View Full Version : Initial Officer Selection
I am doing some comparative research into initial officer selection processes.
The Brit system termed the AOSB (Army Officer Selection Board) is a two phase exercise comprising the two-day AOSB Briefing (http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/AOSB_Briefing.pdf) followed by, if successful, the four-day AOSB Main Board (http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/AOSB_Main_Board.pdf).
During the ASOB Briefing candidates "will be assessed on physically and practical exercises designed to test your leadership and teamwork potential." While during the Main Board; "The officers assessing you will be interested in your approach to problems and challenges, and your attitude towards other members of the group – both as a team player and as a team leader."
The Royal Marines have the POC (Potential Officers Course) (http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/royalmarines/careers/potential-officers-course/index.htm) which claim; "The POC is designed to see whether you are likely to meet the challenge. It is a gruelling test of your physical fitness, and we are assessing your determination and commitment. But we are looking for a little more than that: your leadership potential and intelligence, how you communicate and whether you can keep a sense of humour even when exhausted. Can you think on your feet when the going gets tough?"
As far as the US is concerned I have a document Policies, Procedures, and People: The Initial Selection of U.S. Military Officers (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/p010347.pdf).
Two questions.
One, is this document an accurate and current reflection of the subject matter? Or is there better out there?
Two, it is not evident from the quoted document whether any of the US initial officer selection processes involve group activities such as the Brit examples. Is this so?
Clarity would be appreciated.
Having just finished Army OCS I can say the initial selection was non existent. I went before a board of three Officers, they asked a few trivial questions. Basically tried to make sure I was not completely incompetent. About 25% of the candidates is OCS were garbage (many did not make it through). So I do not give much to the initial selection.
The worst part of the initial selection was the one year wait to get into OCS. Frankly, many highly qualified future Officers were dissuaded by the long wait.
There are no group activities until OCS.
Having just finished Army OCS I can say the initial selection was non existent. I went before a board of three Officers, they asked a few trivial questions. Basically tried to make sure I was not completely incompetent. About 25% of the candidates is OCS were garbage (many did not make it through). So I do not give much to the initial selection.
The worst part of the initial selection was the one year wait to get into OCS. Frankly, many highly qualified future Officers were dissuaded by the long wait.
There are no group activities until OCS.
Thank you for the response. If I may ask a question or two (assuming you to be a 'young' officer with the training fresh in your mind).
One, (in the military context) do you believe (or were you taught to believe) that leadership can be taught (off a zero base if necessary) or that those with 'natural' leadership ability routinely demonstrate this skill by the age of officer selection (18-22) which can be honed and developed but not taught?
Two, cadets learn to assess each other pretty well during an Officer Cadet Course and know who the 'no-hoper's' are. Do you consider it fair to to such individuals to let them start a course only to be failed after months of sweat and toil (and humiliation)? And does their presence on the course distract the other course members?
From YouTube we get these clips on:
ASOB - Briefing (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUmwWAalwws)
ASOB - Main Board (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LpH0L0XaM5c&feature=relmfu)
SethB
08-28-2011, 05:41 PM
Army OCS assumes that Officership can be taught on the fly, sometime after OCS. There is a minimal amount of selection.
They go through the right steps, but they provide no quality control.
There are teamwork exercises, but people that fail them and prove themselves unable to either lead or follow routinely graduate.
I still believe that OCS ought to be selection based, where qualified, board selected candidates are evaluated in a modified SFAS setting and judged on (primarily) integrity, flexibility and determination.
The current setup is a watered down, 12 week USMA, which is not surprising considering that the men that started it were VMI/USMA sourced Officers, and it hasn't changed as much since 1941 as one might hope.
Just my opinion, as a grad.
Fuchs
08-28-2011, 06:07 PM
The best wartime recruiting scheme is imo to approach proved NCOs who showed the necessary potential.
The best peacetime recruiting scheme is imo still to be attractive for a far too large quantity of applicants and then be able to pick the most promising ones in an assessment centre approach (btw, the latter was pioneered by the Prussian army pre-WWI).
The situation as of now seems to be that
* we apply peacetime mechanisms because we're 'not enough' at war for a real wartime mode
and
* we fail to attract enough applicants for a well-done peacetime mechanism.
This "we" means "just about every country on earth".
IIRC even wartime officer courses of the Wehrmacht (can't vouch for this) required to dismiss 40% of those who attended the course back to their NCO life.
The best wartime recruiting scheme is imo to approach proved NCOs who showed the necessary potential.
If one assumes that the value of direct entry officers (which I do) is that you get to produce experienced senior officers young enough to actively and energetically command brigades/divisions/corps/armies. The platoon/company command phase is merely an 'apprenticeship' to gain the operational insight and experience required for higher command.
To keep this in mind one has to work backwards from the estimated number of generals an army needs to figure out how many 'quality' officers one needs to commission every year.
By all means make up the numbers of the up to field officer ranks from NCOs who may be of an age which may limit them to say a maximum of Lt Col. But be wary of denuding the NCO structures of the quality that makes them the backbone of the army as a result.
My position has always been that an army does not need lieutenants to command platoons (senior sergeants have done that before) but lieutenants who have aspirations of higher command need to gain the experience of commanding a platoon (preferably in combat) for as long as possible.
Yes I accept that during wartime many things change as the attrition rates demand rapid replacements... but something as got to give... and that is normally quality.
The best peacetime recruiting scheme is imo still to be attractive for a far too large quantity of applicants and then be able to pick the most promising ones in an assessment centre approach (btw, the latter was pioneered by the Prussian army pre-WWI).
Can you explain what you mean by "an assessment centre approach".
The situation as of now seems to be that
* we apply peacetime mechanisms because we're 'not enough' at war for a real wartime mode
and
* we fail to attract enough applicants for a well-done peacetime mechanism.
This "we" means "just about every country on earth".
The selection process is not IMHO dependent upon war or peace. Length of training probably does though.
In addition, I am still not sure why there is a need for a degree before commissioning when there is plenty of time in a 25-30 year career to take three or so years for the purpose (around the senior Capt/Maj level for the infantry). Too much time and money (again IMHO) is invested in training of officers the majority of whom (it seems) will leave the service before they have justified the initial expense.
IIRC even wartime officer courses of the Wehrmacht (can't vouch for this) required to dismiss 40% of those who attended the course back to their NCO life.
Yes, that is how it worked in Rhodesia despite having used the Brit AOSB system which I say is an indictment of either the AOSB system or how it was run there back then. The Brit approach (as I understand it) is that passing the AOSB virtually assures one of a commission as the onus passes to the course instructors to 'develop' the cadets over the period of the course. Not sure that is the best way either.
IMHO those that pass the AOSB should get commissioned but for the reason that the AOSB selection mechanisms are accurate and as a result the cadet is worthy of a commission in the end.
Fuchs
08-28-2011, 08:32 PM
Assessment centre approach means to keep them busy, challenged and under observation for a long enough time (days) that they cannot fake qualities that they don't possess.
SethB
08-29-2011, 12:11 AM
Selection and development need to be separated, or you will accomplish neither.
The USMC OCS model is the most successful that I can think of for this very reason.
Ulenspiegel
08-29-2011, 07:23 AM
@Seth B
One interisting aspect of the officer selection in the Prussian army and Reichswehr was that the CO of the regiment the officer candidate would join did the final decision whether the candidate is accepted or rejected.
Later (3-4 years after commission) the same CO would deceide whether the officer attend the section process for staff officer training. You can combine selection and developement, however, the regiment CO needs a good vision of the product (officer) he has to produce.
@JMA
Do you propose a merger of NCO and officer corps?
Assessment centre approach means to keep them busy, challenged and under observation for a long enough time (days) that they cannot fake qualities that they don't possess.
Yes that is what I understand, thanks for the clarification.
Perhaps the following paper will be of value to you as it compares this selection process over the procedures of a number of countries:
Research and Study Group 31 - Officer Selection (http://www.iamps.org/RTO_HFM_023_RSG_31Final_Report.pdf)
Maybe you can help me here, but it does not appear that the current German system (as explained in the document) has a practical task phase (held outside as opposed to in a lecture room or equivalent). That said two days of tests is far better than a mere paper exercise (IMHO).
Selection and development need to be separated, or you will accomplish neither.
The USMC OCS model is the most successful that I can think of for this very reason.
Just to see if we are on the same page here.
'Selection' takes place before the course begins (with the successful candidates being allowed to start the course) and 'development' takes place during the course itself (taking this raw material and moulding it into something vaguely resembling what is expected of a young officer).
How may I ask is the USMC model more successful in this regard?
@JMA
Do you propose a merger of NCO and officer corps?
No, not at all.
I believe that under the almost universal system officers and NCOs complement each other in making up the whole. There are specific skills required amongst the Officer corps as there are amongst the NCO corps. I don't believe you can mix and match the two without something getting compromised. There are a percentage of NCOs who display the skills required of an officer and who should be considered for officer training on application. But as I said in an earlier post IMHO care should be taken not to denude the NCO corps of its brightest and best (with the resultant massive downstream knock-on effect) in order to address a (normally short term) platoon commander shortage.
There is an old US Cavalry saying (I believe) which goes: "Officers come and officers go but the don't hurt the troop". This can only be true if the NCO structure is strong and intact.
In the doc Research and Study Group 31 - Officer Selection (http://www.iamps.org/RTO_HFM_023_RSG_31Final_Report.pdf) in the year under review only a small percentage of German officer candidates appear to have come through from the ranks.
I suggest that the officer function at company level be carefully kept in focus when discussing such matters. He is serving his apprenticeship for higher command. He needs the experience for this and he needs the support of quality NCOs to achieve this.
A thought that I kept in mind all the time and later never let any of the officer cadets under my control forget is that when you command a platoon you have 100-150 years of military service in your hands (when the total service of the platoon is added up)... and that is one massive responsibility which the army can not allow you to squander. (A believe you me any platoon sergeant worth his salt won't let you do so either).
I don't know the state of the NCO corps in various armies but I hear that in the Brit army the NCOs may not be what they once were. But the problem (one problem) is that the officer corps has its challenges. One of which seems to be the initial selection process which allows too many people through who are not up to the required standard.
Deal with this problem but do not tamper with the NCO structure in order to achieve a quick fix. That is what I am saying.
Red Rat
08-29-2011, 09:11 AM
The UK AOSB is failing more candidates then ever before. Candidates are also scrutinised closely at the officer academy (Royal Military Academy Sandhurst - RMAS), especially those aspiring to the combat arms.
Royal Marines officers also had to undertake the Admiralty Interview Board (AIB) in addition to POC, although I am not sure if this is still the case.
The general consensus is that the UK officer selection procedure is providing both the number and quality of officers required - that at least is the opinion of commanders. Most debate within the UK army at the moment is less on officer selection and more on officer training and development; namely the RMAS syllabus and the tactics used in the field exercises there, as well as special to arm training (Basic Officers Course in the US terminology) after officer training.
I will see if I can get some hard statistics on AOSB pass/fail rates and those for RMAS.
Ulenspiegel
08-29-2011, 10:10 AM
JMA, thank you for your long response, gave me some stuff to digest.
My question arose as the officer and NCO recruiting in Germany perfectly mirrowed the school system during the last 150 years. With dramatic changes in our educational system (dying of Hauptschule, much more Abiturienten) one question is how the armed forces are affected and how could we for example make NCO positions more attractiv for Abiturienten.
The low number of ACTIVE officers coming from the ranks is quite usual in the German army during peace time. You got a completely different answer, if you check reserve officers, many of them decided during the first six month of their mandatory service to serve longer and attend the required NCO courses.
SethB
08-29-2011, 01:29 PM
The USMC uses a board to select applicants. It is highly selective.
Then they go to ten or twelve weeks of OCS, where 50% pass.
There is no emphasis on training, just selection.
Then they go to The Basic Course for six months of training in the basics, followed by an MOS course (Infantry, Artillery, etc).
It's a good system. I like working with Marines. Very professional and well educated. A far cry from the Army system.
60% of Marines come from OCS. 30% come from USNA, where there is less selection. The two groups don't always get along at first...
stanleywinthrop
08-29-2011, 03:24 PM
The USMC uses a board to select applicants. It is highly selective.
Then they go to ten or twelve weeks of OCS, where 50% pass.
There is no emphasis on training, just selection.
Then they go to The Basic Course for six months of training in the basics, followed by an MOS course (Infantry, Artillery, etc).
It's a good system. I like working with Marines. Very professional and well educated. A far cry from the Army system.
60% of Marines come from OCS. 30% come from USNA, where there is less selection. The two groups don't always get along at first...
To emphasis this point the entire OCS course is an evaluation and selection process and candidates are told this from the very beginning. The only actual skills learned there are drill, basic weapons handling (but no live-fire), and fire team and squad tactics. Thats it. The learning takes place at TBS.
The UK AOSB is failing more candidates then ever before. Candidates are also scrutinised closely at the officer academy (Royal Military Academy Sandhurst - RMAS), especially those aspiring to the combat arms.
Royal Marines officers also had to undertake the Admiralty Interview Board (AIB) in addition to POC, although I am not sure if this is still the case.
The general consensus is that the UK officer selection procedure is providing both the number and quality of officers required - that at least is the opinion of commanders. Most debate within the UK army at the moment is less on officer selection and more on officer training and development; namely the RMAS syllabus and the tactics used in the field exercises there, as well as special to arm training (Basic Officers Course in the US terminology) after officer training.
I will see if I can get some hard statistics on AOSB pass/fail rates and those for RMAS.
Happy to hear this. I think my point was that the AOSB should produce passes who are more likely to complete the course and obtain a commission rather than err on the side of leniency and push candidates through to maybe... just maybe... pull through on a wing and a prayer. Hard on the course, an additional unnecessary training cost and psychologically devastating on some of the individuals who fail in the end.
Of course the AOSB can't be foolproof and there will be those who make it through with flying colours yet fail to perform on the course. I believe that these cases should be studied and the AOSB reports reviewed to refine the process.
All this said IMHO if the OSB is an effective process then the vast majority of those who pass and go on to officer training should be commissioned in the end.
Having been on the receiving end of courses (as course officer) selected by others through an OSB process that I and the Course Instructors (NCOs) had to train in which it was quickly apparent there were no-hoper's became pretty irritating. These extras serve to further divide the attention that can be given to others to good effect in addition to being a waste of money.
All this said I do know from experience that there is always some pressure on the system to come up with 'right' number of commissions to fill the vacancies. This is the thin edge of the wedge that starts the rot.
Good if you can find some stats.
The USMC uses a board to select applicants. It is highly selective.
Then they go to ten or twelve weeks of OCS, where 50% pass.
There is no emphasis on training, just selection.
Then they go to The Basic Course for six months of training in the basics, followed by an MOS course (Infantry, Artillery, etc).
It's a good system. I like working with Marines. Very professional and well educated. A far cry from the Army system.
60% of Marines come from OCS. 30% come from USNA, where there is less selection. The two groups don't always get along at first...
Up front let me say that this obviously works for the marines (and that's really all that counts).
My initial focus was upon the initial pre-course selection process because it is the quality of which informs as to how many (what percentage) pass in the end. The attrition rate I experienced was similar to the 50% you speak of. I am now questioning this in the light of the quality of the initial pre-course selection process.
What happens to the 50% who fail? What is the cost of training those who don't make it? What psychological impact does this (largely avoidable failure) have on these individuals? Are they lost to the service? Is there not some room for improvement in the initial selection process?
Up front let me say that this obviously works for the marines (and that's really all that counts).
My initial focus was upon the initial pre-course selection process because it is the quality of which informs as to how many (what percentage) pass in the end. The attrition rate I experienced was similar to the 50% you speak of. I am now questioning this in the light of the quality of the initial pre-course selection process.
What happens to the 50% who fail? What is the cost of training those who don't make it? What psychological impact does this (largely avoidable failure) have on these individuals? Are they lost to the service? Is there not some room for improvement in the initial selection process?
Initial selection is... not very valuable. It certainly dismays those who are not determined (it takes about a year from the day you walk into a recruiters office to OCS), but leadership cannot be screened for.
My OCS class started with 128, only 87 commissioned as 2lt's. Many of those would did not make it went to good schools, got good grades had fine jobs ect.
Our distinguished leader grad failed out of college the first time and finished at some tec school no one has never heard of. But I would follow him into anything. That just goes to prove being a leader is completely different than the resume padding kids do now a days.
I have a masters in Middle eastern studies and know arabic, does that make me a good officer? No. Does charisma matter? No.
IMHO It all comes down to two things. 1st. I am willing to suffer for those around me. 2nd can I make the hard decision at the right time.
Few have it. After 12 weeks you know who do.
Now to adress your other question, what happens to those who fail. In most cases you get recycled and can class up with another company. Some chapter out of the army, some go AIT. If you cannot get through OCS the second time you need to be let go. It is just not that hard of a course. I am sure it is crushing to fail.
The Initial selection needs to be tighter. But by what metrics?
Also think of the needs of the Army - does that reserve quartermaster need to be a stud?
SethB
08-30-2011, 01:43 AM
What happens to the 50% who fail?
They go home. As do those that are selected but decline a commission, which is different than the Army, where those who don't graduate often end up being assigned to an enlisted job according to the needs of the Army.
What is the cost of training those who don't make it?
Cheap. In comparison to training them. USMA spends $400,000-$800,000 and has no selection mechanism aside from the admissions process. OCS costs a fraction of that.
What psychological impact does this (largely avoidable failure) have on these individuals? Are they lost to the service? Is there not some room for improvement in the initial selection process?
I'm not worried about those that aren't selected as much as I am getting the best.
Leadership isn't the thing to focus on. Integrity, intestinal fortitude and team playing are very important.
When I went through Army OCS, we has a student 1SG who reported a cadre member to the 1SG for the heinous crime of allowing them off a punishment detail early.
When asked why, he smiled and said "because I intend to get an Excellence [rating]."
That, right there, is an example of someone who has the wrong motivations. Had he ignored the situation to help his colleagues I could respect his decision. Had he told the 1SG in the interest of consistency, fairness, discipline or upholding the standard, I could agree. But those that are motivated for personal profit cannot be taught to be good leaders.
Some friendly questions for clarity... not to be seen as provocative please.
Initial selection is... not very valuable.
Lets call it initial pre-course selection.
This is my point of this thread. IMHO it should be valuable. Otherwise you waste time, money and effort on people who have no chance of making it.
It certainly dismays those who are not determined (it takes about a year from the day you walk into a recruiters office to OCS),...
That then is a self inflicted wound. Why not put them through a normal recruits course and then some time with the trained soldiers (while waiting for OCS)... and maybe a quick trip to the rockpile? (You learn a lot about a person by observing him under fire)
... but leadership cannot be screened for.
Not sure about that. Maybe not if all one has to go on are reports school teachers etc. I believe the idea of the Brit AOSB is to create situations where the leadership ability and or potential of candidates can be observed. (See Youtube videos posted above in post #4 to this thread)
My OCS class started with 128, only 87 commissioned as 2lt's. Many of those would did not make it went to good schools, got good grades had fine jobs ect.
Our distinguished leader grad failed out of college the first time and finished at some tec school no one has never heard of. But I would follow him into anything. That just goes to prove being a leader is completely different than the resume padding kids do now a days.
I have a masters in Middle eastern studies and know arabic, does that make me a good officer? No. Does charisma matter? No.
IMHO It all comes down to two things. 1st. I am willing to suffer for those around me. 2nd can I make the hard decision at the right time.
Few have it. After 12 weeks you know who do.
Now to adress your other question, what happens to those who fail. In most cases you get recycled and can class up with another company. Some chapter out of the army, some go AIT. If you cannot get through OCS the second time you need to be let go. It is just not that hard of a course. I am sure it is crushing to fail.
30 odd years ago this would not have caused me to raise an eyebrow.
But now consider this. That a third failed would indicate that the initial selection could be improved, yes? This third indicates a wate of time, money and effort IMHO.
Well as to the academic qualifcations. How much is enough? I would settle for a set minimum standard for acceptance. The same for the physical. He/she either can or they can't... a pass or fail situation. Has he/she met the academic requirements? And more than the requirement is a bonus. Is he/she pshysically able to carry out the duties of an officer? Any bigger, stronger, fitter is a bonus.
That said I question the 60:30:10 breakdown of the 'whole person' grading sustem. In my humble opinion the academic (60%) and the physical (10%) should be pass or fail. I would also question the vality of the 30% allocated to leadership potential as measured by high school sports participation and high school teacher recommendations.
So what I am suggesting is that phase on is to ascertain whether he/she meets the academic and physical standards required. If yes then a process run by the military (like the Brit AOSB) should select for leadership potential as a second stage. Proof positive of leadership qualities are essential if the candidate is to progress to the training IMHO.
The Initial selection needs to be tighter. But by what metrics?
Think I have covered that above.
Also think of the needs of the Army - does that reserve quartermaster need to be a stud?
You get your reserve quartermasters out of direct entry OCS courses?
I would have thought that the best candidates for this type of position would be seasoned and experienced NCOs with 15 plus years of experience, yes?
(T&A Commissions (technical and administrative) are/were a Brit method of promoting NCOs with the ability, service and experience from warrant officer to commissioned officer. Worked well.)
Granite_State
08-30-2011, 02:41 PM
I can speak at some length about USMC OCS, having graduated just over two years ago. It was pretty selective when I went through, and has gotten dramatically more so in the last two years. Potential candidates go through a selection board, where Physical Fitness Test (PFT), college grades, recommendations, interview with your recruiter, and a host of other factors weigh in. The Marine Corps takes recruiting very seriously BTW.
OCS itself is a ten week officer boot camp (vice 13 on the enlisted side), with a little less of the mind games but a much larger leadership screening component. The latter is based on many factors, but one of the biggest ones are billets in small unit blank fire tactical scenarios (fire team and squad sized) and some fire team leadership puzzles (get this barrel over this 20 meter water obstacle using only a rope, pipes, and each other, in five minutes, etc.). I think the latter idea was borrowed from the Reichswehr.
Attrition in my platoon was pretty low, around 25-30%. Should have been a little higher.
They go home. As do those that are selected but decline a commission, which is different than the Army, where those who don't graduate often end up being assigned to an enlisted job according to the needs of the Army.
I'm not sure of the total number involved here. But looking back it seems such a waste to squander to the opportunity to accommodate young people who had at one point significant interest in a carreer in the services.
I question as I did with the current Brit system why they are commissioned before they are fully trained and ready to command a platoon in battle. The Brits do the AOSB as a pre-course initial selection (over a total of 6 days) followed by the Officers Course of 48 weeks when they are commissioned and then attend the 16 week Platoon Commanders Battle Course after which they are posted to their units and take command of their platoons. Although 80% plus of cadets who start the Officers Course are graduates it is not a requirement prior to commisssioning. (Red Rat correct me here if necessary).
Why not hold back the commissions until after the successful completion of the 16 week Platoon Commanders Battle Course (to allow for those who perform poorly to exit out the side door).
My approach to the academic is that the military needs control over what degree courses are taken and indeed what lines of study are beneficial to the military and the officers carreer. The only value I can see in the requirement for a degree before commissioning is that the officers at platoon level will be a few years older and perhaps more mature. I would argue that it would be better to take the kids in young and raw and blood them. Once the settling has taken place where the service likes what it sees and believes there is a future for the individual and the individual wants to stay in the servive then the service can invest in his/her future by sending them to university. (I would suggest that in the case of those who it is apparrent do not have a carreer beyond major that they too can be released to go to college to get a suitable qualification for their futures)
Back to the point. As time passes I am less supportive of the approach where volunteers (for officer training or special units etc) are sucked in and then spat out if they don't make the grade. I am the first one to insist that standards be maintained but I do believe that the methods need to be refined and be honourable in all respects.
Cheap. In comparison to training them. USMA spends $400,000-$800,000 and has no selection mechanism aside from the admissions process. OCS costs a fraction of that.
It seems the USMA is a different kettle of fish altogether. So I don't necessarily agree with the "well we waste less money than they do" approach. Waste is waste and better (more thorough) initial pre-course selection will reduce that.
I'm not worried about those that aren't selected as much as I am getting the best.
The end result is critical but the method of arriving there can be finnessed to get the best without treating the rest like sh*t. Should be the natural approach of an officer, yes?
Leadership isn't the thing to focus on. Integrity, intestinal fortitude and team playing are very important.
Al Capone and many of his mates had proven leadership skills but probably little integrity. I suggest that leadership is the most important aspect. Find out who those are who have it and then filter out those lacking in the moral behaviour and judgement needed in the service (this does not apply only to officers). The papaer Research and Study Group 31 - Officer Selection (http://www.iamps.org/RTO_HFM_023_RSG_31Final_Report.pdf) contains a good piece about the real leadership required by officers. Worth a read to see if we are on the same page on this.
When I went through Army OCS, we has a student 1SG who reported a cadre member to the 1SG for the heinous crime of allowing them off a punishment detail early.
When asked why, he smiled and said "because I intend to get an Excellence [rating]."
That, right there, is an example of someone who has the wrong motivations. Had he ignored the situation to help his colleagues I could respect his decision. Had he told the 1SG in the interest of consistency, fairness, discipline or upholding the standard, I could agree. But those that are motivated for personal profit cannot be taught to be good leaders.
There is a line between honesty and responsibility and being a f**king snitch. I can't believe that this sort behaviour is encouraged in the US services. I will confront a person personally and individually if I believe his out of line but will never run to the teacher with tattle tails. Man, the thought of this makes me want to throw-up.
I can speak at some length about USMC OCS, having graduated just over two years ago. It was pretty selective when I went through, and has gotten dramatically more so in the last two years. Potential candidates go through a selection board, where Physical Fitness Test (PFT), college grades, recommendations, interview with your recruiter, and a host of other factors weigh in. The Marine Corps takes recruiting very seriously BTW.
OCS itself is a ten week officer boot camp (vice 13 on the enlisted side), with a little less of the mind games but a much larger leadership screening component. The latter is based on many factors, but one of the biggest ones are billets in small unit blank fire tactical scenarios (fire team and squad sized) and some fire team leadership puzzles (get this barrel over this 20 meter water obstacle using only a rope, pipes, and each other, in five minutes, etc.). I think the latter idea was borrowed from the Reichswehr.
Attrition in my platoon was pretty low, around 25-30%. Should have been a little higher.
As a young officer IMHO it is important to analyse everything around him and constantly try to figure out how the aim can be achieved in a better, quicker, more effective manner. I still do this 40 years later and I still see things which we/I did wrong or could have done better or more effectively.
BTW the barrel, ropes, pipes and a box full of stones is one of the AOSB group exercises. Watching that exercise is very revealing (and often hilarious) if you are a DS (directing staff). Who says the military is not fun :D
Ken White
08-30-2011, 05:37 PM
I still do this 40 years later and I still see things which we/I did wrong or could have done better or more effectively.Me too on the first. On the latter, too many in my case... :(
Who says the military is not fun :DNot I. My errors were fortunately mostly harmless and I certainly had a ball for 30 years (and almost as much fun for another 18 as a silly-villian employeeeek). :D
I believe there is a series of U.S. Army Regulations that describe the proccesses and steps required to be selected for pre-commissioning training. I'm positive that they spell out in very specific detail what is required, be it for USMA, ROTC, or OCS. For a select few there are also direct commissions and battlefield commissions.
There is a smoke-in-the-wind aspect about this thread about what should be or could be, rather than what is. Check the regulations and see what they say.
By and large our personnel system is set up for rapid mobilization during times of national (or Personnel Command numbers-crunch) emergency, not for a more methodical selection process during peacetime or low-intensity war. Perhaps in a better world there could be a greater depth of analysis the lower the threat level to the country is. Even then it's a crap-shoot because sometimes the maniacs with obvious flaws make better combat leaders than their more restrained and low-key peers.
NCO Promotion Boards have been known to reject guys who never received an Article 15, like they must be rule-abiding sissies, wimps or something worse. No guts no glory.
SethB
08-31-2011, 02:42 AM
NCO Promotion Boards have been known to reject guys who never received an Article 15, like they must be rule-abiding sissies, wimps or something worse. No guts no glory.
I assure you that we (the Army) no longer have that mindset.
As far as mass mobilization, I'm not very worried about having to do it. I think we will fight with what we have, and it will be small enough to not require mobilization, or it will be over before we could set up a draft anyway.
Interesting short article by a journalist who covered an ASOB 30 years after he attended one (and failed).
Donkin on Work - Leadership (http://www.richarddonkin.com/x_army_officer.htm)
I quote:
A popular misconception about the board is that it is looking for future generals. This is not the case. The selection board for the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, is looking for those who have the potential to be a second lieutenant leading a platoon or a troop.
I question this as if all you are looking for is someone to command a platoon most armies have an amazing number competent and experienced NCOs who can do that with ease.
This narrow view and concentration on the first step of the officer ladder may be one of the reasons why officer retention beyond subaltern is becoming a problem in many militaries. We may differ in this view.
Ken White
08-31-2011, 04:35 AM
SethB:
As far as mass mobilization, I'm not very worried about having to do it. I think we will fight with what we have, and it will be small enough to not require mobilization, or it will be over before we could set up a draft anyway.You may or may not be right. FWIW, roughly the same prediction was made by many in the 20s, the late 40s and again in the 50s and 70s. I don't think you are correct but what you or I think is immaterial, The Army and the Nation cannot afford to and will not operate on that premise. Like it or not, we're big and have to be prepared to be far bigger.
JMA:
I question this as if all you are looking for is someone to command a platoon most armies have an amazing number competent and experienced NCOs who can do that with ease.
