Is the US running an empire?

[omarali50]

Professor Manan Ahmed (Pakistani-American, now at Heidelberg) has an article about lack of expertise in the American empire: http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2011/12/us-foreign-policys-lack-of-expertise.html#comments

The point about expertise or lack of it is interesting and worth discussing, but professor Manan (like most left-liberal academics) likes to use the term "empire" a lot...of course, some right-liberal academics use it too (Niall Ferguson?)..I wrote a comment about the usage of this term (you can see it at the above link) because I thought "empire" is not the best description of what the US does in the world today. Descriptions are maps of reality and are necessarily simplified and so on, but even as an oversimplified map, I thought this was not accurate. I dont think Obama wakes up every morning thinking about his far flung empire AS AN EMPIRE. But being a naive amateur, I am doing what I usually do in such circumstances, I am going to go ahead and ask: is "empire" a useful/good way to describe what the US does in the world?

[carl]

Omar:

I read a very interesting book called Empires of Trust that compared Republican Rome to the US. It argues that both are primarily interested in defense and both insure that by pushing the perimeter outward by acquiring and supporting allies. It also says a critical factor is the allies trust that power will be used responsibly so they don't mind being a part of the "empire". In the case of Republican Rome they minded so little some of them fought the Romans so they could be Roman.

Supposedly, this differs from empires of conquest, obviously, but also from empires of commerce which are established for trade rather than defense.

The perimeter of the "empire of trust" keeps getting pushed out because you can't have hostiles directly abutting the perimeter and that results in it always expanding. Imperial Rome had to consciously stop the process but in our case, the oceans may affect it.

Anyway, it was a very interesting book and I wonder if the concept might be of interest to you.

[Dayuhan]

This kind of question has to start with a definition...


empire

Pronunciation: /ˈɛmpʌɪə/
noun

1 an extensive group of states or countries ruled over by a single monarch, an oligarchy, or a sovereign state: : [I]the Roman Empire

[mass noun] supreme political power over several countries when exercised by a single authority: he encouraged the Greeks in their dream of empire in Asia Minor

2 an extensive sphere of activity controlled by one person or group: the kitchen had once been the school dinner ladies' empire

a large commercial organization owned or controlled by one person or group: her business empire grew

OED. QED.

The operative terms: "ruled over", "supreme political power", "control".

Unless someone can tell us who America rules or controls, there is no empire. The term may be used as a rhetorical flourish, but there's little substance to it. The only way you can speak of an American Empire is to dilute the definition of the term "empire" to a point where it no longer means anything at all.

[5th_Req]

Dayuhan, I'd say the United States is an Economic Empire, and has always hd imperial desires in its mercantile pursuits.

The US dollar dominates world markets, and is the reserve currency of choice around the world. Even now.

That's just one obvious example of how the US has considerable control over world markets and international trade. Control enough that I'd call the US an Economic Empire, and without flourish, and without diminishing the term "empire."

[Dayuhan]

If the US is an economic empire, it's a bloody inefficient one. What kind of economic empire runs a gargantuan trade deficit every year? What's the point in an economic empire that loses money?

The omnipresence of the dollar doesn't increase American control, it diminishes it. Because foreign banks can and do lend dollars, often with minimal restrictions on the ratio of loans to deposits, they are effectively able to create dollars, which means the US no longer has even vestigial control over the number of dollars in circulation.

If the US "has considerable control over world markets and international trade", why hasn't the US been able to use that control to skew those markets in its favor? Again, look at that trade deficit. From a trade perspective the whole point of an empire is the ability to enforce favorable terms of trade. Obviously the US is a long way from doing that.

[ganulv]

If the US is an economic empire, it's a bloody inefficient one.
I don’t think there’s such a thing as an efficient empire in any case. They’ve managed to bring interesting things to our world (http://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/Mintz%E2%80%94Quenching%20homologous%20thirsts.pdf ), but often in terribly convoluted ways.

[carl]

An empire will defend its territory. We will defend sort of a far outer perimeter. So in that sense, don't we act as an empire even if we don't absolutely control the nations within that perimeter?

Dayuhan: Those trade deficits may be very bad in the long run but in the short run everybody else is paying our bills for us.

[Dayuhan]

I'm still looking for a standard by which the US can be considered an empire. Not by the traditional "rule and/or control" definition, and the idea of an economic empire seems hard to justify given US trade figures.

If defense of territory makes you an empire, then every country is an empire. I don't see the US defending a perimeter near or far. We're known to attack those who attack us or our allies, those who shelter hostile forces, and sometimes those we merely find obnoxious, but that's not about defending a discrete perimeter, and it's hardly something that characterizes empire.

[ganulv]

I'm still looking for a standard by which the US can be considered an empire. Not by the traditional "rule and/or control" definition, and the idea of an economic empire seems hard to justify given US trade figures.
There’s more than one way to look at the U.S. trade deficit (http://books.google.com/books?id=GYhajCQU8XIC&pg=PT606&lpg=PT606&dq=graeber+trade+deficit&source=bl&ots=A3ASdjLFKS&sig=on7eMzsCgnJVLHkcFy8C8pzx8rU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=aMTqToK5BIHg0QHt_fzXCQ&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=trade%20deficits&f=false). I wouldn’t say that any of them amount to the U.S. being a contemporary empire, but it is singular on the contemporary world stage.

[carl]

Every country may defend its' own territory but empires defend the territory of others. That territory may be seized against the will of the people who live there, the Japanese empire for example. If we are an empire, we defend the territory of others that we haven't seized but consider valuable to us, even if that territory or country can't really do us a lot of good in conflicts elsewhere. Modern Japan would fit that. We will defend Japan, even though in all the wars we've been involved in since 1945, they haven't provided any important direct assistance.

I think we do have a perimeter that we will defend. We don't state it as such but it is there. We will defend Japan. We will defend Germany. Poland is maybe outside the perimeter. Kuwait and South Korea turned out to be inside the perimeter and there was trouble because that wasn't clear. South Vietnam maybe was in but we just failed in that case, though we could afford that failure since the Philippines and Indonesia were between Vietnam and unfettered access to the oceans.

It may not be stated anywhere but judging by our actions, we have staked out a perimeter of sorts starting just after the Spanish-American War and have more or less tried to maintain it since.

[Dayuhan]

There are places important enough to us to fight for, and there are places that are not, but if you laid them out on a map I don't think you'd find anything that could be called a discrete "perimeter"... just places that we think are important and places that we don't.

I can't see how the will and ability to defend allies qualifies one as an empire.

[Ken White]

Why is the idea of containment no longer relevant?Communication and transportation changes over the last 30 years. We're global and thus perneable.
Why is not a global perimeter relevant?Economic changes over the last 30 years. We can't afford it...

[carl]

Ken:

There has been no fundamental change to the nature of transportation in the last 30 years, or for that matter for the last 70 or more. It is still ships, planes, railroads, cars and trucks. We were global 30 years ago and truly global, probably the most global ever, between 1942 and 1945. What has changed about the nature of transportation that makes containment not viable?

Communications has been affected by the internet and sat com but it is just a matter of degree. You could talk around the world by radio decades and decades ago. If you are worried about cyber sabotage, set up defenses. Men have come up with defenses for every threat, this is just another. I don't see how that makes containment not viable. You can't push a submarine or a container ship through a fiber optic cable.

Lack of resources makes a perimeter impracticable, not undesirable. But we don't man most of the perimeter. Countries that aren't enemies do. And to effectively man it, all the have to do is stay not enemies. That seems a less expensive way to do it.

[Ken White]

What has changed about the nature of transportation that makes containment not viable?Ease of transnational movement, porosity of borders, lack of an 'Iron Curtain,' etc.
Communications has been affected by the internet and sat com but it is just a matter of degree... You can't push a submarine or a container ship through a fiber optic cable.No but you can get your message of revolt or whatever to a worldwide audience in seconds -- if you're flexible enough to do that; most large nation are too bureaucratic to be effective at that, 'movements' of all sorts tend to be quite good at it -- and thus at attracting adherents or supporters everywhere.
Lack of resources makes a perimeter impracticable, not undesirable. But we don't man most of the perimeter. Countries that aren't enemies do. And to effectively man it, all the have to do is stay not enemies. That seems a less expensive way to do it.A perimeter is undesirable because once established, it has to be maintained in some fashion. Maintenance entails costs of some sort and everything has a cost. Better to let it just fall into disuse.

Countries who are not enemies (and those who are enemies) shift and change. All countries cater to their perceived interest; they will support our 'perimeter" as long as it suits. As the the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines and the British discovered, 'friends' change...

A far better solution than a perimeter is the ability to respond to provocations with the proper instruments, political or military, rapidly and overwhelmingly locally to deter future provocations and that's, thankfully, where we at last seem to be headed. Long past time...

[Dayuhan]

Why is the idea of containment no longer relevant? Why is not a global perimeter relevant?

Who would you contain?


Maybe it has nothing to do with what an empire is or isn't. It is interesting though. It looks a little like a grand strategy.

It seems less about containment to me than to an effort to respond to perceived threats wherever they emerge... not so much about establishing a clear perimeter as a global game of whack-a-mole.

Either way, as you say, none of this has any relation to empire, and thus it belongs on another thread.

So will anyone try to make a case for an American empire?

[Bob's World]

All "empires" were economic endeavors, forced by the strong onto those who were unable to resist their advances. The nature of empires continues to evolve, becoming less one of expanding one's borders to one of expanding one's economic influence and control. The US runs an odd rendition of this that reflects our internal conflict of wanting to be a good guy, but while also wanting to act like a bad boy. We tend to take on the less desirable aspects of both. This is growing more apparent and less effective over time.

