The new Libya: various aspects

[SWJ Blog]

Libya and the Failure to Learn From Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/libya-and-the-failure-to-learn-from-iraq-afghanistan-and-syria)

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[SWJ Blog]

Pentagon: U.S. Forces in Libya, Looking for ‘Worthy’ Partners (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/pentagon-us-forces-in-libya-looking-for-%E2%80%98worthy%E2%80%99-partners)

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[davidbfpo]

From ECFR by a recommended Italian SME (via Twitter) and starts with:
Those who want to bring the western war against the Islamic State to Libya insist, as a US official put it in a private conversation, that any intervention would be about IS not about Libya. Alas, regardless of what it will be about, it will take place in Libya. That simple geographic reality means the complex political feuds and intrigues that have plagued Libya politics for the last five years will inevitably intrude on any Western intervention. Ultimately, a Western intervention that fails to account for Libyan politics and fails to consider what will replace ISIS in the event it is defeated will have no benefit for Libya or for the West.
Link:http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_march_to_folly_2.0_the_next_western_mil itary_intervention_in5083

Link to ECFR author's bio:http://www.ecfr.eu/profile/C238

[davidbfpo]

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CaiEdsYUEAAuTDS.jpg:large
From the Soufan Group via Twitter. Possibly from this report last week:http://soufangroup.com/libya-extremism-and-the-consequences-of-collapse/

[davidbfpo]

Again via Twitter:https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Caf402qXIAAT7Ty.jpg

[davidbfpo]

A Q&A session with three UK experts before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. A mix of strategy, detail and what next. With some very curious passages, here is one:
The Pentagon and the MOD want to go in sooner rather than later. I don’t know how much they have told the State Department or the Foreign Office about these special forces that are inside the country.Link:http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/libya-examination-of-intervention-and-collapse-and-the-uks-future-policy-options/oral/28637.pdf

(Added) One expert, Professor Matthew Porter, has a separate article with a strategic theme:https://offshorebalancer.wordpress.com/2016/02/11/another-intervention-in-libya-whats-at-stake/

[davidbfpo]

Via Twitter from @BabakTaghvee, an aero-jornalist.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Cbv-WDUW4AIk8FO.jpg:large

[CrowBat]

Via Twitter from @BabakTaghvee...Aw please: avoid (and in big circle too). Sensationalist with illusions of grandeur (he considers himself 'elite', 'chosen to teach prolls' etc.), driving even well-informed French analysts crazy.

Few examples:
- there were 3 F-15Es involved (their route was actually 'quite reminiscent' of the Libyan Raid of April 1986)
- no deployment of US UAVs in Libya is necessary: Global Hawks and Predators are based at Sigonella.

[davidbfpo]

A story in The Daily Telegraph (UK) credited to a reporter in Washington DC, cannot think why. It starts with:
Britain has discreetly deployed military advisers to Libya in order to build an army to fight Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant cells in the country...Special forces commandos are said to be working alongside their US counterparts in the city of Misrata to stop the jihadists’ progress in the lawless terrain across the sea from Italy.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/12176114/British-advisers-deployed-to-Libya-to-build-anti-Isil-cells.html

[SWJ Blog]

The Libya Gamble Part 1: Hillary Clinton, "Smart Power" and a Dictator's Fall (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-libya-gamble-part-1-hillary-clinton-smart-power-and-a-dictators-fall)

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[SWJ Blog]

The Libya Gamble Part 2: A New Libya, With ‘Very Little Time Left’ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-libya-gamble-part-2-a-new-libya-with-%E2%80%98very-little-time-left%E2%80%99)

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[davidbfpo]

An interesting article, although my first reaction was where is the evidence. Would Boko Haram veterans fit in, but then US$1k per month adds to the attraction.
Link:http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-libya-how-boko-haram-africas-jihadis-are-flocking-join-daeshs-holy-war-1547640

[SWJ Blog]

Analysts: Inaction Strengthens IS in Libya (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/analysts-inaction-strengthens-is-in-libya)

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[SWJ Blog]

Another Western Intervention in Libya Looms (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/another-western-intervention-in-libya-looms)

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[davidbfpo]

An almost revisionist article by Shadi Hamid, a senior fellow at the Project on US Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy:http://www.vox.com/2016/4/5/11363288/libya-intervention-success

[SWJ Blog]

History of Regionalism and Tribalism in the Current Political Struggle for Libya: Key Reflections and Recommendations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/history-of-regionalism-and-tribalism-in-the-current-political-struggle-for-libya-key-reflec)

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[SWJ Blog]

Friend or Foe? Doubts Plague US Military in Libya Training (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/friend-or-foe-doubts-plague-us-military-in-libya-training)

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[SWJ Blog]

Now is the Time to Stop the Spread of the Islamic State in Libya (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/now-is-the-time-to-stop-the-spread-of-the-islamic-state-in-libya)

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[CrowBat]

For anybody interested in such curiosities, here a short story on Libya’s Peculiar, Aerial-Refueling MiG-23s (https://warisboring.com/libyas-peculiar-aerial-refueling-mig-23s-af840188b278#.fw3xbaoj8).

