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SWJED
11-29-2005, 08:28 AM
29 Nov. Washington Times - U.S. Decimating Foreign Fighters (http://www.washtimes.com/national/20051128-100829-2969r.htm).


The U.S. is seeing significantly fewer foreign fighters on the battlefields of Iraq, because the coalition has killed or captured scores of terrorists in recent months and is doing a better job of securing the long border with Syria.

But the U.S. military has noticed in recent weeks a willingness of young Iraqis to become suicide bombers, once the monopoly of ideologically driven foreign jihadists.

We are killing them, a senior Pentagon official said yesterday, when asked about shrinking foreign-fighter numbers in Iraq.

The trend is one reason that the Bush administration is talking more confidently about reducing the American troop presence next year to less than a base level of 138,000. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has said the current 160,000 level will revert to 138,000 after the Dec. 15 parliamentary elections.

SWJED
12-09-2005, 07:05 AM
9 Dec. Washington Times - Inside the Ring (http://www.washtimes.com/national/inring.htm).


Commanders are seeing fewer foreign fighters in Iraq, a sign that operations along the Syrian border are working. There also is the hope that al Qaeda leader Abu Musab Zarqawi is encountering difficulty in persuading new jihadists to come to Iraq.

..."In the Multi-National Force-West area of operations, we are facing a locally based Sunni-led insurgency. These local insurgents largely operate in and around their own communities and when not fighting, they blend into the local scene."

"Terrorists and foreign fighters associated with al Qaeda in Iraq are a factor in our area and al Qaeda gains additional synergy by developing marriages of convenience with local insurgency groups composed of the other elements of the insurgency — Saddamists, rejectionists, and criminals. The terrorist and foreign fighter presence in Al Anbar is small, but it's dangerous."

Robal2pl
12-12-2005, 12:09 PM
Hi all !
Does anyone has informations about Chechens in Iraq?
they recived a lot of support from Al-Quaeda and others groups in both wars, so I think that some of them can be active in Iraq now

GorTex6
12-13-2005, 06:18 AM
marriages of convenience with local insurgency

This metaphor was stolen from me over at SOCNET.

Jedburgh
05-12-2006, 01:29 PM
Moderator's Note

This is a new thread, based on two old threads and re-titled. The term foreign fighters (FF) appears in numerous threads, there are two threads specifically on the theme and I understand during the peak of operations in Iraq (OIF) it was frequently raised - although I was unable to identify a specific thread. See Post 28 for details. Moderator ends.


From the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus: Reinforcing the Mujahideen: Origins of Jihadi Manpower (http://jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=180)

Much is written about how non-indigenous, would-be Islamist fighters enter the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan to join the mujahideen fighting U.S.-led coalitions in both countries. Do they enter Afghanistan from Pakistan? Or Iran? Perhaps Central Asia? What about Iraq? Which border is the most porous? Does that dubious honor belong to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Iran? These are, of course, important questions. To know and close the entry points of these aspiring mujahideen would slow the pace at which foreign fighters could join the fray. It also would make local insurgent field commanders unsure about the dependability of the flow of replacement fighters for their units, and thereby probably limit their willingness to undertake operations that are likely to result in sizeable manpower loses.

A more basic question, however, is seldom asked or debated. While it is clear that closing points of entry would give the U.S.-led coalitions a better chance to reduce the level of each insurgency, the more important path to victory probably lies in determining exactly from where these prospective insurgents emanate...

GorTex6
05-14-2006, 03:25 AM
The US government has supported islamic jihadist in the past to keep Russian interests(the infidels lol) out of central asia-see Soviet Afghan war and Chechnya. Ten bucks says they will also be used to keep China out.

Al Qaeda means " the base" or to be more accurate " the database". Twenty bucks says it is a code word for a database of tracked islamic terrorists gathered by a CIA modified version of PROMIS software. When the CIA wants to jack someone up and keep their hands clean-just agitate their pool of jihadists.

aktarian
05-14-2006, 07:54 AM
Al Qaeda means " the base" or to be more accurate " the database". Twenty bucks says it is a code word for a database of tracked islamic terrorists gathered by a CIA modified version of PROMIS software. When the CIA wants to jack someone up and keep their hands clean-just agitate their pool of jihadists.

No. It refers to database of foreign fighters who fought in Afghanistan. People who were sending them to Afghanistan kept their contact info which was used later.

SWJED
07-02-2006, 07:20 AM
2 July Stars and Stripes - Figuring Out the Foreign Fighter Factor in Iraq (http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=38347) by Andrew Tilghman.


Even on Iraq’s western edge, once referred to as the “foreign fighter freeway,” U.S. troops disagree about the role that foreigners play in the 3-year-old insurgency.

“Are there foreigners? Yes. Is it that big an influence overall? Probably not,” Lt. Col. Robert Jones, executive officer for Regimental Combat Team 7, said in a recent interview in his office at Camp Al Asad.

Meanwhile, just a few miles up the Euphrates River, a battalion commander disagrees. “They are the core,” said Lt. Col. Nick Marano, commander of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment based in the Al Qaim region

Both men are talking about the same region, and presumably have access to similar intelligence. But they come to different conclusions about the role of Arab fighters from countries like Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Algeria.

“The fact you are getting so many conflicting views on the ground just shows what a tangled web of violence this has become,” said Farhana Ali, a terrorism expert with the Rand Corp., a California-based think tank.

The question is especially relevant in recent weeks, as U.S. military officials scrambled to identify the insurgent leader who would likely take over after the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born leader of al-Qaida in Iraq...

Some troops say the foreign influence is based more on money than actual military-age men.

“The foreigner is like John Gotti, the foreign influence is money,” said Lt. Col. Norman Cooling, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, currently based in Haditha. Gotti is a New York crime boss who was convicted in 1992 of federal racketeering charges.

“If I could eliminate the foreign influence, it would have a big impact because the local guy in the street would lose his motivation,” Cooling said. “But there are not many foreigners out there operating in the streets. They don’t have to.”

It is also influenced by a range of political factors — both on the Iraqi and American side — that lead some officials to overestimate the significance of foreign fighters, said Anthony Cordesman, a national security expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies based in Washington, D.C...

Merv Benson
07-02-2006, 03:56 PM
I think the difference has a lot to do with the fact that one sees them in transit and the other sees them after they have reached one of their objectives. The MNFI stats suggest that the foreign fighters are responsible for most of the attacks on non combatants which makes up about 70 percent of the casualties over the last year. I would say that is significant and good reason to focus on them.

Stu-6
07-03-2006, 12:20 AM
It seems that it maybe a matter of perspective to foreign fighters maybe small in numbers but disproportionately violent; creating an appearance of greater consequence.

Strickland
07-03-2006, 12:26 AM
What is the objective of AQ or FF in Iraq? Is it to foment a civil war? If so, why have they not bombed or targeted the Shrine of Ali (Najaf) or Shrine of Hussein (Karbala)?

Strickland
07-03-2006, 06:15 PM
Abu Musab al-Masri was just named as the 30th Most Wanted Criminal/Terrorist/Insurgent in Iraq. If AQ and FF are the main problem, why is he only #30? Is this an admission that the real issue remains Sunni rejectionists and not AQ or FF?

Jedburgh
07-03-2006, 07:59 PM
Abu Musab al-Masri was just named as the 30th Most Wanted Criminal/Terrorist/Insurgent in Iraq. If AQ and FF are the main problem, why is he only #30? Is this an admission that the real issue remains Sunni rejectionists and not AQ or FF?
I highlighted the correct answer. ;) Here's the most wanted list:

1 - Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, $10 million bounty. Vice president of dissolved Revolutionary Command Council.

2 - Mohammed Younis al-Ahmed al-Muwali, $1 million bounty. Former Baath Party member accused of funding and leading terrorist operations.

3 - Tahir Jalil Haboh, $1 million bounty. Former intelligence director and member of the Baath Party regional command.

4 - Saif al-Din Flayeh Hassan Taha al-Rawi, $1 million bounty. Chief of staff of the former Republican Guard.

5 - Adul-Baqi Abdul-Karim Abdullah al-Saadoun, $1 million bounty. Insurgent in Diyala province who shuttles to southern Iraq.

6 - Rashid Taan Kadhim, $1 million bounty. Leads insurgent operations in Anbar, responsible for funding terrorist operations in Diyala.

7 - Ahmed Hassan Kaka al-Obeidi, $200,000 bounty. Former intelligence officer and ex-Baath Party official.

8 - Muhdhir Abdul-Karim Thiyab Abdul-Kharbit, $50,000 bounty. Involved in "oil for food program," funds terrorist activities against Iraqi forces in Anbar and funds al-Qaida in Iraq.

9 - Omar Saabawi Ibrahim Hassan al-Tikriti, $50,000 bounty. Head of the former National Union of Iraqi students, chief of Saddam's Fedayeen, supports terrorism. Saddam Hussein's nephew.

10 - Rifaie Abdul-Latif Tulfah al-Tikriti, $1 million bounty. Assumed many posts under the former regime and was member of the former Baath Party, illegally transfers money across the border.

11 - Nihad Naji al-Ithari al-Dulaimi, $200,000 bounty. Former general manager in the intelligence.

12 - Hassan Hashim al-Dulaimi, $200,000 bounty. Secretary of the former finance ministry, an active former Baath Party member.

13 - Fawzi Mutlaq al-Rawi, leads a terrorist group inside Iraq, senior former Baath Party member, supports terrorism in Anbar.

14 - Abu Abdullah al-Shafie, $50,000 bounty. A leader in Ansar al-Islam group/Ansar al-Sunnah since the beginning of 2003, committed terrorist activities in Kirkuk, Nineveh, Diyala.

15 - Malla Halkord Ahmedi, $50,000 bounty. Head of Ansar al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunnah in Baghdad, he runs terrorist operations on a daily basis. A member in Ansar al-Islam before the fall of the regime, a member in the Mujahedeen Shura Council.

16 - Raghad Saddam Hussein, Saddam's daughter. Funds terrorism in Iraq, high officials in former Baath Party facilitate money transfers between her and the terrorists.

17 - Sajida Khairuallah Tulfah Hussein, Saddam's wife. Main source of guidance, logistic support, funds terrorism in Iraq. She has access to Iraqi riches stolen by Saddam.

