PDA

View Full Version : Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)



Pages : [1] 2

davidbfpo
11-10-2011, 01:22 PM
I've looked through the threads here and cannot readily identify a suitable thread on this difficult issue. IIRC the issue of Iraqis attacking Allied forces did crop up elsewhere, although more about betrayals enabling ambushes, not Iraqis killing partners.

There have numerous deaths due to some ANSF killing their allies and partners. It certainly has happened in Helmand of late, IIRC involving teams embedded with the ANSF and recently an Afghan air force pilot killed American trainers.

hat tip to the Lowry Institute's mailing. I was not aware that the Australians have suffered:
There's been another incident overnight in Afghanistan involving Australian soldiers being attacked by an Afghan National Army colleague. This is the third time this year that Australian soldiers have been attacked in this manner, and comes only a week after seven soldiers were seriously wounded and three killed by a 'rogue' Afghan soldier.


There are three possible explanations for these attacks, but it is certainly too early to conclude what has motivated them. The first explanation is that all three are unrelated, coincidental acts of violence by mentally disturbed Afghan soldiers. This explanation is the hardest to accept — it's bewildering for the public and media that a string of deaths could be, essentially, random.

The second explanation is that this is a Taliban campaign to erode the will of Australian soldiers and the public back home, and force an early exit of Australian forces from Uruzgan. This possibility cannot be ruled out. The Taliban's propaganda machine somewhat amateurishly claimed a hand in motivating Shafiea Ullah, yet has claimed neither of the two recent attacks.

The third possibility is that there is something in the particular relationship between Australian mentors and Afghan trainees which is heightening tensions and leading to violent disagreements. Certainly the relationship in certain bases is tense — last week Afghan soldiers in the 6th Kandak were temporarily disarmed — but again there is no proof that the relationship between Afghan and Australian mentors is fundamentally worse than that with other ISAF mentoring teams.

Link:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/11/09/Three-attachs-three-explanations.aspx

That post led to a riposte and I have slightly edited the passages:
Secondly, it is too simplistic to say that (a) it can't be random or that (b) the Taliban are masterminding this. Morale in the ANA is low. Morale in the Taliban is low. Morale in the ANP is low. No one feels safe, no one feels assured in Afghanistan....Working with the coalition provides some level of comfort and support, but it also presents genuine safety risks.

I believe the most likely cause of this is related to the inherent nature of Afghan society. For Afghans, when they face stresses and problems of life, drugs and lethal violence are two very popular choices to remedy the situation. ....As an example, when I was in Afghanistan, the local police chief expressed his concerns about the growing use of RPGs during wedding celebrations. This is a society very different to ours...

...based on my experience, there is every chance this just depressed Afghans dealing with a problem the only way they know how. Their life is short, they play hard.

Link:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/11/09/Reader-riposte-Life-is-hard-in-Afghanistan.aspx

Jedburgh
11-17-2011, 04:09 PM
See also the 12 May 2011 paper, A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility: A Red Team Study of Mutual Perceptions of ANSF Personnel and U.S. Soldiers in Understanding and Mitigating the Phenomena of ANSF-Committed Fratricide-Murders (http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/trust-incompatibility.pdf)

This N2KL Red Team study has four primary purposes:

1. Inform key decision-makers that the murders of ISAF members committed by ANSF personnel do not represent “rare and isolated events” as currently being proclaimed.

2. Explore why this tragic phenomenon is occurring by extensively canvassing ANSF members on their perceptions of U.S. Soldiers and identifying what behaviors, characteristics and/or situations provoke them towards anger and possible violence.

3. Examine U.S. Soldiers experiences with ANSF personnel and what perceptions they have.

4. Based on both ANSF members’ and U.S. Soldiers’ perceptions develop recommendations to counter the growing fratricide-murder threat ANSF personnel pose to ISAF soldiers.

davidbfpo
05-13-2012, 11:59 AM
That was the BBC News headline and:
The men, who were serving as part of an advisory team, were killed on Saturday as they provided security for a meeting with local officials near Patrol Base Attal....near a base in the Lashkar Gah district of Helmand province....

The London-based Defence Correspondent adds:
The rise in "green-on-blue" killings, now averaging one a week this year, is having an impact on trust in a relationship which is key for Nato's exit strategy. Nato says the attack on Saturday is the 16th incident this year in which Afghan soldiers or police - or insurgents wearing military uniforms - have turned their weapons on foreign troops, bringing the death toll from such attacks to 22 so far this year. That toll is higher than at the same time last year...

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18047242

Personally I think the impact is growing at home as it challenges the official narrative of a handover to Afghans akin to "people who kill us and you want us to stay longer?"

carl
05-13-2012, 04:14 PM
The paper Jed cited is excellent. This problem is not going away and as David suggested it may the thing that drives us from Afghanistan sooner rather than later. The paper states that these killings occur mostly because the Afghans murderers are simply angry with the behavior of the ISAF. These are not Taliban agents doing the killing.

Another thing I read is the figures released by the ISAF severely understate the problem because they only report the deaths (I forget about wounded). They don't report the unsuccessful attempts where the would be killers miss or are killed before they can do the deed.

JMA
05-14-2012, 07:05 AM
This quote comes to mind:

"We don't have twelve years experience in Vietnam. We have one year's experience twelve times over." - John Paul Vann

'Cultural incompatibility'?

No I don't believe so... more like the ISAF forces are not committed to the theatre long enough to understand the cultural dynamics of the area.

Because they are there for a short tour there is no incentive for ISAF troops down to troopie level to make the effort to learn and understand the people and their languages.

This short termism as displayed by cultural arrogance is welcomed by the Taliban, sullenly tolerated by the locals... and understandably met with seething anger by Afghans - police and army - who find themselves on the same side as the ISAF forces who treat them with disrespect and disdain.

I mentioned it before somewhere that the mentoring is in the wrong direction. On arrival in theatre fresh units should (in the obvious absence of own forces with the prerequisite experience) receive Afghan mentors to not only guide them culturally but to teach them how the Taliban thinks and acts so that the Taliban can effectively be found, fixed and then killed.

Without the cultural understanding - which includes knowing the enemy - ISAF forces are literally operating in a bubble. Not a smart approach by guys who believe they are smart.

carl
05-14-2012, 03:05 PM
I mentioned it before somewhere that the mentoring is in the wrong direction. On arrival in theatre fresh units should (in the obvious absence of own forces with the prerequisite experience) receive Afghan mentors to not only guide them culturally but to teach them how the Taliban thinks and acts so that the Taliban can effectively be found, fixed and then killed.

That is a very good idea. Select individuals could sort of embed into a unit and stay with them throughout their deployment. When I was in Africa our drivers fulfilled the same kind of role. You listened to the drivers if you knew what was good for you and we would have been completely lost without them.


Without the cultural understanding - which includes knowing the enemy - ISAF forces are literally operating in a bubble. Not a smart approach by guys who believe they are smart.

Guys who believe they are smart and don't often doubt that, aren't. Our powers that be never doubt that they are smart.

Bob's World
05-14-2012, 04:42 PM
That is a very good idea. Select individuals could sort of embed into a unit and stay with them throughout their deployment. When I was in Africa our drivers fulfilled the same kind of role. You listened to the drivers if you knew what was good for you and we would have been completely lost without them.

Guys who believe they are smart and don't often doubt that, aren't. Our powers that be never doubt that they are smart.

Our guys are not being attacked by various members of GIROA because they do not understand Afghanistan (though certainly it is true that in general we do not understand much of that place and the people who live there).

Our guys are being attacked because they represent the forces dedicated to the continued exclusion of the significant populace group that was excluded from full participation in Afghan society when we acted to elevate and sustain the Northern Alliance into power and drive the Taliban into exile.

These attacks are a metric of the unsustainable nature of our strategic approach to Afghanistan, not a metric of our lack of cultural awareness at the tactical level.

Consider this current article:
Arizona Daily Star (Tucson) (azstarnet.com) May 14, 2012

Exclusive: Moderate Taliban Speaks Of Divisions By Associated Press

One of the most powerful men on the Taliban council, Agha Jan Motasim, nearly lost his life in a hail of bullets for advocating a negotiated settlement that would bring a broad-based government to his beleaguered homeland of Afghanistan.

In an exclusive and rare interview by a member of the so-called Quetta Shura, Motasim told The Associated Press Sunday that a majority of Taliban wants a peace settlement and that there are only "a few" hard-liners in the movement.

"There are two kinds of Taliban. The one type of Taliban who believes that the foreigners want to solve the problem but there is another group and they don't believe, and they are thinking that the foreigners only want to fight," he said by telephone. "I can tell you, though, that the majority of the Taliban and the Taliban leadership want a broad-based government for all Afghan people and an Islamic system like other Islamic countries."

But Motasim chastised the West, singling out the United States and Britain, for failing to bolster the moderates within the fundamentalist Islamic movement by refusing to recognize the Taliban as a political identity and backtracking on promises--all of which he said strengthens the hard-liners and weakens moderates like himself.

He lamented Sunday's assassination in Kabul of Arsala Rahmani, a member of the Afghan government-appointed peace council who was active in trying to set up formal talks with insurgents. Rahmani served as deputy minister of higher education in the former Taliban regime but later reconciled with the current Afghan government.

"He was a nationalist. We respected him," Motasim said.

Motasim used his own stature to press for talks nearly three years before the United States began making overtures to the Taliban in late 2010. At the time, he was also chief of the Taliban political committee, a powerful position that he held until he was shot last August. He is still a member of the Taliban leadership council, the Quetta Shura, named after the Pakistani city of the same name.

His voice softened and he paused often as he reflected on the brutal shooting in the port city of Karachi, Pakistan, where he lived, while moving regularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan in areas that he refused to identify.

Several bullets shattered his body and he was hospitalized for many weeks. In the first days after the shooting, he wasn't expected to survive.

The AP spoke to Motasim from Turkey where he had gone for additional treatment. When speaking of his attackers, he referred to them as brothers and colleagues, saying they may have been Taliban hard-liners who opposed his moderate positions.

"My idea was I wanted a broad-based government, all political parties together and maybe some hard-liners among the Taliban in Afghanistan and in Pakistan didn't like to hear this and so they attacked me," he said. Some of the gunmen may have come from Afghanistan and some may have been from Pakistan's North Waziristan where militant groups have found sanctuary, Motasim said.

In the early minutes of the telephone conversation, Motasim was reluctant to talk politics, saying he had been told by his friends and colleagues to stay silent.

"I am not involved in any talks. I am only here for my treatment," he said.

But he gradually opened up, saying the Taliban have three main demands: They want all Afghan prisoners released from U.S.-run detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay and near Bagram Air Field north of the Afghan capital; the names of all Taliban currently on the United Nations sanctions blacklist removed; and recognition of the Taliban as a political party.

He said talks in Qatar ended earlier this year after the United States reneged on a promise to release five prisoners from Guantanamo Bay. "But those are just the famous ones," he said. "There are thousands more being held in Bagram and they are being held under the name of Taliban but they are innocent people, farmers and clerics."

The prisoner exchange issue is rife with sensitivity as the United States has sought to exchange American Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, captured by the Taliban in 2009, for Afghan Taliban held in Guantanamo. It appears the prisoner exchange fell through after the Afghan authorities demanded the five prisoners be repatriated to Afghanistan, according to an Afghan official who asked not to be named because he was not authorized to brief the media. The five prisoners have demanded they be allowed to go to Qatar with their families.

Motasim said he wasn't told why the prisoners were not released but when they weren't the hard-liners among the Taliban took it as a sign that the United States was disingenuous, said Motasim, who acknowledged that the Taliban have set up an office in Qatar.

He said the office has no official recognition as a political headquarters of the Taliban, rather it has been veiled in secrecy and the American interlocutors are engaging with them as insurgents not political representatives of at least some Afghans. Motasim said most of the Taliban who were negotiating with the Americans are on the U.N. sanctions list.

The U.N. Security Council imposed sanctions against the Taliban in November 1999 for refusing to send Osama bin Laden to the United States or a third country for trial on terrorism charges in connection with the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The sanctions--a travel ban, arms embargo and assets freeze--were later extended to al-Qaida. In July 2005, the council extended the sanctions again to cover affiliates and splinter groups of al-Qaida and the Taliban.

"They (the U.S.) have to give political independence to the Taliban," he said.

Looking ahead to next week's NATO summit in Chicago, Motasim said he had a message for participants.

"The decisions of NATO should be for the good of Afghanistan and should not call for more violence. It should call for an end to the fighting, an end to the raids and killings," he said. "Afghanistan is destroyed, the people are displaced, refugees, poor people are dying in their homes and also foreigners are dying here. It should end."

carl
05-14-2012, 05:13 PM
Bob:

You are wrong. At least according to the report cited by Jed you are wrong. Besides your contention just doesn't make sense. It doesn't make sense that a Tajik or Uzbek or anti-Taliban Pashtun shoots an American soldier because of intellectual dissatisfaction with the current constitution. It makes much more sense that they murder because they are angered by they and theirs being dissed in way after way year after year.

The article you cited didn't mention ANSF murdering ISAF. Nor did it mention that perhaps the Pak Army/ISI might oppose a settlement that cuts them out, making it dangerous for anybody who sought to do so.

Pete
05-14-2012, 05:24 PM
It's because Afghans live there and everone else is an outsider. It's the same way people in Mississippi felt about soldiers and administrators from Massachusetts circa 1865.

carl
05-14-2012, 05:45 PM
It's because Afghans live there and everone else is an outsider. It's the same way people in Mississippi felt about soldiers and administrators from Massachusetts circa 1865.

I don't see how that fits ANSF killing ISAF. And this is a problem that seems to be worsening as the years go by, not staying the same.

JMA
05-15-2012, 06:59 AM
That is a very good idea. Select individuals could sort of embed into a unit and stay with them throughout their deployment. When I was in Africa our drivers fulfilled the same kind of role. You listened to the drivers if you knew what was good for you and we would have been completely lost without them.

Saw some footage on Afghan training by the Brits the other night on TV news (in the wake of the latest killings).

After all these years in training people from other countries/cultures/races they have forgotten the simple method... and that is to train the trainers.

Watching some young Brit NCO trying to teach Afghans to shoot through sign language was at the same time hilarious and pathetic. Could not adopt the prone position properly, were not holding the weapon properly in the aim and could see shots striking the ground in front of the target at 25m.

Can't teach the shooting fundamentals of holding, aiming, breathing, squeezing by sign language. Who is kidding who.

Anyone listening out there? Train the - Afghan - trainers first.

Then... been on about this before. Brit troops (and probably the yanks too) should have in theatre 'battle camp' training before deploying operationally. This allows for acclimatisation and should cover 'know your enemy', local culture, locally developed and theatre specific minor tactics, advanced medical training for all, locally specific fieldcraft exercises and the like. Yes by now - ten years on - they should have identified and trained up suitable Afghans to assist with this preparation process and later mentoring on deployment. It is a damning indictment that they have not.

Clearly very little to be gained by sending a battalion to Kenya to prepare for an Afghan tour under battalion officers and NCOs (who know less about the Afghan situation). If they can be away from home for a month in Kenya then they can rather add that extra month on the front end of their Afghan tour?

Sadly although the Brits aimed at redeeming themselves in Afghanistan after the Basra debacle all they have really achieved is to slide deeper into the hole. Very sad.

Bob's World
05-15-2012, 10:47 AM
There two very different, but very powerful forces of insurgency at work in Afghanistan. The first force is the revolutionary energy between the two broad camps of those who associate with "the Taliban" and those who associate with the "Northern Alliance." All we did was tip the balance of power, not resolve the "all in or all out" nature of Afghan patronage that goes along with being on the team in power. Bonn in 2002 was a well-intended disaster. The Constitution of 2003 likewise. Same with the Election of 2004. At that point it was game on for the revolutionary insurgency to grow as all legal options to compete had been effectively denied by well-intended Western Diplomats and Politicians who could not fully appreciate that the very processes and tools that we see as platforms of democracy in the West, where controlled by the populace, become platforms of oppression when controlled by a small group of men dedicated to sustaining a monopoly of power and influence.

The second source our insurgent power in Afghanistan is that of Resistance. It is human nature to resist when one feels that some inappropriate ("illegitimate") influence is shaping ones life though the shaping of the governance over them. Legitimate government can grow illegitimate over time as a populace evolves and a government grows static (consider the US experience and the growth of discontent with British governance), or this can happen all at once following an invasion when the invader stays and begins to shape government to what it sees as appropriate. Sending in more and more security forces (and development forces, etc, etc) can kill/buy ones way to a temporary suppression of the problem at great cost, but drives the roots of the problem deeper into the soil of the affected society at the same time.

As the strength of the political revolution grew following our manipulations of Afghan governance, our response was to send in ever increasing effort to stem the same; thereby feeding an expanding resistance across the largely apolitical populaces of Afghanistan forced into contact with ISAF and Northern Alliance security forces.

Who knows how many of the ANSF have deep-seated grievances, of family members and friends killed by ISAF, homes destroyed, fortunes and influence lost through shifts of patronage caused by our actions, or just patriotic deep-felt resentment over having such a massive, overt external presence dominating their country for so long??

Revolution and Resistance. Its that simple and that complex all at once. We dedicate ourselves to control an outcome that is not ours to control, and throughout the history of mankind this is the inevitable result. Good intentions may ease the conscience on the home front, but does little to mitigate the effect on the other end among the populaces affected by this situation.

carl
05-15-2012, 01:39 PM
Who knows how many of the ANSF have deep-seated grievances, of family members and friends killed by ISAF, homes destroyed, fortunes and influence lost through shifts of patronage caused by our actions, or just patriotic deep-felt resentment over having such a massive, overt external presence dominating their country for so long??

This suggests to me that you may not have read the report. It was done in an attempt to understand why ANSF, who are probably inclined at least a little to be anti-Taliban, are murdering ISAF. The finding is that the murders are probably motivated by the personal and not the political. Have you read the report?

Bob's World
05-15-2012, 02:41 PM
This suggests to me that you may not have read the report. It was done in an attempt to understand why ANSF, who are probably inclined at least a little to be anti-Taliban, are murdering ISAF. The finding is that the murders are probably motivated by the personal and not the political. Have you read the report?

Did you read my response? Half the causation I listed is "personal."

I find most "reports" are highly biased, and that typically are written by people with little understanding of the fundamental nature of insurgency. I offer you a rationale based in a broad understanding of insurgency and my own personal experience, education and training. The facts of each of these attacks are unique. Some may well have been a deeply personal attack to avenge some real or perceived matter of honor; most appear to be against symbols of ISAF in general.

In reading the report in post #2 above, I find the report to actually be quite consistent with my understanding of the situation and consistent with my posts above as well. A mix of resistance insurgency and personal honor, much as I suspected.

davidbfpo
05-15-2012, 03:52 PM
Whilst the this thread's topic is "green on blue" as one observer remarked I do wonder how many ANSF on ANSF deaths or violent incidents there have been?
Given the multi-ethnic composition of the ANSF, surely some of the causation we have all remarked upon applies within too.

I have checked two of my books on the Imperial era on the North-West Frontier, for the experience of the British officered 'Scouts' and found a 1985 review by the late General William Jackson of 'The Frontier Scouts' (my standard text on the Scouts).


Mutual respect and trust...They were all poachers turned gamekeepers: Pathans recruited to keep the peace amongst Pathans....the Pathan's loyalty transcended his tribal affiliations. But loyalty between different races and creeds rests upon the knife edge of suspicion... (there were) so few defections and mutinies occurred in the ruthless atmosphere of the frontier.

carl
05-15-2012, 04:04 PM
Bob:

Yes I did read your response. The acknowledgment of personal reasons for the murders was half of a sentence in the fourth paragraph after two long paragraphs and one short one explicating the broad political situation in Afghanistan as you see it, followed by a fifth paragraph continuing the explication of the big picture. So it was hard to tell if you gave the personal reasons much importance.

True enough that reports are biased, but the so are opinions of the reports. i got a different take out of it than you did. These are personal beefs, with the individual behavior or perceived group offenses against cultural norms and against things like errant air strikes. There isn't much politics behind the murders at least in the sense that you seem to mean. ANSF guys get mad because of the way the ISAF and people in the ISAF act, not because the ISAF is there or because they are dissatisfied that Mullah Omar isn't leading a block of representatives in the government. That makes more sense to me in that murders that aren't committed in the course of other crimes are generally done because the killers has been personally offended by something and big picture politics aren't generally one of those somethings, or so I've read.

I guess you did read the report.

davidbfpo
07-02-2012, 09:23 AM
A slightly different lethal report:
Three British soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan by a local policeman following an argument...The soldiers were serving in an Afghan Police Advisory Team and had been to the check point to conduct a shura (meeting). On leaving, they were engaged by small arms fire by a man wearing an Afghan Police uniform.

What I noted was that the policeman was:
a member of the Afghan Civil Order Police, whose members have a reputation for having better training and greater discipline than the notorious national police.

Now for the fact the politicians will not like, with my emphasis:
the deaths mean that a quarter of all British fatalities this year have been caused by Afghans soldiers with seven murdered at the hands of allies.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9369478/Three-British-soldiers-killed-by-Afghan-policeman-after-argument.html

From the BBC report:
More than 20 foreign personnel have been killed in so-called rogue shootings in Afghanistan this year.

I don't recall this incident, maybe as it shows an ISAF on ANSF incident:
The shooting of 16 Afghans by a US soldier in March has also created resentment.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18670175

davidbfpo
08-12-2012, 11:15 AM
This week in Helmand more 'green on blue':
Three US Marines were killed by an Afghan policeman early on Friday morning after inviting them to a Ramadan breakfast to discuss security. A few hours later, a further three US Marines were later shot dead by an Afghan civilian employee at a Nato base in Garmsir.

There have been 26 “Green on Blue” attacks on foreign troops by members of the Afghan security forces since January in which 34 people have been killed. Last year, there were 21 attacks in which 35 people were killed.

Within an article on other matters:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9469671/Dead-British-officer-was-due-home-from-Afghanistan-in-weeks.html

TheCurmudgeon
08-18-2012, 02:29 PM
Don't know if this has been covered before, but on a long plane ride back from Europe I was thinking about green-on-blue attacks and how many of these attacks appear to be personal retribution. A recent quote from a Marine (those guys are pretty clever) says it best.


Terry Walker, a former Marine trainer in Helmand Province, told Fox News that most of these incidents are due to personal and cultural conflicts. He said Afghans simply have a different way of dealing with their problems.

"You have a strong influence that's tribal," Walker said. "Afghans can't be insulted and they have no conflict resolution capability. The smallest thing can set them off." http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/08/17/coalition-troops-now-armed-at-all-times-on-afghan-bases-in-wake-insider/#ixzz23uK9VjYd

This reminded me of the problems we had in Iraq understanding why their supply systems did not work the way we expected them to. It was because their tribal culture, built on respect for those above them, did not allow underlings to make decisions on their own and that everything had to be cleared.

Curious if our lack of understanding of the intricacies of tribal culture, particularly their need to maintain face in front of the other members of their tribe and their "inferiors" is killing us? If so, what are we doing about it?

Was looking for others thoughts on the matter. I apologize if the topic has already been covered.

ganulv
08-18-2012, 03:13 PM
You might be interested in reading this one (http://db.tt/BknCYq4o).

carl
08-18-2012, 03:51 PM
Curmudgeon:

Here is an item and some replies from the blog about this subject.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/nato-advisors-withdrawn-from-afghan-ministries-after-2-officers-killed

And here is a link to a study of green on blue murders and why they occur.

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/26/125304/a-crisis-of-trust-and-cultural.html

The conclusion of the paper is that the murders are almost all the result of individuals getting angry and getting some back, as you suggest.

I think it is too late to do much about this, especially if Taliban & Co. decide to exploit in a big way what is already a worsening pattern of behavior. I seek others opinion on this. Do you think that if Taliban & Co try hard they can exacerbate this so much that we will get chased out of there much more quickly than we have planned? And, since we plan after 2014 to keep a small force in the country to keep doing the night raid stuff, which the Afghans really really hate, will that be possible if green on blue murders continue and/or get worse?

Bob's World
08-18-2012, 03:54 PM
You might be interested in reading this one (http://db.tt/BknCYq4o).

One 'small thing' that sets them off was our overthrow of one system of govenrance and power to replace it with those who did not have the wherewithal to rise to power on their own.

Another 'small thing' was our occupation that increased in both size and violence as we increased our efforts from about 2005 forward to attempt to put down the revolution that kicked into high gear once we solidified that power change with the monopoly preserving constitution we helped the Northern Alliance push through. Our efforts against the revolution then sparked the growth of the resistance among the more apolitical elements of Afghan society that simply want to be left alone and for us to go home.

Certainly there are personal reasons that produce Green on Blue events; but those pale compared to the larger strategic ones.

carl
08-18-2012, 04:07 PM
One 'small thing' that sets them off was our overthrow of one system of govenrance and power to replace it with those who did not have the wherewithal to rise to power on their own.

Another 'small thing' was our occupation that increased in both size and violence as we increased our efforts from about 2005 forward to attempt to put down the revolution that kicked into high gear once we solidified that power change with the monopoly preserving constitution we helped the Northern Alliance push through. Our efforts against the revolution then sparked the growth of the resistance among the more apolitical elements of Afghan society that simply want to be left alone and for us to go home.

Certainly there are personal reasons that produce Green on Blue events; but those pale compared to the larger strategic ones.

Great speech, but, not true. At least according to the study referenced, and according to common sense.

The reason you cited is political, Taliban noble resistance and all of that. These are murders. Murders are personal. You were a DA. You know that. People have things that they resent and those build up until they decide they have been dissed enough then they murder. There may be some merging there, resentment at the latest air strike gone awry or last night's raid that killed the wrong people (again) but those are still things that get to the murderer on a personal level. Not many commit a deeply personal act like murder because they don't like the way the constitution is written.

But all that doesn't really matter too much. The murders are happening. Do you think Taliban & Co can use this pattern or exacerbate it and direct it?

davidbfpo
08-18-2012, 06:26 PM
Carl,

You asked:
Do you think that if Taliban & Co try hard they can exacerbate this so much that we will get chased out of there much more quickly than we have planned? And, since we plan after 2014 to keep a small force in the country to keep doing the night raid stuff, which the Afghans really really hate, will that be possible if green on blue murders continue and/or get worse?

I have long thought these killings real impact is "back home" and not in-country. It is very easy for a newspaper or other outlet to ask "Why are we bothering? Even the ANSF kill us". Note the French decision to end a combat role a year early after an incident. One cannot help but wonder if other national contingents stay in "Fobistan" to reduce casualties from the Taliban and the ANSF.

Perhaps the US public will tolerate "green on blue" after 2014? What opinions do American members hold on that?

TheCurmudgeon
08-18-2012, 06:41 PM
Perhaps the US public will tolerate "green on blue" after 2014? What opinions do American members hold on that?

Personally, I don't think it will matter. It probably won't even make the news unless it is a slow news day.

In the US, the military has almost reached the level of the French Foreign Legion.

carl
08-18-2012, 07:03 PM
Curmudgeon:

Very interesting comment ref the French Foreign Legion. I don't know if I would go that far. I think the American public has always been far more casualty tolerant that the elites are (if things are perceived as intelligently prosecuted) so I would attribute it maybe more to that, but a very interesting comment. I'll have to think on that.

David:

The US public will tolerate a lot, far more than the elites will. The question is what the elites will tolerate. In these cases maybe the elites are quite willing to tolerate them because it isn't their children being murdered. The victims are the Imperial Legionaires, like Curmudgeon talked about (I've been thinking fast). Also to expand upon my comment about the American public being casualty tolerant, another thing that may be happening is the public has just given up on anything being done to change things. I believe a lot of people on the Council don't much bother with Afghanistan anymore because nothing changes-ever. It and we just keep proceeding the same way. I think there is a possibility that the American public feels the same, nothing will ever change. Why bother thinking about it?

I don't know about this so much, the guys who are actually there will know. How will this affect the actions of the guys in the field, not the officially promulgated policies, but what people actually do?

carl
08-18-2012, 07:16 PM
One cannot help but wonder if other national contingents stay in "Fobistan" to reduce casualties from the Taliban and the ANSF.

I wonder about that too. I wonder if this may be something that will help to bring about a situation whereby after 2014, we are just holed up in fortified camps almost under siege and occasionally making nocturnal sallies via our rotary winged sally ports-sallies that would do nothing but enrage the locals, tighten the siege and enhance the careers of 4 stars and spec ops types.

That would be something wouldn't it, the ultimate culmination of career-centric coin.

carl
08-18-2012, 07:34 PM
You might be interested in reading this one (http://db.tt/BknCYq4o).

That was interesting. One of the passages was this "The intercommunal wars that had spiraled out of control since the mujahideen military victory in April 1992 are in fact the virulent manifestations of the century-long policies of internal colonialism carried out by Pashtun-dominated governments, supported in large measure by decades of Cold War politics in the region."


That seems so obvious when somebody else says it, but was something I never would have thought of.

TheCurmudgeon
08-18-2012, 08:04 PM
I wonder about that too. I wonder if this may be something that will help to bring about a situation whereby after 2014, we are just holed up in fortified camps almost under siege and occasionally making nocturnal sallies via our rotary winged sally ports-sallies that would do nothing but enrage the locals, tighten the siege and enhance the careers of 4 stars and spec ops types.

That would be something wouldn't it, the ultimate culmination of career-centric coin.

That I could see ... although, to be honest, I think that we have been involved in a career-centric fight for some time..

carl
08-18-2012, 08:24 PM
That I could see ... although, to be honest, I think that we have been involved in a career-centric fight for some time..

