The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[SWJED]

Moderator's Note

Eighteen threads, many very small, a few large, have been merged into one, Just found a 2010 thread Applying Clausewitz to Insurgency (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6743&highlight=clausewitz) and merged that in. October 2015 three threads merged in; one thread remains outside - as it is in a Members Only forum(ends).


Armed Forces Journal commentary - Clausewitz and World War IV (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/07/1866019) by MG Robert Scales, US Army (ret.).


The essence of every profession is expressed in the writings of its unifying theorists: Freud for psychology, Adam Smith on economics, Justice Marshall on law, and — depending on one's preferences — Marx or Jefferson on governance. War is no exception. The 19th-century Prussian writer Carl von Clausewitz is regarded as a prophet whose views on the character and nature of war have held up best over the past two centuries.

Periodically, changes in the culture, technology, economics or demographics induce movements to revise the classic masters. After the Great Depression, Keynes amended Smith, behavioralists supplanted Freud, Marshall gave way to Oliver Holmes, who eventually surrendered to the revisionist doctrines of Hugo Black and Earl Warren. The profession of arms, perhaps more than any other profession, has been — is "blessed" the right word? — by intellectual revisionists more frequently perhaps because armed conflict is the most complex, changeable and unpredictable of all human endeavors. And history has shown, tragically, that failure to amend theories of conflict in time has had catastrophic consequences for the human race.

Changes in theories of war come most often during periods of historical discontinuity. Events after 9/11 clearly show that we are in such a period now. Unfortunately, contemporary revisionists to the classical master have not been well treated in today's practical laboratory of real war. In the moment before Sept. 11, 2001, the great hope was that technology would permit the creation of new theories of war. This view, influenced by the historical successes of the U.S. in exploiting technology, has been carried to extremes by some proponents of "effects-based and net-centric operations." These true believers visualized that sensors, computers and telecommunications networks would "lift the fog of war." They postulated that victory would be assured when admirals and generals could sit on some lofty perch and use networks to see, sense and kill anything that moved about the battlefield. Actions of the enemy in Iraq have made these techno-warriors about as credible today as stockbrokers after the Great Depression.

Theory abhors a vacuum as much as nature, so newer revisionists have popped up in profusion to fill the void left by the collapse of technocentric theories of war. One philosophy proposes to build a new theory of war around organizational and bureaucratic efficiency. Build two armies, so the proponents argue, one to fight and the other to administer, and the new age of more flexible and adaptive military action will begin. Another group of theorists seeks to twist the facts of history into a pattern that brings us to a fourth generation of warfare, one that makes all Clausewitzian theories of state-on-state warfare obsolete. Thus Western states are threatened by an amorphous, globally based insurgent movement. The inconvenience of Middle Eastern states collapsing and reforming in the midst of a state-dependent terrorist environment makes this fourth generationalist assault on the master difficult to sustain, if not actually embarrassing.

To be generous, each of these revisions contains some elements of truth. But none satisfies sufficiently to give confidence that Clausewitz can be amended, much less discarded. To be sure, networks and sensors are useful, even against terrorists, particularly in ground warfare at the tactical level. Armies should be reorganized to fight irregular wars more efficiently. And the influence of the state in irregular war must be revised to accommodate the realities of nonstate threats or, perhaps more accurately, not-yet-state threats; Osama bin Laden's first desire is for his own caliphate, or even emirate. But at the end of the day — and in light of the bitter experiences of recent years — it's clear that none of these rudimentary attempts at revision possesses the intellectual heft or durability to challenge the tenets of the classic master of conflict theory...Follow the link for much more. Hat Tip to John at the OPFOR Blog (http://www.op-for.com/).

[zenpundit]

In the moment before Sept. 11, 2001, the great hope was that technology would permit the creation of new theories of war. This view, influenced by the historical successes of the U.S. in exploiting technology, has been carried to extremes by some proponents of "effects-based and net-centric operations." These true believers visualized that sensors, computers and telecommunications networks would "lift the fog of war." They postulated that victory would be assured when admirals and generals could sit on some lofty perch and use networks to see, sense and kill anything that moved about the battlefield.

I'm pretty sure that Art Cebrowski never put it that way and that he was primarily ( and sensibly) concerned with systemically maximizing a comparative advantage in high tech possessed by the United States. Nothing wrong with that and a major reason why no state desires to go toe to toe with the United States in a conventional war. At no point that I'm aware of did Cebrowski ever say that network-centric warfare would be a blank check for American omnipotence or shag shadowy terror cells out of a civilian populace.

Every theorist has disciples who are so enamored of the strengths of their cherished ideas that they develop blind spots.

[Tom Odom]

n the moment before Sept. 11, 2001, the great hope was that technology would permit the creation of new theories of war.

And in 1992 MG Scales leaned that way himself as we wrote Certain Victory--against the recommendations of some of us--and later in writing Yellow Smoke. I remember reading passages that praised "just in time logistics" as the way ofthe future and declarations that "reach back capablities would mean that intelligence and other administrative functions" could best be done from the rear.

As for Clausewitz et al, classical studies are great and everyone here knows that I believe in studying history as measure of reality. But Clausewitz was not Moses and as far as I know he didn't speak to a burning bush. General Scales sees anything related to EBO as heresy; he has his points in that debate but so do EBO proponents.

At the tactical level, effects can and do work if the interoperative system of assessment and intelligence work closely, especially in a COIN environment where non-lethal is often the means of choice.

Best
Tom

[Tc2642]

Theory abhors a vacuum as much as nature, so newer revisionists have popped up in profusion to fill the void left by the collapse of technocentric theories of war. One philosophy proposes to build a new theory of war around organizational and bureaucratic efficiency. Build two armies, so the proponents argue, one to fight and the other to administer, and the new age of more flexible and adaptive military action will begin. Another group of theorists seeks to twist the facts of history into a pattern that brings us to a fourth generation of warfare, one that makes all Clausewitzian theories of state-on-state warfare obsolete.

I am rather perplexed by this, Clausewitz, never said that 'State on State Warfare' was the be and end all of war theory, neither is 4GW diametrically opposed to Clausewitzian theory, in fact I believe the two theories are rather complementary to each other. Anyone who reads, 'Unrestricted warfare', will see how a state can conduct 4GW against another state.

[Bill Moore]

Tc I have read "Unrestricted Warfare" and concur with your line of thought as far as you expressed it. 4GW can be used to supplement conventional strategies, or used in place of them. I think both the U.S. and USSR employed elements of 4GW against one another, but they were always ready to ramp it up to mutual assured destruction, so in effect the MAD strategy as strange as it sounds had a moderating effect. I think this is where the non-state and state actor employing 4GW differ.

The State actor has centers of gravity that are vulnerable to conventional military attacks, especially by a superior hostile military force. This means State actors will “normally” employ 4GW with a measure of restraint, because they likely do not want to escalate the conflict to the point that they are on the receiving end of conventional military strikes against their security forces and economic infrastructure. Libya was a perfect example of a State employing 4GW that crossed the threshold and was severely punished.

Iran is using 4GW against Israel via a number of surrogate groups. Personally I think Israel is pursuing the wrong strategy to counter it, although there are very few, if any, good options. Maybe the best option is to punish the State sponsoring these attacks? Iran is playing an incredibly dangerous game of brinkmanship with their activities directed against Israel and the U.S., and thumbing their noses at the West with their alleged nuclear program. I won’t discount the complex problems associated with attacking Iran, but allowing a State to play 4GW at an increasingly dangerous level without any response may be more dangerous.

A State actor employing 4GW is worrisome, but they seem to have some constraints, even the extreme ones like Iran. Non State actors on the other hand will employ 4GW tactics/strategy to the extremes possible because they do not have centers of gravity that are vulnerable to conventional military attacks, thus their risk assessment does not persuade them to only push so far then stop. This was validated today with their latest plot uncovered for non-state actors to employ 4GW to murder up to thousands of civilians by blowing up a number of commercial airliners. If a State committed an attack (a crime) like this there would be a very, very severe price to pay, but a non State organization executes an attack like this secure that we can only escalate the conflict so much, and if we escalate carelessly we’ll play into their hands. If we don’t respond we’ll play into their hands. These people won’t hesitate to use WMD against our citizens, and since conventional war fighting theories do not apply against this type of enemy, I would hope MG Scales would be open to additional methods to frame and address the problems we’re facing, which EBO is only an attempt at. It is a far from perfect attempt at doing so, but it does have some merits that should be pursued. None of us can afford the luxury of being myopic in our use of strategies. Very loosely paraphrasing Bruce Lee’s philosophy, he stated that “the usefulness of a cup is its emptiness, so empty your mind of the traditional dogma, so you can learn”. Maybe the paraphrase isn’t even close, but you get my point .

[Tc2642]

None of us can afford the luxury of being myopic in our use of strategies. Very loosely paraphrasing Bruce Lee’s philosophy, he stated that “the usefulness of a cup is its emptiness, so empty your mind of the traditional dogma, so you can learn”. Maybe the paraphrase isn’t even close, but you get my point .

Definitley, I always think that there is a divide between "traditional" camps of thought, usually defined along Clausewitzian lines, and the "non traditional", with the likes of 4GW, netwar, etc. What seems to have happened is that Clausewitizians have seen works like "The Transformation of War" and seeing Creveld's misinterpretation of the "Remarkable Trinity" seem to associate all 4GW theorists as falling into the same trap, and on the other side of the coin, the 4GW theorists seem (in some instances) to have viewed Clausewitz in a far too dogmatic fashion and seemingly state centric (again some Clausewitzians may also be guilty of this fault)

[Strickland]

For the record, Clausewitz defined Absolute War in two ways, one of which was "peoples war," akin to that which he was familiar with in Spain from 1808. Based on this definition, this would mean that Iraq is an absolute war.

[Tc2642]

For the record, Clausewitz defined Absolute War in two ways, one of which was "peoples war," akin to that which he was familiar with in Spain from 1808. Based on this definition, this would mean that Iraq is an absolute war.

The other part of Clausewitz's idea of Absolute war is based in philosophy and pure theory, because Clausewitz used the "absolute" in a Kantian ideal sense of the word, being that in theory there is an ideal absolute but we live in reality and therfore cannot achive this ideal.

There is a good piece by Bruce Fleming which I have recently scanned through called "Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?" which gives a good insight, I have read most of On War but the text can be very confusing and is contradictory in parts, even so I do believe that Clausewitz's theory of war is still unsurpassed and still relevent today.

[Strickland]

I recently attended a lecture by Dr. Sumida (University of Maryland Prof.) concerning Clausewitz's On War. His book, one that he has been working on for 15 years, is due out later this year, and asserts that Peter Paret and Mike Howard were off-base with their assertions in the 1976 translation and accompanying essays. Mike Howard is actually helping him with this work, whicch should be the most definitive study and translation in English yet. The work will teach you how to read Clausewitz, and what it means.

[zenpundit]

should be the most definitive study and translation in English yet. The work will teach you how to read Clausewitz, and what it means.

There must have been something in the water in Germany to produce such a large body of philosophers whose thinking powers were inverse to their writing skills. Clausewitz is far from the worst in that regard. There's also a few exceptions but those philosophers were also poets.

[Merv Benson]

In fairness to Clausewitz, his manuscript was apparently not finished at his death. That suggest that he was not around for the editing process. Nevertheless, he still managed to communicate some insightful things about war.

[Steve Blair]

In fairness to Clausewitz, his manuscript was apparently not finished at his death. That suggest that he was not around for the editing process. Nevertheless, he still managed to communicate some insightful things about war.

Exactly. "On War" was still a work in progress when he died. From what I recall, only the first four books (parts, whatever you want to call them) were really "done" when he died. Still...it's a work that has never really been equalled or surpassed.

And for those who complain that Clausewitz was in places contradictory, he was writing about one of the most complex and contradictory events in human experience. Maybe he just captured its essence well....:)

[Martin]

What do you think about Jomini then?

[Steve Blair]

What do you think about Jomini then?

I think Jomini focused more on the "meat" of conflict as opposed to the theoretical grounding behind it. His decisive battle concept has to a degree (in my view, anyhow) hindered intellectual development on the part of some writers and military leaders. The first sections of "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" has some interesting observations regarding the differences between the two theorists, and I tend to agree with the author in many areas. Jomini seemed to focus more on Napoleonic events while Clausewitz was trying to look beyond that and explain a much larger event.

[Tc2642]

I recently attended a lecture by Dr. Sumida (University of Maryland Prof.) concerning Clausewitz's On War. His book, one that he has been working on for 15 years, is due out later this year, and asserts that Peter Paret and Mike Howard were off-base with their assertions in the 1976 translation and accompanying essays. Mike Howard is actually helping him with this work, which should be the most definitive study and translation in English yet. The work will teach you how to read Clausewitz, and what it means.

Does this mean I will have to spend another two years annotating, underlining and making notes on "On War" again.:eek:

Do you know when the new book is out?

[SWJED]

9 September Real Clear Politics commentary - Clausewitz in Wonderland (http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/09/clausewitz_in_wonderland.html) by Tony Corn.


"Amateurs talk about strategy, professionals talk about logistics." In the five years since the 9/11 events, the old military adage has undergone a "transformation" of its own: Amateurs, to be sure, continue to talk about strategy, but real professionals increasingly talk about -- anthropology.

In Iraq as in Afghanistan, real professionals have learned the hard way that -- to put it in a nutshell -- the injunction "Know Thy Enemy, Know Thyself" matters more than the bookish "Know Thy Clausewitz" taught in war colleges. Know thy enemy: At the tactical and operational levels at least, it is anthropology, not Clausewitzology, that will shed light on the grammar and logic of tribal warfare and provide the conceptual weapons necessary to return fire. Know thyself: It is only through anthropological "distanciation" that the U.S. military (and its various "tribes": Army, Navy, etc.) will become aware of its own cultural quirks -- including a monomaniacal obsession with Clausewitz -- and adapt its military culture to the new enemy.1

The first major flaw of U.S. military culture is of course "technologism" -- this uniquely American contribution to the phenomenon known to anthropologists as "animism." Infatuation with technology has led in the recent past to rhetorical self-intoxication about Network-Centric Warfare and the concomitant neglect of Culture-Centric Warfare. The second structural flaw is a Huntingtonian doctrine of civil-military relations ideally suited for the Cold War but which, given its outdated conception of "professionalism," has outlived its usefulness and is today a major impediment to the necessary constant dialogue between the military and civilians.2

Last but not least, the third major flaw is "strategism." At its "best," strategism is synonymous with "strategy for strategy's sake," i.e., a self-referential discourse more interested in theory-building (or is it hair-splitting?) than policy-making. Strategism would be innocuous enough were it not for the fact that, in the media and academia, "realism" today is fast becoming synonymous with "absence of memory, will, and imagination": in that context, the self-referentiality of the strategic discourse does not exactly improve the quality of the public debate. At its worst, strategism confuses education with indoctrination, and scholarship with scholasticism; in its most extreme form, it comes close to being an "intellectual terrorism" in the name of Clausewitz...

Much more at the link - the above was only the intro...

[aktarian]

Interesting read but I sense some deep hatred toward clausewitz. I wonder why.

Some points:
-He largely ignores Clausewitz's "war is continuation of policy with different means" dictum. Which can be translated into "if you don't have clearly defined long term political goals military actions don't matter". and I think this is main problem in Iraq as golas of "making Iraq democratic" and such are not defined what exactly that means and can mean anything or nothing.
-The article gives the impression that US military is like medrassah where only Clausewitz is taught. while I don't have any first hand experience with such institutions I seriusly doubt this is the case.
-author argues for abandoning Clausewitz. I disagree. He is still relevant though it's necessary to define works that are relevant as well. If you identify guerilla/insurgency/LIC as "next thing" then Mao, Che, Lawrence etc are relevant but Clausewitz should not be ignored. Specially military-policy relations which are extremly important in such conflicts

[CR6]

A lot of post-Vietnam American military thought is informed by the ideas of Clausewitz.

American officers first turned seriously to Clausewitz in an attempt to understand the failure of American policy in Vietnam. Christopher Bassford illustrates this point with the example of the official 1981 Army War College Study on American policy towards Vietnam, On Strategy, authored by Colonel Harry G. Summers. Using Clausewitz’s concept of “the trinity of army, government and people” to demonstrate that the United States had violated Clausewitz’s logic and became involved in Vietnam “without first being clear what (was) intended to be achieved by that war and how (it was to be) conducted.”

On Strategy is an example of the fruit of the armed services’ consideration of On War in the years after Vietnam. As early as 1976, Admiral Stansfield Turner introduced the book to the curriculum of the Naval War College. The Air War College and Army War College followed suit in 1978 and 1981 respectively. As America’s military leaders examined Clausewitz’s theories, his words soon found their way from the seminar rooms of war colleges to the maneuver areas of combat training centers.

At the same time that American war colleges were examining Clausewitz, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), under the leadership of General Donn Starry, was at work developing a doctrine that would allow American forces in Europe, along with their NATO allies, to deal with the threat of the second and third echelon forces of the Warsaw Pact in the event of a conflict against the Soviet Union in Western Europe. The existing doctrine of active defense made no provision for dealing with the battlefield in depth and oriented on terrain rather than enemy forces. General Starry turned his lower ranking “action officers” at the TRADOC installations of Forts Monroe and Leavenworth to develop a doctrine “where the orientation is on the enemy, the action is fluid, and independent action and maneuver could lead to the collapse of the enemy.”

The resulting “AirLand Battle Doctrine”, enunciated in FM 100-5, Operations, contained several of Clausewitz’s concepts. According to Romjue, “Clausewitz's idea that ‘when we speak of destroying the enemy's forces . . . nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces: the moral element must also be considered’" informed AirLand Battle’s offensive tenant of maneuvering strength against weakness through “initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.” Likewise, the defensive concepts of protecting oneself through a “shield of blows” is included in FM-1005, as well as Clausewitzian notions of friction and military action (i.e. war) being the continuation of policy by other means. FM 3-0 retains much this flavor IMO.

So, even if they haven't read On War, a lot of American officers are exposed to Clausewitz through doctrine.

The idea of professionals talking "anthropology" has some merit, but I am unsure of the level of anthropology we can teach to our leaders and troops. Lawrence spent much of his pre-war adulthood on the Arabian penninsula, and was the right man in the right place for the uprising. His success had little to do with officer PME.

[Ironhorse]

Wow. Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play?

I have a soft spot in my heart for old Carl, dialectic approach and all. At one level, he provides a thorough taxonomy. At another, I find his truisms to be generally true. More like the Encyclopedia Britannica than <pick your favorite scholar/pundit with an axe to grind>. And he wrote as excellent historical analysis, not trying to displace Nostradamus or Jean Dixon.

Clausewitz's shortcomings stem less from him than from our own reckless application of his subtle nuances into steadfast bumper-sticker principles. Since he presents the pros and cons of just about all conflict, it is painfully easy to grab a sound bite from him saying whatever you want. And I'm not even one of those "read him in the original German and split hairs about translation" geeks.

Indictments in Tony Corn's commentary re expecting a clean, over-simplified, technological fix to all problems are viable. Symptomatic of American culture today. We've had it too good for too long, and are getting weak. We do, however, have a generation of young warriors who have seen the ugly side of things. I pray that, as they rise in rank, they will apply well the cold hard truths they have learned.

[marct]

Thanks for posting this. I think I am going to assign it as required reading for my 3rd year theory students.

Aktarian, you noted that


He largely ignores Clausewitz's "war is continuation of policy with different means" dictum. Which can be translated into "if you don't have clearly defined long term political goals military actions don't matter". and I think this is main problem in Iraq as golas of "making Iraq democratic" and such are not defined what exactly that means and can mean anything or nothing.

I'm not so sure that he ignored it so much as tried to reformulate it. Certainly that dictum can be interpreted as a requirement for a clear engineering plan for goals. It also should be interpreted that way when it comes to planning specific operations such as OIF.

I think what Corn is trying to do is to look at the next level or two above operational planning - i.e. geo-political strategy. As such, I think it is probably a very useful conceptual exercise to avoid black box conceptual thinking. If we treat "war as a continuation of policy" and "policy as a continuation of war", both "by other means", then it may be possible to set up and train for multiple operational situations. By way of example, if we can train people to recognize when to shift from conventional to COIN, that increases operational flexibility.

CR6, you ended your post with what I think is a really interesting observation.


The idea of professionals talking "anthropology" has some merit, but I am unsure of the level of anthropology we can teach to our leaders and troops. Lawrence spent much of his pre-war adulthood on the Arabian penninsula, and was the right man in the right place for the uprising. His success had little to do with officer PME.

Certainly Lawrence got his "training" by doing - and that included his anthropology (he had no formal training in it). Holding him up as an example of what can be done with appropriate cultural knowledge is a good idea. Using him as an example of what an Anthropologist could do to help out in operations is, I'm afraid, a mistake.

Let me expand on this a bit. I am an Anthropologist and I have taught courses in the history and theory of Anthropology. There are certainly some good examples of Anthropologists working well with the military - Ruth Benedict's analysis of Japanese culture, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, that became the US occupation plan for Japan at the end of WWII is an example. I think more germain examples would be The Nuer by E.E. Evans-Pritchard or Montaignard Tribal Groups of the Republic of Vietnam, US Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg (2nd Ed. 1965). One little known, and rarely mentioned, fact is that during WWII, over 60% of people with Ph.D.'s in Anthropology in the US were working either for the military or for the State department. There are an aweful lot of really good works produced from 1939-1946 or so that deal with using Anthropology in a political military situation.

If we come into the recent present, however, we find a very different story. In 1968, Project Camelot blew up in the news and led to a reaction against using Anthropology within the military. At the 1968 meeting of the American Anthropology Association, a new code of ethics was created (see Handbook on Ethical Issues in Anthropology Chapter 1 - http://www.aaanet.org/committees/ethics/ch1.htm - for some of the history on this). Probably the most import effect of this debate was to influence an entire generation of Anthropologists away from anything to do with the military. Indeed, I have been at conferences where I have been told by a senior professor with a completely straight face, that the military are "a bunch of fascists who are even worse than their capitalist exploiting bosses". The message is quite clear - don't have anything to do with the military and don't have anything to do with businesses. The Corn article talks about Clausewitz being the "scripture" of the military - for Anthropology, the "scriptures" became Marx, Gramsci, and Foucault.

What I am trying to get at here is that, as an institution, Anthropology in North America is pretty strongly opposed to the military. There are very few Anthropologists who are willing to work for the military - it's professional suicide. This situation is slowly changing, but it is going to be difficult to find Anthropologists who are willing or able to work with the military (I exclude myself from this generalization since I am already unpopular for working in the area of business (Organizational Culture) and I'm too interested in military history for most of my colleagues).

All of this is a round about way at trying to answer CR6's uncertainty about "... I am unsure of the level of anthropology we can teach to our leaders and troops". I am quite certain that enough Anthropologists can be found to work with the military on training to give a pretty good structural grounding in the theories and methods in order to conduct analyses. What will probably be missing, at least for the present, is the area specialists who can flesh those structures out into operation information such as that which shows up in Montaignard Tribal Groups of the Republic of Vietnam. And, in all honesty, that is probably exactly the type of analyses that are needed.

Marc

[Tc2642]

Having read through this article it does appear that the writer has not even taken any time to read through Clausewitz (why bother if you think he is redundant?). In terms of theory far from being redundant I would state that he is very much relevant to today’s and future wars. There are a number of inconsistencies in this text, I doubt Clausewitz would have disagreed with ‘know thy enemy and know thyself’, but this does not suggest that Clausewitz is dogmatic, his work was meant as a tool for learning not the end in itself.

He also made very clear in his work that each age war would have its own characteristics particular to that age, that theory should be there to show how things are not how they should be.


Like the aging Marxists with a Karl of their own, the Clausewitzians today are more interested in exonerating their idol from the evil perpetrated in his name than in demonstrating what good he could bring to the current challenges facing the military. It may well be that Marx and Clausewitz were indeed mostly "misread" by most people most of the time, but if the risks of "misreading" are statistically greater than the chances of getting it right, what's the point of making it required reading in the first place?

Yeah, why bother reading something if it is too difficult to understand first time around, this from my point of view is lazy thinking, the ideas and concepts are complex but by rereading certain parts over and reading “On War” in it’s entirety you can avoid misreading it.


A decade ago already, U.S. Army War College professor Steven Metz remarked: "Like adoration for some family elder, the veneration heaped on Clausewitz seems to grow even as his power to explain the world declines. He remains an icon at all U.S. war colleges (figuratively and literally) while his writings are bent, twisted, and stretched to explain everything from guerilla insurgency (Summers) through nuclear strategy (Cimbala) to counternarcotrafficking (Sharpe). On War is treated like holy script from which quotations are plucked to legitimize all sorts of policies and programs. But enough! It is time to hold a wake so that strategists can pay their respects to Clausewitz and move on, leaving him to rest among thehistorians."7

I refer to, http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/METZSLAM.htm,


Does the obsession with Clausewitz really matter that much? You bet it does. As the military-educational complex (150 institutions, of which the Naval War College is the crown jewel) takes in interagency education, the danger is that "strategism" and "Clausewitzology" will spread to other agencies and may aggravate already dysfunctional civil-military relations at the working level. The Iraqi precedent, in that respect, does not bode well.

I don’t like this term strategism, strategy in the simplest terms is using battles to achive the political objective of the war that is being fought. Not strategy for the sake of strategy, who would fight a battle for the sake of it?


But the successor generations should have logically benefited from the "lessons learned" in Vietnam as well as the growing literature on counterinsurgency. Yet instead of being exposed to the policy-relevant Clausewitzian realism of Osgood's Limited War Revisited (1979), the new generation of officers was force-fed with the Clausewitzian "surrealism" of Summers's On Strategy (1981) -- the true beginning of strategy for strategy's sake in America.

So he has more of a problem with Clausewitz being taught in a ‘surrealist’ way than the policy relevant realism of Clausewitz? Hold on, I thought Clausewitz should be confined to the dustbin of history? Not taught from a different perspective

Not really sure about the military educational establishment so will pass without comment.


Yet, while the Osamas of this world were issuing fatwas against "Jews and Crusaders" and defining their own struggle in terms of "Fourth-Generation Warfare," our Clausewitzian Ayatollahs were too busy turning Vom Kriege in a military Quran and issuing fatwas against the theoreticians of 4GW, Netwar, and other postmodern "heresies." If that attitude does not qualify as "dereliction of duty," what does?

I would again state, that from my point of view as a Clausewitzian and someone who belives that Fourth Generational war is with us that the two are not mutually inconceivable together, that they can be conflated.


‘if the Clausewitzian text is indeed so filled with fog and friction, if On War is so hard to teach from that even most educators can't teach it properly, then surely thought should be given to retiring Clausewitz, or the educators -- or both.

I would disagree, may have taken a bit of time but I now have a better understanding of Clausewitz and a broader conception of his ideas and some of the more nuanced points of his work


If, as Gray rightly points out, "strategy is -- or should be, the bridge that connects military power with policy," what kind of a bridge is On War, which devotes 600 pages to military power and next to nothing to policy?

Clausewitz was a soldier, not a politician, thefore why should he write anything about policy, that’s left up to the government.


Why such an irrational "resistance" (in the Freudian sense) on the part of military educators? After all, it does not take an Einstein to realize that, from Alexander the Great to Napoleon, the greatest generals for 20 centuries had one thing in common: They have never read Clausewitz. And conversely, in the bloodiest century known to man, the greatest admirers of Clausewitz also have had one thing in common: They may have won a battle here and there, but they have all invariably lost all their wars.

Hm, Lenin, Mao, Lawerence?



As of this writing (August 2006), it is too early to tell whether Baghdad will be America's Battle of Algiers -- or Battle of Jena. But it is not too early to call for a Renaissance in Strategic Education -- for military and civilians alike. In diplomacy as in academe and in the media, there is unquestionably a need for greater strategic literacy, and the military can play a constructive role; but by the same token, the military will have to free itself from the Clausewitzian straitjacket if it ever wants to make a significant contribution to grand strategy.

http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Keegan/KEEGWHOL.htm

I will try and make a go of going through the rest, but those are my thoughts so far

[SWJED]

On Clausewitz in Wonderland (http://austinbay.net/blog/?p=1412)...

[RDangerfield]

Chris Bassford, who is on the faculty at the National War College and is editor of The Clausewitz Homepage, has posted a somewhat disdainful reply to Tony Corn at http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/OnCornyIdeas.htm. I've got to admit, it is hard to understand why a writer like Corn, who is apparently trying to influence the strategic debate, would launch so many snide ad hominem attacks on people who might otherwise be influenced--which does not include old Carl, of course. I wonder if Tony knows the guy reached room temperature 175 years ago.

[SWJED]

Here is an excerpt from Dr. Bassford's reply A Response to Tony Corn's "Clausewitz in Wonderland" at the The Clausewitz Homepage:


... Nor is Clausewitz responsible for the smothering political correctness that makes it virtually impossible even to discuss things like the strategic history of Islam. Personally, I am still recovering from the high-pitched institutional whining that ensued when I made remarks on that subject virtually identical to Corn's a few weeks ago at one of the nation's premier institutions for strategic education. And almost every PME effort to discuss the "anthropology" of Islam that I have experienced has immediately degenerated into an utterly irrelevant analysis of the finer points of Koranic theology. Corn makes some (seemingly) favorable allusions to the potential value to strategists of understanding modern evolutionary theory (i.e., to Richard Dawkins and his memes). Great stuff! But mention evolutionary theory to a US-government audience and you'll spend the next hour debating the Book of Genesis with folks on the right side of the room; a week later you'll be reading articles by lefties in the Washington Post accusing you of advocating new eugenics laws banning reproduction by racial minorities.

The errors Corn describes originate in American cultural attitudes that certainly do not derive from Clausewitz. Iindeed, it is those cultural attitudes that drive the frequently ludicrous manner in which Clausewitz's ideas are used and taught. Those attitudes will not magically disappear once every copy of On War has been safely burned. If anthropology becomes the new strategic rage, then educators who may be "men of one book" (or even "men of one set of Cliffs notes") will be subjecting students to equally misleading doctrinal discourses on Margaret Mead. (I'm not joking here: Read John Keegan's anthropological absurdities in his A History of Warfare, which are every bit as asinine as his comments on Clausewitz.)

There are a great many ideas in Corn's article that, however disjointed, are worthy of discussion. Rather than respond with my own theory-of-everything, let me focus briefly on Corn's very positive comments on thinking inside the US Marine Corps. Though I am evidently one of the "Clausewitzian petits maitres" Corn finds so objectionable, I know something at least about USMC doctrine, since I wrote small pieces of the current MCDP 1, Warfighting, and virtually all of MCDP 1-1, Strategy and MCDP 1-2, Campaigning (not to mention the Aviation Operations and Reconnaissance manuals…). The MCDPs did not spring full-blown from the pen of any academic, but emerged from an energetic debate within the Corps' leadership. They are, in fact, supremely eclectic works drawing on a vast array of ideas and influences. But only a poseur who had never even looked at the famous Warfighting manual's table of contents (for which I bear no responsibility whatsoever—its primary author, John Schmitt, is a self-professed "Sun Tzu guy") could write that they are "largely exempt from the Clausewitz regimen." Just look at the chapter and section titles: "Nature of War," "Theory of War," "Friction," etc., etc. Or scan the source documentation...

[Jimbo]

I have some problems with Tony Corn's article. The first problem I have is he gives Clauswitzian Theory too much credit for driving U.S. military strategy and doctrine. The U.S. Army has traditionally been driven by Jominian theory as opposed to Clauswitzian. Jomini can be summed up as telling somebody how to fight, and Clauswitz can be summed up explaining the why. The real misunderstanding of Clauswitz is that his work is assumed to be purely a work for military people. Many sections of his work ought to be read by political leaders because I feel he does an outstanding job of explaining the political leadership aspects of startegic decision making. That is why I believe that Clauswitz is more relevant than ever. Furthermore, Clauswitz defined his success as theorist based on timelessness and universiality. Both of which apply. I would argue that 4GW is not a theory. It has merely taking Maoist theory and added the concept of mass media to it. Maybe I can meet corn, since I am supposedly going to work in DC for 6 months from january to june on COIN issues.

[Steve Blair]

I agree, jimbo. Old Carl was writing more of an overarching theory than a simple prescriptive study. Clausewitz also never finished "On War," which is something the detractors tend to overlook.

[marct]

To much commentary on Anthropology for me not to jump in;)


Nor is Clausewitz responsible for the smothering political correctness that makes it virtually impossible even to discuss things like the strategic history of Islam. Personally, I am still recovering from the high-pitched institutional whining that ensued when I made remarks on that subject virtually identical to Corn's a few weeks ago at one of the nation's premier institutions for strategic education. And almost every PME effort to discuss the "anthropology" of Islam that I have experienced has immediately degenerated into an utterly irrelevant analysis of the finer points of Koranic theology.

No question in my mind that Clausewitz isn't responsible for the current PC attitudes, and I can certainly understand the "institutional whining" reaction - I see that frequently enough <wry grin>. Without being there, I honestly couldn't say whether the analysis of Koranic theology was irrelevant or not (probably, but there's always a chance it might not have been).

What is to clear to me is that Bassford got trapped in a debate where theologians (broadly construed to include both deistic and non-deistic theologies) set the rules of discourse. I'll admit to engaging in theological debates myself, usually over Port and/or Brandy. They can be a lot of fun, but the true enjoyment in them comes from one fairly simple fact - they have no immediate relevance to the material world. As such, they really should be exlcuded from discussions dealing with immediate, real world activities unless their relevance can be demonstrated.


Corn makes some (seemingly) favorable allusions to the potential value to strategists of understanding modern evolutionary theory (i.e., to Richard Dawkins and his memes). Great stuff! But mention evolutionary theory to a US-government audience and you'll spend the next hour debating the Book of Genesis with folks on the right side of the room; a week later you'll be reading articles by lefties in the Washington Post accusing you of advocating new eugenics laws banning reproduction by racial minorities.

