U.S. alpine warfare capabilities?

[ganulv]

My understanding is that the 10th Mountain Division carries the <Mountain> designation for reasons related to its history (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0116310/) rather than as a description of its contemporary capabilities and that the relevant Army (http://www.benning.army.mil/amws/) and Marine Corps (http://www.mwtc.usmc.mil/) schools do primarily individual rather than unit training. Is the lack of a large unit dedicated to alpine warfare a calculated decision on the part of the DoD? Are there any small units optimized for mountain warfare? If my understanding of what the Special Forces do is correct I would assume there are SF teams for which this is true, though I understand that there might be some OPSEC concerns there.

Appreciated,
Matthew (http://indiana.academia.edu/MatthewBradley)

[Neil Baumgardner]

The 86th IBCT (Vermont ARNG) is now trained for Mountain Warfare.

Hate to use wikipedia as my source link but I cant find any of the original sources right now http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/86th_Infantry_Brigade_Combat_Team_%28United_States %29

Moderator's Note

Post just approved and clearly pre-empts some of the following posts, PM to author.

[Fuchs]

It's imho a good idea to wait till the AFG campaign is over, for nowadays (afaik) alpine qualification is more about the preparation training for AFG deployment than about real formation specialisation.


There was a great amount of public criticism and outright bashing post-Anaconda concerning the 10th Mountain Div and its lack of mountain training area, lack of acclimatisation prior to deployment, lack of alpine expert trainers and so on.

[ganulv]

There was a great amount of public criticism and outright bashing post-Anaconda concerning the 10th Mountain Div and its lack of mountain training area, lack of acclimatisation prior to deployment, lack of alpine expert trainers and so on.

I think (could be wrong) that the Vermont National Guard runs the Army’s mountain warfare school. I’m not clear as to whether any of their units are true alpine warfare units or not.

The area around Watertown is flat as a board (http://mapper.acme.com/?ll=44.00664,-75.86815&z=9&t=R), but it’s close enough to the Adirondacks for easy day trips. But to keep acclimated to altitude within U.S. territory a unit would need to be based out west.

[Ken White]

The 10th is now only historically linked to its forebear which was trained for alpine warfare when it formed and trained at Camp Hale Colorado during WW II. It did fight in Italy; in the Appenines and the Alps.

Hale post WW II shifted from unit to individual training and later was closed in the 50s. Mountain and Cold Weather Training was moved to Fort Greeley, Alaska. It was closed post Cold War and the VT ArNG picked up the mountain training mission to include for the Active Army. It is individually focused but the School used to be willing to send out Mobile Training Teams to aid units training, probably still do but certainly could if deemed necessary. People in the Active Army also get sent to other nation's real mountain warfare schools (that's not a knock on the Vt Guard but on the fact that, in Vermont, the available mountains aren't...), to include India's but as Gunlv says, to do units, a western location would be necessary.

Anaconda suffered from more flaws than a lack of training, an overweening bureaucracy being but one. That overly bureaucratic bit and its allied overemphasis on force protection is in part a reaction to our less than stellar training; one cannot expect better than average or even average performance from below average training so one tends to be excessively cautious in employment. The sad thing is that Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, the Somalia affair and even moving into Bosnia where Rick Sanchez was afraid to have his Engineers bridge a river in an end 1995 non combat situation all were harbinger and examples of how not to do things. Or, more correctly, how to do things wrongly, expensively, cautiously and without achieving the desired effect in a timely fashion while taking and causing unnecessary casualties... :mad:

That's what happens when you treat your Army not as a real and existing military force but as a mere holding pool of people, funds and equipment for a mobilization and big war you might not ever see. That attitude BTW, is not totally a post Viet Nam phenomenon but it has grown exponentially and dangerously since VN. I believe that is true due to a -- flawed and failing IMO -- effort to influence US policy. The effort has not done that and has instead done the institution itself and the people in it a grave disservice. Not done well by the nation, either...

As Jon Custis once wrote, it's fortunate that most of the folks we fight are even more screwed up than we are... :wry:

[Fuchs]

As Jon Custis once wrote, it's fortunate that most of the folks we fight are even more screwed up than we are... :wry:

Did you already give back your U.S. citizenship?

