The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Taiko]

A question for all the CvC experts. Supposedly War is war and there are many differant types of Warfare. If this is true, then how come CvC said there are 2 types of Wars? One to destroy the enemy and the other to grab some of his territory and either keep it or use it to trade for a peace agreement.

CvC was building on his proposition that war is a continuation of politics by other means through an observational account of the historical transition from 'cabinet wars' (territorial) to 'Nepoleonic wars' (destroy the standing army). It is important to note the correlation in the shifting of policy and the shift in the type of warfare that was being fought to gain the political objectives in both periods, and how this relates to wars of annihiliation and wars of attrition. There are some very interesting insites embedded in these passages which deal with the relationship between generals and policy-makers that have been misinterpreted over the years. From my reading, when CvC talks about the two types of war he is referring to the variation in political objectives a state can achieve through the use of violence.

In making this observation CvC was taking into account the level and intensity of violence required to meet the political objectives set out by policy in both periods. A very rough present day example:

Ireal/Palistinian conflict's political objective is a 'terrirotial one', hence the level and intenisty of violence is only enough to take and hold territory

The initial phase of the Iraq war involved the political objective of overturning a regime, hence the level and intensity of violence was enough to annihilate the standing army and, in theory, the state of Iraq's ability to resist the political objective of the Coalition.

[jmm99]

Delbrück's concepts of Niederwerfungsstrategie (the "strategy of annihilation") and Ermattungsstrategie (the "strategy of exhaustion or attrition") are similar (though more generalized) and extrapolated from CvC.

Two different strategies based on different policy choices.

Regards

Mike

[Fuchs]

(CvC) was clearly a perfectionist and we have no indications as to any major shortcomings.

...save for the worst grammar of all German classic literature and a terribly wrong understanding of Newtonian Physics.

[William F. Owen]

....because Strategy in the end is targeting....who you gonna kill and what are you gonna blow up in order to achieve the political objective. And there are two primary Target categories, type one are military and type two are civilian.
OK, now that IS an interesting point, but probably simplistic view, BUT I'll have to go and drink some coffee on the balcony to think about that. Thank you.

[Taiko]

Strategy in the end is targeting....who you gonna kill and what are you gonna blow up in order to achieve the political objective.

Strategy is the bridge between policy and operations.

[M.L.]

I take it you don't believe in Strategic Targets ?

Why would you say that? Strategy includes targeting, but includes much more as well.

[M.L.]

Strategy is the bridge between policy and operations.

Very good, although I would say this is what strategy does more than what strategy is.

[slapout9]

Targeting is an operational and tactical concept.



M.L., because you said this. A General MUST decide what to attack in order to accomplish his Mission. Picking the proper targets is the most fundemantal act of Strategy there is. How to attack the targets the fundemental act of Tactics.

[slapout9]

OK, now that IS an interesting point, but probably simplistic view, BUT I'll have to go and drink some coffee on the balcony to think about that. Thank you.

Clausewitz is simple! He had a problem with what my English teacher would call the "run on sentence":wry: On another thread about CvC I wrote that the title for his book should have been "Thoughts On War." What we know is CvC wrote every thought On War he had that could be committed to paper. And then in his final notice he clearly stated that his intention was to revise and clarify his thinking. So my thinking is if he had lived he would taken a lot of his wordage out of the final book or at least condensed it down to the very essence of his thinking On War.

Also, I have never read a book that more clearly identifies how criminals think in my life! On War usually makes the top 10 list of books read by inmates in prison. "The Prince" by Machiavelli is usually number one.

But I still say picking the right targets to attack is the essential problem for a General. Criminals do with ease everyday, they very quickly figure out who to hurt or kidnap or what to destroy or steal in order to accomplish their objective. So do good Generals IMO.

[Taiko]

M.L., because you said this. A General MUST decide what to attack in order to accomplish his Mission. Picking the proper targets is the most fundemantal act of Strategy there is. How to attack the targets the fundemental act of Tactics.


And so the superior military cuts down strategy.
Its inferior cuts down alliances.
Its inferior cuts down the military.
The worst attack walled cities.

[slapout9]

And so the superior military cuts down strategy.
Its inferior cuts down alliances.
Its inferior cuts down the military.
The worst attack walled cities.

Thats the other great military thinker isn't it?;)

[M.L.]

M.L., because you said this. A General MUST decide what to attack in order to accomplish his Mission. Picking the proper targets is the most fundemantal act of Strategy there is. How to attack the targets the fundemental act of Tactics.

Picking targets is an operational function, not a strategic one. I defy you to produce a national strategy document which contains specific targets.

Strategic objectives are not the same as targets. A strategic objective may be to destroy the national leadership of an enemy country (say, the president and supreme council of Iran). This strategic objective is then translated at the operational level into either operational targets or tactical objectives.

A strategic target is a target which, if destroyed/defeated, will produce strategic effects. However, this isn't "strategic targeting."

[slapout9]

Picking targets is an operational function, not a strategic one. I defy you to produce a national strategy document which contains specific targets.

Strategic objectives are not the same as targets. A strategic objective may be to destroy the national leadership of an enemy country (say, the president and supreme council of Iran). This strategic objective is then translated at the operational level into either operational targets or tactical objectives.

A strategic target is a target which, if destroyed/defeated, will produce strategic effects. However, this isn't "strategic targeting."


M.L.,it's gonna be alright man:) I am not arguing what is actually taught today as official methodology, I am arguing about what I believe Clausewitz meant in On War. See the differance? So lets not start defying each other about who can produce what because the guy (CvC) is dead and nobody can really prove anything except the quotes from the book and even those are subject to translational debate.

[Taiko]

Colin Gray's Maxim 12:

"The strategist is in the business of currency conversion, in a context that lacks a stable rate of exchange. He or she must determine what kind of military threat or action, on what scale, should generate strategic effect necessary to achieve political objectives. Strategy is exceptionally difficult because its has dimensions that embrace every aspect of war preparation and warmaking. "

However,

"No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy." Helmuth von Moltke the Elder

"Strategy is not, however, the final arbiter in war. The battle-field decides." Charles E. Callwell

Finally,

"Strategy is the use of engagements for the object of the war." CvC

[slapout9]

"Strategy is the use of engagements for the object of the war." CvC

Yes, and to me that is picking targets.

[slapout9]

This is pretty good Strategic Attack USAF Doctine Document 2-1.

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afd2_1_2.pdf

[M.L.]

M.L., because you said this. A General MUST decide what to attack in order to accomplish his Mission. Picking the proper targets is the most fundemantal act of Strategy there is. How to attack the targets the fundemental act of Tactics.

Wrong. Deciding what objectives and conditions must be achieved (end state) is the most fundamental act of strategy. Balancing ways and means to achieve those objectives is second.

Strategy built solely on targeting is poor strategy. That kind of thinking is what went wrong in Iraq. CENTCOM focused on what to attack (Iraqi Army, Hussein Regime), rather than focusing on strategic objectives.

[slapout9]

Wrong. Deciding what objectives and conditions must be achieved (end state) is the most fundamental act of strategy. Balancing ways and means to achieve those objectives is second.

Strategy built solely on targeting is poor strategy. That kind of thinking is what went wrong in Iraq. CENTCOM focused on what to attack (Iraqi Army, Hussein Regime), rather than focusing on strategic objectives.

1- An Objective is a person, place, or thing according to CvC is it not? That is also what a target is it not?

2-CENTCOM focused on attacking the wrong targets...which is very bad Startegy. There was far better plan by General Wayne Downing (who new how to target to achieve the polictical objective) that was rejected and he pretty said what would happen because of that and it did.



From Clausewtiz himself( Book 4)...Strategic targeting all laid out nice and neat.

"Destruction of the enemy's military forces is in reality the object of all combats; but other objects maybe joined to that, and these other objects may be at the same time predominant; we must therefore draw a distinction between those in which the destruction of the enemy's forces is the principal object, and those in which it is more the means. Besides the destruction of the enemy's force, the possession of a place or the possession of some object may be the general motive for a combat, and it may be either one of these alone or several together, in which case still usually one is the principal motive. Now the two principal forms of War, the offensive and defensive, of which we shall shortly speak, do not modify the first of these motives, but they certainly do modify the other two, and therefore if we arrange them in a scheme they would appear thus:—"

Offensive. Defensive.

1. Destruction of enemy's force. 1. Destruction of enemy's force.

2. Conquest of a place. 2. Defence of a place.

3. Conquest of some object. 3. Defence of some object.

[William F. Owen]

Wrong. Deciding what objectives and conditions must be achieved (end state) is the most fundamental act of strategy. Balancing ways and means to achieve those objectives is second.
So what you are saying is the the formulation of Policy is the most fundamental act of strategy?
Policy stand separate from strategy, so I suggest the most fundamental act of strategy is to apply the Ways (Strategy) and Means (Tactics) to gain the Ends (Policy).
The point is your Policy may well be in place before it is opposed and thus require a strategy. Policy is usually the cause of war, thus exists before the strategy is necessary, BUT the Policy will usually have alter to be achievable in Ways and Means. Is this what you meant?

[slapout9]

so I suggest the most fundamental act of strategy is to apply the Ways (Strategy) and Means (Tactics) to gain the Ends (Policy).


Which is just a fancy way of saying.... who you gonna kill or what are you gonna blow up.... is it not? My theory is normal people don't like talking about things like that so they come up with all this JabberWacky talk to make them feel better about what they are really doing or going to do.

Look at the Taliban they have no Military Academies, no War College, no Command and Staff School....but they know who they are going to kill and what they are going to blow up.

Didn't CvC say something to the effect that being an intellectual giant is NOT a requirement of Generalship. It's in the book somewhere.

[William F. Owen]

My theory is normal people don't like talking about things like that so they come up with all this JabberWacky talk to make them feel better about what they are really doing or going to do.
Steady on Tiger!
I'm all for simple and clear spoken or written language, as demonstrating simple and clear thinking. Yes killing and destruction lie at the heart of the military instrument, but "go f*ck 'em up" does not provide a clear basis for guidance.

[slapout9]

Yes killing and destruction lie at the heart of the military instrument, but "go f*ck 'em up" does not provide a clear basis for guidance.

I was having a Stan moment "All problems can be solved by the proper application of high explosives.":wry:

But is does bring to light the non-escapable cause of wars and that is people. CvC said it was policy and it is policy but policy comes from people and often the people that make bad policy never have to pay any consequence for making the bad policy, so sometimes "go f@@k em up" has it's place. It's the would you have assassinated Hitler question?

[M.L.]

So what you are saying is the the formulation of Policy is the most fundamental act of strategy?
Policy stand separate from strategy, so I suggest the most fundamental act of strategy is to apply the Ways (Strategy) and Means (Tactics) to gain the Ends (Policy).
The point is your Policy may well be in place before it is opposed and thus require a strategy. Policy is usually the cause of war, thus exists before the strategy is necessary, BUT the Policy will usually have alter to be achievable in Ways and Means. Is this what you meant?

Strategy = Ends, Ways, and Means

Ends = Goals / Desired End State
Ways = Methods
Means = Resources

Strategy begins at the national level with a policy. There are four instruments of national power that may be used to achieve that policy:
Diplomacy, Information, Economics, and Military. Some call this "Grand Strategy."

The next level down is military strategy (though U.S. doctrine does not distinguish between the two). Military strategy also begins with ends; goals / desired end state. This could mean a military operation, but it could also mean deterrence of a foe or strengthening of an ally.

What is the current military strategy in Korea? One of deterrence.

What was our Cold War strategy? We "won" right? Yet we killed few people and broke few things.

It is only when we go down another level, to the operational level, that we begin to pick targets.

For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. - Sun Tzu

If strategy is about targeting, then how would you explain this quote?

[slapout9]

1-You deter people by threatening the targets they consider valuable/vital to their continued existence. If the threat is directed toward a target they do not consider valuable then there will be know deterrence.

2-The quote is from Sun Tzu not Clausewitz, but it is still targeting because the target is the "mind" of your opponent.

[Ken White]

What was our Cold War strategy? We "won" right? Yet we killed few people and broke few things.we didn't have a strategy, we had a policy -- 'containment' -- that was implemented through a large variety of strategies (many varying from each Administration to the next...) and we killed a lot of people and broke a lot of things...

Nor did we win, we got to a qualified draw that left our nominal opponent in bad shape due to his own profligacy. We also seem determined to do the same sort of thing...:eek:

"Targeting" the noun is a US misapplication of the word targeting, a verb which itself is misuse of the noun target, a word derived from the Celtic Targe, a round shield. :cool:

Long way of saying that targeting can mean different things to different people and a reason to trot out my favorite William F. Halsey quote "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded." Not just Regs, applies even more so to doctrine in general; it's a guide, not a prescription. :wry:
""For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. - Sun Tzu""Sam Griffith has almost as much to answer for as does Robert Strange McNamara. FWIW, Sun Wu, CvC and John Boyd do not have all the answers -- no one does. Hewing overly strongly to the written word causes target fixation and deters flexibility...

[Cliff]

Hewing overly strongly to the written word causes target fixation and deters flexibility...

Ken-

I may need to quote you when I get my latest exam back from my CGSC tactics instructor and find out I didn't adequately follow the dotrine...

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

I may need to quote you when I get my latest exam back from my CGSC tactics instructor and find out I didn't adequately follow the dotrine...the Instructors in the then Department of Tactics at that august institution used to tell the Students at the outset:

"What we are going to teach you will work will work against a near peer opponent in gently rolling open terrain on a clear, mild June day provided you have all your personnel and equipment and all are in good operational condition. If ANY of those factors change, you'll have to adapt."

Or awfully close to that. Seriously. Got that from an old Tanker who instructed CGSC for three years. Hopefully, they're still saying something in the same vein. :wry:

Then there's the doctrine / dogma line... :D

[M.L.]

1-You deter people by threatening the targets they consider valuable/vital to their continued existence. If the threat is directed toward a target they do not consider valuable then there will be know deterrence.

2-The quote is from Sun Tzu not Clausewitz, but it is still targeting because the target is the "mind" of your opponent.

I thought you said strategy=targeting, and targeting=killing people/breaking things...?


Strategy in the end is targeting....who you gonna kill and what are you gonna blow up in order to achieve the political objective.

Well, anyway...there are plenty of people who would agree with you...and many of them worked at CENTCOM in 2002/03.

I take it, then, you would say that the other instruments of power, diplomacy, information, and economics, are not a part of strategy?

[M.L.]

we didn't have a strategy, we had a policy -- 'containment' -- that was implemented through a large variety of strategies.

This is a common misconception. Strategy is not a method or a plan for achieving a goal.

"Containment" is a strategic end state. It describes a desired effect or state of affairs. It was implemented through a variety of methods (ways) using a variety of resources (means), including diplomatic, information, military, and economic.

Like it or not, military operations are a small part of strategy. What most people take to be strategy is really operational art, or even tactics.

[Ken White]

This is a common misconception. Strategy is not a method or a plan for achieving a goal.No misperception involved. I agree with you -- and what I said is not in conflict with that. On the contrary, what you said:
What was our Cold War strategy? We "won" right? Yet we killed few people and broke few things.was wrong on between two and three factors depending upon how one wishes to count. ;)
"Containment" is a strategic end state.Is an end state a t target, in other words?

Was it an end state or a methodology to attain a goal or reach a not specified end state?
It describes a desired effect or state of affairs.Does it do that? Or does it describe a process to arrive at a different end state so that it, containment, is no longer required? :confused:
It was implemented through a variety of methods (ways) using a variety of resources (means), including diplomatic, information, military, and economic.Agreed.
Like it or not, military operations are a small part of strategy. What most people take to be strategy is really operational art, or even tactics.Gee, who knew. And all those years from the mid 50s forward I've been telling folks they were confusing the two I was right all along and apparently didn't know it... :D

However, I totally agree that military operations are or should be a small part of an effective strategy if used at all. That's one of the few Sun Wu and John Boyd things that does apply

In any event. My points stand. Containment was a policy not a strategy and that is proven by assessing the ends, ways and means involved. It was a policy to be followed by a variety of methods including numerous strategies -- and theoretical 'ends' -- that did vary from Prez to Prez. If a strategy is a proactive continuum, it fails on that count also due to said Presidential stops, redirects and starts. The US has great difficulty with strategy due to our political process, electoral cycle. Even during WW II with an unusual and singularly focused government we had several changes in strategy. Correctly, strategy must cope with events and other can impact. Thus, containment, a policy of the US government that carried through eight Administrations was obtained through a variety of way, means -- and strategies -- that adapted to a changing environment.

We killed a bunch of people and broke a lot of stuff in the process. I believe that over 100K US killed and millions of others could be a 'bunch.' Several nations are still recovering from the things we broke in the process (including the US... :( ).

Further, it appears Slap was right. If "... (containment) describes a desired effect or state of affairs..." then that state is a target and if containment was a strategy, then strategy must allow targets? Or did I miss something? I'm old and slow so I may be confused but it truly and not snarkily appears to me you're trying to have it both ways.

[Pete]

Who is this Karl Clausewitz guy and what is his claim to fame? Is he some sort of Dutchman? The Army doesn't need foreign intruders like him muddying the waters of serious discussions about military affairs. This troublemaker should be put in his place by having an NCO from Mississippi deal with him. Maybe Herr Clausewitz would see the light about not causing any further trouble after doing some push-ups, sit-ups, and what the U.S. Army quaintly calls the side-straddle hop.

[William F. Owen]

Strategy = Ends, Ways, and Means

Ends = Goals / Desired End State
Ways = Methods
Means = Resources

Strategy begins at the national level with a policy. There are four instruments of national power that may be used to achieve that policy:
Diplomacy, Information, Economics, and Military. Some call this "Grand Strategy."
To me (and Clausewitz?), Ends is Policy, that is the Policy being opposed. Ways is strategy, and Means is Tactics (= Means of fighting). Thus you have Colin Grays metaphor "The Strategy Bridge" between Ends and Means (Policy and Tactics.)
Yes, strategy employs "all instruments of power." Not sure about there being four or that they are "national." The IRA and Al-Qieda "do/did strategy" with no national status.
Some discussions on this issue should soon be forthcoming at Infinity Journal (http://www.infinityjournal.com)

[M.L.]

Further, it appears Slap was right. If "... (containment) describes a desired effect or state of affairs..." then that state is a target and if containment was a strategy, then strategy must allow targets? Or did I miss something? I'm old and slow so I may be confused but it truly and not snarkily appears to me you're trying to have it both ways.

Now you are playing with semantics. Is a "target" the same as a "goal?" If you use the dictionary definition, yes; down there somewhere a target it a goal. However, this is not how the word "target" is used in military parlance or US doctrine.

The quote from slapout9 that touched off the discussion was this:
"Strategy in the end is targeting....who you gonna kill and what are you gonna blow up in order to achieve the political objective."

This definition of targeting is closer to the traditional military meaning, HOWEVER, as I said at the beginning, strategy is more than targeting.


To me (and Clausewitz?), Ends is Policy, that is the Policy being opposed. Ways is strategy, and Means is Tactics (= Means of fighting). Thus you have Colin Grays metaphor "The Strategy Bridge" between Ends and Means (Policy and Tactics.)


I'd agree with you with everything except means=tactics. Means are resources, not methods. For example, the U.S. Army is an example of means. All together, it might look like this (simplified, of course):

National Strategy for Iraq
Ends (Policy): Regime Change
Ways: Military Action
Means: CENTCOM and assigned forces, allied forces

[Bob's World]

Obviously "Strategy" is a word used in many ways by many communities and cultures. Equally obviously, even within the military context it can have many meanings.

Slap comes at it with more of an Airforce perspective, and as a student of Airforce strategists. The Air Force can only deliver things, so it is quite natural, and not "wrong" for this community to tend to thing of strategy in terms of targeting.

The value of this forum is that we get a chance to hear from a wide range of perspectives on topics like this and expand our horizons a bit in the process.

For me, the aspect of "strategy" I find the most interesting and helpful is not really tied to level of command or to "Ends-Ways-Means" (or to targeting); but rather to seeking a level of understanding of some issue or problem that helps one to shape effective programs of deterrence or response. CvC's trinity is an example of this. It provides a framework that one can lay over any interstate dynamic to apply the facts of the situation against in a manner that is helpful to deterring or responding to warfare.

So, really no "right or wrong"; merely some ideas that are more interesting or helpful than others.

[William F. Owen]

I'd agree with you with everything except means=tactics. Means are resources, not methods.
So strategy links policy with "resources" thus men and equipment?

Classical teaching of Strategy is linking Policy with Tactics. If someone describes something as a "Means to an End", then surely they are suggesting methods used to gain an outcome. Thus when people say the "Ends justify the means" I do not think many are suggesting that the resources expended were done so for good reason. Generally "Means" refers to methods, thus tactics. Clausewitz certainly meant "Means" as being tactics, or more generally "Combat." - Page 95, "let us now turn to the means. There is only one: Combat!"

Additionally, the means can bear on the policy and thus modify it, which again would logically suggest means to be methods and not resources.

[Ken White]

Now you are playing with semantics. Is a "target" the same as a "goal?" If you use the dictionary definition, yes; down there somewhere a target it a goal. However, this is not how the word "target" is used in military parlance or US doctrine.Yep, sure was playing. Couldn't resist it, too great an opportunity to pass up. :D
The quote from slapout9 that touched off the discussion...This definition of targeting is closer to the traditional military meaning, HOWEVER, as I said at the beginning, strategy is more than targeting.No question and I agree. I even went briefly into the etymology of the word, pointing out our misuse of it... ;)

With which lacking this sub thread wouldn't exist. :wry:

I do agree with Bob's World: that stategy, distilled is ""seeking a level of understanding of some issue or problem that helps one to shape effective programs of deterrence or response. CvC's trinity is an example of this. It provides a framework that one can lay over any interstate dynamic to apply the facts of the situation against in a manner that is helpful to deterring or responding to warfare.

So, really no "right or wrong"; merely some ideas that are more interesting or helpful than others.""

