Small War on Basilan (catch all)

[Dayuhan]

Recent events on Basilan, reported by the Christian Science Monitor...


Wednesday's firefight was the bloodiest battle involving the Abu Sayyaf in at least two years. It also raises questions about the effectiveness of US support to Filipino troops.

http://features.csmonitor.com/globalnews/2009/08/13/deadly-filipino-slugfest-between-soldiers-and-islamists/


In Basilan, Philippines, a US counterterrorism model frays

Renewed violence on the island shows the challenge of wiping out militant groups for good.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1211/p04s04-wosc.html

Local reporting suggests that, as has happened frequently in the past, ASG units had advance knowledge of troop movements and were able to move reinforcements into the fight faster than the Philippine military:

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/regions/view/20090813-220130/Abu-Sayyaf-knew-we-were-comingsoldier

There are also reports that MILF forces were involved, though probably not with the approval of the MILF Central Command.

[Bob's World]

The key to victory (i.e., some enduring state of peaceful good governance in the Southern Philippines), has always been in Manila. The military effort helps create conditions for success, but until the government in Manila seriously addresses the legitimate concerns and perceptions of the entire populace it is only a finger in the dike.

The Supreme Court's decision to stymie the peace process was devastating to good results coming from the Basilan Model. This in no way invalidates the model, it actually proves the model. What it invalidates is the positions of those who think these things can be wholly addressed through military means; or engagement by US military.

[Dayuhan]

The key to victory (i.e., some enduring state of peaceful good governance in the Southern Philippines), has always been in Manila. The military effort helps create conditions for success, but until the government in Manila seriously addresses the legitimate concerns and perceptions of the entire populace it is only a finger in the dike.

I agree. The defect in the model, from the start, was that it relied on the Philippine Government doing what it has neither the will nor the capacity to do.

I should note that I think the model has virtues and is by no means a bad thing: my criticism is of the wave of simplistic and naive pronouncements of success that emerged from it, which seemed to me to be both deceptive and self-defeating. Announcing "success" prematurely reduces the will to carry on and complete what has been begun, and generates disillusionment when the inevitable complications arise.



The Supreme Court's decision to stymie the peace process was devastating to good results coming from the Basilan Model. This in no way invalidates the model, it actually proves the model. What it invalidates is the positions of those who think these things can be wholly addressed through military means; or engagement by US military.

I'm not really sure how much impact the court decision would have had in Basilan. The MOA/AD was a primarily Maguindanao initiative that was viewed in the Tausug/Sama/Yakan regions with a fair amount of suspicion and cynicism from the start. The negotiations took place almost entirely between the GRP and the MILF, with little effort made to include the numerous other stakeholders among both indigenous and immigrant populations. I personally think the agreement ws doomed from the start; even before the Supreme Court decision I thought it a likely candidate for a "peace agreement least likely to produce peace" award. In some ways it's a positive thing that it never came around to implementation, which would have been a major mess. Given the degree to which immigrant and indigenous settlements are mixed, an ancestral domain/territorial autonomy "solution" is going to raise massive problems: either you will have an autonomous region that is not even close to geographically contiguous, or you will include numerous people in regions where they will violently resist integration, or you will have to move large numbers of people: not an attractive set of alternatives.

A far better approach, IMO, would be for the Manila government to try to reverse the tragic and stupid mistakes of the 1970s by positioning itself as a neutral arbiter between the immigrant and indigenous populations, targeting equitable justice and fair resolution of disputes instead of taking sides... but unfortunately, that won't happen either.

At this stage very little is going to happen, and all I could suggest would be for the GRP and MILF to agree to cease hostilities until after the 2010 elections and pick up negotiations from there. The current administration is so controversial and so unpopular that anything it initiates is going to be rejected out of hand by both the legislature and the majority of the populace.

It will be difficult and probably not advisable for the US to take a direct or even an open role in negotiations. The (generally exaggerated) involvement of USIP in the MOA/AD negotiations was widely perceived as a US attempt to promote a breakaway entity for some self-interested purpose (resource extraction privileges, a military base, whatever), just as the Arroyo administration's promotion of an agreement that would have required constitutional revisions was perceived as a backdoor attempt to open an amendment process that could be used to remove term limits and keep her in power. Whether or not these ulterior motives actually existed (in the first case probably not, in the second not at all unlikely) is less important than the impact of their perceived existence on public opinion.

[davidbfpo]

I think this article fits here and yes, I know very little about this area. In the UK we rarely see anything on the Phillipines, whether it is more than advocacy you can decide:
A new, purportedly human rights-orientated counter-insurgency strategy has little chance of success in the Philippines if the clientelism of a flawed political and economic system is not simultaneously addressed.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/mark-dearn/new-philippine-counter-insurgency-strategy-fails-to-address-causes-of-confli

[Bob's World]

I suspect there is a little bias and a couple of inaccuracies in that piece, but if one can look past that to the essence, the tone, to the populace's perception, one gets an idea of why this nation has never been able to resolve the conditions that give rise to such persistance of insurgent challenge.

Many want to argue "facts" but facts mean little in insurgnecy, what matters is perception. The final sentence is telling:

"As insurgency expert Robert Kilcullen notes, the aim of counter-insurgency is to “return the insurgency’s parent society to its normal mode of interaction.” In the Philippines it is the normal mode of interaction itself which promotes insurgency, with the veneer of Philippine ‘democracy’ and economic growth sating only the relatively few who benefit from it."

[Dayuhan]

David, I actually think the article would fit better in a thread discussing the NPA insurgency, since it relates more directly to that... but of course that's not even directly related to OEF/P, so I'm not sure where such a thread would belong!

Yes, some bias, some inaccuracy, and a great deal of superficiality... essentially a transcription of what might be called the moderate left position, with little evident effort to challenge or refine that position. The conclusions are of course true enough, but don't reveal anything that isn't already known to anyone half looking, and don't offer much of a solution. That's not unusual: the Philippine left invariably has all the right questions and all the wrong answers.

Probably the most glaring misperception, a very common one in observations of the Philippines, is the Manila-centric perspective the article takes, notably toward extrajudicial killings. The left has consistently tried to portray these as a policy of the Manila government, but that's generally inaccurate. Virtually all political violence in the Philippines revolves around local issues and local rivalries. We always hear about election-related violence, but this rarely if ever stems from Presidential or other national elections. Village, municipal, and provincial elections are where the killing happens: this is where the clan rivalries and family feuds kick in, and where the results actually mean something. Manila politics to most Filipinos is analogous to the Tagalog-dubbed Mexican soap operas that proliferate on daytime TV: entertaining, but distant and with little or no impact on day to day life.

Most of the people being killed on the left (the left does its own share of killing, which of course they don't talk about) are no threat at all to the central government, and the killings actually cause the central government more harm than benefit. The equation is reversed at the local level, where feudal bosses routinely connive with local military and police (or simply use their own assets) to remove people they find inconvenient, embarrassing, or simply offensive. The central government lacks the power to crack the whip over its own people, so they do whatever they want, even when that involves killing people they don't like. The areas in which the NPA is strongest are generally those dominated by self-serving political dynasties that are effectively immune to interference from Manila, and the hostility of the populace is generally directed at the local authority. Manila can certainly be faulted for lacking the will (and often the capacity) to rein in its people, but talk of reform needs to be built around the realization that Manila is less abusive than ineffectual, and what needs to be reformed are the local governments.

Looking specifically at the ethnic/sectarian/separatist insurgency in the south, it's important to avoid the trap of seeing the fight as between "the government" and "the populace". It's actually a fight between two populaces (even that is a simplification, but I'm not writing a book here), with the government vacillating between supporting one side and ineffective attempts at mediation. Neither of the populaces involved trusts the government or has much respect for it. The populaces involved have incompatible demands, and efforts to placate one generally enrage the other. This plays into the hands of local warlords, who control their own people with the old "I may be a bastard, but you need me to protect you from the other" routine, and manipulate the central government with their ability to keep a provisional lid on their area and and to deliver the votes - often over 100% of the votes - to their patrons.

What can be done about this? I wrote about that at some length (dated, but main points remain) here:

http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/journal_of_democracy/v015/15.4rogers.html

and can provide a .pdf with anyone who has the interest or needs a substitute for valium.

If anyone wonders what the US, or any other outside party, can do about this, I'd say very close to nothing. On the historical side we had some role in the way the problems developed (not the cause, but one among many), but I don't see us having much place in the search for a solution. Like everybody else, the Filipinos are carrying some historical baggage. Like everyone else, the job of setting that baggage aside, deciding where they want to be, and going there is ultimately theirs.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan

Agree that the U.S. can do little about it, and by our very presence create a handy 3rd party to lay blame at the feet of (governments do not take responsibility, and even populaces generally prefer to blame someone else's government over their own. This is every bit as true in the U.S. as it is in the Philippines. Well, Philippine culture is actually notably bad at not taking responsibility. 400 odd years of colonial rule and influence didn't help that situation.)

We pointedly avoid involvement in the NPA situation, though it is the main insurgent concern of Manila, it is not ours. However, when one builds security force capacity in another country one has little control over where or how that capacity will be applied. This is a important tidbit that we seem to overlook or minimize. Capacity developed in the south is shifted to the north. In Arab countries capacity developed to counter terrorism is applied to the suppression of nationalist subversion and insurgency. We are not very clever at deducing 2nd and 3rd order effects, so typically we focus on the primary objective and the primary effects of our efforts and go home calling the operation a big success. One reason why I am far more in favor of going after root causes rather than throwing a range of diverse and uncoordinated activities planned by State, Aid, 4 separate services and SOF, and a host of LEAs and NGOs at a problem. No efficiency, little synergy, and virtually all aimed at the symptoms of a problem with US interests in mind; with little consideration of what the higher order effects might be, or how it might affect the interests of the host govt or populace.

