USMC of that era as to where were all the NCOs who are the backbone of the Corps?
There are of course many other questions that are raised... but I don't wish to digress.
How Marlantes finally pulled himself together is less of an issue than how one so 'fragile' found himself in a position of command in combat in the first place. Then again we have his company commander was all of 23 and could hardly be expected to guide and council a young platoon commander during his introduction to combat... and of course where were the old/experienced NCOs when you needed them?
Have you read Black Hearts? I'm pretty sure the reason why it's a favorite among young officers is because it is a remarkably sharp picture of how massive leadership failures at the battalion and company level, combined with lack of forces (reflecting a much broader leadership failure), led to an almost intolerable strain on the platoon in question. That strain led directly to the lack of supervision which allowed some soldiers to commit the atrocities they did. It's one of the best books about the dynamics of one platoon throughout the entirety of their tour to come out of the Iraq war. It's a good read for platoon and company leaders, and an even better one for NCOs.
It's clear from reading the book that most of the platoon are not "head jobs" - Green, the ringleader, who is a clear "head job" and regarded as such by most of the platoon, is not the focus of the book.
Read my comment again.
The father of a freind was a 20mm Oerlikon gunner on a ship in the Pacific in WWII. A natural born gunner like the man said in Twelvo O'Clock High. They were under Japanese air attack and Japanese plane flew by his gun very very close heading for a nearby ship. My freind's father swung the gun to kill the pilot, did so and splashed the plane immediately. The plane was close enought to see the pilot clearly and he always felt bad about what he did, not about splashing the plane, but about aiming for the pilot instead of the engine. It didn't matter that the quickest and surest way to down the plane was to get the pilot. He still felt bad.
So I believe that Marlantes sees that and maybe his way of looking at the thing would have helped that one particular Oerlikon gunner, then or later on.
OK, what Marlantes said was:
"The ideal response to killing in war should be one similar to a mercy killing, sadness mingled with respect."
How do you teach this? Where does the 'mercy killing' angle come from? When the enemy gives you a hard time killing them it is nowhere near a 'mercy killing' which insinuates you assisting a helpless person on their way. If they have given a good account of themselves then some grudging respect would follow.
tequila
02-14-2012, 08:05 PM
Read my comment again.
You appear to be characterizing the book as being about a bunch of nutjobs who raped and murdered an Iraqi girl. The book is not really about that at all, which is why it is one of the more popular books among junior officers (or at least those who read Company Command).
As a fellow Marine, I'm going to step up and defend Marlantes a little bit. Haven't read the second book, but have listened to a few interviews that he has given, so have heard some biographical information that you might not have. I'm not sure where you get the idea that Marlantes was a head case or an ineffective officer, but he did win the Navy Cross and numerous other medals in Vietnam. They don't give that first one out for just checking the box - his citation is here (http://militarytimes.com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php?recipientid=4191)for those interested.
He also emerged from the rock 'n' roll Sixties with a Yale degree and became a Rhodes Scholar post-Vietnam, so maybe he didn't quite disintegrate to the extent you appear to be picturing? He did say that he never had any PTSD-type symptoms until after decades as a successful energy consultant in Asia.
JMA:
When he used the term mercy killing, I didn't think of people, I thought of animals. You put down a horse or a dog when you have to. Maybe Marlantes meant people but what I got was animals and I think that viewpoint would be more helpful to some, not all.
You can't teach it and I don't think it may be all that relevant but if an occasional individual was troubled by something, a suggestion that he think of it that way may be of help.
Very young officers and NCOs was perhaps the best that could be done in Vietnam. As the war progressed the NCOs got younger and younger because IIRC all the older guys who started out weren't available anymore, many because they didn't want to face the prospect of deployment after deployment. Maybe the same thing with the officers. We had a lot of people over there for years. That added to the inequities of the draft system and there just wasn't that much to choose from.
Marlantes was young but he was a very effective combat officer. The choice wasn't really between a Marlantes and somebody better; at that time it was between a Marlantes and a Calley.
You appear to be characterizing the book as being about a bunch of nutjobs who raped and murdered an Iraqi girl. The book is not really about that at all, which is why it is one of the more popular books among junior officers (or at least those who read Company Command).
What I said was:
Yes but... I'll bet the book 'Black Hearts: One platoon's descent into madness in Iraq's triangle of death' will sell more copies than that book about normal, well adjusted soldiers (read boring) as opposed to a bunch of head-jobs.
No I have not read the book... but on the publicity in the media those involved in the rape and murders were indeed head-jobs. I mean does a sane person commit rape and murder? The death penalty should be obligatory in such cases.
Back to my point... my position is simply that books dealing with such horrific crimes will (sadly) attract more readers than one about the non headline grabbing exploits of an officer who led his troops carefully and courageously through some operational tour.
As a fellow Marine, I'm going to step up and defend Marlantes a little bit.
He needs no defence. He has chosen to go public with his thoughts on this (and other) matters. What he writes can this be debated without fear or favour.
My point relating to my joy at reading this book by Marlantes is that he has been there and done that (Navy Cross, Bronze Star and more). This makes what he writes more credible than Grossman, Beevor, Holmes, Bourke etc who appear not to have experienced combat.
That said it does not mean that what he says in incontestable or that his bravery awards should he held up to somehow excuse his self admitted 'issues'. Not so.
jmm99
02-14-2012, 10:05 PM
Yes.
Regards
Mike
JMA:
When he used the term mercy killing, I didn't think of people, I thought of animals. You put down a horse or a dog when you have to. Maybe Marlantes meant people but what I got was animals and I think that viewpoint would be more helpful to some, not all.
Yes he spoke of two incidents. One where he saved an injured seagull from dogs then rung its neck and having to have his dog put down.
Let me repeat what I said earlier:
At the end of the chapter he sums it up like this:
We cannot expect normal eighteen year olds to kill someone and contain it in a healthy way. They must be helped to sort out what will be healthy grief about taking a life because it is part of the sorrow of war.
You see here we go in the direction of Grossman in the thinking that killing is somehow 'bad' and will inevitably lead to feelings of guilt and grief.
Not so. Combat killing in war is not murder, it is not a homicide, it is a justifiable killing. (I'm not talking atrocities here)
Very young officers and NCOs was perhaps the best that could be done in Vietnam. As the war progressed the NCOs got younger and younger because IIRC all the older guys who started out weren't available anymore, many because they didn't want to face the prospect of deployment after deployment. Maybe the same thing with the officers. We had a lot of people over there for years. That added to the inequities of the draft system and there just wasn't that much to choose from.
I seems to have turned into a Henry Ford type production line by the end.
Talking about the older NCOs I noted that where they had been in the service before the war (meaning they joined up in peacetime for peacetime) tended to fall out early (meaning leave the service or find less onerous posts from where to see out the war). The younger ones who joined up during the war (or for the war) seemed to last a lot better. Similar back then for the US maybe?
Marlantes was young but he was a very effective combat officer. The choice wasn't really between a Marlantes and somebody better; at that time it was between a Marlantes and a Calley.
Help me understand it. He did a year (?) tour of which how long was he a platoon commander? Raw soldiers and officers often do well but there is no substitute for experience.
I don't follow the link with Calley.
Yes.
Regards
Mike
Don't agree
Ken White
02-14-2012, 10:56 PM
JMA:
This asks big questions of the USMC of that era as to where were all the NCOs who are the backbone of the Corps?
Carl:
Very young officers and NCOs was perhaps the best that could be done in Vietnam. As the war progressed the NCOs got younger and younger because IIRC all the older guys who started out weren't available anymore, many because they didn't want to face the prospect of deployment after deployment. Maybe the same thing with the officers. We had a lot of people over there for years. That added to the inequities of the draft system and there just wasn't that much to choose from.
JMA:
Talking about the older NCOs I noted that where they had been in the service before the war (meaning they joined up in peacetime for peacetime) tended to fall out early (meaning leave the service or find less onerous posts from where to see out the war). The younger ones who joined up during the war (or for the war) seemed to last a lot better. Similar back then for the US maybe?
Those who served in WW II -- most of the senior NCOs in the Marines and the Army -- hit 20 years service and retirement eligibility in 1962. Some retired but most continued to serve, headed for 30 years. When the US committed to Viet Nam in large numbers, the relatively smaller pre-Viet Nam services had NCOs scattered around the world in jobs that ranged from non-essential to essential. The units that deployed to Viet Nam in 1965-66 took a slew of experienced senior NCOs and most did fairly well. Those NCOs finished their tours in 1966-67 and returned to CONUS. The 'second string' of NCOs culled from around the World went to VN in 1966-67 and they did less well but at least they were there. By 1968-69, it was time for the 'third string' -- except there was none. The stopgap was to send graduates of the Non-Commissioned Officers Candidate course as SGTs to VN plus some returning senior NCOs from the 1965-66 era and a second tour. Good kids, do anything you asked but they didn't know much...