You sound so totally un-American...after all, hooah!!!, Tom Clancy, easy bashing of underdeveloped nations' militaries, huge budgets and so on have convinced MANY U.S. Americans (and others) that all that shines is platinum.

[Rex Brynen]

Pfft, don't think we don't know the real reason the 10th Mountain Division is at Fort Drum (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/29/AR2005122901412_4.html).

[Steve Blair]

Anaconda suffered from more flaws than a lack of training, an overweening bureaucracy being but one. That overly bureaucratic bit and its allied overemphasis on force protection is in part a reaction to our less than stellar training; one cannot expect better than average or even average performance from below average training so one tends to be excessively cautious in employment.

Quite. Especially when one considers that the 10th only provided headquarters elements for Anaconda...the combat force (outside of SpecOps) was from the 101st. Mix and match has become one of our other hallmarks, and we never remember that it quite often doesn't go well...

[Steve Blair]

Pfft, don't think we don't know the real reason the 10th Mountain Division is at Fort Drum (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/29/AR2005122901412_4.html).

Naw...now that we have microbreweries we don't need to go north.

[Ken White]

Did you already give back your U.S. citizenship?With all our flaws, we still do better on more things than do any others of whom I'm aware. Many nations out perform us in specific areas but no one nation is as lucky to have so many fortuitous synergies roll into one acceptable but admittedly not great package. :cool:
You sound so totally un-American...after all, hooah!!!, Tom Clancy, easy bashing of underdeveloped nations' militaries, huge budgets and so on have convinced MANY U.S. Americans (and others) that all that shines is platinum.I think much of that is due to the failings of our media -- that's one area where even the worst in the world are ahead of us. A senior British Officer once said of our news people that their pathetic performance made us look like intemperate and rather ignorant clowns in the eyes of most of the rest of the world -- and he was IMO absolutely right. He added that he was truly shocked in actual interplay to find out that the truth was quite different.:eek:

Contrary to what those Squirrels say, show and write, my observation is that most Americans are pretty well aware of our benefits and shortfalls. The problem is that we're individualistic enough to squabble endlessly over what to do about correcting said shortfalls so needed results are agreed to but the routes are subject to almost endless negotiation and argument. Thus correction comes slowly -- though I sense that may be changing. Exasperation with Washington is always present and waxes and wanes but I think it has edge now that I've never seen before. The political crowd, the media, the White House and Congress really need to wake up and smell the coffee. :wry:

[Ken White]

Mix and match has become one of our other hallmarks, and we never remember that it quite often doesn't go well...Lacking well trained or experienced troops, the results are predictably really bad -- and thus caution inspiring...

An unfortunate side effect is the creation of a culture of "I want only people I know to work for me." This attitude means eschewing the pipeline (which will be the only source of replacements in a larger war...) and creates sycophants. It also drives many good people out of the forces (plural...)

[Pete]

During World War II the 10th Mountain trained at Dolly Sods, West Virginia, now a wilderness recreation area. It's high plateau country and said to have cliffs that the mountain troops used for training on climbing and rappelling. Never saw the cliffs the time I was there.

A girlfriend and I went camping there in 1986. Before we went there she told me how pristine and untouched it was, just like the way it was when Mother Nature had made it. Therefore imagine my startled reaction when we drove in and there was a big sign in color mounted on two posts saying

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE!
IF YOU FIND ONE OF THESE DO NOT TOUCH!

This of course was followed on the sign by images of 81mm, 4.2-inch and 105-mm projectiles. My thought was here I go again.

The main road through the recreation area is straight as an arrow courtesy of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, not a more winding road like civilians or park rangers would have built. Nancy and I had a nice weekend. A local greasy spoon where we ate breakfast had an iron-framed Henry Rifle from the Civil War in fair condition for sale for $700 that I did not buy; today it would be worth about $20-40K, it's hard to say.

[Pete]

When I was at Virginia Tech in 1976 I managed to snag a World War II mountain troops field jacket in unissued condition for a nominal sum. Three hippie-types driving a 1950s station wagon had a breakdown and they were selling their possessions to raise money for repairs.