This narrow view and concentration on the first step of the officer ladder may be one of the reasons why officer retention beyond subaltern is becoming a problem in many militaries. We may differ in this view.No differing by me for one, I think you're spot on. The French, by tradition have two Lieutenants commanding Platoons and the other two are commanded by NCOs. Seems a sensible way to provide experience for a select few who are being groomed to do Officer stuff at echelons above company...
We say we're training future Commanders and Leaders and then we place most in an environment where they are charged with rote operations of questionable value while their drive and initiative gets trampled by set piece training and operations -- that drives many to depart after five years or so and the Army accepts that because a big war will see them called back.
The selection comments you made above are correct IMO. Pete is also mostly correct on why we do what we do. What we have done to pad the mobilization roster is to significantly 'over Officer' US Forces. We have a veritable horde of Generals; same rough number we had at the end of WW II and in the 80s with an almost 800K Army (and we were over officered than; we still have the same rough numbers with about 250-300k fewer troops). We're not approaching USSR norms yet but we do seem headed that way. :rolleyes:
Those charged with selecting and training future Officers are generally doing the best they can with the hand they've been dealt and the products are generally really pretty good (there are always going to be a few less than stellar slip-throughs...) -- the real problem is that our Personnel system does not support the Army, it drives it... :mad:
Red Rat
08-31-2011, 02:07 PM
There is no requirement to have a degree in order to get commissioned in the British Armed Forces, although the majority do now have a degree.
6-10% of British Army officers have now come from the ranks, having served as a soldier or NCO and then applied for a Direct Entry commission (this is in addition to the Late Entry process whereby soldiers who have made it to Warrant Officer Class 1 (Command Segeant Major equiv) can apply for a commission.
There is no requirement to have a degree in order to get commissioned in the British Armed Forces, although the majority do now have a degree.
During the 1990s in the U.S. Army having a master's degree seemed to be a prerequisite for being promoted to major. I don't know whether the same thing is true today.
The thing I can't understand about this situation is that there seems to be an inverse relationship between the number of people having advanced degrees in a specialty or profession and the quality of that particular career field in the U.S. today. The quality of American industries and businesses seems to have gotten worse with every MBA that is awarded to an individual who is then hired. Our kids in school seem to get dumber and even more stupider :eek: as the number of teachers having master's degrees in education increases.
I don't know, maybe it's just me.
ganulv
08-31-2011, 04:25 PM
There is no requirement to have a degree in order to get commissioned in the British Armed Forces, although the majority do now have a degree.
6-10% of British Army officers have now come from the ranks, having served as a soldier or NCO and then applied for a Direct Entry commission (this is in addition to the Late Entry process whereby soldiers who have made it to Warrant Officer Class 1 (Command Segeant Major equiv) can apply for a commission.
During the run-up to the recent Royal Wedding I was doing background reading and was introduced to the existence of the RMAS (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Military_Academy_Sandhurst). Am I correct in my understanding that an important difference between the U.S. and British systems is the lack of a similar institution in the U.S.?
SethB: We have a veritable horde of Generals; same rough number we had at the end of WW II and in the 80s with an almost 800K Army ...
Part of the reason for that is not the personnel guys' fault; rather it is the perverse logic of the TDA Army, in which nobody will treat you seriously unless the CO of your organization is of equivalent rank to that of my CO or my staff-weenie boss in Washington. It turns into "my Dad can beat up your Dad" situations. Thus we have TDA organizations that could be ably commanded by lieutenant colonels which instead have one- or two-stars in charge.
If we ever decide to trim back the Army we should take a serious look at the vast TDA organization empires that have grown up since 1945. Many of them would function more smoothly with less people.
During the run-up to the recent Royal Wedding I was doing background reading and was introduced to the existence of the RMAS (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Military_Academy_Sandhurst). Am I correct in my understanding that an important difference between the U.S. and British systems is the lack of a similar institution in the U.S.?
You probably need to look at West Point (http://www.usma.edu/about.asp).
I suggest that the Brits have fewer routes to a commission than in the US services but this is understandable due to the every shrinking size of the Brit forces. The Brits went from two-year course to one-year some time ago (with a four-month platoon commanders (MoS?) added on afterwards). Reasons anyone?
You may want to consider a four-year commissioning process which includes an academic degree and look into retention beyond the five years.
West Point like Sandhurst are national institutions which are almost impossible to tinker with... say no more.
There is no requirement to have a degree in order to get commissioned in the British Armed Forces, although the majority do now have a degree.
What range of degrees? I wonder apart from the added maturity and life skills and generally improved education level how this all helps the young infantry officer comply with his role... which is to close with and kill the enemy?
(You know my position is that it would serve the military better to send the officers with long term potential off to a civilian university around the rank of major to study something of military value (that said I accept that in some of the technical corps earlier study by an officer would be advantageous).
6-10% of British Army officers have now come from the ranks, having served as a soldier or NCO and then applied for a Direct Entry commission (this is in addition to the Late Entry process whereby soldiers who have made it to Warrant Officer Class 1 (Command Segeant Major equiv) can apply for a commission.
It would be interesting to establish the ages and ranks of the 6-10% who enter Sandhurst from the ranks (with 29 years being the cut off I understand).
ganulv
09-01-2011, 05:12 AM
You probably need to look at West Point (http://www.usma.edu/about.asp).
I’ve never known any West Point graduates, but having met a couple of Naval Academy alums I have to say that my impression is that U.S. service academies manage to turn a lot of ambitious and promising young men and women’s energies towards arbitrary activities that seem to a non-professional to have no necessary relation to being better at being an officer. Don’t know if RMAS is anything like that, but if it is at least it only lasts for a year. (I get that counting the bristles on your toothbrush or whatever can be important just because, but for four years? :confused:)
JMA:No differing by me for one, I think you're spot on. The French, by tradition have two Lieutenants commanding Platoons and the other two are commanded by NCOs. Seems a sensible way to provide experience for a select few who are being groomed to do Officer stuff at echelons above company...
Having arrived at the School of Infantry directly off ops it was like entering another world. In that environment there was a disconnect between what was happening on the ground in the war and in that august training establishment. In wartime one tends to address the immediate issues and let the future look after itself (however that turns out). To their credit there was no necessity to lower the standards to get more junior officers into the field as it was understood that where there was no platoon commander (officer) the platoon sergeant would (and could) do the job.
We say we're training future Commanders and Leaders and then we place most in an environment where they are charged with rote operations of questionable value while their drive and initiative gets trampled by set piece training and operations -- that drives many to depart after five years or so and the Army accepts that because a big war will see them called back.
The tend does tend to get lost over time unless ever new idea is tested against the stated aim and intension before being adopted. You are old enough to remember the Peter Principle (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Peter-Principle-Things-Always-Wrong/dp/0285631764/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1314854841&sr=1-1). What I remember best from it was this as quoted in an artile:
In the chapter `Follower and Leaders', Peter points out the hierarchiological fallacies. He cites the example of the mother of George Washington who, when asked how her son was so accomplished as a General, answered: "I taught him to obey." Peter asks how the ability to lead depends on the ability to follow, as though the ability to float depends on the ability to sink.
We know you can't herd cats so the tendency is to adapt and apply spin to make the crushing of initiative and spirit sound almost noble.
Yes, and the wasted investment when so many leave after five years is justified as you say. They will be available for a future 'big' war through the Reserve. How many people do you think actually believe this?
It takes a pretty mature group of people (or desperate circumstances) for the ‘sacred cows’ to be tackled and revised. Constant review and constant change must be encouraged (unless it will lead to a loss in the annual Army Navy sports competitions that is ;) )
Red Rat
09-01-2011, 07:26 AM
During the run-up to the recent Royal Wedding I was doing background reading and was introduced to the existence of the RMAS (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Military_Academy_Sandhurst). Am I correct in my understanding that an important difference between the U.S. and British systems is the lack of a similar institution in the U.S.?
Yes and No.
The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) is a bit like the Westpoint and the other military academies in the US in that it is a route (in the UK it is the only route) to commissioning. It differs in that it is not a degree awarding institution. The one year RMAS course is primarily designed to develop firstly robust leadership, and secondly a basic level of professional military knowledge. A large part of the syllabus is spent in the field on tactical exercises as a way of developing leadership (with a side benefit of developing tactical proficiency).
Red Rat
09-01-2011, 07:51 AM
What range of degrees? I wonder apart from the added maturity and life skills and generally improved education level how this all helps the young infantry officer comply with his role... which is to close with and kill the enemy?
All sorts of degrees (mine is in Philosophy :D). Apart from the advantages that you elucidate above there is a feeling that there is an adavantage in having a broadly educated officer corps. The main reason however that so many officers have a degree is the amount of social engineering that has happened in the last 15 or so years where the Government stated that they wanted half of all school leavers to have a degree; it is now very hard not to get people with a degree...:rolleyes: Add to this the changes to the (Army) career system whereby initial entry is on a short service commission for 4-6 years, then by competitive selection to an Intermediate Regular Commission (12 years) and then Regular Commission (up until the age of 55). Because people cannot join for a full career on application a great many hedge their bets by taking a degreee as well.
Professionally Qualified Officers (PQOs - doctors, nurses, cghaplains and lawyers) arrive with the recognised qualification and com plete a 6 week course at RMAS. Engineers (civil or otherwise) have to complete the full year at RMAS.
In terms of course length, in the 1970s and early 1980s Regular Commission officers conducted 2 years of training at RMAS and Short Service Commission officers completed 12 months training at Mons Officer academy. IIRC that it was felt that 2 years was somewhat extravagent and Mons was shut with all officers completing a 12 month course at RMAS (less graduates who were an exceptional breed in those days and completed only 6 or 9 months training at RMAS).
Most cadets at RMAS are in the 21-28 age bracket. This ties in with most students graduating aged 21 or 22. Apocryphally most officers from the ranks are aged about the same, assuming they joined at 18/19, realised within two years that they wanted to apply for a commission and then it takes up to 2 years to move them through the selection process to RMAS. The Army is trying to shorted the length of time it takes between a soldier expressing an interest in applying for a commission and getting him to RMAS.
blueblood
09-02-2011, 08:35 PM
No offense, but the recruitment procedure for officers in UK Army seems a little easy (judging by the two videos). Physical and planning tests looked good but GD and PI were not good enough, no idea about the written test.
I faced a tougher competition in GD and PI for getting admission in my college for a simple bachelor's degree and it wasn't even the best in the city, let alone the state or country.
More than 350,000 applied for the written exams for NDA, and NA this year. This does not include CDS.
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-10/pune/29403142_1_exams-upsc-officials-nda
PsJÄÄK Korte
09-03-2011, 07:51 AM
In Finland active officers don't need pre-existing university degree (apart from specialist officers, but they are different kind of breed) because cadets go through three year bachelor's degree in Military science.
Requirements for cadet training are secondary level education and either reserve officer or reserve non-commisioned officer training.
Selection process lasts two days and it consists of
First day (Everyone does same time):
Aptitude test for ability
Aptitude test for personality
Studying material for next day's literature exam
Second day (Timetable depends which platoon you belong)
Cooper's test
Interview
Group test
Medical examination
Literature exam (everyone does same time)
In Finland active officers don't need pre-existing university degree (apart from specialist officers, but they are different kind of breed) because cadets go through three year bachelor's degree in Military science.
Requirements for cadet training are secondary level education and either reserve officer or reserve non-commisioned officer training.
Selection process lasts two days and it consists of
First day (Everyone does same time):
Aptitude test for ability
Aptitude test for personality
Studying material for next day's literature exam
Second day (Timetable depends which platoon you belong)
Cooper's test
Interview
Group test
Medical examination
Literature exam (everyone does same time)
Thanks for the contribution.
Two questions, please.
What is the 'Cooper's test'?
And what percentage of those who start the course pass-out in the end and at what point of the course do most fall out?
PsJÄÄK Korte
09-03-2011, 12:19 PM
Thanks for the contribution.
Two questions, please.
What is the 'Cooper's test'?
And what percentage of those who start the course pass-out in the end and at what point of the course do most fall out?
Oh. It seems to be Cooper test in english instead of Cooper's test
You have to run as "far" as you can in 12 minutes.
Minimum lenght of run for career soldier in Finland is 2600m.
Also I tried to find out on pass-outs and fall-out, but nothing came up.
No offense, but the recruitment procedure for officers in UK Army seems a little easy (judging by the two videos). Physical and planning tests looked good but GD and PI were not good enough, no idea about the written test.
I faced a tougher competition in GD and PI for getting admission in my college for a simple bachelor's degree and it wasn't even the best in the city, let alone the state or country.
More than 350,000 applied for the written exams for NDA, and NA this year. This does not include CDS.
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-10/pune/29403142_1_exams-upsc-officials-nda
I don't want to get into an argument with you but I need to say that looking at those two videos no one can reach a definitive opinion on the quality or otherwise of the aspects of the Brit AOSB.
My interest in this subject is how best to structure the initial pre-course sekection process so as to reduce the attrition rate during the course itself.
I believe that on the information available the Brits run the most comprehensive pre-course selection process (the AOSB in two parts - first for two days then the 'main board' for four days). I hope to get a reply as to their attrition rate over the 44 weeks until commissioning.
Selection of youngsters with leadership potential does not have to be tough... it needs to be rigourous enough to be accurate... thats all.
I'm am also trying to get beyond the feel good situation that comes with the perception that those who pass are of the chosen few and get down to work out which is the most efficient system.
In this process I am constantly reminded what TE Lawrence said about the Brit officer around WW1 - that there was too much body and not enough mind - they have made progress in fixing this I believe (some believe the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction).
Oh. It seems to be Cooper test in english instead of Cooper's test
You have to run as "far" as you can in 12 minutes.
Minimum lenght of run for career soldier in Finland is 2600m.
OK, thanks found the info here. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cooper_test)
blueblood
09-03-2011, 05:08 PM
I don't want to get into an argument with you but I need to say that looking at those two videos no one can reach a definitive opinion on the quality or otherwise of the aspects of the Brit AOSB.
My interest in this subject is how best to structure the initial pre-course sekection process so as to reduce the attrition rate during the course itself.
I believe that on the information available the Brits run the most comprehensive pre-course selection process (the AOSB in two parts - first for two days then the 'main board' for four days). I hope to get a reply as to their attrition rate over the 44 weeks until commissioning.
Selection of youngsters with leadership potential does not have to be tough... it needs to be rigourous enough to be accurate... thats all.
I'm am also trying to get beyond the feel good situation that comes with the perception that those who pass are of the chosen few and get down to work out which is the most efficient system.
In this process I am constantly reminded what TE Lawrence said about the Brit officer around WW1 - that there was too much body and not enough mind - they have made progress in fixing this I believe (some believe the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction).
I apologize if I have offended you in any way. JMA, my grandfather was a British Indian Army officer from 1942-1950, so I was always under the impression that becoming an officer in Royal Army is a very tough nut to crack. But as I said, videos suggested the other way. I could be wrong, but the way I see it, that the cream of British population is shying away from the armed forces.
BTW, I do not have any doubt that the British training is still one of the best
in the world. I have seen a reality TV series about Royal Marines and their training was extremely good from what I judged from a layman's point of view.
I apologize if I have offended you in any way. JMA, my grandfather was a British Indian Army officer from 1942-1950, so I was always under the impression that becoming an officer in Royal Army is a very tough nut to crack. But as I said, videos suggested the other way. I could be wrong, but the way I see it, that the cream of British population is shying away from the armed forces.
Not that easily offended but thanks for the concern.
I suggest that if you cast your mind back to when you were 18-22 and consider who you would choose as a leader if you were to be confronted by a life or death situation. Would it be the biggest guy? The sttrongest guy? The one who could run the the furtherest, the fastest? Maybe none of the above. Maybe it would be difficult to explain/define/quantify how you selected him?
This is what I am tying to establish. What are these important intangibles and what is the best/most efficient/accurate way of selecting those with these characteristics.
BTW, I do not have any doubt that the British training is still one of the best in the world. I have seen a reality TV series about Royal Marines and their training was extremely good from what I judged from a layman's point of view.
Oh BTW I am not an apologist for the Brits.
Winston Churchill once said: "The Americans will always do the right thing . . . After they've exhausted all the alternatives." Sometimes the same must be said of the Brits as well. ;)
The Royal Marines are up there with the best... but don't be fooled by a video. ;)
blueblood
09-03-2011, 07:22 PM
You're welcome.
I am 23 right now, so its a non issue.
I'll go with the smartest guy with a decent fitness level. If physical fitness alone is the criteria, then a NCO may be more qualified than an officer. AFAIK, officers are there to lead and plan whereas grunts are there for firepower.
I have never understood what Winston Churchill was. Sometimes he appeared to be a great leader, sometimes a plain fool and a liar. But that could be my prejudice for I am an Indian.
JMA, let me provide you some info about Indian recruitment procedure, so you can provide a fair assessment with respect to other armies.
For 10+2 - National Defence Academy (NDA), tri service.
http://nda.nic.in/html/nda-admission-details.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Defence_Academy_(India)
For graduation and above
Combined Defence Servies (CDS)
A written exam, if cleared followed by a Services Selection Board (SSB).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Services_Selection_Board
http://arindam.wordpress.com/2008/02/05/the-allahabad-ssb-interview/
Engineers if recruited from college campus can skip the entrance exam appear directly for SSB.
Ken White
09-04-2011, 12:18 AM
Very impressive test and assessment cycle...
The Selection Process of Joining Bangladesh Army (http://bangladeshtalks.com/2011/06/the-selection-process-of-joining-bangladesh-army/) is well laid out in the blog.
In his blog our friend Fuchs has two enteries which connect to this issue:
"Natural", self-organised small units? (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/11/natural-self-organised-small-units.html)
Self organization; online gamer clans and Germanic warbands (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/10/self-organization-online-gamer-clans.html)
From the latter I quote:
The model with the best individual warrior being the leader is furthermore inherently inferior to a model which requires the leader to be a good leader. It's reasonable to assume that some evolutionary selection mechanism is at work in the realm of raiding warbands. This raises additional doubts about the standard description of ancient Germanic warbands.
If Fuchs would like to expand on that here in relation to how one can select for leadership prior to exposure in structured training (in peacetime) or in combat (during a war) it would be appreciated.
Certainly in the last ten years ample opportuniuties have presented themselves to test leadership of junior officers (and naturally NCOs) in combat settings to ascertain whether these officers are followed through alacrity or through the imposed system or through curiosity.
What has happened to those young officers who have found to be lacking? What should happen to those who have proved limited in this regard?
In an off-board discussion one military approached for stats has thrown up a bureaucratic wall. This is less a question of trying to hide something (IMHO) but rather a matter of bureaucrats flexing their muscles.
Simple statistics required are:
What percentage of those who apply for officer training pass the pre-course selection?
What percentage of those who start the course are commissioned at the end?
Not exactly a state secret... or is it?
Another statistic of value will be the number of those who 'drop-out' from the course do so on their own accord. In other words those who realise for one reason or tuther that this (military stuff) is really not for them.
Fuchs
09-10-2011, 09:58 AM
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2011/09/on-identification-of-natural-leaders.html
Ulenspiegel
09-10-2011, 12:08 PM
You need time for the bottom-up selection process. Therefore, this worked in societies/groups in which the difference between is and peace was quite small, the potential leader had ample of time to prove himself. For me it is quite obvious that nomades or people who hunt in larger groups can really gain from a buttom-up process, to a certain extend Swiss Reichsläufer or Landsknechte belong to the same group. Modern online gamer have of course the same opportunity.
Attemps with chosing superiors by the soldiers in armys of societies with large differences between war and peace usually fail (e.g. French revulution, ACW).
Fuchs
09-10-2011, 12:14 PM
Pirates were also self-organising (and the late Carribbean pirates were probably the most democratic societies of their period!).
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2011/09/on-identification-of-natural-leaders.html
Excellent response!
Must post it here is full:
My key thesis is that you can spot natural leaders easier by watching people around them than by watching the potential leader himself.
You will not spot them if you put together a group of potential leaders, but if you put them into a normal sample group they might arise into natural leadership, kind of take over the group and lead it (at least in regard to specific problems).
Why not in a group of potential leaders? I experienced that before. They fight for power or at least reject unfounded claims for power or for having the lead voice.
A normal sample group finding its natural leader is quite close to having a squad well-trained and then seeing their only NCO die in battle. Who of the enlisted men -qualified by training as all of them- will take the lead, and be followed?
The German army began to prepare exactly for this before the First World War, and very often accepted such emergency leaders into NCO rank if they did well enough.
Such natural leaders are not necessarily the best decision-makers, but at least they get loyalty much easier than others (who might need the authority and powers given by the institution to lead men). This should result in superior team morale.
There is a lot to discuss here, but let's select a few items.
Your first comment is good and is what can normally be observed during a recruits course for entry level soldiers. But not all (and in many countries) and indeed a small minority of officers are produced through the ranks (with Israel being a notable exception). And yes how others react to them (the potential leaders) is almost more important than how they themselves act in certain circumstances.
The people who apply to go on an officers course generally believe they are 'leaders' (by some definition which makes them believe so) or they have been told by parents and/or teachers that they are leaders or have leadership potential.
So they arrive en masse for the AOSB or pre-course selection (as applicable in different countries) and the DS (directing staff) have to shift through the assembled multitude. In my experience this normally starts with a paper sort into syndicates/groups of six-eight candidates.
I believe that the leaderless group activities allow the more forceful (not necessarily the best leaders) to assert themselves over the group but once a level of 'stress' is added (normally in tasks which require physical effort) the leadership pattern often changes/alters within the group. In the programme of the longer Brit type AOSB there are also physical group activities where specific candidates are nominated as group leader. And yes here you watch the nominated leader and also the rest of the syndicate very carefully. You learn so much about a person by simply observing them in different circumstances.
I suggest you are looking for leaders who will rise to the occasion and be accepted as leaders when they are given command of a platoon in due course. There has to be a spark (of leadership potential) in there from the outset.
While I agree in principle with theory on leadership succession in small groups squad/section the officer situation is that we need to select for leaders who can be inserted halfway up the rank structure and take command of an infantry platoon in battle (which would typically have a combined total of 100 years plus of military service amongst the men in the platoon). This is significantly different to hierarchical succession in small groups IMHO.
OK so finally, when you have a course full of leaders you can filter for decision making ability. Some of this is attempted on a Brit style AOSB.
Thank you for your input. It is thought stimulating and I respond with what seems logical to me right now. Feel free to debate my assumptions.
Fuchs
09-10-2011, 02:58 PM
There is an additional problem; leaders are not necessarily trying to lead all the time (or so I think).
My personal experience is for example that I had rather leadership episodes in my life than a continuous quest for alpha male position. At times I didn't see a need for leadership, other times I preferred to opt-out of group dynamics or oppose existing leadership. And then there were episodes when the system cheated me so badly that I preferred to oppose it by making a fool of it; identifying and exploiting its holes. To lead a pack in a futile effort to oppose the system seemed pointless, and I didn't try it.
You might end up with false negatives even in great natural leader test regimes.
Ulenspiegel
09-10-2011, 03:30 PM
The people who could choose their leaders must have an good idea what their future leader has to do, therefore, they need to now the trade themselves. How do you create in an western army this knowledge among the enlisted men who have to choose their NCOs or company officers?
My feeling is, that the current system, which was codified around 1700, is a result of the large discrepancy between life in times of war and times of peace.
Fuchs
09-10-2011, 04:27 PM
The people who could choose their leaders must have an good idea what their future leader has to do, therefore, they need to now the trade themselves. How do you create in an western army this knowledge among the enlisted men who have to choose their NCOs or company officers?
It's not about choosing in emergencies, but about following who takes the lead.
Sometime around 1906 (IIRC - memory is tricky) the German army (or Prussian - at that time the institution was divided) decided that their Gefreiter (an experienced enlisted man) had to be proficient enough to take over the job of a NCO.
This did fit well to one of the requirements for Auftragstaktik (or how that was called at that time); you need to be told and able to understand the mission of your superior (and possibly his superior) - and that requires that you are proficient enough for assuming your direct superior's slot.
This served well when leader losses (in part because of leading by example / up front) became quite excessive in WW2.
It's really been done for a century already.
Ulenspiegel
09-10-2011, 05:12 PM
It's not about choosing in emergencies, but about following who takes the lead.
Sometime around 1906 (IIRC - memory is tricky) the German army (or Prussian - at that time the institution was divided) decided that their Gefreiter (an experienced enlisted man) had to be proficient enough to take over the job of a NCO.
This did fit well to one of the requirements for Auftragstaktik (or how that was called at that time); you need to be told and able to understand the mission of your superior (and possibly his superior) - and that requires that you are proficient enough for assuming your direct superior's slot.
This served well when leader losses (in part because of leading by example / up front) became quite excessive in WW2.
It's really been done for a century already.
Our initial question was, how in an western army a bottom-up approach for leader selection could work.
The German army used for both, officer selection and for NCO selection, a top-down approach. The quality of the selection process was, when we use discharge due to incompetence in war time as metric, very good.
Fuchs
09-10-2011, 05:24 PM
Send the leader in place into vacation, let his small unit stand in formation and give it a mission, with promise of a small reward for accomplishment (or another source of motivation). Then have senior enlisted men from another unit observe them.
The problem is of course that this procedure would be known and exploited if it's in widespread use.
Rank structure in Western armies comes from the old class system in Europe. Centuries ago aristocrats were the officers, lower class guys with a head on their shoulders became sergeants (a word which once had the connation of "servant"), and the rest were enlisted. The word infantry has the same origin as infant, because the "better" classes way back then were mounted.
In spite of what the Marxists might want to say, I don't believe that during the last 300 years these class lines were as rigid within societies or military organizations as they'd have us believe. Incompetent officers fall by the wayside, talented NCOs move into the officer corps, good enlisted guys become NCOs, and so forth.
Other factors are at play too -- in a way Robert E. Lee was an aristocrat on a downward slide until he married because his family fortune was gone; though his social and financial status had declined I doubt anyone would criticize his abilities as an officer. Occasionally the fallen nobility make the best officers because they are determined to redeem lost honor.
To get back to the topic of this thread, today the minimum for being an officer is having a college degree, to an extent having the "good family" thing and having strong letters of recommendation with your application. The system isn't rigid though, and guys of modest origins can and do get in and rise to high places.
There is an additional problem; leaders are not necessarily trying to lead all the time (or so I think).
My personal experience is for example that I had rather leadership episodes in my life than a continuous quest for alpha male position. At times I didn't see a need for leadership, other times I preferred to opt-out of group dynamics or oppose existing leadership. And then there were episodes when the system cheated me so badly that I preferred to oppose it by making a fool of it; identifying and exploiting its holes. To lead a pack in a futile effort to oppose the system seemed pointless, and I didn't try it.
You might end up with false negatives even in great natural leader test regimes.
Yes strutting and posturing alpha males all over the show can be tedious for sure.
But here (and we should maybe not restrict ourselves to this) I am looking at the initial pre-course selection of officers which in some cases is made through a 'paper' examination and a single one on one interview to the Brits who seem to have the most time consuming total of six days (in two parts). So yes the people are on show for that period, an hour interview or six days in carefully staged and choreographed circumstances.
On top of a minimum education level (supported by an acceptable IQ level - or what they test for these days) and a physical condition (able to sustain and maintain the required fitness level and endurance ability) which can be established in a short few hours... IMHO the selection should focus upon selecting for leadership characteristics (at a level required by an officer) while filtering out those with character flaws (as far as possible).
We know that kids are pretty good at preparing for exams, interviews and the like these days (why there is even a book available to help you pass the AOSB (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Army-Officer-Selection-Board-AOSB/dp/1907558241/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1315711627&sr=1-1)). So during the selection one needs to introduce a little physical stress. (While I hasten to add that I am not current on what transpires during the modern AOSB) for example on completion of a run or at the end of an obstacle course the candidates are immediately subjected to a time limited mental test to ascertain whether they function under pressure and stress. Not too many can put on a show that can't be 'seen through' by attentive Board staff over a period of days.
The selection quality is largely based upon the Board composition and the ratio of Board members/DS to candidates. The Brits work as follows (http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/AOSB_Main_Board.pdf) (and it would be interesting how other nations work):
The Selection Process
THE BOARD. Up to 40 candidates may be attending the Main Board at any one time. You will be divided into groups of eight, with men and women working together. It is important to remember that you are not competing against the other candidates. You are all being assessed against a common standard and your success is based entirely on your own performance. Equally, there is no single test by which you pass or fail – this is a series of assessments designed to give us an understanding of your officer potential. The officers assessing you will be interested in your approach to problems and challenges, and your attitude towards other members of the group – both as a team player and as a team leader.
Board Composition
The Board consists of the following members:
PRESIDENT. A Brigadier.
VICE PRESIDENT. A Colonel.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT. A Lieutenant Colonel.
GROUP LEADER. A Captain or Major.
EDUCATION ADVISER. A commissioned or retired Army Education Officer.
You need time for the bottom-up selection process. Therefore, this worked in societies/groups in which the difference between is and peace was quite small, the potential leader had ample of time to prove himself. For me it is quite obvious that nomades or people who hunt in larger groups can really gain from a buttom-up process, to a certain extend Swiss Reichsläufer or Landsknechte belong to the same group. Modern online gamer have of course the same opportunity.
Attemps with chosing superiors by the soldiers in armys of societies with large differences between war and peace usually fail (e.g. French revulution, ACW).