For all of the flaws of the British model, they would have never sent so much of their national wealth out to line the pockets of the leaders they established to manage their enterprises for them. The US wants to have that same bad boy influence over others, but being a good guy, we pay retail for it. History will scratch its head over the American experience long after all of us are dead and buried. But we rose to power at at time of unprecedented techno/socio/cultural revolution, and with all of the old guide books on how to be an effective power growing increasingly obsolete, we have to muddle along and break fresh trail. Its about time to toss the old book out altogether and simply devise a fresh approach from scratch.


As to the controlling aspects of our approaches, most countries perceive being contained as a act of war. Certainly the US would think so. In fact, it appears that the US perceives any country daring to nudge against obsolete US Cold War-based containment policies and posturing as bordering on war-like.

I published a paper last year recommending that we retire containment as the foundation for how US grand strategy engages the world and offered an alternative, more positive approach that I attached the President's favorite label of "Empowerment" to. Not the answer, but neither is containment and its variations. We need to begin the dialog.

Dr. Feaver of Duke has been a leading player in the post Cold War era of promoting the idea that it is in making others more like us that the US finds security. So upon a foundation of rusty Cold War containment we have built policies of promoting democracy over self determination, packaging current liberal positions on US values as "enduring universal values," and a penchant for making bold public proclamations judging those who dare to disagree as "evil" or "failed" or simply demanding that they surrender their sovereignty and culture to adopt ours; or to simply resign if we find their continued leadership inconvenient.

Where is that Obama / Clinton's reset button when we need it? Seriously, we have gotten off of the true American path as we have followed various Cold War and post-Cold War side trails. Sustaining old alliances that have become sadly despotic and out of touch with their evolving populaces puts the US at risk of Transnational terrorism rising out of the insurgent populaces of such nations. Equally, demanding or actually creating new governments that are "more like us" but nothing like the people they have been imposed upon places us at risk as well.

Showing people the respect of allowing them to be themselves is what will restore US influence and security. Addressing old relationships that have soured with age is a critical part of that. As an example, swallowing our pride and restoring relations with Iran makes the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia safer. We should not allow the Saudis and Israelis to steer us away from that reality. Privately telling old friends they are screwing up in their relationships at home is never appreciated, but often needed. We need to have a few of those conversations as well, and the first one should be with ourselves.

[Dayuhan]

All "empires" were economic endeavors, forced by the strong onto those who were unable to resist their advances. The nature of empires continues to evolve, becoming less one of expanding one's borders to one of expanding one's economic influence and control....

For all of the flaws of the British model, they would have never sent so much of their national wealth out to line the pockets of the leaders they established to manage their enterprises for them.

Again I have to wonder... where exactly does the US have economic influence and control, and if we have such influence and control, how come we aren't making money?

Sending money out to line the pockets of those who manage the enterprises is a small fraction of our problem. The bigger part is that the cash flow on the enterprises overall is outbound, not inbound. The Chinese, for example, are lining unsavory packets cheerfully and at a vertiginous rate, but at least their bottom line is positive. Ours is not, which is hard to reconcile with the idea of economic empire.


Showing people the respect of allowing them to be themselves is what will restore US influence and security.

Outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which we're trying to leave, where are we not "showing people the respect of allowing them to be themselves"?

[ganulv]

Again I have to wonder... where exactly does the US have economic influence and control, and if we have such influence and control, how come we aren't making money?
It’s too easy to make every Indian’s favorite joke here.http://goodcomics.comicbookresources.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/MadMagazine38.jpg

It’s harder to who figure out who the <we> is. The shareholders of Dell, Inc.? Me when I shop at Wal-Mart?

I take your point regarding the fact that the U.S. only seems to have so much direct control over things economic. It’s not like Commodore Perry is going to show up in Tianjin. But there is influence for sure. What would China’s economy look like if the U.S. Government decided the trade deficit needed to be “fixed” at the expense of imports from China? And why does the CPC get testy about devaluation of the dollar (http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/19/us-usa-dollar-geithner-idUSTRE69H4VO20101019)?

[carl]

Ease of transnational movement, porosity of borders, lack of an 'Iron Curtain,' etc.

That applies to individuals and has mostly to do with political controls or lack thereof at borders. It didn't have anything to do with a hostile nation state having free access to the oceans so its' navy could roam around easily. That is what I mean. That is what the perimeter looks like it is about.


No but you can get your message of revolt or whatever to a worldwide audience in seconds -- if you're flexible enough to do that; most large nation are too bureaucratic to be effective at that, 'movements' of all sorts tend to be quite good at it -- and thus at attracting adherents or supporters everywhere.

That has nothing at all to do with what I'm talking about.


A perimeter is undesirable because once established, it has to be maintained in some fashion. Maintenance entails costs of some sort and everything has a cost. Better to let it just fall into disuse.

Well naturally a perimeter has to be maintained. But it is established because there is some benefit to be derived from it. If it falls into disuse you lose the benefit.


Countries who are not enemies (and those who are enemies) shift and change. All countries cater to their perceived interest; they will support our 'perimeter" as long as it suits. As the the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines and the British discovered, 'friends' change...

That is a given and you adjust as things change. The ultimate goal remains the same.


A far better solution than a perimeter is the ability to respond to provocations with the proper instruments, political or military, rapidly and overwhelmingly locally to deter future provocations and that's, thankfully, where we at last seem to be headed. Long past time...

I disagree. It looks to me as if we are still pursuing the same strategy. We are doing our best to make sure that potentially hostile countries that may be able to deploy powerful navies can't easily get to the oceans.

[carl]

Who would you contain?

Any hostile or potentially hostile country that could deploy a powerful navy.


It seems less about containment to me than to an effort to respond to perceived threats wherever they emerge... not so much about establishing a clear perimeter as a global game of whack-a-mole.

Why are they threats? If you are trying to maintain a perimeter, people will try to penetrate it at various places and you are going to end up playing whack-a-mole.


Either way, as you say, none of this has any relation to empire, and thus it belongs on another thread.

David can handle that when he will.

[AmericanPride]

When Napoleon conquered Europe, he did not only introduce the Napoleonic Code and inspire local nationalisms. He also imposed a severe form of political-economic relationships. From each state he subdued, he demanded outright large sums of treasure. There was a massive influx of foreign wealth into the treasury of France and the personal accounts of Napoleon, his siblings, and his bureaucrats and generals. This is empire. His empire faltered not only on the battlefield, but also because he drained the wealth of his conquests and could no longer finance his campaigns.

I use to subscribe to the theory of the United States as an empire in itself. But the events since 2008 have altered my views. I think the 'empire' can more accurately be described as a global financial empire, with a number of extremely wealthy individuals, families, and corporations at the top. What is an empire? An empire is a system of political control that enables the appropriation of one sub-systems wealth for the benefit of another, dominating sub-system. Historically, this was accomplished through the conquest of nations and states by other nations and states, with the wealth simply pillaged from the villages and treasuries. There is a long, obvious list of this process occurring around the world throughout history, with the Soviet Union in my view as the last "great" empire in this traditional sense. Now, the virtual elimination of financial controls and accountability enabled by the digitization of wealth and finance allows empire to evolve from an object to a process.

What is the role of the United States in this system? The weight of America's economic, political, and military power was used to force open the international system. This was not always the role of the US, since this agenda competed with other moral, political, economic, and security interests. I would place the start of financial primacy somewhere in the late 1970s or early 1980s, with its full power revealed in the first decade of the 20th century. But what is the future of the US central role in this process now that it's fragility has been exposed to the world? The deindustrialization was the first stage in this process, followed by its de-financialization, which has culminated in the situation we are facing now. Next, the material wealth of the US will be expropriated to pay off the public debts incurred in the first two stages. This is already occurring in Greece and Italy. The American people are paying for this process, and their wealth is ending up in the pockets of the global financial elite. This is the definition of empire.

[Ken White]

That applies to individuals and has mostly to do with political controls or lack thereof at borders. It didn't have anything to do with a hostile nation state having free access to the oceans so its' navy could roam around easily. That is what I mean. That is what the perimeter looks like it is about.That's what it looks like to you and to many in the foreign policy establishment.

However, to others, that is a rather narrow view as that hostile nation state is now able to far more easily move far more individuals about and get far more of them in key locations and positions to frustrate your aim to maintain your perimeter.
That has nothing at all to do with what I'm talking about.Oh but it does. Those adherents and supporters can disrupt, politically and practically, any plans you have. As a minor example, the Viet Nam war protestors did not cause the failure of that effort -- but they did have an effect that aided that failure. Major Nidal Malik Hasan was such an adherent. He was one person performing one sad act -- the potential for dozens of such acts, coordinated over the internet is a very real possibility and, target dependent, can have a significant impact as his one off effort did not.

That communication ability and the transnational mobility can have significant impacts on a nations desire and capability to establish and maintain a perimeter (and or the political will of the political class...). Most such impact may be minor and may be long term but their cumulative effect can be decisive and many other nations are far more patient and less short term focused that the US happens to be.
Well naturally a perimeter has to be maintained. But it is established because there is some benefit to be derived from it. If it falls into disuse you lose the benefit.If it ceases to be a benefit due to changing circumstance and you continue to maintain it, you lose the benefit and sustain a cost that could be better expended elsewhere...:eek:
That is a given and you adjust as things change. The ultimate goal remains the same.Does it?
I disagree. It looks to me as if we are still pursuing the same strategy. We are doing our best to make sure that potentially hostile countries that may be able to deploy powerful navies can't easily get to the oceans.The US does not do its best except in rare circumstances and we are not doing our best at that today; it's a half hearted effort nowadays while we adjust. The US also is by design very slow to change its focus and policies. A few folks in Washington are still so focused. Fortunately, more there IMO are more forward looking and preparing for change. This LINK (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jTJeu2vLniWcT_-Sqc5IQQUOPesQ?docId=CNG.1e15397ba6f112f35bec6eb7fd 662ef1.1b1) is but one example. There are others even better and more telling. We'll see.

