Gloomy US intelligence assessment coming or Let's hear from the spies

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den (a UK-based blogsite on matters Afghan) for pointing at Steve Coll's column in the New Yorker:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2011/11/steve-coll-afghanistan-national-intelligence-estimate.html

Circling the Lion's Den summary, edited for brevity:
Excellent, well-informed article by Steve Coll.. on the latest US National Intelligence Estimate on the war in Afghanistan....

The new draft..is said to be gloomier than the typical public statements made by US military commanders in Afghanistan.

It is said to raise doubts about the authenticity and durability of alleged gains in Kandahar and Helmand provinces since the Obama troop surge and also suggests that the next generation of political leaders after Karzai will be more corrupt.

It also questions the success of the programme to train and equip the Afghan military and police forces, noting that the projected cost of running a force of 350,000 after 2014 will be $8-10 billion a year, more than the US is willing or able to pay.

From:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2011/11/debating-us-national-intelligence.html

There are some interesting parts to the Coll article, but this part struck me and partly as SWC have tried to consider what next?


In the Afghan war, there are now two plausible choices. President Obama has committed to one of them: a gradual drawdown by 2014, accepting three more years of sacrifice in blood and expenditure (on a declining slope, it is hoped), in the expectation that Afghan forces can be built up to hold off the Taliban, protect civilians, and prevent civil war, which would almost certainly spill into Pakistan, making things there even worse. Another choice would be to declare that the 2014 project is unaffordable and beyond hope, and to bring troops home faster and sooner. Both choices involve risks.

[jcustis]

I'm curious about the assessment that civil war would certainly spill into Pakistan, and what indicators that statement is based on.

I'm equally interested how domestic politics will serve to frame--or inflame--our way ahead, as the estimate is shared with the Government.

[ganulv]

It also questions the success of the programme to train and equip the Afghan military and police forces, noting that the projected cost of running a force of 350,000 after 2014 will be $8-10 billion a year, more than the US is willing or able to pay.
If Petraeus is of the opinion that a) the only thing standing between the ANA and ANP being an effective bulwark against the Taliban and the Haqqani Network is more time and b) there is no reason to believe that the U.S. Government is ever going to tire of subsidizing the two, effective or not, I have to wonder about his suitability for his current position.


In the Afghan war, there are now two plausible choices.
There would be more if the strategy had not been formulated around a centralized national government.

[Fuchs]

I suspect that the 'projected costs' of running an Afghan army after the withdrawal of most Westerners is a very tricky thing.

The relatively high pays for indigenous troops (all parties) is no doubt a result of the influx of US-$. The pay levels have to shrink once the dollar transfers of all kinds shrink.

Afghanistan can easily sustain a 350k personnel army on its own, all it needs is to raise enough revenue and make sure price levels are not terribly distorted by foreign money. You only need guns, ammo, boots, clothes, food and a meagre extra pay in indigenous cash to run an army. The current situation is ridiculous and current costs are a poor basis for projecting future costs.



There is the major problem of sticky wags, though. It's difficult to actually cut wages, especially if the employed men can mutiny.


This was only a tiny glimpse of the many problems and challenges caused by the limited-duration influx of foreign cash, of course..

[Bob's World]

So now the intel communtiy says this isn't working?

I hope everyone can appreciate the tragic irony of us allowing the intel community to lead us into a threat-centric "strategy" of clear-hold-build; night raids; and outrageous development programs against the resistance aspect of the insurgency internal to Afghanistan (while totally protecting and ignoring the causation of the insanely illegitimate Karzai regime and the Northern Alliance monopoly that is codified by the constitution we helped develop) and doing nothing to address the revolutionary aspect of the insurgency with the Taliban government in exile in Pakistan.

Now the same intel F-tards say "golly, this isn't working." No kidding. I have yet to meet a single person in the intel business who knows anything about insurgency. Not a one. They do threats. That's all they know.

Insurgency is not about threats, it is about governments that are out of synch and out of touch with the people they deem to govern. God save us from the intel community, and the politicians who listen to them.

Venting, but too many great young servicemen and women are being fed into this stupidity and it is all so avoidable.

[Entropy]

One wonders if there is a problem on this earth that Bob's Wold doesn't lay at the feet of those "f-tards" in intel.

[jcustis]

He just hasn't met a whole lotta intel folks, that's all. :p

[Bill Moore]

A good op is due to good planning and good execution, and a bad op is always due to bad intell. It has always been that way :D

Joking aside I tend to agree that most military analysts don't get it, they somehow manage to transform an insurgency into an order of battle with leaders and foot soldiers and suggest if you kill/capture the leaders you win, and 10 years later they're still saying it. Those who embrace population centric COIN, blindly suggest that we have to do development and then the population will simply turn its back on the insurgency, yet 10 years later.....
In my opinion Bob is on to something, and instead of everyone moving to defensive positions, they should try to figure out why are analysis is failing. I think part of it is telling commanders what they want to hear, but that isn't all of it.

[Bill Moore]

Davidbfpo,

This part of the article is what I found of interest.


It is said to raise doubts about the authenticity and durability of alleged gains in Kandahar and Helmand provinces since the Obama troop surge and also suggests that the next generation of political leaders after Karzai will be more corrupt.

I don't think we're capable of determining who is actually running the circus, and just because we have boots on the ground doesn't mean that adversarial forces aren't running the show. Most foreign troops are only capable of seeing overt armed insurgents, but the insurgency consists of much more than the militants. Equally important is the comment about durability. Very few gains are durable, and most will be reversed shortly after we let up a little on the pedal for a lot of reasons. While hardly a strong argument, the recent article in USA Today on the Special Forces village stability operations interviewed Afghans that said as soon as SF leaves the Taliban will return.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/afghanistan/story/2011-11-09/special-forces-key-in-afghanistan/51145690/1


"If the Americans weren't here, the police and the local government would just run away," Mohammed says. "In three days, the district would fall back into the hands of the enemy."

Of course what does Mohammed know, he is only a local. :(

[ganulv]

Equally important is the comment about durability. Very few gains are durable, and most will be reversed shortly after we let up a little on the pedal for a lot of reasons. While hardly a strong argument, the recent article in USA Today on the Special Forces village stability operations interviewed Afghans that said as soon as SF leaves the Taliban will return.From the couple of Afghans I know and the reading I’ve done my guess would be that the Taliban and GIRoA are conceived of by the majority of Afghans as rival Pashtun factions contending for control of centralized government power. One of the factions relies heavily on the aid of a distant foreign power whose date of departure is already set. The other faction just seems like the better bet to come out on top eventually. Does that sound reasonable to those who have been there?

[jcustis]

From the couple of Afghans I know and the reading I’ve done my guess would be that the Taliban and GIRoA are conceived of by the majority of Afghans as rival Pashtun factions contending for control of centralized government power. One of the factions relies heavily on the aid of a distant foreign power whose date of departure is already set. The other faction just seems like the better bet to come out on top eventually. Does that sound reasonable to those who have been there?

I think that is a totally reasonable conclusion. I also think it's important to recall the rise of the Taliban and the fractured state of Afghanistan at that time. We demonized the Taliban for going into league with Al Qaeda, and seemed to be in a bit of disbelief that AQ could be harbored within the country, but the past bears a lot of reflection.

Through either ideological satisfaction, or pay, or both, the Taliban's ranks swelled for a reason, and a lot of that had to do with the governance situation at that time. The footsoldier of today probably fights for a different range of reasons, but we continue to kill them and they continue to join and fight.

Afghanistan has been too brutalized, too fractured, and is too split along tribal lines to be able to embrace a central government unless a terribly broad range of issues (poppy, ISI, the Af-Pak border area, etc.) can be resolved to a level of compromise for the largest affected groups. I think the greatest issue we have is that we don't know how to establish that compromise, and worse, we cannot get the Karzai government to build those bridges and resolve the causes of instability.

The bureaucrats and localized ANSF leadership know what's up, and a look at their behavior in some of the far flung districts, like Rig and Garmsir, is telling.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by ganulv,


One of the factions relies heavily on the aid of a distant foreign power whose date of departure is already set.

First we addressed authenticity and durability, and as you pointed out we need to address sustainability (all concerned). Not taking a side on the debate, but assuming it was even possible for the President to not announce an end date with the current financial crisis and bigger priorities at home and other security concerns, would it make a difference if we stayed at current strength until 2020 in your opinion? On the other hand, I think you overstate the departure, we'll still have a considerable number of troops there long after 2014. If the Taliban is assuming that we're all leaving and taking the kitchen sink with us, they'll most likely end up being disappointed.

Posted by jcustis,


The bureaucrats and localized ANSF leadership know what's up, and a look at their behavior in some of the far flung districts, like Rig and Garmsir, is telling.

Please elaborate or provide a link to stories that will explain the behavior you're making reference to. Thanks.

[Bob's World]

One wonders if there is a problem on this earth that Bob's Wold doesn't lay at the feet of those "f-tards" in intel.

Entropy, I actually am one who does not believe that it was a "failure of intel" that led to 9-11; (that was a failure of foreign policy, not intelligence) but we have been over compensating ever since in a dogged pursuit of "threats" to defeat to ensure that it does not happen again. We have build a massive machine to stare at the symptoms, yet have done little to assess that true failure of policy. We could use some of that great talent in the intel community focused on the real problems, that are internal, rather than all staring outward looking for "threats."

I think the intel community is great at analyzing threats. Next time we are in a war, where success can be achieved by the defeat of some threat, we will need to apply the intel-driven process we apply now.

But what I cannot fathom, is why this community refuses to evolve? Why it refuses to shift focus from the analysis of the symptoms of the problems we face (detailed analysis of various "terrorist" organizations [most of which are actually nationalist insurgent organizations - but why quibble over a person's purpose for action?], the individuals in these organizations, who they talk to, where they sleep, who they call, etc, etc) while completely ignoring analysis of the root causes of this "threat" that lie primarily within the political, policy, operational and tactical approaches of the governments that are being challenged?

This is not state on state warfare that our intel community is trained, organized, and doctrinally equipped for. This is conflict between elements of various populaces and their government. This, for the West, is a conflict between various non-state actors who tap into these nationalist dynamics for all of their manpower, financing and sanctuary; and Western countries whose historic approaches to foreign policy are perceived as a major contributor to the problems between governments and populaces within these various states.

Intel guys will drill into religion and ideology - though ideology does not create such conflicts, but rather is merely the "lubricant" that leaders of such movements apply to get things to move at the rate and in the direction they desire. But they will not drill into what aspects of foreign and domestic policy that are far more provocative than any ideology.

90% of the intel work for the current "threat" is internal (internal to domestic policies for the states where these groups emerge from, and internal to the foreign polices of those states which find themselves the target of transnational terrorism); but 100% of our intel work is directed externally.

Now, you are right, this is not totally the fault of the intel community. I should not blame the scorpion for being a scorpion. Senior leadership outside of the intel community should have reached out and redirected the efforts of the intel guys long ago, and still show no inclination to do so. But nor do I see the intel community standing up in protest as to how they are being abused and misused. In fact, when one goes to them to discuss such matters they typically hide behind snarky self-serving cliche's, like "intel leads ops" and go back to doing what they have always done.