Too true! I remember applying for a position in one US university and being asked if I would give Intelligent Design theory the same weight as Evolutionary Theory. Being 99% sure I wouldn't get the job, and being pretty sickened by the rampant PC attitude of the interviewer, I told her that I would be more than happy to teach a course that included ID theory - along with every other creation myth I was aware of: an "Anthropology of Origin Myths". You can imagine the reaction...

Bassford is also quite right in his comments about Dawkins meme theory - it has a direct relevance to the GWOT. Part of the problem, however, is that he (and the rest of us who use any neo-evolutionary theory) is up against is an institutional reaction within Sociology and, to a lesser extent, Anthropology against anything to do with studying biology in addition to the Genesis crowd. This reaction comes out of a general, post-WWII reaction against the Nazis and their state-sponsored "racial science". The unfortunate problem is that it has, de facto, destroyed a very profitable line of research.

If Bassford really wants to get lambasted in the press by "lefties", he should try integrating Dawkins work with that of Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby and, just for fun, toss in the works of Charles Laughlin. Of course, he would also end up with a theoretical model that actually models mediaspace warefare and how it ties in to insurgency warfare. Obviously, this would be too useful to actually get published in any academic setting...:rolleyes:


The errors Corn describes originate in American cultural attitudes that certainly do not derive from Clausewitz. Iindeed, it is those cultural attitudes that drive the frequently ludicrous manner in which Clausewitz's ideas are used and taught. Those attitudes will not magically disappear once every copy of On War has been safely burned. If anthropology becomes the new strategic rage, then educators who may be "men of one book" (or even "men of one set of Cliffs notes") will be subjecting students to equally misleading doctrinal discourses on Margaret Mead. (I'm not joking here: Read John Keegan's anthropological absurdities in his A History of Warfare, which are every bit as asinine as his comments on Clausewitz.)

Well, I suspect that the doctrinal discourses would be on Clifford Geertz and Clifford and Marcus, with hermeneutic strategies derived from Foucault, but I can't disagree. Too much of Anthropology teaching has moved towards a non-deistic theology - probably an inevitable consequence of institutional vectors following WWII. On this line, I posted an article that appeared in the Times Higher Education Supplement that is relevant in another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=5173#post5173).

Marc

[Ray Levesque]

I believe the biggest problem that most have with Clausewitz is that his book (as if he wrote only one) is selectively read, anecdotally quoted, and rarely thought about in a critical manner. One of the basic problems with Clausewitz is that he died before he actually finished ON WAR. He had the draft, realized he needed to adjust it in light of his thinking about the influence of politics on war, and only had time to finish the first chapter before passing on.

So, are there inconsistencies in ON WAR? Certainly, which is one of the reasons it needs to be critically read and not mindlessly quoted. Having said that an officer can only be better off if he were to read the first book and thought deeply about “real” war, the fog of war, friction, the relationship of politics on war – he’s the only one that has truly tried to get to the nature of war regardless of its type. (Hmmmm...things that seem to have been ignored against the context of the so-called revolution in military affairs and the self-appointed gurus of transformation who focused on "capabilities-based" planning instead of on the real world threat.)

But, keep this in mind, Clausewitz clearly argues that any theory of war had to account for the fact that the majority of wars are limited in nature, and not the total "ideal" wars about which he had been writing. Clausewitz did not create the concept of “unlimited war” except as an ideal that could NEVER be achieved. Critically reading the first chapter of the book is key. So, although he didn’t write about insurgencies per se, his thinking on limited war and the need to align strategic goals (policy) with means still applies.

A pretty good book for understanding not just Clausewitz’ themes, but also how his writings, in particular ON WAR, were put together is READING CLAUSEWITZ by Beatrice Heuser.

However, what’s just as bad as criticizing Clausewitz without critically reading ON WAR is to accept what he says as dogma. He’s great food for thought and has a lot of application still today, but there are other strategic theorists out there that should be read in order to have a deeper understanding of the nature of war and so that you can modify your “lessons learned” to the situation at hand.

[marct]

Times Online October 26, 2006

Euro pact to fight £5bn carousel fraud
By Michael Herman and agencies

The six biggest EU states have pledged to join forces in the fight against the growing problem of so-called carousel fraud, a multi-billion pound tax scam the Government believes is linked to terrorism.


John Reid, the Home Secretary, said that the agreement was a major step towards a common European response to the fraud that is estimated to cost EU states as much as £55 billion in lost taxes each year. It is the first time the problem has been discussed at such a high level between EU members.

More... (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,200-2423125,00.html)

One of my part-time students sent me this link (she is working in the area). Even if the estimates are inflated, it is still an increadible amount of money to be filtered into terrorist coffers.

Marc

[selil]

I've heard it often said that Clausewitz refers to war as inextricably linked to politics and war is a continuation of politics. I can reverse that and say that war is within the spectrum of conflict. Can anybody name a book and chapter where Clausewitz says this explicitly? In book 1, chapter 1 he talks around it, and in my version from Penguin classics Anatol Rapoport discusses it.

The reason being I'm reading Charles Tilly "The Politics of Collective Violence", and he says in Chapter 3 that Clausewitz argued for a segregated (from society) military organization. To me that seems totally counter-intuitive to the themes through out "On War". But, I can't find anything to directly refute it.

Suggestions?

[SteveMetz]

I've heard it often said that Clausewitz refers to war as inextricably linked to politics and war is a continuation of politics. I can reverse that and say that war is within the spectrum of conflict. Can anybody name a book and chapter where Clausewitz says this explicitly? In book 1, chapter 1 he talks around it, and in my version from Penguin classics Anatol Rapoport discusses it.

The reason being I'm reading Charles Tilly "The Politics of Collective Violence", and he says in Chapter 3 that Clausewitz argued for a segregated (from society) military organization. To me that seems totally counter-intuitive to the themes through out "On War". But, I can't find anything to directly refute it.

Suggestions?

I know this isn't really what you were asking, but I'd recommend Tony Echevarria's latest book (http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Contemporary-War-Antulio-Echevarria/dp/0199231915/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1201013873&sr=8-1).

[William F. Owen]

Can anybody name a book and chapter where Clausewitz says this explicitly? In book 1, chapter 1 he talks around it, and in my version from Penguin classics Anatol Rapoport discusses it.



You have the worst translation of Clausewitz ever written. Throw it, and get this one. http://www.amazon.com/War-Carl-von-Clausewitz/dp/0691018545

It's the only acceptable version (that I am aware of) for military thought.

[selil]

I know this isn't really what you were asking, but I'd recommend Tony Echevarria's latest book (http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Contemporary-War-Antulio-Echevarria/dp/0199231915/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1201013873&sr=8-1).


You have the worst translation of Clausewitz ever written. Throw it, and get this one. http://www.amazon.com/War-Carl-von-Clausewitz/dp/0691018545

It's the only acceptable version (that I am aware of) for military thought.

Purchased them both.

You know I blame SWC for this and especially the absent MarcT. In my last semester of course work and my last 4 credits for my doctorate I could have taken Kayaking or Archery. Instead I'm taking two doctoral level sociology classes on conflict and violence. OH and it's SIX credits so I'm tossing two off the bridge for free! But, I get to read books like "The electric kool-aid acid test".... 32 books in 16 weeks...

[Steve Blair]

You may also want to get your hands on Handel's "Masters of War." He goes into some pretty interesting comparisons of ol' Carl, Sun Tzu, and other "old school" military theorists.

[Rob Thornton]

Sam, I'll see if I can get you close when I get home today. It would not hurt to look up some of the other folks who have spent some time thinking about the nature of war.
Best, Rob

[SteveMetz]

Heck, I'd suggest emailing Tony Echevarria. He's better equipped to answer this than anyone I know with the possible exception of Colin Gray or Chris Bassford.

[slapout9]

Selil, try Carl's homepage there is a search able quotes section.
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/CWZBASE.htm

[SteveMetz]

Selil, try Carl's homepage there is a search able quotes section.
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/CWZBASE.htm

That's Chris Bassford's page. Use the search engine to find his admittedly witty goring of me.

[CR6]

That's Chris Bassford's page. Use the search engine to find his admittedly witty goring of me.

Were you REALLY breathless?

[SteveMetz]

Were you REALLY breathless?

LOL. Less so than the dead Prussian, as I reminded Chris.

[Entropy]

Clausewitz and WW IV (PDF File) (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/Articles/Clausewitz%20and%20World%20War%20IV.pdf)


Enter Alan Beyerchen, distinguished historian at Ohio State University. He's adopted a fundamentally different approach and by doing so has captured the intellectual high ground in the battle to amend theory in light of modern war's realities: Beyerchen would embrace rather than replace the master. Beyerchen has developed a taxonomy of war in the modern era in terms of four world wars. Each war was shaped by what he calls "amplifying factors." Amplifiers are not "multipliers" or "enablers" in that their influence on the course of war is nonlinear rather than linear; amplifiers don't simply accelerate the trends of the past, they make war different.

For example, World War I was a chemists' war in that the decisive strategic advantage on the battlefield was driven in large measure by new applications of chemistry and chemical engineering. The war should have ended for the Germans in 1915 when their supplies of gunpowder nitrates exhausted. But the synthesis of nitrates by German scientists allowed the war to continue for another three horrific years. World War II was a physicists' war. To paraphrase Churchill, the atom bomb ended the conflict, but exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum in the form of the wireless and radar won it for the allies. "World War III" was the "information researchers'" war, a war in which intelligence and knowledge of the enemy and the ability to fully exploit that knowledge allowed the U.S. to defeat the Soviet Union with relatively small loss of life.

And:


Beyerchen's idea is that the human and social sciences will change Clausewitz's perception of the constancy of the human influence in war. In effect, he argues that we are beginning the tectonic shift into World War IV, the epoch when the controlling amplifier will be human and biological rather than organizational or technological. From his theory we can postulate a new vision of the battlefield, one that shifts from the traditional linear construct to a battlefield that is amoebic in shape; it is distributed, dispersed, nonlinear, and essentially formless in space and unbounded in time. This war and all to follow will be what I would call "psycho-cultural" wars.


On my first read I think it starts of strong, but several of his conclusions have weak foundations and seem to suggest that future war will resemble Iraq and Afghanistan. Overall very thought-provoking and makes me want to read more about this Beyerchen fellow.

[AmericanPride]

I do not think the article addresses whatsoever war as an abstract idea. Yeah, it pays tribute to Clausewitz, but it never really gets to talking about his ideas; so it's really just a different way in which Clausewitz's ideas may be 'expressed' in a particular circumstance.

Certainly, there are obvious cosmetic changes in the how, but I haven't read much convincing evidence in the why. So I'm not sure if I agree with the idea of "amplifiers" as defined by the MG and Beyerchen because they seem to rework the ways in which wars are defined. I think its a mistaken assumption to define wars in the first place by the perceived dominant factor of influence because that introduces a kind of "heirarchy" of eras in which we can say such and such war was different from this other war when it might not really be the case based on the political conditions of the conflict. It also suggests some kind of progression which also might not exist. I further dislike the idea of supposing some kind of "world war" as if any other (or every other) war which could take place at the same time would somehow have the same shape (how much of the proposals would be relevant in a war with North Korea, or a culturally homogeneous society in general? Even in WW2, the Nazis pursued different strategies in the West and East based on political conditions in the same world war). So, for example, while we can find comparison between "WWIV" and Caesar's conquest of Gaul based on the shrewd manipulation of the enemy's culture and identity politics, there's really no political comparison whatsoever and so it's very much difficult to assert at all that the "psycho-cultural war" actually exists as a type of war rather than a specific strategy suitable for specific conditions (which might not always exist). Was there actually any "evolution" between Caesar's day and now in war itself, or are the (perceived) changes simply reflective of the sophistication of warfighting? I think wars should be defined by their political causes, not the strategies employed in them; to do the latter turns the entire equation upside down. Otherwise, we're left with apparently absurd contradictions as to why the Germans, for example, did not capitulate under years of strategic bombing in WW2 but Zanzibar surrendered to the British in 30 minutes of off-shore bombardment some 40 years earlier. How does that fit into the neatly defined so-called phases, progressions, evolutions, and what-have-you of war?

So, I do agree that the MG's conclusions are excellent and thoughtful, but that's only in the context of the present conditions of war and he provided no reason to think that any other war, now or in the future, will take on that same shape.

[William F. Owen]

There are some things in this that I really want to agree with, but the context he presents them in, causes me to be less than enthusiastic.

What I like, if I read it correctly, was the observation the military technology does not progress logically, but is basically the product of opinion, both faulty and accurate. Tanks are not products of physics. They are products of opinion.

Yes, armies would benefit greatly from "better" infantry and tactical forces. Yes a better understanding of the social sciences would help,

BUT...

The whole set up of US and NATO Armies is biased against creating "cross spectrum" tactical excellence as they have somehow elevated the so called "Operational Level" to near G@d like status. - if indeed it exits in the way folks say it do... :o

Currently, the military thought, so central to the Generals article, is in love with taking the back off the watch, rather than just telling the time.

What is more, when the social scientists turn up and ask, "why do you do this," most military men, will have no idea, as to why they do the things they do, and even when they do, they may well find that the reasoning is faulty. This is not true for all as the CARLS archive so amply shows. Thus I submit there is a limited role for social scientists to analyse the why and how. There is an ample role for the gifted members of the military. The truth really does set you free, but who tells you what is true makes a huge difference.

To take a not so extreme example, how do you practice "COIN" when the enemy is both insurgent, a regular army and special forces? - as in Vietnam. .. or even South Ossetia?

[Ken White]

Certainly, there are obvious cosmetic changes in the how, but I haven't read much convincing evidence in the why.I didn't see it either; though it should be obvious. The lesser reason is political correctness and the kinder, gentler folks of today (mostly...) compared to their Grandparents. Note that no leading Nation has really started a war since the Argentina bit in the Falklands (and that was an aberration) except the US and just recently, Russia, neither of whom are now or ever have been particularly kind or gentle when provoked. The greater reason is the expense, conventional war in the 20 Century model has gotten too expensive for most nations.
Otherwise, we're left with apparently absurd contradictions as to why the Germans, for example, did not capitulate under years of strategic bombing in WW2 but Zanzibar surrendered to the British in 30 minutes of off-shore bombardment some 40 years earlier. How does that fit into the neatly defined so-called phases, progressions, evolutions, and what-have-you of war?Uh, because Hitler had a desire to fight on regardless and had a power structure to enforce his views plus a population that was broadly supportive and Khalid had none of those? I'll also point out that both were chemical 'wars' while the later one did transmute to physics as it went on.
So, I do agree that the MG's conclusions are excellent and thoughtful, but that's only in the context of the present conditions of war and he provided no reason to think that any other war, now or in the future, will take on that same shape.I thought he did -- but was constrained by the fact that as Wilf said:
"Currently, the military thought, so central to the Generals article, is in love with taking the back off the watch, rather than just telling the time.

What is more, when the social scientists turn up and ask, "why do you do this," most military men, will have no idea, as to why they do the things they do, and even when they do, they may well find that the reasoning is faulty. This is not true for all as the CARLS archive so amply shows. Thus I submit there is a limited role for social scientists to analyse the why and how. There is an ample role for the gifted members of the military. The truth really does set you free, but who tells you what is true makes a huge difference.

To take a not so extreme example, how do you practice "COIN" when the enemy is both insurgent, a regular army and special forces? - as in Vietnam. .. or even South Ossetia?"Trying to categorize warfare and put in a pigeon hole is quite dangerous. Also serves absolutely no useful function that I can see...

[AmericanPride]

because Hitler had a desire to fight on regardless and had a power structure to enforce his views plus a population that was broadly supportive and Khalid had none of those?

Indeed -- and that is my intended point. It's one thing to discuss how this or that war ended, but it really comes down to breaking the enemy's will regardless of how that's accomplished. That's why it irks me every time war is defined by the capabilities or strategies in use rather than the extent the belligerents are willing to pursue their desired objectives. I think it's dangerous intellectually to talk about the nature of war, or the outcome of any war, without first discussing its relationship to politics. Having looked through the article again, what I primarily dispute is (1) defining the wars by the capabilities in use which leads to a faulty, perhaps misleading, conception of war and its future; (2) asserting that "psycho-cultural war" is a kind of war instead of a particular strategy used in specific conditions; and (3) claiming said assertion is a revision of the nature of war itself (even if its an addition to the author's accepted idea of war rather than redefining it) rather than an "expression" of it in particular (political) circumstances which might not exist elsewhere or in the future.

[William F. Owen]

I think it's dangerous intellectually to talk about the nature of war, or the outcome of any war, without first discussing its relationship to politics. Having looked through the article again, what I primarily dispute is (1) defining the wars by the capabilities in use which leads to a faulty, perhaps misleading, conception of war and its future.

I think there are two things in play here and they are not the same thing. Military force is a political or diplomatic tool. Military force is applied as a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means.

The political will to employ and persist with military means is not one that should concern the military. What should concern the military is achieving the outcome the politicians want. (it may include loosing or not winning.) - as soldiers that's none of their business.

The expression of military capability, usually refers to a "want to do." This is not the same as a "can do." My guess is that a lot of folks are very reluctant to discuss why an ACR squadron, for example, cannot perform certain missions they are supposed to.

IMO, we have got to recover the idea that military force is only applied to military problems. Military force is primarily destructive and coercive. Its benefits come from actual or threatened harm. How you apply threaten or apply the harm is basically what defines how you work. Just an opinion, but why make it more complicated?

[wm]

IMO, we have got to recover the idea that military force is only applied to military problems. Military force is primarily destructive and coercive. Its benefits come from actual or threatened harm. How you apply threaten or apply the harm is basically what defines how you work. Just an opinion, but why make it more complicated?
Wilf,
I suspect that part of the confusion arises because we have folks wearing uniforms who do a lot things that are neither destructive nor coercive. A medic administering vaccinations to children in Afghanistan, a construction engineer working to build a new school in Iraq, and a wheeled vehicle mechanic fixing a local farmer's tractor in Djibouti are three easy examples. These are not examples of military force in the sense you apply the phrase, but they are examples of a type of force that just happens to be applied by military personnel (among many others).


Trying to categorize warfare and put in a pigeon hole is quite dangerous. Also serves absolutely no useful function that I can see... Ken, it provides the economy with a lot of jobs for people who work in organizations that garner "lessons observed." ;) Too bad we have yet to figure out a way to convert lessons observed effectivelt and efficiently into lesson learned. :( (No offense to folks like Tom Odom intended)

[William F. Owen]

I suspect that part of the confusion arises because we have folks wearing uniforms who do a lot things that are neither destructive nor coercive. A medic administering vaccinations to children in Afghanistan, a construction engineer working to build a new school in Iraq, and a wheeled vehicle mechanic fixing a local farmer's tractor in Djibouti are three easy examples. These are not examples of military force in the sense you apply the phrase, but they are examples of a type of force that just happens to be applied by military personnel (among many others).


Concur. They acts of kindness and are thus choices. The military does these things to help. They are humanitarian. It is "Military Humanitarian Aid" - and that has implications by itself!

If it "saves life and relieves suffering" I am all for it. I can little or no reason to build schools. I'd be genuinely interested in hearing the justification for why that is deemed important.

The militaries primary contribution should be the provision of security to the population and Government. The desired end state should be the level of security where non-military humanitarian aid can be provided. If 90% of the effort is not going in that direction, then I think there is a problem.

[wm]

Concur. They acts of kindness and are thus choices. The military does these things to help. They are humanitarian. It is "Military Humanitarian Aid" - and that has implications by itself!

If it "saves life and relieves suffering" I am all for it. I can little or no reason to build schools. I'd be genuinely interested in hearing the justification for why that is deemed important.

The militaries primary contribution should be the provision of security to the population and Government. The desired end state should be the level of security where non-military humanitarian aid can be provided. If 90% of the effort is not going in that direction, then I think there is a problem.

Spealking from the American perspective, I suggest that the reason the military is doing a lot of this work is because no one other element of our national government is willing or capable of stepping to the plate and taking the mission. We are apparently trying to plus up our capabilities in this area, but not too many folks who are not already wearing uniforms seem willing to place themselves in the harm's way that characterizes the current SWA operating environments in order to do the rest of the nation building work that might help stablize the countries there.

With regard to your last point, I wish it were as easy as, "make secure, then rebuild." I do not have a number/percent but your 90% of the effort in "pure" military work seems high to me. I suspect that part of the feeling of security comes from helping folks to have a better daily life. I'd be less likely to blow things up if I had a predictable supply of water, electricity and sewerage and my kids could get to a school that wasn't in danger of collapse or very far away.

[Steve Blair]

It's also important to remember that, from the American perspective, the Army has historically been involved in humanitarian missions. Going back to the Chicago Fire and earlier, the Army was often involved in a number of areas (to include feeding people). The CCC was built pretty much on the back of the Army during the Depression. It's been debated domestically at times (Sheridan took some heat for getting the Army into Chicago), but it's been a constant (if often ignored) aspect of the Army in the US.

[William F. Owen]

With regard to your last point, I wish it were as easy as, "make secure, then rebuild." I do not have a number/percent but your 90% of the effort in "pure" military work seems high to me. I suspect that part of the feeling of security comes from helping folks to have a better daily life. I'd be less likely to blow things up if I had a predictable supply of water, electricity and sewerage and my kids could get to a school that wasn't in danger of collapse or very far away.

This is the heart of the problem. If a family has food, water and shelter, there is not a lot else. The family either has them, because they are provided or they have them because they can afford them via employment. It is not the militaries task to engage in social agendas. You don't see OXFAM building schools. They save lives. That's it.

I think the reasoning that people join an insurgency because they don't have a school or clean water is spurious and un-proven. Lack of clean water means you die. Lack of school means you are uneducated.

Where does it reason that good infrastructure helps defeat an insurgency? Cyprus, Thailand, and Northern Ireland all had/have excellent infrastructure. They did not help stop an insurgency in any way. The only time when provision of infrastructure the might stop an insurgency is when it's lack is the issue. In Peru, the road building program, actually aided the drugs trade!

I think the military mission should cease at prevent death and stop suffering.

[Ron Humphrey]

This is the heart of the problem. If a family has food, water and shelter, there is not a lot else. The family either has them, because they are provided or they have them because they can afford them via employment. It is not the militaries task to engage in social agendas. You don't see OXFAM building schools. They save lives. That's it.

I think the reasoning that people join an insurgency because they don't have a school or clean water is spurious and un-proven. Lack of clean water means you die. Lack of school means you are uneducated.

Where does it reason that good infrastructure helps defeat an insurgency? Cyprus, Thailand, and Northern Ireland all had/have excellent infrastructure. They did not help stop an insurgency in any way. The only time when provision of infrastructure the might stop an insurgency is when it's lack is the issue. In Peru, the road building program, actually aided the drugs trade!

I think the military mission should cease at prevent death and stop suffering.


he can eat for a day, teach him to fish he and his family can live forever-

The problem with only "saving" them is what your saving them from or for. Doesn't do much good to give them fish it only last for a meal, and it doesn't do any good to teach someone to fish if there is no water nearby, or the water has no fish in it. All the factors must be addressed or it will untimately end up cycling right back to the same problem over and over.

[wm]

I think the reasoning that people join an insurgency because they don't have a school or clean water is spurious and un-proven. Lack of clean water means you die. Lack of school means you are uneducated.

Where does it reason that good infrastructure helps defeat an insurgency? Cyprus, Thailand, and Northern Ireland all had/have excellent infrastructure. They did not help stop an insurgency in any way. The only time when provision of infrastructure the might stop an insurgency is when it's lack is the issue. In Peru, the road building program, actually aided the drugs trade!

I think the military mission should cease at prevent death and stop suffering.
Defeating an insurgency and eliminating the grounds that motivate an insurrection are very different activities. George III and his ministers had the chance to do the latter with the Atlantic coast colonies in North America before 1775 and were forced to try the former with the military after failing to take that opportunity. The French monarchy had a similar opportunity in the later 1700s and failed so miserably that it lost the ability to take the miltary option, leaving it to the other crowned heads of Europe to restore the status quo, at which they also failed miserably (thus the Revolutions of 1848 and the rise of the Anarchists following Metternich and the 1815 Congress of Vienna).

I believe that people tend to be motivated to "act out" against the current power hierarchy for a range of reasons that happen to correspond with Maslow's needs hierarchy. If folks are used to certain levels of misery and then are made more miserable, they may well view the return to their former stayte of "objective" misery as sufficient to stop their complaining, at least until they learn how miserable they are compared to others in the world (the so-called "crisis of rising expectations"). An adequate infrastructure lets folks focus on other things that bother them. I suspect that this is the case in all three examples Wilf cited. If one has adequate food and shelter, one is more likely to view the government's apprently different treatment of one's neighbors, who happen to practice a different form of religion, be of a different ethnic background, etc., as a ground for acting out against the perceived inequality.

[William F. Owen]

he can eat for a day, teach him to fish he and his family can live forever-

The problem with only "saving" them is what your saving them from or for. Doesn't do much good to give them fish it only last for a meal, and it doesn't do any good to teach someone to fish if there is no water nearby, or the water has no fish in it. All the factors must be addressed or it will untimately end up cycling right back to the same problem over and over.

I get it. I really do, but it is not part of the military mission to provide fishing instruction. The military mission is to keep said actual or potential fisherman alive, to be able to learn, or benefit from his piscatorial employment or recreation.

[Ron Humphrey]

I get it. I really do, but it is not part of the military mission to provide fishing instruction. The military mission is to keep said actual or potential fisherman alive, to be able to learn, or benefit from his piscatorial employment or recreation.

The part that really requires the extra steps above and beyond that normal mission is as has been referred to before, The lacking in other parts of the govt constructs to be able to provide the follow-on services. I look at it in sort of a vaccination context. If theres a disease going around and 100's of 1000s are dying from it then Yeah I'll be appreciative of the doctor who comes by with the vaccine and keeps it from killing me. I may however not feel quite so kindly towards the doc when I'm dying from starvation because food wasn't in his job discription.

[Jim Rodgers]

This is based on very limited real world experience, so take it FWIW -

-There seems to be little debate or disagreement about the need to address death\suffering by any and all means. That may mean very basic stuff, but, particularly in the context of an urban insurgency, may be much more complicated.

-For a while there, while the Army was trying to (re)learn COIN, it seemed like the Army was thinking of "hearts and minds" and "warm and fuzzy" as interchangable concepts. I don't think that's appropriate, and it seems like the Army has, in large part, moved past it.

-At a low level - Being friendly to the locals, respecting customs, etc is appropriate from a standpoint of basic respect, human decency, and promoting interaction. More elaborate stuff should probably be weighed carefully against the benefits. Dropping a couple of million on soccer balls to hand out to the kids (or whatever) should probably be approached carefully. If it facilitates interaction, HUMINT, whatever - go for it. If it's just an effort to look like nice guys and gals, a little skepticism by the commander is in order.

-Massive infrastructure projects are, overall, best handled by non-military agencies. But as wm and others point out, the US's agencies for doing that have eroded. Perhaps not in size, but the type of stuff that USAID could do (directly) in Vietnam appear to be much more limited today. This appears to be turning around, but it is, at best, a work in progress. My understanding is that the UK has some of the same issues. Accordingly, as many have pointed out, the military jumps in. The unity of command provided by that approach is also an issue. Also, while US military units never lost freedom of manuever in Iraq, I think you can make a case that civilian agencies did, making a whole of government approach difficult. Probably not the case today, but impressions may linger. Lastly, the US, in particular, has substantial funds available to military commanders, with (relatively) few bureaucratic strings\nightmares attached. Those funds have, at times, been used for massive projects. That might or might not be wise (see below), but part of giving a commander more resources and lattitude is increased liklihood of mistakes. We have wisely resisted applying a lot (in relative terms) of oversight to CERP.

-Large scale infrastructure projects may be a subtle, low-coercion form of population control. It's sufficiently different from what has traditionally been called "population control" (as Ken and Wilf have pointed out elsewhere) that perhaps that not the best term. But a school that redirects children from Tribe A through a path through a dangerous area occupied by Tribe B (less violence, fewer revenge killings), extends the reach of the local government (gotta pay the teachers, gotta patrol the area), employs a few locals and counteracts an insurgent narrative might be a great idea. Our ability to predict 2nd and 3rd order impacts is limited enough that I'm skeptical of leading with massive projects that aren't handed off to USAID or a similar agency, and "schools" in particular would give me pause - but we shouldn't get wrapped around the axle about this or that TTP. If a whole of government approach isn't working in a given security environment, then the military has to step up until the other agencies get ready. Others have talked about the military's efforts giving license to those agencies to sit on their hands, but that's another discussion.

-Large scale infrastructure projects may also be a form of large scale national level diplomacy. They may also something similar to bribery - nothing wrong with that, but apply carefully and evaluate for sustainability. They may also be a counteraction to an insurgent narrative. Or they may just be a bad idea. In short - I'm skeptical of one size fits all answers.

[reed11b]

Where does it reason that good infrastructure helps defeat an insurgency? Cyprus, Thailand, and Northern Ireland all had/have excellent infrastructure. They did not help stop an insurgency in any way. The only time when provision of infrastructure the might stop an insurgency is when it's lack is the issue. In Peru, the road building program, actually aided the drugs trade!

I think the military mission should cease at prevent death and stop suffering.
Sorry Wilf, disagree 100% on this one. unemployment and dissatisfaction strengthens the insurgent leaders ability to recruit. Army units Iraq did a great deal of humanitaruian work early on becouse they were all that was available for it. $87bil for Iraq in '03-04? Never left Kuwait. The building projects you did see came from the CA budget and unit slush funds. If the infastructure had never been there, then your point might have some validity, but in Iraq, it had been there at one point.
Reed

[William F. Owen]

unemployment and dissatisfaction strengthens the insurgent leaders ability to recruit. Army units Iraq did a great deal of humanitaruian work early on becouse they were all that was available for it.

Reed, I am not doubting that, and I have no abiding problem with the military providing humanitarian aid, be it the provision of water, food, power, and constructing shelter where needed. It's both ethical and logical, to a population you are protecting.

I have no real issue if the Army provides employment in providing those things. They can even recruit/train Soldiers and Policemen. That is all part of the mission. Repairing or building roads/railways to assist the logistical provision of aid, is also good.

However, I am sceptical when it comes to building schools, and other types of social programmes and civilian infrastructure. This is getting into muddy water. The Army is not there to provide education and employment. If it needs to hire, then great.

[AmericanPride]

If infrastructure and social well-being is decisive in Iraq as a component of the military strategy, I think that's a situation unique to the country (and region) in general and the conflict specifically. Iraq has few sources of natural wealth and resources, except oil, and so the state itself becomes the primary patron of the citizenry. Add into the mix the complexity of religious, ethnic, and tribal relations without any real unifying identity or ideology, and the only effective means of management is state power; whether that's a reliance on violence (i.e. Saddam), institution-building, or some kind of combination of both. But even while the lack of infrastructure or employment may encourage, for example, a professional soldier with no other opportunities to "work" for the insurgency, that does not suggest the same motivation is applicable to other elements of the insurgency, much less to other wars in general.


The political will to employ and persist with military means is not one that should concern the military. What should concern the military is achieving the outcome the politicians want. (it may include loosing or not winning.) - as soldiers that's none of their business.

I agree for the most part in that military planners should not be concerned with politics at home; but the enemy's politics is fair game. I should have clarified that in my previous statement. Understanding why the enemy fights clarifies how (and to what extent) he fights. So, as for the article, categorizing a war by how it was, or should be, fought is not very useful whatsoever without the "why". Why is the "psycho-cultural war" concept useful if the conditions in which its applicable are not universal?

[Ken White]

AmericanPride; I sort of agree with your post at #5 above with one caveat:
"I think it's dangerous intellectually to talk about the nature of war, or the outcome of any war, without first discussing its relationship to politics."I think it is dangerous practically to try to over define the nature of war as it's an academic exercise with no practical merit. The causes of war are too diverse and the methods of warfare are even more varied. In the immortal words of Donald Rumsfeld, "You go to war with the Army you've got." Just so. I'd add that Army had better be prepared and able to fight that war it got into. It's that simple.

wm's wisdom comes through:
"Ken, it provides the economy with a lot of jobs for people who work in organizations that garner "lessons observed." Too bad we have yet to figure out a way to convert lessons observed effectivelt and efficiently into lesson learned. (No offense to folks like Tom Odom intended)."Yep to the first clause and egos are the answer to the second... Sad. :(

Wilf contributes an absolute gem and one of my pet questions:
"My guess is that a lot of folks are very reluctant to discuss why an ACR squadron, for example, cannot perform certain missions they are supposed to."To which I'm sure he'd add that one could change the ACR (my personal favorite) to several other types of units. That is, IMO, considerably more pertinent a question than is what kind of war are we in...

Which gets to AmericanPride, post 19:
"Understanding why the enemy fights clarifies how (and to what extent) he fights. So, as for the article, categorizing a war by how it was, or should be, fought is not very useful whatsoever without the "why"..."I think that understanding why he fights may -- just may -- give you a clue to to why he fights (though I'm unsure how important that it is). The key being truly understanding as opposed to just thinking one understands (and I suggest the last seven years are living proof of that... :D ). I'm quite sure it does not give you a clue to what extent he will fight because you have a say in that which can change his predilection.
"...Why is the "psycho-cultural war" concept useful if the conditions in which its applicable are not universal?"It isn't... ;)

[reed11b]

However, I am sceptical when it comes to building schools, and other types of social programmes and civilian infrastructure. This is getting into muddy water. The Army is not there to provide education and employment. If it needs to hire, then great.
The exception being civil affairs; however, they are supposed to coordinate local assets, not do it for them. Those type activities did need to get done in Iraq in 03-05 and the local and international resources dropped the ball completly in that particular case. Perhaps the Army trying to pick up the ball created a bad example and false expectations.
Reed

[sullygoarmy]

Thought MG Scales presented a good alternative to the other "Generations of Warfare" articles that are out there. I especially like his focus on the soldier versus technology.

The only point I would bring up is the use of "cultural awareness" versus "cultural understanding". In my simple mind, cultural awareness does nothing for me. You can be aware all you want regarding a foreign culture and still trample all over it. Being aware is one thing, understanding not only the culture but the ramifications of that culture is where we should be trying to get not only our leaders on the ground, but our soldiers as well.

