Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)

[JMA]

Many of us continue to be amused at your deliberate 'incomprehension.' As Jon said, you could probably stop Trolling, it's unseemly. :rolleyes:

There is of course an opposite to that.

My incomprehension is not in, as you assure me, that attempting to raise and address the obvious weakness in operational continuity would be pointless.

My incomprehension is that the US military in general and the General Staff in particular just accepts this war losing limitation without so much as a whimper.

Do you read your own history?


“I remember the day I was ready to go over to the Oval Office and give my four stars to the President and tell him, ‘You have refused to tell the country they cannot fight a war without mobilization; you have required me to send men into battle with little hope of their ultimate victory; and you have forced us in the military to violate almost every one of the principles of war in Vietnam. Therefore, I resign and will hold a press conference after I walk out of your door.’ I made the typical mistake of believing I could do more for the country and the Army if I stayed in than if I got out. I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage on my back.”

General Harold K. Johnson, quoted in Lewis Sorely, ‘To Change a War’,
Parameters, Spring 1998.

You see Ken, just about everyone can rationalize whimping out when confronted by the choice between a display of moral courage and a secure full pension. At least Gen Johnson admits his frailty and expresses regret.

In the meantime shoot the messenger if he makes you feel uncomfortable ;)

.

[Dayuhan]

You see Ken, just about everyone can rationalize whimping out when confronted by the choice between a display of moral courage and a secure full pension.

Point of information, for those in a position to know: if a senior officer did resign in protest against policies deemed impossible to work with, would that officer's pension be at risk?

[Ken White]

Carl:
So what can the military do to reform itself to the extent possible?IMO the problem is individual human failing, societally supported and systemic and the degree of applicability of each factor will vary from situation to situation. In any event, my belief is that little can or will be done barring major systemic changes which are unlikely. Political Correctness in all aspects is very much a societal factor and that changes but slowly; the PC factor is partly responsible for the refusal to acknowledge mistakes. The American public is both tolerant (of wrongdoing) and superficially vengeful (of perceived slights and failures) so the message is mixed. The systemic problems are, simply, that a failure in this regard really has very little practical effect on the institution (as opposed to some persons within the institutions) so there is no impetus for the change.

JMA's 'example' of Howard K. Johnson is proof of that. Had the General done what he is quoted as thinking, it would not have affected the debacle that was Viet Nam one iota.

All that said, incremental improvement can be achieved however and there have been many such improvements over my lifetime -- not enough but there is change, it is improvement and it is constant -- albeit far too slow...

JMA:
In the meantime shoot the messenger if he makes you feel uncomfortable.Pointless and ill informed scolding is not a message. I'm not at all uncomfortable or frustrated. Nor do I block out the problem and pretend it doesn't exist. I learned to live with the reality a great many years ago in the Land of the Morning Calm, so I'm quite comfortable -- you seem to be the one with undue concerns and frustrations relative to a situation upon which you will have absolutely zero effect. ;)

It is fun to watch you fruitlessly gnash your teeth, though. :D

Dayuhan:
if a senior officer did resign in protest against policies deemed impossible to work with, would that officer's pension be at risk?Essentially, so-called Military Retirement Pay in the US is actually retainer pay and is legally deferred compensation, thus it is earned and can be rejected only by the individual in rare circumstances. i.e., the 'system' forces one to take it (yet another point where the system is part -- not all -- of the problem). All the folks I cited above since WW II received their retirement even though fired, I know of two General Officers who 'resigned' in protest -- one over the belief that the Army had gone astray with respect to training and education, the other concerned about the Army's political inclinations -- and both took their retainer pay, one under protest but the Treasury simply paid into his checking account regardless.

Thus, a 'resignation in protest' has none of the martyr effect that makes the idea so popular and somewhat prevalent in other nations with different laws.

The foregoing applies to anyone with over 20 years service (occasionally and / or in view of some medical conditions with fewer years). Those with less service than required for retirement can and do resign for cause or on principle.

In either case, the practical effect of such resignations or departures is almost nothing -- the system just replaces the dearly departed with another body -- often more compliant but if not, he or she too can be replaced. When one of the 80 or so Canadian FlagOs resigns in protest as some have (did they get their Retirement checks???) people notice; if one of the almost a thousand US FlagOs were to resign, few would notice -- the system would not even hiccup. The US tradition of not resigning but trying to work within the system for change is pretty firmly embedded for that reason.

[JMA]

Point of information, for those in a position to know: if a senior officer did resign in protest against policies deemed impossible to work with, would that officer's pension be at risk?

From Understanding Military Retirement Pay (http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/generalpay/a/retirementpay.htm):


The military retirement pay system used to be easy to understand: You put in 20 years, and you got 50 percent of your base pay immediately upon retirement. You put in more than 20 years and you got 2.5 percent more for each year of active duty after 20 years (up to 75 percent).

If the above is correct then if you are looking at a 30 year career and resign at 21 years you stand to lose about 22.5% of your base pay as pension.

But don't be distracted, focus on the issue of moral courage... or the lack thereof.

.

[Dayuhan]

If the above is correct then if you are looking at a 30 year career and resign at 21 years you stand to lose about 22.5% of your base pay as pension.

If we're talking about senior officers they're close to the top of that food chain already, no?

In any event my understanding is that the US has problems retaining its mid to senior officers, largely because their employment opportunities outside the military pay much better. Given that the financial incentives toward getting out exceed those for staying in, it's difficult to postulate a craven financial motive for submitting to the eccentricities of civilian supremacy.


But don't be distracted

I didn't realize you'd raised the issue in an attempt to distract.


focus on the issue of moral courage... or the lack thereof.

Are you suggesting that US military officers lack the moral courage to act on your opinions?

It is possible that they have been so thoroughly trained in the principle of civilian supremacy that they accept it as the lesser of multiple evils, and submit to it.

It is also possible that those who are actually familiar with the goals and constraints in place do not share your opinion of universal incompetence.

Instead of assuming that they haven't the "moral courage" to act on your opinions, why not consider the possibility that they don't share your opinions?

Of course it's possible that you know something they don't. It's also possible that they know things you don't.

[carl]

Carl:IMO the problem is individual human failing, societally supported and systemic and the degree of applicability of each factor will vary from situation to situation. In any event, my belief is that little can or will be done barring major systemic changes which are unlikely. Political Correctness in all aspects is very much a societal factor and that changes but slowly; the PC factor is partly responsible for the refusal to acknowledge mistakes. The American public is both tolerant (of wrongdoing) and superficially vengeful (of perceived slights and failures) so the message is mixed. The systemic problems are, simply, that a failure in this regard really has very little practical effect on the institution (as opposed to some persons within the institutions) so there is no impetus for the change.