Absolutely. Sometimes guys low down the pole and out of the loop can successfully confound it. But I think essentially American COIN=career-centric COIN and I increasingly fear that the American way of war will = career-centric way of war.

TheCurmudgeon
08-18-2012, 09:42 PM
Absolutely. Sometimes guys low down the pole and out of the loop can successfully confound it. But I think essentially American COIN=career-centric COIN and I increasingly fear that the American way of war will = career-centric way of war.

I think it has been that way for some time, possibly since the end of WWII and it is not just COIN ... but that is a different thread.

TheCurmudgeon
08-18-2012, 09:54 PM
One 'small thing' that sets them off was our overthrow of one system of govenrance and power to replace it with those who did not have the wherewithal to rise to power on their own.

Another 'small thing' was our occupation that increased in both size and violence as we increased our efforts from about 2005 forward to attempt to put down the revolution that kicked into high gear once we solidified that power change with the monopoly preserving constitution we helped the Northern Alliance push through. Our efforts against the revolution then sparked the growth of the resistance among the more apolitical elements of Afghan society that simply want to be left alone and for us to go home.

Two points. First (and again), you can't have it both ways: You can't say the population doesn't care and just want to be left alone AND that they are upset with the occupation and therefore are fighting us. If they wanted to fight us they would join the insurgency. I am not a believer in the idea that the Taliban has been working to place moles in the Afghan security forces just to kill one or two people while in fits of rage. You project your beliefs onto another culture in order to satisfy your own narrative.

Second, it is irrelevant to the question asked as I will explain below.


Certainly there are personal reasons that produce Green on Blue events; but those pale compared to the larger strategic ones.

Even if ten percent of the murders were caused by our misunderstanding of a cultural difference then they are worth studying for that reason alone. It is also arrogant to believe that this is just an Afghan problem. If, in fact, it is the result of our ignorance to understand a tribal culture then it is likely to be reproduced in any other similar culture under similar circumstances.

sean bastle
08-19-2012, 03:37 AM
Even if ten percent of the murders were caused by our misunderstanding of a cultural difference then they are worth studying for that reason alone. It is also arrogant to believe that this is just an Afghan problem. If, in fact, it is the result of our ignorance to understand a tribal culture then it is likely to be reproduced in any other similar culture under similar circumstances.

Last CNA study I read put it at 6%, which is significant. Most of those are made up of advisors who are supposed to be getting more culture and language training than the average deployer. (The CNA report was unclas and is probably out there on their website.)

We're engaged in a lot of places around the world. I can't think of any where blue-green accounts for 6% of our casualties. I don't think it was even that high in Iraq, but I don't have the figures in front of me.

Saying the Blue on Green incidents are the result of "cultural misunderstandings" is helpful because in the short term it avoids any questions of the larger strategic and policy issues. But if we are sending people to advise Afghans, Afghans who have no mechanisms for conflict resolution other than going to the gun, then we either need to accept these blue-green incidents as a necessary part of our strategy there or rethink at least that component of the strategy.

sean bastle
08-19-2012, 03:41 AM
Carl,
One cannot help but wonder if other national contingents stay in "Fobistan" to reduce casualties from the Taliban and the ANSF.

Most of these incidents occur on the FOBs where the Coalition\ANSF are training together, and the coalition members killed are the ones doing the training.

TheCurmudgeon
08-19-2012, 11:49 AM
The place of honor (at the collective and individual levels) tends to be read- ily identified within cultures in general, Arab culture in particular (Dodd, 1973), and Arab dispute resolution traditions such as Sulha (Kressel, 1992; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008). The Palestinian Human Rights Monitor (Aug. 2002, p. 2) writes this about the place of honor in Arab society: “The focus on the value of honor has great importance in Arab society.” Barakat (1993) places honor as one of the core values of Arab societies. He writes: “While values of honor, shame, and dignity, are adopted in this Arab vil- lage in Israel, nevertheless they are core values of contemporary social sys- tems in the Arab world, whether in an urban, village or Bedouin community” (p. 44).
The most vivid (and unfortunate) demonstration of the centrality of honor in Arab culture, indeed, at the core of the Arab family, which is the center of Arab society, can be seen in “honor killing.” These are tragic sit- uations where fathers, brothers, and other agnatic male kin murder their own female flesh and blood (daughter, sister, mother) to restore the honor- able status of the family when they perceive a female relative is violating it. There cannot be a more poignant demonstration of the centrality of honor than perceiving of a person willing—indeed, desiring—to kill his own daughter or mother or sister in order to restore perceived lost honor. Pely, D. (2010). Honor: The Sulha's main dispute resolution tool. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 28(1), 67-81. doi:10.1002/crq.20013

Also looking into this from a management point of view. Two studies come to mind. They are business studies designed to examine what management style best motivated employees in different cultures. The first was research done on IBM employees worldwide that was turned into the book Culture's Consequences (http://http://www.amazon.com/Cultures-Consequences-Comparing-Institutions-Organizations/dp/0803973241). The second was the GLOBE (http://http://www.amazon.com/Culture-Leadership-Across-World-ebook/dp/B00872FNU0/ref=dp_kinw_strp_1) study. Not sure how much is applicable.

Dayuhan
08-19-2012, 12:21 PM
The place of honor (at the collective and individual levels) tends to be read- ily identified within cultures in general, Arab culture in particular (Dodd, 1973), and Arab dispute resolution traditions such as Sulha (Kressel, 1992; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008). The Palestinian Human Rights Monitor (Aug. 2002, p. 2) writes this about the place of honor in Arab society: “The focus on the value of honor has great importance in Arab society.” Barakat (1993) places honor as one of the core values of Arab societies. He writes: “While values of honor, shame, and dignity, are adopted in this Arab vil- lage in Israel, nevertheless they are core values of contemporary social sys- tems in the Arab world, whether in an urban, village or Bedouin community” (p. 44).

The most vivid (and unfortunate) demonstration of the centrality of honor in Arab culture, indeed, at the core of the Arab family, which is the center of Arab society, can be seen in “honor killing.” These are tragic sit- uations where fathers, brothers, and other agnatic male kin murder their own female flesh and blood (daughter, sister, mother) to restore the honor- able status of the family when they perceive a female relative is violating it. There cannot be a more poignant demonstration of the centrality of honor than perceiving of a person willing—indeed, desiring—to kill his own daughter or mother or sister in order to restore perceived lost honor.

To what extent would observations on Arab culture apply in Afghanistan? Afghans aren't Arabs.

TheCurmudgeon
08-19-2012, 12:36 PM
Carl:

... here is a link to a study of green on blue murders and why they occur.

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/26/125304/a-crisis-of-trust-and-cultural.html

The conclusion of the paper is that the murders are almost all the result of individuals getting angry and getting some back, as you suggest.

I think it is too late to do much about this ...

Good report. I thought one was out there but could not find it.

Was not encouraged by the recommendations. A couple of things stand out, like GPF should not be partnering/training ASFs. Seems like they don't have the training to deal with the vast cultural differences. You are correct that it is probably too late to fix this but it is a bit of a self correcting problem if they are out by 2014.

The continuing problem will be the people that remain after 2014. If we do not find a way to defuse these problems as they occur they will fester.

TheCurmudgeon
08-19-2012, 12:44 PM
To what extent would observations on Arab culture apply in Afghanistan? Afghans aren't Arabs.

U.S. Powerless Against Honor Killings In Afghanistan (http://http://www.forbes.com/sites/shenegotiates/2012/07/10/u-s-powerless-against-honor-killings-in-afghanistan/)

Woman, two children beheaded in Afghanistan 'honor killing (http://http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/woman-two-children-beheaded-in-afghanistan-honor-killing-1.448854)


A recent study confirmed honor and respect as fundamental cultural values among Afghans, yet found subtle differences in interpretation of honor across groups and situations. Also, the conceptions of honor and respect as held among Afghans do not necessarily correspond with neighboring American concepts.http://www.globalcognition.org/honor-among-afghans/

As I said before, to think that this is just an Afghan (or Arab) problem is to be small minded. It is common to any culture than holds honor in higher regard than other values.

Fuchs
08-19-2012, 01:01 PM
It's ironical how such concepts of honour are usually being considered by Westerner in a context of violence.

Their purpose is actually to avoid violence to make living in a society more possible. Such concepts of honour and the likewise disrespected primitive justice systems such as known from Old Testament or Sharia are meant to maintain peace through deterrence. They also encourage the solution of conflicts through peaceful agreements including compensation for offences.

It's only the cases were the system fails and actually leads to the harsh consequences that create the bad reputation. It's like judging nuclear deterrence by eventual nuclear war. Not entirely unfair, but not exactly satisfactory either.


The really, really bad problems created by such primitive deterrence systems arise when cultures are being mixed. Cultures represent in large part a system of suppressing violent conflicts. To mix multiple cultures in a random way leads to an inferior suppressive effect and consequently to major problems. We can see the same with non-integrating, non-ethnic_ghetto ('China Town') immigrants from alien cultures in Europe.

The elaborate Western approach towards suppression of violence can only be imposed with enough resources (tricky in Afghanistan) and enough acceptance (tricky when the competing approach is based on religion or other ideology).

TheCurmudgeon
08-19-2012, 01:07 PM
It's ironical how such concepts of honour are usually being considered by Westerner in a context of violence.

Their purpose is actually to avoid violence to make living in a society more possible. Such concepts of honour and the likewise disrespected primitive justice systems such as known from Old Testament or Sharia are meant to maintain peace through deterrence. They also encourage the solution of conflicts through peaceful agreements including compensation for offences.

Keen observation. These value systems that each culture have developed are a form of internal conflict resolution system. Like any other mores, norms, folkway, or law, they provide a predictability to day-to-day life and interactions with others. Where two systems are incompatible there will be conflict.

The trick form our perspective is to find a way to either work within their norms, folkways, and laws (which we have a very hard time doing) or to use them to resolve disputes before they turn deadly.

Fuchs
08-19-2012, 01:15 PM
Isn't there a wrestling sport in Afghanistan?
Maybe wrestling could be introduced as some kind of duel for honour.
Whoever feels offended could allowed to try to humiliate his offender in a public fight.
In cases of actual offending actions, our superior officer could order our offender to lose the fight.

I know, a military bureaucracy wouldn't even come close to imagine to institute such a thing.

TheCurmudgeon
08-19-2012, 01:36 PM
Isn't there a wrestling sport in Afghanistan?
Maybe wrestling could be introduced as some kind of duel for honour.
Whoever feels offended could allowed to try to humiliate his offender in a public fight.
In cases of actual offending actions, our superior officer could order our offender to lose the fight.

I know, a military bureaucracy wouldn't even come close to imagine to institute such a thing.

Disruptive thinking ... I like it.

I actually believe something along this line may be what is required.

ganulv
08-19-2012, 04:50 PM
That was interesting. One of the passages was this "The intercommunal wars that had spiraled out of control since the mujahideen military victory in April 1992 are in fact the virulent manifestations of the century-long policies of internal colonialism carried out by Pashtun-dominated governments, supported in large measure by decades of Cold War politics in the region."

Well, Nazif is an Uzbek, so of course he would say that. ;) As a non-expert on such things I labor under the impression that a big part of the appeal of Karzai for the West was the package deal of a Pashtun head of government (to placate Afghanistan’s majority ethnic group) with acceptably moderate (by Western standards) political leanings. A formulation like that doesn’t take into account the fact that there is often factionalism within ethnic groups, as is the case with the Pastun.

Again, my impression as a non-expert.

carl
08-19-2012, 05:25 PM
Ganulv: Uzbekian (spell check tells me that is not a word but if I use enough maybe I can make it one) chauvinism may have something to do with his observation but it seems to fit the very broad historical outline.

carl
08-19-2012, 05:38 PM
Curmudgeon and Fuchs and anybody else:

Do either one of you know if these types of murders have been committed against Indian or Turkish troops and trainers in Afghanistan? It would be interesting to see that data if it exists at all. It would be interesting not from the standpoint of religion but to see if non-western troops are provoking the same reactions.

Also it has been my experience and observation that the most important thing in not pissing off the locals in other countries isn't knowledge of the cultural mores and practices, nor even knowledge of the language. The most important thing is that you conduct yourself, for lack of a better word, as a gentleman. Respectful attitude, friendlyness (sic), punctiliousness about courtesy, restraint etc are the most important things. If the locals see you acting like that they will cut you a tremendous amount of slack on all the gaffes you WILL make and teach you how not to make them again. In other words, you have to conduct yourself in another person's country as you would conduct yourself as a guest in another person's house.

Given the culture of the American military, of which I know only a little, can that be inculcated into the 20 year olds by the 30 year olds? I know people can do it, the Gurkas I've read are real good at that. But can the American military do that as of this date?

Fuchs
08-19-2012, 05:54 PM
Curmudgeon and Fuchs:

Do either one of you know if these types of murders have been committed against Indian or Turkish troops and trainers in Afghanistan? It would be interesting to see that data if it exists at all. It would be interesting not from the standpoint of religion but to see if non-western troops are provoking the same reactions.

I have no statistics, but I expect that whatever statistics exist would lack statistic significance because of the rather small quantities (personnel x years) of such troops there.

TheCurmudgeon
08-19-2012, 06:00 PM
I saw Americans, Germans, and Italians. Did not see any Turks or Indians.

The report cited is pretty interesting.


ANSF members recalled a rather large number of social altercations that they self- reported as near-fratricide murder incidents (N = 14). These often entailed perceptions of U.S. Soldiers disrespecting them or civilians (especially by cursing), where they deemed a home search as a theological violation, or where Afghan women were not perceived as being accorded privacy and/or proper respect (often, this meant not being seen at all). These findings add further credence to the concern that fratricide-murder risks have become fairly common within the last nineteen months, and often stem from personal and social altercations and cultural clashes rather than from insurgent infiltration.A crisis of trust and cultural incompatibility (http://http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/26/125304/a-crisis-of-trust-and-cultural.html)

So if these things were the cause the assumption would be that Turks or Indians (at least Muslim Indians) would not make these mistakes.

I get the impression from the report that there was more depth to what was going on ... that the ANSF were suffering from a lack of pride in themselves and their social status. If they had to stand by as American's did things they felt strongly were wrong while the people they were supposed to be protecting begged them to help, then it is easy to see how the resentment at their own inability could turn to rage. I could be projecting, but the report is at least worth scanning.

TheCurmudgeon
08-19-2012, 06:14 PM
Carl,

In regards to your "gentlemen" comment:


ANSF members further remarked that they thought U.S. Soldiers were uncouth and ignorant in the proper mannerism of Afghan cultural behaviors, particularly Pashtun (this study was completed in a largely Pashtun region). They found their lack of modesty infuriating. They often stated that when they tried to correct U.S. Soldiers’ behaviors, they were reproached through verbal abuse, insults and shouted profanities, or were simply ignored, with the soldiers continuing with the same obnoxious behaviors. Participants often complained that they have had their fill with such abrasive personalities and offensive and vulgar behaviors and that only their orders not to take action has prevented more serious confrontations with U.S. Soldiers. Some said that retraining those that commit these offenses would do no good; that they were born with personality defects that lack decency. These numerous complaints across focus groups indicate that vastly improved cultural sensitivity and human relations (consideration of others) education programs need to be implemented for pre-deployment training as well as during regular ongoing training. Instruction should include how offensive arrogance, insults, bullying and profanity are to Afghans. Leadership at all levels must enforce these standards of conduct. It also seems quite obvious that certain personality types are not suitable for fulfilling the requirements of a counter-insurgency strategy. Those manifesting the abrasive characteristics cited in this study cause great harm with ANSF and Afghan civilian relations; they do not contribute to the mission, they jeopardize it. Therefore, if satisfactory ‘COIN attitude’ adjustments (i.e., a civil demeanor) cannot be instilled during training, then such soldiers should not be deployed. (Recruiting standards addressing such personality traits might also be implemented.) They will be and have been a liability. It only takes the actions of a very few of these types to completely negate everyone else’s work.

emphasis in original

Fuchs
08-19-2012, 06:40 PM
So if these things were the cause the assumption would be that Turks or Indians (at least Muslim Indians) would not make these mistakes.

What's the share of Muslims in the Indian army?

Their main threat is Muslim Pakistan, so Muslim units would probably be ill-motivated while mixed troops would be not very cohesive.

The border with China could be guarded by Muslim Indian army troops, but said border is mountainous just as the critical sections of the border with Pakistan.


Furthermore, "'Muslim' customs barely exist at all. What people perceive as 'Muslim' customs are usually regional / ethnical customs whose more oppressive parts are being 'justified' by reference to religion.

Lots of people in Africa believe you need to cut off genitals from girls because of Muslim faith or they need to hide their faces when neither is true. Ironically, there's often a neighbouring ethnic with the same religion and different if not mirrored customs. Some tribes for example think that covering the face is a male privilege (IIRC the Imuhagh aka Touaregs).


Besides, what would protect our occupation troops from the Muslim Indian sensibilities if the custom incompatibility was really about spiritual issues? ;)

TheCurmudgeon
08-19-2012, 06:42 PM
Fuchs

Good point. My own ignorance showing.

Bob's World
08-19-2012, 06:45 PM
Great speech, but, not true. At least according to the study referenced, and according to common sense.

The reason you cited is political, Taliban noble resistance and all of that. These are murders. Murders are personal. You were a DA. You know that. People have things that they resent and those build up until they decide they have been dissed enough then they murder. There may be some merging there, resentment at the latest air strike gone awry or last night's raid that killed the wrong people (again) but those are still things that get to the murderer on a personal level. Not many commit a deeply personal act like murder because they don't like the way the constitution is written.

But all that doesn't really matter too much. The murders are happening. Do you think Taliban & Co can use this pattern or exacerbate it and direct it?

What is "murder" in an insurgency?

Is it murder when we shoot a kid off his motorcycle for failing to slow down when we flash a light at him?

Is it murder when a head of household rushes to see who is invading his home with an old Russian single-shot shotgun in hand, only to be cut in half by the lead man of a team looking for some HVT?

Is it murder when an IED blows up non-combatants of any ilk?

Comfortable civilian peacetime constructs of law and justice do not readily apply. To write off even most of these Green on Blue events as murders of individual and personal purpose and intent is, IMO, naive at best, and intentionally disingenuous at worst.

They should be considered as yet another powerful metric of the inappropriate nature of our actions and the unlikelihood that current approaches and polices can produce the results we hope for.

carl
08-19-2012, 07:01 PM
Bob:

Nice stump speechifying. You know what we are all talking about even if you don't approve and want to steer things in another direction.

davidbfpo
08-19-2012, 07:16 PM
Carl raises a good point on the details of ISAF deaths; are the non-Western ISAF contributors, like Turkey (1300 men currently, there since 2003) and the very separate, now gone, Indian contingent suffering too?

Wiki shows fourteen Turkish deaths, none from "green on blue", in fact none from hostilities:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalition_casualties_in_Afghanistan and http://icasualties.org/OEF/Index.aspx

Neither show "green on blue" deaths separately alas.

It appears the para-military Indian contingent had two deaths - when guarding the Kabul Embassy and none from the two deployed companies:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Tibetan_Border_Police

carl
08-19-2012, 07:17 PM
Fuchs:

I have another question. Some of the displaced persons that my Mom knew and worked with here in the US in the 10 years or so after WWII said German troops were much better behaved than American troops. (This is not counting reprisals and thing like that.) They said that in the normal course of events they preferred having German troops in the area. I think I read that elsewhere also but can't remember where.

Do you know if that is true? If it is, did specific training cover that or was it just a part of the overall system of discipline and training?

Fuchs
08-19-2012, 07:43 PM
Fuchs:

I have another question. Some of the displaced persons that my Mom knew and worked with here in the US in the 10 years or so after WWII said German troops were much better behaved than American troops. (This is not counting reprisals and thing like that.) They said that in the normal course of events they preferred having German troops in the area. I think I read that elsewhere also but can't remember where.

Do you know if that is true? If it is, did specific training cover that or was it just a part of the overall system of discipline and training?

The Wehrmacht grew to about nine million men, plus Waffen-SS half a million or more. Both were large enough to be bound to have both good and bad apples among their ranks.

Moreover, the quality of a military unit is largely being determined by its commander. There's no reason to believe that an overall poorly-reputed army hasn't some nice units and no reason to believe that an overall well-reputed army hasn't some really stinking bad apple units.

So an entirely well-mannered unit was probably the consequence of fine and well-intentioned leadership of that unit. The same applies to an entirely bad unit.


Military organisations are highly authoritarian, and lots of psychological experiments (edit: example (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment)) have shown that many humans are incredibly obedient even to fake authority. Add in the power of enforcement of orders that a military bureaucracy has and it's easily visible how a commander can shape a unit to either evil or well-mannered. It's even possible within few weeks if the unit is a reservist unit or had previously been rather neutral on the good/evil scale.


Last but not least, Nazi ideology (which was increasingly fed to troops beginning in 1942 because of the harshness of warfare in the East and possibly because the Wehrmacht had to compete with the expanding Waffen-SS for political favour) did not treat all foreign nationalities the same. The Dutch, English, Danish and Norwegians were considered almost equals, while even the allied Hungarians were looked down at (by ideologues) as supposed descendants of the Huns.


That being said, the most likely candidate for well-reputed German units were probably Luftwaffe troops, for they did not act so much as enforcers of occupation as they did act as spenders. The typical problems involving Luftwaffe troops were probably about girls or booze.

davidbfpo
08-19-2012, 07:46 PM
Fuchs asked:
What's the share of Muslims in the Indian army?

After sometime researching via Google it appears that:
1) no official figures for today exist
2) in 1947 Muslims accounted for 30-35% of the army
3) 13% of Indians are Muslim
4) reported in 2011-2012 3% of the army were Muslim, approx. 29k

I find that a rather low number, especially since I've seen reports on locally recruited Kashmiri infantry units.

As they say I know someone who should know, so will ask.

Ray
08-19-2012, 07:49 PM
The whole issue hinges on the culture and mindset!

Ray
08-19-2012, 07:54 PM
Fuchs asked:

After sometime researching via Google it appears that:
1) no official figures for today exist
2) in 1947 Muslims accounted for 30-35% of the army
3) 13% of Indians are Muslim
4) reported in 2011-2012 3% of the army were Muslim, approx. 29k

I find that a rather low number, especially since I've seen reports on locally recruited Kashmiri infantry units.

As they say I know someone who should know, so will ask.

You all don't understand the language, but try getting these translated.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3EHDDbtKdA&feature=player_embedded

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_M0S8KVHHY&feature=player_embedded

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=26lC3A7dbgQ&feature=player_embedded

Ray
08-19-2012, 07:58 PM
What's the share of Muslims in the Indian army?

Their main threat is Muslim Pakistan, so Muslim units would probably be ill-motivated while mixed troops would be not very cohesive.

The border with China could be guarded by Muslim Indian army troops, but said border is mountainous just as the critical sections of the border with Pakistan.


Furthermore, "'Muslim' customs barely exist at all. What people perceive as 'Muslim' customs are usually regional / ethnical customs whose more oppressive parts are being 'justified' by reference to religion.

Lots of people in Africa believe you need to cut off genitals from girls because of Muslim faith or they need to hide their faces when neither is true. Ironically, there's often a neighbouring ethnic with the same religion and different if not mirrored customs. Some tribes for example think that covering the face is a male privilege (IIRC the Imuhagh aka Touaregs).


Besides, what would protect our occupation troops from the Muslim Indian sensibilities if the custom incompatibility was really about spiritual issues? ;)

There are units that are totally Muslim in the Indian Army as in the Grenadiers and Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry.

There are many Muslim who have won the highest gallantry awards of the Indian Army.

The Muslims of the Indian Army are as good as any other.

In the Indian Army, the tradition is that all adhere to the religion and customs of the troops. Hence, it is not surprising to see non Muslim officers of a Muslim unit undertaking Ramzan and being on a fast and anyway, all have to attend the Mosque prayers.

Likewise, I was in a 90% Buddhist unit and underwent all Buddhist religious customs and festivals since it was the majority religion.

In the Indian Army where there is a mixed religious composition, we have an All Faith Temple.

It was no big deal!

And anyway, religion is the last thing on the mind when performing our duties!

carl
08-19-2012, 08:13 PM
Ray:

What would the reaction be of the NCOs and officers to troops from one unit taunting troops from another unit based upon religious or regional differences? Say guys from a predominantly Sikh unit making fun of Gurkas, though the question is not limited to those groups.

Fuchs
08-19-2012, 08:22 PM
And anyway, religion is the last thing on the mind when performing our duties!

That would explain the previous lines.
Your description sounds more like about customs than about actual spirituality. It's more talk as about an American visiting the Oktoberfest in Munich than talk about people who connect faith with the need to kill someone.

Bob's World
08-20-2012, 09:35 AM
Bob:

Nice stump speechifying. You know what we are all talking about even if you don't approve and want to steer things in another direction.

Carl,

I am not "stumping," rather I am stumped at how you think the current rash of killings are not related to the very similar factors driving the larger insurgency.

There is both Revolution and Resistance in Afghanistan, and what we wage against most internal to Afghanistan is the resistance. This resistance is not ideological and it is largely apolitical. It is a natural human response to perceptions that some foreign presence is unnatural, inappropriate, and must go.

We have pressed our units into their lands and populaces and waged COIN against insurgents with little regard for how those tactical efforts strategically affect the larger insurgency. In recent years we have forced greater integration between Afghan soldiers and Western members of the Coalition. We tell our men that they will keep coming back until the Afghans are prepared to take over. No pressure.

Do personal conflicts occur? Of course. But resistance insurgency is personal. It matters little if the trigger event is an attack helicopter shooting up your little brother while he was repairing a culvert, or if the trigger event is some E4 frustrated with your inability or lack of motivation to do something in a particular manner or degree of priority he thinks you should have leveling some grievous insult upon you. Respect is a major causal factor in resistance, just as revenge is.

Even if our guys were a bunch of cultural geniuses these events would still be going on because it is also the latest tactic from the Revolutionary aspect of the insurgency. Join the security forces, get close, attack the foreigners. Target the trust necessary for this coalition to work effectively.

To attempt to rationalize these events off in personal or ideological terms is a dangerous bit of self-delusion.

TheCurmudgeon
08-20-2012, 10:12 AM
In the Indian Army, the tradition is that all adhere to the religion and customs of the troops. Hence, it is not surprising to see non Muslim officers of a Muslim unit undertaking Ramzan and being on a fast and anyway, all have to attend the Mosque prayers.


There is an idea. We could require Soldiers working with ANSF in Afghanistan to attend Friday Prayer with the units they are working with. Could you imagine the maelstrom of news reports and lawsuits that would create.

Heck, even if a forward thinking NCO or Officer decided to attend Prayer (not that it would be allowed) most Americans in his unit would start to wonder about him.

However, if we did how would the Taliban react? Kind of a "two can play at that game" thing. There is disruptive thinking for you.

Fuchs
08-20-2012, 10:36 AM
Keep in mind you need the necessary resources to execute a plan, and American commanders most likely don't have the resources to execute such a plan.

Moreover, the domestic political effect for Obama would be political suicide. He's under suspicion to be a Kenya-born Muslim Manchurian candidate trying to destroy the American way of life...

TheCurmudgeon
08-20-2012, 11:56 AM
Fuchs,

It would never happen. Some time back a female Soldier sued the Army because she was being ordered to wear a Burka. She won.

American's are too arrogant. We think all other cultures need to adapt to us, not the other way around (even at Oktoberfest).

It might be possible on a small scale with SF troops, but not with GPFs.

TheCurmudgeon
08-20-2012, 02:17 PM
Fuchs:

I have another question. Some of the displaced persons that my Mom knew and worked with here in the US in the 10 years or so after WWII said German troops were much better behaved than American troops. (This is not counting reprisals and thing like that.) They said that in the normal course of events they preferred having German troops in the area. I think I read that elsewhere also but can't remember where.

Curious if the level of discipline is a factor. Again, I am oversimplifying, but assuming the German Troops were more disciplined and therefore less likely to mouth off or curse at the population, could that be a factor.

Along a similar line it is worth noting that the Marines were seen as less offensive.


U.S. Marines were viewed as having better attitudes and being more respectful and respected

The same was said about ETT members and females, so it is difficult to say that it was a discipline issue alone. Could have been a training difference. Of course, the other assumption that could be made is that ETT members would probably be older and more experienced.

carl
08-20-2012, 05:36 PM
Carl,

I am not "stumping," rather I am stumped at how you think the current rash of killings are not related to the very similar factors driving the larger insurgency.

There is both Revolution and Resistance in Afghanistan, and what we wage against most internal to Afghanistan is the resistance. This resistance is not ideological and it is largely apolitical. It is a natural human response to perceptions that some foreign presence is unnatural, inappropriate, and must go.

We have pressed our units into their lands and populaces and waged COIN against insurgents with little regard for how those tactical efforts strategically affect the larger insurgency. In recent years we have forced greater integration between Afghan soldiers and Western members of the Coalition. We tell our men that they will keep coming back until the Afghans are prepared to take over. No pressure.

Do personal conflicts occur? Of course. But resistance insurgency is personal. It matters little if the trigger event is an attack helicopter shooting up your little brother while he was repairing a culvert, or if the trigger event is some E4 frustrated with your inability or lack of motivation to do something in a particular manner or degree of priority he thinks you should have leveling some grievous insult upon you. Respect is a major causal factor in resistance, just as revenge is.

Even if our guys were a bunch of cultural geniuses these events would still be going on because it is also the latest tactic from the Revolutionary aspect of the insurgency. Join the security forces, get close, attack the foreigners. Target the trust necessary for this coalition to work effectively.