By better understanding the culture, we can shape our actions to strengthen our currency in the eyes of the population and devalue that of the insurgent...that's really the name of the game.

I know www.clausewitz.com has some of Beyerchen's articles posted there. May be worth a read after going through MG Scales' article.

[AmericanPride]

By better understanding the culture, we can shape our actions to strengthen our currency in the eyes of the population and devalue that of the insurgent...that's really the name of the game.

But is "[strengthening] our currency in the eyes of the population" an effective means in suppressing an insurgency, especially one as complex as the Iraqi insurgency? I'd agree there's a strong correlation, but I'm not certain there's a definite casual relationship of one preceding the other. Even so, I'm not sure how earning someone's fondness or respect will make them desire what they want any less. By nature, insurgencies of whatever type are pro-active and not reactionary; they'll keep fighting until they get what they want. Peace for them is not simply the absence of violence, but the institution of their version of "justice". And that makes me wonder if we have the cultural aptitude to adjust to the Machiavellian nature of power politics? As I see it, we're not so much as engaged in a war in Iraq, but instead shoulder-deep in the cut-throat domestic politics of a foreign country. One day we're shooting up Faction XYZ, the next day we're arming them. That's not war. That's politics. So I'm not sure how effective the military can be in that kind of situation without significantly expanding the scope of responsibilities for the military beyond war. Or, even if it's wise to move the military in that direction.

I agree with your statements about cultural awareness vs understanding, however.

[Ron Humphrey]

By nature, insurgencies of whatever type are pro-active and not reactionary; they'll keep fighting until they get what they want. Peace for them is not simply the absence of violence, but the institution of their version of "justice". .(emphasis Ron)

That this is always the case. Seems like quite a few parts of any given "insurgency" are quite reactionary.

Consider that the "acceptable" versions of justice might quite often vary even within the insurgency itself.

[GlenWard]

hi,

To much commentary on Anthropology for me not to jump in

[SWJED]

hi,

To much commentary on Anthropology for me not to jump in

Please introduce yourself here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/forumdisplay.php?f=33) before you take the leap.

[PhilR]

I'd highly recommend reading Jon Sumida's new book Decoding Clausewitz (Univ. of Kansas Press, 2008). It provides a new, and I believe useful, look at On War. Sumida makes a couple of propositions that put On War into a new light. The first is that the ordering of the "Clausewitz notes" has been mis-interpreted and that On War was substantially complete upon Clausewitz's death (not just Book I as many claim). The second is that Clausewitz was not trying to produce a "theory of a phenomenon", or to explain war, but rather to describe a "theory of practice", to describe a framework for examining and learning about war. In this light Book II, with its description of the process of critical analysis as a means to learn from history, is really the focus of the book.
Fully agree with it or not, I believe this is a good approach for members of this forum to consider. It especially comes to my mind as I track the current multiple SWJ discussion threads on various aspects of Maneuver Warfare, John Boyd and the OODA loop. What comes out is that the value isn't really in what a doctrine or theory says is, but rather the thinking and discourse it promotes. More thinking and discourse means better educated practitioners (whether they be military or civilian).

[nathan3011]

Hey thanks for this i found it a very insightful and interesting read and im in agreement that it was not the reason for today's PC attitude but it could have helped a little bit.

Thanks for this though guys much appreciated and a good read!

[William F. Owen]

Clausewitz is the essential grounding for all modern military thought. It's not as binding as Newtonian physics, but we have nothing else. I concur with the view that Tony Corn has either never read Clausewitz or has failed to discuss and understand what he says, with those who do.

Part of this comes from the increasing confusion caused by the current use of means which have no military purpose. (Building Schools, Aid programs etc) which fall outside the scope of the military instrument and are part of the policy, not the War. A vast amount of what is currently discussed about military thought is not military, or even "Warfare", so folks read Clausewitz and get confused.

Failing to understand Clausewitz is also central to a lot of John Boyd's insights, so again, adhering to one set of faulty argument sets you up for the next error in your OODA loop! - cheap shot, but it was too easy!! :)

[AmericanPride]

In my understanding, the relevancy of Clausewitz in the contemporary operating environment has not eroded, but instead has moved "downwards" to where tactical decisions have the same political effects and aims of war as a whole. Anthropology in war is nothing new -- IIRC Caesar extensively exploited such knowledge in his conquest of Gaul.

[SWJED]

Hey thanks for this i found it a very insightful and interesting read and im in agreement that it was not the reason for today's PC attitude but it could have helped a little bit.

Thanks for this though guys much appreciated and a good read!

Please do an intro (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/forumdisplay.php?f=33) and, per our “house rules”, explain why you found this insightful and interesting... We tend to ask for substance here. Thanks in advance.

[Backwards Observer]

Does the fractious debate on evolutionary theory more-or-less hamstring any effort at describing complex adaptive systems from a human perspective?:confused:

Merry Christmas

[Bill Moore]

Does the fractious debate on evolutionary theory more-or-less hamstring any effort at describing complex adaptive systems from a human perspective?

The evolution of warfare is a fact, not a theory. I'm not sure there is any debate on that, and complex adaptive systems are systems that evolve in response to a changing environment, in other words co-evolution.

Previously I have been hard on the readers/followers of Clausewitz, but that was due to their interpretations and blind obedience to what they think Clausewitz meant to say, such as the debate on center of gravities (COG). The COG process normally results in a lot of wasted time that does nothing to address the real problem, but it results in a must have power point slide for most ring knockers and graduates of CGSC. Clausewitz was a trend setter, not a follower. His intellectual insights were far above most, if not all, other military theorists, but his hordes of worshipers do not fall in the same category.

[Backwards Observer]

The evolution of warfare is a fact, not a theory. I'm not sure there is any debate on that, and complex adaptive systems are systems that evolve in response to a changing environment, in other words co-evolution.

Got it. Thanks!

[Cavguy]

The evolution of warfare is a fact, not a theory. I'm not sure there is any debate on that, and complex adaptive systems are systems that evolve in response to a changing environment, in other words co-evolution.

Just wanted to chime in and differentiate that no one argues against the idea warfare constantly evolves, but whether there are semi-linear "generations" of war (1/2/3/4 GW) is quite a subject of debate here and elsewhere. I, for one, hate the GW concept, for all the reasons outline in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6112).


I would also argue that whether the underlying nature of warfare is different today than in the past is open discussion.

[CR6]

I would also argue that whether the underlying nature of warfare is different today than in the past is open discussion.

I am of the opinion that the nature of war is unchanging but its character may change based on the cultures, available technology, and motivations of the antagonists.

[selil]

I agree with many that "generational" concepts of war are hugely disturbing (even if I've written about it). I've been doing a literature review on the topic and I'm coming to some ideas that may or may not be valid.

1) The reasons for conflict remain the same. The reasons, the issues, the politics, the humanity of conflict is the same throughout history.

2) There are fundamental tactics that remain the same. Small unit to large army the ideas of movement, formation, are re-interpreted but fundamentally similar to previous eras.

3) Strategies appear to evolve but that is a false premise. Understanding and knowledge of the enemy and response techniques to the enemy actions evolve to follow consistent maturation models.

4) The fulcrum of many military eras is a fusion of technology and culture. New weapons cause a scramble to identify new defenses which result in new attack modes. That follow similar strategies of past eras just in newly interpreted roles.

I might suggest that industrial age harmonics rolling through our knowledge economic age have created a tension within military circles (e.g. Nagl v. Gentile). Generational and episodic explanations have a tendency to create waves of new/old thinking. Whereas, usually the point of view of each is increasingly in error as the window of time moves across both points of view. The only constant being change, the only reality being the independent view points of the participants.

Some meager ideas frittered away on Christmas eve.

[Bill Moore]

I, for one, hate the GW concept, for all the reasons outline in this thread.

Concur, although I still think there are some worthwhile observations in the 4GW school of thought. I heard from a credible source that Hammes later wished he didn't attach his ideas to 4GW, because that association ended up discrediting an otherwise great work.

I concur that the character of war evolves primarily based on culture and techology, but I strongly suspect there are other factors. Furthermore, as we all know different cultures evolve at different rates and in different ways. If a particular foe (most of them), can't afford to evolve sufficiently to counter our advanced technological based force, they'll evolve their tactics and strategy in an attempt to mitigate it (co-evoluation), thus equating to what some call asymmetrical warfare. Seems all of our terms asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, etc. are far from ideal, yet those terms emerged for a reason.

[Cavguy]

Concur, although I still think there are some worthwhile observations in the 4GW school of thought. I heard from a credible source that Hammes later wished he didn't attach his ideas to 4GW, because that association ended up discrediting an otherwise great work.


When I first read 'Sling and the Stone', it was an eye-opener that I learned a lot from. Even then (well before my SWC/IW/COIN/4GW/Hybrid War/etc education) I was uneasy with the concept. That didn't take away from the overall lesson of TX's book - these wars are about populations, narrative, and information.

That said, he spent the first 1/3d of the book making a foreceful argument for the GW concept, something that really detracted from my recent re-read.

For novices, the 4GW theory doesn't do any harm, it's just intellectually dishonest, and I still don't understand why Lind and Co. persist in promoting what is a bankrupt construct when other, more intellectually honest approaches are available.

[William F. Owen]

Concur, although I still think there are some worthwhile observations in the 4GW school of thought. I heard from a credible source that Hammes later wished he didn't attach his ideas to 4GW, because that association ended up discrediting an otherwise great work.


Not to doubt the credible source, but having spent some days, a dining in night and a couple of hours on a train with TX, arguing about a whole range of stuff, I think he believes in the idea of 4GW, if nothing else as short-hand for the idea that somehow war is or has somehow changed.

This is the idea I disagree with.

4GW is like MW and EBO. It's a very blunt tool for trying to get an idea across quickly and without having to explain too much.

[UrsaMaior]

Not only iranian but estonian and hungarian military academics have also embraced the 4GW modell. Their understanding of it is similar to those two PLA colonels', basically in this 'new kind of war' everythin' goes, but old fashioned firepower - so to say.


when other, more intellectually honest approaches are available.

May I ask you to let me know where I can find them?

[William F. Owen]

Not only iranian but estonian and hungarian military academics have also embraced the 4GW modell. Their understanding of it is similar to those two PLA colonels', basically in this 'new kind of war' everythin' goes, but old fashioned firepower - so to say.


I think that just shows how poor the overall understanding of War and Warfare may be. It is simply ludicrous in the extreme to suggest that there is a "new kind of War" unless you didn't understand the existing forms of war in the first place.

[UrsaMaior]

With all respect sir, I tend to agree with Steve Metz
Contemporary insurgencies are less like traditional war where the combatants seek strategic victory, they are more like a violent, fluid, and competitive market.

and Gen. Krulak "I feel it will be Stepchild of Chechnya.".

These 'new wars' or conflicts are not the "clean", collateral damage-free and strategically clear (objective: Defeat Hitler, or the Soviet Union) wars we westerners got used to fight. Especially when no future enemy will 'stand up' to a 'fair fight'.

[William F. Owen]

With all respect sir, I tend to agree with Steve Metz
Contemporary insurgencies are less like traditional war where the combatants seek strategic victory, they are more like a violent, fluid, and competitive market.

and Gen. Krulak "I feel it will be Stepchild of Chechnya.".

Please call me Wilf, and with equal respect I disagree with Steve on this one. I agree with Colin Gray. If an insurgency does not have a strategic (change of government?) then it's not an insurgency. People do not take up arms for fun. Violence is instrumental, not recreational.

Good man though Krulak may be, lets not get lumbered with another simplistic analogy like "three-block war."


These 'new wars' or conflicts are not the "clean", collateral damage-free and strategically clear (objective: Defeat Hitler, or the Soviet Union) wars we westerners got used to fight. Especially when no future enemy will 'stand up' to a 'fair fight'.

I'm not sure I understand this. Defeating Hitler was not Collateral damage free. About 27,000,000 civilians died. Allied Forces killed 7,000 French civilians during the Normandy Campaign alone, and about 300,000 German civilians in Bombing raids. That Governments didn't care that much does not define a "new war now that Governments may pretend to care. What you are seeing is merely a form of operations that requires the restriction of force when and if appropriate. It's not new.

If you wish to believe that "no future enemy will 'stand up' to a 'fair fight'" then I would ask where you have found the evidence to support this idea.

[Ken White]

...If an insurgency does not have a strategic (change of government?) then it's not an insurgency. People do not take up arms for fun. Violence is instrumental, not recreational.True.
I'm not sure I understand this. Defeating Hitler was not Collateral damage free...Very true and you just hit the tip of the old iceberg. Consider also the damaging (then to the war and future until today...) political interplay between the UK, US and USSR (among others) and the fact that one of Roosevelt's war aims was to strip the colonies from France and the UK, an attempt in which he was generally successful. WW II was a very big, very messy and not well conducted war, lot of failures military and political by all involved. It also was not totally supported by the non combatant population as many seem to believe.
That Governments didn't care that much does not define a "new war now that Governments may pretend to care. What you are seeing is merely a form of operations that requires the restriction of force when and if appropriate. It's not new.Nope -- nor is it guaranteed to be the only venue...

[selil]

I think that just shows how poor the overall understanding of War and Warfare may be. It is simply ludicrous in the extreme to suggest that there is a "new kind of War" unless you didn't understand the existing forms of war in the first place.

That is a bit troubling. The advent of air power was a new kind of war, add in space operations and planning and new methods of war were adopted, never mind the idea of nuclear weapons opening an entire new form of war, cyber like it or not is likely a new domain even if built on the bones of other forms of war.

I imagine the first generals looking at boats saying "Navy? What? That is no way to wage war. You can't wage war from a boat!".

New or old they are changing and morphing.

[Steve Blair]

That is a bit troubling. The advent of air power was a new kind of war, add in space operations and planning and new methods of war were adopted, never mind the idea of nuclear weapons opening an entire new form of war, cyber like it or not is likely a new domain even if built on the bones of other forms of war.

I imagine the first generals looking at boats saying "Navy? What? That is no way to wage war. You can't wage war from a boat!".

New or old they are changing and morphing.

I see most of these as being new dimensions of war, with the exception of nukes and cyber. Why? Nukes gave generals and politicians their first real weapon that could almost instantly annihilate an opponent. Cyber because it is really attacking different areas and operating with parameters that are considerably different from those of more traditional conflict.

And with the navy analogy...the Romans saw boats as just another way to get close to their opponents and send in the Legions. Boarding tactics were a major part of any of their naval engagements. The Athenians, by contrast, had a very different approach. But they were still different dimensions of the same conflict. Nukes and cyber change the boundaries, IMO.

[Ken White]

is infinitely varied and changes constantly. Woe be to he who doesn't keep up with the changes... :wry:

War is a state of being; warfare is methodology and practice. That's not just semantic BS, the relevant difference is shown by all those who objected to the 'War on Terror' claiming one could not be at war with a tactical method.

[William F. Owen]

is infinitely varied and changes constantly. Woe be to he who doesn't keep up with the changes... :wry:

War is a state of being; warfare is methodology and practice. That's not just semantic BS, the relevant difference is shown by all those who objected to the 'War on Terror' claiming one could not be at war with a tactical method.

Said better than I ever could. Thank you.

[UrsaMaior]

Please call me Wilf, and with equal respect I disagree with Steve on this one. I agree with Colin Gray. If an insurgency does not have a strategic (change of government?) then it's not an insurgency. People do not take up arms for fun. Violence is instrumental, not recreational.

Wilf
If a rebellion, civil unrest etc. has a long term goal can we call it an insurgency? BTW as a newcomer to COIN is there any broadly accepted definition for IN/COIN?


Good man though Krulak may be, lets not get lumbered with another simplistic analogy like "three-block war."

I have not read his work, I only remembered he forecasted the 'new kind of war'. IMHO this urban guerilla, street gang, militia style MOUT war interwoven with the 24/7 media coverage is not something that has historic precedence.


I'm not sure I understand this. Defeating Hitler was not Collateral damage free. About 27,000,000 civilians died. Allied Forces killed 7,000 French civilians during the Normandy Campaign alone, and about 300,000 German civilians in Bombing raids.

The '1000 bomber raid' and similar operations were clearly NOT aimed at military objectives. The first Schweinfurt attacks yes. But not most of the attacks in 1945, and not the night ones. In that sense only the french casulties you mentioned can be called collateral damage. The rest were victims of intended genocide mostly by the nazis and the soviets. But let's stay on topic.


That Governments didn't care that much does not define a "new war now that Governments may pretend to care. What you are seeing is merely a form of operations that requires the restriction of force when and if appropriate. It's not new.

Wilf. An enemy whose actions are clearly aimed at reaching media coverage, and not at causing military losses (in the sense of seriously weakening the enemy warmachine), while at the same time hiding among the civilians hoping to avoid the reprisal, based on 'Human rights to everyone' is not something we have seen before. Of course elements of it yes. But not the whole picture.


If you wish to believe that "no future enemy will 'stand up' to a 'fair fight'" then I would ask where you have found the evidence to support this idea.

If I were a rational, thinking people I would consider my actions and their consequences before I act against a technically or numerically superior enemy. Of course religious fanatics appear from time to time, but get their a***es whacked real quick, after an inital surprise.

But you are right, I reformulate. No sane future enemy will stand up against say NATO and organize its fighting force into neat military units in uniforms ie to put up a fair fight.

In the age of information industrial age armies are as irrelevant as were pre-industrial ones to industrial ones. They still have their validity as deterring force, but the 'succesful' herero or boer war solutions of previous ages cannot be repeated.

Edit
Yours truly Carl has said war is a chameleon. Well it is.

[AmericanPride]

Ursa,

What's 'new' about the nature of war and what makes it 'new'? How does a new tactic indictate a fundamental change in war itself?

Also -- what conditions exist now that compel an adversary to not pursue a conventional war? What makes those conditions enduring?

[zenpundit]

Wilf Owen wrote:

"People do not take up arms for fun. Violence is instrumental, not recreational"

Instrumental for some. States, for example.

Arguably "recreational violence" is an end in itself and a point of recruitment for certain kinds of military forces from tribal raiders, to mercenaries to citizen soldiers where a public demonstration of martial prowess was integral to social concepts of "honor" or future individual political credibility. From counting coup to ethnic cleansing the neighbors who have marginally different customs, taking up arms throughout history has had other pretexts besides strategic political objectives.

I would also argue that some of history's more poorly conceived military ventures failed in part because they were gratuitous gestures of force lacking in a coherent purpose.

[Ken White]

Instrumental for some. States, for example.

Arguably "recreational violence" is an end in itself and a point of recruitment...taking up arms throughout history has had other pretexts besides strategic political objectives.True but that does not indicate that such recourse to arms is recreational even though some, a small percentage and generally young and inexperienced may actually enjoy conflict it is unlikely that the majority of groups that take up arms do so for recreation.
I would also argue that some of history's more poorly conceived military ventures failed in part because they were gratuitous gestures of force lacking in a coherent purpose.Also true but again, not a contradiction of Wilf's point. All Movies lack a coherent purpose IMO yet they are seen by some as recreation and by others as instrumental for achieving social change. Movies are not real and some have entertainment value. War is real, it is singularly lacking in entertainment value...:wry:

[William F. Owen]

Arguably "recreational violence" is an end in itself and a point of recruitment for certain kinds of military forces from tribal raiders, to mercenaries to citizen soldiers where a public demonstration of martial prowess was integral to social concepts of "honor" or future individual political credibility.

...and thus instrumental. Instrumental does not mean "fun free" it just means for a purpose.

If you want to talk movies, I'd say there is an object lesson to be had from studying "The Shield" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Shield) which is exceptional screen writing and where all violent actions have direct story consequences.

[UrsaMaior]

Ursa,

What's 'new' about the nature of war and what makes it 'new'? How does a new tactic indictate a fundamental change in war itself?

Also -- what conditions exist now that compel an adversary to not pursue a conventional war? What makes those conditions enduring?

Excellent questions. In my humble and yet not thouroughly researched opinion

ad 1. War was/is/will be a social "activity" if we accept (I do) van Creveld's findings about it (even Keegan's examples in his falied yet interesting try to refute Clausewitz prove it) iMHO it is an inseperable part of human (or maybe male) nature. So it cannot be old new etc only different. New kind maybe.

Therefore it is a 'new kind' to us since the way it is fought (through media driven pseudo military actions), for it is fought (the suport of the popalation's majority), and by whom it is fought (militias, gangs not something we can call a military with OOB's and C4ISR etc.). Yet it is a war since it is waged on states with clearly defined strategic goals.

It is fundamental because it is irrelevant how big your arsenal is. I would quote Boyd here but in my perception he is not really welcome here, so I merely would like to quote a group called Human League (having lived behind the Iron Curtain while they were hip I only know their songs not their backgrounds). So here it goes "You cannot make friends with an M-16." The net effect of globalisation, the collapse of the colonial system not to mention the cold war is that you cant just invade a country and suppress its population with brute force. It's not a new tactic hit and run is as ancient as the ancient scythians or even older. It is a fundamental change in the circumstances. Industrial age is over and the information age is upon us. But it does not mean we must get more information on possible targets through sensors and share it with the others, rather ' He who has more information of the enemy's intents, support and objctives wins.' to paraphrase Sun Tzu.

ad 2. As I already said in one of my answer to wilf, any rational enemy would avoid a direct confrontation with the military technological, organizational superiority of the West. Why? Because it is obviously counterproductive. As long as we preserve a credible deterring force it wont stand a chance in a classical "clausewitzian" conflict. Therefore if it wants to pursue its goals (and again thanks to globalisation and UN etc. they can be non-state actors as well), it will have to resort to non-conventional means, in which we have a bit poor record.

If we unmake globalisation, and the watcher of human rights (the UN) I don't see any reason not to resort to the ol' victorian methods of brutal population suppression. I am too uniformed to see any of the above coming. But if these are to stay, then classical military operations with army groups and dozens of divisions have ended since any gain from such an industrial style war is insignificant compared to the level of damage evenn the winner has to suffer.

This is my pronouncedly humble opinion since I am yet to publish anything in this issue.

[William F. Owen]

ad 2. As I already said in one of my answer to wilf, any rational enemy would avoid a direct confrontation with the military technological, organizational superiority of the West. Why? Because it is obviously counterproductive. As long as we preserve a credible deterring force it wont stand a chance in a classical "clausewitzian" conflict. Therefore if it wants to pursue its goals (and again thanks to globalisation and UN etc. they can be non-state actors as well), it will have to resort to non-conventional means, in which we have a bit poor record.


I take your point, if the rational enemy was rational and did not possess equivalent technology of his own. It may be different to ours but is may still be effective.

Don't dismiss 6,000 Toyota Land cruisers all armed with MANPADs and ATGMS

"Classical "clausewitzian" conflict.?" Clausewitz wrote about all conflict. Clausewitz applies equally well to COIN as he does "Big Wars".

[selil]

Anybody who thinks in western civilization violence does not exist for the sake of violence has been in the disciplined world of the military for way to long. Detroit devils night (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devil's_Night) would be a good example. The assertion that people don't engage in violence for no reason other than political is a ludicrous as people rioting when their team wins (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5qkoD5Spgg)! Maybe that isn't war, or warfare, or diplomacy, but the assertion appeared to be that people don't engage in violence for acts other than those. To use a word from a previous poster that would be ludicrous.

[William F. Owen]

Anybody who thinks in western civilization violence does not exist for the sake of violence has been in the disciplined world of the military for way to long. Detroit devils night (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devil's_Night) would be a good example. The assertion that people don't engage in violence for no reason other than political is a ludicrous as people rioting when their team wins (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5qkoD5Spgg)! Maybe that isn't war, or warfare, or diplomacy, but the assertion appeared to be that people don't engage in violence for acts other than those. To use a word from a previous poster that would be ludicrous.

Sure people beat their wives because it makes them feel good, and as Brit I have fairly good, and perhaps shameful personal experience of football violence. I would further add that I my experience, football violence was instrumental. It conferred status.

What I said was,

"People do not take up arms for fun. Violence is instrumental, not recreational"

If you can show me any armed group that has organised for recreational violance and show it as a consistent and persistent trend, that undermines the validity of my comment, I will gladly retract it or re-consider it.

[wm]

Sure people beat their wives because it makes them feel good, and as Brit I have fairly good, and perhaps shameful personal experience of football violence. I would further add that I my experience, football violence was instrumental. It conferred status.

What I said was,

"People do not take up arms for fun. Violence is instrumental, not recreational"

If you can show me any armed group that has organised for recreational violance and show it as a consistent and persistent trend, that undermines the validity of my comment, I will gladly retract it or re-consider it.

I suspect that reflection on the second quotation in Wilf's signature block, to wit:
"Pedants will be able to cite exceptions, and thus undermine useful (insightful) theory. Their depredations must be firmly resisted by one simple test: does the theory generally aid understanding of useful military problems? If so, then exceptions are permissible."
is worthwhile to both sides of this debate. Another way of stating this is the old saw "that's the exception that proves the rule."

BTW, I suspect that the comparison commits an error akin to trying to answer this question: "Is it colder in the winter or the country?"
A better framing of the debate would, IMHO, be: Do people routinely engage in violence as a means to some other end or is violence practiced without aim. Accepting the hypothesis that some folks engage in recreational violence still commits one to the position that the violence is not aimless. It is conducted as "a means of refreshment or diversion" to quote Webster's second definition for recreation.

Perhaps the debate should focus on whether the goal of the participation in violence is more or less noble, worthwhile, valuable, etc. Recreation as a goal of violence seems to imply that the end does not justify the means (but I'd be careful saying that at a World Wrestling Fenderation Smackdown event or a major professional boxing event :wry: ).

[UrsaMaior]

I take your point, if the rational enemy was rational and did not possess equivalent technology of his own. It may be different to ours but is may still be effective.

Don't dismiss 6,000 Toyota Land cruisers all armed with MANPADs and ATGMS.

Well, China. Russia, India all possess (sp?) equivavalent technology ie "modern" equipment. But I doubt they will try to 'stand up an' fight' with any sizeable western force. As long as the West has its technological edge in numbers and demostrates its willingness to use it we wont see 6,000 pick ups.


"Classical "clausewitzian" conflict.?" Clausewitz wrote about all conflict. Clausewitz applies equally well to COIN as he does "Big Wars"

Ok I meant big war, or High intensity conflict. Alas it is another argument for me this chaos of terminology. All society has problems naming new phenomenons. See Kilcullen's relevant article.

[zenpundit]

Hi Wilf & Ken,

My problem with your answers is the implicit breadth of your concept of what the word "instrumental" means in this context, which seems to be all violent actions north of an epileptic seizure. :D

Taken to that grand extent, sure, most violence can be defined as purposeful toward an end but when all things are something, then nothing is. Common sense and five minutes observation at a busy intersection in a bad neigborhood at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening will disabuse anyone of the idea that all violence has rational root causes. Sometimes the pretext for violence is a nominal excuse.

Too broad a definition to be useful analytically, in my view. Perhaps WM's suggestion of reframing the debate is more productive

[Ken White]

'Instrumental' to me as Wilf stated simply means it has a purpose other than recreational; whether said purpose is rational or not is neither said or implied.

Though I could make a valid case for any conflict being at least partly irrational. Necessary perhaps but still irrational... :wry:

In any event, I'm not at all sure that debate is merited. Quite the contrary.

[zenpundit]

Hi Ken,

Sorry I can't buy the premise that all organized violence is "instrumental" minus violent acts that might be "recreational" in nature, though "fun" per se cannot be excluded as a byproduct of the former.

I will wish you a Happy New year though! Cheers!

[Ken White]

Happy New Year! :wry:

[William F. Owen]

Sorry I can't buy the premise that all organized violence is "instrumental" minus violent acts that might be "recreational" in nature, though "fun" per se cannot be excluded as a byproduct of the former.


Why not? It's a quite widely accepted premise, coined by Colin S. Gray, if I am not mistaken.

[Bob's World]

How does one best apply Clausewitz's insights on warfare to the realm of Insurgency and counterinsurgency? Reasonable minds can differ, and it is a topic worthy of debate as it strikes to the heart of designing effective strategies, and crafting successful campaign plans for many of the operations we find ourselves embroiled in in the Irregular dominated environment we face today.

The attached paper, written by COL John C Buckley II back in 1995 when he was a Major at Leavenworth does an excellent job of tackling this complex subject. He uses the American experience in Vietnam and the British experience in Ireland to explore his take on a proper application of Clausewitz. Regardless of if you agree or disagree with his position, this is a piece of work well worth considering.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf Alas not working try below.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA300106&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

[slapout9]

Bob's World, can you check the link you posted? I don't think it is working.

[Ron Humphrey]

Bob's World, can you check the link you posted? I don't think it is working.

You may have to already be logged into a .mil site though.

Worked when I'm logged in with my CAC

[davidbfpo]

Slap,

The link posted worked earlier, albeit on another post and the one on this thread doesn't work. Try this: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA300106&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

Got It! Thanks Guys;)

[Bob's World]

All,

Thanks for the assist. Still a rookie at starting a thread and maneuvering around this site. Looks like David's link is working.

[AmericanPride]

I do not think any significant modification is required of Clausewitz in order to understand insurgency. If we accept that the state itself represents and imposes the will of the class which holds power (or in competitive societies, the sum of the resolutions of their conflicts), then the state becomes a vehicle for violence and war, and not its driver. From there we can accept that insurgency comes about as a similar decision for a class to pursue war, but outside of the means of the state. Violence remains instrumental and deliberate.

[wm]

I do not think any significant modification is required of Clausewitz in order to understand insurgency. If we accept that the state itself represents and imposes the will of the class which holds power (or in competitive societies, the sum of the resolutions of their conflicts), then the state becomes a vehicle for violence and war, and not its driver. From there we can accept that insurgency comes about as a similar decision for a class to pursue war, but outside of the means of the state. Violence remains instrumental and deliberate.

Have to disagree--Clausewitz' trinity is the government/leadership, the military, and the people. In an insurgency, the Clausewitzian trinity collapses--the people become the military, or at least a subset of the people do. In conducting counter-insurgency, the leadership of the state tries to impose its will on the people (or, again, a subset of them) by means of the military. This sets the whole trinitarian construct on its head, I think. In the normal way of Clausewitzian war, I submit the leadership uses the military as a means of executing the will of the people. It may be the case that leadership may need to take extra measures to garner the support of the people for military action, but I do not think that suppression of the will of one's own people by military means is really part of the continuation of politics by other means.

[Bob's World]

Tend to agree with WM. American Pride, once you look at the paper, you may well still not agree, but at least you will have worked your way through a well stated argument that offers you a different perspective.

[wm]

One can view Clausewitz' work as an attempt to justify a return to the status quo ante bellum after the defeat of Napoleon. In the good old pre-Napoleonic days, wars were lead by aristocratic leaders of professional armies while the people stayed out of the way, for the most part. Admittedly a subset of the people were engaged in those wars, but, except for the occasional siege, war was conducted by professionals away from population centers. The French Revolution changed much of that, at least as far as France was concerned. War was no longer the private domain of professionals. While not quite total war, the Napoleonic conflicts came pretty close. (The American Civil War and the Franco-Prussina War are the first instances of Western total war in the industrial age, I think.) On this analysis, Clausewitz was much like most other writers and thinkers on the Continent during the period--helping Metternich in his attempt to turn back the hands of time to a point before the Tennis Court Oath and holding them there.

If one accepts this interpretation, then Clausewitz definitely has no purchase as an explanation for insurgency and counter-insurgency.

[Ken White]

with all the other 20 or so who have good things to offer -- but no total solution because there is none. People are too complex and dynamic (Well, not me; the dynamic bit... :D ) and warfare is too subject to change for anyone to have all the answers.

Having said all that, I totally agree with you that insurgency in general and modern insurgency in particular was a little beyond Clausewitz. He offers little help in how to oppose or support it.

[Steve Blair]

Having said all that, I totally agree with you that insurgency in general and modern insurgency in particular was a little beyond Clausewitz. He offers little help in how to oppose or support it.

True, and it was also an area that he had precious little experience with and (it could be argued) wasn't really trying to study or include in his framework. He does deal to a degree with "wars of the people" (don't remember his exact wording ATM), but it's more as an aside and might possibly be something he would have expanded had he lived to finish On War.

I honestly don't think we'll make much progress until we shed the Cold War framework that tends to cloud much of the thinking about insurgencies. Obviously they existed long before the whole US vs. USSR framework, but it seems that a single historical anomaly (the Cold War) has clouded much of that historical memory and tinted our basic approach to insurgencies. The Cold War forced too much focus on State activities and left popular movements and ethnic strife out of the picture or minimized them as root causes or enablers. For example, many of the mistakes the US made in Vietnam came from trying to read the conflict as part of the larger Cold War framework and not being able to "see" the actual, local situation (IMO, anyhow). Insurgencies tend to be multi-faceted, fluid, and subject to many pulls and shifts (not to mention fellow travelers who may not have the same end objectives as the original insurgent leaders - if there are any main leaders), yet we still want to see them as Maoist or "Commie-supported" activities (although you could insert your favorite political motive for 'Commie' and get the same result). And the advances in communication platforms only exaggerate the multi-polar nature of many insurgencies and insurgent movements.

[Ken White]

but to WW II lessons not learned. I'm unsure how to break that mindset but after many years in and a few outside watching the operation, I'm firmly convinced we will continue to have major problems unless we modernize thinking xonsiderably.

That slam, BTW, applies every bit as much to the Civilian Politicians and appointees and to the pundits as it does to the Armed Forces. I'm the old guy but I think all those groups are in a time warp and that the Armed forces are thus constrained to be there as well...

[AmericanPride]

This is why I introduced (in another thread) class analysis into COIN. The "people" as a part of Clausewitz's trinity can be further deconstructed into a sub-trinity of "Class", "Faction", and "Mask". If we conceive of the trinity as the three components of the whole of the state, and the 'people' as another sub-trinity, it is not difficult to extend Clausewitz's theory to insurgency IMO.


It may be the case that leadership may need to take extra measures to garner the support of the people for military action, but I do not think that suppression of the will of one's own people by military means is really part of the continuation of politics by other means.