Even LTG Flynn's paper of a couple years ago that created such a stir by suggesting that we needed to analyze the entire populace and not just the combatant segment of the populace missed the main point. It still missed the point that it is the integration and interaction of government and the populace, not the "enemy" and the populace, that holds the keys to stability. Where is the analysis of GIRoA officials and their links to the segments of the populace that are either supportive or in rebellion? Where is the analysis of what former officials and their linkages that were dispossessed of power, wealth and influence by our efforts to tip the scales against them?

How many intel guys feed the machine for night raids in Afghanistan? How many focus of the effects of such raids and the manner in which they are executed? Such night raids make the insurgency worse along many key drivers of insurgency. We should study that, understand that, and refine operations accordingly. It would lead to about a 90% reduction in the number of such missions conducted though, and that would mean that more "threats" are out there unmolested. Why worry about how each such raid provides powerful motivation for entire communities to support the insurgency. More fun to celebrate the latest "Jackpot." Tactical successes paving the way to operational failure.

It was an intel assessment that lead us to Afghanistan and Iraq. It is intel assessments that point us toward Yemen, HOA and the Maghreb. Intel is great for tactics, but it sucks for strategy. Intel-led strategy is like 5-year olds playing soccer, chasing the ball in a big mob where ever it goes with little regard or understanding for the larger game being played. It ignores geostrategic importance, it ignores vital interests, it only chases the threat. If a place is only important because some non-state actor is currently hiding there, then that place is not important. Some few guys will indeed need to be taken out of those places, but we need to do so with clear understanding of political drivers that distinguish who is who, and not the ideological factors that join them together in action.

The Einstein quote below applies very much to our intel-driven efforts over the past 10 years, and we should think about that.

[Surferbeetle]

But what I cannot fathom, is why this community refuses to evolve? Why it refuses to shift focus from the analysis of the symptoms of the problems we face (detailed analysis of various "terrorist" organizations [most of which are actually nationalist insurgent organizations - but why quibble over a person's purpose for action?], the individuals in these organizations, who they talk to, where they sleep, who they call, etc, etc) while completely ignoring analysis of the root causes of this "threat" that lie primarily within the political, policy, operational and tactical approaches of the governments that are being challenged?

This is not state on state warfare that our intel community is trained, organized, and doctrinally equipped for. This is conflict between elements of various populaces and their government. This, for the West, is a conflict between various non-state actors who tap into these nationalist dynamics for all of their manpower, financing and sanctuary; and Western countries whose historic approaches to foreign policy are perceived as a major contributor to the problems between governments and populaces within these various states.

The short answer is system capture by the idea of doing things.

Everybody is busy doing things and myopically focused on a few bits of the the whole. Few are thinking about the whole. Observations of the whole are continually taken by the system, but there is no mechanism which values and integrates these observations.

We need to purchase less 'toys', train our folks better, have mechanisms to integrate the observations and experience of our whole of government partners and our folks who walk the ground, get our staff folk out from behind monitors and away from the air conditioners/heaters, and decentralize decision making....in short the business model needs to change.

Leviathan and sys admin force is a solution whose time is coming.

http://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_barnett_draws_a_new_map_for_peace.html

The reality today however, is that the system has not yet endured enough trauma to change the business model. :cool:


Even LTG Flynn's paper of a couple years ago that created such a stir by suggesting that we needed to analyze the entire populace and not just the combatant segment of the populace missed the main point. It still missed the point that it is the integration and interaction of government and the populace, not the "enemy" and the populace, that holds the keys to stability. Where is the analysis of GIRoA officials and their links to the segments of the populace that are either supportive or in rebellion? Where is the analysis of what former officials and their linkages that were dispossessed of power, wealth and influence by our efforts to tip the scales against them?

See my answer above...

...and speaking of myopia, please reconsider your (unbreakable?) mental link/chain between governance and 'insurgency'. Take a walk on the wild side and consider other possibilities. A number of us have mentioned this to you a couple of times :D

Strong Societies and Weak States by Joel S. Migdal 978-0-691-01073-1

Seriously, relook the link/chain that you have forged for yourself. :)

[Ken White]

The short answer is system capture by the idea of doing things.
...
...and speaking of myopia, please reconsider your (unbreakable?) mental link/chain between governance and 'insurgency'. Take a walk on the wild side and consider other possibilities. A number of us have mentioned this to you a couple of times :D In both cases...

[ganulv]

Not taking a side on the debate, but assuming it was even possible for the President to not announce an end date with the current financial crisis and bigger priorities at home and other security concerns, would it make a difference if we stayed at current strength until 2020 in your opinion?
I don’t know enough to have an informed opinion, really, but I suspect that there is a reason Afghans are stereotyped as thinking in the longue durée and Americans are stereotyped as thinking in the media cycle.

The bigger part of what I have read about Afghan history and society is via one of the faculty members at my graduate program (http://www.indiana.edu/%7Eanthro/people/faculty/shahrani.html). In a 2009 report his take was that


[t]he contradictory policies and practices of state building, including those of the post-Taliban era under US tutelage, have re-affirmed a dysfunctional, sovereignty-based, person-centred, Kabul-centred and kin-based political culture to the exclusion of more inclusive governance. Military intervention and the “war on terror” have once again empowered the Pashtun elites and a small number of their laganbardaar clients from “minority” ethnic groups to transform Afghanistan from a failed state into, at best, a fragile regional militia state. [p. 10 at LINK (http://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/Shahrani%E2%80%94Afghanistan%E2%80%99s%20alternati ves%20for%20peace%2C%20governance%20and%20developm ent.pdf)]His recommendation is to shoot for a federated* rather than centralized form of government with defense organized at the most local level possible. If I understand the VSO efforts correctly they seem to amount to the training of a gendarmerie. If that is indeed the case then I would guess that a lot of Afghans are reading the program as an effort by Kabul to work its tentacles into their lives rather than as an effort to create true local defense forces something like the minutemen. The creation of something like the minutemen would presume the existence of functional local groups something like New England town meetings and engagement with them, not just handing out small arms to young men in rural areas. I don’t think anyone with good sense would be under the illusion that creation of that sort of federated system would be simple or painless—look at how long it took the Swiss to arrive at their current arrangement—or that a well-resourced strategy aimed at that outcome would invariably succeed.

*It’s not an analogy I have ever seen or heard him use, but something akin to the Swiss Confederation if I understand correctly.

[Steve the Planner]

Ganulv:

For not knowing too much, you sure have laid out a cornucopia.

The Flynn gap was always that it remained threat-focused, and, thus, missed its own hard-earned points.

From ancient days, the first thing an occupier did was go out and count things (Domesday Book, census). Then, based on whatever system existed or didn't, either impose its own political/administrative control systems or coopt and commandeer existing ones.

Locally levied militias were part and parcel of the local levies, taxes, and fealty to the new occupier.

Ours is one of the first times where an occupier occupied in embarrassment and denial, fielded off the controls to others, and left its responsibilities to endlessly spiral out of control---including where the unfocused money as weapons, drives its own illegitimacy, corruption and distance between people and government.

It just didn't work, doesn't work, will never work... Been there, done that.

Now, in the unwind, how do we find the best path?

[Dayuhan]

His recommendation is to shoot for a federated* rather than centralized form of government with defense organized at the most local level possible.

I think this steers toward a dangerous trap that we fall into too easily and too often: the trap of thinking that we installed the "wrong" sort of government and can make everything right by uninstalling that and re-installing the "right" form. This goes back to our typically mechanistic approach to governance in other places, often characterized by a belief that an externally installed government can work if it just achieves some kind of "right" balance or structure.

I don't think that's the case. An appropriate system of governance is never going to be installed. It has to evolve, and the process of that evolution will typically involves some level of conflict and disorder. It's not just about refining the system, it's about the various contending parties refining their expectations and their abilities to work together... or not to, as the case may be.

I don't think we got this wrong because of a threat-centered intel system or because we installed the wrong sort of government. I think we got it wrong the moment we decided that we had to leave behind a functioning government that Americans could recognize as "democracy". Once we chose that road we were on our way into the scheisse.

[ganulv]

I think this steers toward a dangerous trap that we fall into too easily and too often: the trap of thinking that we installed the "wrong" sort of government and can make everything right by uninstalling that and re-installing the "right" form. This goes back to our typically mechanistic approach to governance in other places, often characterized by a belief that an externally installed government can work if it just achieves some kind of "right" balance or structure.
To be clear, I was just regurgitating my understanding of Nazif’s take on things, which has been consistent for the past decade (http://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/Shahrani%E2%80%94Not%20%E2%80%9CWho%3F%E2%80%9D%20 but%20%E2%80%9CHow%3F%E2%80%9D.pdf). Your point is well taken, nonetheless.

[Steve the Planner]

On Dahuyan's point, the latest on Iraq's political/governance structure:

http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayPrintableArticle.jsp?id=4E9052A63044E1F8AD4 CF9297CDAB21C

The article does a fair job of explaining some of the many unresolved sub-national issues pending in Iraq--mostly still chafing at the Baathist restructurings of 1976 and beyond.

Salah ad Din's testing of the Article 140 right to form its own region---the same as KRG---with broad political freedoms separate from a Central government.

In large part, the right to regional governance ala Article 140 is heavily supported by all sides (as a refuge from Central government abuse) but with many varying maelstroms of conflict around the practicalities of it. Central government sends a fixed percentage of money; own courts; police, internal army, etc... (Just like KRG, and what Ganulv's reported proposal suggests).

If Salah ad Din were its own largely Sunni region, does Balad/Ad DuJail (mostly Shia) return to Baghdad Amenate, as geography, population and political history factors suggest? What to make of Sammara, a Sunni city of great Shia religious significance and national importance?

Does, as the Kurdish article suggests, Kirkuk become reconstituted, with Kalar, Kifri and Tuz Hormatu get re-attached (whether from Sulimaniya or Salah ad Din)?

If all this rolling back to pre-1976 sub-national structures were considered, what about returning the Haj Trail lands (the routes from Qom to Karbala/Najaf to Mecca) back to those cities, and away from Sunni Anbar?

The maps and history of all of this are in an article on Musings on Iraq:

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2011/02/look-into-iraqs-creation-governance-and.html

The answers, however, rapidly become complex local ones---as Dayuhan wisely surmises, these are not questions for a foreign power to address, but ones that must evolve, or be fought through by locals.

In truth, Ganulv's reported solutions are, in fact, identical to what is on the front boiler in Iraq today (and will be immediately after our major departure from Afghanistan), whether we pay attention to it or not.

When this issue (Disputed Internal Boundaries) came to the fore in Iraq in 2008 and 2009, Ambassador Crocker wisely determined (to the surprise of many) that these were not issues which the foreigners should push on the Iraqis, but ones they must resolve.

The reason this format of regional governance structures with minimal national power continues to re-emerge is that it is the only historical one that has, over centuries, provided success for these lands in lieu of a major dictatorial power.

There is often more wisdom in history than we care to acknowledge where it conflicts with our intentions.

[Surferbeetle]

The maps and history of all of this are in an article on Musings on Iraq:

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2011/02/look-into-iraqs-creation-governance-and.html

The answers, however, rapidly become complex local ones---as Dayuhan wisely surmises, these are not questions for a foreign power to address, but ones that must evolve, or be fought through by locals.

