The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread) [Archive] - Page 4

Fuchs

12-15-2010, 08:16 PM

Here's the explanation. Paret translation, book one, chapter two, page 95. Tell me what it says! This where Clausewitz defines "means" in terms of Ends, Ways and Means, not just uses the word "means."

from Book 1, chapter 2 (http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/?id=5&xid=324&kapitel=4&cHash=36a606ef9b2#gb_found):
(I blame all cruel grammar and confusion on CvC's original text, as usual!)

"Es ist auch keineswegs schwer, in der Betrachtung die eine Tätigkeit von der anderen zu trennen, wenn man die bewaffnete und ausgerüstete Streitkraft als gegebene Mittel betrachtet, von denen man, um sie zweckmäßig zu gebrauchen, nichts zu kennen braucht als ihre Hauptresultate.

Die Kriegskunst im eigentlichen Sinn wird also die Kunst sein, sich der gegebenen Mittel im Kampf zu bedienen, und wir können sie nicht besser als mit dem Namen Kriegführung bezeichnen."

It is not at all difficult to separate an activity from another one in the consideration, if you consider an armed and equipped force as the given means, about which, to employ them purposefully, you don't need to know more than their main results.

"Welchen allgemeinen Namen man ihnen geben will, lassen wir dahingestellt sein, aber man sieht, daß Artillerie, Befestigungskunst, sogenannte Elementartaktik, die ganze Organisation und Administration der Streitkräfte und alle ähnlichen Dinge dahin gehören. Die Theorie des Krieges selbst aber beschäftigt sich mit dem Gebrauch dieser ausgebildeten Mittel für den Zweck des Krieges. Sie bedarf von den ersteren nur die Resultate: nämlich die Kenntnis der von ihr übernommenen Mittel nach ihren Haupteigenschaften."

[Artillery, fortress art, so-called elementary tactics, the whole organisation and administration of forces and all similar things]. The theory of war itself is concerned with the use of these accomplished means for the purpose of the war. It requires of the former only the results: the knowledge of the adopted means and their main characteristics.

"Ob nun gleich dies Prinzip sich auf einen guten Grund stützt, auf die Wahrheit, daß das Gefecht das einzige wirksame Mittel im Kriege ist: ..."

[...] this principle rest on one good foundation, on the truth, that the engagement is the only effective means in war: ...

"Die Theorie hat also die Natur der Mittel und Zwecke zu betrachten.

In der Taktik sind die Mittel die ausgebildeten Streitkräfte, welche den Kampf führen sollen. Der Zweck ist der Sieg."

The theory has thus to consider the nature of the means and the purposes.
In tactics are the means the accomplished forces, which do the fighting. The purpose is the victory.

"Die Strategie hat ursprünglich nur den Sieg, d. h. den taktischen Erfolg, als Mittel und, in letzter Instanz, die Gegenstände, welche unmittelbar zum Frieden führen sollen, als Zweck."

The strategy has originally only the victory, i.e. the tactical success, as means and as last resort, the subjects/objects/things, which shall lead immediately to peace, as purpose.

"Die Eroberung einer Stellung ist ein solcher auf das Terrain angewendeter Gefechtserfolg. Aber nicht bloß die einzelnen Gefechte mit besonderen Zwecken sind als Mittel zu betrachten, sondern auch jede höhere Einheit, welche sich in der Kombination der Gefechte durch die Richtung auf einen gemeinschaftlichen Zweck bilden möchte, ist als ein Mittel zu betrachten."

The capture of a position is such a engagement success applied to terrain. Yet not merely the individual engagements with special purposes are to be considered as means, but also every higher unit, which in the combination of engagements might form by the direction at a common purpose, is to be considered as means.

The answer is "It depends."
Tactical view: means = material things
Strategic view: means = tactical successes

Pete

12-15-2010, 09:18 PM

When talking about Halleck and others, we need to be very careful that we're not projecting OUR terms and concepts onto their writings. It's quite possible that Halleck simply called movements in the field "operations" without any sort of conception of a "new area of military terminology" (in fact, given the context of the quotes by both Jmm and Pete I'd say that we're likely projecting). Halleck was heavily influenced by Jomini and Napoleon, but I don't recall either of them espousing a specific operational level of warfare.
We could debate the intentions of what Clausewitz, Halleck, and various military leaders really meant to say in their writings from now until doomsday. As far as I know the U.S. Army did not define distinct levels of war, tactical and strategic, until the first version of FM 100-5 published shortly before Pearl Harbor (though I admit it may have come somewhat later). As official U.S. Army doctrine the operational level of war dates from 1982.

Right up through the Vietnam conflict the title page of FM 100-5 had the subtitle of Field Service Regulations to show that the new field manual format was replacing (and/or was the equivalent of) the old U.S. Army Bible that had gotten us through the Indian Wars but had proven to be inadequate in 1917-18. In a similar way the Infantry Drill Regulations stopped being a way to fight after WW I and turned into FM 22-5, purely for ceremonial purposes, and the how-to-fight doctrine began appearing in the new FM format.

Ken White

12-15-2010, 10:54 PM

Balancing a strategy with available resources is the essence of strategic thought.Mulberry harbors did not exist in January 1943 when the Allies agreed to invade western Europe, yet, by June 1944, they were available.

Contrary to your statement, a good strategy may call for 'resources' that need to be finessed, developed or obtained. Constraints imposed by 'available resources' doomed US strategy in both Korea and Viet Nam -- and the jury's still out on the latest two. ;)

As the Actress said to the Bishop, "it's not what you have, it's how you make up your shortfalls."

Fuchs

12-16-2010, 12:26 AM

Actually, the Mulberry Harbour hardware wasn't created out of thin air by a genie either. Many resources were invested, IIRC including pre-war ships.

Ken White

12-16-2010, 01:22 AM

for the Mulberries and the Caissons. Many Companies all over the UK were involved. Of course there was no Genie, there never is. It was an idea that followed the Dieppe debacle and no one is totally sure whose idea it was but the fact remains -- a strategy produced a need for an unheard of, unknown resource, a rather massive resource and that resource was conceived, designed and and prepared in a little over a year. The fact that it made use of other, existing resources is immaterial.

The point was and is that strategy should be conceived without regard to resources. Strategy is often matched to resources available. A far more preferable idea is to make resources match the strategy. Not always possible but should always be the first choice...

William F. Owen

12-16-2010, 06:51 AM

William F. Owen

12-16-2010, 08:16 AM

The answer is "It depends."
Tactical view: means = material things
Strategic view: means = tactical successes

I think existing Clausewitz scholarship using the Paret translation leaves no real ambiguity as to what Clausewitz meant. This is why I strongly recommend that folks read Gray or HR Smith before they dive into Clausewitz.

As an aside, the Oxford Concise first definition of "Means" is "that by which a result is brought about."

William F. Owen

12-16-2010, 08:32 AM

I'm sure Mr. Owen will still tell you blitzkrieg is imaginary.

Not imaginary. It's use just just delineates the informed student from the uninformed, once they are aware of the argument.

I've used the word "Blitzkrieg." Having spent nearly two years reading most of the inter-war FSRs, and the German scholarship on the matter, I no longer do. If I did, I would look like an idiot to those informed on the subject.

I used to say (and sadly believe in ) "Manoeuvre Warfare," and use terms like "Recon Pull." Having studied the subject, and done the work, I no longer do. If I did, I would appear foolish. Thus when I now read a work that talks about "manoeuvre warfare," as a distinct and contrasting form of operations, it tells me the man doing the writing has not examined his subject rigourously.

Tukhachevskii

12-16-2010, 09:48 AM

Glad I had this opportunity to correct you. Means are instrumental. Mere possession has no effect. It is employment. The US had far more resources than North Vietnam, yet they lost. Same in Mogadishu.

Sir, sorry for being a dunce but I really don't get what you're getting at with the above.

Firstly,

Means are instrumental. Mere possession has no effect
I agree wholeheartedly. This is a question of means/resources.

But,

It is employment[WAYs]. The US had far more resources [MEANS] that North Vietnam, yet they lost.
I know they did and that was a problem with both the ENDS (policy) that that sought and the WAYs (Strategy) they employed to achieve those ends...obviously if both the Ends and the Ways are in dissonance then the the MEANS (one's resources) will be merely wasted. One's MEANS merely determine whats feasable not how they can be used (i.e., Juene Ecole VS Battleships, Pre vs Post Anaconda in OEF, etc.) Sorry if I'm barking up the wrong tree:o

Fuchs

12-16-2010, 11:16 AM

I think existing Clausewitz scholarship using the Paret translation leaves no real ambiguity as to what Clausewitz meant. This is why I strongly recommend that folks read Gray or HR Smith before they dive into Clausewitz.

As an aside, the Oxford Concise first definition of "Means" is "that by which a result is brought about."

Clausewitz didn't write "means". He wrote "Mittel".
There are multiple meanings for "Mittel"; average, tools, method

I recommend to read Clausewitz - not a translation, for I haven't seen a good one so far.

M.L.

12-16-2010, 12:36 PM

Mulberry harbors did not exist in January 1943 when the Allies agreed to invade western Europe, yet, by June 1944, they were available.

Contrary to your statement, a good strategy may call for 'resources' that need to be finessed, developed or obtained. Constraints imposed by 'available resources' doomed US strategy in both Korea and Viet Nam -- and the jury's still out on the latest two. ;)

As the Actress said to the Bishop, "it's not what you have, it's how you make up your shortfalls."

I think you may have mistaken my statement to mean "available assets" vs available resources.

One crucial piece of strategy is force development - deciding the types and numbers of assets based on the capabilities you think you will want in the future.

Still, the development of new technologies is limited by the money, R&D people, etc... to develop them.

In the case of Mulberry harbors, someone at some point decided they needed that resource (means) based on a desired method (ways) of achieving a tactical, operational, or strategic goal (ends).

M.L.

12-16-2010, 12:42 PM

Gents, this is getting somewhat pedantic. Let me clarify.

a.) Is Strategy the link between Policy and Tactics? YES/NO
b.) Is that commonly/usefully expressed as "Ends Ways and Means." YES/NO

Colin S. Gray (and many others) calls Policy, Strategy and Tactics, "The Strategy Triad."

Essentially the counter argument (ML) says, as Means is Logistics/Resources, Ends Ways and Means is not an expression of the triad. It's something different. Strategy is Policy, Strategy, and Logistics.

I didn't make this up. I was taught it. It is the main stream view amongst those who know what strategy actually is. It's in the books. IF you think something different, then write an article on any length you requires, arguing that statement A is not connected to Statement B, and I'll get it published in Infinity Journal, (http://www.infinityjournal.com/) and we can see who wants to rebut the argument, in addition to myself!

Seems it has already happened:

"Professor Eliot Cohen has provided a thoughtful outline for strategy. He starts with the requirement to make assumptions about the environment and the problem. Once the strategist has stated his assumptions, then he can consider the ends (goals), ways (the how) and means (resources) triangle." (Emphasis added)

- COL (Ret.) TX Hammes, USMC, "Assumptions – A Fatal Oversight"
Article 1, Issue 1 of Infinity Journal
http://www.infinityjournal.com/article/1/Assumptions__A_Fatal_Oversight

Dayuhan

12-16-2010, 12:50 PM

I would submit that since the fall of Soviet Union the US has been feeling a whole lot less "contained," with our global behavior becoming increasingly outrageous over the past 20 years.

I'd submit the opposite: without the overriding, if often irrational, justification of the commie menace our behaviour has become a great deal less outrageous and a great deal more restrained than it was in the Cold War. Are we still staging coups and propping up tinpot dictators around the world, as we did in the 70s and 80s? Not to nearly the same extent as we once did. Our meddling and intervention in Latin America and East Asia has dropped off to practically nil, with all manner of positive results for those regions. Even in Africa... we're still around, modestly, but we're not holding the skirts of the Mobutus and Selassies and Does of the place, as we once did. What have we now to match the outrageousness of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, of US support for Marcos and Somoza, Duvalier and Noriega, and so many others in so many places? The founding fathers might lie uneasily in their graves these days, but they'd have been spinning like dervishes in the early 80s.

We've had our moments, we always do, but the only one I could really call "outrageous", and certainly outrageously unnecessary, was Iraq. Gulf I was a fairly modest response to a direct externally initiated threat to critical US interests. Afghanistan... well, we went beyond the realm of reason when we decided to try and govern the place, but there was certainly ample justification for going there: it's not like we'd shown any interest before 9/11.

Empirically, in terms of quantity, duration, and intensity of direct and indirect intervention, how would you support the idea that we've become more outrageous since the end of the Cold War?

OEF-P from its very beginning was contained by strict rules that protected the sovereignty of that country. Most of the good of that campaign comes as a result of actions shaped to fit within those tight parameters. OIF and OEF-A began without such constraints, allowing us to act in ways that have done us as much harm as good.

Apples and oranges, really. Regime change is completely unlike support of an allied government threatened (however questionably) by insurgents (however loosely defined, and you have to get very loose indeed to call the Abu Sayyaf "insurgents"). Regime change is of course fundamentally incompatible with respect for the other country's sovereignty.

Tukhachevskii

12-16-2010, 12:58 PM

Sirs, as I see it (and admittedly my eyesight may be poorer than most) what we have is a twofold problem. Firstly, that of designation and secondly of advocacy.

First, many of us have different understandings of the meaning of key words and their referents. Lacking a common terminology (with agreed definitions) we are deploying flaccid designators (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rigid_designator). Not until we can get them rigid can we begin to argue on a level playing field. Perhaps we need some linguistic Viagra!
Secondly, many of us are actually advocating a specific interpretation or view rather than clarifying what our terms mean. I for one don’t believe that there is a universal standard, an unchanging universal Platonic form, to which we can hold up our interpretations as either true or false. Unlike Kripke, then, I don’t believe that our descriptions are adequate to an existing state of affairs (i.e., the correspondence theory of truth (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/)) given that war and warfare are human endeavours (thus socially constructed) and not natural kinds (like rocks or atoms with definable properties). Which merely means that we and up arguing for or against our views (a la Kuhn and Feyerabend). It’s not really a question of what we’re talking about but how we do so and it’s not a question of how things are but how they should be. Many of us are deploying terms in their conventional usage (i.e., as commonly understood (problematic in itself I know, this is not to say the conventional view is “right” of course). Some of us are innovating ideologists using a strategy of paradiastolic redescription (http://www.idehist.uu.se/distans/ilmh/Ren/mach-skin-redescript.htm) (using words in newer/different senses). Some are advocating a view point in the guise of clarifying existing terms. Truth, as Nietzsche said, is a “sum of human relations”. So until we can all agree to what words like “Strategy”, “Operations” and “Tactics” mean we’ll talk past each other only to advocate (not prove) our own viewpoints as valid. That, unfortunately will no doubt result in an infinite regress.

Personally, the manner in which I was taught how to comprehend the relationship between ends, means and ways is similar to that explained by Dr. J. D. Kem, Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade (http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll11&CISOPTR=1080&CISOBOX=1&REC=1#metajump) who’s comments, though used as a campaign planning heuristic, are nonetheless still applicable generally (IMO). However, this does not mean I agree with (or advocate!) many of his other explanations (for instance, re: COG).

Even though we speak of ends, ways, and means, realistically we actually think of the process in terms of ends, means, and ways. The ends (or end state) drive the purpose of the campaign. The means determine how that can be accomplished and have to be considered before you can realistically determine the ways. Put another way, to be able to accomplish certain ways of approaching the campaign requires you to have resources; the resources, or means, determine just how ambitious or constrained you will be in determining the ways to accomplish the mission. [...]

Before a friendly analysis of ends, ways, and means, the enemy must be thoroughly examined in the same manner. The key to determining the means available to the enemy is found in the intelligence estimate in a paragraph called the “enumeration of enemy capabilities.” This list should be a comprehensive list of all of the resources and capabilities available to the enemy. Do not let your intelligence staff officers cheat on this step; it is critical that you assess all the means that are available to the enemy. In a stability operation or insurgency, this is even more important. Not only does the enemy have military forces, but he also will likely use paramilitary forces and insurgents, engage in information operations, and leverage the instability of refugee camps. Today no one wants to take on the United States in a conventional “fair fight” on the battlefield, so our enemies are looking for means to attack us and still get the ends they want. Their means are only limited by their imagination. Many of our enemies will use means that we have not thought of before and would not use even if we had thought of them. Think of those means when considering the means available to the enemy because you may see them in the campaign. Use creative thinking to analyze what the enemy has available to him.

For friendly means, one key document as a starting point is the task organization that indicates allocated and apportioned forces. It is important to have a good feel for all the assets that are available to the campaign planner and when they will be available (force flow). Other critical means that can be brought to bear in the campaign are assets that do not belong to the commander but are conducting activities in theatre that help accomplish objectives. It is critical to be aware of all the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and other governmental agencies (OGAs) in theatre—as well as the media and commercial contractors—and to understand what they can and cannot do. If there is a potential refugee problem in theatre, you can be sure that you would prefer to have the NGOs and others help you keep that under control, even if you have to lend a hand once in a while.

During the initial phases of OIF, a lot of non‐infantry units found out that they could be used for patrols; a lot of non‐MP units found out that they could be used for law enforcement. Do not let “rice bowl” issues keep you from being creative in how to use the assets that are made available in theatre. Units can be given nonstandard missions, and planners must be creative in how they apply assets to each problem. Another important consideration when determining the means available is to think beyond the initial stages of the campaign. For example, engineer assets are critical in both offensive and defensive operations in support of manoeuvre units, but they may have a different focus and “customer” for stability operations. Rotary and fixed‐wing lift will be important for offensive and defensive operations and perhaps even more important for stability operations. You cannot have enough MPs in a stability operation; be prepared to give that mission to other units when the time comes.

Once you have determined the end or end state and you have a comprehensive understanding of the resources and means that are available to you, you can determine the ways—the methods you will use to develop your COA. [see attached JPEG] (pp.20-22)

And this from British Army Field Manual Vol. 1, Part 10 Counter-Insurgency ( http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_army_manual.pdf), which, again, though referring to COIN can be generalised with regards to its implications,

. Ends, Ways and Means. A commander will wish to determine how he can achieve his mission (the ways), what situation needs to be created (the Ends) and what resources are needed to do so (the Means). As in any military situation, commanders planning a counterinsurgency will often find that they are constrained as the paucity of Means required to achieve the Ends impinge of their freedom of action. Commanders should achieve a balance between the Ends, Ways and Means and compromises have to be made (often in time) as illustrated in Figure 7-3 [see attached JPEG]. When tackling Ends, Ways and Means the following should be considered:

• Ends. In order to achieve the Ends it is most likely that the military will be required to provide a secure environment in which other host nation’s government and other civilian organisations can work.

• Ways. The Ways will be the full range of those activities that support the development of the lines of operation required to achieve the Ends. Even though security should be the line of operation that the military focus upon, there will be circumstances where the situation is too dangerous for civilian organisations to operate and the military will have to fill the void through MACE. If the military forces are to lead across the other lines of operation, the prioritisation and planning should involve the host nation’s government and other civilian organisations where possible.

• Means. A commander should not limit his ambition to acquiring the Means required to achieve the Ends. It is likely that he will have to reorganise existing structures, obtain new equipment through Urgent Operational Requirements and use his initiative to fill those gaps that exist. More than any other type of campaign, counterinsurgency lends itself to creative methods of producing the Means. The role of host nation security forces cannot be underestimated. (p. 7-6)

M.L.