If the 'leadership' and 'people' are already two separate components, as you have identified, how is "supression of the will of one's own people by military means" not "the continuation of politics by other means" if the normal course of politics would be for the leadership to "take extra measures to garner... support"?

[Old Eagle]

Look -- there are many useless parts of "On War", especially those prescriptive elements about 19th century warfare. OK. I get it.

The beauty of Clausewitz is the philosophical, enduring portion of a coupla his books.

C posits the theoretical existence of "absolute war". Well worth re-reading on a regular basis. But he goes on to say that absolute war, maybe like the physical concept of absolute zero, cannot exist in reality. He then goes on to explain all the limiting factors on warfare. To my way of thinking, the limitations/constraints that we normally associate with insurgency/counterinsurgency are simply other limiting factors that the boss would be very comfortable with.

Getting hung up on rigid concepts of the Westphalian nation state, and "government" are our biases, not Carl's.

I think that Ken studied under Clausewitz, so he may have a better interpretation than I. :D

[Ken White]

I think that Ken studied under Clausewitz, so he may have a better interpretation than I. :Dstudents; I was already in my dotage, didn't do as well as I might have with him...

My earlier prize pupils Gus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustavus_Adolphus) and Morrie (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurice_de_Saxe) were better, I think. ;)

So, too was my own mentor. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subutai) :D

[wm]

If the 'leadership' and 'people' are already two separate components, as you have identified, how is "supression of the will of one's own people by military means" not "the continuation of politics by other means" if the normal course of politics would be for the leadership to "take extra measures to garner... support"?

I'm not suggesting that we turn out the Army to supress Copperhead riots, which seems to be what you took from my comment. I was thinking more along the lines of a strategic communications campaign (aka propaganda) for home consumption--Buy Bonds, "Loose Lips Sink Ships," "Lucky Strike Green has Gone to War"--that kind of stuff.

I believe , by the way, that we may not be univocal on what is meant by politics. "Politics" in the sense expressed in that famous quote from St Carl has to do with inter-state relations not intra-state relations. It does not have the same sense as "all politics is local" as expressed by Tip O'Neill, which seems to be what is expressed in the quoted comment above.

[AmericanPride]

I'm not suggesting that we turn out the Army to supress Copperhead riots, which seems to be what you took from my comment. I was thinking more along the lines of a strategic communications campaign (aka propaganda) for home consumption--Buy Bonds, "Loose Lips Sink Ships," "Lucky Strike Green has Gone to War"--that kind of stuff.

I understand. However, I would argue that our (American/Western) conception of civil-military relations is unique, and while influenced by the Clausewitz model, I think most other societies have experiences where the military actively intervenes in civil life. That said, while I agree that Clausewitz spoke mostly of 19th century inter-state relations, his concepts are nonetheless applicable because the characteristics of politics do not fundamentally change from one system to another. Advocates of omni-balancing theory suggest that the majority of foreign policy decisions are made for domestic gain, or as the resolution of a state's internal contradiction. In some sense, inter-state relations are a 'continuation of politics by other means'.

[Bob's World]

Its been my assessment that most advocates of applying the concepts advanced by CvC to an insurgency problem are those who believe that success can come through the military defeat of the insurgent himself. Counterinsurgent vs Counterinsurgency.

My take from history is that this only suppressess the violent manifestation of the problem, and that so long as the conditions of poor governance (not effectiveness, but an assessment through the populaces eyes as to their satisfaction and sense of not being able to exert peaceful change) exist the violence will emerge. It may come back with new leaders or ideology, but while critical requirements to any good insurgency, the exact nature of either is immaterial so long as it is effective.

What the author did, is show how CvC's model for state v state warfare can, in effect, "snap into" a similar model of popular warfare over the common ground of the populace. I thought it was a clever adaption, and that the model would be helpful to those who believe that CvC applies to all conflicts a way to perhaps see what others are talking about when they disagree.

[William F. Owen]

Its been my assessment that most advocates of applying the concepts advanced by CvC to an insurgency problem are those who believe that success can come through the military defeat of the insurgent himself. Counterinsurgent vs Counterinsurgency.


If the insurgent is not using military/violent means, then he can't be countered using military force. There's clear blue water between COIN and the social conditions that create it - so yes, there is a fire safety type factor here, but soldiers should not be used to address the social problems.

CvC wrote "On War". Not "On Welfare".

[Bob's World]

If the insurgent is not using military/violent means, then he can't be countered using military force. There's clear blue water between COIN and the social conditions that create it - so yes, there is a fire safety type factor here, but soldiers should not be used to address the social problems.

CvC wrote "On War". Not "On Welfare".

Not all organized violence is "warfare" as addressed by CvC. The point being that even if you have an organized, violent insurgent organization, one can not achieve enduring effect by simply beating them down to the point that they lack capacity to wage violence. Also, that the techniques used to contain the violent actors and secure the populace must be designed so as to not actually antagonize the problem while seeking a solution.

Complex tricky business, but it begins, IMO, by first understanding what it is that you are actually trying to accomplish. And that is not defeat of a foe, but a repair of governance.

[William F. Owen]

Not all organized violence is "warfare" as addressed by CvC. The point being that even if you have an organized, violent insurgent organization, one can not achieve enduring effect by simply beating them down to the point that they lack capacity to wage violence.
Well if you can show me a military model that does not adhere to the CvC trinity, I will be extremely grateful and very interested.

...but once you have "beaten them down" that is the limit of military power. - so I agree, Military power can only solve military problems, and unless you solve the military problem, you cannot generally address any of the other problems

Also, that the techniques used to contain the violent actors and secure the populace must be designed so as to not actually antagonize the problem while seeking a solution.
- I think CvC would agree and he actually warns against embarking on military action, unless you have a clear aim in mind.

I think we may be violently agreeing... :D

[Eden]

Complex tricky business, but it begins, IMO, by first understanding what it is that you are actually trying to accomplish. And that is not defeat of a foe, but a repair of governance.

Not always. That's what we are after, but in many cases the counterinsurgents are not interested in 'repair of governance', but in the perpetuation of their own power/privileges/position. And insurgencies have been suppressed through sheer violence - it can work if the counterinsurgent is ruthless and sufficiently powerful in relation to the insurgent. Ask the post-war Ukrainian nationalists, Apaches, or the Albigensians, if you can find any.

This is a perennial problem for us in COIN when we work with host governments as in South Vietnam or Iraq, or without any governance, as in Afghanistan.

[Ken White]

This is a perennial problem for us in COIN when we work with host governments as in South Vietnam or Iraq, or without any governance, as in Afghanistan.Third time, as they say, is the charm. Maybe the lesson has been learned.

Hopefully, we will discover that there are other ways to influence actions, aid nations who need it, deter insurgents and exercise military power effectively.

Actually, all that's been discovered. The question is will we adopt the principles and techniques -- and actually work smarter...

[LawVol]

Have to disagree--Clausewitz' trinity is the government/leadership, the military, and the people. In an insurgency, the Clausewitzian trinity collapses--the people become the military, or at least a subset of the people do. In conducting counter-insurgency, the leadership of the state tries to impose its will on the people (or, again, a subset of them) by means of the military. This sets the whole trinitarian construct on its head, I think. In the normal way of Clausewitzian war, I submit the leadership uses the military as a means of executing the will of the people. It may be the case that leadership may need to take extra measures to garner the support of the people for military action, but I do not think that suppression of the will of one's own people by military means is really part of the continuation of politics by other means.

In looking at CvC's trinity as applicable to both sides of an insurgency, wouldn't the COIN force's trinity consist of its government, it military, and its people while the insurgents force would consist of its leaders, that segment of the population taking up arms, and the same population the as COIN forces? In other words, using Afghanistan as an example, the good guys' trinity is US/Afghan government, US/Afghan military, and the Afghan people. The insurgency's trinity is the Taliban/AQ leadership, the fighters, and the Afghan people.

Granted issues are encountered when attempting to attack the will of the people as Clausewitz counsels. But what if the concept of "war" is broadened? Although Clausewitz spoke of a political/war continuum (war is the continuation of political activity...), he choose a bright line between the two (or at least appears to when considering his description of war). But if we look at the concept of war as a means to an end, then is it possible to argue that "war" can be viewed as a competition using both violent and non-violent means.

Thus, while violent means may be used to alter the will of the people in traditional war (e.g. attrition warfare), non-violent means are employed when it comes to COIN. Put differently, the alteration of will in the two contexts are different and call for different means. In traditional war, we seek to convince the people to give up fighting. In COIN we're trying to get them to fight or at least dime out the bad guys.

I'm not criticizing here; just trying to understand. I've been reading that Unrestricted Warfare book, so maybe it is coloring my thoughts too much??

[Ken White]

In looking at CvC's trinity as applicable to both sides of an insurgency, wouldn't the COIN force's trinity consist of its government, it military, and its people while the insurgents force would consist of its leaders, that segment of the population taking up arms, and the same population the as COIN forces? In other words, using Afghanistan as an example, the good guys' trinity is US/Afghan government, US/Afghan military, and the Afghan people. The insurgency's trinity is the Taliban/AQ leadership, the fighters, and the Afghan people.I believe your assessment is correct -- but I think it shows why there's a problem in adapting CvC to insurgency in many cases and particularly in the current situations.

CvC posits a Trinity. Good -- where does the US fit in that trinity? An ideal model like your example assumes the US and the HN are in perfect synch and therefor comprise one leg. The actuality in Afghanistan is quite different, just as it is in Iraq and was in Viet Nam. In each case there are significant and troubling differences between the US and the HN. So you end up with a quartet instead of a trinity -- and one leg is shorter than the other; no balance there...:eek:

In most insurgencies there are outside actors that intrude and garble the trinitarian aspect. In your example the opponents also likely have outside players assisting their 'trinity.' Aside from the obvious role of Pakistan, I imagine the Chinese, Indians, Iranians and Russians also are playing. Perhaps others as well.

Of recent insurgencies, Malaya perhaps comes closest to the concept simply because the UK was the government and there was little to no outside support for Chin Peng and the CT. That makes a tremendous difference and is one reason Malaya offers a poor model for COIN efforts.

Philosophy is good; reality is is usually much more messy... :wry:

[Bob's World]

Not always. That's what we are after, but in many cases the counterinsurgents are not interested in 'repair of governance', but in the perpetuation of their own power/privileges/position. And insurgencies have been suppressed through sheer violence - it can work if the counterinsurgent is ruthless and sufficiently powerful in relation to the insurgent. Ask the post-war Ukrainian nationalists, Apaches, or the Albigensians, if you can find any.

This is a perennial problem for us in COIN when we work with host governments as in South Vietnam or Iraq, or without any governance, as in Afghanistan.

But it's not who we are, so we must take the the more complicated route of trying to get a government that we are supporting to actually govern its populace. Ghengis Khan can kill every male taller than a wagon hub and defeat an insurgency very well. We, thankfully, refuse to resort to such ruthlessly simple and effective solutions.

And when an individual, like President Karzai complains that the Americans are not supporting him we should say: We never were. We are supporting the Afghan populace and their efforts to attain good, self-determined governance. If you share that objective and have the support of your populce then you will have our support as well. If you have some other goal, you would be well advised to not count too highly on some personal loyalty committing America to sustaining you in office. As I have stated elsewhere, the days of "Hes a dictator, but he's our dictator" just don't work any more.

(We still have some loose ends to clean up in that regard).

[Ken White]

What your comment proposes is IMO totally correct. F.D.R.s 'our SOB' should never have been adopted -- but it was.

I agree with you on Karzai and we should never have manipulated the Afghans the way we did to put him where he is -- but we did.

In short, I agree with you for the future but that doesn't help now. We have done what we did and are where we are, One would hope that we could learn from history and avoid doing this to ourselves again. Somoza, a host of others in that area, all the many Venezuelans,Vargas, Pinochet, Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, Chalabi / Allawi / Al Maliki, Karzai. Long list. Lot of blowback...

What's that old Pennsylvania Dutch saying? 'Ve are too zoon oldt und too late schmart.'

Anyway -- and I realize you acknowledged we still have some loose ends to clean up -- what's your solution for now?

[Bob's World]

What your comment proposes is IMO totally correct. F.D.R.s 'our SOB' should never have been adopted -- but it was.

I agree with you on Karzai and we should never have manipulated the Afghans the way we did to put him where he is -- but we did.

In short, I agree with you for the future but that doesn't help now. We have done what we did and are where we are, One would hope that we could learn from history and avoid doing this to ourselves again. Somoza, a host of others in that area, all the many Venezuelans,Vargas, Pinochet, Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, Chalabi / Allawi / Al Maliki, Karzai. Long list. Lot of blowback...

What's that old Pennsylvania Dutch saying? 'Ve are too zoon oldt und too late schmart.'

Anyway -- and I realize you acknowledged we still have some loose ends to clean up -- what's your solution for now?

As a junior officer I developed a personal philosophy of "While it is sometimes right to do the wrong thing, it is never wrong to do the right thing." (no need getting into any war stories as to what "wrong things" may have been executed in order to accomplish the mission or take care of my soldiers - statute of limitations, etc)

We have a change of leadership, and with it an opportunity to make significant changes of priorities and focus without the dreaded "loss of face" that seems to trap us into riding bad policies and decisions into the ground.

Recognizing that we have to continue to operate; we must fix this plane in flight. We need a national grand strategy that is based upon a fresh understanding of the dynamic world as it exists today and appears to be trending toward in the future. We then need to reassess every institution, every agency, every policy, and every relationship in the context of that fresh appreciation of the environment and modify, cancel, reinforce, etc each as necessary to bring them up todate and in synch with that new grand strategy.

This should be so comprehensive, that we all grow tired of reporters asking senior leaders "How does this (bill, program, war, relationship, treaty, etc) square with the national grand strategy?"

Once we have this, then we have a anchor point that allows us to get past opinion-based arguments over policy decisions and focus on what we are trying to accomplish, what vital national interest is at stake, and whether or not some proposal is suitable, acceptable, feasible and complete or not. Obviously problems like Afghanistan could be tackled several ways. Once we agree on a context, we will have less to argue about as which way the boss decided to take within that context.

[Ken White]

However, you may recall I also do not think one is possible in this nation due to our political process and schedule. One could argue for hours about what is or have we ever and arrive at several conclusions. Regardless, I think that what you wish for is desirable but probably unachievable.

Even if achievable it would take a few years to be fully implemented and embedded as a process.

What do we do with Afghanistan in the meantime?

[Steve Blair]

However, you may recall I also do not think one is possible in this nation due to our political process and schedule. One could argue for hours about what is or have we ever and arrive at several conclusions. Regardless, I think that what you wish for is desirable but probably unachievable.

Even if achievable it would take a few years to be fully implemented and embedded as a process.

What do we do with Afghanistan in the meantime?

Concur with Ken. I would hazard to state that historically we have never had a national grand strategy, except when looked at with the benefit of hindsight (the Cold War is a good example of that). We have had a national continental expansion strategy, and even that was debated at great length and often subsumed by the debate over slavery and only appears unified and focused with the benefit of about a hundred years of hindsight.

Given our geographical size and diverse population, one could argue that governing the US alone is akin to governing an empire, and that our "national grand strategy" only really comes into focus domestically, and even then it's a pretty hazy picture. Overseas? I don't think you'll ever see it due to the difficulty of getting said domestic empire to agree on anything. Our national interest has traditionally revolved around domestic concerns, with "them folks over yonder" not really factoring into the process. Even with the supposed 'global village,' most of the college students I work with view other countries as exotic destinations for a spring abroad. Policy stuff? Fuggidaboutit.

Like Ken, I think this is an interesting and possibly valuable idea, but in practice I don't think you'll ever see it happen. At least not in the US.

[wm]

With regard to LawVol's position, I think what one ends up with on that analysis is not two 3-legged stools contending with each other for the right to be the preferred place to sit but instead an odd-looking "settee" that has 2 seats, each with 2 uprights and a shared middle upright. The bad news is that when either, or both, of the two seats get occupied, the stress is too great for the shared leg and it snaps, to the misfortune of all. (In this poor metaphor, the occupiers of the two seats just happen to be outsiders who are supporting the two leaderships/armed forces contending for the "hearts and minds" of the people--that poor, over-stressed third leg.) So in the AOR, we have Karzai/ANA contending with Omar/Taliban forces (and maybe others as well--I suspect the various warlords and their supporters in the provinces represent other pairs of leader/army "legs" in the equation) for the "hearts and minds" of a mixed bag of people (Pashtun, Baluchi, etc) that happen to live within arbitrarily drawn boundaries that make up a "nation" called Afghanistan. The US comes along and overbalances the settee (perhaps with AQ sitting on the other seat), just as the USSR did 30 years or so ago, just as the British did more than once in the 19th Century and various Persian states did before them.

In response to Ken's question as to the way ahead, I'll repeat the position I've taken before--we need to back out and let the peoples of the region have the space to make their own decisions about how they want things to go. To continue the furniture metaphor, I submit we need to give them the space to figure out what kind of stool they will create for their country (or countries). That means the US does not sit on one of the setteee's 2 seats and does not allow other outsiders to sit on those 2 seats as well. However, because of the global nature of things, the contending parties don't get carte blanche to do whatever they want. The world as a whole wants peace and prosperity for all. So, how they choose to furnish their Afghan room (or rooms) in the global house must not clash with that design motif. This means that the US takes a position that says something like this: Whatever three legged stool(s) they end up with better not be destabilizing to other areas/nations of the world because that kind of furniture just doesn't fit the decor of the rest of the world. The most important point about this last position is that the US cannot hold it unilaterally. It must be a position agreed to by the rest of the world as well. And that will require the US to collaborate on policies, not dictate them to others.

So to fix the probem in Afghanistan effectively, a US national grand strategy is not sufficient. What is needed is a global strategy, achieving which is probably an even taller order than getting agreement on a US grand strategy.

[Bob's World]

So to fix the probem in Afghanistan effectively, a US national grand strategy is not sufficient. What is needed is a global strategy, achieving which is probably an even taller order than getting agreement on a US grand strategy.

Some day this will happen. Nations working to achieve their national objectives, competing for advantage, but within the framework of a global strategic construct. Would have to be very principle based to work. What the UN might evolve to now that its Cold War mission is long over?

Not in time to help much in Afg. though. But you have to have goals to strive toward, even if they are seemingly unreachable today. At least you stay on azimuth that way.

[LawVol]

With regard to LawVol's position, I think what one ends up with on that analysis is not two 3-legged stools contending with each other for the right to be the preferred place to sit but instead an odd-looking "settee" that has 2 seats, each with 2 uprights and a shared middle upright. The bad news is that when either, or both, of the two seats get occupied, the stress is too great for the shared leg and it snaps, to the misfortune of all. (In this poor metaphor, the occupiers of the two seats just happen to be outsiders who are supporting the two leaderships/armed forces contending for the "hearts and minds" of the people--that poor, over-stressed third leg.) So in the AOR, we have Karzai/ANA contending with Omar/Taliban forces (and maybe others as well--I suspect the various warlords and their supporters in the provinces represent other pairs of leader/army "legs" in the equation) for the "hearts and minds" of a mixed bag of people (Pashtun, Baluchi, etc) that happen to live within arbitrarily drawn boundaries that make up a "nation" called Afghanistan. The US comes along and overbalances the settee (perhaps with AQ sitting on the other seat), just as the USSR did 30 years or so ago, just as the British did more than once in the 19th Century and various Persian states did before them.

I like the "settee" analogy (Ken also alluded to this) and I think it still works, assuming you broaden the scope of war to include all available means. Clausewitz said that the aim of warfare is to disarm the enemy by matching your effort against his power of resistance. Furthermore, the aim of war must be taken as applying to both sides. I take this to mean that it is a fight between the military legs of the trinity stool under the direction of the government and supported by the people.

Expanding this concept dictates that non-violent means (or asymmetric if you prefer) must also be considered since the aim in COIN is not destruction of the enemy but the support of the people. The complication here, as you discussed, it that both sides share that leg. I believe this counsels even further for the expansion of the concept of war (i.e a contest between opposing factions by any means -- still working on this definition though). Am I way off target here?

Of course, it some environments your "settee" can become an even more oddly shaped stool when one considers the varying factions at issue in a particular COIN environment (e.g. US, Afghan government, Pakistan, Taliban, Iran, and the list goes on). However, isn't the fundamental precept still the same? It is still an expanded concept of war fought for control or support of the people using muliple means, both violent and non-violent.

[Ken White]

...Some day this will happen. Nations working to achieve their national objectives, competing for advantage, but within the framework of a global strategic construct.You're probably correct but I'm very happy that I'll be long dead and gone before that disaster befalls the world.

From a nation of sheep to a world of them is not an encouraging thought...

[jmm99]

From BW
Some day this will happen. Nations working to achieve their national objectives, competing for advantage, but within the framework of a global strategic construct. Would have to be very principle based to work.

If the following syllogism is posited (credit Marc T):

Principle > interpretation of principle > implementation of interpretation

the problem lies not so much in divergence as to the principle, but as to divergence in steps 2 and 3. That is the problem, as I see it, in several areas:

1. Using CvC principles - your world

2. Using legal principles - my world

3. Developing a national policy (grand strategy) - another thread.

A global strategic construct (adopted by the world) is beyond my perception.

[wm]

Clausewitz said that the aim of warfare is to disarm the enemy by matching your effort against his power of resistance. Furthermore, the aim of war must be taken as applying to both sides. I take this to mean that it is a fight between the military legs of the trinity stool under the direction of the government and supported by the people.
While I suspect this interpretation is the usual case, it need not be. Since the "nation" consists of the three parts of the trinity, that nation's primary power base most likely derives from a combination of all three parts of the trinity. In a given "nation" one part may dominate, and that part would then be the primary focus of effort by an opponent seeking to impose its will on the other nation (one way of understanding the shwerpunkt). In the good old days, it was largely a matter of army vs. army. But that seems to have become much less likely as nations moved to mobilizing more and more of their population to fight in wars, overtly as uniformed participants, or covertly as partisans, resistance, spies, guerrillas, or what have you. The Franco-Prussian War pointed out that defeat of the main army in the field was not sufficient to impose the will of Germany upon France.

[William F. Owen]

CvC was very concerned with generating big armies and proposed conscription as a result. A nation in arms was relevant to issues of insurgencies of the day. Spain was an object lesson in this and Clausewitz recognised that.

First off, Insurengcies were just not a major issue at the time he was writing, but CvC, like myself, saw Guerillas and Insurgents as just another form of warfare, and his thesis was basically they achieved their aim in the same way as conventional armies - thus needed to be defeated in the same way. Mao-Tse Tung apparently read more CvC than Sun-Tzu and this is where he gets the move to conventional phase, as, in his opinion, only conventional forces are decisive. OK, not always true, but it does have some merit.

Point being, the view that "protecting the population" is the corner stone of COIN, is in fact, the requirement for the military defeat of the insurgency.

[Bob's World]

CvC was very concerned with generating big armies and proposed conscription as a result. A nation in arms was relevant to issues of insurgencies of the day. Spain was an object lesson in this and Clausewitz recognised that.

First off, Insurengcies were just not a major issue at the time he was writing, but CvC, like myself, saw Guerillas and Insurgents as just another form of warfare, and his thesis was basically they achieved their aim in the same way as conventional armies - thus needed to be defeated in the same way. Mao-Tse Tung apparently read more CvC than Sun-Tzu and this is where he gets the move to conventional phase, as, in his opinion, only conventional forces are decisive. OK, not always true, but it does have some merit.

Point being, the view that "protecting the population" is the corner stone of COIN, is in fact, the requirement for the military defeat of the insurgency.


I have to totally agree with your statement of the basis for your position, all the way up to your conclusion. Mao's model for waging an effective insurgency against a state absolutely called for a gradual growth of capacity to ultimately developing a conventional, and decisive, force. This is the essence of Maoist insurgency.

But what we are discussing here is how does the counterinsurgent truly defeat Mr. Mao or Mr Ho or their latter day desciples?? If, when they surge to phase three conventional and decisive operations, and are defeated by the counterinsurgent, they simply step back into phase 2 operations until they once again have the capacity and believe the timing is right to surge yet again to phase three. This can go on for generations.

I believe the essence of our disagreement is that it appears that your position is that when that phase three operation is knocked back to phase 2 or even phase 1 operations the insurgency is defeated. My position is that the insurgency is not defeated under the underlying causes are addressed so that the populace lacks the causation to continue the fight. To, in effect, disempower Mr. Mao or Mr. Ho or whoever else might come along, with whatever ideology they might choose to use.

Most COIN "victories" are little more than delays of the inevitable, because most governments simply do not want to change how they treat their own populace, and prefer to blame unrest on the insurgent, and consider his removal as "mission accomplished." Not all of them announce that wearing a flightsuit on the deck of a carrier, but the effect is the same.

[slapout9]

.
I believe the essence of our disagreement is that it appears that your position is that when that phase three operation is knocked back to phase 2 or even phase 1 operations the insurgency is defeated. My position is that the insurgency is not defeated under the underlying causes are addressed so that the populace lacks the causation to continue the fight. To, in effect, disempower Mr. Mao or Mr. Ho or whoever else might come along, with whatever ideology they might choose to use.

Most COIN "victories" are little more than delays of the inevitable, because most governments simply do not want to change how they treat their own populace, and prefer to blame unrest on the insurgent, and consider his removal as "mission accomplished." Not all of them announce that wearing a flightsuit on the deck of a carrier, but the effect is the same.


This is why I have always said that the Strategic Framework for COIN Strategy should not be Ends,Ways,and Means. It is better framed in the Police Framework of Motive..Methods.. and Opportunity. If you don't deal with the Motive it will never end.;)

[William F. Owen]

I believe the essence of our disagreement is that it appears that your position is that when that phase three operation is knocked back to phase 2 or even phase 1 operations the insurgency is defeated. My position is that the insurgency is not defeated under the underlying causes are addressed so that the populace lacks the causation to continue the fight. To, in effect, disempower Mr. Mao or Mr. Ho or whoever else might come along, with whatever ideology they might choose to use.


....and I agree. If the bad guy keeps getting knocked back to phase 1 or 2, he is not making progress. He may give up. He may have his will to continue, broken. That is all military force can do.

After that it is back to Politics! - and that is when the social/welfare work begins, BUT - that is nothing to do with the military. They've done their bit.

COIN is military. Social equality, welfare and human rights are not Military activities.

[Ron Humphrey]

After that it is back to Politics! - and that is when the social/welfare work begins, BUT - that is nothing to do with the military. They've done their bit.

COIN is military. Social equality, welfare and human rights are not Military activities.](Emphasis Ron)

Without a force to enable an environment which allows them they almost never happen, or if they do it doesn't last long.

So is it as easy as we'd like it to seperate the two?

[Ken White]

Wilf is saying that the military does the force bit and the civilian political -- and aid types -- do the other stuff. That is an approach that I am absolutely convinced is correct as I have watched the US Armed Forces try to mix the two in several nations over many years and we do not do it at all well. In fact we do it badly and the attempts have adversely impacted both our military performance and capability as well as our efforts at the political bits.

I think the answer to Ron's question is Yes, it is easy to separate the two -- provided one wants to do that.

The problem is, of course, that we are not really a colonial or imperial power, thus the idea of military support to the civil power is not natural for us. That's okay -- the answer, IMO, is to avoid if at all possible such efforts. I acknowledge that may not always be possible and for such circumstances, we need a civilian effort prepared to be implemented when necessary. We are doing that now (sort of...) but we really need to back off DoD and the Services filling gaps in the civil structure. What we do not need to do is to let our short attention span derail this effort in a few years or our egos and turf or budget battles interfere.

That last is a very real potential problem. Not only between DoD and the civilian side but within the Department and between Services and Commands, That parochialism is truly dangerous and needs to be halted.

Our past efforts at mixing military and civilian support have done us no favors. Nor are our current efforts, well done as they are, doing long term good.

[jmm99]

From CvC based on Graham's Translation (http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege2/BK1ch01.html) and Vom Kriege (http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege/Book1Ch01VK.htm) (brackets for JMM endnotes added):


War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.

Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power [1]. Violence, that is to say physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law [2]), is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed [3]; and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities in theory. It takes the place of the final object, and puts it aside in a manner as something not properly belonging to war.

Der Krieg ist also ein Akt der Gewalt, um den Gegner zur Erfüllung unseres Willens zu zwingen.

Die Gewalt rüstet sich mit den Erfindungen der Künste und Wissenschaften aus, um der Gewalt zu begegnen. Unmerkliche, kaum nennenswerte Beschränkungen, die sie sich selbst setzt unter dem Namen völkerrechtlicher Sitte, begleiten sie, ohne ihre Kraft wesentlich zu schwächen [1]. Gewalt, d. h. die physische Gewalt (denn eine moralische gibt es außer dem Begriffe des Staates und Gesetzes nicht [2]), ist also das Mittel, dem Feinde unseren Willen aufzudringen, der Zweck. Um diesen Zweck sicher zu erreichen, müssen wir den Feind wehrlos machen [3], und dies ist dem Begriff nach das eigentliche Ziel der kriegerischen Handlung. Es vertritt den Zweck und verdrängt ihn gewissermaßen als etwas nicht zum Kriege selbst Gehöriges.

Assuming for purposes of discussion that the initial definition is valid, an act of violence (from Latin vis = physical force) is essential to the existence of war. The inclusion of "inventions of Art and Science" brings us to the more modern substitution of "armed conflict" for the older term "war".

Taking now, the stages of insurgency (adding phase 0, as suggested by BW in other threads):

phase 0 > phase 1 > phase 2 > phase 3

this is a continuum, which passes from emphasis on the Rule of Law [4] to emphasis on the Principles of War [5]. The key phrase is "the enemy must be disarmed" (müssen wir den Feind wehrlos machen) and its interpretation (what does "disarm" mean). Then, after deciding that, comes its implementation - and who does what to accomplish that.

The civilian world and the military world both play key roles (albeit greater or lesser depending on the given phase). They had best learn to talk to each other.

-------------------------------------------------

[1] "Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power." One wonders what CvC would think of the GCs, other conventions and modern ROEs - which are quite perceptible in our Laws of War.

[2] "... for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law ..." One wonders what CvC would have thought about non-State actors such as AQ, who have their own Rule of Law, Principles of War and Laws of War.

[3] The term "wehrlos" translates generally as "unprotected", "defenseless" or "helpless" (more figurative), which have a broader meaning than "disarmed".

[4] Rule of Law, as used here, is taken in its broadest meaning - including not only acts by a State (everything that a State does is in a sense "a law"), but by non-State actors who are Powers to armed conflicts. While the Rule of Law is aimed more at using non-violent means (absence of physical force) to enforce its rules, it does retain and uses acts of violence (physical force) to compel compliance. So, the continuum cannot be placed into neat, all-inclusive or exclusive boxes.

[5] To what extent the Laws of War have impinged on the Principles of War seems to me to be a difficult question - more so in some areas than others, as I perceive it - without dogmatism as to generalities.

[Surferbeetle]

Wilf is saying that the military does the force bit and the civilian political -- and aid types -- do the other stuff. That is an approach that I am absolutely convinced is correct as I have watched the US Armed Forces try to mix the two in several nations over many years and we do not do it at all well. In fact we do it badly and the attempts have adversely impacted both our military performance and capability as well as our efforts at the political bits.

I think the answer to Ron's question is Yes, it is easy to separate the two -- provided one wants to do that.

The problem is, of course, that we are not really a colonial or imperial power, thus the idea of military support to the civil power is not natural for us. That's okay -- the answer, IMO, is to avoid if at all possible such efforts.

Wilf, Ken, & Ron,

Name order seems to represent a spectrum here...Wilf with the military is for 'traditional' military work, Ken in the middle, and Ron recognizing that warfare is not just limited to shooting bullets.

Recognizing that we are not truly accomplished at coordinated DIME operations is certainly step one, but it's not enough to say let's leave it at that and move on. My thesis is that the previous 'world order' has thawed, large parts of it are again shifting around, and we need to adapt in order set the stage for future success. Did we really successfully set the stage for success after the fall of the Berlin Wall? Well, here is another chance to shine :rolleyes:

I am going to bang my drum again about the need for Full Spectrum capabilities. Fielding effective Full Spectrum forces mean that we must be able to excel throughout the spectrum and, no matter how painful, it's time to get with the program. Perhaps there is more to war than Clausewitz and that damn Fulda Gap mentality...

I'll throw out a couple of 'not invented here' models that we are all familiar with and ask why are we not thinking about them as other than curiosities?

I have book one of Alistair Horne's a Savage War of Peace and his description of the French Section Administrative Specialisee (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_War#French_counter-insurgency_operations) are a western model that has seen limited success in conditions similar to what we face.


The French army resumed an important role in local Algerian administration through the Special Administration Section (Section Administrative Spécialisée, SAS), created in 1955. The SAS's mission was to establish contact with the Muslim population and weaken nationalist influence in the rural areas by asserting the "French presence" there. SAS officers — called képis bleus (blue caps) — also recruited and trained bands of loyal Muslim irregulars, known as harkis. Armed with shotguns and using guerrilla tactics similar to those of the FLN, the harkis, who eventually numbered about 180,000 volunteers, more than the FLN effectives,[16] were an ideal instrument of counterinsurgency warfare.

Hezbollah's model (http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=hezbollah&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34110&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=7a9bbd3f98) is also worth examination:


In addition to Hezbollah’s military structure, the movement also runs a sophisticated network of schools, clinics, and social services. The militia, which is represented in government as well as parliament, also runs news outlets, radio and TV stations, and a telephone communications network. In the group’s demographic strongholds, (which, besides southern Lebanon, include the Bekaa Valley and Dahivah, Beirut’s southern suburb) the vast majority of Hezbollah’s predominantly Shi’a constituents rely on social and charity organizations. Most notable of these organizations are “Imdad”, which provides medical and educational services; “Mu’asasat Al-Shahid”, which pays pensions to families of Hezbollah fighters who are killed in action; and “Jihad al-Bina,” which is still in the process of rebuilding homes destroyed by the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel (Arab News, August 12, 2006). The Paris donor conference of January 2007, in which European nations and the United States pledged $7.6 billion in aid to Lebanon, was seen by many Lebanese as a desperate attempt by the international community to shore up the embattled government and keep up with Hezbollah’s rebuilding schemes, which by then had already handed out millions in cash to people who had lost their homes during the 34-day war with Israel (Daily Star, January 29, 2007; AP, January 24, 2007).