[CrowBat]

BTW, Arnaud Delalande, author of recently published book Iraqi Air Power Reborn (http://www.harpia-publishing.com/galleries/IqAPR/index.html) (covering development of the Iraqi Air Force and Army Aviation since 2003, and available via Amazon (https://www.amazon.com/Iraqi-Air-Force-Reborn-Since/dp/0985455470) as well), is running his own blog, and regularly providing coverage on aerial operations over Libya - by two local air forces.

Here his newest feature: "Libyan airstrikes" situation update 2 - 8 July 2016" (http://aerohisto.blogspot.co.at/2016/07/libyan-airstrikes-situation-update-2-8.html?spref=tw).

His approach to first-hand sources in Iraq and Libya is not only exclusive but (contrary to that of Taghvaee), also reasonable. Arnaud has got several of his articles on Iraq (https://warisboring.com/iraqis-and-americans-butted-heads-over-the-isis-convoy-massacre-fd4ee9e243bb) and Libya (https://warisboring.com/great-now-there-are-two-competing-libyan-air-forces-843114cfec35) published by the WiB too.

[davidbfpo]

The title of a recent Washington Quarterly article by a French adviser on foreign affairs; which ends with:
As much as myths about the 2011 intervention should be debunked, we still have lessons to learn.Link:https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Summer2016_Vilmer.pdf

Topical as today a House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee has issued a critical report on David Cameron over the intervention. Citing one report which starts with:
David Cameron’s intervention in Libya was carried out with no proper intelligence analysis, drifted into an unannounced goal of regime change and shirked its moral responsibility to help reconstruct the country....Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/14/mps-deliver-damning-verdict-on-camerons-libya-intervention

[CrowBat]

Logical consequence of de-facto division of Libya into two:

You’re a Libyan Military Pilot Trainee — Now Who Do You Fight For? (https://warisboring.com/youre-a-libyan-military-pilot-trainee-now-who-do-you-fight-for-e77c1518f62#.tr5erza0g)

In the last three years, perhaps more than 100 Libyan air force cadets have trained at foreign air force academies.

Most of them began their training in 2012 and 2013 before the Libyan government split into two — and the two factions divided up Libya’s air force between them.
...

[CrowBat]

Another excellent piece by Arnaud Delalande:
It Sure Seems Like Egypt and the UAE Are at War In Libya (https://warisboring.com/it-sure-seems-like-egypt-and-the-uae-are-at-war-in-libya-b5d5e786d362#.u2818s3ap)

On Sept. 25, 2016, the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, or BRSC — a group with ties to Al Qaeda — published photos of air strikes that hit the Ganfouda area of Benghazi in eastern Libya. The group’s Sraya media arm claimed that a drone belonging to the United Arab Emirates was responsible for the bombings.

And a week earlier in mid-September 2016, fighters from Ibrahim Jodran’s so-called Petroleum Facilities Guard claimed that either Egypt or the UAE bombed them near the town of Ras Lanuf, killing five fighters involved in a counterattack on Libyan National Army positions.

The reports are just the latest in a growing body of evidence that Egypt and the UAE are directly intervening in the Libya conflict.
...

[CrowBat]

Another of Delalande's features on air warfare over Libya - and let's hope this might not develop into a pattern: A Fierce Air War Over Libya’s Oil Fields Has Killed Innocent Civilians (https://warisboring.com/a-fierce-air-war-over-libyas-oil-fields-has-killed-innocent-civilians-367206001a64#.1akzl47t0)

On Sept. 20, 2016, unidentified aircraft struck a park at Nina Agricultural Project in Sokna, part of the Al Jufrah district 125 miles south of Sirte in Libya. The bombing killed at least seven people and injured as many as 20 others.

The two main government factions — the Libyan National Army and militia forces affiliated with the internationally-recognized Government of National Accord — both denied involvement#… and accused each other of orchestrating the strike.

So who bombed Al Jufrah?

************

BTW, two days ago, a pair of AdA (French AF) did not fly an air strike on Libya. They were also not accompanied by any KC-135FR tanker.

Why do I say it this way? Because official Paris is insistent that its military and intel are NOT involved in Libya, and is strictly curbing any related reporting. In spring this year, a prominent reporter working for Le Monde (which remains one of most influential media outlets in France), reported something else. She was immediately put under all sorts of charges and investigations. When Arnaud Delalande and me prepared a big report on French, US and other (primarily those of two Libyan air forces) aerial ops over Libya for the premier volume of the new (bi-monthly) magazine Airpower (https://www.facebook.com/Airpower-magazine-592981397549683/), the publisher (former military helicopter pilot) got all sorts of problems with authorities. In essence, the French MOD told him they're going to put him under investigation, and practically ban him from all air bases, all official events, and all sorts of official contacts - 'just for the start'.

The 'France-related' part of that story (especially the part detailing early air strikes flown from N'Djamena IAP and Faya Largeau, with involved Rafales IFR-ing from USAF KC-135s over north-eastern Niger), thus came out 'much softened', and including all sorts of 'could be, would be, should be'...

[davidbfpo]

We tend IMHO to overlook Italy's role and knowledge of Libya, so the kidnapping of two Italians and another was missed here. This short report from the Quilliam Foundation, with two Libyan authors is interesting:http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/blog/the-security-conundrum-in-libya-libyas-hidden-war/

Italy already has a military hospital @ Misrata, with a reinforced company of paratroopers for security; they arrived in late September by invitation.