However, he and I have a long standing disagreement over whether the US can have a grand or national strategy. He thinks we really need one and it's possible. I agree it's needed but believe our political process in most circumstances (not all; true existential threats will change that) will not allow it; the domestic, inside the Beltway, infighting will prevent it -- much as containment was a political football during the aberration that was the Cold War.

[Bob's World]

We've been under what Dr. John Lewis Gaddis and others describe as "Grand Strategies of Containment" since the late 1940s.

Personally, I think what worked well enough to get us through the Cold War is in many ways contributing to what we call GWOT today.

Coming soon is a piece proposing a change from this negative, controlling framework to a more positive approach that I see as "A Grand Strategy of Empowerment."

[H. Nelson]

There was a reason Clausewitz wanted his papers burned at his death. 'On War' was an unfinished, poorly thought out, self-contradictory notebook of thoughts.

Sun Tzu is far superior, and if you add him to Boyd you get Maneuver Warfare Theory. I am pretty sure the marines have a statue of Boyd, but I doubt they have one of Clausewitz.

If Clausewitz ever added real value to warefare, it was to frame it as a science. Other than that, he just advanced a murderous and tedious type of fighting that had large consequences in WWI.

Cheers,

H.

http://onparadox.blogspot.com/

[Ken White]

We've been under what Dr. John Lewis Gaddis and others describe as "Grand Strategies of Containment" since the late 1940s.the plural. ;)

Varied strategies in support of a policy of containment. I agree. :D

[M.L.]

Obviously "Strategy" is a word used in many ways by many communities and cultures. Equally obviously, even within the military context it can have many meanings.

Slap comes at it with more of an Airforce perspective, and as a student of Airforce strategists. The Air Force can only deliver things, so it is quite natural, and not "wrong" for this community to tend to thing of strategy in terms of targeting.

The value of this forum is that we get a chance to hear from a wide range of perspectives on topics like this and expand our horizons a bit in the process.

For me, the aspect of "strategy" I find the most interesting and helpful is not really tied to level of command or to "Ends-Ways-Means" (or to targeting); but rather to seeking a level of understanding of some issue or problem that helps one to shape effective programs of deterrence or response. CvC's trinity is an example of this. It provides a framework that one can lay over any interstate dynamic to apply the facts of the situation against in a manner that is helpful to deterring or responding to warfare.

So, really no "right or wrong"; merely some ideas that are more interesting or helpful than others.

Well, I suppose we can all adopt a normative view of strategy. Personally, I'm not giving an op-ed. The Ends-Ways-Means construct I'm advocating isn't my personal pet rock - it is the most commonly accepted definition in military circles and among professional strategists, not to mention US joint doctrine.

Still, to each his own...

[jmm99]

this:


from ML
National Strategy for Iraq
Ends (Policy): Regime Change
Ways: Military Action
Means: CENTCOM and assigned forces, allied forces

No doubt "Military Action" can remove a regime.

But, how does "Military Action" change a regime - that is, provide the replacement regime ?

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

Jeeez....cant leave you guys alone for a minute.:)

As I have said many time Crimes and Wars are caused by people! They are not caused by natural phenomenon like a hurricane or earth quake. So when you analyze the Crime or War you get a list of people and property.....Targets that you can use force against in order to obtain an end to the crime or an end to the war. Choosing (Targeting) which persons or property to use force against is Strategy. And should go from the highest level to the lowest level like CvC said.... there is no level of Strategy, it always present or at least it should. My 2.5 cents anyway.

[William F. Owen]

There was a reason Clausewitz wanted his papers burned at his death. 'On War' was an unfinished, poorly thought out, self-contradictory notebook of thoughts.
Basically you've clearly never read Clausewitz. Yes it's complicated. Study of War and Warfare requires effort and guidance from those who have.


Sun Tzu is far superior, and if you add him to Boyd you get Maneuver Warfare Theory. I am pretty sure the marines have a statue of Boyd, but I doubt they have one of Clausewitz. Sun Tzu is not superior. Let me guess, you've read the Griffiths translation, and you thing Sun-Tzu wrote the "Art of War?"
Boyd? Give me break! A man who didn't know a lot about military history, left almost no writings, and a faith based following based on poor understanding of warfare and War. For a very grass roots intro, try this (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/95-owen.pdf). Plus, search for Boyd in the forums.

If Clausewitz ever added real value to warefare, it was to frame it as a science. Other than that, he just advanced a murderous and tedious type of fighting that had large consequences in WWI.Rubbish. That is completely wrong, and utterly without evidence. You need to have some understanding of a subject before you start pontificating.
(http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441)

[Taiko]

This reminds me of an anecdote from On War:

A colleague wrote to CvC wanting advice on the final exam he was drafting for junior officers. The questions set for the exam included a number of different operations and tactical maneuvers, and the officers had to write which one they thought was best. In responding to the colleague’s letter CvC wrote that he could not answer the question because the examiner did not provide the policy context from which the officers could draw their answers from.

In my opinion it seems you are both arguing past each other in a theoretical vacuum. If you both used the context of policy, and historical examples, there would be cases were you are both right and wrong. Policy will always determine the ways, ends and means at the start of a conflict, however, that does not necessarily mean policy is always the sole arbiter throughout the various phases of war. This is the paradox of the trinity.


ML wrote:

Means are resources, not methods.

If we are viewing this from a strictly CvC perspective, in On War he takes "war preparation", that is logistics and resources as a given. Hence, means are considered tactics/methods of employing violence.


ML wrote:


"Containment" is a strategic end state.

The policy, or end state, was to 'contain' the USSR from expanding into America's sphere of influence. The strategies for achieving 'containment' ranged from Eisenhower's 'massive retaliation', to Kennedy's 'flexible response' and Reagan's 'star wars'/'national missile defense system'.


H.Nelson wrote:

There was a reason Clausewitz wanted his papers burned at his death. 'On War' was an unfinished, poorly thought out, self-contradictory notebook of thoughts. Sun Tzu is far superior, and if you add him to Boyd you get Maneuver Warfare Theory. I am pretty sure the marines have a statue of Boyd, but I doubt they have one of Clausewitz.

Very entertaining indeed and welcome. Pray tell, do you know the difference between war and warfare? There is an old saying that ignorance in bliss, however, when it comes to strategy ignorance gets people killed.

[M.L.]

this:
No doubt "Military Action" can remove a regime.

But, how does "Military Action" change a regime - that is, provide the replacement regime ?

Regards

Mike

A fair point Mike. I use the example of Iraq because it was a simple strategy...though not really a good one...

[M.L.]

Jeeez....cant leave you guys alone for a minute.:)

As I have said many time Crimes and Wars are caused by people! They are not caused by natural phenomenon like a hurricane or earth quake. So when you analyze the Crime or War you get a list of people and property.....Targets that you can use force against in order to obtain an end to the crime or an end to the war. Choosing (Targeting) which persons or property to use force against is Strategy. And should go from the highest level to the lowest level like CvC said.... there is no level of Strategy, it always present or at least it should. My 2.5 cents anyway.


For everyone's edification, here is what US Joint Doctrine says:

"targeting — The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. JP 1-02

"strategy — A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives." JP 1-02

"The three levels of war — strategic, operational, and tactical —
help clarify the links between national strategic objectives and tactical
actions. The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation,
often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or
multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic objectives and guidance
and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives.
The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national
and military strategic objectives through the design and conduct of
operations using operational art. The tactical level focuses on planning
and executing battles, engagements, and activities to achieve military
objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces." JP 3-0

[William F. Owen]

For everyone's edification, here is what US Joint Doctrine says:

"The three levels of war — strategic, operational, and tactical —
help clarify the links between .... JP 3-0
Thanks for the clarification. IMO, the three levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) is just plain wrong. There's actually something of a debate right now as to where the idea of an "operational level came from."

[Bob's World]

Always good to remember that Joint Doctrine, all doctrine, is not law, or somehow deemed smarter or better than any other position on a topic. It is merely the current institutional position on the topic as approved by one commander.

Doctrine is the start point for studying a topic, not the final argument.

Doctrine only applies at all to the organization that publishes it.

I think "Doctrine Man" captures the concept well in this sadly accurate cartoon. Classic.:

[William F. Owen]

Always good to remember that Joint Doctrine, all doctrine, is not law, or somehow deemed smarter or better than any other position on a topic. It is merely the current institutional position on the topic as approved by one commander.

Doctrine should be "That which is taught." That is what the word means. It is the basis for all you do. That the US (and now the UK) keeps doing it badly should be more cause for concern that it is.

[slapout9]

I am not arguing that M.L. is wrong, he is not. I think everything he has posted IS what is being taught as doctrine. What I am arguing is I don't think CvC would agree with a lot of what is being taught.
Here is a copy from Book 3 CvC STRATEGY courtesy of the CvC homepage. I have highlighted what I think are the pertinent points. And I believe he is saying you must pick the right Tagets to engage or you will not win. It is very simple but as CvC said many time that does not mean it will be easy, so Strategy is not a level of war.... it must follow the Army to the battlefield and always be present from the top to the bottom.


Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the war; it must therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which must be in accordance with the object of the war; in other words, strategy forms the plan of the war, and to the said aim it links the series of acts which are to lead to the same, that is to say, it makes the plans for the separate campaigns, and regulates the combats to be fought in each. As these are all things which to a great extent can only be determined on conjectures, some of which turn out incorrect, while a number of other arrangements pertaining to details cannot be made at all beforehand, it follows, as a matter of course, that strategy must go with the army to the field in order to arrange particulars on the spot, and to make the modifications in the general plan which incessantly become necessary in war. Strategy can therefore never take its hand from the work for a moment.

[Fuchs]

It's always the same. Maybe I will sometime be showed an English CvC quote that's not poorly translated - it has certainly not happened yet!


Die Strategie ist der Gebrauch des Gefechts zum Zweck des Krieges...

"Strategy is the use of the combat for the purpose of war"
NOT
"Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the war"

Gefecht = combat, encounter, engagement - always smaller than a "battle" ("Schlacht").
Zweck = purpose, Krieg = war


The other part of the translation is simplified, but largely correct in its meaning.



P.S: CvC in English is really the simplified version; often incorrectly translated and much easier to read. CvC had a very complicated, confusing mind (judged by his writings).

[William F. Owen]

I am not arguing that M.L. is wrong, he is not. I think everything he has posted IS what is being taught as doctrine.
ML is correct in telling us what the doctrine is. Problem is the doctrine is wrong.

What I am arguing is I don't think CvC would agree with a lot of what is being taught.
Welcome to my world.

And I believe he is saying you must pick the right Tagets to engage or you will not win. It is very simple but as CvC said many time that does not mean it will be easy,
OK, but avoid over simplifying. It is WHO to target, when, why and how, plus a few other things.

so Strategy is not a level of war....
Spot on! You are right. The whole idea of "levels of War," is pretty hockey, BUT there are two Things called Strategy and Tactics. Levels is not a perfect noun but an adequate one bearing in mind the target audience.

[Ken White]

This thread is allied (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8647). :D

[Fuchs]

The concept of levels makes sense because there's a hierarchy in armed services and the high command is primarily responsible for what's known as strategy, corps/division command does what's known as operational art (the tactics of the formation level) and the lower level command does the tactical stuff (unit level).

The 'higher' level success or failure also tends to overrule 'lower' level outcomes - this makes the concept not only fitting, but valuable.

The concept of levels also helps to explain people how the work differs between different levels of the hierarchy. It's helpful because with it we can explain a NCO that strategy is not his job and we can explain a general that interfering in company tactics ain't his either.

Finally, some things apply much less at one level than at another one. To cut an enemy off his supply line is much more relevant to division and higher tactics than to small units. Resource allocation is much more relevant to higher than to lower levels of command.


The problems with the levels only arise when people don't invest the brainpower and -time to understand that the limits are not clear-cut, that it's an explanation aid and no mathematically defined nature's law.

[slapout9]

ML
Spot on! You are right. The whole idea of "levels of War," is pretty hockey, BUT there are two Things called Strategy and Tactics. Levels is not a perfect noun but an adequate one bearing in mind the target audience.

Yep, that is why I say Strategy is picking the targets to attack and tactics is about how to attack the target. And that can be the most difficult problem of all....we send a gillion dollar stealth bomber, they send a 50 dollar stealth car bomb:eek:

[Ken White]

The concept of levels also helps to explain people how the work differs between different levels of the hierarchy. It's helpful because with it we can explain a NCO that strategy is not his job and we can explain a general that interfering in company tactics ain't his either.this may be what some would wish but fortunately it doesn't work that way in practice. I suggest that you're advocating, in a so-called professional force, that those with 15-20 years experience should not make suggestions to their nominal betters with only three to five years or less experience. Fortunately, the 'system' and humans do not work that way so far as the up the chain aspects. Unfortunately that also holds true on the down the chain aspects... :o

Good NCOs will offer advice and wise Commanders will at least listen to it; poor Generals will try to control Companies, Platoons and Squads. :wry:

That's true due to, as you said:
The problems with the levels only arise when people don't invest the brainpower and -time to understand that the limits are not clear-cut, that it's an explanation aid and no mathematically defined nature's law.

[slapout9]

I wrote Operations Orders as a squad leader, so was I at the Operational level of War? I dont think so. Operations are a planning/organizing techique not a level of War.

[slapout9]

Part one covers policy creation and the selection of Strategic Targets, notice toward the end it is a Marine Captain who understands what Strategy is:wry:


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=olGwSyouBms


Part two is the execution of the Strategy


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZGWdng1hl0U&feature=related

[Fuchs]

I wrote Operations Orders as a squad leader, so was I at the Operational level of War? I dont think so. Operations are a planning/organizing techique not a level of War.

The similarity of the words doesn't mean much.

I recall someone insisted on the difference between capital and small "o" operations. He attempted to point out how many of today's so-called "operations" are merely minor actions.

The only way how a squad leader writes true capital "O" operations orders is on a keyboard, typing what an officer ranking major or higher dictates.

[Ken White]

I recall someone insisted on the difference between capital and small "o" operations. He attempted to point out how many of today's so-called "operations" are merely minor actions.I did that and it's on the Thread link I posted above. Also, what you say is not what was the intent. That intent was a tongue in cheek poke at pedantry and excessively serious attention to minor issues... ;)

Etymology is more fun than entomology. :D

This, however, was / is thee:
The only way how a squad leader writes true capital "O" operations orders is on a keyboard, typing what an officer ranking major or higher dictates.That may be true in your experience or even in your Army (though I'm doubtful based on my short but beneficial relationship with the Bundeswehr) but it is emphatically far from true in the US Army and in most others I've worked with. Good units expect their NCOs to come up with their own orders to reflect the Commanders intent, not his diktat. Following your model, the NCO who was Squad Leader but serving as an acting Platoon Leader -- and ALL Armies have those either by design or circumstantially -- would only write orders dictated by a Bn Staff Officer. Doesn't work that way.

Seems to me that anyone who succumbs to the view expressed by you is wasting a LOT of talent... :wry:

[Fuchs]

I was thinking of someone else, Ken.

The Bundeswehr has succumbed to an inflationary use of the word "Operationen" as well in the last decade, but a true Operation is still something above brigade level and no NCO will ever or has ever devised an order for that.

You're thinking of what I called "minor action".


The whole dissent may be about the poor current definition of "operation", though. The original operations long before the term inflation was corps-level or above; "Market Garden", "Torch", "Overlord", "Michael", ...


The fact that the term has been put in inflationary use and been applied to small unit tactical matters does not question the validity of an operational level of warfare concept (and that's what slapout did).

[Pete]

One of these days I'm going to need operations to ameliorate the Dupuytren's Contracture I have in my hands. I'll certainly listen to what Ken has to say but I want Tom Odom or Hacksaw to write the Opord. ;)

[slapout9]

The whole dissent may be about the poor current definition of "operation", though. The original operations long before the term inflation was corps-level or above; "Market Garden", "Torch", "Overlord", "Michael", ...


The fact that the term has been put in inflationary use and been applied to small unit tactical matters does not question the validity of an operational level of warfare concept (and that's what slapout did).


That is "not" a level of war......it is a "level of organization" fighting the war. Thats like saying only Colonels and Generals fight wars, majors and captains and lieutenants dont do war. The whole thing is all "skint up and stuff."

[Taiko]

There's actually something of a debate right now as to where the idea of an "operational level came from."

I thought it was Edward Luttwak. He has written the most about the 'levels'.

Policy->Grand Strategy -> Strategy-> Operations-> Tactics-> Technical

[M.L.]

Not sure who coined the phrase, but Operational Art is generally thought to have emerged during the Napoleonic Wars.

[M.L.]

Always good to remember that Joint Doctrine, all doctrine, is not law, or somehow deemed smarter or better than any other position on a topic. It is merely the current institutional position on the topic as approved by one commander.

Doctrine is the start point for studying a topic, not the final argument.

Doctrine only applies at all to the organization that publishes it.

I think "Doctrine Man" captures the concept well in this sadly accurate cartoon. Classic.:

Thanks...but all I did was post what the book said. I didn't endorse it as the law, smarter, better, or even my own opinion.

[M.L.]

My final answers=


Strategy is the balanced application of ends, ways, and means to achieve a political end state.

The instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Economic, Military, and Information) can all be used to execute strategy

Targeting is a small part of strategy.

Strategy includes REMF things like budgeting, procurement, force structure, contracting, etc...

On War's primary usefulness lies in the theoretical understanding of war, which can be used to construct a strategy. CvC's writings that address strategy directly are an artifact of his time period, and more closely resemble operational thought, rather than strategic thought.


So far I've seen nothing discussed that would sway my opinion on the above points.

I'm off to have a really crappy T-Giving dinner at my in-laws. See you all on the flip side....

[Ken White]

Except perhaps that last item and that's mostly an opinion so there will always be variances on that -- though I'm inclined to agree with the caveat that I believe the operational bit to be a European construct, with some applicability in a tight, densely populated European setting and not much in other locales. North America for example, like Asia, is way too large and underpopulated for a great deal of applicability. Island territories or nations do not lend themselves to it nor really does warfare in a jungle setting. Not that any of that changes current US doctrine...:wry:

Hope the meal turns out better than you expect...

[slapout9]

Not sure who coined the phrase, but Operational Art is generally thought to have emerged during the Napoleonic Wars.

Napoleonic...those guys are dead to:wry:

[William F. Owen]

CvC's writings that address strategy directly are an artifact of his time period, and more closely resemble operational thought, rather than strategic thought.

Really? Sorry that is not mine or many other peoples reading of CvC. In fact exactly the opposite would be the case. To me Clausewitz wrote about "Strategy."

Operational Thought = Conduct of Operations. Everyone does operations, from Coys to Corps. Operation Gothic Serpent was a Coy+. Operation Desert Storm was a Theatre.
Hamley's "Operations of War" (1909) makes it quite clear that the purpose of operations is to ensure that tactical action takes place and is prepared and sustained in a way that serves the military objective.
When the Soviets started to use the term "Operational" they meant Division and Corps Tactics.

[slapout9]

There is one doctrine document that goes against conventional wisdom and has a great deal of CvC in it. The Marine Doctrine Document on "Strategy" is a lot different than most of the others. Perhaps the most important is their model goes like this: Ends+Means= A Way (Strategy). Can be downloaded from the SWJ Library. Worth the read IMO.

[William F. Owen]

Perhaps the most important is their model goes like this: Ends+Means= A Way (Strategy). Can be downloaded from the SWJ Library. Worth the read IMO.
That is important. It's completely wrong. Policy must be able to be expressed in tactics, but HOW that is done or how they are linked is the subject of strategy.

[slapout9]

Policy must be able to be expressed in tactics

Yes, it has to come out as a perceptual concrete, you cant just throw out an abstract conceptual idea and say this is Policy or Strategy because nobody will ever understand what you mean. Which seems to be one of our major problems today. President Kennedys speech on our Policy towards an attack form Cuba is a classic. Nobody had any doubt about what he meant, which is/was critical in situations like that.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W50RNAbmy3M&playnext=1&list=PLBB749066A1C4B091&index=40

[jmm99]

and why ?

I'm positing that we are discussing the manual cited by Slap, which would be USMC MCDP 1-1, Strategy (http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/lejeune_leadership/LLI%20Documnets/MCDP%201-1%20Strategy.pdf). Three relevant (and seemingly to me, material) quotes from that publication, dealing with "Ends" and "Means", are these ....

p.40 pdf:


Strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and means. When we apply this process to a particular set of ends and means, the product — that is, the strategy — is a specific way of using specified means to achieve distinct ends. Strategy is thus both a process and a product. Any discussion of ends and means in war must begin with two basic points. First, as we have observed, war is an expression of politics. The ends or goals of any party waging war — even though those goals may be social, economic, religious, or ideological in nature — are by definition political goals. Second, wars are fought by political entities that have unique characteristics and often very dissimilar goals and resources. In order to understand any conflict, we must appreciate the ways in which the means and ends of the participants may vary.

and p.46-47 pdf:


MEANS IN NATIONAL STRATEGY

In the purest sense, the means in war is combat — physically attacking the enemy or defending against his attacks upon us. However, war is not limited to purely military means. In fact, military means are only one element used to implement a national strategy. The relative importance placed on the military element of the national strategy varies greatly depending on the nature and the particular circumstances of the struggle. All of the instruments of power — diplomatic, economic, military, and informational — must be brought to bear and exploited to the fullest in war.

and p.54 pdf


ADAPTING ENDS TO MEANS, AND VICE VERSA

When discussing strategy in the abstract, we often treat means and ends as fixed. In practice, however, we frequently adjust both. The occurrences of war — successes and failures, lessons learned, new ideas, the entry of new combatants — may cause us to shift both our means and our goals. As our resources increase, as we gain confidence in our abilities, and as we find
our enemy more vulnerable than we had imagined, we tend to expand our goals.