American Pride notes the changes taking place that started with the Cllinton - Rubin - Summers strong move to American economic as opposed to military hegemony, an effort that began rather slowly under Reagan and that George H.W. Bush continued. George W. Bush came in inclined to continue that effort but unfortunately his and Rumsfeld's ideas had to be put aside due to 9/11 -- an incident that has its roots in the flawed 'extended perimeter' theory that was a default position after the true containment that was barely possible during the Cold War no longer had a reason to continue. Presidents from Reagan forward tried to continue to keep stuff out on the periphery. They all failed. Hopefully, the next one will be a bit smarter; the system may aid him or her in doing that -- it's realized that things have changed. So has Professor Doctor Lieutenant Colonel Bacevich (LINK) (http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-withdrawal-from-iraq-marks-the-end-of-american-supremacy/2011/12/12/gIQAStpTyO_story.html). I don't often agree with him but he's about right on this

As I said, we, by design, change slowly...

[Surferbeetle]

What is the role of the United States in this system? The weight of America's economic, political, and military power was used to force open the international system. This was not always the role of the US, since this agenda competed with other moral, political, economic, and security interests. I would place the start of financial primacy somewhere in the late 1970s or early 1980s, with its full power revealed in the first decade of the 20th century. But what is the future of the US central role in this process now that it's fragility has been exposed to the world? The deindustrialization was the first stage in this process, followed by its de-financialization, which has culminated in the situation we are facing now. Next, the material wealth of the US will be expropriated to pay off the public debts incurred in the first two stages. This is already occurring in Greece and Italy. The American people are paying for this process, and their wealth is ending up in the pockets of the global financial elite. This is the definition of empire.

Hey AP,

This is a very interesting thesis...have you spent time in Iraq, and are you up for sharing some references?

Iraq trade routes (ancient & modern), privatization efforts, land titles, taxation (state and 'informal'), the 'swiss dinar', the banking system, the lack/incapacity of economic (as well as OSHA and EPA type) regulatory structures, and generator cooperatives (private electrical power solutions), were very interesting to observe on the ground ('03-'04 and '10) from a construction and business viewpoint and to contrast with western systems.

Satyajit Das' book Extreme Money: Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk, Peter Bernstein's book Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk, David S. Landes' book The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, Jurgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson's book Globalization: A Short History, and the USIP's book Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, are interesting to me. I also enjoy the Financial Times www.ft.com (Lex in particular) and find the blog ZeroHedge http://www.zerohedge.com/ to be interesting.

[Dayuhan]

Any hostile or potentially hostile country that could deploy a powerful navy.

It's been a long time since we were seriously worried about anybody's navy.


Why are they threats? If you are trying to maintain a perimeter, people will try to penetrate it at various places and you are going to end up playing whack-a-mole.

Is anyone, anywhere, trying to "penetrate our perimeter"? For that matter, what is our perimeter?


What is the role of the United States in this system? The weight of America's economic, political, and military power was used to force open the international system.

I'm not entirely sure that's true. The international system opened less because America forced it open than because people took advantage of opportunities that openness provided. Participation in that open system has been largely voluntary and largely driven by the desire to take advantage of opportunity. Others have taken advantage rather more effectively than we have. Certainly openness has been opposed in many places by vested interests that saw it as a threat to their dominance of the status quo, but the pressure to open has generally been internal and outbound rather than America forcing its way in.


But what is the future of the US central role in this process now that it's fragility has been exposed to the world? The deindustrialization was the first stage in this process, followed by its de-financialization, which has culminated in the situation we are facing now. Next, the material wealth of the US will be expropriated to pay off the public debts incurred in the first two stages. This is already occurring in Greece and Italy. The American people are paying for this process, and their wealth is ending up in the pockets of the global financial elite. This is the definition of empire.

Again I think the problem is being misconstrued. It's not so much that wealth is being transferred, it's more that imaginary wealth is being exposed as imaginary. If you look at the great losses of "wealth" that occurred in, say, the stock market crash in 2000/2001 and the recent real estate crash, you see pretty quickly that most of the "wealth" that was "lost" never really existed in the first place, other than through consensual delusion.


American Pride notes the changes taking place that started with the Cllinton - Rubin - Summers strong move to American economic as opposed to military hegemony, an effort that began rather slowly under Reagan and that George H.W. Bush continued.

Possibly that was the intention, but American economic hegemony has substantially declined since that time. Economic hegemony is seldom a product of conscious choice or intent: it emerges from superior economic performance.

[Ken White]

Possibly that was the intention, but American economic hegemony has substantially declined since that time. Economic hegemony is seldom a product of conscious choice or intent: it emerges from superior economic performance.However, Rubin was able to and did nudge the process a bit due to actual and imaginary performance at the time... :wry:

[omarali50]

I prefer to stick to simple definitions and the US is not an empire in my mind. But it is interesting to see how many people on this site don't mind the term at all..one lives and learns. That is why its always good to ask. One can find out a lot by just asking...
The way I usually hear the term used is in postmodern/postcolonial discourse (for some reason, the South Asian upper classes are very heavily invested in this concoction..much more so that the Chinese or the Vietnamese..I have some vague theories about why that may be so). There, it is taken for granted that the US is an empire..in fact it is "the empire" without need for further qualification. I find it very irritating, not because I approve of US foreign policy or all its interventions around the world, but because I find it to be a remarkably useless term; misleading and so far from reality that anyone using it as their main unit of analysis is bound to hit a brick wall very soon....

[AmericanPride]

This is a very interesting thesis...have you spent time in Iraq, and are you up for sharing some references?

Iraq trade routes (ancient & modern), privatization efforts, land titles, taxation (state and 'informal'), the 'swiss dinar', the banking system, the lack/incapacity of economic (as well as OSHA and EPA type) regulatory structures, and generator cooperatives (private electrical power solutions), were very interesting to observe on the ground ('03-'04 and '10) from a construction and business viewpoint and to contrast with western systems.

Satyajit Das' book Extreme Money: Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk, Peter Bernstein's book Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk, David S. Landes' book The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, Jurgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson's book Globalization: A Short History, and the USIP's book Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, are interesting to me. I also enjoy the Financial Times www.ft.com (Lex in particular) and find the blog ZeroHedge http://www.zerohedge.com/ to be interesting.

Surf, I have not spent any time in Iraq. My overseas time was spent in northern Kunar and eastern Nuristan in Afghanistan. While I was there, it was announced in the media that Afghanistan had an estimated 3 trillion dollars in untapped mineral wealth. This of course was known since the 1960s. In addition, there has been decades worth of discussions about accessing Central Asian energy resources via Afghanistan, including the Clinton administration's negotiations with the Taliban. So I doubt that we've spent nearly a half trillion dollars fighting in the country for the sole purpose of killing/capturing the fifty or so Al Qaeda operatives that ISAF estimates to be there (on a side note, the Taliban did initially offer to surrender bin Laden, but to a third country; the easy way to capture him at that time would have been to accept and then to interdict his transportation, similar to Reagan in 1985; isn't he a Republican hero?).

The most useful books for me have been Antonio Negri's Empire, which argues that there exists a new global constitution independent of any one nation-state, and the first part of Michael Ruppert's Crossing the Rubicon, which discusses some of the political motivation behind US interest in Central Asia. I don't buy the conclusion of either book, I do find their constructs useful for explaining political and security developments.


I'm not entirely sure that's true. The international system opened less because America forced it open than because people took advantage of opportunities that openness provided. Participation in that open system has been largely voluntary and largely driven by the desire to take advantage of opportunity. Others have taken advantage rather more effectively than we have. Certainly openness has been opposed in many places by vested interests that saw it as a threat to their dominance of the status quo, but the pressure to open has generally been internal and outbound rather than America forcing its way in.

I'd say the truth is somewhere closer to the middle. The Europeans only accepted after their imperial economies were destroyed in a series of global wars. Same with Japan. Much of the struggle of the Cold War was not about two lifestyles or ideologies, but two incompatible economic systems of power. The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a final victory, with the eventually acceptance of China, Russia, etc into this new world order. But I think it should be clarified that any voluntary decision, full or partial, was made by a nation-state's elites and not by its populace. Resistance remains around the world, most notably in the form of Islamic radicalism. However, a growing multitude of dissidents, "global citizens," are also voicing their concerns and taking to the streets. Only recently has the attention of the global financial class have turned to Europeans and Americans. And in there lies my greatest criticism.


Again I think the problem is being misconstrued. It's not so much that wealth is being transferred, it's more that imaginary wealth is being exposed as imaginary. If you look at the great losses of "wealth" that occurred in, say, the stock market crash in 2000/2001 and the recent real estate crash, you see pretty quickly that most of the "wealth" that was "lost" never really existed in the first place, other than through consensual delusion.

This I agree with, insofar that the digitization of wealth and its decoupling from a mineral standard (i.e. gold) has contributed to the explosion of money, specifically in the finance industry, which has ballooned from 13% of US GDP to over 150% since the 1970s. It is like a runaway virus. Much of contemporary discussion focuses on its economic implications. I am more interested in its political and security consequences. So it is my view that finanicalization has produced a global regime, fragmented, haphazard, and short-sighted, but with a universalizing mission nonetheless. And it has now set its sights on expropriating the real wealth of Americans (and Europeans). Instead of using armies and navies, it uses parliaments and laws.