In the meantime, the world wide commitments did not go away; they were culled and cut but there were still plenty of requirements. In 1969 I volunteered to go to VN for a third tour but they called me and said as I had two tours, I would instead go fill a shortfall at either SHAPE or in the MAAG in Iran, my choice -- but VN was out for me. What had also happened was the folks who had completed a second tour decided to depart as had some after a single tour. Most of the WW II folks had over 25 years by 1967 and decided that WWI, Korea and A VN tour were enough. Those of us who'd been in Korea but not WW II couldn't have retired if we wanted to but we were sent to fiull those other requirements so that folks who had been in those slots could get a tour in the SEA War Games.
It all boils down to numbers -- demand exceeded supply due to casualties and retirements and the Army and Marines were directed to not hold anyone over involuntarily to avoid upsetting Voters. Lyndon didn't want to do that. In 2004, Bush did it regardless...
jmm99
02-14-2012, 11:31 PM
from you
The comments section in the Best Defense junior officer preferred reads list cited by JMA tore Grossman apart.
Buried in that comments section, is a link to Tom Aveni's critique of certain Grossman statements, The Dave Grossman Debate (http://www.theppsc.org/Grossman/Main-R.htm). Aveni is part of a larger LEO webpage, The Police Policy Council (http://www.theppsc.org/), which deals with the practical side (as well as the legal side) of LE use of deadly force - and of the various switches that flip or are flipped.
Aveni's work is well known in Michigan because of The MMRMA Deadly Force Project: A Critical Analysis of Police Shootings Under Ambiguous Circumstances (http://www.theppsc.org/Research/V3.MMRMA_Deadly_Force_Project.pdf) (Thomas J. Aveni, MSFP; The Police Policy Studies Counci; February 9, 2008).
I discussed that report and its findings in the HVT thread, Back to the "Standard of Proof" .... (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=121334&postcount=43).
Regards
Mike
You see here we go in the direction of Grossman in the thinking that killing is somehow 'bad' and will inevitably lead to feelings of guilt and grief.
Not so. Combat killing in war is not murder, it is not a homicide, it is a justifiable killing. (I'm not talking atrocities here)
I agree.
Talking about the older NCOs I noted that where they had been in the service before the war (meaning they joined up in peacetime for peacetime) tended to fall out early (meaning leave the service or find less onerous posts from where to see out the war). The younger ones who joined up during the war (or for the war) seemed to last a lot better. Similar back then for the US maybe?
Professor White is the man to ask. I only know what I read. Now if you want to know how to give soccer moms speeding tickets without them getting mad at you, I'm the guy to ask.
Help me understand it. He did a year (?) tour of which how long was he a platoon commander? Raw soldiers and officers often do well but there is no substitute for experience.
Again, refer to Prof. White. But from what I've read, that was a common pattern, at least with the Army. Six months with troops and then six months in some kind of staff position. Madness.
I don't follow the link with Calley.
I understood you to say that Marlantes had some weaknesses from your point of view. When I mentioned Calley, it was along the same lines as when Ken said demand exceeded supply. The choice we had wasn't between Marlantes and an officer who wouldn't have had the weaknesses you perceived. It was between him and a horror of an officer like Calley.
Mike: I read Aveni's critique of Grossman that was buried in the comments. Very good and I got to bed later than usual that night.
Thank you for providing the link to that MMRMA report. I will read it. That kind of thing still fascinates me.
I understood you to say that Marlantes had some weaknesses from your point of view. When I mentioned Calley, it was along the same lines as when Ken said demand exceeded supply. The choice we had wasn't between Marlantes and an officer who wouldn't have had the weaknesses you perceived. It was between him and a horror of an officer like Calley.
Marlantes' problems (thankfully for his troops) seemed to manifest themselves after his service in Vietnam. The fact that (by his own admission) he became barely functional for a period indicates that problem (rather than a weakness). So then by all accounts Marlantes' service in Vietnam was good.
So it all comes back to selection then. My point is that one needs to set minimum levels for intellectual capability (SAT, ACT) and physical ability and spend most of the time the leadership and performance under stress tests ... with the odd psych test thrown in.
The first prize is that nobody falls apart either during or after combat service.
Second prize is that the officer can hold himself and his men together during that combat service and face what the future brings thereafter.
An absolute no-no is for an officer himself to fall apart during a combat tour or prove to be unable to provide the necessary leadership to help his men keep it together when under the stress of combat. Officer selection should attempt to screen for this.
Where this selection and screening fails and the officer fails to perform in combat (and on operations in general) he should be relieved immediately.
Fuchs
02-15-2012, 01:27 PM
An absolute no-no is for an officer himself to fall apart during a combat tour or prove to be unable to provide the necessary leadership to help his men keep it together when under the stress of combat. Officer selection should attempt to screen for this.
JMA, by your measure the Wehrmacht was a terrible military force.
Its officers were falling apart quite often, turned into walking dead, many became alcoholics (especially in rear or flying units).
They did send their officers into vacation, into especially healthy and relaxing Kurorte", sent them away from combat on staff or training assignments and so on or simply insisted that they recovered fully after injuries, requiring weeks of recovery from combat.
JMA, by your measure the Wehrmacht was a terrible military force.
Its officers were falling apart quite often, turned into walking dead, many became alcoholics (especially in rear or flying units).
They did send their officers into vacation, into especially healthy and relaxing Kurorte", sent them away from combat on staff or training assignments and so on or simply insisted that they recovered fully after injuries, requiring weeks of recovery from combat.
Methinks you misunderstand me.
An officer falling apart in combat is the worst case scenario. Panic spreads faster than lightning (I'm told). Therefore all efforts must be made to prevent that happening. When it happens, and it will, act quickly to remove and replace he person.
Two problems. In peacetime there is less importance attached to careful officer selection (based on the martial requirements of soldiering) so those with gregarious sociability (but often little backbone) seem to slip through the selection net. As the war progresses the standard of candidates for officer selection starts to drop and the demand for 'numbers' allows weaker candidates to slip through.
While this is happening with the officers the NCOs are having their own problems (read recent post by Ken White on the matter). So at the end of the day you hope and pray your enemy are having greater problems than you are in this regard... because in the end it is the least incompetent military that wins the fighting war (of course the politicians are bound to screw that up as well).
Rotations are a good thing if they can be maintained (which as the war drags on they probably can't). The system which I agreed with was based on three years as a platoon/troop commander and thereafter 18 months/two years per posting.
The 'route' followed by an officer would be determined by his performance and not some egalitarian ticket punching requirement. That's as I see it.
Fuchs
02-15-2012, 05:21 PM
The system which I agreed with was based on three years as a platoon/troop commander and thereafter 18 months/two years per posting.
Let's assume a small platoon of 20 and 100% officer retention for 30 years. Plus: The entire army is made up of platoons and all-officers staffs, nothing else.
5% of the platoon force would be officers, and 100% of the rest.
With officers serving 1/10th of their career as Plt Ldr, this would mean that there are 9 times as many officers outside of the platoons than inside.
It would be a 2/3 platoon 1/3 staff force with a ratio of enlisted/NCO : officer of 19:10.
Reduce officer retention and the qty of needed Plts would rise, increase platoon size and the army size needed to train enough officers as preparation for worse times would rise. Add non-officers to staffs and staffs would be even more bloated.
Additional layers of command can for the sake of simple math be considered represented by the staff pool.
3 years Plt command for every officer is simply unacceptable. Feel free to calculate it with variables of your choice; you end up with the conclusion that there are simply not enough platoons.
It might be debatable to send a 2nd Lt to a Coy, then promote him to 1st Lt once accustomed with the Coy's mode of operation and assign him to a Plt command for a year. The feel free to extend this for the best 1st Lts - not as an arrested career, but as a distinction and preparation for higher commands.
3 years for all is too much.
Ken White
02-15-2012, 05:57 PM
It is also possible to have NCO Platoon Leaders, thus capitalizing on experience and placing the most capable leader where he -- or she -- can be most effective. A Company commanded by a Major with a Captain Executive Officer / 2iC plus two Lieutenants as Company Officers with no permanent Platoon Assignments would be a far better approach.
The current process (and in the US, certain procedural efforts and requirements) produces too many Lieutenants. That is beneficial in producing a large pool of potential Company Commanders but it is costly way to achieve that minor advantage when better selection and initial entry training would negate that cost and the presumed advantage. When the 'requirement' to keep those excess Officers around for various reasons is considered, it is obvious that a 'requirement' for an excessive number of overly large Staff positions is a natural by product. A study to determine the number of excellent Officers driven out of the Armed Forces by this approach might be instructive.