18 - Maan Bashour, Lebanese Baathist. Has a long relationship with Saddam's regime. He recruits fighters in Lebanon to go to Iraq to support terrorist operations.

19 - Isam Khudhir Abbas al-Dulaimi, $50,000 bounty. Former director in the intelligence agency, he supports the Muhammad Army insurgent group.

20 - Ghazwan Sabti Faraj al-Kubaisi, $50,000 bounty. Senior former Baath Party member, staff major-general in the former intelligence service.

21 - Abdullah al-Janabi, $50,000 bounty. Cleric who supports and takes part in terrorism, he provides financial and moral support in Anbar.

22 - Ibrahim Yosif Turki al-Jubouri, $50,000 bounty. Commits terrorist acts in northern Iraq.

23 - Khalaf Muhammad Mukhlif al-Dulaimi (nickname Abu Marwan), former manager of "special projects," belongs to the former intelligence and after the fall of the regime he escaped Iraq with millions of dollars. Also funds, organizes and smuggles terrorists and weapons to Iraq.

24 - Abu Mtafa al-Shaibani, $200,000 bounty. Head of a terror network paramilitary located in Baghdad and southern Iraq.

25 - Ahmed Watban Ibrahim al-Hassan al-Tikriti, unspecified reward. Funds and guides terrorists, transfers money to terrorists inside Iraq, facilitates the movements of the terrorists to Iraq. Saddam's nephew.

26 - Munthir al-Kassar, unspecified reward. Has relations with the families of elements of the former regime, arms merchants. Supplies terrorists with weapons.

27 - Ahmed Abu Sajjad al-Gharawi, unspecified reward. Head of a terrorist group in southern Iraq.

28 - Mam Abdul-Karim, unspecified reward. Senior member in Ansar al-Sunnah, he is the main facilitator for the operations, funding and communications in north Iraq.

29 - Abdul-Hadi al-Iraqi, top leader of al-Qaida in Iraq and the Mujahedeen Shura Council. He is from Nineveh.

30 - Abu Ayyub al-Masri, $50,000 bounty. New leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. He is an Egyptian and former member in the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Movement.

31 - Saad Hamid Shihab, $50,000 bounty. Facilitates money transfers to terrorists in Salahuddin and Anbar.

32 - Raad Hamid Shihab, $50,000 bounty. Senior former Baath Party official, facilitates money transfers to terror leaders in Saluhuddin and Anbar provinces.

33 - Muhammad Hisham Muhammad (nickname Mansour/Khadim el-Hsein), $50,000 bounty. Has links with Ansar al-Sunnah/Ansar al-Islam and bombmakers in Iraq, provides terrorists with bombs.

34 - Ahmed Muhammad Younis al-Ahmed al-Muwali, unspecified reward. Uses trade and travel as a cover to facilitate and fund terrorist activities.

35 - Sarhid Kadhim al-Janabi, active leader of many terrorist groups in southern Baghdad and the group involved in kidnapping and assassinating foreign and Iraqi officials.

36 - Ahmed Shawqi al-Kubaissi, group leader funding terrorist operations. He issues fatwas to kill army and police officers.

37 - Zuhair Abdul-Ghaffar al-Kubaissi, a terror leader in Baghdad. He issued a fatwa to kill Shiites and is funding hostile activities against Iraqi forces.

38 - Jamal al-Tikriti, high field leader in Omar Brigade. He attacks Iraqi forces in Baghdad with roadside bombs.

39 - Muhammad Fadhil Gharib al-Mashhadani, funds terrorism and facilitates terrorist operations in Diyala.

40 - Talib Yosif Zuwayed al-Issawi, known leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. A spiritual leader to the terrorist organizations.

41 - Sabri Khrebit al-Dulaimi (nickname Abu Ayyub), one of slain militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's aides. He had strong links with Iraqi intelligence, supervises terrorist networks.

Strickland
07-03-2006, 08:49 PM
What is truly amazing about this list is the fact that it demonstrates how little we know and have known in Iraq over the past 3 years. Depending on who you listen to or believe on the open source side, Ibrahim al-Douri died two years ago, last year, or is living in Syria coordinating much of the Sunni Insurgency.

Second, to have anyone from the Kharbit clan/family on the list is amazing. Prior to the invasion we provided them will "a lot" of money for their support. Considering that they were the wealthiest people next to Saddam's immediate family/clan, they hardly needed our help. Probably didnt help that we bombed and killed several of their family members.

Finally, here is some food for thought - The coalition captured Izz al Din al-Majid in Ramadi. He reportedly had $2m with him and $35m in his foreign accounts. He was reportedly trying to buy the allegiance and cooperation of several rival insurgent groups. How do we overcome this type of financial capability? Please explain how a $50,000 bounty (refer to the Most Wanted List) is going to overcome this type of insurgent resource/capability?

Jedburgh
04-06-2007, 01:16 PM
Transcript of testimony by Brian Jenkins to the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment on 5 Apr 07:

Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment (http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT278.pdf)

...Recently, we have begun to focus more attention on what I refer to in my book (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG454/) as the “front end” of the jihadist cycle. Growing concern has produced a growing volume of literature on the topic. My testimony today will simply highlight a few areas for further discussion:

- Building an army of believers—how the jihadists recruit
- Radicalization and recruitment in the United States
- How we might impede radicalization and recruitment, and
- Guiding principles for any actions we might consider.

These comments derive from my own study of terrorism over the years, and from a large body of research done by my colleagues at the RAND Corporation....
In reference to the last line quoted above, here are links to the footnoted documents:

Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1214.pdf)

Al Qaeda Recruitment in the United States: A Preliminary Assessment (http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/2004-MIPT-Terrorism-Annual.pdf) (The link is actually to the MIPT 2004 Terrorism Annual; the article is on page 29 of the pdf)

The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1782/)

Maximus
04-07-2007, 03:14 AM
I recently read John Poole's Terrorist Trail, where this subject is a primary focus. All reviews that I've read and experiences in Iraq back up much of what he writes about where terrorists and global insurgents come from and how they get from point A to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechyna, Pakistan, etc. While I'm not sure if Hezbollah has as strong an influence in as many places as he claims, the book's great nonetheless (plus I don't have anything to refute his claims).

SWJED
04-07-2007, 06:22 AM
I just finished Inside the Jihad: My Life With Al Qaeda - A Spy's Story (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0465023886/104-3075668-4435162?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=0465023886) by Omar Nasiri - highly recommend it.

Cori
04-07-2007, 11:06 AM
Although this report is obviously a little dated now, it's an interesting analysis of jihadist statements about the national origins of "martyrs" killed in Iraq, at least during a slice of 2005 (http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_1_vol_3_-_Arabs_killed_in_Iraq.pdf).

SWJED
05-05-2007, 07:18 AM
5 May Washington Post - An Uphill Battle to Stop Fighters at Border (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/04/AR2007050402214.html) by Joshua Partlow.


Iraqi general in charge of guarding the border with Syria said his forces cannot completely prevent suicide bombers, who often carry fake passports and appear well trained and funded, from slipping into Iraq.

"This borderline cannot be controlled 100 percent," said Maj. Gen. Hadi Taaha Hasoun al-Mamoori, commanding officer of the 2nd Region Department of Border Enforcement, responsible for 830 miles of border and a force of about 12,000 people. "If there was a desire on the part of the Syrians to help us, it would have been possible to wipe out a large segment of the terrorists."

The issue of foreign fighters entering Iraq has become an increasingly high priority for U.S. officials, many of whom consider Syria a primary stopover for insurgents making their way from other Middle Eastern countries to Iraq...

SWJED
05-05-2007, 07:20 AM
5 May NY Times - U.S. Forces Break Up Arms Smuggling Ring in Baghdad (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/05/world/middleeast/05iraq.html) by Alissa Rubin.


American soldiers broke up a weapons smuggling ring on Friday in Baghdad, detaining 16 men who were accused of procuring powerful, armor-piercing bombs and other arms from Iran, the American military said.

The operation, in Sadr City, the heavily Shiite neighborhood that has at times been a center of resistance to the Americans, was one in a series of raids recently aimed at stopping the flow into Iraq of armor-piercing bombs, known as explosively formed projectiles, or E.F.P.’s, said Lt. Col. Christopher Garver, a spokesman for the military. “We’re dismantling the networks link by link, and one link leads us to another,” he said.

But he acknowledged that there were plenty of insurgents willing to smuggle and place the bombs. The military’s hope is to reduce the number of successful attacks by arresting the most experienced of the smugglers and assemblers...

RJO
07-16-2007, 10:53 PM
Not sure if this AFP news report (15 July 2007) (http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/usiraqsaudimilitary&printer=1;_ylt=Ah3_fBdf4cRF6S8JMlnYjGKROrgF) has been noted here:


Most foreign fighters and suicide bombers in Iraq come from Saudi Arabia, despite attempts by US officials to portray Syria and Iran as the main culprits of violence, a US newspaper reported Sunday.

Citing an unnamed senior US military officer and Iraqi lawmakers, the Los Angeles Times newspaper said about 45 percent of all foreign militants targeting US troops and Iraqi security forces were from Saudi Arabia, 15 percent from Syria and Lebanon, and 10 percent from North Africa


RJO

SteveMetz
07-16-2007, 11:20 PM
Not sure if this AFP news report (15 July 2007) (http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/usiraqsaudimilitary&printer=1;_ylt=Ah3_fBdf4cRF6S8JMlnYjGKROrgF) has been noted here:



RJO

I think this reinforces the point I've been trying to make--the Saudis act like they're trying to catch extremists at the same time that they tolerate and even promote the ideology which inspires them. It's like our government arresting people who smoke pot at the same time that they provide everyone with a copy of "Harold and Kumar Go to White Castle"

Ski
07-17-2007, 01:07 PM
Either way, it removes a threat from the Saudi government. They go off to Iraq to fight, most of them die or are captured, so there's one less opposition member to worry about.

Of course, this is a delaying action. Enough of them will come back to Saudi in time to create problems. But the short term results benefit the House of Saud just fine.