Bob's World has come very close to describing the indescribable truth about war between non-western and western forces.


I believe the essence of our disagreement is that it appears that your position is that when that phase three operation is knocked back to phase 2 or even phase 1 operations the insurgency is defeated. My position is that the insurgency is not defeated under the underlying causes are addressed so that the populace lacks the causation to continue the fight. To, in effect, disempower Mr. Mao or Mr. Ho or whoever else might come along, with whatever ideology they might choose to use.

Just because we don't like to use DIME doesn't mean that our opponents do not. I think it's our job to get serious about Full Spectrum and, like it or not, coordinated DIME capabilities are the way forward.

Regards,

Steve

[Ken White]

Wilf, Ken, & Ron,

Name order seems to represent a spectrum here...Wilf with the military is for 'traditional' military work, Ken in the middle, and Ron recognizing that warfare is not just limited to shooting bullets.Cannot speak for those other handsome devils but if by middle, you mean what I said -- we must be able to do it, we do not do it very well and we should avoid trying to do it if possible and, in preparation for that, the emphasis on all other than the military actions must be shifted to civilian agencies of the US government -- then you're correct.
Recognizing that we are not truly accomplished at coordinated DIME operations is certainly step one, but it's not enough to say let's leave it at that and move on. My thesis is that the previous 'world order' has thawed, large parts of it are again shifting around, and we need to adapt in order set the stage for future success. Did we really successfully set the stage for success after the fall of the Berlin Wall? Well, here is another chance to shine :rolleyes:No, we did not. Nor did we set the stage for success in World War II with Civil affairs and Military Government -- we did what seemed to be an adequate (remember that word) solution at the time and one that took advantage of the fact that the quite large Army then in existence was able to provide people with the requisite specialties to get the job done to an adequate level in occupied territories with a thoroughly defeated enemy population.

We're still doing that, because that's the way we've 'always' done it. :rolleyes:

But we no longer have that ultra large Army with all those specialties and draconian "you will" laws; we do not have to accept an 'adequate' solution -- we're supposed to be a lot smarter now... -- and we can afford to pay for the best persons for a given job; and we are not now dealing with defeated former enemy populations who will do what they're told -- and I submit the military mindset is not best suited for winning other minds (not a knock, I include myself and a slew of friends and relatives in that mindset)...
I am going to bang my drum again about the need for Full Spectrum capabilities. Fielding effective Full Spectrum forces mean that we must be able to excel throughout the spectrum and, no matter how painful, it's time to get with the program. Perhaps there is more to war than Clausewitz and that damn Fulda Gap mentality...There is certainly more to war than that -- however, there is little more to warfare than that. Military forces are designed for warfare; they are multi-task capable and can do most anything. However, like any other organization, when they are employed outside their core competencies, effectiveness declines.

That said, as I'm sure you'll recall, I've also been beating the drum for full spectrum capabilities -- however, we seem to differ on who should contribute what to those capabilities. I have no question that some CA capability is required for early entry forces in ANY spectrum. Nor do I question that in some FID efforts, a primarily (not fully, primarily) military CA effort will be required.

I do strongly believe that the US can and should assiduously avoid FID efforts if at all possible. I also believe that many such efforts can be avoided -- e.g. Viet Nam, Iraq and Afghanistan could have been -- but I acknowledge that Politicians will do stupid things due to perceived domestic political pressures and that Armed Forces -- and the rest of the US government -- must be prepared for such commitments. That said, there is no reason to do it 'the way we've always done it' anymore than is there reason to worry about Fulda. The Army isn't the only US government operation that has failed to adapt to a changing world. Nor should it be the only one that does adapt...
I'll throw out a couple of 'not invented here' models that we are all familiar with and ask why are we not thinking about them as other than curiosities?The quick and dirty answer is because we are not they and they are not us. Very differing governmental approaches and traditions. What has worked for them will likely not work for us for several reasons.
Bob's World has come very close to describing the indescribable truth about war between non-western and western forces.
...
Just because we don't like to use DIME doesn't mean that our opponents do not. I think it's our job to get serious about Full Spectrum and, like it or not, coordinated DIME capabilities are the way forward.I totally agree with Bob's World in that and with your statement. We only disagree on from whence a sustained (note emphasis) effort should come.

It is not a question of DIME. However, I believe you're using that as shorthand for FID and COIN assist efforts. (IW may or may not require developmental assistance). If so, in my view, it is a question of using your strengths and not getting tricked into doing something that you are intrinsically not capable of doing well. Sometimes getting into such conflicts is unavoidable but in most cases a little operational and strategic ingenuity -- and an occasional slight risk -- can negate a requirement to get pinned down doing something that is not in your long term interest.

It also is not just that we don't like to do it-- who does? -- it is that we do not and will not do it other than marginally well; it is against the inclinations of the American psyche and few of us will adapt well to doing it. Some will and they can carry us through -- but we, as a nation, can do better.

That is not to impugn any of the people who have worked their buns off and even died in an effort to do the 'DIME' job on the ground now or earlier. They have done and are doing a superb job -- it is, rather, a question of 'whose job is it?' I submit once the initial combat effort is over, it is in our (DoD and the Armed forces) interest on many levels to shift much of the other than military effort to the civilian agencies.

There will be those who will say you cannot get civilians to do that, etc. Sorry, I remember another time and place where that was once said -- and later the place was absolutely crawling with US and third nation civilians who were quite well paid -- and did a good job. In fact, if you look at the history, the Army did a poor job in the FID arena until they got humungous civilian involvement. I cannot speak from experience to either Afghanistan or Iraq but it appears from news reports that increasing civilian involvement there has had a beneficial effect also.

I have a Leatherman tool, A Gerber MultiTool and a Swiss Tool. All three are handy, good for emergencies and quick fixes and I've used all -- but I do find that given the option and a little time to get the right implement, using the proper tool for the job works much better for me. YMMV.

I'll also note that DIME is constituted of four elements -- Military is only one of those...

[Surferbeetle]

Ken,

Subutai (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subutai) certainly has passed on much to his students ;); I also enjoyed learning about Yasotay’s TTP’s as a youngster new to the Army (no wikipedia posting yet, but his devastating attack from an unexpected quarter while on fire has stuck with me all these years…). Sun Tzu’s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun_Tzu) dictum’s have always been worth reflecting upon. Rommel’s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erwin_Rommel), the Gray Ghost’s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_S._Mosby), Gus’s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustavus_Adolphus), and Jomini’s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jomini), actions/works were/are worth the time to study as well.

SOF emphasis on humans being more important than hardware is another commonality that we share. We also both understand that it takes time properly prioritize and allocate scarce resources in order properly train and effectively utilize our forces and that the returns are consistently worth more than the initial effort.


It is not a question of DIME. However, I believe you're using that as shorthand for FID and COIN assist efforts. (IW may or may not require developmental assistance). If so, in my view, it is a question of using your strengths and not getting tricked into doing something that you are intrinsically not capable of doing well. Sometimes getting into such conflicts is unavoidable but in most cases a little operational and strategic ingenuity -- and an occasional slight risk -- can negate a requirement to get pinned down doing something that is not in your long term interest.

Here however is where I respectfully disagree with you. The US Military has the capability, has executed (not as well as we do the traditional stuff – you are correct in noting this), and will continue to have to execute FID/COIN/DIME operations. We have no choice but to improve our skill set (and our interagency cooperation and support) if we desire to maintain or to continue to improve our position in the world.

My 2009 copy of the The Economist’s Pocket World in Figures (http://www.economistshop.com/asp/bookdetail.asp?book=3175) reports Germany’s GDP at 2,897 billion USD and Japan’s GDP at 4,368 USD. Like many today I enjoy the fruits of German automotive engineering and Japanese electrical engineering. When I discussed WWII with some of my relatives they relayed the benefits of reconstruction/economic integration/globalization were not fully visible at the time. I’ll go further and ask you about the national discussion concerning the merits of the Marshall Plan at the time versus the outcomes that you have witnessed. Hindsight being 20/20 the gamble paid off but I'll bet not everybody agreed with the allocation of resources.

The reconstruction effort in Iraq has not matched our successes with the Marshall Plan. Maybe it will down the road, we will see.

My crystal ball on Afghanistan wonders what it is that we expect to gain, however I certainly have no lock on infallibility.


I have a Leatherman tool, A Gerber MultiTool and a Swiss Tool. All three are handy, good for emergencies and quick fixes and I've used all -- but I do find that given the option and a little time to get the right implement, using the proper tool for the job works much better for me. YMMV.

You are right, multitools and duct tape are in fact amazing first responder tools but they are not long-term fixes. However, if the radiator hose pops in (pick your location) you and I are the multitool and duct-tape that have been used to ensure that our ‘car’ can limp to the ‘garage’ where the specialists are. Multitools and ductape are carried/maintained by the wise.


I'll also note that DIME is constituted of four elements -- Military is only one of those...

This is the heart of it. Warfare is not limited to club, sling & stone, rifle, or atom bomb. Warfare is a manifestation of the competition for resources; we are animals despite our prized veneer of civilization. Sometimes we kill, sometimes we embargo, and sometimes we negotiate but it’s all about the competition for resources. We are not thinking wisely when we allow daylight between the objectives of our DIME apparatus or our ability to deploy/utilize DIME elements in peacetime, other than war, or war. Full Spectrum applies to mom, dad, the crumbsnatchers, and the whole of government. Clausewitz is not enough.

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

-- who was very limited in what he did and thus can teach -- and Jomini who I believe is a hack. Sun Tzu is overused...
Here however is where I respectfully disagree with you. The US Military has the capability, has executed (not as well as we do the traditional stuff – you are correct in noting this), and will continue to have to execute FID/COIN/DIME operations. We have no choice but to improve our skill set (and our interagency cooperation and support) if we desire to maintain or to continue to improve our position in the world.I'm not sure we're in disagreement; we certainly are not on what you just wrote. The issue, I thought I was addressing is who should perform the bulk of the other than military effort after initial entry. I contend that is not the Army's job. Are you saying that it is? Or saying that others must help but the Army must be in charge?
My 2009 copy of the Economist’s Pocket World in Figures reports Germany’s GDP at 2,897 billion USD and Japan’s GDP at 4,368 USD. Like many today I enjoy the fruits of German automotive engineering and Japanese electrical engineering. When I discussed WWII with some of my relatives they relayed the benefits of reconstruction/economic integration/globalization were not fully visible at the time. I’ll go further and ask you about the national discussion concerning the merits of the Marshall Plan at the time versus the outcomes that you have witnessed. Hindsight being 20/20 the gamble paid off but I'll bet not everybody agreed with the allocation of resources.Obviously, I'm in need of a class in Communicating.I don't seem to be doing that well. Yes, they are a success story and no one can deny the relative success of the CA/MG effort in bringing that about -- though a read of the history will show that in neither country was everything perfect; it never is. As I thought I said, the system we developed was adequate to contend with populations that had been thoroughly defeated and were complaisant and compliant.

Something I also said which you seem to elide was: "But we no longer have that ultra large Army with all those specialties and draconian "you will" laws; we do not have to accept an 'adequate' solution -- we're supposed to be a lot smarter now... -- and we can afford to pay for the best persons for a given job; and we are not now dealing with defeated former enemy populations who will do what they're told -- and I submit the military mindset is not best suited for winning other minds (not a knock, I include myself and a slew of friends and relatives in that mindset)."

Army run efforts in both Korea and Viet Nam with populations that had not only not been defeated but had no particular reason to be compliant were a totally different thing than postwar Germany and Japan (and I saw the latter). That is the point.
The reconstruction effort in Iraq has not matched our successes with the Marshall Plan. Maybe it will down the road, we will see.Not a fair comparison in any case, putting a devastated continent back on its feet far transcends anything done with one little country that was hardly devastated, indeed and comparitively, had not suffered at all. The Marshall Plan was indeed a success and Kennan and Clayton who refined it and their Secretary of State George C. Marshall deserve a lot of praise for that even if it was the idea of Marshall's predecessor at state, James Byrnes. State and the Economic Cooperation Administration they formed to execute the plan also deserve much credit.

I'm unsure how that bolsters your case; The Army, Civil Affairs and the Occupation had absolutely nothing to do with the Marshall Plan. And, no, not everyone agreed with it but I'm not sure how that interfaces with a discussion of who should perform the bulk of the DI_E work in a FID scenario. Particularly when it was a state effort throughout.
You are right, multitools and duct tape are in fact amazing first responder tools but they are not long-term fixes. However, if the radiator hose pops in (pick your location) you and I are the multitool and duct-tape that have been used to ensure that our ‘car’ can limp to the ‘garage’ where the specialists are. Multitools and ductape are carried/maintained by the wise.Communication again -- I thought I said that. Maybe not. What does this say:"That said, as I'm sure you'll recall, I've also been beating the drum for full spectrum capabilities -- however, we seem to differ on who should contribute what to those capabilities. I have no question that some CA capability is required for early entry forces in ANY spectrum. Nor do I question that in some FID efforts, a primarily (not fully, primarily) military CA effort will be required." I'm unsure how to better word that, what would you suggest?
This is the heart of it. Warfare is not limited to club, sling & stone, rifle, or atom bomb. Warfare is a manifestation of the competition for resources; we are animals despite our prized veneer of civilization...Of course we are but, if I may, warfare is limited to club sling et.al. War, OTOH is not.
Sometimes we kill,That's warfare
sometimes we embargo,That's not warfare, war yes, warfare no. Don't take my word for it:

war·fare
1.
a. The waging of war against an enemy; armed conflict.
b. Military operations marked by a specific characteristic: guerrilla warfare; chemical warfare.
and sometimes we negotiate but it’s all about the competition for resources. We are not thinking wisely when we allow daylight between the objectives of our DIME apparatus or our ability to deploy/utilize DIME elements in peacetime, other than war, or war. Full Spectrum applies to mom, dad, the crumbsnatchers, and the whole of government. Clausewitz is not enough. I do not disagree with a thing you say there. What you carefully do not do is say who has the lead and the responsibility for the D, the I and the E parts prior to (and that is important) and after initial entry.

Nor do you address who should have the lead in peacetime in an effort to forestall, preclude or sidestep a war. If you contend that is an Army job, I totally disagree and again say that simply because we have done it that way for forty years doesn't make it (a) Right or (b) the only way. At one time, I ran the budget for a lot of CA Bdes and Cmds and their ODT in th late 80s-- it was not a good effort for the US though it had undeniable training benefits for the Reservists who went.

I'm watched up close in two wars where the Military took the initial lead (as could be predicted and should continue to occur [I underlined that to draw attention to it]) and did an acceptable job. They later were supplanted by civilian agencies who put more resources in the right place instead of where Military Commanders wanted them. The civilian efforts quickly improved the processes and that convinced me that they need to be involved and that early on. I am essentially seeing the same thing occur today in two theaters.

My point is that -- as I said above -- the Army needs to foster and encourage significant improvement in other government agencies and should absolutely not try to compete with them in a game of "who's in charge."

[Surferbeetle]

Ken,

Communication is a two way street; at least half (and very probably more) of any mis-communication is on me. :)

I gonna stick with Sun Tzu thanks :wry:, and won't argue too much about the other two (Mosby & Jomini) other than to say they are examples of authors who provide insights upon unconventional thinking (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerrilla_warfare) while simultaneously acknowledging both were flawed people in many aspects of their lives.


The issue, I thought I was addressing is who should perform the bulk of the other than military effort after initial entry. I contend that is not the Army's job. Are you saying that it is? Or saying that others must help but the Army must be in charge?


I'm unsure how that bolsters your case; The Army, Civil Affairs and the Occupation had absolutely nothing to do with the Marshall Plan.


Nor do you address who should have the lead in peacetime in an effort to forestall, preclude or sidestep a war. If you contend that is an Army job, I totally disagree and again say that simply because we have done it that way for forty years doesn't make it (a) Right or (b) the only way. At one time, I ran the budget for a lot of CA Bdes and Cmds and their ODT in th late 80s-- it was not a good effort for the US though it had undeniable training benefits for the Reservists who went.

Noting your acknowledgment of our history, let’s take a closer look at our actions with respect to Germany. Here is a short list of US Army Officers (and as you know, but not necessarily everyone else does, military government soldiers were the precursor to civil affairs soldiers) who were involved in planning for and executing ‘nation building’ in Germany during and after WWII:

General George C. Marshall (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Marshall)


George Catlett Marshall (December 31, 1880 – October 16, 1959) was an American military leader, Chief of Staff of the Army, Secretary of State, and the third Secretary of Defense. Once noted as the "organizer of victory" by Winston Churchill for his leadership of the Allied victory in World War II,[1] Marshall served as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff during the war and as the chief military adviser to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. As Secretary of State his name was given to the Marshall Plan, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953.[2]

General Dwight D. Eisenhower (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dwight_D._Eisenhower)


Dwight David “Ike” Eisenhower (October 14, 1890 – March 28, 1969) was the 34th President of the United States from 1953 until 1961 and a five-star general in the United States Army. During the Second World War, he served as Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe, with responsibility for planning and supervising the successful invasion of France and Germany in 1944–45. In 1951, he became the first supreme commander of NATO.[1]

Following the German unconditional surrender on May 8, 1945, Eisenhower was appointed Military Governor of the U.S. Occupation Zone, based in Frankfurt am Main.

General Lucius D. Clay (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Lucius_Clay)


General Lucius Dubignon Clay (April 23, 1897 – April 16, 1978) was an American general and military governor best known for his administration of Germany immediately after World War II. Clay was deputy to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1945; deputy military governor, Germany (U.S.) 1946; commander in chief, U.S. Forces in Europe and military governor of the U.S. Zone, Germany, 1947–49. He retired in 1949. Clay is considered the "father" of the Berlin Airlift (1948–49)

It’s also interesting to look at the military governors (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_Occupation_Zones_in_Germany#The_military_go vernors_and_commissioners) of all of the Occupation Zones in Germany after WWII

The Marshall Plan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan)


The Marshall Plan (from its enactment, officially the European Recovery Program, ERP) was the primary plan of the United States for rebuilding and creating a stronger foundation for the countries of Western Europe, and repelling communism after World War II. The initiative was named for Secretary of State George Marshall and was largely the creation of State Department officials, especially William L. Clayton and George F. Kennan.

The reconstruction plan, developed at a meeting of the participating European states, was established on July 12, 1947

In terms of comparing the costs of reconstruction of Germany (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_plan#Expenditures) and Iraq (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reconstruction_of_Iraq#Funding_for_Iraq_reconstruc tion), I have not adjusted WWII dollars to today’s dollars but the comparison none-the-less reveals we have spent big bucks on both.

Ambassador Dobbins (http://www.rand.org/media/experts/bios/dobbins_james.html) has put out some deeper references (http://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/d/dobbins_james.html) on ‘how to’ and ‘why’ nation building is important which illustrate the importance (warts and all) of the US Military, among others in this process.

Bottom line it is because of my experiences and reading of history that I state that DIME is the tool used


to forestall, preclude or sidestep a war

and yes sir, this definitely means that sometimes the Army has the lead (before, during, and after a shooting war). This does not mean we should always lead, but whether USG personnel are wearing uniforms, wingtips, or birkenstocks at the end of the day we are all USG and all of us need to be on the same page and working toward a shared goal. Once again, DIME elements (to include the Army) have a role before, during, and after a shooting war.


What you carefully do not do is say who has the lead and the responsibility for the D, the I and the E parts prior to (and that is important) and after initial entry.

The President has final responsibility, and I believe that the NSC may be expanding it's coordination role; however for me I follow my chain of command which means I am nowhere near echelons above reality. :)


My point is that -- as I said above -- the Army needs to foster and encourage significant improvement in other government agencies and should absolutely not try to compete with them in a game of "who's in charge."

You are right, all of us need to work harder on playing team and focus on the win as opposed to who's in charge.

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

...In terms of comparing the costs of reconstruction of Germany (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_plan#Expenditures) and Iraq (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reconstruction_of_Iraq#Funding_for_Iraq_reconstruc tion), I have not adjusted WWII dollars to today’s dollars but the comparison none-the-less reveals we have spent big bucks on both.No question -- however my comment was and is that you cannot in any way compare the scale of devastation in Europewith the relatively minor amount of that in Iraq and that the Marsahll Plan was a State Department initiative that the Army was unlikely to have thought of. Whether they might have eventually is immaterial, it was State's game and thus has nothing to do with the Army and DIME. It has everything to do with the D.I.and E, particularly the Diplomacy which is absolutely not a DoD mission though they have stumbled into it by default and need to stumble out of -- as the SecDef and the CJCS have noted. Nor the Economics, also not a DoD forte. Zip on the M side for the Marshall Plan which has little bearing on what I thought we were discussing.
Ambassador Dobbins (http://www.rand.org/media/experts/bios/dobbins_james.html) has put out some deeper references (http://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/d/dobbins_james.html) on ‘how to’ and ‘why’ nation building is important which illustrate the importance (warts and all) of the US Military, among others in this process.I have stated all along that it is -- so why are you trying to convince me of that?
Bottom line it is because of my experiences and reading of history that I state that DIME is the tool used.And I have not disputed that, I agreed with that. Again, no need to convince me of it.
and yes sir, this definitely means that sometimes the Army has the lead (before, during, and after a shooting war). This does not mean we should always lead, but whether USG personnel are wearing uniforms, wingtips, or birkenstocks at the end of the day we are all USG and all of us need to be on the same page and working toward a shared goal.I have agreed with that -- the issue we are having, I think, is the Clintonesque definition of 'sometimes' against my contention that word should be replaced by 'seldom' with respect to most cases for the during and after. My suspicion is that if we concentrated on that and stop diverting to Germany which I really, really wish I had never, ever mentioned and which almost certainly has little relationship to future endeavors we might get to the crux of the matter. :wry:
You are right, all of us need to work harder on playing team and focus on the win as opposed to who's in charge.That was not what I said. That was:

""the Army needs to foster and encourage significant improvement in other government agencies and should absolutely not try to compete with them in a game of "who's in charge.""(emphasis added /kw)

Not "all of us" -- just the Army -- the Army needs to accept that the D.I. and E. are not their missions in most cases. It is the Army who should encourage the other agencies of government to get involved because the non-military aspects of DIME they can do better than the Army will. Not because the CA folks cannot do great work but because they are in and / or must operate within the Army Chain of Command and it will never be a priority mission for the Army. It will be supported and its necessity will be acknowledged -- but it will never get adequate priority. That's not history read; that's life observed.

Do not take that as an attack on CA -- it is not and you should realize that. CA is, as I said, needed and the Army needs to be involved; DIME is critical and the Army needs to be involved and prepared to do it all initially in some circumstances, it just in most cases should not be the lead in the sustained pre conflict and FID efforts for the D.I. and E. aspects -- if for no other reason that it does not have the personnel depth to do it properly on a sustained basis. Unless you want to deploy a year on and ten months off -- or worse... :D.

[Surferbeetle]

we might get to the crux of the matter. :wry:That was not what I said. That was:

""the Army needs to foster and encourage significant improvement in other government agencies and should absolutely not try to compete with them in a game of "who's in charge.""(emphasis added /kw)

Not "all of us" -- just the Army -- the Army needs to accept that the D.I. and E. are not their missions in most cases. It is the Army who should encourage the other agencies of government to get involved because the non-military aspects of DIME they can do better than the Army will. Not because the CA folks cannot do great work but because they are in and / or must operate within the Army Chain of Command and it will never be a priority mission for the Army. It will be supported and its necessity will be acknowledged -- but it will never get adequate priority. That's not history read; that's life observed.

Do not take that as an attack on CA -- it is not and you should realize that. CA is, as I said, needed and the Army needs to be involved; DIME is critical and the Army needs to be involved and prepared to do it all initially in some circumstances, it just in most cases should not be the lead in the sustained pre conflict and FID efforts for the D.I. and E. aspects -- if for no other reason that it does not have the personnel depth to do it properly on a sustained basis. Unless you want to deploy a year on and ten months off -- or worse... :D.

Ken,

I am chasing the macro view with the use of the word 'us' as in all of the USG and I don't take the CA observation personally (and am staying away from the interns as well :wry:). Facts are facts, too much work for too few people and CA work itself is not as high on the priority list as are other missions...got it, no problem.

Lets talk about DIME in terms of USG. We both agree that all of us (DIME people) need to be out there slugging away to solve our nations issues and all of us need to be focused upon our respective parts of the the pie in order to be maximally effective.

Both of us are realists however. DOD has the bodies to mass upon our nations problems, other USG Agencies do not have an expeditionary mindset, do not have an expeditionary structure, and are certainly not funded to the tune of DOD. This is why we have been and are continuing to use multi-tools and duct-tape for permanent repairs.

I haven't read the new budget yet, but press reports do not seem to indicate that our D,I, & E folks have been funded at the DOD level in the new budget...so....GPF forces are doing CMO (Civil Military Operations)/Civil Affairs(CA -ack!)//Military Government(MG)/D,I, & E work just like always (as opposed to sometimes much less seldom) and they will continue to do so until the funding changes.

Wrong, you betcha, but it's the reality of full spectrum my friend. It's always been us (that's why I spent the time on Germany in my previous post), at least they are finally giving us more troops, and are working to reduce the op-tempo with the 2011 withdrawal plan. In the meantime who else but DOD is gonna do it?

Let's just hope the duct tape holds. Maybe we can draft the bankers to help out :rolleyes: they certainly need to give back...

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

Both of us are realists however. DOD has the bodies to mass upon our nations problems, other USG Agencies do not have an expeditionary mindset, do not have an expeditionary structure, and are certainly not funded to the tune of DOD. This is why we have been and are continuing to use multi-tools and duct-tape for permanent repairs.True and that's why we've been talking past each other for hours. Yea, verily, I are a realist -- but I also know that the reality you cite is because; as I said in the first post on the topic -- we've always done it that way.

Not because it's smart, not because it is the best solution, not because the civilians cannot be found to go and do -- We proved in Korea and Viet Nam they can be and are slowly, reluctantly doing so again. My point is and has been that the better way to do business now that we have the civilian side involved if not interested is to keep them involved for the future. That is better for the US worldwide DIME effort, better for the Army -- and will be better for those civilian agencies as they will eventually realize.
I haven't read the new budget yet, but press reports do not seem to indicate that our D,I, & E folks have been funded at the DOD level in the new budget...so....GPF forces are doing CMO (Civil Military Operations)/Civil Affairs(CA -ack!)//Military Government(MG) work just like always (as opposed to sometimes) and they will continue to do so until the funding changes.No one has clue what that budget will look like when the new crowd gets through scrubbing it. In any event, the issue is not this years budget, it's the 2012 and beyond projections.
Wrong, you betcha, but it's the reality of full spectrum my friend.No, it is the reality of the way we've always done it because DoD picked up the odd jobs in order to get the bucks and / or had enough bucks to do it when Congress cut State and Foreign Aid because they're stupid -- Congress, not the programs.
It's always been us (that's why I spent the time on Germany in my previous post),Concentrating on a state Department program? :D Sure it was us in Germany and Japan -- for all the reasons I cited in my first post on the topic -- it could be easily done; not because it was the best solution.
at least they are finally giving us more troops, and are working to reduce the op-tempo with the 2011 withdrawal plan.Ha. Political smoke and mirrors. Don't put that plan in the bank and don't plan on a slowing optempo. :rolleyes:
In the meantime who else but DOD is gonna do it?Probably the increasing number of State and other folks that are in both theaters -- not enough, but more every month.

That is not the issue - I have acknowledged that DoD has done it by default; that 'is the way we've always done it' but I say it is wrong and that DoD will never do it well because it is not a core task. The guys and gals that actually do it will give it their best shot -- but DoD and the Army or SOCOM will not. You know that as well as I do. Probably better.

We know why we're doing it, we know we will always have to do a good bit of it -- but we should also know that it is to the NATIONs advantage for other agencies to have the lead on much of it.
Let's just hope the duct tape holds. Maybe we can draft the bankers to help out :rolleyes: they certainly need to give back...It'll hold, the kids will make it work but there is a better way. I cannot advocate the continued use of duct tape when there's a better solution. No one pays much attention to me and that's okay -- but as long as one person who might make a difference sees it and even if he or she doesn't do what I suggest, at least gives it some thought. The parochial folks don't want change, those who care more for the good of the country than they do for flags and spaces might precipitate some change.

One thing I know -- you're not going to get much change within DoD from the top -- few of those folks are going to be on the cutting edge of anything. Too risky. Change has to come from the bottom. Slow but it works. Eventually...

The Bankers don't need to give back, they're reasonably clean. It's the Money traders and Investment Houses plus Fannie and Freddy -- and their Allies in Congress -- that need to go to jail. Those same clods in Congress are part of the reason we're using duct tape instead of State, Aid, Ag and Commerce.

We've beat this horse enough today. See you tomorrow... ;)

[Entropy]

From the latest Wright Stuff (http://www.au.af.mil/au/aunews/Articles/ClausewitzforComplexWarfare.pdf):


Contemporary interpretations of complex warfare are neither holistic nor precise enough to make a fundamental distinction in strategy – what is static and what is dynamic in a given operational situation? This paper interprets Clausewitz to focus on the unchanging nature and changing character of war, highlighting the importance of discerning both of these aspects to understanding complex warfare. Without a baseline for “the given,” fundamental questions about the causes and context of conflict are not likely to be asked. As a result, plans and operations may produce tactical victories without contributing to desired strategic effects. Currently, three intellectual impediments inhibit our understanding of the nature of war: (1) misapplying Clausewitz’ key concepts of the Trinity; (2) viewing conflict along a uni-dimensional “spectrum of conflict”; and (3) using false dichotomies. These misinterpretations generate imprecise terms and partial concepts that do not adequately address why warfare occurs or capture its changing character in local context. We can overcome these impediments and develop strategic judgment with two basic changes in the way we use Clausewitzian ideas. First, the Trinity should be used to model the nature not just the character of war. This would direct strategists toward the investigation of motives and causes, and lead planners to design those factors into operations rather than assume them away. Second, precise terms with defined opposites should be used. Sharp distinctions, flexibly employed to ascertain what is changing from what is not, could help specify local factors such as causes, key actors, relationships, all key to establishing effective operational priorities.

I haven't read it yet, but it looks interesting.

[William F. Owen]

While I think I get where this guy is coming from, but I was actually a bit confused till be revealed Which Trinity he was referring to -passion, uncertainty, and reason - cos CvC does like Trinities!

What I can't get my head around is this stuff about "Complex Warfare."


Current examples of complex warfare include US-led post-invasion coalition operations in Afghanistan (since 2001) and Iraq (since 2003), the still smoldering Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah conflict of July-August 2006, and
counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Each of these examples involve a variety of armed groups, types and scope of goals, and levels and methods of violence that can suddenly erupt, abate, and reignite due to persistent social instability.

All warfare is and always will be complex! To say it is more complex today than it ever was is an opinion that is evidence free.

What is more, Piracy is really right on the very edge of any workable definition of Warfare, unless they are attempting to do things, they, Pirates historically have not. Piracy is primarily criminal. It may be used in warfare, but that is when it is done with the sanction of a state eg: -"Privateers"

In the round, I like where this guy is coming from, I just don't like how he got here!

[Ron Humphrey]

Got it. Can somebody please tell me then, since it is pretty widely acknowledged that the aforementioned is indeed true; why do we constantly used new or different terminology despite that fact.

Is it perhaps because just as war is war and people are people, those same ol people require a form of reeducation in all things war on occasion that such takes place due to changes in environment, capabilities, and simply being reminded how expensive both in terms of money,time, and most especially human lives it is.

Second in relation to the first is the majority of this renewed verbiage focused on informing those who defend or those being defended? Is there a major difference?

Thought's

[William F. Owen]

Got it. Can somebody please tell me then, since it is pretty widely acknowledged that the aforementioned is indeed true; why do we constantly used new or different terminology despite that fact.


I wish I could. The reason, as you allude, is probably human, and not an actual technical difference. It's probably a subject for a PhD, probably mine.... :)

[Entropy]

Got it. Can somebody please tell me then, since it is pretty widely acknowledged that the aforementioned is indeed true; why do we constantly used new or different terminology despite that fact.


IMO, a lot has to do with the natural tendency of humans as a species to be self-centered and ignore the relevance of anything beyond recent history. We tend to call something "new" when in reality it is only new to us and think of ourselves as smarter than our ancestors and thereby ignore or underplay the hard lessons they've handed down to us.

[William F. Owen]

And here is the stuff (http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/Gardner.pdf)

I also must continue to recommend this book (http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Study-Military-Political-Ideas/dp/1403935866)

Don't pay the $89.95. You should be able to find copies for about $30 on abebooks.com

[Taiko]

Just a couple of interesting incites from my own study for my research phd thesis on Clausewitz and the validity of his propositions on the nature of war and its conduct to insurgencies and counter-insurgencies.

1. In Book 8 Chapter 3 when Clausewitz applies his trinitarian definition to explain the variation in the level and intensity of violence in war he uses the Tatar tribes as an example. In todays vocabulary TaTar tribes were non-state transnational actors, with no government other than the people who made up the tribal alliances based on filial hierarchy and tribal customs. Just as importantly, Clausewitz points out that the people were the military. When we look at Iraq and Afghanistan specifically, there are some interesting commonalities. In terms of looking at what Gray has called the secondary trinity, there is no hierarchy or ordering principle amongst the government, military or people. In many cases one part of the triad can be subsumed by another, Clausewitz's account of the feudal era and cabinet wars, where "the people are all but non-existent", is another example at the other end of the spectrum. All three characteristics, in Enchavarria's words, are regulating principles that are subject to time and place. They are intervening variables that effect the political process of policy making (they give violence its purpose) of both state and non-state actors at the strategic level.