STP,

Good job as always on your map work and the many associated linkages.

As one 'Iraq-Hand' to another here are a few articles that may provide some additional context with respect to the importance of having a broad contact base as well as a flexible mind...(as you and I were 'incentivized' to learn during our time in the Middle East ;) )

Iraq oil: fools rush in, by Lex, Last updated: November 20, 2011 7:21 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com

Central bank gold buying at 40-year high, by Jack Farchy in London, November 17, 2011 7:54 am, Financial Times, www.ft.com

Shell pulls out of Kurdistan oil talks, by Sylvia Pfeifer and Javier Blas in Erbil, northern Iraq, November 16, 2011 10:05 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com

Qatar joins Mexico with oil hedge, by Javier Blas in London, Last updated: October 26, 2011 10:49 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com

Torrents in Arabia: the momentum for reform, by Lex, October 21, 2011 7:22 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com


The Arab spring is delivering on its political promise. Three dictators have been ousted in north Africa, and the momentum for reform may now be unstoppable. If the vaguely democratic awakening that is now taking place is to have any chance of flourishing, however, it must be accompanied by total economic regeneration. Without that, sky-high expectations will be dashed.

[Steve the Planner]

Beetle:

I think this is where we really stalemate on these "threat assessments"---by focusing on things like the stability of a central government as measured by protests, attacks and opposition movements.

Somewhere down the road, Afghans will confront the problems of how they are to govern themselves---within a very conflicts and highly-differentiated political/economic/societal landscape bounded by certain physical geography.

The answers will, in all reality, move to the likes of regional special government considerations and reconstituted maps, boundaries, authorities and allegiances (ala Iraq's Article 140/123 issues). It is complicated stuff, does not result from outsider decisions (and there are many winners and losers) where, through underlying conflict, there are many unresolved grievances.

Economics plays a big role, too, but usually is represented by allocational challenges of the very kind in debate in the US (rich, middle class, poor; who gets it?).

For me, the Arab Spring, in its early stage, is still a debate about who sits in the seat of power, and has not yet reached the meaningful issues: How do we govern ourselves differently to achieve a different result?

Monitoring military threats, and driving responses to metrics related to military threats does not solve the underlying problem, answer relevant societal questions, etc... In fact, maybe the opposite---creating them.

[Bob's World]

I prefer to think of myself as an advocate for a fresh perspective. Some may find that to be "myopic," it's a fine line I admittedly cross at times. Guilty as charged, but that in no way grants amnesty to the intelligence community for remaining doggedly focused on threats to capture, kill or defeat as what we need them to apply their considerable skills on the most. We need them to study the roots, not the branches.

But I don't put everything at the feet of government. I don't think the government of Mexico, for example, created the drug violence that threatens their stability; as an example. Such profit-motivated challengers are not "insurgency" in my opinion, because I do (myopically) believe that conflicts need to be categorized by their causal roots rather than by the various tactical branches they might take. I believe that insurgency must be both internal and political, or it is not insurgency. By categorizing by like causes one also categorizes by family of solution as well. By mixing conflicts of various causation by categorizing by the tactics applied, one is far more likely to apply the wrong type of solution for the problem they actually face.

But when the causal roots are in domestic policy (insurgency) or foreign policy (transnational terrorism), I do indeed strongly advocate that governments challenged in such ways are only likely to find true "victory"/stability by honestly looking at the effects of their actions and making reasonable changes in how they do business where it affects a handful of critical perceptions that are major drivers of such conflicts. Always room for supporting efforts to mitigate those who wage illegal violence, or to improve effectiveness of how the government serves the people, but those should remain supporting efforts.

Governments are made up of politicians, and politicians are not big on personal responsibility. Just a fact.

Militaries fight wars, and went launched by politicians to resolve a conflict with some group waging illegal violence the military is apt to view that engagement as war and warfare. Just a fact.

Stepping back and breaking the cycle requires that we look at such conflicts differently if we hope to achieve different results. After all, its not like the historic approach and our current approach of massive foreign interventions, regime changing/protecting; followed by massive programs of assassination and state building (a bit of an oxymoron of an approach by any measure) is working in any enduring way.

What I offer is cheap and respective of the sovereignty of others in a manner consistent with the principles that America is founded upon. That alone makes it worth serious consideration.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Agree in part. Karzai did not create the problems in Afghanistan.

Pashtun issues are cross-border. 10-20% of Afghanistan's total population is transnational. Answers will not come in a vacuum, especially as Pakistanis, for their own domestic reasons, may pressure Afghans to return home at some point.

One thing I do know is that Ambassador Crocker has a very good grasp of the neighbor issues, which is a big asset. Real-life is that those neighbors in total are not just Pakistan by any means.

Looking perhaps way too out of the box, the underlying problems started with the artificial Durand carve-up, were exacerbated by the Muslin Exodus during the Indian Partition, and the push of that population created historical pressures on the Pashtuns, who are still struggling on both sides of the line with how they will succeed in a future where many different neighbors (internal and external) will ultimately crush them (notwithstanding their deep and unique cultures) if they do not find a self-contained and non-threatening way forward.


All these money flows from us have not been helpful.

[Bob's World]

Afghanistan is a unique situation (ok, all are, but a couple factors really affect this place)

1. The cultural reality of Afghan patronage. This is an all or nothing society. If you are on the in team, you have full chance at power, land, influence, wealth. If you are on the out team you get scraps. When there are major swings of political power it drives an equally major swing of patronage. Over the past several decades the swings forced by Soviets, Muj, Taliban, and US/Northern Alliance have flipped patronage like a pancake, and the effects on the country are hard for non-Afghans to fully comprehend. Who has best title to that rich river bottom land that has switched hands 4 times in 40 years? What tribe should control that cash machine route from Kandahar to Quetta? etc, etc.

We forced the latest swing, and not patronage is firmly in the hands of the Northern Alliance Friends and Families plan. The current constitution and centralized government we were so keen on facilitating not only solidified the Northern Alliance monopoly on power, wealth and influence across Afghanistan (and made all government from District level up into "government in a box" - a box built by the constitution and filled by Karzai) but also turned the flow of patronage into a one-way upward sucking sound as everyone owes their patronage to Karzai and nothing to the people they are sent out to shake down, er, "serve."

The losers cannot accept this. They cannot accept this outcome and they cannot accept this constitution. Both offer little but effective slavery for entire families, tribes and regions. This guarantees insurgency.

I do not know if it is possible to regulate a reconciled form of patronage that breaks up this ageless system and divides power wealth and influence more equitably across the populace. Perhaps, but only if we recognize that this is critical and that must be forced on Karzai and the Northern Alliance, as it is not in their interest lead reform and give up what they hold now by both might and right.

I have not seen any general or any Ambassador see this for the problem it is and take it on.

2. External manipulations, British, Russian, US, etc. The Durand line is much like the line dividing North and South Vietnam. Westerners see these lines as real, legal and definitive. For the affected populaces they were and are largely moot. The only form of legitimacy that matters for insurgency is that in the eyes and minds of the affected populace. The Pashtun populaces in Pakistan are as much "Afghan" as those in Afghanistan. Both are really what I call "self-governed populaces" but both are equally affected by the impact on patronage as described above so are stakeholder populaces in this insurgency.

We'd do well to ignore the Durand line for purposes of defining the insurgency. This really is only a factor if one is out looking for threats to defeat. The brand of COIN I promote is primarily waged in Kabul and focused on tearing down the mechanisms of governance that are at the causal roots of the insurgency. Do that well and the good effects will flow across the Durand line as if it is not there (and for COIN and insurgency it is not there)

I listen to smart military leaders say silly stuff like "we defeated the insurgency in South Vietnam, but later the state of North Vietnam defeated the South in a conventional state on state war." We take ourselves and our lines far too seriously. The south went down in classic phase III Maoist insurgency as planned by Ho and Giap from the very start decades earlier.

But again, if one focuses on fixing government, these lines become far less important than when one is focused on defeating threats.

I'd love to see Crocker and Allen make a full-spectrum reconciliation and follow-on constitutional loya jirga the condition precedent to all development and any hope of ISAF leaving any presence there to help out. Unless we are willing to walk away we will remain a patsy of the Northern Alliance, filling their pockets and protecting there status at the top of the patronage heap.

[Dayuhan]

The cultural reality of Afghan patronage. This is an all or nothing society. If you are on the in team, you have full chance at power, land, influence, wealth. If you are on the out team you get scraps. When there are major swings of political power it drives an equally major swing of patronage.

Agreed.


The losers cannot accept this. They cannot accept this outcome and they cannot accept this constitution. Both offer little but effective slavery for entire families, tribes and regions. This guarantees insurgency.

This outcome is implicit in the cultural reality that you described above. The only question is who gets the top chair and who controls the patronage. That's what's being fought over. The constitution is irrelevant to anyone but a foreigner: whatever document is put in place will be twisted to fit the cultural reality, or ignored. Culture defines documents, documents don't change cultures.


I do not know if it is possible to regulate a reconciled form of patronage that breaks up this ageless system and divides power wealth and influence more equitably across the populace. Perhaps, but only if we recognize that this is critical and that must be forced on Karzai and the Northern Alliance, as it is not in their interest lead reform and give up what they hold now by both might and right.

How is this compatible with your earlier comment about the "cultural reality of Afghan patronage". Are you suggesting that "we" can restructure Afghan cultural realities? I don't see how an effort to "break up this ageless system" is something we can or should be messing with. Trying to dictate how other countries need to be governed seems to me to be something we should be avoiding, not pursuing.

Restructuring patronage systems is not likely to be easy or polite. Factions will fight over profitable milking cows. They will try to butt in on each other's territories. In essence you'd be going back to what you had between the Soviet withdrawal and the rise of the Taliban: chaos and conflict. We can pretend to ourselves that we can "regulate" this or assign who gets what and lay out a "system" for sharing the spoils... but that's a dangerous illusion. The culture is the culture. We won't change it, and it will take over no matter what system we put in place.

I'm recalling the transition from the Marcos dictatorship to the fragile Aquino democracy... Marcos was more corrupt, but things functioned, because the corruption and patronage were largely organized: you knew who to pay, and how much, and you generally got what you paid for. Once that system broke it was a free-for-all, with multiple parties fighting over rackets, everybody wanting a cut and nobody even trying to deliver on their promises. This sort of thing doesn't always make for an improvement.


The brand of COIN I promote is primarily waged in Kabul and focused on tearing down the mechanisms of governance that are at the causal roots of the insurgency. Do that well and the good effects will flow across the Durand line as if it is not there (and for COIN and insurgency it is not there)

Tearing down what you referred to as "the cultural reality of Afghan patronage"? You said it yourself: this is an all or nothing society. Do you want us to change that? Of course we can tear down the government we installed and try again, but whatever goes in will be a product and reflection of the same cultural reality.


I'd love to see Crocker and Allen make a full-spectrum reconciliation and follow-on constitutional loya jirga the condition precedent to all development and any hope of ISAF leaving any presence there to help out. Unless we are willing to walk away we will remain a patsy of the Northern Alliance, filling their pockets and protecting there status at the top of the patronage heap.