JMA's 'example' of Howard K. Johnson is proof of that. Had the General done what he is quoted as thinking, it would not have affected the debacle that was Viet Nam one iota.

All that said, incremental improvement can be achieved however and there have been many such improvements over my lifetime -- not enough but there is change, it is improvement and it is constant -- albeit far too slow...

Thank you for the thoughtful reply. It is an accurate reply, and true to my eye too. So it distresses me horribly.

JMA talks about moral courage and I wonder if we have managed to construct a system that has effectively squelched it amongst the generals. I don't know how we did it or how we can fix. I read a biography of Terry Allen and after he retired he sold insurance. Chesty Puller worried about making his mortgage payments after he retired. These guys nowadays get hired for who they have on speed dial on their cell phone no matter how bad they may have screwed up. We've gone from producing Pullers and Allens to making stars with no souls.

[Ken White]

JMA talks about moral courage and I wonder if we have managed to construct a system that has effectively squelched it amongst the generals...These guys nowadays get hired for who they have on speed dial on their cell phone no matter how bad they may have screwed up. We've gone from producing Pullers and Allens to making stars with no souls.What you say is true for IMO (based on knowing many and watching more) about 10-20%; the other 80 plus are as honest as the system will allow and stay quiet, out of politics and don't go to work for the big Contractors. I suspect those percentages about track the numbers in any trade or profession.

I've known and worked for some great GOs and have also been exposed to and worked for far from stellar stars and a couple of absolute crooked losers. The bad ones kowtow to and use the system for personal prestige and gain, the good ones work around it to get things done and keep people alive. There are, fortunately, far more okay and good ones than bad ones...

As an aside, I didn't know Terrible Terry but I did see Puller at work as CO 1st Marines in Korea and as CG 3d Marine Bde at Pendleton. He was okay but no Saint; like all of us, a mixture of good and bad traits. He was IMO a mediocre at best tactician. He was personally brave but he used his decorations to his advantage and he was rough on people that worked for him. Unquestionably good showman, though.

Nobody's perfect. Nobody.

[JMA]

If we're talking about senior officers they're close to the top of that food chain already, no?

In any event my understanding is that the US has problems retaining its mid to senior officers, largely because their employment opportunities outside the military pay much better. Given that the financial incentives toward getting out exceed those for staying in, it's difficult to postulate a craven financial motive for submitting to the eccentricities of civilian supremacy.

I didn't realize you'd raised the issue in an attempt to distract.

Are you suggesting that US military officers lack the moral courage to act on your opinions?

It is possible that they have been so thoroughly trained in the principle of civilian supremacy that they accept it as the lesser of multiple evils, and submit to it.

It is also possible that those who are actually familiar with the goals and constraints in place do not share your opinion of universal incompetence.

Instead of assuming that they haven't the "moral courage" to act on your opinions, why not consider the possibility that they don't share your opinions?

Of course it's possible that you know something they don't. It's also possible that they know things you don't.

I'm sorry you chose to reply in this manner.

You asked a question and I answered it... you then chose to run out a red-herring - which I had anticipated.

If that quote I posted is accurate then my position - that a general who leaves before his 30 years are up stands to take a financial knock in the process - is correct.

[JMA]

JMA talks about moral courage and I wonder if we have managed to construct a system that has effectively squelched it amongst the generals. I don't know how we did it or how we can fix.

Ernest Hemingway wrote:


“Few men are willing to brave the disapproval of their fellows, the censure of their colleagues, the wrath of their society.

Moral courage is a rarer commodity than bravery in battle or great intelligence.

Yet it is the one essential, vital quality of those who seek to change a world which yields most painfully to change.”

And this one:


"Bravery is the quintessence of the soldier... But moral courage - the strength of character to do what one knows Is right regardless of the personal consequences - is the true face of conscience. Sacking your best friend, facing up rather than turning the blind eye, accepting that the principle at stake is more important than your job... Such actions demand moral courage of a high order."
Lieutenant-General Sir James Glover. Soldier and His Conscience. Pavameiers. 9/1981.

And finally:


"Last, but by no means least, courage—moral courage, the courage of one's convictions, the courage to see things through. The world ; is in a constant conspiracy against the brave. It's the age-old struggle--the roar of the crowd on one side and the voice of your; conscience on the other." -Douglas MacArthur

Your question: "... how can we fix?"

It starts with officer selection... the weaknesses in the system have been discussed elsewhere... where it needs to be specifically "tested" for. Doesn't happen anywhere other than by chance.

If you read Antony Beeevor's book: "Inside the British Army (http://www.amazon.com/Inside-British-Revised-Antony-Beevor/dp/0552138185/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1349155048&sr=8-1&keywords=inside+the+british+army)" you get a glimpse into the difficulties - the change of 'values' among the recent generation - are causing in the Brit military.

How many of the current US generation are prepared to "... to brave the disapproval of their fellows, the censure of their colleagues, the wrath of their society?"

There's your answer...

.

[Gurkha]

I suppose everything is obvious in hindsight but.......I think that at the grand strategic level the mistake the West did was to take on both Iraq & Afghanistan... Bush manipulated the American public into a war on Iraq by creating a brouaha on Islamic & nuc terror. Hell, the public was so scared & enraged they would have even supported a war on Mexico!!. So you hit the Taliban, then invaded Iraq and inoculated the Talibs with driblet force levels and gave 'em time to reorganise, re-equip, recruit & when they were nice n ready you took them on!! Another mistake from the US side was not to get the Indian Army involved : the 2nd largest army, infantry predominant, CI experienced force who were, are & always will be the bulwark against Islamic terror, and who have traditionally fought the Afghans & Pakis from the earliest of times. True it would have been a difficult ask with India's politicians & Paki generals opposing it but in hindsight the involvement of the IA would have substantially enhanced the ability to dominate physically large tracts of land & consequently the population a sine qua non for a successful counter insurgency campaign in a rugged rural setting. See, whenever u deal with monolithic Islamic cultures (as distinct from where they are a minority) please understand that they have a persecution complex ingrained in them.... it seems to them that everybody is out to kill them, defile their books, women, culture... so they keep working themselves into frenzies and literally explode. It was only a question of time before they turned on you even if you did deliver them from Saddam & the Taliban. Unlike the gloomy predictions on this thread, I dont think that the Talibs or the Pakis are going to find it very easy to take over Afghanistan. As for the insurgency campaigns they are like good wines : take a long time to mature... and you remember them for a long time!!

[JMA]

Unlike the gloomy predictions on this thread, I dont think that the Talibs or the Pakis are going to find it very easy to take over Afghanistan.