To attempt to rationalize these events off in personal or ideological terms is a dangerous bit of self-delusion.

Like I said before, murder is personal no matter how much you want it to be related to broader (very broad) political considerations. You were a DA. You know that. The report Curmudgeon and I referenced makes this pretty clear. Did you read it?

I don't believe I am rationalizing anything, nor are the people who have studied this phenomenon. I think you are trying to relate every single thing that happens to your ideas about the hows and whys of the broader war. The old communist commissars used to do that. Every single thing was related to the struggle of the proletariat, even if it wasn't.

And just to top things off, your idea of an apolitical "resistance" to foreign troops is silly no matter how many times you say it. MO has a political agenda, as do the Haqqanis, as does Gulbuddin, as does AQ, as does the Pak Army/ISI, as does the IMU. And I also notice that Taliban & Co are mostly Pashtun. Last time I checked the Hazaras weren't flocking to the Taliban banner, nor were the Uzbeks, nor the Tajiks, nor the Kuchis etc. And I also noticed that a whole lot of Pashtuns on both sides of the border who opposed Taliban & Co have had their throats cut. I will admit that the idea of a national and apolitical "resistance" relieves the mind of the duty of heavy thinking and can give one the warm and fuzzies when contemplating the nobility of the resistance.

I am still very interested in your opinion about what if anything can be done about these murders, or what could have been done in the past about this. Also I am interested if you have any data or opinion about whether non-western troops provoke the same kind of thing. However, if the response is going to be another stump speech about the "big picture", please don't.

Fuchs
08-20-2012, 06:21 PM
...but assuming the German Troops were more disciplined and therefore less likely to mouth off or curse at the population, could that be a factor.

Aside from leadership and random variations, why not blame the jeep?

German troops had almost no motor vehicles for occupation duties, so they were probably much less present in rural areas than the more mobile Anglophone troops on occupation duty.

TheCurmudgeon
08-20-2012, 06:28 PM
Aside from leadership and random variations, why not blame the jeep?

I am sorry, I was referring to the WWII comments on civilians found German's less offensive then Americans. Guess I should have made that clear.

But in the interest of "cultural" considerations, I suppose I should blame the Kamaz instead of the Jeep

carl
08-20-2012, 06:44 PM
Aside from leadership and random variations, why not blame the jeep?

German troops had almost no motor vehicles for occupation duties, so they were probably much less present in rural areas than the more mobile Anglophone troops on occupation duty.

Fuchs I think you may be saying more than you know. We got into trouble in Iran way back when because of the way American troops drove. I read that ARVN troops got into trouble because of the way they drove. In both Iraq and Afghanistan one of the major complaints was/is the way Americans drove and convoy pro force type procedures. I got thoroughly ticked off one day because of the way some spec ops types in Strykers drove. Behavior on the road is one of those things that the ideal "gentleman" is cognizant of but that 20 year olds can disregard in the best of circumstances, not to mention their 40 year old superiors worried about their careers.

Fuchs
08-20-2012, 06:46 PM
I am sorry, I was referring to the WWII comments on civilians found German's less offensive then Americans. Guess I should have made that clear.

Me too. American occupation troops were more motor vehicle-mobile, thus likely more present and more points of contact = more friction. You can also be a much better bully on a rural street if you have a 60 hp jeep with a signal horn than when steering a horse cart.

edit: Carl - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7J4RjwVA-PI
This is an old video, 2009 at the latest.

TheCurmudgeon
08-20-2012, 07:17 PM
Me too. American occupation troops were more motor vehicle-mobile, thus likely more present and more points of contact = more friction. You can also be a much better bully on a rural street if you have a 60 hp jeep with a signal horn than when steering a horse cart.

Makes more sense now. :rolleyes: Most of the places I drove in Afghanistan I was pretty much the only thing on the road, so it never occurred to me. Also, most of the time we were hauling heavy engineer equipment, so it was not as easy to be a bully.

That said, the report cites complaints about Soldier's driving.

Bob's World
08-20-2012, 10:45 PM
Two points. First (and again), you can't have it both ways: You can't say the population doesn't care and just want to be left alone AND that they are upset with the occupation and therefore are fighting us. If they wanted to fight us they would join the insurgency. I am not a believer in the idea that the Taliban has been working to place moles in the Afghan security forces just to kill one or two people while in fits of rage. You project your beliefs onto another culture in order to satisfy your own narrative.

Second, it is irrelevant to the question asked as I will explain below.



Even if ten percent of the murders were caused by our misunderstanding of a cultural difference then they are worth studying for that reason alone. It is also arrogant to believe that this is just an Afghan problem. If, in fact, it is the result of our ignorance to understand a tribal culture then it is likely to be reproduced in any other similar culture under similar circumstances.

And you seem to believe that "the taliban" is some formal organization that one joins...odd. Insurgency is an informal business, and we label people by their actions, but I'd advise against thinking that our labels then convert into some actual formal organization.

"The Taliban" are in simplest terms those Afghans who resist against our presence or who revolt against the government of Afghanistan. Why would you assume that those Afghans who opt to join the security forces of Afghanistan at one point in their life might not some months later come to realize they made the wrong decision for them and decide to act in a manner that supports the insurgency??

I do not project Western beliefs or values on anyone, I simply look past what we wish the facts of some situation were to attempt to understand them for what they actually are.

So many of our programs intended to achieve COIN success produce reasonably positive tactical effects that we can measure, so we assume those programs to be moving us toward our strategic goals. Like adding tactical successes can ultimately get to strategic success. But what we ignore or don't understand is that many of those same actions that produce positive tactical effects also produce negative strategic effects due to how they are implemented. In those cases every action moves us closer to strategic failure at the same time that we delude ourselves that we are closing in on tactical success. Night Raids, Clear-Hold-Build operations, training ANSF, etc all fit in this category much of the time.

So, a man joins the ANSF in a belief that he is best served by supporting the current government. Then over time some mix of how he is treated by his foreign trainers, the types of operations he goes out on, etc combine to make him realize that in now believes he is better served by supporting change. This does not mean he was a "mole" planted by Taliban leadership, he could be, but he could have just been "radicalized" by his exposure to his trainers or the ANSF experience in general.

Dayuhan
08-20-2012, 11:37 PM
So, a man joins the ANSF in a belief that he is best served by supporting the current government.

I'm not sure it's safe to assume that everyone who joins the ANSF believes that he is best served by supporting the government. Might there not be cases where people who aren't particularly supportive of the government join the ANSF for a paycheck, or for personal security? I suspect that taking sides is often more closely related to personal factors than to any particular belief about what's best for the country.

In parts of the Philippines it's still common for clans to place some of their young men in the military and police, just to have contacts there down the line. No idea if that's done in Afghanistan, but it wouldn't surprise me.

Just saying I don't think it's safe to assume that those in the ANSF are or ever have been supporters of the government.

Has there been any effort to break these killings down into efforts to kill any American, generically, and those targeting a specific American?

Fuchs
08-21-2012, 01:00 AM
I'm not sure it's safe to assume that everyone who joins the ANSF believes that he is best served by supporting the government. Might there not be cases where people who aren't particularly supportive of the government join the ANSF for a paycheck, or for personal security? I suspect that taking sides is often more closely related to personal factors (..)

I meant to write something similar, but then I concluded that this is actually included in what he wrote.

sean bastle
08-21-2012, 04:07 AM
Has there been any effort to break these killings down into efforts to kill any American, generically, and those targeting a specific American?

There has been, but its hard to get good data because in so many cases the "shooter," is killed themselves. But the thought is that in most cases the perp is just trying to kill any American. Or, perhaps more appropriately, as many Americans as possible.

Bob's World
08-21-2012, 09:41 AM
I'm not sure it's safe to assume that everyone who joins the ANSF believes that he is best served by supporting the government. Might there not be cases where people who aren't particularly supportive of the government join the ANSF for a paycheck, or for personal security? I suspect that taking sides is often more closely related to personal factors than to any particular belief about what's best for the country.

In parts of the Philippines it's still common for clans to place some of their young men in the military and police, just to have contacts there down the line. No idea if that's done in Afghanistan, but it wouldn't surprise me.

Just saying I don't think it's safe to assume that those in the ANSF are or ever have been supporters of the government.

Has there been any effort to break these killings down into efforts to kill any American, generically, and those targeting a specific American?

Dayuhan, Curmudgen - neither one of you needed to make this point in response to my post, as I had already made it as a cornerstone position OF my post

"So, a man joins the ANSF in a belief that he is best served by supporting the current government"

(Key phrase being "a belief that he is best served." I never said that these were all patriots who joined on some partriotic agenda to make GIRoA work. Some certainly are, but I never even implied that most were anything but individuals trying to do what they see is best for them. Same is true when they opt to act in a manner that supports the insurgency.)

J Wolfsberger
08-21-2012, 12:17 PM
Can anyone point me to any sort of survey that attempts to quantify Afghan attitudes (preferably by tribal affiliation) toward the Afghan government, US troops or the US in general?

I don't mean the type of "opinion" polls we're currently getting inundated with in the US during the presidential election season. I mean the kind of internal polls the campaigns conduct where they don't dare lie to themselves.

If we don't understand how or what the Afghans really think of their own government and us, it seems like we're flying blind trying to understand what prompts this type of violence.

TheCurmudgeon
08-21-2012, 12:51 PM
Can anyone point me to any sort of survey that attempts to quantify Afghan attitudes (preferably by tribal affiliation) toward the Afghan government, US troops or the US in general?

I don't mean the type of "opinion" polls we're currently getting inundated with in the US during the presidential election season. I mean the kind of internal polls the campaigns conduct where they don't dare lie to themselves.

If we don't understand how or what the Afghans really think of their own government and us, it seems like we're flying blind trying to understand what prompts this type of violence.

Carl posted this some time back:

A crisis of trust and cultural incompatibility (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/26/125304/a-crisis-of-trust-and-cultural.html#storylink=cpy)

It is limited to ANSF attitudes, as opposed to the general population, and it has a relatively small sample. Still, it is pretty good.

davidbfpo
08-21-2012, 08:08 PM
A very different place, but useful here and I emphasis the question mark. An account by an Israeli Defence Force soldier deployed to checkpoint duties:
the checkpoints’ primary mission is to demonstrate presence, to exhibit the army’s constant surveillance and its overwhelming force. Because the checkpoints are pervasive and involve intense interaction with the civilian population, they have become the clearest expression of the IDF’s dual message to West Bank Palestinians: you cannot hide and you cannot fight; Israel is both omnipresent and omnipotent.

Link:http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.4/oded_naaman_israeli_defense_forces_palestinians_oc cupation.php

TheCurmudgeon
08-21-2012, 09:37 PM
That the soldier’s power exceeds any rule does not render him powerful but, rather, destroys him. Being “above the law” drains the soldier of his defining principles. At times, he might feel he is passively witnessing the person he has become: his hands, signaling arbitrarily “go ahead,” “wait over there,” “shut up,” “show me this,” “show me that”; his voice uttering words: “I don’t care, your permit has expired,” “have a good day,” “where do you think you’re going?”
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.4/oded_naaman_israeli_defense_forces_palestinians_oc cupation.php

A bit of a two way street ... How do we prepare the average general purpose Soldier for this level of power ....

Fuchs
08-21-2012, 10:16 PM
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.4/oded_naaman_israeli_defense_forces_palestinians_oc cupation.php

A bit of a two way street ... How do we prepare the average general purpose Soldier for this level of power ....

Judging by anecdotal evidence about American policemen and anecdotal personal experience with airport security, I wouldn't exactly suspect a grand spring of great trainers for that in the U.S..

Ken White
08-22-2012, 02:47 AM
Unfortunately, they are rarely allowed to train others because we are wedded to the foolish myth that anyone / everyone can do anything / everything and to the equally foolish dream that people must move about frequently and go to new jobs so they are more qualified to do more things... :rolleyes:

Thoise two fallacies have ruined US police practices, are almost directly reponsible for the flaws in airport screening and have harmed the Armed forces of the US -- all significantly.

Curmudgeon:

You avoid having to do that if at all possible because that is not s GP task for the GPF. It's a highly specialized task that requires specialized training and selective assignments -- anathema to the US Army...

You could also re-define "average" -- or realize that many members of that 'average' cohort are more competent than their nominal superiors.

carl
08-22-2012, 03:48 AM
Judging by anecdotal evidence about American policemen and anecdotal personal experience with airport security, I wouldn't exactly suspect a grand spring of great trainers for that in the U.S..

The behavior of TSA people at airports in the US varies radically. Denver is great and has been for years. Atlanta TSA inspires dark thoughts of retribution and D.C. seemed to vary. That can't be just random. It has to be the result of the leaders in the various places and maybe a culture that gets established, all things that are within the control of the powers that be, if they care about it, as Ken says.

Same thing with cops. It depends fully upon the leadership and the culture that gets established. And that can change, and change fairly quickly once the right people are put in charge and given support.

This is an aside but we thought that a lot depends, or seemed to, upon how quick backup can get there. If you are a stater in Montana at 0300 40 miles from anywhere, you are a lot less likely to be needlessly aggressive than if you are an LAPD guy on the city street at 0300. In one case backup may arrive in 20 to 40 minutes in the other it may arrive in 1 or 2. That makes a difference.

carl
08-24-2012, 04:13 AM
A thought occurred to me relating to this subject and I will present in full expectation that it will be torn apart but I'll do it anyway. Because I'm far away and trons, even hostile ones, can't hurt me.

I think you can look at part of the success of our efforts in Iraq (such as they were) as being due to AQI behaving very badly and convincing the Sunni tribes through that bad behavior the we were the better choice since one had to be made. They pissed off the people more than we did and the people turned on them and they were almost completely suppressed, at least for a time.

You can look at our experience in Afghanistan in a similar way, except we are AQI so to speak. We have behaved badly over the past 11 years and the Afghans, as evidenced by these murders, are turning on us. They may not like Taliban & Co much but they like our presence even less than the resources we bring to keep Taliban & Co out. It seems that a significant proportion of them may be more willing to take their chances with Taliban & Co without us than to tolerate us hanging around any more.

The point of my observation is that AQI lost in Iraq because they made the very great error of pissing off the people more than their opponents. We have made the exact same mistake in Afghanistan and may get chased out by Afghan gov forces (in effect) because of it.

I now stand ready for my point to be brutally refuted.

TheCurmudgeon
08-24-2012, 10:41 AM
I would like to offer three ideas for consideration.

First, reduce or limit the number of general purpose forces working directly with ANSF.

Second, create a Cultural Liaison Officer who is imbedded in units working directly with ANSF. Their job is to observe and identify potential cultural issues that could fester and explode into violence. There would be one on the ISAF side and one on the ANSF side. The would consult together and make recommendations for interventions.

Third, institute a Sulha style conflict resolution system. The Sulha’s task is to facilitate transformation of the disputants’ as well as their clans from a desire for revenge (with its potential implication of endless blood revenge cycles) to a willingness to forgive, binding all disputants, for all generations, past, present, and future. The Sulha is based on a mix of mediation and arbitration applications performed interchangeably by a Sulha committee ( Jaha) composed of community dignitaries—men with standing and clout. On the “mediation side,” Sulha strives to reconcile differences between the disputants’; on the “arbitration side,” the decision of the Jaha is final and binding. (Pely, D. (2010). Honor: The Sulha's main dispute resolution tool. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 28(1), 67-81. doi:10.1002/crq.20013) The intent would be to arbitrate disputes in a system that would be acceptable to the Afghans.

The overall intent would be to identify problems at the unit level and resolve disputes there. Where this is not possible the alternative would be to personnel actions to separate the ISAF or ANSF personnel who are most antagonizing the situation.

TheCurmudgeon
08-24-2012, 10:43 AM
A thought occurred to me relating to this subject and I will present in full expectation that it will be torn apart but I'll do it anyway. Because I'm far away and trons, even hostile ones, can't hurt me.

I think you can look at part of the success of our efforts in Iraq (such as they were) as being due to AQI behaving very badly and convincing the Sunni tribes through that bad behavior the we were the better choice since one had to be made. They pissed off the people more than we did and the people turned on them and they were almost completely suppressed, at least for a time.

You can look at our experience in Afghanistan in a similar way, except we are AQI so to speak. We have behaved badly over the past 11 years and the Afghans, as evidenced by these murders, are turning on us. They may not like Taliban & Co much but they like our presence even less than the resources we bring to keep Taliban & Co out. It seems that a significant proportion of them may be more willing to take their chances with Taliban & Co without us than to tolerate us hanging around any more.

The point of my observation is that AQI lost in Iraq because they made the very great error of pissing off the people more than their opponents. We have made the exact same mistake in Afghanistan and may get chased out by Afghan gov forces (in effect) because of it.

I now stand ready for my point to be brutally refuted.

Carl,

While I think there were additional consideration in what happened in Iraq, particularly the willingness of the Sunni’s to work with us instead of in parallel to us, the imputes for the actions of the Sunni’s was certainly AQI’s lack of understanding of their target audience.

Fuchs
08-24-2012, 10:54 AM
First, reduce or limit the number of general purpose forces working directly with ANSF.

In my experience the difference between "general purpose" troops and specialists is often only one of paperwork and a course.

I wouldn't be satisfied by such a criterion.


Instead, one might create a list of units that worked fine and the time periods thereof.
Next, look up personnel files to identify people who experienced these good practices for long enough, finally check them with an interview. Said interview might be in a bar with some cool beer - a more promising environment than some sterile interviewer's desk.

TheCurmudgeon
08-24-2012, 11:09 AM
In my experience the difference between "general purpose" troops and specialists is often only one of paperwork and a course.

I wouldn't be satisfied by such a criterion.

I agree, it is a vaguely defined term, and not all units are the same. I guess I would like to see more mature, experienced forces working with the ANSF.


Instead, one might create a list of units that worked fine and the time periods thereof.
Next, look up personnel files to identify people who experienced these good practices for long enough, finally check them with an interview. Said interview might be in a bar with some cool beer - a more promising environment than some sterile interviewer's desk.

I think you just described the SF selection system:D

Fuchs
08-24-2012, 11:44 AM
Top U.S. General: We Don’t Know Why Afghan Troops Are Killing Us (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/allen-green-on-blue/)

By Spencer Ackerman
August 23, 2012


General John Allen, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said he still doesn’t know why at least 10 NATO troops have died in the last two weeks at the hands of the Afghan forces they mentor. He suspects it may have something to do with asking those Afghans to perform dangerous operations during the recent Muslim holy month. Maybe.

If that doesn’t sound like a positive sign for the decade-long war — after all, the entire American strategy now depends on turning security over to the Afghans — Allen wasn’t in a mood to sugar-coat Afghanistan. In what may have been the bluntest press conference delivered by a top commander since the U.S. went to war in 2001, Allen told Pentagon reporters he expected Afghanistan will still suffer from “violence” after U.S. combat ends in 2014; that Hamid Karzai’s government has to act “now” to govern parts of the country that NATO has taken from the Taliban; and that a reduction in violence in the country since last year “may not be statistically significant.”

(...)

Ken White
08-24-2012, 03:43 PM
Ascribing western thought processes to either Afghans or Arabs is likely to provide an incorrect assessment of the 'problem.'

People who regard personal or family honor -- or the display of the concept -- as more important than communal factors are going to react to different stimuli than will those who espouse a communitarian outlook as is common in the west.

We were no uglier in Afghanistan than we were in Iraq -- in fact, due to sheer numbers and locales, one could make the case that we were and are less 'ugly' (whatever that means) -- It's just that not only are the denizens of either nation Western, Afghans aren't Arabs.

Ken White
08-24-2012, 03:50 PM
Instead, one might create a list of units that worked fine and the time periods thereof.
Next, look up personnel files to identify people who experienced these good practices for long enough, finally check them with an interview. Said interview might be in a bar with some cool beer - a more promising environment than some sterile interviewer's desk.Marines. too. It worked quite well.

Regrettably, as Curmudgeon said, that has some relationship to SF selection -- not much but some -- and the larger Army has been forced to avoid such a sensible process as it would be 'unfair' and not 'objective' as the Congress of the US has told DoD their Officer selection processes must be. That destructive fallacy is now migrating to the NCO Corps and the prognosis ain't good... :rolleyes:

Can't officially compare units, either -- that might introduce an 'elitist' tendency which is anathema to the social engineers. :mad:

Ken White
08-24-2012, 03:59 PM
I agree, it is a vaguely defined term, and not all units are the same. I guess I would like to see more mature, experienced forces working with the ANSF.I think you just described SF. ;)

Always use the right tool for the job, horses for courses and all that... :o

carl
08-24-2012, 04:32 PM
I would like to offer three ideas for consideration.

The first idea is great. And if we reduced all forces to the point where we could support them via means other than through Karachi, that would kill two birds with one stone.

For the second, would the cultural liaison officers have any real authority to actually do something or be limited to advice only? Also, isn't that the job of the small unit leadership in any case?

For the third, sounds good to me but how would you do it with all the personnel and unit turbulence and movement on our side?

carl
08-24-2012, 04:44 PM
Fuchs:

The article you cited said the GEN Allen didn't know why the Afghan gov people were shooting our people. We've been there eleven years and he's guessing about fasting during daylight hours having something to do with it. An article linked to that one said GEN Allen is leaving and his replacement will be the FIFTH overall commander in 4 years. The top job over there seems to be turning into another ticket to be punched on the climb up the career ladder.

I have concluded that we have the best machines, but at least at the top, we don't have the best men. They do-that is if you judge the best men by if they win or not, not by how likely they are to slit your throat.

carl
08-24-2012, 04:52 PM
Ascribing western thought processes to either Afghans or Arabs is likely to provide an incorrect assessment of the 'problem.'

People who regard personal or family honor -- or the display of the concept -- as more important than communal factors are going to react to different stimuli than will those who espouse a communitarian outlook as is common in the west.

We were no uglier in Afghanistan than we were in Iraq -- in fact, due to sheer numbers and locales, one could make the case that we were and are less 'ugly' (whatever that means) -- It's just that not only are the denizens of either nation Western, Afghans aren't Arabs.

Could that view of honor vs communitarian values be ascribed to the view of 18th and 19th century Southerners vs Northerners in the US?

We may not be any uglier in Afghanistan that we were in Iraq but the results of that are turning out to be much more important in Afghanistan. We have handled cultural differences before over hundreds of years. We don't seem to be doing so good a job anymore. And it seems from what I've read, the kinds of things that are setting these guys off are the kinds of things that set most people off, Western or Eastern.

TheCurmudgeon
08-24-2012, 07:46 PM
For the second, would the cultural liaison officers have any real authority to actually do something or be limited to advice only? Also, isn't that the job of the small unit leadership in any case?


I would have them assigned to the Battalion attached to the Platoon. They would have whatever authority the BN CDR gave them. I would probably have them report to the BN CSM, but I am not totally convinced that is the best way to go.

First line supervisors are the wrong person for this job. They are too close the the Soldiers involved and will take sides. This needs to be a "disinterested" party who observes and consults with his opposite number. He should have cultural training and preferably language ability. I would like him to be a senior NCO (E-7 or above).

davidbfpo
08-24-2012, 09:29 PM
I have merged two threads, the new 'Green-on Blue - Is our cultural ignorance killing us ... literally' and the older thread 'What causes some in the ANSF to kill ISAF?'.

Stats: x17 posts, 2415 views and x79 posts with 2151 views.

The title has become 'Green on Blue: causes and responses' (merged thread).

Ken White
08-25-2012, 07:54 PM
Could that view of honor vs communitarian values be ascribed to the view of 18th and 19th century Southerners vs Northerners in the US?Absolutely. Still somewhat true today.

Fortunately... ;)
We may not be any uglier in Afghanistan that we were in Iraq but the results of that are turning out to be much more important in Afghanistan...That's your assessment. Mine differs, it's not an ounce more important, it just has a different effect due to the cultural difference.
We have handled cultural differences before over hundreds of years. We don't seem to be doing so good a job anymore.Again our assessments differ, my reading of history says that we have done far from a good job at that. Certainly Metacom, Thayandanega, Osceola, Sitting Bull, Emiliano Aguinaldo and Pancho Villa didn't think so. In my travels here and there from 1947 forward, I found that most of the folks with whom I had contact were very polite but in real serious conversation would point out that they didn't believe we got along at all well with their nation or culture...

I've been in virtually all Asian nations, a couple on the other continents and throughout the ME. I can't think of a single nation where, once you break past the politeness barrier (Most other cultures are more polite than Americans IMO) a majority of people would agree we get along with other cultures all that well.
And it seems from what I've read, the kinds of things that are setting these guys off are the kinds of things that set most people off, Western or Eastern.What one reads -- and infers -- versus what happens on the ground often differ significantly.

However, could it be that the 'set-off' factors are or certainly may be the same but the fact that the reaction is different in Afghanistan is the crux of the problem?

carl
08-26-2012, 07:47 PM
Ken:

Well if the North-South divide between a concept of honor and communitarian values could be bridged so as to allow for a pre and post Civil War Army that wasn't riven by a huge number of murders done by Southerners to Northerners, I don't see that as the persuasive explanation for all these murders.

There is a matter of degree of course but in our history we have worked successfully with people from radically different cultures who worked as closely or more closely with our forces as do the ANSF people without, to my knowledge, these types of murders being committed at such rates. I am thinking of things like the KATUSAs, all the many Indian scout and auxiliary units during the course of expansion in North America, and the Philippine Scout and Constabulary units. We have even successfully worked with Muslim men from a culture just as prickly if not more so than the Afghans, those being the Moro members of the Philippine Constabulary.

I agree that many people from other nations, when pressed, will say they don't like the Yanks much, even those working with us as allies. But that degree of dislike doesn't lead to murder on such a rate. This is something that I don't believe has a precedent, though my historical knowledge is limited.

Whether this is more or less important than problems in Iraq or if it is only the effect is different isn't the important thing in my mind. The important thing is that these killings may result in us getting bounced out of there much sooner and in a much more confused way than we are planning on. Maybe not of course, but I think that is more than possible edging into probable territory.

That reaction to set off factors may be different in Afghanistan than elsewhere is a very good point. But we have been there for 11 years. We should know how things differ and make or have made changes in order to allow for those differences. However, judging by the number of murders and their increasing frequency, we haven't. I don't think things had to come to this point. But they have and I don't think much, if anything can be done about it.

Ken White
08-27-2012, 04:10 AM
There is a matter of degree of course but in our history we have worked successfully with people from radically different cultures ..I think you may wish to read a little more deeply into that thought. There was friction in many of the cases you cite, just didn't arise with folks who were into multi-generation blood feuds.
We have even successfully worked with Muslim men from a culture just as prickly if not more so than the Afghans, those being the Moro members of the Philippine Constabulary. Also, the Moro Constabulary guys in the 5th Region were told by their Imams and Datus to go and to do good -- and they did. They were also locally receruited and employed. With the Afghans, we deliberately avoided local recruiting or getting elders and Imams involved. That doesn't mean we didn't know better, it means we deliberately decided to support other values. A mistake? Sure, one of many -- but stemming not so much from ignorance as from egos and arrogance "we know what's best..." :mad:

Having worked with Filipinos to include Muslims and with Afghans, I disagree with that assessment of temperament....
The important thing is that these killings may result in us getting bounced out of there much sooner and in a much more confused way than we are planning on. Maybe not of course, but I think that is more than possible edging into probable territory.Given the extremely confused way we are now leaving, I doubt more confusion would be possible but if it were, it might even help. More speed in leaving, a more likely outcome would not be at all bad.
That reaction to set off factors may be different in Afghanistan than elsewhere is a very good point. But we have been there for 11 years.No, we have not. We have been there for 11 one year or less tours, a very different thing.
We should know how things differ and make or have made changes in order to allow for those differences.We do know but we cannot change the way we do business. Many thing we do are not really very smart but they are deeply imbedded and both societal and Congressional pressures as well as long standing policies preclude any significant change. You and I can talk about what's wrong until we're both blue in the face, we can agree on much of what should be changed but in the end, I'll tell you it will not be changed and you'll say that it isn't right. I'll then say "you're correct -- but it still won't change." We've already done that on this and similar topics. No sense in doing it again.
However, judging by the number of murders and their increasing frequency, we haven't.Oh, many have -- problem is that most of 'em figure out what to do just before they rotate and and new guy comes in, won't listen to the old guy because he's smart (ego and arrogance again...) and proceeds to make the same mistakes...:(
I don't think things had to come to this point. But they have and I don't think much, if anything can be done about it.In reverse order, I agree little to nothing can or will be done about it but disagree that it didn't have to come to this point. It did. The minute George W. Bush decided to change the game plan and stay in Afghanistan, it was pre-ordained. I was telling folks that right after I came on this board five years ago. Nothing's changed. Nothing. Except we told the world we were going to leave which just encouraged everyone involved -- including the homicidally inclined -- to cock a snook at anything American.

carl
08-27-2012, 03:02 PM
we agree on most things, we just use different words and angles to get to the same place.

We did work with all those groups successfully and there was some friction, but not to the point of forcing premature withdrawal because of frequent murders. There are reasons for that, reasons within our control, reasons that you alluded to. The practices that resulted in this mess aren't the result of of ineluctable forces of nature, they are the result of human decision making. Humans can change what they decide, even though the military-political culture seems set in stone. For the moment in this conflict, nothing will change, granted. But that doesn't mean this failure can't be used as a wake up call. It must be used as a wake up call because if we get into a tussle with the Red Chinese and haven't changed our ways, things will go poorly.

You mention that we haven't been in Afghanistan for 11 years. No, we have. United States forces have been in Afghanistan for 11 years. That is what the world, and the American people see. We have been there for 11 years. They don't see that we have had 11 different iterations of United States forces, each so different that we in effect went in and pulled out 11 times. Neither do they see that was something that was fully within our control and that we made a conscious decision to be foolish. Now you are right that the set-in-stone culture made that inevitable. But that can be changed.