SteveMetz
07-17-2007, 01:10 PM
Either way, it removes a threat from the Saudi government. They go off to Iraq to fight, most of them die or are captured, so there's one less opposition member to worry about.

Of course, this is a delaying action. Enough of them will come back to Saudi in time to create problems. But the short term results benefit the House of Saud just fine.


I think you've nailed Saudi strategy. They rely on us to kill their excess militants for them. And it irks me to no end that we play along.

Tom Odom
07-17-2007, 01:37 PM
I think you've nailed Saudi strategy. They rely on us to kill their excess militants for them. And it irks me to no end that we play along.


Agreed. It is much the same with government policy in Egypt where radical venting against the West and Israel is allowed to bleed off any pressure on the government.

Tom

Ken White
07-17-2007, 04:07 PM
line numerous times in our history. Penalty of being nice guys. That's fine and we should be like that but we could sure be a bit smarter about it... :o

Firestaller
07-17-2007, 06:19 PM
line numerous times in our history. Penalty of being nice guys. That's fine and we should be like that but we could sure be a bit smarter about it... :o



I don't think that we're in the Middle East because we're "nice guys."


The Middle East serves our economic strategic interest ... the question is "how much of this interest are we willing to take?"

Ken White
07-17-2007, 06:28 PM
I don't think that we're in the Middle East because we're "nice guys."


The Middle East serves our economic strategic interest ... the question is "how much of this interest are we willing to take?"


both counts with only a slight tilt toward your version. I think a far better question is "why did our lack of strategic vision allow this to come to pass?"

Granite_State
07-20-2007, 03:03 AM
I think you've nailed Saudi strategy. They rely on us to kill their excess militants for them. And it irks me to no end that we play along.

And they get the side benefit of killing Shiites and potential Iranian allies in the process. Two birds with one stone.

Jedburgh
08-03-2007, 04:40 PM
Here's one take on the subject in the US, from the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 2 Aug 07:

Behind the Indoctrination and Training of American Jihadis (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373588)

On July 26, a former Washington, DC cab driver and resident of Gwynn Oak, Maryland was sentenced to 15 years in federal prison for providing material support to a terrorist group. Ohio-born Mahmud Faruq Brent, 32, admitted to attending training camps run by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, Army of the Pure) in 2002, a Pakistani-based jihadi group established during the 1980s campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After training at various locations in Pakistan, Brent returned to the United States, residing in Baltimore when he was arrested in August 2005. Brent told Tarik Shah—who pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide material support to al-Qaeda—that he had been up in the mountains training with the mujahideen. Through Shah, Brent's training is linked to other cases of Americans who attended LeT-run camps in Pakistan. After Shah's arrest, he agreed to record conversations with Brent in cooperation with the FBI. In Shah's cell phone, along with Mahmud al-Mutazzim, another name Brent used, was the contact information for Seifullah Chapman, who also knew Brent. Chapman, a former Marine, was part of the "Virginia Jihad Group," another informal network convicted of terrorism-related charges stemming from their training in Pakistan. He was sentenced in 2005 to a 65-year prison term.

As disturbing as these cases are individually, collectively they demonstrate an even more troubling trend of radicalized American Muslims—bound by Salafi ideology—receiving training overseas and returning to the United States for potential future operations.....

Rex Brynen
11-22-2007, 05:05 AM
Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of U.S. (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/22/world/middleeast/22fighters.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin)
New York Times, November 22, 2007

By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.

BAGHDAD — Saudi Arabia and Libya, both considered allies by the United States in its fight against terrorism, were the source of about 60 percent of the foreign fighters who came to Iraq in the past year to serve as suicide bombers or to facilitate other attacks, according to senior American military officials.

The data come largely from a trove of documents and computers discovered in September, when American forces raided a tent camp in the desert near Sinjar, close to the Syrian border. The raid’s target was an insurgent cell believed to be responsible for smuggling the vast majority of foreign fighters into Iraq....

Jedburgh
11-28-2007, 04:32 PM
Speaking to the NYT article that Rex linked is the Terror Finance Blog, 27 Nov 07:

Saudi Arabia Releases 1,500 Repentant Jihadists (http://www.terrorfinance.org/the_terror_finance_blog/2007/11/saudi-arabia-re.html)

On November 26, 2007, Arab News reported that Saudi Arabian authorities had released after their repenting of their Jihadist ways, approximately 1,500 “reformed extremists”. It went on to say that: “The committee has met around 5,000 times to offer counseling to 3,200 people, who were accused of embracing the takfeer ideology. The committee has successfully completed reforming 1,500 people." So who are these reformed extremists? The New York Times reports that of the estimated 60 to 80 foreign fighters who enter Iraq each month, nearly half of them are from Saudi Arabia. They arrive in Iraq not only with arms, but also with millions of dollars. Funds donated to the insurgents by private Saudi citizens as zakat. According to the Los Angeles Times, 50% of these Saudi fighters come to Iraq to be suicide bombers. Once caught by American forces they are repatriated to Saudi Arabia for prosecution......

ODB
05-07-2008, 02:29 AM
Any thoughts on this?

http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=180


Faced with a large population of young, Islamic-extremist prisoners during the Afghan jihad, governments across the Arab world found a release valve for radical religious pressures in their societies by freeing ideological prisoners on the condition that they would go to fight the atheist Soviets in Afghanistan. Many such prisoners agreed and were released by regimes that hoped they would go to Afghanistan, kill some infidels, and be killed in the process. Many of these fighters were killed, but many were not and returned to bedevil their respective governments to this day. Still, for more than a decade, the Afghan jihad allowed Arab governments to redirect domestic Islamist activism outward toward the hapless Red Army. Although the policy proved shortsighted, it reduced domestic instability for most of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.

Today, it is hard to know for sure whether this trend is repeating itself. Yet, we do know three things for certain: (a) every Arab government faces a domestic Islamist movement that is broader and more militant—though not always more violent—than in the 1980s; (b) the insurgency in Iraq, because the country is the former seat of the caliphate and is located in the Arab heartland, is an attraction for Islamists far more powerful than was Afghanistan; and (c) the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan seems to be more than sufficient to allow a steady increase in the combat tempo of each insurgency. Thus, the situation seems ideal for Arab governments to try a reprise of the process that lessened domestic instability during the Afghan jihad.

This circumstantial argument that the current situation in Iraq is an almost ideal opportunity for Arab regimes to export their Islamic firebrands to kill members of the U.S.-led coalitions and be killed in turn is augmented—if not validated—by the large numbers of Islamic militants that have been released by Arab governments since the invasion of Iraq. The following are several pertinent examples drawn from the period November 2003-March 2006:

November 2003: The government of Yemen freed more than 1,500 inmates—including 92 suspected al-Qaeda members—in an amnesty to mark the holy month of Ramadan [1].

January 2005: The Algerian government pardoned 5,065 prisoners to commemorate the feast of Eid al-Adha [2].

September 2005: The new Mauritanian military government ordered "a sweeping amnesty for political crimes, freeing scores of prisoners…including a band of coup plotters and alleged Islamic extremists" [3].

November 2005: Morocco released 164 Islamist prisoners to mark the end of the holy month of Ramadan [4].

November 2005: Morocco released 5,000 prisoners in honor of the 50th anniversary of the country's independence. The sentences of 5,000 other prisoners were reduced [5].

November-December 2005: Saudi Arabia released 400 reformed Islamist prisoners [6].

February-March 2006: In February, Algeria pardoned or reduced sentences for "3,000 convicted or suspected terrorists" as part of a national reconciliation plan [7]. In March, 2,000 additional prisoners were released [8].

February 2006: Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali released 1,600 prisoners, including Islamist radicals [9].

March 2006: Yemen released more than 600 Islamist fighters who were imprisoned after a rebellion led by a radical cleric named Hussein Badr Eddin al-Huthi [10].

The justifications offered by Arab governments for these releases vary. Some claim they are to commemorate religious holidays or political anniversaries; others claim they are part of national-reconciliation plans. In some of the official statements announcing prisoner releases, Islamists are said to be excluded from the prisoners freed; in others, they are specifically included. In all cases, the releasing governments are police states worried about internal stability in the face of rising Islamist militancy across the Islamic world, the animosities of populations angered at Arab regimes for assisting the U.S.-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the powerful showings Islamist parties have made in elections across the region. While the motivation of Arab governments in releasing large numbers of prisoners is impossible to definitively document, it seems fair to conclude that those governments are not ignorant to the attraction that the U.S. occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan will exert on newly freed Islamists, nor of the chance that it might take no more than a slight incentive to dispatch some of the former prisoners to the war zones. It may well be that the West is seeing but not recognizing a reprise of the process that supplied manpower to the Afghan mujahideen two decades ago.

Ron Humphrey
05-07-2008, 03:18 AM
Any thoughts on this?

http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=180

To look for ways to utilize their prison populations for warfighting, building foreign bases, creating havoc, or anything else they could find to help divest themselves of the burden of caring for/ dealing with them. In that sense it doesn't seem all that surprising.

bourbon
05-07-2008, 05:41 AM
Any thoughts on this?

http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=180
Thoughts of how we could exploit this immediately come to mind. I imagine it would largely hinge on tagging and tracking technology available. Do we have subdermal gps chips yet? Can they be inserted surreptitiously? Those who would know likely cant say. This does not directly address the topic at issue, but it is where my mind jumped to.

Rex Brynen
05-07-2008, 11:46 AM
It seems to me that Scheuer is really stretching to make his supposed point here.

Several of the prisoner releases that he cites are overwhelmingly criminal, not political, prisoners. In these cases, most were nearing the end of their sentences, and their release (to mark religious and national holidays) has come to be as much an expected part of the judicial and incarceration system as is parole in the US.

Second, Arab regimes are--precisely because of blowback from the Afghan experience--fully aware of the dangers of militants traveling out of country to receive "work experience" in a foreign insurgency. It stretches credulity to expect that most would today see this as an effective strategy for limiting domestic national security challenges given their knowledge that most of those chickens come home to roost.

Third, some of those prisoner releases have to be seen in the context of successful deradicalization efforts by Arab governments. In Algeria, for example, national reconciliation efforts have reduced the militant Islamist movement to a tiny, tiny fraction of what it was during the height of the post-1991 civil war (a conflict that claimed well over 100,000 lives). Egypt and Saudi Arabia have also experienced some substantial deradicalization successes, in part because of their manipulation of selective inducements such as early release.