[Dayuhan]

We pointedly avoid involvement in the NPA situation, though it is the main insurgent concern of Manila, it is not ours. However, when one builds security force capacity in another country one has little control over where or how that capacity will be applied. This is a important tidbit that we seem to overlook or minimize. Capacity developed in the south is shifted to the north. In Arab countries capacity developed to counter terrorism is applied to the suppression of nationalist subversion and insurgency. We are not very clever at deducing 2nd and 3rd order effects, so typically we focus on the primary objective and the primary effects of our efforts and go home calling the operation a big success. One reason why I am far more in favor of going after root causes rather than throwing a range of diverse and uncoordinated activities planned by State, Aid, 4 separate services and SOF, and a host of LEAs and NGOs at a problem. No efficiency, little synergy, and virtually all aimed at the symptoms of a problem with US interests in mind; with little consideration of what the higher order effects might be, or how it might affect the interests of the host govt or populace.

To some extent yes, the built capacity is transferred, but the extent is limited. The fight with the NPA is, even more than the fight in the south, more political than military, and military action isn't all that prevalent. It's at a bit of an impasse. Most at the center know that political reform is needed to finish the reduction of the NPA, but Manila hasn't the will - or in many cases the ability - to take on the feudal rulers in the provinces and force reform. The feudal rulers in the provinces use repression to bottle up symptoms and keep Manila off their backs. That typically takes the place of close-range shootings by men on motorcycles. That hasn't really been affected by US capacity building; it's something they already knew how to do.

Similarly, I'm not really convinced that US "capacity building" has really had much impact on the ability of Arab regimes to suppress their populaces. It's a capacity they've always had and always used; they probably know more about it than we do. Our intel sharing cooperation probably helps us more than it helps them.

In some ways the current administration in Manila is well placed to lay on some pressure: there's a real mandate, the election isn't being questioned, and there's no rumbling of coup threats. These are factors that the military and the provincial elites have long used to keep the central government bottled up, and they aren't much in play now. Unfortunately, i don't see this administration having the backbone ort initiative to take on that kind of job.

[Dayuhan]

Reports are not entirely consistent. but it seems that a group of 41 Philippine Army soldiers, identified in most reports as special forces, ran into trouble in southern Basilan and took 19 dead and 12 wounded in a 6 hour fight. Apparently 6 were killed after being captured. The incident occurred not far from the site of a 2007 battle in which 23 Philippine Marines were killed, 14 of whom were beheaded. Reports say the army group was responding to the reported presence of an armed group including one of those responsible for the 2007 incident.

The opposing force was reportedly largely MILF, despite an ongoing cease fire and peace talks. The MILF central committee, which is far from Basilan and has limited control over its forces there, claims that their camp was attacked and they responded. The Army says their force was ambushed.

Reports from the field suggest that the Army group encountered a small armed group near an MILF camp, shooting started, and the MILF force and armed locals piled on. That's not at all unlikely. Several armed groups operate there, memberships overlap and blood ties abound, villagers are armed, and the Army is not popular. If something starts and there's a point of advantage (and an opportunity to possibly recover weapons) it's very likely that all kinds would respond.

Manila politicians are already claiming that the MILF leaders ordered the attack (unlikely) and demanding an end to the cease-fire and an aggressive military response. That plays well to the populace: the Christian majority largely sees Muslims as inherently treacherous and violent, and it's widely believed that they can only be controlled by stomping them into submission. The government says the peace process will continue.

I'm no expert on the military side, but there seems to be a repeating pattern of Philippine forces walking into these situations and taking heavy casualties, and a continuing inability to rapidly reinforce or support forces that run into trouble in the field. I have to wonder if US training and material support, which has been in place for quite a while now, is doing anything to address that.

Some links:

http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=739276&publicationSubCategoryId=63

http://www.malaya.com.ph/oct20/news1.html

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/10/19/11/al-barka-how-villagers-killed-marines-special-forces-troops

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/79953/afp-spokesman-suggests-suspension-of-ceasefire-with-milf

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/79823/afp-investigates-%E2%80%98operational-lapses%E2%80%99-in-basilan-clash

[GI Zhou]

I just have this feeling that having seen the Philippine Rangers gearing up to deploy in 1999, that this all too common. Macho bravado is no substitute for good tactics and civil affairs. A sorrier bunch had not seen for a long time.

[Bill Moore]

I'm no expert on the military side, but there seems to be a repeating pattern of Philippine forces walking into these situations and taking heavy casualties, and a continuing inability to rapidly reinforce or support forces that run into trouble in the field. I have to wonder if US training and material support, which has been in place for quite a while now, is doing anything to address that.

Dayuhan, I think you know the JSOTF mission is an advise and assist mission, not a train and equip mission, so the short answer to your wondering is no.

http://jsotf-p.blogspot.com/

The fact of the matter is the Gov of the Philippines has for years under invested in its military and its law enforcement, which I suspect is one reason corruption is rampant and obviously a key reason they're combat ineffective outside of a few narrow parameters.

U.S. laws and policy prohibit us from training and equipping them, unless it is under title 22 authorities (there are some exceptions, but the exceptions are not the norm). We are stuck with a Cold War Security Cooperation/Security Assistance process that undermines our efforts at every turn.

It is tragic so many young men are dying in a conflict that could should have been settled by now; however, there is little incentive to negotiate seriously when the State doesn't have the means to secure the area.

[Bob's World]

Like most insurgencies, the conflict is waged in some remote corner among the disaffected segment of the populace; too often with the military as the agent of the government; but can only be resolved ("won" or "lost" for those who insist on applying the language of war and warfare to what is a political dynamic) in the capital

It will be decisions and paradigm shifts made, adopted and operationalized in Manila that will ultimately bring stability to places like Basilan. OEF-P is a good US operation, but it will never achieve that effect as it is designed to bring some small degree of goodness to that small (ok, not so small) corner of the Philippines where the various manifestations of Philippine insurgency among the Muslim segment of the populace manifest. As we all know, this same insurgency manifests differently in other regions of the country among other segments of the populace, and has been porpoising up and down with varying degrees of activity and violence for hundreds of years.

The root causes of how the central government governs, how the cultural system of elites vs peasants; Catholic vs. Muslim; etc, etc (so many long established roles and perceptions that serve to always allow one small segment of the populace to achieve success while the majority feel trapped or disrespected) go unaddressed.


This is largely true in Afghanistan as well. Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police are also great SOF programs among the people in the regions where disaffection with the government is high; yet the true root issues in Kabul and the historic inertia of that culture also prevent any true addressing of the issues that could actually resolve that conflict.

We can mitigate symptoms of such conflicts, or we can exacerbate symptoms of such conflicts, but we cannot truly resolve the actual roots of such conflicts with such engagement. US foreign and US military policies and doctrines need to evolve to grasp this reality. Our history and doctrine on COIN tout temporary suppressions as "wins," or overly focus on military actions that occurred over major political changes that were implemented where more enduring effects were achieved (most famously in Malaya, or perhaps the American Colonies), so we miss the most important lessons to be learned from such operations.

In the Philippines we primarily conduct mitigation operations. In Afghanistan we conduct a mix of mitigation and exacerbation operations (but see that latter group as also contributing to success,( i.e., Ranger raids on Afghan homes to take out low-level Taliban leaders of the resistance movement in Afghanistan proper, or haul off their friends and family to gain more info to capture or kill such leaders; or drone strikes into Pashtun homes in the FATA in efforts to kill senior leaders of the revolutionary core of the insurgency).

We must change how we think about these types of conflicts, and how we think about what our proper role (if in deed, any role is proper in most cases) to best help bring stability and enduring peace to such people should be as well.

Until then Manila will keep sending good young citizens out to do battle with other good young citizens in an effort to not have to take on the hard decisions about who they are and how they govern. Same same in Kabul. And the US will keep sending good young men out help those governments in those Sisyphian-like efforts.

We can do better, but first we must think differently. Until then, there will continue to be avoidable "bad days" like this.

[Bill Moore]

Beating the drum about good governance isn't irrelevant, but this discussion is focused on the AFP's tactical capability period. Yes, good governance could probably rapid resolve the major security challenges in the S. Philippines, but the fact of the matter is there won't be anything resembling good governance in the near term if ever for a lot of reasons.

In the meantime, Dayuhan asked if JSOTF-P's train and equip effort was addressing black and white logistical shortfalls that would enable the AFP to fight more effectively and the answer is no.

Good governance also concerns the government taking care of their security forces.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Any music without a steady drumbeat usually ends up rambling along aimlessly... Like COIN operations designed to pursue threats or effectiveness...

Certainly governments need to take care of their security forces. Not giving orders like "Deploy down to Basilan and defeat the Muslim insurgents" is one great way governments can do this. Giving them the world's best training and equipment prior to giving them that order is certainly better for the security forces, but does not move said government any any closer to "good governance." More effective, yes, but (drum beat coming) but effectiveness of government does not cure insurgency where poor governance exists; and ineffectiveness of government will not create insurgency where good governance exists. I will keep pounding a stake into the heart of that vampire-like bit of COIN BS until it finally dies.

Personally, I think it is time to fold the tent on OEF-P and right-size our operations there to free up capacity to provide a more balanced approach to the entire theater. But that is a conversation we can have over a couple of beers.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan, I think you know the JSOTF mission is an advise and assist mission, not a train and equip mission, so the short answer to your wondering is no.

Yes, I was imprecise with the words... I should have wondered whether US advice and assistance had done anything to address these issues. Of course I already knew the answer was no, which raises the next question: what exactly has all the advice and assistance done?


The fact of the matter is the Gov of the Philippines has for years under invested in its military and its law enforcement, which I suspect is one reason corruption is rampant and obviously a key reason they're combat ineffective outside of a few narrow parameters.

Corruption is rampant because the people involved are corrupt, and because the organizational culture stresses loyalty to other members of the force over effectiveness of the force. Everybody in the ranks knows who's corrupt, who's selling weapons, who has what rackets. They don't tell, because that would be ratting, and not ratting is more important than winning fights. You have to wonder how the guys doing the fighting feel about that, especially knowing that most of the guns and ammunition used against them came from government stock, but that's the way it is and has been for a long time.

If you tripled the budget tomorrow, corruption would just get worse. There'd be more to steal.

It's true that the Philippine military is woefully underresourced, but in incidents like this you have to wonder if what they have is being used effectively. They have aircraft... nothing terribly modern, but an OV-10 or an MG520 can be a useful thing if it shows up. Even if the actual fighting is in dense brush and too close for effective air support, aircraft can be both a physical and psychological deterrent to other forces looking to move in and join the fight, no? The UH-1 is hardly cutting edge but they've delivered reinforcements to many battlefields in many places and I'd think they could do so again (unless generals are using them as taxis at the time). They have artillery... obsolete by modern standards but with effective communication and training I imagine it could be used to provide some support to a unit under attack in the field. If nothing else, you'd think they could have had other units ready to relieve a group that's going into an area with a long-standing reputation for resistance.