Where are the grave errors and heresies in the above ? Please enlighten, so I can get back to my hamster joust. :)


One can quibble about whether there are three DIE (diplomatic, informational, economic) elements or more - all of these (3 or more) non-military elements being part of the "politiical struggle" in my eyes.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

I'm guessing it's "wrong" because it is not found within the "four squares" of CvC. Mike you might need to bring him along on implied terms...;)

[jmm99]

and definitely no legalisms. :D

From MCDP 1-1, Strategy (http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/lejeune_leadership/LLI%20Documnets/MCDP%201-1%20Strategy.pdf) (pp.9-10 pdf):


Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting, stresses that war is fundamentally political in character and that war must serve policy. What matters ultimately in war is strategic success: attainment of our political aims and the protection of our national interests. History shows that national leaders, both political and military, who fail to understand this relationship sow the seeds for ultimate failure — even when their armed forces achieve initial battlefield success. Battlefield brilliance seldom rescues a bad strategy.
.....
MCDP 1-1 focuses on military strategy in its most fundamental sense, exploring the question “How do military means relate to political ends?” It provides a conceptual basis to help us to understand both our own and our enemies’ political and military objectives, the relationships among them, and the nature of any particular situation in which military means might be used. It explores how political entities integrate military means with the other elements of their power in order to attain their political ends. A common conceptual understanding of these matters helps Marines develop the adaptability that our warfighting philosophy demands.

and the first quote from MCDP 1, Warfighting (http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/lejeune_leadership/LLI%20Documnets/MCDP1%20Warfighting.pdf) ("primacy" as we say in the trade) (p.9 pdf):


“Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.” [1] — Carl von Clausewitz

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 119. This unfinished classic is arguably the definitive treatment of the nature and theory of war. All Marine officers should consider this book essential reading.

Regards

Mike

[Pete]

Before you military intellectuals get too carried away, it's only fair to point out that the average Deutsche Soldat thinks much more often about sex than he does about abstract military theory. Here's the proof:

Vor der Kaserne
Vor dem großen Tor
Stand eine Laterne
Und steht sie noch davor
So woll'n wir uns da wieder seh'n
Bei der Laterne wollen wir steh'n
Wie einst Lili Marleen.

[Fuchs]

Show me a nation where the "average soldier" thinks more about military theory than about sex.

Even I think more about (of) sex than about military theory. ;)

[jmm99]

over$exed ba$tards, here are 18 versions of Lili Marleen, and more, at The Official Lili Marleen Page (http://ingeb.org/garb/lmarleen.html), including Dietrich's version (best in my ears) - and a Finnish version from 1942. Remember to shoot straight. :D

Cheers

Mike

[Pete]

Even I think more about (of) sex than about military theory. ;)
Well, whatever you do don't wave it around in public. Some people still have vivid memories of their previous experiences with the German armed forces.

[Kiwigrunt]

Show me a nation where the "average soldier" thinks more about military theory than about sex.

Even I think more about (of) sex than about military theory. ;)

You disappoint me...but, are the two not nearly the same thing? link (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBharndqLNA&NR=1)

[William F. Owen]

and why ?

Ends+Means= A Way (Strategy), as written by Slap is wrong. I didn't say MCDP was wrong.

....but,
Strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and means. When we apply this process to a particular set of ends and means, the product — that is, the strategy — is a specific way of using specified means to achieve distinct ends.
is essentially correct. As is,

In the purest sense, the means in war is combat — physically attacking the enemy or defending against his attacks upon us. However, war is not limited to purely military means. In fact, military means are only one element used to implement a national strategy.
Point being, Militaries fight. They break and kill. They should not attempt to be the other instruments of power.

I'm guessing it's "wrong" because it is not found within the "four squares" of CvC.
Sorry but I am the last man to be bound to the purity of the text. I am interested in what CvC taught, not what he wrote in each and every sentence.

[slapout9]

Ends+Means= A Way (Strategy), as written by Slap is wrong. I didn't say MCDP was wrong.



Except Slap didn't say that, the MCDP on Strategy says that.

Slap don't do any Ends,Ways or Means regardless of the order. Slap does Motive, Methods, and Opportunity.

[William F. Owen]

Except Slap didn't say that, the MCDP on Strategy says that.
I said, "as written" in terms of Ends+means = A Way. As far as I can tell MCDP doesn't actually say that either.

[slapout9]

I said, "as written" in terms of Ends+means = A Way. As far as I can tell MCDP doesn't actually say that either.

I was trying to show the doctrinal publication contrast between the usual equation for Strategy. Which is Strategy=Ends+Ways+Means as opposed to the Marine version of Ends+Means= a Way (A Strategy).
It was close enough for Guvmint work IMO.

[jmm99]

Not to turn this into a math discussion, but if math principles are applied, the result is not a simple sum of A + B.

The quote from MCDP 1-1, Strategy, dealing with the inter-relationship of ends and means is this:


Strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and means. When we apply this process to a particular set of ends and means, the product — that is, the strategy — is a specific way of using specified means to achieve distinct ends.

I read that as suggesting a mental process where the set of ends (what policy desires as end goals) is mapped to the set of means (capabilities available), where the mapping link between any given end and given means is the way one uses the means to reach the end.

So, what we are talking about math-wise, is a product - an intersection of two sets (as in this Venn Diagram):

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6d/Venn_A_intersect_B.svg/200px-Venn_A_intersect_B.svg.png

Say A = the set of all means available and B = ends desired.

Some of the means in set A will not be material to any of the ends in set B; those means are excess capabilities in the particular situation.

What are more important are the ends that lie outside of the intersection. For those ends that cannot be linked to existing means, either those ends have to scrapped, or the means have to be expanded, or a combination of both.

BTW: I'm not suggesting that everyone start constructing Venn Diagrams (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venn_diagram); nor am I suggesting how military strategists should do their job. I am simply stating what the two publications by the Corps mean to me.

----------------------------
As to non-military tasks,


from Wilf
Point being, Militaries fight. They break and kill. They should not attempt to be the other instruments of power.

Sure, as someone on the non-military side of the ledger, I'd be more than happy to do all of "DIE, etc." elements - and get the appropriations that go with them. That is not the reality in the USG.

As it presently stands, US troopers are tasked with many "DIE, etc." tasks; and they perform them if possible. That does not make those tasks "military" ("M").

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

If you want to get mathematical isn't a product(multipication) the result of some arithmetic calculation?

[Ron Humphrey]

I was trying to show the doctrinal publication contrast between the usual equation for Strategy. Which is Strategy=Ends+Ways+Means as opposed to the Marine version of Ends+Means= a Way (A Strategy).
It was close enough for Guvmint work IMO.

but did want to respond to this.

When actually looking at strategy why exactly would one ever limit themselves to only that available at a given time in relation to ends or means.

Both are fluid and in reality shouldn't one be willing to at least in thought exercise expect to plan taking into account unknowns as well as knowns.

This merely meaning that no given strategy is isolated unto itself. There are multiple in multiple areas of discourse, political, military, economic, social, etc.

-

Now back to my corner :D

[Taiko]

but did want to respond to this.

When actually looking at strategy why exactly would one ever limit themselves to only that available at a given time in relation to ends or means.

Both are fluid and in reality shouldn't one be willing to at least in thought exercise expect to plan taking into account unknowns as well as knowns.

This merely meaning that no given strategy is isolated unto itself. There are multiple in multiple areas of discourse, political, military, economic, social, etc.

-

Now back to my corner :D

Good point. This goes towards what is the dynamic nature of the trinity during the phases of a war. Prior to roling the iron dice a good strategist should be able to identify all of the primary and secondary regulating principles of the trinity in regards to their own country as well as those of the protagonist(s), and be able to have contingencies in place if the regulating principles shift during the course of the war.

[Polarbear1605]

I would like to get some discussion onthis one. :)
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA522035&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Apparently, its an award winner. ;)

[jmm99]

"D", not "M"; that is, part of the "pollitical struggle", not part of the "military struggle" - both having to be co-ordinated to match the policy goal which underwrites both the political and military as policy's continuations.

I'll give the article's conclusion the Fruit Salad Award of the Year to Date (mixing apples and oranges):


The ten tenets listed below mix thoughts on war, strategy, and bargaining. They will shape the mindset of strategists and prepare them to embrace the principles of BT/NT by being a guide, easing the way, training the judgment, and helping strategists avoid the pitfalls of forgetting that conflict is costly and risky and absolute victory is unrealistic.

1. Many victories have and will be suicide to the victor.

2. War is continuous bargaining through action and words.

3. War is an extension of policy, which subordinates war‟s violence and creativity.

4. Strategy is a continuous process of understanding, shaping, and adapting that uniquely connects force to policy, for a continuing advantage.

5. Strategy must be efficient and tailored and it is formed by asking the right questions.

6. Force is the more costly and risky way to change policy or reallocate resources.

7. Employing less force than is required to win absolutely can be a viable short cut or a possible trap.

8. Words and actions reveal information about you, your enemy, the environment, and the nature and direction of the conflict…so constantly listen and reframe the problem and strategy accordingly.

9. Be persistent in pursuing your interests, but not rigid in pursuing any particular solution.

10. The post conflict leaders must have had a say in the bargain and seat at the table regardless of which side it was on.

Regards

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

Good point. This goes towards what is the dynamic nature of the trinity during the phases of a war. Prior to roling the iron dice a good strategist should be able to identify all of the primary and secondary regulating principles of the trinity in regards to their own country as well as those of the protagonist(s), and be able to have contingencies in place if the regulating principles shift during the course of the war.

Excellent point but how far is this feasible?

[Bob's World]

For those who have not seen it, this presentation on Clausewitz by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II at the US Army War College is a good summary from a guy who's put a lot of thought into the topic.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=otJp3Qt7Vuw

For a very practical guide for looking at "strategy" I have found John Collin's "Military Strategy: Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives to be an excellent guide. He does a good job of breaking things down into practical, digestable chunks. For example, after reading the past page or so of this thread I thought "I wonder what Collins said "strategy" is. He didn't. A book on strategy, and his definition for strategy is " See grand strategy; military strategy; military tactics, operational art; tactics." Each of those, or course branch out as well. As if "strategy" is just a term to describe the trunk of a tree, but that one has to climb up work their way around in the branches to find the specific answers they seek.

I think most are happy to simply walk by the tree, kick the trunk and say "Ah, Clausewitz," or perhaps "Ah, Ends-Ways-Means," and move on. I recommend climbing the tree. Collins is a good guide for that little adventure.

[slapout9]

Here is the Michael Porter (Harvard Business School) definition of Strategy. Strategy has nothing to do with How! It is selecting the Objective (Position) that is unique and sustainable.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ibrxIP0H84M

[M.L.]

but did want to respond to this.

When actually looking at strategy why exactly would one ever limit themselves to only that available at a given time in relation to ends or means.

Both are fluid and in reality shouldn't one be willing to at least in thought exercise expect to plan taking into account unknowns as well as knowns.

This merely meaning that no given strategy is isolated unto itself. There are multiple in multiple areas of discourse, political, military, economic, social, etc.


Strategy is not limited to available ways and means. In fact ways (doctrine) and means (force structure) of military strategy are predicated on the ends (goals) of US national and defense strategies.

Sometimes this system gets out of whack - Iraq, as an example, was an ambitious goal without the ways or means to achieve it (i.e. "You got to war with the Army you have, not the Army you would want to have.) We developed the ways and means over time, and at great expense.

Strategy must balance ends, ways, and means. This includes not only what you have and want now, but in the future.

[slapout9]

Strategy must balance ends, ways, and means. This includes not only what you have and want now, but in the future.

This is where I think we (US) get into trouble. Strategy is about UN-BALANCING the Enemies ends,ways,and means.

[Fuchs]

I disagree, there are many examples where strategy isn't even focused on an enemy (especially non-military strategies).

Besides - what does "UN-BALANCING the Enemies ends,ways,and means." mean at all?

The German strategy for defeating France in 1940 certainly didn't do that, but the success was 100% against France. That strategy was employed boldness to counter superior economic support and it created a scissor-paper situation with the operational success of a decisive battle idea against the long positional warfare idea of the French.

The enemy's ends, way and means weren't unbalanced, but simply countered with custom-designed approaches which were fuelled by desperation.

[slapout9]

The enemy's ends, way and means weren't unbalanced, but simply countered with custom-designed approaches which were fuelled by desperation.

In other words they completely un-balanced the enemy physically and psychologically.

[Fuchs]

Define "un-balance" in this context.

[M.L.]

As I recall, Germany eventually lost WWII.

The victory over France in 1940 was an operational masterpiece, but the Germans, while spectacular operationally and tactically, were horrible strategically - primarily because Hitler fancied himself a strategist when in reality he was nothing of the kind.

Tactics win battles, operations win campaigns, but strategy wins wars. Germany lost the war due to strategic errors, too numerous to list here.

[slapout9]

Define "un-balance" in this context.

'Mystify, Mislead and Surprise" as Old Confederate fighter would say.

[Bob's World]

As I recall, Germany eventually lost WWII.

The victory over France in 1940 was an operational masterpiece, but the Germans, while spectacular operationally and tactically, were horrible strategically - primarily because Hitler fancied himself a strategist when in reality he was nothing of the kind.

Tactics win battles, operations win campaigns, but strategy wins wars. Germany lost the war due to strategic errors, too numerous to list here.

I think you meant to say "Hitler...[was] horrible strategically." I don't think "Germans" got much of a vote on strategic issues in that era.

[slapout9]

I have read the posted paper two times and it started good..... but then it seems to run out of steam...... or maybe the author just didn't go far enough with the basic idea. But it was an interesting paper and War as a form bargaining by Armed Groups is an idea that has merit. The New Trinity of Power,Profit and Prestige was also interesting.... a lot of Gang Psychology in there.

[Fuchs]

As I recall, Germany eventually lost WWII.

The victory over France in 1940 was an operational masterpiece, but the Germans, while spectacular operationally and tactically, were horrible strategically - primarily because Hitler fancied himself a strategist when in reality he was nothing of the kind.

Tactics win battles, operations win campaigns, but strategy wins wars. Germany lost the war due to strategic errors, too numerous to list here.

The strategy of 1940 turned a terrible war situation into a near-win. It was good strategy (or lucky, it depends).

The events of 1941 were part of a different strategy.


The land campaigns of 1940 were meant to a) improve Germany's difficult raw material supply situation (Swedish ore secured by occupying Norway - captured Eastern French iron ore mines played that role in WWI) and then turned the imbalance of power in Germany's favour by knocking out one of the three most powerful armies and one of the three most powerful air forces of the world at once.
The strategic effect was huge and a clear look at the events of 1940 should enable you to see the separation between the 1940 strategies and the 1941 madness.

[M-A Lagrange]

The strategy of 1940 turned a terrible war situation into a near-win. It was good strategy (or lucky, it depends).

The events of 1941 were part of a different strategy.


The land campaigns of 1940 were meant to a) improve Germany's difficult raw material supply situation (Swedish ore secured by occupying Norway - captured Eastern French iron ore mines played that role in WWI) and then turned the imbalance of power in Germany's favour by knocking out one of the three most powerful armies and one of the three most powerful air forces of the world at once.
The strategic effect was huge and a clear look at the events of 1940 should enable you to see the separation between the 1940 strategies and the 1941 madness.

You can even add the complete un relevance of the French strategy and army which was basically not up to date (very few armored vehicles, no airborne, trench war as only winning model...) and French generals incompetency due to politic and administrative management.
The german movement around the Ligne Maginot through Belgium is a good exemple of excellent tactic and strategy to fix and desorganise opponents.
An interresting book published last year shows that French could have damage much more the Germans in 1940 (but still loose the battle) if Petain did not surrender against the will of the national assembly.
But it's pure fiction...

[Fuchs]

You can even add the complete un relevance of the French strategy and army which was basically not up to date (very few armored vehicles, no airborne, trench war as only winning model...) and French generals incompetency due to politic and administrative management.
The german movement around the Ligne Maginot through Belgium is a good exemple of excellent tactic and strategy to fix and desorganise opponents.
An interresting book published last year shows that French could have damage much more the Germans in 1940 (but still loose the battle) if Petain did not surrender against the will of the national assembly.
But it's pure fiction...

Except that they had more and on average more powerful tanks, had more motor vehicles, more halftracks, ...

The Germans didn't move so much around the Maginot line as they moved into the flank of the anticipated counter-offensive. The French weren't surprised about the (initially) silence along the Maginot line. The line served its purpose by allowing France to deploy less troops there than would otherwise have been necessary. It was an economy of force obstacle that was meant to compensate for France`s smaller population.

The really relevant book about the campaign (expecially about its decisive parts) is this one (http://www.amazon.com/Blitzkrieg-Legend-1940-Campaign-West/dp/1591142946/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1291974811&sr=8-1). It was published by the official German military history agency/archive and is the official German account of the campaign - based on an incredible archive research.

[M.L.]

The strategy of 1940 turned a terrible war situation into a near-win. It was good strategy (or lucky, it depends).

The events of 1941 were part of a different strategy.


The land campaigns of 1940 were meant to a) improve Germany's difficult raw material supply situation (Swedish ore secured by occupying Norway - captured Eastern French iron ore mines played that role in WWI) and then turned the imbalance of power in Germany's favour by knocking out one of the three most powerful armies and one of the three most powerful air forces of the world at once.
The strategic effect was huge and a clear look at the events of 1940 should enable you to see the separation between the 1940 strategies and the 1941 madness.

As I said before, operations (the operational level of war) wins campaigns. You will see in your quote above the words land campaigns. 1939-1945 were all a series of campaigns which supported the German strategic objectives for WWII. They lost. Good operationally, poor strategically.

[M.L.]

I think you meant to say "Hitler...[was] horrible strategically." I don't think "Germans" got much of a vote on strategic issues in that era.

No....I meant to say exactly what I said. "The Germans" includes Hitler. Regardless of who had a vote, Germany pursued strategic ends as a nation, and Hitler most certainly did not act alone.

[Fuchs]

As I said before, operations (the operational level of war) wins campaigns. You will see in your quote above the words land campaigns. 1939-1945 were all a series of campaigns which supported the German strategic objectives for WWII. They lost. Good operationally, poor strategically.

The strategy evolved, though. The early strategy was successful.

[Bob's World]

No....I meant to say exactly what I said. "The Germans" includes Hitler. Regardless of who had a vote, Germany pursued strategic ends as a nation, and Hitler most certainly did not act alone.

The ones who dissented were killed or otherwise marginalized. No, your statement is overly broad, and therefore wildly inaccurate. Did the poor strategy of Germany in WWII lead to their ultimate decimation as a nation? Certainly. Were the German high command schooled in Clausewitz and well aware of the role Napoleon had in both building and destroying France and did they see the same flaw of human nature in Hitler leading them to the same inevitable end? Yes. But Napoleons and Hitlers do not lead by consensus or work to enact the will of the people, rather they dictate. The cautions on the effects of absolute power are wise, (as we sadly see every day in Afghanistan as well...)

I was just offering you a hand, you don't have to take it, and are certainly entitled to your opinions. I figured you had misspoke. I know I often do.

[Infanteer]

As I said before, operations (the operational level of war) wins campaigns. You will see in your quote above the words land campaigns. 1939-1945 were all a series of campaigns which supported the German strategic objectives for WWII. They lost. Good operationally, poor strategically.

I'm starting to see a point to the argument (made by Wilf I believe) that the "operational level of war" actually doesn't exist at all. All operations did was provide a theoretical link between tactics (combined arms warfare of the German variety) and strategy (a quick defeat of the French through a bypass of their main forces in Belgium) - there was no operational level that existed independant of this; all commanders from Platoon to Army Group conducted operational art when they ensured their tactics met the strategy.

So, the German's had good strategy in 1940; their strategy of three concurrent drives into the vast Russian steps was not so good.

At a grand strategic/policy level, getting into a two-front war with the free world was disasterous.

[M.L.]

The ones who dissented were killed or otherwise marginalized. No, your statement is overly broad, and therefore wildly inaccurate. Did the poor strategy of Germany in WWII lead to their ultimate decimation as a nation? Certainly. Were the German high command schooled in Clausewitz and well aware of the role Napoleon had in both building and destroying France and did they see the same flaw of human nature in Hitler leading them to the same inevitable end? Yes. But Napoleons and Hitlers do not lead by consensus or work to enact the will of the people, rather they dictate. The cautions on the effects of absolute power are wise, (as we sadly see every day in Afghanistan as well...)

I was just offering you a hand, you don't have to take it, and are certainly entitled to your opinions. I figured you had misspoke. I know I often do.

It is a commonly accepted practice to discuss history in terms of the Germans, the Japanese, the Americans, etc...

History books, you will find, refer to Hitler, the German High Command, the German Army, etc... as simply the Germans; the German strategy, the German offensive, the German tactics, etc... This isn't new. To split hairs in terminology based on the political situation in Germany is not worth the time.

To debate who had what say in the German strategy is largely irrelevant when discussing the efficacy of the strategy itself, and the efficacy of the strategy was the crux of the discussion.

If you want to talk about WHO was responsible for the poor German strategy...I got it. However, I was simply evaluating the strategy vis a vis France in 1940.

[M.L.]

I'm starting to see a point to the argument (made by Wilf I believe) that the "operational level of war" actually doesn't exist at all. All operations did was provide a theoretical link between tactics (combined arms warfare of the German variety) and strategy (a quick defeat of the French through a bypass of their main forces in Belgium) - there was no operational level that existed independant of this; all commanders from Platoon to Army Group conducted operational art when they ensured their tactics met the strategy.

So, the German's had good strategy in 1940; their strategy of three concurrent drives into the vast Russian steps was not so good.

At a grand strategic/policy level, getting into a two-front war with the free world was disasterous.

The defeat of France was an operation that was part of a larger strategy. The fact is that Hitler hated Bolsheviks, and blamed them for Germany's fortunes in WWI. Hitlers strategy was essentially no different than the Schlieffen Plan; defeat France first, then Russia. To say the German strategy was good in 1940 but poor in 1941 doesn't make sense. The strategy never changed. It was poor from the beginning. It just went well at the beginning, and crappy at the end.

You could make the case that the operational level of war does not exist. 90% of the strategic community would disagree with you, but you could make the case nevertheless.

Let's use Germany as a case study. The German strategy to defeat France first was achieved by a sequenced series of operations. The first of these was called Case Yellow, and the second Case Red.

This process of sequencing operations to achieve strategic effects is operational warfare.