12-16-2010, 01:04 PM

Clausewitz didn't write "means". He wrote "Mittel".
There are multiple meanings for "Mittel"; average, tools, method

I recommend to read Clausewitz - not a translation, for I haven't seen a good one so far.

This is a very valuable insight. The context of the Paret translation (sorry, I'm inhibited by my poor command of German) always suggested to me that Clausewitz uses the term to mean both resources (tools) and methods.

Thanks for confirming my suspicions.

M.L.

12-16-2010, 01:11 PM

Essentially the counter argument (ML) says, as Means is Logistics/Resources,

By the way, I clearly stated in a previous post that Logistics and Resources were NOT the same thing. I'm all for civil debate, but if you'd like to quote me, I'd prefer you actually read my posts, then get it right.

Thanks.

Means=Resources (Logistics is not the same thing)

slapout9

12-16-2010, 01:21 PM

What we are talking about is why I believe Strategy should be changed from Ends,Ways,Means to the Police view of Motive, Method, and Opportunity. People cause crimes and they cause wars whenever you get away from the primary Motivation of the war you are on the road to loosing. CvC wrote alot about motivation of the enemy and it is the true COG IMO. And any Strategy has to start with that IMO.

Fuchs

12-16-2010, 01:36 PM

I'd submit the opposite: without the overriding, if often irrational, justification of the commie menace our behaviour has become a great deal less outrageous and a great deal more restrained than it was in the Cold War. Are we still staging coups and propping up tinpot dictators around the world, as we did in the 70s and 80s? Not to nearly the same extent as we once did.

Did you miss OIF, subsidies to Musharraf's Pakistan and the support to Ethiopia for invading Somalia???

Bob's World

12-16-2010, 02:11 PM

Did you miss OIF, subsidies to Musharraf's Pakistan and the support to Ethiopia for invading Somalia???

Fuchs, to find a better list of our "tinpot dictators" Google foreign fighters and the states that they come from to find the ones with Muslim connections.

For those of other persuasions one would need different search criteria. Correlating targets of US foreign aid and the Freedom House rankings of nations in regards to freedom is a good start. Obviously our Muslim friends show up here as well.

Friendly dictators used to be a great tool, but in the current and emerging globalized environment it really carries more baggage than goodness. Unfortunately, we are still deeply entwined in that business as we have yet to recalibrate to what effective post-cold war policy should look like.

Ken White

12-16-2010, 03:01 PM

I think you may have mistaken my statement to mean "available assets" vs available resources.Resources IMO are used to provide assets. If a specific asset or item is required, you must have the resources or wherewithal to procure or produce the desired item.
One crucial piece of strategy is force development - deciding the types and numbers of assets based on the capabilities you think you will want in the future.No question, thus my comment on the Mulberries. They were not envisioned prior to late 1942, were available in mid 1944 so had the strategy been constrained by available technology in 1943, Normandy might not have occurred. In the event, resources -- to include production capability -- were available to procure what was determined necessary and the rest is history.

What will be required in the future is always going to be problematic, thus my comment that maximum flexibility is necessary. The strategist must constantly refine and innovate. Unfortunately, that seems to be the case for the US only when we are forced into an existential war. :(
Still, the development of new technologies is limited by the money, R&D people, etc... to develop them.This is the crux of our disagreement. While those factors certainly impact, such development is actually far more dependent on the ideas of the strategists.
In the case of Mulberry harbors, someone at some point decided they needed that resource (means) based on a desired method (ways) of achieving a tactical, operational, or strategic goal (ends).They decided on A way and proceeded to implement it. They could well have come up with other less resource intensive ways had they desired or been forced to do so... ;)

The basic point is a strategy should not fetter small minds -- nor fall prey to them. :D

Backwards Observer

12-16-2010, 05:31 PM

Paret translation, book one, chapter two, page 95.

So much then for the ends to be pursued in war; let us now turn to the means.

There is only one: combat. However many forms combat takes, how ever far it may be removed from the brute discharge of hatred and enmity of a physical encounter, however many forces may intrude which themselves are not part of fighting, it is inherent in the very concept of war that everything that occurs must originally derive from combat.

The emphasis here is on means as an action. To understand means as including or even subsisting solely of resources suggests a strategy that may be skewed from the performance of the engagement to the accumulation and management of materiel. The effectiveness of such a strategy may or may not be suitable, but it does seem to be a reinterpretation of the Prussian's intent. The disagreement here has a vaguely theological tone. Just a layman's impression.

M.L.

12-16-2010, 05:53 PM

Resources IMO are used to provide assets. If a specific asset or item is required, you must have the resources or wherewithal to procure or produce the desired item.No question, thus my comment on the Mulberries. They were not envisioned prior to late 1942, were available in mid 1944 so had the strategy been constrained by available technology in 1943, Normandy might not have occurred. In the event, resources -- to include production capability -- were available to procure what was determined necessary and the rest is history.

What will be required in the future is always going to be problematic, thus my comment that maximum flexibility is necessary. The strategist must constantly refine and innovate. Unfortunately, that seems to be the case for the US only when we are forced into an existential war. :(This is the crux of our disagreement. While those factors certainly impact, such development is actually far more dependent on the ideas of the strategists.They decided on A way and proceeded to implement it. They could well have come up with other less resource intensive ways had they desired or been forced to do so... ;)

The basic point is a strategy should not fetter small minds -- nor fall prey to them. :D

Actually, I don't really disagree with you other than to say that resources are always limited in some form or fashion, therefore, a balancing act must take place.

I do not suggest that we ought to inhibit strategy based on currently available assets. Nor do I suggest that expanding resources and innovation (creating new means) should not be part of a strategy.

What I am suggesting is that ends are not the end-all be-all of strategy. They must be balanced by ways and means.

One of the most often overlooked resources (means) is time. Time is always constrained. Thus, the strategist (even given "infinite" funds), must decide on the allocation of those funds in time. A good example of this is the decision of the Japanese government during WWII to cease work on a nuclear weapon, which was based on an assessment of the time it would take to bring the project to fruition measured against their perception of the time to accomplish strategic objectives. Obviously, the Allies came to a different conclusion.

Another example (at the operational level) is sea port and airhead capacity. Though we may have enough forces to accomplish a certain objective, we must balance that with the limited means of inflowing those forces to the theater of operation (in a force projection scenario). Thus, we must examine the intended strategic end state in time, then determine the best way ahead given limited means.

Every situation is different. Which means are constrained and how much are different. Never the less, strategy must always balance ends with the means that are reasonably available and/or attainable.

M.L.

12-16-2010, 05:58 PM

The emphasis here is on means as an action. To understand means as including or even subsisting solely of resources suggests a strategy that may be skewed from the performance of the engagement to the accumulation and management of materiel. The effectiveness of such a strategy may or may not be suitable, but it does seem to be a reinterpretation of the Prussian's intent. The disagreement here has a vaguely theological tone. Just a layman's impression.

I would simply say that Clausewitz used the term "means" to indicate both resources and methods. The modern "Ends, Ways, Means" construct delineates those two into means (resources) and ways (methods).

The contemporary construct is consistent with Clausewitz's idea, just not his terminology. To my mind, it adds more clarity.

As far as "a strategy that may be skewed from the performance of the engagement to the accumulation and management of materiel.", I'm advocating nothing of the kind. You'll often see the word "balance" in my posts, which I believe is the essential skill for the strategist.

Backwards Observer

12-16-2010, 06:09 PM

You'll often see the word "balance" in my posts, which I believe is the essential skill for the strategist.

Agreed.

In a war of ideas, how would you categorise "the idea"?

Bob's World

12-16-2010, 06:23 PM

Agreed.

In a war of ideas, how would you categorise "the idea"?

"war of ideas" is a misnomer.

Was the "idea" of Nazisim the problem in WWII?
Was the "idea" of Communism the problem in the Cold War?
Is the "idea" of Islamism the problem today?

When Ends between two parties come into conflict and both have the will, ways and means to promote/protect their ends from that competitor one is likely to end up in violent competition.

The "idea" is typically a tool employed to build "will" among the populace. Critical, but not the bad guy we make it out to be.

Even today Islamism as an idea is not the threat. Dig deeper, get past the rhetoric, look to what political issues are really at stake. Sometimes one doesn't like what the find when they do that, as it causes them to question their "rightness" in the matter.

Smedley Butler had such a moment after his long career of distinguished service. Others as well. Its a dirty business, this competition between nations, and one doesn't scramble to top without getting a little muddy.

Backwards Observer

12-16-2010, 06:52 PM

"war of ideas" is a misnomer.

Was the "idea" of Nazisim the problem in WWII?
Was the "idea" of Communism the problem in the Cold War?
Is the "idea" of Islamism the problem today?

When Ends between two parties come into conflict and both have the will, ways and means to promote/protect their ends from that competitor one is likely to end up in violent competition.

The "idea" is typically a tool employed to build "will" among the populace. Critical, but not the bad guy we make it out to be.

Even today Islamism as an idea is not the threat. Dig deeper, get past the rhetoric, look to what political issues are really at stake. Sometimes one doesn't like what the find when they do that, as it causes them to question their "rightness" in the matter.

Smedley Butler had such a moment after his long career of distinguished service. Others as well. Its a dirty business, this competition between nations, and one doesn't scramble to top without getting a little muddy.

Makes sense. I thought about writing "war of ideas", but I didn't want it to be taken the wrong way. Well, I'm glad I asked first, because if you'd asked me that I would've had to go take a nap. Prosit!

slapout9

12-16-2010, 07:42 PM

CvC on proper Strategic Analysis: highlights are my own. Ends,Ways and Means are only half a Strategy, it completely overlooks the Human element of the motive for War. It is the Human element that always beats America...you would think we would have learned that by now.

"If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance,which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors,viz. The total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter-though not exclusively-of figures,and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gaged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it."

M.L.

12-17-2010, 12:01 AM

Agreed.

In a war of ideas, how would you categorise "the idea"?

I'd go back to Clausewitz's definition of war - essentially an act of violence to compel an enemy to do our will. Therefore, a "war" which consists solely of opposing ideas isn't really a "war."

M.L.

12-17-2010, 12:12 AM

Dayuhan

12-17-2010, 12:38 AM

Did you miss OIF, subsidies to Musharraf's Pakistan and the support to Ethiopia for invading Somalia???

I didn't miss OIF, just referred to it as "Iraq", which I thought sufficiently obvious. I didn't claim that US intervention had ceased, only that it has been scaled back from its Cold War peak.

Fuchs, to find a better list of our "tinpot dictators" Google foreign fighters and the states that they come from to find the ones with Muslim connections.

Actually foreign fighter sources don't correlate very well with dictators installed or sustained by the US. Libya and Syria provide large numbers of foreign fighters, and they have some of the tinniest tinpot dictators around, but those dictators were not installed by the US and are not sustained or supported by the US. The Saudi Government was not installed by the US, receives no US aid, and is in no way dependent on the US.

There's a world of difference between dealing with pre-existing independent autocracies, as we do in China, Uzbekistan, Saudia Arabia, the Gulf States, and many other places, and directly interfering in local political processes to install and preserve autocrats who answer to us and serve our interests, which was our favored MO during the Cold War.

If you're going to maintain that US interference in the domestic affairs of other countries has increased since the Cold War, that really needs to be supported by some evidence, since it's anything but clear. In much of the world, in fact, the trend seems to be quite the opposite.

Friendly dictators used to be a great tool, but in the current and emerging globalized environment it really carries more baggage than goodness.

Very true, but just because there are dictators, friendly or otherwise, doesn't mean they are our tools or our responsibilities. During the Cold War we got used to assuming that any dictator who was nominally on our side was our creation and our tool (even though in fact we often ended up being their tools), and that perception has carried over. It's often not valid. We do ourselves no favors by trying to impose a Cold War paradigm where it doesn't fit, or by squeezing ground truth into a model rather than adjusting the model to deal with varying ground truths.

M.L.

12-17-2010, 01:51 AM

Not imaginary. It's use just just delineates the informed student from the uninformed, once they are aware of the argument.

My mistake.

There was simply no such thing as "blitzkrieg tactics".

I was under the impression that when one uses the words "no such thing as" that it was equivalent with "imaginary."

As an example,

"There is simply no such thing as Santa Clause."
"Santa Clause is imaginary."

Well, Santa Clause is REAL! And so is blitzkrieg!

Merry Christmas!

Backwards Observer

12-17-2010, 03:25 AM

Therefore, a "war" which consists solely of opposing ideas isn't really a "war."

That's a relief. Thanks for the reply. Frohe Weihnachten.

Infanteer

12-17-2010, 06:30 AM

Well, Santa Clause is REAL!

WHAT!?! :eek:

So are his presents the means, or is it the delivery of said presents that constitutes the means?

Tukhachevskii

12-17-2010, 10:02 AM

"war of ideas" is a misnomer.

Was the "idea" of Nazisim the problem in WWII?
Was the "idea" of Communism the problem in the Cold War?
Is the "idea" of Islamism the problem today?

.

I don't quite agree with the above. Are you talking about "ideas" per se or "ideology"? Ideologies are very important. The "idea" that they are and that there are purely material causes to conflict ignores how one comes to understand/comprehend those causes in the first place. Ultimately, Ideas (relatively free floating concepts) or ideologies (codified systems of thought/dogma) are fundamental to understanding intentions. We don't interpret the world outside of ideology or thought systems or culture. A stream may be a flowing source of fresh water to one group of people (and thuse a natural resource to be exploited) and a living avatar of the mountain god to another. Acknowledgement of it in the former sense doesn't really help us in tackling the problem that one tribe seems to have inadvertendly decalred war on another by taking water/eseence from the stream. Two different sets of peoples may exist in the same material environment but because of their cultural predispositions or their ruling ideology (they may well be alternatives) we intepret and therefore act upon their situation differently. American's have a view of the world which though they find perfectly normal (and thus non-ideological) and the rest of us don't (we have our own normalised/ideological views of the world and vice versa; free-world anyone? Different stata of society and in/out groups will also have their ideologies as will ruling classes/elites, etc. The world simply isn't value-nuetral or non-ideological in anything other than the brute physical sense of "this is something solid in my hand" one associated with physics or natural science.

The fact that we have a global Islmist insrugency is because
Firstly) it defines all Muslims as Muslims and as a Supra-state entity (the Ummah), thereby helping to internationalise local conflicts (which may well be nothing to do with Islam) much like Catholicism did in the early modern period,
Secondly) it provides an insturmental and explanatory framework/narrative within which to situate their identites ("British" muslims can empathises with Muslims in suffering in Palestine) and,
Thirdly), it is the basis for that interpretation in the first place.

It's easy for us in our ideologically relativist countries ("the west" if you like, though itself an ideological construct) to think that we don't think ideologically (when we do). Part of the problme resides in our rationalist propensity to divide life into distinct realms when in actual fact fact it's all inter-related. Ideas are not separable from actions, motives or historical events (a la Collingwood (http://plato.standford.edu/entries/collingwood/#ReaCau))

Dayuhan

12-17-2010, 10:16 AM

The fact that we have a global Islmist insrugency is because...

When did this become "fact"?

I'm not sure it's possible to have a "global insurgency" without stretching the definition of insurgency beyond the breaking point, nor am I convinced that there is a "global" conflict of any sort currently in progress.

M.L.

12-17-2010, 11:39 AM

WHAT!?! :eek:

So are his presents the means, or is it the delivery of said presents that constitutes the means?

I would say this:

Ends: Nice Children rewarded / naughty children punished
Ways: Deliver gifts to nice children/coal to naughty children via night air assaults
Means: Sleigh/reindeer, elf army, north pole strategic force projection base.

Bob's World

12-17-2010, 03:50 PM

I don't quite agree with the above. Are you talking about "ideas" per se or "ideology"? Ideologies are very important. The "idea" that they are and that there are purely material causes to conflict ignores how one comes to understand/comprehend those causes in the first place. Ultimately, Ideas (relatively free floating concepts) or ideologies (codified systems of thought/dogma) are fundamental to understanding intentions. We don't interpret the world outside of ideology or thought systems or culture. A stream may be a flowing source of fresh water to one group of people (and thuse a natural resource to be exploited) and a living avatar of the mountain god to another. Acknowledgement of it in the former sense doesn't really help us in tackling the problem that one tribe seems to have inadvertendly decalred war on another by taking water/essence from the stream. Two different sets of peoples may exist in the same material environment but because of their cultural predispositions or their ruling ideology (they may well be alternatives) we interpret and therefore act upon their situation differently. American's have a view of the world which though they find perfectly normal (and thus non-ideological) and the rest of us don't (we have our own normalized/ideological views of the world and vice versa; free-world anyone? Different stata of society and in/out groups will also have their ideologies as will ruling classes/elites, etc. The world simply isn't value-nuetral or non-ideological in anything other than the brute physical sense of "this is something solid in my hand" one associated with physics or natural science.

The fact that we have a global Islmist insurgency is because
Firstly) it defines all Muslims as Muslims and as a Supra-state entity (the Ummah), thereby helping to internationalise local conflicts (which may well be nothing to do with Islam) much like Catholicism did in the early modern period,
Secondly) it provides an insturmental and explanatory framework/narrative within which to situate their identites ("British" Muslims can empathizes with Muslims in suffering in Palestine) and,
Thirdly), it is the basis for that interpretation in the first place.

It's easy for us in our ideologically relativist countries ("the west" if you like, though itself an ideological construct) to think that we don't think ideologically (when we do). Part of the problem resides in our rationalist propensity to divide life into distinct realms when in actual fact fact it's all inter-related. Ideas are not separable from actions, motives or historical events (a la Collingwood (http://plato.standford.edu/entries/collingwood/#ReaCau))

No, I'm simply saying that ideology is not the overarching bogeyman it is made out to be.

Catholics in N. Ireland did/do not resist English occupation because Irish tend to be Catholic and English tend to be Protestant; but it makes a handy label that diverts attention away from the political nature of the conflict for the state.

"ideology" of communism was used to help move forward the "idea" of liberty from European colonialism in many countries. It wasn't communism that caused the problem, it was the presence of illegitimate foreign/foreign created governance.

We see much the same today with Islamism. It is a handy devise for a certain family of populaces with similar political issues to take on where legal means of challenging those political issues are limited at best.

Its nice to be able to blame one's problems on others. Addicts of all sort do this with a skill of rationalization that blinds them to how they are lying to themselves and everyone around them. They become delusional, and it is only when they have that "face down in the gutter, come to Jesus" moment of how F'd up they are that true healing can begin. This is why one of the first steps of the 12-step program is the admission of responsibility for the problem.

Every government faced with insurgency should begin with a 12-step program; in fact, a session at all of these large summit meetings should be held in the basement of a church or community center, with world leaders sitting humbly in a circle on hard plastic chairs as they take turns recounting their problems and struggles to overcome them.

Tukhachevskii

12-17-2010, 05:36 PM

No, I'm simply saying that ideology is not the overarching bogeyman it is made out to be.

Catholics in N. Ireland did/do not resist English occupation because Irish tend to be Catholic and English tend to be Protestant; but it makes a handy label that diverts attention away from the political nature of the conflict for the state.

"ideology" of communism was used to help move forward the "idea" of liberty from European colonialism in many countries. It wasn't communism that caused the problem, it was the presence of illegitimate foreign/foreign created governance.

We see much the same today with Islamism. It is a handy devise for a certain family of populaces with similar political issues to take on where legal means of challenging those political issues are limited at best.