In my view the professional military has a special responsibility in trying to change that culture. I just started Losing Small Wars and Ledwidge made a comment about the military profession and the legal and medical ones. The comment highlighted to me that the military profession, as practiced in the US now at least at the high levels, isn't up to the professional standards of the docs and lawyers. They must give their best professional advice whether the client/patient wants to hear it or not. IF they don't they can be and sometimes are held accountable. Our high end military doesn't meet or have to meet the same standards of professional behavior. They go along with things they know, or should know, can't work by hiding behind the "can do" attitude or complicated power point presentations about how things aren't really bad. (They're really good, see look at slide 37!) Or they'll shrug their shoulders and say we'll look into it. These murders are a fine example of the incompetence of the high level US military. They have been ramping up for several years and the top US commander when asked why, makes a guess about Ramadan because he doesn't know.

The US military must take a hard look at itself, especially/mainly the stars and multi-stars, figure what is wrong and articulate a way to fix it. That would move them up to the level of professionalism at least of the docs and lawyers. They have to at least be able to tell the patient/client the truth and continue to tell the truth even if the patient doesn't want to hear it. I of course, can't make that happen. I don't know who can or how they can. I just know that if they don't we will have more trouble and maybe really big trouble.

That second quote in your last post: only the first sentence was mine. Where did the rest of it come from?

Absolutely. Your assessment of the relative pricklyness of the people you worked with must be countenanced. But you didn't work with the Moros of 1900. You worked with the Moros of much later. Judging from my reading (from within the safe confines of my US armchair), they weren't the same Moros. And I'm not sure what propensity for multi-generational blood feuds have to do with an argument at a checkpoint that results in two US and one ANSF dead, as happened yesterday.

jcustis
08-27-2012, 05:10 PM
I would like to offer three ideas for consideration.

First, reduce or limit the number of general purpose forces working directly with ANSF.

Second, create a Cultural Liaison Officer who is imbedded in units working directly with ANSF. Their job is to observe and identify potential cultural issues that could fester and explode into violence. There would be one on the ISAF side and one on the ANSF side. The would consult together and make recommendations for interventions.

Third, institute a Sulha style conflict resolution system. The Sulha’s task is to facilitate transformation of the disputants’ as well as their clans from a desire for revenge (with its potential implication of endless blood revenge cycles) to a willingness to forgive, binding all disputants, for all generations, past, present, and future. The Sulha is based on a mix of mediation and arbitration applications performed interchangeably by a Sulha committee ( Jaha) composed of community dignitaries—men with standing and clout. On the “mediation side,” Sulha strives to reconcile differences between the disputants’; on the “arbitration side,” the decision of the Jaha is final and binding. (Pely, D. (2010). Honor: The Sulha's main dispute resolution tool. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 28(1), 67-81. doi:10.1002/crq.20013) The intent would be to arbitrate disputes in a system that would be acceptable to the Afghans.

The overall intent would be to identify problems at the unit level and resolve disputes there. Where this is not possible the alternative would be to personnel actions to separate the ISAF or ANSF personnel who are most antagonizing the situation.

This sounds like good stock for a Joint Forces Quarterly or PRISM article that you should write.

There's been a lot of studying and admiring of the problem in this thread, and you've had the most concrete recommendations.

At the tactical level, even if we cannot put a finger on 100% of the causation, we need better means to deter, prevent, and defeat future attacks. I think we are headed in the right direction, but in the wake of some of the personal protection measures that are being implemented aboard secure sites (magazine inserted and Condition 1 or 3 at all times), we probably stand to fan flames over some parts of the problem. I hope we can avoid a cycle of damned if you do and damned if you don't.

To shift trails a bit, it is my opinion (alone) that we really need to consider Afghan sensibilities over women as well. I'm not convinced that the employment of women in FETs, in support of ETTs, and through other means that have them brushing up against ANSF, makes the situation of Green-on-Blue any easier to resolve. I think it in fact heightens the risks of an Afghan male losing his bearing.

The same could be said though for building COPs and FOBs where one can get ten flavors of ice cream in one of the most dismal parts of Afghanistan, and then inviting ANSF over who still sleep in hand-wrought mud buildings. Don't read the above paragraph and assume I am a male chauvinist (sp?), but it comes to mind among many other things we could probably stand to do differently over there.

Sidenote-Has anyone done any scrounging to see if the Soviets had similar problems during their time in AFG and trying to prop up a government?

davidbfpo
08-27-2012, 05:54 PM
Jon asked:
Has anyone done any scrounging to see if the Soviets had similar problems during their time in AFG and trying to prop up a government?

I have looked thought the 'Soviet Experience in Afghanistan' thread, plus some of the linked articles and found nothing. There is one article (Post No.12) that refers to KGB advisers undergoing a two year training before deployment and concerns over "Muj" infiltration of Afghan forces.

IIRC the Soviet intervention suffered from Afghan Army units defecting or refusing to fight, not individual acts of murder. There is long-standing story that a massacre of Soviet advisers and families in Herat before the 1980 intervention, but in my recent reading this appears to be a legend.

Ken White
08-27-2012, 08:27 PM
we agree on most things, we just use different words and angles to get to the same place.Mmmm. To an extent but we have significant philosophical differences and when that's added to the experience variations, it's more than different words and angles... :o
We did work with all those groups successfully and there was some friction, but not to the point of forcing premature withdrawal because of frequent murders.I doubt the frequent murders will cause a withdrawal. I also suspect that the friction involved in those other situations was seen as less benign than it is looked at historically.

There are other problems. Take KATUSAs for example, their baser options were constrained by very, very rigid, almost sadistic ROK Army discipline -- the Afghans don't operate that way. The Moros in the Constabulary were constrained by their Chiefs and Imams. The Afghans have Elders and Imams but Afghan culture is far more individualistic and less communitarian; those community leaders are heeded pretty much only when it suits.
For the moment in this conflict, nothing will change, granted. But that doesn't mean this failure can't be used as a wake up call. It must be used as a wake up call because if we get into a tussle with the Red Chinese and haven't changed our ways, things will go poorly.Perhaps you missed it in your reading but things always go poorly for us in every war -- and the lower the intensity of those wars, the longer it takes us to learn and get down to business. So, your statement is correct -- we will not change and if we get into difficulties with the Chinese, things will go poorly for us. Only when we bring masses of people into the forces and they and the enemy of the moment FORCE new thinking do we start improving (Note that not since we were in WW II have we faced an enemy significant enough and / or with capability to force that; not once since 1945). As I said, you and I can wish as much as we want to but that is not going to change...:(
...United States forces have been in Afghanistan for 11 years. That is what the world, and the American people see.I cannot dictate what the world or most Americans (including you, apparently -- or do you??? ;) ) believe they see. Nor am I much concerned about them or that -- it does not change the reality, if they miss that, it's a lick on them...
They don't see that we have had 11 different iterations of United States forces, each so different that we in effect went in and pulled out 11 times. Neither do they see that was something that was fully within our control and that we made a conscious decision to be foolish. Now you are right that the set-in-stone culture made that inevitable. But that can be changed.Well, maybe you do see but you're still living in a dream world. Yes, it can be changed but while to you there is cause for such change to be forced, I can assure you that most of the political and military establishment and most definitely the Congress do NOT see it that way. It can be changed but it will not be.
The comment highlighted to me that the military profession, as practiced in the US now at least at the high levels, isn't up to the professional standards of the docs and lawyers.Given the significant problems with the Health Care and Legal industries, you'll pardon me if I find that allegory totally laughable. That doesn't mean the upper echelons of the Military are good or even marginally competent, they are not (and anyone who believes that is not a systemic problem isn't really looking at why it's that way...) -- but simply that the Medical and Legal profession are little if any better and IMO anyone who thinks they are needs to undertake deeper study of all three.
The US military must take a hard look at itself, especially/mainly the stars and multi-stars, figure what is wrong and articulate a way to fix it. That would move them up to the level of professionalism at least of the docs and lawyers.Most of them know what's wrong, however, they are systemically constrained and cannot do what you wish. Since I strongly disagree on the levels of professionalism of the docs and lawyers -- and at my age and with my background, I bet I've had far more dealings with both those than you have -- I'll simply point out that all three professions have systemic constraints that limit their ability to truly force change and increase effectiveness. It is what it is and the best approach is to live with it and try to circumvent those systemic thin gs to the extent possible.
...I just know that if they don't we will have more trouble and maybe really big trouble.Almost certainly -- that's the way it's been for over 200 years; unlikely to change barring a disaster; those forced most earlier changes. A few changes occur without that impetus or catalyst but they come very slowly.
That second quote in your last post: only the first sentence was mine. Where did the rest of it come from?Bad edit on my part, now corrected. Sorry.
And I'm not sure what propensity for multi-generational blood feuds have to do with an argument at a checkpoint that results in two US and one ANSF dead, as happened yesterday.Then you have missed the most important point in this sub-thread. Violence in problem solving leads to feuds. A history of such conflicts while present to an extent in some of the other culture herein mentioned (to include us in the West and in the US in particular) is, in Afghanistan which has not undergone the leavening / 'civilizing' processes of most modern nations including the Philippines, literally defines the Afghans. The propensity to get hacked off at a slight, real or perceived and take violent reprisal action is deeply embedded due to that lack of leavening. You or I get insulted, we may get angry, may even get even -- but neither of us is likely to have first thoughts of the offending person being dead at our feet. Some gang bangers here operate that way but not too many of even those; in Afghanistan, it is the norm. It can and likely will be changed but it'll take more than has occurred in the last 50 years there to cause that change.

Check the LINK (http://www.google.com/imgres?hl=en&client=firefox-a&hs=29l&sa=X&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&channel=fflb&biw=1134&bih=926&tbm=isch&prmd=imvns&tbnid=q67aP8xQBMe4BM:&imgrefurl=http://www.gocomics.com/doonesbury/2008/01/13/&imgurl=http://assets.amuniversal.com/2f0ec0705d4b012ee3bd00163e41dd5b&w=600&h=793&ei=PtM7UNe7EOTe2QWUr4DgAg&zoom=1&iact=hc&vpx=115&vpy=119&dur=2495&hovh=258&hovw=195&tx=146&ty=183&sig=113357141366235772832&page=1&tbnh=138&tbnw=104&start=0&ndsp=30&ved=1t:429,r:0,s:0,i:75). It was set in Iraq where some elements of the culture exist but the Arabs are sort of laid back about it, they tend to be patient and wait for an opportunity in order to avoid adverse consequences -- the Afghans do not do laid back, they do not wait, they're hotheads and they're into instant response and consequences be damned... :wry:

Steve Blair
08-27-2012, 08:47 PM
I could bore people with tales of Indian scouts during the Frontier Army period of our own history, but won't. Suffice it to say, though, that the relationship there was not smooth or painless (for either side).

Fuchs
08-27-2012, 08:57 PM
So, your statement is correct -- we will not change and if we get into difficulties with the Chinese, things will go poorly for us. Only when we bring masses of people into the forces and they and the enemy of the moment FORCE new thinking do we start improving (Note that not since we were in WW II have we faced an enemy significant enough and / or with capability to force that; not once since 1945).

I'd like to intervene and assert that the U.S.Army did not improve in WW2 until after the Battle of the Kasserine Pass (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Kasserine_Pass) in early 1943.

I've so far not seen any evidence for quality improvements by the influx of fresh recruits by early '42.

The idea of how fresh troops bring change in themselves doesn't sound plausible to me anyway, for they could not have much impact prior to becoming majors - and that lasts a while, at the very least about two years in World War mode of operations (90 day wonders who miraculously survived their early engagements and keep getting field-promoted) afaik.


- - - - -

I also like to point out that the North Koreans and Chinese on their offensives should be counted as capable enough to force some improvements on the U.S.Army. The lasting effect of their offensive infantry actions in hilly/mountainous terrain (prior to the Korean War turning into a static war) was astonishingly marginal, but they did exert a lot of pressure and generated some thorough embarrassment on parts of army and marines.

Fuchs
08-27-2012, 08:59 PM
IIRC the Soviet intervention suffered from Afghan Army units defecting or refusing to fight, not individual acts of murder.

The Afghans of the 80's were mostly different Afghans, and the society was different. A generation worth of civil war has been added since, and this has disrupted the civil society, customs, mentality and much else that could be considered relevant.

Dayuhan
08-27-2012, 10:39 PM
The Moros in the Constabulary were constrained by their Chiefs and Imams.

Moros who joined the Constabulary generally did so because their datu (chief) decided to back the Americans, generally as a way to gain leverage over other datus or to gain the inside track on positions and largesse the Americans were expected to dole out. The datus were fairly astute and in many cases the tactic was effective. The individual soldiers would be unlikely to turn on Americans because in their eyes they were still in the service of their own datu and any move of that sort would be a move against their own clan.

Afghanistan is of course completely different. I'm always hesitant to accept the idea that we used to know how to do certain things, and subsequently forgot. More often the circumstances have changed to the point that what worked before no longer works.

Ken White
08-27-2012, 11:02 PM
I'd like to intervene and assert that the U.S.Army did not improve in WW2 until after the Battle of the Kasserine Pass (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Kasserine_Pass) in early 1943.

I've so far not seen any evidence for quality improvements by the influx of fresh recruits by early '42.I agree and have before -- it was actually 1944 before the influx of new people gained enough seniority to challenge the system. That applies to all services.
The idea of how fresh troops bring change in themselves doesn't sound plausible to me anyway, for they could not have much impact prior to becoming majors - and that lasts a while, at the very least about two years in World War mode of operations (90 day wonders who miraculously survived their early engagements and keep getting field-promoted) afaik.Also agree with that -- and have long said so here. That's mostly why I say it was '44 before they had an impact.

I also like to point out that the North Koreans and Chinese on their offensives should be counted as capable enough to force some improvements on the U.S.Army. The lasting effect of their offensive infantry actions in hilly/mountainous terrain (prior to the Korean War turning into a static war) was astonishingly marginal, but they did exert a lot of pressure and generated some thorough embarrassment on parts of army and marines.Mostly correct and they did force some minor improvements, unfortunately in that respect but fortunately in most respects Korea ended too soon for many of those improvements to survive the onset of Peace... :rolleyes:

Mostly, out of Viet Nam, we got bad habits... :wry:

Ken White
08-27-2012, 11:12 PM
Afghanistan is of course completely different. I'm always hesitant to accept the idea that we used to know how to do certain things, and subsequently forgot. More often the circumstances have changed to the point that what worked before no longer works.Yes. There's also the fact that people interpret 'history' differently and thus 'learn' varied lessons -- witness Carl and I -- or Gian and I... :wry:

Certainly the cultural differences of those groups Carl cites offer significantly different circumstances. The societal norms of even as late as the 1960s were far more permissive of the application of force or behavioral rules (both US and others...). Many differences.

All compounded if one cannot assure that one puts the most qualified person in charge, insure said person correctly interprets the lessons of the past and is then permitted (by law, societal pressure, superiors or other possible impediments) at least the potential to employ them, then awesome success is not probable. In fact, marginal success may not be...

TheCurmudgeon
08-28-2012, 11:14 AM
This sounds like good stock for a Joint Forces Quarterly or PRISM article that you should write.

Not there yet, still doing research. Contacting the key players in the things I have read to get further information. If the stars align I will try to set up a symposium type event at the campus I work at to discuss the issue. If I can't do that I will put what I can together and see who might want to read it.


At the tactical level, even if we cannot put a finger on 100% of the causation, we need better means to deter, prevent, and defeat future attacks. I think we are headed in the right direction, but in the wake of some of the personal protection measures that are being implemented aboard secure sites (magazine inserted and Condition 1 or 3 at all times), we probably stand to fan flames over some parts of the problem. I hope we can avoid a cycle of damned if you do and damned if you don't.

My concern is that we do not even recognize the warning signs until that warning sign is a barrel in our face. We don't understand the culture of the people we are working with and have no interest in trying. We are teaching them so they must fall in line with our methods, end of story ... at least until something bad happens.

Ken White
08-28-2012, 04:57 PM
We don't understand the culture of the people we are working with and have no interest in trying. We are teaching them so they must fall in line with our methods, end of story ... at least until something bad happens.Moral of that is do not use a crew of HVAC technicians to do EMT jobs. You cannot and will not fix that basic incompatibility problem with all the edumacational finesse in the world. The GPF milieu, Army or Marine, will never do the 'COIN' thing properly -- nor should it be able to do so. Use SF for that; if there aren't enough of them, you best have a Plan B...:mad:

As an aside, the application of 'metrics' in warfare usually is quite mistaken -- though we are indeed foolishly wedded to the concept. :rolleyes:

Steve Blair
08-28-2012, 05:20 PM
Afghanistan is of course completely different. I'm always hesitant to accept the idea that we used to know how to do certain things, and subsequently forgot. More often the circumstances have changed to the point that what worked before no longer works.

Typically what happens is a handful of individuals may have worked out what works (or what comes close to working). Those ideas, which are very situational and contextual, are either ignored or imperfectly documented by the institution in question, which then assumes that they are prescriptive ideas that work in any situation. The institution is not good at teaching people how to learn or comprehend their environment...that takes time and skills that may not be easily learned or taught (especially when the system places a premium on more technical or quantifiable skills). We don't do well what we don't value, and can usually be counted on to incorrectly document those things that we don't value. Thus we may build one heck of a bridge, but we'll insist on putting one where it isn't needed, or saddle a group with maintenance costs that they can't possibly afford.

TheCurmudgeon
08-28-2012, 05:28 PM
Moral of that is do not use a crew of HVAC technicians to do EMT jobs. You cannot and will not fix that basic incompatibility problem with all the edumacational finesse in the world. The GPF milieu, Army or Marine, will never do the 'COIN' thing properly -- nor should it be able to do so. Use SF for that; if there aren't enough of them, you best have a Plan B...:mad:

Agreed. But as you have pointed out on numerous occasions that is what will only happen in a perfect world.

If what I am thinking about works it may be applicable in other places (think JIIM). Not sure any of it is worth spit, but keep thinking that I ought to do something, even if its wrong. ;)

Ken White
08-28-2012, 07:32 PM
Agreed. But as you have pointed out on numerous occasions that is what will only happen in a perfect world.Not really, I have pointed out that has happened since 1961 (and looks as though it may well occur in the future). However, it does not necessarily have to happen in even an imperfect world. That's not quite the same thing as hoping for a perfect world that will never appear.
... keep thinking that I ought to do something, even if its wrong. ;)That is truly the American way... :wry:

The old US Army dictum was "Never apologize, never complain; always be five minutes early; and do something even if it's wrong." Worked well enough until 1918. Regrettably, we have not changed with the times; the time available for course corrections that then existed no longer is available. I think that approach is very much responsible for all the errors in the small wars arena and in many Army problems since 1961.

Added to that, the political class will seize upon any scholarly study, flawed or perfect, that supports what they want to do regardless of the merit or cost benefit ratio of that idea. It's the old "be careful what you wish for, you may get it..." :(

Ken White
08-28-2012, 07:38 PM
The institution is not good at teaching people how to learn or comprehend their environment...that takes time and skills that may not be easily learned or taught (especially when the system places a premium on more technical or quantifiable skills). * We don't do well what we don't value, and can usually be counted on to incorrectly document those things that we don't value...(emphasis added / kw)Terribly, scarily, disgustingly true... :mad:

* Not only regardless of value but tilted toward simplicity and ease of acquisition. Witness the Army's 'return' to the Three Event Physical Fitness Test instead of implementing the hard earned combat focused fitness requirements which the three event test will not reflect in any way. However, it'll be easier to administer and score and will offer 'an even playing field to all.' Sad. :mad:

davidbfpo
08-28-2012, 10:11 PM
Abu M is critical of the proposed new ISAF general:
The cultures, politics, tribes and peoples of Afghanistan are at least as complex as those of ancient Gaul, yet we Americans are so arrogant to think that we can send officers there with no experience and, owing to our superior knowledge of combat operations, watch them succeed. We will then send units which have never deployed to Afghanistan to partner with Afghan forces and wonder why they do not get along.

This is madness. The casual arrogance with which the U.S. military has approached the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has a direct relation to the difficulty with which we have fought each war. That we think we can send a commander to Afghanistan with no prior knowledge of Afghanistan and watch him be successful in the eleventh year of the conflict shows that after eleven years of conflict, we really don't know too much about Afghanistan. And we might not know too much about conflict either.

Note his post's title provides some context and the link is:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2012/08/monday-morning-mini-rants.html

Fuchs
08-28-2012, 10:16 PM
The old US Army dictum was "Never apologize, never complain; always be five minutes early; and do something even if it's wrong."

Maybe it's five minutes early, but that's usually overshadowed by being a couple years late...

TheCurmudgeon
08-28-2012, 11:04 PM
The old US Army dictum was "Never apologize, never complain; always be five minutes early; and do something even if it's wrong." Worked well enough until 1918. Regrettably, we have not changed with the times; the time available for course corrections that then existed no longer is available. I think that approach is very much responsible for all the errors in the small wars arena and in many Army problems since 1961.
That all depends on who thinks I am wrong now doesn't it ...


Added to that, the political class will seize upon any scholarly study, flawed or perfect, that supports what they want to do regardless of the merit or cost benefit ratio of that idea. It's the old "be careful what you wish for, you may get it..." :(
Fear of what someone else will do with what I write is not going to change my mind about writing it ... it will only change where I decide to send it.

Ken White
08-28-2012, 11:53 PM
That all depends on who thinks I am wrong now doesn't it.Mine was a generic statement. Obviously you missed the "1918" as well as the "we" in that statement, applying to the US as an entity. I doubt you were responsible for all the errors since 1961 and I have no clue -- nor do I care -- whether you are wrong or right on this issue.
Fear of what someone else will do with what I write is not going to change my mind about writing it ... it will only change where I decide to send it.I doubt fear can be instilled on an internet discussion board. I'd certainly never try to do that and you apparently missed the "flawed or perfect" element in comment stating my opinion on the crass stupidity of the Political class -- at whom that comment was directed.

If I intend a comment to be personal, it will be quite clear that was my intent.

Like this:

I suggest you read what's written and avoid interpolating between the lines. :wry:

Now back to the thread.

Fuchs:

Don't mix the political caution and the military propensity for a lack thereof. My comment was about the US Army, not the United States. US politicians ALWAYS address foreign policy (to include unleashing military forces) through the lens of domestic politics and that grinds rather slowly. ;)

TheCurmudgeon
08-29-2012, 01:44 AM
...just having a little fun. Nothing more:D

Guess it is difficult to tell sometimes.

davidbfpo
08-29-2012, 11:47 AM
Found via another discussion board:
If IEDs were eliminated as causal factors since July 2010, the percentage of all ISAF casualties in Afghanistan through hostile action reaches a staggering 33% caused by the intentional actions of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) or Afghan Security Guard (ASG) personnel. Put simply, one out of every three ISAF killed since June 2010 has been murdered by the Afghans he is training or otherwise serving with.[i] This may be the highest incidence of intentional fratricide in recorded military history


Let’s put our critical thinking caps on. Once we put this emerging phenomenon into some rational perspective we’ll find that it’s 1) hardly “emerging;” and 2) not a phenomenon at all but rather the norm in a region and within a culture where conflict is not some abstract or strategic concept but instead is an intensely personal and familial endeavor. It’s the nature of the particular beast that we’re fighting and, if we’re going to fight this beast on its home turf, then we’d better understand it and develop approaches and polices that acknowledge the reality of this conflict.

Link:http://www.defenceiq.com/army-and-land-forces/articles/green-on-blue-the-nature-of-the-beast-in-afghanist/?goback=%2Egde_2311273_member_155080732

carl
08-29-2012, 09:25 PM
Not sure any of it is worth spit, but keep thinking that I ought to do something, even if its wrong. ;)

If there is a problem and you desire to fix it, that is good. If you are afraid to do anything in case it may be wrong, that is bad because you will be paralyzed. So if after due consideration, if you think there is a good chance you can improve things by doing something, do it. That is better than doing nothing and hoping for the best, mostly. In any event it is admirable because it is an act of moral courage.

carl
08-29-2012, 10:50 PM
Mmmm. To an extent but we have significant philosophical differences and when that's added to the experience variations, it's more than different words and angles... :oI

No, you're wrong. We're about the same, except I cock my hat forward and you cock yours to the rear.


I doubt the frequent murders will cause a withdrawal. I also suspect that the friction involved in those other situations was seen as less benign than it is looked at historically.

We'll see if the murders will 'cause a premature and precipitate bug out. I think they will but time will tell.

I am quite sure that in those other situations things weren't so benign. But the point isn't that they were all tea cakes and teary eyed farewells, the point is they didn't result in this level of murder.


There are other problems. Take KATUSAs for example, their baser options were constrained by very, very rigid, almost sadistic ROK Army discipline -- the Afghans don't operate that way. The Moros in the Constabulary were constrained by their Chiefs and Imams. The Afghans have Elders and Imams but Afghan culture is far more individualistic and less communitarian; those community leaders are heeded pretty much only when it suits.

Why are those things problems? Problems with what?


Perhaps you missed it in your reading but things always go poorly for us in every war -- and the lower the intensity of those wars, the longer it takes us to learn and get down to business. So, your statement is correct -- we will not change and if we get into difficulties with the Chinese, things will go poorly for us. Only when we bring masses of people into the forces and they and the enemy of the moment FORCE new thinking do we start improving (Note that not since we were in WW II have we faced an enemy significant enough and / or with capability to force that; not once since 1945). As I said, you and I can wish as much as we want to but that is not going to change...:(

I miss almost everything in my reading. But once in a while things stick, especially after I go back and read it again and again.

One of the things I didn't miss was that in the past, we started off bad but seemed to learn more quickly than we do now. The Philippines is an example. We started out not so good but basically pacified the islands (Bob's World: I know what you are going to say) in just a few years. Those were the days when a Lt. could pass a paper up and have it read and actually acted upon.

We can't seem to do that now. We seem to make the same mistakes for generation after generation. I just finished No Sure Victory and its thesis-that the Army was pre-occupied with meaningless measurements, metrics, for their own sake-seems to me to be as valid today as then.

One of the other things I picked up from my reading (it took six books read twelve times to do it) is that we had a lot of time to make up for some of our unpreparedness and that time was given to us by things that aren't there anymore. The Royal Navy isn't there anymore. The potential adversary in the Pacific doesn't have an economy much smaller and more backward anymore. The Red Army won't be fighting against the enemy too anymore. The upshot of all this is we won't have to time to get it right in the midst of the fight anymore. I think it is complacency to believe that we will.


I cannot dictate what the world or most Americans (including you, apparently -- or do you??? ;) ) believe they see. Nor am I much concerned about them or that -- it does not change the reality, if they miss that, it's a lick on them...

They act upon what they see. So what they see is that the US has been there for 11 years. They aren't going to say that "Oh well, you're right. I see it now. We've been there once, 11 times. Why in that case I'll judge the thing entirely differently." They aren't going to say that. We, the US, have been there for 11 years.


Well, maybe you do see but you're still living in a dream world. Yes, it can be changed but while to you there is cause for such change to be forced, I can assure you that most of the political and military establishment and most definitely the Congress do NOT see it that way. It can be changed but it will not be.

You would like my dream world. The Coca-Cola is always cold, but not too and it is served by smiling women with wonderous hip to waist ratios with large..., anyway like there ain't no gravity there. And there is always a tailwind and I never miss a prarie dog, ever. You should come.

Like I said, we mostly always agree. Just check your last sentence.


Given the significant problems with the Health Care and Legal industries, you'll pardon me if I find that allegory totally laughable. That doesn't mean the upper echelons of the Military are good or even marginally competent, they are not (and anyone who believes that is not a systemic problem isn't really looking at why it's that way...) -- but simply that the Medical and Legal profession are little if any better and IMO anyone who thinks they are needs to undertake deeper study of all three.

That is what I do, bring laughter to the world. But the health care industry isn't run by docs, it is run by MBAs. But in any event lawyers and docs have ethical standards that most of them are quite serious about. And the prospect of losing license or being disbarred for not meeting those standards is taken very seriously by them. Some of them, many of them maybe, aren't so good, but enough are that docs are highly respected and parents still are quite happy when their children go into the law.


Most of them know what's wrong, however, they are systemically constrained and cannot do what you wish. Since I strongly disagree on the levels of professionalism of the docs and lawyers -- and at my age and with my background, I bet I've had far more dealings with both those than you have -- I'll simply point out that all three professions have systemic constraints that limit their ability to truly force change and increase effectiveness. It is what it is and the best approach is to live with it and try to circumvent those systemic thin gs to the extent possible.

You're wrong about the level of professionalism of lawyers and docs vs. the stars and multi-stars. There are legions of lawyers who will fight other lawyers on matters of law and basic justice. Docs upend the conventional practice of medicine on a regular basis. That is how the field progresses. Our multi-stars in my view, remember that I am dreamy and miss a lot, fight tooth and claw to maintain the status-quo. I don't ever see any star or multi-star saying, "Boy did we screw up." of "Boy was that guy an idiot." The lower down officers will say that, but not the high boys. If that has happened regularly, I missed it again.



Then you have missed the most important point in this sub-thread. Violence in problem solving leads to feuds. A history of such conflicts while present to an extent in some of the other culture herein mentioned (to include us in the West and in the US in particular) is, in Afghanistan which has not undergone the leavening / 'civilizing' processes of most modern nations including the Philippines, literally defines the Afghans. The propensity to get hacked off at a slight, real or perceived and take violent reprisal action is deeply embedded due to that lack of leavening. You or I get insulted, we may get angry, may even get even -- but neither of us is likely to have first thoughts of the offending person being dead at our feet. Some gang bangers here operate that way but not too many of even those; in Afghanistan, it is the norm. It can and likely will be changed but it'll take more than has occurred in the last 50 years there to cause that change.