The Lieutenants would be assigned all the myriad peacetime additional duties and for operations, to missions as needed. This would among other things accustom them to NOT working only with people they 'know' (no matter how cursorily or briefly) but with a changing number of persons, tasks and capabilities. It would build in a requirement for and training in flexibility and trust.
A beneficial side effect would almost certainly be insistence by all four of those officers and all their contemporaries that training be improved... ;)
ganulv
02-15-2012, 06:48 PM
We cannot expect normal eighteen year olds to kill someone and contain it in a healthy way. They must be helped to sort out what will be healthy grief about taking a life because it is part of the sorrow of war.
You see here we go in the direction of Grossman in the thinking that killing is somehow 'bad' and will inevitably lead to feelings of guilt and grief.
Not so. Combat killing in war is not murder, it is not a homicide, it is a justifiable killing. (I'm not talking atrocities here)
<Homicide> is a values-free descriptive term (homo- ‘human being’ + -cide ‘killing’) in most formal usages. I would assert that using the term in that way makes getting at the relevant factors much easier. Are (some) killers bothered because killing is inherently bad? Or because it has been drummed into their heads since birth that killing is inherently bad? What if someone is bothered because they were not bothered by ending a human life as they had been told their entire life that they would/should be?
It might be interesting to compare and contrast how soldiers deal with the job of killing with how medics deal with the job of preventing death.* For example, a reverse triage situation presents a particularly difficult combination of acts of omission and commission.
*As an aside, many career park rangers have come upon multiple mangled corpses and have unsuccessfully administered CPR multiple times over the courses of their careers. Killologists should really talk to them at length about these sorts of things.
davidbfpo
02-16-2012, 11:36 AM
Following Ganulv's question above I have started a new thread 'How LE & others deal with the job of killing and death':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15164
Two posts in response have been moved to the new thread.
Let's assume a small platoon of 20 and 100% officer retention for 30 years. Plus: The entire army is made up of platoons and all-officers staffs, nothing else.
5% of the platoon force would be officers, and 100% of the rest.
With officers serving 1/10th of their career as Plt Ldr, this would mean that there are 9 times as many officers outside of the platoons than inside.
It would be a 2/3 platoon 1/3 staff force with a ratio of enlisted/NCO : officer of 19:10.
Reduce officer retention and the qty of needed Plts would rise, increase platoon size and the army size needed to train enough officers as preparation for worse times would rise. Add non-officers to staffs and staffs would be even more bloated.
Additional layers of command can for the sake of simple math be considered represented by the staff pool.
3 years Plt command for every officer is simply unacceptable. Feel free to calculate it with variables of your choice; you end up with the conclusion that there are simply not enough platoons.
It might be debatable to send a 2nd Lt to a Coy, then promote him to 1st Lt once accustomed with the Coy's mode of operation and assign him to a Plt command for a year. The feel free to extend this for the best 1st Lts - not as an arrested career, but as a distinction and preparation for higher commands.
3 years for all is too much.
Sorry, don't follow your reasoning.
First I speak only of the infantry here (as high command usually falls to those from the infantry or armour with rare exceptions of course).
Getting to major is usually by time served. In my system it was normally nine years from commissioning to major (making it ten years with one year officer training included).
So we start with three years as a platoon commander, followed by two years (during which the Lt to Captain promotion exams must be completed). This could be as a support platoon commander, Bn Intelligence Officer, Regimental Signals Officer, or at some training establishment.
That brings you to acting-captain. Then follows four years to major in two two year stints. Probably one as a staff officer and one as a company 2IC (or possibly one in training) and during which the 'Company Commanders' course (or later termed the Combat Team Commanders course) would have to be completed. Then the best get command of a company in their parent regiment (don't think the US use this in the manner of the Brits?). The also rans may get posted to other regiments/battalions where there are vacancies and some may not get given command of an infantry company at all.
So some basic math.
12 rifle platoons = 12 subalterns. A rotation of four per year. By a simple projection 5 of the eight would likely return to command a company. The other three might have left the military, died, fired/court marshalled, failed their promotion exams, not deemed suitable to command a company or given command of a company where there is a vacancy.
So of the company commanders only one out of five would go on to command the battalion. Of the others some will have left the service, some fired, died, failed staff course, not deemed the best of the 'vintage' available to be given the command (and get streamed into staff forever).
And so on.
You follow my drift?
It is also possible to have NCO Platoon Leaders, thus capitalizing on experience and placing the most capable leader where he -- or she -- can be most effective.
It seems obvious that you commission them rather than mix say warrant officers with officers. One would need to look at their future utilisation after say a maximum of three years as a platoon commander. Training? Admin? Logistics? How many would make it to company commander?
I suggest if one worked the numbers carefully one would be able to calculate the minimum number of (direct entry) officers needed to fill the posts required above the rank of major... because IMHO they have had served their 'apprenticeship' as a platoon commander (preferably in a war).
A company commanded by a Major with a Captain Executive Officer / 2iC plus two Lieutenants as Company Officers with no permanent Platoon Assignments would be a far better approach.
This US business of having a captain command a company with less training/experience/whatever than a major seems strange when compared to the Brit (and probably others systems).
I don't think floating officers serve any real purpose nor does the time so served provide any real experience.
The platoon commanding phase must IMHO mean living with, fighting with and if necessary dying with the platoon. That is the required 'apprenticeship'.
The current process (and in the US, certain procedural efforts and requirements) produces too many Lieutenants.
Easy to fix. Make the selection more arduous.
That is beneficial in producing a large pool of potential Company Commanders but it is costly way to achieve that minor advantage when better selection and initial entry training would negate that cost and the presumed advantage.
Exactly!
When the 'requirement' to keep those excess Officers around for various reasons is considered, it is obvious that a 'requirement' for an excessive number of overly large Staff positions is a natural by product. A study to determine the number of excellent Officers driven out of the Armed Forces by this approach might be instructive.
Excellent officers would be driven out if their careers are being blacked by 'dead wood' blocking their route to command companies, battalions etc for a reasonable length of time (two years). There are also other reason why the retention of officers suffers and those are mainly not service related - wife pressure, chasing higher income etc - and the hidden one which none will admit being not wanting to be exposed to combat again (among those who had a bite of the cherry in Iraq or Afghanistan and found it sour to their taste).
The Lieutenants would be assigned all the myriad peacetime additional duties and for operations, to missions as needed. This would among other things accustom them to NOT working only with people they 'know' (no matter how cursorily or briefly) but with a changing number of persons, tasks and capabilities. It would build in a requirement for and training in flexibility and trust.
Ditch the surplus... don't accommodate them. *
A beneficial side effect would almost certainly be insistence by all four of those officers and all their contemporaries that training be improved... ;)
Training for whom?
* In earlier posts I stated and still believe that young men who have given the best years of their life to the service should be able to exit it with dignity if the service no longer requires there service. This would entail funded study etc etc.
Following Ganulv's question above I have started a new thread 'How LE & others deal with the job of killing and death':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15164
Two posts in response have been moved to the new thread.
Good move.
I suggest that some of the current discussion around here may better belong in the 'Initial Officer Selection' thread.
This headline nearly put me off even reading this BBC report, it has some "gems":
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-16973421
Its that leadership thing again.
The Rand Study:Steeling the Mind (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG191.pdf) also highlights the importance of the role of thinking, caring leaders.
No amount of management can replace an ounce of real, from the heart, leadership.
Ken White
02-16-2012, 08:48 PM
It seems obvious that you commission them rather than mix say warrant officers with officers.Why? they're thoroughly mixed currently...
One would need to look at their future utilisation after say a maximum of three years as a platoon commander. Training? Admin? Logistics? How many would make it to company commander?Nominally about 50%. Far better than the current 80% +.
...because IMHO they have had served their 'apprenticeship' as a platoon commander (preferably in a war).I'm not at all convinced that being a Platoon Commander is necessary or even all that beneficial. Does it work? Surely. Is it the current norm? Mostly (a very few slip through with little or no Platoon Leader time). The US norm is more nearly one year than three and I believe three would not be acceptable in the US for a number of reasons though I acknowledge it might work elsewhere.
This US business of having a captain command a company with less training/experience/whatever than a major seems strange when compared to the Brit (and probably others systems).It worked well when we had people being promoted to Captain only after ten or more or more years service. Fairly well when that dropped to six or so years. It doesn't do as well with the Viet Nam and current abbreviated time of two to three years or thereabouts.