Certainly there are recent cases of released prisoners going on to cause mayhem elsewhere (Shakir al-'Absi of Fateh al-Islam comes to mind), and there is particular grounds for concern regarding Yemen's detention-and-release (or escape) policies.

However, I suspect that a look at the background of captured foreign jihadists in Iraq in particular would show that very, very few of them had been imprisoned Islamists given early release in their native countries. On the contrary--and rather more alarmingly--a significant proportion were rather latent Islamists mobilized into action by US intervention in Iraq.

Ron Humphrey
05-07-2008, 01:55 PM
Several of the prisoner releases that he cites are overwhelmingly criminal, not political, prisoners. In these cases, most were nearing the end of their sentences, and their release (to mark religious and national holidays) has come to be as much an expected part of the judicial and incarceration system as is parole in the US..

This one I can agree with you on



Second, Arab regimes are--precisely because of blowback from the Afghan experience--fully aware of the dangers of militants traveling out of country to receive "work experience" in a foreign insurgency. It stretches credulity to expect that most would today see this as an effective strategy for limiting domestic national security challenges given their knowledge that most of those chickens come home to roost..

The thing about that is how often those in power don't actually care to look so far as the roosting since their expectation is for it not to happen until after their gone. I will accept however that some of those whose leadership seem to never (:wry:) be gone may tend to look at it more long term.

Van
05-07-2008, 05:20 PM
Someone in the Arab world read their history carefully, and is undoubtedly laughing his rear end off at the symmetry of the situation.

One piece of driving force of the Crusades was "What the heck do we do with all these uppity younger sons?"

Now, I know that this is only one piece, usually ignored under the religious, political, and economic issues, but it was a piece of the European motivation. Looks like the Islamic violent fundamentalist extremist terrorist criminal elements (or whatever Dept. of State wants us to call them this week) jumped on this population control technique.

BillClewis2
05-13-2008, 02:23 AM
The author should have given consideration to profile information gleaned from Abu G detainees. It would have been a larger sampling as well as truer indication of FF presence and country of origin for FF's picked up in IZ.

Van
05-13-2008, 10:48 AM
Bill, this sounds really interesting and like a great thread. What are we referencing?

Shek
05-13-2008, 05:16 PM
Bill, this sounds really interesting and like a great thread. What are we referencing?

http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/04/beyond-iraq-and-afghanistan.php ;)

Jedburgh
09-25-2008, 06:29 PM
The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, 24 Sep 08:

Jihadis Publish Online Recruitment Manual (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374435)

To become a full fledged jihadi, volunteers must go through gradual ideological reform and build a sense of security and vigilance needed for clandestine activities. To further their preparation, one al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadi internet forum uploaded a new manual entitled The Art of Recruitment, offering tutorials in techniques for approaching and recruiting suitable people to join the global Salafi-Jihadi movement.

A jihadi forum participant using the nickname Abu Amr al-Qaedi uploaded the 51-page recruitment manual. The work contains a logical means of recruiting candidates for jihad, using three phases of “solitary preaching” and cultivation. The recruiters are instructed to cover every phase before moving to the next step. The successful completion of all three phases should lead to the formation of an active jihadi cell. In preparing the manual, al-Qaedi says he took into consideration the differences between people living in Muslim countries not occupied by crusaders, such as Jordan, Libya, Egypt, Algeria and others. "The purpose of the booklet is to transform the candidate into a devout and distinguished jihadi who understands the fundamentals of jihad, consequently becoming one of the ‘victorious cult.’” Al-Qaedi defines “solitary preaching” as a personal, direct contact between the candidate and the recruiter. Direct contact presents a good opportunity to comprehensively mold the candidate into a pious member of the Salafi-Jihadi movement and closely observe the recruitment progress. The recruiter can easily clarify any frustrations the candidate might have about joining jihad, refute discrepancies and, above all, preserve the confidentiality of the operation from the notice of security forces.....

drewconway
06-02-2009, 01:55 PM
An interesting note from Fed Biz Ops this morning (https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=426af744b18b9d198180dc3023cfe3cb&tab=core&_cview=0) regarding an academic conference on foreign fighters.


The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) intends to negotiate and award a sole source contract with Foreign Policy Research Institute Inc., 1528 Walnut St Ste 610, Philadelphia, PA, for access to plan, coordinate, and execute an open academic conference on the Foreign Fighters. This conference is geared toward assisting USSOCOM in better understanding the foreign fighter problem on a global scale...The conference is scheduled from 14 July to 15 July 2009, the period of performance will complete on 25 July or after all conference materials are delivered to USSOCOM.

More here (http://www.drewconway.com/zia/?p=931)

marct
06-02-2009, 03:34 PM
Hi Drew,

Thanks for the note! I do wish that these conferences would get a little more advance notice, though :wry:.

drewconway
06-02-2009, 07:12 PM
I got some additional information on the conference (http://www.drewconway.com/zia/?p=931#comments) for those interested

marct
06-02-2009, 07:14 PM
Thanks, Drew. I'll probably go for the video-on-demand option :D.

Valin
07-25-2009, 12:52 PM
Counter Terrorism Blog (http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/07/foreign_fighters_and_their_eco.php)
Matthew Levitt

On July 14-15, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) sponsored a conference in Washington DC at the National Press Club on "The Foreign Fighter Problem." I presented a paper for a panel on "Foreign Fighters and their Economic Impact," focused on the case study of Syria as a foreign fighter hub for AQI. The following is taking from the introduction to my paper:


Running an insurgency is an expensive endeavor. Financing and resourcing insurgent activities, from procuring weapons and executing attacks to buying the support of local populations and bribing corrupt officials, requires extensive fundraising and facilitation networks that often involve group members, criminal syndicates, corrupt officials, and independent operators such as local smugglers.....

The full paper is available online here (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1314).

George L. Singleton
07-25-2009, 01:35 PM
Dr. Levitt is a senior fellow and director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near Policy and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His linked article draws on his testimony in the civil case Gates V Syria, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No 06-1500 (RMC), September 2008, as well as on his interviews and research for a study co-authored with Michael Jacobson entitled “The Money Trail: Finding, Following and Freezing Terrorist Finances (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008). It also draws on the Sinjar documents made public by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, where the author is an adjunct fellow.

For a few years I was Assistant to the Executive Vice President for all bank Operations and Real Estate [he later was promoted to Vice Chairman of the Board] at Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company in NYC…then the fourth largest bank in the world. Today MHTCo. is by multiple mergers a part of JP Morgan Chase Bank.

Subsequently I am retired from US Civil Service and from the Air Force Reserve (6 years active, 25 in the weekender Reserve at the JCS level with HQ USSOCOM for almost 10 years)

My unique bank officer training and few years experience in both domestic and international bank operations, money wire transfer, Federal Reserve Bank operations, Broker Loan, Letters of Credit, Bills of Trade, off shore bank operations and accounts, etc. allow me, even in my old age, to know a fair amount about the mechanics of money laundering and movement of funds for wayward, as in terrorist, purposes.

I advised the shadow #2 of what became the Homeland Security Department before it was “stood up” in the field of money gamesmanship, for free, my duty as a knowledgeable citizen, and was glad to have done so. Some little good perhaps came from my suggestions and shared knowledge to a then active duty Navy Rear Admiral whose career field was the military side of terrorism senior management.

I have highlighted some statements by Dr. Levitt at the conclusion of his article…these are bits and pieces cut and pasted by me, to note that I may disagree with Dr. Levitt that insurgency is not primarily a military activity. Rather than be the village idiot know it all myself, perhaps others here on SWJ may want to comment on this focused topic…that insurgency is not primarily a military activity.

I, for one, think we all agree that use of military force of any sort is traditionally a form of foreign policy, but since we are dealing with a stateless grouping of terrorists, the floor is open for some new definitions.

Dr. Levitt’s complete article which is public domain information I think would be useful if reprinted in THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL whose current issue theme is to discuss and invites articles/contributions to help them better develop their strategy and tactis regarding insurrections, guerilla warfare, the sorts of things Dr. Levitt’s good article deals with in terms of the “show me the money” theme.


Finally, insurgents traditionally seek to discredit the government they are fighting and breed dependency on the part of local populations through low intensity conflict warfare targeting local political and economic interests. Later, they may seek to control territory. Note, for example, that the Abu Ghadiyah network “planned to use rockets to attack multiple Coalition forces outposts and Iraqi police stations, in an attempt to facilitate an AQI takeover in Western Iraq,” according to information released by the Treasury Department. In both cases, insurgents have to assume a level of financial responsibility for the local economy while increasing the costs of the insurgency and also building grassroots support among local populations.

It should be stated from the outset that, given the relatively strong return on minimal financial investment, Syrian support for insurgents and terrorists will remain an attractive option for the regime in Damascus so long as it continues to be a viable and productive means of furthering the regime’s domestic and foreign policy goals. And given the financial interests of local and national officials, cracking down on established smuggling networks (and thereby threatening the regular payments that supplement officials’ income) is no easy task. A multi-faceted approach to the foreign fighter facilitation network problem is therefore required, including:

A plan to backfill the local economies with jobs and services to replace the losses sure to follow the shuttering of the smuggling economy;

An anti-corruption and civil society campaign aimed at breaking the traditional and deeply ingrained culture of bribing people in positions of authority as the cost of doing business;

Robust efforts to secure political stability in Iraq generally and specifically in areas controlled or largely influenced by insurgents;

Diplomatic efforts to address the underlying policy concerns that have led Syria to support insurgents and terrorists as a means of furthering domestic and foreign policy;

Finally, all efforts on the Syrian side of the border will have to be replicated by concurrent and parallel efforts on the Iraqi side of the border.

At the end of the day, however, political and diplomatic efforts may fall short, in which case targeted financial sanctions – focused on illicit activity, authority figures engaged in criminal or other activity threatening regional security, and corruption – present an attractive second option.