The jacket was different from the standard WWII one in major ways -- it had a zipper on the front and on its pockets and also a G.I. khaki belt that went through a tunnel around the waist . The buckle was the old-fashioned hollow square kind, not the shiny brass of the dress uniform or the 1950s.

The jacket had a cargo compartment in the back that opened with a zipper, as well as adjustable packstraps inside. I read that the straps were not for carrying cargo in the back, but rather to allow the jacket to be taken off and carried on the back when temperatures in the mountains go from winter at night to summer during the day.

The firm Willis & Geiger is said to have been the company that made these jackets. They were a rich-guys' outfitter based in NYC that sold outdoor stuff to Theodore Roosevelt, Amelia Ehrhart and Earnest Hemingway. W&G designed and made the main Army Air Corps leather jacket of WWII.

W&G went out of business around 10 years ago, Their business model was to sell extremely expensive reproduction military stuff to guys who are legends in their own minds, like the author Tom Clancey. (You can see him on his back covers wearing his Ray-Bans and their flight jackets.) The last owner of W&G, Land's End, let the company go under about 10 years ago because of its financial problems.

[jmm99]

These two deal primarily with training:

Studies in the History of the Army Ground Forces, No. 28, "History of the Tenth Light Division (Alpine)." (http://www.history.army.mil/books/agf/agf28.htm)

Studies in the History of the Army Ground Forces, No. 23, "Training for Mountain and Winter Warfare." (http://www.history.army.mil/books/agf/agf23.htm)

This one covers one regiment's combat history:

History of the 85th Mountain Infantry in Italy (http://www.10thmtndivassoc.org/85thhistory.pdf)

One of the factors giving rise to the division's formation was the relative success of Finnish skiers in the Winter War.

Our neighbor's son (item 8 iii (http://familytreemaker.genealogy.com/users/r/o/m/Keith-A-Romberg/BOOK-0001/0005-0004.html) - F.A. Romberg) was a good skier and 100% Finnish, and ended up in the 85th Mountain Infantry (KIA 14 Apr 1945, Castel d'Aiano, Italy - SS citation (http://militarytimes.com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php?recipientid=26660)).

Regards

Mike

[Pete]

One of the factors giving rise to the division's formation was the relative success of Finnish skiers in the Winter War.
I didn't know they had tall mountains in Finland, so for the first time in my life I must be wrong again. Blame it on our insular American culture in which we have little awareness of foreign peoples and places. :eek: No wonder the Soviets had all the trouble they did in Finland, what with all of those 14,000-foot mountain ranges and such that they have there. :p

[Rifleman]

I don't know why the US Army hasn't embraced the idea of a true alpine unit. Perhaps it wouldn't need to be a division but at least a brigade. Basing such a unit at Ft. Carson is usually mentioned but Ft. Huachuca would be another possibility. The desert mountains of the southwest might serve as a good substitute for parts of Afghanistan.

My unit conducted annual winter training in the Italian Alps, but that's just what it was: winter training in an alpine environment, not training as true alpinists. We spent a lot of time on snow shoes pulling the ahkio around, setting up the arctic tent, and firing up the Yukon stove but we did no technical climbing or rope work. I suppose it was good toughness training but it sure wasn't technical training.

On a historical note, I'm aware of three technical climbs by US units in WWII: Riva Ridge by elements of 10th Mtn Div, Pointe du Hoc by 2d Ranger Bn, and Monte la Difensa by First Special Service Force. And although I said US units, I haven't forgot that FSSF was half Canadian.

Not sure about the Dieppe raid. I know 4 Commando with some 1st Ranger Bn attached made a climb there to attack a battery but I'm not sure if it was a technical climb or a scramble of sorts.

[jmm99]

can handle making molehills into mountains. Look at what the Delaware Finns (http://www.genealogia.fi/emi/art/article298re.htm) (the first Finns in the US in the 1600s) did to West Virginia - and that was by long-distance sorcery. :D

Seriously, a major Russian problem (leading to ceasefires in the Winter and Continuation Wars) was not just the Finnish capability to inflict casualties, but also the Finnish capability to accept casualties. Let's look at some KIA comparisons.