I don't think floating officers serve any real purpose nor does the time so served provide any real experience.That depends entirely on how they are employed. I've seen it work well when units in combat were seriously short of LTs. That being short of them is also a concern in major high intensity conflict. Better to inculcate good practices then to have to do it ad-hoc.
The platoon commanding phase must IMHO mean living with, fighting with and if necessary dying with the platoon. That is the required 'apprenticeship'.Sounds good but I disagree. It is one method, it worked for you -- has worked for many -- however, I'm unsure what Officer skill it imparts other than a slightly more all encompassing knowledge of how the Troops live and play. It's been my observation that only a few of them take that knowledge beyond Major, even fewer past LT Colonel and only a rare few past Colonel. That, in theory, is (in US usage and with which I disagree) why there are Sergeants Major, to remind those senior souls how the Enlisted Swine believe and feel... :wry:
Easy to fix. Make the selection more arduous.Agree that is the fix; disagree that it is easy. Politicians can take umbrage at the slightest hint of 'unfairness' as they see it. In this politically correct era, worldwide, the slightest hint of the arduousity being 'discriminatory' would kill it.
Excellent officers would be driven out if their careers are being blacked by 'dead wood' blocking their route to command companies, battalions etc for a reasonable length of time (two years). There are also other reason why the retention of officers suffers and those are mainly not service related - wife pressure, chasing higher income etc - and the hidden one which none will admit being not wanting to be exposed to combat again (among those who had a bite of the cherry in Iraq or Afghanistan and found it sour to their taste).All true, always a problem...
Ditch the surplus... don't accommodate them. *You and I are in agreement. Unfortunately, the senior leadership of the US Army doesn't agree with us.
Training for whom?Everyone. Our (US) 'training' succumbs to cost accountants, psychologists who are concerned with extraneous foolishness in some cases and political correctness. It will not be improved unless there is a grassroots swell of large amplitude or an existential war occurs.
* In earlier posts I stated and still believe that young men who have given the best years of their life to the service should be able to exit it with dignity if the service no longer requires there service. This would entail funded study etc etc.Agree.
Ignoring the areas of agreement.
Why? they're thoroughly mixed currently...Nominally about 50%. Far better than the current 80% +.
Because that's the way it is now means that the right way?
Ever thought why some pilots are officers and other are warrant officers? It makes sense to you?
I'm not at all convinced that being a Platoon Commander is necessary or even all that beneficial.
Thanks like saying a sergeant doesn't need to have served as a troopie.
I'm totally flabbergasted at this comment of yours, to the extent, that being so far apart there is no point in proceeding with the discussion on this point.
It worked well when we had people being promoted to Captain only after ten or more or more years service. Fairly well when that dropped to six or so years. It doesn't do as well with the Viet Nam and current abbreviated time of two to three years or thereabouts.
It is how it is now that matters... and it is sub optimal now. It needs to be addressed.
But can it be addressed? Probably not as with West Point taking four years there is probably a demand by those graduates to make major after six years of commissioned service. The solution lies in questioning why West Point needs four years... because that four-year time at 'school' leads to a serious drop in experience and command competence at company commander level across the military as the demand for rapid advancement leads to competence and experience being sacrificed.
That depends entirely on how they are employed. I've seen it work well when units in combat were seriously short of LTs.
That is not the situation at the moment though is it?
That being short of them is also a concern in major high intensity conflict. Better to inculcate good practices then to have to do it ad-hoc.
I can see no point in pushing officers up the line so fast that they gain no practical experience along the way. Look at the career development of a civil engineer. Where does he start and how does he advance - the engineer/foreman/worker structure is similar to the military.
Sounds good but I disagree. It is one method, it worked for you -- has worked for many -- however, I'm unsure what Officer skill it imparts other than a slightly more all encompassing knowledge of how the Troops live and play. It's been my observation that only a few of them take that knowledge beyond Major, even fewer past LT Colonel and only a rare few past Colonel.
That's not my understanding. Perhaps here is an area for study. To see what value general staff place in their time and experienced gained at platoon commander level (with a comparison, say, between the Brits and the yanks).
That, in theory, is (in US usage and with which I disagree) why there are Sergeants Major, to remind those senior souls how the Enlisted Swine believe and feel... :wry:
Beyond battalion level that ceases to be that important as it is where the troops are that the finger needs to be kept on the pulse.
Agree that is the fix; disagree that it is easy. Politicians can take umbrage at the slightest hint of 'unfairness' as they see it. In this politically correct era, worldwide, the slightest hint of the arduousity being 'discriminatory' would kill it.
Ok so we accept the system is 'broken' but can't be fixed. Live with it maybe but know that it reduces the efficiency of the military.
All true, always a problem...You and I are in agreement. Unfortunately, the senior leadership of the US Army doesn't agree with us.Everyone. Our (US) 'training' succumbs to cost accountants, psychologists who are concerned with extraneous foolishness in some cases and political correctness. It will not be improved unless there is a grassroots swell of large amplitude or an existential war occurs.Agree.
Ok then never present to anyone (especially oneself) that any other way is acceptable and know that the effect of this is a disincentive for capable people to join in the first place or maybe why capable people don't stay in the service.
What if someone is bothered because they were not bothered by ending a human life as they had been told their entire life that they would/should be?
Well there are (without doubt) quite a number of us out there who are not bothered. Yes, have thought about it... but on reflection am satisfied that the opinion of those who have never been in combat about how those of us who have should feel isn't worth a bucket of spit.
From John Keegan's book 'Face of Battle':
'Of course, killing people never bothered me,' I remember a grey haired infantry officer saying to me, by way of explaining how he had three times won the Military Cross in the Second World War. In black and white it looks a horrifying remark; but to the ear his tone implied, as it was meant to imply, not merely that the act of killing people might legitimately be expected to upset others but that it ought also to have upset him; that, through his failure to suffer immediate shock or lasting trauma, he was forced to recognised some deficiency in his own character or, if not that, then, regrettably, in human nature itself. Both were topics he was prepared to pursue, as we did then and many times afterwards.
If you work on even the most sane, well adjusted person long enough and hard enough then they may develop self doubts. What is in fact happening now is that prior to experiencing combat young soldiers are be 'conditioned' that they will develop significant psychological issues as a result not only of experiencing combat but from just thinking about being exposed to combat. So tell me who is the sick one in all this?
ganulv
02-17-2012, 05:07 PM
Well there are (without doubt) quite a number of us out there who are not bothered. Yes, have thought about it... but on reflection am satisfied that the opinion of those who have never been in combat about how those of us who have should feel isn't worth a bucket of spit.
I know a fellow who had 90+ confirmed kills in Vietnam and told me he likely killed that many more. I won’t speak for him as to whether that fact ‘bothered’ him but he doesn’t hide the fact that it had everything to do with his later career as an RN. I also know a former state Supreme Court justice who helped send more than one 17–year–old boy to the gas chamber. I never associated with the old man outside of a work setting but my impression of him was that those decisions hadn‘t bothered him in the least over the years since he made them. I doubt either of them care very much at all of how I feel about them, but FWIW I’ve never spent a moment with the former that I didn’t thoroughly enjoy and I’ve never been slow to get out of the same room as the latter.
Ken White
02-17-2012, 05:49 PM
Because that's the way it is now means that the right way?Nope -- but your suggestion just continues what we are now doing. :D
It works, so will many other methods...
Ever thought why some pilots are officers and other are warrant officers? It makes sense to you?Yep, it makes sense in that Aviation unit commanders should be officers, mostly but not all. I prefer NCO to the Warrant Officer usage so I'd say most Pilots should be NCOs and not Officers. Most everyone fell into Officers as pilots way back when due to the education variance. Those days are gone. As I've reminded you before, we used to ride to work on Elephants -- we quite and not just because the Parking Lot Attendants got upset... :D
Thanks like saying a sergeant doesn't need to have served as a troopie.Not what I said and you know it -- I said it's not necessary for an Officer to serve as a Platoon Leader, not that he should not command troops on a mission basis and live with them for months at a time. We want to put them in the same environment and for some time, we just would do it slightly differently. Personally, I think all of 'em should serve as Troopies for a bit -- but that's another thread...
I'm totally flabbergasted at this comment of yours, to the extent, that being so far apart there is no point in proceeding with the discussion on this point.Okay :cool:
It is how it is now that matters... and it is sub optimal now. It needs to be addressed...But can it be addressed? Probably not...as at company commander level across the military as the demand for rapid advancement leads to competence and experience being sacrificed...That is not the situation at the moment though is it?Yes, yes, yes, No -- unfortunately.
I can see no point in pushing officers up the line so fast that they gain no practical experience along the way. Look at the career development of a civil engineer. Where does he start and how does he advance - the engineer/foreman/worker structure is similar to the military.We agree on that, we just do not agree on how things should -- and could be -- done.