Maybe... but how long until its back to the dominance of the warlords/druglords/tribal chiefs? Is there a positive outcome scenario?

[ganulv]

Another mistake from the US side was not to get the Indian Army involved : the 2nd largest army, infantry predominant, CI experienced force who were, are & always will be the bulwark against Islamic terror, and who have traditionally fought the Afghans & Pakis from the earliest of times. True it would have been a difficult [t]ask with […] Paki generals opposing it […]

Opposed it? The Pakistani securitocracy would have s*#t bricks if the Indian Army had been brought in on OEF!

[davidbfpo]

This article in The Guardian appears to have caused a few ripples on Twitter, he's wrong, he's right and he's confused.

I don't think his message is "on message"; the title & sub-title:
Nato withdrawal from Afghanistan could be speeded up, says Rasmussen
Exclusive: Redeployment of some troops might be accelerated, says Nato chief, who admits 'green on blue' attacks have hit morale

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/01/nato-forces-afghanistan-early-retreat?CMP=twt_gu

What he said:
From now until the end of 2014 you may see adaptation of our presence. Our troops can redeploy, take on other tasks, or even withdraw, or we can reduce the number of foreign troops...From now until the end of 2014 we will see announcements of redeployments, withdrawals or drawdown … If the security situation allows, I would not exclude the possibility that in certain areas you could accelerate the process.

(On green on blue) Political leaders in the capitals of troop-contributing countries know very well that this is part of a tactic or strategy to also undermine public and political support at home … The real target is politicians, media, opinion-formers at home in partner nations and allied nations.

(On the post-2014 deployment) The core will be a training mission. Of course, we will have to ensure that our trainers can operate in a secure environment so we need capabilities to make sure that our trainers can operate

Personally I think he is signalling that ISAF contributors will leave soon. I am not sure the 'green on blue' attacks if at the Taliban's direction are aimed at the "distant enemy". Rather that it is aimed at undermining trust between ANSF & ISAF, so weakening both and then the "distant enemy".

[Dayuhan]

If that quote I posted is accurate then my position - that a general who leaves before his 30 years are up stands to take a financial knock in the process - is correct.

It isn't correct, because you shifted the goalposts when you wrote this:


If the above is correct then if you are looking at a 30 year career and resign at 21 years you stand to lose about 22.5% of your base pay as pension.

We were talking about generals, and an officer who resigns at 21 years isn't a general. By the time a general is a general - and by the time a "moral courage resignation" would mean anything at all - he's already quite close to the top of the pension food chain. Given that, and given that officers who resign generally earn more in the private sector than they did in the military, it's difficult to support the premise that failure to resign in support of your opinions is financially motivated. Is it not possible that the officers in question simply don't share your opinions?


Maybe... but how long until its back to the dominance of the warlords/druglords/tribal chiefs? Is there a positive outcome scenario?

That would depend on how you define a positive outcome. Personally, the probable return to dominance of the warlords/druglords/tribal chiefs would be an acceptable outcome, if not entirely positive, as long as the warlords/druglords/tribal chiefs believe that attacking us or harboring those who do will bring unacceptable consequences to them. I don't think transformation of Afghanistan was ever going to be a practical or achievable goal, but I also don't believe that it was necessary to transform Afghanistan to remove the threat.

[JMA]

It isn't correct, because you shifted the goalposts when you wrote this:

We were talking about generals, and an officer who resigns at 21 years isn't a general. By the time a general is a general - and by the time a "moral courage resignation" would mean anything at all - he's already quite close to the top of the pension food chain. Given that, and given that officers who resign generally earn more in the private sector than they did in the military, it's difficult to support the premise that failure to resign in support of your opinions is financially motivated.


Is it not possible that the officers in question simply don't share your opinions?

To term the issues I raise as simply my opinions is disingenuous to say the least. In this case the issue of tour lengths - or as I prefer to term it operational continuity - it is a hardy annual with roots (as far as the US is concerned) back to Vietnam. You remember this quote?


"We don't have twelve years experience in Vietnam. We have one year's experience twelve times over." - John Paul Vann

The Brits too have issues relating to 'short-termism' and ‘six-month wars’:


Short-termism and the ‘six-month wars’

As the occupation proceeded, and as one UK brigade gave way to another every six baleful, casualty-filled months, the situation gradually, inexorably deteriorated. Battalions cycled through, finding themselves less and less capable of maintaining any real form of authority on the streets of Basra. The British MP and former soldier Adam Holloway observed a correlation between the optimism inherent in the six-monthly end-of-tour summaries: ‘Every six months there was a little spike of hope upwards. This reflected the departures of senior officers out of Basra at the end of their six-month tours, as it had been left on a high note – as they presented the place in better condition at the end of their tour than at the beginning.’ In Afghanistan and Iraq, army units served six months in heatre.40 Every British soldier knows the routine well: one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for ‘tea and medals’, as the saying goes. This is another legacy of Northern Ireland. Units on long tours in the ‘Province’ served two years – as did the headquarters units – and were posted there with their families. Short-toured units served six months. The six-month rotation was retained for Bosnia in the early 1990s and flows on today.

Ledwidge, Frank (2011-07-15). Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (pp. 34-35). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

Now while it appears those who get bent out of shape when reminded of this issue - about which they have long capitulated to the politicians on - the problem continues to have a significant negative impact upon operational performance in Afghanistan.

I take criticism from whence it comes... so being called a troll by certain people for raising this particular issue is more of an accolade than a criticism as it takes more moral courage and determination to pursue a issue - where I am not alone as at happens - than rolling over in that canine act of submission and effectively wimping out.

Moving on to the issue of pensions. For the record my first comment in this thread was #228:


... Then as per normal the politicians will get off scott free and the "generals" may... just may, suffer reputational damage but will not lose their pensions. ...

I have used "US military in general and the General Staff in particular", 'senior officers' and 'generals'. It seems clear that if a 'general' or 'senior officer' leaves before his 30 years are up he will take a financial knock.

You offer that these 'generals' could earn more outside the military is probably correct but betrays an opinion that salary and earnings are everything. Maybe for you but any soldier who is motivated but that would have been dumb to have joined up in the first place. I would suggest that most/a lot would rather stay in the military until 64 and go out with a pension of 75% of current earnings (or whatever). For those who can't stay - iow have reached their ceiling and are faced with not being promoted after 5 years in current rank and therefore out - perhaps they can take solace in their disappointment by the comfort of earning more out of the army.

Now please drop the red herrings and comment if you can on the moral courage issue.

For starters look up John Paul Vann and see what his moral courage cost him.