Yes you need time for a bottom-up leader selection process which is why it can't work in a modern military officer selection process where in addition to the leadership skills required there are significant technical and tactical skills required to command a platoon in battle which can't immediately be met by some troopie selected purely on a combination of proven leadership and personal battle skill.
So what this initial pre-course officer selection process aims at (amongst other things) is to identitfy with accuracy these people with this (charismatic or otherwise) leadership potential.
How to achive this so as to reduce the attrition rate during the actual officers course. That is the question.
Rank structure in Western armies comes from the old class system in Europe. Centuries ago aristocrats were the officers, lower class guys with a head on their shoulders became sergeants (a word which once had the connation of "servant"), and the rest were enlisted.
Well the difference today and the only justifiable reason IMHO for direct entry half way up the rank structure is to ensure your generals are young enough and active enough to be able to direct the course of a war.
To take it from the level of private/rifleman/trooper etc would mean that your generals would all be around 60 years old and getting ready for retirement rather than the next war.
Hence my contention that during (direct entry) officer selection you are actually selecting for potential generals and not merely company level commanders.
Hence my contention that before degree courses you attempt to blood your young officers in combat so as to see it they have what it takes in this regard. In the last ten years or so there has been ample opportunity to test officers at all level in combat. A six month tour here ansd a six month tour there does not cut it IMHO.
Once this (combat) filter has been applied then the military can decide you they are going to invest in in terms of degree level and higher education. I call this putting the horse before the cart.
Ulenspiegel
09-11-2011, 06:43 AM
What would you do in long phases of peace without an low intensity conflict which would give the best opportunity for selection? How can we implement something that resembles the "real" thing ??
Ulenspiegel
09-11-2011, 07:23 AM
In spite of what the Marxists might want to say, I don't believe that during the last 300 years these class lines were as rigid within societies or military organizations as they'd have us believe. Incompetent officers fall by the wayside, talented NCOs move into the officer corps, good enlisted guys become NCOs, and so forth.
To get back to the topic of this thread, today the minimum for being an officer is having a college degree, to an extent having the "good family" thing and having strong letters of recommendation with your application. The system isn't rigid though, and guys of modest origins can and do get in and rise to high places.
I know only for the German armies, here the vertical mobility was high in the TYW, became very rigid- now we have separation of NCO and officer corps- between 1700 and 1918, and more flexible again after WW1.
The requirements for an officer candidate in the Prussian army around 1890 was, that he had the Primareife (finished his 11the grade with success) and he came from a good family, most important he was not workingclass.
The the regimental commander decided which applicants could join the regiment.
I do simply not understand as civilian with only 15 month military service as an enlisted man why this work well. Even after 40 years of peace the regimental commanders had a still clear vision what they wanted.
Or more relevant: Would today a brigade commander be able to select the right men from a pool of applicants?
Ulenspiegel
09-11-2011, 11:06 AM
@JMA
Another concept would be the one found in the Roman army. You have centuriones which cover the ranks of sergeant - Lt. Col and came usually from the ranks, this means you merge the NCO corps with parts of the officer corps.
Genenerals (legates) had a different carier path.
ganulv
09-11-2011, 05:03 PM
To get back to the topic of this thread, today the minimum for being an officer is having a college degree, to an extent having the "good family" thing and having strong letters of recommendation with your application.
Hence my contention that before degree courses you attempt to blood your young officers in combat so as to see it they have what it takes in this regard. In the last ten years or so there has been ample opportunity to test officers at all level in combat. A six month tour here ansd a six month tour there does not cut it IMHO.
Once this (combat) filter has been applied then the military can decide you they are going to invest in in terms of degree level and higher education. I call this putting the horse before the cart.
Does anyone know what the stated justification for the expectation of a bachelor’s degree for new officers is in the U.S. branches?* In my experience, a non-professional degree (from a U.S. institution, at least) is pretty hit-or-miss as far as vouching for a holder’s basic capabilities. Apart from the holders of math and math-heavy degrees such as physics, I would guess that few college graduates can match mortarmen in terms of basic math skills, for example. And the holder of a humanities degree from Big State U has spent most of his/her instruction hours in a lecture hall and has had most of his/her assignments marked by a harried professor or an even more harried graduate student and as such received little of the kind of interaction that is effective in improving writing skills.
*It makes sense to me for direct commissions, since their college experience puts a premium on professional training.
In around 1980 I heard that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Field Artillery were vitually tied for which branch had the highest wash-out rate in their Officer Basic Courses. At the time CE narrowly won because FA recycles more of its OBC failures into the next OBC class. CE and FA OBCs are more math- and computationally-intensive than the other OBC schools.
Enlisted FA and and Infantry mortar guys having fire direction MOSs have high math scores on their AFQT exams (military entrance exams), college degree or no degree. In spite of that many in command at company, battery and battalion levels worry about what their flakier FDC guys might do during live fire situations ... :eek:
Occasionally military organizations need guys with good math skills.
From a letter by Evelyn Waugh, the British novelist, to his wife in 1943, as quoted in the Oxford Book of Military Anecdotes edited by Max Hastings:
No. 3 Commando was very anxious to be chums with Lord Glasgow, so they offered to blow up an old tree stump for him and he was very grateful and he said don't spoil the plantation of young trees near it because this is the apple of my eye and they said no of course not we can blow up a tree so it falls down on a sixpence and Lord Glasgow said goodness you are so clever and he asked them all to luncheon for the great explosion. So Col. Durnford-Slater DSO said to his subaltern have you put enough explosive in the tree. Yes sir, 75 lb. Is that enough? Yes sir I worked it out by mathematics it is exactly right. Well better put a bit more. Very good sir.
So when Col. D Slater DSO had had his port he sent for his subaltern and said subaltern better put more explosive in that tree. I don't want to disappoint Lord Glasgow. Very good sir.
So they lit the fuse and waited for the explosion and presently the tree, instead of falling sideways, rose 50 feet into the air taking with it 1/2 acre of soil and the whole of the young plantation.
And the Subaltern said Sir, I made a mistake, it should have been 7 1/2 lb not 75. Lord Glasgow was so upset he walked in dead silence back to his castle and when they came to the turn in his drive in sight of his castle what should they find but that every pane in the glass was broken.
Lord Glasgow gave a little cry and ran to hide his emotion in the lavatory snd there when he pulled the plug the entire ceiling, loosened by the explosion, fell on his head.
This is quite true.
Evelyn Waugh
What would you do in long phases of peace without an low intensity conflict which would give the best opportunity for selection? How can we implement something that resembles the "real" thing ??
Well that is really the situation as it stands now. Despite having a war (the US and the Brits certainly) to test and blood their young officers do these countries seize the opportunity to step away from the peacetime assessment and use the war to test their junior officers to validate (or otherwise) the peacetime selection process?
The question is whether the peacetime selection criteria used throughout the service produce the desired outcomes.
@JMA
Another concept would be the one found in the Roman army. You have centuriones which cover the ranks of sergeant - Lt. Col and came usually from the ranks, this means you merge the NCO corps with parts of the officer corps.
Genenerals (legates) had a different carier path.
My contention is that the insertion of direct entry officers half way up the rank structure can only be justified if there is a clear assessment that these people have the potential to reach and perform well as senior officers (battalion commanders and above). The initial pre-course selection must (IMHO) focus upon this end. Where such tighter selection criteria are used and results in shortages of company grade officers these should be made up through the promotion from the ranks (which should be done with due care to prevent the senior NCO ranks from being denuded of their brightest and their best and thereby reducing and demeaning the expected quality of company senior NCOs which has historically been the strength and backbone of the infantry).
In case anyone had come to believe that the yanks had faleen asleep behind the wheel on this one their 'best and brightest' officers (on Command and Staff course) periodically produce intelligent comment on this matter... but as they say 'it is extremely difficult to turn a supertanker in high seas'.
American Centurions: Developing U.S. Army Tactical Leadership for the Twenty-first Century (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a403836.pdf)
In this paper Major Timothy F. Watson in his conclusion states:
..the U.S. Army should consider instituting a standardized assessment and selection board to screen officer candidates. The assessment and selection board identifies those most likely to succeed in pre-commissioning programs and as future officers thereby preserving the valuable resources dedicated towards developing leaders.
I agree (FWIW) and hope that this kind of thinking officer (probably by now a full Col or Brig) can figure out how to turn a supertanker in high seas.
(Then) Maj Watson's paper is well worth a read.
Fuchs
09-14-2011, 09:52 AM
My contention is that the insertion of direct entry officers half way up the rank structure can only be justified if there is a clear assessment that these people have the potential to reach and perform well as senior officers (battalion commanders and above). The initial pre-course selection must (IMHO) focus upon this end. Where such tighter selection criteria are used and results in shortages of company grade officers these should be made up through the promotion from the ranks (which should be done with due care to prevent the senior NCO ranks from being denuded of their brightest and their best and thereby reducing and demeaning the expected quality of company senior NCOs which has historically been the strength and backbone of the infantry).
You're obviously thinking of leading officers, but many(if not most) are rather specialists - either for staffs or for technicalities.
The German army hires medical doctors, construction engineers (bridge-building expertise for army engineers!) and the like whom it doesn't produce in its own university system (which is more about business, engineering, psychology etc). These fully-educated people could earn 60,000-100,000 € p.a. in civil jobs and need to get at least a respectable rank and associated pay or you'll only get the worst graduates. Afaik these officers entry around captain/major rank and reach LtCol quite easily (medical staff is very high-ranked in Germany). You basically give them a quick entry training about their powers and limits and then you've got a ready officer with a very much needed special proficiency.
This thread appears to focus on officers for leadership instead of officers for very education-intensive jobs. Maybe the title should be modified.
By the way, about company and Plt NCOs beign the backbone of an army: There was a time in germany when even Lt Generals in command of a division were competent enough to spot training deficiencies down to lack of navigation skill or skill with emplacing a machine gun on inspections (reminds me also of an American general who lead a platoon in an assault on a building during WW2 in order to teach the Lt how to do it). A very good basic soldiering competency of leading officers (Truppenoffizier) is certainly a great advantage.
Ulenspiegel
09-14-2011, 12:27 PM
There was a time when even many high officers earned their Nahkampfspange or Panzervernichtungsabzeichen - close combat clasp and tank destruction badge, this is of course also a sign that something went wrong :-)
Is for an infantry/tank officer an university education during his/her fist 9 years really a good idea? From an academic POV it does not make sense.
If an officer decided to leave after 12 years, he/she should attend university during his last 2 or 3 years, then leave with a "fresh" graduation/diploma. If an officer decides to stay he could get an military graduation, i.e. staff officer courses.
You're obviously thinking of leading officers, but many(if not most) are rather specialists - either for staffs or for technicalities.
Yes, probably mainly 'teeth arm' officers (infantry/armour) than other.
The German army hires medical doctors, construction engineers (bridge-building expertise for army engineers!) and the like whom it doesn't produce in its own university system (which is more about business, engineering, psychology etc). These fully-educated people could earn 60,000-100,000 € p.a. in civil jobs and need to get at least a respectable rank and associated pay or you'll only get the worst graduates. Afaik these officers entry around captain/major rank and reach LtCol quite easily (medical staff is very high-ranked in Germany). You basically give them a quick entry training about their powers and limits and then you've got a ready officer with a very much needed special proficiency.
This thread appears to focus on officers for leadership instead of officers for very education-intensive jobs. Maybe the title should be modified.
Again. yes. Direct entry by qualification is necessary for the likes of medical staff etc and yes there will be times when their pay may well be higher than the equivalent infantry officer of the same rank. For example the medical officer in a battalion can never be more than a major (as the CO is a Lt Col) but he may fall on a totally different pay scale.
By the way, about company and Plt NCOs beign the backbone of an army: There was a time in germany when even Lt Generals in command of a division were competent enough to spot training deficiencies down to lack of navigation skill or skill with emplacing a machine gun on inspections (reminds me also of an American general who lead a platoon in an assault on a building during WW2 in order to teach the Lt how to do it). A very good basic soldiering competency of leading officers (Truppenoffizier) is certainly a great advantage.
One certainly hopes that officers will retain their 'eye' for detail as they rise up the ranks.
In war time with general mobilisation the quality control thing starts to fall apart. But then the last two Brit Lt Cols (Jones and Thorneloe) to be KIA were way to far 'up front' for their rank and died needlessly.
The value of the NCO structure is making sure the 'blunt instrument' know as the infantry platoon can carry out their mission in unison with many other platoons simultaneously and with control and coherence. One leading officer no matter how proficient or experienced can do this alone.
Young officers at platoon/troop level have at best three years of platoon commanding (in my war - but it seems less in others these days). The NCOs spend much more time at this level and like with old wine they just get better with age (and experience). My contention is that this (platoon) structure (through which young officers fleetingly pass) must be protected and maintained at all costs.
(This said about the opportunity to command a platoon in battle should be what every young officer dreams of. I really can't believe that any 'bright eyed and bushytailed' young officer would be satisfied with getting a sniff of combat command for six months and then return to peacetime soldiering at home.)
Fuchs
09-14-2011, 01:41 PM
The academic studies aren't just for jobs after the 12-year team or for improved recruiting success among good school graduates.
It's most relevant for forming thought processes, for opening the mind to learning, science, methodologies, independent work and much more. Studying engineering is for example much, much tougher than the learning in an officer course.
I believe I remember having read that Petraeus confessed that after many years of military service and military learning his experience at some university was a shock. Suddenly, it wall all very difficult and he couldn't easily convince people any more (command authority makes this much, much easier, apparently...). He had to add a lot to his repertoire for success in such an environment.
There are furthermore experiences of armies that did not emphasize academic learning for officers and tended to neglect technical and organisational aspects of the military as well as intellectual thought about what combat arms should do and how.
That being said, I doubt that the German system with special universities for the armed services is a good idea. It would make more sense to expose the students to civilian life more and get a wider choice of specialisations, but that would in turn require that some normal universities introduce trimesters.
The academic studies aren't just for jobs after the 12-year team or for improved recruiting success among good school graduates.
It's most relevant for forming thought processes, for opening the mind to learning, science, methodologies, independent work and much more. Studying engineering is for example much, much tougher than the learning in an officer course.
I believe I remember having read that Petraeus confessed that after many years of military service and military learning his experience at some university was a shock. Suddenly, it wall all very difficult and he couldn't easily convince people any more (command authority makes this much, much easier, apparently...). He had to add a lot to his repertoire for success in such an environment.
There are furthermore experiences of armies that did not emphasize academic learning for officers and tended to neglect technical and organisational aspects of the military as well as intellectual thought about what combat arms should do and how.
I don't have a problem with education per se.
I suggest that before the military invests hugely in an individual's higher education it should have a very good idea that he has general staff prospects.
As I have stated above there are two minimum standards to be set for potential officers and that being his attained education level (with the potential to study further) and physique and fitness level (with the ability to develop both further). Once you have put that stuff aside you will be able to concentrate on identifying the characteristics which are required of an officer.
The further education aspect can be revisited once he has been selected for training and passed the officer training course. With a bit of luck there may be a war on at the time and one can cycle the new officers through to gauge their combat performance. Thereafter as part of career development they can be sent to universities to do the appropriate courses. As I said put the horse before the cart.
I can't believe that it is worth the investment to put candidates through university degree before you are (pretty) sure they are likely to succeed. So when a premier military institution grades candidates on the following basis one tends to get a little worried;
A cadet's class rank, which determines his army branch and assignment upon graduation, is calculated as a combination of academic performance (55%), military leadership performance (30%), and physical fitness and athletic performance (15%)
Where one might ask is the assessment on leadership ability, tactical skill and understanding etc etc?
If you select on this basis then I suggest you need to believe that leadership can be taught. Now that's another story.
That being said, I doubt that the German system with special universities for the armed services is a good idea. It would make more sense to expose the students to civilian life more and get a wider choice of specialisations, but that would in turn require that some normal universities introduce trimesters.
I suggest we are in agreement on this. I have never been sold on the concept of military education whether high-school or university. These 'specialisations' I suggest should be selected to improve individual performance in the military environment.
Ulenspiegel
09-14-2011, 04:59 PM
The academic studies aren't just for jobs after the 12-year team or for improved recruiting success among good school graduates.
It's most relevant for forming thought processes, for opening the mind to learning, science, methodologies, independent work and much more. Studying engineering is for example much, much tougher than the learning in an officer course.
I believe I remember having read that Petraeus confessed that after many years of military service and military learning his experience at some university was a shock. Suddenly, it wall all very difficult and he couldn't easily convince people any more (command authority makes this much, much easier, apparently...). He had to add a lot to his repertoire for success in such an environment.
There are furthermore experiences of armies that did not emphasize academic learning for officers and tended to neglect technical and organisational aspects of the military as well as intellectual thought about what combat arms should do and how.
That being said, I doubt that the German system with special universities for the armed services is a good idea. It would make more sense to expose the students to civilian life more and get a wider choice of specialisations, but that would in turn require that some normal universities introduce trimesters.
The current German officer candidates pay IMHO a very high price for their university education, as they do not get a proper platoon commander training. They start in special officer companies and have seen and led only a few months enlisted men before they are promoted to Oberleutnant. Are they really able to perform their role as deputy company commander?
Compare this with the Reichwehr when a OC had to serve as enlisted man with enlisted men for two years (a little bit excessive:-), then he got 1.5 years officer training (he was now Fähnrich). He was promoted to Leutnant after 3.5 years and served 4-5 years before attending staff officer courses (=university). Why don't we use this template?
Fuchs
09-14-2011, 05:40 PM
Hush! All things Reichswehr are evil, didn't you know?
Ulenspiegel
09-14-2011, 05:43 PM
Hush! All things Reichswehr are evil, didn't you know?
You don't have to tell the politicians that the "new" model is actually an old one. Good chance they do not know history.
Fuchs
09-14-2011, 06:18 PM
SOMEBODY will find out. There's always opposition, to everything. Especially inside the bureaucracy.
They WILL use lame complaints like stupid Reichswehr analogies and myths.
Just look at the "Kriegsnah ausbilden" drama. Politicians hardly read it, but somebody read it and launched the PC complaint campaign.
We can propose smart yet non-PC stuff as outsiders or at least with protection of anonymity, but even a simple memo in the bureaucracy itself would be a powder keg.
jmm99
09-14-2011, 11:45 PM
Hey South Africa,
Change of Command Ceremony (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHNMyD3Yio4), 2nd Battalion - 4th Infantry Regiment, ~ 2007-2009 (youtube, 22 Mar 2009; LTC Watson to LTC Rickard)
Rebalancing Forces In Response to the QDR (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/is_201103/ai_n57240450/pg_2/) (Army Mar 2011):
LTC Timothy F. Watson is a Senior Service College Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. Previously, he was assigned as a senior task farce observercontroller at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La. LTC Watson commanded the 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, at Fort Polk and deployed to Baghdad, Iraq, to perform full spectrum counterinsurgency operations.
The Officer Core (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/04/letters-to-the-editor/8410/) (Letter to Editor - Atlantic Apr 2011) - still LTC.
And finally to vindicate your more than less on target crystal ball - this time (November 17, 2010 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE S7993 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-11-17/pdf/CREC-2010-11-17-pt1-PgS7993-5.pdf)):
THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:
To be colonel
.....
TIMOTHY F. WATSON
Regards
Mike
Hey South Africa,
Change of Command Ceremony (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHNMyD3Yio4), 2nd Battalion - 4th Infantry Regiment, ~ 2007-2009 (youtube, 22 Mar 2009; LTC Watson to LTC Rickard)
Rebalancing Forces In Response to the QDR (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/is_201103/ai_n57240450/pg_2/) (Army Mar 2011):
The Officer Core (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/04/letters-to-the-editor/8410/) (Letter to Editor - Atlantic Apr 2011) - still LTC.
And finally to vindicate your more than less on target crystal ball - this time (November 17, 2010 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE S7993 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-11-17/pdf/CREC-2010-11-17-pt1-PgS7993-5.pdf)):
Regards
Mike
One wonders if Col Watson's views on this issue have changed over the years?
A paragraph of his Letter to the Editor of April 2011 is worth a quote here:
Much of what combat commanders do can’t be learned in a classroom. Education and innovation, while important, are no substitute for experience. This is a significant difference from the business examples the author relies on. A better comparison is to a surgeon rather than a Silicon Valley entrepreneur. Some hotshot officer with fewer years in service and fewer deployments under his belt is probably not going to perform better in combat than an older guy who’s been there before. We’d rather work for the graybeard.
Could not have said it better myself ;)
The current German officer candidates pay IMHO a very high price for their university education, as they do not get a proper platoon commander training. They start in special officer companies and have seen and led only a few months enlisted men before they are promoted to Oberleutnant. Are they really able to perform their role as deputy company commander?
Compare this with the Reichwehr when a OC had to serve as enlisted man with enlisted men for two years (a little bit excessive:-), then he got 1.5 years officer training (he was now Fähnrich). He was promoted to Leutnant after 3.5 years and served 4-5 years before attending staff officer courses (=university). Why don't we use this template?
As I mentioned before (in post#80) the bias is currently in favour of the academic in many (most?) cases. In the quote (I posted) it is 55% academic to 30% leadership performance with fitness and physical coming in at the remaining 15%. I believe that like the physical (which should be judged on a pass or fail basis - meaning you are either physically capable or you are not) the academic results should be based on whether the guy has absorbed enough of the theoretical part of the course to be able to draw on what he learned when operating in the field (again he is either able to do this or he is not). The initial precourse selection of aspirant officers must be that they are intellectually capable of passing a degree course within the military skills parameters.
Again I would state that the platoon commanding phase of an officers career is merely to provide the grounding and experience at that level to provide an understanding of how wars are fought on the front lines when he (at a higher command) sends soldiers into battle (from afar).
How much time and experience does an officer need at the platoon/company level? Perhaps another subject for discussion. Does an officer need to serve in the ranks before being commissioned? Perhaps another subject for discussion.
Regardless of whether the potential officer comes as direct entry or from the ranks my contention is that an accurate initial pre-course selection system will be beneficial and reduce the course attrition rates.
Well if the Reichwehr system was good then why does the current German not continue to use it? Surely the officer selection and training process can't be tainted by the past, can they?
If I understand you correctly it is the university education which conflicts with platoon commanding and training. Well if so that is why a speak of putting the horse before the cart. Which must be taken care of first? My view is that first you train and test for leadership and officer characteristics (at platoon level) then you select an education route most suited to his branch and career professional knowledge requirements. Remember the big picture. You are training future generals here.
Fuchs
09-15-2011, 09:14 AM
Well if the Reichwehr system was good then why does the current German not continue to use it? Surely the officer selection and training process can't be tainted by the past, can they?
One of the central themes of the Bundeswehr is its integration in society - avoidance of becoming a state in a state, a closed sub-society. This is out of a fear that an army could become powerful politically.
The Reichswehr did never attempt a coup d'etat, its worst political influence was to face left-wing uprisings in force and be not available against right-wing ones (leaving them to the police).
Nevertheless, there's the image of a terrible, terrible right-wing out-of-civilian-control Reichswehr that would be unsuitable in a democracy.
As a consequence, similarities with Reichswehr, especially in regard to its officer corps are under scrutiny as a principle.
Ulenspiegel
09-15-2011, 10:07 AM
Again I would state that the platoon commanding phase of an officers career is merely to provide the grounding and experience at that level to provide an understanding of how wars are fought on the front lines when he (at a higher command) sends soldiers into battle (from afar).
Here we may observe an fundamental difference in leadership culture between German (until 1960) and Anglo-American. The officer losses of the German ground forces in WW2were much higher than US or UK losses of the same rank - generals ~10 times higher. People who know much more about military history than me attribute the leading up-front for both, the higher losses and the higher performance of the German ground forces.
How much time and experience does an officer need at the platoon/company level? Perhaps another subject for discussion. Does an officer need to serve in the ranks before being commissioned? Perhaps another subject for discussion.
Serving with the ranks means an officer applicant has a chance to experience very early how his future subordinates tick. In an all-volunteer force the basic training for OC and enlisted men should have the same quality, so this time is well spent IMHO.
Another side effect is, you could observe wether the officer candidate has leadership potential, maybe a chance for bottom-up selcetion.
A longer time as platoon leader was used to give the officer the opportunity to serve in other units, develope a deeper understanding of the other elements in his regiment or division. The highest priority had the applied tactics, this meant combined arms warefare after 1919.
Regardless of whether the potential officer comes as direct entry or from the ranks my contention is that an accurate initial pre-course selection system will be beneficial and reduce the course attrition rates.
Concur
If I understand you correctly it is the university education which conflicts with platoon commanding and training. Well if so that is why a speak of putting the horse before the cart. Which must be taken care of first? My view is that first you train and test for leadership and officer characteristics (at platoon level) then you select an education route most suited to his branch and career professional knowledge requirements. Remember the big picture. You are training future generals here.
You describe my opinion much better than I could do myself.
Ulenspiegel
09-15-2011, 10:25 AM
SOMEBODY will find out. There's always opposition, to everything. Especially inside the bureaucracy.
They WILL use lame complaints like stupid Reichswehr analogies and myths.
Just look at the "Kriegsnah ausbilden" drama. Politicians hardly read it, but somebody read it and launched the PC complaint campaign.
We can propose smart yet non-PC stuff as outsiders or at least with protection of anonymity, but even a simple memo in the bureaucracy itself would be a powder keg.
OK, the Bundeswehr had officer schools for the first 18 years, then switch to the university system. So I am optimistic that the political issues could be solved when the wheel is re-invented.
One of the central themes of the Bundeswehr is its integration in society - avoidance of becoming a state in a state, a closed sub-society. This is out of a fear that an army could become powerful politically.
The Reichswehr did never attempt a coup d'etat, its worst political influence was to face left-wing uprisings in force and be not available against right-wing ones (leaving them to the police).
Nevertheless, there's the image of a terrible, terrible right-wing out-of-civilian-control Reichswehr that would be unsuitable in a democracy.
As a consequence, similarities with Reichswehr, especially in regard to its officer corps are under scrutiny as a principle.
OK, thanks I have a better understanding now.
OK, the Bundeswehr had officer schools for the first 18 years, then switch to the university system. So I am optimistic that the political issues could be solved when the wheel is re-invented.
In another 20 years? ;)
Compare this with the Reichwehr when a OC had to serve as enlisted man with enlisted men for two years (a little bit excessive:-), then he got 1.5 years officer training (he was now Fähnrich). He was promoted to Leutnant after 3.5 years and served 4-5 years before attending staff officer courses (=university). Why don't we use this template?
That's a long time to evaluate officer candidates before sending them off to university. The U.S. way is to have the guy have his degree beforehand.
Ulenspiegel
09-15-2011, 06:52 PM
That's a long time to evaluate officer candidates before sending them off to university. The U.S. way is to have the guy have his degree beforehand.
In the Imperial German Army and Reichswehr only a very small percentage (~6%) of the officers survived the selection for the Kriegsakademie and the three years there. A much broader training and educational effect was caused by the preparation for the Kriegsakademie, usually lasting more than one year.
My point is, if you do not need a degree for your job, it makes more sense to attend university at the end of your first 12 years, in a civilian branch if you want to leave, in a military branch or a civilian with clear application for your career path if you want to stay for 20 years or longer.
I have no problem with your model but oppose the current German one, which combines for my taste to many negative aspects.
Here we may observe an fundamental difference in leadership culture between German (until 1960) and Anglo-American. The officer losses of the German ground forces in WW2were much higher than US or UK losses of the same rank - generals ~10 times higher. People who know much more about military history than me attribute the leading up-front for both, the higher losses and the higher performance of the German ground forces.
A 10 times higher casualty rate for generals? Have you not considered that rather than this being a virtue this may have been a serious problem?
I suggest the initial higher performance of the German Army was due to their being better prepared at the start of the hostilities. But never underestimate the yanks, they a fast learners, which they certainly did after they got a bloody nose at Kasserine Pass. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Kasserine_Pass) and the rest is history.
Serving with the ranks means an officer applicant has a chance to experience very early how his future subordinates tick. In an all-volunteer force the basic training for OC and enlisted men should have the same quality, so this time is well spent IMHO.
One needs to manage career time very carefully. There is a short 30 years to get to general staff (Brigadier) which would make you 48-50 (which is pushing the limits IMHO). Now if you take four years out of that for officer training and later a university degree and say 15+ years to Lt Col means the brightest would get there at 45-47 while the norm will be to make it just in time and get to stay on for another five years (talking loosely about the US system in terms of age here). Having generals over 60 is ridiculous and they should be put on pension and out to pasture at or before the age of 60.
Having done the 'enlisted' recruit training and then it all again on officers course I see it like this. The principle difference would be that on a recruits course you are taught to be rifleman and how to take part in the various phases of war (as a rifleman) and how to use the various platoon weapons. On the other hand the officer needs to approach all training from the position of commanding a platoon in the various phases of war (through an understanding of the roles and duties of all the ranks in these activities). With weapons he must both learn how to use them as well as how to employ them. I found higher quality (and rank) NCOs as instructors on my officers course which was to be expected.
I don't regret my short time in the ranks before being commissioned (12 months) as I certainly learned a lot and it helped me settle in quickly (quicker) as a 2Lt, but I do believe that officer training should be geared to producing an officer capable of commanding a platoon from day one rather than relying on previous service to give him the confidence to do the job. The training itself must be good enough to achieve that.
Another side effect is, you could observe whether the officer candidate has leadership potential, maybe a chance for bottom-up selection.
A longer time as platoon leader was used to give the officer the opportunity to serve in other units, develop a deeper understanding of the other elements in his regiment or division. The highest priority had the applied tactics, this meant combined arms warefare after 1919.