Combined with regional diplomacy employing a variety of countries’ efforts to cajole Damascus when possible and sanction the regime when necessary, sanctions can at least increase the costs to the regime of its continued belligerent behavior. Sanctions alone will never solve national security problems, but when used in tandem with other elements of national power in an integrated, strategic approach they can be very effective.

Were the shadow economy of smuggling enterprises to contract, the most critical and time sensitive issue would be to successfully jumpstart legitimate economic growth in its place. In the words of General Sir Frank Kiston, “The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.”

Bob's World
07-25-2009, 02:05 PM
I will read this article with some interest, as the whole nature of AQ and the phenomenon of "foreign fighters" one of the main areas that our policy and intel types don't get and mischaracterize.

First: AQ is not an Insurgent organization. As a non-state entity AQ has no state and no populace. They are a new breed, a franchiser, a non-state acting like a state to conduct unconventional warfare to incite insurgency in many states, and to borrow members of said insurgencies to contribute to shared ends.

Second as to Syria. This is the route, the pipeline these nationalist insurgents who share ends with AQ travel along and through. Is the pipe the problem or the ends of the pipe? Many branches feed into the main line going through Syria, and most of those branches originate in the lands of our allies. The largest branch begins in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have a long history of diffusing dissidence at home by encouraging the exportation of such dissidents to go to places like Afghanistan in the 80s, and more recently Iraq. We need to overcome our politically driven tendency to focus on largely irrelevant aspects like the pipeline through Syria; and focus on the real issue: The dissatisfied insurgent populaces of the states these men and the money that funds them come from.

Bob's World
07-25-2009, 02:40 PM
Ok, I read Dr. Levitt's article. It adds nothing new, merely parroting the same old, flawed thinking. So I ask, does Dr. Levitt really just not get it? Or, in the alternative, does Dr. Levitt and the others who work so hard to shift the focus to state's like Syria have some alternative motivation, and what is it??

AQ is in Iraq for one reason: Because America is there. Fight us where we are, follow us where we go. Remain focused on their primary goal of taking down the Saudi Government and to break the will of the US to prop up the many governments of the region that we have invested so heavily in over the duration of the Cold War and work to sustain in a favorable relation with us today long after that conflict is over.

Foreign Fighters travel to Iraq for similar reasons to fight with AQ. They have poor governance at home that they want to change but believe that they cannot so long as that same governance is protected by the US; and they buy into the AQ mantra that step one is to break the support of the US to the region.


So, like flood waters flowing down hill to the sea; will blocking the path of least resistance stop the flood? No.. it merely changes the route.


This is not unlike a similar situation in US history. My family were Quakers back in the 17 and 1800s; and by the 1830s had migrated to southern Ohio and Michigan. There many of them became heavily involved in the very illegal business of smuggling escaped slaves out of the South up into the North and to Canada.

The governments and populaces of those states largely turned a blind eye to this illegal activity because they in some measure supported the moral cause for the action. Would strong sanctions against these states or populaces worked to shut down the pipeline? Perhaps, but at what consequence? Would targeting the otherwise solid citizens engaged in actually running the pipeline out of their strong religious and moral convictions shut down the pipeline? Doubtful, and again at what consequence?

After all the real problem was not the pipeline, but the governmentally supported institution of slavery; and the destination of Canada and the promise of freedom as powerful of a draw to enslaved people as the Ocean and gravity are to water.

We lacked the moral courage to make the hard decision to do the right thing then, and chose instead the harder path to the eventual unavoidable resolution of the problem.

We face a similar choice in the Middle East today. We can make the hard moral choice now; or ignore it and face the much harder inevitable resolution. I for one, vote for the former.

Men like Dr. Levitt are dangerous. Challenge them and their thinking. Challenge me and my thinking, but above all, think, and draw your own conclusions. The rhetoric is loud, but really does not stand up to close inspection.

bourbon
07-25-2009, 05:00 PM
Or, in the alternative, does Dr. Levitt and the others who work so hard to shift the focus to state's like Syria have some alternative motivation, and what is it??
Dr. Levitt is a senior fellow The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which was founded by AIPAC. While WINEP avoids AIPAC’s partisan image and was established to present a balanced view of the Middle East, its critics contend it a research arm of the pro-Israel lobby.

If one were looking for such an alternative motivation I would start there.

Tom Odom
07-26-2009, 06:47 AM
Dr. Levitt is a senior fellow The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which was founded by AIPAC. While WINEP avoids AIPAC’s partisan image and was established to present a balanced view of the Middle East, its critics contend it a research arm of the pro-Israel lobby.

If one were looking for such an alternative motivation I would start there.

yep

davidbfpo
03-15-2010, 09:48 PM
On the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, US soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines have confronted third-party national combatants. Widely known as 'foreign fighters,' these individuals have gained deadly skills, combat experience and global connections that can be exported and exploited to devastating effect, Michael P Noonan writes for FPRI.

Appeared Oct '09 and missed by me.

Link:http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200910.noonanm.disruptingforeignfighterflow.html

The issues around foreign fighters has appeared on SWC before, within existing threads; notably when concerning Iraq and the article is a good read.


The foreign fighter pipeline has three phases: (1) source country/flashpoint, (2) safe havens and the transit network, and (3) target locations. Others suggest that a fourth phase, outflow destinations, is important as well.

(Concludes)..while foreign fighters are by no means chiefly responsible for all of the problems in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan, working against them successfully will help to reduce violence in the war zones. Combined with effective actions on the ground, an indirect strategy that husbands and appropriately distributes resources across borders to limit recruitment, transit, and logistics for these international killers is essential to success.

AdamG
04-06-2010, 01:40 PM
A wave of Germans traveling to training camps for militant jihadists has alarmed security officials back in Europe. The recruits are quickly becoming radicalized and, in some cases, entire families are departing to hotbeds for terrorism. It is even believed that colonies catering to German Islamists have taken shape in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,687306,00.html

Bob's World
04-06-2010, 04:05 PM
Some are mercs, most are simply the "road team" for the hometown insurgency of their homeland.

AQ's message is clear and effective, essentially: "you can't win at home until you break the support of the US to the region and to your government." So they go to where the west is most vulnerable and attempt to hurt them there.

To me the only logical point to target is the perception within each of these states these men travel from that the U.S. stands between them and achieving better governance at home. Simply killing them when they arrive only motivates more to come; the routes they travel will flow to the paths of least resistance; and to target them in their homelands is to only validate AQ's propaganda as we step in to help some fairly unsavory state leaders to suppress the insurgent segments of their societies in the name of "counterterrorism."

My $.02

davidbfpo
04-06-2010, 07:05 PM
The German journalist Yassin Musharbash has written before extensively on this "tourism" to the FATA; the 'German colony' had not been detected until the Sauerland (or Saarland) plotters were arrested and made admissions when in custody. Note the 'colony' in South Waziristan is linked to a rather low profile AQ-leaning group the Islamic Jihad Union, for a fuller details (albeit from 2008):http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefaijuoct08.pdf

The IJU attracted the Sauerland plotters to a "holiday camp", where it was "fun" and to their surprise asked them to return home, to await the call, not fight in the FATA etc.

In response to Bob's World and I
To me the only logical point to target is the perception within each of these states these men travel from that the U.S. stands between them and achieving better governance at home.

I agree we do need to find messages that undermine the AQ / IJU "offer" at home, that mixture has yet to emerge IMHO. These messages cannot be solely be state responses. That AQ has killed more Muslims than non-Muslims is not said enough. A difficult thing messages.

See this CTC article for analysis on Muslims -v- non-Muslim deaths:http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Deadly%20Vanguards_Complete_L.pdf

Bob's World
04-07-2010, 09:28 AM
David,

When I say target perceptions, I do not mean messaging. No mere words mean much, when our actions speak volumes.

What I mean is a holistic top-down assessment of the nature of our entire foreign policy, with a focus on these nations where the populaces seem most inclined to join the foreign fighter band wagon; and then looking past they hyperbole of "Islamism" and "Caliphates" and "terrorism" and looking at things more fundamental such as how the West is perceived in that populace and what goes to shape that perception, and how we can modify our behavior and words to create better perceptions without also compromising critical national interests. Asking ourselves if we are supporting a populace or a government or worst yet, just a particular leader? Have we fallen into a relationship where we can be reasonably perceived by that populace as injecting our will over that of the populace and de-legitimizing their leadership in their eyes?

I hate victim mentality. You see it in individuals, and in groups of individuals. You often see it in governments faced with insurgency. You see it in the West's approach to the terrorist attacks of the past decade. "Oh woe is us, we are innocent and being attack for no reason by evil people." While nothing justifies acts of terrorism, nor absolves those who practice it, it is not healthy to simply think that you are a victim and that everyone else is wrong and must make all of the adjustments so that you can continue with your own destructive behavior. It is a syndrome common to addicts.

The West needs to take a 12-step program. "Hello, I am the West, and I have a problem..." Once we get as serious about our own behavior as we have been about modifying the behavior of others, we can begin to get in front of this.

So yes, we must manage perceptions in these populaces that feel inclined to attack us. But no, that does not mean seeing it as their entire fault and sending them a nice note to please stop.

Jedburgh
05-05-2010, 04:30 PM
USIP, 4 May 10: Why Youth Join al-Qaeda (http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR236Venhaus.pdf)

Summary
• Interviews and personal histories of 2,032 “foreign fighters” show that rather than be recruited, young men actively seek out al-Qaeda and its associated movements.
• Al-Qaeda is more than just an organization; it is an ideology and a popular global brand that spins a heroic narrative with an idealized version of Islamic jihad.
• Al-Qaeda’s ubiquitous message of anti-Muslim oppression and global jihad appeals to the developmental needs of adolescents.
• To defeat al-Qaeda, it is crucial to understand who seeks to join and why.
• Common myths and misconceptions about why young men join extremist movements ignore the proximate causes.
• Potential recruits have an unfulfilled need to define themselves. Al-Qaeda’s ability to turn them to violence is rooted in what each seeks: Revenge seekers need an outlet for their frustration, status seekers need recognition, identity seekers need a group to join, and thrill seekers need adventure.
• To prevent radicalization, calm the revenge seeker with programs to vent his frustration (e.g., sports, creative arts, political discussion outlets, young adult mentors); promote the status seeker with opportunities to show off his self-perceived talents (e.g., local political participation, international exchange programs, positive public media depictions of young Muslims); give the identity seeker groups to join (sports leagues, model governments, student societies, community service programs, adventure groups); and turn off the thrill seeker by tarnishing al-Qaeda’s image.
• Fragmented efforts of public diplomacy, strategic communications, and information operations are underresourced, poorly coordinated, and understaffed given the strength and pervasiveness of al-Qaeda’s message.
• A U.S. Strategic Communications Agency should be established to consolidate efforts under a cabinet-level secretary of strategic communications; execute a presidentially approved national communications strategy; manage funding of all U.S. communications programs; enable, empower, support, and reinforce credible existing voices in the Muslim world; build U.S. message credibility with honest, transparent dialogue that closes the “say-do” gap in recent foreign policy; and collect, synthesize, and analyze public opinion research.