Again, I'm no expert on the military side, but over and over again they seem to be sending guys out into the hornet's nest without the capacity to back them up if the hornets get stirred up. That just seems wrong on any number of levels.


It will be decisions and paradigm shifts made, adopted and operationalized in Manila that will ultimately bring stability to places like Basilan. OEF-P is a good US operation, but it will never achieve that effect as it is designed to bring some small degree of goodness to that small (ok, not so small) corner of the Philippines where the various manifestations of Philippine insurgency among the Muslim segment of the populace manifest. As we all know, this same insurgency manifests differently in other regions of the country among other segments of the populace, and has been porpoising up and down with varying degrees of activity and violence for hundreds of years.

It's fair to say that OEF-P covers only a small corner even of the Muslim insurgency.

To some extent yes, but it's also a bit more complicated than that. You can blame Manila for its inability to control the local elites that gain from keeping the conflict going, but you can't overlook the role that the local elites play, or the structure that makes it difficult for central government to overcome or work against local elite interests.

I wouldn't refer to the NPA and the various Muslim groups as manifestations of "this same insurgency". Different things in most ways.

One of the difficult aspects of the Muslim insurgency is that the majority populace is actually much less inclined to accommodation than the government. The government simply reflects the existing cultural bias... they try to compensate to some extent, but generally with little effect.


We can mitigate symptoms of such conflicts, or we can exacerbate symptoms of such conflicts, but we cannot truly resolve the actual roots of such conflicts with such engagement. US foreign and US military policies and doctrines need to evolve to grasp this reality. Our history and doctrine on COIN tout temporary suppressions as "wins," or overly focus on military actions that occurred over major political changes that were implemented where more enduring effects were achieved (most famously in Malaya, or perhaps the American Colonies), so we miss the most important lessons to be learned from such operations.

In the Philippines we primarily conduct mitigation operations. In Afghanistan we conduct a mix of mitigation and exacerbation operations (but see that latter group as also contributing to success,( i.e., Ranger raids on Afghan homes to take out low-level Taliban leaders of the resistance movement in Afghanistan proper, or haul off their friends and family to gain more info to capture or kill such leaders; or drone strikes into Pashtun homes in the FATA in efforts to kill senior leaders of the revolutionary core of the insurgency).

We must change how we think about these types of conflicts, and how we think about what our proper role (if in deed, any role is proper in most cases) to best help bring stability and enduring peace to such people should be as well.

Until then Manila will keep sending good young citizens out to do battle with other good young citizens in an effort to not have to take on the hard decisions about who they are and how they govern. Same same in Kabul. And the US will keep sending good young men out help those governments in those Sisyphian-like efforts.

We can do better, but first we must think differently. Until then, there will continue to be avoidable "bad days" like this.

If "we" means the US, I don't think anything "we" do is going to make any difference at all in the Philippines.

[Ken White]

Yes, I was imprecise with the words... I should have wondered whether US advice and assistance had done anything to address these issues. Of course I already knew the answer was no, which raises the next question: what exactly has all the advice and assistance done?
...
If "we" means the US, I don't think anything "we" do is going to make any difference at all in the Philippines.All that is sadly correct. Why?

Why can't we use our own rules instead of trying to play by those of others. Why do we play on the turf of others, turf about which we remain almost willfully and stubbornly ignorant. Why don't we play to our strengths; have a few people that know a lot about specific areas and we listen to those people instead of egoistically (a term used due to its absolute appropriateness in these matters...) and arrogantly rejecting their knowledge...

As our interventional failures are known and proven all over the world and not just in the Philippines, why do we keep doing it so badly? Our poor methodology provides little to no success at great cost.

[Steve Blair]

As our interventional failures are known and proven all over the world and not just in the Philippines, why do we keep doing it so badly? Our poor methodology provides little to no success at great cost.

I would posit that one of the reasons is that our interventions are often motivated by emotion and not necessarily long-term calculation. Combine that with a deliberately unstable political system and a military that tends to reject learning and lessons, and you get a bad mix.

[Ken White]

I would posit that one of the reasons is that our interventions are often motivated by emotion and not necessarily long-term calculation. Combine that with a deliberately unstable political system and a military that tends to reject learning and lessons, and you get a bad mix.a Master of Understatement... :wry:

[ganulv]

I would posit that one of the reasons is that our interventions are often motivated by emotion and not necessarily long-term calculation.
Are you suggesting that concentrating on what is urgent rather than what is important is the American Way? Hmmm, that would explain why the Man of Steel is always getting run so ragged…

[Steve Blair]

Are you suggesting that concentrating on what is urgent rather than what is important is the American Way? Hmmm, that would explain why the Man of Steel is always getting run so ragged…

Not so much urgent (as many of Wilson's interventions weren't urgent per se), although we do have a massive addition to instant gratification....;) I would say that we tend to react to things that are emotional triggers and not necessarily products of calculation or long-term policy/planning. TR, for example, did avoid some interventions that he may have been emotionally or philosophically attracted to but determined that in long-term policy terms they weren't good ideas.

[ganulv]

Not so much urgent (as many of Wilson's interventions weren't urgent per se), although we do have a massive addition to instant gratification....;)

I’ve seen so much management by urgency that I am convinced a lot of people are confused about the concept. When I hear the word I think careening bus or CPR rather than the kind of institutional financial issue that I have been told is so urgent that I really should be good enough to postpone my reimbursement for six months. By my definition that issue can’t be urgent. But maybe there’s a reason I don’t get paid the big bucks like middle management. :D

[Bill Moore]

Bob,

I don't disagree with your drum beat, I can dance to it, but too often you hijack forums that are focused on different issues. Despite the flawed strategy approach and other issues I won't address here, the one issue that we may be able to address is improving our security force assistance system.

Dayuhan, advise and assist authorities only gets you so far, so I think there needs to be some expectation management/strategic communications to clarify the limits of our support.

I don't think our time there was wasted, but agree we certainly didn't maximize our return on investment.

As for good governance, and Bob knows this, the JSOTF has actually done quite a bit to assist with good governance at the local level, and they improved helped improve the relationship between the populace and the military in many areas, but obviously southern Basilan is not one of those areas.

It frustrates the hell out me that whether it is in Afghanistan, the Philippines, or elsewhere we can't accomplish relatively simple objectives like developing effective security forces due to a number of factors, but most prevalent is a failed SC/SA system.

I have no hope of improving our overall strategy.

[carl]

.I'm no expert on the military side, but there seems to be a repeating pattern of Philippine forces walking into these situations and taking heavy casualties, and a continuing inability to rapidly reinforce or support forces that run into trouble in the field. I have to wonder if US training and material support, which has been in place for quite a while now, is doing anything to address that.

I know nothing about the Philippine Army and Marines so I have some questions. Do they have a well developed NCO corps? Are the junior officers, a junior officer would I assume be leading a 41 man unit, selected for merit or something else? How experienced would he have been? Would the Marine guys who were around in 2007, not just the ones in the fight, still be around the area and if they were would they and the Army talk to each other?

These questions are prompted by Dayuhan's observation that the same thing happened in the almost the same place before.

[Dayuhan]

As for good governance, and Bob knows this, the JSOTF has actually done quite a bit to assist with good governance at the local level, and they improved helped improve the relationship between the populace and the military in many areas, but obviously southern Basilan is not one of those areas.

This is optimistic, I think. I don't think there's been any real lasting impact on local governance. People on Basilan realize that the American presence has brought additional resources and that the military and civilian leaders behave better when Americans are watching, and they appreciate that. They also know that the same people are in charge, there's been no effort to impose accountability on previous acts of corruption, collusion, and abuse, and that as soon as the Americans leave the status quo ante will return.

Realistically, I don't see any way that advice and assistance from the US military is going to have any real impact on the black hole of local governance and civil-military relations on Basilan or Jolo. It's too much to expect. On the other hand, I can see how US military advice and assistance could help the Philippine military use its existing resources more effectively, improve their small unit tactics, and develop practices that would help prevent incidents like this. That wouldn't address the root causes of the war, but realistically nothing the US does is going to address the root causes of the war.

Obviously these incidents can't be counted as failure of the US "advise and assist" mission: you can't make anyone follow advice. It does raise the question of whether maintaining the mission in the form it's taken over the last decade is going to achieve significant incremental gains. My own feeling is that we've accomplished most of what we can, and that it wouldn't be a bad idea to start packing up. I also think it would be a good idea to state, bluntly and publicly, that in our opinion we've done all we can, and that ultimately this insurgency is driven not by AQ or international extremism, but by governance issues that can only resolved by the Philippine government.

If it were up to me I'd have the local CIA station draw up a detailed report on collusion, corruption, and abuse and how they sustain the insurgency and cripple the COIN effort, naming names and giving specifics. The end recommendation would be that the US needs to withdraw, because until the Philippine government gets serious about bringing its own people within the rule of law there's nothing meaningful we can accomplish. I'd have them e-mail the thing back to the home office with a direct cc to Wikileaks.

These issues need to be addressed by the Philippine government, but as long as they can keep the issues in the shadows, the Philippine government will avoid addressing them, because they are very uncomfortable issues. The US can't address or resolve the issues, but we can put a spotlight on them and help get them out of the shadows, which I think in the long run will help a lot more than trying to paper over the cracks and pretend the system just needs a minor bit of tuning up.

Of course it's not up to me and never will be, which I admit might be a good thing :D

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan,


I also think it would be a good idea to state, bluntly and publicly, that in our opinion we've done all we can, and that ultimately this insurgency is driven not by AQ or international extremism, but by governance issues that can only resolved by the Philippine government.

Two points, first I am in general agreement with your comment above as truth today; however, there were some ties to AQ (very loose) previously, and of JI played a role due to their regional ambitions.