[jmm99]

Online downloads (here (http://www.angelfire.com/cantina/negri/)) and Negri Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Negri).

Regards

Mike

[ganulv]

Again I think the problem is being misconstrued. It's not so much that wealth is being transferred, it's more that imaginary wealth is being exposed as imaginary. If you look at the great losses of "wealth" that occurred in, say, the stock market crash in 2000/2001 and the recent real estate crash, you see pretty quickly that most of the "wealth" that was "lost" never really existed in the first place, other than through consensual delusion.
in his book Zombie capitalism: global crisis and the relevance of Marx (http://www.haymarketbooks.org/pb/Zombie-Capitalism). You don’t to know anything about Marx to come to that conclusion, but coming to it via Marx doesn’t make it wrong, either.

[Tukhachevskii]

This kind of question has to start with a definition...



OED. QED.

The operative terms: "ruled over", "supreme political power", "control".

Unless someone can tell us who America rules or controls, there is no empire. The term may be used as a rhetorical flourish, but there's little substance to it. The only way you can speak of an American Empire is to dilute the definition of the term "empire" to a point where it no longer means anything at all.

Empire is very much a flaccid / non-rigid designator (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rigid_designator) (to use Kripke’s suggestive term) as it seems to possess different qualities or denote differing activities depending upon the purpose of the enunciator. This is a problem that socio-linguists call “field specific vocabulary”. Very often the sense and reference of a word or proper noun (&c) may diverge in actual usage (often called semantic slippage). Dictionary definitions (and I’ve said this before (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=121434&postcount=46)) don’t really help considering (quoting Wittgenstein) that usage defines meaning. Can you guess that I despise analytical philosophy / logical positivism:D That said I agree with Prof. Finley (http://www.jstor.org/pss/642267) when he says ...

Historians, we are told on all sides, have signally failed to clarify the terms 'empire' and 'imperialism', though they employ them all the time. The man in the street, curiously enough, sees no great problem, and I shall argue that he is right. Much of the trouble in the professional literature stems from a elementary confusion between a definition and a typology. It would not be a useful definition of empire, for example, that excluded either the Athenian or the Persian empire because Athens was a democratic city-state or Persia an autocratic monarchy; whereas that distinction might be important in both a typology and an analysis.


Here, here. Historians and international relations theorists have pro-offered their own definitions. Alexander Moytl, in Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse and Revival of Empires (http://www.amazon.com/Imperial-Ends-Alexander-J-Motyl/dp/0231121105) offers this definition...


• I define empire as a hierarchically organized political system with a hub like structure—a rimless wheel—within which a core elite and state dominate peripheral elites and societies by serving as intermediaries for their significant interactions and by channelling resource flows from the periphery to the core and back to the periphery.
• Continuous empires are tightly massed and, in all likelihood, territorially contiguous; discontinuous empires are loosely arranged and often involve overseas territories.
• The core elite’s rule of the periphery may be formal, involving substantial meddling in the personnel and policies of the periphery, or informal, involving significantly less interference and control.
• Decay is the weakening of the core’s rule of the periphery.
• Decline is a reduction in the imperial state’s power in general and military capability in particular.
• Disassemblage entails the emergence of significant interperiphery relations and spells the end of empire as a peculiarly structured political system.
• Attrition is the progressive loss of bits and pieces of peripheral territories.
• Collapse is the rapid and comprehensive breakdown of the hub like imperial structure.
• Revival, or reimperialization, is the re-emergence of empire—that is to say, the reconstitution of a hub like structure between a former core and all or some of the former periphery. (p. 4-5)
Moytl’s “hub-like structure” is similar to the that discussed in “What’s at Stake in the American Empire Debate” (https://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/APSRMay07NexonWright.pdf).


Peter Turchin, in War and Peace and War (http://www.amazon.co.uk/War-Peace-Rise-Fall-Empires/dp/0452288193/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1324290409&sr=1-1), offers this...

An empire is a large, multiethnic territorial state with a complex power structure. The key variable is the size. When large enough, states invariably encompass ethnically diverse people; this makes them into multiethnic states. And given the difficulties of communication in pre-industrial times, large states had to come up with a variety of ad hoc ways to bind far-flung territories to the centre. One of the typical expedients was to incorporate smaller neighbours as self-contained units, imposing tribute on them and taking over their foreign relations, but otherwise leaving their internal functioning alone. Such a process of piecemeal accumulation usually leads to complicated chains of command and the coexistence of heterogeneous territories within one state.( p.3)


I think a working definition of empire would be command (which includes the fuzzier notion of influence) –itself derived from the ancient Greek notion of Hegemony- of one territorial polity over another whether formally or informally (often also called hegemony in some circles). This approach deployed by David Healy in his article ‘Imperialism’, in the Encyclopaedia of American Foreign Policy, Vol. 2, 2nd Ed (http://www.amazon.com/Encyclopedia-American-Foreign-Policy-2/dp/0684806576) which takes his analysis through the US’s formal imperial phase (i.e., continental expansion, the annexation of Texas, the Philippines, etc.) through to its modern informal stage (I highly recommend this to Dayuhan). However, Prof. Finley’s typology is also helpful ...



A crude typology of the various ways in which one state may exercise its power over others for its own benefit will be helpful at this point:
1) restriction of freedom of action in interstate relations;
2) political, administrative, or judicial interference in local affairs;
3) military and naval conscription;
4) the exaction of 'tribute' in some form, whether in the narrow sense of a regular lump sum or as a land tax or as transport tolls or in other ways;
5) confiscation of land, with or without subsequent emigration of settlers from the imperial state;
6) other forms of economic subordination or exploitation, ranging from control of the seas, trade embargoes, and 'Navigation Acts' to compulsory delivery of goods below the prevailing market price, and the like.

I stress the word 'may': inclusion in the 'empire' category does not depend on the presence of all these forms of exploitation together.
I think those with more time on their hands than I currently have can provide examples for the US for each of these (and, of course, for other countries!;)).


A different typological definition would be that of archaeologists Michael E. Smith and Lisa Montiel (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278416500903726) (cf. JPEG below). Jan Nederveen Pieterse seems to be using a number of these when discussing U.S. “Neoliberal Empire” (http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/21/3/119.abstract);

‘Universalistic empires, in their dominant political culture and/or political practice, do not recognize other polities as legitimate equals.’ This is in other words ‘empire without end’ (as Virgil described the Roman Empire). Neoliberal globalization was universalistic as an economic regime (free markets are the sole effective system); the war on terrorism is universalistic in giving the United States the exclusive and combined roles of prosecutor, judge and executioner. Major previous empires claimed legal status. That the Roman and British Empires brought the rule of law was the basis of their claim to constitute a ‘Pax’. Neoliberal globalization was rules-based, but the new empire is founded on the rule of power, not the rule of law. The United States doesn’t endorse the International Criminal Court, claims exemption from its mandate for American nationals and uses this in negotiating trade and aid. The US exists in a state of ‘international legal nihilism’ with a steadily growing record of breaches of international law. These features are encoded in the Bush Doctrine: ‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’; and the threat of preventive strike, including nuclear strike. The former sets the terms for universalism and the latter places the United States outside international law (p.121).

[cont. below]

[Tukhachevskii]

It would appear from a book review in Orbis ( http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=the%20mechanics%20of%20empire&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CF0QFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fpri.org%2Forbis%2F4901%2Fhil len.mechanicsofempire.pdf&ei=2BLvTuvyJojc8gOMzc2PCg&usg=AFQjCNGCToibIG15d0wB_Ur_HOaZZJd0Rw) that various authors also see the US as an empire but with varying accents on “empire” as a concept. However, I feel only a dictionary definition, for all its non-rigidness (an oxymoron I know given the purpose of dictionaries) will suffice for Duyahan. As such, I see your definition and raise you this, with the aid of my magnifying glass, from The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1, A-O ( http://www.google.co.uk/products/catalog?hl=en&q=the+compact+edition+of+the+oxford+english+dictio nary&um=1&ie=UTF-8&tbm=shop&cid=17829532425130888873&sa=X&ei=eRTvTpLOAoiZ8gO9lN2UCg&ved=0CEgQ8wIwAA#) (I knew it would come in handy some day:rolleyes:);



Empire:

Owing partly to historical circumstances, and partly to the sense of the etymological connexion between the two words, empire has always had the specific sense ‘rule or territory of an Emperor’ [which see Finley’s comments above-T] as well as the wider meaning which it derives from its etymology.
I. Imperial Rule or dignity.
1. Supreme and extensive political dominion; esp. that exercised by an ‘emperor’ (in the earlier senses), or by a sovereign state over its dependencies.
2. transf. and fig. Paramount influence, absolute sway, supreme command or control [NATO anyone?! I would have included S. Korea but C&C reverts to them soon!- T]
3. The dignity or position of an emperor also the reign of an emperor.
4. A government in which the sovereign has the title of emperor.

II That which is subject to imperial rule.
5. An extensive territory (esp. an aggregate of many separate states) under the sway of an emperor or supreme ruler; also, an aggregate of subject territories ruled over by a sovereign state.
6. transf. and fig. (cf. realm).
7. A country of which the sovereign owes no allegiance to any foreign superior.

III. 8. attrib. and Comp., as empire-plan, -race, etc.; (in matters of dress, of the first Napoleonic empire) Empire City, State; in U.S. a name for the City and State of New York.
(p.854)

So much for clarification. :o

[ganulv]

Dictionary definitions (and I’ve said this before (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=121434&postcount=46)) don’t really help considering (quoting Wittgenstein) that usage defines meaning.
Lexicography has come a long way since Herr Wittgenstein’s time. Any contemporary dictionary worth consulting has utilized corpora (http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/) in the process of article creation.