Update 5th November 2016: both Italians have been released.

[davidbfpo]

A political overview by Alison Pargeter, a SME on Libya:https://www.opendemocracy.net/alison-pargeter/failing-libya?

She ends with:
For all the peace process of the past year, therefore, Libya is still caught in the bind of the same old forces that brought the country to its knees in the summer of 2014. Thus while Libya may be on its way to defeating Daesh, it is certainly no nearer to peace, let alone to the civil state that so many dreamed of when they rose up against Qadhafin in 2011.

While no one is pretending that dealing with Libya is easy, the international community should at least be asking itself some difficult questions about the role it has played.

[davidbfpo]

A short article by Peter Oborne, which includes a British 'double game':
Meanwhile, it is important to remember that despite its official pronouncements, even the British government – for all its statements of support – is playing a double game.In recent months, British special forces have reportedly been fighting (http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sirte-libya-british-commandos-frontline-uk-britain-michael-fallon-islamic-state-669841059) on the same side as the GNA against IS in Sirte.
Meanwhile, as Middle East Eye revealed (http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/french-led-secret-operations-room-backing-renegade-general-libya-81826394), British special forces have also based themselves in a French-led multinational military operations centre in Benghazi supporting renegade Libyan general Khalifa Haftar.
Haftar is on the opposite side to the GNA government in Tripoli.
British forces are on both sides at once as the GNA attempts to assert control over Libya. This reflects a shambolic British policy lacking integrity, strategy or coherence.Link:http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/libyas-tripoli-government-farce-1979201566


He also refers to a new iCG Report on Libya: The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset and summary he writes:
This beautifully researched document is replete with distressing details about the failure of the Sarraj government, revealing for example that no cabinet meeting has taken place since last June.Link to ICG Report:https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/libyan-political-agreement-time-reset

[CrowBat]

Libyan airstrikes Situation Report : 17 October - 6 November 2016 (http://aerohisto.blogspot.co.at/2016/11/libyan-airstrikes-situation-report-17.html)

[davidbfpo]

A rare report on this urban conflict, now in it's sixth month:http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-security-insight-idUKKBN13D226

Not encouraging for other cities.

[Bill Moore]

The article points out two things. The first, which most ground troops already know is that urban warfare is a slow and messy fight that produces high casualties. The second, known by some, is that ISIL is producing some top rate fighters that are not only tenacious, but highly skilled in both conventional and unconventional warfare. Whether you want to refer to Mao's phases of guerrilla warfare, or just use common sense, this article points out how these conflicts ebb and flow in intensity.

Those are the knowns. The unknowns, are where the fighters that escaped this particular battle (but also others such as Mosul) will go next? Will they be able to generate another 5th column in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, or even Europe? Will they be able to convert this 5th column into a conventional like force that hold ground? Will they able to transfer the skills they have learned and procure the necessary military materials to create major havoc elsewhere? Will western nation police forces be able to cope with this threat? Regarding the material aspect, I think that will be their major challenge. These violent movements have made substantial progress in war torn areas where military and munitions were readily available (Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia). That isn't the case in most of the West, so logistic challenges may limit the major threat to what many refer to as the arc of instability. However, that doesn't prevent them from conducting simple or sophisticated terrorist attacks in the West.

While the through, by, and with approach has it merits, if we're honest with ourselves, we must admit it also has its shortfalls. When the West chooses to depend upon surrogates or partner nation (if you can call Libya a nation anymore) forces they have opted to take a slow approach. This often based on the perception that it reduces risk to Western forces, but it doesn't take into account risk to achieving the mission.

Increasingly time matters. Time creates opportunities for adversaries, whether it is Russia in Syria, Iran in Iraq, or the weakening of a coalition before the conventional clearing operations are over. When we consider whether to use a unilateral, combined, or enabled (working through partners) approach, we shouldn't automatically default to one approach is better than the other, or that effective COIN efforts take 10 or more years. We need to consider what our aims strategic aims are, and assess the merit of each course of action, to include mixed approaches, to achieve that aim.

[CrowBat]

Well, it's certainly so that the Daesh is 'producing' some 'tenacious, highly skilled in both conventional and unconventional warfare' fighters. But, it seems nobody said so to the fighters of the GNA in Libya.

What's the point? I think the situation should be put within its context - which is: developments in Libya of the last four months ('or so').

As should be known by now, Haftar's forces ('LNA') - supported by Emiratis, Egypt, and Jordan - are on something like advance. That is: depends on what part of Libya are we talking about, and against what kind of opponents too.

Let's start with the start.

It all began with above-reported establishment of the UN-supported GNA government in Tripoli - which is a de-facto Misuratan government. While this kicked Turkey and Qatar out of the overall game, it also offended Haftar - plus his Emirati, Egyptian, and Jordanian supporters - and then so much so, the LNA launched an all-out attack on the Ansar ash-Sharia in Benghazi area.