Who observes? If the man with possible officer potential is in a platoon who is there to observe him? A Lt or 2Lt? Too light for that task. The NCOs? Not sure that NCOs of sergeant down are the best to identify officer potential.
Again IMHO it is a case of how much time you can devote to this preliminary background learning. If on is to set a minimum time served I would say a year (being half training and half in a platoon - hopefully on active service) with a maximum of say three years. (I can explain this another time as |I believe the next entry into the commissioned ranks would be from platoon sergeants of around 7-10 years service through a differently designed course (probably shorter than a year).
If the young officer spends three years with his platoon then he will learn all the stuff you are talking about while being supported by an experienced platoon sergeant. Better to experience the active service as a platoon commander for three years than to have a few years in the ranks and then short time on operations as an officer IMHO. Three years is maximum with a platoon then its time to move on.
The U.S. way is to have the guy have his degree beforehand.
Who pays the costs of getting the degree?
Fuchs
09-15-2011, 08:19 PM
There's no perfect model in existence (it was, but times and demands were different then).
We have too many conflicts:
(1) officers who leave after x years - officers who serve till retirement
(2) officers to lead men in combat - offers who lead support people - officers who do very important jobs without many subordinates
(3) effectiveness - costs
(4) uncertainty about potential - desirability of having officers qualified all the time, instead of adding learning-intensive basic qualifications after many years in service
(5) costs of long education and training - benefits of the same
(6) specialization on military skills - ability to get a job after life in uniform, ability to grasp and respect civilian stuff
(7) need for high quality - need for great quantity (in case of mobilization)
I suspect different career / education / training patterns are justified for different groups of army officers
(a) young officers and former NCOs (promising NCOs get a second NCO course (Feldwebellehrgang) and as a test the opportunity to lead a platoon for minimum 1 year or an equivalent staff task)
(b) civilian experts joining with full civilian qualification
(c) proved officers, selected for staff service (i.G.)
(d) proved officers, selected for leading army field units
(e) useful officers, selected for leading other units
example:
(a) Quick (6 months) lieutenant course (~ "70% solution" for up to company command)
(b) Quick (3 months) officership training (use of personal equipment, survival, regulations).
(c) staff courses and academic studies (military history, logistics, intel, art of war, technology of war) that span years, but with interruptions by normal staff assignments - and much autodidactic learning effort is expected
(d) command courses and academic studies that span years, but mostly command assignments. These officers should not be branch officers, but become combined arms officers.
(e) Branch-related courses to add competence in management and the area of occupation (logistics, for example)
JMA's concerns about wasting too much training on duds should be addressed by this. The young officers would either be proved NCOs or wouldn't get much training till being commissioned.
Young recruits on the direct path to officer would not sign up for many, many years - instead, they would sign up for two years and becoming lieutenant of the reserves. The army could then invite as many as it needs to further active service (signing up for a few years with expectation to move up to captain and probably get a company command minimum for a year, then in a third step become career officers).
Ulenspiegel
09-16-2011, 05:17 AM
A 10 times higher casualty rate for generals? Have you not considered that rather than this being a virtue this may have been a serious problem?
I suggest the initial higher performance of the German Army was due to their being better prepared at the start of the hostilities. But never underestimate the yanks, they a fast learners, which they certainly did after they got a bloody nose at Kasserine Pass. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Kasserine_Pass) and the rest is history.
Here I disagree, the difference in generals becoming KIA is a problem of very low losses on the allied side (only 30 US generals/admirals died). The readiness of the German army was in most fields low in 1939/40, it was outnumbered and outclassed in men and hardware, the only difference was leadership. A very good discussion is Frieser "Die Blitzkrieglegende", IIRC there is an English edition. When this leadership causes acceptable higher losses it is worth to consider IMHO.
Here I disagree, the difference in generals becoming KIA is a problem of very low losses on the allied side (only 30 US generals/admirals died). The readiness of the German army was in most fields low in 1939/40, it was outnumbered and outclassed in men and hardware, the only difference was leadership. A very good discussion is Frieser "Die Blitzkrieglegende", IIRC there is an English edition. When this leadership causes acceptable higher losses it is worth to consider IMHO.
Found the book here: The Blitzkrieg Legend: The Campaign in the West, 1940 (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Blitzkrieg-Legend-Campaign-West-1940/dp/1591142946/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1316158932&sr=8-1)
I must find a copy and read it to improve my knowledge of that era.
Prepared does not necessarily mean more tanks or planes. From my knowledge of that era I am aware that German officers were trained at a tactical level 'two-up' which would have prepared them for the mssive growth of the army after 1939 and it was probably a contributing factor to their tactical superiority at the outbreak of the war.
There's no perfect model in existence (it was, but times and demands were different then).
snip...
Excellent response. Let me chew on it and I will reply later or over the weekend.
Ulenspiegel
09-16-2011, 10:24 AM
Found the book here: The Blitzkrieg Legend: The Campaign in the West, 1940 (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Blitzkrieg-Legend-Campaign-West-1940/dp/1591142946/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1316158932&sr=8-1)
I must find a copy and read it to improve my knowledge of that era.
Prepared does not necessarily mean more tanks or planes. From my knowledge of that era I am aware that German officers were trained at a tactical level 'two-up' which would have prepared them for the mssive growth of the army after 1939 and it was probably a contributing factor to their tactical superiority at the outbreak of the war.
The training level of most German divisions was poor in 1939, improved during the winter1939/40; equipment was often WW1 stuff and all the main issues were, when we use the assessment of the Wehrmacht, only solved around May 1941. Of course, the propaganda photos in 1939/40 showed a "reality" that was only true for 25% of the German divisions.
IIRC the German Auftragstaktik became part of the regulations in 1888.
This concept only worked when leaders were able to clearly understand the intentions of their superiors. Therefore, we found quite early a tendency in the Imperial German army to train leaders who were able to command one or two levels above their paygrade.
Interesting is that the entrance exam for the war academy - the candidate was usually Leutnant or Oberleutnant - comprised applied tactics of combined regiments at the beginning of the 1920ies. My understanding is, that the long service time as Leutnant was used quite efficiently and was not lost time.
The experiences of WWI were brought to paper in the 1920ies and practical conclusions published as Truppenführung around 1934. So I do not have evidence that the leadership principles (for officers) were a result of the small Reichswehr and a planned expansion of the ground forces, but often were in place pre-WW1 and were only refined in the interwar period.
The training level of most German divisions was poor in 1939, improved during the winter1939/40; equipment was often WW1 stuff and all the main issues were, when we use the assessment of the Wehrmacht, only solved around May 1941. Of course, the propaganda photos in 1939/40 showed a "reality" that was only true for 25% of the German divisions.
IIRC the German Auftragstaktik became part of the regulations in 1888.
This concept only worked when leaders were able to clearly understand the intentions of their superiors. Therefore, we found quite early a tendency in the Imperial German army to train leaders who were able to command one or two levels above their paygrade.
Interesting is that the entrance exam for the war academy - the candidate was usually Leutnant or Oberleutnant - comprised applied tactics of combined regiments at the beginning of the 1920ies. My understanding is, that the long service time as Leutnant was used quite efficiently and was not lost time.
The experiences of WWI were brought to paper in the 1920ies and practical conclusions published as Truppenführung around 1934. So I do not have evidence that the leadership principles (for officers) were a result of the small Reichswehr and a planned expansion of the ground forces, but often were in place pre-WW1 and were only refined in the interwar period.
To win in war all you have to be is better 'prepared' than your enemy. This does not mean you need to be 100% prepared as preparation is a journey and not a destination.
Google Books allows one to browse The Blitzkrieg legend: the 1940 campaign in the West (http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Blitzkrieg_legend.html?id=7Y0MxdP-ws4C) to an extent, which is useful.
I have a copy of On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung (http://www.amazon.co.uk/German-Art-War-Truppenfuhrung-Stackpole/dp/0811735524/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1316230665&sr=1-1).
The concept of combat power (or fighting power) - Kampfkraft is worthy of greater study in terms of reaching a greater understanding of the role of leadership in this and how to select officers who have the required characteristics to enhance this. Kampfkraft is without doubt a critical force multiplier.
The article The Perfect Officer - by Henrik Bering (http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/87236) contains enough to keep an enquiring intellect busy for months.
The key element of fighting power is leadership. In screening for officer material, the German emphasis was on all-around personality, rather than on intelligence and education alone. Intelligence is important, but even more important is character. A man can be clever and a coward. Or he can be indecisive. What the Germans were looking for was determination, the individual’s willingness to assume responsibility, and his ability to handle adversity. Here van Creveld uses the German word: the officer had to be Krisenfest, “crisisproof,” i.e., steady in emergencies.
Ulenspiegel
09-17-2011, 05:39 AM
The article The Perfect Officer - by Henrik Bering (http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/87236) contains enough to keep an enquiring intellect busy for months.
Here H. Bering put van Creveld's statement which is found in "Fighting Power" a little bit out of context.
The search for candidates with character was the central piece in the Prussian army's selection process, here the regimental commander did most of the work. Therefore my question how he could do this even after decadeds of peace.
Formal education was secondary, sometimes trouble in school or family indicated an independent personality which was preferred. See Jörg Muth "Command Culture". However, the Reichswehr increased the educational requirements 1920 as von Seeckt felt that modern warfare requires an sharp intellect.
Kriesenfest as important filter was only added in the last two years of WW2 and not found earlier.
Here H. Bering put van Creveld's statement which is found in "Fighting Power" a little bit out of context.
From the article:
The Israeli military analyst Martin van Creveld attributes the Wehrmacht’s frighteningly effective performance during World War II to its fighting power, or Kampfkraft, which he defines as “the sum total of mental qualities that makes armies fight.” As he notes in his book, Fighting Power, while weaponry and tactics undergo changes due to the advance of technology, the nature of fighting power remains constant. Thus, according to his equation, “within the limits of its size, the military worth of an army equals the quantity and quality of its equipment multiplied by its fighting power.”
And from On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung (http://www.amazon.co.uk/German-Art-War-Truppenfuhrung-Stackpole/dp/0811735524/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1316230665&sr=1-1):
The caliber of a leader and of the men determines the combat power (Kampfkraft) of a unit, which is augmented by the quantity, care, and maintenance of their weapons and equipment.
OK you get to a Board member on an AOSB.
Task: Leaderless group activity.
Scenario: Motor accident, biker trapped under vehicle and bike on fire. Save him.
Biker pulled from blazing crash scene by random bystanders in Logan, Utah (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vNR0b-hDZrQ)
Spot the natural leaders...
Ulenspiegel
09-17-2011, 12:06 PM
From the article:
And from On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung (http://www.amazon.co.uk/German-Art-War-Truppenfuhrung-Stackpole/dp/0811735524/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1316230665&sr=1-1):
Sorry for the confusion, I was refering to the "kriesenfest" attribute of officer candidates which was a new invention in 1944 and indicated a deteriorating situation of the German ground forces. It does not play a major role in van Crefeld's argumentation and in the Prussian/German officer selction. Bering gives it more importance than van Crefeld and other.
There's no perfect model in existence (it was, but times and demands were different then).
We have too many conflicts:
(1) officers who leave after x years - officers who serve till retirement
This is no problem if those who leave and those who stay are in keeping with the needs of the army. Its a problem if the best and the brightest leave and the army is left with the dross.
(2) officers to lead men in combat - offers who lead support people - officers who do very important jobs without many subordinates
For the purpose of simplicity try to focus only on the teeth arms (infantry and armour) for the moment. This sets the general standard and the other arms may well have slight or significant different requirements which need to be taken into consideration. The principle that needs to be established IMHO is which officers need which degrees as an essential requirement at the time of commissioning (for example medical officers).
(3) effectiveness - costs
Effectiveness can cover a wide range of aspects. But left me assume that it means the amount and quality of training and education required to allow the officer to function 'effectively' in a war time operational environment. The cost issue would be assessed on the benefits arising from the investment. Are we on the same page here?
(4) uncertainty about potential - desirability of having officers qualified all the time, instead of adding learning-intensive basic qualifications after many years in service
If you mean qualified at the beginning and at the time of commissioning then (as i have said) I don't believe its necessary. You analyse the career path of the officers in each branch then you establish the what-when-where-how of training and education needed along the way. I genuinely can see no point in a degree being needed from the get-go (other than for the likes of medical officers that is).
(5) costs of long education and training - benefits of the same
Think I have covered this. You don't spend all the money up front. You set career milestones at which point certain courses must be successfully completed (this would be a mix of internal and degree training and education). The benefits of this training and education would have to have been apparent to have been set as a requirement. It would not be discretionary but a stipulated requirement set by the service. In other words external university or higher education that will be authorised and paid for by the military will be what will benefit the service. No chance of (for example) a Corps of Engineers officer taking three years out at government expense to read philosophy (for example).
(6) specialisation on military skills - ability to get a job after life in uniform, ability to grasp and respect civilian stuff
Concentrate on the military skills. If the service decides that at major or so that he has no further career growth potential then let him choose a 'second career degree and let the service send him full time to a university. He would have given the best years of his life to the service and it is fair and honourable to help him on his way in this manner IMHO.
(7) need for high quality - need for great quantity (in case of mobilisation)
What we have covered here is what would be the plan under normal peacetime (or with a small war somewhere). Once there is a need to mobilise then all training is limited to the 'must knows' with the 'should knows' and 'could knows' being dropped for the time being.
Are we on the same page?
The article The Perfect Officer - by Henrik Bering (http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/87236) contains enough to keep an enquiring intellect busy for months.
Thought I would extract some quotes from Bering's article as they apply to officer selection:
...Of all the jobs in the world, then as now, the wartime officer’s is the most dangerous and demanding, physically and emotionally.
...Among the characteristics required in a successful commander are imagination, intuition, and an ability to improvise, all qualities associated with a free and independent mind.
…What further characterizes a great commander is the ability to keep calm under stressful circumstances, the ability to tune out irrelevant information and to keep functioning when things go wrong.
…How do you combine the need for obedience and discipline with the need for imaginative and independent thought?
…as the German 1936 Truppenfuhrung manual put it, “a readiness to assume responsibility is the most important of all qualities of leadership,”…
…In [Israeli] officers’ training, the emphasis is on initiative and self reliance;
Ok, so how do the current initial pre-course officer selection processes (in the various militaries) select for these characteristics? Then how during the actual training course leading to commissioning are situations created where cadets are tested individually for the above characteristics?
I suspect different career / education / training patterns are justified for different groups of army officers
(a) young officers and former NCOs (promising NCOs get a second NCO course (Feldwebellehrgang) and as a test the opportunity to lead a platoon for minimum 1 year or an equivalent staff task)
(b) civilian experts joining with full civilian qualification
(c) proved officers, selected for staff service (i.G.)
(d) proved officers, selected for leading army field units
(e) useful officers, selected for leading other units
Yes, I believe so and must state again that this must be carried out in a manner suitable to the career route of the individual as deemed necessary by the individuals applicable service requirements. No way that an individual in the infantry decides he wants to read philosophy or study accounting.
One year at platoon commanding? Only in a time of full mobilisation with the nations back against the wall. Otherwise three years is (or should be) the standard IMHO.
example:
(a) Quick (6 months) lieutenant course (~ "70% solution" for up to company command)
(b) Quick (3 months) officership training (use of personal equipment, survival, regulations).
(c) staff courses and academic studies (military history, logistics, intel, art of war, technology of war) that span years, but with interruptions by normal staff assignments - and much autodidactic learning effort is expected
(d) command courses and academic studies that span years, but mostly command assignments. These officers should not be branch officers, but become combined arms officers.
(e) Branch-related courses to add competence in management and the area of occupation (logistics, for example)
Yes, as long as the courses and lines of study are set by the military and the applicable service/branch and these take place over a period rather than precommissioning or immediately thereafter.
JMA's concerns about wasting too much training on duds should be addressed by this. The young officers would either be proved NCOs or wouldn't get much training till being commissioned.
Yes, do not let the military be used as any easy route to get a degree in exchange for a few years service. Select them when they are young, 'bright-eyed and bushy-tailed', test them early (thank those who don't make it for their efforts and treat them with dignity on exit) and sit with the successful young officers and plan their futures sketching out both a high-road route and a low-road route telling them what is expected of them and how they will be assessed (and again given these young men are giving the best years of their lives treat them with absolute honesty and respect).
The commissioning of NCOs should be handled carefully. While it would be crazy to ignore officer potential as it exists the potential catastrophic downside is that being an NCO gets to be seen as a second grade soldier. This is why I suggest that there is an early window of opportunity for a commission from the ranks and that being (say) within the first three years of service (normally) undergoing the normal officer training course (of say a year) with the next window of opportunity being at senior NCO level (at say warrant officer - in the Brit sense - after 15 years service. This second group would be mainly for technical/administrative/training officer positions with relatively few GD (general duties) commissions leading to platoon commanding and the like. Any army which tampers with the senior NCO structure at platoon/company/battalion level does so at its peril... IMHO
Young recruits on the direct path to officer would not sign up for many, many years - instead, they would sign up for two years and becoming lieutenant of the reserves. The army could then invite as many as it needs to further active service (signing up for a few years with expectation to move up to captain and probably get a company command minimum for a year, then in a third step become career officers).
I assume this is for a volunteer? (dealing with conscripts would be based on different criteria)
Your thinking on this is interesting and I would be interested in how potential officers would view such a stepped career process. I like the idea that the military gets to decide who goes and who stays rather than guaranteed employment for a number of years by regulation.
Fuchs
09-18-2011, 08:50 AM
…How do you combine the need for obedience and discipline with the need for imaginative and independent thought?
Discipline can be done right or wrong. Those who understand the reason why an increased level of discipline is needed in an army (and it's not needed in an air force!) can will have no problem with discipline that they wouldn't have with a training plan.
There are times for ideas and there are times when a team has to act together and quickly, towards a purpose. Poor leaders may stick to the latter all the time, but good superiors understand that different situations demand different approaches.
Besides; Auftragstaktik leaves a lot of room for independent action within the limits of obedience.
Ulenspiegel
09-18-2011, 09:10 AM
Yes, do not let the military be used as any easy route to get a degree in exchange for a few years service. Select them when they are young, 'bright-eyed and bushy-tailed', test them early (thank those who don't make it for their efforts and treat them with dignity on exit) and sit with the successful young officers and plan their futures sketching out both a high-road route and a low-road route telling them what is expected of them and how they will be assessed (and again given these young men are giving the best years of their lives treat them with absolute honesty and respect).
That would be great. Especially give them a chance for a low-road route.
.....
I assume this is for a volunteer? (dealing with conscripts would be based on different criteria)
Your thinking on this is interesting and I would be interested in how potential officers would view such a stepped career process. I like the idea that the military gets to decide who goes and who stays rather than guaranteed employment for a number of years by regulation.
Most German reserve officers were/are conscipts. Usually the candidates were asked after 6 months by their company commander to become a ROC and stay for 2 years (with better pay). I know some good reserve officers who would really enjoy the model Fuchs proposes.
However, with an all-volunteer force the ROC supply may be hurt.
Discipline can be done right or wrong. Those who understand the reason why an increased level of discipline is needed in an army (and it's not needed in an air force!) can will have no problem with discipline that they wouldn't have with a training plan.
There are times for ideas and there are times when a team has to act together and quickly, towards a purpose. Poor leaders may stick to the latter all the time, but good superiors understand that different situations demand different approaches.
Besides; Auftragstaktik leaves a lot of room for independent action within the limits of obedience.
We probably need to accept that the leadership and discipline has a cultural component which means that different nations will aprroach these matters differently and with different results and there is no point in attempting to duplicate to the letter another's approach in a different environment.
Examples of the Brit approach to discipline are:
Pride in Oneself
Discipline is teaching which makes a man do something which he would not, unless he had learnt that it was the right, the proper, and the expedient thing to do. At its best, it is instilled and maintained by pride in oneself, in one’s unit, in one’s profession; only at its worst by a fear of punishment.
Field Marshal Earl Wavell The Good Soldier (1945).
Overcoming Instincts
Foreign visitors sometimes talk of our ‘natural’ discipline. Of course it is not natural! You might as well talk of the ‘instincts of a gentleman’. A man becomes a gentleman only by overcoming his instincts. It is the same with discipline.
Field Marshal Sir William Slim Courage and Other Broadcasts (1957).
Fuchs
09-18-2011, 06:00 PM
Hmm, let me explain the German army way as I learnt it.
An anglophone scholar (forgot who - either Gudmundsson or v.Creveld) once wrote about it that for Germans (in WW2), battle was the source of discipline itself. He came close.
The German keyword here is Gefechtsdisziplin - combat discipline.
It's the compound of obedience with thinking and comradeship.
A (small9 unit cannot withstand the stress of battle without discipline, thus discipline needs to become natural for army soldiers. It needs to be trained with discipline in little everyday affairs, but the superiors should always remember that it's combat, not the everyday affair that warrants this effort!
This is of utmost importance, for exaggerations that do not pursue the goal of robustness under combat stress will stifle the "thinking" part that's of great importance for actual performance in battle (and for developing leaders).
As a consequence, it's quite unimportant whether all soldiers wear the sleeves up, down or whether they mix it. They may march in lock-step or not.
All that counts is that superiors used enough discipline standards to instil and maintain discipline. Discipline is a skill that need training and maintenance, it is not a performance.
Just a note to say I will be travelling for the next week or so. Will look in while on the road.
Ken White
09-20-2011, 08:08 PM
As a consequence, it's quite unimportant whether all soldiers wear the sleeves up, down or whether they mix it. They may march in lock-step or not. All that counts is that superiors used enough discipline standards to instil and maintain discipline. Discipline is a skill that need training and maintenance, it is not a performance.To engrave this on a large plaque, have copies made and posted at the entrance to the US Army Sergeant Majors Academy and all the various Staff and War colleges.
Probably need one at each entrance to the Pentagon as well.
Certainly need one on E Ring...
Hmm. Every Division and BCT headquarters...:rolleyes:
selil
09-21-2011, 06:29 PM
To engrave this on a large plaque, have copies made and posted at the entrance to the US Army Sergeant Majors Academy and all the various Staff and War colleges.
Probably need one at each entrance to the Pentagon as well.
Certainly need one on E Ring...
Hmm. Every Division and BCT headquarters...:rolleyes:
If you make the plaque I'll hang it in my office at NDU :)
Ken White
09-21-2011, 06:51 PM
If you make the plaque I'll hang it in my office at NDU :)It'll take a bit -- not as quick as I used to be and minor busy right now. PM me a Snail Mail Address in the next week or so...
Bill Moore
09-22-2011, 06:57 AM
Bravo! Although I suspect we have slim hopes of thining the ranks of the dumbest people in the world who focus on what type of socks your wearing, or if your sleeve is turned, or your boot laces aren't left over right, etc. We used to have a different breed of Sergeant Major, one that both the enlisted and officers deeply respected. Uniform violations in garrison weren't tolerated, but few were focused on non-sense in the field, they were focused on training, and in combat on effectiveness. Now we're paying them big money to be fashion police.
Obviously our form of discipline didn't work for the PLT PBS Frontline did a special on last night. It was a case study on the most undisciplined soldiers I ever recall seeing. I suspect the senior NCOs kept them in the right uniform (fashion police patrols), but were obviously missing on combat patrols where discipline was really needed.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/woundedplatoon/
I do not lack sympathy for those with PTSD, and while the documentary attempts to make all these cases out to be PTSD they're not. Several members of this platoon had criminal records and a long history of discipline issues before going to combat, where they claim to have shot civilians for fun, they had one dumb kid trying to hug an Iraqi women, etc. Hard for me to believe the Army allowed a unit like this to exist, much less deploy, and worse deploy in combat with no adult supervision. No wonder so many Iraqis hate us.
Ken White
09-22-2011, 02:18 PM
Obviously our form of discipline didn't work for the PLT PBS Frontline did a special on last night. It was a case study on the most undisciplined soldiers I ever recall seeing. I suspect the senior NCOs kept them in the right uniform (fashion police patrols), but were obviously missing on combat patrols where discipline was really needed.I suspect you're right. I saw little evidence of any real NCO involvement in what those kids did at any point. I also noticed there were incidents of unaimed pray and spray firing and just general poor tactical competence.
We recruit but do not select. We fill out counseling sheets but do not fire due to lack of competence. We train lethality and appearance well -- discipline and common sense not at all... :rolleyes:
I do not lack sympathy for those with PTSD, and while the documentary attempts to make all these cases out to be PTSD they're not. Several members of this platoon had criminal records and a long history of discipline issues before going to combat, where they claim to have shot civilians for fun, they had one dumb kid trying to hug an Iraqi women, etc. Hard for me to believe the Army allowed a unit like this to exist, much less deploy, and worse deploy in combat with no adult supervision. No wonder so many Iraqis hate us.Yep. I didn't see much PTSD -- just a bunch of kids with no control just as occurred at Abu Gharaib and dozens (probably hundreds) of other times. The NCO Corps has has lost the bubble, I think...
Of course, at their behest, we do now have the most atrocious set of uniforms ever... :rolleyes:
ganulv
09-23-2011, 12:54 AM
A recent post (http://www.onviolence.com/?e=479) at the On Violence (http://www.onviolence.com/) blog asserts that
We [in the U.S. Army] can’t become better leaders until we figure out that we are managers. Yes, management is a dirty word, but we ignored it and now most officers/senior NCOs/warrant officers can’t manage their time or communications–at the least, few do it nearly as well as they should.
Does anyone energetically second or strenuously object to the above?
Ken White
09-23-2011, 03:15 AM
Both at all times but frequently one must be temporarily subjugated to the other... :wry:
I for one do not either second or object to the premise. It has merit and much truth but it is merely one way to describe the problem. Others will say that one who cannot manage time or comms is inefficient, ineffective, poorly trained or not a good leader -- all those comments are also true. :cool:
Sadly, regardless of the attitude of the United States Army Human Resources Command, not everyone of equal educational attainment and broadly similar professional background can do both those things adequately -- much less well...
In our quest for personal excellence, we often forget the fact that the US Army and our friends in other services are not optimum combat forces. They are by design, adequate (barely, some say...) forces for employment on nationally directed missions one of which may be combat. Democracies do not want their armed forces to be too competent. Won't tolerate that, in fact. Our armed forces are products of 200 plus years of evolution and ever increasing bureaucratic sclerosis subject to the whims and vagaries of Congress. They have antiquated personnel systems and compensation processes that are absolutely inimical to flexibility and good order (be that led or managed... :wry:).
We skimp on training funds and overspend on equipment to compensate for that shortcoming to a degree. As a result of all that, the services are on balance and in fact mostly marginally trained, not too well disciplined and the Army at least has elevated people of relative inexperience and mediocre competence to positions as leaders, commanders or staff persons with which a number cannot cope effectively.. A mentality that says SFCs or CPTs must be in SFC or CPT positions, regardless of knowledges, skills and ability promotes people to check boxes and fill holes (a dogma that drives many good SSG and LTs out). Personnel management failure on high -- and that is purely a management problem -- leads to all sorts of management problems down the chain. Toleration of that poor management -- at all levels -- is a leadership problem and that absence of leadership is noted and also trickles down the chain. :rolleyes:
The position expressed by Michael C. is his take and is certainly correct in many aspects; he's a smart guy -- but I personally think that his two art forms, management and leading are, individually, mild complications and collectively they become IMO excessive complications. Leadership is nothing more than three things -- know your job, do your job and be fair. I submit that management can well be similarly described. So can the old fashioned Army term that encompasses both those and other skills as well -- be tactically and technically competent.
That used to be the goal of all systems, processes, training and PME. That seems to have been discarded. It shows...
Managers organize, Leaders motivate. Military competence requires both skills.
This is a perennial issue that comes up in the military from time to time.
Lets listen to what a great soldier once said on the matter:
Leadership and Management
We do not in the Army talk of “management”, but of “leadership”. This is significant. There is a difference between leadership and management. The leader and the men who follow him represent one of the oldest, most natural and most effective of all human relationships. The manager and those he manages are a later product, with neither so romantic nor so inspiring a history. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality and vision: its practice is an art. Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculation, of statistics, of methods, timetables and routine; its practice is a science. Managers are necessary; leaders are essential.
- Address to the Australian Institute of Management 4 April 1957 by Field Marshal Sir William Slim Governor General of Australia.
...and another one which is short and sweet:
In A Nutshell
Fixed (things) - management
Variables (people) - leadership
- Major General Julian Thompson, Commanding 3 Command Brigade in the
Falklands Conflict 1982.
Back to the point... IMHO select officers for their leadership ability and train them to manage (where necessary)... you can't turn managers into leaders.
Ken White
09-23-2011, 02:33 PM
This is a perennial issue that comes up in the military from time to time...IMHO select officers for their leadership ability and train them to manage (where necessary)... you can't turn managers into leaders.We knew that. Though it seems we may have forgotten it... :(
Hey JMA !
... you can't turn managers into leaders.
It wasn't long ago that the Air Force and to some extent the Army thought they could convert senior NCOs (leaders) into managers. :rolleyes:
We don't turn combat and combat support personnel into desk drivers and we really don't want desk drivers designated as leaders (see below).
Hi Ken !
A mentality that says SFCs or CPTs must be in SFC or CPT positions, regardless of knowledges, skills and ability promotes people to check boxes and fill holes...
'Nuff said :cool:
We knew that. Though it seems we may have forgotten it... :(
Well what to do about it?
Is it current (US) thinking that an attack by a battalion/company/platoon/section can be managed or is officer and NCO leadership required?