That's not my understanding. Perhaps here is an area for study. To see what value general staff place in their time and experienced gained at platoon commander level (with a comparison, say, between the Brits and the yanks).I can understand your understanding - and I can agree with it from the standpoint of the Commonwealth Armies. From the standpoint of the US Army, time spent as a platoon leader is currently almost superficial, it is a way station and for many not a particularly enjoyable one (which is an absolute pity and an indictment of the way we do things here...). My comments re: the field Grades is based on the US model. I can't speak to SA or Rhodesia but I have worked with, seen and freely acknowledge the Strynes, Canadians and British do a better job -- that's mostly because they use their NCOs, particularly Sergeants Major (Co and higher...), correctly -- we too often do not.
Beyond battalion level that ceases to be that important as it is where the troops are that the finger needs to be kept on the pulse.In many respects but not totally...
Ok so we accept the system is 'broken' but can't be fixed. Live with it maybe but know that it reduces the efficiency of the military...maybe why capable people don't stay in the service.Sadly correct... :mad:
Yep, it makes sense in that Aviation unit commanders should be officers, mostly but not all. I prefer NCO to the Warrant Officer usage so I'd say most Pilots should be NCOs and not Officers. Most everyone fell into Officers as pilots way back when due to the education variance. Those days are gone. As I've reminded you before, we used to ride to work on Elephants -- we quite and not just because the Parking Lot Attendants got upset... :D
Most armies live with the archaic remnants of a class system as reflected in their rank structure. In many cases it has become so ingrained that it has become accepted by all. The Israelis have made an effort to produce a more egalitarian approach which works for them under their circumstances.
In the British military the significantly reduced numbers of the in-bred upper class no longer find the military and attractive option due to the presence of significant numbers of middle-class 'usurpers' and the requirement to actually spend more time soldiering than on 'hunting, shooting and fishing' (and the pay is not good).
Most armies need to use a flame thrower to clean out their systems and shake off these relics of a past social order.
Not what I said and you know it -- I said it's not necessary for an Officer to serve as a Platoon Leader, not that he should not command troops on a mission basis and live with them for months at a time. We want to put them in the same environment and for some time, we just would do it slightly differently. Personally, I think all of 'em should serve as Troopies for a bit -- but that's another thread...
This butterfly approach that the US military seem to apply to officer postings where they flit from one post to the next without spending enough time in any one to benefit significantly from the experience.
On a 'mission basis'? How would that work? What period are we talking about here? Why this sub-optimal solution when the obvious one stares you in the face?
I went the route of first serving in the ranks. First did my conscript training in SA, followed by full recruit training (20 weeks) followed by six months operational, followed by full 12 month officers course (then some years later was myself course officer on a 12 month officers course). I believe I understand the process differences in the training approach.
As stated before elsewhere on SWC time in an officers career is precious. Recruit training teaches one to be a rifleman in an infantry platoon. Recruits re not taught section and platoon level tactics and platoon weapons employment. Officer cadets are and their training in this aspect is totally from the perspective of commanding. That they will during the training take part in section and platoon attacks in probably close to all the possible positions from basic rifleman to platoon commander is essential in the training of young officers. It is for this main reason (as I stated before) that one can not reduce officer training courses by the length of a recruit course where candidates have been through that mill already.
My personal experience (of first doing a recruit course and then serving some operational time) was such that I would make it an essential route to a commission if I were so able. The minimum of a year is well spent in that. Is there a maximum? Probably three years where the entry age was 18.
I can understand your understanding - and I can agree with it from the standpoint of the Commonwealth Armies. From the standpoint of the US Army, time spent as a platoon leader is currently almost superficial, it is a way station and for many not a particularly enjoyable one (which is an absolute pity and an indictment of the way we do things here...). My comments re: the field Grades is based on the US model. I can't speak to SA or Rhodesia but I have worked with, seen and freely acknowledge the Strynes, Canadians and British do a better job -- that's mostly because they use their NCOs, particularly Sergeants Major (Co and higher...), correctly -- we too often do not.
First of all the South African military organisation was a complete shambles. Luckily it never had to deploy in any sizable numbers. Based on National Servicemen (all white males were conscripted for two years) with total reliance on reservists (the Citizen Force and Commandos) as commanded by bureaucratic Permanent Force (no troopies just what they called a 'leader group' most no better than your average civil servant) one can be grateful that the war in SWA/Namibia and in Angola required a relative few competent officers to prosecute. And yes there were the required number of skilled and competent officers and SNCOs to drive the war using reserve and conscript troops. Grateful too that the enemy was low grade local riff-raff with slightly better but very poor quality Cubans. Probably the best out of the South Africans were the artillery who with their G5/G6 guns were magnificent.
Rhodesia worked pretty much according to the British system but had much more flexibility to adapt to the developing war situation as it was unencumbered by suffocating tradition and bureaucratic restraint. There were still many problems some of which were adequately addressed (some not).
Now because the majority of young US officers have a superficial platoon commanding experience that does not mean that this experience (certainly in the war environments recently and currently available) is not without value. If nobody has it then you are in no position to miss it. To agree that it has value would imply that the US officer corps is somehow lacking which is not about to be acknowledged anytime soon.
Ken White
02-18-2012, 05:13 PM
Most armies need to use a flame thrower to clean out their systems and shake off these relics of a past social order.Agree.
This butterfly approach that the US military seem to apply to officer postings where they flit from one post to the next without spending enough time in any one to benefit significantly from the experience.Also agree...
On a 'mission basis'? How would that work?The LTs are given peacetime / garrison duties that let them understand the mechanics of the system; they are given field training or exercise missions in temporary command of elements -- A Squad, section ,Platoon or parts thereof assembled for the specific task at hand. Sometimes a platoon plus MGs and /or a mortar or AT weapons, a mix of vehicles / elements for other than walking Infantry -- all sorts of combination. In training, designed for their training value and to develop flexibility and familiarize both the LT and the Troops to working with different approaches and persons. In combat of course the only focus would be to best accomplish the task at hand.
What period are we talking about here?I tend to agree with your three year spans...
Why this sub-optimal solution when the obvious one stares you in the face?First, because there is NO optimal solution. The issue is to impart knowledge and capability in lieu of experience, so nothing is going to do that too well. Secondly, among all less than optimal solutions IMO the one that develops trust of unknown persons with adequate experience or training level and promotes flexibility in thought and outlook is preferable to one that encourages trust of only the familiar ("I know him so I can trust him...") and which constrains flexibility due to excessive but natural adherence to organizational lines. Pursue those two lines of thought for a bit...
Thirdly, the "obvious" solution is not obvious, it's just the way we've done it for centuries. that does NOT mean its optimal. Nor does the fact that you and many others were well served in the training and learning processes by your particular experience counter the fact that a good many -- perhaps more -- are not so well served by it.
I went the route of first serving in the ranks. First did my conscript training in SA, followed by full recruit training (20 weeks) followed by six months operational, followed by full 12 month officers course (then some years later was myself course officer on a 12 month officers course). I believe I understand the process differences in the training approach.You understand what you -- to use your word from above -- flitted through as an Enlisted guy. :D
I submit a year as Joe Tentpeg is not enough time to say that one has learned what it's like to be a Private Soldier or, even more important, a junior NCO.
That said, 12 months for a new LTs course seems about right -- and serving as an instructor in such a course, which not everyone does, was / is bound to be enormously helpful in learning what makes new LTs tick.
It is for this main reason (as I stated before) that one can not reduce officer training courses by the length of a recruit course where candidates have been through that mill already.Yes.
My personal experience (of first doing a recruit course and then serving some operational time) was such that I would make it an essential route to a commission if I were so able. The minimum of a year is well spent in that. Is there a maximum? Probably three years where the entry age was 18.We're in near agreement. IMO the minimum should be 18 months operational or in-unit service (not counting recruit or initial entry training which I think should be about six months, perhaps more if (as is true in the US army), esoteric, non military but societal 'training' is also included. Three to four years should indeed be about the maximum and service as a junior NCO should be a 'plus' in the selection criteria. However, commissioning of longer serving persons (and not just as Lieutenants...) should be reasonably common. In the US, the Marines do that better than does the Army and the British system of commissioning senior NCOs toward the end of their service for specific and normally limited duties is good. The world is full of late bloomers...:D
Rhodesia worked pretty much according to the British system but had much more flexibility to adapt to the developing war situation as it was unencumbered by suffocating tradition and bureaucratic restraint. There were still many problems some of which were adequately addressed (some not).Always going to be true; we humans are imperfect...