To keep a long story a short one, the LNA advance in Benghazi area literally destroyed Ansar ash-Sharia. And when I say 'destroyed', I really mean that: for all practical purposes, this group is out of the war. On 7 October, a LNA/AF air strike on one of their remaining positions near Benghazi has killed their last leader, Mukhtar Burezeiza (he took over from Zahawi, two years ago).

After that, Haftar - who's playing the game of relevancy with the UN, knowing there is going to be some sort of a cease-fire, sooner or later, and the power is going to be distributed rather by force than by diplomacy - turned on that 'Petroleum Security Force' (or whatever is the designation).

Namely, this militia - led by the 'Libyan Oil King', Ibrahim Jathran - switched sides to the GNA, back in September. This created a weird situation where the GNA controlled export terminals while Haftar controlled oilfields (except in Ubari area, where the oil terminal was controlled by the local Toubou militia). Obviously, that was bad for business ('spice must flow', after all), so Haftar launched a 'major military campaign': his forces advanced on Agedabia and arrested Jathran's brother - mayor of Agedabia - thus forcing his tribe to switch sides. Then Haftar signed a death warrant for Jathran, in turn forcing him to start supporting the Saraya militia (led by Sadeq Ghariyani)...

The last anybody heard about Jathran is that he got seriously wounded during one of many LNA/AF air strikes in Syrte area...

With this, Jathran's Petroleum Force was out of the war, and Haftar is ever since in control of most of Libya's oil.

Meanwhile, Haftar & Consorts (i.e. Emiratis, Egyptians and Jordanians), bribed Farej Again - GNA's defence minister - and Abdulrahman Swehli, to change to his side. They pocketed the money, but didn't like the idea. Instead, they defected - but not to Haftar: they established their own (third in total) government of Libya (and all three are still active), back in October:

Rump of GNC and Ghwell stage coup, declaring themselves back in power (https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/10/14/gnc-and-ghwell-stage-coup-declaring-themselves-back-in-powe/)

In a dramatic turn of events, a handful of members of the former General National Council and the former Tripoli “prime minister” have staged an apparent coup in Tripoli, taking over the#the GNC’s old premises next to Tripoli’s Rixos Hotel and declaring themselves in power again.

This evening Ghwell issued a statement from the GNC’s old premises next to Tripoli’s Rixos Hotel, declaring a state of emergency and what he called it an “historical initiative to rescue Libya”.
The Rixos conference centre, which previously served as the GNC’s chamber, and the “Hospitality Palaces” across the road were taken over six months ago by the State Council headed by Abdulrahman Sewehli, but it pulled out a couple of days ago, citing security issues.

Today’s takeover followed a stand-off#in the area since early morning between gunmen supporting the former GNC and those linked to Sewehli. It ended with the latter withdrawing. Disgruntled over unpaid salaries, their commitment was already weakened. It is believed they had already threatened to quit and were in contact with Ghwell supporters – which was why the State Council decided to withdraw.
...

Not that this third government has any kind of power, or political or military relevance: even the UN told them to, essentially, f..k off... and Italians, who actually work with all sides at the same time (i.e. at least with the LNA and the GNA at the same time), are ignoring them too... but one can't but love it when people blame the NATO for all of this....

Anyway, while Haftar was cleaning up all the way between Benghazi and Agedabia, he (and the USA, and the British, and French, and Italians) has left the GNA - i.e. Misuratans - bleed themselves to death against the Daesh in Syrte.

Namely, he and his LNA - the famed 'fighters against jihadists and Islamist terrorism' (while at least one third of the LNA consists of Libyan Salafists) - did not assault Syrte: they've left Misuratans do so, with US help of course.

And Misuratans, as naive as they are, did it with such gusto - and so much support from the USN (and USMC's Harriers and combat helicopters) - that they not only destroyed the Daesh, but also themselves. Namely, the Daesh has so heavily mined that city, that Misuratans are suffering terrible losses. Word has it they're losing 4 own combatants for every 1 Daesh they kill. Total of their KIA was well over 1,000 back in early October, and might have reached 2,000 by now. That's approximately seven times more losses than they suffered while assaulting Syrte back in 2011; certainly several times more than Haftar suffered in two years of fighting for Benghazi.

Keep in mind that Misurata is a city of about 500,000. Which in turn means: they cannot sustain such losses. In essence, after this battle - and no matter if 'right' or 'wrong' in general context - they'll be out of this war, too.

...while at the same time, the LNA is not only getting aircraft and helicopters from Egypt, or air support from the UAEAF, but now also has the money to hire Il-18 transports of the Molovan company Renan Air to haul cargo and troops from it, as seen at these photos found by Arnaud (https://twitter.com/Arn_Del/status/802450070503378944), yesterday.

With other words: I would say that the civil war in Libya is entering its closing phase. One in which the UN-supported government in Tripoli remains where it is, but its military forces (GNA) are out of condition to continue fighting. Which means that everything is going to be decided by military dictatorship of Haftar, supported by Emiratis, Egyptians, and Jordanians...

EDIT: forgot to add my usual, 'Congratulations Oblabla', fantastic foreign policy... :rolleyes:

[Azor]

With other words: I would say that the civil war in Libya is entering its closing phase. One in which the UN-supported government in Tripoli remains where it is, but its military forces (GNA) are out of condition to continue fighting. Which means that everything is going to be decided by military dictatorship of Haftar, supported by Emiratis, Egyptians, and Jordanians...