Somebody will be filling their pockets and protecting there status at the top of the patronage heap no matter what we do. It's not something we are going to change and it's not something a new constitution will change. It's a cultural reality and we have to work within cultural realities. The culture may evolve to a new reality but it won't happen because we want it to, and the process is going to involve a bunch of mess no matter what we do.

I think your diagnosis is reasonably accurate as a broad picture... but do you really think the US should be committing itself to an effort to restructure Afghan cultural realities?

My opinion only of course, but I don't think our problem is that we built the wrong kind of governance in Afghanistan, but that we tried to build governance in Afghanistan in the first place.

[Entropy]

Now that I'm not restricted by my Iphone (no keyboard and I'm not a master texter), I can give a more substantive reply.


So now the intel communtiy says this isn't working?

If by "now" you mean "at least since 2007-2008 and more like 2005" then you'd be right! The Intel community (IC) completed an NIE on Afghanistan in 2008 that used words like "grim," "gloomy" and "downward spiral." There was another assessment done a year ago and now this latest one. Unfortunately, the 2008 NIE is still classified because the Bush administration decided not to issue an unclassified executive summary or unclassified key judgments (Some said the administration tried to suppress it - I'm sure that had nothing to do with it coming right before a Presidential election :rolleyes: ). However, Washington is a leaky sieve, and thanks to a host of "anonymous senior officials" who can leak without retribution, we basically know the NIE's broad conclusions. You can read two summaries and analysis for yourself here (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/world/asia/09afghan.html?pagewanted=all) and here (http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=5867448&page=1#.TtMBQlZQCxQ) although there are many more if you spend a minute on Google. Additionally, there are more details available in Wikileaks if you want to go that route -for obvious reasons, I can't and won't link to them here.


I hope everyone can appreciate the tragic irony of us allowing the intel community to lead us into a threat-centric "strategy" of clear-hold-build; night raids; and outrageous development programs against the resistance aspect of the insurgency internal to Afghanistan (while totally protecting and ignoring the causation of the insanely illegitimate Karzai regime and the Northern Alliance monopoly that is codified by the constitution we helped develop) and doing nothing to address the revolutionary aspect of the insurgency with the Taliban government in exile in Pakistan.

There's a saying that goes something like, "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." In this case, I'd settle for any evidence for the assertion you make here. Maybe I'm wrong, but I seem to recall that "clear, hold and build" was not the brainchild of the IC, but came from a certain coterie of active and retired senior flag officers, advisers like Kilcullen, think-tankers, etc. The strategy was transferred to Afghanistan after the apparent "success" in Iraq. I also seem to recall that many people who knew a thing or two about Afghanistan at that time warned that the TTP's as well as the strategy used in Iraq were not likely to work in Afghanistan, but all these COIN "experts" assured us they'd take Afghanistan's unique circumstances into account.


Now the same intel F-tards say "golly, this isn't working." No kidding. I have yet to meet a single person in the intel business who knows anything about insurgency. Not a one. They do threats. That's all they know.


Just "venting" here, but it kind of pisses me off when someone doesn't do 10 minutes worth of research and fact-checking before impugning an entire profession. People can draw their own conclusions about this statement, I don't feel it necessary to comment on it further.


Insurgency is not about threats, it is about governments that are out of synch and out of touch with the people they deem to govern. God save us from the intel community, and the politicians who listen to them.

Yes, God save us please! :rolleyes:

Please tell us who politicians should listen to instead? CNAS? Retired General Officers? The defense industry? Whichever bureaucracy (or foreign power) has the best lobbyists? Serious question.

Of course, I might point out that "threats" are part of intel's raison d'erte and are its most important function whether you choose to accept that fact or not. The primary purpose of intelligence is to provide warning for "threats" be they strategic or tactical. Enemy and potential enemy capabilities and intentions (ie. "threats") are always going to be at the top of the intel priority list. This isn't exactly new. I think I've pointed out to you before that intelligence requirements, which are defined by military Commanders and our civilian leadership, are what drives intelligence and, guess what? Those requirements are largely threat-based. If that bothers you, then you need to take it up with those Commanders and civilian leaders.


Entropy, I actually am one who does not believe that it was a "failure of intel" that led to 9-11; (that was a failure of foreign policy, not intelligence) but we have been over compensating ever since in a dogged pursuit of "threats" to defeat to ensure that it does not happen again. We have build a massive machine to stare at the symptoms, yet have done little to assess that true failure of policy. We could use some of that great talent in the intel community focused on the real problems, that are internal, rather than all staring outward looking for "threats."

Well, you are wrong - 9/11 was an intel failure. As I said previously, intel's primary purpose is to provide strategic warning for such events. As it happens, the IC did know an attack was coming, just not the details. Unfortunately, details matter and the IC messed that up. That's not to say the IC was wholly to blame for 9/11 of course.


Why it refuses to shift focus from the analysis of the symptoms of the problems we face (detailed analysis of various "terrorist" organizations [most of which are actually nationalist insurgent organizations - but why quibble over a person's purpose for action?], the individuals in these organizations, who they talk to, where they sleep, who they call, etc, etc) while completely ignoring analysis of the root causes of this "threat" that lie primarily within the political, policy, operational and tactical approaches of the governments that are being challenged?

Frankly it amazes me that you, as a retired senior officer, do not know the answer to this question. Intel is a support element which helps to guide policy, not dictate it. You seem to think Intel is not only capable of putting policymakers into a box, but should put them into a box. I'm sorry but that is wishful thinking and even dangerous. Intelligence must inform policy, not determine it.

And, if you read some more US-Afghan history, the IC did evolve in exactly the manner you describe. During the post-invasion period (roughly 2002-2004) the intel community assessed that the Taliban was essentially destroyed and was no longer a threat. The IC's focus in Afghanistan therefore shifted to concern about the return of warlordism and chaos in Afghanistan. At the time, the concern was that the Taliban's defeat would create a power vacuum and return Afghanistan to the very conditions that gave rise to the Taliban in the first place. It was in this context that efforts were made to demobilize the "Northern Alliance" factions and begin the process that lead to the 2003 Loya Jirga and 2005 elections. In that context, there's this article which discusses policymaker views (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?pagewanted=all) at that time as well as a bit of what was going on. Does that sound like an intel-driven threat-based policy discussion to you? The answer is "no" because intel was primarily supporting the various "non-kinetic" initiatives (reconstruction, DDR, demining, etc.) because the intel community believed the Taliban was no longer a threat.

Now, one can say the intel folks got it wrong and focused too much worry on the dangers of a return to warlordism, but I think it's pretty hard to argue what you seem to be arguing, which is that the intel community has been static for 10 years and focused on "threats" to the exclusion of all else.

At the same time, the IC has long been cognizant of corruption in Afghanistan in general and with Karzai in particular. My memory is a bit foggy at this point, but I seem to recall a lot of skepticism regarding Karzai's grandiose plans to reign in corruption and the drug economy after his 2005 election. Whatever skepticism did exist was overwhelmed by a bevy of useful idiots inside the beltway. We've known about the issue of overcentralization of Afghanistan's government for years as well. Questions about that came up immediately after the 2003 Loya Jirga and especially during the 2005 elections. It was ignored because it was decided (not by intel) that Karzai was going to be our guy.

Additionally, the IC has been telling policymakers for years about Pakistan's duplicity - why have policymakers not responded in an effective way? Is that something you can blame on bad intel? It's not like the facts of any of this are new or even controversial and it's not as if policymakers have not been exposed to all of this - they have been, but have ignored it for various reasons. Maybe this will come as a shock to you, but policymakers tend to ignore intel when it conflicts with the policies they'd prefer to implement.

Frankly, the rest of your comments suffer from the basic misunderstanding I just described. In short, while in principal I agree with your signature on Einstein and simplicity, one shouldn't run with it and go from simplicity to simplistic.

[Entropy]

We forced the latest swing, and not patronage is firmly in the hands of the Northern Alliance Friends and Families plan.

Ok, you bring this point up a lot. Let's examine it. What was the alternative? It was the Northern Alliance along with Royalist and various other Pashtuns that helped us to overthrow the Taliban. What were we supposed to back in 2002 - say "thanks, now sod off?" What do you think would have happened? What was the viable alternative?

It used to be that Afghanistan's minorities (Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks) could live with a soft Pashtun dominion, but the Taliban changed all that. The simple fact is that they would not have demobilized their militias if they had not been given a powerful stake the government. It's possible a more decentralized government structure would have assuaged their fears while creating better governance from the Pashtun perspectives, but that wasn't a certainty IMO. The analytical error we made, I think, was that we assumed most Pashtuns would be happy because Karzai and some others in the government (ie. Royalists) were Pashtun.


I do not know if it is possible to regulate a reconciled form of patronage that breaks up this ageless system and divides power wealth and influence more equitably across the populace. Perhaps, but only if we recognize that this is critical and that must be forced on Karzai and the Northern Alliance, as it is not in their interest lead reform and give up what they hold now by both might and right.

Force Karzai? With what leverage?


I have not seen any general or any Ambassador see this for the problem it is and take it on.

Well, they've been trying to "force Karzai" to be a good guy for a long time now, which is what you seem to advocate. Maybe we can keep trying to force the Pakistani's to play nice too - that's worked equally well. :rolleyes:


2. External manipulations, British, Russian, US, etc. The Durand line is much like the line dividing North and South Vietnam. Westerners see these lines as real, legal and definitive. For the affected populaces they were and are largely moot.

That is only true for those who live near the border. For almost everyone else in Pakistan and Afghanistan the border dispute is important and the border is real.

Funny you don't mention Pakistan when talking of external manipulation. When it comes to Afghanistan, they are the masters. Your ideas on what we should do in Afghanistan seem to assume no interference from Pakistan and other outside powers.


We'd do well to ignore the Durand line for purposes of defining the insurgency. This really is only a factor if one is out looking for threats to defeat. The brand of COIN I promote is primarily waged in Kabul and focused on tearing down the mechanisms of governance that are at the causal roots of the insurgency. Do that well and the good effects will flow across the Durand line as if it is not there (and for COIN and insurgency it is not there)

You think the Pakistanis might have something to say and do about that? What you've described here is Pakistan's greatest fear - another schism with the bulk of Pashtun and Baloch lands ceded to Afghanistan. Once Pakistani gets a whiff that this is the new US policy, they will take action and this policy will fail.


But again, if one focuses on fixing government, these lines become far less important than when one is focused on defeating threats.

Great, please operationalize "fixing government."


I'd love to see Crocker and Allen make a full-spectrum reconciliation and follow-on constitutional loya jirga the condition precedent to all development and any hope of ISAF leaving any presence there to help out. Unless we are willing to walk away we will remain a patsy of the Northern Alliance, filling their pockets and protecting there status at the top of the patronage heap.

What is a "full-spectrum" reconciliation and how can Crocker and Allen "make" it? What makes you think another constitutional Loya Jirga will result in a better outcome than the last one? In other words, do you really think the current power brokers would submit to such a process without knowing the outcome first? And if they know the outcome is going to be a reduction in their power then it seems to me they will either game the system or refuse to participate.

The problem is akin to trying to get an alcoholic to quit drinking. There's simply not a lot we can do that will actually work.

[Bob's World]

Ok, running out the door, so I'll just touch one point:

The single essential task for stability in Afghanistan is not the "defeat" of any particular threat, nor is it the preservation of the current government. The later drives the former.