In the Vietnam War, the USA had ~58,200 KIA, as compared to a 1970 pop. of ~203,000,000. That works out to .287 KIA per 1000 pop.

South Boston (per Jim Webb) had 25 KIA, as compared to a pop. of ~34,000. That works out to .735 KIA per 1000 pop.

Our "Copper Country" area (4-county totals; specifics in the Vietnam Wall.pdf attached to this post) was between the USA and South Boston - 29 KIA, 1970 pop. 55,253; .525 KIA per 1000 pop.; although Ontonagon County exceeded South Boston - 9 KIA, 1970 pop. 10,548; .853 KIA per 1000 pop.

Before we hit the next paragraph, one should reflect on the fact that the Vietnam War was not an "existential war" to the USA.

My grandfather was born in the village of Pörtom (Pirttakylä), Finland. During the Winter & Continuation Wars, the Pörtombor sustained 75 KIA, from a 1940 pop. of 3,324. That computes to 22.563 KIA per 1000 pop. For a pop. of 203,000,000 (USA 1970), equivalence would require 4,580,300 KIA !!! The two Finnish wars were more "existential" than not.

The Pörtombor have no particular claim to fame, but were simply representative (Finland for both wars: ~88,000 KIA & MIA, 1940 pop. ~ 4,000,000; 22.0 KIA & MIA per 1000 pop.).

A possibly substantive factoid (from my cousin whose ancestry is Pörtombor, but who grew up in another nearby community) is that young, male Pörtombor have a reputation for cruising around in neighboring communities looking for festivities (e.g., wedding receptions) and picking group brawls. Cf., Dave Grossman's and Lonnie Athens' theories on violence (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=124028&postcount=26).

Regards

Mike (and from Mannerheim the Dog :))

PS: just for the sake of the record (from AGF No. 23 cited in post #14 above):


... As American newspaper readers became bored with the war in December 1939 a new conflict broke out between small Finland and the giant Soviet Union. The Finns, instead of being overwhelmed as most observers expected, surprised the world with the tenacity and effectiveness of their resistance. Ski troops, clothed in white to mask their moves' disrupted Russian Supply columns and won victory after victory.

Those initial victories of the highly Specialized Finnish winter troops aroused the interest of American political and military leaders. On 6 January 1940, Louis Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of War, asked General Marshall what consideration the General Staff had given to the subject of special clothing, equipment' food, transportation and other essentials necessary for an effective field force under conditions approximating those of the campaigns in Finland and Northern Russia.[1]

Three weeks later The Chief of Staff replied that operations of this nature had been under continuous study in connection with the problem of the defense of Alaska. Winter training had also been conducted annually by troops stationed in severe climate and had been especial y successful at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, where some of the men had become highly skilled in the use of skis. "It is my intention," General Marshall added' "to continue, accelerating where practicable, tests of food, clothing, equipment and transportation in order to standardize for the purpose the types best suited to operations under severe winter conditions. The campaign in Finland is being studied and should be of considerable assistance. Winter maneuvers, on a larger scale than yet attempted are desirable, but to date funds for this purpose have not been available."[2]

1. Memo of Mr. Louis Johnson, ASW, for the CofS, USA, no file, 6 Jan 40, sub: Campaign under Extreme Conditions of Weather. In AGO 370.22 (1-6-40)

2. Memo of the CofS, USA, G-4/31624, 24 Jan 40, sub as above. Ibid.

So, blame the Finnish link on Louis A. Johnson (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_A._Johnson) (a resident of West Virginia).

[Pete]

This place (http://www.mountainzone.com/mountains/detail.asp?fid=4364256) is named for a kinsman of mine. Around 1900 Gus Eisen gave the testimony to U.S. Congress that caused Sequoia National Park to be founded right before the logging companies got in there and turned the trees into picnic tables.

[Firn]

I don't know why the US Army hasn't embraced the idea of a true alpine unit. Perhaps it wouldn't need to be a division but at least a brigade. Basing such a unit at Ft. Carson is usually mentioned but Ft. Huachuca would be another possibility. The desert mountains of the southwest might serve as a good substitute for parts of Afghanistan.