That would depend on how you define a positive outcome. Personally, the probable return to dominance of the warlords/druglords/tribal chiefs would be an acceptable outcome, if not entirely positive, as long as the warlords/druglords/tribal chiefs believe that attacking us or harboring those who do will bring unacceptable consequences to them. I don't think transformation of Afghanistan was ever going to be a practical or achievable goal, but I also don't believe that it was necessary to transform Afghanistan to remove the threat.

I addressed that to Ghurka as I would far more value his opinion and response.

[Dayuhan]

To term the issues I raise as simply my opinions is disingenuous to say the least. In this case the issue of tour lengths - or as I prefer to term it operational continuity - it is a hardy annual with roots (as far as the US is concerned) back to Vietnam.

The issue itself is well established. Your particular positions on the issue and your specific comments on the appropriate response for US personnel affected by the issue are entirely your opinions. Of course you're entitled to those opinions, but accusing those with other opinions of incompetence or lack of moral courage, and insinuating that they don't do what you think they should because they fear for their pensions, seems a bit uncalled for.


the problem continues to have a significant negative impact upon operational performance in Afghanistan.

There are many problems that have significant negative impacts on the situation in Afghanistan, and many of those problems trace back to political decisions. That's an inherent facet of any military culture that accepts civilian supremacy, especially, as Ken has so often and accurately pointed out, in conflicts that are not perceived as existential threats.


Moving on to the issue of pensions. For the record my first comment in this thread was #228:

"... Then as per normal the politicians will get off scott free and the "generals" may... just may, suffer reputational damage but will not lose their pensions. ..."

Yes, that's what you said. It was pointed out subsequently that they would not in any event "lose their pensions", which are protected by law. They might have to take a slightly smaller pension, a quite different thing and, given the financial opportunities available in the private sector, not a very compelling factor. The only point to this is that there's really no reason to suppose that anyone has a craven financial motive for not doing as you think they ought.


You offer that these 'generals' could earn more outside the military is probably correct but betrays an opinion that salary and earnings are everything.

You're the one who offered the opinion that "salary and earnings", in the form of a pension, are a factor in individuals not doing what you think they ought to do. I merely pointed out that if that sort of mercenarism really is in play, the logical decision would be to make a large and visible issue out of whatever is bothering you and parlay the media coverage into an attractive private sector billet. Resigning in public protest is not going to change the system, but it will buy 15 minutes of fame and can be an astute career move.


Now please drop the red herrings and comment if you can on the moral courage issue.

Has it been established that there is a "moral courage issue"?


For starters look up John Paul Vann and see what his moral courage cost him.

His "moral courage" gained him a good job in the private sector, and when he wanted to go back to Vietnam it gained him a civilian role a good deal higher in the food chain than he would have risen in a similar time frame if he'd stayed quiet. He got famous and earned a notoriety he never would have enjoyed otherwise. Whether or not he intended his actions to be an astute career move, they worked out to be one. Whether his actions indicated moral courage or self aggrandizing showboating would be a matter of opinion. I'd suspect a bit of both, as they are not in any way incompatible.


I addressed that to Ghurka as I would far more value his opinion and response.

The private message function is always available if you wish to avoid public comment.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Sorry, but have not been keeping up.

Does anyone have statistics for green-on-blue attacks from Iraq? ... from any other conflicts outside Afghanistan?

How about green-on-green from Iraq?

Thanks

[JMA]

Has it been established that there is a "moral courage issue"?

Well yes. Maybe you missed it?

As a matter of interest what did they teach you in the Peace Corps about the meaning of "duty of care"?


His "moral courage" gained him a good job in the private sector, and when he wanted to go back to Vietnam it gained him a civilian role a good deal higher in the food chain than he would have risen in a similar time frame if he'd stayed quiet. He got famous and earned a notoriety he never would have enjoyed otherwise. Whether or not he intended his actions to be an astute career move, they worked out to be one. Whether his actions indicated moral courage or self aggrandizing showboating would be a matter of opinion. I'd suspect a bit of both, as they are not in any way incompatible.

Wow... ten minutes on Google and you are an expert on the life of John Paul Vann. Amazing.

As a Peace Corp agriculturalist I guess it would be lost on you that a good many people who enter the service do so because they see it as a low paying calling or profession and understand and accept they will never make top dollar in terms of pay. For these professionals it has little to do with going where the money is and more about the honour of service through soldiering.

I believe you should withdraw your criticism of the man's character.


The private message function is always available if you wish to avoid public comment.

Drop the smart comments... I suggest that Ghurka's response would be more valuable to all who may have an interest in the issue than what you as a non-military guy can offer.

[JMA]

The issue itself is well established. Your particular positions on the issue and your specific comments on the appropriate response for US personnel affected by the issue are entirely your opinions. Of course you're entitled to those opinions, but accusing those with other opinions of incompetence or lack of moral courage, and insinuating that they don't do what you think they should because they fear for their pensions, seems a bit uncalled for.

Lets start with the common debating tactic where when a sensitive issue is raised there is a tendency to try to turn it into and anti-American "attack" of sorts. Numerous times over the past few years I have suggested that this level of high-school level maturity in debate is out of place here where people should be encouraged to question and explore.

Shooting the messenger is another immature debating tactic which is seen way too often around here.

But I digress...

Once again you attempt disingenuously to present what I have posted on this issue as purely my opinion. The quote from your General Harold K. Johnson indicates that he believes there was a moral courage dilemma in his career and he made the wrong choice. There are others who have attempted to argue that any such display of moral courage would not have changed anything. Tolerating cowardice is quite frankly shocking and there should be not such debate among the officer corps.

It may indeed not affect the military but it sure affected the good general because as he said:

" I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage on my back."

Come on... you know your way around Google tell me what pathology a "lack of conscience" may indicate?


There are many problems that have significant negative impacts on the situation in Afghanistan, and many of those problems trace back to political decisions. That's an inherent facet of any military culture that accepts civilian supremacy, especially, as Ken has so often and accurately pointed out, in conflicts that are not perceived as existential threats.

I am talking about this one in particular.


Yes, that's what you said. It was pointed out subsequently that they would not in any event "lose their pensions", which are protected by law. They might have to take a slightly smaller pension, a quite different thing and, given the financial opportunities available in the private sector, not a very compelling factor. The only point to this is that there's really no reason to suppose that anyone has a craven financial motive for not doing as you think they ought.

LOL... now you attempt to spin your way out of the hole you dug for yourself.

Now that you are an expert on military pensions do tell me what happens to a major with 15 years service if he resigns for whatever reason?