The single essential task is to change the government to a form that leverages the patronage culture toward stability rather than as a wedge that is continually driven between the victor and the loser. We must either:

1. Dedicate our main effort to forcing the current regime to take this on (and yes, the constitution is critical as it enforces this cultural wedge with the rule of law and Western support. If the design of the constitution does not describe and allow enforcement of a equitable distribution of patronage across society there will always be conflict. If the design of the constitution fuels a centralized upward Ponzi scheme of patronage there will always be outrageous, destructive corruption. If the constitution vests all power in one man, there will always be government in a box and never be legitimacy of government at any level in the eyes of people who are governed at those levels).

or

2. We must pack up and leave, recognizing that the only "vital interest" that we have in the region did not become vital until our own actions there had contributed so powerfully to the growing instability in Pakistan.

As an idealist, I vote for option 1. As a realist I vote for option 2. So, believe in 1, but execute 2. If we had vital national interests and if this were geo-strategically key terrain I would say commit to option 1 and make it work. We don't have either, so again the answer is 2.

What we do now is a threat-focused, tactically driven compromise that can only create suppression of threats for some temporary period of time to the current, unsustainable model of governance that is the root cause of the conflict. It is "doctrinally correct" but criminally stupid in its design.

[Fuchs]

Force Karzai? With what leverage?

His life.
He can neither survive in Afghanistan without U.S. money nor in exile against the will of the CIA.


This was no PC answer, but Karzai's dependance is still quite obvious. He's only independent and capable of own decisions in the framework of continued support.

[Steve the Planner]

Entropy:

A mouthful.

I find it funny that the MG Flynn Intelligence gap was, perhaps, a gap between what was informing and driving military actions on the ground, as opposed to one of general understanding elsewhere.

There is no shortage of better wisdom all over the US, from Open Source to non, but it did not seem to survive translation into rational and consistent application.

I enjoyed Bob's latest mind warp: Let's go down to Kabul and....Karzai....regulated patronage.... Helps to understand the gap.

When I indicated that Crocker has a good grasp of the neighbors, that hardly meant that he was, or could, just go over there and fix them, as Bob suggested. Rather, it meant a realistic understanding of the complex challenges and linkages to all---most of which we could never really understand to their indigenous and competing satisfactions anyway.

At best, you discuss, you find common ground where you can, you diffuse the immediate bombs once triggered. It is a whack-a-mole task at best, and little of it is best done in a public spotlight.

It is from the complex understanding, however, that we can then understand our situation, and where/what comes next for us----a potentially very different problem set than what comes next for THEM.

Fact is that we are too often viewing these systems from a warped perspective of immediate post-conflict survivors, fueled by massive economic distortions/dislocations (some of our own doing).

The damage and fragmentation, however, is hardly the result of just us after 2002. The story goes before (and will continue after us). In reality, the door to Afghanistan's own destruction began when it broke politically between the new wave and the old traditional societies. That followed with various factions taking sides and bringing in outside influence to support their side. Pandora's Box was opened by Afghans, not us.

The big problem I have in these conflict zones with too-long US involvement is where our critics forget, after a decade or so, that it was pretty bad before we came, and the door to our coming was always opened from the inside.

Iraq, once credibly aspiring in the 1970s to be a jewel, was consumed by a brutal and self-inflicted war pattern resulting from attacks on its neighbors (Iran, then Kuwait). It's economic, physical and social infrastructure was destroyed then, not by us. The Anfal, draining the marshes, and mass graves pre-date us.

Same patterns in Afghanistan. The Taliban turning brutal, oppressive, and threatening to its neighbors and the world is what, in large part, drove a situation where someone had to go in and put a stop to it.

Obviously, our actions afterwards are a debate. But it is one intrinsically wrapped up in the delusional "Failed State" policies floating around Washington----lets just create a series of protectorates which we can manage through proxies (while outwardly asserting their independence and self-governance).

Just so much Lawrence/Bell delusions of grandure.

What to do next with these countries is something, however brutal and frustrating, which must come from within (even if that initially means returning to the initial Pandora's Box and the underlying and still unresolved internal and neighbor problems.

Remember that it was Crocker who was sitting at the table with Afghanistan's neighbors (Pakistan, India and IRAN) to resolve the What Comes Next problem when the talks blew up after the Axis of Evil speech.

The US, now, is probably not the right player to put that Genie back in the Bottle---so it falls back to the neighbors and Afghanistan. Bad choices (one at the expense of another) will create reactions, and re-iterations). It is a process we stopped but needs to get back on track. The answers will not be ours.

As you rightly point out, intelligence was not the gap, and gloom is nothing new. Intelligence informing the ground actions (the MG Flynn problem) is, and remains the gap: Let's go up to Kabul and straighten things out...Let's get those Pakistanis in line...Let's have Karzai arrange a Loya Jirga...

[Entropy]

His life.
He can neither survive in Afghanistan without U.S. money nor in exile against the will of the CIA.


This was no PC answer, but Karzai's dependance is still quite obvious. He's only independent and capable of own decisions in the framework of continued support.

Karzai can't live in exile "against the will of the CIA?" Please explain what you mean. It sounds like you're suggesting that we threaten him with assassination.

[Entropy]

BW,

In my judgment option 1 in a pipedream and option 2 is not yet acceptable to a domestic political establishment that wants to avoid the political consequences of "losing" in Afghanistan. That is, admittedly, a cynical view, but these are cynical times.

[Fuchs]

Karzai can't live in exile "against the will of the CIA?" Please explain what you mean. It sounds like you're suggesting that we threaten him with assassination.

Well, I mean you could.



Force Karzai? With what leverage?

[Entropy]

Well, I mean you could.

The problem with threats used as coercion is that the threats must be credible in the eyes of the one being threatened. Is it really credible for Karzai to believe the US will not only abandon him, but kill him if he doesn't, in effect, become our puppet and then diminish his own authority in Afghanistan? I can't read the man's mind, but I really doubt it.

The second problem with threats is that if Karzai calls the bluff, then you have to be committed to actually carrying them out. So is, the US really prepared to deliver on those threats? No, it isn't.

The third problem with threats is that even if the above conditions are met, the person/country being threatened usually has the capability for some kind of reciprocity. Are we willing to suffer those consequences? Probably not.

This is the fundamental problem with the notion that we can force Pakistan and/or the Karzai government to bend to our will through threats.

[Old Eagle]

I'm not sure what an f-tard is, but I assume it's a legal term because, as I recall, BW is a JD.

BW -- Big point of contention: Intel doesn't lead anywhere. It informs and policy-makers (at the national level) and commanders (in the field) determine what actions will best accomplish their objectives. Classic case study by both academics and practitioners was the gap between intel analyses on how well the war was progressing in Vietnam (not well) and the commanders' assessments of the same topic (turned the corner, light at the end of the tunnel, etc.). In Washington, Pres Johnson reportedly chose commanders' assessments over intel, and in the field, Westmoreland let it be known that he had no use for gloomy intel.

This should come as no surprise. The analyst in the rear has much less on the line than the commander in the field. What happens to commanders who step forward and say, "Things are not going well; I think we're screwing this up."?

Can't wait to see how things play out at Langley now that Brother P is in charge.

[Bob's World]

BW,

In my judgment option 1 in a pipedream and option 2 is not yet acceptable to a domestic political establishment that wants to avoid the political consequences of "losing" in Afghanistan. That is, admittedly, a cynical view, but these are cynical times.

No more a pipedream than offered by our current approaches; only at a fraction of the cost and actually directed at the root causes rather slapping than away at the symptoms...

Strategic thinking should not be constrained by budget, policy, doctrine or degree of difficulty. There are plenty of folk in the chain of command who will slap all of those constraints into place. Start off as smart as possible and let such "realities" dumb it down. If one starts off stupid however it only gets dumber from there, and then the full onus is placed on the operators on the ground to somehow turn crapola into shinola. We owe those guys better. Way better. We owe the American people and those people we impact abroad (both allies and host nation) as well.

[Old Eagle]

BW, if strategic thinking shouldn't be constrained by budget, policy, etc., how can it maintain any semblance of reality? By Army defn., strategy is the balancing of ends (based on national policy/grand strategy), ways (based on existing or developing doctrine) and means (resources -- one of which is budget).

[Bob's World]

BW, if strategic thinking shouldn't be constrained by budget, policy, etc., how can it maintain any semblance of reality? By Army defn., strategy is the balancing of ends (based on national policy/grand strategy), ways (based on existing or developing doctrine) and means (resources -- one of which is budget).

Fair point, let me clarify.

I believe there are two components to strategy, the second component being the one you describe above and absolutely constrained by "Acceptable, Suitable, Feasible, Complete" criteria as it lays out the Ends-Ways-Means in which some action should be addressed. I frankly find this to be the least interesting aspect of strategy.

The first component is what I call "strategic understanding," that strategic mission analysis, that strategic SOD, that strategic drilling into the essence of some problem to understand it at a fundamental level in all of its complexity. This is the step that is often skipped in favor of pulling some doctrinal solution off of the shelf.

This is the aspect of strategy that should not be constrained and should not be left to some action officer's version of what some historian thought was important about the last war, that was also deemed to be politically correct enough for publication by the general officers in his chain of command... (i.e., "doctrine")

It goes to Einstein's famous quote (love how that man thought about thinking)

“If I had an hour to save the world
I would spend 59 minutes defining the problem
and one minute finding solutions”

or

"If I had an hour to solve a problem and my life depended on the solution, I would spend the first 55 minutes determining the proper question to ask, for once I know the proper question, I could solve the problem in less than five minutes."

[Dayuhan]

His life.
He can neither survive in Afghanistan without U.S. money nor in exile against the will of the CIA.

This was no PC answer, but Karzai's dependance is still quite obvious. He's only independent and capable of own decisions in the framework of continued support.

In the old days, If Karzai was unsatisfactory we'd just find a momentarily compliant general who was willing to tell us what we want to hear and have him stage a coup, after which he'd stop telling us what we want to hear and do whatever he pleased. Didn't work especially well in the old days, no reason to expect that it would work much better now.

Yes, Karzai is dependent. That doesn't give the US infinite options in dealing with him, because the US is constrained by its own prior efforts to convince the US populace that the Karzai government is "legitimate" and "democratic". To reverse that and take the position that we installed the wrong sort of government and we have to go back and do it all again would be politically unfeasible, not least because it would raise the prospect of another decade-long effort to keep yet another new government in power.

In theory, the US can ditch Karzai, and if they do he will fall. In theory, that provides leverage, and the US should be able to tell Karzai that they'll ditch him if he doesn't do what he's told to do. In practice, we won't do that and he knows it, so the bluff is pointless.

Even if Karzai would do what RCJ wants him to do, there's not a snowball's chance in hell that the Taliban would settle for shared patronage and a piece of the action. They want the whole thing and all they have to do to get it is hold on until we leave. Why should they compromise, except as a tactical step aimed at eventual victory?


The single essential task is to change the government to a form that leverages the patronage culture toward stability rather than as a wedge that is continually driven between the victor and the loser. We must either:

1. Dedicate our main effort to forcing the current regime to take this on (and yes, the constitution is critical as it enforces this cultural wedge with the rule of law and Western support. If the design of the constitution does not describe and allow enforcement of a equitable distribution of patronage across society there will always be conflict. If the design of the constitution fuels a centralized upward Ponzi scheme of patronage there will always be outrageous, destructive corruption. If the constitution vests all power in one man, there will always be government in a box and never be legitimacy of government at any level in the eyes of people who are governed at those levels).