My unit conducted annual winter training in the Italian Alps, but that's just what it was: winter training in an alpine environment, not training as true alpinists. We spent a lot of time on snow shoes pulling the ahkio around, setting up the arctic tent, and firing up the Yukon stove but we did no technical climbing or rope work. I suppose it was good toughness training but it sure wasn't technical training.


Training individuals is certainly no proper way to make a true mountain brigade, as especially on high altitudes and very difficult terrain and weather every untrained or unfit person becomes a liability to your squad/platoon. To pull off combined arms under such circumstances training needs, well, to train that.

Ciaspole/Snowshoes with ski poles and akhios are an excellent way to help non-skiier to move through high snow, and are superior in very steep slopes or difficult terrain but are of course inferior in not so dense vegetation, roads, and generally open terrain. Sadly with the abolition of the "leva" the Alpini have no longer a very large pool of good skiiers among the rank, as the volunteers are no longer from the local valleys and regions but mostly, roughly 70% from southern Italy (Puglia, Campania, ...). You also no longer find nowhere as easily recruits with already considerable technical or Alpine climbing or mountaineering experience which could be prime material for guides. It is a bit sad to hear instead of furlan, piemontèis, lumbard, now the napoletano or other southern dialects, but the forces are not attractive enough for men and women from the wealthy regions.

Of course the regional character has thus been greatly weakened and the connection between the brigades and the locals can no longer be as strong as they used to be. Also you no longer have a fair rappresentation of all the population, and the low pay and not so good education does very little to attract certain members of our society.

Anyway I still believe that proper leadership, discipline and training are more important and the increased time of service should in theory compensate the weaknesses of the new ways. New times, new ways. Let us just hope that this concept won't get tested too severly.

[blueblood]

US Army often send some troops to India for some mountain warfare training. But AFAIK they conduct these exercises on HAWS, Gulmarg instead of Parvat Ghatak school, Tawang.

Royal Marines also came for the joint exercise few years back and didn't fair well. Most of the contingent failed to cope up with the altitude.

[Fuchs]

It takes six weeks to acclimatise in high mountains. Few exercises are along enough for that - and even if they are, the first 4-6 weeks are going to be ####ty.

[ganulv]

I lived at 2350 meters for a year in Central America. A couple of days after my arrival I was invited in on a game of pick-up football with the members of a catechism class. Despite being in reasonable condition, about five minutes later I was feeling a kind of pain I had never known before. And 2350 meters isn’t really that high!

Acetazolamide can help acclimatization but it isn’t a Golden Hammer. Being in Royal Marine condition at sea level would certainly speed acclimatization but no more than that. Seems a lot of time and money to spend on an exercise which was bound to fail.

[blueblood]

Well, the Royal Marines were on their way home from Astan when this exercise happened and IIRC Marines train in Norway for arctic warfare but then Snowy plains of Norway are no Himalayas. I agree with Fuchs, not sure about 6 weeks though. During Kargil, Indian Army's non mountain infantry were acclimatized for 15 days. Brig Ray may know better.

[Firn]

Altitude sickness is one of the reasons why India has such a high number of troops stationed high up in the Himalaya. As Ganulv worte, the thin air doesn't care how tough and mentally strong you are.

Every decent alpinist who has climbed in the Himalaya or other really high mountains (should) know the various procedures. The usually tight schedules of tourists for climbs like the Kilimanjaro are not quite ideal, and many suffer accordingly. IIRC in the Kargil conflict some Indian units suffered due to military necessity a quick rush up from the plains to the higher regions, with similar results. Every rushed meter of altitude increases the pain and the risks.

As usual it all depends on context, training and then especially one the T's of METT-TC. Maybe it should be spelled out fully as METWTS-TC, as the importance of weather and support is great indeed, as the mountain warfare has shown in the last hundred years.

[blueblood]

Altitude sickness is one of the reasons why India has such a high number of troops stationed high up in the Himalaya. As Ganulv worte, the thin air doesn't care how tough and mentally strong you are.