You're the one who offered the opinion that "salary and earnings", in the form of a pension, are a factor in individuals not doing what you think they ought to do. I merely pointed out that if that sort of mercenarism really is in play, the logical decision would be to make a large and visible issue out of whatever is bothering you and parlay the media coverage into an attractive private sector billet. Resigning in public protest is not going to change the system, but it will buy 15 minutes of fame and can be an astute career move.

More spin.

What price moral courage?

It is indeed unlikely that a resignation on the grounds of conscience would change much... but that not why those with character, principle and the courage of their convictions resign. They do it so as to be able to live with themselves. This is obviously an area that you have no understanding of.

.

[Dayuhan]

Lets start with the common debating tactic where when a sensitive issue is raised there is a tendency to try to turn it into and anti-American "attack" of sorts.

How about the rather juvenile scene where the guy in the faraway comfy chair accuses those in the hot seat of cowardice and incompetence because they don't do what he thinks they should... what does one call that, if not pathetic?


The quote from your General Harold K. Johnson indicates that he believes there was a moral courage dilemma in his career and he made the wrong choice.

General Johnson believed that he faced a moral courage dilemma and believed, in retrospect, that he made the wrong choice. That cannot be extrapolated to an assumption that anyone else faces a moral courage dilemma or to any assumption about what the most courageous choice for any other individual might be. A moral courage dilemma is an intensely personal thing, and any attempt to define anyone else's dilemma or to dictate what the best or bravest choice another person could make to resolve their personal dilemma is pointless and... well, pathetic again. General Johnson is of course in a position to speak on the dilemma he faced, and to admit that in his retrospective opinion his decision was wrong. Accusing others of making wrong or cowardly choices when you're not in their shoes and have no clear or complete grasp of the dilemmas they face is a very different story.


Tolerating cowardice is quite frankly shocking and there should be not such debate among the officer corps.

Are you accusing someone of cowardice? If so, who?


LOL... now you attempt to spin your way out of the hole you dug for yourself.

So says the spinner in the hole.

The hole you dug is the claim that an officer could "lose their pension" if they took a stand on their beliefs, and the suggestion that this craven financial fear was intimidating officers into moral cowardice. As Ken points out, this is a complete load of bollocks. You cannot "lose your pension". It's yours, no matter what you say about anyone. You can forgo future pension if you choose to resign, but that doesn't mean you "lose your pension" because what you haven't yet earned isn't yours and you can't possibly lose it... and given the employment opportunities available in the civilian worlds, financial incentives support resignation, not staying in. The charge that officers are wimping out and avoiding morally courageous actions (as defined by you, of course) for financial reasons, is unsupportable and IMO inappropriate.


Now that you are an expert on military pensions do tell me what happens to a major with 15 years service if he resigns for whatever reason?

Presumably he gets his pension - the pension he's earned - and a job that will probably pay more than he earned in the military.


It is indeed unlikely that a resignation on the grounds of conscience would change much... but that not why those with character, principle and the courage of their convictions resign. They do it so as to be able to live with themselves. This is obviously an area that you have no understanding of.

Neither you nor I understand the dilemmas faced by others, or whether - for example - a braver decision in any given case is to quit or to stay the course and work with what can be done. The difference is that you're ready to accuse others of cowardice and incompetence on the basis of decisions you don't understand, and I'm not.

[Dayuhan]

do tell me what happens to a major with 15 years service if he resigns for whatever reason?


Presumably he gets his pension - the pension he's earned - and a job that will probably pay more than he earned in the military.

I understand that this is not correct, and that there would not be a pension. A mistake, but one that makes no difference whatsoever. If the hypothetical major in question really faced a moral dilemma so pressing that continued service would be incompatible with "character, principle and the courage of... convictions" he would simply resign, move to the private sector, and come away with a financial gain. The idea that officers are being whipped into submission and moral cowardice by financial threat still holds no water at all. If you're talking about Generals, as you were when you raised the point, it holds... well, less than no water, if that's possible.

Just noticed this...


As a Peace Corp agriculturalist I guess it would be lost on you that a good many people who enter the service do so because they see it as a low paying calling or profession and understand and accept they will never make top dollar in terms of pay.

You persist in the bizarre and incorrect notion that I've ever had anything to do with agriculture, and that two years spent over 30 years ago somehow defines my perceptions... but aside from that, has it crossed your mind that those who serve as volunteers might also be familiar with the notion of working at less than top dollar? People who serve in the aid profession face a very similar situation, and many of them, as do many of their counterparts in the military, do eventually leave, both because they find the limitations imposed on them frustrating and because they'd prefer (as one sometimes does when approaching middle age) to earn more money. Whether or not these resignations, in either case, have anything do do with "moral courage" would depend entirely upon the individual circumstances.

[JMA]

How about the rather juvenile scene where the guy in the faraway comfy chair accuses those in the hot seat of cowardice and incompetence because they don't do what he thinks they should... what does one call that, if not pathetic?

Is that the best you can do?

I appreciate that your not having served as a soldier in combat precludes a practical understanding of the subject at hand.

Let’s start with (British) Major-General Sir James Wolfe:


… Room for a military criticism as well as a place for a little ridicule upon some famous transactions of that memorable day… But why this censure when the affair was happily decided? To exercise ones ill-nature? No, to exercise the facility of judging… The more a soldier thinks of the false steps of those that have gone before, the more likely his is to avoid them. - Major-General Sir James Wolfe

It should be standard practice among the officer corps to vigorously debate battles and actions of the past. As an officer cadet I was allowed to exercise my mind in this fashion – often outrageously – most probably to the intense boredom of the course staff. I was later able to return the favour to officer cadets and young officers who came under my wing.

You see I have been there and done that. I raised issues and was sometimes slapped down and sometimes thanked for the input. This is a dynamic and vital ongoing process which has an intimate outcome on the lives of young men. The importance of arming young officers with the ability see and understand the importance and end result of their decision making in terms of lives and broken bodies is – I understand – beyond the ken of those whose biggest decisions hinge around the selection of which hybrid seed to recommend for the coming season.

Physical courage is a simple matter. You either have it or you don’t. In terms of officers you need to have it in sufficient quantity to make decisions and lead your men in the stress of combat.

Moral courage is a different animal.


Moral courage is higher and a rarer virtue than physical courage. - William Slim

General Johnson did face a moral dilemma and by his own admission failed not only himself – but also his soldiers, the US military and the country. Yes, to face a moral dilemma of such magnitude is to find oneself in an intensely lonely situation. The situation he faced had not appeared overnight but rather was a situation that developed over time. He reached the point where he believed he needed to act – in his words: “I remember the day I was ready to go over to the Oval Office and give my four stars to the President…” - but then wimped out. At the time he justified it as follows: “I made the typical mistake of believing I could do more for the country and the Army if I stayed in than if I got out”.