Presley Cannady
05-16-2010, 06:44 AM
To defeat al-Qaeda, it is crucial to understand who seeks to join and why.

Curious. How much of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS recruitment of 14-30 year olds did we have to understand to beat them?

Kiwigrunt
05-29-2010, 06:20 AM
An eight minute TED talk (http://www.ted.com/talks/sharmeen_obaid_chinoy_inside_a_school_for_suicide_ bombers.html) on how the Taliban recruit/brainwash children.

davidbfpo
09-06-2010, 10:33 PM
A SWJ Blog pointer to the Newsweek article 'Inside Al Qaeda', a recommendation from another watcher and the All Things CT (from Australia) too. Sub-titled:
Nine years after 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s network remains a shadowy, little-understood enemy. The truth, as revealed by one of its fighters, is both more and less troubling than we think.

Newsweek link:http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/04/inside-al-qaeda.html

All Things CT link:http://allthingsct.wordpress.com/2010/09/07/death-of-a-hoary-old-chestnut/

An interesting account of a juvenile, of Afghan origin living in Pakistan, being recruited, trained and then leaving - in response to his mother's pleas. Yes, some gaps and credibility to this armchair watcher.

So now All Things CT's comment:
one thing stood straight out when I read this. Their account of the class size–some 30 persons. Why this stood out is that this was the size of AQ’s basic training course at al-Farouq (though sometimes they had up to 40). And this size is actually bigger than the advanced training course size at Tarnak, which usually sat at around 15-20 persons.

Previous reports from recent training had tended to suggest AQ was only training at around 15 or so in a group, so this 30 figure stood out immediately. Whether they can still do this is of course a matter for debate, but nonetheless, even with talk of taking out so many fighters, which the authors cover in their article, this account of a full training compliment gives pause for thought.

Then there is a Peter Bergen piece:http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/04/why-osama-bin-laden-still-matters.html

All Things CT again:
Might we finally be seeing the death of that hoary old chestnut thrown about for so long–about a robust pre-9/11 ”AQ” with a large membership base of at least several hundred or more usually several thousand members, instead of the just under 200 strong membership (198 actually) it had as 9/11 loomed??? As long term readers of this blog will know it is one of the first things I wrote about when I started allthingsct last year.

Peter Bergen’s new piece gives me hope that this may be taking place.

davidbfpo
10-19-2010, 07:34 AM
A German story, albeit reported in The Scotsman:
GERMAN intelligence sources have revealed how a group of Islamist radicals discovered the path of Holy War was more difficult than they supposed. The nine would-be terrorists travelled, with two women, from Germany to Afghanistan in 2009 in a bid for glory.

(Later)They were also alienated by the experienced Uzbek fighters they had been taken on by, dispelling their notions of Islamic unity.

Link:http://www.scotsman.com/news/Wouldbe-jihadists-find-holy-war.6587573.jp

Yes, "spin" from Germany, but accords with other independent reports on the reality volunteers find upon joining the global Jihad.

Bob's World
10-19-2010, 07:49 AM
Best to focus on the aspects of a problem within one's control

Causation rests primarily with the Government; Motivation comes from elsewhere.

As an example, within the states the Tea Party drives the Obama administration mad, but for the policies of the Obama administration, there would be no Tea Party. They attack the symptom, but don't ask; 'What is it about our approach to governance that leaves this segment of the populace feeling that they must organize and challenge us?"

The big benefit on this particular example is that those who join the Tea Party still have hope. Not the hope offered by the Administration in it's campaign bid, but the hope that comes with the certainty that the Constitutional guarantees of term limits, their right to vote, the timeline of when elections will be held, the knowledge that the President will not call upon the military to thwart the will of the people, etc. This is why the US can absorb a lot more causation than other countries can.

Motivation is another factor. This gets to ideology, recruiting, etc. But just as a wet forest is hard to burn, a well governed populace is hard to motivate to act out illegally to challenge government.

Germany must ask itself why it, of all non Muslim European states provides the most foreign fighters to Afghanistan? May be closely related to the fact that Turkey is a major source of foreign fighters there as well.

Jedburgh
11-08-2010, 07:13 PM
INEGMA, 8 Nov 10: Conduits to Terror - Classifying the Methods of Jihadist and Middle Eastern Terrorist Recruitment (http://www.inegma.com/reports/Special_Report_11/Conduits%20to%20Terror%20-%20%20Classifying%20the%20Methods%20of%20Jihadist% 20and%20Middle%20Eastern%20Terrorist%20Recruitment _low_res.pdf)

...From the perspective that people are the core of any organizations’ sustainable achievement, and that manpower is a critical success factor for terrorists, this report will investigate the recruiting and training methods and trends in terrorist organizations of the Middle East and Central Asia. The source of much disagreement today is whether recruitment is driven by a central leadership structure or more “bottom-up” in that actors self-radicalize and carry out an attack....

Bob's World
11-09-2010, 09:22 AM
I realize "terrorist organizations" rolls off the tongue easier than "unofficial political organizations employing terrorist tactics where denied legal venues to affect change"; but it sure muddies the water.

Terrorism is a tactic. It is time to stop describing organizations by their tactics and begin recognizing them by their purpose.

"For want of a nail" the war was lost. Today it appears to be for want of a word.

Jedburgh
01-07-2011, 12:53 PM
International Security, Winter 2010/11:

The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad (http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00023)

...The purpose of this article is threefold: first, to establish foreign fighters as a discrete actor category distinct from insurgents and terrorists; second, to present new empirical information about Muslim foreign fighters; and third, to propose a plausible hypothesis about the origin of the phenomenon. The analysis is based on a new data set of foreign fighter mobilizations, a large collection of unexplored primary and secondary sources in Arabic, as well as personal interviews with former foreign fighters conducted in Britain, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia.

The scope of the article has two important limitations. First, the conceptual focus is on movement formation, not on general mechanisms of foreign fighter mobilization. I do not formulate a universal theory of foreign fighters, predict rates of recruitment, or explain individual recruitment. Second, the empirical focus is on the Muslim world. A study of Muslim foreign fighters arguably has intrinsic value, because Muslim war volunteers are much more numerous and have affected many more conflicts than have foreign fighters of other ideological orientations. In addition, their involvement in major conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as their role in facilitating al-Qaida recruitment, make them a particularly significant challenge to contemporary international security....

Bob's World
12-29-2011, 10:43 AM
Still valid. By following the back trail of the "foreign fighters" (more accurately, young men who are frustrated with their own governance and opportunity at home, but who feel they are unable to act out to effect change yet on the home front). AQ targets these young men with an ideologically fused message that focuses on a message that is in effect: 'we will help you at home, but first you must help us abroad. Breaking the influence of the US over the region and with these governments is the critical first step."

For the US the main effort must be one of updating our Foreign Policy from one overly rooted in the Cold War (What does one become when ones starts out as the lesser of two evils, and the greater evil falls away?) to one designed for the world emerging around us today. Our interests have not changed, but the environment has. Military efforts to mitigate the symptoms of the friction caused by our policies must be held in a focused, supporting role for best effect.


Some thoughts for you all to consider from someone who was embedded with the Egyptian Army during the first Gulf War:

1. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have a lot in common in that the populaces of both states suffer under dictatorships that are supported in power largely by the U.S in exchange for support that we ask of those governments.

2. Most foreign fighters (some 40%) in Iraq are indeed Saudi, and I would expect a large number to come from Egypt as well, though I am not aware of their open source percentage. Some 20% each come from Libya and Algeria.

3. The Saudi's fear any growth of Shia power in particular and Iranian power in general and often play the U.S. has a hedge to protect them from this. This is due largely to the heavily oppressed Shia minority in NE Saudi Arabia that is the most motivated dissident group in Saudi Arabia, though there is a large Sunni dissidence as well.

4. This thread started off by stating how "Egypt" was running insurgent supporting information on TV, I suspect that "Egypt" i.e., the state of Egypt, was not running this at all, and the reason this was running was because it is very popular with a suppressed Egyptian populace.

5. The Saudi and Egyptian populaces fully recognize that they have no real hope of resolving their issues of poor governance at home until they can break the support of the U.S. in the region in general, and to their governments in particular. This is a critical point to understand. Young Saudi and Egyptian men see phase one to successful nationalist insurgency at home to be this breaking of U.S. support to two governments that have very little in common with the principles that the U.S. holds so dear.

6. When you see that the Saudi government is "cracking down on terrorists" at home, you would be wise to consider that the people they are cracking down on are Saudi citizens who are rising up in a quest for self-determined governance, and that this tremendous "help" by our Saudi allies most likely translates to their populace as all the more why reason they must work harder to break U.S. support to this government.

7. Some of these Saudis follow an extreme Wahabist brand of Islam, but most are moderates who want something even more extreme in this region of the world: self-determined democracy.


My point in all of this is that this often gets colored in just one way as it is presented to the American populace. We see ourselves as "the good guys" and therefore our allies are on the "good guy" team too. We are good guys, but as our leadership has stated, we are addicted to oil, and addicts make bad decisions. Just keep an open mind, and try to see these things though the perspectives of others as well.

To apply the concepts that I presented a few months ago in the paper on "Populace-Centric Engagement" the course I would offer is that we need to be much more tuned in to the needs, will and requirements of populaces like those of Egypt and Saudi Arabia; and take a much firmer line with their governments, using a full bag of carrots and sticks to put more effort to getting them to evolve their governments in ways that give their entire populaces more voice, and less effort on turning a blind eye to that in order to gain their support for GWOT related issues, or out of fear that they would somehow stop selling us oil.