Very often the sense and reference of a word or proper noun (&c) may diverge in actual usage (often called semantic slippage).I’m guessing that anyone who has spent any amount of time in the military could probably act as an expert witness in spotting this phenomenon.


A different typological definition would be that of archaeologists Michael E. Smith and Lisa Montiel (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278416500903726) (cf. JPEG below).Professor Smith’s work is interesting enough, but IMHO he’s still trying to formulate typologies and explain the real world by hammering facts into them. My own take is that trying to explain complexity is bogged down by the formulation, justification, and reformulation of typologies. A 1:1 map of the world doesn’t do a bit of good, either, of course…

[carl]

However, to others, that is a rather narrow view as that hostile nation state is now able to far more easily move far more individuals about and get far more of them in key locations and positions to frustrate your aim to maintain your perimeter.Oh but it does. Those adherents and supporters can disrupt, politically and practically, any plans you have. As a minor example, the Viet Nam war protestors did not cause the failure of that effort -- but they did have an effect that aided that failure. Major Nidal Malik Hasan was such an adherent. He was one person performing one sad act -- the potential for dozens of such acts, coordinated over the internet is a very real possibility and, target dependent, can have a significant impact as his one off effort did not.

What you are talking about are networks of agents and saboteurs. Those have been around since the beginning of time, and have been controlled, or not controlled since the beginning of time. There is no fundamental change there. James Wilkerson, the senior American general in the early 1800s, was a Spanish spy. So, no, I think it doesn't. Everybody wants to ascribe to the internet, iphones and tweets some revolutionary effects. There are some effect, but I don't think they have been revolutionary.

Just as freedom of movement of people across borders hasn't changed much. In fact in some places and ways, it was far easier in the old days. Look at American migration to Texas. That resulted in Mexico losing the state. So again, no. Nothing fundamental has changed.


If it ceases to be a benefit due to changing circumstance and you continue to maintain it, you lose the benefit and sustain a cost that could be better expended elsewhere...:eek:

The question isn't if a strategic arrangement, maintaining a far perimeter, can become obsolete and not be worth the cost. That is of course true. The question is has it. I think it may still have considerable value.


Fortunately, more there IMO are more forward looking and preparing for change. This LINK (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jTJeu2vLniWcT_-Sqc5IQQUOPesQ?docId=CNG.1e15397ba6f112f35bec6eb7fd 662ef1.1b1) is but one example. There are others even better and more telling. We'll see.

This may turn out to be a game changer on the order of ocean going ships. I doubt it. It will more likely be another in a long line of technological marvels that makes war more deadly, but does not change the basic patterns. Hypersonic bombs delivering warheads from far away are really cool but you still have to find the target, actually hit the target, do enough damage to disable or destroy the target and do it often enough to make a difference. We'll see. I don't think it will make navies or the importance of freedom of navigation for big ships less important.


Presidents from Reagan forward tried to continue to keep stuff out on the periphery. They all failed.

What failure? Most of our fights have been on the periphery. After 9-11 we moved out quick to the periphery as best we could figure it. I think the driving force in many American actions has been to preserve the advantage that primitive technology and distance gave us for the first 120 years or so of our existence. That being that all those wars happened over there, not over here. Tech changed with development of motorized ships and we had to change with it to keep the wars over there. We no longer just depend the wars being over there because they couldn't come over here. We had to fight on the periphery of over there to keep the wars from coming here.

The internet wows the young and the beltway people but it hasn't had the effect that motorized long range ships have had on the strategic calculus of the world.

[Ken White]

What you are talking about are networks of agents and saboteurs. Those have been around since the beginning of time...Look at American migration to Texas. That resulted in Mexico losing the state. So again, no. Nothing fundamental has changed.Nothing fundamental has changed. However, the capability to organize efforts in both those aspects in this era has changed. As could the numbers of such folks and the effects they can try to achieve. That coupled with the decreased power of States and the societal softening changes worldwide introduced in the last 50 years so provide some opportunities for others and some significant restraints on our actions -- some domestic political -- which never before existed.
The question isn't if a strategic arrangement, maintaining a far perimeter, can become obsolete and not be worth the cost...

This may turn out to be a game changer on the order of ocean going ships...I don't think it will make navies or the importance of freedom of navigation for big ships less important.Others agree with you. Many do not, I don't. We'll see.
What failure? Most of our fights have been on the periphery.The failures which demonstrate the flaws in the theory in the current era. Those include the failure to react properly against the Embassy seizure in Tehran, all the foolishness and waste in Lebanon, all the other probes and provocations from the ME to which we reacted poorly or not at all, the flaws of Desert Storm, diddling around in Somalia, even Libya -- all flawed, all misapplications of force which due to poor execution exposed weaknesses in our capabilities that invite further failures.
After 9-11 we moved out quick to the periphery as best we could figure it. I think the driving force in many American actions has been to preserve the advantage that primitive technology and distance gave us for the first 120 years or so of our existence. That being that all those wars happened over there, not over here... We had to fight on the periphery of over there to keep the wars from coming here.We can agree on that.
The internet wows the young and the beltway people but it hasn't had the effect that motorized long range ships have had on the strategic calculus of the world.We can also agree on that.

However, a lesser effect is not no effect. Put simply, opponents have capabilities and flexibility they did not have before and we do not have all the capabilities and freedom of action that we once possessed. The world has changed -- is still changing -- and we are behind the curve.

Where we disagree is on the utility today of trying to keep things out on the periphery. In my view that Internet and the speed of today's movement versus that of even 50 years ago negate the advantages of a far perimeter in an era where we have become far larger -- and a wealthier, more juicy target -- more clumsy, far more domestically politically polarized and for many reasons considerably less flexible in our abilities to react...

Ponder overextension (LINK) (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Overextension)..

[carl]

Nothing fundamental has changed. However, the capability to organize efforts in both those aspects in this era has changed. As could the numbers of such folks and the effects they can try to achieve. That coupled with the decreased power of States and the societal softening changes worldwide introduced in the last 50 years so provide some opportunities for others and some significant restraints on our actions -- some domestic political -- which never before existed.

We'll have to disagree on this. I don't see much change in capability either. You want capability look at the old Comintern. Those guys had capability and not a twitter account among them. I don't see the decreased power of "States" either. I see some weak States and some strong ones, just like always.


The failures which demonstrate the flaws in the theory in the current era. Those include the failure to react properly against the Embassy seizure in Tehran, all the foolishness and waste in Lebanon, all the other probes and provocations from the ME to which we reacted poorly or not at all, the flaws of Desert Storm, diddling around in Somalia, even Libya -- all flawed, all misapplications of force which due to poor execution exposed weaknesses in our capabilities that invite further failures.

Your original statement was this "Presidents from Reagan forward tried to continue to keep stuff out on the periphery. They all failed." All the places you mentioned are out on the periphery. They may have been failures of execution but they were failures of execution on the periphery, where we can afford them. There was no failure to keep stuff out on the periphery. All those things are still in a state of flux, out on the periphery.

9-11 is the glaring exception and we moved lickety-split to try and push that threat back out.


However, a lesser effect is not no effect. Put simply, opponents have capabilities and flexibility they did not have before and we do not have all the capabilities and freedom of action that we once possessed. The world has changed -- is still changing -- and we are behind the curve.

Where we disagree is on the utility today of trying to keep things out on the periphery. In my view that Internet and the speed of today's movement versus that of even 50 years ago negate the advantages of a far perimeter in an era where we have become far larger -- and a wealthier, more juicy target -- more clumsy, far more domestically politically polarized and for many reasons considerably less flexible in our abilities to react...

It is always a competition between what we can do and what they can do and how fast both can do it.

The far perimeter in my view is still important because the things that move and apply real power are still the physical things, the ships and organized bodies of men. Keeping them on the other side of the oceans is still a matter of holding, with the help of friends, that far perimeter. The internet and immigration don't affect those things so much.

[Ken White]

We'll have to disagree on this.You want capability look at the old Comintern. Those guys had capability and not a twitter account among them.Very familiar with them. Hopefully you noted that the bulk of their true successes, many of which still bedevil us, were in the areas of Agitprop and Intel ops; their actual military successes were virtually nil. ;)
All the places you mentioned are out on the periphery. They may have been failures of execution but they were failures of execution on the periphery, where we can afford them...There was no failure to keep stuff out on the periphery. All those things are still in a state of flux, out on the periphery.Can we afford them? As even you go on to note, most are still in a state of flux and that periphery affects us significantly (among many other things like Afghanistan, see TSA and the costs of added 'security' to our economy...)
9-11 is the glaring exception and we moved lickety-split to try and push that threat back out.Uh huh. How we doing on that? Lickety split is rarely the best way to handle threats.
It is always a competition between what we can do and what they can do and how fast both can do it.Picture Joe wearing 90 pounds of stuff leaving his air conditioned billet in an air conditioned MRAP after a breakfast of SOS and Eggs in the air conditioned DFAC and then picture his Afghan opponent with maybe 20 pounds of stuff and a rice ball for breakfast. No freon. Who's going to be the most agile...

Picture a US intel Analyst who picks up a good intercept and tries to get some action on it but the Chain of Command has other priorities - versus his Afghan counterpart who has no chain, just a direct boss. Who's going to be the most agile.

That carries all the way to the top. There is no competition on speed and their speed far outweighs our "what we can do"...
The far perimeter in my view is still important because the things that move and apply real power are still the physical things, the ships and organized bodies of men.Really? Would it were so. We're going broke fighting shadows out on the periphery...
Keeping them on the other side of the oceans is still a matter of holding, with the help of friends, that far perimeter. The internet and immigration don't affect those things so much.We can disagree on all that. Same old story -- don't fight the other guy on his turf using his rules...