Well, I do miss a lot. But no, I haven't missed the point. While all you say may be true, it is beside the point. It is a given. That is the way those guys are. We went over there and we decided to do what we have done. If we haven't taken what they are like into account, that is our fault. And it is a failure of the professional military. What training should have been done wasn't. What units should have been doing the training weren't. The counter intelligence that should have seen some of this coming didn't. What limits on troop behavior that should have been emplaced (sic) and enforced weren't. Shoot, some of this may have been caused because Afghans are offended by cursing. It may be smirking fashionable to say that is impossible to control but it isn't. That it wasn't seen to be important and controlled is a failure of the professional military that may have cost lives.

Sometimes it seems to me that this problem is being presented as an inevitability. I don't think it was inevitable. I think we did an awful lot to bring it on ourselves. The trouble with presenting it as inevitable is that that is a cop-out. It is an excuse for and a rationalization of human failure, avoidable human failure. Improvement can't come unless it is acknowledged that things indeed can be improved. Viewing these things as inevitable is just throwing up hands and saying "Don't blame me. Nothing could have been done anyway." That's a cop-out.

Ken White
08-30-2012, 12:19 AM
No, you're wrong. We're about the same, except I cock my hat forward and you cock yours to the rear.Can't speak for yours, you're wrong on mine. Another standing broad jump at a wrong conclusion. :D
I am quite sure that in those other situations things weren't so benign. But the point isn't that they were all tea cakes and teary eyed farewells, the point is they didn't result in this level of murder.That's true and no one has said otherwise. It is also irrelevant, as are all those other experiences. What we did then and can do now are very different things.
Why are those things problems? Problems with what?Comparing Kumquats to Mushmelons. Usually leads to erroneous conclusions...
...Those were the days when a Lt. could pass a paper up and have it read and actually acted upon.Very true -- and those days are gone, never to return. That's just one problem in your allegory.
We can't seem to do that now. We seem to make the same mistakes for generation after generation. I just finished No Sure Victory and its thesis-that the Army was pre-occupied with meaningless measurements, metrics, for their own sake-seems to me to be as valid today as then.Very astute of you -- I've been pointing that out to you for several years and you finally got it -- when someone else also said it. :wry:
The upshot of all this is we won't have to time to get it right in the midst of the fight anymore. I think it is complacency to believe that we will.I don't disagree with that in broad principle, we will have less time and less aid. However, I do not agree that we are being complacent about it or that the sky is falling / will fall. Few things are that simple.
They act upon what they see. So what they see is that the US has been there for 11 years. They aren't going to say that "Oh well, you're right. I see it now. We've been there once, 11 times. Why in that case I'll judge the thing entirely differently." They aren't going to say that. We, the US, have been there for 11 years.So what? Who cares what they think. It affects nothing. Least of all the fact that while the US has been there for 11 years, the US Army has been there for 11 one year or less tours. Perception is not reality
Like I said, we mostly always agree. Just check your last sentence.We agree on the result or end state frequently, we more frequently disagree strongly over the why and how.
You're wrong about the level of professionalism of lawyers and docs vs. the stars and multi-stars.We disagree on that as well and I almost certainly have far more experience interfacing with all three. No sense wasting pixels on it.
Our multi-stars in my view, remember that I am dreamy and miss a lot...Oh, I do. ;)
... fight tooth and claw to maintain the status-quo. I don't ever see any star or multi-star saying, "Boy did we screw up." of "Boy was that guy an idiot." The lower down officers will say that, but not the high boys. If that has happened regularly, I missed it again.That's because they do not -- and cannot -- do it publicly (Legally among other reasons, most good, some not). You miss it because it's hidden. Those guys are just like every other group of humans, there are good, bad and indifferent folks, there are fighters and there are go along, get along people. However, you can't see that because a lot of media and writer types hang on to the images of Catch -22. Reality isn't quite like that.

Well, I do miss a lot. But no, I haven't missed the point. While all you say may be true, it is beside the point. It is a given. That is the way those guys are. We went over there and we decided to do what we have done. If we haven't taken what they are like into account, that is our fault...It was known and taken into account and the Pols said 'Go.' Once there, the average westerner makes the mistake of trying to treat everyone as if they were fellow westerners and reasonably trustworthy. The locals are not other Westerners and they are trustworthy IF you know what that means to them. There' not enough training time in any Army to cope with that cultural divide -- what you're asking is that those western kids park a lifetime of upbringing and familiarization with a type society and adapt to the mores of a very different society. Not going to happen, not without years of training and effort. The SF guys can handle it, they've had those years of training for the cultural divide. The large Army, the GPF cannot afford the training time nor should they be able to handle it. Not their job. They are being misapplied at political direction (and they know that...) and are coping as best they can.
And it is a failure of the professional military... That it wasn't seen to be important and controlled is a failure of the professional military that may have cost lives.What is your solution for how to control the issues cited in the second quote in David's 11:47 AM post? What training would you insist upon to provide an ability to cope with that?

You're long on criticism of things you don't fully comprehend and short on positive suggestions...
Sometimes it seems to me that this problem is being presented as an inevitability. I don't think it was inevitable.Almost nothing is inevitable. Sets of circumstances can conspire to make a given situation very difficult but little is inevitable.
I think we did an awful lot to bring it on ourselves.I agree but I bet our reasons are quite different. :rolleyes:
The trouble with presenting it as inevitable is that that is a cop-out. It is an excuse for and a rationalization of human failure, avoidable human failure. Improvement can't come unless it is acknowledged that things indeed can be improved. Viewing these things as inevitable is just throwing up hands and saying "Don't blame me. Nothing could have been done anyway." That's a cop-out.That's an indictment with some merit. Problem is that no one is claiming inevitability -- predictable, yes but not inevitable. Again we agree on a result -- but you're evading a significant point to make that statement.

That point is that once the decision to remain in Afghanistan against the advice of all those Stars you denigrate while knowing little to nothing about them is that what has happened with respect to Afghans shooting westerners was not inevitable -- but it was so extremely likely to occur that few should've been surprised.

You can slam the Flag Os -- some of them deserve it but not all do -- but do not give the Politicians who overruled them and told them to stay there and who then dictate the rules through Lawyers and with the advice of Doctors (PhDs but still...).

I await your solutions to controlling the situation and for the training that should have been or could be conducted.

Dayuhan
08-30-2012, 12:52 AM
The Philippines is an example. We started out not so good but basically pacified the islands (Bob's World: I know what you are going to say) in just a few years. Those were the days when a Lt. could pass a paper up and have it read and actually acted upon.

We can't seem to do that now. We seem to make the same mistakes for generation after generation.

I've seen this comparison made before, and I remain unconvinced. I don't think it's historically accurate and I don't think the Philippine-American War provides much in the way of relevant comparisons with Afghanistan.

To cite only the most obvious differences, the Philippine American War was purely a war of colonial conquest. There was no effort to create a viable indigenous government, we were there to conquer, hold, and rule. It was also a different age, with vastly different ideas about what was wand was not acceptable, starting with the whole idea of a war of outright colonial conquest.

The times they have a'changed. In many was they've a'changed for the better, but the changes do provide some new kinks for those who would occupy other countries.

jcustis
08-30-2012, 03:07 AM
From a sample of just two guys who I've polled, and who are either currently in or recently out of theater, the boys seem to be thinking about all of the implications of trying to work the paradigm of mentorship from Afghan to ISAF, building rapport, and identifying causes of friction so as to defuse problems before the become something more dramatic. The discussion distinguished ANSF losing their mind and bearing and initiating an attack on ISAF, and ANSF infiltrated by Taliban and committing an attack.

They also identified that the adage of "criticize in private, praise in public" holds true in much of what they do during interactions. For those moments when they feel like taking an Afghan and kicking him in the ass and throwing his weapon off of a cliff because he simply won't listen when the s*it is flying, they make a point to get back to the individual as soon as things calm down, and explain why they got so pissed or animated, and so the Afghan can truly understand why their actions weren't cool. They recognize it is a tough balance, and it isn't something that they were trained to do. It seems to come from basic, simple, good soldiering and junior leadership skills.

Still, a common theme that we've talked about here already came through in one guy's comment:


If you suck at being a people person, take a knee, face out, drink water, and pull security.

They also make a point to provide for internal security against the possibility of an green-on-blue attack (detect and defeat), and are clear to never become lax and forget to watch their back.

davidbfpo
08-30-2012, 10:43 AM
Diggers suffer again:
An Afghan army soldier shot dead three Australians and wounded two more at a patrol base in southern Afghanistan. Hours later, two Australian (SF) soldiers were killed in a helicopter crash in Helmand province.

The Australian PM stated:
In a war of so many losses, this is our single worst day in Afghanistan....Indeed, I believe this is the most losses in combat since the days of the Vietnam War and the Battle of Long Tan. This is news so truly shocking that it's going to feel for many Australians like a physical blow.

This is what hurts at home:
Australia has now lost 38 troops in the eleven-year-long campaign in Afghanistan, including seven who were killed by Afghan soldiers.

I've not seen this official assessment before:
Nato commanders believe around one in four of such attacks can be linked to infiltration or coercion by the Taliban and the rest are rooted in violent arguments based on cultural or personal clashes.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/9508043/Five-Australian-troops-die-on-worst-day-in-Afghanistan.html and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19418267

carl
08-30-2012, 02:09 PM
David:

25% of these murders being the result of Taliban & Co. action is up from the 10% they used to quote. Combine that with this "The Taliban has been actively recruiting members of the Afghan security forces, publicly announcing that insider attacks were a central part of their strategy against Nato forces" from one of the articles you linked to and things are looking a bit dark.

Back in post #21 I wondered if Taliban could take advantage of this trend and exacerbate it for gain. I would bet now that is exactly what they are doing. I was skeptical they would do that because I figured it was a waste to use a genuine infiltrator for onesys, twosys and threesys killings rather than using them for bigger things associated with attacks, like opening the gates and things (though I read that happened on an attack on the ANP). But Taliban & Co. and the Pak Army/ISI are nothing if not adaptable and it would be smart to take advantage of something that was already going on and pushing it. The results so far have been pretty good for them. Hardly a day goes by now without some killings. Over the course of weeks the casualty effect is the same as a successful big attack and the morale effect upon us is vastly greater. The enemy is doing well.

jcustis
08-30-2012, 04:05 PM
The need to constantly look over your shoulder has got to be a drain on the effectiveness of the primary mission. You can only sleep with one eye open for so long.

A gauge of whether the Taliban infiltration factor is truly on the rise will be the moment when a platoon-sized ANSF element turns on a Squad-sized ISAF mentor element, murders them all, and then melts away with their ammunition and weapons. It would not be hard to do.

We would be royally screwed then. Royally screwed...

Among other basic weapons drills, I'd be running some El Presidente work if I was in charge of getting a mentor team trained up.

carl
08-30-2012, 08:16 PM
I found this item in a May 1, 2012 BBC story about ANA troops working with British soldiers:
Also, Taliban ring tones have been banned, even when the Afghan security forces use them as a joke

I remember reading also, on Afghan Analysts Network I think, that if somebody goes through a Taliban & Co. checkpoint, they had better have a Taliban ring tone-or else. When those ANA guys go on leave everybody in the family must have to keep close track of phones and tones. That country seems like it is very hard to live in.

davidbfpo
08-30-2012, 09:32 PM
In Post 103 Jon Custis asked:
Has anyone done any scrounging to see if the Soviets had similar problems during their time in AFG and trying to prop up a government?

Hat tip to a SWC member who knows Russian we now have some scrounging.

On the attachment a Russian article which has been edited down to the keypoints; if you want the original:http://www.proza.ru/2010/05/11/907

Of 190 dead advisers, 145 were officers:http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclope...893@cmsArticle

carl
08-31-2012, 02:50 AM
That's true and no one has said otherwise. It is also irrelevant, as are all those other experiences. What we did then and can do now are very different things.

But why? Why can't we accomplish things like that now? That is at the heart of much of my concern. There is, I see from my armchair, a military culture that in many ways prevents things that should be done from getting done.


Very true -- and those days are gone, never to return. That's just one problem in your allegory.

Again, why? What I hear when you say that is the Army used to be able to do some effective things 100 years ago but that can't now and never will be able to again. Why not? Why can't what is keeping that from happening be changed? For example, Congress doesn't care if over emphasis on seniority is inculcated into cadets at West Point (one of Jorg Muth's theses). They just care about the football team and that there is a girl or two with stripes. That over emphasis is within the purview of the professional military establishment. The things they have control over, they won't change.


Very astute of you -- I've been pointing that out to you for several years and you finally got it -- when someone else also said it. :wry:

Shoot Ken, I can't catch a break even when I agree with you. (grumble, grumble, grumble)


So what? Who cares what they think. It affects nothing. Least of all the fact that while the US has been there for 11 years, the US Army has been there for 11 one year or less tours. Perception is not reality

Perception may not be reality, but it is mostly what people act upon. So perception is quite important. In my view, it is in the interests of the general officer protection society that that not be known. If it was carefully explained to the Americans, they would arch eyebrows and say "How the heck can you guys be so stupid?" As it is they can blame it on somebody else, or the weather, or the mountains, or history.


We disagree on that as well and I almost certainly have far more experience interfacing with all three. No sense wasting pixels on it.

Multi-stars you indeed do have more experience. I think I saw one once. Docs and counselors, maybe not...


That's because they do not -- and cannot -- do it publicly (Legally among other reasons, most good, some not). You miss it because it's hidden. Those guys are just like every other group of humans, there are good, bad and indifferent folks, there are fighters and there are go along, get along people. However, you can't see that because a lot of media and writer types hang on to the images of Catch -22. Reality isn't quite like that.

That is close to an apologia for the multi-stars, in my skewed view anyway. They will get no sympathy from me. I haven't heard of anybody resigning in protest. I haven't heard of anybody really spilling the beans after they retire. I see a lot of guys who cover for each other, sometimes at the expense of their troops and who make a lot of money after they retire.


It was known and taken into account and the Pols said 'Go.' Once there, the average westerner makes the mistake of trying to treat everyone as if they were fellow westerners and reasonably trustworthy. The locals are not other Westerners and they are trustworthy IF you know what that means to them. There' not enough training time in any Army to cope with that cultural divide -- what you're asking is that those western kids park a lifetime of upbringing and familiarization with a type society and adapt to the mores of a very different society. Not going to happen, not without years of training and effort. The SF guys can handle it, they've had those years of training for the cultural divide. The large Army, the GPF cannot afford the training time nor should they be able to handle it. Not their job. They are being misapplied at political direction (and they know that...) and are coping as best they can.

That sounds a lot like what the military said after Vietnam. "We didn't make any big mistakes. It was those politicians." I don't buy that people can't make the adjustment. They make adjustments all the time in normal life. You don't go places and say things in other places and various times. People can learn that. I agree it is not going to happen with the present big military, but to get back to my previous point, why can't that be changed, at least parts of it?


What is your solution for how to control the issues cited in the second quote in David's 11:47 AM post? What training would you insist upon to provide an ability to cope with that?

You're long on criticism of things you don't fully comprehend and short on positive suggestions...

Well, I figure it this way. I am riding in the boat and I only know a little about actually operating the boat but I know enough to know when the boat is sinking. So I says out loud "Hey you guys! The boat is sinking!" And then the captain an 1st mate say "You don't know what you are talking about." Then I says again this time sputtering 'cause the water is up to my mouth "No glub glub really! It's phfft splish sinking!" Then they reply "Well when you can come up with a suggestion about how to fix it, then you can complain." Then I is no more.

Though Curmudgeon has some good ideas. The guys JCustis talked to had some good ideas. Kilcullen had some good ideas. Frank North had some good ideas. Barry Petersen had some good ideas too. Lots of people have had good ideas. I only knows I is drowned.


That point is that once the decision to remain in Afghanistan against the advice of all those Stars you denigrate while knowing little to nothing about them is that what has happened with respect to Afghans shooting westerners was not inevitable -- but it was so extremely likely to occur that few should've been surprised.

You can slam the Flag Os -- some of them deserve it but not all do -- but do not give the Politicians who overruled them and told them to stay there and who then dictate the rules through Lawyers and with the advice of Doctors (PhDs but still...).

Two things about that. First is, as I said above, that sounds an awful lot like the multi-stars are setting up others to take the fall, a lot like they did after Vietnam. Second is if it was so likely how come the multi-stars are so surprised that one of them is making silly guesses about Ramadan? If it was so likely they should have seen it coming and done something to head it off. They didn't, on both counts.


I await your solutions to controlling the situation and for the training that should have been or could be conducted.

I'll be happy to send as much as you care to hear via personal message or email. I won't do it here for a couple of reasons.

1. I'm a big chicken.

2. I don't like to jump through hoops at another's command. It looks bad
and my Mom, God rest her soul, would frown at that.

Ken White
08-31-2012, 05:06 AM
But why? Why can't we accomplish things like that now? That is at the heart of much of my concern. There is, I see from my armchair, a military culture that in many ways prevents things that should be done from getting done.It's not just military -- though that certainly is a part of it; rather small part, really -- it's a societal and political problem. US society has changed and demands different things than it de even 50 years ago. The US political milieu has added more and more restrictive laws to everything.
Again, why? What I hear when you say that is the Army used to be able to do some effective things 100 years ago but that can't now and never will be able to again.I've never said that nor am I saying it now. What I am saying is that the days when LTs got listened to much above Co level are gone -- they will return but only when we are confronted with an existential fight. That's what it will take to cur through the societal, Congressional and military bureaucracy and inertia.
Again Why not? Why can't what is keeping that from happening be changed? For example, Congress doesn't care if over emphasis on seniority is inculcated into cadets at West Point (one of Jorg Muth's theses). They just care about the football team and that there is a girl or two with stripes. That over emphasis is within the purview of the professional military establishment. The things they have control over, they won't change.I think you just answered your "Why not?" question...

Congress funds on whims. Upset them, ignore their priorities and you lose bucks. The Army doesn't want to lose bucks. Congress likes the one year tour, congress likes a one-size-fits-all personnel system that is 'fair' and objective' (Read NOT meritocratic...).
Perception may not be reality, but it is mostly what people act upon. So perception is quite important.We can disagree on that.
In my view, it is in the interests of the general officer protection society that that not be known....Again we disagree -- the responsibility for one year (or less) tours is directly attributable to the US polity. The Army would change if they could and IF they didn't have to attract the Millenials into the service. Start sending folks over for more than a year and the divorce rate would climb significantly while the enlistment and officer accession rate would decline precipitously.
Multi-stars you indeed do have more experience. I think I saw one once. Docs and counselors, maybe not...So in other words you're condemning a whole slew of people based on your perceptions? :wry:

That ain't reality...:D
That is close to an apologia for the multi-stars, in my skewed view anyway.It isn't and your view is indeed skewed. I have no delusions of changing that view .
They will get no sympathy from me. I haven't heard of anybody resigning in protest.I'm sure that will really perturb a bunch of people...

Resigning in protest isn't the American way, never has been. The Parliamentary democracies are big on it but we're a Republic and do things differently.
I haven't heard of anybody really spilling the beans after they retire. I see a lot of guys who cover for each other, sometimes at the expense of their troops and who make a lot of money after they retire.That, too is the American way -- that societal thingy...

That sounds a lot like what the military said after Vietnam. "We didn't make any big mistakes. It was those politicians."Some in the military. most of us knew better
... why can't that be changed, at least parts of it?I've answered that question from you half dozen times over the last couple of years and just above. You don't like my answer and that's okay but no sense wasting pixels on it.
...Second is if it was so likely how come the multi-stars are so surprised that one of them is making silly guesses about Ramadan? If it was so likely they should have seen it coming and done something to head it off. They didn't, on both counts.You state what one said publicly. What do you know about what others said publicly or not?
I'll be happy to send as much as you care to hear via personal message or email. I won't do it here for a couple of reasons.

1. I'm a big chicken.

2. I don't like to jump through hoops at another's command. It looks bad
and my Mom, God rest her soul, would frown at that.Commands and requests are very different things. I'm in no position to give you a command -- perception? or chip? :o

A PM would be interesting and it'll remain private. And remember, even Chickens cross roads...;)

SWJ Blog
09-04-2012, 07:20 PM
Afghanistan: Green on Blue Attacks Are Only a Small Part of the Problem (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/afghanistan-green-on-blue-attacks-are-only-a-small-part-of-the-problem)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/afghanistan-green-on-blue-attacks-are-only-a-small-part-of-the-problem) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog
09-04-2012, 07:20 PM
Afghanistan: Green on Blue Attacks Are Only a Small Part of the Problem (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/afghanistan-green-on-blue-attacks-are-only-a-small-part-of-the-problem)

Anthony Cordesman being the author.



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/afghanistan-green-on-blue-attacks-are-only-a-small-part-of-the-problem) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

jmm99
09-05-2012, 02:00 AM
Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php) (by Bill Roggio and Lisa Lundquist; August 23, 2012, data last updated on Aug. 31, 2012).

Covers 2008 to date, with links to sources of the reported incidents, as well as summaries by province, etc. It also documents the different positions as to causes suggested by ISAF, NATO, US and Afghani authorities.

Regards

Mike

davidbfpo
09-07-2012, 07:57 PM
A snippet via a FP Blog comment and from a reporter whose documentaries are amazing IMO:
A better alternative, in my opinion, is Ben Anderson's No Worse Enemy. Anderson is a British television reporter who lived first with British troops in Helmand province, then with their US Marine successors.

The most striking thing about the book are the verbatim exchanges between Afghans and Western troops. Anderson doesn't speak Pashtun, but he filmed practically everything, and later had the statements from the Afghans translated. These vividly show the breadth of the disconnect, which was often widened by the failure of the official Afghan translators with the troops to provide complete and accurate translations.

Link:http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/06/more_unwarranted_optimism_about_afghanistan

TheCurmudgeon
09-08-2012, 12:32 PM
General Bradshaw announced that the allies had agreed on joint counterintelligence teams, as well as joint post-attack assessments and “direct input from Afghan Army religious and cultural affairs advisers” to improve cultural sensitivity.

Culture Clash With Afghans on Display at Briefing (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/world/asia/afghan-and-american-culture-clashes-at-center-stage.html?ref=world)

We are working to educate Afghans on our culture, not sure we working to respect theirs in their own country.

Afghans create 'Western culture' manual to help counter insider attacks (http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghanistan/afghans-create-western-culture-manual-to-help-counter-insider-attacks-1.188275http://)

TheCurmudgeon
09-08-2012, 02:30 PM
Anyone familiar with the concept of "non-mediated peacekeeping"? It was used to refer to joint Palestinian/Israeli patrols under the Oslo accords form about 1993 to about 2000.

jcustis
09-09-2012, 07:29 AM
The Platoon Leaders Fight: Lessons from Maiwand (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-platoon-leaders-fight-lessons-from-maiwand)


We encountered many Afghans that had a level of ego development similar to people in the Godfather or the Wire. They are very emotional, have a strong sense of ego, and will die for their pride. However, Afghans been taught to suppress feelings from a young age and to always present a calm exterior. Once they get pushed over the top, it will all come out with tremendous force, often in the form of bullets from their weapon. We had an Afghan policeman with no strong Taliban sympathies confess he almost tried killing several of us after listening to some very emotional Taliban propaganda songs. Respect them, know how not to offend them or you might find them trying to kill you even if they have no Taliban loyalties. If you want to get anywhere with them, you have to accept them for who they are, rather than try to impose on them who you want them to be.

Fuchs
09-09-2012, 12:52 PM
I wonder if there's some warrior ethos history in Central Asia / Pashtun history that could be exploited, i.e. revived complete with a codex or something.

Imagine the Afghan government running an army with little pay, but a codex as robust as Bushido and after a long period of service the soldiers get farm land for retirement, late Republic/Early Imperial Roman style (in a newly developed irrigation area).


A lot of what I learned about the ANA/ANP points at a horrible lack of robust motivation / loyalty from recruit to senior Cmd. The development of a robust motivation system (NOT a higher monthly paycheck than TB have on offer) and robust roots (i.e. guarded garrison towns where soldiers after two years of service live with their family, disabled vets work in service jobs and the units deploy from there for weeks or months).

ANA/ANP seem to be awfully underdeveloped in regard to social life and prestige.

jcustis
09-09-2012, 05:17 PM
Intereting questions to ponder. Much of the ANSF are no more than what could be considered migrant labor. This problem is how the ALP became part of the big show, but we started at the local level too late.

Fuchs
09-09-2012, 06:08 PM
To establish the army as a social entity, as a 'tribe' (preferably universally respected), might also help to overcome the inherent divisions and might eventually even help the idea of a politically unified state.

Kinda USMC- or Legion trangre-like; an institution which is not comparable to others because of the degree at which it integrates and gives a new meaning; joining the army as joining another 'tribe'.

The individuals of such an army wouldn't turn on foreign 'allies' individually or in small groups, but if at all then as a whole. The army with its roots-building, its indoctrination etc could provide the compass to stay clear off stupid individual moves.

TheCurmudgeon
09-09-2012, 08:53 PM
To establish the army as a social entity, as a 'tribe' (preferably universally respected), might also help to overcome the inherent divisions and might eventually even help the idea of a politically unified state.

Kinda USMC- or Legion trangre-like; an institution which is not comparable to others because of the degree at which it integrates and gives a new meaning; joining the army as joining another 'tribe'.

Not sure that would be preferable in the social setting of Afghanistan (or other similarly situated societies) where connection to an existing tribe is a matter of critical importance. To join another tribe might be seen as forsaking your existing connection.

In addition, for this to work the new tribal affiliation would have to be of greater status than the one you are forsaking. Not the case of the Afghan security forces, at least not based on my experience. While the officers were held in high regard by the population, the average soldier was not. The social status of a common soldier while I was in Afghanistan 2006-7 was about equal to a welfare recipient in the US - someone who could not make their way on their own ability and needed to join the military to get by or provide for their families. They were near the bottom of the social ladder with little honor associate with their job.

Not sure this is still the case. I had heard that Afghan TV had started a reality program based on an elite tactical unit and that, at least that unit's social status was held in high regard. However I don't believe it has filtered down to the average Soldier. While I was there anyone who could claim status as a mujahedin had a higher social status than an enlisted Soldier.

jcustis
09-09-2012, 09:23 PM
It was still largely true in 2010 and 2011. Most folks feared, but did not respect, ANSF in S. Helmand.

ganulv
09-09-2012, 10:38 PM
To establish the army as a social entity, as a 'tribe' (preferably universally respected), might also help to overcome the inherent divisions and might eventually even help the idea of a politically unified state.

There are plenty of examples of ‘tribal’ societies within which other types of corporate groupings exist—Plains Indians warrior societies, East African age sets—but these play a role within the tribal organization, they do not supplant it. Historically there are the examples of the Janissaries and mamluks, but that was a different time…

Fuchs
09-10-2012, 12:52 AM
Historically there are the examples of the Janissaries and mamluks, but that was a different time…

Remember the "Your old life ends when you join the Légion Etrangère!" and the "Once a Marine, always a Marine!" attitudes.

The institution needs to foster such attitudes and perceptions, but my time in uniform taught me how quickly an institution can do exactly that. We didn't have extreme trainers in the Luftwaffe of the post-Cold War 90's, but the trainers I've experienced still managed to turn 80-90% of the young men into something very dissimilar to what they were before - in a few weeks. Social life changed abruptly (and we all became horny on day 3 of basic after seeing no women at all for days, but that's another story).
I remember I had a diary for a few years. It ends with the note that I will "today" take the train to the barracks.

tequila
09-10-2012, 04:04 AM
There are plenty of examples of ‘tribal’ societies within which other types of corporate groupings exist—Plains Indians warrior societies, East African age sets—but these play a role within the tribal organization, they do not supplant it. Historically there are the examples of the Janissaries and mamluks, but that was a different time…

Remember that the Janissary/mamluk institution always existed as an attempt by the central ruler to establish a tribal-free institution and break his dependency on tribal or feudal forces.


The institution needs to foster such attitudes and perceptions, but my time in uniform taught me how quickly an institution can do exactly that. We didn't have extreme trainers in the Luftwaffe of the post-Cold War 90's, but the trainers I've experienced still managed to turn 80-90% of the young men into something very dissimilar to what they were before - in a few weeks. Social life changed abruptly (and we all became horny on day 3 of basic after seeing no women at all for days, but that's another story).
I remember I had a diary for a few years. It ends with the note that I will "today" take the train to the barracks.

Remember though that the average Western young person doesn't have the sort of strong group identity that exists in tribal/clan/qawm-oriented societies. Indeed, a lot of young people joining the military are looking for exactly that strong group identity to be a part of. Thus they are far more accepting of such training.

ganulv
09-10-2012, 04:36 AM
Remember that the Janissary/mamluk institution always existed as an attempt by the central ruler to establish a tribal-free institution and break his dependency on tribal or feudal forces.

Of course, but what I meant by the difference in the times is that the institutions were built with individuals who were either purchased as property or given as human tribute. That’s something that’s just not going to happen in the contemporary world.

TheCurmudgeon
09-11-2012, 04:22 PM
More on Bordin's report “A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility (http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/trust-incompatibility.pdf)” . From the Stars and Stripes article "Previously rejected report is now key to US effort to curb insider killings in Afghanistan".


At the time he published it, though, Bordin’s research was roundly dismissed by the military, and the then-public report was quickly slapped with a “classified” label.