EDIT: forgot to add my usual, 'Congratulations Oblabla', fantastic foreign policy... :rolleyes:

I thought that the GNA only existed on paper, and that the squabble remains between the original GNC and the CoD?

At any rate, I prefer Haftar and the influence of the Jordanians, Egyptians and Emiratis to Islamists and the influence of the Turks and Qataris.

As for Obama, the sooner that the war ends, the sooner he can declare the past 5+ years of chaos as worth the NFZ and ousting of Qaddafi.

Obama made many rookie mistakes in his first term. From the standpoint of US national security, I would say that Operation Odyssey Dawn was worse than Operation Iraqi Freedom, despite the difference in casualties, especially American. Why?


Libya had agreed in 2003 to abandon its WMD programs in return for a resumption in normal relations with the West
China and Russia were under the impression that the NFZ would not be a cover for intervening on behalf of the rebels, which the British, French and Qataris did; the latter on the ground, in contravention of the UNSCR
Iran and North Korea regarded OOD as a betrayal of Libya's abandonment of WMDs
Between OOD and the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, rogue nuclear states observed that no gentleman's agreement or guarantee could substitute for the deterrence of nuclear weapons
Nuclear proliferation by North Korea and Pakistan, as well as potentially by Iran and others is more of a national security threat than the ongoing mess created by OEF

[CrowBat]

I thought that the GNA only existed on paper, and that the squabble remains between the original GNC and the CoD?The GNA remains relevant: Haftar is never going to be recognized by the UN, and thus not by Western powers either - and he knows that.

But, meanwhile he's in a position where without him, there's no Libyan state.


At any rate, I prefer Haftar and the influence of the Jordanians, Egyptians and Emiratis to Islamists and the influence of the Turks and Qataris.'Problems':

- a) One third of Haftar's LNA are Salafists. In comparison, and no matter how much declared 'Islamist', the GNA forces are none of that.

- b) Egypt is a military dictatorship; Jordan is a 'royal' dictatorship (no matter how much nice-talked because its a US ally); and UAE is a dictatorship too.

Any idea what three dictatorships are likely to do with a military dictator in Libya? For example, how likely are they to install a pluralist democracy...?


Obama made many rookie mistakes in his first term. From the standpoint of US national security, I would say that Operation Odyssey Dawn was worse than Operation Iraqi Freedom, despite the difference in casualties, especially American. Why?


Libya had agreed in 2003 to abandon its WMD programs in return for a resumption in normal relations with the West
China and Russia were under the impression that the NFZ would not be a cover for intervening on behalf of the rebels, which the British, French and Qataris did; the latter on the ground, in contravention of the UNSCR
Iran and North Korea regarded OOD as a betrayal of Libya's abandonment of WMDs
Between OOD and the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, rogue nuclear states observed that no gentleman's agreement or guarantee could substitute for the deterrence of nuclear weapons
Nuclear proliferation by North Korea and Pakistan, as well as potentially by Iran and others is more of a national security threat than the ongoing mess created by OEF

Aha. An imposing list of arguments.

BTW, have you ever heard of some human beings called 'Libyans'? If you have, what's with their rights and interests? Is it so these don't matter because they are 3-5 million of predominantly Moslem Arabs and Berbers? Or shall I conclude you're one of those advocating retention of oppressive dictatorships in interest of Western-centric POVs...?

[Azor]

The GNA remains relevant: Haftar is never going to be recognized by the UN, and thus not by Western powers either - and he knows that. But, meanwhile he's in a position where without him, there's no Libyan state.

Then there has to be an accommodation made.




a) One third of Haftar's LNA are Salafists. In comparison, and no matter how much declared 'Islamist', the GNA forces are none of that.

None? The GNC did not have any Muslim Brotherhood elements? Ankara and Doha are both supporting secularists, deviating from their usual policy of supporting the MB?


b) Egypt is a military dictatorship; Jordan is a 'royal' dictatorship (no matter how much nice-talked because its a US ally); and UAE is a dictatorship too.

So? Qatar is a dictatorship and Turkey is transforming itself into one as well. So much for the "model" Muslim country...


Any idea what three dictatorships are likely to do with a military dictator in Libya? For example, how likely are they to install a pluralist democracy...?

So the Turks and Qataris want pluralist democracy? Not the MB in power?



Aha. An imposing list of arguments.

BTW, have you ever heard of some human beings called 'Libyans'? If you have, what's with their rights and interests? Is it so these don't matter because they are 3-5 million of predominantly Moslem Arabs and Berbers? Or shall I conclude you're one of those advocating retention of oppressive dictatorships in interest of Western-centric POVs...?


I was arguing why intervention in Libya was a strategic mistake, not that the people of Libya don't deserve liberal democracy.

I can think of many peoples deserving of Western protection from domestic and foreign oppression, where intervention would have caused a greater disaster, namely nuclear war.

After the ousting of Qaddafi and the annexation of Crimea, how can any state possessing or developing nuclear weapons see any benefit in dismantling their weapons or programs? For guarantees that can be breached? For a few years of sanctions relief?