He ends with “I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage on my back.”

By his own admission General Johnson failed himself, his soldiers, the military and the country.


General Johnson believed that he faced a moral courage dilemma and believed, in retrospect, that he made the wrong choice. That cannot be extrapolated to an assumption that anyone else faces a moral courage dilemma or to any assumption about what the most courageous choice for any other individual might be. A moral courage dilemma is an intensely personal thing, and any attempt to define anyone else's dilemma or to dictate what the best or bravest choice another person could make to resolve their personal dilemma is pointless and... well, pathetic again. General Johnson is of course in a position to speak on the dilemma he faced, and to admit that in his retrospective opinion his decision was wrong. Accusing others of making wrong or cowardly choices when you're not in their shoes and have no clear or complete grasp of the dilemmas they face is a very different story.

Do you really think General Johnson needs you to make excuses for him?

He admits to the lapse… but the only thing he did not do was to place a cost – in terms of lives – on that lapse.

Yes, the decision is indeed “intensely personal” but the cost of that failure goes way beyond that. For the ultimate cost there is no one other than General Johnson who must bear the responsibility.

Let’s look at that Johnson quotation again:


“I remember the day I was ready to go over to the Oval Office and give my four stars to the President and tell him, ‘You have refused to tell the country they cannot fight a war without mobilization; you have required me to send men into battle with little hope of their ultimate victory; and you have forced us in the military to violate almost every one of the principles of war in Vietnam. Therefore, I resign and will hold a press conference after I walk out of your door.’ I made the typical mistake of believing I could do more for the country and the Army if I stayed in than if I got out. I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage on my back.”

General Harold K. Johnson, quoted in Lewis Sorely, ‘To Change a War’,
Parameters, Spring 1998.

Others seem also to make the “typical mistake” of balancing an act of moral courage against the effect of acting with conscience. Even here.

Johnson blew it on a grand scale (because of his position at the time)… and this should be a case study of the failure of moral courage – or moral cowardice (as you prefer) – to be discussed at every level of officer training.

I am not accusing Johnson of cowardice… he has admitted to it. I am saying that the Johnson admission should be used to stiffen the resolve of those still serving to act according to their conscience and not make the same mistake he did by making the “typical mistake” of trying to rationalise moral cowardice in terms of the effect or outcome only.

However, all is not lost.

Here is a masters thesis from a thinking youngster which I suggest you should not only read but study. This IMHO is the type of thinking which allows one to retain a glimmer of hope for the US military as a whole.

Moral Courage or Heresy:
The Benefits and Pitfalls of Military Leaders Speaking Out (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a491711.pdf)

Ending with a quote from this thesis:


Conclusion: Every military leader must put aside careerist goals and rank ambition in order to speak up for what is right. They must expose flawed policies, strategies, and decisions in order to possibly save the lives of our servicemen and protect the country.

[Gurkha]

:o Lets keep the focus on the major issue :Is the green on blue due to a faulty strategy of training the Afghans ? I put it that it is not. I think that he NATO forces have done well given the constraints.Those who expected miracles, whether in the military / NGOs / civilian bureaucracy, are being impractical and rather naive. I think the West's interest would be best served by propping up those who profit most from status quo & those who are the natural enemies of the Taliban & Pakistan. Note that the present Pathan leadership under Karzai may not completely welcome the Taliban as they would have to play 2nd fiddle to them. I think that the more pressing worry (which nobody wants to think about) is the steady deterioration of Pakistan which is a recalcitrant,paranoid & nuclear armed state.

As for military leaders & idealism : its the same story in every army..or navy or airforce... the guys who get to the top are ...SURVIVORS!! You shed some of your idealism, most of your conscience & all your beliefs on the climb..believe me!!:wry:

[Ken White]

Well said, all of it...

[JMA]

Is the green on blue due to a faulty strategy of training the Afghans ? I put it that it is not. I think that he NATO forces have done well given the constraints.

Two points.

What is green-on-blue caused by in your opinion?

If the 'constraints' lead to poor outcome how come no one is questioning the constraints?


Those who expected miracles, whether in the military / NGOs / civilian bureaucracy, are being impractical and rather naive.

Who expected miracles? If the job was not possible to be done with any real chance of success then why bother?


I think the West's interest would be best served by propping up those who profit most from status quo

Not sure I agree with this...


... & those who are the natural enemies of the Taliban & Pakistan.

Who are these? The druglords and the warlords?

.

[Gurkha]

ARMCHAIR ANALYSIS

1. Causes
(a) Taliban infiltrator campaign.
(b) Radicalised ANA soldier.
(c) Faulty strategy : large numbers of isolated detachments.
(d) Ineffective background check programme.
(e) Self portrayal as the losing side : announcement of withdrawal.
(f) Cultural & personal aggravation at functional level.

2. Constraints , who do you expect will speak up :-
(a) The NCO from Special Forces / Marine ? Infantry whose ethos & training calls for
him to always achieve the impossible for 'regimental izzat' (look it up) no matter
how lunatic the orders sound ?
(b) The career major who would have been selected to undertake this difficult task
and who knows the unemployment stats in civvy street ?
(c) The colonel whose brethren conceptualised the plan in the first place... and
who isnt on site anyway ?
(d) The general who has been hand-picked to settle Afghanistan because of his
"can- do" attitude (otherwise he would have been commanding a recruit training
centre in Kalamazoo )
(e) Or the civilian bureaucrat who has learnt to survive ?
3. Why bother ?
(a) The idea wasnt bad in itself and did work for a while till the announcement
regarding the withdrawal.
(b) Why bother...how else would the programme to train the ANA get accelerated.
By the time NATO leaves it needs a force which would not collapse at the first
sight of the Taliban...I think they would have achieved that.

4. The balance : There is no black & white in AfPAk but lots of grey , tan & mauve !!
The warlords of today are the Talibans enemies so ..... The Long term strategy

(a) The withdrawal in 2014 is not or rather must not be considered as the
endgame. Politically, socially & for the boots on ground you may just waiting to
get out and put the whole mess behind but thats not how grand strategy is
executed.
(b) It must be seen as the second phase of the campaign in which indigenous
forces will hold off the Taliban or strike them when they make the first headlong
surge : spring & summer of 2015.
(c) They need to be hit by a combination of Special forces,missiles and from the
air. all the while in close coordination with friendly factional forces.
(d) It may be more easy for the Taliban to play the role of insurgents than a
governing force : remember the LTTE.
5. Take a step back and look at the issue from a larger timescale & wider perspective....easier said than done though, especially if you've seen regimental blood spilt..