[carl]

Very familiar with them. Hopefully you noted that the bulk of their true successes, many of which still bedevil us, were in the areas of Agitprop and Intel ops; their actual military successes were virtually nil. ;)

I take you basic position vis-a-vis the movement of people and modern internet commo to be the following. "Those adherents and supporters can disrupt, politically and practically, any plans you have. As a minor example, the Viet Nam war protestors did not cause the failure of that effort -- but they did have an effect that aided that failure." Now that seems to be related to what you say the bulk of the true successes of the Comintern were, agitprop and intel ops. Which is why I said that that all this internet, people movement stuff isn't anything new, that is has been done for forever. Where did "actual military successes" come from?


Can we afford them? As even you go on to note, most are still in a state of flux and that periphery affects us significantly (among many other things like Afghanistan, see TSA and the costs of added 'security' to our economy...)

I would answer, can we afford not to keep them on the periphery? That cost of keeping them on the periphery is significant but not fatal, or even close to fatal. The costs of letting them get close would I judge be far greater.

TSA is not on the periphery. It is security theatre staged right here.


Uh huh. How we doing on that? Lickety split is rarely the best way to handle threats.

Well, so far we haven't had another 9-11. That may change in the next 5 minutes, but up to now it has worked out pretty good in that respect.


Picture Joe wearing 90 pounds of stuff leaving his air conditioned billet in an air conditioned MRAP after a breakfast of SOS and Eggs in the air conditioned DFAC and then picture his Afghan opponent with maybe 20 pounds of stuff and a rice ball for breakfast. No freon. Who's going to be the most agile...

Picture a US intel Analyst who picks up a good intercept and tries to get some action on it but the Chain of Command has other priorities - versus his Afghan counterpart who has no chain, just a direct boss. Who's going to be the most agile.

What does that have to do with the comment that prompted it? What does this have to do with strategy of maintaining a far perimeter? It has a lot to do with a less than proficient military though.


Same old story -- don't fight the other guy on his turf using his rules...

Beats the hell out of fighting him on our turf, which is the whole point of maintaining the far perimeter.

[Ken White]

Where did "actual military successes" come from?Here:"The far perimeter in my view is still important because the things that move and apply real power are still the physical things, the ships and organized bodies of men."
I would answer, can we afford not to keep them on the periphery? That cost of keeping them on the periphery is significant but not fatal, or even close to fatal. The costs of letting them get close would I judge be far greater.Perhaps. Much depends on who 'they' are -- and how we respond to them. As I keep unsuccessfully trying to show, the situation and the 'rules' have changed. You don't appear to think so, I do so we're unlikely to agree and that's okay.
TSA is not on the periphery. It is security theatre staged right here.Obviously. It's also quite expensive security theater in more ways than the cost of the service. The impact on US productivity is real and as unnecessary as is periphery theater. That's not a slam; there's a place for periphery line holding but as a general rule, the result is not worth the expense. One size fits all seldom is effective be it airport screening or line monitoring / holding.
Well, so far we haven't had another 9-11. That may change in the next 5 minutes, but up to now it has worked out pretty good in that respect.We'll never know how other options might have accomplished the same thing...
What does that have to do with the comment that prompted it? What does this have to do with strategy of maintaining a far perimeter? It has a lot to do with a less than proficient military though.Can't believe you missed the connection. It has to with just that, the proficiency thing -- but not just the military, that too -- rather the entire spectrum of action and responses. Our total government lack of flexibility and more importantly our self imposed restraints will be consistently out run or circumvented by those who are more adept and less concerned with rules.
Beats the hell out of fighting him on our turf, which is the whole point of maintaining the far perimeter.Or we could lure him to turf or time of our choosing where our rules work not to his advantage but to ours... ;)

[carl]

I still don't understand how military success got in there since I contend that movement of people and internet is nothing new and nothing more than networks of agents controlled from outside if that. They really aren't that important and don't mean much militarily. I used Comintern as an example of how effective networks existed in the past. They you said the Comintern had virtually nil military success. I'll buy that. What has military success are military forces normally, not twitter enabled enthusiasts.

I still don't understand what TSA airport security theatre has to do with keeping trouble far out on the periphery.

We will never know if things other than what we did overseas post 9-11 would have worked better. But still we know what we did has worked so far.

I did and still miss the connection. My original comment was a banal observation that there is always competition between them and us relative to capabilities and speed of application. You responded with examples of ineptitude. There would be a connection if we were by nature incapable of competing. I don't buy that. Where we are showing deficiencies we should identify and fix them, not throw up our hands and say, we just can't.

What are these rules you mention that we are concerned with and they are not?

Luring the enemy to our turf sounds great but there is the how are we going to do that problem combined with we are seeking mostly to maintain a status quo and they want to change things. That gives them the initiative, unless we go out to where they are, the periphery, and keep them occupied. That is taking the big picture initiative away from them I think.

[Ken White]

on most all of that...

[Bob's World]

In a piece I am preparing for work I lay out five points that I am currently labeling as "Strategic Assertions" (open to good ideas for a better heading). The first assertion could probably be informally called "relax and breathe":

1. The U.S. is incredibly secure and stable. No other nation enjoys the strong geo-strategic and geo-political reality enjoyed by the U.S., and this reality is not challenged in any existential way. The U.S. possesses global key terrain, is rich in resources of every nature and secure from invasion. The nature of the U.S populace and construct and evolution of our political systems are uniquely suited to the populace-empowered environment emerging on the back of rapid technological advances. While these advances do empower new challengers difficult for states to control, such control is not necessary to guard our future security. It is critical to the security of the nation to recognize while yes, the U.S. has troops in combat; the U.S. absolutely is not a nation at war. To assert a “war” status for every combat action creates unnecessary strategic risks for our nation and limits far more options than it enables. Freeing senior leaders from the strategic burden of “winning” the current fight empowers them to embrace more effective approaches across the span of domestic and foreign policy designed to secure our vital interests into the future.

More than "running an Empire" the US is working to maintain its national interests as it has come to define them, in a manner it has grown accustomed to applying. As the environment has evolved there have emerged new challengers that are not well addressed by the old tools of statecraft, and that make the degree of certainty we have grown used to in recent years increasingly difficult to sustain at a reasonable cost. This first assertion is to simply offer a reminder that in the big scheme of things we are sitting pretty damn good.

[davidbfpo]

Robert's quest:
In a piece I am preparing for work I lay out five points that I am currently labeling as "Strategic Assertions" (open to good ideas for a better heading).

It seems to be an educational awareness project from the first point.

So my offer of a heading is: Less Shock, More Awe: Know where the USA is.

[AmericanPride]

In a piece I am preparing for work I lay out five points that I am currently labeling as "Strategic Assertions" (open to good ideas for a better heading). The first assertion could probably be informally called "relax and breathe":

1. The U.S. is incredibly secure and stable. No other nation enjoys the strong geo-strategic and geo-political reality enjoyed by the U.S., and this reality is not challenged in any existential way. The U.S. possesses global key terrain, is rich in resources of every nature and secure from invasion. The nature of the U.S populace and construct and evolution of our political systems are uniquely suited to the populace-empowered environment emerging on the back of rapid technological advances. While these advances do empower new challengers difficult for states to control, such control is not necessary to guard our future security. It is critical to the security of the nation to recognize while yes, the U.S. has troops in combat; the U.S. absolutely is not a nation at war. To assert a “war” status for every combat action creates unnecessary strategic risks for our nation and limits far more options than it enables. Freeing senior leaders from the strategic burden of “winning” the current fight empowers them to embrace more effective approaches across the span of domestic and foreign policy designed to secure our vital interests into the future.

More than "running an Empire" the US is working to maintain its national interests as it has come to define them, in a manner it has grown accustomed to applying. As the environment has evolved there have emerged new challengers that are not well addressed by the old tools of statecraft, and that make the degree of certainty we have grown used to in recent years increasingly difficult to sustain at a reasonable cost. This first assertion is to simply offer a reminder that in the big scheme of things we are sitting pretty damn good.

In a strictly national security sense, I would agree with you that the United States is "incredibly secure and stable". But much of this strength does not depend on America's favorable "geo-strategic" position. The United States is also incredibly sick from decaying infrastructure and education, a structurally unsound economy, and declining military capabilities. No single power may currently have the ability to unilaterally challenge the United States politically, economically, or militarily, but unless substantial reforms are made, specifically in the economy and the defense economy, the United States will find itself standing alone. It is my personal belief that a confrontation with China over Taiwan will play out much the same way the 1956 Suez Crisis turned out for the UK. That will be the final end of "empire".

[carl]

Mr. Jones:

I rather like what you wrote.

American Pride:

After Suez, Britain faded away militarily. If Red China took Taiwan, I think John Lehman or his ghost would finally see a 600 ship US Navy.

[Dayuhan]

This is getting into a generic discussion of US foreign policy, and drifting away from the initial question of whether or not the US is an empire. Going back a ways (I've been busy)...


Empire is very much a flaccid / non-rigid designator (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rigid_designator) (to use Kripke’s suggestive term) as it seems to possess different qualities or denote differing activities depending upon the purpose of the enunciator.

If a term means whatever the person using it wants it to mean, it means nothing at all. We might as well ask whether the US is a zucchini.


However, I feel only a dictionary definition, for all its non-rigidness (an oxymoron I know given the purpose of dictionaries) will suffice for Duyahan.

I don't necessarily need a dictionary definition, but a discussion of whether or not the US (or anyone) is an empire has to be built around some consensus over what an empire is, or there's nothing to talk about.