Its nice to be able to blame one's problems on others. Addicts of all sort do this with a skill of rationalization that blinds them to how they are lying to themselves and everyone around them. They become delusional, and it is only when they have that "face down in the gutter, come to Jesus" moment of how F'd up they are that true healing can begin. This is why one of the first steps of the 12-step program is the admission of responsibility for the problem.

Every government faced with insurgency should begin with a 12-step program; in fact, a session at all of these large summit meetings should be held in the basement of a church or community center, with world leaders sitting humbly in a circle on hard plastic chairs as they take turns recounting their problems and struggles to overcome them.

OK. I see where you're comming from. I think the kind of instrumental ideology you are talking about is often refered to by Marxists as false conscousness or nystification. What I'm trying to get at is something deeper and more constitutive. When Stalin was approached by the Allies to reinstate the Collective Security pact he shrugged it off and went for the Nazi's instead (who were ideologically predisposed toward hating the Bolsheviks more than the "Western" Allies). How do we explain that through pure materialism? According to one kind of non-ideological/idea centric conception (structural realism) Stalin's "real" interests should have been to join the Allies and balance against Nazism. He didn't. So Ideas, or what he was thinking (his biases if you will) are imortant factors as is the background knowledge to which they refered. Stalin's reasoning was that the capitalist powers (of which Fascist/Nazi germany was the most aggressive) wanted the Soviet Union (their natural enemy) to be dragged into a war with nazism (the highest stage of capitalism) to weaken the USSR. Stalin thought, why the hell do I want to do that. Better to let the advanced capitalist state (Germany) fight the lesser capitalist states and let them exhaust each other to the death or one will win (germany) which will then be so weakened that it too will be unable to stop the eventual triumph of communism. Either way we (the USSR) stay out of it until a more propitious time so, yeah, lets make our bed with Hitler, its better for us. (This is not the famous ICEBREAKER thesis by the way, that;'s a purely military hypothesis that sought to argue wether the USSR was preparing to invade Germany...they were but only after what they assumed would be a war of exhuastion between the Nazis and the "Allies". (See Albert Weeks's Stalin's Other War (www.amazon.com/Stalins-Other-War-Strategy-1939-1941/dp/0742521923) or read the review here (www.fpp.co.uk/online/03/04/Stalin_plans.html));

To conclude that ideology was readily disposable, meaningless, or otherwise irrelevant to Soviet policy making, especially as concerned the global arena and long-standing Leninist revolutionary goals, is unrealistic, unhistorical and inaaplicable. For the Soviet regime, its ideological underpinnings were fundamental. It is no exageration to say, one must think, that, to use the Soviet expression, ideology served as the Soviet regime's "lodestar". (p. 2 from the book)

Now, assuming Stalin (or Muslims) would actually get into a church you assume that we all share the same understanding/interpreation of "reality" (which isn't neutral) and that we can all be set free from our mind forged manacles to see reality as it really is (only we can't because reality depends upon one's point of view/culture/ideology [in the non-instrumentalist socially constructive sense]). Berger and Luckmann have a pretty good go at expalining that kind of stuff here (www.amazon.co.uk/Social-Construction-Reality-Sociology-Knowledge/dp/0140135480)

M.L.

12-18-2010, 03:43 AM

Interesting passage from Brassey's encyclopedia of land forces and warfare By Franklin D. Margiotta:

"[Carl von Clausewitz] introduces the term campaign on the strategic level because he needs a military operation between "engagement" and "war" since the distance in time, space, and force is too great between the two.

One can justifiably argue that Clausewitz sometimes reached the conclusion that there should be a third military level between strategy and tactics, but he did not define a new one expressly below strategy."

As I have said before, the operational level of warfare was born, though not matured, in the Napoleonic period. Clausewitz, writing On War as more or less an "After Action Review" of the Napoleonic period, recognized this nascent concept. However, it wasn't until WWI, when the need to coordinate vast armies, as well as synchronize combined arms tactics, did the operational level truly come into its own.

slapout9

12-18-2010, 04:43 AM

One can justifiably argue that Clausewitz sometimes reached the conclusion that there should be a third military level between strategy and tactics, but he did not define a new one expressly below strategy."

CvC said somewhere(can't remember which book) that the connection between Strategy and Tactics is Marching! Remember Strategy is choosing the right point,the right time,and the right force. You march to the right point, at the right time, with the right force in order to engage the enemy with Tactics.

William F. Owen

12-18-2010, 07:14 AM

CvC said somewhere(can't remember which book) that the connection between Strategy and Tactics is Marching! Remember Strategy is choosing the right point,the right time,and the right force. You march to the right point, at the right time, with the right force in order to engage the enemy with Tactics.
I cannot remember that he did say that, but that is largely correct. A campaign/operation merely ensures that tactics take place in the time and place relevant to the strategy.

"[Carl von Clausewitz] introduces the term campaign on the strategic level because he needs a military operation between "engagement" and "war" since the distance in time, space, and force is too great between the two.
This is not correct. Campaign does not sit between Strategy and tactics.

However, it wasn't until WWI, when the need to coordinate vast armies, as well as synchronize combined arms tactics, did the operational level truly come into its own.
Not true. The British had no concept even close to "the operational level," and they did the majority of the effective fighting in 1918. Indeed they never even talked about "operational level" until they copied the US in the 1980s.

Why does anyone want to put a level between Strategy and Tactics? Why complicate something with a falsehood?

The Operational Level is a sophistry invented by men unable to comprehend the basics. The conduct of Operations, does not make for an "Operational level" because all levels of command conduct operations!

jmm99

12-18-2010, 10:24 AM

this question:

from Wilf
Why does anyone want to put a level between Strategy and Tactics?

from THE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE GUIDE TO NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES VOLUME I: THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGY. 4th Edition, J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., Editor, July 2010 (p.13; p.21 pdf):

CHAPTER 2
A SURVEY OF THE THEORY OF STRATEGY
J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.

A common language is both the product of and basis of any effective theory; people conversant in the theory habitually use words in the same way to mean the same thing. Such meanings may be unique to the theoretical context even if the word has other non-theoretical usages. Thus, the word "passion" used in a Christian context has an entirely different meaning than in secular usage. Similarly, doctrinal military terms, while hopefully used consistently by military individuals and organizations, may differ slightly (or even radically) in common usage. Strategy is such a word. Defining it is not as easy as one would think, and the definition is critical.

Part of the problem is that our understanding of strategy has changed over the years. The word has a military heritage, and classic theory considered it a purely wartime military activity—how generals employed their forces to win wars. In the classic usage, strategy was military maneuvers to get to a battlefield, and tactics took over once the forces were engaged. That purely military concept has given way to a more inclusive interpretation. The result is at least threefold: 1) Strategists generally insist that their art includes not only the traditional military element of power but also other elements of power like politics and economics. Most would also accept a peacetime as well as a wartime role for strategy. 2) With increased inclusiveness the word strategy became available outside the military context and is now used in a variety of disciplines ranging from business to medicine and even sports. 3) As the concept mutated, the military had to invent another term—the U.S. settled on operations or operational art—to describe the high-level military art that had once been strategy.[1]

1. See Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” Survival, Vol. 47, No. 3, Autumn, 2005, pp. 33-54.

Both CvC and Jomini (both used "operations" as a key element of their strategic teaching) are rejected as being too military only and theater-specific (pp.13-14 of above text):

Clausewitz wrote,

“Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it: he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual engagements.”[2]

Because this is a classic definition, it is not satisfactory—it deals only with the military element and is at the operational level rather than the strategic. What Clausewitz described is really the development of a theater or campaign strategy. Historian Jay Luvaas used to say that because Clausewitz said something did not necessarily make it true, but did make it worth considering. In this case we can consider and then ignore Clausewitz.

The Nineteenth Century Swiss soldier and theorist Antoine Henri Jomini had his own definition.

Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of war. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradiction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops.[3]

This again is military only and theater-specific.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds./trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 177.

3. Antoine Henri Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill, trans., 1862, reprint, The West Point Military Library Series, Thomas E. Griess and Jay Luvass, eds., Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971, p. 62.

So, the reasion why the "operational level" was introduced was not because the changers were "unable to comprehend the basics". They knew exactly what both CvC and Jomini said - it's quoted above by Bartholomees. The reasons are the two he sets out above and which I requote:

1) Strategists generally insist that their art includes not only the traditional military element of power but also other elements of power like politics and economics. Most would also accept a peacetime as well as a wartime role for strategy. 2) With increased inclusiveness the word strategy became available outside the military context and is now used in a variety of disciplines ranging from business to medicine and even sports.

And an interesting thought from David Betz (at this KoW post, The State of Strategy (http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/05/the-state-of-strategy/)) re: the result of this switcheroo:

David Betz 25 May 2010 at 08:26
Not just you, no; I was struck by a similar thought. If you look at Thomas’s list of old Europe strategists they’re all military up to Engels and Lenin. With the Americans it’s military up to Wohlstetter. ‘Applied strategy’. After that it’s much more civilian and abstract. Strachan talks about this in his series of articles in Survival about strategy starting with ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’. The bottom-line seems to be that during century 20 for a number of reasons (but most significantly because of nukes) strategy came to be something ‘practiced’ in the main by civilian academics; the military meanwhile became more or less completely focussed on their ‘operational art’–moving brigades around on a map. So who does ‘strategy’ now? The military? Well, not so much. The politicians? One suspects not. Which leads to the unsettling suspicion that the answer is no one. Which kind of makes sense when you look at the state we’re in.....

The best answer that I've seen (so far) as to why there is an "operational level of war".

Cheers

Mike

PS: So far, 1891 Bigelow, The Principles of Strategy (previously linked to Google Books) is an interesting read - lots of Jominian-CvC "operations" viewed with US military vignettes.

slapout9

12-18-2010, 12:18 PM

From Book 2-Chapter 1, the J.J.Grahm edition copied from The Clausewitz Homepage. Bold section is added.

"Marches are quite identical with the use of the troops. March in the combat, generally called evolution, is certainly not properly the use of weapons; but it is so completely and necessarily combined with it, that it forms an integral part of that which we call a combat. But the march outside the combat is nothing but the execution of a strategic measure. By the strategic plan is settled, When, where, and with what forces a battle is to be delivered?—and to carry that into execution the march is the only means"

From Book 3-Chapter 8,same source as above. Strategy as a Triple determination.

"Strategy fixes the point where, the time when, and the numerical force with which the battle is to be fought. By this triple determination it has therefore a very essential influence on the issue of the combat."

William F. Owen

12-18-2010, 12:44 PM

1) Strategists generally insist that their art includes not only the traditional military element of power but also other elements of power like politics and economics. Most would also accept a peacetime as well as a wartime role for strategy.
2) With increased inclusiveness the word strategy became available outside the military context and is now used in a variety of disciplines ranging from business to medicine and even sports.

Sorry, this is garbage. Strategy has always included all instruments of power, but strategy also assumes an opponent, and is always under pinned by the use of force. So strategy only applies in peace, if you are prepared to use force.

That folks in Sport or medicine, use the word "strategy" is utterly irrelevant to any argument in this area.

M.L.

12-18-2010, 02:10 PM

M.L.

12-18-2010, 02:14 PM

M.L.

12-18-2010, 02:23 PM

A campaign/operation merely ensures that tactics take place in the time and place relevant to the strategy.

Campaign does not sit between Strategy and tactics.

Huh?

William F. Owen

12-18-2010, 02:42 PM

Huh?
Why Huh?
Policy, Strategy, Tactics. Roger so far?
They all have casual relationships with each other. Roger so far?

Campaign has no casual relationship. Destroying Rome (the Policy) means campaigning in Italy. That's a given. Destroying the Roman Army (the strategy) will have no effect if done Spain or Gaul. Conversely conquering Carthage, means Campaigning in Carthage.

Fuchs

12-18-2010, 02:47 PM

I think it's about time to agree that we disagree about the operational level.

M.L.

12-18-2010, 04:39 PM

I think it's about time to agree that we disagree about the operational level.

Actually, I don't think we disagree at all. Mr. Owen admits that campaigning (operations) links strategy to tactics.

Of course, he disagrees with himself in the same post.

I'll agree to the fact that I don't really understand what he thinks, and I don't think he understands what he thinks either.

M.L.

12-18-2010, 04:47 PM

Why Huh?
Policy, Strategy, Tactics. Roger so far?
They all have casual relationships with each other. Roger so far?

Campaign has no casual relationship. Destroying Rome (the Policy) means campaigning in Italy. That's a given. Destroying the Roman Army (the strategy) will have no effect if done Spain or Gaul. Conversely conquering Carthage, means Campaigning in Carthage.

Causal relationship? You have to go to Italy to destroy Rome?

Honestly, I have no idea what you are trying to prove.

M.L.

12-18-2010, 04:51 PM

Mr. Owen,

Why are you ignoring the fact that in your own Infinity Journal the very first part of the very first article of the very first issue discusses ends, ways, and means as I have been articulating it?

Are you going to post something here that says Eliot Cohen and T.X. Hammes are as naive as I am for buying into the ends/ways/means concept? I suppose they are also part of the 99% of us who doesn't get it? If that is the case, how did that article ever make it into your journal?

Just curious....

Sargent

12-18-2010, 05:58 PM

I learned the "operational level" of warfare via a simple explanation using logistics. It made the point very clear: At the strategic level, you have the goods being produced and shipped in their masses from the factories and the homeland to the theatre. At the tactical level (which can reach as high up as the "army" -- basically, the tactical level is the fighting force), you have units making use of these goods. How they exist at the strategic level is of no use to the tactical level, so the operational level is the point at which those large parcels of goods are taken apart and reassembled into new packages that make sense for utilization on the battlefield.

This logic can be applied in all military matters. The strategy which guides a war or military action is of no use to the operating units. It must be broken down into campaigns and operations and so forth, which can be put into action by those forces. So, for the Americans, the strategic level is DC, the operational level is the -COM (CENTCOM, PACCOM, etc.) and the tactical level are the guys in country.

I think the problem arises because "operational" has a variety of uses. Let's call it the "transitional" level of warfare. This sort of thinking may seem irrelevant for most, but without this separate level the US military, in all of this overlarge glory, does not work effectively.

What I find interesting about Owen's argument against the operational level of warfare is that England was the operational level of the Allied invasion of Western Europe. An essential strategy along with the means (masses of troops and goods) were funnelled into England over the course of years and prepared for deployment to and effective use upon the battlefield. This came in the form of developing the invasion and campaign plans, the training and organization of the troops and units, and the preparation of the supplies. It is simply unthinkable to conclude that something very different from either strategy or tactics did not occur during this process.

By the way, I highly recommend the Navy War College's JMO core course to give a good sense of the existence of this space in warfare. It kills the students, because it's very work intensive, but as a "tourist" I enjoyed it very much. of course, the students thought I was a bit looney for literally begging the powers that be to let me sit in - it was a quick and dirty way for me to accomplish some dissertation research -- besides, as a civilian it's a rarefied area you can't usually access, so to me it was all exciting. Anyway, I believe they put the syllabus online.

Jill

M.L.

12-18-2010, 07:52 PM

jmm99

12-18-2010, 08:14 PM

You asked a question and I answered it.

As to this:

from Wilf

Quote:

1) Strategists generally insist that their art includes not only the traditional military element of power but also other elements of power like politics and economics. Most would also accept a peacetime as well as a wartime role for strategy.

2) With increased inclusiveness the word strategy became available outside the military context and is now used in a variety of disciplines ranging from business to medicine and even sports.

Sorry, this is garbage.

you'll have to argue that out with COL Bartholomees at the War College.

One simply has to wonder how poor old CvC and Jomini (and Mahan, Halleck and Bigelow) managed to deal with strategy and tactics sans benefit of an operational level of war (operational warfare).

Please excuse - I have to get back to my hamsters (upcoming hamster races and hamster jousts post Boxing Day, you know) to get from them a quick rundown on operational art from a hamster's viewpoint.

Regards

Mike

M.L.

12-18-2010, 09:22 PM

Why does anyone want to put a level between Strategy and Tactics? Why complicate something with a falsehood?

The Operational Level is a sophistry invented by men unable to comprehend the basics. The conduct of Operations, does not make for an "Operational level" because all levels of command conduct operations!

This is clever indeed. What Mr. Owen is trying to do here is make his point by demeaning the opposition.

You see according to Mr. Owen, if you think there is an operational level of war, then it just isn't that you have a bad idea...no, its much worse: You are too stupid to "comprehend the basics."

If you ask me, that is pretty bold for someone who not only contradicted himself in his own post, but also challenged anyone who saw ends/ways/means as goals/methods/resources to publish it in Infinity Journal, only to find out that the FIRST ARTICLE in the FIRST ISSUE of that journal contained EXACTLY THAT!

I don't usually use the little smiley icons, but :eek:
WTF, over?

Fuchs

12-18-2010, 09:49 PM

Well, it's not his journal alone and the consistency of an advocate doesn't tell about the quality of his position anyway.

I feel that the arguments were traded and rejected by both sides, I don't expect either side to change the opinion any time soon.

M.L.

12-19-2010, 02:45 AM

Another good article on operational warfare, focusing on British doctrine.

da.mod.uk/defac/publications/jk.pdf

M.L.

12-19-2010, 03:35 AM

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 06:56 AM

This is clever indeed. What Mr. Owen is trying to do here is make his point by demeaning the opposition.
To demean the opposition would be a breach of good form. To argue against bad ideas is a requirement.

You see according to Mr. Owen, if you think there is an operational level of war, then it just isn't that you have a bad idea...no, its much worse: You are too stupid to "comprehend the basics."
The point merely being, IF you understand the relationship between strategy and tactics, why put operations in there.
I reject the operational level of war, because I see no need for it. It adds nothing. I also think having "levels of war" is not useful.

If you ask me, that is pretty bold for someone who not only contradicted himself in his own post, but also challenged anyone who saw ends/ways/means as goals/methods/resources to publish it in Infinity Journal, only to find out that the FIRST ARTICLE in the FIRST ISSUE of that journal contained EXACTLY THAT!
That article was written by T.X.Hammes. Not me.

T.X. know each other and we argue a lot. First time we met, I called him on 4GW. I think we've been pretty friendly ever since! I allow writers to write what they want, even when I think they are completely wrong. Get the debate out there. As long as they are talking about strategy, it's all good. I don't aim to suppress debate. I want debate, and I want evidence.

M.L.

12-19-2010, 02:07 PM

To demean the opposition would be a breach of good form. To argue against bad ideas is a requirement.

The point merely being, IF you understand the relationship between strategy and tactics, why put operations in there.
I reject the operational level of war, because I see no need for it. It adds nothing. I also think having "levels of war" is not useful.

That article was written by T.X.Hammes. Not me.

T.X. know each other and we argue a lot. First time we met, I called him on 4GW. I think we've been pretty friendly ever since! I allow writers to write what they want, even when I think they are completely wrong. Get the debate out there. As long as they are talking about strategy, it's all good. I don't aim to suppress debate. I want debate, and I want evidence.

Fair enough. We'll throw Hammes and Cohen in the "99% that don't get it" bin.

Incidentally, I don't disagree with the "Policy-Strategy-Tactics" triad per se. It is a useful idea; its just not the same thing as Ends-Ways-Means.

I've tried to restrict myself to empirical evidence so far, but I thought I'd throw this bit in.