Hey JMA !
It wasn't long ago that the Air Force and to some extent the Army thought they could convert senior NCOs (leaders) into managers. :rolleyes:
We don't turn combat and combat support personnel into desk drivers and we really don't want desk drivers designated as leaders (see below).
Perhaps it is important to identify which positions require management skills and which have a primary leadership requirement.
For example the US war effort is recognised (by non-US countries) to be led by outstanding competence in logistic supply (rather than fighting prowess) which arises from superior management organisational skills. US logistic systems are not flawlessly carried out as many US soldiers will tell you but nevertheless vastly superior to the rest.
I guess when NCOs reach a certain level the leadership positions reduce and there is more of a demand for paper pushing management types. So what to do with the older NCOs of an age where they are too old to lead men in battle?
Ken White
10-01-2011, 05:03 AM
Well what to do about it?
Is it current (US) thinking that an attack by a battalion/company/platoon/section can be managed or is officer and NCO leadership required?In reverse order, no, we know better; leadership is required. We also know a bit of management is required to get that unit in shape and position for that attack. We used to combine those traits fairly well for about 80% of the leaders and commanders -- nobody ever gets to 100%. Nobody. Ever...
The answer to your question is to not re-elect a single incumbent to the US Congress until they get the message that they have been so wrong for so long and they still haven't got it right. I see no real chance for improvement until that happens -- or we get in a major, existential war, we tend to throw away the stupids when those occur; performance rules...
We weren't perfect but we were better with people 40 years ago -- then the US Congress decreed that all selection criteria must be 'fair' and 'objective.' This caused managerial (or even lesser) types who would not have been selected for senior officer or NCO positions prior to the mid-60s to be considered; the move to 'objective' criteria required the use of 'metrics' in selection so it could be proven that all pegs were round (one way or another...). Add the fact that democracies do not like their Armies to be too competent; makes the legislators and the social set nervous. All that results in a very egalitarian Army. :rolleyes:
Regrettably, warfare is not egalitarian. :eek::(
Ken White
10-01-2011, 05:23 AM
I guess when NCOs reach a certain level the leadership positions reduce and there is more of a demand for paper pushing management types.Officers and NCO come with either a managerial bent -- and job -- or one that espouses leadership. Key is to put the right shaped peg in the proper hole -- that's where we fail. Started that foolishness in the 1960s, literally took the personal out of Personnel -- and that was NOT the improvement it was supposed to be...
Miserably, we seem to think that all of like schooling and experience are absolutely interchangeable. They are not, of course...
So what to do with the older NCOs of an age where they are too old to lead men in battle?Do what the Bundeswehr did upon formation in 1955, put old one-eyed, one-armed Afrika Korps veteran Feldwebels in position as Company operations directors to whom young Hauptmann HAD to listen [Eek -- un-American, that...] -- they fought (in the combat expertise and directive sense) the Company, the Officers led it.
Also do what the Brits do, commission 'em as Captains and let serve out a few years as Trainers and technical masters of the job at hand [Also un-American because any generalist can do everything well -- even if he is 24 with only three years experience...] -- that way the Generalists can head for Generalship.
This is not rocket science... :rolleyes:
Fuchs
10-01-2011, 06:59 AM
The Bundeswehr had very ill-trained young officers in the 50's. That deficiency was resolved by the early 60's; more well-trained/well-educated lieutenants are naturally more assertive in contact with subordinate senior NCOs.
I've seen this back in my time in uniform; an Oberfeldwebel reports something to a Oberleutnant, begins to lecture him about the meaning of some detail and the Oberleutnant interrupts him, telling him that he did the exact same thing that they're talking about back when he was a Fähnrich.
So what you propose, Ken, is the American way: Expose 90-day-wonders to experienced NCOs.
In reverse order, no, we know better; leadership is required. We also know a bit of management is required to get that unit in shape and position for that attack.
I knew you would know that Ken ;) ... but how many serving members (say) under 35 know that?
We used to combine those traits fairly well for about 80% of the leaders and commanders -- nobody ever gets to 100%. Nobody. Ever...
That was then... what about now?
Combine, I would suppose would be that leadership characterists were deemed essential while management ability would be deemed desirable, yes?
The answer to your question is to not re-elect a single incumbent to the US Congress until they get the message that they have been so wrong for so long and they still haven't got it right. I see no real chance for improvement until that happens -- or we get in a major, existential war, we tend to throw away the stupids when those occur; performance rules...
Well then the prognosis is not good.
We weren't perfect but we were better with people 40 years ago -- then the US Congress decreed that all selection criteria must be 'fair' and 'objective.' This caused managerial (or even lesser) types who would not have been selected for senior officer or NCO positions prior to the mid-60s to be considered; the move to 'objective' criteria required the use of 'metrics' in selection so it could be proven that all pegs were round (one way or another...). Add the fact that democracies do not like their Armies to be too competent; makes the legislators and the social set nervous. All that results in a very egalitarian Army. :rolleyes:
Regrettably, warfare is not egalitarian. :eek::(
Perhaps then (back to the title of this thread) if it is so difficult to deal with people once in the service pre-employment selection (for officers and men)becomes even more important, yes?
Also do what the Brits do, commission 'em as Captains and let serve out a few years as Trainers and technical masters of the job at hand [Also un-American because any generalist can do everything well -- even if he is 24 with only three years experience...] -- that way the Generalists can head for Generalship.
I said some time ago that IMHO officers (of the direct entry variety) should not become involved in the training of (enlisted) recruits and (for the most part) the training of junior NCOs. The required officers for this aspect of training should be those commissioned from the ranks.
It worked for the RLI where three ex-RSMs (regimental sergeants major) - two from the regiment itself with the last one reaching the rank of major being in charge of all recruit training. Its the experience of that environment and of the skills required of the basic soldier that makes the use of warrant officers commissioned from the ranks as training officers essential.
The Bundeswehr had very ill-trained young officers in the 50's. That deficiency was resolved by the early 60's; more well-trained/well-educated lieutenants are naturally more assertive in contact with subordinate senior NCOs.
I've seen this back in my time in uniform; an Oberfeldwebel reports something to a Oberleutnant, begins to lecture him about the meaning of some detail and the Oberleutnant interrupts him, telling him that he did the exact same thing that they're talking about back when he was a Fähnrich.
So what you propose, Ken, is the American way: Expose 90-day-wonders to experienced NCOs.
Well when there is a problem with (company level) officer quality then such remedial action needs to be taken. When there is a problem with NCO quality then heaven help that army... and that country.
There will always be inexperienced officers arriving in platoons where there is (hopefully) an experienced sergeant. That is how it works in the Brit and generally in the US system. You owe it to your soldiers that when you do this to a platoon that it is a person with proven officer characteristics needing experience at that level and not some clown with a pip (or bar) on his shoulder. Hence the need for detailed and careful officer selection.
Ken White
10-01-2011, 10:15 PM
So what you propose, Ken, is the American way: Expose 90-day-wonders to experienced NCOs.Because we are not (unfortunately) going to train officers the way it is done in Germany (not invented here) nor are we going to leave Officers in position long enough to become truly competent and effective (I recall that in the late 90s, the CG of the Fallschirmjaeger Division commented that he had known all five of the US Commanders rotating through his one nearby American Division...). Neither will we have a much needed General Staff (also not invented here...). :rolleyes:
In an off board series of discussions it appears that the value of a university degree before or as part of the commissioning process is being questioned more and more.
My question was and remains that is it not better to take them in young and train them as soldiers and officers and test them at platoon level (hopefully in battle) before investing in their tertiary education?
One aspect seemingly not taken into account when lamenting low officer retention rates is that maybe for a greater number than acknowledged the military was used as a means to obtain a degree and a reasonable CV (resume) entry of having served as an officer. How many are in it for the education? Half?
A possibly superior approach being flighted is that instead of the military training being fitted in the breaks in the academic year is for the military selection and training taking full precedent until you have the service the right officers in which you would be prepared to invest in (in terms of education). Not going to happen in the US one accepts.
Fuchs
10-02-2011, 09:20 PM
I remember Creveld wrote something about the academic issue for officers in his 'The Sword and Olive' book about the IDF. IIRC he pointed out that its introduction solved some problems, such as officers with too narrow thinking.
I remember Creveld wrote something about the academic issue for officers in his 'The Sword and Olive' book about the IDF. IIRC he pointed out that its introduction solved some problems, such as officers with too narrow thinking.
This education is indeed necessary.
The question I pose is when, before commissioning, parallel with the commissioning process or after commissioning when his potential has been proven, should this education take place.
Fuchs
10-02-2011, 11:37 PM
You're considering drop-outs after years of training a waste.
Look at it another way; those are the officer reserves for times of need. You don't need to pay them any more (instead, they work and pay taxes), but you can still call them up.
You're considering drop-outs after years of training a waste.
Look at it another way; those are the officer reserves for times of need. You don't need to pay them any more (instead, they work and pay taxes), but you can still call them up.
Depends what you mean by drop-outs.
There are a few aspects here. One, where people sign up for officer training with the hidden intention of getting a degree and moving on as soon as they are able. In this case it explains the retention problems and that there is really little or nothing the military can do about it as the people leaving will give any reason for doing so other than the truth. The second reason for officers leaving (that they will not be honest about) will be that they do not want a second round of the type of warfare as experienced in Iraq and/or Afghanistan. Having spent a small fortune on their (non-military) education it turns into a waste as there are other ways to approach this.
Then if one takes the scenario where the following sequence is followed:
* careful initial pre-course selection over a period of days (along the lines of the Brit AOSB) - no harm done for those who fail the selection process.
* The first phase of training on the actual course (up to ten weeks) where the basic training/drill/physical will see a number of those unsuitable for the rigours of the military existence (certainly in war) - in this event those who drop out can select to be discharged or transfer to an other ranks/enlisted recruit course to continue serving. Note: In my experience the majority of those that make it through first phase generally make it through to commissioning. If they don't then a discharge should be offered. Sure money on training is wasted in this process but it is justified by not putting unsuitable officers in command of men. If the drop out rate during the course is high then review the initial selection process to see how these persons managed to pass that selection process.
* Young newly commissioned 2Lts spend three years commanding a platoon (with hopefully significant combat exposure). Note that there is a significant difference between mere combat experience and combat command experience. - here if the man fails to meet the requirements of an officer at that level he is either offered the chance to take a discharge or accept a low road career path. No point of passing 'failed' officers onto the reserve unless you want to destroy it.
* Now you take your young officers and discuss likely career paths honestly with them. Plan for university education in subject matter that suits the military and their likely promotion path and corps/branch. These are the people who are giving the best years of their lives to the military - treat them with respect and as national assets. Some of these may decide to leave the service at some point and be of value to the reserves.
Note: while this thread is about officers IMHO a similar process should be taking place in terms of selection and career planning among NCOs. We know we can produce any number of troopies in 6 months but seasoned NCOs like a good brandy take years to mature. They too are giving the best years of their lives to the military and need to be afforded the same respect as officers as a result.
So, back to your point, if you are talking about officers who have proved themselves as platoon commanders leaving the military after say 5 years then yes they will still be of value to the reserve.
Fuchs
10-03-2011, 10:29 AM
* Young newly commissioned 2Lts spend three years commanding a platoon (with hopefully significant combat exposure).
I see this here again and again in the forum.
You got your priorities wrong.
To have a super army is not important.
To maintain peace is important.
Accordingly, you DO NOT WANT your officer corps to be combat-experienced!
A combat-experienced officer corps is a symptom of a national security policy failure!
I see this here again and again in the forum.
Maybe
You got your priorities wrong.
Which priorities? Political, military, both?
To have a super army is not important.
To maintain peace is important.
Especially if the peace is being guaranteed by the US ;)
Accordingly, you DO NOT WANT your officer corps to be combat-experienced!
On the contrary if there is a war on the go it should be used to test weapon systems and soldiers in battle. To neglect to do this is sheer insanity. This is the only time I could support short tours and that would be to expose as many soldiers as possible to war time conditions and hopefully combat before peace breaks out. Helps to focus a soldiers mind.
A combat-experienced officer corps is a symptom of a national security policy failure!
You mean the politicians screwed up again? ;)
From a military point of view soldiers must be as best prepared for action as possible in the event of war breaking out. Other wise why have a military?
Even the yanks and the Brits who seem to jump in and out of wars have their challenges and so countries whose armies only spend time on peace keeping duties at best in all honestly should probably be graded 'pathetic' by comparison.
It is clear that in the absence of war there is a tendency for the wrong selection criteria to be used for officer advancement. There is little point in having an army comprising a bunch of 'prancers and dancers' as one US general called them. The question is how to keep the soldiers edge during peacetime.
Fuchs
10-03-2011, 04:07 PM
Again, you got your priorities totally wrong.
You should not wish for being experienced in first aid training when you crashed your car again and your wife lies next to you, bleeding.
You should with to not drive that stupidly and not crash your car in the first place, much less repeatedly.
What you're doing is to propose that every driver should regularly be involved in car crashes, in order to be better prepared for the next tone. That's totally misguided (if not crazy) thinking.
Again, you got your priorities totally wrong.
Not quite
You should not wish for being experienced in first aid training when you crashed your car again and your wife lies next to you, bleeding.
Not sure about that... but if I found myself in a car crash with my wife lying bleeding next to me I would certain wish that I was well trained and experienced in more than just first-aid.
You should with to not drive that stupidly and not crash your car in the first place, much less repeatedly.
Where I come from we call it defensive driver training and like soldiering I would not advocate that soldiers do anything stupidly or foolishly. In fact that is (partly) what sergeants are for... to make sure soldiers don't do anything foolish or stupid and to kick ass if they do... and this extends to 2Lts too.
A person who repeatedly makes the same mistake should not be an officer... nor a soldier for that matter.
What you're doing is to propose that every driver should regularly be involved in car crashes, in order to be better prepared for the next tone. That's totally misguided (if not crazy) thinking.
Not quite.
The combat being experienced in Afghanistan is not Stalingrad so it is a low risk high return situation. (Note: my comments on IEDs made in the UK in Afghanistan thread stand, but for the rest (the remaining 25%) of the casualties it is indeed a low intensity war.)
Exposing young officers to combat is the first step, with the second (and more important) being requiring them to actually command in combat (in other words make decisions in a time of high stress). Sure some won't make it but the return on the investment for the military and the country through the experience gained by the majority is worth the sacrifice IMHO.
Take those US forces who have been involved in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Do you think the military is better prepared for future combat because of the experiences? Of course.
Combat is a soldiers trade and the more he gets (like making love) the better he becomes.
Fuchs
10-03-2011, 05:24 PM
You don't seem to get it because of a tiny field of view on this.
Sure, once you're in a mess you want to be able to reduce its severity.
The wish for this ability is inferior to the wish for not getting into that mess in the first place, though.
For that reason it's a foolish mistake to hope for combat experience. The correct hope is to avoid war.
And there's more than hoping that can be done.
Your tiny angle of view on a military education topic keeps you from considering that in almost all cases preserving peace is superior to "winning" war.
Armed forces of a rationally-led state exist in order to keep that state out of war, not to win wars. Aiming at not getting involved in wars means that the ideal education and experience path for the officer corps cannot lead through wartime experience (save for foolish volunteers who get involved in other's wars).
What you are instead aiming at is a systematically inferior path.
It wasn't long ago I asked you what a military should do (other than attain victory). You responded with me earning a load of disrespect (but yet, never answered my question).
The deterrence and diplomatic theories that you peruse have all but been proven to be a failure by more than one Western nation. It's one thing to deter an attack against one's State and entirely another set of rules to deter or stop an attack against another State.
Do you then propose we train all our soldiers in some sort of diplomatic gaming vs marksmanship and combat ? Heh, we could then do away with politicians and everybody would simply join the ranks :D
Hmmm, who exactly has a narrow view ?
You don't seem to get it because of a tiny field of view on this.
If you are talking about the benefits and value of exposing a young platoon commander to combat then yes I am focussing on a very small (but important) aspect of the whole.
Sure, once you're in a mess you want to be able to reduce its severity.
The wish for this ability is inferior to the wish for not getting into that mess in the first place, though.
I suggest it is rather the politicians who screw up and start wars and when that happens the military is more or less left to sort out the mess. It is up to the military to prepare itself for this eventuality.
For that reason it's a foolish mistake to hope for combat experience. The correct hope is to avoid war.
And there's more than hoping that can be done.
On the contrary I suggest it is foolish for a military not to prepare fully for the day when the politicians land them in a real shooting war. The nation will never forgive the military if after the millions/billions/trillions/zillions spent on it in peacetime they collapse like a wet paper bag when the shooting starts.
If junior officers can be exposed to combat then it is valuable. If officers at every command level can be exposed to combat then it is valuable. All this is preparation of the officer for higher command. If there is no combat situation available then how to simulate it?
Your tiny angle of view on a military education topic keeps you from considering that in almost all cases preserving peace is superior to "winning" war.
There are things a soldier can influence or control and there are others over which he has none. I was taught to prepare for the 'worst case scenario'. If we are to be sent to war then the least we can do is give a good account of ourselves.
Armed forces of a rationally-led state exist in order to keep that state out of war, not to win wars. Aiming at not getting involved in wars means that the ideal education and experience path for the officer corps cannot lead through wartime experience (save for foolish volunteers who get involved in other's wars).
What you are instead aiming at is a systematically inferior path.
The politicians make all these decisions and not the military. The military tends to be left to pick up the pieces. Would-be aggressors should take one look at the military that should convince them not to try and push their luck.
So when the politicians screw up (which is certain) then you need your military to have a deterrent effect ;)
http://i193.photobucket.com/albums/z273/orafs/T%20Shirts%20Air%20Force/RhodesiansareComingSmall.jpg
Fuchs
10-03-2011, 07:23 PM
Deterrence was proved to be a failure?
I suspect our survival of the Cold War, the history of Switzerland and Sweden as well as a lot of other examples beg to differ.
Victory as commonly defined is often a form of failure. The harm done to the own country by warfare is often greater than the harm done by not going to war (if there's any of the latter at all).
(The foolishness of the 2002-2011 Iraq conflict is a good example: pretty much nothing was gained but the busting of a few stupid fantasies. Thousands died, ten thousands were crippled, trillions of dollars were spent - for no real gain.)
The military shall -in the event of war- achieve the minimal net damage outcome for the country, with political efforts to the same end in parallel.
The mission for the government as a whole is to avoid damage altogether, to maximise the benefits of the population. The details are tricky from a philosophical point of view, but it's quite obvious that in our age you cannot really be better off with "winning" a war of choice than choosing not to go to it. You don't get to annex fertile lands or gold mines any more these days, not even oil fields.
This leaves wars of necessity, which again are only meeting the criteria if they're the least terrible alternative. To choose a more terrible alternative than a less terrible one is folly/incompetence, thus you gotta choose the least terrible (again, determining this is tricky detail stuff). Obviously, if the least terrible alternative is the only one that should be used, war can only be the way to go if it's the least terrible way to go.
After all, war is a terrible alternative, thus it's in the context "of war or not war" pointless to cover the "most beneficial" line of argument that applies to many peacetime policy outcomes.
So what's the military's purpose in peacetime?
Support the policy in its quest for good outcomes by making war and sovereignty violations less likely. This can be pursued by putting a hefty risk premium on all foreign aggressions. This risk premium is the visible and widely known probability that an aggression would fail to overcome the resistance (at costs that appear to be acceptable to the aggressor's top decisionmakers).
That may be no fool-proof method, not 100% reliable - but then again only fools look for such methods in a world of mortals.
To consider a combat-experienced officer corps the way to go, the best scenario, equals the wish for a country's involvement in warfare in at least a 20 year intervals. That's a wish for a periodic failure of the government to keep the country out of a great mess.
It's not even close to a good idea.
The BBC has recently broadcast a series on the RMA Sandhurst (http://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/training/17057.aspx).
It is a three part series and can be seen here (http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b014v3qs/Sandhurst_First_Encounter/)
For those not residing in the UK you will have to find a UK proxy server to use. For those don't know how to do that just ask your average 12 year old he'll know. ;)
This current series can be compared to a 1975 BBC Panorama broadcast on Sandhurst. (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00kfytm)
In addition there is a two part series on officer training in the Royal Marines circa 1989 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00jsd7c)
Together with the AOSB videos - AOSB Briefing (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUmwWAalwws&feature=relmfu) and the AOSB Main Boar (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LpH0L0XaM5c&feature=relmfu)d - one will get a fair idea of how the Brits approach the selection and training of their officers.
To consider a combat-experienced officer corps the way to go, the best scenario, equals the wish for a country's involvement in warfare in at least a 20 year intervals. That's a wish for a periodic failure of the government to keep the country out of a great mess.
It's not even close to a good idea.
Most militaries have to prepare in times of peace. This makes for a process where the assessment of how an officer will perform under combat conditions based on guesswork, supposition and wishful thinking. Actual exposure to combat takes the guesswork out of it.
What I'm saying is that if a nation finds itself at war then its military would be negligent if it does not ensure that the maximum number of young officers get exposed to combat and given the opportunity to command troops in combat.
There is a tendency for those who have not been exposed to combat to underplay the development benefit and value of the combat experience. You learn a lot about yourself and war through combat experience... especially if you bleed a bit in the process.
Ulenspiegel
10-04-2011, 10:01 AM
@Fuchs
While I think that you are right with your priorities and Switzerland is a very good example for maintaining a credible defense which resulted in more than a century peace.
However, if a country is forced into war this opportunity should be used to assess peactime training and procedures to the gratest exent. Do not enforce the opportunity but use ist when it occured.
Fuchs
10-04-2011, 10:49 AM
He (appeared to) hope for the effect, thus hoped for the opportunity, thus in my opinion hoped for a grave national security policy failure.
Deterrence was proved to be a failure?
I suspect our survival of the Cold War, the history of Switzerland and Sweden as well as a lot of other examples beg to differ.
I sincerely doubt that a nuclear deterrent will hold much water today and your Neutral Nations "cookie cutter" approach will work with any of the current NATO nations. But, you already knew that.
Victory as commonly defined is often a form of failure...
I’ve read your blog (at your invitation) and it seems much of this text is but regurgitation.
(The foolishness of the 2002-2011 Iraq conflict is a good example: pretty much nothing was gained but the busting of a few stupid fantasies. Thousands died, ten thousands were crippled, trillions of dollars were spent - for no real gain.)
I would tend to agree with you there but as JMA pointed out, the trained military officers and NCOs did not decide their fate, rather defended their oaths and positions. Without their training they would have all suffered needless death. That would be what you conclude as precluding foolishness and a few stupid fantasies ? What sort of training would have prepared them for a decision to go to war ? Running to the Canadian border ?
The military shall -in the event of war- achieve the minimal net damage outcome for the country, with political efforts to the same end in parallel.
Very easy to say… Based on your broad military experience and vision ?
So what's the military's purpose in peacetime?
Support the policy in its quest for good outcomes by making war and sovereignty violations less likely. This can be pursued by putting a hefty risk premium on all foreign aggressions. This risk premium is the visible and widely known probability that an aggression would fail to overcome the resistance (at costs that appear to be acceptable to the aggressor's top decisionmakers).
In supporting the current administration I don’t see the choices you are providing. This thread is about professional military education. What exactly would senior officers and NCOs do once the administration has declared war ?
That may be no fool-proof method, not 100% reliable - but then again only fools look for such methods in a world of mortals.
That statement means exactly what ?
To consider a combat-experienced officer corps the way to go, the best scenario, equals the wish for a country's involvement in warfare in at least a 20 year intervals. That's a wish for a periodic failure of the government to keep the country out of a great mess.
It's not even close to a good idea.
Why periodic failure ? What do the Swiss and Swedes do right this second that makes you think their system is better ? Begging for and wasting humanitarian funds and deciding how and who should be eligible to be killed in Africa with little to no experience ? It's a great way to collect insurance premiums, but not for me.
He (appeared to) hope for the effect, thus hoped for the opportunity, thus in my opinion hoped for a grave national security policy failure.
Its good to throw ideas around even if based on your misinterpretation of what I am saying. (In the process I learn to express myself better)
If through the failure of the politicians the opportunity for combat experience becomes possible the military should seize the opportunity with both hands.
Is Germany making the most of the opportunity on offer in Afghanistan in this regard?
Its good to throw ideas around even if based on your misinterpretation of what I am saying. (In the process I learn to express myself better)
I understood you from the start... But then, experience does actually do that to most of us :cool:
Fuchs
10-04-2011, 07:22 PM
regurgitation
A new word for me today. I think I didn't need this one in many years of English conversations so far...but it might come handy next time I discuss with/against you.
Originally Posted by Fuchs
The military shall -in the event of war- achieve the minimal net damage outcome for the country, with political efforts to the same end in parallel.
Very easy to say… Based on your broad military experience and vision ?
Based on logic.
Feel free to provide an example in which my statement is in your opinion wrong and justify your opinion about the wrongness in that case.
A falsifiable statement is about the best contribution that you can get in a discussion. Falsify it to prove that it's wrong - if not, it will be upheld.
Besides; don't try strawman arguments ("cookie cutter") on me. I should have established a reputation that I don't respond to rhetoric dirty tricks nicely by now.
Feel free to duel me on the level of logic.
Surferbeetle
10-05-2011, 02:49 AM
Fuchs,
Sie sind ein Botschafter für Deutschland hier bei SWJ und ich bin ein fur Amerika ja?
Die Welt ändert sich, und die zeit kommt gleich, das Deutschland mehr tun muss als Sie jezt tut. Hoffentlich, als Amerika sich ändert, wird auch Deutschland sich ändern. Ich hoffe das Deutschland auf die Europäer aufpassen kann wie Amerika das getan habe (oder velicht besser).
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_HardChoices_BarnoBensahelSharp_0.pdf
Ich lese was hier geschrieben wird, und ich denke daran. Manchmal ist es quatsch, aber dann was ich schreibe ist auch manchmal quatsch.
Trotzdem, Krieg ist etwas ganz anders als was normalerweise ist, und ich glaube das mann muss Krieg erleben um zu es besser zu verstehen.
Der Botschafter und der Jager haben und brauchen Geduld. :wry:
The military shall -in the event of war- achieve the minimal net damage outcome for the country, with political efforts to the same end in parallel.
Feel free to provide an example in which my statement is in your opinion wrong and justify your opinion about the wrongness in that case.
With the exception of your blog, there is nothing in US Military doctrine to support the above statement. It does however sound nice and presumes an ideal outcome. The common soldier is taught to fight until there is a cessation of hostilities. That is, there is nothing about minimal damage. Since it is the politicians that send the soldier to war I would have to assume they agreed to and understood the outcome. The soldier is however solely responsible to be prepared for that day and return victorious. Such preparation can only be achieved through professional training and exposure.
Now that our enemy is content with mass casualty production our administration has taken off the kid gloves. If you ever read or listened to General Franks and most of our administration you'd quickly note there is no military-related concern over damage.
... don't try strawman arguments ("cookie cutter") on me.
Just for the record, I did not distort, exaggerate nor misrepresent your argument regarding the Neutral Nations. I did however question whether their use of deterrence (way back when) is the best approach for today's NATO forces. The playing field has changed and our enemy no longer plays by the rules.
I should have established a reputation that I don't respond to rhetoric dirty tricks nicely by now.
You established much more than that well before I came along. Your text in post 144 is a good example :D
Fuchs
10-05-2011, 07:36 AM
You really thought telling a German to assume at a soldier's point of view and ignore the political point of view is a good idea?
As if soldiers are merely executing policy, and should not be bothered by what's responsible or desirable in regard to policy? Not bother about right or wrong of their mission? To a German?
Did you really think this through?
If you didn't think so; why your resistance to look at the issue from a political point of view, with the military merely being a tool and not the part of society that one identifies with or cares most about?
Besides; I don't care about whether something is supported by U.S. military doctrine or not. It's not the benchmark for correctness or anywhere close to it. The same applies to all other doctrine nationalities.
Steve Blair
10-05-2011, 01:45 PM
@Fuchs
While I think that you are right with your priorities and Switzerland is a very good example for maintaining a credible defense which resulted in more than a century peace.
However, if a country is forced into war this opportunity should be used to assess peactime training and procedures to the gratest exent. Do not enforce the opportunity but use ist when it occured.
I suspect that an objective look at Switzerland would show that it wasn't just their "credible defense" that allowed for peace. For example, it's quite often convenient (for a number of reasons) for belligerent powers to have a "neutral zone" where they can conduct business (and if you doubt this, look at the activities of the OSS and other groups in Switzerland during World War II as well as the banking habits of certain other powers during that same conflict).
You really thought telling a German to assume at a soldier's point of view and ignore the political point of view is a good idea?
As if soldiers are merely executing policy, and should not be bothered by what's responsible or desirable in regard to policy? Not bother about right or wrong of their mission? To a German?
Well, I’m 50% Swiss German (and my mother Malaysian) so that could be the problem with both my resistance to politics and perhaps Germans !
Jetz isch färtig luschtig :eek:
The German soldiers I know that were in Afghanistan were not at all happy with Germany’s politicians. Until just recently they couldn’t return fire before reciting some kind of “UN, stop or I’ll shoot” and some of their Tornados took off from Bahgram unarmed !?!? This passive political policy could not have been good for German soldiers. Somewhere between the American and German versions lies a great start for politically driven war :rolleyes:
... why your resistance to look at the issue from a political point of view, with the military merely being a tool and not the part of society that one identifies with or cares most about?