I have to disagree with your comments that the JSOTF didn't impact good governance at the local level. By no means am I implying that corruption doesn't exist, but the relationship between the security forces and the locals have a much better relationship in many locations. That isn't true in Southern Basilan and at least one other location in the Sulu Archipelago, but it is true for many regions. Having watched that unfold over the years to me it is self evident, to others it may not be. You can argue correctly that alone isn't enough and you would be correct, but while uneven much progress has been made. I suspect we can't make much more progress with our current approach, and it is up to the Filipinos, or sadly it ups to the Government of the Philippines.

[jcustis]

I sponsored a Philippine Marine Corps Marine for a year at a PME school, and he stated that yes, logistics and technical support (e.g. FLIR-equipped helicopters) was what the AFP needed, not the will to fight.

ETA: It seems as those violence is on the uptick, with seven soldiers reported killed on follow-on fighting/attacks.

[Dayuhan]

here were some ties to AQ (very loose) previously, and of JI played a role due to their regional ambitions.

There were ties between AQ and the ASG, but borrowing a leaf from the gospel according to Robert C Jones I'd point out that the insurgency existed long before the ASG and will probably exist long after it. The ASG is probably best understood as a failed attempt by AQ to leverage the conditions supporting insurgency and to fill the leadership void left when the MNLF leadership reached various accommodations with the government. Both AQ and JI have tried to use the pre-existing conditions to their advantage, with varying levels of success, but they're not driving the insurgency, they're riding on it.


I have to disagree with your comments that the JSOTF didn't impact good governance at the local level. By no means am I implying that corruption doesn't exist, but the relationship between the security forces and the locals have a much better relationship in many locations. That isn't true in Southern Basilan and at least one other location in the Sulu Archipelago, but it is true for many regions. Having watched that unfold over the years to me it is self evident, to others it may not be. You can argue correctly that alone isn't enough and you would be correct, but while uneven much progress has been made. I suspect we can't make much more progress with our current approach, and it is up to the Filipinos, or sadly it ups to the Government of the Philippines.

Good governance and relations between security forces and the populace are two different things. In terms of governance, the dominant clans are still very much in control, and those leopards have not changed their spots. They may be adopting a somewhat less egregious pattern of corruption and abuse for the time being but they are still in it for themselves and they will still do what's required to keep themselves in power and in the money. I don't think there's been any change that will be sustained for any length of time.

Relations between security forces and the populace have improved to some extent. They could hardly have gotten worse. By 2001/2002 the security forces were in the awkward position of being mistrusted and resented by both sides. The Christian population was up in arms at the universally held perception that the security forces were colluding with the ASG, sharing ransoms and other profits. The Muslim populace knew, as they've known all along, that the government was the enemy. I think they still know that. They may not think it's the right time to take the enemy on, except in the rare times and places when they have the advantage, but the knowledge is still there.

Things are quieter, but these cycles have come and gone before. Whether or not this will last will only be known after we leave. I'm not at all optimistic. I don't see any evidence that there's been any fundamental or lasting changes in the aims or methods of any of the players.

I still think the Tausug/Yakan insurgency is primed to take off again. The only question is what sort of identity it will take... an MILF that learns to bridge the gap between the Maguindanao/Maranao leadership and the Tausug/Yakan populace, or a renewed, back-to-basics offshoot of the ASG, or an MNLF revival, or something completely different. Time will tell.

[Bob's World]

I am with both Bill and Dayuhan on this. Yes, JSOTF-P has made a marked influence on HOW the security forces of the Philippines engage the general populace that they encounter in the course of their duties in a very positive way. The reason this is creating what is likely an enduring effect is because the security forces have been pleasantly surprised that by treating the populace with respect and dignity and by infusing greater justice into their implementation of the rule of law they encounter far less violence directed against them.

Also, the security forces are in many ways the only physical manifestation of the central governance down at the local level. So, in about 300 years this should have spread and elevated up to where it actually has an impact on the primary source of the problem up in Manila. A good program with good effects, but not a program that has any hope of actually addressing the true problems in the Philippines. As I said, same same for VSO, ALP and the Commandos in Afghanistan.

We delude ourselves with unsubstantiated theories of "bottom up" legitimacy and good governance. The anti-bodies projected downward from the central governance (that we too often refuse to engage at the strategic - policy level) prevent any true change from occurring.

As Dayuhan often, and accurately points out, it is the elite, the landowner caste, etc who project and sustain the system that promotes so much discontent, not the government. Same was true in the American South. It was not the federal government that was oppressing the African American populace, it was an overall accepted culture of oppression, primarily projected from local level officials, business, etc. But it was by implementing change at the very top and enforcing those changes throughout the system that put us on the path toward stability.

The same will be true in the Philippines, and the same will be true in Afghanistan. Too bad we have a policy of no true engagement at that level for fear that those governments will not support perceptions of US interests that are the true reason for our presence in the first place. Those interests having very little to do with nationalist insurgencies in either case. Until then, we keep sending out the troops to mitigate the symptoms at the bottom, and attempt to convince ourselves that we are actually addressing the true problem and producing enduring good for the affected populaces and nations of such engagement. There is little evidence of that being the case.

[Bill Moore]

Dayuhan,


Good governance and relations between security forces and the populace are two different things. In terms of governance, the dominant clans are still very much in control, and those leopards have not changed their spots.

A State's security forces are an element of governance, so I disagree that good relations between a State's security forces and its populace are not good governance, but I do agree with your last part of your comment.

Bob's World,


The same will be true in the Philippines, and the same will be true in Afghanistan. Too bad we have a policy of no true engagement at that level for fear that those governments will not support perceptions of US interests that are the true reason for our presence in the first place. Those interests having very little to do with nationalist insurgencies in either case. Until then, we keep sending out the troops to mitigate the symptoms at the bottom, and attempt to convince ourselves that we are actually addressing the true problem and producing enduring good for the affected populaces and nations of such engagement. There is little evidence of that being the case.

We claim to follow a 3D approach (Diplomacy, Defense, and Development), and I guess that is true, but these three approaches are still largely stove piped efforts that are occassionally fused at the tactical level due to the initiative of the action agents on point, but at the strategic level we're still drifting aimlessly. You are absolutely right that we all too often default to bottom up solutions by focusing on solving the problem with security forces, and these are problems that can't be resolved by security forces.

We not only need to reform our security cooperation/security assistance programs so we can cost effectively help produce capable security forces, we also need to revamp our strategy development and planning efforts that operationalize those strategies so we truly put first things first and put the military in a supporting role, instead of a decisive role, but I suspect that won't happen anytime soon.

[Dayuhan]

Yes, JSOTF-P has made a marked influence on HOW the security forces of the Philippines engage the general populace that they encounter in the course of their duties in a very positive way. The reason this is creating what is likely an enduring effect is because the security forces have been pleasantly surprised that by treating the populace with respect and dignity and by infusing greater justice into their implementation of the rule of law they encounter far less violence directed against them.

Interesting, though, that this supposed attitude change doesn't seem to be reflected in other parts of the country, even where troops have moved in that were previously stationed in Basilan and Jolo. Obviously we won't know whether there's been a long-term change until we leave, but I'm a good deal less optimistic than some. We'll see.


So, in about 300 years this should have spread and elevated up to where it actually has an impact on the primary source of the problem up in Manila...

We delude ourselves with unsubstantiated theories of "bottom up" legitimacy and good governance. The anti-bodies projected downward from the central governance (that we too often refuse to engage at the strategic - policy level) prevent any true change from occurring.

As Dayuhan often, and accurately points out, it is the elite, the landowner caste, etc who project and sustain the system that promotes so much discontent, not the government. Same was true in the American South. It was not the federal government that was oppressing the African American populace, it was an overall accepted culture of oppression, primarily projected from local level officials, business, etc. But it was by implementing change at the very top and enforcing those changes throughout the system that put us on the path toward stability.

What I think you're missing here is that the local elites control the Manila government. They dominate the legislature and virtually everyone in the executive and judicial branches has their roots in that class. They're good at talking about reform, making a gesture here and there, and making very sure that any program threatening their power never gets off the ground. They also tend to stick together. Once in a while someone will become a liability and be tossed to the sharks, but for the most part they close ranks against any effort to diminish their power or bring them within the rule of law. They're generally pretty effective at it.

I think in the case of the American south you may be glossing over some things. The moves from the top didn't emerge from a vacuum and they weren't initiated from the top. They were a response to a whole lot of agitation from Americans who found that old order unacceptable. The moves came from the top, but they came because of pressure from the bottom.

One thing that makes the southern Philippines insurgency so intractable is that the majority populace lines up strongly on the side of an aggressive, repressive military response. If anything the Government is more inclined toward accommodation. The majority populace doesn't want to talk about root causes, they want to crush the rebellion and beat the rebel populace into submission.


Too bad we have a policy of no true engagement at that level for fear that those governments will not support perceptions of US interests that are the true reason for our presence in the first place. Those interests having very little to do with nationalist insurgencies in either case. Until then, we keep sending out the troops to mitigate the symptoms at the bottom, and attempt to convince ourselves that we are actually addressing the true problem and producing enduring good for the affected populaces and nations of such engagement. There is little evidence of that being the case.

Again, I don't think any level of US engagement is going to matter much. It's really not about us.

[Bob's World]

What I think you're missing here is that the local elites control the Manila government. They dominate the legislature and virtually everyone in the executive and judicial branches has their roots in that class. They're good at talking about reform, making a gesture here and there, and making very sure that any program threatening their power never gets off the ground. They also tend to stick together. Once in a while someone will become a liability and be tossed to the sharks, but for the most part they close ranks against any effort to diminish their power or bring them within the rule of law. They're generally pretty effective at it.

I think in the case of the American south you may be glossing over some things. The moves from the top didn't emerge from a vacuum and they weren't initiated from the top. They were a response to a whole lot of agitation from Americans who found that old order unacceptable. The moves came from the top, but they came because of pressure from the bottom.




Of course there was "pressure from the bottom." That is the essence of insurgency. Sometimes it is primarily illegal and violent; sometimes it is primarily illegal and non-violent; usually it is some mix of legal and illegal, violent and non-violent approaches that ultimately lead to change.