As another case study, take OPERATION TORCH. The Allies invade North Africa. The strategy is to expel the Germans from North Africa in order to control the Suez Canal and set the conditions for an assault into Italy.

So, where do you land in North Africa? At what beaches or ports? What are your intermediate objectives to achieve the desired strategic effects?

This is operational warfare. Its hard, and not many people can do it well. Wishing it away is a technique, although I wouldn't recommend it.

[Ken White]

...The strategy never changed. It was poor from the beginning. It just went well at the beginning, and crappy at the end...You could make the case that the operational level of war does not exist. 90% of the strategic community would disagree with you, but you could make the case nevertheless.Hmm. That could mean that there is none... :wry:
This is operational warfare. Its hard, and not many people can do it well. Wishing it away is a technique, although I wouldn't recommend it.Seriously speaking, I agree that it exists. I also agree that not many can do it well -- or, perhaps, that its techniques and principles are often misapplied...

The latter, I think. There are times, places and proper use. We as an an Army have a tendency to use precepts and principles when they are not appropriate simply because they are taught, ergo they must be used...:o

[William F. Owen]

You could make the case that the operational level of war does not exist. 90% of the strategic community would disagree with you, but you could make the case nevertheless.
You can make the case because those that pump the "operational level" cannot make a solid case. The idea of an "operational level of war" is severe impediment to clear thinking and action. It was invented by folks who didn't understand Strategy and Tactics.

What is a level of war? I submit it's meaningless. There is Policy, Strategy and Tactics. Operations is merely the planing and conduct the sustains tactics in a time and space.

That you can and must conduct operations, in no way makes the case of an "operational level." How do Divisional or Corps Tactics differ from "Operations?" The idea that Tactics "stops" at the Battle Group level is clearly absurd. Additionally, very small sub-unit actions get called "Operations."

This process of sequencing operations to achieve strategic effects is operational warfare.
So campaign planning and "operational level Warfare" is the same thing?

So, where do you land in North Africa? At what beaches or ports? What are your intermediate objectives to achieve the desired strategic effects?
Those are entirely tactical decisions. Planning is required. That plan and its conduct can be called an Operation. Its still tactics.

I've read just about all there is to read on the so-called "Operational level of war," from Hamley to Naveh, and most of the Soviet stuff. It's pseudo-academic, and does not conform to the Ends, Ways and Means.

[Tukhachevskii]

PLANNING FOR AND APPLYING MILITARY FORCE: AN EXAMINATION OF TERMS (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=646)

[Polarbear1605]

You can make the case because those that pump the "operational level" cannot make a solid case. The idea of an "operational level of war" is severe impediment to clear thinking and action. It was invented by folks who didn't understand Strategy and Tactics.

What is a level of war? I submit it's meaningless. There is Policy, Strategy and Tactics. Operations is merely the planing and conduct the sustains tactics in a time and space.

That you can and must conduct operations, in no way makes the case of an "operational level." How do Divisional or Corps Tactics differ from "Operations?" The idea that Tactics "stops" at the Battle Group level is clearly absurd. Additionally, very small sub-unit actions get called "Operations."

So campaign planning and "operational level Warfare" is the same thing?

Those are entirely tactical decisions. Planning is required. That plan and its conduct can be called an Operation. Its still tactics.

Got to agree with WILF on this one; at least on the American side. US Generals are getting famious for bad strategy. Most recently Iraq and Afghanistan. Operations are in fact tactics and excuse generals from studing and thinking strategy. Strategy (and its application) does not come with a set of stars; it has to be learned by study. Consequently, generals advise the national command authority badly and ignor setting the strategic tapistry for regional conflicts.:(

[slapout9]

Generals are getting famious for bad strategy. Most recently Iraq and Afghanistan. Operations are in fact tactics and excuse generals from studing and thinking strategy.

Yep, the Operational level of war is nothing but a Guvmint jobs program. It just adds another useless layer of "Planners" to the situation.

[M.L.]

So campaign planning and "operational level Warfare" is the same thing?

For the most part, yes. Campaign planning occurs at the operational level of war, although the operational war is not limited to campaign planning.

"The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives."

[SWJ Blog]

The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/the-us-in-afghanistan-follow-s/)

Entry Excerpt:

The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory
by Ben Zweibelson

Download the Full Article: The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/621-zweibelson.pdf)

Over the past nine years United States counterinsurgency strategy reflected a reliance on Clausewitzian industrial-era tenets with a faulty emphasis on superior western technology, doctrine fixated on lethal operations, and a western skewed perspective on jus ad bellum (just cause for war). American military culture is largely responsible for the first two contextual biases, while western society is liable for the third in response to September 11, 2001. To turn this operational failure around, the U.S. military instrument of power should replace the teachings of 19th century German military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz with Ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu and abandon the aforementioned contextual factors in favor of more appropriate counterinsurgency alternatives. These include an increased emphasis on civil-military relations, jus in bello (just conduct during war) through non-lethal operations, and quantifiable conflict resolution that includes negotiating with moderate Taliban militia groups, as unpalatable as that sounds to military purists. This paper stresses that moderates do not include radical Islamic terrorists or non-native fighters.

Download the Full Article: The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/621-zweibelson.pdf)

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/the-us-in-afghanistan-follow-s/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
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[Bob's World]

Collins does not define the operational level of war, but he does define "operational art"

"Military plans and operations that implement military strategies at theater level. Campaigns predominate if armed combat occurs."

He defines campaigns as:

"A series of theater-level military actions that may or may not be strategically significant."

To complete this, he defines theater operations as:

"A major politico-military or geographic area (such as Western Europe or the Middle East) for which military commanders in chief prepare plans and conduct operations."

Its not like we're discussing Bigfoot or the Loch Ness Monster. These are simply theoretical constructs to focus and guide military planning and operations. The fact that they exist is indisputable. One can debate their value, but their existence is irrefutable.

[M.L.]

Those are entirely tactical decisions. Planning is required. That plan and its conduct can be called an Operation. Its still tactics.

Tactics? Really? So General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was the commander for Torch, was planning a tactical engagement?

Well, I suppose that is one way to look at tactics....

[Fuchs]

I agree, and it makes sense to think of an operational level of war, for it makes the thinking easier, separates the dissimilar tactics of units and large formations.

Tactical advices that make sense for battalions often don't make sense for army groups or corps.

Things like march planning, bridging equipment allocation or air power allocation to regions and tasks simply play no role at the battalion level while stuff like this is very important for corps commanders. It's the operational level where things like fuel, ammunition, formation reserves become endogenous instead of exogenous factors.
It makes no sense to treat everything below strategy level the same just because up to just below the supreme commander everyone is supposed to act in his commander's intent with no clear break that separates operational and tactical actions.


Today:

Tactics can be necessary from individual to corps level.

Operational art can be necessary from brigade to army/air force HQ level. I once wrote that operational art is formation tactics to approximate its meaning.

Strategy can be necessary from theatre commander (even if he's only in control of a reinforced battalion in a tiny mission) up to head of state.
Countries with civilian control over the military should allocate the ultimate strategy decision-making authority to the head of state, with good advice and staff support by the military. Said head of state can delegate it down to theatre commander level.

[William F. Owen]

Tactics? Really? So General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was the commander for Torch, was planning a tactical engagement?

Well his staff was. Yes. The purpose to which all planning was centred was the performance of tactics.

For the most part, yes. Campaign planning occurs at the operational level of war, although the operational war is not limited to campaign planning.
So why not just say "campaign planning." Adding "operational level of war" adds nothing. If a campaign plan ends up being called "Operation Iraqi Freedom" it does not the "operational level" of war make!

"The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations."
OK, so if I re-write that as ""Campaigns are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish objectives within theaters" is that materially different of misleading?

"These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives."
No it does not. Logistics and administration are tactical disciplines.

Question: Can you write a manual on Divisional Tactics? If yes, then there is no "operational level." There is Policy, Strategy and Tactics, and only one of those is a "level of war" because it's the "only level."

[Fuchs]

Question: Can you write a manual on Divisional Tactics? If yes, then there is no "operational level." There is Policy, Strategy and Tactics, and only one of those is a "level of war" because it's the "only level."

The snake bites its end. You need to have defined the limit of tactics (thus have decided whether all the stuff others consider to be operational is tactics as you think) to decide whether you can write such a manual. The question does therefore provide no logically coherent test.

You dismiss the separation of tactics from operational level, et you accept the division between strategy and tactics. I suspect you won't be able to justify the latter division and defend it against the same kind of critique you offer against the operational level.
Mater Tzu taught that it was all the same, after all.


Generally, commanding of many is like commanding of a few.

It is a matter of dividing them into groups.

[M.L.]

To illustrate the point, lets take the example of Operation Michael in 1918. The German tactics - using storm troops to infiltrate the allied line, then regular infantry to exploit, worked brilliantly. The offensive exceeded all German expectations. Likewise, the Germans executed three other offensives along the western front, all of which succeeded in gaining ground.

Unfortunately, the German offensives did not produce any strategically significant results. What was missing was an operational plan. These successful tactics were not linked to strategic effects, which is what operational planning does.

The offensives were not properly sequenced or focused to achieve operational objectives. Nor were the logistics trains able to keep up with the offensives. Eventually they culminated.

Let us suppose Operation Michael had been properly planned operationally. Rather than three additional, unfocused offensives, the Germans would have reinforced the original offensive to drive to Amiens, which was a key regional transportation node. Had the Germans taken Amiens, they very well could have cut the Britain-France line, enveloping the British from the south and pushing them into the sea.

The other three offensives had no operational objectives comparable to Amiens. They simply gained more ground for the Germans, which in the end, only gave them a longer line to defend.

German commander Erich Ludendorff was so focused on tactics, i.e. "break through the line," that he failed to plan properly at the operational level.

Take a look at this map of the western front of March, 1918: http://goo.gl/5BYjD.

Now go to google maps and check out Ameins here:

http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&source=s_q&hl=en&geocode=&q=amiens&sll=39.099726,-94.578567&sspn=0.854716,1.783905&ie=UTF8&hq=&hnear=Amiens,+Somme,+Picardy,+France&ll=49.896404,2.360687&spn=0.709479,1.783905&z=10

It's pretty apparent why operational planning is important.

[M.L.]

Question: Can you write a manual on Divisional Tactics? If yes, then there is no "operational level." There is Policy, Strategy and Tactics, and only one of those is a "level of war" because it's the "only level."

You can write a manual and call it anything you want. I don't see your point.

[Ken White]

For the most part, yes. Campaign planning occurs at the operational level of war, although the operational war is not limited to campaign planning.""...that its techniques and principles are often misapplied...We as an an Army have a tendency to use precepts and principles when they are not appropriate simply because they are taught, ergo they must be used...""
Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives." (emphasis added / kw)The first item in bold print is an invitation to the Type A go-getters of the US Army to go 'Operational' as that clause implies they are doing something more grand than the humdrum (and 'low level' thus simply using the 'Operational level' concept elevates one above the hoi polloi...) application of decent tactics to obtain goals. The second leads some to believe that if they merely label what they do as being at the Operational level, they are in fact doing great things. -- I cite Norm Schwarzkopf as an example with his contention that the Desert Storm tactical ploy (not his idea, BTW) was an "Operational level maneuver."

The Operational level aspects of Desert Storm were the placing of forces including Third US Army, VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps (+) in theater -- after that it was all tactical. Similarly, placing US Forces in Afghanistan was an Operational level move that made all of Afghanistan and what transpires there 'Operational level.' Everything downstream is tactical -- but I'll bet big bucks a lot of RC / BCT and even Bn Staff time in country is spent on 'Operational level planning...' and merging LOO (a must use term as it has been favored by the current Vice Chief... :rolleyes: ).

We embraced the Operational Level of war as a result of its use in European Armies as a descriptor of the tactical deployment and support evolutions of echelons above Corps. That was done in the late 70s and 80s as we were then almost totally focused (wrongly...) on Europe and loved all things European. There is great applicability of the level in Joint Operations and the Army as a participant in those needs to understand the principles but the applicability to Army units in Theater is far less clear. The term was not in general use in the US Army prior to the 1980s and we went to North Africa -- and a lot of other places in several Theaters -- during WW II without using it. ;)

Further, as Bob's World's quoted comment of Collins emphasizes the operational ART consists of "Military plans and operations that implement military strategies at theater level. Campaigns predominate if armed combat occurs." Thus if one accepts that and most do, then whether there is an Operational Level of War becomes a semantic food fight (in which we are all merrily engaging... :D ) and is perhaps intriguing but little more. I'd also note that it is an art, not a science...

What is important is the potential misuse -- and waste of staff time -- of Operational level planning efforts on what are tactical evolutions. Far more pernicious is that unwarranted elevation inadvertently (or deliberately in some cases) encouraging Staff and Commander to interfere with tactical evolutions by subordinate Commanders in the guise of 'engineering success' and insuring 'all the LOOs are followed...' while operating under the delusion that they are a high level planning operation using military science to control the destiny of nations by directing the Plebs to perform the proper tactical evolutions to attain strategic goals...

My Mother told me to be careful what I wanted, I might get it. Long experience tells me the US Army needs to follow that precept and be careful what they promulgate as doctrine -- because they almost certainly will get it. If it's provided it will almost certainly be used -- even if it's ill advised and sadly or even dangerously misapplied, misplaced or misused. :eek:

[Fuchs]

What was missing was an operational plan. These successful tactics were not linked to strategic effects, which is what operational planning does.

The offensives were not properly sequenced or focused to achieve operational objectives. Nor were the logistics trains able to keep up with the offensives. Eventually they culminated.

Let us suppose Operation Michael had been properly planned operationally.

It was planned properly, under the constraints of the time.
The very same limitations were present in late 1917 when half of the Italian army's power was destroyed in the Battle of Caporetto (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Caporetto).

The enemy in France proved to be more resilient and to have greater reserves. The failure was not an unsatisfactory operational plan, but a wrong strategy: Germany should have agreed to the 14 Points plan of Wilson (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourteen_Points) for damage control.

[slapout9]

Campaigns predominate if armed combat occurs." Thus if one accepts that and most do, then whether there is an Operational Level of War becomes a semantic food fight (in which we are all merrily engaging... :D ) and is perhaps intriguing but little more. I'd also note that it is an art, not a science...


It's like Vodoo if enough people believe in it then it does exist.....the big dogs says there is an Operational level so there is going to be one whether we like it or not.:wry:

[M.L.]

Here is a simple question. Must tactics be linked to strategy?

If the answer is yes, then a case can be made for operational planning.

If the answer is yes, BUT I don't like it to be called "the operational level of war", then you are arguing about semantics, not warfare, and it's not worth our collective time to debate the issue.

If the answer is no, well, that is your opinion and you are certainly entitled to it. The vast majority of military theory and history disagrees with you, but drive on with your bad self.

[Infanteer]

The defeat of France was an operation that was part of a larger strategy.

I don't see it that way, and I don't really recall it being explained that way when I learned about strategy and tactics. The defeat of France was a strategy; a linking of ways and means to ends. Ends were defined by German policy (sometimes called grand strategy, but I find that muddies the definition of strategy). The defeat was accomplished by tactical maneuvers by the Army Group commanders down, all who were able to link their tactics to the strategy of knocking out France.

The most clear way of explaining this relationship that I was given was the Schlieffen Plan. The policy was a rapid defeat in West to quickly reinforce the East. The strategy was the "wide right hook" through Belgium, keeping the right strong and tactics were all the stuff that the military performed to do so. Obviously, there was a failure in the application of the operational art as the tactics, especially concerning 1st Army in and around Paris, did not synch with the strategy.

I'm not arguing that the operational art doesn't exist - it is the art of linking tactics to strategy and people can be poor or good at it. It involves those factors that you mention.

What I am arguing (after seeing how Wilf explained it) is that it is not a separate and distinct "level of war" that is practiced by commanders and their staffs; rather it is a mechanism that they all use. I am arguing this because it makes sense to me and upon reflection, I've never seen any manual really make a good explanation for the operational art as a separate and distinct level of war. As a platoon commander in Afghanistan, I used operational art to apply my tactics (patrolling) to the strategy (neutralizing insurgent access to the population) which supported the policy (supporting the Karzai government). Comd RC(S), a Div Comd, did the same thing by using the operational art to link his tactics for Moshtarek (maneuvering forces into a contested area) to the strategy (neutralizing insurgent access to the population) which support the policy (supporting the Karzai government). Sure, Major General Carter and I had different considerations, but it doesn't change the fact that our processes were the same.

Tactics: "the art or science of disposing military or naval forces for battle and maneuvering them in battle." from Dictionary.com. Makes sense to me. Arguing that the "operational art" is what brigades and higher do is just making up a name instead of simply acknowledging that tactical considerations are different for different levels of command. It appears to be forcing a distinction where none really exists. Fuchs states that since there is a difference between battalion and corps tactical considerations, that there must be separate and unique "level of war". Things like march planning, bridging equipment and air power sound like tactics to me. Tactical considerations are also different between platoon and battalion - are there different levels of war at play here? No - tactics are applied by anyone commanding troops, from a squad leader to an Army group commander; the considerations just differ based on the amount of men commanded and the size of the terrain being utilized.

Now, as M.L. said, 90% of the community may say I'm wrong, but 90% of the community also pushed out crap like Maneuver Warfare and Pop-centric COIN, with all the inherent flaws, as doctrine so I'm okay with that. Maybe I'm just being argumentative, but the argument above makes more sense to me than the one that states that there is some magical level between tactics and strategy. Operational art is a independant variable existing within tactics and strategy, not a concrete level between them. One does not get promoted to Brigadier General and all of the sudden leave the realm of tactics to function on the "operational level of war".

[M.L.]

It was planned properly, under the constraints of the time.
The very same limitations were present in late 1917 when half of the Italian army's power was destroyed in the Battle of Caporetto (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Caporetto).

The enemy in France proved to be more resilient and to have greater reserves. The failure was not an unsatisfactory operational plan, but a wrong strategy: Germany should have agreed to the 14 Points plan of Wilson (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourteen_Points) for damage control.

You are 100% wrong. The door to Amiens was open. Ludendorff had only to walk through it, and he didn't. To say that Michael was planned properly is a gross misinterpretation of history. Show me one historian who agrees with you, and I'll concede the point.

[Fuchs]

Door open or not - there was not enough operational mobility to compensate for the defender's interior lines (intact and uninterrupted rail-road network). That's why the offensive had no regular Schwerpunkt.

It was simply not about manoeuvring on large scale, but about pushing to opposing armies towards collapse.

Besides; nothing beyond the first day could possibly be planned. There had been no sustained breakthroughs for three and a half ears on that front.

[M.L.]

Infanteer,

The defeat of France was a strategic objective, achieved through a series of two operations. These, in turn, were achieved using blitzkrieg tactics.

Strategic Objective --> Defeat of France

Operational Objectives -->
-->Secure the northern flank by occupying Belgium
--->Attack south, bypassing the Maginot line, and taking Paris

These objectives were supported by a series of engagements and battles using blitzkrieg tactics.

[M.L.]

Door open or not - there was not enough operational mobility to compensate for the defender's interior lines (intact and uninterrupted rail-road network). That's why the offensive had no regular Schwerpunkt.

It was simply not about manoeuvring on large scale, but about pushing to opposing armies towards collapse.

Besides; nothing beyond the first day could possibly be planned. There had been no sustained breakthroughs for three and a half ears on that front.

That's why Amiens was so important - it would have interrupted the railroad network and cut off the British from the French.

[Infanteer]

The defeat of France was a strategic objective, achieved through a series of two operations. These, in turn, were achieved using blitzkrieg tactics.

Yes, and those two operations were tactical plans. "You, move XVI Corps here and you, take X Corps down here to keep the reserves occupied". Repeat down to "you, drive your tank over there and you shoot at those guys".

I don't see how one of these is on a separate level of war from the other.

[M.L.]

I'm not arguing that the operational art doesn't exist - it is the art of linking tactics to strategy and people can be poor or good at it. It involves those factors that you mention.

If you believe that strategy must be linked to tactics, then you are on the right track.

Whether is should be called a "level or war" or not is largely irrelevant - that is an argument about what should be in the dictionary. I personally believe it should be portrayed as a level of war because there are important concepts in operational warfare which are neither tactical nor strategic.

Operational warfare is neither concrete nor distinct from tactics or strategy. If its purpose is to link the two, how could it be? That is why many people who haven't had the opportunity to either serve at those level or read a lot of history have a hard time envisioning operational warfare. Tactics and strategy are easy because they exist at opposite ends of a continuum. Operational warfare is tougher.

Despite the numerous opinions in this forum, I've seen little in the way of evidence that would convince me that operational warfare does not exist. People here are very good at giving opinions, but not as good at proving a point through the use of empirical evidence, acknowledged experts, and/or historical vignettes.

I've offered several historical examples which demonstrate both the existence and importance of operational warfare.

[M.L.]

Yes, and those two operations were tactical plans. "You, move XVI Corps here and you, take X Corps down here to keep the reserves occupied". Repeat down to "you, drive your tank over there and you shoot at those guys".

I don't see how one of these is on a separate level of war from the other.

Because completion of operational objectives achieves strategic effects. Completion of tactical objectives (take that hill, destroy that battalion), does not.

Taking a Corps here or there achieves strategic objectives, and is significantly more difficult than driving a tank here or there.

Can't you see how absurd it is to suggest that maneuvering a Corps is the same as maneuvering a tank?!

[M.L.]

Gents-

I understand many of you disagree with me. Got it. But from now on, please provide some sort of evidence to support your contentions.

If all you have is your opinion, you are welcome to it, but frankly I'm not interested unless you have a background which suggests that you have a unique perspective on the matter.

Otherwise, we are spinning our wheels. I don't really care what your opinion is without evidence to back it up. Nor should you care about my opinion.

[slapout9]

M.L.,
There is a paper I posted on here a few years ago that deals with this subject. I am trying to find it and will post it again when I do. Here is the short version. General MacArthur supposedly said Strategy "Is Maneuver of Large Scale Forces". The paper goes on to point out that Maneuver dealt with the selection of the battlefield and the movement to the battlefield. Once you got to the battlefield (within range of the enemies weapons) you were at the tactical level of war.