Still, in my experience, the Commonwealth Armies do a much better job of teaching and training the basics than does the US. We could and should adapt some of their practices. In fact, we have -- we just discarded the good and picked the wrong things to keep. :mad:
Now because the majority of young US officers have a superficial platoon commanding experience that does not mean that this experience (certainly in the war environments recently and currently available) is not without value. If nobody has it then you are in no position to miss it. To agree that it has value would imply that the US officer corps is somehow lacking which is not about to be acknowledged anytime soon.I agree with all that but also must note that reality is a bitch and must be dealt with. The US Army is (and others are) not likely to change. The current system has evolved over time and does work. That doesn't mean one should not try other ways. Armies are bureaucracies with closed minds. People, fortunately, are not as loth to experiment and try new idea and things... :wry:
Semper Fi, Ken,
You are the essesance of a line company grunt down through all of your days.
You are right and true. Semper Fidelis! I'am without reservation, proud of you!
Ken White
02-19-2012, 05:26 AM
You've been quiet lately -- I guess you've been up to something...:D
Et Tu on the Semper Fi. Guns up...;)
Dropping the areas of agreement...
The LTs are given peacetime / garrison duties that let them understand the mechanics of the system; they are given field training or exercise missions in temporary command of elements -- A Squad, section ,Platoon or parts thereof assembled for the specific task at hand. Sometimes a platoon plus MGs and /or a mortar or AT weapons, a mix of vehicles / elements for other than walking Infantry -- all sorts of combination. In training, designed for their training value and to develop flexibility and familiarize both the LT and the Troops to working with different approaches and persons. In combat of course the only focus would be to best accomplish the task at hand.
Don't worry about the 'system' get them into the 'firing line' to develop leadership skills and learn what commanding soldiers in war is all about.
Command of a squad/section and a platoon should have taken place on officers course. If not how was the individual's knowledge/understanding and ability to apply minor tactics assessed?
If a 2Lt needs training in squad/section level tactics then send him back to officers school.
Perhaps here we get to the US 'problem' Von Schell identified back in 1930. Too much time on training courses and not enough time practically exercising these skills at unit level. By this I mean company, battalion and higher exercises with supporting arms in all the phases of war.
I tend to agree with your three year spans...
In the war it got down to two years, but I'm told that during peacetime three years was the norm.
If one looks at your Pamphlet 600–3 under Infantry Branch one finds:
(2) Assignments. The typical Infantry lieutenant will be assigned to a Brigade Combat Team as his first unit of assignment. The key assignment during this phase is serving as a platoon leader in an operating force unit. Early experience as a rifle platoon leader is critical, as it provides Infantry lieutenants with the opportunity to gain tactical and technical expertise in their branch while developing leadership skills.
They seem to acknowledge that commanding a platoon is 'the key assignment' but does not state for how long though.
Then on to captains:
(5) Desired experience. The key assignment for an infantry captain is successful service as a company commander. There is no substitute for an operating force company command. It develops an Infantry officer’s leadership and tactical skills and prepares him for future leadership assignments at successively higher levels of responsibility. The goal is to provide each infantry captain 18 months (± 6 months) operating force company command time.
± 6 months ??? That could mean as little as a year. Not good enough quite frankly. Two years is good (especially at war), three years better (in peacetime).
First, because there is NO optimal solution. The issue is to impart knowledge and capability in lieu of experience, so nothing is going to do that too well.
War is the greatest teacher (that is why I continue to suggest that the recent and current 'wars' have provided a wonderful opportunity to blood the young officers. Was the opportunity used to the maximum or was one 'tour' (half as a platoon commander) the order of the day?
In peacetime experience is gained through field exercises. There is no substitute for experience.
Secondly, among all less than optimal solutions IMO the one that develops trust of unknown persons with adequate experience or training level and promotes flexibility in thought and outlook is preferable to one that encourages trust of only the familiar ("I know him so I can trust him...") and which constrains flexibility due to excessive but natural adherence to organizational lines. Pursue those two lines of thought for a bit...
Why would one need to develop the trust of 'unknown persons'? The whole reason for having standing battalions is for them to train together to develop cohesion as a unit and maintain a state of readiness, yes?
Officers cycling through on 2-3 years postings will establish themselves quickly and if competent gain the trust of not only their troops but also their fellow officers.
Thirdly, the "obvious" solution is not obvious, it's just the way we've done it for centuries. that does NOT mean its optimal. Nor does the fact that you and many others were well served in the training and learning processes by your particular experience counter the fact that a good many -- perhaps more -- are not so well served by it.
All I say is that we need to be brutally honest with ourselves as to where the problems lie and if there are solutions, to acknowledge them (even though the 'system' will never allow them to be addressed).
You understand what you -- to use your word from above -- flitted through as an Enlisted guy. :D
I submit a year as Joe Tentpeg is not enough time to say that one has learned what it's like to be a Private Soldier or, even more important, a junior NCO.
In my case if you count my South African National Service my pre officers course military experience was 18 months. My point was that this experience should be between 1-3 years.
My concern here is that if it were to be three years minimum and add to that the minimum three years for a degree then you have taken six years out of the productive commissioned service of an officer.
In wartime (in my experience) the benefit of prior service before commissioning as opposed to those who had none was quickly made up for where the direct entry officer had an experienced sergeant. In peacetime I would not know.
My opinion is therefore that the 3 years in the ranks is rather a maximum as longer would introduce the age factor which may negatively impact on the career potential of the individual.
That said, 12 months for a new LTs course seems about right -- and serving as an instructor in such a course, which not everyone does, was / is bound to be enormously helpful in learning what makes new LTs tick.
I only served in wartime so my observations relate accordingly.
I served for three years as a Troop/Platoon Commander. Personally I believe I was a better officer serving the full three years as such. Looking back 30 years nothing has changed in that regard.
Secondly I don't know what post a 2Lt can hold other than platoon commander after (your) one year? What? Staff job? No. Training? No. Have stated before that recruit training is best handled by NCos and officers (who have been commissioned when sergeant major). A (direct entry) officer knows next to nothing about what training at that level should entail and of them a 2Lt knows less than nothing. If being a staff officer is mere sticking pins in maps (a corporals job) then maybe. But I still maintain the individual officer's personal development is better served by further time with a platoon.
I would be interested to hear where 2Lts/Lts serve if they generally serve only 6-12 months as a platoon commander?
It is interesting to watch fellow young officers grow and develop over their three years as a platoon commander at war. Then later to be involved in such training. The first course I took was a Nation Service course (six months - so they were 180 day wonders a not of the 90 day variety). Interesting in that they were mostly graduates retuning to do their service. The regular course (1 year) were mostly school leavers of the bright eyed and bushy tailed variety.
All that remained to connect the dots from that experience was hours of contemplation over 30 years normally with bitterly cold beer in hand watching a glorious African sunset.
We're in near agreement. IMO the minimum should be 18 months operational or in-unit service (not counting recruit or initial entry training which I think should be about six months, perhaps more if (as is true in the US army), esoteric, non military but societal 'training' is also included. Three to four years should indeed be about the maximum and service as a junior NCO should be a 'plus' in the selection criteria. However, commissioning of longer serving persons (and not just as Lieutenants...) should be reasonably common. In the US, the Marines do that better than does the Army and the British system of commissioning senior NCOs toward the end of their service for specific and normally limited duties is good. The world is full of late bloomers...:D
Effectively your 18 months is two years then. I agree with that but would add the 'give or take' condition so as not to exclude a deserving candidate. I would add the maximum condition for this 'window of opportunity' to commissioning. Remember the aim would be to look for those showing exceptional potential. I do accept that under the current mass production of officers those who have already served have had the chance to see if the army suits them (must do or they would not seek a place on an officer course) and the army has a pretty clear view of the person concerned (my concern being that at company level a captain as a company commander and a Lt as 2IC may be a bit 'light' to recognise leadership potential of an individual troopie in the company).
There should indeed be later windows of opportunity for commissioning. Probably at the end of the platoon sergeant cycle where commissions into GD (general duties), training and Q&A should be available. For example posts such as Quartermaster, Transport Officer etc would all have been filled by those commissioned from the ranks (in my world).
Ken White
02-19-2012, 02:43 PM
Command of a squad/section and a platoon should have taken place on officers course. If not how was the individual's knowledge/understanding and ability to apply minor tactics assessed?'Command' in a course setting is not the same as doing it in combat or in a working unit on exercises. I know you know that, just stating the obvious so no one misses that critical point.
If a 2Lt needs training in squad/section level tactics then send him back to officers school.
...
Perhaps here we get to the US 'problem' Von Schell identified back in 1930. Too much time on training courses and not enough time practically exercising these skills at unit level. ??? Now you're trying to confuse me -- take it easy, I'm old...:D
...± 6 months ??? That could mean as little as a year. Not good enough quite frankly. Two years is good (especially at war), three years better (in peacetime).Agreed. I'd even go for less time in a full bore war as opposed to a low intensity effort such as Viet Nam, Afghanistan or Iraq.