I don't think this is compatible with what you wrote earlier:


The cultural reality of Afghan patronage. This is an all or nothing society. If you are on the in team, you have full chance at power, land, influence, wealth. If you are on the out team you get scraps. When there are major swings of political power it drives an equally major swing of patronage.

If the problem is "the cultural reality of Afghan patronage", how can you say that "the single essential task is to change the government to a form that leverages the patronage culture toward stability"? If your earlier post is accurate, the essential task is not to change the government, but to change the cultural reality, because that cultural reality will dictate the actual pattern of governance no matter what formal structure you put in place. Culture trumps structure, every time.

Do you really think the US should be committing itself to an effort to alter Afghan cultural reality?

It may well be true that Afghan stability depends on a change in this culture... but do we really need stability in Afghanistan? I submit that we do not need it and are not in a position to achieve it with the time and resources we are prepared to commit. All we need is to assure that all of the contending parties understand that the cost of attacking us or sheltering those who do exceed any possible benefits.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

What I said is I think the US should pack up and leave. In regards to reconciliation and a new constitution designed to build trust between those who have no trust for each other and to override the natural "all or nothing" execution of patronage for a more equitably shared form: I said it is idealistic and necessary for any enduring stability. IF the US truly had vital interests at stake there, and IF this was a geo-strategically vital region for the US (no on both counts IMO), then yes, we should stay and take on this difficult, idealistic mission. But it isn't, so we shouldn't.

And we absolutely should not stay simply to attempt to prop up the existing system that we put in place as it is irreparably illegitimate and designed in a manner guaranteed to promote perpetual instability and conflict. A disaster at any price, and we are paying a premium. I really can't sugar coat it any more than that. LTG Barno set us on a course to this place, yet because the insurgency he set in motion had not picked up steam yet at the time he left he is not only held blameless, he holds an influential position at the helm of a major think tank selling solutions to the current mess. Ironic.

[Steve the Planner]

I always get frustrated by supposedly well-informed people criticizing "patronage" systems.

Having spent 25 years in and around government at every level, you would have to be on drugs to not understand that patronage and preference are key drivers of almost all political processes.

The balance to keep these things in check are, among other things, transparent budget and financial reporting processes, management and performance metrics, ethics and contract guidelines, and, when all else fails, an FBI investigation. Did I say I am from Maryland?

In Iraq, a tremendous amount of fraud, waste and abuse was ours (US), and not Iraqis. (SIGAR always reports its big busts, and plenty of sources for the rest).

Effective management and performance controls are, in the best light, ideals, but, in the course of decision-making, political and budget trade-offs, and implementation, there is often a "slip twixt the cup and the lip," and that's without a backdrop of war, corruption, and lost in translation.

Under those conditions, any complex and challenging programs, projects, and tactics are running hard against any credible probability of successful implementation. Bottom Line: Lucky if anything works out.

Constant management focus, once a program gets underway, is disaster avoidance (from many sources), and afterwards, whether success is possible.

These are embedded realities underscoring any credible assessments in Afghanistan (policing, anti-corruption, extension of services, etc...), and really unaffected by changes in personalities (Karzai, for example).

Sorry, Bob, but strategies that do not factor in these essential system parameters are just pipe dreams.

This stuff is just plain hard.

[Bob's World]

Steve,

I don't criticize the Afghan patronage system. I simply recognize how fundamental it is to all things Afghan and I also recognize how the current Constitution of Afghanistan takes that traditional system and horribly perverts it into what I can only describe as a Ponzi scheme. Patronage does not create the problems in Afghanistan, but it is the dormancy at work that leads to universal flips of fortune when regime changes take place such as the one we implemented in our efforts to exact revenge on AQ. The US needs to appreciate that it was our efforts that caused the latest "flip" and that it was our efforts that led to the current constitution that has so disrupted how patronage works in that society.

State department agonizes over "corruption" as one of their primary "causes" of instability and seek to eradicate it at all levels. They see the "corruption" inherent in normal day to day Afghan patronage as a problem. I don't agree at all. I do find it ironic, however, that State Department equally cheers the Afghan Constitution and their role in helping Karzai and the Northern Alliance develop this current document. If I were to identify a COG for the current insurgency in Afghanistan the current Constitution would certainly be on my top-3 list. That document set the insurgency in full motion. It codified the Northern Alliance monopoly on governance (and thereby patronage, power and wealth); It ensured that virtually all government officials would be hand selected by, and owe their patronage to, the President in that Northern Alliance controlled system. That turned off the natural cycle of patronage at every level and created a massive sucking sound upwards. This made is so that the non-Northern Alliance factions could not simply wait and compete, they were at that point forced to fight or submit. They chose to fight, and you have to respect them for that.

I curse what the constitution does to Afghan patronage, not Afghan patronage. It destroys legitimacy of government at all levels across Afghanistan (but particularly in the non-Northern Alliance areas) and it is the primary driver of the outrageous degree of corruption that has plagued Afghanistan in recent years.

I agree complete that strategies must factor in such things, and cannot simply look at threats, infrastructure, cleared ground, etc. I completely agree.

[Dayuhan]

I still think you're vastly overrating the impact of a Constitution on a political culture. The culture comes through no matter what the Constitution says; if the Constitution is not compatible with the prevailing political culture it's ignored or manipulated. I think Karzai and his people would have found ways to dominate the patronage system no matter what the Constitution said... as you said above, the tradition is winner take all. Similarly, the Taliban aren't going to settle for part of the pie. They want to be the winner and to take all.

This is perhaps more clear if you've been in a country through changes of Constitutions and seen how little things actually change.

That's not to say political cultures don't evolve. They do, but they can't be evolved by some internal or external deus ex machina bringing a new system or a new Constitution. They evolve through a process of negotiation and competition, and that process often involves violence. The process can't be short-cut, because it's not just about finding a "right" system, it's also about the contending factions and populaces evolving to a point where the political culture begins to change. Even if you could jump 20 or 50 years into the future and look at what system eventually emerges in Afghanistan, you couldn't simply install that system today and cut out the process.

[Fuchs]

A constitution can coin the entire country if it's well-done and comes at a time when the country is desperately in need of a new way.

[Bob's World]

Consider the matter of "War Lords" that the US found so offensive.

Who did War Lords owe their patronage to??

Who provided security under the War Lord system??

How was security paid for, and who paid for it under the War Lord system?

Who benefited from patronage under the War Lord system?


None of that exists any more under the constitution. Some good in that, and much bad as well. The net loser is the average Joe Afghan.

Sure the people did not select their War Lord, but they respected and understood the process under which a guy rose to that position and how he held it. He had "legitimacy" of the variety that is essential for stability. Not the legal variety we put so much stock in with our "rule of law" approach.

Today leaders at District and Province level are selected from above and owe their patronage to above. The security leaders do not owe patronage to the political leader at their level, but to above as well. Money is collected and sent up. Security and Political leaders compete with each other for influence from their respective Patrons on high, and one sure way to be a rising star is to send big bags of cash up to Kabul. The loser of this competition? Average Joe Afghan.

I do not say that constitutions are cure-alls. Like the Rule of Law in general, they can be a miracle of COIN like the US Constitution is; or a miracle of Insurgency causation like the Afghan Constitution is. The difference is in fine nuance and the societies they are applied to. I do not know what an effective Afghan Constitution looks like. It will contain many aspects that make US officials blanch. But so long as it empowers the positive aspects of that society and creates mechanisms that allow for trust to grow where none currently exists it will be a major move toward stability.

[Entropy]

It seems to me the elephant in the room is, and always has been, Pakistan. As long as Pakistan continues to believe it must essentially control most of Afghanistan, then our efforts at promoting Afghan governance will fail. Afghanistan is simply too weak economically and politically to fend off its neighbor to the east. Any kind of stability in Afghanistan - no matter the system of governance - is going to require Pakistani support. It's been ten years and I don't see any signs that Pakistan is ready to look at Afghanistan as much beyond a pawn in its conflict with India.

[Steve the Planner]

Entropy: Or vice versa for India. (Iran? China? Russia? US?)

Fuchs: The idea of a post-capitulation "new way" forward just doesn't seem to me to apply where (1) there was a winner/loser, unresolved competition, no capitulation; (2) a weak country dependent on others where all those others had separate goals and agendas (however sane or not).

The same in Iraq we, perhaps, held off and delayed decades of pent-up competition/vengeance/reckonings/reconciliations. In January 2012, all these unaddressed issues must, once again, find their resolutions.

Is progress measured by the conflict that results in resolutions, or the suppression of conflicts by external forces that will ultimately have to be resolved?

Sometimes, the Motto--- Will FIGHT for Peace---is not misplaced. Successful conflict resolution is predicated on recognizing that there is conflict, the parties in conflict, and the matters over which they are in conflict. Dealing with them frankly and objectively is not easy.

[Bob's World]

Pakistan and Afghanistan will always have a shared border, a shared populace and a shared destiny.

I believe the Elephant in the room is the US. We can agonize over how Pakistan being Pakistan is an obstacle to our objectives in the region, but Pakistan will not stop being Pakistan simply because we find it inconvenient to our current objectives in the region. We did not curse Pakistan for being Pakistan when we found that to be convenient to our current objectives in the 80s.

We cannot simply demand that everyone bend to our whim and will as it suits us. We are attempting to create something in Afghanistan that suits us and that suits the Northern Alliance. It does not suit much of the populace in the region, spanning borders in all directions. Nor does it suit the governments of Afhanistan's neighbors. These are inconvenient metrics we choose to ignore.

Our actions are well intended and make a certain American-centric sense. But they are il-conceived as they are not built upon a sophisticated strategic understanding of the region or of insurgency. It was an ugly baby. It is an ugly adolesent. No amournt of nurturing will grow it up to be a beautiful adult. It's never too late to reframe and start over, it is never too early to stop doing what cannot work.

Blaming Pakistan, AQ, Hekmayer, ideology, etc, etc is a natural response but does not address our own mistakes that contribute so heavily to the current situation. Taking responsibility for one's own actions are step one to getting healthy. We need to take step one.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Agree with your observation that we are trying to create something that suits the Northern Alliance (again, competition and conflict in a winner take all system), but I believe that what suits them, and what we thought we might get from them (minimal governance/stability), are at loggerheads.

Our actions, however intentional or unintentional, have fueled a great many consequences, which are, perhaps, more apparent after the big surge than when the pot was essentially left on a low boil for many years.

The issue remains, concurrent with the perennially gloomy NIEs whether we ever should have aspired to much more than "keeping a lid on it." Are all the current consequences the result of the pressures to do more, and not to just do what was minimally necessary?

[Bob's World]

There is no easy answer at this point, but there are smart answers.

If we simply pack up and walk, if we do not garner guarantees in advance from those who will swoop in to fill the vacuum, it will be those at the lowest level who have trusted in us the most that will suffer the most.

If we stay we will need to make dramatic changes in our priorities and approaches. We will need to be more accepting of the fact that US goals, values and interests are not only not universal, but for many in this region they are incomprehensible.