Enter the ICBM... that changed everything because there is no place on earth that can't be hit by a missile, so the new idea was that Maneuver (operations) no longer truly existed, everything had become Tactical.... guided by Strategy (battle command). Some even thought that Strategy no longer even truly existed, except at the Political level.

[M.L.]

Slap,

I'd be very interested in reading such an article. I'll look forward to your post.

[William F. Owen]

T
You dismiss the separation of tactics from operational level, et you accept the division between strategy and tactics.
The differentiation of Strategy and Tactics is the same differentiation of Ways and Means. Tactics is fighting and the activities that support fighting. Strategy is how the fighting realises its political Ends.

[M.L.]

The differentiation of Strategy and Tactics is the same differentiation of Ways and Means. Tactics is fighting and the activities that support fighting. Strategy is how the fighting realises its political Ends.

An interesting opinion. And what facts and/or history do you base it on?

[William F. Owen]

Here is a simple question. Must tactics be linked to strategy?
A strategy has to be realisable (doable) in tactics.

If the answer is yes, then a case can be made for operational planning.
Yes. You have to plan operations. At the lowest level, you plan a patrol. At the highest you plan how Armies/Corps/Fronts and Army Groups fight.

If the answer is yes, BUT I don't like it to be called "the operational level of war", then you are arguing about semantics, not warfare, and it's not worth our collective time to debate the issue.
What words mean, matters a great deal. Clarity of expression is usually clarity of thought and this action. Hannibal planned operations, but he had no "operational level of war." Same is true of Napoleon, Montgomery, Allenby and Slim. They all planned and conducted operations. That does not create a "level of War."

The vast majority of military theory and history disagrees with you, but drive on with your bad self.
The vast majority of military theory and history does not disagree with me, and that which is does is usually abysmal. If you think there is something called "Manoeuvre Warfare" then you'll gravitate to "Operational level of War," in a flash, because its simply bad theory, not held to rigour.

[William F. Owen]

An interesting opinion. And what facts and/or history do you base it on?
That's not an opinion. It's the central logic of all strategic theory.
Clausewitz!
If you want the seminal modern work on "Operations" and how they relate to Strategy and Tactics, go and read Hamley's "Operations of War."

[slapout9]

Slap,

I'd be very interested in reading such an article. I'll look forward to your post.

May take a little while. I had to PM Dave Dilegge, I think he is actually the one that found it. It is much more than an article it was an entire report of historic examples of Operational Maneuver.

[William F. Owen]

If all you have is your opinion, you are welcome to it, but frankly I'm not interested unless you have a background which suggests that you have a unique perspective on the matter.

Background? Sorry do you mean some sort of rank or supposed experience? I'm a former NCO with no academic qualifications. None of that dis-qualifies me from this debate. I just read the books, study the art, speak at the conferences and publish the odd-article and edit a strategy magazine.

[Infanteer]

I think we are violently agreeing on at least part of this. We concur that "operational art" or "operational technique" exist, and that it exists to link tactical actions with strategic goals. While there is concurance on existance, the debate seems to focus on what exactly it is.

I wouldn't consider this to be purely semantics. The discussion, although a bit esoteric, is probably important as it informs our understanding of the essential concepts we use to guide the profession. If our basic definitions of how we do things are flawed, then all that flows from it likely to be flawed as well.



Despite the numerous opinions in this forum, I've seen little in the way of evidence that would convince me that operational warfare does not exist. People here are very good at giving opinions, but not as good at proving a point through the use of empirical evidence, acknowledged experts, and/or historical vignettes.

I've offered several historical examples which demonstrate both the existence and importance of operational warfare.

I'd lob the same critique at you. You've simply offered vingettes, and I've disputed your application of definitions in these vignettes and offered alternative explanations. That's fine if you don't care about what I've said - if you don't wish to dispute my alternative explanation of terminology, fill your boots. Wishing away a counter-argument with an appeal to authority, as you did above, is not conducive to proving your point.


Because completion of operational objectives achieves strategic effects. Completion of tactical objectives (take that hill, destroy that battalion), does not.

This seems again to force separate definitions onto a single concept - is there any value to split objective into different catagories? My objective, as tank platoon commander of 3 Troop, is to take the bridge. Your objective, as Army Commander, is to move 2nd Army into province X to cut lines of communication between his capitial and his Field Army.

They are both objectives that require the application of tactics - ensure supplies are in place, select routes, use SOPs to react to enemy actions, etc. So calling one a tactical objective and the other not seems wrong. They are both objectives that have operational aspects (ie: effects that affect the next tactical engagement) - if the platoon commander doesn't take the bridge, can the invasion of province X continue? It seems to me that your idea of operational objectives is actually just a fancy way of saying "important objectives."

If the operational level was distinct and only practiced by some, then its method, "campaign planning", should be uniquely practiced, should it not? But the idea of "campaign planning" isn't something that exists only with certain sized formations; it exists when someone at any level of command decides to initate an operation through linking a series of tactical actions. When I sat down with my ANA counterpart and worked out a plan for 2 weeks of patrolling with a particular village, we were planning a campaign by linking our planned patrols and ambushes. Except for size and scope, I don't see how planning Operation Torch was something conceptually different.

This goes back to the tank platoon and the Corps. The comparison of the process of maneuvering a tank platoon and maneuvering a Corps was not to say the they involve the same execution, it was to point out that they both involve a process that is largely similar; linking tactical actions to strategic plans. If you execute operational technique well, your tactical actions as a platoon commander or a corps commander will push your further towards your strategic goals.

[William F. Owen]

The defeat of France was a strategic objective, achieved through a series of two operations. These, in turn, were achieved using blitzkrieg tactics.

There was simply no such thing as "blitzkrieg tactics". The defeat of the French Army and the BEF was a campaign predicated on one high risk endeavour, and that was the crossing of the Meuse in a very tight time frame. The Germans were much aided in this by excellent combined arms tactical doctrine, and an abysmal performance by the French.

[M.L.]

Background? Sorry do you mean some sort of rank or supposed experience? I'm a former NCO with no academic qualifications. None of that dis-qualifies me from this debate. I just read the books, study the art, speak at the conferences and publish the odd-article and edit a strategy magazine.

I'm not suggesting that it does. However, there are two ways to offer a credible opinion.

1. My opinion is XYZ, and here is the history/theory/logic/facts to support it.
2. My opinion is XYZ, and here is my direct experience to support it.

Of course, you are welcome to express your opinion absent either of the above, however, it is simply not very compelling.

[M.L.]

There was simply no such thing as "blitzkrieg tactics". The defeat of the French Army and the BEF was a campaign predicated on one high risk endeavour, and that was the crossing of the Meuse in a very tight time frame. The Germans were much aided in this by excellent combined arms tactical doctrine, and an abysmal performance by the French.

Wow. First there is no such thing as operational warfare, and now there is no such thing as blitzkrieg. I'm actually stunned.

Thanks for your....interesting perspective.

[M.L.]

The differentiation of Strategy and Tactics is the same differentiation of Ways and Means. Tactics is fighting and the activities that support fighting. Strategy is how the fighting realises its political Ends.

Wrong.

Means = Resources
Ways = Methods

There are Ends, Ways, and Means at every level of warfare.

[Pete]

Is the proper adjective "Clausewittian" or "Clausewitzian," and is there a difference between the commonly-used British and American usages?

Because there is no letter "z" in Wilf's name I think in his particular case the adjectives will be "Wilfian" or "Wilfianalistic." Perhaps "Wilfianalistical."

[Infanteer]

Wow. First there is no such thing as operational warfare, and now there is no such thing as blitzkrieg. I'm actually stunned.

Thanks for your....interesting perspective.

All the serious analysis I've read on the German Army of the Second World War says as much - the Germans certainly never called it that. Citano uses the term in his writing, but he acknowledged that it was never an actual system and that the name "blitzkrieg" only has utility as a shorthand for German combined arms tactics.

[Fuchs]

"Blitzkrieg" as a word was introduced by a British newspaper and subsequently adopted by German propaganda at least a bit. It was not in use by the German military forces as a description for what they did. Even German post-war literature is quite devoid of it unless you read an English translation.

[M.L.]

Blitzkrieg is a commonly used term to describe German tactics during WWII. Who coined the term is irrelevant. If you like, use the term "German WWII tactics."

[William F. Owen]

Blitzkrieg is a commonly used term to describe German tactics during WWII. Who coined the term is irrelevant. If you like, use the term "German WWII tactics."

Commonly used by people who have not studied the subject in detail. Go and read the German field service regulations of 1934, the Soviet field service regulations of 1936, and the British of 1937. Compare and contrast and then perhaps tell us what you think "blitzkrieg" means, as a distinctive doctrine.

Manoeuvre Warfare is commonly used, yet I submit it's baby talk.
People say "Strategic Bomber", when there is simply no such thing. Again, it's meaningless.


Wow. First there is no such thing as operational warfare, and now there is no such thing as blitzkrieg. I'm actually stunned.
Well go and read the literature. Study the art. The sophistry of the "operational level" is new, but the myth of the "blitzkrieg" is about 60 years old and well covered in the literature in the last 20.

[William F. Owen]

Means = Resources
Ways = Methods
So Means is logistics and Ways is tactics?


There are Ends, Ways, and Means at every level of warfare.
So what you are saying is the End Ways and Means does not pertain to strategy they are purely functions within the construct of the "3 Levels of War?"

M.L. - I'm not locking horns with you for fun. This is important stuff, because you end up with senior military men talking about "Strategic, Operational and Tactical Mobility," = Baby Talk. Meaningless!

You cannot talk about strategy is you think Means = Resources. If it does, how would you translate "Means to an End" in terms of teaching/doctrine?

[M.L.]

So Means is logistics and Ways is tactics?


So what you are saying is the End Ways and Means does not pertain to strategy they are purely functions within the construct of the "3 Levels of War?"

No. Look at what I typed.
Me: "There are Ends, Ways, and Means at every level of warfare."

There are EWM at the strategic level, EWM at the operational level, and EWM at the tactical level.

How exactly could you read that and come to the conclusion that EWM does not apply to strategy?

Type Ends, Ways, Means into Google and see what you come up with.

Means=Resources (Logistics is not the same thing)

"Means to an end" is a colloquialism which has no relevance to the Ends, Ways, Means framework of strategy.

Let me give you an example

End= Cripple German Economy and Industry
Way=Bombing
Means=Bombers (crews, airfields, ordinance, fuel, parts, etc...)

As for blitzkrieg, again, it is a commonly understood to describe German WWII tactics, and it is easier to type than "the German WWII way of war which fused combined arms, speed, surprise, and "small unit initiative with armored formations (enabled by the radio)."

That the term was coined after the war is irrelevant. It was never used by the Germans. Fine. Historians are comfortable with the term without throwing a hissy fit, so I am too.

As for the operational level of war, the linking of strategy to tactics must occur. This is operational warfare.

We'll agree to disagree. Thanks for your interesting and informative opinions.

[M.L.]

For those of you who are willing to entertain the idea that the vast majority of the military and history communities are not insane, and that there actually might be an operational level of war, I recommend this book:

http://www.history.army.mil/books/OpArt/index.htm

It is free to read online and traces operational warfare from its birth in the Napoleonic Era to 1991 and the Gulf War. The preface is two pages and describes the differences between strategy, operations, and tactics pretty well in a short space.

For the rest of you, well, you may find this an interesting work of fiction....

[Bob's World]

ML,

You are clearly a military professional who knows a great deal about his profession and also takes great comfort in that knowledge. Such is the science of war and the path for development of leaders. There is no criticism intended or implied in that observation.

Doctrine and knowledge provide a comfort zone to operate competently within sight of. But one only discovers new places and new ideas when they release themselves from that comfort zone and strikes out into less familiar territory. SWJ is an excellent place for such exploration. What I have come to appreciate is that what one understands is far more important than what one knows. Knowledge is just the doorway to understanding. This takes one into the art of war.

Take it from one who defends hard gained positions more stubbornly than most. But even when digging in hard, I am listening to what is being said, thinking about why it is others may believe things differently than I do, and am continually improving my position. Few things are black and white in this business.

Bob

[William F. Owen]

Let me give you an example

End= Cripple German Economy and Industry
Way=Bombing
Means=Bombers (crews, airfields, ordinance, fuel, parts, etc...)
End = The Unconditional surrender of Germany
Strategy = includes the physical destruction of the means of production
Ways = aerial bombing, sabotage, etc etc etc.


Historians are comfortable with the term without throwing a hissy fit, so I am too.
Historians maybe. Those who study warfare to inform current and future practice are not.

As for the operational level of war, the linking of strategy to tactics must occur. This is operational warfare.
How is strategy - by it's very nature as the link between policy and tactics, not already linked to tactics?

[William F. Owen]

For those of you who are willing to entertain the idea that the vast majority of the military and history communities are not insane.
No one said they were insane. They are just very poor at studying their art, and use language badly. Military history is mostly poor, in terms of informing practice.

It is free to read online and traces operational warfare from its birth in the Napoleonic Era to 1991 and the Gulf War. The preface is two pages and describes the differences between strategy, operations, and tactics pretty well in a short space.
So Hannibal, Julius Caesar and Alexander didn't conduct operations? What was anyone one of them doing that Napoleon was not?

If you want to see just how poor the intellectual and historical basis for "An operational level" is, go read Shimon Naveh. "The Pursuit of Excellence."

[Infanteer]

I have that book on my shelf and I've tried twice to get into it, both times being repelled by his esoteric style and heavy wordsmithing of the English language.

[Ken White]

For those of you who are willing to entertain the idea that the vast majority of the military and history communities are not insane, and that there actually might be an operational level of war, I recommend this book:

http://www.history.army.mil/books/OpArt/index.htmI agreed there is an Operational Art so I guess that proves that I do not consider most of the military and history communities to be insane. My point is the rather more important issue that Military folks are too often slaves to doctrine.

Two items from your link are pertinent. The first by BG (Ret) Harold W. Nelson discussing US history and usage:
"The U.S. fought its wars for more than 200 years without needing an “operational level.” Strategy and tactics were good enough for Clausewitz and Jomini - and for our fathers and grandfathers as they fought the biggest wars known to man. They learned how to plan and conduct campaigns without any special terminology, so why do we need a new term, an intermediate level, in our hierarchy of warfighting concepts? I believe the introduction of the new term reflects a revision in our view of war rather than recent changes in the nature of war. A quick look at some of the things our predecessors wrote and studied convinces me that there was a growing awareness of what we now call the operational level of war long before we introduced the term. Its application should, therefore, help us to understand the use of military force in twentieth-century wars while helping us plan for the future."Good summary and most of us can agree with that to at least some degree.

The second point -- and the problem as it exists with the "Operational Level of War" is illustrated by a clutch of items by BG (Ret) John S. Brown, former Chief Of Military History.
"Twentieth-century Americans adopted an egalitarian attitude toward military staff work; rather than evolving a small, highly specialized elite cadre, they rotated officers between staff and line assignments fairly routinely. In the views of the officers themselves, they “did their time” on staff in order to return to the troop, flight, or sea duty they truly preferred.
. . .
The mathematics worked out to a return to troops as a field-grade officer within two to three as opposed to four to five years. A fraction of SAMS’s popularity was its exploitation of a time-honored American technique: Seduce talented officers into staff work by promising to make them line officers in due course.
. . .
Whatever their motives, SAMS graduates proliferated throughout the Army and enhanced staff proficiency - particularly with respect to the operational art heavily emphasized at the time. They were reinforced by an emphasis upon the operational art in the basic course, and thus the tendency of all recent officer graduates of the service school systems to use concepts and vocabulary that facilitated its use. The 1986 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100–5, Operations, deployed an array of historical operational vignettes to make its points; such terms as Center of Gravity, Lines of Operation, and Culminating Point were recommended as key concepts for operational design. Although they did not develop a precise equivalent to SAMS, Navy and Air Force educators also gave due attention to the operational art and campaign planning during this period and developed appropriate literature for their student officers as well." (emphasis added / kw)The first item placed in bold is important to put SAMS in perspective for what it really is and to add tha another fraction of that popularity is the intellectual cachet note. The point, though, is those officers leave SAMS for a Corps or Division Staff -- but later will likely command Bns and Bdes; thus the SAMS 'Operational' mentality gets transferred to lower level by that as well as the trickle down effect cited in the second item emphasized.

Those two factors mean that the 'Operational level' as a methodology is significantly overly insinuated and thus often misunderstood and misused throughout the Army.

This also from BG (Ret) Brown:
"During DESERT STORM the arms and services operated together with an unprecedented virtuosity that smashed a theretofore formidable opponent in a brief time - with astonishingly few casualties. One would be hard put to imagine a more effective demonstration of joint and combined operations than that turned in to liberate Kuwait."I beg to differ. One would be hard put to find another 'war' wherein the opponent could have been dispatched in half the time with a third the effort. Desert Storm was an aberration, 100 US casualties in 100 hours to accomplish the mission (more or less...) is not a war, it is an FTX with live Ammo. :mad:

Unfortunately, that operation not only set some unattainable expectations in the minds of many (not least US Politicians...), it more damagingly embedded the myth of the Operational level of War in the US Army and due to that essential overselling, over insinuation and potential for misuse of an important concept and the (dare I suggest excessive...) number of SAMS graduates, the Operational Art is prostituted, misused and obscures or deters proper tactics. As Wilf and others with academic and experience at upper echelons cred note {LINK} (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=939).

Anyone who espouses the valid need for an Operational art and interface between Tactics and Strategy should be concerned with addressing that very real problem.

[Ken White]

I have that book on my shelf and I've tried twice to get into it, both times being repelled by his esoteric style and heavy wordsmithing of the English language.Heavy going... :D

[slapout9]

"Strategy may dictate whether or not to fight, but operations will determine where and when to fight and tactics how to conduct the fight. " From the Preface of the book.


I thought this was pretty good.


Also this appears to be the study I was talking about, the time frame is right around 2005 and the length of the study over 450 pages is also right, the cover is different but I don't always remember stuff like I used to.

[Fuchs]

So Hannibal, Julius Caesar and Alexander didn't conduct operations? What was anyone one of them doing that Napoleon was not?

They manoeuvred only one army (corps) at once, while Napoleon centrally commanded (at the same time!) several corps which moved with more than a day's march separation.


Caesar occasionally sent a legion away to deal with a minor problem, but such a detached legion would follow a different purpose than the main army.

Hannibal left some garrisons behind, but he manoeuvred with a single army.


The one core advance of Napoleon for the art of war was to march the corps dispersed and then let them converge to decisive battles - all while under his control (with some delay, of course).

There were few previous examples that resembled such activity, and the only ones where the theatre commander/king really kept more than one army/corps under his control was when an army in a coastal region was paired with a fleet (such as Alexander's advance in the Levant).
The Steppe people leaders temporarily lost control of their detached armies/corps.

[Infanteer]

They manoeuvred only one army (corps) at once, while Napoleon centrally commanded (at the same time!) several corps which moved with more than a day's march separation.

Yes, more likely due to the size of Revolutionary Armies than anything else. I agree with you that this is a key distinction between Napoleonic Armies and its predecessors. However, this does not mean that Caesar, Hannibal and Alexander did not conduct campaign planning - they still had to sit down and say "Hmm, to pacify Gaul, I need to burn out the Belgae while still keeping these fellows around Cisalpine Gaul in line. So, I'll do X, Y and Z with Legions X, XV and II".

For some reason the military profession more than many others falls for that curious human tendency to believe that what we are doing in our generation is something new and transformational and progressive when compared to everybody before us.

[William F. Owen]

The one core advance of Napoleon for the art of war was to march the corps dispersed and then let them converge to decisive battles - all while under his control (with some delay, of course).

...but people had done that before. Ghenghis Khan in Transoxianna in 1219/20 is just one of several examples I can think off. Ancient "Armies" often had to march dispersed because they simply ate out the land they were covering.

I was re-reading Moltke last night, and noted he only ever talks of "Strategy" and "Tactics." - as does Hamley. Both men understood the need to conduct "Operations," but merely saw this as the necessary preliminaries to battle.

[Bob's World]

WILF,

Since we are really just talking about the terms and concepts we use to describe this fundamental human dynamic of warfare, my question is what harm comes from some incorporating an "operational level" in their descriptions and some preferring a leaner "Strategy and Tactics" approach? Neither actually changes the dynamics of warfare, they merely break it down and describe it differently.

Do you see some danger from employing the concept of operational levels of warfare, or do you simply find it superfluous to the more established Strategy/Tactics approach?

If no harm, then no foul. After all, this is theory to describe something real. The theory cannot change the reality.

[William F. Owen]

Do you see some danger from employing the concept of operational levels of warfare, or do you simply find it superfluous to the more established Strategy/Tactics approach?


Excellent question. I find it superfluous, and there fore actually damaging. My sole concern is the teaching that informs practice. I really have little or no time for abstract theory, unless it contributes to action, so....

a.) The Operational level adds nothing, IF you understand Strategy and Tactics as described by classical military thought. If Moltke didn't need it, why do we?
b.) Adding and dreaming up stuff like the operational level, basically shows we do not study warfare correctly. It's a sophistry. It undermines teaching that works, if the teaching is done well.

It's liken "Hybrid Warfare." If you use baby talk, then you'll end up thinking like a baby. If you use silly words, you'll end up doing silly stuff.

[Fuchs]

a.) The Operational level adds nothing, IF you understand Strategy and Tactics as described by classical military thought. If Moltke didn't need it, why do we?
b.) Adding and dreaming up stuff like the operational level, basically shows we do not study warfare correctly. It's a sophistry. It undermines teaching that works, if the teaching is done well.

a) We might face a better enemy sometime - someone who's not stuck in the 19th century.

b) Would only relevant if your a.) was correct.


The operational level may be another set of tactics, but it makes sense to separate it from small-unit and unit tactics simply because you cannot lead a corps like you can lead a company. You cannot lead a company like you need to lead a corps. I wouldn't mind calling it "lower tactics" and "higher tactics", but the convention is to call it "tactics" and "operational art".