2. Keeping this in mind reread pages: 92-94 (Book 1 Chapter 2: Purpose and Means, in the Howard and Paret translation). Of most interest, "operations with direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliances, or paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene etc." I believe this is applicable to both the non-state insurgencies and the counter-insurgencies efforts of the state. Of most importance is how we define alliance. In terms of traditional/complex insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, the alliance can be seen as the political relationship between the people, military, and the government. Operations with direct political repercussions describes how violence is used for the purpose of either maintaining or disrupting the alliances of either side. In many respects from these two points alone Clausewitz has at a very basic level explained what the purpose of "the surge" in Iraq was about at the strategic level, and could just as easily be applied to the Af/Pak conflict zone. In my opinion, you could almost translate these two points as a summary of Kilcullen's main theory in Accidental Guerrilla. There are other "nuggets of gold" scattered throughout his work that I believe are relevant to understanding insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in general and in specifics.

Admittedly, I am still a novice when it comes to both understanding Clausewitz, insurgencies, and counter-insurgencies. However, as I progress with my thesis I would like to contribute more to this discussion as I believe that Clausewitz can provide some important insights, and I would greatly appreciate any corrections in my understanding of the concepts.

[William F. Owen]

In terms of traditional/complex insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, the alliance can be seen as the political relationship between the people, military, and the government. Operations with direct political repercussions describes how violence is used for the purpose of either maintaining or disrupting the alliances of either side. In many respects from these two points alone Clausewitz has at a very basic level explained what the purpose of "the surge" in Iraq was about at the strategic level, and could just as easily be applied to the Af/Pak conflict zone.
You are correct. Attacking or seeking to effect the internal relationships inherent to Clausewitz's description. Thus all insurgencies and all conflict is complex, just based on the number of relationships and the speed at whih they change. There is no, and never has been, any simple conflict or simple insurgency. IMO, attempting to define these things as "complex" actually obscures understanding.


In my opinion, you could almost translate these two points as a summary of Kilcullen's main theory in Accidental Guerrilla. There are other "nuggets of gold" scattered throughout his work that I believe are relevant to understanding insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in general and in specifics.
Well in my Military Thought reading list, Clausewitz is at the top, but "Accidental" does not even make the list. - and there's the reason.

[Bob's World]

Part of the problem we face now is that on top of a fairly sound family of doctrinal terms we overlaid new terms that overlapped, like "Irregular Warfare" and "Security Force Assistance."

We've also tweaked old definitions to better fit either the things we were doing, or the foggy perceptions of what was going on around us. "Unconventional Warfare" was abused in the name of this, though recently ADM Olson intervened and reinstated the classic, narrow definition for UW.

Then there is our experience and sloppy aplication of terms. Calling everything either "Insurgency" and therefore "Counterinsurgency" also added murk to the waters. The major operations in Iraq and Afganistan are arguably neither one COIN for US forces, yet for a generation COIN is defined by these operations.

Meanwhile, where has SOF, arguably the keeper of these torches, been? Out hunting bad guys, like the intel guys told us to.

Time to clean this mess up a bit; and efforts are underway to do so. Patience everyone.

[slapout9]

Time to clean this mess up a bit; and efforts are underway to do so. Patience everyone.

Now you are talking;)

[Taiko]

My apologies for a lengthy post. I have been thinking about this subject for quite some time, however, up until now I have not had the chance to discuss it with people who have knowledge on the subject area. My supervisor has a wealth of knowledge on terrorism and insurgency, but little on Clausewitz, so I have had to muddle through the master theorists work on my own.


From a Clausewitzian perspective war is war. Its very essence is a violent clash of two or more opposing wills. For Clausewitz, why we fight is more important than how we fight. If we can understand why we are fighting it will be a lot easier to work out how to fight. I think that he would be amused at the length strategic theorists have gone in developing labels and theories for warfare, and would remind us the this is what Jomini, Bulow, and Lloyd were essentially doing, and point out this is why their theories are now dated and of relevance only to specific circumstances. I think he would argue that whatever adjective you would like to attach to warfare be it conventional, unconventional, regular or irregular, traditional or complex insurgency and counter insurgency, high and low intensity conflict, war is war. He would also warn us that in becoming too preoccupied with the type of warfare we are fighting we may commit the cardinal sin of losing sight of the political objective, and focus too narrowly on the military aim.

One of the roles of theory is to provide a common language that policy-makers, military professionals, and civilian academics can use in order to better communicate their understanding of the phenomena they are dealing with. I will argue that CvC's paradoxical trinity provides this language. The paradoxical trinity was designed to explain the nature of war. CvC argued that in order to conduct war successfully it is pivotal that we understand the nature of it. In addition, war's nature, that is the level and intensity of violence, is variable. It changes from war to war, and just as importantly its nature may change multiple times during a single war.

To use Afghanistan as an example:

Using CvC tripartite definition of war, the nature of the initial stages of the Afghan conflict would look something like this.

US: (violence) purpose, hostile feelings/intentions,chance and probability-policy-(politics) government, military, people

Warlords: (violence) chance and probability, purpose, hostile feelings/intentions-policy-(politics) military, people, government

Taliban: (violence) purpose, hostile feelings/intentions, chance and probability-policy-(politics) government, military, people

The arrangement of the intervening variables is obviously subject to debate. However, the debate begins with the nature of the war, why we are fighting, rather than, how to fight the war, and it uses a common language. The logic being once we can establish which of the intervening variables plays the most dominant role in determining the nature of the war, we can then move onto to developing the strategies, operational and tactical methods to conduct the war. If we fast forward to present conditions in Afghanistan we can establish that the nature of war has changed since its initial phases.

US: (violence) chance and probability, purpose, hostile feelings/intentions-policy-(politics) government, military, people

Coalition Partners: (violence) chance and probability, purpose, hostile feelings-policy-(politics) people, government, military

Afghanistan (state): (violence) chance and probability, purpose, hostile feelings and intentions-policy-(politics) government, military, people

Taliban: (violence) chance and probability, hostile feelings/intentions, purpose-policy-(politics) military, people, government

We could even break this down further to the international, regional, district, and local level in order to build a picture of the nature of the war in progress ,the plethora of actors involved, the level of intensity in violence and the various political objectives. As such, the trinity can be used not only at the policy-making level, but by the junior officer at the tactical level, to inform their judgement on the nature of the war and how to conduct it. For example, we could also include all coalition partners and other states with invested interests in the conflict in order to get a full picture at the international level. Alternatively, we could go to the local level to identify the nature of the various tribal interest and their alliances, the level of violence, the military aims and political objectives. As we can see, war and warfare is a very complex phenomena, because in reality each actor needs to take into account its own variables as well as the variables of all the other actors in order to determine the level of intensity in violence and where that violence can be directed in order to achieve the political purpose which called the war into being.

At no stage in developing this understanding of the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan did I need to specifically refer to a specific style of warfare. To be quite honest, I believe that the phrase 'military operations' does not need an adjective to describe how we should conduct the war in Afghanistan at the general level. That is the task of the paradoxical trinity and why CvC spent over 30 years developing it. The preoccupation with trying to label 'warfare' distracts us from the main task of establishing what the specific nature and characteristics of the war are, and determining the strategic, operational, and tactical methods needed to meet the level and intensity of the violence to fulfill our political purpose.

I am not arguing that the amount of work that has gone into understanding how to fight the war in Afghanistan, or similar conflicts, is superfluous. Far from it. Rather, in a similar vein to CvC, I'm arguing that we should shift the ontological term of reference away from warfare and trying to establish principles of military victory, and back towards the nature of war and its conduct, that is, how to use violence in order to achieve a political objective. This is where the study of civil wars, revolutionary wars, wars of independence, cabinet wars, world wars (insert adjective of choice) etc. can serve its purpose, as it will help in creating a better understanding of what roles each of the intervening variables play in determining the nature of the war we are fighting and the level of intensity in the violence used.

Just to finish off quickly. I think that it is important to recognise the limits of Clausewitz's theory. In writing On War, it is my opinion that CvC's sole purpose was to write about the role and use of combat to achieve a political objective. As has been shown, due to the complex task of warfare, the militaries role in a conflict is just that, combat. In Afghanistan, for example, the military role is to disrupt the attempts of the Taliban and A'Q from developing military and political alliances with the Afghan people. And, create alliances with the Afghan people in order to determine friend from foe. This will determine the level and intensity of violence needed in order to achieve the military aim. Their sole purpose is to create the space needed in order for civilians, Afghani civilians with help from American civilian agencies, to develop the foundations for a stable government at the local, regional, national and international level. Essentially, develop the military and political environment that leaves the Taliban/A Q with zero military and political support. That is after all the most basic political purpose of the war. I'll leave it at that, however, there is obviously more nuance to CvC's theory, to the conflict in Afghanistan and the political objectives in play, but I guess that is for my thesis.

If anyone is interested I have just completed a work in progress paper (3000 words), as part of the requirements of my research phd, on CvC's paradoxical trinity. Feel free to PM me for a copy

[William F. Owen]

Taiko

Good post. For me, 90% of you are saying reflects my often repeated opinions here. Particularly


From a Clausewitzian perspective war is war. Its very essence is a violent clash of two opposing wills. For Clausewitz, why we fight is more important than how we fight.
One of the roles of theory is to provide a common language that policy-makers, military professionals, and civilian academics can use in order to better communicate their understanding of the phenomena they are dealing with.
At no stage in developing this understanding of the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan did I need to specifically refer to a specific style of warfare. To be quite honest, I believe that the phrase 'military operations' does not need an adjective to describe how we should conduct the war in Afghanistan at the general level.

On the last point, describing the nature of the conflict, is only necessary for purposes of how modern militaries understand war, and not how war actually is. People get upset when you say "War is War."

This is where the study of civil wars, revolutionary wars, wars of independence, cabinet wars, world wars (insert adjective of choice) etc. can serve its purpose, as it will help in creating a better understanding of what roles each of the intervening variables play in determining the nature of the war we are fighting and the level of intensity in the violence used.
Again that is useful.

Have you read this (http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Study-Military-Political-Ideas/dp/1403935866)

[Ron Humphrey]

Taiko

Good post. For me, 90% of you are saying reflects my often repeated opinions here. Particularly


From a Clausewitzian perspective war is war. Its very essence is a violent clash of two opposing wills. For Clausewitz, why we fight is more important than how we fight.
One of the roles of theory is to provide a common language that policy-makers, military professionals, and civilian academics can use in order to better communicate their understanding of the phenomena they are dealing with.
At no stage in developing this understanding of the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan did I need to specifically refer to a specific style of warfare. To be quite honest, I believe that the phrase 'military operations' does not need an adjective to describe how we should conduct the war in Afghanistan at the general level.

On the last point, describing the nature of the conflict, is only necessary for purposes of how modern militaries understand war, and not how war actually is. People get upset when you say "War is War."

Again that is useful.

Have you read this (http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Study-Military-Political-Ideas/dp/1403935866)

get upset:D
Aside from the most likely reason which may be that many like myself don't really know better(Don't know what we don't know) Thus the benefit in those such as are on this forum sharing the experience in efforts to correct said ignorance.

Still at least for myself the issue with the generality of the the statement is that it leaves me perplexed when I look around at the various conflicts throughout the globe and how in each respectively it probably seems very warlike yet might not be defined as such in many minds.

- If a one tribe out of forty has chosen to actively engage in combat against a given party yet the others are also interacting with both that tribe and the opposed party whose at war and whose SFA or FID or just plain politikin

- Is the mexican government at war with La Familia and others or is it simply LE

Are the FARC and the gov of Columbia at war or is the gov practicing CT/CN/LE

Are the battles the Pakistani Army are engaged in right now War or something else does that determination effect whether ISAF is at war or FID/SFA in regards to direct action.

- Many other examples come to mind which at first blush tend to reinforce the commonality your statement implies but in the same they also seem to be far more or less than war; context depending.

Finally if one accepts that a given action is war than don't you necessarily have to determine what comes between War and Peace and at which point or under which circumstances that is?

Oh heck Now I've confused myself:eek:
Help:wry:

[William F. Owen]

Still at least for myself the issue with the generality of the the statement is that it leaves me perplexed when I look around at the various conflicts throughout the globe and how in each respectively it probably seems very warlike yet might not be defined as such in many minds.


For me, War is, as CvC said it was, the setting forth of policy by other means. Within that, I include any and all forms of violence that challenge the power of the state. FARC and Narco Gangs in Mexico are good examples of exactly that.

The primary purpose of Government is the defence of the nation, in it's widest sense. Any violent attempt at changing that, or even modifying it, is War/conflict/armed struggle/pick your bumper sticker.

Now there are many other forms of armed violence. That between criminal gangs for example, but this is where considering the purpose, and not the nature of the conflict becomes relevant. Conflict between criminals are armed struggles over the population, terrain, and economic resources. The same maybe true of nomads and tribes. Point being, all these conflict reflect enduring and relationships between them.

Is a little group of nomads fighting to protect a water hole is the same as a super power fighting to protect it's oil? I submit it is, and it is useful to recognise it.

[Taiko]

Finally if one accepts that a given action is war than don't you necessarily have to determine what comes between War and Peace and at which point or under which circumstances that is?Help:wry:


War is not an isolated phenomena. It has its own grammar (warfare), but not its own logic. In other words, war has no inherent nature or laws of its own. Social conditions give rise to war and are the same conditions that circumscribe and moderate it. Just as importantly, the social conditions themselves are not part of war, as they already exist before fighting starts, hence, war is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means. War is a sub-concept of politics, it is politics that provides war with its logic and gives it its nature.

War begins not with the attack by Actor A, but with the defense of the attack by Actor B. Without the violent clash of opposing wills, attack and defense, there is no war, as defined by CvC. It ends when the political objective that calls war into being is achieved, that is to say, when one actor's will over the other meets no violent resistance, or when pure exhaustion on either sides results in neither being able to enforce its will on the other resulting, once again, in the ending of physical resistance. The political objective that calls war into being determines when it ends, that is to say, the political objective determines what the peace will look like. How that peace is established, the acceptance of the new political/social conditions by both actors, will also set up the possible conditions for a future war. World War 1 and 2 are classic examples of the interplay of politics, peace and war, or of war as the continuation of politics by other means. The countless wars within the various states of Africa could also be used as an example.

[William F. Owen]

War begins not with the attack by Actor A, but with the defense of the attack by Actor B. Without the violent clash of opposing wills, attack and defense, there is no war, as defined by CvC.

Hmmmm... I like that. Good observation. This would also define the attack of Actor A, as a de-facto "act of war," in that B would seek to oppose it. EG: Hitler's various unopposed occupations were acts of war, but uncontested, thus no war.

...so Bin Laden's and AQs various attacks or "acts of war" do not lead to a "war" until 911.

[slapout9]

For me, War is, as CvC said it was, the setting forth of policy by other means. Within that, I include any and all forms of violence that challenge the power of the state. FARC and Narco Gangs in Mexico are good examples of exactly that.

The primary purpose of Government is the defence of the nation, in it's widest sense. Any violent attempt at changing that, or even modifying it, is War/conflict/armed struggle/pick your bumper sticker.

Now there are many other forms of armed violence. That between criminal gangs for example, but this is where considering the purpose, and not the nature of the conflict becomes relevant. Conflict between criminals are armed struggles over the population, terrain, and economic resources. The same maybe true of nomads and tribes. Point being, all these conflict reflect enduring and relationships between them.

Is a little group of nomads fighting to protect a water hole is the same as a super power fighting to protect it's oil? I submit it is, and it is useful to recognise it.



Wilf,using violence to impose your will on your opponent is almost an exact definition of a crime against a person. So was 911 a crime or an act of war? Can it be both at the same time?

[Bob's World]

Just as war is politics by other means, war is far more than just the violent application of politics as it is the overall continuum that is important, and not just the violent phase viewed in isolation. To do so removes perspective and purpose from the actions of the parties, and makes it merely a mindless test of strength and will. The key in warfare is not simply to prevail in that physical contest, but to also achieve the political objective. HOW one addresses the physical will largely determine if one shapes the right conditions - physical, mental, emotional, etc among both the victor and the vanquished, the warriors, and the populaces and governments that set them on this course.

Our definition for FID runs the full range, from "phase 0" times of peace up through full combat operations and back again. It is continuous.

COIN, on the other hand, as currently defined, ignores the critical "road to war" phase (99% of the time for most populaces, and 50% for even the most unstable of populaces) and only begins once the violence does. This asymmetry of definitions is, in my mind, a major obstacle to clear understanding in this area.

So, concepts that I am playing with to clean up understanding and enhance effectiveness of engagement:

What I am playing with is a proposal to expand the spectrum of COIN to match the spectrum of FID;

To clarify that COIN is executed by the HN; and that FID is that done by those who intervene to support the HN; and UW that which is done by those who intervene to counter the HN/support the dissident.


There is a similar asymmetry in the definitions of FID and SFA. FID is restricted to just internal threats, but all forms of engagement. SFA is expanded to include external threats, but is limited to just security force engagement. The proposal I support (from the boys at Bragg) is to simply expand FID to also include external threats; at which point SFA neatly nests under FID as a clear subset.


Oh, and as to CvC: His writing is based on State vs State conflict, and must be read as such. As he stated himself in regards to the struggles Napoleon faced in dealing with the Spanish populace-based resistance to his occupation. (Paraphrasing) "This is something very different. I don't understand it, but I know it is different and I need to think about it..."

So do we.

[Taiko]

Oh, and as to CvC: His writing is based on State vs State conflict, and must be read as such. As he stated himself in regards to the struggles Napoleon faced in dealing with the Spanish populace-based resistance to his occupation. (Paraphrasing) "This is something very different. I don't understand it, but I know it is different and I need to think about it..."

I would disagree with this assessment. Two points to begin with.

1. Clausewitz stated that a "more general and theoretical treatment of the subject may become feasible if we consider the nature of states and societies as they are determined by their time and prevailing conditions...all conduct war in their own particular way, using different methods, and pursuing different aims". I will invoke the spirit of Colin Gray on this one, and argue that "war is a social institution and it is wage by societies, not only by states". In Book One Chapter One he uses the word 'state' once. In his tripartite definition of war he uses the word government, not state. In applying his trinitarian definition he used the example of the nomadic tartar tribes. In Book 1 Chapter 2 on the purpose and means of war he never refers to the state or state vs state conflict.

2. In developing the concept of center of gravity, "in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion".

Clausewitz's initial military experience was in the twilight of the cabinet wars of the Monarchies. As an adult he observed the birth of the nation-state, and witnessed war approach its absolute level. Society and how its was governed, the structure of the state, was fundamentally different in both cases. With Prussia's first defeat by Napoleon he counseled for a popular uprising and the forming of militias. In addition, there are also the lectures he gave and untranslated monographs he wrote on small wars and he spent a considerable amount of time studying guerilla warfare.

I agree with your assessment of the purpose of violence in your first sentence (sorry I haven't worked out how to multi-quote yet), however, Clausewitz's theory is combat-centric. In saying that, I do believe that it was Clausewitz who introduced the concept of the physical and psychological effort needed in order to impose one's will on an opponent. As "military force is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated".

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,using violence to impose your will on your opponent is almost an exact definition of a crime against a person. So was 911 a crime or an act of war? Can it be both at the same time?

Was 911 perpetrated for political purposes? If yes, then yes. Forget the act. What was the purpose?

[William F. Owen]

J
Oh, and as to CvC: His writing is based on State vs State conflict, and must be read as such.
None of that is true. If you want to read CvC in a myopic and simplistic way, then go ahead, but that is not how it was intended to be read or the purpose to which the work was directed. To whit,

The key in warfare is not simply to prevail in that physical contest, but to also achieve the political objective. - something best said, and best explained by CvC.

[Bob's World]

None of that is true. If you want to read CvC in a myopic and simplistic way, then go ahead, but that is not how it was intended to be read or the purpose to which the work was directed. To whit,

The key in warfare is not simply to prevail in that physical contest, but to also achieve the political objective. - something best said, and best explained by CvC.

Actually, probably more "myopic and simplistic" would be to take one man's incomplete writings, based on a very particular experience set and timeframe, and apply them with Biblical certainty to every circumstance... but that's just me.

There is great value in CvC, but it is what it is, no more and no less.

[Taiko]

Clausewitz is more often quoted than read. There is little wonder that he was afraid of being subject to misinterpretation and half baked criticism, for "in matters of this kind everyone feels he is justified to publish the first thing that comes into his head when he picks up a pen" :D I have that printed out over my desk and it is something I keep in mind everyday before I type a single word.

[Bob's World]

Also, due to the nature of his writings, one learns much more about what he was thinking than about what he ultimately concluded. It is a view of his journey, and to quote out of context something said in a written muse is unlikely to convey what he ultimately came to believe on a topic.

[Taiko]

That is my major concern at the moment when writing my thesis. I can generally see when some one has taken CvC out of context. For example, Jim99 back on page 2 has taken CvC out of context by quoting a phrase from his logical line of inquiry, without realizing that CvC disputes this assumption in his material line of inquiry. Unless you know the Kantian theoretical method of inquiry then a lot of CvC work seems to be contradicting itself and is easily quoted out of context. Moltke and Ludendorf are prime examples. In most of the books I've read about CvC the writer generally argues that Book 1 is a guide to Books 2-8. However, I'm of the impression that Books 2-8 can show how CvC arrived at his conclusions in Book 1. To use a mathematical analogy, Book 1 is the answer, Books 2-8 is the equations he used to get to that answer. Although that is a fairly tenuous position.

[William F. Owen]

There is pretty simple test to apply to CvC. What did he actually say or imply, that misleads us about the enduring nature of war? What?

His observations apply just as well to the FARC in Colombia, or Hezbollah in the Lebanon, as they do the City States of Greece, or Soviet Russia.

My use and referencing of CvC is simply based on the fact that we have no one who has ever provided better insights. Is it perfect? No, but there simply is nothing else. Clausewitz is to War, what Newton was/is to Physics. Was Newton perfect? Was he always? No, but who did it better?

[William F. Owen]

Unless you know the Kantian theoretical method of inquiry then a lot of CvC work seems to be contradicting itself and is easily quoted out of context. Moltke and Ludendorf are prime examples.
Foch has a similar weakness, in that while is observations about the conduct of operations are generally sound, his writings on the Nature of Modern War quotes CvC, but then seem to go off into a world their own, where quotes are used as selective evidence.


In most of the books I've read about CvC the writer generally argues that Book 1 is a guide to Books 2-8. However, I'm of the impression that Books 2-8 can show how CvC arrived at his conclusions in Book 1. To use a mathematical analogy, Book 1 is the answer, Books 2-8 is the equations he used to get to that answer. Although that is a fairly tenuous position.
That maybe annoyingly insightful. I'll now have to spend the evening testing that that hypothesis. Stand by for PM, so as we do not bore the Hitsonim. :D

[Bob's World]

I've no problem with Carl. He thought about his experiences and wrote about what he thought. There is solid value there.

I do sometimes scratch my head a bit at those who attribute perhaps a bit too much to his writings. But then, I was the kid in 12th grade lit class who thought it was a bunch of silly BS as we sat around discussing all of the different hidden meanings the Mr. Melville had supposedly written into Moby Dick. Sometimes I think we can overthink a good thing and take it places the author never intended, which is fine, so long as one recognizes that they have left the original and are merely using it as a base of intellectual operations to explore new territory.

As to CvC; War and politics; and War between sovereign states vice war within sovereign states: I have a thought.

Many on this site share the position that "war is war." That is fine, they may be correct, but I disagree. I find it to be a dangerously simplistic position that contributes significantly to being overly threat focused in a populace-based conflict, and years of frustrating failure in stabilizing a country.

We all recognize that Politics between sovereign states is a very different thing than politics within sovereign states. They have to be, the relationships and equities are very different things, and to approach either the same as the other is to fail in both.

The applies to warfare. As an extension of politics, warfare within a state, within a populace, is a very different thing that warfare between states and between populaces. Sure there are many similarities in how it looks on the surface; but the underlying relationships, motivations, etc are very, very different.

If I get in a dispute with a stranger and punch him the results and follow-on consequences are very different than if I get in a dispute with my neighbor and punch him, or if I get in a dispute with my son and punch him. We all understand this; yet when it becomes warfare many set this understanding aside and believe that a combatant is a combatant, yet every action carries very different consequences. Now sometimes the neighbor conflict occurs. Sometimes that young man you've raised steps up to challenge the old man. These things happen. It's life. Sometimes a populace steps up to challenge the established governance as well.

All must be dealt with, but all require a very different approach if one is to avoid the pitfalls of so many nations that have gone before us treating all as if they are one and the same.

[William F. Owen]

But then, I was the kid in 12th grade lit class who thought it was a bunch of silly BS as we sat around discussing all of the different hidden meanings the Mr. Melville had supposedly written into Moby Dick.
Well, I was the kid staring out of the window, thinking what a crock, Melville was. I absolutely concur with your position. Maintaining a realistic and thus somewhat sceptical view is inherently useful.

Many on this site share the position that "war is war." That is fine, they may be correct, but I disagree. I find it to be a dangerously simplistic position that contributes significantly to being overly threat focused in a populace-based conflict, and years of frustrating failure in stabilizing a country.
...but that's not what "War is War" is meant to convey. It has nothing to do with being threat focussed. It is to do with the enduring nature of war - but I personally am threat focussed.

We all recognize that Politics between sovereign states is a very different thing than politics within sovereign states. They have to be, the relationships and equities are very different things, and to approach either the same as the other is to fail in both.
How so? Pashtuns in A'Stan, and Pashtuns in Pakistan. Communists in North Vietnam, and Communists in South Vietnam. Nazis in Austria, and Nazis in Croatia.

The applies to warfare. As an extension of politics, warfare within a state, within a populace, is a very different thing that warfare between states and between populaces. Sure there are many similarities in how it looks on the surface; but the underlying relationships, motivations, etc are very, very different.
OK, so how do you differentiate between a Civil War and an Insurgency, in a way that usefully aids our understanding?

All must be dealt with, but all require a very different approach if one is to avoid the pitfalls of so many nations that have gone before us treating all as if they are one and the same.
So the need for differing approaches is defined by something other than the effect of the political outcome? Hafez Assad, had not problem levelling Hama, to resolve his "internal dispute" with the Muslim Brotherhood.

[Bob's World]

When I say poilitcs between vs within, I mean more how a national leader approaches problems with the leaders and populaces of another country are far different than how he approaches problems with leaders and the populace of our own country. The difference between foreign policy and domestic policy. Same degree applies to the difference between foreign war and domestic war.

As to civil war, which I was not referring to at all, it is as close to "hybrid warfare" as any I have seen (certainly the example always tossed out of Hezbollah using missiles to frustrate the IDF recently is NOT hybrid at all) as it mixes components of both state-based warfare and populace-based warfare. But that is a separate book unto itself to explore that line of thought...

No I mean the differnce between an insurgency and a declared war between two nations. That and no more. Very different. For the lead squad on the ground they may look very similar; but they are not, and while that lead squad may well be doing much of the same things both to secure itself and to accomplish their mission; the nuances of the difference are critical for successful results; and the consequences of ignoring them are the difference between resolving the problem and turning it into a festering sore that never heals.

[max161]

But I believe that by studying Clausewitz we can better understand the nature of war and through thorough study (along with Sun Tzu and other great theorists) we can develop plans to deal with complex problems - however, we must understand that we might not get it right the first time! Clausewitz does not pretend to give us the answers but his real goal was to help guide students of war (and human nature) to develop the "inward eye" or coup d'oiel that would combine experience with the study of theory to allow planners and more importantly commanders to cut through the fog and friction of war, while lacking perfect clarity of information, to exercise good military (and political) judgment to deal with war.

However, it is our Jominian quest to find the perfect checklist to solve every problem that causes us to misread, misquote (or quote out of context) and misunderstand Clausewitz and the importance of his work that remains of value today and as long as there is the human element in war (passion, hate, greed; rational control; and chance - which I suggest transcends whatever label of war we want to put on it - Major Combat Operations or Maneuver Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, or Irregular Warfare).

Again the answers are not in O War or in the Art of War (Sun Tzu's and certainly not Jomini') but the "answers" can be discerned through study and experience.

[William F. Owen]

When I say poilitcs between vs within, I mean more how a national leader approaches problems with the leaders and populaces of another country are far different than how he approaches problems with leaders and the populace of our own country. The difference between foreign policy and domestic policy. Same degree applies to the difference between foreign war and domestic war.
OK. That's an interesting basis for a discussion, as in Domestic v Foreign. Of course a great many "domestic" insurgencies, have an international dimension.

[William F. Owen]

However, it is our Jominian quest to find the perfect checklist to solve every problem that causes us to misread, misquote (or quote out of context) and misunderstand Clausewitz and the importance of his work that remains of value today and as long as there is the human element in war (passion, hate, greed; rational control; and chance - which I suggest transcends whatever label of war we want to put on it - Major Combat Operations or Maneuver Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, or Irregular Warfare).

Excellent observation. Never really read Jomini in any detail, and never felt I had to, for just the reason you outline.

However, I am currently reading Vauban's treatise on Siegecraft, which is really good example of solid tactical writing, in a "here's how you do it," way that makes very good sense, because with a specific context you can give specific advice, complete with "common errors made when conducting a siege" - Gold dust.

[jmm99]

re:
So was 911 a crime or an act of war? Can it be both at the same time?

Yes (both) and yes.

----------------------
PS: Taiko


re:
For example, Jim99 back on page 2 has taken CvC out of context by quoting a phrase from his logical line of inquiry, without realizing that CvC disputes this assumption in his material line of inquiry.

Can't find a post on page 2 where I quote CvC; are you referring to this post on page 3 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=67453&postcount=44) ? I've no desire to argue with you about what I said (I'll stand by it); but you confused me as to what your reference was.

[slapout9]

Excellent observation. Never really read Jomini in any detail, and never felt I had to, for just the reason you outline.

However, I am currently reading Vauban's treatise on Siegecraft, which is really good example of solid tactical writing, in a "here's how you do it," way that makes very good sense, because with a specific context you can give specific advice, complete with "common errors made when conducting a siege" - Gold dust.

Wilf, do you have a full title for the Vauban's book?

[War Hammer]

It is best to consult insurgents themselves as to whether or not Clausewitz does apply to insurgency.

The following is from Vietnamese General Truong Chinh's PRIMER FOR REVOLT (edited by Bernard Fall). It contains the answers that many seek.

l. Politics and military action -- Then two questions are closely related: "War is a continuation of politics." ( Marx). The politics of our Democratic Republic are hampered by the French colonialists; we must therefore act militarily to overcome the obstacles they have put in our way, so that our politics can be carried out successfully. Military action is a measure by which politics are executed. '' War is a means of politics. "War is the continuation of politics by other means." (Clausewitz).

This is why military action can only succeed when politics are correct. And conversely, politics cannot be fulfilled without the success of military action. When military action is successful the aim of war is also realized. After a war comes to an end, politics continue to be carried out by other, more moderate means. That is the relation between military affairs and politics.

Those who rely only on politics often do not realize the important role of armed force in history, do not realize that sometimes armed force must be used to fight the internal enemy or external aggressors. Internally, such people often accept reconciliation contrary to principle. In foreign relations, they are liable to surrender, or make diplomatic concessions. Again, those who have a tendency only to rely on military action are inclined to militarism. They tend to believe that everything can be settled by armed force; they do not apply political mobilization, are unwilling to give explanations and to convince people; they even use threats, or bring pressure to bear on the people.

Or, fighting spiritedly, they neglect political work; they do not seek ways of building ties of affection between officers and men, do not act in such a way that the army and the people can wholeheartedly help one another; and they neglect propaganda directed to the breaking of the morale of the enemy troops. Such people know only how to fight; they fail to consolidate the National United Front, fail to seek new allies outside the country, and neglect the study of the internal and world situation, which is indispensable to the development of correct internal and foreign policies.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bernard Fall wrote in a footnote regarding the above paragraph.

"This paragraph is perhaps the most important in the whole book, for it points directly to the present deficiencies in Western operations in South VietNam, with their overemphasis on military technology and their lack of a valid political rationale. e.g., strategic hamlets are a technique, not an ideology."

[slapout9]

It is best to consult insurgents themselves as to whether or not Clausewitz does apply to insurgency.

The following is from Vietnamese General Truong Chinh's PRIMER FOR REVOLT (edited by Bernard Fall). It contains the answers that many seek.

l. Politics and military action -- Then two questions are closely related: "War is a continuation of politics." ( Marx). The politics of our Democratic Republic are hampered by the French colonialists; we must therefore act militarily to overcome the obstacles they have put in our way, so that our politics can be carried out successfully. Military action is a measure by which politics are executed. '' War is a means of politics. "War is the continuation of politics by other means." (Clausewitz).

This is why military action can only succeed when politics are correct. And conversely, politics cannot be fulfilled without the success of military action. When military action is successful the aim of war is also realized. After a war comes to an end, politics continue to be carried out by other, more moderate means. That is the relation between military affairs and politics.

Those who rely only on politics often do not realize the important role of armed force in history, do not realize that sometimes armed force must be used to fight the internal enemy or external aggressors. Internally, such people often accept reconciliation contrary to principle. In foreign relations, they are liable to surrender, or make diplomatic concessions. Again, those who have a tendency only to rely on military action are inclined to militarism. They tend to believe that everything can be settled by armed force; they do not apply political mobilization, are unwilling to give explanations and to convince people; they even use threats, or bring pressure to bear on the people.

Or, fighting spiritedly, they neglect political work; they do not seek ways of building ties of affection between officers and men, do not act in such a way that the army and the people can wholeheartedly help one another; and they neglect propaganda directed to the breaking of the morale of the enemy troops. Such people know only how to fight; they fail to consolidate the National United Front, fail to seek new allies outside the country, and neglect the study of the internal and world situation, which is indispensable to the development of correct internal and foreign policies.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bernard Fall wrote in a footnote regarding the above paragraph.

"This paragraph is perhaps the most important in the whole book, for it points directly to the present deficiencies in Western operations in South VietNam, with their overemphasis on military technology and their lack of a valid political rationale. e.g., strategic hamlets are a technique, not an ideology."


War Hammer, I think that is one of most outstanding posts ever put up here. Well Done!

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, do you have a full title for the Vauban's book?