I'm curious to know if you have ever served on a military staff above brigade? You see, I have, and in combat no less. I've also commanded and served on staff in combat at the tactical level, and I have served on staff at the strategic level (though not in combat).

In my experience there are three levels of war. (I have an idea why you don't like the term "levels", and I agree that it is a poor word to describe a continuum that is not always clearly stratified). I believe there are three levels because there are different sets of skills required to plan at the operational level, and those skills are distinct from, though related to, both tactics and strategy. So, while you "see no need for" the operational level, I do, having done the work myself.

Of the three, operational warfare is the most difficult to understand. Although there is doctrine and it is taught in the US officer education system, one really has to get out there and do it in order to appreciate it fully.

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 02:33 PM

Fair enough. We'll throw Hammes and Cohen in the "99% that don't get it" bin.
99% maybe high, but no impossible

Incidentally, I don't disagree with the "Policy-Strategy-Tactics" triad per se. It is a useful idea; its just not the same thing as Ends-Ways-Means.
Tell me why. If it's a useful idea, why not use it.

I'm curious to know if you have ever served on a military staff above brigade? You see, I have, and in combat no less. I've also commanded and served on staff in combat at the tactical level, and I have served on staff at the strategic level (though not in combat).
Never done any time in any HQ above Brigade, and I've only ever done it in training.

Of the three, operational warfare is the most difficult to understand. Although there is doctrine and it is taught in the US officer education system, one really has to get out there and do it in order to appreciate it fully.
OK, so at which level of Command does "Operational Warfare" begin? What does it mean? Why is it not called "Divisional or Corps Tactics?"

To repeat myself, I used to be an "Operational Art" and Manoeuvre Warfare "Groupy." Spent a lot of time reading Glantz and studying Soviet Doctrine. I waffled on about "Deep Battle" and "Simultaneity" etc etc.

Then I started to write about it and thus have to really understand what I sought to discuss and guess what..... It turns out to be utterly empty. All definitions of the "Operational Level" turn out to utterly evidence free. Thus I ceased to be a believer. I looked behind the curtain, and there was nothing.

Then I found and read Hamely. So then went back and re-read all the classics and found they made no mention of it, at all!

I could choose to believe in an "Operational level" but I want evidence. Doctrine is not religion. ....and I live in Israel, where many in the IDF worship the "Operational Level," and where no one can really explain it either. To me, it's like Manoeuvre Warfare (and actually part of it). It evaporates under rigour.

Fuchs

12-19-2010, 02:48 PM

It's not a natural law thing that's simply there beyond doubt.

It's a definition, and as such it's useful to help people to establish order in chaos. Tactics need to vary on every level - individual, squad, platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, corps, army, theatre.
This multitude of levels is too difficult, thus it helps to group them.

The mall unit and unit tactics (even those which apply for formations as well) are called tactics.
The unique formation tactics are called operational art.
Theatre command and civilian input should be strategy (although even two army group HQs and a national general staff can delve into detail problems of an operational plan if it encompasses enough forces and if there's a fighting break as during the drôle de guerre).

Now there are three levels, and it becomes much easier to explain a platoon leader why his behaviour needs to change in order to meet higher plans. You tell him about the operational level and how its demands can even look pointless or contradictory at his tactical level.

You can on the other hand also easily communicate that tactical fights aren't enough. It's not enough to be better in many, many small fights. You need to look at the bigger picture of operations as well, where tactical successes can even be counter-intentional (when you want to deceive about your strength or allow an enemy to enter a trap, for example).

Wilf; remember how useful it looked to you a few years ago. That's a great part of the utility of the concept of an operational level. Thinking in three levels is easier than thinking in ten levels. You may think that you reached the point where you don't need this aide any more and are too irritated by the artificiality of the distinction, but that doesn't make it a poor idea.

Besides; would you really argue for no separation between buddy team tactics and whatever is was right below the "Germany first!" strategy?
Buddy team tactics in in-house fighting should be subsumed under "tactics" just like Operation Zitadelle? Really?

I don't think so, obviously.

slapout9

12-19-2010, 02:54 PM

OK, so at which level of Command does "Operational Warfare" begin? What does it mean? Why is it not called "Divisional or Corps Tactics?"

M.L.,
I think that is a very valid question and would like to hear your response because it is vey confusing, to me at least.:confused:

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 03:28 PM

Now there are three levels, and it becomes much easier to explain a platoon leader why his behaviour needs to change in order to meet higher plans. You tell him about the operational level and how its demands can even look pointless or contradictory at his tactical level.
Example?

Wilf; remember how useful it looked to you a few years ago. That's a great part of the utility of the concept of an operational level. Thinking in three levels is easier than thinking in ten levels. You may think that you reached the point where you don't need this aide any more and are too irritated by the artificiality of the distinction, but that doesn't make it a poor idea.
a.) I thought it useful because I merely never questioned it. I just assumed it was. It was only when I started researching doctrine above the battle group level I began to find it answered none of the "So what" questions.
b.) Two levels is easier than than three. Again, I don't think this levels thing adds anything.
c.) I don't get irritated because I think I know more. I get irritated that there is an idea out there which no one seems to be able to explain to me in simple language and answer the questions I ask.
To whit,

The unique formation tactics are called operational art.
OK.
Why?
What tactics are unique to the formation level?
What is it about "Operational Art" that is not merely the planning and conduct of "Operations" and at every level of command?

Infanteer

12-19-2010, 04:02 PM

I continue to follow this; despite some "thread fencing" which tends to detract from things, it is still an interesting and useful thread - if anything it presents a dialectic of operational theory to help us to determine what is useful and what is not.

I don't think anyone disputes that there is an "operational" aspect in warfare - all sides have acknowledged that it:

a. exists
b. exists to provide some link from strategy to tactics.

Thus "operational warfare" is the aspect of warfare concerned with this mechanism and "operational art" is the application of it. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think all sides agree to this.

Where we seem to get off the rails is, at least as this thread goes, is that it isn't very well defined.

Fuchs labels it as a form of "high tactics". Brigade/Division and up.

M.L., however, provided the following (which was useful):

Well said. I'd also add that operational warfare is tough because:

1. It links strategy to tactics, and therefore has elements of both. There is a temptation to lump it into one bucket or the other.

2. It is dynamic. What level of command plans at the operational level can change depending on the operation.

3. It isn't always there. A single aircraft performing an air strike to kill Saddam Hussein is a tactical action with a strategic effect. There is no need for operational planning (though one might argue that such a strike is part of an operational campaign).

Points 2 and 3 seem to refute Fuchs' definition. Points 2 and 3 also point to an ambiguous nature of "operational warfare"; it fluctuates in who is applying it and it isn't always a factor in an operation. If I may, let me pose the following two questions for everyone as a way of focusing the discussion onto something to help us better define it and, perhaps, break some of the deadlock:

1. Is a commander of a field force always applying tactics? Is the CFLCC in the run-up to Desert Storm? How about VII Corps Commander? How about a company commander?

2. Is a commander of a field force always applying the operational art? Is the CFLCC in the run-up to Desert Storm? How about the VII Corps Commander? How about a company commander?

Fuchs

12-19-2010, 04:12 PM

Your name is not William.

Feel free to prove that my statement is false.
It doesn't matter what others say or write, you need to prove it , really really prove it beyond doubt. Only my opinion on this counts, not anyone else's opinion.
Prove it to ME.

I'll explain; I just took it for granted that William was your name, but then I asked myself why? So what? There was no evidence (except that other appear to think that William is our name).

- - - - -

Wilf, the operational level as such was created because people agreed on it. You may go on a crusade and proclaim the hypothesis that the operational level doesn't exist, but you do not seem to grant us the chance to falsify your hypothesis. You're even moving goalposts - a few pages ago it looked as if we only needed to show the utility of the concept to justify it, now you're not content with that.
Besides, you're asking questions that were answered pages ago. And some of these questions aren't even useful.

The whole discussion comes to no end because you demand evidence for a clear black/white cut between military art & science.
There's no such clear cut, and it appears as if nobody but you seems to have a requirement for it.

To lead Operation Zitadelle is nothing like leading a fire team. There has to be a distinction somewhere in between, and the interested part of mankind appears to have agreed on calling the intermediate between strategy and tactics "operational art".

The exact separation is difficult because the meaning of designations such as brigade, division and corps varies over time and between countries. There are even differences between different conflicts that enable at times a division to play a role that had been played by an army group in an earlier conflict (division in Georgia 2008 ~ army group in France 1940).

You want clarity of separation where clarity is neither required nor appropriate.

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 04:17 PM

Well said. I'd also add that operational warfare is tough because:

1. It links strategy to tactics, and therefore has elements of both. There is a temptation to lump it into one bucket or the other.

2. It is dynamic. What level of command plans at the operational level can change depending on the operation.

3. It isn't always there. A single aircraft performing an air strike to kill Saddam Hussein is a tactical action with a strategic effect. There is no need for operational planning (though one might argue that such a strike is part of an operational campaign).

OK, apologies that I missed this (HT to Infanteer)

1. Why is a link between strategy and tactics needed? The link is obvious and enduring. There is no link between Policy and Strategy.

2. So one day a level of command will not be working at the operational level and the next it will? Does this apply to all levels of command? If not, which ones does it apply to?

3. Broadly concur. To me an air strike to kill Saddam is a tactical action that supports the policy and is thus part of the strategy.

So essentially this link between Strategy and Tactics is dynamic both to the level of command and is sometimes is not required to link the two. So I would now ask, what purpose does it fulfil when it is present?

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 04:29 PM

Your name is not William.
I agree. My name is actually Jochim Kipod, the killer Hedgehog of Carpathia!

Wilf, the operational level as such was created because people agreed on it.
Yes, and folks thought the earth was flat, EBO was a good idea, and so was 4GW.

The whole discussion comes to no end because you demand evidence for a clear black/white cut between military art & science.
The only evidence I want is to be shown why it is useful. What does it add. How is it better to have something between Strategy and Tactics, rather than worse.

To lead Operation Zitadelle is nothing like leading a fire team.
OK, but that's Command. Commanding Operation Zitadelle was not the same as commanding Operation Anaconda. Operations are not the "Operational level of War." I know of one operation in Ulster that was just a total of 24 men.

The exact separation is difficult because the meaning of designations such as brigade, division and corps varies over time and between countries. There are even differences between different conflicts that enable at times a division to play a role that had been played by an army group in an earlier conflict (division in Georgia 2008 ~ army group in France 1940).
Yet Divisional Tactics are always definable as how a Division fights and operates.

You want clarity of separation where clarity is neither required nor appropriate.
I want clarity of expression to the degree I can understand it.

Fuchs

12-19-2010, 04:48 PM

slapout9

12-19-2010, 04:50 PM

Your name is not William.

Feel free to prove that my statement is false.
It doesn't matter what others say or write, you need to prove it , really really prove it beyond doubt. Only my opinion on this counts, not anyone else's opinion.
Prove it to ME.

- - - - -

Not true, you are making the accusation so the burden of proof is on YOU not Wilf. Unless you are legally insane in which case there is know proof. I am not being snarky either just the "Joe Friday Method" of analysis.

Fuchs

12-19-2010, 04:51 PM

I want clarity of expression to the degree I can understand it.

This might help, although definitions may vary in other countries.

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war.
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005.

Tactical level of war:

(DOD) The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. See also operational level of war; strategic level of war.

The accurate distinction (brigade , division = tactical level or not) depends on the conflict and the involved forces. The operational level can begin at brigade to theatre level and might reach up to the head of state (if that person gets involved).

Fuchs

12-19-2010, 04:56 PM

Not true, you are making the accusation so the burden of proof is on YOU not Wilf.

That's my point. I detached and replayed his style of argumentation to show exactly that.

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 05:01 PM

The inflationary mis-use of the word "operations" is no good argument.

Most so-called operations should be called "action" or "plan". The so-called "Operation Anaconda" wouldn't have been more than a regimental order of the day in 1944.
Sorry, but did not Op Anaconda use theatre level assets and aim at the capture of Bin Laden? Something central to US Policy. How is this inflationary use of the term "Operation."
Your argument would be that not everything called or planned as an operation is in reality an "operation?"

Fuchs

12-19-2010, 05:16 PM

OEF-A was an operation (that was dragged on till it became something else).
Anaconda was at most a small battle.

Nobody claims that battle outcomes cannot be of direct interest to the strategic intent. An operation can culminate in a battle of decision, for example.

Part of the problem in this discussion is that you're arguing about the absence of something, but you do so against a majority position.

The people who believed that earth was flat were not providing evidence, the guy who challenged the majority opinion provided the evidence.

It's on the other hand hard and at times impossible to prove absence of something.

You dismiss the arguments for the presence of the subject in question, though.

I think we should move the discussion into a more promising direction: You challenge the majority opinion and official opinion, thus you should provide evidence - of the existence of something.

Prove that the use of the "operational level of war" idea is disadvantageous, hurting military thought. (And keep in mind that this is about net effects.)

slapout9

12-19-2010, 06:04 PM

The people who believed that earth was flat were not providing evidence, the guy who challenged the majority opinion provided the evidence.

And what did the majority do? They threatened to kill him or put him in prison because it violated Doctrine:eek:

Fuchs

12-19-2010, 06:37 PM

Yeah, but won't do that to Wilf. Not yet. ;)

Pete

12-19-2010, 08:22 PM

Perhaps the following will lend an appropriate level of dignity to this thread:

DEAR EDITOR: I am 8 years old.
Some of my little friends say there is no operational level.
Papa says, 'If you see it in THE SUN it's so.'
Please tell me the truth; is there an operational level?

VIRGINIA O'HANLON.
115 WEST NINETY-FIFTH STREET

Yes, VIRGINIA, there is an operational level. It exists as certainly as love and generosity and devotion exist, and you know that they abound and give to your life its highest beauty and joy. Alas! how dreary would be the world if there were no operational level. It would be as dreary as if there were no VIRGINIAS. There would be no childlike faith then, no poetry, no romance to make tolerable this existence. We should have no enjoyment, except in sense and sight. The eternal light with which childhood fills the world would be extinguished.

Not believe in the operational level! You might as well not believe in fairies! You might get your papa to hire men to watch in all the chimneys on Christmas Eve to catch Santa Claus, but even if they did not see Santa Claus coming down, what would that prove? Nobody sees Santa Claus, but that is no sign that there is no Santa Claus. The most real things in the world are those that neither children nor men can see. Did you ever see fairies dancing on the lawn? Of course not, but that's no proof that they are not there. Nobody can conceive or imagine all the wonders there are unseen and unseeable in the world.

Sargent

12-20-2010, 03:38 AM

Wilf Owen wrote: "The only evidence I want is to be shown why it is useful. What does it add. How is it better to have something between Strategy and Tactics, rather than worse."

At the risk of shamelessly tooting my own horn (and as an old-school WASP it makes me feel very uncomfortable even to consider that I am doing that...), I would ask why it is you do not think my explanation of the "operational level of warfare" did not provide the evidence you seek? (It was the post about which ML responded "Well said..." that has been quoted recently.) I am not a faithful accolyte of the subject or concept, but I did bother to learn it from the inside, as it was taught to military personnel in this country, and having done quite a bit of research and work in American logistics history, I did find something very useful in that level between the strategic and the tactical. Joint Operational Logistics in the contemporary American setting is a thing very different from the strategic and the tactical -- and, at the risk of sounding looney tunes, I found it fascinating to explore that space. Transplanting the operational (or, as I called it, "transitional") level of warfare concept to other areas of military affairs did not require me to make many blind leaps either. But, as I'm technically still a student (in a few months I shall become an insufferable PhD and expound from on high and expect unconditional acceptance...chuckle), I'm perfectly happy to examine the issue from another perspective and consider how it might not really work.

So, what is wrong with the explanation given? How is it unsatisfying? What is the critique? Seriously.

Cheers,
Jill

M.L.

12-20-2010, 03:44 AM

Incidentally, I don't disagree with the "Policy-Strategy-Tactics" triad per se. It is a useful idea; its just not the same thing as Ends-Ways-Means.

Tell me why. If it's a useful idea, why not use it.

This concept illustrates the necessary connection between actions on the battlefield and policy objectives. Essentially, it is a richer statement of Clausewitz's axiom that "war is a continuation of policy by other means." In other words, war is an inherently political act. Therefore, everything which happens in war must serve political ends, right down to and including tactics.

By contrast, ends, ways, and means, is not a framework for connecting low level actions (tactics) to terminal goals (policy). Rather, it is an analytical framework within policy, strategy, etc... which aids in the conceptualization, planning, and execution of related actions.

In his book Modern Strategy Gray gives us his seventeen dimensions of strategy, which he groups into three categories. These align (roughly) with ends, ways, and means.

The first group is "People and Politics", which are the ends (goals).
The second is "Preparation for War", which are the means (resources).
Finally, the third is "War Proper", which are the ways (methods).

With respect to operational warfare and its relationship to strategy, Gray says the following in a 2009 monograph, SCHOOLS FOR STRATEGY: TEACHING STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY CONFLICT

A strategist is understood to be a professional military person charged either, or both, with: (1) guiding and shaping subordinate military operations by major units in campaigns for the purpose of securing military
advantage (success or victory); and (2) guiding and shaping the course of military events for the purpose of achieving the polity’s political goals.

In short, the subject of primary interest here is education for generals coping down the chain of command with the use of major military formations, and for generals striving to deliver upwards for the satisfaction of policy the military advantage achieved by the operational level of warfare. I am aware of the historical fact that in different times, places, and circumstances, the relations among politics, strategy, and tactics can assume widely different forms. Nonetheless, the two core behaviors just identified as our prime foci, truly are ubiquitous in kind. All belligerents have to strive for purposeful coherence in the activities by the elements that contribute to their military instrument; and all belligerents, similarly, must seek to employ that instrument in such ways that their political ambitions are advanced.

OK, so at which level of Command does "Operational Warfare" begin? What does it mean? Why is it not called "Divisional or Corps Tactics?"

As I posted previously, this can vary depending on the context. In the US system, the operational level is really the domain of the Corps. Only a Corps is manned to execute the inherently joint functions of a truly operational headquarters. However, there is no hard and fast rule. As Gray states above, the relationships are dynamic.

In response to the second question above, planning Corps operations (and to some extent, Division) are not like planning, say, a company operation, only on a larger scale. To call something "Corps Tactics" would be to suggest as much, and therefore be misleading.

Then I found and read Hamely. So then went back and re-read all the classics and found they made no mention of it, at all!

The word "strategy" appears exactly once in The History of the Peloponnesian War. Yet, this is one of the most influential books on strategy ever written, and is required reading in most strategic studies programs. Similarly, the absence of the words "operational warfare" from history doesn't really tell us that much. As I have said before, it is better to focus on ideas rather than words.

I could choose to believe in an "Operational level" but I want evidence. Doctrine is not religion.

I'm not sure exactly what you want as evidence. Do you mean evidence aside from the overwhelming majority of military thinkers? You reject that as "99% of thinkers are wrong." Or perhaps historical case studies? You reject that as misinterpretation. Or do you want doctrine? You reject that as "not religion."

If operational warfare is the link between strategy and tactics, the perhaps the best evidence is your own words:

A campaign/operation merely ensures that tactics take place in the time and place relevant to the strategy.

I've rarely seen a better definition of operational warfare...

William F. Owen

12-20-2010, 07:31 AM

A campaign/operation merely ensures that tactics take place in the time and place relevant to the strategy.

I've rarely seen a better definition of operational warfare...