Tactical success at battalion level can sabotage the corps leader's intent. An example would be a battalion being able to defeat attackers when it was supposed to let them pass into a trap. The separation of tactics and operational art helps people to understand that there are differences, to tolerate superficially suboptimal events (such as getting no artillery support) at the unit level in favour of the operational intent.
The differentiation between unit and formation tactics is useful in many ways.

[William F. Owen]

a) We might face a better enemy sometime - someone who's not stuck in the 19th century.
Is Newtonian physics stuck in 18th century?

The operational level may be another set of tactics, but it makes sense to separate it from small-unit and unit tactics simply because you cannot lead a corps like you can lead a company.
That's command. That's nothing to do with an supposed "operational level." All commanders and all levels are require to plan and conduct operations.
There are tactics for platoons and their are tactics for Corps. All do "operations."

Tactical success at battalion level can sabotage the corps leader's intent.
An example would be a battalion being able to defeat attackers when it was supposed to let them pass into a trap.
As the attackers were defeated, where's the problem? Looks like just a bad plan to me.

The differentiation between unit and formation tactics is useful in many ways.
The differentiation is the level of command. One is formation. One is Unit.

[Bob's World]

Wilf,

OK, fair enough, and I completely agree that many of the concepts, (and Hybrid warfare is an excellent example) are wheeled out by those who study a current problem and cook up a name for it without bothering to look at the thousands of years of historical examples that provide context to that "modern" problem. Too often we don't need any of the myriad new names, merely better understanding of existing concepts.

I'm not convinced "operational level of war" falls into that category though. I think it rests on a solid foundation of historical study and experience, and is not just a concept cooked up to label something that someone sees sitting in front of them that they personally have never seen before. I'm comfortable with the concept and see its value in helping to focus a certain scope of strategy and tactics to pursue policy. Certainly for the US with our Geographic Combatant Command construct it serves a valuable purpose.

Now, as to the appropriateness of GCCs; that is another debate for another thread...

[Fuchs]

Is Newtonian physics stuck in 18th century?

That's command. That's nothing to do with an supposed "operational level." All commanders and all levels are require to plan and conduct operations.
There are tactics for platoons and their are tactics for Corps. All do "operations."

As the attackers were defeated, where's the problem? Looks like just a bad plan to me.

The differentiation is the level of command. One is formation. One is Unit.

Newtonian physics has become obsolete early in the 20th century when relativity theory arrived.

The inflationary use of the word "operations"," operational", "operator" is no argument against an operational level of war.
Small units and units don't need to plan much if anything in mobile warfare, while corps and divisions need tor amp up their planning to cope with the demands of mobile warfare.

Wilf, either I have not made my point clear (and I think I did) or you truly don't understand the operational level of war. A battalion's success that ruins the plan of a corps is a disaster.



Wilf, sometime in 2009 you turned into a Clausewitzian acolyte. Fine. There's a problem though: You seem to dismiss almost everything that came after Clausewitz, probably with the single exception of Foch.

You're closing your eyes and then you pretend there's nothing new because you cannot see it.

[Infanteer]

If no harm, then no foul. After all, this is theory to describe something real. The theory cannot change the reality.

Definitions are crucial - if we define something wrong or incorrectly, then we likely have a skewed application.

Sure, I can say an elephant has 2 trunks and 6 legs; that theory doesn't change the reality that an elephant has 1 trunk and 4 legs. But when I use my 2 trunks/6 legs theory and fight an elephant in real life, my skewed understanding probably leads to a less than optimal outcome.


The operational level may be another set of tactics, but it makes sense to separate it from small-unit and unit tactics simply because you cannot lead a corps like you can lead a company. You cannot lead a company like you need to lead a corps. I wouldn't mind calling it "lower tactics" and "higher tactics", but the convention is to call it "tactics" and "operational art".

....and you cannot lead a brigade or a squad like you can lead a corps or a company. So there are distinctions at almost every echelon - why does one line of distinction constitute a separate "level of war"? Differences at each echelon are a function of size and scope, not of differing levels of war.

Does a Corps commander use tactics? Does a platoon commander use operational art? As a commander, will I one day transition to "operational art"? Or will I simply command more people to move to and within battle or, as a staffer, plan to do so with more people, more stuff and more ground? How is command of VII Corps by General Franks in 1991, wheeling a few armoured divisions into the Iraqi flank, any different from a company commander wheeling his combat team into an enemy position?

I think the answers to this expose the folly of defining "operational art" and "campaigning" as being on a unique plane done only by certain people. It is done by any commander, and his staff, at any level who plans and initiates an operation.

[William F. Owen]

Newtonian physics has become obsolete early in the 20th century when relativity theory arrived.
Yet we still use them and they still provide clear and explicit guidance for practical engineering.


The inflationary use of the word "operations"," operational", "operator" is no argument against an operational level of war.
Yet it,
a.) Adds nothing.
b.) People don't need it.
c.) It's tramples on the good guidance set by strategy and tactics.


Wilf, either I have not made my point clear (and I think I did) or you truly don't understand the operational level of war.
What is there to understand? Enveloping an enemy division using three brigades and Corps level reserves does not require "an operational level." Its tactics at the Corps level, thus the Corps level of Command. Moltke knew this and never talked about the "operational level." Planning relates to a level of command.

A battalion's success that ruins the plan of a corps is a disaster. Only if an idiot did the planning. Show me when this has ever happened?

Wilf, sometime in 2009 you turned into a Clausewitzian acolyte. Fine. There's a problem though: You seem to dismiss almost everything that came after Clausewitz, probably with the single exception of Foch.

...and you'd be completely wrong. Yes I adhere to classical teachings, (Clausewitz, Foch, Moltke, Hamely, Callwell and few others) but I in no way reject other useful teaching. Please show me some, if you can find it.
I think the work of Robert Leonhard and Jim Storr are profoundly useful (both men are still living) as is some of that of Stephen Biddle.
...but most modern military thought is garbage. I would cite the "operational level" as being a good example.

[slapout9]

Saw this over at Zenpundits website. One of the best and easiest articles to read and understand CvC by Colin S. Gray.

http://www.clausewitz.dk/ColinGray1.pdf

[Fuchs]

You draw Moltke the Elder, I bring Guderian, Manstein and their whole generation to the table, they spoke regularly about "operativ" in the meaning of "operational".

The operational level was especially helpful as a construct (which are tactics and strategy as well - all mere acoustic words and b/w contrast without the meaning given to it by others than us) during the Interwar Years.

The tactics had evolved and solved the breakthrough problem, but the exploitation of the breakthrough - the whole mobile warfare thing that was supposed to follow - had to be developed during the inter-war years. The acceptance of an operational level of warfare helped greatly in the process.
Those who did not fully embrace or understand it were stuck in short-range stuff, in tactical considerations about defeating the line in depth and the formations deployed in the line (Liddell-Hart, the French, the Italians) while those who embraced the idea that there's something "operativ" above the division tactics (~equivalent of today's large reinforced battalion battle groups) were able to address the real remaining challenge: What to do, that to achieve after a breakthrough - and how?


It's always possible to ignore the value of designations - especially if one doesn't recognize the differences like others do. The differences between leading a company and a corps are large enough to justify a separation. You can discuss against that as much as you want - that merely shows that you don't see the difference.

We could as well fragment the art of war into many more levels - small unit, multiple small units (Coy), combined arms command (mixed Bn / Bn battle group), command of multiple combined arms forces in a formation (Bde or Div), one level higher with integrated aviation support and other specialized assets (Div or Corps), theatre command, military strategy, civilian strategy.

In the end, it's much easier to just fragment it into strategic, operational, tactical and let different manuals for different unit/formation sizes suffice for the subdivisions.

"Operational Level of War" is well understood and until the early 90's "operations"/"operativ" was also well understood because the inflationary use hadn't taken effect yet. It's language, its meaning is shared and understood and it serves the purpose of communication.


A personal crusade should rather be directed against the inflationary use of words which ruins well-defined words such as "kinetic" or "operation".

[William F. Owen]

You draw Moltke the Elder, I bring Guderian, Manstein and their whole generation to the table, they spoke regularly about "operativ" in the meaning of "operational".
Moltke never once interposed the term "Operativ" as a link between Strategy and Tactics. He merely used it in the same way as Hamley, Foch and others.
Guderian and Manstein used the term in the same way. Truppenfuhrung makes not mention of the "Operational Level" and nor do any of Guderian's orders cited in his memoir. They are all issued to levels of command, and were obviously planned as such.


The operational level was especially helpful as a construct during the Interwar Years.
By whom and when?

Explicitly, what do you mean by "operational level?"

[Tukhachevskii]

As I see it we're stuck in a kind of langauge game with different people using different rules. As Wittgenstein said "the meaning of a wrod derives from its usage". Just becasue someone said "operativ" doesn't mean that they understand that word (or its referent, a different kettle of fish, I know) to mean the same as, say, "operatsiia" or "operational". Just because the Ancients used the word Strategos doesn't mean they meant strategy or strategic (even thought that's the root of our current terminology)...startegos actually refered to (the) command(er) of tactical formations not to a level of war. As Peter Winch might argue ...are people acting operationally when they themselves wouldn't know what that was i.e., does operational art exist before or after it is defined and people understand themselves to be doing it? Does the fact that Napoleon is conducting "grand tactics" (the term then in currency) but to us it looks alot like what we now call "operational art" mean he was conducting operational art or was he conducting tactics? The Wehrmacht of the Second World War (as argued by Michael Geyer) was actually applying mechanisation and technology to tactics to create an industrial form of "grand tactics" which they "euphemistically " termed "operativ". If one were to ask them what that term actually meant...what would the answer have been?

[Fuchs]

"operativ" was in everyday use describing plans and actions on army to theatre level. I don't refer to memoirs and especially not to their English translations - I refer to how the word was actually used in the 30's and 40's.

Besides; TF does use the term as well - in the original.

"31. Die Dauer operativer und taktischer Handlungern ist nicht immer im voraus zu übersehen, auch erfolgreiche Gefechte verlaufen oft langsam,"

(~The duration of operational and tactical actions cannot always be anticipated, even successful engagements often develop slowly.)

It took me five second to find this example.

[Pete]

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http://dlxs2.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html) published by the U.S. War Department during the late 19th and early 20th centuries uses the word operations as a synonym for "activities," as shown below:


Volume XII - in Three Parts. 1885. (Vol. 12, Chap. 24)
Chapter XXIV - Operations in Northern Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland. Mar 17-Sep 2, 1862.
Part I -- Reports, Mar 17-Jun 25
Part II -- Reports, Jun 26-Sep 2
Part II -- Supplement. 1886.
Part III -- Correspondence

Volume XIII. 1885. (Vol. 13, Chap. 25)
Chapter XXV -- Operations in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, the Indian Territory, and the Department of the Northwest. Apr. 10-Nov. 20, 1862.

Volume XIV. 1885. (Vol. 14, Chap. 26)
Chapter XXVI - Operations on the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Middle and East Florida. Apr 12, 1862-Jun 11, 1863.

Volume XV. 1886. (Vol. 15, Chap. 27)
Chapter XXVII - Operations in West Florida, Southern Alabama, Southern Mississippi (embracing all operations against Vicksburg, May 18-Jul 27, 1862); and Louisiana, May 12, 1862-May 14, 1863; and operations in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, Sep 20,1862-May 14, 1863.

[jmm99]

HT to Pete for going back to the Civil War histories of the later 1800s, which brought to mind Halleck as a US military author of 1860 and earlier.

First this, from NYT of 1863, "REPORT OF MAJ.-GEN. HALLECK.; A Review of the Military Operations of the Past Year (http://www.nytimes.com/1863/12/12/news/report-maj-gen-halleck-review-military-operations-past-year-synopsis-report.html). SYNOPSIS OF THE REPORT." (Published: December 12, 1863), which provides some examples of what he meant by operations:


Gen. HALLECK then briefly recounts the minor operations of the Army of the Potomac up to the battle of Rappahannock Station, but gives no new facts. The operations in Western Virginia have been mainly of a defensive character, in repelling raids and breaking up guerrilla bands.

The force in the Department of North Carolina during the past year has been too small for any important operations against the enemy, and has acted mostly on the defensive. But HILL's operations against FOSTER in North Carolina, as well as LONGSTREET's against PECK in Virginia, were entirely unsuccessful.

Gen. GILLMORE's operations before Charleston are recited at some length, with this comment:

"Gen. GILLMORE's operations have been characterized by great professional skill and boldness. He has overcome difficulties almost unknown in modern sieges. Indeed, his operations on Morris Island constitute almost a new era in the science of engineering and gunnery. Since the capture of Forts Wagner and Gregg he has enlarged these works, and established powerful batteries which effectually command Fort Sumter, and can render efficient aid to any naval attack upon Charleston. They also control the entrance to the harbor."

In the Department of the Gulf operations have been generally successful. The preliminary movements to the siege of Port Hudson are given at length. On the 8th of July the place unconditionally surrendered. We captured 6,233 prisoners, 51 pieces of artillery, two steamers, 4,400 pounds of cannon-powder, 5,000 small arms, 150,000 rounds of ammunition, &c. Our loss from the 3d to the 30th of May, including the assault of the 27th, as reported, was about 1,000.

Halleck was a writer (both of things military and things internationally legal). His discussion of operations just before the Civil War is found in Henry Wager Halleck, Military Art and Science (http://books.google.com/books?id=NSFEAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA410&lpg=PA410&dq=tactics+Operations+halleck&source=bl&ots=zMMbBCO4QI&sig=1GN_gYd0DwSVTHC_7f7BfmaNqFw&hl=en&ei=a3MGTZmEFYPFnAfJ1e3lDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBcQ6AEwAA), 1860, 449 pages (ca. 10mb download from Google Books), beginning at pdf p.45:

1354

but more in depth at pp.51-58 (of pdf) - looks a lot like Jomini.

That is part of Chapter 2, Strategy, so it seems to this reader that Halleck saw operations as a subset of strategy, involving planning and execution of those plans via campaigns in each theatre of operations - as opposed to the larger application of strategy in the theatre of war.

Regards

Mike

[Steve Blair]

When talking about Halleck and others, we need to be very careful that we're not projecting OUR terms and concepts onto their writings. It's quite possible that Halleck simply called movements in the field "operations" without any sort of conception of a "new area of military terminology" (in fact, given the context of the quotes by both Jmm and Pete I'd say that we're likely projecting). Halleck was heavily influenced by Jomini and Napoleon, but I don't recall either of them espousing a specific operational level of warfare. In fact, I'd argue that given the communication limitations that existed during their time such a distinction would be impractical at best.

[jmm99]

Dennis Hart Mahan (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Hart_Mahan), Advanced-guard, out-post, and detachment service of troops (1847, rev, 1863; 305 pages) (Google Books, 8mb download), from CHAPTER IX, PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY (http://books.google.com/books?id=424DAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA169&lpg=PA169&dq=operations+tactics+%22Dennis+Hart+Mahan%22&source=bl&ots=qk79iZrK-v&sig=CqqF50dFD1zDuw7aCaIEkmtg1HI&hl=en&ei=jIMGTfqpKsTMngfA4-XlDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CCkQ6AEwBQ):


484. Plan of Campaign.—Before undertaking any military operation, great or small, we should first settle down upon some decided end to be gained; determine upon beforehand, as far as practicable, the steps to be taken to attain our object. In one word, we should clearly see what we propose to accomplish, in order that we may not go blindly to work and leave anything to chance. The mental process by which all that is here supposed is elaborated is termed the laying out of the plan of campaign.
Samo as Halleck with more detail (see pages before and after above quoted) - operations, campaigns and planning linked.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

no big deal.

BTW: I'm not contending that Halleck and Mahan were into a "new area of military terminology" - from what I can see (and from Halleck's bibliography in his Strategy chapter - and I positing that everyone who comments on Halleck and Mahan will have at least skimmed through their stategy chapters), they were lifting these concepts from earlier writers.

Regards

Mike

[Steve Blair]

no big deal.

BTW: I'm not contending that Halleck and Mahan were into a "new area of military terminology" - from what I can see (and from Halleck's bibliography in his Strategy chapter - and I positing that everyone who comments on Halleck and Mahan will have at least skimmed through their stategy chapters), they were lifting these concepts from earlier writers.

Regards

Mike

No biggie, Mike. Just pointing out that the term operations back then was used very loosely to describe just about any field activity by troops. I don't know that they had the same conceptions about the term "operational" that we do when we mention the "operational level of war." I would contend that they would use campaign in that sense...but even then it can get convoluted because campaigning was also used at the time to indicate service in the field.

Just going for some historical context is all.

[M.L.]

A couple of key points:

- Simply because someone did not use the term "operations" doesn't mean they didn't think or plan at the operational level. Scouring books for some kind of litmus test involving particular words doesn't prove much. It's more appropriate to examine the history and apply a critical analysis.

- Don't get hung up on the word "operations." The use of that word is not limited to operational warfare. Simply because something is called "Operation XYZ" doesn't mean it is operational planning.

- Perhaps the real question to ask is if there is a particular set of skills required to plan and execute at the operational level? Having worked at the tactical and strategic levels, as well as the operational level, I believe there is. Furthermore, I believe history shows both the existence of and the need for operational war fighting. The vast majority of military historians, commanders, planners, and theorists recognize its existence and importance.

To argue that there is no such thing as operational warfare is a long hill to climb in the face of this overwhelming evidence and agreement.

- As a final note, it is important to understand where the influential thinkers of the 19th century were coming from (Clausewitz, Jomini, et al.). The Napoleonic wars were so fundamentally different from previous wars, due in large part to the French Revolution, that the post-Napoleonic era thinkers were struggling to make sense of what had just happened. They had inklings of what would become operational art, particularly the Germans, but no one really caught on until after WWI. The trench warfare of the western front really exposed the need for operational thinking, particularly as it related to joint warfare.

[M.L.]

End = The Unconditional surrender of Germany
Strategy = includes the physical destruction of the means of production
Ways = aerial bombing, sabotage, etc etc etc.


Ends, Strategy, Ways? ?????

Did you Google Ends, Ways, Means? I don't mean to be a jerk, but if you seriously don't understand Ends, Ways, Means, then it is going to be pretty hard for us to have a conversation.

[Fuchs]

Well, he's right that crippling the economy was no end, but an interim step:
It improved the chances of allied forces in battle which in turn was supposed to force the enemy to surrender (or wipe him out).

[Pete]

Don't get hung up on the word "operations." The use of that word is not limited to operational warfare. Simply because something is called "Operation XYZ" doesn't mean it is operational planning.
The word operations has long been part of the U.S. military vocabulary -- however, the Operational level of warfare did not become part of U.S. Army doctrine until the AirLand Battle version of FM 100-5 circa 1982. It is said to have been inserted between the Tactical and Strategic levels at the behest of Bundeswehr officers who reviewed the draft manual. About that time in the U.S. Army there had been consideration given to the idea of abolishing the Corps-level headquarters, so inferentially the Operational level might have been seen as a justification for continuing to retain the Corps. This is not the only thread we've had on the Operational level of war.

[Pete]

Click here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7644&page=4<br />) for a previous discussion of the Operational level of war. You'll have to scroll down almost to the end to find it.

[jmm99]

John Bigelow, The principles of strategy: illustrated mainly from American campaigns (http://books.google.com/books?printsec=frontcover&dq=bigelow+%22principles+of+strategy%22&sig=NOMe8-3N-s6VVlnEmHHzzRdJHF0&ei=rNgGTbL8CcGB8gaM89TUCg&ct=result&id=Pu0nAAAAYAAJ&ots=gumMShw0Hy&output=text) (1891; 200 pages) (Google Books, 11mb download);

and Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, The operations of war: explained and illustrated (http://books.google.com/books?id=MbTzrcRjUf4C&printsec=frontcover&dq=Hamley+%22Operations+of+War.%22&source=bl&ots=lPx8Rx5qRx&sig=xDqxm6zMnIr0VQqdt1WC4ktsLHk&hl=en&ei=jNwGTdu1EILGlQf7ttmACA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=12&ved=0CEIQ6AEwCw) (1866; 438 pages) (Google Books, 17b download); cited by Wilf in an earlier post.

I haven't downloaded either - projects for tomorrow.

Briefly back to Halleck and Mahan (similar to Jomini), their divisions of:

1. Theatre of war (singular and with an overriding strategy for the war - which can be global or more limited),

2. Theatre(s) of operations - depends on an "army" or "armies", and if "armies" whether they act in concert (thus, one theatre) or not (thus, multi-theatres), and

3. Zone(s) of operations - divisions of the "theatre of operations";

and other terms of art dealing with operations, suggest to this reader that to them (1) operations and campaigns, their planning and execution, were a subset of strategy; and (2) that (1) links the strategy for the war to grand tactics and tactics involved in individual engagements.

In essence, the picture I get is that operations and campaigns are the way to string together the individual combats into a necklace of pearls leading to the ultimate rare pearl (the end goal that culminates the strategy for the war).

Jomini (ch III vs ch IV in his Art of War) clearly distinguishes between Strategy (including operations and campaigns, planning and execution) in ch III and Grand Tactics and Battles (including Tactics) in ch IV. Halleck and Mahan followed Jomini in that regard.

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Ends, Strategy, Ways? ?????

Did you Google Ends, Ways, Means? I don't mean to be a jerk, but if you seriously don't understand Ends, Ways, Means, then it is going to be pretty hard for us to have a conversation.
Fairly obviously a typo, compounded by a paste error.

Ends = A policy =The Unconditional surrender of Germany
Ways = A strategy = that includes the physical destruction of the means of production
Means = Tactics = aerial bombing, sabotage, etc etc etc.

[M.L.]

Fairly obviously a typo, compounded by a paste error.

Ends = A policy =The Unconditional surrender of Germany
Ways = A strategy = that includes the physical destruction of the means of production
Means = Tactics = aerial bombing, sabotage, etc etc etc.

Ok. Really, put Ends, Ways, Means into Google and let me know what you find.
Means ≠ Tactics.