“The findings are not consistent with our assessment” of Afghan forces, then-coalition spokeswoman Lt. Cmdr. Colette Murphy was quoted as saying in the Wall Street Journal in June 2011. The study, she added, “was systematically flawed, and suffered from generalizations, narrow sample sets, unprofessional rhetoric, and sensationalism.”

Bordin said that following the publication of his report, he was removed from his position as leader of a Red Team — a research group formed to find solutions to military shortcomings — and shortly afterward, a decision to renew his contract was rescinded and he had to leave Afghanistan.


Bordin regards the military’s refusal to act on his suggestions for a year and a half as a willful error that cost lives. He said at one point, when he returned to Afghanistan last May as the leader of a Human Terrain Systems Team, he was immediately demoted after military leadership found out about his report and he was even forbidden from briefing a general on his green-on-blue findings. He resigned his post shortly thereafter.

“That was the height of immoral behavior,” he said. “I have knowledge that can help save American lives … and I was ordered not to give that information out to another military entity.”

Previously rejected report is now key to US effort to curb insider killings in Afghanistan (http://www.stripes.com/previously-rejected-report-is-now-key-to-us-effort-to-curb-insider-killings-in-afghanistan-1.188770)

In my research I have corresponded with Dr. Bordin. He is very bitter about not being able to share what he knew with units getting ready to deply to Afghanistan.

jcustis
09-12-2012, 03:16 AM
I'm not surprised, although I can imagine "forbidden" is actually more like "ignored".
During an Iraq deploy, we ignored two HTS reports because they were 180 degrees out from what we were seeing on the ground. they had not even been on the ground until my boss invited them up and showed them.

The fact that he is crying over spilled milk is telling. Not the way to solve the problem.

TheCurmudgeon
09-12-2012, 11:45 AM
I'm not surprised, although I can imagine "forbidden" is actually more like "ignored".
No, in this case "forbidden" means forbidden. He had a request from 1st Army to come stateside and brief trainers for units getting ready to deploy. His "commander" told him he could not go and could not brief anything from the report. Hence, he resigned.

You are right though, there are a lot of people who don't like to hear anything outside their chosen narrative. See it here all the time.


The fact that he is crying over spilled milk is telling. Not the way to solve the problem. Maybe not, but I am not sure what you think his options were.

davidbfpo
09-12-2012, 12:49 PM
Hat tip to Robert du Bois via his Powerful Peace Blog for this part of an ISAF press conference, with Lt. General Terry:
Q: General, it’s Mike Evans from the Times.

Can I ask you, sorry, about the insider threat again? Since about 75 percent of the cases of green-on-blue appear to be non-insurgent-related, are you not more concerned about there being a build-up of cultural differences, cultural resentment between particularly the Americans as they are getting more of the victims and more of the cases than anyone else, and their Afghan partners? Isn’t that something which should be of greater concern?

And you mentioned also one aspect that where Afghan soldiers go on leave. I wondered if this is a particular problem where it becomes known to the Taliban that a local guy has joined up, he’s come back for a bit of home leave, is that a very vulnerable time when these guys might be either radicalized or intimidated?

LT. GEN. TERRY: Yeah, I would just say that we offered to the Afghans they ought to take a look at the leave period. I offered that one — that one to them personally based on my experience in the United States Army.

I find that my soldiers are most vulnerable as they — as they go out on leave as they expose themselves outside of the structure of the Army. And so I asked the Afghans, the national security forces to take a look at that.

We are – back to the cultural sensitivity piece of this – I would just say there are a number of factors that go into the remaining percent out there. We believe that 25, 26 percent of that — that other percentage out there personal related. Some of that can be defused with a greater understanding of cultural sensitivities.

I would just say that what we all recognize is that this is a society that’s really been traumatized by 30-plus years of war. It also has a gun culture out there. And we also understand that a lot of grievances and dispute resolutions are done, frankly, at the barrel of a gun out there.

So as we look toward cultural sensitivity, especially with things like Pashtunwali and greater understanding of the culture and of the religion, I think we also have to understand what this country and what this population has gone through over time.

So specifically we do export that back into the training base, not just on the U.S. side, but across all the troop-contributing nations out there. I fundamentally believe that this is, based on my experience of three tours over here, is that the closer you are in a — in terms of a relationship and friendship with the Afghan partners, probably the safer you are. And that’s counterintuitive. But a lot of that is really built around the Afghan out there, and specifically the Pashtuns and Pashtunwali.

And what we are moving toward and continue to train toward is that you’ve got to understand the sensitivities out there, and as you come into the theater, if you haven’t been here before, that you understand how to build those relationships with your Afghan partners out there.

Thanks. That’s a great question.

Link:http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2012/09/mil-120905-dod02.htm

carl
09-12-2012, 06:00 PM
How Disruptive Thinking is rewarded ...

It wasn't disruptive thinking, it was a simple report of a factual situation with recommendations about how to fix it. That is the problem, fact is not recognized, respected and is actually actively suppressed by the military establishment. That is very bad. It is almost as if Baghdad Bob has found a new home.

Another thing that strikes me about this is in the Stars and Stripes story one of the things they used to discredit the report was the kind of language it supposedly used. The called it "unprofessional rhetoric, and sensationalism.” That is what plain speaking is perceived as now by the military establishment. That is very bad too.

JCustis: The phrase "crying over spilled milk" belittles what actually happened. A lethal problem was id'd in its initial stages, the report was suppressed and its author ostracized. Now the report is recognized, many deaths later, but still the author, who may have done more research on this problem than anybody, isn't consulted and instead seems to be frozen out. That isn't good. Even a civilian like me, can see something quite wrong is happening.

jcustis
09-13-2012, 01:48 AM
I fully intended to belittle WHAT WAS REPORTED.

Two sides to the story with the truth undoubtedly in-between. I recounted onne of my HTS experiences to demonstrate where I was coming from, and I very much doubt that the military is as culpable as the Dr. makes it out to be. Something is not jiving here.

Ken White
09-13-2012, 02:53 AM
I think I'll wait for more details. I'm with jcustis (but I'm older and far more cynical) something ain't jiving...

carl
09-13-2012, 03:49 AM
JCustis & Ken:

Hmm. You guys have me thinking now. Waiting for more information is almost always a wise thing to do. And when two guys who have experience in these things that I don't say things don't seem to jibe, that is a cause for pause (see how easy I made that rhyme, comes natural).

I hope more information about this comes out. It seems to me a worthwhile subject for investigation. Dr. Bordin seems sincerely upset that he wasn't listened too and was actually suppressed and that this cost lives. He also seems to genuinely know what he is about unlike the people JCustis referred to. Then there were the games the military establishment played, attempts to discredit, using classification to prevent embarrassment; that seems to indicate attempts at damage control. And the contents of the report seemed accurate and prescient. But two guys who know what they are about see something that doesn't quite jibe. That is pretty weighty too.

Hmm. I hope somebody digs more into this.

JMA
09-13-2012, 05:42 PM
What the Western media doesn't say about green on blue attacks in Afghanistan (http://www.defenceiq.com/army-and-land-forces/articles/green-on-blue-the-nature-of-the-beast-in-afghanist/) Note. Posted previously on Post 123.

Afghanistan: ‘Green on Blue’ Killings Explained (http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/08/26/afghanistan-green-on-blue-killings-explained.html)

Ken White
09-13-2012, 06:05 PM
Good find. Key paragraph:
The strategic drawdown may provide some quantitative relief from the frequency of these attacks, but don’t bet on it because Afghan history is very unkind to retreating foreign forces. Perceptions are critical in this region. If these insider attacks continue and are politicised without intellectual challenge and a rational response through policy, then we run the very real risk of an ill-considered accelerated retreat masquerading as a withdrawal. We may suddenly find ourselves in the same strategic position as we did in Iran in 1978, Lebanon in 1984, and Somalia in 1994.I think we can bet the farm on that...

The bit about perceptions is, I think, a slight misnomer. 'Beliefs' are critical in this Region might be slightly more accurate. One belief is that stuff is settled man to man.

Which sorta negates the value of UAV weapon strikes... :rolleyes:

ADDED: Heh, we both missed the earlier post, I guess...

carl
09-16-2012, 11:43 PM
Six more ISAF troops killed. 2 on the 15th and 4 on the 16th.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/

Bill Moore
09-17-2012, 02:48 AM
This video is worth watching, it may provide some inisights on why some attack. It could also be propaganda.

http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/15/world/asia/afghanistan-fatal-attack/index.html?hpt=hp_t1

I'm not sure what video will appear, you may see a link to several. The one I'm referring to is the interview with the Afghan who actually conducted one of these attacks in 2010 killing two U.S. service members.

Here is a better link

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=doiOo_dUpWU&list=UUupvZG-5ko_eiXAupbDfxWw&index=1&feature=plcp

Bob's World
09-17-2012, 09:33 AM
Bill, sounds about right.

A man acts out in an act of personal resistance. He then flees and is taken in by the revolutionary Taliban leadership in Quetta. Not planned by the revolution, but rather leveraged and encouraged by the revolution after the fact.

Of course we don't recognize this distinction within the insurgency of personal/community resistance that is a response to our presence and actions; vice the revolutionary insurgency that is political and a response to our empowering the Northern Alliance into power and then working to sustain them there.

Instead we focus on "urban vs rural" or "Quetta Shura vs Haqqani," etc. True distinctions, but not particularly helpful in shaping our understanding or more effective solutions. Our blaming these events on lack of cultural understanding is equally true, but largely irrelevant and unhelpful.

I believe this guy's assessment is correct, however. there will be more of this.

tequila
09-18-2012, 01:29 AM
US-Afghan military operations suspended (http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/17/13923373-us-afghan-military-operations-suspended-after-attacks?lite#__utma=238145375.91686904.1343426945. 1347813207.1347931395.4&__utmb=238145375.1.10.1347931395&__utmc=238145375&__utmx=-&__utmz=238145375.1347931395.4.4.utmcsr=nbcnews.com |utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/&__utmv=238145375.|8=Earned%20By=msnbc%7Cworld%20ne ws=1^12=Landing%20Content=Mixed=1^13=Landing%20Hos tname=www.msnbc.msn.com=1^30=Visit%20Type%20to%20C ontent=Internal%20to%20Mixed=1&__utmk=258237129)


Most joint U.S.-Afghan military operations have been suspended following what authorities believe was an insider attack Sunday that left six NATO troops dead, including four Americans, officials told NBC News.

“We’re to the point now where we can’t trust these people,” a senior military official said. So far this year, 51 NATO troops have been killed in these so-called blue-on-green attacks ...


So are we at the point where force protection matters more than winning, or even holding?

jcustis
09-18-2012, 02:18 AM
This popped up in CNN today. Seems like a pretty clear case of imbalance in conflict resolution skills between Green and Blue.


Oceanside, New York (CNN) -- Deployed to a volatile outpost in southern Afghanistan where U.S. Marines routinely face a mix of skirmishes and hidden explosives, Greg Buckley Jr. sensed that an attack was imminent.

And he knew that it would come from within.

The 21-year-old Marine was posted to Garmsir in Helmand Province, where he was training local security forces as part of NATO's planned withdrawal in 2014.

It was during a static-filled phone call to his father over the summer that the Long Island native mentioned a run-in he had with an Afghan trainee while on guard duty.

NATO releases details of brazen raid on base in Afghanistan


When friends become enemies The encounter was the first in which the Buckley family's eldest son seemed to sense something was wrong, according to what he told his family in phone conversations and a letter.

"The guy turned around and said to Greg, 'We don't want you here. We don't need you here,'" his dad said.

"Greg turned around again and said, 'Why would you say that?'" according to Greg Buckley Sr.

But the trainee apparently wouldn't relent, repeating the phrases for hours over the course of a night in which the young Marine was on guard watch.

"Greg said, 'I thought I was going to lose my mind,'" his father said. "Pitch black out, and all he kept saying over and over again is, 'We don't want you. We don't need you. We don't want you.'"

"It was just tormenting for him."

The two men then finally confronted each other, yelling until a group of officers separated them, he told his father.

"One of his superiors came over and had Greg apologize to the guy," said the elder Buckley.

The 21-year-old agreed and extended his hand, but the man refused.

About a month later, Greg phoned his father again.

"He told me if I have to stay here until November... I'm not going to come home."

Greg also asked his father to prepare to tell his mother and his two younger brothers that he'd be killed.

"I don't understand," his father said. "Out in the field?'

"No, in our base," Greg replied.

4 NATO troops killed in 'insider' attack in Afghanistan

On August 10, 2012, Greg Buckley Jr. was gunned down by the very forces he had been training, just days after learning that he was to head home early.

"It was only two days he had left there in Afghanistan," his father told CNN.

The phenomenon is known as "green-on-blue," due to a color-coding system used by NATO. It has become disturbingly more frequent in Afghanistan, with more than 50 NATO troops killed this year by local forces, the first time that's happened in a single year in the U.S.-led war.

Last year, 35 people died in such insider attacks, and even less the year before, according to NATO figures.

The killings have prompted suspensions of training new recruits while eroding the trust between NATO and its Afghan allies.

The gunman involved in Greg's death attacked from inside his outpost and killed two other fellow Marines, his dad said.

But Greg Sr. said his son had informed his superior officers that "one day they are going turn around and turn those weapons on us."

CNN cannot independently confirm that Greg informed superior officers. Calls and emails to NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan were not immediately returned.

More than a decade after the war began, the Buckley family is now struggling to cope with the loss of its eldest son. More than 2,000 other U.S. service members have been killed in Operation Enduring Freedom.

"It's not really day-by-day," said Greg's mother, Marina Buckley. "It's more minute-by-minute."

Back in Oceanside, the Buckley family on Friday attended the town's first home football game, where their fallen son had intended to watch his youngest brother play varsity for the first time.

"Greg was supposed to be home for this game," said Justin, 17, who wore the number 30 on his back, Greg's old basketball number.

"I would tell him I love him and I miss him."

The senior running back, who donned a camouflage jersey along with his team, broke to the outside on Friday for a 25-yard score that helped cement the Sailors' improbable second-half comeback against top-ranked East Meadow.

After crossing into the end zone, Justin raised his hand to salute -- honoring his fallen brother.

Entropy
09-18-2012, 03:16 AM
So are we at the point where force protection matters more than winning, or even holding?

Winning? Our strategy was never about winning, it was about getting out of dodge with some semblance of honor.

carl
09-18-2012, 03:27 AM
It will be interesting to see, in the sense that the way a ship founders exactly is interesting to a naval architect, how fast things begin to unravel from here. It will also be interesting, in a sort of bureaucratic forensic sense, to see how everybody on our side scrambles to blame somebody else or explain how things are actually going well.

davidbfpo
09-18-2012, 10:24 AM
Afghan 'green-on-blue' attacks

2007 - 2 attacks, 2 Isaf soldiers dead
2008 - 2 attacks, 2 dead
2009 - 6 attacks, 10 dead
2010 - 6 attacks, 20 dead
2011 - 21 attacks, 35 dead
2012 (so far) - 36 attacks, 51 dead


Source: International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) via BBC:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19632779

Fuchs
09-18-2012, 11:04 AM
The expansion of this activity in 2011 does not match the rather steady expansion of general incidents over the last years.

It should be possible to identify something that changed in 2011 or 2010 as an important influence on the problem.

TheCurmudgeon
09-18-2012, 11:25 AM
The expansion of this activity in 2011 does not match the rather steady expansion of general incidents over the last years.

It should be possible to identify something that changed in 2011 or 2010 as an important influence on the problem.

Maybe this? Obama announces Afghanistan troop withdrawal plan (http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-22/politics/afghanistan.troops.drawdown_1_afghanistan-drawdown-surge-forces-president-barack-obama?_s=PM:POLITICS) June 22, 2011.

They know we are leaving so they don't have to pretend that they like us anymore. Vast oversimplification, but you never know...

TheCurmudgeon
09-18-2012, 11:31 AM
Nato says it is restricting operations with Afghan troops following a string of deadly attacks on its personnel by rogue Afghan security forces.

Only large operations will now be conducted jointly, with joint patrols evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Nato curbs Afghan joint patrols over 'insider' attacks (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19632779#)

Doesn't really address the inside-the-wire threat.

Fuchs
09-18-2012, 11:31 AM
Maybe this? Obama announces Afghanistan troop withdrawal plan (http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-22/politics/afghanistan.troops.drawdown_1_afghanistan-drawdown-surge-forces-president-barack-obama?_s=PM:POLITICS) June 22, 2011.

They know we are leaving so they don't have to pretend that they like us anymore. Vast oversimplification, but you never know...

Really? They think they won so they double their efforts to kill, including kill themselves?
Must be some non-European logic, for sure.

Entropy
09-18-2012, 12:01 PM
Really? They think they won so they double their efforts to kill, including kill themselves?
Must be some non-European logic, for sure.

I'd have to look up the details, but I think it was 2011 when the mentoring mission increased substantially. So, there were a lot more ISAF troops embedded with and training a lot more Afghans.

JMA
09-18-2012, 12:21 PM
Really? They think they won so they double their efforts to kill, including kill themselves?
Must be some non-European logic, for sure.

Does 'European' logic matter?

The problem is how many members of ISAF understand Afghan logic?

tequila
09-18-2012, 01:15 PM
The expansion of this activity in 2011 does not match the rather steady expansion of general incidents over the last years.

It should be possible to identify something that changed in 2011 or 2010 as an important influence on the problem.

I imagine this might have something to do with it:


Since 2009, the army has grown more than 56 percent, Hill said. In the past year, it's grown by about 50,000 soldiers, more than 23,000 of them are in training, and the army consistently meets its recruiting goals, he added.
(http://www.army.mil/article/52527/Afghan_forces_expand__increase_capabilities/)

It's tough to imagine any army growing that fast without loosening vetting standards or adopting a simple "push 'em out" style of training. And that's just the ANA - I can't imagine standards in the ANP, much less the Afghan Local Police.

TheCurmudgeon
09-18-2012, 01:46 PM
Really? They think they won so they double their efforts to kill, including kill themselves?
Must be some non-European logic, for sure.

I have to agree with JMA on the logic thing. The way we think does not matter.

But I also doubt that the announced withdrawal was an important factor. The increase in forces and in mission is probably the largest single factor. If it was, then nothing really changed. The increase is simply mathematical. Increase the number of trainers and Afghans being trained and you increase the number killed.

Entropy
09-18-2012, 02:10 PM
It seems pretty clear to me that this is the beginning of the end in Afghanistan. Once the election is over, expect the timetable to be moved up to next year.

TDB
09-18-2012, 02:26 PM
It seems pretty clear to me that this is the beginning of the end in Afghanistan. Once the election is over, expect the timetable to be moved up to next year.

Definitely. Strong hints the British drawdown with be far more rapid than previously stated. Soon enough it will be like rats fleeing a sinking ship.

carl
09-18-2012, 02:58 PM
Perhaps this belongs someplace else, but here I place it for now.

What if Taliban & Co. and the Pak Army/ISI continue to push this? The object of that would not be simply ejecting us from Afghanistan but ejecting us ignominiously. That would serve the greater purposes of humiliating the west, furthering the Islamo-fascist agenda and stoking the megalomania of the Pak Army/ISI. They could impose upon us conditions in return for not placing us in a position whereby we would be besieged in our big bases, have to run a gauntlet to get out and still end up leaving a lot of materiel.

I say this because as others have noted, the rate at which these attacks have occurred has increased very substantially in recent months. With that in mind, I don't think it beyond imagination that Taliban & Co may be behind that. If so, they could stop it. Even if not, they still could put a big damper on them by saying they would not take in the killers. But we would have to give something to them and their Pak Army/ISI masters.

The recent killing of 4 and wounding of 2 SF guys makes me think this may be progressing beyond pissed off ANSF guys getting some back. Apparently 6 ANP officers were involved somehow in a fight with the SF. One died and the others fled and haven't been found. If it was group attack that is very significant and makes me think Taliban & Co are starting maybe to direct things.

So to me, the US has been backed into a corner and some very decisive things will have to be done. We can't just meander along and pretend that things are going ok enough because 'look how well the spec ops night raids are going' (facetiousness alert, but only partly). We will have to do some actual things. Some things that come to my fevered mind are-basically surrender to Taliban & Co and the Pak Army/ISI, or permanently cut the Karachi supply line and publicly recognize Pak Army/ISI as the enemy and take things from there, or find and bump off Mullah Omar, or publicly partner with India or just turn the whole thing over to them, or a combination, or ten things I haven't thought of.

The point is muddling along won't do anymore. If I was Taliban & Co and Pak Army/ISI I would push this for everything I could get out of it which will force us to act.

JMA
09-18-2012, 05:59 PM
I have to agree with JMA on the logic thing. The way we think does not matter.

But I also doubt that the announced withdrawal was an important factor. The increase in forces and in mission is probably the largest single factor. If it was, then nothing really changed. The increase is simply mathematical. Increase the number of trainers and Afghans being trained and you increase the number killed.

I wonder how many officers and NCOs studied this prior to deploying to Afghanistan?:

Passing It On: Fighting the Pushtun on Afghanistan’s Frontier By General Sir Andrew Skeen (1932) (http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Skeen.pdf)


And that brings me to the tribesman’s patience. These folks have nothing to do but to watch for an opportunity. If it doesn’t come one day, it is bound to come the next or the next, or, at any rate often enough to make it worth their while to watch for it. And if, when it comes, it looks like being too costly, they are perfectly ready to put it off till a better chance comes. Remember, they have had no work to do, no camp to get to, they have range upon range of hill to screen them for as long as they choose, and night has no terrors for them. They will return to the job day after day without anyone having an inkling of their presence, and then when the real chance comes they seize it like lightning. – page 12

I have watched YouTube videos of some training. I note that ISAF personnel are being used to train and mentor Afghans who are of an age and rank who probably would not be allowed to train own forces at that level. I would suggest that the tension would begin to build up right there. The Golden Rule for training troops outside your language/cultural/ethnic/racial milieu should be on the basis of Train-the-Trainer. We just don't seem to learn.

.

carl
09-18-2012, 07:40 PM
I have watched YouTube videos of some training. I note that ISAF personnel are being used to train and mentor Afghans who are of an age and rank who probably would not be allowed to train own forces at that level. I would suggest that the tension would begin to build up right there.

That is a very good observation, one of those human factors things that are so important and so often overlooked. I never thought of it of course.

Fuchs
09-18-2012, 07:52 PM
Does 'European' logic matter?

I intentionally gave you guys the line about logic as a trigger, waiting for the inevitable Pavlov' reaction to follow.
You are utterly predictable.

It's still in fashion to talk up cultural differences, and the pattern of reasoning at SWC is under extreme influence of this fashion.


In short: Yes, European logic does matter, for it's still logic.
I can think of at least two ways how it's logical even for a European to increase attacks and risks when victory is already accepted as a soon-to-come certainty. Didn't want to play devil's advocate to myself, and I guess you guys won't come up with such an explanation.

There's actually something to be learnt from it, that is, if the information is correct and the seemingly paradox logic does apply.

Feel free to explain mysteries with the universal explanation of "culture" and you won't ever reach that insight.



Think for yourself:
How can it be rational to increase attacks after victory is believed to be certain?

(Assuming for a moment that the public withdrawal intentions did prompt the increased attack activity, which I still consider very unlikely.)

tequila
09-18-2012, 08:50 PM
Maybe it's not a purely cultural clash at all:

Afgan security forces worry about fratricidal brothers-in-arms (http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/10/us-afghanistan-killings-idUSBRE8390ND20120410)


While NATO soldiers worry whether an Afghan partner might turn from an ally to a lethal foe, Afghan soldier Sayed Rahim says he's afraid his own comrades at a small outpost in eastern Paktika province will kill him.

"There are some soldiers who have Taliban war songs on their cellphones," Rahim said. "Do we do our duty, or should we watch out for these guys who will kill us one day?"

While successive attacks by rogue Afghan security forces against NATO allies worry Western commanders, less-known incidents of Afghan-on-Afghan violence within the security forces point to Taliban infiltration nearer to home.

...

Personal grievances, battle stress, and domestic problems are behind more attacks than Taliban sympathies, according to NATO forces, who put the number of incidents by Islamic militant infiltrators this year in single digits.
The NATO coalition says a similar number of Afghan troops and police have died at the hands of their own compatriots.

"I can't really sleep. Soldiers don't trust one another very much. When I go to sleep I fear someone will shoot me dead," said Rahmatullah, a comrade of Rahim's near the Pakistan (http://www.reuters.com/places/pakistan) border, through which insurgents cross with reinforcements and material.

"We are also very fearful of food and night guards but what can we do? We are soldiers and have to do the job," the 24-year-old said in a province where an Afghan policeman this month drugged nine colleagues and shot them dead as they slept ...

JMA
09-19-2012, 09:32 AM
That is a very good observation, one of those human factors things that are so important and so often overlooked. I never thought of it of course.

The sheer volume of training they are attempting probably means that anything vaguely approaching decent training is quite impossible when it appears some of the participating ISAF countries have training problems of their own.

.

JMA
09-19-2012, 09:37 AM
Maybe it's not a purely cultural clash at all:

Afgan security forces worry about fratricidal brothers-in-arms (http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/10/us-afghanistan-killings-idUSBRE8390ND20120410)

What's up with the Afghan counter-intelligence?

It appears they need so many recruits they will take anyone with two arms, two legs and two eyes... OK maybe one eye is good enough.

Look at the Afghan national characteristics. Treachery comes first. I predict whole ANA units will change sides when the crunch comes.

IMHO it is unacceptable that soldiers should be placed at this risk. There should be consequences for those who failed to see this risk.

.
.

Dayuhan
09-19-2012, 10:19 AM
Look at the Afghan national characteristics. Treachery comes first. I predict whole ANA units will change sides when the crunch comes.

I wouldn't be surprised if they did change sides... but is that "treachery", or is it simply us misreading their actual loyalties? After all, what reason do Afghans have to be loyal to us and our interests?

I'm reminded, somehow, of the wounded outrage that Americans in the Philippines expressed during WW2 when the same Filipino elites that had collaborated with Spanish and American invaders proceeded to collaborate in turn with Japanese invaders.

Why would we expect Afghans to be loyal to anything but their own perception of their own interests? Of course they'll put on a show of "loyalty" as long as that advances their own perception of their own interests, but as soon as the interests change, so will the loyalty. That's human nature, not an Afghan national characteristic.

jcustis
09-19-2012, 11:39 AM
IMHO it is unacceptable that soldiers should be placed at this risk. There should be consequences for those who failed to see this risk.

You don't have to look for scapegoats. The risks are known, and yes, even junior troops are taught to acertain then. How far they go after being taught is a different matter, but at some point you cannot guard against all possible green-on-blue opportunities ... every moment. Nothing would get done.

It's totally acceptable that there are occupational hazards.

There is a mission with inherent risks to it, thus part of the nature of war.

JMA
09-19-2012, 11:48 AM
I wouldn't be surprised if they did change sides... but is that "treachery", or is it simply us misreading their actual loyalties? After all, what reason do Afghans have to be loyal to us and our interests?

Yes, depends on from which angle you look at it.

It would be treachery if a battalion of ANA switches sides and shoots/beheads the US mentoring/training team with them.

If that were to happen on whose doorstep would you lay the blame?

JMA
09-19-2012, 12:00 PM
You don't have to look for scapegoats. The risks are known, and yes, even junior troops are taught to acertain then. How far they go after being taught is a different matter, but at some point you cannot guard against all possible green-on-blue opportunities ... every moment. Nothing would get done.

It's totally acceptable that there are occupational hazards.

There is a mission with inherent risks to it, thus part of the nature of war.

There are acceptable risks, unacceptable risks and pure gambles.

Looking at the stats for this years and noting that NATO halts routine joint patrols with Afghan forces (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-us-afghan-patrols-20120919,0,4169136.story) that more than just me believes it has reached the "unacceptable risk" level.

It is also as much about the causes than just the actual risk itself.

You can teach "junior troops" as much as you like but - to be brutally honest - how many of them - as opposed to officers and SNCOs - are capable of diplomacy/courtesy/discretion/and all those good things when interacting with the ANA?

Is this not where the friction point is?

carl
09-19-2012, 01:08 PM
The sheer volume of training they are attempting probably means that anything vaguely approaching decent training is quite impossible when it appears some of the participating ISAF countries have training problems of their own.


You can teach "junior troops" as much as you like but - to be brutally honest - how many of them - as opposed to officers and SNCOs - are capable of diplomacy/courtesy/discretion/and all those good things when interacting with the ANA?

Is this not where the friction point is?

So we have people like Stephen Green and members of the "Kill Team" doing training. And who have been doing it for months and months. We have dug a pretty deep hole.

jcustis
09-19-2012, 02:03 PM
There are acceptable risks, unacceptable risks and pure gambles.

Looking at the stats for this years and noting that NATO halts routine joint patrols with Afghan forces (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-us-afghan-patrols-20120919,0,4169136.story) that more than just me believes it has reached the "unacceptable risk" level.

It is also as much about the causes than just the actual risk itself.

You can teach "junior troops" as much as you like but - to be brutally honest - how many of them - as opposed to officers and SNCOs - are capable of diplomacy/courtesy/discretion/and all those good things when interacting with the ANA?

Is this not where the friction point is?

They are all capable, and that is statistical fact. Being a decent, restrained person is not the sole domain of the SNCO or officer.

Across the hundreds and thousands of patrols conducted, the number of troops killed is significant relative to the beholder. I do not think we have reached any unacceptable level, but it would seem some handlers somewhere believe so, and that is risk-averse IMO.