In the Arab Muslim world there are few successes when it comes to freedom and democracy. However, Tunisia comes to mind as the only one of these countries ranked as "free" (FH) or as a democracy, albeit a "flawed" one (EIU). Behind Tunisia is Morocco (hybrid government, partly free) and Lebanon, but the latter is over 40% Christian, and the Muslims are evenly divided between Sunni and Shia.

As in Africa, energy resources have proven to be a curse, as can be seen in Libya, Algeria and the Gulf Arab states, with the wealth acting as more of a hindrance than help as far as liberal democracy is concerned.

Tunisia is an interesting case, as in the aftermath of the Revolution, Islamist parties only received 37% of the vote, compared to 65% for Egypt. Whereas Tunisia's parliament elected an interim president who was a secularist and the subsequent 2014 race was between two secularists, Egypt narrowly elected an Islamist president (Morsi).

Of all the countries caught up in the Arab Spring, Tunisia's Revolution seemed to involve the least foreign interference, in stark contrast to Libya, Syria and to a lesser extent Egypt. Even Tunisia's version of the Muslim Brotherhood seems closer to the Christian Democratic parties of Europe, than its sister organizations in Turkey and Egypt.

[CrowBat]

None? The GNC did not have any Muslim Brotherhood elements?The GNC - not.

It was the pre-GNC government (which was never recognized interntionally, and which quit once the UN-supported government arrived in Tripoli) that was 'MB-influenced'.


Ankara and Doha are both supporting secularists, deviating from their usual policy of supporting the MB?Irrelevant - because, and as described above: they're out of the game. Not only that even Ansar ash-Sharia was destroyed, but after all experiences of the last two years, nobody is going to listen to them any more. Which means they have no meaningful 'proxies' in Libya.


I was arguing why intervention in Libya was a strategic mistake, not that the people of Libya don't deserve liberal democracy.You're arguing in US/Western-centric style - while entirely ignoring the core reason for the situation.

Time and again, you come to post about something like 'historian approach to monitoring the situation' etc. But, when it comes to apply your studies of history, you seem unable to do so. Why?

If you check the British history: the country began making giant leaps forward the moment it started sorting out its human-rights-related issues - and it grew as powerful precisely because it did so centuries ahead of anybody else. The Netherlands - ditto. If you check the US history: even more so (although the time-lapse was measured by decades, rather than by centuries).

But, in the case of countries like Libya, and just like the entire 'establishment' (whether political or academic) you're approaching the topic from the tail first: correspondingly, it's 'all about intervention'...

...and 'not the least about Libyans'...?

Sorry, but such discussions are meanwhile getting boring.

Thus, and excuse me, please, but I'll reply only to what I find interesting:


Tunisia is an interesting case, as in the aftermath of the Revolution, Islamist parties only received 37% of the vote, compared to 65% for Egypt.Sigh... as if it would be that much different anywhere else (than it turned out in Tunisia)...

And re. Egypt: Egypt is no example for anything at all. The country is such an utter chaos and wishful thinking that nobody understands it - especially not Egyptians (indeed, Egyptians can't even agree with themselves if they are Egyptians or Arabs, just for the start).

At most, one can say that Egyptians made a mistake during their elections - and elected by heart, not by reason. Then they realized they made a mistake - and corrected it, but in wrong fashion: instead of giving it a second chance and waiting for next elections, they all (including most of MBs) supported a military coup. Obviously, that was their next mistake, and now they have to wait for the next opportunity to correct it.


Of all the countries caught up in the Arab Spring, Tunisia's Revolution seemed to involve the least foreign interference, in stark contrast to Libya, Syria and to a lesser extent Egypt.Oh, really...?

The only difference between Tunisia and all the other 'caught in the Arab Spring' was that Tunisia was over very quickly - and then because Ben Ali was a man enough to admit to himself that people don't want him, and to go.

That's something that 'can't happen' to such megalomaniacs like Q, like Assad, or quite a few others.

[Azor]

I'm glad to see that Ankara and Doha are "out of the game" and have "no meaningful proxies" in Libya. Hopefully the situation winds down, as the country has more than enough oil and gas revenue potential to support its population decently. Yet Libya's black gold and small population as been about as much benefit to the average Libyan as Equatorial Guinea's has. Hopefully the unity government, when it is finally established, can be prevailed upon to follow the Norwegian model. After supporting the rebellion, the least that London and Paris can do is midwife a better future than the past under Qaddafi.


You're arguing in US/Western-centric style - while entirely ignoring the core reason for the situation. Time and again, you come to post about something like 'historian approach to monitoring the situation' etc. But, when it comes to apply your studies of history, you seem unable to do so. Why? If you check the British history: the country began making giant leaps forward the moment it started sorting out its human-rights-related issues - and it grew as powerful precisely because it did so centuries ahead of anybody else. The Netherlands - ditto. If you check the US history: even more so (although the time-lapse was measured by decades, rather than by centuries). But, in the case of countries like Libya, and just like the entire 'establishment' (whether political or academic) you're approaching the topic from the tail first: correspondingly, it's 'all about intervention'...

I would say that economic advancement led to political advancement, as greater income and wealth as well as the greater diffusion of both, produced a middle class upon whose acquiescence the rule of the <1% rested.