[William F. Owen]

Ok. Really, put Ends, Ways, Means into Google and let me know what you find.
Yes, and 99% is wrong. You can type "strategic Bomber" into Google and similar rubbish will spout out. A bomber cannot be "Strategic" anymore than a Corporal.
Why we have a problem is because Officers seek education in Google and Wikipedia and not by actual rigourous study of the work proven as useful.

Ends Ways and Means IS Policy, Strategy and Tactics, if you are using classical teaching. Means is tactics. Read Clausewitz. He makes it even more plain. Means is "Combat." Thus a strategy has to be executable in tactical forms, as in Combat - not in resources.
Moltke, Foch, Clausewitz and Hamely did not write about Strategy and Resources. They wrote of strategy and tactics.

[slapout9]

Ends Ways and Means IS Policy, Strategy and Tactics,

Pretty good, Policy,Strategy,Tactics is much more descriptive.


In todays world a Strategic Bomber could be a Corporal,thats part of the problem.

[William F. Owen]

Pretty good, Policy,Strategy,Tactics is much more descriptive.


It is. Thank Carl von Clausewitz.

[slapout9]

It is. Thank Carl von Clausewitz.

However I still believe that Staretgy is "What" to attack. What is the Center of Garvity? Tactics is the "How." How can I best attack the Center of Gravity?

[Polarbear1605]

Why we have a problem is because Officers seek education in Google and Wikipedia and not by actual rigourous study of the work proven as useful.

Hear! Hear!

[Tukhachevskii]

[snipped due to length]

Sir, the following observations may be of some use to you and the other members of the SWC in the discussion especially with regards to the issue of interpretation, meaning and intention.

Firstly, from Peter Winch, The Idea of A Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Science-Relation-Philosophy-Routledge-Classics/dp/0415423589/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1292350609&sr=8-1)


But ideas cannot be torn out of their context in that
way; the relation between idea and context is an internal one. The idea gets its sense from the role it plays in the system. It is nonsensical to take several systems of ideas, find an element in each which can be expressed in the same verbal form, and then claim to have discovered an idea which is common to all the systems. This would be like observing that both the Aristotelian and Galilean systems of mechanics use a notion of force, and concluding that they therefore make use of the same notion. (p. 107-8)


And with regards to Clausewitz (which I thought might be pertinent in a more general way to the discussion) the following from Jan Willem Honig ‘Clausewitz’s On War: Problems of Text and Translation’, in Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Clausewitz-Twenty-First-Century-Hew-Strachan/dp/0199232024/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1292350099&sr=1-1), Ed. by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe.



Let us begin with one seemingly innocuous example: the translation of the word ‘Niederwerfung’. Although (as we will see in a moment), they are by no means consistent, Howard and Paret have a pronounced preference for translating this word as ‘defeat’. This is a defensible choice of words, but Niederwerfung, which literally means ‘to throw down’, suggests something altogether more definite and final than ‘defeat’. It suggests putting an enemy in a situation from which no recovery is possible. ‘Defeat’, on the other hand, is more readily understood as a transitory situation, a moment in a process which, overall, is marked by both reversals and successes. One suffers, or inflicts, a defeat. An enemy, however, is only once ‘overthrown’—to use the word by which Niederwerfung is traditionally translated. Niederwerfung became an established technical term in the German military vocabulary of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century. It possessed a specific meaning, which the less decisive ‘defeat’ does not adequately capture: the destruction of the enemy’s means of resistance, that is, his armed forces. This came to be regarded as the central aim in war. Clausewitz already understood the term as such and, indeed, he can be credited with developing the conceptual framework that explained why the enemy’s Niederwerfung played such a singular and critical role in war. The contemporary English and French military literature assimilated the idea and translated the term, respectively, with ‘overthrow’ and renversement. (p. 61)

Clausewitz posits, on the first page of On War, that war is ‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’. This, if it is to be achieved, requires making him, in Howard and Paret’s translation, ‘powerless’. The word Clausewitz uses, however, is more specific. He writes ‘wehrlos’ or defenceless. ‘Power’ suggests something broader and vaguer that may be more in tune with modern perceptions of international relations which stress the importance of power, but I would argue that Clausewitz intends to be more precise. Making the enemy ‘wehrlos’, or ‘disarming’ him, is the natural aim in war, as without means of resistance the enemy has no choice but to do the victor’s will. It therefore constitutes the focus of military operations, or what Clausewitz calls the Ziel, or military aim. Choosing ‘powerless’, because of its broader, more political meaning, might also easily further confuse the rigorous distinction Clausewitz makes throughout the first chapter between the political aim, or Zweck, and the subordinate military Ziel. Howard and Paret’s translation does not reproduce Clausewitz’s rigour: Zweck variously appears as aim, object, purpose, end, goal, and requirements. These translations overlap with those chosen for Ziel. As neither Zweck nor Ziel always appears with their clarifying adjective ‘political’ or ‘military’ (kriegerisch), English readers must work harder to uncover the logic than Clausewitz intended. (p. 62)

Clausewitz is at pains to emphasize the importance and specificity of disarming the enemy and, in this context, also repeatedly clarifies the relationship between disarmament and overthrow. On the opening page of book I, chapter 2, he writes that the aim in war is ‘[I]den Gegner niederzuwerfen, d.h. ihn wehrlos zu machen’—‘to overthrow the enemy, that is, to make him defenceless’. Translating this with ‘to overcome the enemy and disarm him’ (90) does not quite equal the clarity of the original. Other examples of clear and consistent use of the terms abound; in the third section of chapter 3 of book I, he talks about ‘Entwaffnen oder Niederwerfen des Gegners’ (where the ‘oder’, or ‘or’, must be interpreted as indicating an equivalent, not an alternative). Subsequently, in the fourth section, he writes ‘daß die Entwaffnung oder das Niederwerfen des Feindes, wie man es nennen will, immer das Ziel des kriegerischen Aktes sein muß’—‘that the disarmament or the overthrow of the enemy, call it what you will, must always be the aim of the military act’. The opening sentence of book VII, chapter 3 reads: ‘Das Niederwerfen des Feindes ist das Ziel des Krieges, Vernichtung der feindlichen Streitkräfte das Mittel’—‘The overthrow of the enemy is the aim of war, the destruction of the enemy armed forces the means’. And, finally, in the concluding book on the plan of war one reads ‘daß die Niederwerfung des Feindes, folglich die Vernichtung seiner Streitkräfte das Hauptziel des ganzen kriegerischen Aktes sei’—‘that the overthrow of the enemy, consequently the destruction of his armed forces is the main aim of the whole military act’. One further thing is worth noting here: Clausewitz’s choice of the word Akt (which also already appears in his definition of war: ‘War is an act of force etc.’). The use of this word reinforces my earlier point on ‘overthrow’ in that overthrowing an enemy suggests a definite end result. This makes sense as part of an ‘act’, as this not only implies something that possesses a clear beginning, but also a clear finality. In Howard and Paret, where the word Akt is directly translated, it usually appears as ‘action’—which is open to the same objection I raised with respect to the choice of ‘defeat’ instead of ‘overthrow’: it does not possess the same sense of defined singularity, of clear finality, of the German. Despite a clearly consistent, coherent, and very deliberate choice of words, the Howard–Paret translation renders the quoted passages as follows (I have italicized the different translation choices for Niederwerfung): ‘disarm or defeat’ (p. 75); ‘to overcome the enemy, or disarm him—call it what you will— must always be the aim of warfare’ (note also the inversion!) (p. 77); ‘In war, the subjugation of the enemy is the end, and the destruction of his fighting forces the means’ (p. 526); and ‘that the grand objective of all military action is to overthrow the enemy—which means destroying his armed forces’ (p. 577). (p. 62-3)

Absolute war, Clausewitz argues, could only exist in reality if three conditions could be met. First, war must be an isolated act, something that arises ‘urplötzlich’ without any reference to ‘political life’ (Staatsleben).
The ‘ur’ emphasizes the primeval suddenness of the event, which is rather too lamely rendered by ‘suddenly’ in Howard–Paret (78). Second, war should consist of ‘einem einzigen Schlag ohne Dauer’, that is, ‘a single blow of no duration’. This instantaneity, which the logic demands, is not properly reflected in translating this with ‘a single short blow’ (79). Finally, the result of war must be ‘absolute’. ‘Absolute’ is translated with ‘final’ (80), which given the immediate context is defensible, but, within the broader context of the importance Clausewitz attaches to this particular word, is more difficult to accept. Once more, the translation may suggest less logical rigour and precision than the original possesses. (p. 66)

{My emphasis in all the above quotes}

As I see it a great deal of our terminological confusion rests with our inability to determine the quite specific felicity conditions (http://grammar.about.com/od/fh/g/felicityconditionsterm.htm) necessary to determine whether, say, someone’s use of the term “operational” actually means “operational” as in operational art, operational level of war, or operations (activities) in general, i.e., previous usages of operations were often simply a shorthand for “military activities in general” as in “our operations in Europe” which obviously means our “military operations in Europe” or, if spoken by a CEO then “our business activities in Europe”, etc. Indeed, the Soviet concept of deep operations (glubokaia operatsiia) is only vaguely related to, for instance, Dupuy’s and his collaborators’ conception of Operations in FM 100 Operations of the 1980s. Soviet military thinking was based upon materialist dialectics and the revealing of the scientific laws of warfare (something which, ironically, the current SOD enthusiasts are trying to recreate thereby forgetting altogether the art in operational art which takes into account friction, fog and chance and the necessity for coup d’oliel (sp?) ...at least in my reading!

[Fuchs]

Show me an English CvC quote with more than one line and I'll point out the translation mistake(s). It's really that bad.

His grammar was even worse, though. A CvC-German translation seems overdue.

[JMA]

Why we have a problem is because Officers seek education in Google and Wikipedia and not by actual rigourous study of the work proven as useful.

Yes, and then of those you do pick up a book... they want to pick-up one book only.

[M.L.]

Yes, and 99% is wrong. You can type "strategic Bomber" into Google and similar rubbish will spout out. A bomber cannot be "Strategic" anymore than a Corporal.
Why we have a problem is because Officers seek education in Google and Wikipedia and not by actual rigourous study of the work proven as useful.

Ends Ways and Means IS Policy, Strategy and Tactics, if you are using classical teaching. Means is tactics. Read Clausewitz. He makes it even more plain. Means is "Combat." Thus a strategy has to be executable in tactical forms, as in Combat - not in resources.
Moltke, Foch, Clausewitz and Hamely did not write about Strategy and Resources. They wrote of strategy and tactics.

Again, wow. There is so much wrong with the above statement I don't know where to begin.

Lets see....

Strategic Bomber = Enola Gay

Strategic Corporal = Lynndie England

Strategy and operations were not as distinct in the Napoleonic era as they are today. Therefore, much of what we think of as operational war fighting was indeed "strategy" during that time. Modern operational warfare BEGAN to emerge in the Napoleonic era, but began to take its contemporary form in WWI. Given this information, you'll note that your rather restrictive list of sources (Moltke, Foch, Clausewitz and Hamely) all hail from periods of history when operational warfare was in its infancy. Unsurprisingly, you won't learn much about operational warfare this way. That's like reading about the Wright Brothers in an attempt to understand a jet. Perhaps a broader range of reading is in order.

I've read Clausewitz. While Clausewitz is useful, your interpretation is far too literal. Focusing on the exact wording of a book, written nearly 200 years ago in a different language, is inadvisable at best.

I assure you that I didn't attain my education on Wikipedia or Google. However, it seemed to me that you needed a simple way to verify that contemporary military views the ends/ways/means construct as I have explained to you. You seem to have taken the point in admitting that 99% see it my way. You do not agree - fair enough. A standard distribution would tell us that you are either incredibly bright or incredibly dull. I'll leave that judgement to the crowd.

[jmm99]

No doubt about this:


from T
...whether, say, someone’s use of the term “operational” actually means “operational” as in operational art, operational level of war, or operations (activities) in general, i.e., previous usages of operations were often simply a shorthand for “military activities in general” as in “our operations in Europe” which obviously means our “military operations in Europe” or, if spoken by a CEO then “our business activities in Europe”, etc.

which is the same point that Steve Blair made.

I addressed two books (Halleck & Mahan; both in American as originally written ;)) and specifically one chapter in each book - that on strategy, which includes the author's discussion of operations. I also mentioned Jomini Chap III, also on strategy with a comprehensive discussion of operations.

None of them is merely dealing with "operations (activities) in general", but with operational art as a subset of strategy (as I view what I read). I suppose someone else could slog through those several hundred pages and reach a different conclusion on what they say. If so, I'd be interested to read that analysis.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

Strategic Corporal = Lynndie EnglandShe had no strategic or operational impact and very little tactical impact -- unless you consider a failure of leadership and training leading to an unnecessary capture and the resulting dumb publicity stunt that was an embarrassment to the Army to have any real effect or lasting military impact...

As for the Enola Gay, good one. Really.

Coulda used Bockscar also. Though one could wonder about the other 3,968 B-29s and variants built and one probably could omit mention of their service as tactical bombers during the Korean War or their service as air sea rescue aircraft and tankers later in life. :D
A standard distribution would tell us that you are either incredibly bright or incredibly dull. I'll leave that judgement to the crowd.Can't speak for the rest of the crowd but IMO Wilf's more than bright enough. Little arrogant sometimes but then there's a lot of that going around. ;)

[jmm99]

of the Great White Bear's "Hear! Hear!", the combined two phrases "policy strategy tactics" + "ends ways means" (in Advanced Search), returns two hits: This thread; and a link that leads to U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, GUIDE TO NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, VOLUME I: THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGY, 4th Edition, Edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr (June 2010). Pdf links for Vol I (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=1004) and Vol II (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=1005).

The specific cite (where "policy, strategy, tactics" and "ends, ways, means" are discussed and dissected) is to CHAPTER 1, WHY IS STRATEGY DIFFICULT?, by David Jablonsky. This is 10 pages worth reading - with supporting references, starting (but not ending) with CvC:


FROM REVOLUTIONS TO TOTAL WAR

In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, there was a growing recognition of the increased complexity of strategy, summarized in Carl von Clausewitz’s warning that “there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.”[5] At the tactical level, the Prussian philosopher wrote, “the means are fighting forces trained for combat; the end is victory.” For the strategic, however, Clausewitz concluded that military victories were meaningless unless they were the means to obtain a political end, “those objects which lead directly to peace.”[6] Thus, strategy was “the linking together (Verbindung) of separate battle engagements into a single whole, for the final object of the war.”[7] And only the political or policy level could determine that objective. “To bring a war, or any one of its campaigns to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy,” he pointed out. “On that level strategy and policy coalesce.”[8] For Clausewitz, this vertical continuum (see Figure 1) was best exemplified by Frederick the Great, who embodied both policy and strategy and whose Silesian conquests of 1741 lie considered to be the classic example of strategic art by demonstrating “an element of restrained strength, . . . ready to adjust to the smallest shift in the political situation.”[9]

With his deceptively simple description of the vertical continuum of war, Clausewitz set the stage for the equivalent of a Copernican shift in the strategic ends‑ways‑means paradigm. Now that paradigm was more complex, operating on both the military and policy levels with the totality of the ends, ways, and means at the lower levels interconnected with the political application at the policy level of those same strategic elements. This connection was the essence of Clausewitz’s description of war as a continuation of political intercourse (Verkehr) with the addition of other means. He explained that


We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different.... The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace.... War cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.[10]

5. Original emphasis. Carl von Clausewitz, Two Letters on Strategy, Peter Paret and Daniel Moran, ed./trans., Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1984, p. 9.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 142‑143.
7. Michael Howard, Clausewitz, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 16; Clausewitz, On War, pp. 127‑132.

8. Clausewitz, On War, p. 111. “In the highest realms of strategy ... there is little or no difference between strategy, policy and statesmanship.” Ibid., p. 178. Winston Churchill relearned these lessons in World War I. “The distinction between politics and strategy,” he wrote at that time, “diminishes as the point of view is raised. At the Summit, true politics and strategy are one.” Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1915, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1929, p. 6.

9. Clausewitz, On War, p. 179.

10. Ibid., p. 605.

The remainder of Jablonsky's "brief" goes on to discuss levels of war (including operational) and DIME, etc.

Relevant to the present discussion is an SSI monograph, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=939), by Brigadier Justin Kelly, Dr. Michael James Brennan (2009):


Brief Synopsis

The publication of the 1982 version of Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced to the English-speaking world the idea of an operational level of war encompassing the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. It was followed 3 years later by the introduction of the term “operational art” which was, in practice, the skillful management of the operational level of war. This conception of an identifiably separate level of war that defined the jurisdiction of the profession of arms was, for a number of historical and cultural reasons, attractive to U.S. practitioners and plausible to its English-speaking allies. As a result, it and its associated doctrine spread rapidly around the world. The authors argue that as warfare continues to diffuse across definitional and conceptual boundaries and as the close orchestration of all of the instruments of national power becomes even more important, the current conception of campaigns and operations becomes crippling. To cope with these demands by formulating and prosecuting “national campaigns,” the authors propose that the responsibility for campaign design should “actually” return to the political-strategic leadership of nations supported by the entirety of the state bureaucracy. This would mark the return of the campaign to its historical sources. If the United States and its allies fail to make this change, they risk continuing to have a “way of battle” rather than a “way of war.”

Cheers

Mike

[M.L.]

She had no strategic or operational impact and very little tactical impact -- unless you consider a failure of leadership and training leading to an unnecessary capture and the resulting dumb publicity stunt that was an embarrassment to the Army to have any real effect or lasting military impact...

You may be thinking of Jessica Lynch. England was part of the Abu Ghraib fiasco.


Can't speak for the rest of the crowd but IMO Wilf's more than bright enough. Little arrogant sometimes but then there's a lot of that going around. ;)

Fair enough. Like I said, his construct of ends/ways/means is fundamentally and radically different from conventional military thought and theory. He could be a prodigy who is fantastically ahead of his time. Or, he may simply misunderstand the subject. I tend toward the latter explanation, but I've been wrong before...

[M.L.]

of the Great White Bear's "Hear! Hear!", the combined two phrases "policy strategy tactics" + "ends ways means" (in Advanced Search), returns two hits: This thread; and a link that leads to U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, GUIDE TO NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, VOLUME I: THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGY, 4th Edition, Edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr (June 2010). Pdf links for Vol I (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=1004) and Vol II (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=1005).

The specific cite (where "policy, strategy, tactics" and "ends, ways, means" are discussed and dissected) is to CHAPTER 1, WHY IS STRATEGY DIFFICULT?, by David Jablonsky. This is 10 pages worth reading - with supporting references, starting (but not ending) with CvC:



The remainder of Jablonsky's "brief" goes on to discuss levels of war (including operational) and DIME, etc.

Relevant to the present discussion is an SSI monograph, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=939), by Brigadier Justin Kelly, Dr. Michael James Brennan (2009):



Cheers

Mike

Uh-oh. The Kelly/Brennan SSI monograph uses the word Blitzkrieg, which is an imaginary doctrine, on page 91. How could a general officer and a PhD both be talking about imaginary things like blitzkrieg and operational warfare?!

I trust Mr. Owen will set them straight!

[slapout9]

Like I said, his construct of ends/ways/means is fundamentally and radically different from conventional military thought and theory.

It is very radical as it is taught, but it is not so radical when it is viewed through CvC and On War. Not radical at all from that stand point.

[Ken White]

of a drink... :D
You may be thinking of Jessica Lynch. England was part of the Abu Ghraib fiasco.Terrible thing is I should've remembered Lynndie particularly well because my son's platoon was in the exterior security Company from the 82d that was at Abu Gharaib at the time -- he told me in a November Sat Phone call that they had seen and elevated the problems to Bde and thence to Div. Thence they went to Sanchez's puzzle palace and that all hell was about to break loose. Wasn't quite that bad but break loose it did... :wry:

Fascinating since there's little doubt that Sanchez's pressure for intel certainly contributed to if it did not lead to the excesses. Chain of command failure from the top down. They got Karpinski and the Bn Cdr but I'm still waiting for the Courts Martial of the Company Commanders and 1SGs. Rick of course skated...

I hied to Lynch as the IMO more notable impact of the two. However, with England, the leadership and training criticism is also valid and the resulting publicity was also an embarrassment to the Army -- though the 'dumb' in this case was photographing the even more stupid actions of the MPs -- which was in process of coming out without the pictures.

Still, I think my point remains valid -- neither of the young ladies achieved strategic, operational or tactical import or really created any lasting effect.

[M.L.]

It is very radical as it is taught, but it is not so radical when it is viewed through CvC and On War. Not radical at all from that stand point.

CvC is quoted often, and misinterpreted more often. This is a case of both.

Mr. Owen is focusing on the words of On War in a vacuum, rather than a broader view of the ideas within their historical context.

I can quote you CvC that will seemingly justify war crimes, or anything else for that matter. However, an honest interpretation of CvC certainly does not advocate war crimes.

Two things make CvC more valuable as a broad, "big idea" kind of work than as a book of quotable quotes. First, the book was never finished. Second, CvC uses a dialectical method to form his ideas. He may express one idea in one passage, then an opposing idea in the next passage. Simply quoting one passage doesn't really tell us much. We have to read the entire work and synthesize the big ideas.

That is why when someone quotes Clausewitz to me, I know he/she doesn't really get it. Someone who really knows CvC will rarely quote, but will often summarize.

[slapout9]

.

As for the Enola Gay, good one. Really.



Not really, when the Air Forces deactivated the Strategic Air Command and reorganized there units it was because they had finally realized that there is no such thing as a Strategic Bomber or a Tactical bomber for that matter. There are just Bombers with differant ranges and payload capabilites but they are all Bombers. What you have are Missions (that could be considered either Strategic or Tactical) but ANY bomber including a guy with a car packed full of explosives could carry them out.

[M.L.]

Still, I think my point remains valid -- neither of the young ladies achieved strategic, operational or tactical import or really created any lasting effect.

I'd say Abu Ghraib was a huge setback strategically from an information operations standpoint. It completely undermined the US narrative of "liberating" the Iraqi people, as well as further undermining the already underwhelming international support.

It was certainly a rallying cry for insurgent recruitment, both inside Iraq and out.