"A Manual of Siege craft and Fortification" - Sebastien Leprestre De Vauban

[William F. Owen]

It is best to consult insurgents themselves as to whether or not Clausewitz does apply to insurgency.

Clausewitz's observations apply to all organised forms of violence for political ends. He is not giving instruction. He is making an observation. Mao was heavily influenced by, Clausewitz as was Marx. Communist and "Revolutionary" writings, are all using Clausewitz and is gets dumbed down for the peasants to understand.

Again, those who have a tendency only to rely on military action are inclined to militarism. They tend to believe that everything can be settled by armed force; they do not apply political mobilization, are unwilling to give explanations and to convince people; they even use threats, or bring pressure to bear on the people.
This is near enough a direct quote from Mao, and PU-29, the field regulations of the Soviet Army, makes the same point quite clearly. The Communists needed to argue this to make their case, that all military action was essentially progressing "Wars of liberation." They keep stating it, not because it was insightful, but because most of them did not understand it, where as it was central to colonialist and bourgeois use of military force - eg: Look at the British and French Empires.

[Taiko]

We all recognize that Politics between sovereign states is a very different thing than politics within sovereign states. They have to be, the relationships and equities are very different things, and to approach either the same as the other is to fail in both.

Hans Morgenthau would disagree. On topic, this was the point CvC was making with his trinitarian definition, especially the subjective characteristics: the government, the military, and the people. These three intervening variables contribute to the dynamic relationship that goes towards understanding political power and how policy is made. Neo-classical realist theory has done some major work on looking at the relationship between the government, the military and the people in respect to foreign and domestic policy. I would argue that at the domestic level, the relationship is no different, in terms of the pushing and pulling of all three characteristics in determining political power and its relationship to public policy, especially when dealing with an internal insurgency. Mao uses CvC's trinitarian definition of the people, the government, and the military, in his 'Selected Military Writings', to work out his three phases of revolutionary war. Each of these characteristics feature heavily in determining when one moves from one phase to the next. Just as Lenin used CvC trinitarian definition in understanding the roles of the subjective characteristics of politics and how they shape internal revolutionary wars.

After reading up on FID and SFA, I think I understand the point you are making Bob's World. Its an important one in relationship to the limits of CvC because in developing his theory he took military preparations: arming, training etc as a given. In terms of understanding and implementing FID and SFA this is clearly not the case. So there is a major hole in my thesis that I needs to work on in regards to understanding the role of the military outside of combat. Although, FID and SFA from what I can understand of it, is in many respect, directed towards combat. All the same, thanks for the heads up.

My apologies Jim99 I did mean your post on page three. There is little to debate. If you used that passage to support any argument, you will be criticised for taking it out of context.

Thank you for the reference War Hammer. I've got most of Giap's work but this fleshes it out a bit more.

[max161]

On topic, this was the point CvC was making with his trinitarian definition, especially the subjective characteristics: the government, the military, and the people. These three intervening variables contribute to the dynamic relationship that goes towards understanding political power and how policy is made.


This is one of the problems with reading Clausewitz. His work gets reduced to sound bites. I think you have to put the people, military and the government in context (On War, page 89, Howard and Paret translation). We should pay close attention to his words.

"War is more that a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the gvien case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendancies always make war a paradoxical trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject tot reason alone.

The first of the three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope of which courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of the government alone.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rotted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between would conflict with reality to such an extent that for reason alone it would be totally useless.

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets."

This is the problem (and beauty and value) in reading Clausewitz. Our tendency to believe that he was only talking about state on state warfare in his theory misses the point that he was really concerned with a theory of war that transcended a nice neat description. His final analogy in the quote above is perhaps his last laugh for us. As we think he espoused the concrete theory of war we should try to suspend an object on a string between three magnets and see what happens. The interplay of primordial violence, hatred and enmity or the blind natural forces with chance and probability and the creative spirit with policy and reason makes warfare a complex undertaking and this true chameleon exists in whatever form of warfare we want to call it from Major Combat Operations or Maneuver Warfare to Irregular or Hybrid War. The object among the magnets never stops moving, it never remains in the same position, its position is constantly changing much like the character and form of war. These "tendencies" and the interplay between them must be examined when looking at the kind of wars in which we find ourselves and they exist in every form of conflict in some form or another. And of course if one is missing ( as in reason or rational control)then there is no moderating factor and the relationship is very out of balance which can be found in such places where tragic atrocities have occurred (e.g., Rwanda, Sudan, etc). But the last laugh is that there is in fact no simple template for war. There is no simple relationship between the people, military, and government and like Sun Tzu said - war is a matter of life and death for the state and therefore it must be studied. We would do well to study Clausewitz and Sun Tzu well but what they really wanted us to do is study the nature of war as well as the evolving forms and characteristics of war that we see and think we will see in the future and try to understand that the interplay of these tendencies must be examined and understood in order to develop political and military strategies in which to achieve our aims.

I think his last laugh is that in the end you cannot develop a concrete theory of war that applies to all wars past, present, and future because just like the object suspended between the magnets even when there appears to be no movement for a period of time one slight shift will cause it to get out of balance and continue to shake and shudder as the random interplay of energy and magnetic force acts on the object. The nature of war has never changed but the characteristics and forms surely do. We must continue to study.

[Taiko]

I agree. Refer back to post 57:

(Violence) purpose, hostile feelings/intentions, chance and probability-Policy-(Politics) government, military, people.

War is not an isolated phenomena. As such, violence is a dependent variable and policy is the independent variable. The level and intensity of Violence is determined by three intervening variables, that are objective, in so far as they are always present in war. Policy itself is decided by political power which, in turn, is made up of three intervening variables whose characteristics are subjective. Meaning they are determined by time and place. However, Policy is not a tyrant. To avoid the charge of political determinism within the theory, Clausewitz argued that while politics exerts a subordinating influence over war for the purpose of realising its goals, its influence runs up against, and is in turn reduced or elevated by, the play of chance and the force of hostile feelings and intensions. In addition, the influence of policy is also limited by the subjective characteristics of the institutions and representative bodies, that call it into being, that is to say, the political process of policy-making which is subject to time and place.

The reason I have highlighted the secondary trinity (government, people and military) is because this is the part of the CvC tripartite definition which has come under heavy criticism by Kaldor, Van Creveld, Holsti, Smith etc., who argue that we are in a post-trinitarian security environment, which is incorrect.

[max161]

The reason I have highlighted the secondary trinity (government, people and military) is because this is the part of the CvC tripartite definition which has come under heavy criticism by Kaldor, Van Creveld, Holsti, Smith etc., who argue that we are in a post-trinitarian security environment, which is incorrect.

I could not agree more that it is wrong to think that we are in a post trinitarian security environment. It is as if we have found something new in thinking that war has shifted from state to state to war only among the people. I get tired of people making the choice between enemy centric and population centric warfare. There is always both. The chart I see in briefing slides that makes me chuckle is when defining Irregular Warfare they depict the "secondary trinity" (I like that) and then show a shift from Military and government to emphasis on military and people. To me this shows a classic misunderstanding to the paradoxical trinity and what Clausewitz intended for us to see.

[Taiko]

"These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rotted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between would conflict with reality to such an extent that for reason alone it would be totally useless."

This is the main part of his definition that they, the post-trinitarians, all seem to miss. I am still having trouble working out why they think that there has to be a arbitrary or static relationship between government, military, and people. CvC never claimed there was one and specifically said that if theorists tried to contrive one then they would "conflict with reality". I think it was Gray who first called it the 'secondary trinity' in his rebuttal of van Creveld et al. Gray response is interesting. I agree with a lot he has written, but I think he is wrong to say that as a 'secondary part of the trinity' it is not as important as the first. You can not dismiss it that easily.

[jmm99]

from Taiko
My apologies Jim99 I did mean your post on page three. There is little to debate. If you used that passage to support any argument, you will be criticised for taking it out of context.

Your last sentence makes your mentality quite clear to me.

[Taiko]

Once again my apologies. I did not mean to come across as derogatory or condescending. I will try to justify my remarks in regards to your post.

The direct quote you have used from CvC is his attempt to abstract all the material variables that goes towards making war what it is. What CvC is trying to do here is establish whether war can be considered as a isolated phenomena with an inherent nature of its own. The last sentence in the quote you have used is the most telling, "that aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as something not actually part of war itself".

Using a logical line of inquiry, war as an abstraction or isolated phenomena CvC concludes, is subject to the laws of necessity which would result in a never ending escalatory cycle of violence reaching an absolute level. In reality this is not the case. In the past, many theorists and military professionals have taken this quote out of context in order to justify the position that politics has no place in war and its conduct. This is far from what CvC had in mind when he wrote this phase, as he totally rejects it when he applies a material line of inquiry.

Having said that, I agree with most of the points you are making with the rest of your post on page three, it is just a little puzzling that you would use that specific phrase from CvC to make your points, considering its origins, and what CvC was specifically trying to prove with it. In many respects it was a knee jerk reaction on my part and I did not intend to come across as flippant, nor to undermine, or dismiss out of hand, your contribution to the thread.

[jmm99]

it's a sign of weakness (She Wore a Yellow Ribbon (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/She_Wore_a_Yellow_Ribbon)). :D

As to the three substantive paragraphs, your paras 1 & 2 do not disturb me. We could discuss all of that, as well as CvCs historical summaries, and his auto-Socratic methodology of self-discourse. But, none of that was what my post sought to address - and also get some answers from more learned folks.

Now to this one...


... it is just a little puzzling that you would use that specific phrase from CvC to make your points, considering its origins, and what CvC was specifically trying to prove with it.

The answer is pretty mundane. This paragragh is one of the few (if not the only one) where CvC mentions international law (Völkerrecht). Since that was the focus of my post I took what I could get.

Now, CvC had no reason to go extensively into I Law or the Laws of War (LOAC) because in his experience they were not an important consideration. It was not until his fellow Prussian Lieber (as an expat to the US) took off with 1863 General Orders No. 100 that we see a decent codification. Thus, my first question in post #44 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=67453&postcount=44):


[1] "Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power." One wonders what CvC would think of the GCs, other conventions and modern ROEs - which are quite perceptible in our Laws of War.

I suspect he might say something along the lines that those constraints would affect the appearence (form as we see it), and impose limitations on its theoretical "growth pattern", but not affect its basic substance - e.g., his survey of European warfare post-Westphalia and pre-Napoleon. He probably would have used different words (I've used a neo-Platonist formula; as I understand it, he was more of a German Romanticist; but I'm no CvC SME).

Next question is also factually-based. In CvC's time, Transnational Violent Non-State Actors were not much of an issue (the transnational anarchists came later). So, that breed of cat was also not within his experience. Hence:


[2] "... for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law ..." One wonders what CvC would have thought about non-State actors such as AQ, who have their own Rule of Law, Principles of War and Laws of War.

I suspect he would have extrapolated from the history known to him. Perhaps looking at the Roman Empire (which he found unique). This seems to be a more important question than the first.

The third reference to CvC is this:


[3] The term "wehrlos" translates generally as "unprotected", "defenseless" or "helpless" (more figurative), which have a broader meaning than "disarmed".

My suggestion being that CvC (in normal German usage) is not limited to putting a round between the other guy's eyes, or him physically dropping his musket. There are other ways to accomplish the same result as kill or capture.

Anyway, those were my questions re: CvC - as yet unanswered.

Thanks for the PMs.

[Taiko]

"Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power." One wonders what CvC would think of the GCs, other conventions and modern ROEs - which are quite perceptible in our Laws of War. I suspect he might say something along the lines that those constraints would affect the appearence (form as we see it), and impose limitations on its theoretical "growth pattern", but not affect its basic substance - e.g., his survey of European warfare post-Westphalia and pre-Napoleon. He probably would have used different words (I've used a neo-Platonist formula; as I understand it, he was more of a German Romanticist; but I'm no CvC SME).

Not to sure about IL and GC. In terms of the morality of war, CvC was happy to leave it to the philosophers. I suspect as a realists he would of argued that IL and GC are little more than sandcastles that are all to easily washed away by the tides of war (my words not his). So I think you are right in assuming it would not effect its basic substance. However, when you take into account the importance of the population in small wars there is a place for upholding domestic law and GC, if for anything else then to maintain the moral high ground in the propaganda war. I think the US found out the hard way with a certain prison in Iraq that there is strategic capital in the GC. Although as an aside, the reports on A'Q war crimes and atrocities are all but missing from western media. But from all accounts A'Q paid a heavy price for its atrocities in Iraq especially in turning the population against it. So GC and more importantly domestic laws/custom would have to be an important toolkit for COIN. So CvC is limited in this respect. Mao certainly understand the power of the GC and upholding domestic law more so than CvC, in terms of fighting an effective revolutionary war.

In regards to ROE, he would most probably cite Prussia's first experience with Napoleon and warn that when rolling the iron dice we should make sure to understand the war being fought, not mistaking it for what we want it to be, unless we take up a dress rapier against a broadsword and vice versa. This observation is very apt for current circumstances in my opinion.



Next question is also factually-based. In CvC's time, Transnational Violent Non-State Actors were not much of an issue (the transnational anarchists came later). So, that breed of cat was also not within his experience. Hence: I suspect he would have extrapolated from the history known to him. Perhaps looking at the Roman Empire (which he found unique). This seems to be a more important question than the first.

Close, he actually used the example of Tartar tribes as transnatinal non-sate actors.


suggestion being that CvC (in normal German usage) is not limited to putting a round between the other guy's eyes, or him physically dropping his musket. There are other ways to accomplish the same result as kill or capture

Book 1 Chapter 2: Purpose and Means covers a lot of ground in terms of the various aims and effort require to achieve various political effects. But, in many parts of his work he emphasis the importance of combat. "Combat in war is like cash payment in commerce", being the most well known and quoted. In essence CvC produced a combat-centric theory.

[William F. Owen]

Close, he actually used the example of Tartar tribes as transnatinal non-sate actors

CvC was very aware of the Catholic and Protestant "insurgencies" and Wars within Europe, including the Hussites. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hussite_Wars) These are all basically "trans-national" or "non-state".

[Bob's World]

What appears to be emerging from this thread is a reemergence of the concept that war is essentially war, as the ends are similar in populace-based conflict and state-based, and CvC can be applied to both without obvious breakdown of his theory; therefore similar ways and means applied to either will produce similar effects.

I can track along with CvC's theory not being rendered invalid by populace-based conflict; but I believe the leap of logic to concluding also that ways and means that are effective in defeating another state are also effective in resolving a conflict with one's own populace is both too broad, and unsubstantiated by historical fact.

So keep CvC in your rucksack as a good source, but continue to seek other sources to fleshout how something that can appear and act so similar in so many ways can also be so different and require very different approaches; both in general, and certainly by case.

I guess we could say that war is like women. War is war and women are women -- but while the similarities are obvious, it is a foolish man indeed who disregards or disrespects their differences... Either way, us guys are quite likely to make a mess of it.

[William F. Owen]

I can track along with CvC's theory not being rendered invalid by populace-based conflict; but I believe the leap of logic to concluding also that ways and means that are effective in defeating another state are also effective in resolving a conflict with one's own populace is both too broad, and unsubstantiated by historical fact.


What is a "populace based conflict?"

I only ask as all Wars are about political outcomes. It's the authority to which the people defer and obey, which is the issue, not they themselves. That is the same for all human conflict.

In those terms, fighting the Taliban is no different from fighting the Waffen SS. The prize was not the German people, no more than the prize is the "Afghan" people. The prize is someone exercising a useful degree of authority over them.

The nature of the fighting however, may have to be different, for POLITICAL reasons, as Clausewitz explains.

[jmm99]

Just a couple of little points.


from Takio
Close, he actually used the example of Tartar tribes as transnatinal non-sate actors.

Depends on how you translate the Tartar passage from Bk 8.3B:


Die Tatarenschwärme suchen neue Wohnsitze. Sie ziehen mit dem ganzen Volke aus, mit Weib und Kind, sie sind also zahlreich wie verhältnismäßig kein anderes Heer, und ihr Ziel ist Unterwerfung oder Vertreibung des Gegners. Sie würden mit diesen Mitteln bald alles vor sich niederwerfen, ließe sich damit ein hoher Kulturzustand vereinigen.

I'd translate "dem ganzen Volke" as "their entire Nation"; and "Die Tatarenschwärme" as the "The Tartarhordes" (literally, it's "The Tartarswarms"; but the later Tartar political entities usually are called "Hordes" - e.g., the "Golden Horde").

I may be influenced by reading Gabriel's bio of Subotai. The historical facts are that when the Tartars "ziehened aus", they were very much a nation-state (with geographic bounds as they chose to define them; and a clear governance structure). They also a very organized military structure (part and parcel of their government). So, legally, I'd class them as a nation-state (albeit living in tents); and their soldiers as regular combatants (brutal, but regular).

The Germanic tribes who crossed into the Roman Empire seem more akin to Transnational Violent Non-State Actors - not nation-states; and their troops more akin to irregular combatants. Which period of German history you pick makes a difference. The Germanic groups named by Tacitus (ca. 100ce) had defined boundaries, a governance structure, etc. By 400ce, that had been disrupted by pressure from the East, resulting in the Rhine Crossing, etc.

I think Wilf is more factually on point with this:


from Wilf
CvC was very aware of the Catholic and Protestant "insurgencies" and Wars within Europe, including the Hussites. These are all basically "trans-national" or "non-state".

Agreed factually - and good examples of pre-Westphalian non-state actors in armed conflicts. However, did CvC discuss them ? I did a search through the On War I downloaded (Graham trans.); and had no hits for Catholic, Protestant, Hussite or religious. Anyway, if someone could supply a CvC reference to those armed conflicts, if it exists ?

[Taiko]

In regards to Jim99 point about CG I was not happy with my original conclusions. So I went back to Mao and my trinitarian definition and would like see if my new conclusions makes sense especially in regards to Bob's World points.

In Mao's 'Selected Military Writings' he goes into great detail about how PoW and the general population should be treated. I would argue that in many respects this can be pivotal in winning a revolutionary war. If CvC's trinity cannot account for it then the theory loses its validity in explaining the nature of war in all its variations.

So after some tossing and turning last night I think I have found how the trinity can be used to explain it. Focusing on the first half of the trinity Clausewitz argues that the level and intensity of violence is determined by three intervening variables:

(Violence) purpose, hostile feelings/intentions, chance and probability

I would contend that how you treat PoWs (GC) and the populace (domestic law/custom) can specifically be accounted for in shaping the hostile feelings/intensions that go towards determining the level and intensity of violence. Metz, for example, explains how after 'shock and awe' the proto-insurgencies focused on exacerbating the anger of the population, against the US, by targeting basic infrastructure. They were attempting to shape the level and intensity of the violence via controlling/manipulating the hostile feelings of the Iraqi people.

Another example from the US is the change in how they treated PoW and combatants. As in the case of Mao, this was a major psychological operation that was specifically aimed at the moral of the opponents fighting force and a way to shape the hostile feelings/intentions of it. When the Red army captured enemy soldiers, they "re-educated" them and let them go. In Iraq the same process was implemented in the prisons by the US to "de-radicalize" combatants through the introduction of moderate clerics. In terms of the general population the key to shaping and controlling the hostile feelings/intentions lead to a shift in search and seizure operations to take account of local customs/law. Just as paying compensation was used to pay for damages or the death of a family member using the tribal customs.

Obviously this is just a basic summary. However, I think I have a handle on the first part of the trinity. The second part of the trinity, in relation to how this effects the intervening variables that determine political power I'm still working on. In terms of my explanation for the first part I would appreciate any thoughts from SWC members.

Good point about the Tartar's Jimm99 and the Hussites Wilf. Looks like its back to the drawing board in looking at transnational non-state actors. Although I think the second part of the trinity (politics) government, people, military, will be able to account for it. Its just a matter of finding the write words.


So keep CvC in your rucksack as a good source, but continue to seek other sources to fleshout how something that can appear and act so similar in so many ways can also be so different and require very different approaches; both in general, and certainly by case.
I guess we could say that war is like women. War is war and women are women -- but while the similarities are obvious, it is a foolish man indeed who disregards or disrespects their differences... Either way, us guys are quite likely to make a mess of it.

Well put, the last part made me laugh :D Although I have been working on a diagram that might have some utility and would mean you need not hump CvC's book around.

[jmm99]

This Wiki, Chinese Civil War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Civil_War), has an interesting set of stats:


KMT Strength

4,300,000 (July 1945)
3,650,000 (June 1948)
1,490,000 (June 1949)

CPC Strength

1,200,000 (July 1945)
2,800,000 (June 1948)
4,000,000 (June 1949)

Just as the radio broacasts of the Truman-Dewey results were my first introduction to politics (where I had an idea of what was going on), the 1948-1949 news broadcasts were the first war results I could intelligently follow.

My recollection includes entire KMT armies switching sides. So, when I saw the Wiki stats, I thought Mao made a lot of converts in a hurry. Was my recollection correct ? Yup, in Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=siZLk8XKCcIC&pg=PA133&lpg=PA133&dq=%22china%22+%22civil+war%22+%22changing+sides%2 2&source=bl&ots=C-v1AC3DiS&sig=dHcumTy0RJWvgx91NIWlU81Yh5o&hl=en&ei=t15mSueaGuORtgfpmKz0Dw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5), The Chinese Third Revolutionary Civil War, 1945-49, by Christopher Lew, which takes you to p.133. You can scroll up to p.132, where four KMT Armies (5th, 15th, 16th & 20th) defected within a month.

So, looking at the CPC "conversion" program is as or more important than looking at its kill or capture programs - at least for that phase of that armed conflict.

And, the book confirmed my distant recollections. Now, if someone can tell me where I left my vehicle (which one is it ?), I can try to find my way home. :)

-------------------
PS: Even if CvC did not discuss Hussites in particular (Wilf has yet to chime in on that), that would not invaldate application of On War's basic substance to situations involving non-state actors employing irregular combatants. CvC did not claim to write a Bible (or a cookbook), did not claim to have covered all historical examples (see Bk 2.6 On Examples, last two paragraphs), and did not claim a crystal ball to predict the future. To paraphrase Darrow (aka Henry Drummond (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inherit_the_Wind_(1960_film))): On War is a good book, but it is not the only book.

[Taiko]

There is currently an academic proposal outlining a proposal to develop a 'De-sacralising Information Strategy'. As the name suggests the aim is to "articulate, accelerate and intensify doubts and tensions amongst those considering or already associated with Extremists groups". The method being to target 'schismatic asabiyya' by "injecting, and then continuously reinjecting, the most vivid available insiders' awareness of the ugly, decidedly non-sacred realities of groups devoted to religiously inspired violence, into the internal and external conversations of: potential extremists, their extended families, and friends".

If interested please PM me for a copy.

[William F. Owen]

Agreed factually - and good examples of pre-Westphalian non-state actors in armed conflicts. However, did CvC discuss them ? I did a search through the On War I downloaded (Graham trans.); and had no hits for Catholic, Protestant, Hussite or religious. Anyway, if someone could supply a CvC reference to those armed conflicts, if it exists ?

I think CvC just didn't bother. He must have been aware of it, and I think it falls within the construct he uses. Point being, CvC was concerned with War as the use of Armed Force. Rebellions of that time and previously, had to raise and field Armies. That was the Warfare. His observations on War, all still stand.

Modern Insurgencies still do the same thing, in order to become a military threat. If an irregular force cannot be a military threat, it cannot win, unless there are some other powerful circumstances in play (Spain and the Madrid bombing). "Terrorism" has been remarkably indecisive as an instrument of gaining political goal.

[Bob's World]

What is a "populace based conflict?"

I only ask as all Wars are about political outcomes. It's the authority to which the people defer and obey, which is the issue, not they themselves. That is the same for all human conflict.

In those terms, fighting the Taliban is no different from fighting the Waffen SS. The prize was not the German people, no more than the prize is the "Afghan" people. The prize is someone exercising a useful degree of authority over them.

The nature of the fighting however, may have to be different, for POLITICAL reasons, as Clausewitz explains.

This is a phrase I use to differentiate between a state seeking a political objective from another state through war (state-based conflict) and a populace seeking a political objective from its own government through warfare (populace-based conflict)

My position being that how I resolve my differences with my own populace MUST be very different to how I resolve my differences with the government of some other state. I may well want and need to crush the will of the populace of that competitor state in order to defeat their government; but if a government needs to crush the will of its own populace in order to sustain itself in power, that is probably a governemnt that is so failed it needs to be replaced.

Some would quibble that a good COIN effort is only out to crush the will of some narrow segment of the populace...this is a slippery slope. Far better to ensure the dissident populace has a voice and to work to effect changes where appropriate and to keep the COIN as much in the lanes of law enforcement as possible in dealing with the criminal elements of the movement; while bringing the majority of the group back into the fold of good citizenry.

King George could have crushed the American Revolution with few simple reforms and an apology. Instead he sent the most powerful Army and Navy in the world and initiated the demise of his Kingdom. There are lessons to be learned from the mistakes of others.

[William F. Owen]

My position being that how I resolve my differences with my own populace MUST be very different to how I resolve my differences with the government of some other state. I may well want and need to crush the will of the populace of that competitor state in order to defeat their government; but if a government needs to crush the will of its own populace in order to sustain itself in power, that is probably a governemnt that is so failed it needs to be replaced.
...but that's the point. You do not need to crush the will of the people of the opposing state. You merely need to crush the will of their leadership, and/or destroy their military means. The same objective should be central to defeating insurgents, and was to every successful UK COIN campaign.
The COIN failures, (Ireland and Israel/Palestine) left in place a military capability and a functioning leadership - which both went on to create states!

...same with the Americans!


King George could have crushed the American Revolution with few simple reforms and an apology. Instead he sent the most powerful Army and Navy in the world and initiated the demise of his Kingdom. There are lessons to be learned from the mistakes of others.
Not once it became a military problem, and Kings do not apologise! (Passion, reason, chance etc) If they do, they have no political authority! - thinking 1770's, not 2010's.

[slapout9]

I have a question for any students of CvC. CvC lists 6 or 7? ways (6 offensive and 1 defensive) that a military can use to defeat an enemy. One he called "operations against the political object"......what exactly did he mean by that? I don't think he ever brings it up again after listing it.

[Bob's World]

I guess this gets to what has been labeled "The American Way of War" (inaccurately, in my opinion).

When Grant assumed command of the Union Army, while he understood that it was very important to defeat Lee's Army and also valuable to capture the Confederate Capital, he also instinctively understood that he needed to crush the will of the Confederate populace, so that the entire Confederate nation would know it was defeated once the war was over. To that end, he positioned himself with Meade to ensure that Meade did not lose his focus on Lee and Richmond; but launched coordinated efforts under his most trusted Lieutenants to crush the will of the South. Sherman in the South, and Sheridan in Virginia. It worked, and coupled with a generous peace the war was over when it was over.

In WWI no such effort against the Axis populace was waged, and the peace was onerous, resulting in no resolution at the end of that conflict as dictated by France and England.

In WWII the war was taken to the people of Japan and Germany. Once their militaries were defeated and capitals captured, their populaces were also fully cognizant of their defeat. Again, coupled with a generous peace, those wars were truly over once over.

For any nation to defeat the United States, if all they do is occupy DC and defeat our military, they are probably about 20% of the way to their ultimate objective. They must crush the will of the American populace to resist to truly win. On the other hand, we have been able to stabilize the growing dissent born of the racial inequities from the slave heritage of our Black populace by "merely" recognizing that the government was wrong and passing and enforcing laws to bring this disaffected segment of the populace into the fold of good governance. It is an ongoing business, this good governance, one clear metric of that being the response of the Black populace to the election of President Obama. Most white Americans didn't think it was a big deal to elect a black man; but for the Black populace it was this huge indicator of validation and citizenship.

Now, we could have dealt with the Civil Rights movement by targeting senior leadership, locating and breaking up networks, and placing increased security on those individuals and facilities targeted by the "rebels." Usually if a segment of your populace is so dissatisfied as to take up arms, or apply more peaceful tactics as those encouraged by Gandhi and King, they have some valid points, and those points must be addressed.

[Ken White]

...coupled with a generous peace, those wars were truly over once over.It's still too early to state that categorically. All nations do not have the short memory and attention spans of the US...

[Steve Blair]

It's still too early to state that categorically. All nations do not have the short memory and attention spans of the US...

I think Bob'sWorld has a point, although I wouldn't put it in such sweeping terms. One could also argue that Grant's focus on Southern popular will wasn't intuitive...in fact it appears that he came to the conclusion over time, based in no small part on his experiences during the Vicksburg campaign. Most of these things do evolve over time.

[AmericanPride]

I do not think Germany and Japan were offered "generous" peace terms. Not only were they thoroughly destroyed, they were completely dispossessed of their political systems, much of their economic capacity, and of any territorial or colonial ambitions and claims (some of which are still outstanding). They were then made dependent on the victors for their security and stripped of any autonomous means of waging war. Nor do I think the Civil War ended with the surrender of the rebel armies, but it continued through Reconstruction until finally the Federal Government no longer had the political will to address it, giving birth to the 'Solid South' and systematic segregation. Both Clausewitz and Machiavelli advised against a "generous" peace insofar that the intent of war is to strip the enemy of his will or capacity to fight, and that an enemy wounded, but not killed, will strike you again when the time is right for them to do so ("never do a slight injury to an enemy"). So the intent isn't to find "generous" peace terms, IMO, but terms aligned with the political objectives sought in the first place so that the future behavior of the defeated actor is no longer a threat. Sometimes be 'generous', sometimes be harsh.

[Bob's World]

Its also important, I think, to remember that CvC served and studied warfare in a period of major transition.

Prior to Napoleon tapping into the newly unleashed power of a populace empowered Nation of France; warfare in Europe had largely been a game of chess between Kings; defeat an army or navy, take a capital, make it too expensive and win. The populace did not have a true stake in it. Napoleon understood the power of engaging the populace and used it to dominate the continent. Students of Napoleon tend to focus on Generalship and tactics, but his real edge was the mobilization of a National populace to the cause.

Western warfare was clearly different both before and after Napoleon. Not because of Napoleon, but because of the American and French Revolutions. It shifted the COG from the Army or the Capital to the will of the populace. Prior to this Armys and Capitals were extentions of the King's purse. Empty his purse and win. After, they were capitalized by the collective and willing support of the populace, far deeper pockets than any King possesses.

[Bob's World]

I do not think Germany and Japan were offered "generous" peace terms. Not only were they thoroughly destroyed, they were completely dispossessed of their political systems, much of their economic capacity, and of any territorial or colonial ambitions and claims (some of which are still outstanding). They were then made dependent on the victors for their security and stripped of any autonomous means of waging war. Nor do I think the Civil War ended with the surrender of the rebel armies, but it continued through Reconstruction until finally the Federal Government no longer had the political will to address it, giving birth to the 'Solid South' and systematic segregation. Both Clausewitz and Machiavelli advised against a "generous" peace insofar that the intent of war is to strip the enemy of his will or capacity to fight, and that an enemy wounded, but not killed, will strike you again when the time is right for them to do so ("never do a slight injury to an enemy"). So the intent isn't to find "generous" peace terms, IMO, but terms aligned with the political objectives sought in the first place so that the future behavior of the defeated actor is no longer a threat. Sometimes be 'generous', sometimes be harsh.

Generous is a relative thing.

Both were allowed to self-determine their government.
Both were allowed to remain nations.
Both were rebuilt with Western Capital and protected by Western military power and they recovered.

Brutal in combat, gracious in victory. This was the measure of success for 200 years.

Now with Globalization and the empowering of populaces there is another major change that must be assessed for impact on warfare, lest we piss away more generations of young men chasing the wrong measures of success.

[Ken White]

Both Clausewitz and Machiavelli advised against a "generous" peace insofar that the intent of war is to strip the enemy of his will or capacity to fight, and that an enemy wounded, but not killed, will strike you again when the time is right for them to do so ("never do a slight injury to an enemy").rode to work on Horses. We don't do that anymore.

Nor do we kill our enemies in the sense you write. The Mothers of America, the Intelligentsia and the chattering classes generally do not approve of that approach today. Unfortunate IMO but that's the way it goes. :wry:

Icons die, new ones arise, rules are modified, times change. So do mores...

[Taiko]

I have a question for any students of CvC. CvC lists 6 or 7? ways (6 offensive and 1 defensive) that a military can use to defeat an enemy. One he called "operations against the political object"......what exactly did he mean by that? I don't think he ever brings it up again after listing it.

I would like to have a crack at this one using the Paret/Howard translation if I may. What CvC was referring to with "operations that have direct political repercussions" was the balance of power between the states of Europe. As such, operations were design to "disrupt the opposing alliances, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene etc". The operations are aimed at the opposing policy-makers calculations of probability in terms of the cost and benefits of the outcome of initiating or continuing military action in gaining a political objective, as it was at direct military action and defeating the opponents army.

Its very similar to Sun Tzu's observation that:

The superior military cuts down strategy
Its inferior cuts down alliances
Its inferior cuts down the military
The worst attacks walled cities

From my reading of the text, the passage you refer to specifically looks at how a state can bolster its military capacity via the formation of alliances. This will have a direct effect on the balance of power and would have to be taken into account before the first shot is fired (cutting down strategy). I am not sure why he calls them "operations", unless he was referring to the establishment of military ties with other nations via inter military exchanges. An alternative reading could interpret it to say that after the first shot has been fired, when conducting a campaign you choose who and when you fight carefully in order to defeat the weaker members of an alliance quickly, and propose terms for them to either join you or surrender (cutting down alliances). In many respects you could interpret this as a strategy of attrition (cutting down the military), in so far as you are trying to create a political outcome by first attacking your opponents allies, rather than direct confrontation with the opponents main, and one would assume larger, military (attacking walled cities). If you read some of the examples he gives of Napoleon's campaign he does talk about this particular style of operation. Specifically when Napoleon faces two or more armies fielded by different states. CvC goes into some detail as to which army should be engaged first and uses that passage to argue why. Although I can't cite were they are in the book off the top of my head.