OK, but
a.) That's a planning function.
b.) It could take place at all levels of command.
c.) It doesn't interpose itself between Strategy and tactics. It's exactly what the British Army did for 200 years before suddenly adopting the "operational level."

Tukhachevskii

12-20-2010, 11:17 AM

Colin S. Gray (and many others) calls Policy, Strategy and Tactics, "The Strategy Triad."

That’s news to me (and him too more than likely, unless he’s one of those types who is unself-conscious about what he says and rather more concerned with the volume of his work....you’d think I disliked him from that comment:rolleyes:) The following quotes are from Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History (http://www.amazon.co.uk/War-Peace-International-Relations-Introduction/dp/041538639X).....

... it is essential to be clear as to the meanings of, and distinctions among, three key terms: tactics, operations and strategy.

Tactics, operations and strategy

• Tactics refers to the actual use of armed forces, primarily, though not exclusively, in combat. In essence, tactics are about how to fight, about military behaviour itself.

• Operations refers to the use made of tactics for the conduct of a military campaign.

• Operational art is the skill with which forces are manoeuvred so that they are well positioned for tactical advantage. But it refers also to the ability to know when to accept or decline combat, with a view to advancing campaign wide goals. Operational art uses the threat and the actuality of battle to win a campaign.

• Strategy refers to the use made of operations for their impact upon the course and outcome of a war. Strategy [ways] is the bridge between military power [means] and policy [ends]. (p. 40)

(All emphasis and additions in parentheses are mine)

Gray is one of those who uses the term “operational” inconsistently throughout the book but who also believes that Napoleon invented the operational level, or, perhaps more strictly speaking practiced it but may not have known about it (which basically means Gray’s taking modern concepts and applying them to people and places who would not have known about them and thus couldn’t possibly be doing such things- the empiricism of Elton (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geoffrey_Elton) or Acton (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Dalberg-Acton,_1st_Baron_Acton) rather than the verstehende/hermeneutic (http://www.answers.com/topic/verstehen) Collingwood (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R._G._Collingwood)-ian one)...

Napoleon’s military genius did not lie in any unique understanding of warfare and how to succeed at it. He did not know things about war that were mysteries to other professionals. Rather, his genius lay in the ability actually to do what the general wisdom recognized should be done. Recall that strategy – or, in Napoleon’s case, largely operations [?!]– is an eminently practical undertaking. He had an outstanding coup d’oeil on the battlefield. He was a brilliant practitioner, by any historical standard, of operational manoeuvre for battle. (p. 44)

Personally, I was taught that Napoleon was a master “grand tactician” (http://www.amazon.com/George-Jeffreys-tactics-grand-Napoleonic/dp/B0006YWRJW) (the term and concept then in practical use). He could not have been operationally, or for that matter strategically, capable because his wars never brought about a more favourable peace nor did they secure his long term goals of French continental hegemony and thus, he couldn’t have understood strategy either given the numerous opportunities he had for forming favourable alliances. Of course operational art as a self-consciously practised and taught concept didn’t exist either so he wouldn’t have understood what we are arguing about over strategy and operational art (given they would have understood those terms differently, if at all). Obviously, in today’s terminology, Napoleon didn’t harmonise his ends (policy) with his ways (strategy) which meant he merely frittered away his means (making his eventual defeat all the more likely) though in his age, suffused as it still was with notions of glory and honour that really didn’t matter (realpolitik and came later).

In the age of Napoleon the term “Strategy” actually encompassed what we now largely subsume under “theatre strategy” and “operations” with “grand tactics” bridging that and “minor tactics” (the clue’s in the name!). If we want to know what Napoleon intended at Jena (for instance) than we must think like him, with knowledge then available to him, not in terms and concepts he would not have comprehended and would not have acted upon. In his day “grand strategy” (a term we still use) covered things like “national military strategy”/ “foreign policy” (&c) that Clausewitz subsumed under the simpler (and “theoretically” parsimonious sounding) term politik (and he, too, was innovating by trying to come up with a theory of warfare using existing terms to convey new meanings).

Do I believe that there is an operational level of war? I believe that we (some of us at any rate) believe that there is and thus we act on that belief thereby making it a self-fulfilling prophecy just as people did when they thought there were such things as river faeries and thunder cracks were proof of the existence of Thor and thereby acted accordingly (whether or not there is an existential, un-changing, “real” entity that equates to what we describe as “operational” level warfare...who knows? I’m just a poor, ugly, semi-literate man on a tiny blue planet in a very large universe:)...I’ll leave that for my betters to thrash out:wry:).

Anyway, I’m done for this year.

It’s Christmas and much as I enjoy these “virtual” debates ---I really couldn’t care less who’s right or wrong on the internet and I really don’t have an axe to grind or a name/reputation to make/maintain for myself--- there’s mulled wine to be drunk, presents to be opened, children to be played with, single women to be flirted with, family fences to be (temporarily) mended, a Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0080297/) marathon to be watched and all kinds of meat and poultry to be enjoyed. Let’s spare a thought too, over Christmas, for all those brave men and women who will be celebrating (if they have that luxury) in less friendly climes, yet, without whom, the peace we enjoy on the home front would be impossible.

Happy Christmas everyone!

(As a gift allow me to leave you all this chipper variant on my favourite carol Good King Wenceslas (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=11GlNvi7hPY) by the Irish Rovers)

William F. Owen

12-20-2010, 12:44 PM

Gray is one of those who uses the term “operational” inconsistently throughout the book but who also believes that Napoleon invented the operational level, or, perhaps more strictly speaking practiced it but may not have known about it ...

I know Colin Gray pretty well. I owe him a huge debt as concerns his teaching and ideas. He literally "freed my mind," with a lot of writing.
His latest book uses the "Triad," but makes mention of the "operational level" issues. He is very aware of my thoughts on the matter, but he is Colin Gray and I am Wilf Owen.

M.L.

12-20-2010, 01:28 PM

A campaign/operation merely ensures that tactics take place in the time and place relevant to the strategy.

OK, but
a.) That's a planning function.

For sure. The question is, does it require a unique skill set? Is planning at the operational level fundamentally different from strategy/tactics? I would say yes, and most military thinkers agree.

b.) It could take place at all levels of command.

Careful with semantics. Lets not confuse the term "operations" used in its broad sense with "operational warfare." Yes, a company commander can plan an operation, however, that does not equate to operational warfare. Operational warfare, in contrast with operations, only takes place in major formations, namely Corps and above, and possibly Division if properly augmented.

I'll grant you it is poorly named, which contributes to the confusion.

c.) It doesn't interpose itself between Strategy and tactics. It's exactly what the British Army did for 200 years before suddenly adopting the "operational level."

Again, you are confusing what they did with what they called it. I may be misreading your above statement, but you seem to be saying that the British did operational-level planning for 200 years without labeling it as such.

It is one argument to say that a unique realm exists in which military professionals link strategy to tactics, but it isn't a "level of war." It is another to say that no unique realm exists. You seem to be arguing the former here, in which case the issue is one of semantics. In other posts, you seem to argue the latter, in which case this issue is one of existence.

In any case, simply because no one wrote down the words "operational warfare" doesn't mean it didn't exist, or that no one was doing it.

William F. Owen

12-20-2010, 02:32 PM

F Yes, a company commander can plan an operation, however, that does not equate to operational warfare. Operational warfare, in contrast with operations, only takes place in major formations, namely Corps and above, and possibly Division if properly augmented.
OK, so what you are telling me is that Operational Warfare is something that takes place at the Corps level (and above) and is thus done by Corps Staff, but is also done by Divisions if they have Corps assets?

So basically, Operational Level Warfare is how Corps fight?

If so, when does a Corps employ "Operational Level Warfare" and when does it not?

Again, you are confusing what they did with what they called it. I may be misreading your above statement, but you seem to be saying that the British did operational-level planning for 200 years without labeling it as such.
Let me be clear. They conducted and taught soldiers to plan and conduct "Operations." Basically staff work. They called this "Operations of War." It was largely focussed on Campaign planning. They did not make it something between Strategy and Tactics. Quite the opposite.
This is the model and teaching I subscribe to.

slapout9

12-20-2010, 02:36 PM

Careful with semantics. Lets not confuse the term "operations" used in its broad sense with "operational warfare." Yes, a company commander can plan an operation, however, that does not equate to operational warfare. Operational warfare, in contrast with operations, only takes place in major formations, namely Corps and above, and possibly Division if properly augmented.

I'll grant you it is poorly named, which contributes to the confusion.

That is what I was looking for, if I understand it correctly. Operations planning is concerned with Combat but Operational Warfare has two sides so to speak. On one side is the Combat Operation and the other side for lack of a better term I will call Logistics Operation usually on a very large scale. The Logistics side tends to link up to Strategy while the Operation side tends to link down toward the actual Battle. Which is why they call it the bridge between Strategy and Tactics.

Is that about right? Yes,No, I missed the whole thing?:eek:

M.L.

12-20-2010, 03:11 PM

OK, so what you are telling me is that Operational Warfare is something that takes place at the Corps level (and above) and is thus done by Corps Staff, but is also done by Divisions if they have Corps assets?

Operational planning is inherently joint in nature. In the US system, the Corps staff is properly manned to synchronize and integrate joint capabilities in support of land campaigns. Divisions are not, and would need to be augmented with additional personnel and capabilities to fight at the operational level.

So basically, Operational Level Warfare is how Corps fight?

If so, when does a Corps employ "Operational Level Warfare" and when does it not?

I wouldn't say that. "How" implies a prescriptive approach, which is more like tactics. In this sense, operational planning is closer to strategy, which is descriptive in nature, though more narrow in scope. Nor would I necessarily limit operational warfare to the Corps. It may be executed by a joint task force, of which a Corps may be the land forces component. It may also be executed by the combatant command, though generally the combatant command is concerned with strategy. Again, "who" does it and "when" are largely dependent on the context.

Let me be clear. They conducted and taught soldiers to plan and conduct "Operations." Basically staff work. They called this "Operations of War." It was largely focussed on Campaign planning. They did not make it something between Strategy and Tactics. Quite the opposite.
This is the model and teaching I subscribe to.

Fair enough. The question, then, is this: Was "Operations of War" and campaign planning fundamentally different from both tactics and strategy, while linking the two? If not, what is "Campaign Planning", and is it tactics or strategy?

Bob's World

12-20-2010, 03:26 PM

OK, so what you are telling me is that Operational Warfare is something that takes place at the Corps level (and above) and is thus done by Corps Staff, but is also done by Divisions if they have Corps assets?

So basically, Operational Level Warfare is how Corps fight?

If so, when does a Corps employ "Operational Level Warfare" and when does it not?

Let me be clear. They conducted and taught soldiers to plan and conduct "Operations." Basically staff work. They called this "Operations of War." It was largely focussed on Campaign planning. They did not make it something between Strategy and Tactics. Quite the opposite.
This is the model and teaching I subscribe to.

I really don't have a dog in this fight, but to me, when we discuss the operational level of war, it is not how Corps fight; rather it is the scope of the fight that one traditionally assigns a Division, Corps or even an Army, to handle. That scope is often regionally/terrain defined; but could be defined by some functional characteristics as well.

How a Corps fights, well, as Wilf clearly states. That is tactics.

Infanteer

12-20-2010, 03:50 PM

For sure. The question is, does it require a unique skill set? Is planning at the operational level fundamentally different from strategy/tactics? I would say yes, and most military thinkers agree.

What exactly is contained in this unique skill?

Careful with semantics. Lets not confuse the term "operations" used in its broad sense with "operational warfare." Yes, a company commander can plan an operation, however, that does not equate to operational warfare. Operational warfare, in contrast with operations, only takes place in major formations, namely Corps and above, and possibly Division if properly augmented.

Canada's contribution to Afghanistan is a Brigade; this Brigade conducts logistics that go back to Canada, is a joint HQ and has an air component, and deals with the "Command" back in Canada. Does it practice "operational warfare", "tactical warfare" or both?

Ken White

12-20-2010, 03:52 PM

How a Corps fights, well, as Wilf clearly states. That is tactics.but yes on that last.

M.L.

12-20-2010, 04:13 PM

That is what I was looking for, if I understand it correctly. Operations planning is concerned with Combat but Operational Warfare has two sides so to speak. On one side is the Combat Operation and the other side for lack of a better term I will call Logistics Operation usually on a very large scale. The Logistics side tends to link up to Strategy while the Operation side tends to link down toward the actual Battle. Which is why they call it the bridge between Strategy and Tactics.

Is that about right? Yes,No, I missed the whole thing?:eek:

I think you are on the right track. Operational warfare is largely (but not exclusively) concerned with logistics. Operational objectives link both up to strategy and down to tactics.

I go back to my favorite example, which is Operation Michael in 1918. Here is an excerpt from A World Undone by GJ Meyer, which describes the situation after German Storm Troops had successfully broken through the Allied line:

No one including [German Chief of Staff] Ludendorff could have said at that point what the purpose of a continued...advance was supposed to be. His astonishing progress gave rise to a question: progress toward what? What actually was the value of the ground he had taken and the great expanses of territory that lay open in front of him? The absence of an answer exposed the emptiness of the Michael operation... "We tear a hole in the enemy line," Ludendorff had said when challenged, "and everything else follows."

Michael's tactical successes did not give rise to strategic success because the two were not linked. This is because strategy and tactics are not inherently linked by their nature, as Mr. Owen suggests. This is the realm of operational warfare. In this case, had Ludendorff pressed for the French communications hub of Amiens as his operational objective, and been able to reinforce success toward the objective with men and materials (although there were practical problems with the latter), he might have succeeded in splitting the French/British line and pushing the Brits into the sea.

M.L.

12-20-2010, 04:23 PM

What exactly is contained in this unique skill?

Without going into exhaustive detail, the ability to plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns and major operations which accomplish strategic objectives. This includes setting the conditions for tactical engagements and battles which link to strategic objectives or effects. Operational planners use operational concepts, such as Center of Gravity and Lines of Operation, to plan operational activities.

Canada's contribution to Afghanistan is a Brigade; this Brigade conducts logistics that go back to Canada, is a joint HQ and has an air component, and deals with the "Command" back in Canada. Does it practice "operational warfare", "tactical warfare" or both?

Tactical warfare. This brigade is necessarily linked logistically with its home nation, however, the conduct of operational warfare has less to do with the structure of a unit than its scope of responsibility vis a vis the theater of operations. In other words, an operational headquarters has certain characteristics (joint, logistics focus, etc...) because it is doing operational planning. This doesn't mean that all joint HQ with extended logistics are working at the operational level.

Structure is an outgrowth of operational responsibilities - operational responsibilities are NOT a consequence of structure.

Infanteer

12-20-2010, 06:04 PM

M.L. - thank you for the response. You'll find some follow up questions below; I ask not for the sake of being difficult - I'm only trying to link personal experiences to what appears to be your very concrete definition of operational warfare.

Without going into exhaustive detail, the ability to plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns and major operations which accomplish strategic objectives. This includes setting the conditions for tactical engagements and battles which link to strategic objectives or effects. Operational planners use operational concepts, such as Center of Gravity and Lines of Operation, to plan operational activities.

Well, I don't know why one would plan a campaign or major operation to not accomplish strategic objectives, so I think we can simply go with the following:

plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns and major operations.

Does this seem agreeable?

Is the scope of this limited by a minimum geographic size? How about a minimum size of friendly forces? Does a Company that builds a District Stabilization Plan which focuses on a series of operations over a extended period of time constitute conducting operational art?

Tactical warfare. This brigade is necessarily linked logistically with its home nation, however, the conduct of operational warfare has less to do with the structure of a unit than its scope of responsibility vis a vis the theater of operations. In other words, an operational headquarters has certain characteristics (joint, logistics focus, etc...) because it is doing operational planning. This doesn't mean that all joint HQ with extended logistics are working at the operational level.

Structure is an outgrowth of operational responsibilities - operational responsibilities are NOT a consequence of structure.

Ok.

So when this HQ conducts a "Provincial Stabilization Plan", focuses on identifying insurgent centers of gravity within the Province and plans along key counterinsurgent lines of operation (stability, governance, development and security sector reform) it is not doing Operational Warfare?

M.L.

12-20-2010, 09:52 PM

M.L. - thank you for the response. You'll find some follow up questions below; I ask not for the sake of being difficult - I'm only trying to link personal experiences to what appears to be your very concrete definition of operational warfare.

Well, I don't know why one would plan a campaign or major operation to not accomplish strategic objectives, so I think we can simply go with the following:

plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns and major operations.

Does this seem agreeable?

Very much so. I think your simple definition above trends toward an explanation of operational warfare. In my previous answer, I'd was trying to pull out some of the unique skills required to do what you state above.

Is the scope of this limited by a minimum geographic size? How about a minimum size of friendly forces? Does a Company that builds a District Stabilization Plan which focuses on a series of operations over a extended period of time constitute conducting operational art?

Operational art contains many tools for conceptualizing military operations at large. That doesn't mean we are working at the operational level. Again here, an overuse of the word "operation" contributes to our collective confusion.

There are no hard or fast rules, however, I'd have a hard time being convinced that a series of company operations would end with a strategic effect. Rather, these "operations" are more likely a series of tactical actions toward stabilizing a district. This may, in turn, serve an operational objective, such as stabilizing a key province (Kandahar, for example).

So when this HQ conducts a "Provincial Stabilization Plan", focuses on identifying insurgent centers of gravity within the Province and plans along key counterinsurgent lines of operation (stability, governance, development and security sector reform) it is not doing Operational Warfare?

Doing "Campaign Planning" is currently fashionable in U.S. brigades. This is an operational tool that helps conceptualize, frame, and link things like, security, governance, and economics. However, this doesn't mean brigades are doing operational warfare - they are just using the tools.

The size of a unit, its area of responsibility, the tools it uses to plan, etc... are not necessarily indicative of operational warfare.

They key question to ask is whether the campaign/operation being planned sets the conditions for tactical success that in turn creates a strategic effect. This is the "linking" of tactics to strategy that must be accomplished in the operational realm.

William F. Owen

12-21-2010, 12:04 PM

Michael's tactical successes did not give rise to strategic success because the two were not linked.
That is simply not true. King George actually warned his staff that if German success continued, "we may have lost the war."
Luckily the whole offensive was very badly planned in terms of exploitation, and had almost no reserves to replace very high casualties - which is why it failed. Had tactical success, such as that seen in the first 36 hours continued, they would have knocked the UK out of the war.

This is because strategy and tactics are not inherently linked by their nature, as Mr. Owen suggests.
As I suggest? Sorry 800 years of written military thought say they are linked as do 5,000 years of recorded Military History. Your case is based on a 1980s invention of Corps Operations.
They are linked. If not then Strategy is not linked to tactics and tactics does not bear on Policy. If that's the case then the whole conceptual edifice that puts "Operations" between Strategy and tactics falls apart.

In this case, had Ludendorff pressed for the French communications hub of Amiens as his operational objective, and been able to reinforce success toward the objective with men and materials (although there were practical problems with the latter), he might have succeeded in splitting the French/British line and pushing the Brits into the sea.
"Operational Objective"? So basically you mean "objective". Nothing you state there makes the case for an "operational level of war.

This is after the fact justification of the worst sort. The British went on to fight solidly for the "100 days" with nothing even remotely resembling the "Operational Level." You cannot say "oh they had it, but they didn't call it that." In the minds of British Generals and Staffs, there was NO operational level. ...and it worked just fine! The UK did not adopt the Operational Level until well into the 1990's. We even won the Falklands without it!