History says we will ultimately adopt some version of "pack up and leave." Perhaps, like Kissinger in the '70s we will negotiate "a decent interval" to walk away with some form of "success" to point to. Or perhaps we do like the Baltimore Colts.... Time will tell. (or note, I suspect the Vietnamese are more forgiving of our departure there than the people of Baltimore of for how the Colts broke it off)

[Fuchs]

Fuchs: The idea of a post-capitulation "new way" forward just doesn't seem to me to apply where (1) there was a winner/loser, unresolved competition, no capitulation; (2) a weak country dependent on others where all those others had separate goals and agendas (however sane or not).

I didn't write "post-capitulation".

The Eastern Europeans and the recent incarnation of the French Republic appear to have had quite good experiences with their constitutions.

[Entropy]

Bob,

My comment was an implicit criticism of our own strategy. It's success is based on Pakistan playing ball and they haven't played ball for 10 years, yet we continue to try to change Pakistan instead of changing strategy. And the reason, I hate to say, is domestic politics. Our politicians, for obvious reasons, do not want to own the perception of us "losing" in Afghanistan. They keep hoping that someone will deliver something like we got in Iraq - an honorable disengagement.

[Dayuhan]

Consider the matter of "War Lords" that the US found so offensive.

Who did War Lords owe their patronage to??

Who provided security under the War Lord system??

How was security paid for, and who paid for it under the War Lord system?

Who benefited from patronage under the War Lord system?


None of that exists any more under the constitution. Some good in that, and much bad as well. The net loser is the average Joe Afghan.

Sure the people did not select their War Lord, but they respected and understood the process under which a guy rose to that position and how he held it. He had "legitimacy" of the variety that is essential for stability. Not the legal variety we put so much stock in with our "rule of law" approach.

Today leaders at District and Province level are selected from above and owe their patronage to above. The security leaders do not owe patronage to the political leader at their level, but to above as well. Money is collected and sent up. Security and Political leaders compete with each other for influence from their respective Patrons on high, and one sure way to be a rising star is to send big bags of cash up to Kabul. The loser of this competition? Average Joe Afghan.

I do not say that constitutions are cure-alls. Like the Rule of Law in general, they can be a miracle of COIN like the US Constitution is; or a miracle of Insurgency causation like the Afghan Constitution is. The difference is in fine nuance and the societies they are applied to. I do not know what an effective Afghan Constitution looks like. It will contain many aspects that make US officials blanch. But so long as it empowers the positive aspects of that society and creates mechanisms that allow for trust to grow where none currently exists it will be a major move toward stability.

Is the Warlord system disrupted by the Constitution, or by our presence and our support for the Government?

If we weren't there, Karzai - like every other ruler of an essentially feudal country - would have to rely on the barons to implement his policies, maintain order, and collect the tithes. The barons would have enormous leverage and would be able to control a great deal of patronage themselves. Unless Karzai had a substantial military apparatus that was directly loyal to him (not likely in our absence) the barons would largely take over, as they'd be the ones controlling the coercive force and collecting the revenue.

These things are not functions of the Constitution. They are functions of the balance of power: who has the guns and the money. The Constitution hasn't changed the balance of power of the culture, our guns and money supporting Karzai has altered it... for as long as we're there at least.


If we simply pack up and walk, if we do not garner guarantees in advance from those who will swoop in to fill the vacuum, it will be those at the lowest level who have trusted in us the most that will suffer the most.

Are we in a position to "garner guarantees" that would be observed or that would mean anything after our departure? I'm not sure I'd bet on it.


If we stay we will need to make dramatic changes in our priorities and approaches. We will need to be more accepting of the fact that US goals, values and interests are not only not universal, but for many in this region they are incomprehensible.

I suspect that the idea of compromise, inclusion, and an orderly sharing of patronage are high on the list of "US goals, values and interests" that are incomprehensible for many in the region. Easy for us to say that these things must happen for stability to arrive, but if the idea is coming from us and has yet to achieve substantial traction among the people and leaders who are expected to share... well, good luck.


A constitution can coin the entire country if it's well-done and comes at a time when the country is desperately in need of a new way.

Very true... but the people in that country have to agree that they need a new way and they have to have a basic level of agreement on what that new way should be. Not likely to work if the new way is brought by a foreign power.

[Bob's World]

The constitution as written is what disrupts the Patronage process. Equally disruptive (and part of the constitution) are the centralized form of government and the centralized national military and police.

For what purpose does Afghanistan need a centralized police and military??? Only one: to control the populace of Afghanistan. We just saw it as how grown up states do business, so we went a long and promoted this without appreciating the real purpose. Plus we saw it as an additional counter to the messy War Lord system.

The War Lord system has served to defeat the most powerful professional militaries of the Western world (British , Russian, US); so to what purpose would one create a national force? Such a force is far easier for a professional military to defeat, and the remnants would be forced to surrender on day 3-4 of the war when the capital fell. A "well regulated militia" answering to District and Provincial governors selected by elders and shuras of the regions they represent would be far more cost effective and far more legitimate, and far more appropriate to the true security needs of the country.

If we were there protecting such a regional, bottom-up system of locally legitimate leaders and locally raised and trained militias there would be no disruption of the patronage system. We could have provided the checks and balances to ensure that no region used its force to dominate another, and none would have the power on their own to threaten any neighbors as well. The only problem with such a system is that the Northern Alliance would not be able to dominate the entire country as they do now with centralized control and a national security force made primarily of Northern Alliance personnel.

We were so fixated on what we wanted and what we thought was "right" that we never saw that we were being played the entire way by the Northern Alliance. What Afghanistan needs is a new Loya Jirga with appropriate reps from across the populace to develop a system that makes sense to them. They will tell us everyone is represented at such Jirgas, but when one asks penetrating questions one quickly finds out that only those inside the circle of patronage trust get invited. MG Nick Carter worked his tail off in Kandahar to get past the games and get the best representation as possible at such Jirgas. He totally gets it. But even with his focus I am sure we got played as well. We are babes in the Afghan woods.

[Ken White]

We were so fixated on what we wanted and what we thought was "right" that we never saw that we were being played the entire way by the Northern Alliance...We are babes in the Afghan woods.Syngman Rhee suckered Truman (and MacArthur...), The Diems played the Kennedy brothers like a fiddle. They and others played us before there was a Northern Alliance. The Kosovars were the most blatant but fortunately did little damage -- only because no one paid much attention to To Wesley Clark and Clinton didn't know what to do...

Those who want to save the world cause considerable harm. More harm than good, as always...

[Dayuhan]

The constitution as written is what disrupts the Patronage process. Equally disruptive (and part of the constitution) are the centralized form of government and the centralized national military and police.

Again, I don't think so. yes, the patronage system is distorted, but it's not by the Constitution, it's by our guns and money supporting Karzai. Without that, Karzai would have to reach an accommodation with the regional power brokers no matter what the Constitution says. Even with all the power vested in him by the Constitution, how long do you think he'd last without us?

I know that to an American and a lawyer it's akin to blasphemy, but in much of the world what's written on paper has little or nothing to do with actual power relationships. Those are determined by guns and money, not by words on paper.


If we were there protecting such a regional, bottom-up system of locally legitimate leaders and locally raised and trained militias there would be no disruption of the patronage system. We could have provided the checks and balances to ensure that no region used its force to dominate another, and none would have the power on their own to threaten any neighbors as well.

Do you really believe that such a system would be so easily manageable, or that "we" could realistically provide meaningful checks and balances?


We are babes in the Afghan woods.

Now you make sense. Yes, we are babes in the Afghan woods: babes with guns and money, a dangerous combination. We will be played no matter what system we install. We will be manipulated no matter what system we install. The problem is not that we installed the wrong system, the problem is that we think we can install a workable system at all. We can't. There isn't one. The Afghans may be able to evolve one over time, but we can't impose one and we can't simply force everyone to sit down and make one. It will emerge gradually from a period of competition and conflict, like most political systems.

The answer (IMO as always) is not to install better governments, the answer is to stop trying to install governments. The local political culture will emerge no matter what we install, and we have a very hard time walking away from these projects once we embark on them. That leads us to a place where we're supporting a government that cannot stand, but that we refuse to let fall, close to a worst case scenario. Note that our refusal to let it fall is not a function of vital national interests - there aren't any - but of reluctance to drop a project once we invest ourselves in it. That's our habit, and because of that habit we need to be very careful about what projects we invest ourselves in. The last thing I'd want to see is us investing ourselves in an effort to produce a new and improved Afghan government, because I think in 10 years time we'd be right back where we are now: that government will be overtaken by the political culture no matter how it's structured.

[davidbfpo]

My comment was an implicit criticism of our own strategy. It's success is based on Pakistan playing ball and they haven't played ball for 10 years, yet we continue to try to change Pakistan instead of changing strategy. And the reason, I hate to say, is domestic politics. Our politicians, for obvious reasons, do not want to own the perception of us "losing" in Afghanistan. They keep hoping that someone will deliver something like we got in Iraq - an honorable disengagement.

Entropy,

In another post you referred to:
It seems to me the elephant in the room is, and always has been, Pakistan.

I would argue that there are two elephants in the Afghan policy arena or strategic space. Pakistan and domestic politicians, mainly in the USA.

What is clear in the UK is that a significant factor in the informal, conversational airing of the issues around our Afghan involvement is that "losing" means all the nearly four hundred dead's lives have been wasted. A point that is beginning to appear in TV documentaries. Given our history with Afghanistan and the "kith & kin" impact of South Asian affairs I doubt if there is any prospect - for the UK - of an 'honourable disengagement'.

I have noted almost no reaction in the UK amongst our Pakistani-related communities (which are mainly Kashmiri) to the recent border post attack; probably a reflection of their negative attitude to the politics of Pakistan.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan, Hey I always make sense! (ok, at least that's what my mother tells me.)

Also, I get it that you disagree in regards to the effect and importance of the Afghan Constitution. I think you're wrong, but I can live with neither of us changing our mind on this issue.

I don't take this position as a lawyer, though being one does bring a certain background and experience that shapes my thinking. I don't take this position as a guy who spent 20 years as a US Special Forces officer (and yes, we often jump out of short aircraft...). I don't take this position based on my time and experience in Afghanistan. Nor from all of the research and writing on insurgency in general and related matters over the past 7-8 years. All of these things do contribute, however to my thinking on this.

I do not believe that ALL constitutions can have such positive or negative effects, nor do I believe that every nation needs a constitution. I do believe, however that some constitutions are special in terms of their either positive or negative effect on the likelihood of insurgency in the nation they define. The US Constitution is an example of excellent preventative COIN (Of note it was produced by one class of citizen, but from across the young country, and with no external influence as to what it should or should not be; and all of those men had been oppressed citizens, insurgents, and were newly counterinsurgents at the time of the convention). The Afghan Constitution is an example of excellent insurgency causation (of note, half the populace was excluded from representation and Western "experts" weighed in throughout the process). My assessment. Reasons for that laid out above.

Oh, and put on your helmet before reading this post! :D

[Dayuhan]

I make an issue of it because I believe that the focus on "The Constitution" or "the Government" raises a very dangerous possibility. If that's presented as the problem, some less than bright person somewhere is going to have the wonderful idea that all we have to do to solve the problem is to fix the Government or change the Constitution, and that's just going to start the cycle of mess and intervention all over.