Certainly as professional soldiers we are morally responsible and many are in fact bothered by their missions and responsibilities. There is a very fine line where a soldier decides that policy is not for him. Professional officer and NCO training indeed covers sound moral judgment, use of force and extent. That is also too easy to say sitting in Washington or Berlin while that individual is in a fire fight for his life or being chased by an African with a machete. If the military never left our shores I couldn’t agree more with your opinion, but we have yet to create a deterrent (military or political) that has influenced our enemy to “sit this one out”. In the end, we are in fact just a tool in the President’s kit bag.
Besides; I don't care about whether something is supported by U.S. military doctrine or not. It's not the benchmark for correctness or anywhere close to it. The same applies to all other doctrine nationalities.
It's too easy to say you don't care about doctrine and unfortunately, without it, I am certain there would be a lot more destruction and far fewer professional soldiers.
Fuchs
10-05-2011, 03:22 PM
I suspect that an objective look at Switzerland would show that it wasn't just their "credible defense" that allowed for peace. For example, it's quite often convenient (for a number of reasons) for belligerent powers to have a "neutral zone" where they can conduct business (and if you doubt this, look at the activities of the OSS and other groups in Switzerland during World War II as well as the banking habits of certain other powers during that same conflict).
Canaris (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Canaris) saved Switzerland in 1940, but without their overt defence-readiness and non-intervention policy he wouldn't have been able to do so.
(It was the Swiss' overt army strength and fortification strength that allowed him to bluff and tell Hitler that Switzerland would be a too tough nut, while he had in fact long-obtained detailed and correct construction drawings and locations for every single Swiss fortification thanks to fabulous Humint.)
Spain and Portugal are fine examples for countries which could get along as neutral countries just fine. Sweden did well, too.
Besides; I was rather writing about deterrence and non-aggression policy than about neutrality. Defensive alliances that do not turn aggressive may be fine.
Repeat:
Deterrence was proved to be a failure?
I suspect our survival of the Cold War, the history of Switzerland and Sweden as well as a lot of other examples beg to differ.
Occasionally deterrence is not perfect, but it's the prime mechanism to preserve peace next to good relations and not proved to be a failure at all.
ganulv
10-05-2011, 03:46 PM
Spain and Portugal are fine examples for countries which could get along as neutral countries just fine. Sweden did well, too.
Besides; I was rather writing about deterrence and non-aggression policy than about neutrality. Defensive alliances that do not turn aggressive may be fine.
Repeat:
Occasionally deterrence is not perfect, but it's the prime mechanism to preserve peace next to good relations and not proved to be a failure at all.
How would you assess Portugal’s colonial wars within your framework? Were they the result of policy failure—either via poor colonial administration or just by trying to maintain colonies in the first place—or were they the result of a failure in deterrence (my understanding being that during the initial period of the anti-colonial violence the fact that the Portuguese forces stationed in their colonies received second-rate kit was indicative of their relative importance in the scheme of things)? Or both or neither?
Fuchs
10-05-2011, 04:04 PM
I was looking at Europe in regard to Portugal.
The nearest it came to real troubles post-Napoleon was when the Allies wanted the Azores as base for the 2nd Battle of the Atlantic.
In case of Portugal, a minimum amount of deterrence (merely enough military to be acknowledged as a sovereign nation) did work.
Colonialism in itself was always a failure that did not benefit more than a tiny share of the population. The only European overseas adventures that really paid off were discoveries (which brought the potato to the Old World, for example) and trade outposts.
Even the great Spanish booty of gold and silver in the 16th century did no more than to cause inflation and neglect of domestic economy for domestic needs.
Back to the year 2011...
But today (91 to present) Portuguese military as a deterrent ranks where ?
Could they even muster a viable threat to say keep the Spaniards at bay ?
They've either been supported by the British and Belgians, or, similar to today, lead by the Italians.
ganulv
10-05-2011, 04:39 PM
I was looking at Europe in regard to Portugal.
The nearest it came to real troubles post-Napoleon was when the Allies wanted the Azores as base for the 2nd Battle of the Atlantic.
In case of Portugal, a minimum amount of deterrence (merely enough military to be acknowledged as a sovereign nation) did work.
I think a lot of the disagreement over the last couple of days on this thread might boil down to the fact that your framework assumes that a military’s job is defense of borders against incursion by neighboring national forces (correct me if I am wrong). This is just not and probably never will be the whole of the job description of the U.S. Military. Since WW2 ended it has been a purveyor of American hegemony (not saying that American hegemony is good or bad, just that that role seems uncontestable to me) and it plays a role in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.* I personally think the military should never be conceived of as the main institution for CT as in prevention—civilian intelligence agencies and the Coast Guard are the institutions I think of as the foilers of terrorist plots, and I for one do believe we should take seriously the notion that the State Department can play an important role in ameliorating conditions that foster terrorism (but do fully acknowledge that such an assertion is open to plenty of critiques)—but I don’t see why the U.S. would ever want to remove its military’s role in responding to acts of terrorism.
*I try to use a term other than ‘terrorism’ whenever possible for a variety of reasons, but here I mean it as shorthand for “non-state actor perpetrated paramilitary violence.” Or something like that…
Fuchs
10-05-2011, 04:45 PM
Back to the year 2011...
But today (91 to present) Portuguese military as a deterrent ranks where ?
Could they even muster a viable threat to say keep the Spaniards at bay ?
They've either been supported by the British and Belgians, or, similar to today, lead by the Italians.
This has been off-topic for a while...
Today they have good relations with all potential threats, the international system adds deterrence (every aggressor would have a severe political loss) and its military is strong enough to signal sovereignty.
On top of that they're in NATO and EU, the two most powerful alliances in human history. What endangers them the most today is the excessive disrespect and aggressiveness of their allies, which can drag Portugal into conflicts just as excessive disrespect and aggressiveness of an ally dragged Germany into the First World War.
I suspect you have an exaggerated idea of deterrence.
Deterrence does not require to ensure defeat or destruction of an aggressor. It merely needs to turn an aggression into an undesirable scenario for the potential aggressor.
In some cases this means that the mere fact that an aggression wouldn't directly turn into an occupation (~Czechoslovakia), but instead lead to a messy resistance (official and covert, ~Finland and ~Iraq) would deter. You gotta get this into the potential aggressor's head, of course.
Stupid aggressors are stupid - some people only learn through pain.
I suspect you have an exaggerated idea of deterrence.
Deterrence does not require to ensure defeat or destruction of an aggressor. It merely needs to turn an aggression into an undesirable scenario for the potential aggressor.
Nope, not at all exaggerated. I simply used your version since it was you telling me the role of the military in a sovereign state. :D
In fact, I doubt that Portugal could do much if Spain decided to come across her border - similar in shear size to say Russia if they once again decided on invading Estonia.
This is just not and probably never will be the whole of the job description of the U.S. Military.
Don't go telling anyone that I actually agree 1,000% with Ganulv... But I do. :eek: We have never been content with sitting at home watching the Europeans get into wars and screwing things up ;)
Fuchs
10-05-2011, 06:14 PM
Nope, not at all exaggerated. I simply used your version since it was you telling me the role of the military in a sovereign state. :D
So what's the military's purpose in peacetime?
Support the policy in its quest for good outcomes by making war and sovereignty violations less likely. This can be pursued by putting a hefty risk premium on all foreign aggressions. This risk premium is the visible and widely known probability that an aggression would fail to overcome the resistance (at costs that appear to be acceptable to the aggressor's top decisionmakers).
I emphasised the possibly overlooked part now.
Deterrence works also if a potential aggressor estimates that he will succeed to disarm and occupy the country, but concludes that it's not worth it because it would be too costly.
I think a lot of the disagreement over the last couple of days on this thread might boil down to …
Well the introduction of the political factors has little to do with the topic of the thread.
One understands that Germany had a bad (understatement) experience and that shows up in the thinking introduced into this thread by Fuchs. I am not sure how prevalent this line of thinking is in Germany and how it may influence the selection and training of officers.
As opposed to the US and the UK there is probably no requirement for the German military to be ready for a war right now and thus there is most likely a lack of urgency in the military and (back to the thread) no requirement to select for an officer (and NCO) corps which is not only trained for but also psychologically ready for a war.
A person who sits in a base in Afghanistan in a passive, mainly static role is not a soldier but more a kind of militia. I can understand that given Germany's recent history they have probably selected out those who have aggressive soldier tendencies and retained and promoted passive individuals who will not upset the national psyche by producing a military which will bring back memories of the past. This is understandable.
It would be worthy of a separate study to see how the German military has been contained and restrained over the years to the point where perhaps they merely just go through the motions (of being a military) and effectively pack no punch. Quite sad but again, understandable.
Fuchs
10-05-2011, 07:18 PM
No, the lack of balls is a political issue. It's not really an officer corps issue. The politicians moved some game chips to AFG, they are not really at war. Why should our soldiers risk much? There's nothing to be gained.
The intensity of the experience has rather led to the acknowledgement that you better avoid wars. Seeing how your "allies" planned to nuke our country (your part and the other part of it) in many major exercises was certainly influential, too. At one point in the 80's the German representatives did quit a NATO exercise and our soldiers did afaik quit it, too. The Americans were playing genocide against Germany in that NATO exercise.
Overall, there's little if anything to net gain in war, but much to lose.
To rest planning and concepts on recurring war means thus to plan for recurring catastrophic failure of your national security policy and that's strictly unacceptable.
If there's anything specific German in this, it's that we don't do small wars as much as great ones. With us, it's usually the big deal. We fought the Thirty Years War, the Seven Years War, the army-annihilating wars of the Napoleonic Age, the army-annihilating wars of German unification wars and both world wars. During WW3 we would have become the 137k sq mile Chernobyl.
We don't pay attention to the marginal profits to be had from warfare such as oil contracts or junior officer experiences. War means to use mass destruction - even without so-called WMDs.
Being on the "winning" side doesn't improve it - we know both sides, and neither is a good idea.
Don't fight a war if it's not the least terrible alternative. Period.
To repeatedly manoeuvre your country into a position where organised mass killing and mass destruction is the least terrible alternative means that your manoeuvring would be terrible. In fact, doing so once already disqualifies the whole political establishment of the country.
Deterrence works also if a potential aggressor estimates that he will succeed to disarm and occupy the country, but concludes that it's not worth it because it would be too costly.
While I got your point the first time around, it seems the Russians don't always see things the way we want to rationalize :D
Well the introduction of the political factors has little to do with the topic of the thread.
I'd have to disagree with that having served in embassies in Africa and Europe and observed just who ends up at a working post and who ends up in say Frankfurt or Paris. Never used to have much to do with an officer's background nor education, but as of late the Ambassador can pick and choose not only his State staff, but deny potential "do gooders" which would infect his country team (disagree with the Amb's logic and lack of background at post).
It would be worthy of a separate study to see how the German military has been contained and restrained over the years to the point where perhaps they merely just go through the motions (of being a military) and effectively pack no punch. Quite sad but again, understandable.
According to our folks the German officers and NCOs are sick of their passive roles in Afghanistan. Their officer training rivals any of the West but yet are not employed to use it. The German police certainly are not restricted to daylight ops and ask first before you shoot only when accompanied by an American medivac helo. Going through Rein Main filled with H&Ks is impressive !
No, the lack of balls is a political issue. It's not really an officer corps issue. The politicians moved some game chips to AFG, they are not really at war. Why should our soldiers risk much? There's nothing to be gained.
Nobody can be sure whether the soldiers are using the political smokescreen to excuse their lack of determination in prosecuting the war in their little area of Afghanistan.
It is a low intensity war. The practical and combat experience to be gained would come cheap at the price for the German military... after all when last were German soldiers exposed to combat to any significant degree?
The intensity of the experience has rather led to the acknowledgement that you better avoid wars. Seeing how your "allies" planned to nuke our country (your part and the other part of it) in many major exercises was certainly influential, too. At one point in the 80's the German representatives did quit a NATO exercise and our soldiers did afaik quit it, too. The Americans were playing genocide against Germany in that NATO exercise.
Yes I understand the history is bad and had FDR and Truman had a better grasp of what lay ahead with the Soviets (as Churchill for example did) there would have been no Cold War, no NATO and no threat of the nuclear destruction of geographical Germany. That is history.
Overall, there's little if anything to net gain in war, but much to lose.
To rest planning and concepts on recurring war means thus to plan for recurring catastrophic failure of your national security policy and that's strictly unacceptable.
Let me answer that with a few quotes:
The military don't start wars. Politicians start wars. ~William Westmoreland
and
Anyone who has ever looked into the glazed eyes of a soldier dying on the battlefield will think hard before starting a war. ~Otto Von Bismark
If there's anything specific German in this, it's that we don't do small wars as much as great ones. With us, it's usually the big deal. We fought the Thirty Years War, the Seven Years War, the army-annihilating wars of the Napoleonic Age, the army-annihilating wars of German unification wars and both world wars. During WW3 we would have become the 137k sq mile Chernobyl.
We don't pay attention to the marginal profits to be had from warfare such as oil contracts or junior officer experiences. War means to use mass destruction - even without so-called WMDs.
Being on the "winning" side doesn't improve it - we know both sides, and neither is a good idea.
Yes... but how does this impact upon Initial Officer Selection?
Don't fight a war if it's not the least terrible alternative. Period.
Yes I agree, as I believe do most soldiers who have been involved in a war. Now the question is how do you sell that to the politicians.
To repeatedly manoeuvre your country into a position where organised mass killing and mass destruction is the least terrible alternative means that your manoeuvring would be terrible. In fact, doing so once already disqualifies the whole political establishment of the country.
My point on this remains that the military must be prepared and ready to pick up the pieces when the politicians screw up. Of course if you have no effective military there will be no toys for the politicians to play with... not much of a deterrent though. Maybe thats the current German thinking?
I'd have to disagree with that having served in embassies in Africa and Europe and observed just who ends up at a working post and who ends up in say Frankfurt or Paris. Never used to have much to do with an officer's background nor education, but as of late the Ambassador can pick and choose not only his State staff, but deny potential "do gooders" which would infect his country team (disagree with the Amb's logic and lack of background at post).
You are correct in the context of your service but perhaps not in the context of Initial Officer Selection. I would dearly like to know what qualifications these Ambassadors have and on what basis they are appointed. Would love to hear more about the intrigue and doings and screwings in these Embassies ;)
According to our folks the German officers and NCOs are sick of their passive roles in Afghanistan. Their officer training rivals any of the West but yet are not employed to use it. The German police certainly are not restricted to daylight ops and ask first before you shoot only when accompanied by an American medivac helo. Going through Rein Main filled with H&Ks is impressive !
They want to be careful. If they show interest in or enthusiasm for any form of 'closing with and killing the enemy' their careers may well come to a grinding halt.
Wasn't there a quote attributed to David Hackworth (or maybe Charlie Beckwith) about (how mad the US system had become) where an officer had been marked down for being too enthusiastic?
Edit: It was Hackworth and he quoted a report : “Lieutenant Col. Gibson has strong emotional feelings and frequently expressed his opinion that a soldier’s duty is to fight. This attitude limits his value to the service, his desire for self improvement, and adversely affects his subordinates.”
I would dearly like to know what qualifications these Ambassadors have and on what basis they are appointed.
PM sent :eek:
Be careful what you wish for !
Fuchs
10-06-2011, 01:54 PM
Yes... but how does this impact upon Initial Officer Selection?
Select 'em for the "right" kind of war: Great Wars of necessity.
Part of great wars is the annihilation of entire battalions, if not divisions and armies. Crisis becomes the litmus test.
The ability of a young man to withstand crisis (extreme psychological pressure) can be tested and later improved (by getting him accustomed and more physically fit).
Send him in full firefighter equipment through a firefighter training house with lots of smoke and flames, a screaming and pushing Oberfeldwebel behind him if you like.
Visit him after work or school, put him through hours of stress and simulate a car accident if you like.
PM sent :eek:
Be careful what you wish for !
Now tell Fuchs its clowns like these who help start the wars soldiers die in.
Select 'em for the "right" kind of war: Great Wars of necessity.
Not going to happen. 39-45 (followed by Korea) did if for Europe and the yanks. The yanks took Europe through an impressive production run of planes/tanks/ships/war materials and soldiers. Think they can out-do China in this?
No the yanks will 'negotiate'. Hand Alaska back to the Russians and make a peace offering of Hawaii to China. There will be no great war.
Part of great wars is the annihilation of entire battalions, if not divisions and armies. Crisis becomes the litmus test.
Then what is the point of training if such losses are inevitable? Just push the cannon fodder forward... followed by the burial parties.
The ability of a young man to withstand crisis (extreme psychological pressure) can be tested and later improved (by getting him accustomed and more physically fit).
I merely suggest that a test of this should happen before he is selected for officer training with more of the same during the course. Don't wait until he is commissioned before you realise he can't take it.
Send him in full firefighter equipment through a firefighter training house with lots of smoke and flames, a screaming and pushing Oberfeldwebel behind him if you like.
Visit him after work or school, put him through hours of stress and simulate a car accident if you like.
Yes good stuff... and while you have Afghanistan on the boil send him in there to give a taste of the real thing, yes?
The Transformation of Selection Procedures - Hugh Murray (http://www.moderntimesworkplace.com/archives/ericsess/sessvol1/Murrayp45.opd.pdf) outlines the development of the Brit Army Officer Selection Board (AOSB) as we have come to know it.
A must read for those interested in this subject.
From Policies, Procedures, and People: The Initial Selection of U.S. Military Officers - Dr. Jane M. Arabian (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/p010347.pdf) we learn:
Rather than identify and select individuals for attributes, skills, and abilities needed at advanced officer grades, the U.S. military practices an "up or out" philosophy wherein the training and selection of officers occurs throughout the course of a career.
and also from the summary:
Officer selection and commissioning in the U.S. is notable for the variety of programs, both within and between the Service branches. Although the initial selection process is central to the development of a volunteer, professional cadre of officers, the emphasis is more on "growing" military officers rather than on the initial selection process itself. Selection and training are continuous processes revolving around an "up or out" philosophy; in fact, the promotion system, beyond the scope of this paper, is an integral part of the system. As noted earlier, the U.S. approach to officer selection is to identify intelligent men and women of good character who can be trained to provide the leadership and management of the armed forces.
One wonders whether this is an accurate representation of the US system and if so is this really the most effective way to approach this matter?
Ken White
10-08-2011, 06:50 PM
The approach is based on equal opportunity in all aspects -- anyone remotely qualified should get a chance to compete. There's more to it than that but it's complex and tedious and that egalitarian aspect is the principal driver.
A Commission in the US Armed Forces is certainly a chance to compete. I could make a strong case for the fact that our system is too competitive. That excess breeds cases where top flight individuals are sabotaged or subverted, usually covertly, by nominal peers as too threatening to their own advancement.
It is not ideal from a military stand point but it does mesh with the 'we're all in this together' mentality of most Americans and it is very much dictated by a vigilant (for a change...) Congress which resolutely and consistently insists on 'fairness' and 'objectivity.'
Yes, both chimerical but there you are... :wry:
The answer to your question is no, it is not the most effective way -- far from it. We know that and grouse about it from time to time. However, it is an acceptable way and it works particularly well (is ideal even) in the rushed raising of a mass Army ala 1861, 1917 and 1940 -- it is thus a hedge for an uncertain future that works quite well for really bad times and at other times adequately for most purposes if not really well for many.
From the paper Officer Selection in the federal Armed Forces of Germany - Wener Birke (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADP010360&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) we learn:
Military officer selection, for the most part, still takes place according to principles that were introduced 1955, which had the objective of preventing as much as possible, any misuse of the armed forces.
and
Aptitude tests did not, therefore, initially focus abilities the candidates needed in order to meet certain performance requirements, but on personality traits, attitudes and motives that had been declared selection criteria for political and moral reasons.
and finally:
By filling in questionnaires and talking to examiners in interviews, applicants had to prove that they were prepared, without any reservations, to uphold the values of the new democratic Constitution and to treat their subordinates as “citizens in uniform”.
One certainly hopes that the Germans have got over their angst over their past and once they do (if they have not done so already) it will probably take 30 years to cleanse its military from the people who were appointed on the basis of their political acceptability (and probably the absence of the warrior character so desperately needed in an army and once so adundantly available in Germany).
Fuchs
10-08-2011, 07:09 PM
The written word and reality weren't exactly in convergence during the 50's and 60's...actually, they were much more apart than even nowadays.
This plus the fact that we're running out of witnesses for the period who were sufficiently high-ranked and are still having a clear mind means that such studies have to be taken with a grain of salt.
Btw, there was a intra-Bundeswehr cultural war going on during the 50's and 60's about "Innere Fhrung", which adds complexity to the issue. Some authors (such as Uhle-Wettler) were still discussing Innere Fhrung critically in the early 80's (and Uhle-Wettler still made it to LtGen and chief of NATO Defence College!).
The written word and reality weren't exactly in convergence during the 50's and 60's...actually, they were much more apart than even nowadays.
This plus the fact that we're running out of witnesses for the period who were sufficiently high-ranked and are still having a clear mind means that such studies have to be taken with a grain of salt.
Btw, there was a intra-Bundeswehr cultural war going on during the 50's and 60's about "Innere Fhrung", which adds complexity to the issue. Some authors (such as Uhle-Wettler) were still discussing Innere Fhrung critically in the early 80's (and Uhle-Wettler still made it to LtGen and chief of NATO Defence College!).
OK... but the bottom line is that the German military is still carrying baggage from the past. Time to get over it?
Fuchs
10-08-2011, 10:16 PM
OK... but the bottom line is that the German military is still carrying baggage from the past. Time to get over it?
Some people place an emphasis on the idea that you won't be happy to have a strong defence against tyranny by foreign powers if you have tyranny at home.
The Bundeswehr is supposed to be loyal to the constitution, obey the law and to obey all lawful orders of its civilian leaders (peacetime: Minister of Defence, wartime: Chancellor).
It doesn't make much sense to ditch these requirements from officer selection, especially as only really, really few candidates of today will have any problem with this hurdle. Those who (would) fail to master this requirement are people whom nobody wants to see as a German officer.
Overall, you miss entirely the point regarding shedding historical Bundeswehr baggage. The actual improper burdens are different ones.
Some people place an emphasis on the idea that you won't be happy to have a strong defence against tyranny by foreign powers if you have tyranny at home.
The Bundeswehr is supposed to be loyal to the constitution, obey the law and to obey all lawful orders of its civilian leaders (peacetime: Minister of Defence, wartime: Chancellor).
It doesn't make much sense to ditch these requirements from officer selection, especially as only really, really few candidates of today will have any problem with this hurdle. Those who (would) fail to master this requirement are people whom nobody wants to see as a German officer.
Overall, you miss entirely the point regarding shedding historical Bundeswehr baggage. The actual improper burdens are different ones.
No, no, no Fuchs the Germans have got the wrong end of the stick.
Were Hitler and his cronies generals who conducted a military coup? No.
Hitler was a politician who was elected to power. And (to be kind) the military would have been required to support the elected government of the day. (As the US military is required to do regardless of what insane plans the incumbent president comes up with - the ease (and timidity) the US military allow their presidents to send them to the slaughter does not remind you of the German military back then?)
So in the post-war era to wrap the military up under the strictest political control was insanely stupid for an otherwise intelligent nation. (Post war traumatisation of the German nation must be the reason)
The German military should have been rebuilt on the principle of the independence of the military not as a bunch of emasculated supposed soldiers all dressed up in pretty uniforms and merely going through the motions and under the whip of their political masters.
The aim would surely have been to prevent the politicians (from ever again) misusing the military. What checks and balances have been put in place to ensure that? Now the pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme where the forces are little better than your average gendarmerie or militia. Such a damn pity.
Fuchs
10-09-2011, 07:30 AM
The Nazi period isn't the key influence here.
The generals cooperated with Hitler because most of them were national-conservatives and thus in the political spectrum that formed the coalition which Hitler needed to get a majority. Plus they executed orders that they shouldn't have executed. But that's not the formative experience.
The Reichswehr -albeit never doing a coup d'etat itself- was not protecting the young Weimar Republic against right-wing coup attempts, only against left-wing uprisings.
It was disloyal and practically not under control of the government, especially not governments led by social democrats.
As such, it was a lingering threat to the republic.
This disloyalty (coupled with a desire to not have a "brown" army) is the story behind the Bundeswehr-politician relationship of the 50's to 70's.
I don't see any reason why the really not very restrictive hurdles and rules that shall ensure lawfulness and loyalty of the Bundeswehr should be removed.
The lack of orientation at combat (commonly the buzzword "Armee im Einsatz" is used to push personnel towards more caring about this war) is a consequence of 55 years of peacetime service, 35 of which happened with the assumption that in the event of war we'd be nuked anyway (and heroic Stotrupp exploits would thus be irrelevant).
We also have a rank inflation and top heaviness, results of force reductions that did cut more % of the indians than of the chieftains.
The Nazi period isn't the key influence here.
The generals cooperated with Hitler because most of them were national-conservatives and thus in the political spectrum that formed the coalition which Hitler needed to get a majority. Plus they executed orders that they shouldn't have executed. But that's not the formative experience.
The Reichswehr -albeit never doing a coup d'etat itself- was not protecting the young Weimar Republic against right-wing coup attempts, only against left-wing uprisings.
It was disloyal and practically not under control of the government, especially not governments led by social democrats.
As such, it was a lingering threat to the republic.
This disloyalty (coupled with a desire to not have a "brown" army) is the story behind the Bundeswehr-politician relationship of the 50's to 70's.
I don't see any reason why the really not very restrictive hurdles and rules that shall ensure lawfulness and loyalty of the Bundeswehr should be removed.
The lack of orientation at combat (commonly the buzzword "Armee im Einsatz" is used to push personnel towards more caring about this war) is a consequence of 55 years of peacetime service, 35 of which happened with the assumption that in the event of war we'd be nuked anyway (and heroic Stotrupp exploits would thus be irrelevant).
We also have a rank inflation and top heaviness, results of force reductions that did cut more % of the indians than of the chieftains.
Yes I accept that the post-war Germany did whatever it could to prevent the same happening again. I accept this. My point is simply that in the process they have probably got it right to the extent they wanted. Where does that leave them now? As far as the military is concerned it does not look good and despite the opportunity to put on a good show in Afghanistan they remain an unknown quantity. I'm sure there are many German soldiers who are up for the fight but are not being allowed to do so. I do not wish to go on and on about the German military but quite frankly the modern German Army has a long way to go to build a reputation.
Fuchs
10-09-2011, 02:56 PM
Reputation?
Our Allies know our relative performance in multinational exercises, and so would potential aggressors if there were any.
Reputation?
Our Allies know our relative performance in multinational exercises, and so would potential aggressors if there were any.
Exercises?
No, the word must get out that the Krauts are back... screw with them at your peril! That reputation is earned the hard way.
Fuchs
10-09-2011, 05:24 PM
Exercises?
No, the word must get out that the Krauts are back... screw with them at your peril! That reputation is earned the hard way.
OMG. Old problem.
You want to see great proficiency in firefighting by sending men repeatedly to building fires so they're prepared for when a house nearby burns while I do not want any houses to burn.
Do you get it?
OMG. Old problem.
You want to see great proficiency in firefighting by sending men repeatedly to building fires so they're prepared for when a house nearby burns while I do not want any houses to burn.
Do you get it?
I'll tell you what I get. It is the old problem of those who have not been in action playing down the significance of the experience as opposed to those who have been in action recognising the value of the experience.
Your analogy of the firemen sounds good but is not accurate it would be better to frame it in the manner of saying that in the event of a fire the whole team that will arrive at the scene will be attending their first fire. The expectation is that because they have simulated many fires during training that they will perform well.
The reality is of course that it's more like saying the doctor and his whole team who is about to carry-out open-heart surgery on you have never done an operation before but have practised on the odd doll and even one dead monkey. I guess you'll be okay with that?
Combat experience is of course not essential but does give soldiers an understanding of the combat situation and believe it or not the more experience they get the better they learn to handle it (there are of course some who don't learn to handle it and the sooner you can identify these people and move them on the less likely it will be that they will get people killed).
Fuchs
10-09-2011, 06:26 PM
There's not going to be a problematic asymmetry as long as potential credible aggressors (if in existence) have no major combat experience.
Even in case of an asymmetry, there's still huge doubts about the usefulness of small wars experiences for great wars.
The German army got almost nothing out of the Spanish civil war (and that wasn't even very small), the British were awfully ill-prepared for great war little more than a decade after the 2nd Boers War.
The Russians didn't impress much in 1914 (two armies of theirs being mauled in Eastern Prussia) despite having more than a handful of "combat experienced" leaders from the 1904/05 war with Japan.
The U.S.A.A.F. had volunteers in England and China, but was still poorly prepared for air combat in December 1941.
Dozens of colonial wars did not help the British to be a major land power in 1914.
Nor were the French aware in Summer of 1914 that their supposed furor gallicus or how they called it (the idea that French infantry is uniquely well-suited for offensive action) was bullocks - despite having had lots of colonial wars, too.
Israel's edge in conventional warfare was dulled, not sharpened, by the low level conflict with Palestinians.
The Russians blundered into Grozny mere five or six years after completing their long Afghan small war experience.
You are greatly exaggerating the importance of having some leaders had their baptism of fire in a small war.
A war that's big enough to give most leaders their baptism of fire is on the other hand so costly that the mere idea that the (quickly perishable) experience was worth it sounds ludicrous to me.
You are greatly exaggerating the importance of having some leaders had their baptism of fire in a small war.