Would the insurgency have been fundamentally changed had Abu Ghraib not happened? Impossible to say, but I believe that it certainly hurt the US strategically, though perhaps not (as you say) in a lasting way.

I think the larger point is that the levels of warfare are very dynamic. Certain acts by units or even individuals at the tactical level can and do have strategic effects.

[slapout9]

CvC is quoted often, and misinterpreted more often. This is a case of both.

Mr. Owen is focusing on the words of On War in a vacuum, rather than a broader view of the ideas within their historical context.



I agree but so does Colin S Gray in the article by him that I posted. Both simply believe that CvC is the best we have as far as a general theory of War. As to whether they are right or not I don't know as I think CvC is only half right myself. What I do know is that Wilf is not stupid! Stubborn cetainly but he is not dumb.

[M.L.]

Not really, when the Air Forces deactivated the Strategic Air Command and reorganized there units it was because they had finally realized that there is no such thing as a Strategic Bomber or a Tactical bomber for that matter. There are just Bombers with differant ranges and payload capabilites but they are all Bombers. What you have are Missions (that could be considered either Strategic or Tactical) but ANY bomber including a guy with a car packed full of explosives could carry them out.

Let's not confuse things (assets/forces) with effects.

A bomber, in and of itself, is not an inherently strategic asset.

A bomber which drops a nuclear device, well, that tends to have a strategic impact.

The original conception of a strategic bomber was that of an aircraft which was designed to go after targets which would yield strategic effects. For example, the B-1 was designed to penetrate Soviet airspace (integrated air defense threat) and deliver a nuclear payload - a strategic mission if I ever saw one.

So, we can generally associate certain forces with certain effects at every level of war (ends, ways, and means...IF you believe in that voodoo), however, that does not preclude the use of those forces for other missions.

A primarily tactical asset can have a strategic effect. The opposite is true, though common sense says that would be a waste of resources.

[slapout9]

I can quote you CvC that will seemingly justify war crimes, or anything else for that matter. However, an honest interpretation of CvC certainly does not advocate war crimes.



So can I and have often said that CvC would make an excellent Chief of Police. And this is why I think Strategy is so difficult for people to learn and this is my own theory....Strategy is nothing but Criminal Behavior and that is very difficult for a normal person to practice but it is very easy for a criminal personality to practice, which is why they are so difficult to fight or capture. They don't think like the rest of us. Sneaking up behind someone and shooting them is criminal behavior but on the battlefield it is considered good Strategy. That is why Strategy (Evil Behavior) must be well controlled by an Honest Policy level or it will all go crazy. Just my opinion.

[M.L.]

I agree but so does Colin S Gray in the article by him that I posted. Both simply believe that CvC is the best we have as far as a general theory of War. As to whether they are right or not I don't know as I think CvC is only half right myself. What I do know is that Wilf is not stupid! Stubborn cetainly but he is not dumb.

Fair enough. As I said, "Wilf" has some different ideas about things, most of which don't stand up to critical analysis. I don't discount the possibility that he is a genius rather than a loon. Many visionaries were considered mad, only to be venerated later.

Who knows? In 10 years I might be talking about how the latest idea of Means=Tactics was developed long ago on SWJ by a maverick strategist, and how I was there to witness it.

[slapout9]

Let's not confuse things (assets/forces) with effects.

A bomber, in and of itself, is not an inherently strategic asset.

A bomber which drops a nuclear device, well, that tends to have a strategic impact.

The original conception of a strategic bomber was that of an aircraft which was designed to go after targets which would yield strategic effects. For example, the B-1 was designed to penetrate Soviet airspace (integrated air defense threat) and deliver a nuclear payload - a strategic mission if I ever saw one.

So, we can generally associate certain forces with certain effects at every level of war (ends, ways, and means...IF you believe in that voodoo), however, that does not preclude the use of those forces for other missions.

A primarily tactical asset can have a strategic effect. The opposite is true, though common sense says that would be a waste of resources.

My statement was not my opinion that was and is the official Air Force position on their reorganization of forces. My opinion is you can "dedicate" a certain number of forces of any type to a Strategic Mission and say that they are Strategic Bombers ,but it has nothing to do with a type of Plane. What if a SF type infiltrated into the designated Strategic target with a suitcase Nuke is he not a Strategic bomber? Especially if his sole mission was to prepare for and train for nothing but that. I believe it is the dedication of certain assets to certain missions that makes them or doesn't make them Strategic.

[slapout9]

Two things make CvC more valuable as a broad, "big idea" kind of work than as a book of quotable quotes. First, the book was never finished. Second, CvC uses a dialectical method to form his ideas. He may express one idea in one passage, then an opposing idea in the next passage. Simply quoting one passage doesn't really tell us much. We have to read the entire work and synthesize the big ideas.



Absolutley, that is why I say On War should be retitled "Thoughts on War" because he never finished editing the book(s) he appears to have conversations (Thoughts on War) with himself to sort out his final theory which we may never know.

[Ken White]

Fair enough. Like I said, his construct of ends/ways/means is fundamentally and radically different from conventional military thought and theory. He could be a prodigy who is fantastically ahead of his time. Or, he may simply misunderstand the subject. I tend toward the latter explanation, but I've been wrong before...Haven't we all. Likely will be again. :D

He understands it, he just doesn't agree that it's a valid premise and he is not alone in that. There are others about. We adopted it at the request of NATO -- not just the Bundeswehr and Pete is correct, saving the Corps was an issue at the time. I was still active at the time and blithering away with TRADOC -- a fate worse than death...
...How could a general officer and a PhD both be talking about imaginary things like blitzkrieg and operational warfare?!I dunno -- how could a general officer and a Phd do this [url=http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=939](LINK)[/url? As an aside, I've seen a number of really dumb things said and done by many General Officers and PhDs. Neither of those august credentials confers infallibility, not by a long shot -- and taking either as hewers of stone as in the gospel tablets is seriously dangerous.
I'd say Abu Ghraib was a huge setback strategically from an information operations standpoint. It completely undermined the US narrative of "liberating" the Iraqi people, as well as further undermining the already underwhelming international support.We can disagree on all that. IO has its place but is woefully misused and misunderstood -- sort of like the operational art -- it was an IO ding without question but little more.

The bulk of the Iraqi people never believed we were there to liberate them. Many still do not -- and many more only now are really wondering what the heck we were doing. We were never going to have much international support in that. Abu Gharaib merely gave people an excuse to voice as cover for what they were going to do -- or really, not do -- anyway.
It was certainly a rallying cry for insurgent recruitment, both inside Iraq and out.Mmm. Perhaps. In any event, the net impact of that added recruitment had little overall impact and likely did not prolong things as much as did general US Army ineptitude in the prosecution of the entire effort. In fairness to that Army and the people who went, they were asked to do something that previous leadership had not trained them for and they did a good job of turning it around. Abu Gharaib will likley not rise much above footnote status in the Official History.
Would the insurgency have been fundamentally changed had Abu Ghraib not happened? Impossible to say, but I believe that it certainly hurt the US strategically, though perhaps not (as you say) in a lasting way.I suppose it depends on one's definition of strategic harm. IMO, harm has to be lasting and affect the course of a campaign if not of a war to be 'strategic'-- otherwise, they are generally operational impacts that may or may not cause some strategic rethinks. Abu Gharaib did not rise to the level of inducing such a rethink. No strategic modification was undertaken -- or needed.
I think the larger point is that the levels of warfare are very dynamic. Certain acts by units or even individuals at the tactical level can and do have strategic effects.I agree with that -- but also suggest that such impacts are extremely rare and almost never rise to the level of strategic impact unless by accident or other mischance. I'll try to think of an example, there must be one but I'm drawing a blank right now...:wry:

[slapout9]

Means=Tactics was developed long ago on SWJ by a maverick strategist, and how I was there to witness it.

Means=weapons and troops to me.

[William F. Owen]

Strategic Bomber = Enola Gay
One long range bomber that performed an entirely tactical action

Strategic Corporal = Lynndie England
A woman who did something criminal, and tactical to the extent that it has policy implications (actually it probably didn't.)

Tactics bear on the policy, and may modify it, as they set forth the strategy. None of that makes bombers or corporals strategic.


Strategy and operations were not as distinct in the Napoleonic era as they are today. Therefore, much of what we think of as operational war fighting was indeed "strategy" during that time.
I think that impression may be the source of your confusion.


Given this information, you'll note that your rather restrictive list of sources (Moltke, Foch, Clausewitz and Hamely) all hail from periods of history when operational warfare was in its infancy.
Yes, a short list. Not many people know their stuff, and the late 18th century creates the corps military ideas for most of the 20th. Indeed most of it is still relevant today


Unsurprisingly, you won't learn much about operational warfare this way.
Sorry, but I am pretty well read in Triandiffilov, Tuckachevsky, and Svechcin, the most of the "fathers" of deep battle, operational art and all the other Soviet Era work that has been greatly over blown, as a result of being not well understood. If you want to start a thread on Triandifillov, and the 1929 FSR, then be my guest.


I've read Clausewitz. While Clausewitz is useful, your interpretation is far too literal. Focusing on the exact wording of a book, written nearly 200 years ago in a different language, is inadvisable at best.
So Google is right and Clausewitz is wrong..... :wry:

[William F. Owen]

Means=weapons and troops to me.
Almost. It's the USE of weapons and troops. Combat, thus fighting, thus tactics.

[William F. Owen]

A bomber which drops a nuclear device, well, that tends to have a strategic impact.
Not true. It depend what it drops the bomb on and why. The delivery will always be tactical, and it is by no means certain that the result with the deliver the policy, thus be "strategic."

CvC is quoted often, and misinterpreted more often. This is a case of both.
OK, explain how. Tell me why Clausewitz is wrong about means. I argue Clausewitz, with some pretty big dogs in the Clausewitz world, so I'm very much up for examining this is in some detail, if as you say, "I don't get Clausewitz."

[William F. Owen]

Uh-oh. The Kelly/Brennan SSI monograph uses the word Blitzkrieg, which is an imaginary doctrine, on page 91. How could a general officer and a PhD both be talking about imaginary things like blitzkrieg and operational warfare?!

I trust Mr. Owen will set them straight!
I know Justin. We talk... quite a lot! I strongly agree with some of what he writes and not so much with other stuff.
As he isn't here, I'll leave it at that.

[Fuchs]

There are strategic bombers because that's what they're called. They are not necessarily "stategic", but they are "strategic bombers" necause that#s what they're called.

A chair is a chair because it's being called a chair.

[Tukhachevskii]

Almost. It's the USE of weapons and troops. Combat, thus fighting, thus tactics.

Now I'm confused. I was always taught that...

Ends = Policy

Means = Resources avaliable to acheive ends

Ways = Strategy or how resources can be applied/and shape the ways to acheive the ends (Strategy encompasses operations and tactics given that strategy determines them all).

[William F. Owen]

Now I'm confused. I was always taught that...

Ends = Policy

Means = Resources avaliable to acheive ends

Ways = Strategy or how resources can be applied/and shape the ways to acheive the ends (Strategy encompasses operations and tactics given that strategy determines them all).

Glad I had this opportunity to correct you. Means are instrumental. Mere possession has no effect. It is employment. The US had far more resources than North Vietnam, yet they lost. Same in Mogadishu.

[William F. Owen]

There are strategic bombers because that's what they're called. They are not necessarily "stategic", but they are "strategic bombers" necause that#s what they're called.

A chair is a chair because it's being called a chair.

That's not really the point. "Strategic bombers" are usually just "Long Range Bombers." Given that, which do think is the more accurate, thus more helpful name?

[Fuchs]

We're not discussing how to christen the category of hardware, but what's its designation. They're being called "strategic bombers" and this makes them "strategic bombers". Things are what we call them.


Sure, long-range bomber would be more descriptive for most examples, but then again long range wasn't relevant for many examples. The Russians traded fuel for bombs and flew mostly short-range missions with their Pe-8, for example.

"Heavy bomber" suits most best, for their relatively large size is the most outstanding shared characteristic. It might still mislead because the payloads of many such bombers were often rather light, though.

[Bob's World]

They are called strategic bombers because they were intended to be employed to product strategic effects. The same is true for SOF.

All actions are tactical in nature; from pushing the big red button in a missile silo somewhere, to pulling the trigger on one's rifle as one eases the sights slightly in front of that running enemy. It is the nature of the intended effects that determines if something is "tactical" or "strategic."

If one is employing a "strategic bomber" or submarine, or whatever for tactical purposes, then it is a tactical platform at that point. Nothing is inherently one or the other, it depends on the mission.

[M.L.]

Now I'm confused. I was always taught that...

Ends = Policy

Means = Resources avaliable to acheive ends

Ways = Strategy or how resources can be applied/and shape the ways to acheive the ends (Strategy encompasses operations and tactics given that strategy determines them all).

You're on the right track. Mr. Owen will disagree with you, but even he will admit that 99% of the broader military community embraces this meaning of ends, ways, and means.

[M.L.]

My statement was not my opinion that was and is the official Air Force position on their reorganization of forces. My opinion is you can "dedicate" a certain number of forces of any type to a Strategic Mission and say that they are Strategic Bombers ,but it has nothing to do with a type of Plane. What if a SF type infiltrated into the designated Strategic target with a suitcase Nuke is he not a Strategic bomber? Especially if his sole mission was to prepare for and train for nothing but that. I believe it is the dedication of certain assets to certain missions that makes them or doesn't make them Strategic.

I agree with you for the most part. A B-1 was designed for strategic effects, but has and is doing tactical missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

One item of food for thought might be a low-density asset, such as the B-2. With only 20 in the inventory, destruction of one or more might give an potential enemy a decisive strategic advantage. So, that is an example of an asset that by its fundamental nature is strategic.

[M.L.]

They are called strategic bombers because they were intended to be employed to product strategic effects. The same is true for SOF.

All actions are tactical in nature; from pushing the big red button in a missile silo somewhere, to pulling the trigger on one's rifle as one eases the sights slightly in front of that running enemy. It is the nature of the intended effects that determines if something is "tactical" or "strategic."

If one is employing a "strategic bomber" or submarine, or whatever for tactical purposes, then it is a tactical platform at that point. Nothing is inherently one or the other, it depends on the mission.

Well said. I'd just tack on the above about low-density, strategically important assets.

[Entropy]

The distinction between "tactical" and "strategic" regarding specific airframes isn't relevant anymore, if it ever was to begin with.

[slapout9]

The distinction between "tactical" and "strategic" regarding specific airframes isn't relevant anymore, if it ever was to begin with.

Yes,that is doctrinally correct. The Strategic and Tactical Air Commands no longer exist! They were combined into the Air Combat Command and they can do both types of Missions depending on the situation.

[M.L.]

Not true. It depend what it drops the bomb on and why. The delivery will always be tactical, and it is by no means certain that the result with the deliver the policy, thus be "strategic."

OK, explain how. Tell me why Clausewitz is wrong about means. I argue Clausewitz, with some pretty big dogs in the Clausewitz world, so I'm very much up for examining this is in some detail, if as you say, "I don't get Clausewitz."

Very well.

You quote Clausewitz as stating that means is "Combat."

He also says the following (from the Paret translation)

"Creation and maintenance [of fighting forces] are obviously only means; their use constitutes the ends."

"The original means of strategy is victory"

"Individual engagements with particular aims are to be classified as means"

"A set of secondary objectives may serve as means to the ultimate goal"

"Surprise, therefore, becomes the means to gain superiority..."

"The simultaneous use of all means intended for a given action appears as an elementary law of war."

So, you can quote Clausewitz to me all you like. A broader synthesis of his ideas, which does not rely on the exact wording of whatever translation you are reading, is a more convincing argument than "Clausewitz said XYZ."

[slapout9]

You're on the right track. Mr. Owen will disagree with you, but even he will admit that 99% of the broader military community embraces this meaning of ends, ways, and means.

Well now let me piss everybody off. I say this.

1-Ends=Strategy because it decides what Objectives (Centers of Gravity to attack).

2-Ways=Tactics or how many ways can you organize your means to attack the COG's.

3-Means=the available weapons and troops to do it with.

[William F. Owen]

Very well.

You quote Clausewitz as stating that means is "Combat."


Here's the explanation. Paret translation, book one, chapter two, page 95. Tell me what it says! This where Clausewitz defines "means" in terms of Ends, Ways and Means, not just uses the word "means."


You're on the right track. Mr. Owen will disagree with you, but even he will admit that 99% of the broader military community embraces this meaning of ends, ways, and means.
No he's not. You are misleading him. This explains why most people do not understand strategy, and that would be 99% of the broader military community.

If you think that means is "resources" then you will never be able to explain the fundamental relationship between tactics and strategy.
based on that, the side with the most resources wins. Strategy is a not a bridge between politics and equipment.

[William F. Owen]

1-Ends=Strategy because it decides what Objectives (Centers of Gravity to attack).

2-Ways=Tactics or how many ways can you organize your means to attack the COG's.

3-Means=the available weapons and troops to do it with.

Ya Allah!! No!
Ends is the Policy. It is the "end state" you seek. (destination)
Ways is how this will be sought. (journey, route,)
Means is the application of the ways. (walking, swimming, riding)

Strategy links Policy with Tactics. This is why tactics must support the Policy, and the strategy can only be effective in tactics.

[slapout9]

If you think that means is "resources" then you will never be able to explain the fundamental relationship between tactics and strategy.
based on that, the side with the most resources wins. Strategy is a not a bridge between politics and equipment.

That is solid gold IMO. That is why Guerrilla forces are willing to take the risk of spitting in Superman's face. They know how to organize their fighters into Kryptonite.

[slapout9]

Ya Allah!! No!
Ends is the Policy. It is the "end state" you seek. (destination)
Ways is how this will be sought. (journey, route,)
Means is the application of the ways. (walking, swimming, riding)

Strategy links Policy with Tactics. This is why tactics must support the Policy, and the strategy can only be effective in tactics.

In a perfect world I would agree, but this is America we don't do Policy, we don't plan stuff because that is Commonism(I spelled it right) and we don't do Commonism. We do the Invisible Hand Thing, so I think the best we can do is pick the right target and let that be the End.

[Fuchs]

They are called strategic bombers because they were intended to be employed to product strategic effects. The same is true for SOF.

Funnily, the procurement of B-17 bombers was initially officially justified with the need to defend the U.S. against hostile navies...

--------------

@Wilf:
Tell me the book & chapter for the way, means, ends stuff in "Vom Kriege" and I'll look up the German original.
He most likely choose one of two German words for "means" - they are both more specific in their meaning than "means".

[Ken White]

You're on the right track. Mr. Owen will disagree with you, but even he will admit that 99% of the broader military community embraces this meaning of ends, ways, and means.and I'll also agree with Wilf that a large percentage -- not 99 but a bunch -- of the broader military community is out to lunch on a lot of things.

That is primarily due to the fact that they have other, more important to them, interests. Thus they only focus peripherally and as deemed necessary (or only when forced for too many...) on things militaire. Ponder that. :wry:

Describing 'means' as resources is totally inadequate. Methods would be far better word in that overly simplistic definition of strategy...

I can get a twofer out of this, you quoted Bob's World:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
They are called strategic bombers because they were intended to be employed to product strategic effects. The same is true for SOF.:While I agree with Bob on many things, I have to point out that while certainly part the stated intent of SF and lesser SOF was to be able to provide strategic effects, the actuality is that only quite rarely will they actually do or have done that.

They and the bombers are yet another case of the continuum that is warfare and are more proof the direct application of a 'strategic tool' to tactical applications is far more common than is the reverse, a tactical item or effort having a strategic effect.

As Fuchs illustrates, things nominally designed for a specific role -- quite often hewing to the 'strategic' in the political justification -- are most often used as tactical methodology and requirements of the moment happen to dictate. Flexibility is super critical...

As an aside, one of my recurring arguments with Bob's World is that the US does not do Grand Strategy, the political milieu won't stand for it. Regardless, the Pols do however like to be seen as 'strategic thinkers'... ;)

[Bob's World]

Ken,


We do hate to constrain ourselves, and certainly a Grand Strategy does that, as well as guide our policies and actions.

One of my favorite insights on this topic is from a discussion shared by David Eisenhower that he had with is father, Ike.

What Ike said, was in essence, that the most important aspect of Containment was not the containment of others, but the containing effects it had on ourselves.

I would submit that since the fall of Soviet Union the US has been feeling a whole lot less "contained," with our global behavior becoming increasingly outrageous over the past 20 years. OEF-P from its very beginning was contained by strict rules that protected the sovereignty of that country. Most of the good of that campaign comes as a result of actions shaped to fit within those tight parameters. OIF and OEF-A began without such constraints, allowing us to act in ways that have done us as much harm as good.

But yeah, Grand Strategy is often more concept than reality. Too inconvenient. Too difficult to formulate or adhere to.

[jmm99]

a cheap lawyer's trick (and we certainly don't want to be that ;)).

Actually, the 2009 SSI monograph uses "blitzkrieg" 10 times - of which this on p.34 (p.42 pdf) seems material to the present conversation:


The Germans in the interwar years did not, as far as can be determined, recognize the term “operational art.” The independence that commanders enjoyed under freie operationen to sequence tactical actions in pursuit of higher-level objectives meant that the role that we currently ascribe to operational art existed in the broad fabric of the German understanding of war and consequently in their preparation of leaders and training of staffs. World War II German operational art was therefore seen in praxis rather than in doctrine.

Advanced combined arms tactics applied by aggressive leaders sometimes exercising considerable personal initiative to create and develop deep penetrations, followed by wide envelopments to encircle, isolate, and destroy large enemy groupings, was the German way of war. It was shared by the German military in a sufficiently broad sense apparently that it did not warrant comprehensive theoretical examination. The contribution of German theorists following World War I was therefore not in operational art, but in the development of an approach to combined arms tactics that was startlingly effective and which closely fitted the requirements of the German way of war.

The employment of these combined arms tactics to execute annihilating cauldron battles came to be known in the Anglophone world as “Blitzkrieg.” The execution of Blitzkrieg in attacks on France and Russia, in turn, demonstrated both its power and its limitations.

Regards

Mike