Every decent alpinist who has climbed in the Himalaya or other really high mountains (should) know the various procedures. The usually tight schedules of tourists for climbs like the Kilimanjaro are not quite ideal, and many suffer accordingly. IIRC in the Kargil conflict some Indian units suffered due to military necessity a quick rush up from the plains to the higher regions, with similar results.

As usual it all depends on context, training and then especially one the T's of METT-TC. Maybe it should be spelled out METWTS-TC, as the importance of weather and support is especially great, as the mountain warfare has shown in the last hundred years.


Yes, initially when the mobilization was not fully completed IA units from plains were called in since most mountain units were engaged on the eastern border with China. Thus, they suffered from altitude sickness and other problems but as soon as the brass realized this, they initiated acclimatization program for the rest of the troops. So, now Indian Army has a policy to impart mountain warfare training to every infantry soldier, mountain unit or not. My cousin is a Major in artillery regiment and his first posting after his commission was to man a post at 3000m on LOC.

Most western armies don't need to emphasize on mountain warfare as it does not fit the criteria for their area of operations. Like Indian Army and Navy were never too interested in raising a Marine divison.

[Morgan]

Though it's been 20 years (good god!!), the Mountain Warfare School at CP Ethan Allen in VT was pretty damn good. Two phases, summer and winter with each phase lasting two weeks. After completion of both phases, one is awarded the Ram's Head device, only authorized for wear in Vermont.

The Army's mountain/ winter warfare school in in Alaska and is 6-weeks long. Don't know much about it since I've neer been there but I'm told it's pretty good.

Last I knew, the only unit in the 86th IBCT that was an actual mountain unit was 3-172d INF...had lead climbers, assault climbers, etc. Not sure if that's the case now.

It'd be great if every one of our light infantry brigades had at least one company dedicated as a mountain unit. It's great that we send so many of our joe's to jump school but mountain training has a more practical application.

[ganulv]

I agree with Fuchs, not sure about 6 weeks though. During Kargil, Indian Army's non mountain infantry were acclimatized for 15 days. Brig Ray may know better.

I guess it may be an issue of semantics. Does ‘acclimatize’ imply nothing beyond “no more altitude sickness at a given altitude” or does it imply “optimized for a given altitude”?

From Zubieta-Calleja, et al.’s article “Altitude adaptation through hematocrit change” (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18204195):


Adaptation = Time/Altitude, where High altitude adaptation factor = Time at altitude (days)/Altitude in kilometers (km). The time in days required to achieve full adaptation to any altitude, ascending from sea level, can be calculated by multiplying the adaptation factor of 11.4 times the altitude in km.

[kowalskil]

My understanding is that the 10th Mountain Division carries the <Mountain> designation for reasons related to its history rather than as a description of its contemporary capabilities ...

Generals probably think that mountain fighting is now less important than in the past. How else can this be explained?

Ludwik Kowalski (see Wikipedia)
.

[Fuchs]

Generals probably think that mountain fighting is now less important than in the past. How else can this be explained?


With a preference for expensive hardware solutions. The 101st (helicopter mobile) division was probably the real U.S. mountain division for a long time.

[Steve Blair]

With a preference for expensive hardware solutions. The 101st (helicopter mobile) division was probably the real U.S. mountain division for a long time.

Not likely.

[Pete]

We've had the reactivated 10th Mountain Division for around two decades, but I doubt they are trained up to the same standards of the World War II outfit. Still, I have to wonder whether their mountain-climbing training was really put into practice very frequently in Italy during '44-'45 -- did they really have to go up and down on ropes on cliffs as a matter of course?

This special training thing might be a bit like the Airborne philosophy -- it's not as much about the efficacy of large-scale parachute drops in combat today or rock-climbing, it's about the motivation level of the guys who volunteer for that kind of thing in the first place, and the "Never Quit" attitude they have.

[ganulv]

Still, I have to wonder whether their mountain-climbing training was really put into practice very frequently in Italy during '44-'45 -- did they really have to go up and down on ropes on cliffs as a matter of course?

That’s one of those “Hopefully, never!” things, right? For example, even if the EOD guys have never once been called to urgently disarm a nuclear weapon I still think it is worth the trouble to train them to be able to!