William F. Owen

12-21-2010, 12:10 PM

Operational art contains many tools for conceptualizing military operations at large. That doesn't mean we are working at the operational level. Again here, an overuse of the word "operation" contributes to our collective confusion.
So Operational Art is not related to "Operational Warfighting?" I thought one expressed the other?
By tools, do you means staff procedures used to aid planning?
Does conceptualizing mean "planning?"

They key question to ask is whether the campaign/operation being planned sets the conditions for tactical success that in turn creates a strategic effect. This is the "linking" of tactics to strategy that must be accomplished in the operational realm.
Sorry, to me the campaign/operation being planned sets the conditions for tactical success is tactics. Intelligence, Logistics, planning, and Command are the realm of tactics and I cannot see how calling them the "Operational Level" makes it any different.

....and I thought the "Operational level" was related to Corps and Divisions with Corps assets?

12-21-2010, 12:48 PM

When in doubt, go to the doctrinal literature. The following is a list of definitions from JPub 1-02. Seems to me to be pretty clear what distinguishes the operational level of war from the tactical and strategic. Also the definition of operational seems rather straightforward.

(interestingly, IMO, is the fact that battle is referenced but the J Pub has no definition for it)

engagement — . . . 2. A tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver forces. See also battle; campaign

campaign — A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign plan. (JP 5-0)

campaign plan — A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign; campaign planning. (JP 5-0)

campaign planning — The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operation plan for a campaign. Campaign planning may begin during contingency planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the President or Secretary of Defense selects the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. See also campaign; campaign plan . (JP 5-0)

major operation — A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. See also operation. (JP 3-0)

operation — 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

operational art — The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 3-0)

operational level of war — The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 3-0)

tactical level of war — The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. See also operational level of war; strategic level of war. (JP 3-0)

strategic level of war — The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. See also operational level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 3-0)

M.L.

12-21-2010, 02:28 PM

I'm going to leave most of your comments alone since we've been there and done that, and I sure no one wants to rehash deeply entrenched positions (least of all me).

That is simply not true. King George actually warned his staff that if German success continued, "we may have lost the war."

King George hardly seems like right fellow to give a professional military appraisal of the situation.

In fact, continued German tactical success paradoxically weakened their position by extending their lines and creating salients without any operational gains. Another case for linking tactics to strategy - failure to do so can turn tactical success into strategic failure.

Luckily the whole offensive was very badly planned in terms of exploitation, and had almost no reserves to replace very high casualties - which is why it failed. Had tactical success, such as that seen in the first 36 hours continued, they would have knocked the UK out of the war. Sounds like a lack of operational planning to me!

As I suggest? Sorry 800 years of written military thought say they are linked as do 5,000 years of recorded Military History. Since operational warfare emerged in the Napoleonic wars and came into its own in WWI, it follows that you wouldn't find much written about it. This is like saying "There is NOTHING about this nuclear weapon crap in almost all of recorded military history!" Yeah, well, it's sort of a RECENT concept you see...

"Operational Objective"? So basically you mean "objective".

No, I really do mean operational objective, i.e. an objective reached by a series of tactical actions which produces an operational or strategic effect.

This is after the fact justification of the worst sort. Some call it history...

slapout9

12-21-2010, 02:31 PM

This is like saying "There is NOTHING about this nuclear weapon crap in almost all of recorded military history!" Yeah, well, it's sort of a RECENT concept you see...

Spilled a lot of coffe over that one:D:D:D

M.L.

12-21-2010, 02:35 PM

So Operational Art is not related to "Operational Warfighting?" I didn't say that.

I thought one expressed the other? You thought wrong. You don't believe in operational warfare, so I don't expect you to understand it.

By tools, do you means staff procedures used to aid planning? No.

Does conceptualizing mean "planning?" No.

Sorry, to me the campaign/operation being planned sets the conditions for tactical success is tactics. Intelligence, Logistics, planning, and Command are the realm of tactics and I cannot see how calling them the "Operational Level" makes it any different.Fair enough. Great opinion - you are welcome to it.

....and I thought the "Operational level" was related to Corps and Divisions with Corps assets?You said that, not me.

Ken White

12-21-2010, 05:28 PM

...Operational planners use operational concepts, such as Center of Gravity and Lines of Operation, to plan operational activities.That could be construed as use of proper jargon delineates august Operational planners from the great unwashed...;)

It could also lead one to give great credence to this comment by WilF:""Your case is based on a 1980s invention of Corps Operations."" While I realize that is not strictly true it is FACT that all those operational art concepts were in existence and were used prior to the introduction of the operational level concept to the US.
Doing "Campaign Planning" is currently fashionable in U.S. brigades. This is an operational tool that helps conceptualize, frame, and link things like, security, governance, and economics. However, this doesn't mean brigades are doing operational warfare - they are just using the tools.Or misusing them...

That goes back to my original and I believe rather important issue on this sub-thread: ""My point is the rather more important issue that Military folks are too often slaves to doctrine"" as exemplified by this quote from BG (Ret) John S. Brown: ""They were reinforced by an emphasis upon the operational art in the basic course, and thus the tendency of all recent officer graduates of the service school systems to use concepts and vocabulary that facilitated its use.""

Wilf may have a problem with operational art. I do not, it exists and is useful. I do have a major problem with the misuse of doctrinal concepts and seeming military elitism obscuring reality, muddling good tactical planning and operations and the creation of oversized Staffs that lend little to actual warfighting. For, as you also said:
Structure is an outgrowth of operational responsibilities - operational responsibilities are NOT a consequence of structure.That is too often forgotten -- by too many... :mad:

Over a good many years I've seen too many Army concepts the led to an almost cult like following and belief in the awe and majesty of a particular subset of Soldiery or skill being annointed. That "airborne mystique" foolishness will get you killed; SF and SOF are handy but are far from being the epitome of combat soldiering; Aviation is now a branch but has not really done itself many favors. Similarly, Operational Level Planners and SAMS graduates are not necessarily the solution to all Army problems. Not that anyone has said they are -- but I do see a trend... :wry:

M.L.

12-21-2010, 05:57 PM

It could also lead one to give great credence to this comment by WilF:""Your case is based on a 1980s invention of Corps Operations."" While I realize that is not strictly true it is FACT that all those operational art concepts were in existence and were used prior to the introduction of the operational level concept to the US.

Couldn't agree more. However, you will note a common theme throughout my posts that the operational level existed since Napoleon; it just wasn't labeled as such. The terminology wasn't introduced until the 1980s, but the concepts have been around for a while.

Mr. Owen's argument is largely based on the absence of operational-level terminology from the historical record. My counter-argument is that the words matter very little since the ideas were there. As a demonstration, I repeat my previous observation:

The word "strategy" appears exactly once in The History of the Peloponnesian War. Yet, this is one of the most influential books on strategy ever written, and is required reading in most strategic studies programs. Similarly, the absence of the words "operational warfare" from history doesn't really tell us that much. As I have said before, it is better to focus on ideas rather than words.

Ken White

12-21-2010, 11:00 PM

Couldn't agree more. However, you will note a common theme throughout my posts that the operational level existed since Napoleon; it just wasn't labeled as such. The terminology wasn't introduced until the 1980s, but the concepts have been around for a while.I think you just reinforced my point. We have a terminology (not totally a concept) introduced about 30 years ago and it has already permeated the Army and use of the concepts have filtered down by your own admission to BCT level -- and folks tell me that it also appears at Bn level -- the mis-application you wrote of earlier...
Mr. Owen's argument is largely based on the absence of operational-level terminology from the historical record. My counter-argument is that the words matter very little since the ideas were there...True and, IMO, an esoteric argument between two hard heads -- no insult intended, I also fit that description, just not into fighting this particular issue -- my concern is rather with the appropriate application versus inappropriate use of ANY military technique.

The Operational Level as holy grail is blatant misuse. Operational art is a concept, it has applicability in some cases, none in others. Its use in the wrong situation is at least wasteful and time consuming for little to no benefit and at worst is going to get people killed unnecessarily.

As the Actress said to the Bishop, it's not what you have, it's how you use it...

Chris jM

12-22-2010, 12:54 AM

To rudely interject into this debate with a straw-man argument of my own...

How about viewing this argument as a framework whereby government policy is set/translated into the levels discussed:

- Strategic Policy (how AfPak is to be shaped IOT disrupt violent extremism, deny AfPak to AQ and stabilise the Pak nuclear capability)
- Operational/ Theatre-level Policy (conduct a COIN-based campaign around the key pop centres while conducting FID IOT achieve transfer)
- Tactical Policy (ROEs/ Clear-Hold-Build process/ priorities on minimising civ and FF cas)

Military forces are only ever able to operate tactically, but the tactical effects can be in support of either strategic, operational or tactical policy depending on their employment, task, etc.

Viewing the three 'levels' of war as distinct elements of policy-making, rather than a physical level in which one functions, seems to be an elegant solution to some of the points either side of the debate.

M.L.

12-22-2010, 01:01 AM

... my concern is rather with the appropriate application versus inappropriate use of ANY military technique.

The Operational Level as holy grail is blatant misuse. Operational art is a concept, it has applicability in some cases, none in others. Its use in the wrong situation is at least wasteful and time consuming for little to no benefit and at worst is going to get people killed unnecessarily.

No argument here. The misuse of concepts is rampant (center of gravity comes to mind in the US system). My argument with Mr. Owen is with the existence of operational warfare. The fact that the concepts are misunderstood and/or badly applied is a related but separate issue. Just because something is misused doesn't make that something inherently bad.

M.L.

12-22-2010, 01:04 AM

Ken White

12-22-2010, 03:09 AM

Just because something is misused doesn't make that something inherently bad.Too many year in and watching the critter that is the US Army lead me to take strong exception. If something can be misused, it will be. Murphy rules, particularly in combat.

That is particularly true in the structured, heirarchial military environment. The solution is to, when misuse is detected, rapidly examine the issue and institute corrective measures. The US Army does not do that at all well. It is too bureaucratic to spot misuse until it is thoroughly embedded in the muscle memory of the organism; It is loth to take corrective measures because that means one GO would have to publicly criticize -- even if indirectly -- others, an absolute no-no; and / or admit that the 'system had erred -- another no-no; and lastly, the pet corrective measure is to punish everyone by introducing even more bureaucratic rules.

Ponder reflective belts in a combat zone. For that matter, ponder reflective belts in an Armed Force not in combat. Some dubious implications there... :rolleyes:

Ergo, it is imperative that the potential for misuse be thoroughly understood and steps to mitigate the potential disasters be takenbefore a program is introduced. That really was not done with 100-5 (either edition of profound -- if different * -- impact). Unfortunately, it is rarely done with much of anything in the Army...:mad:

The US Army does not do take steps to preclude misuse of doctrine, equipment or ideas, either -- it is too eager to be seen as an intellectual catchment that is the equal of the vales of academe (scary thought, that...) and to be 'professional' in all things. That factor plus the too rapid turnover of senior personnel into too many quite different jobs and overlapping bosses and subordinates which creates short term-ism and 'my watch-itis' preclude sensible assessment of potential unintended consequences.

Someday, when you're old and gray, recall that some old Dude on an internet message board said "Mark my words, the proliferation and misuse of SAMS and Staffs as well as the Operational Level of War theme will each in their own way cause grave problems for the Army and that last will likely result in unnecessary deaths."

Laugh now -- but recall later... ;)

* Also ponder those significant differences within six short years of 'immutable' Doctrine with a capital 'D.' :wry:

M.L.

12-22-2010, 04:53 AM

Too many year in and watching the critter that is the US Army lead me to take strong exception. If something can be misused, it will be....

Perhaps this is true. However, it seems that it would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to build a body of doctrine which would be impossible to misuse. It is hard to think of a concept which hasn't been misinterpreted, misrepresented, misused, or even abused at one time or another.

Humans are imperfect creations which give rise to imperfect ideas and actions. Armies are made from humans, ergo....

We're probably stuck trying to do the best we can with the best ideas we can think of. And although I agree with you that the Army has its share of morons masquerading as leaders, it is as much a commentary on American society as it is the institution.

In short, I largely agree with your formulation of the problem, however, the solution seems to me to border on impossible.

mmx1

12-22-2010, 05:19 AM

For those uninclined to buy the book, he makes a brief(er) version of his argument in the latest issue of JFQ

http://www.ndu.edu/press/war-and-its-aftermath.html

Ken White

12-22-2010, 05:52 AM

...it is as much a commentary on American society as it is the institution.Armies represent the society from which they come... :(
In short, I largely agree with your formulation of the problem, however, the solution seems to me to border on impossible.Given the current attitudes and culture, you're correct. However, there is a solution. Required is raising the standards for entry, officer and enlisted. Yes, that means fewer people in the active Army and thus a major strategic (and operational...) recast away from big Organizations and mass to flexible organizations and agility. We should allow the ArNG to be larger than the active Army with effectively current standards for available mass when required. Most importantly, we must significantly improve training, particularly initial entry training (also both officer and enlisted...). We train now better than ever but it's still just a bit above marginal...

All that must lead to fostering innovation and initiative as opposed to the current largely unintended but highly effective stifling of those traits. That will be difficult, American society's risk aversion has migrated into uniform. :mad:

However, those fixes will be for naught lacking a major revamp of the personnel system. The 1919 Per System with Congressionally mandated add-ons in the interest of 'fairness' are a major part of the problem. Trying to stick round pegs in square holes, the HRC goal, is a big part of that misuse problem...

The Per mavens will fight any change tooth and nail -- it'll make their job far more difficult. The senior Generals will not change it, the current system worked for them so any reform -- sorely needed -- will have to start at the bottom and work upward.

My belief is that Congress in the next few years will largely be receptive to logical changes. That window should be used.

I've spent many years frothing about our wasted potential -- but it's still there, it just needs to be unleashed (an advised term...). ;)

mmx1

12-22-2010, 07:01 AM

Though on further review (I came across this thread while curious about the book cited at the top), neither Sherman, Clausewitz, or an argument for total war appear in the JFQ piece. Instead his argument here is a much tamer "offensive war requires subsequent military governance".

Still, I find his argument for militarizing strategy by making the Joint Chiefs a centralized combatant command a questionable application of the World War II model to the regional problems of today.

William F. Owen

12-22-2010, 07:48 AM

Wilf may have a problem with operational art. I do not, it exists and is useful.

Well I don't have a problem with "Operational Art," if its the art of planning operations. Not just useful. It's essential.

Here are my "problems."

a.) There is simply no need to interject a concept between Strategy and Tactics. It isn't need. Most military men never needed it. Why do it? (it may exist as an "idea", but there are many "ideas" that lack utility)

b.) The idea of "levels of war," is not useful, especially when expressed in terms of Strategic, Operational and Tactical. For example, you can't have Strategic, Operational and Tactical "Mobility" in ways you can usefully define.

c.) The claim that Napoleon "invented" the operational level is without evidence or any form of proof. What Napoleon did was conceptually no different from what Marlborough did in 1704, and Napoleon studied Marlborough! Based on the idea that the operational level of war is "battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces," then this exactly defines how Hannibal and Ghengis Kahn fought. If the Operational level existed for the last 200 years, then it always existed!
If anyone can furnish any actual historical evidence to the contrary, I will happily study it in detail.

d.) The whole concept of "Operational Level" is, IMO, steeped in a lack of clarity. The definitions used in JPub 1-02 are not rigourous. Warfare is done by Command, so Corps, Division, Formation, etc. Commands make plans and issue orders. That is simple, effective and proven to work. What proven advantage does the "Operational level" deliver.

In conclusion, I see the "Operational level" as something like Manoeuvre Warfare, and EBO. Something that at best adds nothing, bar sophistry, and at worst is highly counter-productive.

Cavguy

12-22-2010, 08:16 AM

Having Mr. Melton as my tactics instructor the past year -

His main point is that none of the Iraq governance/occupation debacle should have been a mystery. We planned for 3 years prior to 1945 how we would govern Germany, and it paid off, with similar planning for Japan. If we had started with our 1945 governance regs/books we would have been better off.

He notes that before a country can be effectively occupied its will must be broken, and that our decisive/CoG effort against the Iraqi military failed to break the will of the population prior to occupation.

Thus he advocates an attritional campaign prior to any occupation operation. He does not advocate attrition in all things, but cites "maneuver warfare" as appropriate for limited and raiding war, not occupation war because it does not break the will of the populace to carry the fight.

A simplified version of his book.

William F. Owen

12-22-2010, 11:49 AM

His main point is that none of the Iraq governance/occupation debacle should have been a mystery. We planned for 3 years prior to 1945 how we would govern Germany, and it paid off, with similar planning for Japan. If we had started with our 1945 governance regs/books we would have been better off.
Strongly concur. So would Carl.

He notes that before a country can be effectively occupied its will must be broken, and that our decisive/CoG effort against the Iraqi military failed to break the will of the population prior to occupation.

Same again.

Thus he advocates an attritional campaign prior to any occupation operation. He does not advocate attrition in all things, but cites "maneuver warfare" as appropriate for limited and raiding war, not occupation war because it does not break the will of the populace to carry the fight.
As there is no functional difference between "attrition" and "manoeuvre" I can't see the issue here. For example, raiding is aimed at causing attrition.

12-22-2010, 12:20 PM

it seems that it would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to build a body of doctrine which would be impossible to misuse. It is hard to think of a concept which hasn't been misinterpreted, misrepresented, misused, or even abused at one time or another.

I propose that misuse of doctrine is not quite as significant a problem as abuse of it. Instantiating the apparent truth of the Bentham quotation in M.L.'s signature block, I propose two ways that doctrine is abused:

1. Unthinking application of doctrinal "school solutions" to solve operational problems I do not mean problems at the operational level of war. I do mean problems we encounter while trying to conduct any operation(the second definition for operation found in my earlier post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=112136&postcount=381) of J Pub 1-02 definitions). Doctrine is a guide to help one formulate a solution for problems, not a canned set of solutions.

2. Trying to be too fine-grained when defining doctrinal terminology. In Chapter 3 of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle cautions the reader as follows:

We must not expect more precision than the subject-matter admits. . . . Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. . . . We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.
Expecting doctrine to provide an all-inclusive list of necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of any given term is actually a variation on the first instance of abuse, one which I would describe as solving problems by definition. This often works just fine in mathematics and theoretical physics, but not so well when we are contemplating the actions of those finitely rational creatures with feet of clay that we call human beings.

Bob's World

12-22-2010, 01:37 PM

We also went into Germany expecting the German people to fight us for every inch of ground; whereas we went into Iraq expecting to be greeted like the the guys who liberated Paris. Query: Did we have master plan for rebuilding France?? I suspect we didn't.

Most problems in life are foreseeable if you have your eyes open and are looking at things with a clear perspective. On Iraq, there was no room for clear perspectives, those voices where shouted down, ignored, or simply mowed over. (Speaking from one working on the Army staff during the period that the concept of going into Iraq first came up and watching in shocked amazement as it developed...)

slapout9

12-22-2010, 02:40 PM

Sherman, was my kind of General wherever he could he made War against Rich civilians which was the real key to victory. He understood it is about breaking the will of the State no so much about breaking the will of the Army. He destroyed the Civilian Infrastructure (he choose CvC type 2 War) that caused the Government, the People and the Army to ALL collapse, because the Civilian Infrastructure of Food,Weapons,Recruits is the real key to most Wars IMO............And Karl Marx wrote about this as a reporter in London before it happened:eek:, he actually said that Georgia was the Center of Gravity along with about 300,000 rich slave owners. Economic analysis is vastly underrated as a Strategic and Criminal analysis tool IMO. OK I am done now:D

slapout9

12-22-2010, 04:53 PM

Interesting way to do COIN with the idea of establishing Economic Advantage.