As for humanitarian intervention, I would start with Sudan and the Congos first...


And re. Egypt: Egypt is no example for anything at all. The country is such an utter chaos and wishful thinking that nobody understands it - especially not Egyptians (indeed, Egyptians can't even agree with themselves if they are Egyptians or Arabs, just for the start). At most, one can say that Egyptians made a mistake during their elections - and elected by heart, not by reason. Then they realized they made a mistake - and corrected it, but in wrong fashion: instead of giving it a second chance and waiting for next elections, they all (including most of MBs) supported a military coup. Obviously, that was their next mistake, and now they have to wait for the next opportunity to correct it.

The only difference between Tunisia and all the other 'caught in the Arab Spring' was that Tunisia was over very quickly - and then because Ben Ali was a man enough to admit to himself that people don't want him, and to go. That's something that 'can't happen' to such megalomaniacs like Q, like Assad, or quite a few others.

The Egyptian military has its hooks in the economy in the way that the Revolutionary Guards do in Iran. It didn't appear the Tunisia had the same situation...

Subsequent violence aside, the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia lasted for the same duration and inflicted the same number of fatalities, irrespective of post-revolutionary violence.

It seems that the moderate opposition in Tunisia was stronger than it was in Egypt, and that the Muslim Brotherhood in the latter was decidedly Islamist, anti-Western and anti-GCC.

As for Bashar al-Assad's personality, I don't find him on the same plane as Hussein in terms of brutality. I also believe that Syrian regime activities are more dictated by Iran and Assad's inner circle than him personally...

But, we will know more when the dust finally settles.

[CrowBat]

I would say that economic advancement led to political advancement, as greater income and wealth as well as the greater diffusion of both, produced a middle class upon whose acquiescence the rule of the <1% rested.Along the theory about the 'China prototype'...?

That's plain silly: it's not really working even in China - at least not without another oppressive dictatorship. :rolleyes:

I do not understand why is it so hard to understand that it works only the other way around: give people the freedoms, keep them safe from terror, then let them develop - and they'll manage it. I do not recall a single example of where this didn't work.


It seems that the moderate opposition in Tunisia was stronger than it was in Egypt, and that the Muslim Brotherhood in the latter was decidedly Islamist, anti-Western and anti-GCC.'Moderate opposition'... sigh: with very few exceptions (and most of these would certainly surprise you), 99% of people are always 'moderate', no matter what country, ethnic group or religion. Question is always what is done to support one or the other side.

Thanks whoever, Tunisia was left on its own - by supporters of pluralism and by those of extremism.


As for Bashar al-Assad's personality, I don't find him on the same plane as Hussein in terms of brutality.Such standpoints are simply based on lack of knowledge about Assadist regime.

Here a few examples of what is going on in their prisons, every single day, since nearly 50 years (warning: GRAFFIC, not recommended for consumption after breakfast): Assadist regime in 30 seconds (https://twitter.com/Paradoxy13/status/701434454569578497).

[Azor]

https://warisboring.com/a-new-civil-war-could-break-out-in-libya-1e0fa7c20cf0#.io8ubnwxy

Fresh fighting would pit the Libyan National Army against the Government of National Accord

by WOLFGANG PUSZTAI & ARNAUD DELALANDE


Beginning in December 2016, the Saraya Defend Benghazi — also known as Benghazi Defense Brigade — an Islamist militia group that formed in June 2016 to oppose Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s Tobruk-based Libyan National Army, was involved in the attack on facilities in Libya’s Oil Crescent.

The LNA decisively repulsed the attacks. But the wider conflict is only deepening — and could spark a new civil war in Libya pitting the two major claimants to the country’s leadership. Haftar and his allies in Tobruk on one side. On the other, the Government of National Accord in Tripoli.
Resource constraints on both sides could head off further fighting — assuming the local allies of both Haftar and the GNA behave themselves.

The December fighting was fierce...

[CrowBat]

...and another one by Arnaud: Erik Prince’s Mercenaries Are Bombing#Libya (https://warisboring.com/erik-princes-mercenaries-are-bombing-libya-88fcb8e55292?mc_cid=926225d076&mc_eid=4a82c9f57e#.ihhjm6qtq)


On Jan. 11, 2017, Intelligence Online — a professional journal covering the world’s intelligence services — revealed that the pilots of Air Tractor attack planes flying from Al Khadim air base in Libya are private contractors working for Erik Prince, the founder of the company formerly known as Blackwater.

War Is Boring’s own sources in Libya confirmed the assertion. Our sources said that the pilots flying the United Arab Emirates Air Force IOMAX AT-802 Air Tractors — converted crop-dusters — are mercenaries and aren’t Arabs. Most of the for-profit aviators are American, according to IOL.
...