[Steve Blair]

We've had the reactivated 10th Mountain Division for around two decades, but I doubt they are trained up to the same standards of the World War II outfit. Still, I have to wonder whether their mountain-climbing training was really put into practice very frequently in Italy during '44-'45 -- did they really have to go up and down on ropes on cliffs as a matter of course?

This special training thing might be a bit like the Airborne philosophy -- it's not as much about the efficacy of large-scale parachute drops in combat today or rock-climbing, it's about the motivation level of the guys who volunteer for that kind of thing in the first place, and the "Never Quit" attitude they have.

Of course the 10th Mountain isn't trained to the same standards. That was a "heritage" naming that coincided with some of the light division ideas...rather like the 101st still being called airborne in some instances when in fact it's not or the 1st Cavalry Division (which is of course an armored division).

[Pete]

I was in 7th ID in '82-'84 when the light division concept was first floated. The light TO&E was designed to fit within a certain number of C-141 sorties, 600 or so. So far so good, but what happens when they get there?

The World War II idea of attaching heavy battalions to infantry divisions seems like a good idea, particularly when they habitually train together. The old light ID concept would have been better had there been a cavalry troop (or two or three with a squadron HQ) that could have deployed with them by air, with tank and 155 howitzer battalions being sent by ship for arrival later.

[Fuchs]

The World War II idea of attaching heavy battalions to infantry divisions seems like a good idea, particularly when they habitually train together. The old light ID concept would have been better had there been a cavalry troop (or two or three with a squadron HQ) that could have deployed with them by air, with tank and 155 howitzer battalions being sent by ship for arrival later.

Even better: Have small combined arms armoured recce battalions and let them train with reservist infantry battalions from time to time - using updated assault gun tactics.

[Pete]

The light infantry concept of the early 1980s came about when the situation in El Salvador and Nicaragua was going on.

Nicaragua had some light armor but not much, so a light force might have been all that was needed. It could be that the light TO&E was designed for a specific conflict or conflicts in that region, not the proverbial "Full Spectrum of Operations."

We still have variants of the light TO&E in the force structure so I still think attaching heavier battalions to lightly-armed units like that is a good idea. The attached units should be stationed at the same installation as the unit they support so they can train together.

[Fuchs]

I have read stuff about "light division" concepts from the early 80's that rather pointed at a high tech, high battlefield agility force - meant to drive around red hordes in Europe instead of grinding them.

[Steve Blair]

I have read stuff about "light division" concepts from the early 80's that rather pointed at a high tech, high battlefield agility force - meant to drive around red hordes in Europe instead of grinding them.

That was one of the many concepts that floated around about the light divisions. There was the 9th Division, which was intended to be the high-tech test bed, and then there were the others (the 7th among them) that were intended to be more as Pete described. Over time the light concept settled more on the 25th ID and the 10th Mountain, which both provided a good chunk of "expeditionary" Army forces prior to Sept 11 (the 10th was in Somalia, for example).

[ganulv]

I stopped by the recently opened Thunderbolt Ski Museum in Adama, Massachusetts, earlier today. Adams had multiple native sons in the original iteration of the 10th Mountain Division and there are a few items donated by them on display at the museum. I got a few snapshots if anyone is interested.


http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8362/8378809798_d87d843dca.jpg (http://www.flickr.com/photos/mtbradley/8378809798/)


Overwhites. (http://www.flickr.com/photos/mtbradley/8378809798/)



http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8043/8377724129_ec98d76d76.jpg (http://www.flickr.com/photos/mtbradley/8377724129/)


Frank Prejsnar's ice axe. (http://www.flickr.com/photos/mtbradley/8377724129/)




http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8354/8378818408_04646d5ea1.jpg (http://www.flickr.com/photos/mtbradley/8378818408/)
Skis, poles, and rucksack. (http://www.flickr.com/photos/mtbradley/8378818408/)






http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8364/8378825454_bf4b0ca949.jpg (http://www.flickr.com/photos/mtbradley/8378825454/)
Skins. (http://www.flickr.com/photos/mtbradley/8378825454/)