I realize that, as Omar points out, in much of the world the idea of an American Empire is simply taken for granted. That perception seems less around any clear idea of what an empire is than around a vague notion of size and power that controls all.

There is a curious human attraction to the idea of what might be called "malevolent design"... the idea that all that happens is planned by some omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent force intent on advancing its own designs. For much or the world the "US Empire", usually through some combination of the CIA, the military, The Oil Companies, etc, or all of them working in concert, fills this role. For Americans it's more likely to be The Bankers, or the Global Financial Elite.

Of course none of these theories hold up to serious scrutiny, but it doesn't matter: people believe them anyway. Somehow the belief is more comforting that a chaotic, undesigned and generally blundering reality.

It might approach accuracy to say that while the US is not an empire by any accepted or reasonably arguable definition of empire, the perception of imperial presence and design is widespread and does affect people's decisions and actions, and therefore must be taken into account. Since that perception will prevail no matter what the US says or does, there's little point in trying to reverse it, but its impact on reactions and decisions must be taken into account in planning.

[Dayuhan]

The whole topic of the US, China, and Taiwan runs way off the topic of the thread and might deserve one of its own. There's probably already one out there.

[Fuchs]

What "economic" threat" can the PRC bring to bear on the US that will not have as great or greater adverse impact on them?

# To not increase the value of the Renminbi.

# To spend a couple hundred billion USD on buying control of key U.S. companies (with shares in supposedly scattered ownership), and let them move HQ and factories (if any of the latter are still in the U.S.).

# To undermine the lead currency role of the USD with strategies based on PRC buying power and currency reserves, thus degrading the U.S.'s ability to print money without severe inflation effects.

# To stop rare earths exports or keep them small.

# To aim at key U.S. industry sectors with camouflaged subsidies for competing PRC industries., in order to push them over the cliff during the next crisis.

# To aim at U.S. companies of medium size but great importance with bank credits, withdrawing the credits in the worst possible moment in order to break the companies.

# To make U.S. companies (say, car makers) dependent on PRC and PRC-controlled suppliers in a few bottlenecks and then cut off the supply in order to break those companies.

# To lure U.S. government and corporations into deals which will then be cancelled according to PRC plan; meant to steal two to three years from U.S. strategies (having hoped for pay-off from the deal and then needing to find a substitute after wasting years).

[carl]

Fuchs:

Most of those seem a little far fetched or would require us to sit by idly while our pockets get picked. Buy up companies and move them to China?!

As far as rare earths go, they aren't very rare. The only reason the Chinese dominate that market is they don't bother much with environmental protection and can mine them cheaper. If they started to squeeze, all the old mines would open up again and there goes their leverage.

[Bob's World]

"Control" and "how do we relinquish what we do not have."

A fair question that a peer at work often asks as well for slightly different reasons. Much of this debate comes down to differences of definition and shades of meaning I suspect.

After all, how many of those in any walk of life who rely heavily on controlling measures are truly in control of anything? In fact, one clear sign that a leader is out of control is the degree of his reliance on controlling techniques to accomplish his or her mission. Usually at the root of such approaches are inflated senses of fear, insecurity, lack of self-confidence, or perhaps even an overblown sense of how right one is that anything else is "wrong" so therefore one is helping others by "sharing" this goodness with them.

For me the primary difference between "control" and "influence" is not in the degree of actual ownership one has on what occurs, but rather in how narrowly one defines desired outcomes and acceptable approaches to achieve the same.

As an example, in 1945 the US committed itself to preserve Ibn Saud and his family in power over the Arabian Peninsula. Now, the Saudis got to power on their own (ok, with significant British and Wahabist power leveraged artfully to that purpose), and have largely stayed there on their own (equally artfully leveraging US and Wahabist power). These are guys who understand power and who are not shy about doing whatever needs to be done to sustain it. Even striking such a deal as the one Ibn struck with FDR there on the deck of the Quincy. Certainly the U.S. does not "control" this in the purest sense of the word. The Saudi family absolutely has free will and many could make strong arguments that in many ways and instances it is they who have exercised excessive control over the U.S.

But the U.S. has defined a specific outcome (Rule by the Saudi family) and has dedicated itself to preserving that outcome. It is not the Royals who are under our control by this approach, rather it is the people of Arabia who have lost control of their governmental process through this approach. As I have mentioned before on this site, insurgency does not happen when the government loses control of the people, insurgency happens when the people perceive that they have lost control of the government. US foreign policy toward Saudi Arabia robs the populace of that region of such control. This is a reality fully appreciated by the populace there, and this is a reality fully exploited by AQ in their messaging to those citizens of the region most dissatisfied with this state of affairs.

We also act in a controlling way when we play "king-maker" as we did in elevating the Northern Alliance into power in Afghanistan and selecting Mr. Karzai as the leader we felt most apt to support our interests there. It is our desire to preserve this outcome we selected that keeps us pinned to the mat in Afghanistan to this day.

"Influence," on the other hand simply lays out a broad range of acceptable ends, and ways and means to achieve and preserve the same; and then encourages or facilitates as necessary efforts to move in that general direction.

Controlling approaches are never appreciated, but in some rare cases are reasonably justifiable, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A problem I see in US foreign policy is that we have come so used to the employment of controlling approaches that we now use it on our "friends" (as exampled most recently in our leveraging of NATO to garner support to our efforts in Afghanistan) and in situations where there really is no need to specify a specific result or approach (Egypt).

So, is it a literal "control" over the thoughts and actions of other governments? No, but no less offensive and dangerous all the same. So, does this mean the U.S. is "running an Empire"? History will be the best lens to judge that through. One thing is more certain, however, and that is that such "empire-lite" or "empire-like" approaches do create a growing point of vulnerablity in the emerging operating environment.

[Fuchs]

Fuchs:

Most of those seem a little far fetched or would require us to sit by idly while our pockets get picked. Buy up companies and move them to China?!

As far as rare earths go, they aren't very rare. The only reason the Chinese dominate that market is they don't bother much with environmental protection and can mine them cheaper. If they started to squeeze, all the old mines would open up again and there goes their leverage.

I looked into the rare earths thing and yes, they are rare. My source was a dedicated document from the German geological office (BGR).
Besides; one year shutdown of rare earth deliveries means the businesses depending on them crash long before some alternative source is ready to fill the gap.

http://www.bgr.bund.de/cln_116/DE/Gemeinsames/Produkte/Downloads/Commodity__Top__News/Rohstoffwirtschaft/31__erden,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile. pdf/31_erden.pdf

http://www.bgr.bund.de/cln_116/DE/Gemeinsames/Produkte/Downloads/Commodity__Top__News/Rohstoffwirtschaft/33__elektronikmetalle,templateId=raw,property=publ icationFile.pdf/33_elektronikmetalle.pdf


You can buy shares of corporations from a stock exchange, and you can do so using many agents and many accounts. It's possible to gain critical influence (25%) or control (50%) of many corporations this way, for the possession of their shares is often scattered. Add one or two minor purchases (5-15%) and you've succeeded without NSA et al taking notice.

[AmericanPride]

I would address it if I could figure out what it was.

I stated it in very plain in English in Post #54.

[Fuchs]

About the thread's supposed topic:

Nowadays I wouldn't say the U.S. is running or trying to build an empire.

There's just 'something' that makes U.S. politicians and their groupies very interested in getting involved in and designing foreign places. You may call this thing missionary drive, think tank dynamics, bureaucratic dynamics (especially USN-related), boredom, distraction from domestic failures and much else, but it's distinct from actually running an empire.

This interest in foreign troubles looks on the surface paradoxical in light of the world-famous shortcomings in regard to geography and foreign culture awareness.


Long story short; I don't think that this special interest in foreign troubles serves the country well.

[carl]

carl: My use of 1956 Suez Crisis is not to illustrate the military impotence of a declining imperial power. Instead, its important to acknowledge that the event (1) demonstrated British acknowledgement of its own decline and (2) illustrated the role of economic and political power in undermining military capabilities.

Ok let's see if I can figure this out.

Point (1). The British had already acknowledged their declining power. They had been pulling out of colonies for years. By doing that they had acknowledged they didn't have the stuff to hang on anymore.

Point (2). Strength of economy and political power help with military power. But you said that it doesn't illustrate the military impotence of declining imperial power. That confuses me.

Point (3). (my point). What you say relies on the premise that the US is in a similar position of weakness and decline as Great Britain was in 1956. I don't accept that premise at all.

And in another place you said NATO didn't have to fire a shot to get Britain and France out of there. But Britain was part of NATO so they never would have fired a shot.

So, no. I still can't figure it out.

[ganulv]

This interest in foreign troubles looks on the surface paradoxical in light of the world-famous shortcomings in regard to geography and foreign culture awareness.
Maybe rather than paradoxical the latter in fact has something to do with the former.* :rolleyes:

*And should anyone think it, no, I am not beating up on my country or my countrymen. I, for one, am an American who knows quite a bit about geography and foreign (and domestic!) cultures. And I know plenty of Americans who know more about the two than do I. I am not convinced that many of those pulling the policy strings even care to know, however.

[carl]

Ganulv:

Nobody thinks you are beating up on your country or countrymen. Besides if you were and we deserved it, we're the better for it.

[AmericanPride]

Point (1). The British had already acknowledged their declining power. They had been pulling out of colonies for years. By doing that they had acknowledged they didn't have the stuff to hang on anymore.

The Suez adventure is a clear example of an imperial power seeking to assert its authority in the method with which it is most accustomed without acknowledging significant changes in international security dynamics that renders its past practices ineffective. Which leads to point 2...


Point (2). Strength of economy and political power help with military power. But you said that it doesn't illustrate the military impotence of declining imperial power. That confuses me.