In peacetime experience is gained through field exercises. There is no substitute for experience.True, thus my comment there is no optimum solution to replace experience.
Why would one need to develop the trust of 'unknown persons'? The whole reason for having standing battalions is for them to train together to develop cohesion as a unit and maintain a state of readiness, yes?Yes -- However, in a full up war ala WW II or some parts of Korea, casualties and other things, the size of the Army, will entail a personnel turnover rate sometimes reaching 15 to 30% of a unit in a month. The unit cannot quit, it will receive replacements and Officers and NCO will be moved within Bns, even Bdes to replace combat losses -- one WILL deal with 'unknown persons.'
Officers cycling through on 2-3 years postings will establish themselves quickly and if competent gain the trust of not only their troops but also their fellow officers.Totally true but in heavy combat, that much time will absolutely not be afforded. In Korea, I had three Co Cdrs in a month, I cannot even recall the name of the second who was there for three or four days. In Viet Nam, we got in a new Bn Cdr, he got a DSC, wounded, evacuated and replaced three weeks later. The new guy was there for three months and then moved to be the Bde S3. Another LTC came in and I left a couple of weeks after that. The point is that rotations and personnel turbulence entail a lack of trust of persons one does not personally know if one knows that the training of one's forces are not as good as they should or could be so one needs to learn that even marginal training is, in fact, overcome by most people. Best way to learn that is by exposure to many persons in many units and sub-units.
You mention troops trusting Officers, yes, it is important that they do that -- it is even more critical that seniors trust juniors; else those seniors will be reluctant to grant the independence of action and give mission orders instead of detailed instructions...
In my case if you count my South African National Service my pre officers course military experience was 18 months. My point was that this experience should be between 1-3 years.Yes but my point was that your experience in a unit was only a year or a bit less; initial entry training is important and counts for a lot -- but it is not the same as experience IN a unit.
My concern here is that if it were to be three years minimum and add to that the minimum three years for a degree then you have taken six years out of the productive commissioned service of an officer.True but there's only so much time...
In wartime (in my experience) the benefit of prior service before commissioning as opposed to those who had none was quickly made up for where the direct entry officer had an experienced sergeant. In peacetime I would not know.Same effect, same solution. The problem is that in large Armies (and in peacetime) every LT will not have a decent, much less an expereienced Sergeant... :eek:
Secondly I don't know what post a 2Lt can hold other than platoon commander after (your) one year? What? Staff job? No. Training? No.Not 'my' one year, that's a wartime minimum. I opted for three years (meaning peacetime and in these little wars). Agree on the Staff jobs but it's a matter of time and experience. As an aside, I don't particularly agree with the excessive number of ranks we currently have, officer or NCO. Just LT instead of 2LT and 1LT. Three years as a LT, then to the Captains course, thence to a staff job then to the Co XO / 2iC job...
... But I still maintain the individual officer's personal development is better served by further time with a platoon.Substitute 'as a Company Offcier in a line organization' for "with a Platoon" and I agree. ;)
I would be interested to hear where 2Lts/Lts serve if they generally serve only 6-12 months as a platoon commander?Heh. Right now (and during the Viet Nam fracas) we make 'em 1LTs and put them on a Staff. :rolleyes:
As I noted before, you and I don't differ that much...
'Command' in a course setting is not the same as doing it in combat or in a working unit on exercises. I know you know that, just stating the obvious so no one misses that critical point.???
No, that’s not the whole story. On officers course the cadet has no unit to exercise with … other than where a course will exercise with a trained unit (battalion/company) so as to provide the necessary command opportunities. In war time units cannot be spared from operations for this purpose. Cadet therefore need to rely on exercising with the ‘demonstration troops’ available at their school. Rhodesia could only muster/spare a company of such troops at the School of Infantry to firstly, demonstrate tactical actions up to company level to successive cadet courses and also to provide the troops to command in field exercises. In my year and in the years I was an instructor at the ‘School’ we exercised so regularly and often with these troops that we got to know most by name. (In fact one of my tasks when an instructor was to deploy the Dem Company on operations to clear gooks from one of our training areas because their presence was starting to interfere with our training schedules -bloody cheeky of them!)
On arrival in their units the newly commissioned officers normally joined their company in the field. No time to exercise prior to operational deployment. Two options on arrival. One, where a suitably experienced platoon sergeant existed the young officer would be thrown directly in the deep end. Two, if there were any doubts the new officer would be placed as a side kick rifleman with the most experienced platoon commander until considered ‘safe’ to let him take over his own platoon.
During (ultra boring) peacetime one imagines there would be plenty of opportunities to exercise with his unit of which he is a platoon commander.
So to repeat my earlier point… if a commissioned officer needs to be exercised commanding squads/sections then you need to go find his course officer and administer the coup de grace.
.Yes -- However, in a full up war ala WW II or some parts of Korea, casualties and other things, the size of the Army, will entail a personnel turnover rate sometimes reaching 15 to 30% of a unit in a month. The unit cannot quit, it will receive replacements and Officers and NCO will be moved within Bns, even Bdes to replace combat losses -- one WILL deal with 'unknown persons.'
Korea was 1950-53 so we have not seen a ‘full up’ war for 60 years. Lets stick to the small wars then, shall we?
Talking of ‘replacements’ not sure how it worked in Korea and even Vietnam but (if you read Ambrose and Keegan on) the post D-Day period was a real shambles as far as the US forces were concerned. Depending on who the replacements are the ‘trust thing’ works in all directions. Best to withdraw hard hit units to refit and retrain before being once again inserted into the line, yes?
Totally true but in heavy combat, that much time will absolutely not be afforded. In Korea, I had three Co Cdrs in a month, I cannot even recall the name of the second who was there for three or four days. In Viet Nam, we got in a new Bn Cdr, he got a DSC, wounded, evacuated and replaced three weeks later. The new guy was there for three months and then moved to be the Bde S3. Another LTC came in and I left a couple of weeks after that. The point is that rotations and personnel turbulence entail a lack of trust of persons one does not personally know if one knows that the training of one's forces are not as good as they should or could be so one needs to learn that even marginal training is, in fact, overcome by most people. Best way to learn that is by exposure to many persons in many units and sub-units.
High casualty rates are surely exceptional and should be dealt with as such? There is more to it than trusting the new officers, there is the matter of the impact of the casualties on the morale of the troops. To them the loss of the CO might have less impact than that of their best friend.
Not sure that is a good reason to utilise ‘butterfly’ postings for officers. Better to gave them a solid grounding in their first three years so that they are able to handle such situations with maturity should they arise later?
You mention troops trusting Officers, yes, it is important that they do that -- it is even more critical that seniors trust juniors; else those seniors will be reluctant to grant the independence of action and give mission orders instead of detailed instructions...
Trust is earned and works in all directions.
To your second point… if the junior commanders prove they are competent they can be allowed more latitude in this regard. Not sure how that can be earned within the 6-12 months US officers spend as platoon commanders.
Yes but my point was that your experience in a unit was only a year or a bit less; initial entry training is important and counts for a lot -- but it is not the same as experience IN a unit.
My personal experience may not have been optimal but I fail to see why three years in the ranks followed by 12 month officer training is required prior to commanding a platoon for 12 months or less (unless that is an admission of the demise of the ‘hairy ass’d platoon sergeant of old? – Sgt Rock in the comics I read as a kid.). My point is that it is a maximum beyond which the person will have to wait for the second window of opportunity to commissioning being one step beyond platoon sergeant.
The problem is that in large Armies (and in peacetime) every LT will not have a decent, much less an expereienced Sergeant...
That’s a problem with the NCO structure which should be addressed, surely?
Not 'my' one year, that's a wartime minimum. I opted for three years (meaning peacetime and in these little wars).
Snap.
Agree on the Staff jobs but it's a matter of time and experience. As an aside, I don't particularly agree with the excessive number of ranks we currently have, officer or NCO. Just LT instead of 2LT and 1LT. Three years as a LT, then to the Captains course, thence to a staff job then to the Co XO / 2iC job...
My system was 4 years to acting-captain but… but a full 9-10 before you got full command of a company. Company 2IC was also for a senior captain (7-8 years commissioned service) - most certainly not a step up for a Lt who has only the experience of 12 months as a platoon commander.
Substitute 'as a Company Offcier in a line organization' for "with a Platoon" and I agree.
‘With’? Why not… ‘In command of a platoon’?
Right now (and during the Viet Nam fracas) we make 'em 1LTs and put them on a Staff. :rolleyes:
In the staff doing what? Folding maps? Sticking pins in maps? Making tea?