Americans all wish that the Middle East would change how it views us. I suggest that the critical first step is changing how we view them. The Cold War lens we view them through gets a little cloudier every day.

carl
12-29-2011, 09:33 PM
Still valid. By following the back trail of the "foreign fighters" (more accurately, young men who are frustrated with their own governance and opportunity at home, but who feel they are unable to act out to effect change yet on the home front).

I think you are giving way to much credit to the political motivation of the "young men." That probably does exist, but as or more important is just the restlessness and violent tendencies of young men. Just about any half-baked political theory is going to be enough to get them to doing what young men are so prone to do anyway, be violent.

The underwear bomber, the Times Square bomber and many of the people going from the UK and US to Pakistan or Yemen or Somalia weren't frustrated by political helplessness at home. They have more opportunity to affect political change in the US and UK than anywhere. The underwear bomber was a rich kid whose family had real influence at home. He and the others just picked something to be upset about and somebody else took advantage of it.

Similar thing with many of the imported suicide bombers. They weren't the most politically sophisticated. They were the isolated losers.

There are a lot of things that motivate these guys but to focus on political grievances is give them a certain false nobility and to miss something as important, the violent nature of youth and violent movements that take advantage of that.


5. The Saudi and Egyptian populaces fully recognize that they have no real hope of resolving their issues of poor governance at home until they can break the support of the U.S. in the region in general, and to their governments in particular. This is a critical point to understand. Young Saudi and Egyptian men see phase one to successful nationalist insurgency at home to be this breaking of U.S. support to two governments that have very little in common with the principles that the U.S. holds so dear.

I wonder if this has observation has been overtaken by events or was flawed in an Arab world sense to begin with. The Tunisians did pretty good without us interfering much. I think the jury is still out on Egypt but we didn't do much except watch. Libyans threw off a tyranny that wasn't supported by the US and in fact did it with US help. The Syrians are keeping up the fight against a tyranny that is hostile to the US and has been for years. It seems to be that Arab tyrannies stand or fall pretty much on their own ability to keep power and our support or money doesn't have a whole lot to do with it.

Dayuhan
12-29-2011, 10:25 PM
Interview-based studies of foreign fighter motivation yield little or no evidence to suggest that breaking US support for the home country government is a significant motivation. The motivation cited is consistently of the "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" variety. It's also hard to ignore the reality that foreign fighters have been effectively recruited from countries where the government was not supported by the US, such as Syria and pre-revolution Libya, and the foreign fighters have been successfully recruited from all of these countries to fight in wars that had nothing to do with the home country government, such as the resistance to Soviet-era Afghanistan.

This theory seems to me to be unsupported by any evidence, and it's a dangerous theory: it suggests that al we have to do to de-motivate foreign fighters and terrorists is to fix the governments of Saudi Arabia et al. This we cannot do, and trying would make a huge mess and likely give us a great deal more terrorism.

US military intervention in Muslim countries motivates foreign fighters and provides them with a target. Easiest way to manage that is less intervention, and certainly less occupation, which provides enduring motivation and static targets.

We deceive ourselves if we pretend that these problems were created by meddling and that they can be resolved by good meddling. The answer to bad meddling isn't good meddling, it's less meddling.

carl
12-29-2011, 11:33 PM
We deceive ourselves if we pretend that these problems were created by meddling and that they can be resolved by good meddling. The answer to bad meddling isn't good meddling, it's less meddling.

Geesh that is nice writing. I'm jealous...again.

davidbfpo
01-01-2012, 12:07 AM
The term foreign fighters (FF) appears in numerous threads, there are two threads specifically on the theme and I understand during the peak of operations in Iraq (OIF) it was frequently raised - although I was unable to identify a specific thread.

Bob's World recently resurrected the issue on an old thread about the media in OIF and led me to think again about the issue.

The use of the term 'Wild Geese' IIRC comes from Irish history and I think is appropriate:
More broadly, the term "Wild Geese" is used in Irish history to refer to Irish soldiers who left to serve in continental European armies in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries.

Link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_of_the_Wild_Geese

jmm99
01-01-2012, 04:42 AM
about any "appropriate" comparison of the "Wild Geese" (whether Irish, Scottish or even English) with the AQ "foreign fighters".

The Wild Geese served in regular regiments, or in regular naval forces, which fought conventionally and under the laws of war then extant. Their motto was Pro Deo, Rege et Patria:

http://indigo.ie/~wildgees/galmoy/gal_flag.jpg

Their uniforms were well-defined in terms of "Rege et Patria" (several Jameses and their United Kingdom):

http://indigo.ie/~wildgees/galmoy/gal_unif.jpg

and in the British uniforms of the time, including reversed colors for sergeants.

See Wild Geese Heritage Museum and Library (http://indigo.ie/~wildgees/index.htm), with articles on the regiments of Galmoy (http://indigo.ie/~wildgees/galmoy/index.htm) and Lally (http://indigo.ie/~wildgees/lally.htm) (quite representative of the Wild Geese in the French Service (http://indigo.ie/~wildgees/wildgees.htm)), the Wild Geese in the Spanish Service (http://indigo.ie/~wildgees/s-wgeese.htm), etc.

Trinity College (Dublin), Centre for Irish-Scottish and Comparative Studies (CISCS), made a large-scale study of Irish Military Migration to France (http://www.tcd.ie/CISS/mmfrance.php):


Organised recruitment of Irish regiments to the French army dates from 1635 and seven regiments were recruited to fight in France. Harman Murtagh states that the Walls of Coolnamuck, Co. Waterford played a crucial role in this recruitment. While numbers declined in the 1640's, eight regiments fought in French service after the Catholic defeat in Ireland. Wall's own regiment passed to the exiled James Stuart, Duke of York, and disbanded in 1664 (then called the Royal Irlandais).

The most significant military migration to France occurred with the advent of the Williamite wars in the early 1690's, the defeat of James II's army in Ireland, and the Treaty of Limerick (1691). The first mass military migration of troops that would later form the Regiments Irlandais or Irish regiments took place in 1690. In exchange for a contingent of French soldiers sent to Ireland, around 5,000 Irish soldiers sailed from Kinsale to Brest in France under the command of Justin MacCarthy, Viscount Mountcashel. This group formed a foreign brigade within the French army, receiving the higher rate of pay. Soldiers in French military service enlisted for a minimum of six years according to a law of 1682. This term of service was increased to eight years in 1762 but the reality was rather different. Terms of service lasted from a few weeks to decades. The wages of ordinary soldiers were fixed at six sous per day until 1762 when they were raised to eight sous. Foreign troops were paid one sou more per day. Andre Corvisier estimates these wages were equal to that of a tradesman or a peasant, but soldiers had the advantage of receiving pay on Sundays and holidays.

Further migration of Irish troops took place after the defeat of the Jacobite forces, supported by Louis XIV in his European campaign against William of Orange. Under the Treaty of Limerick (1691), the Williamite commander, General Ginkel (1644-1703) allowed for the transport to France of all Irish forces who wished to leave. About 12,000 sailed for France and this group formed a separate army in France under the command of James II and then his son, James III. This army, unlike Mountcashel's brigade, was not part of the French army although the French crown paid the troops.

According to John Cornelius O'Callaghan, the organisation of the Irish regiments in France (in French service and the Stuart army) was along the following lines before the Treaty of Ryswick (1697). The infantry regiments of Clare, Dillon and Lee, with a total strength of over 6,000 troops formed Mountcashel's brigade in French service. The Stuart army in France had ten infantry regiments in seventeen battalions, three independent companies, two troops of Horse Guards and two regiments of Horse, each containing two squadrons, amounting to 12,326 soldiers and horsemen. This gave the Jacobite forces a total strength in France of 18,365.

With the return of peace, the French army was reformed in 1698 and the Irish regiments were extensively reduced. Henceforth, the Irish and Jacobite regiments, troops and companies were reorganised into an Irish force in the service of the king of France. As Louis XIV had recognised William of Orange as king of England, he could not openly harbour an army of the deposed king of England and pretender to the throne on his soil. However, this did not change the conviction of the Jacobite forces in his army, as later invasion attempts would prove. As a result of the reform, the infantry was reduced to eight one-battalion regiments of fourteen companies of fifty men, giving a paper strength of 700 men per regiment and a total infantry force of 5,600 men. The regiments were named after the colonel proprietors, Albermarle, Berwick, Burke, Clare, Dillon, Dorrington, Galmoy and Lee. The cavalry were reduced to one regiment of two squadrons, commanded by Dominic Sheldon. Like ordinary French soldiers, the disbanded troops were left to fend for themselves, and many turned to brigandage and begging, reinforcing negative French stereotypes of Irish immigrants.

The War of Spanish Succession (1701-1713) provided employment for all elements of the French army including the Irish regiments. With the end of the conflict, the Irish regiments were again reduced, this time to five regiments. The regiments of Berwick, Clare, Dillon, Dorrington and Lee remained in service, as did Sheldon's cavalry under the new colonel-proprietor Christopher Nugent. Burke's infantry passed into Spanish service, the other regiments were disbanded and the soldiers were incorporated into the surviving regiments. A royal decree of 2 July 1716 introduced a system of troop records to the French army. French regimental commanders were henceforth required to keep precise registers of non-commissioned officers and ordinary soldiers. These records provide the core source for the website of ordinary soldiers in the Irish regiments and can shed new light on the composition of the bulk of the troops in the Irish regiments from 1691 to the French Revolution. In 1791, the foreign regiments were disbanded as a result of French army reforms of the French Revolution. As yet the database is incomplete, including 16000 out of approximately 20,000 soldiers in French service for the period under examination. It is envisaged that the officers and the remaining ordinary soldiers will be included at a later date.

Regards

Mike

Bill Moore
01-01-2012, 08:44 AM
Men participate in foreign wars for many reasons, the least of which is that they're frustrated with their own government at home. Many men search for adventure and it isn't much more complicated than that. You can join a mercenary group, join a resistance movement, etc. to fight communism, a dictatorship, to support a communist insurgency, wage Jihad, or carry the Cross into battle. Men throughout time have longed for the excitment of battle. Only the bureaucrats would come up with something along the lines that they're frustrated with their government at home.