[JMA]

ARMCHAIR ANALYSIS

1. Causes
(a) Taliban infiltrator campaign.
(b) Radicalised ANA soldier.
(c) Faulty strategy : large numbers of isolated detachments.
(d) Ineffective background check programme.
(e) Self portrayal as the losing side : announcement of withdrawal.
(f) Cultural & personal aggravation at functional level.

2. Constraints , who do you expect will speak up :-
(a) The NCO from Special Forces / Marine ? Infantry whose ethos & training calls for
him to always achieve the impossible for 'regimental izzat' (look it up) no matter
how lunatic the orders sound ?
(b) The career major who would have been selected to undertake this difficult task
and who knows the unemployment stats in civvy street ?
(c) The colonel whose brethren conceptualised the plan in the first place... and
who isnt on site anyway ?
(d) The general who has been hand-picked to settle Afghanistan because of his
"can- do" attitude (otherwise he would have been commanding a recruit training
centre in Kalamazoo )
(e) Or the civilian bureaucrat who has learnt to survive ?
3. Why bother ?
(a) The idea wasnt bad in itself and did work for a while till the announcement
regarding the withdrawal.
(b) Why bother...how else would the programme to train the ANA get accelerated.
By the time NATO leaves it needs a force which would not collapse at the first
sight of the Taliban...I think they would have achieved that.

4. The balance : There is no black & white in AfPAk but lots of grey , tan & mauve !!
The warlords of today are the Talibans enemies so ..... The Long term strategy

(a) The withdrawal in 2014 is not or rather must not be considered as the
endgame. Politically, socially & for the boots on ground you may just waiting to
get out and put the whole mess behind but thats not how grand strategy is
executed.
(b) It must be seen as the second phase of the campaign in which indigenous
forces will hold off the Taliban or strike them when they make the first headlong
surge : spring & summer of 2015.
(c) They need to be hit by a combination of Special forces,missiles and from the
air. all the while in close coordination with friendly factional forces.
(d) It may be more easy for the Taliban to play the role of insurgents than a
governing force : remember the LTTE.
5. Take a step back and look at the issue from a larger timescale & wider perspective....easier said than done though, especially if you've seen regimental blood spilt..

Very good response... thanks.

Seems you believe the big 'factor' was the announcement of the date of withdrawal?

[Gurkha]

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/10/a_marines_perspective_on_rajiv_chandrasekarans_lit tle_america

[Gurkha]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-platoon-awaits-end-of-afghan-war/2012/10/12/afe31b8e-1259-11e2-be82-c3411b7680a9_story.html?hpid=z3

[davidbfpo]

Sorry, but have not been keeping up. Does anyone have statistics for green-on-blue attacks from Iraq? ... from any other conflicts outside Afghanistan? How about green-on-green from Iraq?Thanks

The questions posed set my mind thinking, alas not about Iraq as The Curmudgeon asked. Nor do I recall the issues being raised on SWC re Iraq, except for one post about two senior US Army officers being killed at an un-occupied Iraqi Army roadblock - which is not a 'green on blue' attack. In a moment I will check the now closed OIF forum for likely suspects.

There is a "lurker" who maybe able to help, so a RFI will be despatched.

In the post-1945 British experience of 'small wars', mainly in colonies, I can only recall one incident in Aden in 1967, when a local armed police mutinied and ambushed a patrol. The first full account I found:http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Aden/mutiny. and a blogsite with more details:http://gmic.co.uk/index.php/topic/29334-as-the-sun-goes-down-aden-the-saa-armed-police-mutinies-of-june-1967/page__st__80

There were a series of mutinies in East Africa in 1964, in newly independent Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda which were suppressed by British troops swiftly, so not really 'green on blue'. One explanation:http://britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/Tanganyika.htm

I have a vague recollection that in the early period of the Mau Mau Emergency in Kenya, that a tiny number of incidents occurred as loyalties were stretched. In Cyprus in the EOKA (Greek) Emergency the police remained loyal, it was a locally recruited Greek Cypriot & Turkish Cypriot force with some British officers, although again Greek loyalties were stretched. If 'green on blue' had occurred then I doubt it would have been publicly reported.

Before 1945 there were 'green on blue' incidents, notably in Iraq, but that was an attempt to end British involvement by the Iraqi state:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iraqi_War

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thanks Davidbpro ...

So that begs the question: "what is unique about this time?" Is it the nature of the mission - a complete cultural overhaul? Is it our attitude? Is it the fact that we want to be their friends rather than their conquerors?

I do remember something about the uprisings with the Bangladesh in 1857 that had a cultural overtone. ( http://bangladesh2000.com/bdall/uprising1857.html) Not sure anything else really compares.

Iraq and Afghanistan make a nice "compare and contrast" as far as green-on-blue goes. Not really sure what the answers (multiple) are. Heck, not sure I am even asking the right questions.

[davidbfpo]

Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon
Sorry, but have not been keeping up. Does anyone have statistics for green-on-blue attacks from Iraq? ... from any other conflicts outside Afghanistan? How about green-on-green from Iraq?Thanks

A "lurker" has assisted from their extensive first-hand knowledge and reading. In Rhodesia there was one recorded incident of 'green on blue' when a Selous Scout member defected to the nationalist cause, killing the other patrol members, i.e. an ex-nationalist who joined the Scouts defected again. The African members of the RSF, especially the Scouts, were very well rewarded and treated well - so minimising the risks.

In Algeria there were no instances of 'green on blue', this was put down primarily to the French being ruthless, so those locally recruited and there were tens of thousands knew the consequences of turning their guns inwards. Look on the web for the story of the Harki's, many of whom the French did not evacuate and there were more regular, non-French units - not only from Algeria.

[davidbfpo]

A "lurker" has responded to my RFI, drawing on their experience and knowledge of non-Afghan 'green on blue':
Vietnam had lots of problems with Vietnamese troops attacking Americans, though they didn't make the news that the ones in Afghanistan -- sad as they are -- have made. In one incident (recorded in the archives) a whole advisory team was pulled out because of the danger from the local "friendly" troops. I've heard other stories. Iraq had some, but I the ones that come to mind were insurgents dressed in American or Iraqi uniforms when they attacked Americans, not Iraqi soldiers who did. I lived on an Iraqi base for two and a half years or more and had no problems, though I was always a little concerned when I was somewhere without my weapon and no Americans in sight.

Secondly, returning to Afghanistan, any research and analysis is degraded by the lack of any living shooter being available for interview - either they die at the scene, die later in the follow-up or simply escape - sometimes then appearing in a Taliban video.

[davidbfpo]

A short article by an Afghan journalist, who blogs whilst in the USA on:http://www.afghanlord.org/

I am pretty sure this is the first Afghan comment on the issue I've seen; excluding the Taliban and officialdom.