Far better, I think, to focus on what you described like this:


The cultural reality of Afghan patronage. This is an all or nothing society. If you are on the in team, you have full chance at power, land, influence, wealth. If you are on the out team you get scraps.

Our people need to understand that the obstacle is not a government or a document, but the existing cultural reality, something that is not going to change because we put someone new on the chair or change Constitutions. Understanding that provides a badly needed perspective: people who might be tempted to try and "fix" a government or a Constitution might think twice - or one hopes more than that - about trying to "fix" a culture.

[Bob's World]

I make an issue of it because I believe that the focus on "The Constitution" or "the Government" raises a very dangerous possibility. If that's presented as the problem, some less than bright person somewhere is going to have the wonderful idea that all we have to do to solve the problem is to fix the Government or change the Constitution, and that's just going to start the cycle of mess and intervention all over.

Far better, I think, to focus on what you described like this:



Our people need to understand that the obstacle is not a government or a document, but the existing cultural reality, something that is not going to change because we put someone new on the chair or change Constitutions. Understanding that provides a badly needed perspective: people who might be tempted to try and "fix" a government or a Constitution might think twice - or one hopes more than that - about trying to "fix" a culture.

This is the balancing that I am attempting to get at with an idea I am calling "exploitable gaps." Essentially that any form of government can be stable if it is in synch, along a handful of critical measures, with the populace it serves. When the government is out of synch a "gap" emerges that is then easily exploitable by internal and external actors alike who may come along with any range of agendas and purposes. The key to success being to get the government to move to being in line with their populace.

Efforts to preserve the status quo of governance where such a gap occurs, and to help that government "control the populace" and drag them back into submission can only suppress the problem, and likely broaden the gap.

Equally, efforts to over-westernize/liberalize some government may very well drag a government that had previously been in synch with its populace out of that zone and create a gap where none previously existed. US calls for "democracy" and "universal US values" are both powerful examples of well -intended concepts (make others more like us and they will be less likely to oppose us) that are potentially extremely dangerous when one applies this deeper understanding of insurgency. Such radical reforms based upon externally determined answers as to what "right" looks like could also take a government that is out of synch in one direction, and move it past the populace even farther in the other direction. (Example, the Syrian and Iranian governments are clearly two that are out of synch with their populaces. The US has no clue what those populaces want, need, or expect of their governance. Our message should simply be "listen to your people, not to us, and get in synch with their expectations of you, not ours." I suspect that governments and populaces everywhere would find that a refreshing change of rhetoric for the US and might point out to us that "you sound more like America and less hypocritical of your own professed principles now.")

Like a boss once used to always remind us, "target audience, target audience, target audience." Governments are bureaucratic and slow to reform. Populaces are in a period of relatively rapid reform. Governments are getting out of synch. They are unlikely to find stability by mirroring the US in deed, but rather in spirit; by seeking to better understand their own populace and to create a system consistent with their culture that allows them to stay better aligned and to build a sense of confidence in the populace that they retain the degree of legal control over government that makes sense to them.

(oh, and I should have attached this with the previous post - warning a couple of F-bombs get dropped)

http://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=ron+white+put+on+the+helmet&view=detail&mid=1C25140E6BB36E3951361C25140E6BB36E395136&first=0&FORM=LKVR

[Dayuhan]

any form of government can be stable if it is in synch, along a handful of critical measures, with the populace it serves. When the government is out of synch a "gap" emerges that is then easily exploitable by internal and external actors alike who may come along with any range of agendas and purposes. The key to success being to get the government to move to being in line with their populace.

I think this overlooks a major problem: it's not just about the government being "in synch with the populace", it's also about the various portions of the populace being in synch with each other and having even marginally compatible ideas about how they want to be governed. If multiple factions of the populace are at each others throats, and if their idea of "good governance" is "we rule and you get your asses kicked", it's not likely that any form of government will bring stability.

Government cannot be more stable than the society it governs. As M-A points out, government is not somehow above and apart from the population: it reflects the divisions and conflicts inherent in the nation.

[Bob's World]

no argument. This goes to the fundamental duty of sovereignty: "To protect the populace."

This means that it must protect diverse segments from each other, from external as well as internal threats; and from the government itself. Protection goes beyond the phyical, but also to the economic, social, etc. I see this all as part of "getting in synch with the populace. If one segment is favored over another, or if one is allowed to abuse another, then that government is "out of synch." Those are the points of friction, like rumble strips on the highway, that should wake government up to the fact they are drifting off course and need to update their game. (I.e., its not the ditch's fault when you drive into it.)

Or where you are, its not the rice paddy's fault. (that is some crazy driving in N. Luzon, particularly when the farmers are using long stretches of the road to dry their rice). Raising the point, I guess, that some places are more challenging for governments than others.

[Dayuhan]

This means that it must protect diverse segments from each other, from external as well as internal threats; and from the government itself. Protection goes beyond the phyical, but also to the economic, social, etc. I see this all as part of "getting in synch with the populace. If one segment is favored over another, or if one is allowed to abuse another, then that government is "out of synch."

If there are multiple segments of the populace and each believes that it should be favored over the others, not favoring one over the other will put you out of synch with all the segments.

Again, it must be stressed that Government is not above or apart from the society. Whatever divisions and conflicts exist in the society will be reflected in the Government. If those divisions and conflicts are at a point where there is no trust or consensus on even the most basic ideas of how the society is to be governed, Government is not going to be able to come up with some deus ex machina reconciliation and impose it on all factions.


(that is some crazy driving in N. Luzon, particularly when the farmers are using long stretches of the road to dry their rice).

The rice on the road stuff is no big deal once you're used to it. Up here in the mountains crazy driving looks like this...

http://i22.photobucket.com/albums/b329/dayuhan/busoffroad1.jpg

And for perspective...

http://i22.photobucket.com/albums/b329/dayuhan/busoffroad2.jpg

The little spot in the upper right corner is the bus.

[Bob's World]

(now is where I would make my pitch that a well crafted constitution creates the framework that allows those diverse segments of the populace to learn to trust in each other over time; and that also allows them to learn to trust in their government over time as well)

Those pics look like the road to my dad's house in SW Oregon, and the ones I roamed and worked growing up. That I can deal with. A quarter mile thunder run down a single lane of elevated two-lane roadbed with no shoulders, surrounded by rice paddies and one lane covered in a farmer's crop, while someone else is making the same decision from the other side was new for me.

[Dayuhan]

(now is where I would make my pitch that a well crafted constitution creates the framework that allows those diverse segments of the populace to learn to trust in each other over time; and that also allows them to learn to trust in their government over time as well)

Again, the weakness is that the Constitution has to be crafted by those same diverse segments, and if the divergence is very large, there's little trust, and the definitions of what sort of governance is "good" are far enough apart, it's not likely that they're going to be able to craft a Constitution that can keep things together. It takes some trust and a rough level of consensus to build a system that promotes reconciliation.

It needs to be remembered that in itself a Constitution is just a piece of paper with words on it. What makes it more than that is the belief in what those words say and the agreement among the contending factions that they will abide by what's said. Without the belief and the consensus, there's nothing there that means anything.


A quarter mile thunder run down a single lane of elevated two-lane roadbed with no shoulders, surrounded by rice paddies and one lane covered in a farmer's crop, while someone else is making the same decision from the other side was new for me.

Ah, but there's a system. Actually several systems. One is that the guy whose driving side of the road is open has the right of way, and the other guy drives up on the rice, avoiding whatever obstacles the farmer has put out to avoid having people drive on the rice. Another is that whoever has the bigger vehicle has the right of way. Another is that whoever has the more expensive vehicle has the right of way. Another is that whoever flashes his lights, leans on the horn, and hits the accelerator first has the right of way. It's kind of a rule-free negotiation conducted at speed on a collision course.

Somebody always gets pushed out of the way, and some rice always gets crushed... or there's a crash and everybody gets messed up. There's probably some sort of metaphor there for governing societies where different factions have incompatible expectations.

[Dayuhan]

(now is where I would make my pitch that a well crafted constitution creates the framework that allows those diverse segments of the populace to learn to trust in each other over time; and that also allows them to learn to trust in their government over time as well)

Slightly OT, but this article might interest you:

http://tinyurl.com/bumtjp8

Foreign Affairs on "Writing Constitutions in the Wake of the Arab Spring"

[Bob's World]

Slightly OT, but this article might interest you:

http://tinyurl.com/bumtjp8

Foreign Affairs on "Writing Constitutions in the Wake of the Arab Spring"

1. Those of the group currently holding power acting to preserve that power; and

2. Western "do-gooders" who come in convinced that specific degrees of certain values, or that specific forms of government are the only right answer and work to force them into the document or to criticize a document that lacks them. (whatever happened to broad principles and self-determination?)

You see both at work in this quote from the article:

"That intention became clearer in mid-November, when the Supreme Council released a set of draft constitutional provisions that would give the military immunity from civilian supervision and empower the armed forces power to approve legislation proposed by the parliament. This went well beyond the "Turkish model" -- parliamentary sovereignty limited by military oversight -- that has been widely suggested, and precipitated a crisis in the military's relations with the civilian population and a new round of protests.

The constitution that emerges over the next year will likely lay out a parliamentary system. It will be influenced by Islamic ideas but will be characterized by the need for the dominant parties to form coalitions if they are to govern. It is unlikely, and probably undesirable, that a single party will be able to secure a simple majority in the parliament. This should lead to some compromise and moderation among the most extreme parties. But while certain human rights will be codified in the new code, the parties might be forced to focus on the political status of the civilian government and religious rights. The future status of Egyptian women is thus cause for concern. The Supreme Council already set aside some Constituent Assembly seats for women, but gender is not listed in the declaration's provisions banning discrimination. Women were also excluded from the preparations for the recent elections."

As I recall women's rights are not addressed in our base constitution either. Our nation had to evolve to a point where such an addition made sense. I'll need to think on this a bit, but I suspect I can come up with 5-10 guidelines for crafting a constitution for best COIN effect over time.

The bottom line must be one of shared trust. That when one has lost all faith in politicians, one can still trust in their government. That government is a system, and a good constitution lays out a good system. People come and go, some good, some bad, but a good or bad system is a gift that keeps on giving, producing good or bad fruit depending on it's nature.

There is much "bad fruit" laying about in Afghanistan. It is time we focused on the tree it drops from and better understand the roots that nurtured and gave rise to the same. We have a heavy hand in that, and our well-intended, insurgency-ignorant, advisors to that process were manipulated artfully by the Northern Alliance to serve their selfish interests.

We show no signs of learning this lesson, so undoubtedly will repeat our mistakes in places like Egypt, Libya, etc, etc, etc.

[Dayuhan]

We show no signs of learning this lesson, so undoubtedly will repeat our mistakes in places like Egypt, Libya, etc, etc, etc.

If we've any common sense at all, we won't make any mistakes in the writing of Constitutions in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, because we won't be involved in the process in any way. Mistakes will surely be made, but they'll be their mistakes, which is as it should be.

I can't see how the US or any American should have any involvement at all in writing a Constitution or structuring a government for Egypt, Tunisia, Libya... or Afghanistan.