The combined forces of Britain, France, and Israel were defeated by economic pressure by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the remainder of the NATO alliance. The importance of overt military power was undone by economic intrigue and political isolation. Britain and France did not recognize this potentiality in the emerging American system as they were conceptually trapped in the age of bald-faced imperial designs. As a result, they were thoroughly surprised, embarrassed, and emasculated.


Point (3). (my point). What you say relies on the premise that the US is in a similar position of weakness and decline as Great Britain was in 1956. I don't accept that premise at all.

The US is in a similar position insofar the international security system is gradually changing and that America's security posture and structure is ill-suited for future threat scenarios. A military confrontation with the PRC over the independence of Taiwan is one such scenario.

The argument is rather straightforward.

[carl]

American Pride:

Ok, I get it now and can see you point as stated following, "The Suez adventure is a clear example of an imperial power seeking to assert its authority in the method with which it is most accustomed without acknowledging significant changes in international security dynamics that renders its past practices ineffective." I would quibble a bit on some of the words but I see it.

I am not too sure it applies. I get the broad point but in Suez all the economic and political power was applied by friends and allies to restrain an ally. That is a difference so great from our situation in the western Pacific as to perhaps negate your point.

The world is changing but I think we do recognize it and are adapting, though slowly. But that is another question.

[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note


The whole topic of the US, China, and Taiwan runs way off the topic of the thread and might deserve one of its own. There's probably already one out there.

Yes many of the posts here have drifted onto the defence of Taiwan, Republic of China / RoC, but on a quick check there is no existing thread on the subject. I do recall the issue being discussed before and someone posting a comprehensive assessment of the issues (maybe Entropy IIRC).

I shall ponder a new thread and copying the posts here to it.

[Dayuhan]

But the U.S. has defined a specific outcome (Rule by the Saudi family) and has dedicated itself to preserving that outcome. It is not the Royals who are under our control by this approach, rather it is the people of Arabia who have lost control of their governmental process through this approach.

Has the US dedicated itself to preserving rule by the Saud family? How do you know? Certainly the US has and will continue to protect the Saudi family against external aggression, especially from powers perceived as hostile to the US. We don't know if the US would protect the Saud family from domestic dissent, because so far they haven't required any such protection.

In any event an attempt to portray Saudi Arabia or Taiwan as part of an American Empire would be treading on pretty thin ice... again, unless we completely redefine "empire".


About the thread's supposed topic:

Nowadays I wouldn't say the U.S. is running or trying to build an empire.

There's just 'something' that makes U.S. politicians and their groupies very interested in getting involved in and designing foreign places. You may call this thing missionary drive, think tank dynamics, bureaucratic dynamics (especially USN-related), boredom, distraction from domestic failures and much else, but it's distinct from actually running an empire.

This interest in foreign troubles looks on the surface paradoxical in light of the world-famous shortcomings in regard to geography and foreign culture awareness.

Long story short; I don't think that this special interest in foreign troubles serves the country well.

I agree with you for the most part, which might be a historic first.

There are some consistently contradictory streaks in America's engagement with the rest of the world. Americans have a strong isolationist impulse and a strong expansionist impulse, a strong desire to be (and be perceived as) hard-nosed minders of their own interests and an equally strong desire to be (and be seen as) a benevolent force acting for The Greater Good. Oscillation across these spectra is unpredictable and not always rational, which gets messy at times.


I looked into the rare earths thing and yes, they are rare.

Not entirely rare, but not common in commercially exploitable concentrations, which is reasonably close to being the same thing. It's like they only exist in China, though. The US has a major deposit in CA and was a major producer until '94, when the operation was closed due to cheaper and less environmentally contentious imports from China. That operation could of course be restarted. There's a very large deposit in Greenland and significant ones in Australia, Canada, and other locations. The current Chinese near-monopoly has attracted attention and it's not likely to last long.


You can buy shares of corporations from a stock exchange, and you can do so using many agents and many accounts. It's possible to gain critical influence (25%) or control (50%) of many corporations this way, for the possession of their shares is often scattered. Add one or two minor purchases (5-15%) and you've succeeded without NSA et al taking notice.

This would be much easier in theory than in practice.

Overall, the list of economic "threats" doesn't look terribly threatening and would be insufficient to really impact the US or to deter it from any course of action that is was really intent on pursuing.

[davidbfpo]

I follow the logic of citing the Suez adventure or episode within this thread, although I have m' doubts it is a lesson learnt by the USA.

In my limited reading, now years ago on Suez in 1956 I was struck by the political naivety of both France and the UK, notably over "taking on" Arab nationalism as personified by Nasser and the assumption military action would be a strategic success.

A few years ago a BBC radio documentary returned to the issue, probably in 2006 and had a stunning revelation. They interviewed a SAS officer who had accompanied a group of anti-Nasser Egyptian exiles far south of the Anglo-French military advance and the group went onto to a RV with sympathisers inside Egypt prepared to help overthrow Nasser. Slight snag it was all a state security set-up and the exiles were executed.

There are a number of factors at play in using the lessons of Suez for the USA to learn and how does the Bay of Pigs compare for example?

[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note

An update to an earlier post. There is no need for a 'Defend Taiwan' thread, since 2006 the issue has appeared repeatedly on 'China's Emergence as a Superpower':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4366

I shall copy this thread's posts to there.

Can all posts on defending Taiwan be posted on the main 'superpower' thread please.

[AmericanPride]

I commented before on the appealing principle of "malevolent design", and its impact on conspiracy theories around the world.

I could not find your previous comment, though I assume its a refutation of my assertion that the United States is subject to the global pillaging brought about by financial capitalism. I believe it is disingenuous to conflate "traditional" conspiracy theories (i.e. new world order, alien collaboration, etc) with the claim that a financial structure exists that encourages the concentration of wealth into a very few amount of hands at the expense of much of the rest of the world irrespective of nationality and political boundaries. Nor do I find the design "malevolent" insofar that its largely the culmination of unintended consequences and that, properly regulated, the transfer of wealth is not invariably a negative outcome. This is really elite theory applied on a global scale, aided by the deconstruction of regulations and barriers to the mobility of finance, and the de-terroritalization of power and wealth. This has resulted in the appropriation of private property in the United States and Europe (a process that has already occurred in the developing world) and extensive elimination or reduction of valued public services. In the US particularly, even though finance has been decoupled from material wealth, it has created the false conflict between social programs and defense, where in reality the true conflict is between the public good and private wealth. There has been little discussion about corporate accountability, corporate taxation, capital gains taxation, or structural economic reform; all issues that have a direct bearing on the concentration of wealth.

[Surferbeetle]

... the claim that a financial structure exists that encourages the concentration of wealth into a very few amount of hands at the expense of much of the rest of the world irrespective of nationality and political boundaries. Nor do I find the design "malevolent" insofar that its largely the culmination of unintended consequences and that, properly regulated, the transfer of wealth is not invariably a negative outcome. This is really elite theory applied on a global scale, aided by the deconstruction of regulations and barriers to the mobility of finance, and the de-terroritalization of power and wealth.

AP, Dayuhan, et al,

Appreciate this discussion...

Some references which might be of interest to you.

Ricardian Model (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_trade#Ricardian_model) from wikipedia


The Ricardian model focuses on comparative advantage, perhaps the most important concept in international trade theory. In a Ricardian model, countries specialize in producing what they produce best, and trade occurs due to technological differences between countries. Unlike other models, the Ricardian framework predicts that countries will fully specialize instead of producing a broad array of goods.

An American-centric view from the US Congressional Budget Office, Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 (http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/124xx/doc12485/10-25-HouseholdIncome.pdf), October 2011


The rapid growth in average real household market income for the 1 percent of the population with the highest income was a major factor contributing to the growing inequality in the distribution of household income between 1979 and 2007. Average real household market income for the highest income group nearly tri- pled over that period, whereas market income increased by about 19 percent for a household at the midpoint of the income distribution. As a result of that uneven growth, the share of total market income received by the top 1 percent of the population more than doubled between 1979 and 2007, growing from about 10 percent
to more than 20 percent. Without that growth at the top of the distribution, income inequality still would have increased, but not by nearly as much. The precise reasons for the rapid growth in income at the top are not well understood, though researchers have offered several potential rationales, including technical innovations that have changed the labor market for superstars (such as actors, athletes, and musicians), changes in the gover- nance and structure of executive compensation, increases in firms’ size and complexity, and the increasing scale of financial-sector activities.


As a result of those changes, the share of household income after transfers and federal taxes going to the highest income quintile grew from 43 percent in 1979 to 53 percent in 2007 (see Summary Figure 3). The share of after-tax household income for the 1 percent of the popu- lation with the highest income more than doubled,climbing from nearly 8 percent in 1979 to 17 percent in 2007.

The population in the lowest income quintile received about 7 percent of after-tax income in 1979; by 2007, their share of after-tax income had fallen to about 5 per- cent. The middle three income quintiles all saw their shares of after-tax income decline by 2 to 3 percentage points between 1979 and 2007.

America’s inequality need not determine the future of Britain, By Martin Wolf, December 22, 2011 8:34 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com


People will disagree over why rising inequality matters and what should be done about it. I suggest it matters most, at least in the high-income countries because it both undermines hopes for any reasonable degree of equality of opportunity and cements the inequalities in power that have, in turn, allowed the preservation of a wide range of privileges, particularly in taxation.

These outcomes should matter even to those who have no concern for equality of outcome. I would add that some – perhaps a great deal – of the ultra-high incomes at the top are almost certainly the fruit of rent extraction facilitated by a breakdown in the control exercised by principals – outside investors – over their agents – corporate executives and financiers. Huge rewards then are both unjust and inefficient.