But if you don't think local elites have a major impact on US politics, you haven't been paying attention. This is true in every country to some degree, and in a country with any form of republican democracy it is very true and significant. Lyndon Johnson showed tremendous selfless moral courage in ignoring what all of the polls, advisors, and his own political instincts were warning him about what would happen to his political career if he insisted on pushing for civil rights reforms, but in the face of all of that, push he did. Many experts believe that it was this, far more than the nature of events in Vietnam, that was the primary factor in his decision not to run for a second term. The three landmark civil rights bills that he pushed through congress changed America forever and for better. It all looks so benign and obvious now in retrospect, but at the time it was HUGE, not obvious at all, and stirred up tremendous turmoil.

As information technology continues to empower populaces and non-state actors there will be increasing demand for political elites and their backers to take note of what the people are telling them and to actually address reasonable concerns that they may well have been ignoring and suppressing for generations or even centuries. The tide is turning. Those governments who recognize this and evolve will prevail and endure; those who think that they are somehow immune to this powerful dynamic will ultimately implode. Even those that may seem so stable on the surface today. The signs are there for those who are willing to pause and read them.

The instinct of most such governments is to double-down on internal security and intel in an effort to suppress the growing resistance. While this can have a very real temporary effect on suppressing the symptoms, it at the same time exacerbates the root causes, and makes the problem worse. Inevitably at some point this approach collapses.

Americans may well cheer when a Qaddafi is dragged from a sewer pipe and riddled with bullets. Will they cheer as loudly when these scenes are of leaders we see as critical allies?? Just as national leaders must evolve and be more in tune to their populaces as a whole (and not just the traditional powerful elite), so too must powerful nations that may well be stable at home be more in tune to such perceptions among the populaces of the nations we engage with and rely upon for economic or security interests that we perceive as vital.

The world is evolving at an unprecedented rate on the back of technology. Those governments who are willing to evolve with it will prevail. Those who cling dogmatically to the status quo will struggle or fail.

[Dayuhan]

But if you don't think local elites have a major impact on US politics, you haven't been paying attention. This is true in every country to some degree, and in a country with any form of republican democracy it is very true and significant.

I think you're missing the matter of degree. Philippine local elites don't "have a major impact" on policy, they control it. They don't influence the government, they are the government Imagine a place in the US where local elites can fix an election to the point where the non-preferred candidate gets zero votes and votes for the preferred candidate exceed the number of voters, or where supporters of opposing candidates can be beaten or killed without legal repercussions, where the local elites control virtually every form of economic enterprise and openly treat the public coffers as a private account. Can you imagine an American town where citizens line up in the Mayor's parlor to beg for the favors funded with public money, while someone sits by taking note of who gets what so the favors can be called in later?


Lyndon Johnson showed tremendous selfless moral courage in ignoring what all of the polls, advisors, and his own political instincts were warning him about what would happen to his political career if he insisted on pushing for civil rights reforms, but in the face of all of that, push he did. Many experts believe that it was this, far more than the nature of events in Vietnam, that was the primary factor in his decision not to run for a second term. The three landmark civil rights bills that he pushed through congress changed America forever and for better. It all looks so benign and obvious now in retrospect, but at the time it was HUGE, not obvious at all, and stirred up tremendous turmoil.

Yes, it was huge... but again, there was real support for reform from a large part of the populace, including a large part of the populace outside the group that was being discriminated against. That supported a good deal of the moral courage. You don't see Christian Filipinos in Manila demanding fair treatment for their Muslim brothers in Mindanao. The attitude is more on the "kill 'em all" side. There's virtually no constituency supporting moral courage, and a huge constituency opposing it.


As information technology continues to empower populaces and non-state actors there will be increasing demand for political elites and their backers to take note of what the people are telling them and to actually address reasonable concerns that they may well have been ignoring and suppressing for generations or even centuries. The tide is turning. Those governments who recognize this and evolve will prevail and endure; those who think that they are somehow immune to this powerful dynamic will ultimately implode. Even those that may seem so stable on the surface today. The signs are there for those who are willing to pause and read them.

I think the impact of information technology is overrated. It's a tool and people will use it, take it away and they'll use other tools. There were revolutions before it hit - ask the Marcos family - and they managed to communicate. Certainly facebook and twitter mean squat on Basilan, and they aren't rallying any support in Manila either.

Again, if Filipino political elites "take note of what people are telling them" about Mindanao, the repression will only get worse, because the bulk of the populace doesn't want concessions or reform.


Americans may well cheer when a Qaddafi is dragged from a sewer pipe and riddled with bullets. Will they cheer as loudly when these scenes are of leaders we see as critical allies??

Hosni Mubarak was a "critical ally", and Americans seem able to cope with him being in jail. Egyptians seem reasonably amenable to a continuing relationship with the US. These situations are not unmanageable, especially if we let go when it matters.


Just as national leaders must evolve and be more in tune to their populaces as a whole (and not just the traditional powerful elite), so too must powerful nations that may well be stable at home be more in tune to such perceptions among the populaces of the nations we engage with and rely upon for economic or security interests that we perceive as vital.

The world is evolving at an unprecedented rate on the back of technology. Those governments who are willing to evolve with it will prevail. Those who cling dogmatically to the status quo will struggle or fail.

In many ways yes, we have to be more attuned to populaces as a whole. That includes being aware that most populaces don't want us interfering in the internal affairs of their nations, at all. Responding to situations and trying to help populaces that have decided it's time to move is one thing, and there's a place for it. Trying to initiate change ourselves or trying to appoint ourselves champion of a populace is a very different thing and it's not generally going to be advisable. In most of these cases it really isn't about us, and we have to accept that we are not going to be the drivers of evolution, in the Philippines and in most other places.

[ganulv]

Can you imagine an American town where citizens line up in the Mayor's parlor to beg for the favors funded with public money, while someone sits by taking note of who gets what so the favors can be called in later?

I’m not an insider, but isn’t this more or less how campaign finance works in the United States? I know more than one person who spent years trying to jump through the hoops leading to a green card to find that they all disappeared once they made a donation to their Representative. And they are small, small potatoes in the finance pot.

Not discounting that the Philippines and the U.S. are categorically different places, by the way.

[tequila]

Can you imagine an American town where citizens line up in the Mayor's parlor to beg for the favors funded with public money, while someone sits by taking note of who gets what so the favors can be called in later?


Obligatory New Jersey mention here (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/nyregion/24jersey.html?pagewanted=print).

[Dayuhan]

Yes, ithappens in the US, and many other places. The difference is in degree. Imagine New Jersey to the 12th power, then add a bit for good measure.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan,


Yes, it was huge... but again, there was real support for reform from a large part of the populace, including a large part of the populace outside the group that was being discriminated against. That supported a good deal of the moral courage. You don't see Christian Filipinos in Manila demanding fair treatment for their Muslim brothers in Mindanao. The attitude is more on the "kill 'em all" side. There's virtually no constituency supporting moral courage, and a huge constituency opposing it.

You hit upon an important element of social change, first there must be a shift in what is accepted as conventional wisdom, and once that shift takes place, structural changes will adapt to the new conventonal wisdom. Bob's repeated reference to our Civil Rights Movement is a great example.

I'm not convinced that corruption and prejudice towards Filipino Muslims is as indelible as you assume. The same opinions offered about racism in the U.S. in the 60s would have sounded like wise counsel, but in hindsight it apparent changes in popular social values are possible, as they have been throughout history. It is a human trait to assume that perceived reality today will be the same tomorrow.

I think you’re correct that we can’t accomplish much more with our advise and assist mission, but before one simply pulls the plug they really need to assess the risks at multiple levels, and none of those levels has anything to do with AQ, but rather regional stability, economic, social and political repercussions, and another failed mission because we failed to focus our efforts on the right focus areas. Of course if the conflict elevates into a major slug fest again with high casualties and massive IDP flows it will create an opportunity for regional extremists to leverage.

We all want to run to the sounds of the gunfire, but as you have stated previously the real problem is in Manila, and if the USG isn’t working with the Filipinos (not just the government, but whole of society) to help negotiate solutions we’re not going to accomplish anything enduring. Our approach shouldn’t be one of war (in this situation), but rather an approach to achieving peace using all the hard lessons learned by the West and the UN in tens of peace operations around the world. That would be an entirely different approach than the one being pursued now, although a peace settlement is being discussed on the side. The Peace Effort should be the main effort and all efforts supporting. That wouldn’t prevent the security forces from going after terrorists, but it would put the operation in a different context.

A whole of society approach is something that we have given lip service to, but rarely pursued it as seriously as I think we should have. In the Philippines we have already seen the power of using text messaging as a means to mobilize the populace to oust powerful actors. Could it be that most people are good, but don’t know how act good, or have little hope that one voice will be able to make a change; however, if they sense the potential to make real change they’re much more apt to act?

The younger Filipinos who are being exposed to new ideas due to the information revolution will be able to start a new national social consciousness that will take time to shatter the old, but the U.S. could help with this (primarily with information), and I argue in some cases should help. We’re not advocating a violent uprising, but a new conversation that challenges the old paradigms.

Peace Groups (NGOs) are already facilitating discussions between Muslim youth in the south and Christian youth in the north. These discussions if not overly controlled will allow for some frank discussions and help shatter misperceptions and create a demand for justice over time.
When one works in the developing world for years on end it is easy to get jaded (based on realistic assessments), but we can’t afford to give up all hope. If we do, then I agree why we even try to help.

[Bob's World]

What Bill just said.

The realization that I have come to over the years is that much of good "COIN" is in many ways counter-intuitive. Governments are, by definition, the legal actor. Insurgents, by definition, are the illegal actor. When the populace, regardless of how morally just their cause may be, decides that acting out through illegal actions and violence is their only option it is natural for the state to respond through the application of greater security. All the more so if one is armed with a COIN doctrine that tells you that "insurgency and COIN are forms of complex war and warfare."

Bottom up approaches can do good things, but are not likely to produce enduring effects in such top down problems.

Focused security efforts, even focused capture/kill operations, are often justified and can be a critical component of an effective campaign (if executed by the host nation and not some foreign power that is working its own agenda for its own interests and who is more apt to miss the nuance of "purpose for action" that distinguishes a "transnational terrorist" from a "nationalist insurgent."). But such efforts must be in a clearly subordinate and supporting role to efforts to evovle and address the aspects of governance that are at the causal roots of such conflicts.