A war that's big enough to give most leaders their baptism of fire is on the other hand so costly that the mere idea that the (quickly perishable) experience was worth it sounds ludicrous to me.
I don't think I am.
As I said those who have not experienced combat tend to underrate the value of the combat experience both to the individual and as a means of assessing him.
Here I am talking about officers... young platoon commanding officers.
There are two aspects I believe to be important and they are:
* The experience of combat itself.
* The ability to lead and command his men in combat.
Putting young officers through this experience in any war (we only seem to have small ones since Korea) is valuable. The man learns about himself and the institution learns about him. Some make the grade and some don't and yes it is more than just pass or fail it is a question of degree.
This takes us into the realm of courage/bravery/fear/cowardice.
IMHO it is the personal characteristic of unselfishness that is the most important in this regard. You see it is this characteristic which you seek in officers because they must put everything and I mean everything before their own self.
‘Unselfishness, as far as you are concerned means simply this - you will put first the honour and interests of your country and your regiment; next you will put the safety, well-being and comfort of your men; and last - and last all the time - you will put your own interest, your own safety, your own comfort’. - Field Marshal Sir William Slim Courage and other Broadcasts (1957).
A young officer is expected to place his duty to his men ahead of the selfish emotion of fear (for his own life). It actually makes it easy (for an officer) to conquer fear if you are driven by doing your duty to the men you command. Good officers at platoon and Army level are those who put duty first. Those who can't trump fear or their personal interests with the call to duty at platoon level will not make the grade as general officers IMHO.
So it is not exposure to combat merely for the sake of it but really much a deeper exploration of the character of the officer. He either makes it or must be on the next plane home (as you can't sacrifice the lives of soldiers because you are trying to be nice or fair to the officer in question). My theory is (and it is not scientifically proven I accept) is that the degree of selfishness or rather selflessness is a pretty accurate predictor of a persons combat courage.
Now selfless duty of officers to their nation and their men is an absolute requirement for an officer IMHO and combat exposure as a young platoon commander is a brutal and unforgiving test of this characteristic.
The Canadian article/paper Courage Under Fire: Defining And Understanding The Act - T. Robert Fowler (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_13/iss_1/CAJ_vol13.1_06_e.pdf) is a must read in this regard to get the context of what I mean.
Now, to what extent during officer selection is his degree of selfishness or selflessness tested for and established? And if not adequately, why not?
Fuchs
10-11-2011, 10:55 AM
I don't think I am.
As I said those who have not experienced combat tend to underrate the value of the combat experience both to the individual and as a means of assessing him.
As I wrote you seem to underrate if not ignore entirely the costs that are associated with the generated "value".
As I wrote you seem to underrate if not ignore entirely the costs that are associated with the generated "value".
Run those costs by me again will you?
Fuchs
10-11-2011, 03:48 PM
Run those costs by me again will you?
Nation at war? Build-up of hate? People dying or being maimed? people wasting their time instead of being productive? Distraction from actual domestic problems? Fiscal cost? Diplomatic relations degraded? Risk of exposing weaknesses, thus weakening national security through a weaker deterrence?
Nation at war? Build-up of hate? People dying or being maimed? people wasting their time instead of being productive? Distraction from actual domestic problems? Fiscal cost? Diplomatic relations degraded? Risk of exposing weaknesses, thus weakening national security through a weaker deterrence?
The military does not start a war. I do not suggest that politicians start a war so as to exercise their troops and test their weapon systems.
Therefore all of the points you raise are not applicable.
All I am saying is that if the opportunity presents itself (in a small war) to test your officers (and men) in combat (as it has high value) it should be carried out deliberately as a matter of policy to make sure you test and assess the right people (being the young officers in this instance). Simple as that.
Fuchs
10-11-2011, 04:25 PM
Either you talk about the war/peace decision or you're wasting our time with utterly trivial points.
Of course do soldiers gain combat experience in combat. This only becomes relevant to the discussion in any capacity once there's a decision about whether and how many of them do so.
That means the war/peace decision.
Besides that, I simply don't believe you.
You do obviously yearn for seeing the nation's military leaders seasoned by war in regular intervals. That's implies periodic involvement in wars, which usually means periodic decision for a war of choice.
You can't have it both ways; reject needless wars and yearn for a combat-experienced officer corps.
Either you talk about the war/peace decision or you're wasting our time with utterly trivial points.
Of course do soldiers gain combat experience in combat. This only becomes relevant to the discussion in any capacity once there's a decision about whether and how many of them do so.
That means the war/peace decision.
Besides that, I simply don't believe you.
You do obviously yearn for seeing the nation's military leaders seasoned by war in regular intervals. That's implies periodic involvement in wars, which usually means periodic decision for a war of choice.
You can't have it both ways; reject needless wars and yearn for a combat-experienced officer corps.
OK so I'm a war monger now? ;)
You seem intent on creating a connection the political peace/war decision with the military using a war opportunity to test their officers in combat.
If a war comes along the opportunity will present itself and should be used.
Can we move on now please.
I stated in post #7 to this thread:
..., I am still not sure why there is a need for a degree before commissioning when there is plenty of time in a 25-30 year career to take three or so years for the purpose (around the senior Capt/Maj level for the infantry). Too much time and money (again IMHO) is invested in training of officers the majority of whom (it seems) will leave the service before they have justified the initial expense.
It seems from the private messages and off board conversations I have had recently that this remains and issue.
One normally serves 15-20 years from commissioning to Lt Col. There is sufficient time there to fit in a degree and the command and staff course.
My contention is that it is not just a question of a degree but what degree that is important and this must be in the hands of the military.
I would suggest that the academic equivalent of a military MBA must be considered and take place over two years and must be completed before promotion to Lt Col. Probably the best time is after the age of 30.
Initial officer selection can accept SAT/ACT results. This is all that is needed to assess future likelihood of academic success. It is a pass or a fail.
To go a step further the same should apply to the physical assessment at initial selection. A pass or a fail. It is ridiculous to believe that a stronger man will make a better officer than one of adequate physical ability.
Also when the physical and the academic are weighted it tends to diminish the importance of leadership qualities that are required and need to be selected for. The leadership qualities requirement should be absolute and not part of a balancing act with weighted scores from SATS/ACT results and a physical rating.
Sadly the US seems to have bought into the 'whole person' stuff when selecting potential officers.
From the document OFFICER SELECTION (RTO HFM 023 – RSG 31):
All three service academies use the “whole person” concept for evaluating applicants. At West Point, a “whole person score” (WPS) is derived from weighting three factors: academic aptitude, which combines SAT or ACT scores with high school rank (60 percent); leadership potential, which is estimated from athletic participation in high school and high school teacher recommendations (30 percent); and physical aptitude, which is measured with the Academy’s Physical Aptitude Examination (10 percent).
What seems bizarre is that the most crucial aspect being the leadership potential is relegated to a mere 30% and based on a school teachers assessment. Can't be right can it?
I had read the following quote before but not read that it had activiely been used in the lead up to WW2:
I divide officers into four classes -- the clever, the lazy, the stupid and the industrious. Each officer possesses at least two of these qualities. Those who are clever and industrious are fitted for the high staff appointments. Use can be made of those who are stupid and lazy. The man who is clever and lazy is fit for the very highest commands. He has the temperament and the requisite nerves to deal with all situations. But whoever is stupid and industrious must be removed immediately."
Attributed, circa 1933
General Baron Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord (1878-1943)
German Chief of Army Command (1930-33)
Then we have the following explanation which does not seem to have the proper attributes but nevertheless makes interesting reading:
German Army officer selection (http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:tIrW4jn5p8AJ:www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A18810434+officer+selection+and+training&cd=191&hl=en&ct=clnk&client=safari)
If there is more detail on this out there it would be appreciated...
ganulv
10-17-2011, 01:17 AM
Also when the physical and the academic are weighted it tends to diminish the importance of leadership qualities that are required and need to be selected for. The leadership qualities requirement should be absolute and not part of a balancing act with weighted scores from SATS/ACT results and a physical rating.
Sadly the US seems to have bought into the 'whole person' stuff when selecting potential officers. […] What seems bizarre is that the most crucial aspect being the leadership potential is relegated to a mere 30% and based on a school teachers assessment. Can't be right can it?
I have an acquaintance who taught at West Point immediately prior to her retirement from the Army a couple of years ago and the next time I have a chance I will try and remember to ask her about the logic of the application process. But at first blush I wonder if the criteria may be geared toward selecting those individuals most likely to see the West Point experience through to its conclusion rather than toward selecting those individuals most likely to be good officers. From afar my impression is that the right to wear a class ring from a U.S. Service academy is a first rate achievement. But I also have the impression that a lot of the tasks mastered (or at least borne) do not necessarily have anything to do with the training of a good officer. I am sure some reading the above will say, “What the hell does this guy know?” while others will say, “That’s putting it politely.”
For what it is worth, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy is the most difficult of the Service academies to gain admittance to, as well as one of the most difficult of all undergraduate institutions in the United States for the same.
Ulenspiegel
10-17-2011, 05:45 AM
Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord also made the following statement:
"Vorschriften sind für die Dummen"
Rules are for the fools. :-)
I have an acquaintance who taught at West Point immediately prior to her retirement from the Army a couple of years ago and the next time I have a chance I will try and remember to ask her about the logic of the application process. But at first blush I wonder if the criteria may be geared toward selecting those individuals most likely to see the West Point experience through to its conclusion rather than toward selecting those individuals most likely to be good officers. From afar my impression is that the right to wear a class ring from a U.S. Service academy is a first rate achievement. But I also have the impression that a lot of the tasks mastered (or at least borne) do not necessarily have anything to do with the training of a good officer. I am sure some reading the above will say, “What the hell does this guy know?” while others will say, “That’s putting it politely.”
For what it is worth, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy is the most difficult of the Service academies to gain admittance to, as well as one of the most difficult of all undergraduate institutions in the United States for the same.
I am sure that every aspect of human endeavor can be improved upon and at least refined.
My first question is whether the aim of the officer training is to produce future generals or to produce thousands of officers who then make their way in the military on an 'up or out' basis. In just about every case it is the latter... but the question needs to be asked, is this the right way?
Then based on the above and other considerations how important is it to throughly test and screen potential officers before they are taken into service and start training? We have variations from the five day British (and other) AOSB (Army Officer Selection Board) to a paper assessment with an interview (and then use the training course itself as the main selection mechanism).
The next aspect is the weighting of the selection criteria for admission to the training. Is the 60:30:10 (academic:leadership: physical) weighting correct or should a specific SAT/ACT score be a pass without weighting. The same with the physical should an assessment be made as to the physical health and potential of an individual be made on a pass or fail basis (and as the kid will be between 18-22 one would take into account how much the individual will 'fill out' over the training period). Next, should the military rely on the leadership assessments of high school teachers? I suggest not. So here we have a major issue which (will not be changed anytime soon but) deserves some thought.
Then there is the issue of the timing and composition of the degree course which officers (undoubtedly) require. Sandhurst nowadays takes in cadets 80%+ of which have degrees (of their own choosing). The US seems to have different models but effectively demand a degree before promotion to the rank of captain. Or is the trick to get them bright eyed and bushy tailed between 18-22 and select and filter carefully (with an eye on identifying those with general staff potential) then taking them through company level command before assessing whether there is a long career ahead. If yes then you sit individually with each officer and plan his future (subject of course to his achieving certain laid down milestones along the way) and send him off to university (on full pay) for a few years to prepare him for the future. Attendance on the Command and Staff Course and the degree wiuld be required before promotion to Lt Col. (which would be after 15-20 years of commissioned service).
Now rather than the rather brutal 'up or out' policy those who are not considered to have general staff potential are offered a 'low road' career option or an exit from the service. The exit process would involve attendance at a university on full pay to enable the person to obtain a degree to prepare him for a second career after the military. It is important that young men who have given the best years of their lives to the service are not discarded but treated with dignity and respect.
There is another side to this and it is that if the selection process was more focussed on the long term potential of potential officers it would mean that a greater reliance would fall on creating platoon and other company level officers from the ranks. This would lead to marked reduction in the quality of company level NCOs if the 'best' were commissioned (or made platoon commanders) unless a serious leadership and NCO development programme was developed concurrently.
It is really all about thinking. The current systems 'work' for most countries but outsider logic and clarity often helps with the process of improvement. If you can ask people in the service the 'why' question and they can't answer the problem lies with them and not you.
Remember too: The Mind Is Like A Parachute, It Only Works When It's Open
Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord also made the following statement:
"Vorschriften sind fr die Dummen"
Rules are for the fools. :-)
Yes, I wonder what a world with no rules would be like? ;)
Clearly he had a clear thinking mind like another of that era being von Lettow-Vorbeck.
Have you read his My reminiscences of East Africa (http://www.amazon.co.uk/s/ref=nb_sb_noss?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=Lettow-Vorbeck&x=0&y=0)? He certainly gave the Brits and South Africans the run around in East Africa 1914-18. A guerilla war genius. I wonder why he is not studied more widely?
davidbfpo
10-17-2011, 11:19 AM
JMA you asked:
...von Lettow-Vorbeck....Have you read his My reminiscences of East Africa? He certainly gave the Brits and South Africans the run around in East Africa 1914-18. A guerilla war genius. I wonder why he is not studied more widely?
The WW1 German General von Lettow-Vorbeck has appeared before on SWC IIRC, although not sure whether in any depth. Added:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=651
My response to why is he not studied more widely: the campaign however skilled was a faraway sideshow and he was a mere nuisance to the Allied effort (mainly British Empire) on the main front. Secondly he lost and in the inter-war years any information gathering and writing outside Germany was focussed on the main front(s). I also wonder if his reliance on African soldiers (Askari's) had an impact, especially in South Africa. Perhaps his prowess as a guerilla has outweighed his skill as a leader?
Ulenspiegel
10-17-2011, 11:30 AM
Yes, I wonder what a world with no rules would be like? ;)
Clearly he had a clear thinking mind like another of that era being von Lettow-Vorbeck.
Have you read his My reminiscences of East Africa (http://www.amazon.co.uk/s/ref=nb_sb_noss?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=Lettow-Vorbeck&x=0&y=0)? He certainly gave the Brits and South Africans the run around in East Africa 1914-18. A guerilla war genius. I wonder why he is not studied more widely?
In German it is more regulations, SOPs, not laws. He referred to the obvious problem that known regulations produce a high degree of predictability, something not very healthy in war.
The Cuyahoga Kid
10-17-2011, 12:48 PM
From afar my impression is that the right to wear a class ring from a U.S. Service academy is a first rate achievement. But I also have the impression that a lot of the tasks mastered (or at least borne) do not necessarily have anything to do with the training of a good officer. I am sure some reading the above will say, “What the hell does this guy know?” while others will say, “That’s putting it politely.”
I'm biased, but from my limited experience, I'm highly inclined to agree. Service Academies may have higher performing alumni than other commissioning sources (I assume this is the case, don't actually know), but I think that's because of selection bias more than anything else, and despite the type of training provided there.
Boondoggle
10-17-2011, 05:34 PM
I've had that quote on the wall behind me in my office for years. First remember hearing it (of all places) when I was a 2ndLt at The Basic School.
Moving right along to officer development...
The paper Officer Development : A Contemporary Roadmap by Maj William D Linn, II (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485472) is an intelligent contribution to this matter. In the paper Maj Linn provides a comparison with the systems used by US allies.
FWIW I agree with much of what he writes... but obviously not all.
One example of an area of agreement is:
Officers should select degrees that have applicability to their profession, but not all will lie within the traditional confines of military-related fields. The Army should recognize that both the degree and the environment in which the officer earns his degree are of equal importance.
ganulv
10-24-2011, 03:52 AM
Apropos from The Paper of Record earlier this week. LINK (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/magazine/dont-blink-the-hazards-of-confidence.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all)
Apropos from The Paper of Record earlier this week. LINK (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/magazine/dont-blink-the-hazards-of-confidence.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all)
Good find of a good article.
I suggest IMHO the key to his thought pattern is the following:
To know whether you can trust a particular intuitive judgment, there are two questions you should ask: Is the environment in which the judgment is made sufficiently regular to enable predictions from the available evidence? The answer is yes for diagnosticians, no for stock pickers. Do the professionals have an adequate opportunity to learn the cues and the regularities? The answer here depends on the professionals’ experience and on the quality and speed with which they discover their mistakes. Anesthesiologists have a better chance to develop intuitions than radiologists do.
This is of course why the Brits have a brigadier, a full colonel and a half colonel for each three day Main Board AOSB of 40 candidates with a major or senior captain per group of eight.
Of course in the Brit army they now have now 60 years of experience with the 'modern' selection process whereby they can access the records back to the AOSB for all of the current general staff and note how accurate their predictions and findings back then were (as well as on the various promotional courses along the way).
I wonder what the author would find if he were to revisit the existing AOSB today?
Indeed a good article and find !
Just one more reason that the selection process is carried out by those who have actually "been there, done that".
The story was always the same: our ability to predict performance at the school was negligible. Our forecasts were better than blind guesses, but not by much.
And this quote sounds like the politicians running the Army :rolleyes:
The statistical evidence of our failure should have shaken our confidence in our judgments of particular candidates, but it did not. It should also have caused us to moderate our predictions, but it did not. We knew as a general fact that our predictions were little better than random guesses, but we continued to feel and act as if each particular prediction was valid.
Indeed a good article and find !
Just one more reason that the selection process is carried out by those who have actually "been there, done that".
And this quote sounds like the politicians running the Army :rolleyes:
Your point is good in that this is a story from a (then) young psychologist who was involved in the process of selecting people for a duty beyond his understanding or comprehension (being in this case infantry officers for combat duty) little wonder he got it wrong.
This officer selection (AOSB) should not be staffed by those officers who are available but by the best who may need to be pulled off operations and leave for the purpose (not joking). Only the best should be tasked with this selection process.
This officer selection (AOSB) should not be staffed by those officers who are available but by the best who may need to be pulled off operations and leave for the purpose (not joking). Only the best should be tasked with this selection process.
JMA,
Completely agree. My selection for senior NCO included a bunch of admin weenies looking for shined boots and nice uniforms :mad:
My education and experience had no part in this process. How ironic that a decade later they would invite me back to active service on the dark continent.
What a shame and a real waste of time !
Finally I got round to finding the recent BBC Sandhurst series on Youtube:
Sandhurst : Episode 1 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GmXGW6gtmqA&feature=results_main&playnext=1&list=PLB8B8488EF277085B)
Sandhurst : Episode 2 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rD7TVlbVnw&feature=related)
Sandhurst : Episode 3 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e-Glbbz5TdQ&feature=related)
Enjoy
This thread seems to have died a natural death.
Thought I would add this:
Unobtrusive indicators of the "good [combat] officer":
* Distrust any officer with a perfect or near perfect record of efficiency reports. he is conforming to the existing value system and will have no interest in changing it.
* Look carefully at a man who gets low marks on "tact" and who "deviates from accepted doctrine." He may be creative.
* An officer who gets low marks on loyalty is especially valuable, for he is unwilling to acquiesce to his superior's policies without debate. He is likely to have an independent mind.
* Be suspicious of any officer who has accumulated awards for valour without having sustained physical injury. Trust a Purple Heart wearer.
* Distrust any officer who has had "all his tickets punched" and who sports an array of staff awards on his chest. He is likely to be a manager playing the system.
* Distrust all officers who use "buzz words" and have a poor vocabulary. they tend to be managers of the most obsequious type. True leadership is likely to be foreign to them.
* Trust a man who heads for the sound of the guns and has repeated tours of combat and command duty at all unit levels; it is preferable that he have only minimal exposure to staff work.
* Trust an officer who was seen by his men in combat and whose command performed well and showed low rates of drug use, fragging, body counting, etc.
* Search for the officer whose readiness reports indicate a high percentage of equipment which is deficient. He is a man addicted to the truth.
- Gabriel/Savage, Crisis in Command, 1978
Fuchs
02-08-2012, 10:30 AM
Eike Middeldorf et al, "Taktik im Russlandfeldzug" (Tactics in the Russian Campaign), 1956, p. 228
[About how to hunt guerrilla groups]Die geeignete Form hierzu sind Jagdkommandos in Strke von hchstens 40 bis 60 Mann. Sie verlangen aber eine andere Art von Fhrern und Kmpfern als die Kampftruppe sie fordert. Die besten Kmpfer gegen Banden waren meist sogenannte "Auenseiter", d.h. Soldaten, in deren Beurteilungen oft die Bemerkung "schwieriger Untergebener" zu finden war.
The suitable form for this are Jagdkommandos [literally: hunting commands] in strength of at most 40 to 60 men. They demand a different kind of leaders and fighters than the combat troops demand. The best fighters against gangs were mostly so-called "outsiders", means soldiers in whose personnel reviews often had remarks such as "difficult subordinate".
davidbfpo
02-08-2012, 12:09 PM
On another thread, not on this theme, Ken W. posted this valuable observation:
The need for immediate, unthinking obedience served a valid military purpose for many centuries but it has become a harmful anachronism in the last 100 or so years.
Link in Post 15:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15109
I have assumed this is a valid point. Has this been recognised in contemporary officer selection? Or should it?
Fuchs
02-08-2012, 02:22 PM
It depends.
Sometimes very urgent action is required. In this case the superior needs to have enough trust of his subordinates that they execute asap without much 'thinking'.
Those who need bureaucracy-given authority to enforce such a rapid reaction are likely the same who are not competent enough to convince their subordinates in less urgent situations and demand 'unthinking obedience' on such occasions, too.
Eike Middeldorf et al, "Taktik im Russlandfeldzug" (Tactics in the Russian Campaign), 1956, p. 228
The suitable form for this are Jagdkommandos [literally: hunting commands] in strength of at most 40 to 60 men. They demand a different kind of leaders and fighters than the combat troops demand. The best fighters against gangs were mostly so-called "outsiders", means soldiers in whose personnel reviews often had remarks such as "difficult subordinate".
Somewhat in support in this is the British manual 'Keeping the Peace' Part 2 - Tactics and Training - 1963.
332. Leadership and battle discipline.. Fighting an underground enemy probably requires a higher standard of junior leadership than any other type of warfare yet experienced. ... Command often has to be decentralized and the training of junior commanders must, therefore, be directed towards giving them the ability and confidence to make sound decisions and act on their own initiative.
Which leads onto David's question...
I have assumed this (the need for immediate, unthinking obedience) a valid point. Has this been recognised in contemporary officer selection? Or should it?
Start with Antony Beevor's 'Inside the British Army' - Part 2: To Be An Officer. 1990
...following on from my previous post you need higher quality junior commanders to be able to 'operate in small groups with little or no outside help'.(Keeping the Peace 1963)
What has changed? Nothing. Churning officers out by the hundred to meet the requirements does nothing to improve individual quality.
Now move onto Richard Holmes' 'Acts of War' - pages 316-31
Where do you draw the line on where 'immediate instinctive' (rather than unthinking) obedience to the word of command begins and ends?
Holmes cites 'Crisis in Command' where testimony to the US Senate indicated 254 Vietnam 'combat refusals' in 1971 alone.
So I suggest this is being phrased incorrectly.
The problem with command decisions and subsequent orders is when they fail and waste soldiers lives. The solution to this is not for subordinates to second guess the orders they receive but rather for the quality of officers to be improved. This not happening.
The troopie/the private soldier/the grunt still needs to 'do what he is told' without question. It is the NCOs and the officers who need to get their act together.
It depends.
Sometimes very urgent action is required. In this case the superior needs to have enough trust of his subordinates that they execute asap without much 'thinking'.
Those who need bureaucracy-given authority to enforce such a rapid reaction are likely the same who are not competent enough to convince their subordinates in less urgent situations and demand 'unthinking obedience' on such occasions, too.
So this brings us full circle back to leadership.
Got a delightful book the other day (available through the US Marine Corps Association) called 'Battle Leadership' by Captain Adolf Von Schell. A German officer who served during WW1 and then attended US Staff College in 1930-31 the nine short chapters are based on lectures he gave to the US military over that period (so appears not to be a translation).
He says this on leadership:
To be an officer means to be a leader - to be a leader of troops in battle. It is certainly correct that leaders, like great artists, are born and not made; but even the born artist requires years of hard study and practice before he masters his art. So it is with the military leader; if he is to learn the art of war, he must practice with the tools of that art. (page 93)
Ken White
02-08-2012, 07:32 PM
The troopie/the private soldier/the grunt still needs to 'do what he is told' without question. It is the NCOs and the officers who need to get their act together.I very much agree the latter item is needed.
However, I disagree strongly on the initial statement. Such troopies/private soldiers/grunts will become the NCOs -- rapidly in event of a major conflict where casualties are far heavier that in any of the post 1950 wars -- and you will have institutionalized unthinking response and conditioned the Officers (who may themselves have been rankers at one time, or not ...) to such an attitude.
After learning that was a poor design for modern war in World War II, that's the level to which most armed forces in the west have descended today -- and you want perpetuate that? :eek:
I very much agree the latter item is needed.
However, I disagree strongly on the initial statement. Such troopies/private soldiers/grunts will become the NCOs -- rapidly in event of a major conflict where casualties are far heavier that in any of the post 1950 wars -- and you will have institutionalized unthinking response and conditioned the Officers (who may themselves have been rankers at one time, or not ...) to such an attitude.
After learning that was a poor design for modern war in World War II, that's the level to which most armed forces in the west have descended today -- and you want perpetuate that? :eek:
OK, lets start with point one. What do you believe the problem is behind the failure to enable junior leaders to act with greater initiative and independence? Followed by, is the selection process (specifically for direct entry officers) suitable to select for the increased requirement for independence and initiative?
Then onto the area of apparent disagreement.
Explain to me if you will what is the degree of flexibility soldiers (at the various levels) should have in obeying orders?
Fuchs
02-08-2012, 08:28 PM
There's not enough choice, so not all NCOs / officers can be true leaders. Simply not enough recruits for that.
The issue is thus not the choice who becomes a superior, but who is being allocated to a (small) unit command which requires a lot of leadership instead of management (many officer jobs are about being staff working bees or about being a liaison+responsibility-bearer).
A natural leader should be recognised and if acceptable with his other traits be employed in a combat or engineer unit or in a rotten unit that needs repair - not be mis-used as staff working bee or lead a repair shop, for example.
This does of course require that combat troops get priority for quality personnel (and thus prestige advantage) over support and staff units.
A stupid private on the major's office phone may be a nuisance and require training even for simple jobs - a stupid infantryman may kill his squad through stupidity.
Ken White
02-08-2012, 09:46 PM
OK, lets start with point one. What do you believe the problem is behind the failure to enable junior leaders to act with greater initiative and independence?Lack of trust. That is engendered by two things, the relative youth with thus presumed nominally poor judgmental skills thereunto pertaining and / or inadequate training. It is my belief that a significant improvement in training is possible, affordable and can be effective in alleviating concerns about youth and judgement. Another approach -- or, better, a complementary one -- is to improve personnel selection, psychological assessment and management by leaving people in units longer so that trust can be developed by exposure; the current common practice of excessive rotations of personnel (the US is the worst offender but others have the problem to a lesser extent) is detrimental to unit cohesion and the critical -- really critical -- building of trust.
Followed by, is the selection process (specifically for direct entry officers) suitable to select for the increased requirement for independence and initiative?No. Fuchs comment, discussed below is one reason. Essentially, there is legislative and societal pressure to not do this to avoid any hint of discrimination. I know...:rolleyes:
Explain to me if you will what is the degree of flexibility soldiers (at the various levels) should have in obeying orders?That answer to the question you asked is almost none at entry progressing to a great deal as trust is earned as shown by promotions. If Officer are accorded the luxury of questioning an order and being forced to resign or comply after due discussion, the only issue for other ranks should be the length of discussion. Concomitant with this is that promotions should be on merit and not as is today normal throughout western armies based on a reward for doing a good job. A method of pecuniary or other awards for doing a good job at any level should be totally separated from promotions to higher rank which must be rigidly merit based (good luck with that in any Democratic nation...).
The question you should have asked, based on your statement: "The troopie/the private soldier/the grunt still needs to 'do what he is told' without question." and my response to that should have been "Explain to me if you will what is the degree of flexibility soldiers (at the various levels) should have?"
Obeying isn't the issue, obedience is necessary but "without question" is questionable. :D
In training and in peacetime or less than full bore conflict, Troops should be encouraged to ask questions (which annoys the hell out of insecure NCOs and Officers :D) simply because they will learn more and faster if they do so. I've watched a lot of Armies around the world at work. In all of them, the good units had NCOs and Officers who encouraged questions and who went to great pains to tell their Troops WHY they were doing certain things. The rationale is that if a Troopie gets used to one explaining things in a way that makes sense, he learns that there's a method to what often seems to be madness and that his superiors are not mental midgets then, when there is not time for questions, he will just act -- and do so with decent judgement. The NCOs and Officers also learn who will ask the best -- and the dumbest -- questions. It's a two way learning exercise and everyone and the unit benefit.
Fuchs:
There's not enough choice, so not all NCOs / officers can be true leaders. Simply not enough recruits for that.That can often be true, will be true in major war but in peace or given small wars, there can be more choice. Most Armies are reluctant to exercise that choice due to societal, statutory or other constraints. Still, your statement has broad and great applicability. There are two solutions to that, fewer Officers and NCOs (most Armies have too many of both) and separation of rewards system from promotion systems -- too many Officers and NCOs rise to Peter Principle levels merely by sticking around long enough to get promoted. Seniority in point of time in service or time in grade exists because of the inability to be more selective in who gets promoted in peacetime. there are many ways to get around that...