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/alex-de-waal/counter-insurgency-on-the-cheap

M.L.

12-22-2010, 05:05 PM

I propose that misuse of doctrine is not quite as significant a problem as abuse of it. Instantiating the apparent truth of the Bentham quotation in M.L.'s signature block, I propose two ways that doctrine is abused:

1. Unthinking application of doctrinal "school solutions" to solve operational problems I do not mean problems at the operational level of war. I do mean problems we encounter while trying to conduct any operation(the second definition for operation found in my earlier post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=112136&postcount=381) of J Pub 1-02 definitions). Doctrine is a guide to help one formulate a solution for problems, not a canned set of solutions.

2. Trying to be too fine-grained when defining doctrinal terminology. In Chapter 3 of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle cautions the reader as follows:

Expecting doctrine to provide an all-inclusive list of necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of any given term is actually a variation on the first instance of abuse, one which I would describe as solving problems by definition. This often works just fine in mathematics and theoretical physics, but not so well when we are contemplating the actions of those finitely rational creatures with feet of clay that we call human beings.

Fair criticisms. As you point out, the nature of doctrine is less a problem than the application of it. The villain here may be planning, or the application of doctrine to a given problem. The whole idea of "planning" in a military sense is formulating a solution for a given problem from beginning to end before any action has been taken. While this idea is useful for simple problems, it is less useful for complex problems.

The Cynefin framework is a useful tool for categorizing problems (http://www.slideshare.net/kdelarue/keith-de-la-rue-cynefin-03-presentation).

http://www.hlswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Cynefin-Adapted.jpg

You will see that simple and complicated problems lend themselves to the sort of planning espoused by many military professionals: sense the problem, categorize/analyze it, and apply the appropriate doctrinal solution based on previous analysis/categorization. Unfortunately, most military problems are not simple or complicated, but trend toward complex. In the case of complex problems, "planning" as we know it is less useful than acting, making sense of the response, then adapting. Obviously, a dogmatic adherence to doctrine precludes this sort of adaptive process.

Pete

12-22-2010, 07:17 PM

... it just needs to be unleashed (an advised term...). ;)
Watch out, Ken might be about to cry "Havoc" and let slip the beagles of Fayetteville.

M.L.

12-22-2010, 07:37 PM

c.) The claim that Napoleon "invented" the operational level is without evidence or any form of proof....

I was going to leave this entire entry alone since it is basically a rehash of previous arguments. However, the above statement merits a brief response.

I never claimed that Napoleon "invented" the operational level. Although there has been some discussion to that effect, the broad consensus is that the first vestiges of operational warfare "emerged" during the Napoleonic era.

To say that someone "invented" it is like saying that someone "invented" strategy. On the contrary, operational warfare, like strategy, is an evolving conglomeration of ideas.

jmm99

12-22-2010, 08:22 PM

from ML
....the broad consensus is that the first vestiges of operational warfare "emerged" during the Napoleonic era.

As I think has been obvious, my interest in this topic is historical and in the 19th century texts (CvC, Jomini, Mahan, Halleck, Bigelow, as examples). I don't have the professional competence to judge what "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" are or are not in the present-day; or whether the present-day usage of those terms (obviously replete in US manuals) is good, bad or indifferent.

What I do see in the 19th century is replete with references to the planning and execution of operations and campaigns - and a very rich vocabulary (of what I would call "terms of art") dealing with operations and campaigns; as well as something of a hierarchy of divisions (e.g., theatre of war, theatre(s) of operations, zone(s) of operations).

What are the "vestiges" of "operational warfare" in the Napoleonic era as you see those "vestiges" ? If those "vestiges" exist, they are not readily apparent to me. I see a very well developed "operational art" in what I've read (cited above); but I do not see "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" until into the 20th century - e.g., Fuller as cited by the Brit LTG in his article.

Regards

Mike

slapout9

12-22-2010, 08:31 PM

M.L.

12-22-2010, 08:40 PM

Copy of an article from (JFQ latest edition) one the other CvC threads. Has some stuff to say about the Operational Level of War, it appears he agrees somewhat but not completely with Wilf. It is a very good article at any rate IMO.

http://www.ndu.edu/press/war-and-its-aftermath.html

Ack. I was excited to read this until I saw it was by Steven Melton. You might want to read the first 30 pages or so of his book, The Clausewitz Delusion. IMO, he is pretty mixed up and has some very wrong ideas.

However, just my opinion.

M.L.

12-22-2010, 09:00 PM

As I think has been obvious, my interest in this topic is historical and in the 19th century texts (CvC, Jomini, Mahan, Halleck, Bigelow, as examples). I don't have the professional competence to judge what "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" are or are not in the present-day; or whether the present-day usage of those terms (obviously replete in US manuals) is good, bad or indifferent.

What I do see in the 19th century is replete with references to the planning and execution of operations and campaigns - and a very rich vocabulary (of what I would call "terms of art") dealing with operations and campaigns; as well as something of a hierarchy of divisions (e.g., theatre of war, theatre(s) of operations, zone(s) of operations).

What are the "vestiges" of "operational warfare" in the Napoleonic era as you see those "vestiges" ? If those "vestiges" exist, they are not readily apparent to me. I see a very well developed "operational art" in what I've read (cited above); but I do not see "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" until into the 20th century - e.g., Fuller as cited by the Brit LTG in his article.

Regards

Mike

Mike,

I agree that the operational level as we know it emerged in WWI, specifically 1916-18, as the combined arms battlefield.

However, some of what we now lump into operational warfare did emerge during the Napoleonic wars. The French Revolution gave rise to a new era in warfare in the sense that virtually all the resources of the state were mobilized for war. Among the many impacts of this change, two seem salient here. First, it broadened the necessary scope of strategy (to include non-military considerations, such as a state's economic base). Second, it gave rise to huge land forces, and as you say, the rough outlines of modern command echelons began to emerge.

This meant commanders had to coordinate the activities of large units which were not necessarily collocated, and perhaps even in multiple theaters (think US civil war). Furthermore, these activities had to be linked to broader strategic objectives related not just to military means, but to the state itself, as well as the people of the state.

The operational level did not emerge suddenly and totally in the early 1800s, nor did it do so in 1918. Rather, it emerged over a long period of time between Napoleon and WWI. Certainly, it continues to evolve, but the combined arms battlefield of 1918 is not too much different from, say, Desert Storm in 1991.

slapout9

12-23-2010, 12:24 AM

Ack. I was excited to read this until I saw it was by Steven Melton. You might want to read the first 30 pages or so of his book, The Clausewitz Delusion. IMO, he is pretty mixed up and has some very wrong ideas.

However, just my opinion.

I think this will be under the Kindle tree so I will let you know.

jmm99

12-23-2010, 02:41 AM

LTC Melton was the teacher; Cavguy was the student. Some brief (subdued) comments by the latter are here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=84329) (Wilf Bait: The Clausewitz Delusion; post starting thread), here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=106529&postcount=63), and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=112265&postcount=75).

Here is not the place for me to comment on LTC Melton's article, Conceptualizing Victory Anew (http://www.ndu.edu/press/war-and-its-aftermath.html) (2011), which is subtitled "Revisiting U.S. Law, Doctrine, and Policy for War and Its Aftermath" - thus, entering my ballpark.

Basically, Melton mixes military strategy with "grand strategy" (a term he uses; also expressed inter alia as: Policy/Politik; the National Security Strategy; or Beaufre's "total strategy"). I'd argue that the results in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan (whether one calls them victories, half-victories or defeats) were primariily set by Policy/Politik. All four cases involved "first halves" and "second halves" (the latter still being played out in the continuations of OEF and OIF). Tell truth, Melton's article has little content re: either "Law" or "Policy" - and the "Doctrine" discussed is military. The military does not establish Policy/Politik except in the early 1990s science fiction of Charlie Dunlap (one of our great military lawyers, who should visit here), where the military makes a real hash of it.

Like the poltergeist, I'll be back :D - with discussion of agreement with LTG Kiszely re: Jomini and Fuller; and, taking off from that, my summary of what Jomini included in "Strategy", "Grand Tactics" and "Logistics".

Regards

Mike

Dayuhan

12-23-2010, 04:49 AM

His main point is that none of the Iraq governance/occupation debacle should have been a mystery. We planned for 3 years prior to 1945 how we would govern Germany, and it paid off, with similar planning for Japan. If we had started with our 1945 governance regs/books we would have been better off.

He notes that before a country can be effectively occupied its will must be broken, and that our decisive/CoG effort against the Iraqi military failed to break the will of the population prior to occupation.

Certainly the planning for the governance and occupation of Iraq was woefully inadequate and based on some astonishingly inappropriate assumptions... but comparisons to Germany and Japan are unlikely to be useful. The same qualities that made Germany and Japan formidable opponents in war made them excellent candidates for organized reconstruction; likewise the same qualities that made Iraq such a failure at war made it an extremely poor candidate. The obvious difference - the extreme ethnic and sectarian divisions and the hostility produced by extended and brutal minority rule - is only the most obvious of many.

I suspect that failure to break the will of the population to resist our occupation was less an issue than our failure to accurately assess the will of the various sectors of the populace to kill each other.

jmm99

12-23-2010, 05:40 AM

We first look to LTG Kiszerly's comments in regard to a portion of the historical development from Jomini to Fuller (the former with little substantial impact on the latter). We then will look to Jomini's Art of War taken as a whole, in its view of strategy and tactics.

1. Historical View of LTG Kiszely

Here we follow the development and expansion of Jomini's concept of "grand tactics" (which we will then show is something of a red herring in this particular historical kettle of fish). So, we proceed to John Kiszely, Thinking about the Operational Level (http://da.mod.uk/defac/publications/jk.pdf) (2005; HT to ML), pp.38-39 (pp. 1-2 pdf; emphasis added and paragraphs subdivided for ease of reading in this post and references to the endnotes, included here as subquotes):

A level between the tactical and strategic had also been identified by Baron Jomini, writing in the 1830s: a level he termed grand tactics. Jomini was much admired and quoted by many British military writers, such as E. B. Hamley, so that Jomini’s concept of ‘grand tactics’ was well known to the military establishment: for example, at the Staff College where Hamley was the commandant from 1870 to 1878. An instructor there at the end of the nineteenth century was the military historian, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, who developed his own ideas of ‘grand tactics’ which he defined as ‘the higher art’ of generalship, ‘those stratagems, manoeuvres and devices by which victories are won’.[4]

4. Brian Holden Reid, Studies in British Military Thought. Debates with Fuller and Liddel Hart,(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), p.67 & 70.

But the greatest development of thinking in Britain about this level resulted from the work of J. F. C. Fuller. He, too, used the term grand tactics, which, in his 1926 book, The Foundations of the Science of War, he described as ‘the plan of the war or campaign…[which] secures military action by converging all means of waging war towards gaining a decision’. [5]

5. J. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, (London: Hutchinson, 1926) pp 107-108.

He subsequently defined grand tactics as ‘the organization and distribution of the fighting forces themselves in order to accomplish the grand strategic plan, or idea’, [6] which is a long way from Jomini’s rather prosaic concept [7] and comes close indeed to our definition of the operational level today.

6. Holden Reid, op cit, p.65. See Chapter 5 ‘Fuller and the Operational Level’.

7. ‘Grand tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map.’ Baron Jomini, The Art of War, (London: Greenhill Books, 1996), p.69. According to Holden Reid, Jomini’s influence on Fuller was ‘negligible’, op cit, p.66.

Grand tactics, as defined by Jomini (as opposed to Henderson's and Fuller's later extensions), was based on tactical combinations, which linked tactics to operations and campaigns. Since the latter were expressly part of Jomini's strategy construct, it is true that grand tactics linked tactics and starategy. But, grand tactics were not part of operations and campaigns in Jomini's construct of the "art of war".

2. Summary of Jomin's Construct

Jomini's "The Art of War" is sometimes translated as "Summary of the Art of War". The original French ("Précis") may translate better to "handbook" than "summary"; but this relatively slim book was indeed a "summary" of Jomini's military studies and experiences as a staff officer expressed in prior multiple volumes.

The 1862 West Point Preface recommends starting with "Strategy" (Chap III) and then proceeding through the following chapters before returning to Chaps I and II. The first two chapters are concerned with the political and moral aspects of war (more akin to Policy/Politik and National Security Strategy, though those terms absent from Jomini - so also "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" are absent).

Following the advice from That Place on the Hudson, we will start with Chap III, entitled "Strategy" and subtitled "Definition of Strategy and the Fundamental Principle of War", which begins::

The art of war, independently of its political and moral relations, consists of five principal parts, viz: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the Art of the Engineer. We will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them. In order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a general when war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highest importance, as a plan of campaign, and afterwards descends to the necessary details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formation and handling of a great army. (p.59)

We will follow Jomini's structure in his presentation of the first three "principal parts" of war, Strategy, Grand Tactics and Logistics. We continue with what the "strategic general" does first:

We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the character of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war, and select the most suitable base of operations, taking into consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies. (p.59)

Jomini then continues with this simplified model war with introduction of a number of "terms of art" that are later much more fully described (pp.60-61). He then lists 13 points that are embraced by strategy (pp.61-62), which define the limits of his purely strategical construct. He also lists "other operations of a mixed nature" (river crossings through winter quarters) "the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy." (p.62). He also lists the 8 general objects of Grand Tactics (pp.62-63), after reiterating the differences between Strategy, Grand Tactics and Logistics:

The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises.

To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contra-distinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; Logistics brings the troops to this point; Grand Tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops. (p.62)

This introduction ends with the "Fundamental Principle of War" (pp.63-64) - basically: git thar firstest with the mostest.

The remainder of Chap III is captioned "Of Strategic Operations" (p.65) and is following by Arts. XVI-XXIX, which are expressly concerned witn operations.

Chap IV is titled "Grand Tactics and Battles" and continues in more specifics in Chap VII, “Of the Formation of Troops for Battle, and the Separate or Combined Use of the Three Arms"; again defining Grand Tactics:

Grand Tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress, The guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of startegy, is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession of which promises the most important results. (p.161)

Chap V is titled "Of Several Mixed Operations, Which Are in Character Partly Strategical and Partly Tactical".

The foregoing establishes that Jomini separated Strategy (including Operations) from Tactics (where Grand Tactics consisted of tactical combinations); knew Mixed Operations (Strategical-Tactical); and knew Logistics which supported both Strategy and Tactics depending on the context. His "operational art" (which was well developed in his system) was part of his strategical construct, except in a limited number of "Mixed Operations" (where "the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy"; see p.62).

Regards

Mike

12-23-2010, 01:19 PM

The villain here may be planning, or the application of doctrine to a given problem. The whole idea of "planning" in a military sense is formulating a solution for a given problem from beginning to end before any action has been taken.
I submit that one ought not to apply doctrine to solve a problem. Rather one ought to use doctrine as a way of informing one's thinking about a problem. However, doctrine ("what is taught" as Wilf so often reminds us) is only part of what one ought to apply to gain better understanding. Doctrine is that subcategory of the realm of common sense that is unique, in this case, to military knowledge. We each have a host of other pieces of knowledge, AKA common sense, from other frames of reference that should also be brought to bear.

Contrary to the assertion in the second sentence above, planning is not creating "a soup to nuts" (my paraphrase of "from beginning to end") solution to a problem. Instead, planning identifies a number of alternative steps that may make sense to start resolving a problem, based on one's current understanding of that problem. One is unlikely to have perfect understanding of a problem; and problems tend not to be static (that is, they morph as they are addressed--a variation on Heisenberg's discovery that to measure is to distort). Therefore, good planning includes the understanding that what is proposed is only a first approximation of the early steps in a way ahead. Additionally, good execution recognizes that any plan has limitations.

The Cynefin framework is a useful tool for categorizing problems (http://www.slideshare.net/kdelarue/keith-de-la-rue-cynefin-03-presentation).

http://www.hlswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Cynefin-Adapted.jpg

You will see that simple and complicated problems lend themselves to the sort of planning espoused by many military professionals: sense the problem, categorize/analyze it, and apply the appropriate doctrinal solution*based on previous analysis/categorization. Unfortunately, most military problems are not simple or complicated, but trend toward complex. In the case of complex problems, "planning" as we know it is less useful than acting, making sense of the response, then adapting. Obviously, a dogmatic adherence to doctrine precludes this sort of adaptive process.
*emphasis added by WM.

The quoted post included a very nice four-fold division (Bentham must be spinning his grave) of the problem set. However, it relies on a presumption that the relationship known as cause and effect holds--a premise that David Hume, among others, would contest vigorously. Additionally, by the very simplistic assertions, it seems to imply a one-to one mapping between effects and causes. I submit that generally a given problem had a multiple reasons for arising and that its resolution will also require multiple, and quite different, efforts. And, again, the bolded text points to the wrong way to apply doctrine IMHO.

M.L.

12-23-2010, 03:16 PM

I submit that one ought not to apply doctrine to solve a problem. Rather one ought to use doctrine as a way of informing one's thinking about a problem....

Contrary to the assertion in the second sentence above, planning is not creating "a soup to nuts" (my paraphrase of "from beginning to end") solution to a problem....

The quoted post included a very nice four-fold division (Bentham must be spinning his grave) of the problem set. However, it relies on a presumption that the relationship known as cause and effect holds--a premise that David Hume, among others, would contest vigorously...

Just to be clear, I wasn't advocating the use of doctrine or planning as I articulated it. I was actually trying to point out how these concepts are commonly misused.

Also, there are systems in which cause/effect is not only straightforward, but predictable. However, these are usually mechanical, and to a lesser extent, biological systems. Hume wrote specifically about human rationality and knowledge, i.e. sociocultural (human) systems. These systems, Hume would agree, rarely display cause and effect as such. In fact, Dr. Russ Ackoff contended that there was no such thing in sociocultural systems due to the presence of choice (free will). Instead, he suggested the human systems consist of actions (no cause necessary), reactions ("effect" where an action is both necessary and sufficient), and response (where an action is necessary but not sufficient, however, someone chooses to act).

I would also contend that there is more to a complex or chaotic system than perceptions of cause and effect, namely emergence, co-evolution, etc...

Just wanted to clarify my own position on the matter...

M.L.

01-03-2011, 07:13 PM

Well, I couldn't just let this thread die a graceful death. So, as my latest inflammatory comment, I offer yet more evidence that the consideration of resources is central to strategy.

Robert H. Kohn writes the following in the most recent issue of Army History (http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/AH78%28W%29.pdf):

The challenge to military professionalism in the twenty-first century lies in three interconnected areas. The first is intellectual: the ability to wage war successfully in a variety of circumstances without wasting the ives of soldiers or their equipment and supplies (which are always limited, even for a superpower at the zenith of its relative strength).

Later in the article, Kohn explicitly states that this is a strategy issue:

A failure in the first area—strategy—is obviously the most dangerous.

This seems to validate the Ends/Ways/Means construct (where Mean=Resources) as previously discussed.