My sense is that the Philippines is not ready to reform itself yet. Such reforms will likely come in time, but our pushing to make it happen on our timeline IAW our parameters is not likely to produce anything that will be best for that nation. We American's buy too quickly into our own PSYOP, and lack strategic patience. That can be a bad combination that results in dangerously aggressive acts of "do gooderism."

I don't believe that the US has much to fear coming out of the Philippines, or really anywhere in South East Asia. Sure, some small group may come from, or stage from that area, but that is equally true of virtually any place on Earth. This is not about Muslims, this is about Muslims who are held in bad political situations that they perceive are both beyond their control, and that they equally perceive are kept beyond their control due to the actions of some manipulative foreign power. Most of the South East Asian nations worked through these issues on nationalism and sovereignty in the post WWII social upheaval. This is always a roller coaster journey, as cultures as well as governments must evolve in fits and starts toward what works for them. This is a journey that can be guided or encouraged, and perhaps facilitated in some degree. Our problem is that we are so enamored over what works for us is that we forget that our own populace had to evolve in the isolation of the Colonies for a couple hundred years first, and then had to work through another couple hundred years of trial and error democratic experimentation to get to the "masterpiece" we enjoy to day (tongue firmly in cheek).

I hope we never lose our genuine spirit of to do good and to share the fruits of our labors. But I do wish we would develop the strategic patience that more mature nation's seem to possess, (and that we would learn to look at insurgency in a more holistic fashion than our military doctrine-based approaches; or State/Aid democracy/development-based approaches tend to lend themselves to.)

Cheers!

Bob

[Dayuhan]

You hit upon an important element of social change, first there must be a shift in what is accepted as conventional wisdom, and once that shift takes place, structural changes will adapt to the new conventonal wisdom. Bob's repeated reference to our Civil Rights Movement is a great example.

I'm not convinced that corruption and prejudice towards Filipino Muslims is as indelible as you assume. The same opinions offered about racism in the U.S. in the 60s would have sounded like wise counsel, but in hindsight it apparent changes in popular social values are possible, as they have been throughout history. It is a human trait to assume that perceived reality today will be the same tomorrow.

I wouldn't say prejudice toward Philippine Muslims is necessarily indelible, but it's deeply entrenched and I see no sign at all that it's changing. If anything it looks like it's getting worse. It's really quite striking, and it prevails even among many who on other issues seem quite progressive. I don't think it can't change, but I don't see that it's changing.

Corruption is another story. It's a major issue and there's a lot of resentment, but the focus is invariably on national-level corruption. That's partly because the media are Manila-centric, and partly because it's safer. Political violence in the Philippines is overwhelmingly on the local level. Media can run all the exposes they want and complain all they want about national politicians, but those who do the same at the local level often encounter bullets. These killings are almost never solved and they are generally ignored by police, who know perfectly well what's going on.


I think you’re correct that we can’t accomplish much more with our advise and assist mission, but before one simply pulls the plug they really need to assess the risks at multiple levels, and none of those levels has anything to do with AQ, but rather regional stability, economic, social and political repercussions, and another failed mission because we failed to focus our efforts on the right focus areas. Of course if the conflict elevates into a major slug fest again with high casualties and massive IDP flows it will create an opportunity for regional extremists to leverage.

All true, but again I don't think "we" have much of a role to play.


We all want to run to the sounds of the gunfire, but as you have stated previously the real problem is in Manila, and if the USG isn’t working with the Filipinos (not just the government, but whole of society) to help negotiate solutions we’re not going to accomplish anything enduring. Our approach shouldn’t be one of war (in this situation), but rather an approach to achieving peace using all the hard lessons learned by the West and the UN in tens of peace operations around the world. That would be an entirely different approach than the one being pursued now, although a peace settlement is being discussed on the side. The Peace Effort should be the main effort and all efforts supporting. That wouldn’t prevent the security forces from going after terrorists, but it would put the operation in a different context.

We actually tried throwing pressure behind a "peace agreement", with USIP taking the lead role and substantial if fairly quiet pressure on the diplomatic level. That turned out to be an unmitigated disaster. The agreement was fatally flawed from the start - I recall nominating it for a "peace agreement least likely to produce peace" award - and was inevitably shot down. The US pressure was deeply resented by much of the populace and gave rise to all sorts of bizarre rumours that the US had cut a deal with the MILF to back the agreement in exchange for economic concessions and base rights. Nothing was accomplished and a fair bit of damage was done.


A whole of society approach is something that we have given lip service to, but rarely pursued it as seriously as I think we should have. In the Philippines we have already seen the power of using text messaging as a means to mobilize the populace to oust powerful actors. Could it be that most people are good, but don’t know how act good, or have little hope that one voice will be able to make a change; however, if they sense the potential to make real change they’re much more apt to act?

The younger Filipinos who are being exposed to new ideas due to the information revolution will be able to start a new national social consciousness that will take time to shatter the old, but the U.S. could help with this (primarily with information), and I argue in some cases should help. We’re not advocating a violent uprising, but a new conversation that challenges the old paradigms.

Information technology, social media etc can spread hate and prejudice as easily as expanded consciousness. Much of the world (including much of the US) uses the internet for affirmation, not information; they construct closed networks of sites and individuals who tell them what they want to hear and feed their prejudices. Again, I agree that it's possible that change will happen, but it's also possible that it won't, or that the mutual antipathy could get worse... and either way, I don't think anything the US does is going to help, and doing the wrong thing could easily hurt.


Peace Groups (NGOs) are already facilitating discussions between Muslim youth in the south and Christian youth in the north. These discussions if not overly controlled will allow for some frank discussions and help shatter misperceptions and create a demand for justice over time.

This is not a bad thing, but it's not a new thing either. I hope it works, but I've little optimism, based on observation of both sides.


When one works in the developing world for years on end it is easy to get jaded (based on realistic assessments), but we can’t afford to give up all hope. If we do, then I agree why we even try to help.

There's a difference between losing hope and understanding that not everything is about us and there are often limited possibilities for us to act productively. There may be times when we can be useful, but they're few and far between and opportunities have to be taken with a great deal of subtlety and a lot more understanding of the situation than we've demonstrated so far. A clumsy and ill advised effort to help is likely to do more harm than doing nothing at all.

[Dayuhan]

From this morning's news...

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/10/25/11/p4m-bounty-led-al-barka-fiasco


P4M bounty led to Al-Barka fiasco?

Military admits 'lapses' in Basilan incident

MANILA, Philippines - The P2-million bounty each on the heads of an Abu Sayyaf terrorist leader and a fugitive Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) commander may have caused the haphazard mission that led to the deaths of 19 soldiers in Al-Barka, Basilan last week, sources alleged.

The Special Forces mission that went awry sought to capture the Abu Sayyaf's Long Malat Solaiman and MILF commander Dan Laksaw Asnawi, who were behind the beheading of Marines in the same town in 2007.

The military on Tuesday admitted lapses in the failed Special Forces operation that also left more than a dozen other soldiers injured.

[Dayuhan]

The realization that I have come to over the years is that much of good "COIN" is in many ways counter-intuitive. Governments are, by definition, the legal actor. Insurgents, by definition, are the illegal actor. When the populace, regardless of how morally just their cause may be, decides that acting out through illegal actions and violence is their only option it is natural for the state to respond through the application of greater security. All the more so if one is armed with a COIN doctrine that tells you that "insurgency and COIN are forms of complex war and warfare."

One of the great dangers of doctrines and models is that once we adopt them we become enamored of them, and when reality doesn't fit the doctrine or model, we try to modify reality instead of changing our perceptions.

In the southern Philippines the core conflict, the conflict that kicked off the violence in the early 70s and sustains it today, is not between "the government" and "the populace". It's between two portions of the populace, both of which consider themselves aggrieved. One of the great failures of governance in this conflict was the decision of government to take the side of one portion of the populace against the other. One of the major causes of the failure of the recent US-supported "peace agreement" was that it treated the problem as a dispute between government and insurgents, and excluded one of the contesting populaces from the process. The task of government is not to reach a peace agreement with the insurgents, but to broker a peace agreement between two portions of its own populace that have irreconcilably different demands, neither of which trusts the government or each other. Not easy even for a functional government with some popular support for a peace process. For a largely dysfunctional government with a populace clamoring for a hard-line approach... beyond not easy.


I don't believe that the US has much to fear coming out of the Philippines, or really anywhere in South East Asia.


There we agree.


This is not about Muslims, this is about Muslims who are held in bad political situations that they perceive are both beyond their control, and that they equally perceive are kept beyond their control due to the actions of some manipulative foreign power.

The perception of "kept beyond their control due to the actions of some manipulative foreign power" doesn't really exist here. The bulk of the Muslim populace here has a reasonably positive perception of US involvement, which they see as a controlling factor on the Philippine government. There's probably more distrust of US motives on the settler side. One of the odd quirks of all this is a widespread belief among Mindanao settlers that the US has cut a devious deal with the MILF to support a breakaway in return for access to "the oil" and base rights. There's no hard evidence that there is any oil or that the US wants a base in Mindanao, but that never stopped anyone from believing!


Most of the South East Asian nations worked through these issues on nationalism and sovereignty in the post WWII social upheaval. This is always a roller coaster journey, as cultures as well as governments must evolve in fits and starts toward what works for them.

Thailand has an intractable problem with Muslims in the south, Indonesia has all kinds of simmering ethnic issues and separatist sentiments, Vietnam and Laos have issues with their ethnic minorities... it's still being worked through all over SE Asia.


This is a journey that can be guided or encouraged, and perhaps facilitated in some degree.

I'd be very, very hesitant about trying to assert a US role in that effort. It's possible that we could help; it's also possible - and I think rather more probable - that we can make things worse. We don't understand these issues as well as we think we do, and we often seem reluctant to listen to those who do understand them. Subtlety is needed, and that's not traditionally a US strong point.


Our problem is that we are so enamored over what works for us is that we forget that our own populace had to evolve in the isolation of the Colonies for a couple hundred years first, and then had to work through another couple hundred years of trial and error democratic experimentation to get to the "masterpiece" we enjoy to day (tongue firmly in cheek).