[OUTLAW 09]

AFRICOM commander voices concern over Russian meddling in Libya:
http://trib.al/mjYc2WP
#

[AdamG]

Russia "appears to have deployed" special forces to an airbase in Egypt 60 miles from the border with Libya in the past few days, according to U.S., Egyptian, and diplomatic sources, per a Reuters report.
Last week the U.S. military commander who oversees U.S. operations in Africa, Marine General Thomas Waldhauser, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia is trying to once again "exert influence" in the country, which used to be its client state. Waldhauser said a good way to characterize what appears to be happening between Russia and Libya is how Russia has been trying to support Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Why it matters: Russia might be planning to prop up Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar, which would not be in the best interests of the U.S., according to Waldhauser. That's because Haftar is in a deadlock with the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli.

https://www.axios.com/russian-troops-reportedly-spotted-in-egypt-2314277229.html

[OUTLAW 09]

Peskov: Russian 'excessive' interference in Libyan affairs not possible or expedient

Q: What's excessive?'

A: I've said all I want to

[CrowBat]

How Emirati air power turned Haftar's Libyan oil ports disaster to victory (http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/how-did-libyan-national-army-manage-retake-oil-crescent-such-short-time-393617622)

How could an army have lost an entire region in a few days - and then recovered it so quickly?

On 14 March, General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army launched a counterattack against the fighters of the Saraya Defend Benghazi and the Petroleum Facilities Guard coalition, which had managed to take most of the coastal cities near the oil terminals 10 days earlier.

This lightning counter-offensive has left observers skeptical. How could an army have lost an entire region in a few days - and then recovered it so quickly?

The reasons for the failure of Haftar to contain the offensive on the oil terminals in the first place were multiple. Unlike their first attempt in#December 2016, the SDB and PFG fighters managed to rally some militias from Misrata including the al-Marsa Brigade. That's the first reason.

Secondly, the SDB-PFG convoy coming from Zillah, a town in the Sahara Desert where the SDB were based, joined the fight quickly and attacked several locations, taking Haftar troops - which were already limited in number because they were fighting on other fronts, particularly Derna - by surprise. The UAE's Wing Loong drones, supporting Haftar's forces,#apparently failed to spot the oncoming convoy in the desert.
...

[davidbfpo]

A SME has a report on the situation, which is summarized in the sub-title:
Given the complex attitudes towards foreign interventions in Libya, we need a clear strategy that stands up to local, regional, and international scrutiny.Or the closing paragraphs:
This is exacerbated by the secrecy and ambiguity over the intentions of intervening countries. Ambiguity and lack of transparency create hearsay and fuel accusations, drawing interveners into the local dynamics of the conflict, making it impossible to be seen as an apolitical or non-partisan player. This cannot help but undermine diplomatic action. In the case of the GNA, the international intervention only fuelled accusations that it was little more than a puppet government, created by external powers and serving a foreign agenda. Such accusations weakened it further and chipped away at its legitimacy.
If nothing else, my research underscores the need for greater transparency, so that international actions and intentions can stand up to the scrutiny of the many competing local groups that will need to be brought onside if Libya is to see peace.LinK: https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/alison-pargeter/libya-damned-if-we-do-and-damned-if-we-don-t?

[davidbfpo]

A short paper from ICSR and their explanation:
International stakeholders seem determined to push for Libyan elections at the end of 2018, a stance echoed by verbal commitment of national politicians. However, the outlook of elections in Libya this year remains uncertain. Seven years have passed since the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi, who ruled Libya for 42 years. Elections could provide the positive changes this troubled country needs; at the same time, they also bear the potential to exacerbate the volatile security situation and political divisions in the country. Rightly so, Libyans demand that the transition phase needs to end, and current profiteers should have fewer advantages from the current divided system.
Link:https://icsr.info/2018/08/09/libyan-elections-in-2018-a-potentially-ruinous-endeavour/

[davidbfpo]

An ICSR report and the full title is slightly different: 'Ghosts of the Past: The Muslim Brotherhood and its Stuggle for Legitimacy in post-Qaddafi Libya'.
In Summary:
This report by ICSR Research Fellow Inga Kristina Trauthig tackles the most important global movement of political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood, and looks at it from a local perspective. It traces and explains the history of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB), before examining how the movement has tried to establish itself as a legitimate political actor with regards to its Islamic credentials in the Libyan political sphere after 2011.

Among other things, this report finds that:

The LMB today is still haunted by the ghosts of its past, such as the decade-long demonisation of the Qaddafi regime, its exiled organisational structure and, on a related note, its impotence at failing to develop a strong social base.
Overall, the LMB has exhibited a more hawkish policy approach and, while striving to grow in importance, has cooperated with some of the more radical Islamist groups.
Finally, the LMB’s central attempt to represent itself as the true bearer of Islam (Islam’s vanguard) mattered little in a country where many of the political organisations operating in the country have paid lip service to Islam, resulting in no political force the LMB could effectively position itself against.

Link to full report:https://icsr.info/2019/01/30/ghosts-of-the-past-the-muslim-brotherhood-and-its-struggle-for-legitimacy-in-post%E2%80%91qaddafi-libya/

[davidbfpo]

A rare report on events in Libya, now over who controls the oilfields and of course the consequences. Alas the map is dated July 2018, presumaly the areas of control have not changed since then.
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/08/conflict-erupts-for-control-of-libyas-largest-oil-field

[davidbfpo]

A rare first-hand report from Libya and details the civil war underway. Some interesting points on the militia.
Link:https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/03/19/a-minister-a-general-militias-libyas-shifting-balance-of-power/