Happy New Year all.

slapout9

01-03-2011, 07:24 PM

In fact, Dr. Russ Ackoff contended that there was no such thing in sociocultural systems due to the presence of choice (free will). Instead, he suggested the human systems consist of actions (no cause necessary), reactions ("effect" where an action is both necessary and sufficient), and response (where an action is necessary but not sufficient, however, someone chooses to act).

While I am a fan of Dr. Ackoff the free will concept is pretty questionable. People are conditioned through Religion,Education,Family,etc. to the point that I would say free will is a pretty rare thing.

slapout9

01-03-2011, 07:26 PM

This seems to validate the Ends/Ways/Means construct (where Mean=Resources) as previously discussed.

Happy New Year all.

Of course it means that. We even have ways and means committees in Congress which is why it will never change:D. However I do think CvC meant Fighting (tactics) when he talked means, at least that is my understanding.

Infanteer

01-03-2011, 08:34 PM

Agreed with Slapout - I just reread the first 3 books of On War and I see "Means" as the application of violence through the engagement to meet the strategy.

Resources seemed to be lumped in with the preparation of forces for the fight, lying outside of the Ends-Ways-Means construct.

That being said, Ends-Ways-Means is simply a tool as Clausewitz saw it. You can define a new Ends-Ways-Means tool that includes resources, but some would say you're muddying the waters of essential definitions.

M.L.

01-03-2011, 10:04 PM

Gents,

I'd refer you back to our German friend Fuchs who aptly pointed out that the German word used in on war has a dual meaning of both methods and tools (resources). Furthermore, you'll note that CvC uses the word in both these contexts in On War. The modern construct delineates these two concepts into separate concepts for clarity. So, the modern ends/ways/means is in keeping with CvC's idea, just not his phraseology.

Bob's World

01-03-2011, 11:38 PM

Speaking of "Ends-Ways-Means", someone help me understand this as it applies to AFPAK.

When I go to what the President of the United States says the "Ends" are, he says quite clearly that it is:

“To disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

As to "Ways" we have the ISAF Mission:

"In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population."

As to "Means", we have ISAF itself.

I guess my question is, in what universe do the Ways laid out in the ISAF mission lead to the Ends laid out by the President of the US??

M.L.

01-04-2011, 02:43 AM

I guess my question is, in what universe do the Ways laid out in the ISAF mission lead to the Ends laid out by the President of the US??

Aha. Now THAT is a fantastic question, which goes right to the heart of the "strategy" in Af/Pak.

As I have often said, strategy is complex, but at its heart is the ends/ways/means equation. Achieving political ends with the military methods and resources available. All three must be linked and balanced.

I'd say the fact that your question must be asked is an indicator of a major strategic shortcoming.

jmm99

01-04-2011, 03:18 AM

I thought you were familiar with that universe ;) - The White House, specifically the Office of the Press Secretary (For Immediate Release, December 01, 2009), Fact Sheet: The Way Forward in Afghanistan (http://m.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/way-forward-afghanistan):

OUR MISSION: The President’s speech reaffirms the March 2009 core goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan. To do so, we and our allies will surge our forces, targeting elements of the insurgency and securing key population centers, training Afghan forces, transferring responsibility to a capable Afghan partner, and increasing our partnership with Pakistanis who are facing the same threats. ... [etc., etc.]

No mention of drones, direct actions or of any "attack plan" (except by AQ vs US) in this one or in this one, The Way Forward in Afghanistan (http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/defense/afghanistan).

Welcome to the wonderful universe of politics and policy.

Regards

Mike

PS: You know better than I that the stated end is being furthered by a continuation of OEF (e.g., drones, direct actions), divorced from ISAF.

Pete

01-04-2011, 03:45 AM

Perching on the western edge of the Missouri River, Fort Leavenworth had been the home of the Infantry and Cavalry School since 1881. The initial purpose of the school was to train lieutenants for duties in units larger than companies. By 1893, the school’s curriculum had expanded to a two-year program taught by seven academic departments within what was now called the General Service and Staff College. The Department of Military Art taught classes in international law and military history, and the faculty used map problems to teach strategy and grand tactics at the corps, division and brigade levels. [italics added]
Almost as though by serendipity the other day SWJ Blog had an entry about Major General Fox Connor, the chief of operations of the AEF during the First World War. The quotation above is from an AUSA Land Power monogaph on General Connor by Major Ed Cox, who recently published a full-length biography of Connor.

My reason for posting is that in its context "grand tactics" in the above excerpt might be construed as being a sort of operational level of warfare. I'm ambivalent about this debate -- I really don't give a damn whether the U.S. Army has two or three levels of warfare, provided of course that the job gets done.

The 2001 version of Field Manual 3-0 had a really incoherent explanation of what the operational level was. I got the distinct impression when I read it that Fort Leavenworth tried to include all of the comments it had received on DA Form 2028 from the staff review of the draft manual -- hence what may have once been a useful definition of the operational level in the draft was rambling and all over the map in the published version. (If Fort Leavenworth won't defend its own version why should any of us care?) I haven't seen the current version of the manual and don't know how it defines the operational level or how useful that description is.

jmm99

01-04-2011, 04:21 AM

From the 2008 FM 3-0 (3 page snip of 6-1 thru 6-3 attached) at p. 6-1, para 6.3:

The levels of war define and clarify the relationship between strategy, operational approach, and tactical actions (See figure 6-1, page 6-2). The levels have no finite limits or boundaries. They correlate to specific levels of responsibility and planning. They help organize thought and approaches to a problem. .....

Cheers

Mike

Pete

01-04-2011, 05:24 AM

I'd say the fact that your question must be asked is an indicator of a major strategic shortcoming.
I doubt there is any formal mechanism that compels policy-makers at the national level to formally notify the Pentagon of every shift in foreign policy -- for that matter, nothing requires the White House press secretary to clear his statements in advance with DoD before they're announced to the public. It goes back to the extent to which different parts of the government are on the same sheet of music. President Obama didn't want an unseemingly abrupt withdrawal frm Afghanistan, but he didn't want to have the surge either. This disconnect between the Pentagon and White House has been known for months.

slapout9

01-04-2011, 02:49 PM

“To disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

See that is exactly what I am talking about....that statement guarantees TOTAL Strategic failure! Al Qaeda is NOT a country, when you think in terms of countries you will loose.....they just move to Yeman(kant spelt stuff two gud)or anyplace else thay can find a support group.

Xenophon67

03-16-2011, 05:00 AM

"However brave a nation may be, however warlike its habits, however intense its hatred of the enemy, however favourable the nature of the country, it is an undeniable fact that a people's war cannot be kept up in an atmosphere too full of danger. If, therefore, its combustible material is to be fanned by any means into a considerable flame it must be at remote points where there is more air, and where it cannot be extinguished by one great blow." Clausewitz, On War, Chapter XXVI

Perhaps the Taliban do not fit exactly into the 'people's war' mold, however, I think this mainly unread chapter holds some weight when discussing the validity of CvC in Afghanistan.

Clearly, the number of dead civilians will not determine victory - absurd. Body counts...attrition...where is Bob McNamara when you need him?

Center of Gravity - elusive no doubt, lost in the fog of war, once 'found' does planning and execution fall victim to friction and the opportunity lost again - perhaps. CoGs do exist, they are viable, yet to muster the resources and especially the will to relentlessly attack them is another matter altogether.

Regardless of the means - the way to reach an end state is to make the 'atmosphere too dangerous' and to take the 'air' away.... Enough with the metaphors.

Population-centric COIN advocates need to rethink the CoG identification of the civilians as the singular source of Taliban power.

However costly (and probably unrealistic) it might be to seal off/control the border- it must be done. Simultaneously, totally eradicate the poppy fields. Then the Taliban are truly without air to breath, the very essence that gives them strength is gone.

"From this it follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim of warfare." Clausewitz, On War, Chapter 1

Sealing off the border (Algeria-Maurice Line) stops the influx of insurgents, arms and transport of opium. Destruction of the opium eliminates the money to pay the insurgents, buy the arms and bribe officials. Even if this effort is not totally successful it will lead to a culminating point whereby an 'overthrow' can occur, their resources denied to them, their air gone - a dangerous atmosphere indeed.

Victory - well how about after the overthrow an opponent 'pinned' to the ground. Perhaps it is best to talk about management of the conflict, on our terms, in our favor.

Good posts - very thought provoking. I am going back to scour CvC.....

kowalskil

04-21-2011, 10:20 PM

That's an interesting one. The Soviets killed roughly 5-6% of the total population of Afghanistan and drove another 20% into exile in Iran and Pakistan. I'm having a bit of trouble remembering if they were successful, anyone?

I do not think they benefitted from that war. In fact, it contributed to the end of the USSR.

Ludwik Kowalski
.

Bill Moore

04-21-2011, 11:32 PM

I can't recall the books, but there were two that I recall reading that claimed the insurgents were ready to call it quits due to the brutal and effective tactics the Soviets were employing and this was according to the insurgents themselves. Maybe, or maybe not, I'm simply presenting a counterargument. It was clear that the introduction of the Stinger changed the character of the war in favor of the insurgents.

Oppressive and brutal COIN operations have been proven to work repeatedly, while half stepping has a very bad track record of success. I'm not advocating we forfeit our morals to crush another country's insurgent problem, but to claim that they "can't" kill their way out of the situation is misleading. In most cases they certainly can, but to do so would be a violation of international law and norms, a Pyrrhic victory, so we encourage them to pursue other strategies.

SWJ Blog

05-21-2011, 12:15 PM

From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/05/from-mars-to-minerva-clausewit/)

Entry Excerpt:

From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War
by Tony Corn

Download the Full Article: From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/767-corn.pdf)

A decade after 9/11, the absurdity of the U.S. grand strategy in the Long War is never better illustrated than by the fact that Washington currently spends $ 100 billion dollars a year in Afghanistan chasing a grand total of 100 Al Qaeda fighters (one billion per terrorist). If there is only one reason to rediscover Liddell Hart today, it is because, as Sir Ernest Rutherford famously said in a different context: “We are running out of money, gentlemen. It’s time to start thinking.”

Download the Full Article: From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/767-corn.pdf)

Dr. Tony Corn taught European Studies at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute in Washington DC.

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SWJ Blog

05-25-2011, 12:10 PM

Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/05/reflections-on-clausewitz-and/)

Entry Excerpt:

Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army
by Christopher Otero

Download the Full Article:Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/772-otero.pdf)

One of the most intellectually challenging moments in the United States Command and General Staff College is when after 10 years of serving in an Army at War you are finally introduced to the two major theorists of modern warfare, Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl Von Clausewitz. Both are considered to be the most prominent theorists of the western way of warfare and the question that often gets framed by our instructors is which of these two best inform your understanding of modern war? Do you consider yourself Jominian or Clausewitzian in your outlook?

Download the Full Article:Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/772-otero.pdf)

MAJ Christopher Otero, USA, is an active duty military intelligence officer who has served multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq at the Battalion, Brigade Combat Team, and Division level. MAJ Otero is currently attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect the position of the United States Army or the Department of Defense.

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davidbfpo

08-29-2011, 07:33 PM

Hat tip to Zenpundit for linking a talk our Wilf gave in May 2011, enjoy:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4288

Scroll down to bottom of the article.

Bill Moore

08-30-2011, 04:48 PM

David, thanks for the link, it was an interesting presentation. Although he probably posted in SWJ, I just don't recall seeing it, but his comment that war changes very slowly, but politics change all the time (thus shaping the way the war is fought) was helpful to me in framing the debate.

OfTheTroops

08-31-2011, 09:25 PM

Just a fledgling but did he not just id the COG as attrition of x percent of the population. Upon attaining said attrition the will of the enemy will be broken.

And Punitive campaigns are not Sherman's (American) strategy its Rome's strategery.

As for external actors modifying a people. Isnt that what conquerors do. I am pretty sure as you all have said post mcarthur japan, post Iskander iraq hell Istanbul now Constantinople Constantinople is now Istanbul

May the right ways find the right ends(ours). And politically total war is a high state of war That table sets itself. If the cold war went hot we woulda seen total war. It has to be costly for the people to find it necessary.

tequila

08-31-2011, 11:46 PM

I can't recall the books, but there were two that I recall reading that claimed the insurgents were ready to call it quits due to the brutal and effective tactics the Soviets were employing and this was according to the insurgents themselves. Maybe, or maybe not, I'm simply presenting a counterargument. It was clear that the introduction of the Stinger changed the character of the war in favor of the insurgents.

Note that the Soviets had already decided to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1985 (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%203%201985-10-17%20Chernyaev%20Diary.pdf), before the introduction of the Stinger missile. To put it in terms of American politics, they'd already reached their Tet '68 moment and were groping towards "Vietnamization".

Bill Moore

08-31-2011, 11:59 PM

tequila, I was aware of that, but I don't think the reason was due to anything like a Tet offensive, but rather a realization that no good was going to come out of a continued occupation. The Soviets didn't suffer any major military defeats prior to 85 that I can recall. People object strongly when I propose we had similiar (far from identical) strategies, and while they didn't call it clear, hold and build, I can interpret their actions as such. They also had pockets of success, just we did.

According to a former KGB agent, the Soviets reportedly reached out the U.S. asking for some relief in Afghanistan, claiming that the West (to include the USSR) faced a common threat from Islamists. If true, they called that one correctly.

Fuchs

09-01-2011, 04:28 AM

Note that the Soviets had already decided to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1985 (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%203%201985-10-17%20Chernyaev%20Diary.pdf), before the introduction of the Stinger missile. To put it in terms of American politics, they'd already reached their Tet '68 moment and were groping towards "Vietnamization".

Did you expect Americans to have ever getting involved much in a conflict before it was too late to be decisive without screwing it up? ;)

SWJ Blog

05-15-2012, 10:00 AM

Clausewitz and the Non-State Actor: A Contemporary Application of the Paradoxical Trinity to Countering Terrorism (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/clausewitz-and-the-non-state-actor-a-contemporary-application-of-the-paradoxical-trinity-to)

Entry Excerpt:

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jmm99

07-25-2012, 12:59 AM

http://clausewitzforkids.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/2-1-11.jpeg?w=403&h=681

From The Children's Illustrated Clausewitz (http://clausewitzforkids.wordpress.com/);

from start:

Guten Morgen, class. This week, we will be talking about the theory of war. We will be talking about how we define and classify the art of war and the science of war, and how we develop and study and analyze the theory of war. You must please listen very carefully to be sure that you understand. Some of this is quite hard to explain. ...

to end:

-What are ‘resources?’

Your resources are made up of your fighting forces – your men – and the country, the land and the people and things on it. In war, the result is never final. Things can always change. And things are different in theory than they are in reality. Yes, Otter?

-What’s ‘theory’ mean?

Not a bad question, kid; not a bad question at all.

Regards

Mike

Tukhachevskii

07-25-2012, 08:24 AM

I really don't have a dog in this fight, but to me, when we discuss the operational level of war, it is not how Corps fight; rather it is the scope of the fight that one traditionally assigns a Division, Corps or even an Army, to handle. That scope is often regionally/terrain defined; but could be defined by some functional characteristics as well.

How a Corps fights, well, as Wilf clearly states. That is tactics.

That basically accords with Soviet/Russian doctrine too. Strategy and Operations refered to territorial/geographic expressions within which even an Army or frnt level action was considered tactics whe in contact. I find that Soviet doctrine was much more rigourous in its conceptual usage. Though over-reliance on concepts warps reality knowing what they mean can be an important part of the cognitive cement that binds armies together (unlike SOD! which I think no-one understands outsdie the small psuedo-intelletucal beret wearers who formulated it:rolleyes:).

Fuchs

07-25-2012, 12:41 PM

What counts is the utility of the word.

To have a special word makes only sense if its content is distinct from the content of an alternative word.

The challenges faced by a modern corps commander or his WW2 equivalent, an army commander, are different than the challenges faced by a brigade commander.
Logistics play a greater role, fixed values become variables (such as through the ability to influence the theatre air war), geography and time are to be considered on another level. An army commander concerns himself with the question where to cross a river and what to do next, while a brigade commander is concerned with how to cross the river and how to get his folks over it in time to proceed.

You cannot expect much success if you take the classic tactics of a battalion and simply interpolate to Corps level. You need different stuff, and said different stuff should be identified with a different term.

I don't care much whether you call it "grand tactics", "operational art" or differently, but "operational art" happens to be the widespread term for it and this makes it first choice for communication. The choice has been made already, so there's little to gain by discussing language since the differences warrant a different term as laid out before.

SWJ Blog

10-03-2012, 10:14 AM

Carl von Clausewitz, Meet Albert Einstein and Max Planck (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/carl-von-clausewitz-meet-albert-einstein-and-max-planck)

Entry Excerpt:

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Jrizzuto77

10-23-2012, 07:38 PM

Jomini's view on the role of intelligence is prescriptive. In Jomini's, The Art of War, Article XLII, he discusses the role of intelligence. According to Jomini, "one of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war is to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the proceedings." Jomini, is specifically talking about the critical importance of analyzing your adversary's relative strengths and weaknesses in order to gain an advantage.
**The views expressed in this are those of MAJ Rizzuto, Command and General Staff College, and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of the Army, DoD or the US Government. **

Fuchs

10-23-2012, 07:54 PM

Jomini's view on the role of intelligence is prescriptive. In Jomini's, The Art of War, Article XLII, he discusses the role of intelligence. According to Jomini, "one of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war is to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the proceedings." Jomini, is specifically talking about the critical importance of analyzing your adversary's relative strengths and weaknesses in order to gain an advantage.

Sounds nice, but Marshal Suvorov didn't care about this and never lost a battle.

Besides, research has revealed that we humans are idiots. We stick to our first impression, and info that arrives later only reinforces said impression - even if it's factually in conflict. This kind of undermines whatever sense a huge analytical effort makes in theory.

jmm99

10-23-2012, 09:37 PM

Sumida wrote his book, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to "On War" (http://www.amazon.com/Decoding-Clausewitz-Approach-Modern-Studies/dp/0700616160/ref=tmm_hrd_title_0) (2008); book review (http://www.clausewitz.com/bibl/Klinger-ReviewSumidaDecodingClausewitz.html) by Janeen Klinger, Professor of Political Science, US Army War College.

Sumida's 2002 (pre-book) syllabus for his Clausewitz course (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Sumida/SumidaSyl.htm), requires besides "On War" (P & H version), these refs:

Guy Claxton, Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind: How Intelligence Increases When You Think Less (http://www.amazon.com/Hare-Brain-Tortoise-Mind-Intelligence/dp/0880016221/ref=tmm_hrd_title_0) (New York: Harper Collins, 1997). A biography of my brain written by Claxton with my full tortoise-like co-operation.

Jon Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (http://www.amazon.com/Inventing-Grand-Strategy-Teaching-Command/dp/0801858003/ref=tmm_hrd_title_0) (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997; paperback 1999).

Jon Sumida, “The Relationship between History and Theory in On War: the Clausewitzian Ideal and Its Implications,” (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Sumida/SumidaJMH1.htm) Journal of Military History, 65 (April 2001): 333-54. Re this article, you might want to look at Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War," (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Beyerchen/CWZandNonlinearity.htm) International Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992), pp. 59-90.

For anyone who is interested enough to actually work through this syllabus, Strassler's redo in The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (http://www.amazon.com/The-Landmark-Thucydides-Comprehensive-Peloponnesian/dp/0684828154/ref=tmm_hrd_title_0), will probably be useful for review of basic power concepts.

Regards

Mike