Yes... not to mention a civil war of positively African proportions, one of history's great genocides, and various other digressions. Europe was even worse: it took them centuries of almost continuous war to arrive (assisted by exhaustion) at the current level of peace and stability. In much of the world that process was frozen by the colonial imposition of order at the expense of stability. Now it's thawed out. No real reason why we should expect it to be any prettier for them than it was for us.

[Bob's World]

Well, we all know that the friction between Muslim south and Catholic north did not begin in the 1970s. Conditions of insurgency ebb and flow within every populace, but are poorly understood if only measured from when the first and last shots are fired. That is like saying a volcano exists only when it is erupting....

And in the Philippines I agree that it is doubtful that many blame the government there on the US; certainly some probably do, as this is a matter of perception far more than fact. Other places more so.

As to the many small issues between governments of SEA and minorities, yes, racism is a powerful force in Asia, and other factors as well contribute to such issues, but I was speaking in larger terms. Shortly after 9/11 there was great emphasis on Indonesia in particular "largest Muslim nation on Earth" and Malaysia as well. That because they had large Muslim populaces they would automatically become hotbeds of AQ influence. This is when Ideology was widely proclaimed as the Center of Gravity of this conflict as well.

But insurgency is political, not ideological; and Nations like Indonesia and Malaysia while very Muslim have already thrown off Western influence over their governments and have governments of their own that, as you note, they are continuing to refine. This is not the case in the greater Middle East where AQ finds many populaces who have not yet stepped out from under this manipulative external influence. Arab Spring is doing more to reduce the likelihood of transnational terrorism coming out of the Middle East and being directed at the West than any of our efforts in Iraq or Afghanistan. Yes, those countries will have long, generational journeys to "good governance," but so long as they don't blame the bad governance they will certainly experience along the way on us they will not have much motivation to attack us.

Like Iran, who has bad governance in spades, but it is not one they blame the West for. Same with the Philippines. The ideological fear mongering that has made these conflicts all about "clashing civilizations" or Islam vs. Christian have done us all a disservice as these positions are based on very flawed understandings of insurgency. I guess it is easier to say that Muslims hate us than it is to say that our foreign policy has unduly disrupted the governance of others for reasons that placed US interests over those of the affected populace.

[Dayuhan]

Well, we all know that the friction between Muslim south and Catholic north did not begin in the 1970s.

It didn't begin in the 70s, that was the point where it tipped into large-scale violence. More important, though, it wasn't "friction between Muslim south and Catholic north", it was friction between indigenous populations and settlers, both in the south. In many ways it's better to speak of conflict between settler and indigenous populaces and remove the religious aspect altogether, because ultimately the conflict isn't about religion, it's a fight over land and political power between indigenous and migrant populaces.

The first great mistake the government made was to try to alleviate agrarian unrest in the north by opening the south to sponsored settlement, without considering the potential impact on the south. That mistake is essentially irreversible: the settlers aren't leaving. The indigenous populace - now a numerical minority in many areas they traditionally controlled - wants the future to be decided by them: they see the majority as an imposed condition that should not be allowed to dictate terms. The settlers - many in their 3rd and 4th generations, some more - don't agree.

The second great mistake the government made was when the violence between settler and indigenous militias broke out, they took the side of the settlers instead of trying to act as a neutral mediator and law enforcer. That might theoretically be reversible, but realistically it will take generations: trust is easier to break than to make, and the Philippine government has little credibility as a neutral mediator.

The third great mistake came after the fighting reached a stalemate and government bought a window of peace by buying off key insurgent leaders with lucrative government posts. That offered a window of opportunity for government to step in and govern, but the window was not exploited: government preferred to offer unlimited license to steal and abuse to anyone who could keep the peace and deliver the votes in a given territory.

There have been others, including the disastrous failed "peace agreement" that we saw recently. I don't see the fight/talk/fight cycle changing any time soon. I am definitely curious over what form the next incarnation of Yakan/Tausug insurgency will take... there will be one, almost certainly.


This is not the case in the greater Middle East where AQ finds many populaces who have not yet stepped out from under this manipulative external influence. Arab Spring is doing more to reduce the likelihood of transnational terrorism coming out of the Middle East and being directed at the West than any of our efforts in Iraq or Afghanistan. Yes, those countries will have long, generational journeys to "good governance," but so long as they don't blame the bad governance they will certainly experience along the way on us they will not have much motivation to attack us.

OT here, but again I think you're drastically oversimplifying the sources of AQ influence, and perhaps adjusting them a bit to fit them into your model.


Like Iran, who has bad governance in spades, but it is not one they blame the West for. Same with the Philippines.

Many Filipinos do blame the US for their situation, with some reason, but it's more a left narrative than a Muslim narrative. Every place is different.

In Indonesia and the Philippines jihadi movements have drawn their support not from the global AQ narrative, but from local sectarian conflict. They've done this with limited success. Support in Indonesia has been sporadic, limited, and closely linked to outbreaks of sectarian violence. There's little evidence that the jihadi narrative has ever had much pull in the Philippines: the ASG never drew popular support until the KFR business started drawing in money, and the JI connection is primarily opportunistic, not ideological.

[Bob's World]

Once again, your violent agreement is noted. :)

Yes, the indigenous population and those "settlers", who came from where and represented who? And of course Magsaysay's program to help reduce the Huk problem in the north by forcing massive resettlement to the south. But at the end of the day, who does the populace go to for resolution of such problems?? The Government. If they find no justice, no equity there, if they really don't feel that government to be their government, what do they turn to next? This is the essence of insurgency.

Careful readers will note that i too recognize that many Filipinos do blame the US for their situation. Insurgency is all about perception, and facts and truth are distant cousins at best.

As to AQ everywhere. AQ does not create insurgency. AQ ideology does not create insurgents. AQ is an opportunist, non-state actor that targets Muslim populaces with actionable grievances and conducts UW to attempt to incite local insurgency to action, and to recruit individuals to conduct AQ specific operations as well. The governance-populace dynamic in SEA shook off Western manipulation in the 40s-70s and is on their own messy journey of self-determination, so AQ is not needed and has little influence there. In the Middle East the path to self determination began with the Turkish and Iranian revolutions over 100 years ago, but was quickly quashed by European and US efforts to secure their own interests in the region. It began moving again post-cold war, and even blind men could see this as "Arab Spring" took these movements to the next level. AQ has set up franchised UW shops around the region to leverage this popular energy. They do not cause it, they support it. (We do not support it, we help suppress it or stand neutral. We are in a quandary of the principles we profess, the values we peddle as "universal," and the fears over economic and security interests that drive us to decisions that no one can figure out).

No, I do not fight to force things into my model, I merrily tweak and revise my model whenever new insights come to the surface. You, my brother, do fight to embrace the model. That is fine. I feel that your instincts tell you that there it great validity in it, but that you have a very fact-reliant component to your thinking, that makes you resist. Like Thomas, you must see and touch the holes. Facts are important, but so is faith and instinct, because sometimes the facts lie; and certainly that narrow set of facts that gets entered into evidence (captured in history) will always tell the story that the storyteller wants to tell.

As I gently goaded Gian last week in response to his comments on a "failure of generalship," I can see many things our generals do that I disagree with, but I see them acting IAW their training, doctrine and experience. What really kills us is a "failure of historian-ship."

[Dayuhan]

Yes, the indigenous population and those "settlers", who came from where and represented who? And of course Magsaysay's program to help reduce the Huk problem in the north by forcing massive resettlement to the south.

The settlers didn't and don't represent anyone, except themselves. Settlement was encouraged by government but it wasn't really organized for the most part, people pretty much just went, on their own. Magsaysay's resettlement of people from the Huk areas had little visible impact in Mindanao: the Huk areas are Tagalog speaking, and the settlers in the areas where there's conflict with the Muslims are overwhelmingly Ilonggo speakers fro Negros and Iloilo, where the Huks never got established.


But at the end of the day, who does the populace go to for resolution of such problems??The Government. If they find no justice, no equity there, if they really don't feel that government to be their government, what do they turn to next? This is the essence of insurgency.

The point that needs to be remembered in this case is that people didn't go to the government for resolution. They just started fighting each other. At that stage it wasn't insurgency at all, it was sectarian conflict, though the conflict was actually driven less by religious issues than by conflict over land and political control. It didn't become "insurgency" until the government took sides.

The point of all this is simply that this is not a fight between "the insurgents" and "the government", and it can't be resolved by trying to broker a peace between the insurgents and government. That flawed interpretation has already led to one disastrously failed attempt at peacemaking, and it will lead to others if it isn't changed. You can't resolve the "insurgency" without addressing the underlying sectarian conflict, and that's populace vs populace, not populace vs government.


Careful readers will note that i too recognize that many Filipinos do blame the US for their situation. Insurgency is all about perception, and facts and truth are distant cousins at best.

Returning to the point, I'll just repeat that the perception that the US is to blame for their situation really isn't much of a factor in the conflict in the southern Philippines.


AQ is an opportunist, non-state actor that targets Muslim populaces with actionable grievances and conducts UW to attempt to incite local insurgency to action, and to recruit individuals to conduct AQ specific operations as well. The governance-populace dynamic in SEA shook off Western manipulation in the 40s-70s and is on their own messy journey of self-determination, so AQ is not needed and has little influence there.

Again I think this is an wildly oversimplified rendition that omits many of the forces driving support for AQ and overemphasizes what has in actual fact been AQ's least successful narrative. The conclusion re Indonesia and the Philippines is I think incorrect. AQ's lack of appeal in these places hasn't come about because AQ isn't needed, but because AQ's attempts at organizing here have stressed global narratives that have minimal resonance for populaces focused on local issues.


In the Middle East the path to self determination began with the Turkish and Iranian revolutions over 100 years ago, but was quickly quashed by European and US efforts to secure their own interests in the region. It began moving again post-cold war, and even blind men could see this as "Arab Spring" took these movements to the next level. AQ has set up franchised UW shops around the region to leverage this popular energy. They do not cause it, they support it. (We do not support it, we help suppress it or stand neutral. We are in a quandary of the principles we profess, the values we peddle as "universal," and the fears over economic and security interests that drive us to decisions that no one can figure out).