As I stated in a previous post. I think this has direct implication in small wars, the Anbar Uprising is a good example of fostering alliances and using them against your opponent. From how I read it, the fact of the matter is A'Q is dependent on alliances in order to operate and survive. The same could be said of the Taliban and its need for developing military and political alliances with the Afghan population. So I think CvC has a valid point to make at the strategic level in regards to the current conflicts in Iran and Afghanistan, specifically when choosing who and when you fight, how and why. Which is what strategy is all about at the end of the day.


For any nation to defeat the United States, if all they do is occupy DC and defeat our military, they are probably about 20% of the way to their ultimate objective.

Now this is an interesting argument in relation to CvC and his criticism of Napoleon's strategy against Russia. He was very critical in how Napoleon conducted the campaign. Specifically, the push to take the capital without defeating the army, and the subsequent 'asymmetrical campaign' the Russians conducted using both militias and regular army to push Napoleon out of Russia. There are a number of examples within this campaign of how a countries territory can provide the strategic depth to make time a decisive factor in defeating an opponent in my opinion. I think studying that campaign still has value today.


Nor do we kill our enemies in the sense you write. The Mothers of America, the Intelligentsia and the chattering classes generally do not approve of that approach today. Unfortunate IMO but that's the way it goes.

I agree with your point on principle. However, would it be fair to argue that if a conflict has a direct and lasting impact on the civilians quality of life then the situation would be radically different? The Cold War would be a good example in the context of the general US populations acceptance of the need to use or threaten to use force on a large scale. The point being, if the territory of the population is under direct threat then they would expect the government to do whatever it is in their means to safeguard it and the population.

[Ken White]

I agree with your point on principle. However, would it be fair to argue that if a conflict has a direct and lasting impact on the civilians quality of life then the situation would be radically different? The Cold War would be a good example in the context of the general US populations acceptance of the need to use or threaten to use force on a large scale. The point being, if the territory of the population is under direct threat then they would expect the government to do whatever it is in their means to safeguard it and the population.Not funny 'ha-ha,' funny peculiar -- they're fickle. With respect to your question re: quality of life, I suspect there are many variables and regardless the 1/3 Rule will almost certainly apply.

The cold war was an extremely artificial period in history and little that occurred offers examples of value, not least because most of it is shrouded in myths. For example, many Americans believed that a Nuclear War would likely mean the end of the world as we knew it, thus the issue was not quality of life for many but of life itself, so destroying the USSR first was an acceptable figurative alternative.

However, threatening and actually using force are two different things. My thought is that most in the west are not unwilling (which is not the same as being willing) to use force but are repelled by excessive force. To defeat the enemy, if that is possible, is fine, to humiliate and degrade that defeated enemy is a different thing and that will usually draw the fire of the chatterers et.al.

By the same token, defending the hearth and visiting destruction in a distant land are two different things; as in Bob's World's point on the Stranger versus the Neighbor versus the Son -- all impose different constraints in varying degrees. Kill' em all to safeguard the Clan -- but don't be mean to that poor man who surrendered. Yet and contrarily, people can be vindictive...

All in all, absent specifics, it's quite difficult to predict how a population might react. Even with specifics, they'll fool you often as not. Populations are not only fickle, they aren't very consistent (purposely redundant)...

[slapout9]

I would like to have a crack at this one using the Paret/Howard translation if I may. What CvC was referring to with "operations that have direct political repercussions" was the balance of power between the states of Europe. As such, operations were design to "disrupt the opposing alliances, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene etc". The operations are aimed at the opposing policy-makers calculations of probability in terms of the cost and benefits of the outcome of initiating or continuing military action in gaining a political objective, as it was at direct military action and defeating the opponents army.




You are probably right on this, but I was wondering could he have meant direct operations against sovereign political leaders such as the Strike against Qaddafi of Libya? More or less bypassing the military force and going to the political COG with Military means?

[William F. Owen]

When Grant assumed command of the Union Army, while he understood that it was very important to defeat Lee's Army and also valuable to capture the Confederate Capital, he also instinctively understood that he needed to crush the will of the Confederate populace, so that the entire Confederate nation would know it was defeated once the war was over.
Well that's the medieval way of war. La Grande Chavauche, was riding into the enemies territory and showing complete disregard for the Monarch, by doing or taking what you wanted, and showing the population that you, not the king was in control. Target was the enemy King. I submit the same was true in the South.


In WWI no such effort against the Axis populace was waged, and the peace was onerous, resulting in no resolution at the end of that conflict as dictated by France and England.
Not true. The Allies conducted a catastrophic blockade of Germany which very much contributed to the break down of law and order in 1918. Starving population, forced the leadership to sue for peace. Again, the target is the leadership. The Allied mistake, was no occupation of Berlin, and the creation of the new German Government.


In WWII the war was taken to the people of Japan and Germany. Once their militaries were defeated and capitals captured, their populaces were also fully cognizant of their defeat. Again, coupled with a generous peace, those wars were truly over once over.
That assumes that war is deterministic. Capture captial = sustainable peace. Napoleon captured and burnt Moscow. Did him no good at all. The Sandanista capturing Managua, didn't end the war, or create peace. BTW, the whole Sandanista revolution is text book Clausewitz.


For any nation to defeat the United States, if all they do is occupy DC and defeat our military, they are probably about 20% of the way to their ultimate objective. They must crush the will of the American populace to resist to truly win.
History shows that MOST of the population give up the armed struggle once Government and Army have ceased to represent them/cease to function. Some of the population may continue to fight, but it is almost never decisive by itself. (French resistance - and they had a Government and Army in exile!)

Now, we could have dealt with the Civil Rights movement by targeting senior leadership, locating and breaking up networks, and placing increased security on those individuals and facilities targeted by the "rebels."
No you couldn't. If you had done, you would have created the justification for an armed struggle. Number of US Troops killed by the Civil Rights Movement? Black Panthers? They didn't get very far. Besides, nothing about the US CRM, has ever been shown to me as military problem.

[Taiko]

You are probably right on this, but I was wondering could he have meant direct operations against sovereign political leaders such as the Strike against Qaddafi of Libya? More or less bypassing the military force and going to the political COG with Military means?

In terms of COG in relation to operations with direct political repercussions. CvC argued, for example, that if Napoleon was facing more than one allied army he should direct his military against the best commanders of the allied forces first. He reasoned that the psychological blow to the allies if Napoleon defeated their most competent Generals would have direct impact on the morale of the military, the political calculations of the monarchs, and the cohesion of the alliance, in terms of their continuing capacity to resist (See for example Book 2 Chapter 5 pp: 159-164 of Paret/Howard translation were he deliberates on the various COG that Napoleon could of used, to show how to apply critical analyses to a General's decision making process). Although, CvC use of COG was determined by a number of different factors including political objective (primary), terrain, number and competency of armies etc. I suspect that if the military operation caused a significant effect in disrupting the cohesion/morale of the military and the psychological state of mind of the policy-makers and, in turn, caused them to re-evaluate the probabilities of success and failure then it could be considered a COG. The importance of targeting the military capacity to wage war directly, or the policy-makers calculations of probability in continuing the war in order to achieve the political objective, would be dependent on time, place, and capability. Having said that, I realize that COG is a heavily debated concept within the US military so I'm sure there will be some who disagree with this assessment.

Edit: One of the problems with specifically trying to target the policy-maker as a COG, Qaddafi for example, is that he/she can in may cases be replaced, a standing army can not be replaced as quickly. An alternative argument would be that A'Qs COG, or any insurgency for that matter, is its ideology CvC called it 'popular opinion', not its leadership. The exception being if the policy-maker holds that much power that the regime would collapse if he/she is removed.

[William F. Owen]

I suspect that if the military operation caused a significant effect in disrupting the cohesion/morale of the military and the psychological state of mind of the policy-makers and, in turn, caused them to re-evaluate the probabilities of success and failure then it could be consider a COG.
Don't suspect. It's a fact. That is exactly the aim at the heart of Operations or Campaigning. It works in all forms of warfare - and can be taught in terms of explicit statements and guidance to that effect.

[slapout9]

Now, we could have dealt with the Civil Rights movement by targeting senior leadership, locating and breaking up networks, and placing increased security on those individuals and facilities targeted by the "rebels." Usually if a segment of your populace is so dissatisfied as to take up arms, or apply more peaceful tactics as those encouraged by Gandhi and King, they have some valid points, and those points must be addressed.


That is why on another thread I posted King's letter from a Birmingham jail. In the letter he reveals how he was not afraid of the KKK because they were a minority and he believed that the majority of White People were not racist which is true and something that is usually left out of any discussion of the civil rights movement, just like Obama could not have become President without the White Majority voting for him. It is not politically correct to talk about it but it is a fact and King recognized that and in a since Gandhi recognized that he would win because of the morality and decency of the British people as a whole. That is also why he supported the British during WW2 as he recognized that he could not win with non-violent means against the German Army.

[slapout9]

most trusted Lieutenants to crush the will of the South. Sherman in the South, and Sheridan in Virginia. It worked, and coupled with a generous peace the war was over when it was over.



Ah now Sherman understood SBW.... pure war against the Rich People. He had special maps made based upon the tax rolls of Georgia at the time and his line of march went right through the the richest counties, partly for his resupply needs but mainly to destroy the economic clout of the rich ruling class, IMO that more than anything won the war except maybe burning Atlanta and Vicksburg which was really the same idea as Sherman's just a more confined area(s). It's what I would have been doing to Saudi Arabia after 911 instead of this let's invade every other country except the one that is really the problem.....but I digress sorry CvC.:wry:

[KalWa]

Any opinions about Van Creveld's "Transformation of War" vis-a-vis Clausewitz's "On War"?

[William F. Owen]

Any opinions about Van Creveld's "Transformation of War" vis-a-vis Clausewitz's "On War"?

Sadly the only possible explanation is that he never read Clausewitz, or of he did failed to understand it. The 4GW guys have never read Clausewitz either.

Almost 99% of Clausewitz critics have simply never read him, or tried to understand what he says, in an overall context. Thus they takes quotes out of context.

[Ski]

Utterly false. Lind has read Clausewitz in German and thinks very highly of his work.



Sadly the only possible explanation is that he never read Clausewitz, or of he did failed to understand it. The 4GW guys have never read Clausewitz either.

Almost 99% of Clausewitz critics have simply never read him, or tried to understand what he says, in an overall context. Thus they takes quotes out of context.

[William F. Owen]

Utterly false. Lind has read Clausewitz in German and thinks very highly of his work.

Yes, knowing Bill Lind, I can attest he has read Clausewitz, yet he and I have very different understandings of what CvC wrote. 4GW flows from Van Creveld's "non-trinitarian War" thinking - so I find it hard to see how a 4GW thinker would regard Clausewitz in a good light.
Why, if you had deep understanding, or think highly of CvC would you construct 4GW? CvC deals with almost every aspect of the relevant arguments. If someone wants to tell me, that 4GW is "CvC for dummies" I'll think again.

[Taiko]

Any opinions about Van Creveld's "Transformation of War" vis-a-vis Clausewitz's "On War"?


To understand Creveld's work on the 'transformation of war, you should begin with his previous book 'The Rise and Decline of the State'. Creveld's main argument on the transformation of war derives from what I believe to be a false assumption that states are in decline or do not exist. I think it is important to realise that he confuses CvC theory on the nature of war, with his writings on its conduct. They are different. CvC applied his theory on the nature of war to those being fought at the time. They so happened to be inter-state wars. CvC never wrote that this was, is, or will be the only kind of war, far from it. Afterall, he wrote a number of monographs on small wars and lectured about small wars to Prussian staff officers for five years. CvC argued that inter-state war had the potential for being the most violent and comes closest to reaching absolute war. He was correct.

Creveld's critique of CvC and the so called 'post-CvC' warfare comes from his reading on CvC's theory of the conduct of war, not its nature. It is really a straw man argument. CvC wrote that the conduct of war will always correlate with its nature, so of course warfare is going to change, simply because of the subjective characteristics of the actors and the political motivations of the time. Creveld misreads CvC differentiation between the objective nature of war and its subjective characteristics. Confusing what is subjective with what is objective. He then bases his whole argument on the reversal of the pardoxical trinity. Claiming that CvC wrote that the relationship between the people, government and the military is a static one, when in fact CvC wrote that it was always dynamic and in flux. Like a magnet suspended between three magnets. CvC never argued that inter-state war is the only kind of warfare, he simply applied his theory on the nature of war to the wars of his time.

One of the problems with Creveld's work is that a number of other theorists: Mary Kaldor, Rupet Smith, Kaveli Holsti etc all base their criticism of CvC and their arguments on 'post-CvC/post-trinitarian warfare' on Crevelds reading of CvC, not what CvC wrote himself. So Willf is correct, CvC is more often quoted than he is read. The problem is not so much that you can use CvC to argue anything. The important distinction to make is that you can take CvC out of context to argue anything. If you understand CvC theoretical methods it is very easy to indentify those who have taken him out of context to try and support their own argument/agenda.

[jmm99]

My added 2 farthings is that MvC may have been too influenced by the turmoil following WWII and the fall of the various colonial empires. The boundaries of the neo-colonial states were artificialities of the colonial systems. In addition, many of those new governments were frankly not ready to govern. It is one thing to be an insurgent; and quite another thing to be an incumbant.

[max161]

I think it is important to realise that he confuses CvC theory on the nature of war, with his writings on its conduct. They are different. CvC applied his theory on the nature of war to those being fought at the time. They so happened to be inter-state wars. CvC never wrote that this was, is, or will be the only kind of war, far from it. Afterall, he wrote a number of monographs on small wars and lectured about small wars to Prussian staff officers for five years. CvC argued that inter-state war had the potential for being the most violent and comes closest to reaching absolute war. He was correct.

......
One of the problems with Creveld's work is that a number of other theorists: Mary Kaldor, Rupet Smith, Kaveli Holsti etc all base their criticism of CvC and their arguments on 'post-CvC/post-trinitarian warfare' on Crevelds reading of CvC, not what CvC wrote himself. So Willf is correct, CvC is more often quoted than he is read. The problem is not so much that you can use CvC to argue anything. The important distinction to make is that you can take CvC out of context to argue anything. If you understand CvC theoretical methods it is very easy to indentify those who have taken him out of context to try and support their own argument/agenda.

Taiko: That is probably the most brilliantly succinct explanation of the misunderstanding of Clausewitz I have seen. Your words should be repeated at every chance. Thanks for this.

Dave

[MikeF]

To understand Creveld's work on the 'transformation of war, you should begin with his previous book 'The Rise and Decline of the State'. Creveld's main argument on the transformation of war derives from what I believe to be a false assumption that states are in decline or do not exist. I think it is important to realise that he confuses CvC theory on the nature of war, with his writings on its conduct. They are different. CvC applied his theory on the nature of war to those being fought at the time. They so happened to be inter-state wars. CvC never wrote that this was, is, or will be the only kind of war, far from it. Afterall, he wrote a number of monographs on small wars and lectured about small wars to Prussian staff officers for five years. CvC argued that inter-state war had the potential for being the most violent and comes closest to reaching absolute war. He was correct.

Creveld's critique of CvC and the so called 'post-CvC' warfare comes from his reading on CvC's theory of the conduct of war, not its nature. It is really a straw man argument. CvC wrote that the conduct of war will always correlate with its nature, so of course warfare is going to change, simply because of the subjective characteristics of the actors and the political motivations of the time. Creveld misreads CvC differentiation between the objective nature of war and its subjective characteristics. Confusing what is subjective with what is objective. He then bases his whole argument on the reversal of the pardoxical trinity. Claiming that CvC wrote that the relationship between the people, government and the military is a static one, when in fact CvC wrote that it was always dynamic and in flux. Like a magnet suspended between three magnets. CvC never argued that inter-state war is the only kind of warfare, he simply applied his theory on the nature of war to the wars of his time.

One of the problems with Creveld's work is that a number of other theorists: Mary Kaldor, Rupet Smith, Kaveli Holsti etc all base their criticism of CvC and their arguments on 'post-CvC/post-trinitarian warfare' on Crevelds reading of CvC, not what CvC wrote himself. So Willf is correct, CvC is more often quoted than he is read. The problem is not so much that you can use CvC to argue anything. The important distinction to make is that you can take CvC out of context to argue anything. If you understand CvC theoretical methods it is very easy to indentify those who have taken him out of context to try and support their own argument/agenda.

Good post Taiko. I don't understand all of it, but keep writing.

v/r

Mike

[Firn]

I recently studied Clausewitz more closely, especially the chapters which are not very well known. Here is the chapter on "Volksbewaffnung" or "Arming the Nation". This chapter has to been seen as part of the strategic defence integrated in his overall concept of war. Given that the Prussian court and a great part of the establishment feared that arming the people could result in anti-royalist revolutions and Clauswitz pressed for such a strategy one should not be surprise that this influences the way he presents this topic. It didn't certainly prevent Lenin and Mao from learning.

The chapter is here (http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege2/BK6ch26.html)


Given the political background, now wonder he starts like that.


A PEOPLE'S war in civilised Europe is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. It has its advocates and its opponents: the latter either considering it in a political sense as a revolutionary means, a state of anarchy declared lawful, which is as dangerous as a foreign enemy to social order at home; or on military grounds, conceiving that the result is not commensurate with the expenditure of the nation's strength.


He continues and describes how warfare changed forever with the inclusion of the popular masses:


The first point does not concern us here, for we look upon a people's war merely as a means of fighting, therefore, in its connection with the enemy; but with regard to the latter point, we must observe that a people's war in general is to be regarded as a consequence of the outburst which the military element in our day has made through its old formal limits; as an expansion and strengthening of the whole fermentation-process which we call war.

The requisition system, the immense increase in the size of armies by means of that system, and the general liability to military service, the utilizing militia, are all things which lie in the same direction, if we make the limited military system of former days our starting point; and the levée en masse, or arming of the people, now lies also in the same direction.

If the first named of these new aids to war are the natural and necessary consequences of barriers thrown down; and if they have so enormously increased the power of those who first used them, that the enemy has been carried along in the current, and obliged to adopt them likewise, this will be the case also with people-wars


Then he broadens it and explains why the people's war is a special case:


In the generality of cases, the people who make judicious use of this means, will gain a proportionate superiority over those who despise its use. If this be so, then the only question is whether this modern intensification of the military element is, upon the whole, salutary for the interests of humanity or otherwise,—a question which it would be about as easy to answer as the question of war itself—we leave both to philosophers.

But the opinion may be advanced, that the resources swallowed up in people's wars might be more profitably employed, if used in providing other military means; no very deep investigation, however, is necessary to be convinced that these resources are for the most part not disposable, and cannot be utilized in an arbitrary manner at pleasure. One essential part that is the moral element, is not called into existence until this kind of employment for it arises.


Sic, keep in mind the various guerilla wars as in Spain, Napoleonic Russia, the Sovietunion in WWII, China during and after the WWII and Afghanistan. But so far it can still be still be seen in the prism of the industrial wars (WWI, WWII) to come. But as it is part of the book on defense, it increasingly focuses on the effects of the resistance of the agitated people against an invader.



We therefore do not ask again: how much does the resistance which the whole nation in arms is capable of making, cost that nation? but we ask: what is the effect which such a resistance can produce? What are its conditions, and how is it to be used?

It follows from the very nature of the thing that defensive means thus widely dispersed, are not suited to great blows requiring concentrated action in time and space. Its operation, like the process of evaporation in physical nature, is according to the surface. The greater that surface and the greater the contact with the enemy's army, consequently the more that army spreads itself out, so much the greater will be the effects of arming the nation.

(Spain seems now in his mind)

Like a slow gradual heat, it destroys the foundations of the enemy's army. As it requires time to produce its effects, therefore whilst the hostile elements are working on each other, there is a state of tension which either gradually wears out if the people's war is extinguished at some points, and burns slowly away at others, or leads to a crisis, if the flames of this general conflagration envelop the enemy's army, and compel it to evacuate the country to save itself from utter destruction


A very important part comes than:


In order that this result should be produced by a national war alone, we must suppose either a surface-extent of the dominions invaded, exceeding that of any country in Europe, except Russia, or suppose a disproportion between the strength of the invading army and the extent of the country, such as never occurs in reality.

Therefore, to avoid following a phantom, we must imagine a people-war always in combination, with a war carried on by a regular army, and both carried on according to a plan embracing the operations of the whole.

To which the politcal context - fear of popular revolution, similar the French one - influenced the last sentence is unknown. (As said before, CvC's idea of an militia was considered dangerous by Prussia's ruling class.) It is a very interesting statement and especially interesting when used to analyse the situation in Afghanistan. To which extent the safe tribal areas in Pakistan and the flow of ressources and money substitute the "regular army" is quite a question. Note also that Allies play a very important part in the strategic defense according to other Chapters.

Interestingly Mao warned the guerilla leaders in Latinamerica to accept his specific strategy, which relied to a great deal on the huge and difficult terrain of China and the support of the large rural majority as dogma.

While he limits the power of the unsupported "guerilla war" he then up with this.


The conditions under which alone the people's war can become effective are the following—

1. That the war is carried on in the heart of the country.

2. That it cannot be decided by a single catastrophe.

3. That the theatre of war embraces a considerable extent of country.

4. That the national character is favourable to the measure.

5. That the country is of a broken and difficult nature, either from being mountainous, or by reason of woods and marshes, or from the peculiar mode of cultivation in use.

Whether the population is dense or otherwise, is of little consequence, as there is less likelihood of a want of men than of anything else. Whether the inhabitants are rich or poor is also a point by no means decisive, at least it should not be; but it must be admitted that a poor population accustomed to hard work and privations usually shows itself more vigorous and better suited for war.


Very hard not to think about Afghanistan, or China in WWII, isn't it?


One peculiarity of country which greatly favors the action of war carried on by the people, is the scattered sites of the dwellings of the country people, such as is to be found in many parts of Germany. The country is thus more intersected and covered; the roads are worse, although more numerous; the lodgement of troops is attended with endless difficulties, but especially that peculiarity repeats itself on a small scale, which a people-war possesses on a great scale, namely that the principle of resistance exists everywhere, but is nowhere tangible.

If the inhabitants are collected in villages, the most troublesome have troops quartered on them, or they are plundered as a punishment, and their houses burnt, etc, a system which could not be very easily carried out with a peasant community of Westphalia.


... or Afghanistan

What follows shows that the writer has experienced and studied guerilla war very carefully.


National levies and armed peasantry cannot and should not be employed against the main body of the enemy's army, or even against any considerable corps of the same, they must not attempt to crack the nut, they must only gnaw on the surface and the borders. They should rise in the provinces situated at one of the sides of the theatre of war, and in which the assailant does not appear in force, in order to withdraw these provinces entirely from his influence.

Where no enemy is to be found, there is no want of courage to oppose him, and at the example thus given, the mass of the neighboring population gradually takes fire. Thus the fire spreads as it does in heather, and reaching at last that part of the surface of the soil on which the aggressor is based, it seizes his lines of communication and preys upon the vital thread by which his existence is supported.


Surly on of the most interesting descriptions written on the topic. Take away "National Levies and armed peasantry" and use "Insurgency" and it becomes rather "modern".

I will continue later to comment it.

[Firn]

For although we entertain no exaggerated ideas of the omnipotence of a people's war, such as that it is an inexhaustible, unconquerable element, over which the mere force of an army has as little control as the human will has over the wind or the rain; in short, although our opinion is not founded on flowery ephemeral literature, still we must admit that armed peasants are not to be driven before us in the same way as a body of soldiers who keep together like a herd of cattle, and usually follow their noses


The Soviet campaign came into my mind when reading the above and the following, "Bear went over the mountain" has just so many corrisponding examples and situations.



Armed peasants, on the contrary, when broken, disperse in all directions, for which no formal plan is required; through this circumstance, the march of every small body of troops in a mountainous, thickly wooded, or even broken country, becomes a service of a very dangerous character, for at any moment a combat may arise on the march; if in point of fact no armed bodies have even been seen for some time, yet the same peasants already driven off by the head of a column, may at any hour make their appearance in its rear.

If it is an object to destroy roads or to block up a defile; the means which outposts or detachments from an army can apply to that purpose, bear about the same relation to those furnished by a body of insurgent peasants, as the action of an automaton does to that of a human being. The enemy has no other means to oppose to the action of national levies except that of detaching numerous parties to furnish escorts for convoys to occupy military stations, defiles, bridges, etc.

In proportion as the first efforts of the national levies are small, so the detachments sent out will be weak in numbers, from the repugnance to a great dispersion of forces; it is on these weak bodies that the fire of the national war usually first properly kindles itself, they are overpowered by numbers at some points, courage rises, the love of fighting gains strength, and the intensity of this struggle increases until the crisis approaches which is to decide the issue.

Then, once again I'm surprised how well CvC puts his words.



According to our idea of a people's war, it should, like a kind of nebulous vapoury essence, never condense into a solid body; otherwise the enemy sends an adequate force against this core, crushes it, and makes a great many prisoners; their courage sinks; every one thinks the main question is decided, any further effort useless, and the arms fall from the hands of the people.

Still, however, on the other hand, it is necessary that this mist should collect at some points into denser masses, and form threatening clouds from which now and again a formidable flash of lightning may burst forth.




These points are chiefly on the flanks of the enemy's theatre of war, as already observed. There the armament of the people should be organised into greater and more systematic bodies, supported by a small force of regular troops, so as to give it the appearance of a regular force and fit it to venture upon enterprises on a larger scale.

From these points, the irregular character in the organisation of these bodies should diminish in proportion as they are to be employed more in the direction of the rear of the enemy, where he is exposed to their hardest blows. These better organised masses, are for the purpose of falling upon the larger garrisons which the enemy leaves behind him.

Besides, they serve to create a feeling of uneasiness and dread, and increase the moral impression of the whole, without them the total action would be wanting in force, and the situation of the enemy upon the whole would not be made sufficiently uncomfortable.

Mao seems to have take the whole last page out and slightly modified it when he described his three phases of the revolution. Not unlikely, given that he read Lenin's take on it and the (badly) translated work.


I will follow it up with the second part of the chapter in which he also talks about the paradox that rapid tactical attacks are the mainstay of the people's war in the strategic defence.

[UrsaMaior]

What was beyond CvC's reach was obvious to MvC. WMDs, people's war at its best and globalization. These all contribute to the decline of the nation state (because of the decline of nationalism as its basic principle). I will write a paper on it if I have the time.

CvC basic assumptions are valid (center of gravities, war is a continuation of politics etc.) and will be valid as long as we accept the definition: war is organised violence.

MvC might be a bit too much for some, yet he has valid points about declining states and about who and why fights.

Don't think only of western hemisphere. See Katanga e.g. a state was turned upside down by a mining company. IMHO Tom Odom can give us quazillion examples of VNSAs way before AQ and Hizbullah.

[Firn]

What was beyond CvC's reach was obvious to MvC. WMDs, people's war at its best and globalization. These all contribute to the decline of the nation state (because of the decline of nationalism as its basic principle). I will write a paper on it if I have the time.


I would advise you to read Taiko's excellent post - just like him I do not agree with the simplistic assumption of the "decline of the nation state" on which a good part of MvC theory is grounded. While there is change, the state is still by far the most dominating form and actor of the will and interests it's people. Not that this adds or takes away from the work CvC.

[UrsaMaior]

I would advise you to read Taiko's excellent post - just like him I do not agree with the simplistic assumption of the "decline of the nation state" on which a good part of MvC theory is grounded. While there is change, the state is still by far the most dominating form and actor of the will and interests it's people. Not that this adds or takes away from the work CvC.

Yes sir I did read it and it will likely to become an often quoted source, alas westerners often commit the mistake of thinking only of their experience, their circumstances, what they see. In ex-communist countries like mine, or ones around Mr Creveld's, not to mention quasi states like so many in Africa the stuctures are not that solid. Even here say Deutsche Telekom group is a state in the state, with extra privileges etc. and we are EU and NATO and stuff. I would also like to raise your attention that MvC has not spoke about the state "vanishing" or "disappearing" only about the serious decline it has to endure in its population's prefernce list.

It might well be that the current crisis will slow or even reverse the continous decline of nationalism as the binding power of nation states, but until 2008 it was not the case, at least in young democracies or ex-colonies.

[Firn]

There is certainly no need or urge to give me a sir, I'm better off without that moniker :D

Perhaps we should bring the thread back on track, discussing the application of CvC to insurgency in general. Crefeld's interesting work merits another one.

What attracted me to that chapter of CvC was both the profound analysis carved in very fitting words and Mao's theories on guerilla warfare. It is well noted that Mao, just like Lenin had closely studied "On War" and when one has read his Yu Chi Chan one sees IMHO a very strong connection in thought and wording.

About the goal of the struggle:

Mao (Chapter 1)


There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national policy. On the contrary, it must be organized and conducted in complete accord with national anti-Japanese policy. It is only who misinterpret guerrilla action who say, as does Jen Ch'i Shan, "The question of guerrilla hostilities is purely a military matter and not a political one." Those who maintain this simple point of view have lost sight of the political goal and the political effects of guerrilla action. Such a simple point of view will cause the people to lose confidence and will result in our defeat.

CvC (Book 8, Chapter 6B):


Now, this unity is the conception that war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself.

We maintain, on the contrary: that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means. We say, mixed with other means, in order thereby to maintain at the same time that this political intercourse does not cease by the war itself, is not changed into something quite different, but that, in its essence, it continues to exist, whatever may be the form of the means which it uses, and that the chief lines on which the events of the war progress, and to which they are attached, are only the general features of policy which run all through the war until peace takes place.

Accordingly, war can never be separated from political intercourse, and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.



Take CvC:


National levies and armed peasantry cannot and should not be employed against the main body of the enemy's army, or even against any considerable corps of the same, they must not attempt to crack the nut, they must only gnaw on the surface and the borders.

Where no enemy is to be found, there is no want of courage to oppose him, and at the example thus given, the mass of the neighboring population gradually takes fire. Thus the fire spreads as it does in heather, and reaching at last that part of the surface of the soil on which the aggressor is based, it seizes his lines of communication and preys upon the vital thread by which his existence is supported.

Mao: (Chapter 2)


While these units function as guerrillas, they may be compared to innumerable gnats, which, by biting a giant both in front and in rear, ultimately exhaust him. They make themselves as unendurable as a group of cruel and hateful devils, and as they grow and attain gigantic proportions, they will find that their victim is not only exhausted but practically perishing. I

On could easily go on and on. That it is not to say that Clausewitz was the only inspiration, far from that. But one wonders why it seems so commonplace to see Mao basing his (military) thoughts primarily on Chinese sources.

[Taiko]

Nationalism is a very amorpheous concept. We have seen the shift from civic nationalism, that brought us the second world war, to ethnic nationalism that brought us the war in Yogoslavia and in various African states. In the case of Yugoslavia its important to remember that the conflict was about the establishment and expansion of state territory, for example a greater Serbia. Religious and ethnic nationalism has brough us conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan. Again, the conflict is over who has control of the state apparatus, that is who has rightful claim to the monopoly of force, and governance, the how and why laws are made, implemented and enforced.

The problem with the whole 'hearts and minds' concept is that it is not the militaries job to win 'hearts and minds', its the governments responsibility. Without a stable government that can claim to have a monoply of force, that is not currupt, can provide basic services, there is no security. I think thats worth repeating, without a viable and functioning 'state' there is no security. South Vietman during the late 60's-70's perfect example. Again, this is CvC's paradoxical trinity at work. You can surge all you want, 100 000-200 000 soilders but it is important to remember that the military is only one side of the trinity, there is also the people and the government. At the end of the day if you do not have a stable government as the head of state then you are heading into a protracted war which will cost blood and treasure without a necessarily beneficial outcome for the people.

MvC specifically misinterprets the second half of the equation in many conflicts. The struggle for power, the will to define, create, and expand a state is still a basic function of most intra-state conflicts, and is still a concern for inter-state conflict. As CvC would say that is the purpose.

[Cavguy]

One of my CGSC instructors (retired officer) has this boo (http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Delusion-American-Screwed-Afghanistan/dp/0760337136)k coming out next month. He argues our fixation with Clausewitz is responsible for us becoming strategically muddled.

He's let some of it fly in my classes so far, my opinion is he has created a strawman of Clausewitz and the whole center of gravity concept. He believes the trinity only applied in his era, and is irrelevant.

He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, total war and mass destruction to crush the willingness of the targeted society to resist. He figures this historically as 5-18% of the relevant population as KIA. The reason populations should suffer is to humiliate the warrior class and show that they are impotent to protect their society.

Provocative, to say the least. I got into quite a debate with him in class over some of it, and the moral implications therof. The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

I have paraphrased (perhaps inaccurately) some of the arguments made. Will have to wait for the book to appropriately and fairly respond to the arguments. Recommend Wilf review it for SWJ though.



The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward) (Hardcover)
by Stephen L. Melton
http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Delusion-American-Screwed-Afghanistan/dp/0760337136
Product Description

In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.

This book reveals the failings of the U.S. Army in its adoption of a postmodern “Full Spectrum Operations" doctrine, which codifies Clauswitzian thinking. Such an approach, the author contends, leaves the military without the doctrine, training base, or force structure necessary to win offensive wars in our time. Instead, the author suggests, the army should adopt a new doctrinal framework based on an analysis of the historical record and previously successful American methods of war. A clear and persuasive critique of current operative ideas about warfare, The Clausewitz Delusion lays out a new explanation of victory in war, based on an analysis of wartime casualties and post-conflict governance. It is a book of critical importance to policymakers, statesmen, and military strategists at every level.

[Klugzilla]

It sounds like he is making the typical misinterpretation of the trinity. The trinity is composed of three principal tendencies or forces: hostility, chance, and purpose. These are universal to war and human nature. The "secondary" trinity (military, governement, and people) is often mistaken for what Uncle Carl was actually talking about and may not be applicable to all situations today. Tell him to go back to the pond.

[tequila]

That's an interesting one. The Soviets killed roughly 5-6% of the total population of Afghanistan and drove another 20% into exile in Iran and Pakistan. I'm having a bit of trouble remembering if they were successful, anyone?

[Schmedlap]

The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.
Given his background and yours (in terms of level of responsibility), does it feel like you're being scolded by a four-year-old? Just curious, because I've always wondered how I would react in a situation like that. Thankfully, it hasn't happened yet.