Taken from his article:
The basic cultural characteristics of Afghans are based on a hierarchy of respect and care for family, clan and tribe. Considering this simple fact, it is very easy to understand why Afghan police soldiers would become rogue and turn their guns against NATO troops. Most of those rogue soldiers became lethal enemies after losing a member of their families through NATO airstrikes. If someone is killed as a result of an accidental NATO bombing, it is likely that he or she has family left behind. The family’s pride is wounded and someone in the family must bring the pride back....

Another reason motivating some members of the Afghan police forces to turn against NATO troops is the continuation of night raids....According to ISAF Data, night raids have killed over 1,500 Afghan civilians in less than 10 months in 2010 and early 2011.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/nasim-fekrat/root-cause-of-green-on-blue-attacks

[davidbfpo]

i rarely cut & paste from SWJ responses, but the comment by 'RantCorp' has three "gems" from historical, Western experiences. First and I admit this didn't feature in my looking back at history:
The Indian Mutiny of 1857 being the mother of all green on blue attacks in this neighborhood. However what is often overlooked is that the Mutiny was mercilessly put down by forces which were comprised 80% native troops.

In Vietnam 'blue on blue':
In VN after records started being kept from 1969 the incidence of ‘fragging’ ran up to 500 a year with 10% being fatal. This record was only concerned with attacks using fragmentation grenades. One can only speculate how many ‘wild’ bursts or ‘negligent’ discharges which resulted in fratricide were done with varying degrees of malice.

In WW2 with US paratroopers 'blue on blue':
What surprised him on D-Day and still startled him 40 years later as he recounted the events was some individuals didn't even hit the ground before they were shot dead by their comrades.

Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/vsoalp

[davidbfpo]

On SWJ now awhile ago Gautam Das contributed 'The Afghan National Army in 2014', which is worth reading and has some pointers for this thread IMHO. His bio (shortened) states:
The author was in the Indian Army from 1968 to 1991, an officer of the infantry..he has helped train Afghan Army officers of an earlier Afghan Army

He starts with:
It took the British in India a full century of trial-and-error (1757 – 1857) to finally come up with the organisation of a native army with which India could be kept stabilised for their needs. The first instance of a serious shock actually caused the local army that they were most satisfied with, the East India Company’s Bengal Army, to completely dissolve in the Mutiny of 1857.

By contrast, the US believes that in the mere 10 to 11 years since its entry into (or invasion of) Afghanistan in October 2001, it has hit upon the best possible model for a new Afghan National Army (ANA) to turn the security of the country over to by the end of 2014


The ANA is now about 43 percent Pathan (Pashtun), 32 percent Tajik, 12 percent Hazara and 10 percent Uzbek, with the rest made up of smaller ethnic groups, which is approximately the percentages of these communities in the Afghan population. Any spirit of camaraderie among different ethnic groups of new recruits within the ANA is very new...

(Much later).....most worryingly, can an ANA of near-illiterates (the rank-&-file has 86 percent illiteracy), of various often antagonistic ethnic groups be turned into a cohesive modern army after a mere 15 weeks of recruit training? This is about one-half or less of the time the Pakistan Army takes to turn an educated young recruit, from the same or similar human communities, into a disciplined professional soldier in an army based on the ethnicity-based regimental system.

Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-afghan-national-army-in-2014

[davidbfpo]

A NYT article based on interviews, including contact with the ANA soldier who in May 2012 killed a US soldier in Kunar Province:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/world/asia/afghan-soldiers-journey-from-friend-to-killer-of-americans.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0&smid=tw-share&pagewanted=all

Not seen this before:
many senior coalition and Afghan officials are now concluding that after nearly 12 years of war, the view of foreigners held by many Afghans has come to mirror that of the Taliban. Hope has turned into hatred, and some will find a reason to act on those feelings.

[davidbfpo]

A very interesting article, that ends with an optimistic passage:
"We have a pretty good relationship [with the cops] around here," explained one of the US soldiers afterward. "We don't have many problems."

First Lieutenant Cummings.....echoed the assessment: "For the most part, it's easy to work with [Afghans], you just walk in and they're happy to see you, happy to talk with you...[But the Afghan cops are] usually hesitant to go on patrol with you, unless you have a really good relationship with them, and that just comes with time ... if you go in there and sit down and have a conversation with them every day."

Link:http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/04/the_anatomy_of_green.php

[Bob's World]

A key fact that ISAF leadership always downplays is that Green on Blue attacks track along with all other forms of enemy attack in Afghanistan, peaking as fighting season peaks and fading as fighting season fades.

I would think that personal quarrals rooted in cultural misunderstanding would stay fairly constant throughout the year.

[davidbfpo]

Scattered reports of deaths within Kabul ANA Officer Academy (aka 'Sandhurst in the sand'), apparently after an argument between an ANA soldier and others. With a senior German officer injured and a US soldier killed.

Links:http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/world/asia/afghanistan-attack.html?_r=0

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28659874

[davidbfpo]

Highest ranking US officer killed since WW2 (excluding "friendly fire"), from ABC TV, very speculative about circumstances and whether it was planned:http://abcnews.go.com/International/american-general-killed-shooting-afghan-military-academy/story?id=24843479#.U-DsoyvA7Rc.twitter

[davidbfpo]

Via John Schindler's Twitter:
Latest: Kabul media are reporting that the 15 wounded in today's attack incl 7 US (1 a BrigGen), 5 UK, 1 German, 3 Afghans (incl 1 general).

"We are investigating but it appears that an Afghan army officer opened fire." -- GEN Mohammed Afzal Aman, G3 @ Afghan MoD, told AFP

Before today:
n recent months, the number of insider attacks has dropped significantly as protective measures were continued and fewer international troops worked directly with Afghan forces.

In June, two coalition servicemembers were wounded in a suspected insider attack at a police station. In February, two U.S. Special Forces soldiers were killed and four others were wounded when a suspected member of the Afghan security forces opened fire on them. And in April, an Associated Press journalist was killed and another seriously wounded when a police commander opened fire on them inside a heavily guarded Afghan security forces base in eastern Afghanistan.


Link:http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/report-us-major-general-killed-in-afghan-insider-attack-1.296839

[davidbfpo]

The US General RIP is:
Maj. Gen. Harold J. Greene, deputy commanding general of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan in Kabul. U.S. officials said five of the eight wounded Americans are in serious condition; a number of British soldiers were also wounded.Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/numerous-casualties-in-shooting-at-afghan-training-academy/2014/08/05/434613ba-1cb0-11e4-ae54-0cfe1f974f8a_story.html?hpid=z1

An official bio when in his last post:http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/271929.pdf