The issue is thus not the choice who becomes a superior, but who is being allocated to a (small) unit command which requires a lot of leadership instead of management (many officer jobs are about being staff working bees or about being a liaison+responsibility-bearer).
A natural leader should be recognised and if acceptable with his other traits be employed in a combat or engineer unit or in a rotten unit that needs repair - not be mis-used as staff working bee or lead a repair shop, for example.
This does of course require that combat troops get priority for quality personnel (and thus prestige advantage) over support and staff units.
A stupid private on the major's office phone may be a nuisance and require training even for simple jobs - a stupid infantryman may kill his squad through stupidity.Yes!
ganulv
02-08-2012, 11:55 PM
The NCOs and Officers also learn who will ask the best -- and the dumbest -- questions. It's a two way learning exercise and everyone and the unit benefit.
I’ve seen that process any number of times but hadn’t ever seen it articulated. Danke! :)
Ulenspiegel
02-09-2012, 09:29 AM
JMA wrote:
Got a delightful book the other day (available through the US Marine Corps Association) called 'Battle Leadership' by Captain Adolf Von Schell. A German officer who served during WW1 and then attended US Staff College in 1930-31 the nine short chapters are based on lectures he gave to the US military over that period (so appears not to be a translation).
IIRC von Schell was there as student, his instructors recognized his qualities and hard earned practical experience and allowed him to give lectures. This is dicussed in "Command Culture" from Joerg Muth.
JMA wrote:
IIRC von Schell was there as student, his instructors recognized his qualities and hard earned practical experience and allowed him to give lectures. This is dicussed in "Command Culture" from Joerg Muth.
Such discussion always takes place on such courses where students draw on the experiences of others. With the arrogance of today's youth probably less likely to happen these days though, sadly.
The lectures in the Von Schell book were however (I quote):
Most of the lectures contained in this volume were delivered either to the students of the Advanced and Company Officers' Classes or to the officers of the 29th Infantry.
The question you should have asked, based on your statement: "The troopie/the private soldier/the grunt still needs to 'do what he is told' without question." and my response to that should have been "Explain to me if you will what is the degree of flexibility soldiers (at the various levels) should have?"
...and I would ask you to define what you mean by flexibility in that context.
Obeying isn't the issue, obedience is necessary but "without question" is questionable. :D
My context for my original statement is the only one that really matters... combat.
If I give the command (which I did often enough) ... 'Prepare to assault' I would not have tolerated it (if it had happened) had some troopie asked/suggested/questioned/whatever: 'Excuse me sir, don't you think we should rather pull back to a safe distance and call in an airstrike then all go back to base for tea?'
Battle orders at that level must be carried out without hesitation and without question... even today.
I do, however, recall reading of a US company commander refusing to take his company into the attack citing the lack of fire support planned while knowing that additional fire support was indeed available. Not sure of the wording of that exchange (if it did indeed happen) but I sympathise. In the Brit tradition in such a situation one would request the oder to attack with a lack of fire support in writing as this avoids any counter accusation of insubordination. Know of a few instances where that happened in my war.
Out of combat a young officer should rarely issue orders without first discussing matters with his platoon sergeant (or in certain circumstances his company commander). In my three years as a operational (at war) Troop (platoon) commander it would be inconceivable to think that I ever issued orders for base routine/training/etc (other than in actual combat) without first discussing this with my sergeant. (And before the troopies were informed it is likely that the sergeant would have prepared the corporals and as such the troopies would have an idea of what was coming before the order group) So what is there for some troopie to question? If I have failed to elucidate my orders/instructions clearly a troopie may seek clarity but not question.
In training and in peacetime or less than full bore conflict, Troops should be encouraged to ask questions (which annoys the hell out of insecure NCOs and Officers :D) simply because they will learn more and faster if they do so. I've watched a lot of Armies around the world at work. In all of them, the good units had NCOs and Officers who encouraged questions and who went to great pains to tell their Troops WHY they were doing certain things. The rationale is that if a Troopie gets used to one explaining things in a way that makes sense, he learns that there's a method to what often seems to be madness and that his superiors are not mental midgets then, when there is not time for questions, he will just act -- and do so with decent judgement. The NCOs and Officers also learn who will ask the best -- and the dumbest -- questions. It's a two way learning exercise and everyone and the unit benefit.
Maybe its semantics.
As I have stated above I am happy for anyone to seek clarity but not to question. The difference is obvious... and maybe can be discussed as a separate issue.
Finally, if you have a situation where officers and NCOs are issuing 'questionable' orders then you have the wrong guys in the job. Fire them!
In the Afghanistan thread a year or more ago when I suggested that seats on every flight out (back to the UK or Stateside) should have seats reserved for officers/NCOs who have been relieved (fired) I received the indignant response that in the US you don't fire people you reassign them. Maybe there lies the problem?
Lack of trust. That is engendered by two things, the relative youth with thus presumed nominally poor judgmental skills thereunto pertaining and / or inadequate training. It is my belief that a significant improvement in training is possible, affordable and can be effective in alleviating concerns about youth and judgement. Another approach -- or, better, a complementary one -- is to improve personnel selection, psychological assessment and management by leaving people in units longer so that trust can be developed by exposure; the current common practice of excessive rotations of personnel (the US is the worst offender but others have the problem to a lesser extent) is detrimental to unit cohesion and the critical -- really critical -- building of trust.
For counterinsurgency warfare you are looking for characteristics in officers which better equip them for the type of 'decentralised' warfare. They specifically require independence of thought and spirit and initiative to operate outside direct control. If officers who display these characteristics are grouped in units which are deployed into such a theatre then the best result will be achieved.
It is little wonder that 'counterinsurgency' has developed a bad name because the stuff produced off a Henry Ford type production line gets rotated through these war theatres in rapid succession whether they suit the requirements of the type of warfare or not.
Interestingly Von Schell detected (back in 1930) the US obsession with training and courses at the expense of experience gained in command over time. I quote Von Schell (circa 1930-31):
Service with troops [for the US officer] is no more than an interlude in this constant change between teaching and being taught.
If this is still remotely true then one can see where the problem lies. As I said of the Brits in Afghanistan they will not/would not let the specific requirements of waging war in Afghanistan get in the way of their bureaucratic and sometimes statutory systems. Little wonder they are about to lose two wars back-to-back.
Ken White
02-10-2012, 07:08 AM
...and I would ask you to define what you mean by flexibility in that context.Flexibility was your word, not mine. You asked: "Explain to me if you will what is the degree of flexibility soldiers (at the various levels) should have in obeying orders?" As I wrote, obedience is not an issue or in question IMO -- as to an answer to your question as nearly as it applies, he should have the flexibility to ask questions. How much is dependent upon the circumstances and the people involved; some kids should be encouraged to ask questions, some should be discouraged. Many questions in training , few to none in combat. The old "depends on the situation" applies, as always...
My context for my original statement is the only one that really matters... combat.I thought that's what we were discussing, combat or training for it. That last is when the questions should be encouraged, if that occurs and decent answers are given, then there will be no questions in combat...
...I would not have tolerated it (if it had happened) had some troopie asked/suggested/questioned/whatever: 'Excuse me sir, don't you think we should rather pull back to a safe distance and call in an airstrike then all go back to base for tea?' Nor should you, nor would I or would I even suggest that -- nor would most anyone else suggest it and I doubt many if any Troops would ask that -- other than to pull your leg, which I suspect happened a bit...:D
Out of combat a young officer should rarely issue orders without first discussing matters with his platoon sergeant (And before the troopies were informed it is likely that the sergeant would have prepared the corporals and as such the troopies would have an idea of what was coming before the order group {{ * }}) So what is there for some troopie to question? If I have failed to elucidate my orders/instructions clearly a troopie may seek clarity but not question.I don't disagree with any of that, nor did I suggest anything to the contrary. It's during that {{ * }} time (as well as in all training) that questions should be encouraged. If you were successful and I suppose you were, then your NCOs did that -- whether you approved or knew or not. ;)
As I have stated above I am happy for anyone to seek clarity but not to question. The difference is obvious... and maybe can be discussed as a separate issue.While I agree in principle, we used different strokes, I never objected to questions or suggestions -- some Privates can come up with amazingly good ideas if one just listens. :wry:
I received the indignant response that in the US you don't fire people you reassign them. Maybe there lies the problem?I recall the exchange. I do not recall any indignation directed at you or the suggestion, rather a resigned 'we don't do it that way.' Whether we should or not is another story...
For counterinsurgency warfare you are looking for characteristics in officers which better equip them for the type of 'decentralised' warfare. They specifically require independence of thought and spirit and initiative to operate outside direct control. If officers who display these characteristics are grouped in units which are deployed into such a theatre then the best result will be achieved.It makes no difference how good, how capable they are or how they are grouped. If they are not trusted, they will not be allowed by their superiors to exercise much independence. The obvious flip side is, as I wrote, better training promotes more trust. As I've written many times, our training is marginal and Congress and the senior leadership of the US Army are not much interested in improving it a great deal. Bad cess to them and you and I can complain about it but that won't fix the problem.
It is little wonder that 'counterinsurgency' has developed a bad name because the stuff produced off a Henry Ford type production line gets rotated through these war theatres in rapid succession whether they suit the requirements of the type of warfare or not.That's partly true but there are other negative factors. It's simply an idea whose time has past. You were on the cusp as that era passed. Enjoy your memories but don't grouse at others who are precluded from doing many things you and I could do.
Ulenspiegel
02-10-2012, 07:25 AM
Interestingly Von Schell detected (back in 1930) the US obsession with training and courses at the expense of experience gained in command over time. I quote Von Schell (circa 1930-31):
Service with troops [for the US officer] is no more than an interlude in this constant change between teaching and being taught.
But let's be fair, at the beginning of this thread you critizised suggestions to let officers spend more time with enlisted men. However, v.Schell is talking about a generation of Reichswehr officers, who had exactly to do this. :-)
Another point is that the German officers were taught in a different way and were taught different aspects of their profession, so Muth in "Command Culture" for example found these differences more important when he compares teaching and learning at the Hauptkadettenanstalt vs. Westpoint and at the institutions/courses for staff officer training.
On the other hand, the lack of understanding on the German side when it comes to non-military aspects of strategy and a better performance of their US couterparts may have been the other side of the coin.
IMHO here Erich Ludendorff is a very good example, as high officer (GM) still leading from front, very good staff officer, but no real feeling for economic impact of US war participation.
But let's be fair, at the beginning of this thread you critizised suggestions to let officers spend more time with enlisted men.
I did?
Bob's World
02-10-2012, 10:40 AM
Perhaps in the next conflict, when a savvy enemey kicks the plug out of the wall on all of the cyber/space-based capabilities, leader reliance so heavily to maintian 24/7 audio/visual contact with small units much of this will change.
Things have "progressed" much in a very short time. When a handful of ODAs linked up with the Egyptian Ranger Brigade (first unit to arrive) in a sparse bit of desert just south of Western Kuwait, my communications requirement was to make one morse code HF contact per day (and that was more a matter of SOP than necessity). That was September 1990. Our mission was "simple": Make contact with Arab forces closing in country and build a coalition. I saw the Major rarely, and BN CDR came out once or twice. I relied on my men, and my men relied on me. We figured it out.
There is no putting the genie of high tech capabilities that have resulted in nannie cam leadership of late back in the bottle, but we need to make damn sure we are building a force that is ready to be just as effective when someone takes that genie away, bottle and all.
Fuchs
02-10-2012, 11:47 AM
IMHO here Erich Ludendorff is a very good example, as high officer (GM) still leading from front, very good staff officer, but no real feeling for economic impact of US war participation.
Are you sure? That's the "total war" (including "total mobilization" of people and economy) guy. He must have changed a lot between 18 and 35...
Ulenspiegel
02-10-2012, 12:28 PM
Are you sure? That's the "total war" (including "total mobilization" of people and economy) guy. He must have changed a lot between 18 and 35...
He did not understand the discrepancies in manpower and industrial production of Imperial Germany and USA and their impact, at least according to some of his remarks in 1917.
To be a proponent of a total war in the sense of total mobilization does not necessarily require the ability to correctly access the resources of your enemy.
One could add that most German generals were at best only reactive when it came to economic mobilization, usually the #### had already hit the fan when their mobilization started.
Ulenspiegel
02-10-2012, 12:47 PM
I did?
Starting with post ~95 you criticised some suggestions as too time-consuming, esp. the very long time an officer of the Reichwehr would stay in the ranks of Leutnant/Oberleutnant in the time 1919-1932.
This allowed them to gain a lot of theoretical knowledge, gave them the opportunity to learn how to teach, and the time to train with the troops, usually at least one stint in a different branch.
Haupmann v. Schell refers to this generation of officers, when he made the statement you cite, therefore, my confusion. :D
...It makes no difference how good, how capable they are or how they are grouped. If they are not trusted, they will not be allowed by their superiors to exercise much independence. The obvious flip side is, as I wrote, better training promotes more trust.
While I do not disagree that better training promotes trust, I submit that trust is rather hard to practice when those outside the chain of command, but who hold the purse strings, force military leaders to micromanage for a variety of reasons.
Case in point: at least one US 4-star general (CG, USAMC) (probably several others that included the CJCS and the VCJCS, the CENTCOM Cdr, and the CSA) getting daily reports by bumper number on the status of uparmoring Humvees in Iraq/Kuwait. Possible reason: some zealous reporters' stories on GI inventiveness in concocting ballistic protection for Humvee passengers, a vehicle never envisoned as an armored personnel carrier, and the knee jerk response by certain elected officials and their staffs to such stories.
The following from Bob's World latest post
There is no putting the genie of high tech capabilities that have resulted in nannie cam leadership of late back in the bottle, but we need to make damn sure we are building a force that is ready to be just as effective when someone takes that genie away, bottle and all.
is just the latest variation on a theme. I seem to recall Bn Cdrs micromanaging platoon-level fights in VN from their helicopters. With that kind of background informing the leadership development of the mentors of much of today's military senior leadership, is it any wonder that the best we might hope for from the current crop of seniors is something like a Reaganesque "trust but verify"?
I can only speak to the American military, based on my experience. One hopes that other nations' militaries are not equally "blessed" with such trust and oversight.
I don't disagree with any of that, nor did I suggest anything to the contrary.
As I suggested earlier it may all be in the semantics.
I tend to shy away from the word 'questions' because it may be construed as order being 'questioned'.
There is a big difference between in combat and during training for combat.
During training there is plenty of time to discuss the reasons behind actions with all ranks. Certainly in the time I spent training officers I encouraged them to think/analyze/etc... in fact if they did not have an opinion on the matter under discussion I considered them to be (intellectually) limited.
In fact when you are training for a war into which you will be hurled in a matter of months or less it tends to focus the attention. It is in this period of training for war that you allow troops to seek clarity, to discuss drills and tactics and reach a level where they understand what is expected of them and the possible tactical options that they will be required to take part in. (note: no use of the word 'question'.)
Once you cock your weapon and head out the time for seeking clarity is over. You just do as you are damn well told.
Starting with post ~95 you criticised some suggestions as too time-consuming, esp. the very long time an officer of the Reichwehr would stay in the ranks of Leutnant/Oberleutnant in the time 1919-1932.
This allowed them to gain a lot of theoretical knowledge, gave them the opportunity to learn how to teach, and the time to train with the troops, usually at least one stint in a different branch.
Haupmann v. Schell refers to this generation of officers, when he made the statement you cite, therefore, my confusion. :D
You will have to give me the exact quote.
'Learn how to teach'? Von Schell talks of the US focus on teaching or being taught. The problem he identified then is the lack of time to 'exercise' with a unit in the field. The assumption is that when a person completes a course he has that skill.
What I am saying is that the skill is not mastered until it is exercised in as near to a war time setting as can be simulated... repeatedly.
Again I suggest any misunderstanding we may appear to have is through the choice of words.
BTW another gem of a book is 'Hans Von Luck - Panzer Commander (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_von_Luck) - The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck'.
Bob's World
02-10-2012, 02:49 PM
In 1932 in the US Army:
36 years time in service to make Colonel (on average, and a vast improvement from the 58 years required a century earlier)
Mean age of
LTs: 32
CPTs: 43
MAJs: 45.5
LTCs: 52.3
COLs: 59
My first BN CDR in 1986 was a Vietnam vet who had commanded 5 times at the Company level. While he was exceptional, he was not the exception. Good Commanders commanded.
Like in so many aspects of life, at some point you have to find the balance between old enough to know what to do, and young enough to still be able to do something about it.
(A great resoure for those interested in an army that is much more like what we need today than what we have coming out of 65 years of Cold War, Post Cold War and GWOT buildup is "The Regulars - The American Army 1898 - 1941" by Edward M. Coffman)
Ken White
02-10-2012, 03:54 PM
As I suggested earlier it may all be in the semantics.Not that (3), I agree with that. It's a feature of this discussion.
I tend to shy away from the word 'questions' because it may be construed as order being 'questioned'.See? That's just being finicky and over semantically involved. :D
There is a big difference between in combat and during training for combat.That (1). The difference should be as slight as one can make it. I agree with the rest of that thought. Particularly this:
It is in this period of training for war that you allow troops to seek clarity, to discuss drills and tactics and reach a level where they understand what is expected of them and the possible tactical options that they will be required to take part in.However, this is a reversion to semantics:
(note: no use of the word 'question'.)We each had / have a choice, I never object to questions, the more nervous types often do. ;)
Once you cock your weapon and head out the time for seeking clarity is over. You just do as you are damn well told.That (2). I certainly did not always do that and I rather doubt you did either. That, frankly is dangerous and just wrong. Things change and you have to adapt. You cannot ask for thinking Officers and NCOs -- and other ranks -- on the one hand then ask for robot like total compliance on the other; you can't have it both ways (I'd also note we're back to that trust thingy... :cool:).
In 1966 in Viet Nam, I was unfortunately * attached to Dave Hackworth, then an Acting Bn Cdr, at one time. He gave me a mission using the Platoon of which I was the acting PL and I said "Yes, Sir" then went about it in a totally different manner than the way he had over directed be employed. He was afterwards quite torqued but couldn't say or do much but grumble because we had been successful and had no casualties. Aside from that incident I have many, many times disregarded orders, in peace and in combat, and done so with variations from very slight to totally ignoring and turning off my radio. I strongly encourage anyone who thinks to do the same. YMMV. :D
* He blustered and boasted a lot, bluffed -- poorly -- a lot...
Ken White
02-10-2012, 04:14 PM
While I do not disagree that better training promotes trust, I submit that trust is rather hard to practice when those outside the chain of command... the knee jerk response by certain elected officials and their staffs to such stories.Sadly true and an indictment of the media and the Congress but not so much those Leaders who were forced into such a position. That story, in variations, is all too common. It's also worldwide though we have over developed it here in the US.
I seem to recall Bn Cdrs micromanaging platoon-level fights in VN from their helicopters. With that kind of background informing the leadership development of the mentors of much of today's military senior leadership, is it any wonder that the best we might hope for from the current crop of seniors is something like a Reaganesque "trust but verify"?Goes back further than that. Tales of Patton and even Bradley visiting the Troops and getting over directive abound. It got kicked up a notch in Korea after the mess settled down into trench warfare; too many senior Commanders (and their Staffs...) with too little to do could visit and 'engineer success.' Sad.
In Viet Nam the trend was excacerbated by the fact of major shortfalls in Captains and Senior NCOs in 67-68 -- those Bn Cdrs learned 2LTs and brand new SGTs would do anything you asked but didn't know much and so need a lot of supervision...:rolleyes:
The trend and tendency was / is reinforced by the type of low intensity warfare in VN and today; gives the senior folks with too little to do a chance to piddle. That's particularly bothersome in an Army that prides itself on 'zero defects' like performance and staying busy. It's also all too easy with today's Comm and surveillance assets...
It, as Bob says, is not going away and is likely to get worse before it gets better. The saving factor is that such foolishness cannot be practiced in a major, high intensity rapidly moving conflict and we can learn to do it right -- after unnecessarily killing too many people and firing the nervous... :(
I can only speak to the American military, based on my experience. One hopes that other nations' militaries are not equally "blessed" with such trust and oversight.Based on my observation, it's endemic worldwide, the more democratic the nation, the worse the problem... :wry:
In 1966 in Viet Nam, I was unfortunately * attached to Dave Hackworth, then an Acting Bn Cdr, at one time. He gave me a mission using the Platoon of which I was the acting PL and I said "Yes, Sir" then went about it in a totally different manner than the way he had over directed be employed. He was afterwards quite torqued but couldn't say or do much but grumble because we had been successful and had no casualties. Aside from that incident I have many, many times disregarded orders, in peace and in combat, and done so with variations from very slight to totally ignoring and turning off my radio. I strongly encourage anyone who thinks to do the same. YMMV. :D
I'm not sure I fully understand what you are meaning here (and the circumstances where a bn comd issues patrol orders directly to a platoon - where was your coy comd?)
Are you saying that a Bn Comd gave orders for a patrol more than the mission (being what to do) and instructed on the execution (how to do it) as well?
I can't think of circumstances where that would be required or advisable other than where the platoon commander is an absolute greenhorn or in an 'in contact' defensive setting where the movement tolerances are extremely tight.
The guiding principle in issuing such orders is to tell the patrol comd what to do (the mission) but not how to do it (the execution).
What I learned at the feet of the masters and adopted myself was to brief a patrol commander on his task (mission) then tell him to go away and plan his patrol but before he issued orders to come back to me and run the outline plan past me. In this way I could get a feel for the competence of the commander while at the same time being able to influence the conduct to some degree (while knowing that once the patrol commander was on his own he could do almost as he pleased regardless of what I had said).
This is how the men are separated from the boys. The more competent officers/NCOs tend to be given all the more testing patrol tasks while the junior ones or those about which there are some doubts get given the routine stuff.
As stated I never deviated from my orders because I was never told how to do it but suggest that where patrol comds find themselves in such a situation where they deviate from the orders on how to do it the troopies don't need to know this is happening. The last thing one needs, as it is bad for discipline, is for a general belief to develop that orders are negotiable where all junior officers and NCOs believe that they can decide which orders to follow and which to ignore.
Ken White
02-11-2012, 03:13 AM
I'm not sure I fully understand what you are meaning here (and the circumstances where a bn comd issues patrol orders directly to a platoon - where was your coy comd?)In reverse order, The Platoon was a Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon which did reconnaissance and surveillance missions as well as some limited economy of force actions. Only one per Battalion, assigned to Headquarters Company (which does not exercise tactical command). It is one of three tactical Platoons (Recon, Antitank, Mortar) which operate independently and directly under Bn Control. They are generally placed under Operational Control of other Bns only rarely; this was one of those rare times. Indeed, during seven years in such platoons in three units, that was one of only two times, both quite brief, such detachment was experienced.
I was given an over prescriptive order for a reconnaissance and an economy of force mission combined. Mission was not a particular problem but the 'how I think this should be done' way it was couched, engendered in large part due to that trust issue; he didn't know me or the capability of the Platoon, I didn't know him (that happens often in large Armies that rotate people frequently) was IMO the wrong approach, likely to result in failure and with a chance of own casualties. So, rather than get in an argument I would lose, I just said "Yes, Sir" and went ahead and did it my way.
Are you saying that a Bn Comd gave orders for a patrol more than the mission (being what to do) and instructed on the execution (how to do it) as well?Exactly. Most would never do that, Hackworth, OTOH, was a legend in his own mind... :rolleyes:
I can't think of circumstances where that would be required or advisable other than where the platoon commander is an absolute greenhorn or in an 'in contact' defensive setting where the movement tolerances are extremely tight.I agree -- even given a cross attachment where neither person knows the other and the competence of the tasked organization is not known, it's rare but it does happen.
What I learned at the feet of the masters and adopted myself was to brief a patrol commander on his task (mission) then tell him to go away and plan his patrol but before he issued orders to come back to me and run the outline plan past me. In this way I could get a feel for the competence of the commander while at the same time being able to influence the conduct to some degree (while knowing that once the patrol commander was on his own he could do almost as he pleased regardless of what I had said).\That's the way it's done ordinarily. For this particular mission, there was a time problem and that's why we were doing it instead of his own Reconnaissance Platoon. Which might've had a problem doing it in any event, that platoon had been combined with that Battalion's Antitank Platoon into what they called the 'Recondo' Platoon, it was, in essence a junior rifle company and was used as such and thus did not do reconnaissance missions often.
As stated I never deviated from my orders because I was never told how to do itWell, good for you. Everyone should be so lucky. It is indeed a rare circumstance to be told 'how' but it does happen.
,,,but suggest that where patrol comds find themselves in such a situation where they deviate from the orders on how to do it the troopies don't need to know this is happening. The last thing one needs, as it is bad for discipline, is for a general belief to develop that orders are negotiable where all junior officers and NCOs believe that they can decide which orders to follow and which to ignore.We can disagree on that with a situation dependent caveat (that approach is sometimes needed, more often not. The Troops aren't stupid...). I always had more confidence in myself, in the other NCOs and the Troops than that. In my experience that vaguely martinetish attitude certainly exists and is in fact too prevalent but everyone doesn't operate that way. Fortunately IMO.
In reverse order, The Platoon was a Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon which did reconnaissance and surveillance missions as well as some limited economy of force actions. Only one per Battalion, assigned to Headquarters Company (which does not exercise tactical command). It is one of three tactical Platoons (Recon, Antitank, Mortar) which operate independently and directly under Bn Control.
Yes of course that is the standard battalion arrangement.
They are generally placed under Operational Control of other Bns only rarely; this was one of those rare times. Indeed, during seven years in such platoons in three units, that was one of only two times, both quite brief, such detachment was experienced.
Yes not normal for standard infantry but SF would be used to be being tasked to 'answer a question' through recce just about anywhere (but would certainly not be told how to do it).
I was given an over prescriptive order for a reconnaissance and an economy of force mission combined. Mission was not a particular problem but the 'how I think this should be done' way it was couched, engendered in large part due to that trust issue; he didn't know me or the capability of the Platoon, I didn't know him (that happens often in large Armies that rotate people frequently) was IMO the wrong approach, likely to result in failure and with a chance of own casualties. So, rather than get in an argument I would lose, I just said "Yes, Sir" and went ahead and did it my way.
OK
It is indeed a rare circumstance to be told 'how' but it does happen.We can disagree on that with a situation dependent caveat (that approach is sometimes needed, more often not. The Troops aren't stupid...). I always had more confidence in myself, in the other NCOs and the Troops than that. In my experience that vaguely martinetish attitude certainly exists and is in fact too prevalent but everyone doesn't operate that way. Fortunately IMO.
Yes the troopies may get an idea of what is happening... I agree they are not all stupid, but I suggest it is a test of character for the patrol comd to resist the temptation to 'wave a flag' saying look what I'm doing. I'm flipping the Bn Comd.
Now moving along to the combat refusals in Vietnam. I assume there were valid reasons for these? If not how did this cancer start and spread?
Ulenspiegel
02-11-2012, 11:56 AM
You will have to give me the exact quote.
'Learn how to teach'? Von Schell talks of the US focus on teaching or being taught. The problem he identified then is the lack of time to 'exercise' with a unit in the field. The assumption is that when a person completes a course he has that skill.
What I am saying is that the skill is not mastered until it is exercised in as near to a war time setting as can be simulated... repeatedly.
Again I suggest any misunderstanding we may appear to have is through the choice of words.
BTW another gem of a book is 'Hans Von Luck - Panzer Commander (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_von_Luck) - The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck'.
In the German system of ~1900 to 1935 there was no automatism between graduation and promotion (in contrast to Westpoint). Hauptkadettenanstalt graduates usually did not get their Leutnantspatent but had to prove themselves again in their regiment before getting their new rank/position.
Other differences can be found in academic cuture:
From German officers it was not requested to find a textbook solution, differnt opinions were encouraged. No need to please an superior in courses by finding the "correct" solution.
Interaction of the staff at the Germanan military institutions and their students was very different to the situation in the US couterparts. Staff was not only superiors but in many situation acted as peers/comrades.
Officers who strived for staff positions were expected to understand these points and were able to contribute to this with their teaching.
Quality of academic staff and differences in the curriculum (leadership vs management).
Ken White
02-11-2012, 04:27 PM
Now moving along to the combat refusals in Vietnam. I assume there were valid reasons for these? If not how did this cancer start and spread?I think there were probably two poles:
- A few of what most would consider a sensible refusal to do something illegal or bone stupid that the system virtually had to illuminate and that many resulted in a mere wrist slap while a very few were miscarriages of justice.
- A few egregious acts of sheer cowardice (or abysmal stupidity based on flawed principle) that merited a more harsh punishment than they received with perhaps the odd miscarriage of justice.
...And the majority of those refusals fell in between those two poles. Without being present and witnessing events, all we can do is speculate. I tend not to put much faith in written ex post facto reports -- most have an agenda. Come to think of it, that's true of most records and reports out of Viet Nam IMO. Lot of fudging went on... :rolleyes:
I can however go beyond speculation on the spread of the problem -- political correctness and diffidence caused by changes in moral values in the west generally during the 1960s and by the perceived unpopularity (not only perceived with respect to the Media and most politicians, just with respect to the bulk of the US populace...) of that war. :eek:
ADDED: Missed this
...but I suggest it is a test of character for the patrol comd to resist the temptation to 'wave a flag' saying look what I'm doing. I'm flipping the Bn Comd.Agree, generally nothing should be said but IMO, any questions from observant Troops should be answered honestly with an explanation that avoids the perception of "look what I'm doing..."
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