As I noted before, you and I don't differ that much...
OK, lets go find a couple of hundred bright eyed and bushy tailed youngsters with woodsman’s skills and turn them into ‘steely eyed trained killers’. ;)
Ken White
02-20-2012, 09:08 PM
In my year and in the years I was an instructor at the ‘School’ we exercised so regularly and often with these troops that we got to know most by name...
During (ultra boring) peacetime one imagines there would be plenty of opportunities to exercise with his unit of which he is a platoon commander.And to most of the rest; different strokes... :wry:
Korea was 1950-53 so we have not seen a ‘full up’ war for 60 years. Lets stick to the small wars then, shall we?To this, OTH -- you can do that if you wish; the US does not have the option of being unprepared for a major war. As has ben said many times, we can afford to lose small wars -- we cannot afford to lose a big one. Hopefully there'll be no more -- but I sure wouldn't bet tghe Farm on it... :o
Talking of ‘replacements’ not sure how it worked in Korea and even Vietnam but (if you read Ambrose and Keegan on) the post D-Day period was a real shambles as far as the US forces were concerned. Depending on who the replacements are the ‘trust thing’ works in all directions. Best to withdraw hard hit units to refit and retrain before being once again inserted into the line, yes?Yes to all. On the last item, ideally but not always possible...
To this, OTH -- you can do that if you wish; the US does not have the option of being unprepared for a major war. As has ben said many times, we can afford to lose small wars -- we cannot afford to lose a big one. Hopefully there'll be no more -- but I sure wouldn't bet tghe Farm on it... :o
How prepared is the US for a major war?
If the US has difficulty with two simultaneous small wars (Iraq and Afghanistan) and the earlier Vietnam surely that should start warning lights flashing?
And to most of the rest; different strokes... :wry:
Interesting discussion over the last week or so (which properly belongs in the Initial Officer Selection (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=14027) thread).
There seems to be competitive demands on time between what we seem to have come to some agreement on and that which is happening on the ground.
We agree basically that the best entry route for an officer is first as an enlisted man for between 18 months to three years, then officers course for a year.
The US military demands that an officer is in possession of a degree before reaching the rank of captain which effectively takes another (minimum) three year bite out of time before reaching the rank of captain (being training time plus four years).
Looking at it then from the age of 18 we would have, three years enlisted service, one year officer training, a three year degree, and four years from commissioning to captain = 11 years or the age of 29 - during which of these 11 years only four have been productive as an officer.
To this we then add the five years from captain to major and we have officers attaining the rank of major at 34. Then another seven years to half colonel = 41, then another six years to full colonel = 47. Too old for two reasons.
This projects even older ages onto general staff who will be physically older and less able to function in a wartime setting and will be found deeper into the 'cognitive decline' range which has an onset commencement from the age of 45.
Something has to give.
Fuchs
02-22-2012, 03:10 AM
Which country was ever well-prepared for major war since the 1880's?
I can identify examples for the early and mid 19th century, but none later.
Maybe my expectations are just really high, but judging by your question yours aren't exactly low either.
Which country was ever well-prepared for major war since the 1880's?
I can identify examples for the early and mid 19th century, but none later.
Maybe my expectations are just really high, but judging by your question yours aren't exactly low either.
Took me immediately to the words of your Von Schell circa 1930.
Quite rightly he noted that the US homeland had no real threat of sudden invasion from anyone. They could therefore take their time to prepare for any war (WW1 and WW2) and enter it at a time and place of their choosing when ready. They then have time to start up those massive (and effective) Henry Ford style industrial and manpower production lines in their build up to a major war.
As such US forces can remain dispersed in their various 'camps and forts' to cater for any future sudden uprising of the indigenous Indian population. ;)
motorfirebox
04-11-2012, 10:07 AM
This article (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-army-medication-20120408%2C0%2C4054138%2Cfull.story) seems related, albeit unintentionally on the part of the author. It really seems like this is putting the cart before the horse. You have soldiers being stretched thin on repeated deployments to theater where the rules are muddy at best, against an enemy that camouflages itself as the population that the soldiers are nominally in place to protect. When the stress starts to fray the soldiers, you medicate them to deal with that damage. And then when a soldier malfunctions... you blame the meds? Are these people stupid or just retarded?
davidbfpo
04-11-2012, 11:06 AM
Motorfirefox,
The issues around the prescription and or use of drugs by the US military, based on a similar news story (from the UK) was posted on the thread concerning Sgt. Bales alleged murder in Afghanistan, Post 147 onwards:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15273&page=8
We don't know how his court-martial will go, but one suspects that his defence may include the use or misuse of drugs and that may finally get sustained attention to the issues. It would be ironic if a murder trial did that and we know that trials, coroners inquests, leaks and non-official action often do better than officialdom in challenging procedures.
There is a plea from the heart on the thread by Mike Few 'White Paper: PTSD and mTBI' which IMO takes a stark look at how soldiers deal with the job of killing and far more - mainly written in 2009:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7069
davidbfpo
07-25-2012, 02:33 PM
A BBC Radio File on Four programme summarised:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18902195
The study by Dr Deirdre MacManus, at The Kings Centre for Military Health Research, found an association between soldiers' experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and violent behaviour at home. Soldiers involved in direct combat were twice as likely as others to admit having hit someone at the end of the tour, the research found. A third of the victims were someone in the family - often a wife or girlfriend.
Cultural change needs to be encouraged... so servicemen realise it's not un-macho to put their hands up and say 'I need help'.”
Dr MacManus said: "The association between performing a combat role and being exposed to combat, and subsequent violence on return from deployment, is about two fold. We also saw that soldiers who had seen more than one traumatic event were more likely to report being violent."
A BBC Radio File on Four programme summarised:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18902195
... and how many committed such acts of violence before a combat tour?
ganulv
07-25-2012, 04:04 PM
... and how many committed such acts of violence before a combat tour?
I can’t immediately find the text of the study, but I did find a 2011 study (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/kcmhr/publications/assetfiles/iraqafghan/MacManus2011-Impactofpre-enlistmentantisocialbehaviour.pdf) lead-authored by Dr. MacManus. From p. 5:
Interestingly a pre-enlistment history of A[nti-]S[ocial]B[ehavior] was not significantly associated with being deployed to Iraq in this study. However, it was associated with spending on average more time on the deployment in the past 3 years, serving in a combat role and being more likely to discharge a weapon in direct combat. This implies that those with a history of ASB may be more likely to be selected into the infantry which would increase the likelihood that they will be in direct combat situations and thus be more likely to have to discharge a weapon in combat or it may be hypothesised that they may have a lower threshold for violence in the combat situation.
I can’t immediately find the text of the study, but I did find a 2011 study (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/kcmhr/publications/assetfiles/iraqafghan/MacManus2011-Impactofpre-enlistmentantisocialbehaviour.pdf) lead-authored by Dr. MacManus. From p. 5:
As always, a good find, thank you.
For me the conclusion of the abstract says it best:
Conclusion: The results of this study suggest that those already demonstrating ASB prior to joining the military are more likely to continue on this trajectory, thus emphasising the importance of considering pre-enlistment behaviour when exploring the aetiology of aggression in military personnel.
I would suggest that pre-enlistment behaviour should be considered before allowing the person to sign-on in the military in the first place. Remember the days when people when convicted were given the opportunity to go to prison or join the army? Selection is the problem.
Then selection itself becomes the problem when (as with the Brits in the Great War) your fit, healthy and capable are slaughtered while your "sick, lame and lazy" stay safely at home.
That said, my comment related to that pre-enlistment behaviour was a better basis to predict post combat ASB than merely exposure to combat itself.
I can’t immediately find the text of the study, but I did find a 2011 study (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/kcmhr/publications/assetfiles/iraqafghan/MacManus2011-Impactofpre-enlistmentantisocialbehaviour.pdf) lead-authored by Dr. MacManus. From p. 5:
David, as an ex-Brit copper perhaps your comments on the 5% ASB in the general population against the criteria of the study, please.
davidbfpo
05-25-2018, 06:53 PM
I thought that the Forum had a thread on the Haditha murders in November 2005, a search says not, but this "long read" is worth reading.
Update: the main thread has been found, this post has been copied there, after approx. 800 views in a week. The thread is in the Historians area and is:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?819-Dealing-with-Haditha
Link:https://taskandpurpose.com/true-story-marine-corps-blew-biggest-war-crimes-case/
(https://taskandpurpose.com/true-story-marine-corps-blew-biggest-war-crimes-case/)
Powered by vBulletin® Version 4.2.5 Copyright © 2024 vBulletin Solutions Inc. All rights reserved.