Shrinking away from the issue is not the answer, not in 2005 or 2012. It merely seems so due to the decent interval we have chosen to pursue.

carl
09-19-2012, 02:45 PM
They are all capable, and that is statistical fact. Being a decent, restrained person is not the sole domain of the SNCO or officer.

Across the hundreds and thousands of patrols conducted, the number of troops killed is significant relative to the beholder. I do not think we have reached any unacceptable level, but it would seem some handlers somewhere believe so, and that is risk-averse IMO.

Shrinking away from the issue is not the answer, not in 2005 or 2012. It merely seems so due to the decent interval we have chosen to pursue.

I am not trying to be argumentative but your comment prompts two questions.

Even if statistically the risk of being killed by an ANSF person is low, how much would these killings raise the level of suspicion and would that level of suspicion hinder good training and cooperation? You know guys there. Has this had an effect?

Also having the right temperment (sic) and character is not solely confined to officers and SNCOs, but are the units doing the training picking and choosing who will do the training depending on who is suited for it? Again you know people who would know.

Madhu
09-19-2012, 04:01 PM
Maybe it's not a purely cultural clash at all:


Looking at the numbers, is the rate any different or is the total number of these incidents increased because of more contact between trainer and trainee in a volatile and idiosyncratic environment, depending on the particular situation?

What I mean to say is that I know the numerator of these incidents. What's the denominator? Anyway, the overall rate being the same may not matter in the war-of-narratives, where everyone is probably correct in one way or another. We have a mix of things going on, I'd bet, but I'd only be betting. I have no idea.

BTW, how does one grade such an incident? Is the Taliban ringtone incidental, is this purely a personal matter, how does one determine a metric based on the story told in Tequila's linked article?

This is an interesting link, too (from 2010):


The Taliban have infiltrated the Afghan army and police, a recently-retired United Nations official has warned.

Dr Antonio Maria Costa, former head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, said Taliban sleeper cells had been set up inside the security forces.

They had already carried out a number of attacks and were planning further attacks on Nato-led troops, he said.

A spokesman for the coalition forces said infiltration was a rare problem and most Afghan troops were loyal.

Dr Costa's comments come as the coalition is preparing to hand over control of the country's security to Afghan forces by 2014, the BBC's Gerry Northam reports.

Meeting the handover target in four years requires 141,000 new recruits to be found within a year - more than the current size of the Afghan army.

There are fears that the Taliban are taking the opportunity to enlist insurgents into the ranks.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11464175

The standard Western punditry argues a lot about timelines and endates. I see less punditry about others reacting to our signaled plans to build up the Afghan security forces. For every signal we send to stay, we get local and, shall we say, regional, signals to go. I think. Well, I don't know. Thinking aloud here....

1. Did we go too big, too fast?
2. Is our signaling to stay, instead of keeping mum on our plans and having some element of surprise and initiative, the real problem,and not our signaling to go?
3. How do lone wolf incidents play into the Taliban narrative - and how do they relate to what we do? What should be considered a lone wolf incident?
4. How does one tell a lone wolf incident from a personal and individual "culture" clash between two individuals?
5. Are we interpreting a certain level of local violence as something new and different and relating to "us", when it's simply the environment and our place in it?
6. What does "infiltration" mean, and what constitutes infiltration in an environment such as Afghanistan?

And so on....

Does JMA have a point? These incidents were bound to happen? Even if we predicted it, could we realistically have done things differently, like slowing recruitment, educating the larger public, better counterintelligence? I don't know. Wonder what you all think.

Dayuhan
09-20-2012, 01:47 AM
It would be treachery if a battalion of ANA switches sides and shoots/beheads the US mentoring/training team with them.

If that were to happen on whose doorstep would you lay the blame?

If you want to lay blame, you have to lay it on whoever did the killing. Whether that makes it treachery or betrayal is another question altogether.

Going beyond immediate blame, though, I'd want to look at the assumptions behind so much of what goes on in Afghanistan. We want to conjure up a national government and a national military, structured along western lines, in a place where loyalty is not to nation but to clan or tribe. We assume that once someone joins an army they are then "loyal" to the government and the nominal chain of command, and if they act on any other loyalty we speak of treachery and betrayal.

Our idea of a national army and a national government stem from our idea of a nation, and I'm not sure that concept has much meaning in Afghanistan. If it doesn't, and if our purposes are incompatible with the perceived interests of large numbers of Afghans, the idea of creating an army (let alone a nation) from scratch - hard enough in the best circumstances - is going to be pretty unrealistic and is likely to involve all kinds of obstacles and hazards.

Is it rally possible to develop an effective strategy and to implement an effective campaign to achieve that strategy if the policy goal the strategy is meant to advance is fundamentally flawed and unrealistic?

Saw this elsewhere on the site; pessimistic but I suspect not entirely inaccurate:

http://nation.time.com/2012/09/19/afghanistan-the-best-thing-we-can-do-is-leave/

JMA
09-20-2012, 07:23 AM
If you want to lay blame, you have to lay it on whoever did the killing.

Beyond those who do the killing - who should be the target of multiple precision (or as near as damn-it) air strikes - for those who should have foreseen the problem and built in contingencies and/or acted timeously there should be consequences.


Whether that makes it treachery or betrayal is another question altogether.

One assumes that the ISAF forces doing the mentoring and the training are acting in good faith on the basis that the trainees are loyal to the Karzai government.

So if you have a new and interesting definition of "treachery" I'm all ears.

Now if you want to understand more about the risks and the permutations go read Alistair Horne's book about Algeria 1954-1962:

A Savage War of Peace (http://www.amazon.com/Savage-War-Peace-1954-1962-Classics/dp/1590172183/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1348125002&sr=8-1&keywords=a+savage+war+of+peace)

Go for an el-cheapo 2nd hand copy, you won't regret it. You will get a perspective of what can and probably will happen as melt-down approaches.

Better still try to find something covering the time of the Soviet withdrawal as that may be more accurate in respect of the Afghan specifics. (Anyone recommend something on this?)

JMA
09-20-2012, 09:38 AM
Saw this elsewhere on the site; pessimistic but I suspect not entirely inaccurate:

http://nation.time.com/2012/09/19/afghanistan-the-best-thing-we-can-do-is-leave/

David posted reference to Ben Anderson's documentary a week ago: here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=140482&postcount=138)

Beyond the book there is a YouTube video which captures the interaction clearly.

Panorama : The Battle for Bomb Alley (Afghanistan War) 1/2 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5wEW5UVXemc&playnext=1&list=PL5FCFBEFC25A127D6&feature=results_main) in two parts.

Little wonder the "local" Afghans find it all somewhat confusing... with some positively freaking out to the point of killing.

Not sure who thought up the idea about joint patrols in the first place. Its a really dumb idea other than for - low risk of contact - presence patrols as the last thing you want is to get into a contact with the enemy with these ANA clowns - with different training and approach to warfare - as a wild card in your midst.

Moderator's Note

Thread created for a Q&A interview with Ben Anderson:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16590

davidbfpo
09-20-2012, 10:46 AM
The author of this commentary is:
.. the British Army adviser to Brigadier Shirin Shah, Commander of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in central Helmand...Lt Col Charlie Maconochie is the Commanding Officer of 3/215 Brigade Advisory Group and 3rd Battalion The Rifles..

Much of the article will be familiar to readers, this paragraph with my emphasis is of note:
The catalyst for the majority of insider attacks appears to be a mix of personal grievances, cultural disparities and psychological distress. The largely unreported number of attacks by Afghan soldiers on their own forces bears this out. Insurgent involvement in some attacks should be seen as a desperate act by an enemy that is under growing pressure from increasingly confident and capable Afghan security forces. There is simply no evidence of any widespread insurgent infiltration of the Afghan forces.

He ends with the official mantra:
Our campaign plan is on track, but we still have much work to do as advisers. At this vital stage, we must not let anything knock us off course.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9550536/Green-on-Blue-attacks-must-not-deter-us-in-Afghanistan.html

TDB
09-20-2012, 11:24 AM
The author of this commentary is:

Much of the article will be familiar to readers, this paragraph with my emphasis is of note:

He ends with the official mantra:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9550536/Green-on-Blue-attacks-must-not-deter-us-in-Afghanistan.html

I was thinking about this yesterday. We heard abut attacks on ISAF troops because it's of national interest, however we don't hear about green on green. I'd find that far more interesting.

Entropy
09-20-2012, 12:46 PM
The largely unreported number of attacks by Afghan soldiers on their own forces bears this out.

Not really surprising. We in the West keep thinking these people are "Afghans" in the same way that we consider ourselves to be "Americans" or whatever nationality. We assume their national loyalty is roughly the same as ours. In Afghanistan, national identity is usually a second or third tier concern. To expect them to gel into a cohesive force and put aside their other identities and loyalties in favor of a national identity is foolish whether we are talking about building an army or limiting corruption.

Look at what's happening to the Syrian military which is fracturing along ethnic and sectarian lines even though it was a cohesive national force for several decades. Yet we expect to actually build a national force from scratch in Afghanistan? It might work long enough for us to exit Afghanistan, if we're lucky.

Surferbeetle
09-20-2012, 01:14 PM
Not sure who thought up the idea about joint patrols in the first place. Its a really dumb idea other than for - low risk of contact - presence patrols as the last thing you want is to get into a contact with the enemy with these ANA clowns - with different training and approach to warfare - as a wild card in your midst.

As your post reflects, not everybody is cut out for being outside the wire/away from the big px for statistically significant portions of their lives.

Big FOB's, small minded TCN policies, lack of language & culture skills, fortress embassies, all lead to a certain constrained viewpoint which leads to where our self-selected/self-imposed azimuth has taken us.

No easy cookie-cutter fixes are available to us that I am aware of, just lots of hard work ahead over the next few decades.

JMA
09-20-2012, 04:43 PM
They are all capable, and that is statistical fact. Being a decent, restrained person is not the sole domain of the SNCO or officer.

I know a lot of officers and SNCOs who would not have been suited to mentoring and cross-cultural military training. Then lower down the scale I would suggest that the limitation would be in finding junior soldiers who are course qualified for such training and from tat group those who have the disposition to cooperate across cultural/religious/ethnic/racial lines in the stress of combat while operating effectively.


Across the hundreds and thousands of patrols conducted, the number of troops killed is significant relative to the beholder. I do not think we have reached any unacceptable level, but it would seem some handlers somewhere believe so, and that is risk-averse IMO.

As an officer you would need to decide on - and live with the consequences of - what IYO constitutes an acceptable and what an unacceptable risk to your troops. This may involve a career affecting act of moral courage to just say no. I also suggest that it is fair for senior commanders to assist those operating at the coal face in terms of making such decisions and not leave them hanging out there on their own.


Shrinking away from the issue is not the answer, not in 2005 or 2012. It merely seems so due to the decent interval we have chosen to pursue.

Maybe this matter has been allowed to slip and as such it needs a major correction right now.

.

carl
09-20-2012, 04:46 PM
Not really surprising. We in the West keep thinking these people are "Afghans" in the same way that we consider ourselves to be "Americans" or whatever nationality. We assume their national loyalty is roughly the same as ours. In Afghanistan, national identity is usually a second or third tier concern. To expect them to gel into a cohesive force and put aside their other identities and loyalties in favor of a national identity is foolish whether we are talking about building an army or limiting corruption.

I understand what you are saying but I think you might be overstating it. Everything I've read seems to indicate that the Afghans do think of themselves as Afghans. Taliban & Co are always careful to portray themselves as an Afghan movement, not a Pathan group. No group in the country talks about partition to my knowledge. They have been a definable country for a lot of years. National loyalty may not be the same as ours but it is there. The Indian Army is able to accommodate radically differing identities within an organization that is loyal to the center. Maybe they have something to teach, something along the lines of the Pathan Rifles and Hazara Light Infantry.

Entropy
09-20-2012, 05:22 PM
I understand what you are saying but I think you might be overstating it. Everything I've read seems to indicate that the Afghans do think of themselves as Afghans. Taliban & Co are always careful to portray themselves as an Afghan movement, not a Pathan group. No group in the country talks about partition to my knowledge. They have been a definable country for a lot of years. National loyalty may not be the same as ours but it is there. The Indian Army is able to accommodate radically differing identities within an organization that is loyal to the center. Maybe they have something to teach, something along the lines of the Pathan Rifles and Hazara Light Infantry.

Most Syrians think of themselves as Syrian, yet they are in civil war. Same with Lebanon. Same with Iraq. How does one square the idea of an Iraq national identity when the Kurds have a semi-autonomous enclave and when, just a few years ago, there were active campaigns of sectarian cleansing?

So, I'm not saying national identity doesn't exist, I'm saying that on many matters other identities trump national identity. For Afghanistan, the various groups talk about one Afghanistan, but their ideas about how that one Afghanistan should be organized and who should control the levels of power vary widely. If you look, for instance, at voting patterns in Afghanistan they highly correlate to ethnic and/or sectarian identity.

carl
09-20-2012, 06:45 PM
Entropy:

I can't make a real strong argument about the Afghans having a stronger sense of national identity than the Syrians, Iraqis and Lebanese. But I think that possibility exists. Afghanistan was a country for a long time before all those places were. They have only been what they are now since just after WWII. Before that they were briefly run by the British and the French and for a long time before that they were part of the Ottoman Empire. Afghanistan has been more or less Afghanistan (more or less everybody, more or less) since the late 1700s I believe.

carl
09-22-2012, 01:20 PM
Ryan Crocker does not mince any words when discussing the current situation in Afghanistan in this story.

http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/09/18/crocker-taliban-infiltration-worse-than-reckoned.html

This is what he had to say about Sec Panetta's statement about the the green on blue killings being signs of Taliban & Co's last gasp.


"I will believe it's their last gasp when I've got my boot on the throat of the last one of them," Crocker told Bloomberg News after his remarks at the Carnegie Endowment.

He said these things about Taliban infiltrators into the ANSF.


"I think we underestimate at our peril" the number of Taliban "sleepers" in the ranks of the Afghan National Security Forces that the allies have been pressing to take the lead security role, Crocker said in remarks Monday to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

We have been wondering here why the sudden increase in the rate of green on blue killings in the recent past. Sarah Chayes says in the same story that it just took some time for Taliban & Co to get the program up to speed.


"So do I. There was an explicit announcement by the Taliban that they were planning to infiltrate," said Sarah Chayes, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment and a former advisor to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"When insider attacks increased sharply some months after that announcement (by the Taliban earlier this year), there is no reason to dismiss the idea that they executed their strategy," Chayes said.

Lastly and most interesting to me Amb Crocker said it is possible that another 9-11 could be launched from a Taliban II controlled Afghanistan and he said this about promises.


Crocker also warned of a possible bloodbath if the U.S. pulls out before ANSF is ready to take over. "Who gets it in the neck? It's all those people we made all those promises to, starting with the women" of Afghanistan who have struggled for civil rights and education in the male-dominated society, Crocker said.

This was a very interesting story.

carl
09-22-2012, 01:32 PM
Here is a link to the video of Amb Crocker's remarks to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/17/ambassador-ryan-crocker-on-afghanistan/drea

I haven't watched it yet. I only read the story quoted in the post above.

Madhu
09-22-2012, 02:29 PM
on CSPAN.

Good set of links on infiltration, carl. I've been a bit leery of official explanations, to be frank - even of the widely discussed study on these incidents showing them to be mostly about personal grievances. Not fair, I know, but after years of hearing certain statements over and over again, and then comparing the statements to reality, I've learned to be a bit wary....

(He did mention what I like to call the "Pressler Canard". Drives me batty. Why this continued restating of a narrative history that isn't "quite so" by diplomats and SA experts? I will never understand it. I honestly believe it's hurt our efforts.)

carl
09-22-2012, 06:50 PM
That is what Amb Crocker said in the presentation I linked to. He said the links between the two are still strong and if a 9-11 were to occur here again, it would most likely originate from a Taliban controlled Afghanistan.

You all MUST listen to this presentation. He does not mince words. It is the best thing I've heard on this in a long long time.

He said too that he considers part of our national security to consist of human and moral values, this in connection to our obligation to stand by people we have made promises to.

He said this in the context of being able to speak freely.

"God it's great not to be an official anymore."

Finally, regarding our maybe attacking Iran he said that the only thing worse than an Iran with nuclear weapons is an Iran with nuclear weapons that somebody had tried to keep them from getting with military force.

This video is GREAT!

Dayuhan
09-23-2012, 12:49 AM
I wondered what the basis was for these comments:


“There’s a new spirit out there” among ordinary Afghans, said Crocker. While intangible, the high hopes and lofty aspirations of today’s Afghans—especially among youth and women—may be the most auspicious sign of Afghanistan’s future potential.

Maybe Afghanistan is different, but in my experience US ambassadors don't typically have much contact with ordinary citizens of the countries in which they are posted.

I also wonder about the positive comments made about the ANA... there seem to be widely varying opinions in circulation, some saying the ANA and ANP are rapidly building into capable forces, some saying the exact opposite. Based on admittedly non-scientific observation, the higher on the administrative food chain the person making the comments stands, the more positive the comments seem to be. That would seem a point of worry, if you're cynical.

I also have to wonder about the basis for the opinion that another major terrorist attack would likely be planned in the Af'/Pak region, rather than in, say, Yemen or Somalia or Egypt or Western Europe. It may indeed be so, but it would be interesting to know the reasoning or evidence behind that opinion.

I do think that an American withdrawal from Afghanistan would increase the likelihood of major terrorist action, mainly because AQ desperately needs to have the US out there attacking and ideally occupying Muslim nations. If we deprive them of that they will try to provoke us again. I don't see that as a reason to stay in Afghanistan, just as a reason to expect what's coming, try to prevent it and prepare responses that do not involve feeding AQ with the means they require to thrive.

Fuchs
09-23-2012, 01:13 AM
There are a couple dozen ANA battalions, and even a year ago there was a list about how many of them were how capable.

The differences between battalions exist, there are regional differences concerning the environment and employment of battalions and overall it's entirely predictable that people who've had contact with one or few battalions each don't have a homogeneous opinion about the ANA.

Dayuhan
09-23-2012, 01:30 AM
Beyond those who do the killing - who should be the target of multiple precision (or as near as damn-it) air strikes - for those who should have foreseen the problem and built in contingencies and/or acted timeously there should be consequences.

Not sure who you mean by this... who should be accountable, those who failed to anticipate these events in any given incident or those responsible for the overall policy of trying to build an army?


One assumes that the ISAF forces doing the mentoring and the training are acting in good faith on the basis that the trainees are loyal to the Karzai government.

Why would one assume that trainees are loyal to the Karzai Government?


Now if you want to understand more about the risks and the permutations go read Alistair Horne's book about Algeria 1954-1962:

A Savage War of Peace (http://www.amazon.com/Savage-War-Peace-1954-1962-Classics/dp/1590172183/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1348125002&sr=8-1&keywords=a+savage+war+of+peace)

Go for an el-cheapo 2nd hand copy, you won't regret it. You will get a perspective of what can and probably will happen as melt-down approaches.

Better still try to find something covering the time of the Soviet withdrawal as that may be more accurate in respect of the Afghan specifics. (Anyone recommend something on this?)

Having been through a full meltdown and a partial meltdown I have some idea of the risks and permutations, though of course those are different in every individual meltdown. The question to me is less what the particular risks and permutations of this impending meltdown are that why we should be involved in it at all.


Not sure who thought up the idea about joint patrols in the first place. Its a really dumb idea other than for - low risk of contact - presence patrols as the last thing you want is to get into a contact with the enemy with these ANA clowns - with different training and approach to warfare - as a wild card in your midst.

In terms of achieving the goals of any given patrol I'm sure you're right, the joint patrol is a liability. If the overall policy goal is to build a functioning army, though, I don't know how you get around those situations... of course it will be easier and the short-term goal is more likely to be achieved if you do it yourself, but that doesn't move you toward the "build an army" goal. I don't approve of that policy (obviously), but once the policy is laid down from above I don't know how much latitude the commanders in the field have in executing it. I'm sure they're well aware of the risks and liabilities intrinsic to the policies of trying to build nations, armies, and governments, but they don't have the option of changing the policy. How do you "build an army" in that kind of environment without sending trainers out into positions where they're at risk of being killed by those they train, or without accompanying trainees on missions where they are likely to be a liability?

Wyatt
09-23-2012, 02:57 AM
best part of the Crocker interview was the information on the early iranian involvement. I have read a decent amount on afghanistan (a pittance compared to many here) but I had never head anything about that what so ever. Very interesting.

Bill Moore
09-23-2012, 04:02 AM
Posted by Carl


That is what Amb Crocker said in the presentation I linked to. He said the links between the two are still strong and if a 9-11 were to occur here again, it would most likely originate from a Taliban controlled Afghanistan.

You all MUST listen to this presentation. He does not mince words. It is the best thing I've heard on this in a long long time.

I think the comment about another 9/11 coming out of a Taliban controlled Afghanistan is the only comment he made that I didn't concur with. Maybe or maybe not, but they don't need this type of safehaven to facilitate that type of attack. I suspect the Americans for the most part are prepared to stay the course by providing funding to sustain the Afghan security forces after we withdraw most of our combat power. It is cheap insurance.

I thought the most important historical tidbit he pointed out was that the USSR installed government and security forces didn't fail until the Afghan government couldn't/wouldn't pay their soldiers, which was the beginning of the end. I suspect that was due to the USSR pulling the rug out from under their feet. A mistake we don't want to make.

Excellent presentation.

JMA
09-23-2012, 02:42 PM
I think the comment about another 9/11 coming out of a Taliban controlled Afghanistan is the only comment he made that I didn't concur with. Maybe or maybe not, but they don't need this type of safehaven to facilitate that type of attack. I suspect the Americans for the most part are prepared to stay the course by providing funding to sustain the Afghan security forces after we withdraw most of our combat power. It is cheap insurance.

I thought the most important historical tidbit he pointed out was that the USSR installed government and security forces didn't fail until the Afghan government couldn't/wouldn't pay their soldiers, which was the beginning of the end. I suspect that was due to the USSR pulling the rug out from under their feet. A mistake we don't want to make.

Excellent presentation.

Bill, with respect. Think Vietnam.

Is it only Americans who think that this will be anything other than a rerun of that debacle?

The (US) money won't filter down into the pay packets of the troops and the US Congress will pull the funding... and the whole of the Karzai regime will move to Dubai to live happily ever after on the billions of US cash already stashed there... and Afghanistan will return to its old ways.

davidbfpo
09-23-2012, 04:01 PM
I couldn't locate the video of Amb. Crocker, so settled for the transcript and found a few good passages:
...we, Americans, are not overly brilliant at. We’re all about today and tomorrow....So we tend to lose track of how important history is elsewhere in the world and how it shapes the present and informs the future.

Ken W. in particular reminds us of this American habit.

Iran-US cooperation:
During those pre-attack discussions—and you’ll remember the air war began in early October—the Iranian thrust was, you know, what do you need to know to knock their blocks off? You want their order of battle? Here’s the map. You want to know where we think their weak points are? Here, here, and here. You want to know how we think they’re going to react to an air campaign? Do you want to know how we think the Northern Alliance will behave? Ask us. We’ve got the answers; we’ve been working with those guys for years. This was an unprecedented period since the revolution of, again, a U.S.- Iranian dialogue on a particular issue where we very much had common interest and common cause.

Incidentally there is no mention of the Indians, who had an advisory group with the Northern Alliance - the only foreign "boots on the ground". Nor the discussions and agreements with Iran before Gulf War Two, especially over overflight, SAR etc.

Back to Iran & Afghanistan:
The Iranians have always pulled their punches in Afghanistan. They could have been a lot worse than they have been. The only explosively formed projectile—EFP that killed so many Americans in Afghanistan we’ve ever found evidence of—in Iraq, sorry—the only one we’ve ever found evidence of in Afghanistan was an inert one that we believe was left for us to find as a reminder—say, you know, we’re only using one hand, and only three fingers on that hand.

On the ANA/ANSF I too wondered, especially when reading they still today have a 15% absentee or desertion problem.

Fuchs
09-23-2012, 05:10 PM
Iran-US cooperation:

That's from the short period when the Iranian government proposed political peace and cooperation to the U.S..
A 'historical' chance that the Neocons threw away because they preferred their model of what the world is like over facts.

Bill Moore
09-23-2012, 05:34 PM
Posted by JMA


Bill, with respect. Think Vietnam.

Is it only Americans who think that this will be anything other than a rerun of that debacle?

The (US) money won't filter down into the pay packets of the troops and the US Congress will pull the funding... and the whole of the Karzai regime will move to Dubai to live happily ever after on the billions of US cash already stashed there... and Afghanistan will return to its old ways.

Ultimately those who doubt our commitment to remain committed may sadly prove to be correct. We have some wise advisors in our Department of State and Department of Defense who like AMB Crocker admit they can't predict the future the 30th and 40th order effects of any decision, they can still provide the President and Congress sound recommendations based on history and convergence of trends that are shaping the future. Yet as I suspect most know those decisions are ultimately made by politicians who are more concerned about short term influence over the electorate than long term strategic influence in the world.

Based on this reality any doctrine we develop that relies on enduring efforts is often doomed from the start because we fail to understand our own context, even if we have (bold statement I know) have a good understanding of the historic context in the foreign countries we're trying to influence.

Dayuhan
09-23-2012, 11:43 PM
I suspect that was due to the USSR pulling the rug out from under their feet. A mistake we don't want to make.

Maybe it would be a mistake, that would depend on circumstances. If we're pouring money in, the money is pouring out into offshore accounts, and the troops aren't being paid, do we pour more money in? All the US can do is help, we can't make a government function or stand. If we're helping and the government in question isn't doing it's share, we have to pull the plug, come what may. Nobody anywhere should have a blank check on US support.

Of course if the plug gets pulled there will be a chorus of howls about debacles and betrayals and abandonment, that's a given. Still gotta do what you gotta do.

carl
09-24-2012, 03:52 AM
People often say that attacks on the scale of 9-11 can be done from somewhere else, Yemen, Somalia, Western Europe etc. I have never bought that. Amb Crocker explained why it can't be done from Yemen. Western Europe is crawling with proficient police forces and intel services who are paying attention and whose individual officers and agents dream of being able to nab an AQ guy. If AQ wanted to use the area that used to be Somalia, they would have to get the Somaliland gov to go for it, which it probably won't, or the Puntland gov to go for it which probably won't and if they went to Mog the Ugandans would kill them and if they went south the Kenyans would kill them (both with copious help from us) and that would leave them with only thorny scrubland presided over by who knows who with access to nowhere.

They are in the best and probably only place for them in the world now, Pakistan mostly, because the Pak Army/ISI doesn't mind them too much. If Taliban took back Afghanistan there would be an even better place for them. This isn't before 9-11 anymore. Everybody is paying attention. They haven't gone anywhere else because they can't. The advantage of having a place where the authorities not only won't come after you but actually support you can't be done without.

Amb Crocker said some things about Kabul but I wish he had said more. The size of that place is a major change from 2001 as he mentioned. It has to have a very great effect upon how far a Pak Army/ISI supported Taliban & Co will be able to go after 2014.

Maybe H. Karzai has no intention of bugging out if the time comes. Amb Crocker very strongly said that Mr. Karzai's life depends upon what happens. That doesn't sound like a guy who is planning on running. And he has done some very brave things in the past.

Who knows how good the ANSF is, but it only has to be better than Taliban & Co. Another thread talked about some Taliban acknowledging that they cannot take Kabul. So it may not be such a sure thing how far Taliaban & Co. can go after 2014.

David mentioned the Indians. I wish Amb Crocker had had the time too also. They are the gorilla that sits quietly in the corner. If we decide to stop paying for the insurance policy that a post 2014 ANSF would be, I suspect the Indians, the Iranians, the Turks, the Russkis and the U-Pick-Astanis will make their own arrangements.

Bill Moore
09-24-2012, 08:22 AM
Attacks that did not require a safe haven in Afghanistan
1995 Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway
1995 Oklahoma City Bombing
2002 Bali Bombins
2004 Madrid Train Bombings
2004 Beslan school hostage crisis
2005 London bombings
2006 Mumbai train bombings
Thousands of terrorist attacks in Iraq, now Syria.
Contrary to the Ambassador's claims, Al Qaeda in Yemen have been developing some cutting edge tactics and techniques for conducting terrorist attacks against airlines.

Future attacks will not require a safe haven since Al Qaeda is now largely decentralized and its core becoming less relevant. Terrorists historically have often found safe haven in major western cities by practicing good operational tradecraft and operations security measures. Safe haven for an insurgency and terrorists are two different animals. An intelligent mass murderer could develop a 9/11 like plot in his home and with funding facilitate the development of a cell to conduct the attack. Many will fail, just like the 9/11 should have in hindsight, but due to human error and dumb luck some will succeed. Training for the attacks could have taken place in U.S., much like the actual 9/11 hijackers did with flight school, martial arts training, etc. (flight simulators, recon airport secuirty, etc.). No doubt having Afghanistan was nice, but it isn't necessary to facilitate a major terrorist attack, and now operating from Afghanistan if more likely to result in compromise than success. We would be foolish to assume that any one piece of dirt is critical, and excessive focus on that piece of dirt will blind us to threats emerging from other parts of the world. We created a narrative that we can't escape from.
Future so called safe havens will definitely include parts of the many of the new Arab Spring countries, Yemen, Iraq, Mali, Indonesia, Philippines, Mexico, Somalia, etc. They will include the world of cyber which result in radicalized individuals in our own cities.

The Ambassador has a wealth of experience on point in a lot of rough areas, but like all he is subject to personal biases and clings to the narrative that he was part and parcel in creating.

carl
09-24-2012, 02:11 PM
Bill:

Nope, Amb Crocker is right. AQ hasn't changed its ideology, nor has Taliban nor has Pak Army/ISI. If Taliban & Co were to reacquire Afghanistan, I see no reason at all why they would not resume doing what they had done before.