What I think you don't want to see here is that the energy that AQ has successfully tapped is the generic resentment toward the west and toward military intervention in Muslim lands. AQ's attempts at leveraging resentment toward Muslim leaders have generally failed rather miserably, which doesn't necessarily mean those populaces like their governments, but does suggest that they don't care to be ruled by AQ. AQ gets all kinds of support when they are fighting foreigners somewhere far away, but the support dries up when they try to start revolution at home.

The Arab Spring movements have succeeded where AQ failed, and they did it without help from AQ. They did it by holding out hope that AQ didn't and tapping popular support that AQ can't draw. I don't see anything to suggest that AQ has an inside track in the Arab Spring movements, in fact those movements have left them out in the cold in many ways

[Bob's World]

Well, where you see me making over-simplified points, I see you agonizing over details that are not material to forming a strategic understanding of the nature of the problem at hand.

Once one has a strategic understanding of the nature of the dynamic of insurgency (with historic western biases captured in all of the COIN literature, histories, governmental lessons learned and doctrines, etc distilled out to the degree possible) one get gets a basic framework for understanding that then allows them to look at any single specific situation with all of its unique facts, cultures, history, etc and begin sorting out where to begin and what to focus on. I shift the focus from the insurgent (for those in the war is war, just kill the threat camp) and from the populace (for those in the "win the hearts and minds", "control the populace," and development camps) to one that focuses on the government. Not to make any government more "effective" (which too often leads to long, expensive programs of building security force capacity, massive development programs, massive rule of law programs, etc) but rather on what I simply call "goodness." Those critical, intangible aspects of human nature that are so fundamental to human happiness that when abused or ignored by some government lead to growing "conditions of insurgency" or despair and frustration and anger that lead good honest citizens to be willing to act out illegally against their own government to seek change.

Governments don't like this. Far better to blame others, or to blame the economy or other factors beyond their control. "goodness" is always totally within the control of any government and typically costs little if anything to implement, adopt or repair. Populaces inherently understand this, and it contributes to why it is these conditions that fuel the fires of insurgency. They realize that these conditions exist because the government either intentionally wants them to exist, or simply does not care about them enough to make minor changes required to address them.

Arab Spring events are merely the latest major move by these populaces, and are indeed connected to the major moves the 1906 and 1908 constitutional revolutions in Iran and Turkey. The conditions of governance across the region are untenable and are changing. Evolution of governance can relieve this pressure, or those same governments can ratchet up the security and public bribes in efforts to reduce popular pressure so that they can retain the status quo that they are happy with. AQ indeed did not cause the Arab Spring revolts, but to say it was "without them" misses that AQ has played a role in this over all dynamic of helping to people to understand that they can act out, that they can stand up. I doubt many want what AQ is selling, or want to live in a Caliphate controlled by AQ. But they want liberty, self-determination, respect, justice under the law. They also want to feel that their government answer to them and to God as they see appropriate (not as some Western power sees appropriate based on completely different values, culture, etc).

Is the totality of this overwhelming in details? Certainly, but there is a common essence that allows us to make sense of it all and focus on the right things. Plus the beauty of my approach is that it can be no less effective than other approaches, and will always be far less expensive, dangerous or intrusive to implement.

[davidbfpo]

A general point and heard repeatedly a few years ago in London at an Islam seminar, which I'd filed away until reading Bob's last post:
...they want liberty, self-determination, respect, justice under the law. They also want to feel that their government answer to them and to God as they see appropriate (not as some Western power sees appropriate based on completely different values, culture, etc).

Nearly all those speaking, mainly from the Middle East, wanted ACCOUNTABILITY. Yes, we want other non-material things, but what we want will not be what you prescribe or have followed. We will follow our own path.

[Bob's World]

Dave,

Excellent add. The US used to promote self-determination and take the position that we had no right to levy moral judgments onto others, and certainly no duty to intervene in small conflicts where we had little direct stake at risk.

Then came our emergence to the top of the heap following WWII, and our series of policy and prinicple compromises made over the course of the Cold War; our belief that those compromises and our efforts "won" the Cold War; to where we are today.

A country that has been too quick to apply military force, a country that has become so convinced of its "rightness" that we proclaim our values to be "universal" and call for a "new world order" under US leadership in our National Security Strategy. We push for Democracy as we see it and presume ourselves to have a "responsibility to protect" popualces seeking to sort out their own futures in far away lands. Until we turn and look back to where we came from, we will never realize how far we have drifted.

Said another way, we have grown up and become our parents; and frankly, we were not much pleased with them when they acted in this same way....

[Dayuhan]

Bit of rush at the moment, will have more to say re previous post, but I have to ask about this...


The US used to promote self-determination and take the position that we had no right to levy moral judgments onto others, and certainly no duty to intervene in small conflicts where we had little direct stake at risk.

When exactly was this the case?

[Ken White]

1801???

:d

[Bob's World]

1801???

:d

I suspect Ken might have been at that particular cabinet meeting, so I defer to his assessment...:D

But the true sea change was as we came to realize post-WWII that it was not going to be all sunshine and roses with our good allies, the Soviets and the Chinese, and found ourselves in a bi-lateral contest for influence that came to be divided along ideological lines.

You can't argue "self-determination" when the insurgency you are trying to stop from throwing the puppet government of your Colonial French pals out of power are employing a Communist ideology that will likely expand the influence of our own opponent and reduce our influence at the same time. So we switched to selling "Democracy" as a counter. Sorry to all you nations in the buffer between East and West, self-determination is now off the table.

Earlier, when we were competing with the Brits for influence over the Saudi Oil market, and the Brits were making a stink over the Saudi prractice of slavery and offering a very low ball price based on what they were "stealing" oil from the Iranians for; we offered a much more attractive price and assured the Saudis that we had no right to comment on slavery or offer any other moral judgement.

A slippery slope....time to put our climbing spikes on and get back up to the high ground that we imagine ourselves to still be standing on.

[Dayuhan]

But the true sea change was as we came to realize post-WWII that it was not going to be all sunshine and roses with our good allies, the Soviets and the Chinese, and found ourselves in a bi-lateral contest for influence that came to be divided along ideological lines.

You can't argue "self-determination" when the insurgency you are trying to stop from throwing the puppet government of your Colonial French pals out of power are employing a Communist ideology that will likely expand the influence of our own opponent and reduce our influence at the same time. So we switched to selling "Democracy" as a counter. Sorry to all you nations in the buffer between East and West, self-determination is now off the table.

Again, when was self-determination ever on the table? That little Philippine escapade in 1898, was that about self-determination? Or our repeated pre-war forays into Central America? Ask a Nicaraguan or a Honduran when the US was ever concerned with self-determination. We might have paid lip service to the idea when trying to criticise some other colonial power, but it's not something we ever paid much regard to in our own sphere of influence.

The only thing that changed after WW2 was we were messing around in a larger area.


Well, where you see me making over-simplified points, I see you agonizing over details that are not material to forming a strategic understanding of the nature of the problem at hand.

Trying to formulate a response in a specific situation armed primarily with a generic "strategic understanding" and insufficient awareness of local detail can cause problems. In a vague and passing attempt to keep on topic, the recently failed effort at peacemaking in the Philippines is a good example. The reflexive assumption that insurgency is a matter to be resolved between government and insurgents led to the exclusion from the process of the other concerned populace, which in turn led to the failure of the effort and general waste of our already limited credibility and influence capital in the area.


Once one has a strategic understanding of the nature of the dynamic of insurgency (with historic western biases captured in all of the COIN literature, histories, governmental lessons learned and doctrines, etc distilled out to the degree possible) one get gets a basic framework for understanding that then allows them to look at any single specific situation with all of its unique facts, cultures, history, etc and begin sorting out where to begin and what to focus on.

I'm not sure a prior commitment to a generic "strategic understanding" is actually an advantage in assessing a specific situation. As with any prior assumption, this can blind us to reality on the ground. Certainly if we're assessing a problem we call "insurgency" we should be aware of the possibility (or likelihood) that governance is a major part of the problem, but approaching with the fixed assumption that governance IS ithe problem and that peace can only be made by the government addressing the insurgents concerns and negotiating peace with the insurgents... well, that's just as bad as approaching the situation with any other base of fixed assumptions.

To me the key is to approach with awareness of multiple possibilities and without any fixed assumptions in place. I agree that the previous set of fixed assumptions was defective and caused all manner of trouble, but I don't think replacing it with a new set of fixed assumptions is an answer.


Not to make any government more "effective" (which too often leads to long, expensive programs of building security force capacity, massive development programs, massive rule of law programs, etc) but rather on what I simply call "goodness." Those critical, intangible aspects of human nature that are so fundamental to human happiness that when abused or ignored by some government lead to growing "conditions of insurgency" or despair and frustration and anger that lead good honest citizens to be willing to act out illegally against their own government to seek change.

Governments don't like this. Far better to blame others, or to blame the economy or other factors beyond their control. "goodness" is always totally within the control of any government and typically costs little if anything to implement, adopt or repair. Populaces inherently understand this, and it contributes to why it is these conditions that fuel the fires of insurgency. They realize that these conditions exist because the government either intentionally wants them to exist, or simply does not care about them enough to make minor changes required to address them.

Here I think you stray into troubled waters. First, there's an assumption that your definition of "goodness" is universal and universally sought. This is pretty tenuous. For a whole lot of people in a whole lot of troubled places politics are defined in terms of us and them: "goodness" is "we rule, they don't" and "badness" is "they rule, we don't".

If "goodness were so easy to achieve, and required such minor changes and minimal costs, there's be a whole lot more of it in the world. It is in fact very difficult to attain, and can generally only be achieved through extended internal conflict, often involving violence. We cannot make other governments "good".


the beauty of my approach is that it can be no less effective than other approaches, and will always be far less expensive, dangerous or intrusive to implement.

How is trying to change governance in other nations anything but intrusive, especially when we're the ones deciding what changes are needed?

I think your theoretical framework breaks down rather badly when translated to actual policy recommendations. Either it comes down to trying to use "influence" - even when we haven't any - to change the way other governments govern, or as trying to impose ourselves as uninvited and generally unwanted "champions of the populace". Either course has abundant potential for unintended adverse consequences.

The least expensive, dangerous, and intrusive response to another county's internal conflict is neither "suppress the insurgency" nor "make the government good". The least expensive, dangerous, and intrusive response is to mind our own gottverdammt business.