This is a semantic point but I'll bring it up. Amb Crocker referred to another 9-11. I referred to another 9-11. None of the attacks you mentioned were on the scale of 9-11 nor were any of them intended to be on the scale of 9-11. Now to your list.

I think you may be casting your net a little bit wide when you throw in Beslan, and Oklahoma City. Yes obviously attacks can be planned and carried out by other people in other places than Pak Army/ISIland and Afghanstan but the context of the discussion is AQ or AQ affiliated or sympathetic organizations. If you are going to include Beslan, OKC and Tokyo why not throw in the attack on Mecca or the Red Army Brigades in Italy or killing of the guy in Sarajevo that started WWI? And if you are going to include Iraq and Syria why not include Vietnam, Algeria, Cyprus and all the terror associated with the war in central Africa in the 90s and 2000s?

I did read that some of the London train bombers traveled to Pakistan for training. The failed Times Square bomber traveled to Pakistan for training and the guy from Denver who wanted to blow up the subway traveled to Pakistan for training. And the Mumbai attack was planned and run by the ISI from Pakistan. So I think that if you want to run a big op, especially a big complicated one, are AQ or affiliated, there is only one place in the world you can do that from and that is Pak Army/ISIland now, and Afghanistan if Taliban & Co get their bloody mitts on it again.

AQ in Yemen may be able to sneak an explosive cartridge on a cargo plane or make jockey shorts that might go bang but those are not ops on the scale of 9-11. In order to do something like that you need a country that likes you to live in. Cyber planning always sounds good but people still have to train somewhere, practice somewhere and make things somewhere. About the only place they can do that now, in the context of which we are speaking, is Pak Army/ISIland or perhaps Afghanistan again in the future.

We would be foolish to think that any one piece of dirt the only one that is needed to do bad things from. But we would be equally foolish to not to recognize that one particular piece of dirt is critical, and has been critical if you are looking at a particular type of big attack.

Ultimately though, the point isn't that is it possible that something big could be pulled off from somewhere else. Amb Crocker said that if Taliban gets Afghanistan back, AQ will be back with them. The last time that happened, it was not good.

Dayuhan
09-25-2012, 12:17 AM
Straying a bit from the thread topic, but I expect David will sort that out...


AQ in Yemen may be able to sneak an explosive cartridge on a cargo plane or make jockey shorts that might go bang but those are not ops on the scale of 9-11. In order to do something like that you need a country that likes you to live in.

Ramzi Yousef hatched an ambitious plan to blow up airliners, assassinate the Pope, and fly a commercial jet into Langley from an apartment in downtown Manila. He might have pulled it off if he hadn't gotten sloppy.

carl
09-25-2012, 03:28 AM
Ramzi Yousef hatched an ambitious plan to blow up airliners, assassinate the Pope, and fly a commercial jet into Langley from an apartment in downtown Manila. He might have pulled it off if he hadn't gotten sloppy.

He did indeed. He also attended an AQ training camp in Afghanistan I believe. He hid out in Pakistan for a while. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is his uncle. And he finally got picked up in Pakistan. So I would say, his case buttresses my point.

davidbfpo
09-25-2012, 08:06 AM
Thanks Dayuhan:
Straying a bit from the thread topic, but I expect David will sort that out...

Yes I will. The issue of safe haven(s) for AQ and other terrorist groups has appeared before, so I'm not sure if there is an alternative home for these posts, if not a new thread will emerge.

The new consolidated thread on safe haven, sanctuary, sanctuaries and ungoverned spaces is called 'Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3905

davidbfpo
09-25-2012, 09:14 PM
I missed this BBC Radio 4 programme, but the News website has a story on the issue and this appears in a side-bar.

Captain Doug Beattie has completed 3 tours of Afghanistan, most recently with the Territorial Army. He told File on 4 about the tribal allegiances which conflict with the work of many Afghan recruits.

There is a podcast for File on 4, but not yet this programme:http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/fileon4


Do not think of the Afghan Police as your local policeman who really looks after criminality. What you're looking at is a man who is normally illiterate, who is heavily armed, but has no concept of the rule of law. This young man is policing the area he lives in so they have family, friends and tribal leaders coming up to them and asking them to turn a blind-eye when they are moving a poppy crop through a checkpoint - that happens quite a bit."

"But sometimes there is an insurgent who could be known to the policeman who will ask him to turn a blind-eye so he can carry out whatever he intends to carry out. We know this and we've monitored this in some occasions. It's not because the policemen is aligned to the insurgency, it's not because he is a Taliban who has joined the police, it is because of these external influences against him from his family, from his tribe.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19672852

JMA
09-26-2012, 01:32 AM
I missed this BBC Radio 4 programme, but the News website has a story on the issue and this appears in a side-bar.

Captain Doug Beattie has completed 3 tours of Afghanistan, most recently with the Territorial Army. He told File on 4 about the tribal allegiances which conflict with the work of many Afghan recruits.

There is a podcast for File on 4, but not yet this programme:http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/fileon4

It's up now on the link and follow instructions on link:



.

Gurkha
09-30-2012, 05:15 AM
I think you guys are being too hard on yourselves or have extremely inflated opinions about the abilities of your armies !! The Afghans in general and the Pashtuns specifically see Westerners as violently different in terms of religious, cultural, ethnic and political orientation. To top it all you appear the losing side with a planned departure date !! What did you expect ? To complicate things you have a rabidly anti US country through which your major Lines of Communication pass. I think that you're doing pretty well for now. My solution : shore up the moderates, Hazaras, Shias & Tajiks, kick the Pakis in the balls while you skedaddle.

JMA
09-30-2012, 05:36 AM
I think you guys are being too hard on yourselves or have extremely inflated opinions about the abilities of your armies !! The Afghans in general and the Pashtuns specifically see Westerners as violently different in terms of religious, cultural, ethnic and political orientation. To top it all you appear the losing side with a planned departure date !! What did you expect ? To complicate things you have a rabidly anti US country through which your major Lines of Communication pass. I think that you're doing pretty well for now. My solution : shore up the moderates, Hazaras, Shias & Tajiks, kick the Pakis in the balls while you skedaddle.

History will judge the West harshly over the Afghanistan debacle.

US and Brit politicians must carry the can for this but the US and Brit militaries also come out of this poorly. Then as per normal the politicians will get off scott free and the "generals" may... just may, suffer reputational damage but will not lose their pensions. Once again the price for political and military incompetence is paid by soldiers with their lives and physical mutilations.

What remains bizarre is the almost universal knee jerk blind loyalty displayed towards the politicians and generals - whose performance varies between plain incompetence and criminal negligence - by the rank and file soldiers. This I suggest is a psychological pathology worthy of study.

.

JMA
09-30-2012, 07:35 AM
I missed this BBC Radio 4 programme, but the News website has a story on the issue and this appears in a side-bar.

Captain Doug Beattie has completed 3 tours of Afghanistan, most recently with the Territorial Army. He told File on 4 about the tribal allegiances which conflict with the work of many Afghan recruits.

There is a podcast for File on 4, but not yet this programme:http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/fileon4

These issues and potential risks would be obvious to those who a have worked with indigenous troops.

Once again the old "hardy annual" of the lack of continuity among Brit (and also US) troops leads to a lack of expertise in not only this aspect - being the understanding of Afghan culture - but all aspects of military operations in the Afghanistan theatre that contributes to the overall crisis.

In terms of the Brits a six month tour bestows "Afghan expertise" on a soldier. A whole six months... wow!

Ken White
09-30-2012, 03:01 PM
I think you guys are being too hard on yourselves or have extremely inflated opinions about the abilities of your armies !!Accurate assessment on your part and correct on both counts. The latter problem leads directly to the former. That uncharitable opinion is also influenced heavily by US domestic -- and electoral -- politics. JMA is right to assert that both the Politicians and the Generals bear responsibility for most of the errors (of commission and omission...) but the US milieu virtually demands that the Generals accede to anything, no matter how stupid, the Politicians want and that those Politicians (and by both affinity and direction, the Generals) never admit error. Dumb way to do business but we've managed to live with it for a couple of centuries...
... you have a rabidly anti US country through which your major Lines of Communication pass. I think that you're doing pretty well for now. My solution : shore up the moderates, Hazaras, Shias & Tajiks, kick the Pakis in the balls while you skedaddle.Sound advice. Regrettably the US Foreign Policy 'establishment' would have conniption fits at the mere thought the 'unequal treatment' thus shown -- or of admitting that the entire early moves were ill advised. They will also dismiss that last part, they having never subscribed to the reality that if one grabs an opponent there, hearts and minds will follow.

Ken White
09-30-2012, 03:12 PM
Once again the old "hardy annual" of the lack of continuity among Brit (and also US) troops leads to a lack of expertise in not only this aspect - being the understanding of Afghan culture - but all aspects of military operations in the Afghanistan theatre that contributes to the overall crisis.As always I totally agree militarily and practically but still cite the political infeasibility of longer tours for both nations. In both nations, the domestic political desirability will always outweigh the military optimum unless there is an existential issue. In Afghanistan (and Iraq) there was no such issue.

Both Armies knew all that so they accepted the rules. That excuses neither Army for not doing a better job of training or placing rotations to maximize the capability attainable. Both could have done a far better job at that but Gurkha's comment about "inflated opinions" allied with super egos interfered... :mad:

JMA
09-30-2012, 03:33 PM
As always I totally agree militarily and practically but still cite the political infeasibility of longer tours for both nations. In both nations, the domestic political desirability will always outweigh the military optimum unless there is an existential issue. In Afghanistan (and Iraq) there was no such issue.

Both Armies knew all that so they accepted the rules. That excuses neither Army for not doing a better job of training or placing rotations to maximize the capability attainable. Both could have done a far better job at that but Gurkha's comment about "inflated opinions" allied with super egos interfered... :mad:

Ken, I raise this point again - the "C" word - so as to ensure that this critical factor is not lost in the churn of misinformation and the search for reasons for the lack of performance.

I continue to be amused that there are little or no offers of how greater operational continuity could be achieved given the imposed limitations or what improved system could be sold to the idiots in your congress (that would have some chance of success).

...or maybe someone may be willing and able to support the current failed system... (thereby possibly gaining a few "Brownie points" in the process). Any takers?

jcustis
09-30-2012, 03:33 PM
We cannot seem to focus on the right things. I see this effort going nowhere and, frankly, a waste of time that could be better applied. I find it funny that the general in charge of the effort can't seem to get fully behind it. :rolleyes:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghan-troops-get-a-lesson-in-american-cultural-ignorance/2012/09/28/6882621a-08d4-11e2-a10c-fa5a255a9258_story.html


By Kevin Sieff and Richard Leiby, Updated: Friday, September 28, 3:55 AMThe Washington Post KABUL — A new Afghan army-issued guide explains to soldiers here that when their Western counterparts do something deeply insulting, it’s likely a product of cultural ignorance and not worthy of revenge.

Eleven years into the war in Afghanistan, NATO troops and Afghan soldiers are still beset by a dangerous lack of cultural understanding, officials say, contributing to a string of insider attacks that have threatened to undermine the military partnership. Fifty-one coalition troops have been killed this year by their Afghan counterparts.

To address a laundry list of cross-cultural pitfalls — and to avoid their potentially fatal consequences — the Afghan Ministry of Defense this month introduced a pamphlet called “Cultural Understanding — A Guide to Understanding Coalition Cultures.”

The 18-page training guide, written in Dari, will soon be distributed to Afghan military leaders across the country. The booklet will be taught in three one-hour sessions to all soldiers as well as new recruits.

It is intended to “strengthen our understanding of our [NATO] counterpart,” according to an English translation of the pamphlet that was provided to The Washington Post. But in doing so, it also reveals seemingly minor — and rarely acknowledged — cultural faux pas that have created palpable tension between the two forces.

“Please do not get offended if you see a NATO member blowing his/her nose in front of you,” the guide instructs.

“When Coalition members get excited, they may show their excitement by patting one another on the back or the behind,” it explains. “They may even do this to you if they are proud of the job you've done. Once again, they don’t mean to offend you.”

And another tip: “When someone feels comfortable in your presence, they may even put their feet on their own desk while speaking with you. They are by no means trying to offend you. They simply don’t know or have forgotten the Afghan custom.” Pointing the soles of one’s shoes at someone is considered a grievous insult in Afghanistan.

The guide also warns Afghan soldiers that Western troops might wink at them or inquire about their female relatives or expose their private parts while showering — all inappropriate actions by Afghan standards.

As NATO winds down its mission here, the “Cultural Understanding” guide marks the Afghan army’s most significant effort to identify long-standing points of contention and confusion between the two forces.

Despite those points, the coalition is described glowingly, often in florid language.

The United States is “a little like a lovely carpet. Different colored strands combine to make a beautiful whole.”

NATO’s coalition is described as a “work of art.”

The task of laying out a set of commonly misinterpreted behaviors fell to Brig. Gen. Mohammad Amin Nasib, the bearish, affable head of religious and ideological affairs at the Ministry of Defense, and his senior military adviser from the NATO side, Michael W. Gore, a mild-mannered Navy commander and chaplain.

“Some would argue that we’re too late, but any time is the right time to promote understanding of each other’s culture,” Gore said. “The Golden Rule goes a long way in any culture in helping to foster tolerance and understanding.”

Nasib wasn’t quite as buoyant. “Unfortunately, it’s too late,” he said. “It should have been done early.”

Fuchs
09-30-2012, 03:41 PM
In terms of the Brits a six month tour bestows "Afghan expertise" on a soldier. A whole six months... wow!

Expectations for learning progress must have been lowered.

Back in 1941, having seen six weeks of the French campaign easily qualified for being a Blitzkrieg expert in Britain. In fact, most who were considered experts of this then-new thing had seen it not at all or had seen only about two weeks of it, and in a secondary area of the theatre.


Presently, I am imagining how Churchill tells Montgomery to first spend a year in Egypt and learn a lot before taking any action.

JMA
09-30-2012, 03:52 PM
As always I totally agree militarily and practically but still cite the political infeasibility of longer tours for both nations. In both nations, the domestic political desirability will always outweigh the military optimum unless there is an existential issue. In Afghanistan (and Iraq) there was no such issue.

Both Armies knew all that so they accepted the rules. That excuses neither Army for not doing a better job of training or placing rotations to maximize the capability attainable. Both could have done a far better job at that but Gurkha's comment about "inflated opinions" allied with super egos interfered... :mad:

As a follow up...

I read in that Washington Post article about the concern that after 11 years in Afghanistan lamenting the cross-cultural issues which remain. One wonders whether any of the new generation of soldiers know that famous quote out of Vietnam to illustrate the point?

jcustis
09-30-2012, 04:01 PM
I continue to be amused that there are little or no offers of how greater operational continuity could be achieved given the imposed limitations or what improved system could be sold to the idiots in your congress (that would have some chance of success).

...or maybe someone may be willing and able to support the current failed system... (thereby possibly gaining a few "Brownie points" in the process). Any takers?

JMA, for the love of God, stop trolling. What point are you trying to prove besides parading your annoying approach (on second thought--don't answer that)?

If you haven't figured it out by now, folks have stopped feeding the pigeons for the most part when one comes flopping into threads looking for trouble, because dealing with the #### is a pain in the ass.

Go back to the RLI thread and stay industrious there.

tequila
09-30-2012, 04:33 PM
Some additional data on "green-on-green" attacks, that is insider attacks within the Afghan Army and police:

Afghan troops killing colleagues in greater numbers (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/world/asia/afghan-troops-killing-colleagues-in-greater-numbers.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all)


Even as attacks by Afghan security forces on NATO troops have become an increasing source of tension, new NATO data shows another sign of vulnerability for the training mission: even greater numbers of the Afghan police and military forces have killed each other this year.

So far, Afghan soldiers or police officers have killed 53 of their comrades and wounded at least 22 others in 35 separate attacks this year, according to NATO data provided to The New York Times by officials in Kabul. By comparison, at least 40 NATO service members were reported killed by Afghan security forces or others working with them.

Both figures fall under what officials call insider attacks, and both numbers have climbed sharply over the past two years, Western officials say. But while officials say that a vast majority of attacks on Western forces are born out of outrage or personal disputes, the Afghan-on-Afghan numbers are said in larger part to reflect a greater vulnerability to infiltration by the Taliban.

Further, there are concerns about cultural clashes within the rapidly expanding Afghan forces themselves, Afghan and NATO officials say, raising questions about their ability to weather the country’s deep factional differences after the NATO troop withdrawal in 2014.

“Three decades of war can play a pivotal role in the internal causes,” said Maj. Bashir Ishaqzia, commander of the Afghan National Police recruitment center in Nangarhar Province. He said one of the biggest challenges for the army and police forces was a lasting “culture of intolerance among Afghans, as well as old family, tribal, ethnic, factional, lingual and personal disputes.”

JMA
09-30-2012, 04:48 PM
Expectations for learning progress must have been lowered.

Back in 1941, having seen six weeks of the French campaign easily qualified for being a Blitzkrieg expert in Britain. In fact, most who were considered experts of this then-new thing had seen it not at all or had seen only about two weeks of it, and in a secondary area of the theatre.

We have a saying: "In the land of the blind the man with one eye is king."

The cycle continues:


"In Afghanistan and Iraq, army units served six months in heatre.40 Every British soldier knows the routine well: one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for ‘tea and medals’, as the saying goes."

Ledwidge, Frank (2011-07-15). Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (p. 35). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.


Presently, I am imagining how Churchill tells Montgomery to first spend a year in Egypt and learn a lot before taking any action.

Under those circumstances you do the best you can. The general practice is to look for those with the best experience to lead new ventures (be they anything from an invasion to a patrol).

...but it is not merely time in theatre that counts it is time in combat with a variation of situations. Not sure sitting in Bagram counts for much other than for the "field hospital" there which by all accounts is the best the Brits have ever had.

JMA
09-30-2012, 04:49 PM
JMA, for the love of God, stop trolling. What point are you trying to prove besides parading your annoying approach (on second thought--don't answer that)?

If you haven't figured it out by now, folks have stopped feeding the pigeons for the most part when one comes flopping into threads looking for trouble, because dealing with the #### is a pain in the ass.

Go back to the RLI thread and stay industrious there.

LOL... I guess that means you have nothing to contribute on this issue ;)

Ken White
09-30-2012, 04:59 PM
I continue to be amused that there are little or no offers of how greater operational continuity could be achieved given the imposed limitations or what improved system could be sold to the idiots in your congress (that would have some chance of success).Been answered dozens of times, you just refuse to accept reality. There would be no chance of such success.

"" In both nations, the domestic political desirability will always outweigh the military optimum unless there is an existential issue. In Afghanistan (and Iraq) there was no such issue.""

""That excuses neither Army for not doing a better job of training or placing rotations to maximize the capability attainable. Both could have done a far better job at that but Gurkha's comment about "inflated opinions" allied with super egos interfered...""

Many of us continue to be amused at your deliberate 'incomprehension.' As Jon said, you could probably stop Trolling, it's unseemly. :rolleyes:

JMA
09-30-2012, 05:40 PM
Been answered dozens of times, you just refuse to accept reality. There would be no chance of such success.

"" In both nations, the domestic political desirability will always outweigh the military optimum unless there is an existential issue. In Afghanistan (and Iraq) there was no such issue.""

""That excuses neither Army for not doing a better job of training or placing rotations to maximize the capability attainable. Both could have done a far better job at that but Gurkha's comment about "inflated opinions" allied with super egos interfered...""

Many of us continue to be amused at your deliberate 'incomprehension.' As Jon said, you could probably stop Trolling, it's unseemly. :rolleyes:

Ken, I can understand your frustration at not being able to operate anywhere near the optimum but it is unseemly... no maybe just not the most intelligent choice to just block out the factor and pretend it does not exist.

It took the Brits on the ground in Helmand years and years of repeatedly drawing attention to the shortage of helicopters to support their operations there. Finally the penny dropped... and now - while the problem is not solved - there is general acceptance among the politicians and general staff that this is indeed a problem.

In this regard - the lack of operational continuity through short tours - one aspect of the Brit problem is covered in the General Sir Richard Dannatt and diplomat Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles spat (http://whoknowswho.channel4.com/stories/Dannatt,_Cowper-Coles_and_the_lying_game).

Two other arguments relate to concern about the effect on the marriages of soldiers on long tours together with the anticipated increase in PTSD within a smaller cohort with greater combat exposure.

Not sure anyone has done the calculations on how the PTSD plays out among long tours in a smaller cohort as compared with short tours among a larger cohort.

This is the sort of problem that should be given to staff courses and SNCOs to figure out as to what would be the ideal. It would be an exercise in applied intelligence and the results should be thrown in to the faces of the politicians - like the Brits did over their helicopter shortage - until the penny drops.

There is a principle here... and that should be fought for. It is quite unacceptable that officers accept circumstances that lead to largely preventable deaths of the men over whom they have aq duty of care.

I know only of Maj Sebastian Morley (of the SAS) who resigned in disgust over the use of Snatch LandRovers saying such continued use in the era of the IED was 'cavalier at best, criminal at worst'. Appears moral courage is not the strong suit out there. Perhaps this is why some get so irritated when they are reminded that their silence is a failure in the duty of care to their men.

Surferbeetle
09-30-2012, 06:09 PM
There is a principle here... and that should be fought for. It is quite unacceptable that officers accept circumstances that lead to largely preventable deaths of the men over whom they have aq duty of care.

I know only of Maj Sebastian Morley (of the SAS) who resigned in disgust over the use of Snatch LandRovers saying such continued use in the era of the IED was 'cavalier at best, criminal at worst'. Appears moral courage is not the strong suit out there. Perhaps this is why some get so irritated when they are reminded that their silence is a failure in the duty of care to their men.

Small unit tactics seem to be your strong suit, while you are often wide of the mark in other areas. ;)

We have conducted GWOT for over a decade; FOB's, MRAP's, helicopters, and incredible supply chains are a few physical examples of what you miss in your argument as quoted above. For those who consistently work outside of these physical manifestations of concern, we have our training, teamwork, and a wide variety of skills which allow us to operate globally 24/7.

In terms of your attempt to (mis)characterize our concern for our soldiers you have not served with us, and it shows in your posts.

JMA
09-30-2012, 06:44 PM
Small unit tactics seem to be your strong suit, while you are often wide of the mark in other areas. ;)

You forgot to add... "in my opinion".


We have conducted GWOT for over a decade; FOB's, MRAP's, helicopters, and incredible supply chains are a few physical examples of what you miss in your argument as quoted above.

There is a sound basis for criticism that as technology has increasingly become available at platoon level in modern armies many of the basics of soldiering have become neglected.

(For those with a professional interest in soldiering it would be worthwhile to compare infantry training courses going back in ten year intervals to establish what has been added to and what has dropped out of training. I suggest there will be interesting findings.)

BTW... FOBs (aka "Beau Geste" forts) are a significant part of the problem.


Will pass on the rest because its Sunday :)

.

Surferbeetle
09-30-2012, 07:06 PM
You forgot to add... "in my opinion".

Always...let's assume that is the case for both you and I ;)


There is a sound basis for criticism that as technology has increasingly become available at platoon level in modern armies many of the basics of soldiering have become neglected.

True


BTW... FOBs (aka "Beau Geste" forts) are a significant part of the problem.

True...they can also be viewed as soundproof opaque cages in many instances...


Will pass on the rest because its Sunday :) .

Works...:wry:

carl
09-30-2012, 10:43 PM
(...the Generals) never admit error.

This seems to have become something that is writ in stone. It is to me, a critical failing that bodes disaster in the future because I think it human nature that if one can never admit error, eventually one's ability to perceive error is affected and one who can't perceive error is doomed. It wouldn't be so bad if just the generals were doomed but they will take a lot of others with them.

It seems to me too that lower down on the rank scale, people will see error quite clearly and will admit it and come up will all sorts of ways to fix it. But higher up on the scale, that disappears. So the problem isn't the people as a whole, just the ones who make high rank, mostly.

Ken, I ask your opinion on something, and I ask it of others too. Can anything be done to change that, by the military itself I mean?

Dayuhan
09-30-2012, 11:45 PM
History will judge the West harshly over the Afghanistan debacle.

G.B. Shaw's version of General Burgoyne commented, on the verge of his own defeat by insurgents: "History, sir, will tell lies, as usual".

I suspect that history will treat the current Afghanistan "debacle" largely as a footnote. In 2027 the inmates on SWJ will doubtless be discussing it with great vigor, but for students of history in the broader sense it will be a niche specialty. I'd also expect the primary focus of history to be on the odd politics of the decision to try to build a nation, rather than the mode of execution.

One can certainly argue over whether any given set of different tactics might have made a difference, but we'll never know where the road not take would have led, and ultimately it seems to me that the whole venture would have been rendered unsustainable in any event by the unrealistic goals imposed by mission creep. we can argue over whether the wrong thing was done wrong or right, but it's still the wrong thing.

Ken White
10-01-2012, 02:15 AM
Ken, I ask your opinion on something, and I ask it of others too. Can anything be done to change that, by the military itself I mean?You took that out of context. What I wrote was:

""... the US milieu virtually demands that the Generals accede to anything, no matter how stupid, the Politicians want and that those Politicians (and by both affinity and direction, the Generals) never admit error. Dumb way to do business but we've managed to live with it for a couple of centuries...""

Note that I wrote the "US milieu" meaning the public, the media and the Politicians. The allegation was directed at the Politicians, the Generals were merely a parenthetical add-on, thus a minor part of the problem. Note also that I wrote that the Generals were a minor part due to both affinity [nearness to the Political aspect of military effort] AND direction -- the Politicians will just fire them if they don't behave. See MacArthur, D; Denfield L.; Singlaub, J.; Dugan, M; McChrystal S.. As I also wrote, it's been that way for us for a couple of centuries (See Lee, C.; Taylor Z.; McClellan G.).

The FlagOs all know that so the pressure for them to conform is tremendous. Note also that this by you:
I think it human nature that if one can never admit error, eventually one's ability to perceive error is affected and one who can't perceive error is doomed.assumes that the Politicians (and to an extent, the Generals) cannot admit error -- they can admit it but to do so in the US milieu is effectively political suicide. So they just don't admit them publicly because it is considered harmful to their cause -- very different thing. The Army's really very good about identifying and admitting error of and within itself, it just doesn't like to acknowledge them publicly.

It's not a US failing, it exists worldwide. Nor is it a military failing, it affects other professions as well; the military in the US is just more visible AND moire directly tied to the political machinery.

It's a human failing. It could possibly be changed if you can (a) change human nature; and (b) insure that those changes stick, i.e. that the selected 'honest' LT ort other person lower down the rank scale does not change to become more 'accommodating' as he grows older.

I'd say the prognosis for changing that is quite dim. FWIW, the problem has affected all Armies about whom I've read and with whom I have served or trained -- been around for Centuries so it's probably not going away. Some will say that in WW II, people got relieved for such behavior. True, some people did but others like MacArthur, Bradley, Clark and many more did not. People aren't perfect, never have been and likely never will be; certainly not in our lifetimes.

It is a problem but it is a minor problem. You want to fix things, get Congress to back off insisting that military selection processes be 'fair' and 'objective' and using their budget power to affect procurements (and behavior...) Those factors each cause ten to twenty times more damage -- and kill more people -- than FlagOs acceding to the demands of Politicians

carl
10-01-2012, 04:02 AM
Ken:

I realized what your context was and I tried to change it, not because I wanted to misrepresent you but because I wanted to limit the scope of your answer. I wanted to limit the scope not for any nefarious reason but because changing the civilian political climate is something the military can influence but not all that much. So what I wanted to know is what the military can do for itself. Sorry I was unclear.

All of your points are good and I realize that this tendency is a human failing. But human failings can be, if not eliminated, minimized. What can the military do, do you think, by itself and for itself to minimize this? For example, there were two examples in the early 2000s of the military just flat out lying-about Mr. Tillman and Ms. Lynch-for no good reason at all. Congress didn't cause this, it was I think the military flat out lying for its own purposes and people in Congress were a bit upset about this. But there were no severe penalties paid by the people responsible for the lies. Another example is the platoon leader of the 'kill team' getting his promotion. I hope it is within the power of the military to severely punish flat out liars and keep lousy officers from getting promoted. What can the military do do you think to help improve, not cure, improve, the situation?

I think people start out seeing error and not admitting it. But I think also that as that pattern persists over years and decades, the pattern changes from seeing but not saying to not seeing at all. It eliminates a step and soothes minds that would be troubled by the stress of seeing but not saying. There is less stress if the organization learns not to see at all. That may be a little vaporous but it is something I have seen in my life. It is sort of defining deviance down like Mr. Moynihan said. After a while, you don't even see it anymore because it is the new norm.

carl
10-01-2012, 05:45 AM
Ken:

Maybe this won't help but I'll try to give an example of the kind of thing military may be able to do for itself by using the US airline business to illustrate.

In the last 40 years or so the accident rate for US sked airlines has fallen dramatically so that it is now approaching zero, someplace it will never reach but it is pretty darn good. That dramatic increase in the safety of operations came about from the industry and all of its components basically reforming itself. The FAA, NTSB, the airlines, the training establishments and the associated researchers first identified specific problem areas and developed specific practices to remedy them. This was helped considerably of course by some tech innovations but training and procedural changes were as, if not more important. Congress, to my knowledge, didn't have a whole lot to do with this besides saying 'Go get 'em boys'. The industry, as a whole, did this and the results were quite impressive.

So what can the military do to reform itself to the extent possible?