AdamG
01-11-2012, 02:56 PM
Men participate in foreign wars for many reasons, the least of which is that they're frustrated with their own government at home. Many men search for adventure and it isn't much more complicated than that. You can join ...wage Jihad

To wit, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=130824&postcount=1

davidbfpo
01-28-2013, 11:57 PM
Foreign fighters is "pet" interest and Thomas Hegghammer, from Norway's Defence Research Institute, has circulated his article 'Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting', which has been published in an American academic journal (APSR) and is on his own website:http://hegghammer.com/_files/Hegghammer_-_Should_I_stay_or_should_I_go.pdf

The article's synopsis:
This article studies variation in conflict theater choice by Western jihadists in an effort to understand their motivations. Some militants attack at home, whereas others join insurgencies abroad, but
few scholars have asked why they make these different choices. Using open-source data, I estimate recruit supply for each theater, foreign fighter return rates, and returnee impact on domestic terrorist activity. The tentative data indicate that jihadists prefer foreign fighting, but a minority attacks at home
after being radicalized, most often through foreign fighting or contact with a veteran. Most foreign fighters do not return for domestic operations, but those who do return are more effective operatives than non-veterans. The findings have implications for our understanding of the motivations of jihadists, for assessments of the terrorist threat posed by foreign fighters, and for counter-terrorism policy.

Fifteen pages, so to printed off and read another day.

SWJ Blog
10-15-2013, 12:52 AM
Foreign Fighters in Syria and Beyond (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-beyond)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-beyond) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
11-16-2013, 10:30 PM
I have refrained from posting the many reports on the flow of European recruits to the violent jihad in Syria, with the various estimates of the numbers involved and the rare report on persons returning being arrested.

Here is a good introduction:
Syria since 2011 has emerged as the greatest of all jihad contests for foreign fighters. Given its proximity to Europe, large numbers of Westerners have gone to fight in Syria, via Turkish “ratlines,” raising concerns among European security services about what these violent young men might do when they return home. Significant numbers of angry young mujahidin from Europe have joined the fight in Syria, on a scale never before seen in counterterrorism circles, leading to something approaching panic among Western intelligence agencies.

Link:http://20committee.com/2013/11/16/syrias-jihad-reaches-europe/

The article is about recent arrests in Kosovo, the author wonders if the action was prompted by militants assaulting two US citizens.

Bill Moore
11-17-2013, 10:31 AM
I have refrained from posting the many reports on the flow of European recruits to the violent jihad in Syria, with the various estimates of the numbers involved and the rare report on persons returning being arrested.

Here is a good introduction:

Link:http://20committee.com/2013/11/16/syrias-jihad-reaches-europe/

The article is about recent arrests in Kosovo, the author wonders if the action was prompted by militants assaulting two US citizens.

Some supporting fires:

http://theconversation.com/is-it-a-problem-that-australia-sends-the-most-foreign-fighters-to-syria-18283

Is it a problem that Australia sends the most foreign fighters to Syria?


ASIO believes that there are at least 200 Australians who have gone to fight in Syria, more than double the number believed from any other Western country.

But why has Australia’s contribution to the Syrian War been so large both in absolute numbers and relative to its population size?

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/20/foreign-jihadists-surpass-afghan-soviet-war-storm-/?page=all

Foreign jihadists surpass Afghan-Soviet war, storm Syria in record numbers


The number of foreigners in Syria has not reached the level in Afghanistan three decades ago, but that civil war lasted nine years, while the Syrian rebellion is 2 years old.

Mr. Zelin said the rate of foreign recruits streaming into Syria is “unlike anything else.”

The foreign fighters — called jihadists, or holy warriors — come from at least 60 nations. Most are Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Libya and Tunisia, but a few dozen are from Western Europe, particularly Britain, Belgium, France and the Netherlands, Mr. Zelin said. Ten to 20 fighters have come from the United States, he said.

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-dutch-foreign-fighter-contingent-in-syria

The Dutch Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria

This author has identified at least 20 individuals from the Netherlands who have fought or are fighting in Syria, although there could be more than 100.[6] At this point, it is not possible to access specific details about the fighters’ backgrounds—such as their socioeconomic positions—but in some of the cases there is enough information to paint a rough sketch of these foreign fighters.

The majority of the 20 identified Dutch foreign fighters came from Moroccan, Somali and Turkish communities in the Netherlands, although one Dutch man was originally from Bosnia.[7] Most commonly, the individuals in question are of Moroccan descent.[8] They largely came from the Dutch cities of Zeist, Delft, Rotterdam and The Hague (specifically the notorious Schilderswijk[9] neighborhood).[10]


Abu Fidaa was confident that the jihadists in Syria have an excellent strategy. He claimed that they can easily uncover a spy, and that their long-term vision gives them ideological and strategic strength. This is the advantage they have over secular groups, said Abu Fidaa. The non-secular rebels do not look at Syria in a vacuum; after freeing Syria from Bashar al-Assad, he explained, they will help their Palestinian brothers. According to Abu Fidaa, “We are not planning to return [to the Netherlands]. Freeing Syria will take a while. A true mujahid will never be able to leave Syria…If we give up at any point, all our efforts and the efforts of people before us will have been for nothing.


According to the AIVD, “Several members of radical Islamist organisations such as Sharia4Holland and Behind Bars are among those that left to Syria to join the jihad. This is indicative of how blurred the line between radicalism and jihadism has become. These movements have created an environment in which people with similar ideas meet and develop radical ideas into jihadist ideologies. This group dynamic has led to a rapid radicalization of many individuals as well as concrete attempts to join the jihad in Syria.”

davidbfpo
11-28-2013, 06:01 PM
Thomas Hegghammer, of the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, has a good piece in WaPo 'Number of foreign fighters from Europe in Syria is historically unprecedented. Who should be worried?'. He opens with:
Since 2011, large numbers of European Muslims have gone to Syria to fight with the rebels. But exactly how many are they, and which countries are providing most of the fighters? The question matters because some of these foreign fighters may return to perpetrate attacks in the West, and Western governments are now grappling with the question of how to design and calibrate countermeasures.

Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/11/27/number-of-foreign-fighters-from-europe-in-syria-is-historically-unprecedented-who-should-be-worried/

Why the title? He writes:
Incidentally, it is worth noting, for perspective, that the Danish Syria contingent of 65 people is the population-adjusted equivalent of 3,600 Americans.

There is a main thread on foreign fighters, but this article warrants a new, temporary thread. The main thread is:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=14841

I know that European Muslims, a simple generalisation, have fought before in conflicts such as Bosnia, Kashmir, Afghanistan, maybe Chechnya and without much adverse comment at the time in Libya. Often those who survive have not actually fought, although they claim to; some remain in situ, a good number die and others return totally disenchanted.

What is intriguing is the estimated number of fighters coming from Denmark and Norway, although maybe not nationals.

During the Spanish Civil War, which has some similarities to Syria, large numbers of volunteers fought with the Republicans - following their "left-wing" views and the need to confront fascism. The 'International Brigades' are well known, unlike the small numbers of volunteers who fought for the Nationalists.

In my very limited reading I do not recall the return of the 'International Brigades' being seen as a national threat; monitored yes and some curiously formed part of the instructor cadre of SOE in WW2.

ganulv
11-28-2013, 06:39 PM
In my very limited reading I do not recall the return of the 'International Brigades' being seen as a national threat; monitored yes

One of my favorite anthropologists, Elman Service (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elman_Service), was a veteran of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.


and some curiously formed part of the instructor cadre of SOE in WW2.

Dedicated to the fight against international fascism. Makes perfect sense to me! :)

davidbfpo
12-02-2013, 11:22 PM
In talking to a couple of local community contacts a variety of reasons have been given for the motives of those who fight on the 'rebel' side in Syria. Curiously much emphasis was put on non-ideological reasons:
It is a humanitarian jihad...The Alawite's are heretics...the conflict is glamourised....people here (in Birmingham, UK) feel helpless as they watch non-MSM footage of the war and simply want to do something physical themselves.

Talking about the threat of 'returning fighters' one was quite dismissive:
How many have fought overseas before? Very, very few return to launch attacks....Many having "tasted" real-life battle are not the same, it turns them off. Yes a few can "flip" and others can see that happening if they socialise.

One remarked that:
We ask them, the aspiring jihadist fighters, those who claim they must go to Syria to help, what are you doing now to help? The war is two years old. Do you realise most assistance for civilians / refugees come from non-Muslims in the West and their governments? When did you last contribute to a collection?

Recommended as a source was an American convert, Bilal Abdul Kareem, who now reports from inside Syria. From an interview he explains:
It has been a long year but one that I think is well worth it. I’ve met some extraordinary people and I really feel that more people need to know who these Islamic fighters are and what they want. That doesn’t mean that my goal is for them to necessarily like them, but my goal is for them to know them and then they can decide for themselves.

Link:http://passionislam.com/articles.php?articles_id=265

omarali50
12-03-2013, 05:58 PM
In the background of all these efforts, we must also remember that there is the matter of young men and their love affair with male bonding and adventure.
The ideological justification is obviously there, but this (biological?) urge is not trivial.
There is probably an extensive literature about such things that I am just too ill-informed to have read. I look forward to enlightening posts.

Firn
12-03-2013, 09:01 PM
I think it is important to address at least one troublesome statistical bit about the catchy title. Obviously he put it up to get the attention American audience, but still some statistical problems get ignored in the whole article. I will tackle just one.

It is key to understand that small samples yield extreme results more often than large samples do which means the same as large samples are more precises than small samples.

A quick look at the last table, estimated fighters per million Muslims shows that the smallest countries tend indeed to give the most extreme results while the large countries tend to cluster around the center. Italy is at the first glance really the only outlier. (Interestingly the topic was and is pretty nonexistent in the Italian media)

Wikipedia gives a rough overview on muslim numbers per country:

Austria 475,000
Belgium 638,000
Bosnia 1,564,000
France 4,704,000
Denmark 226,000
Germany 4,119,000
Italy 1,583,000
Norway 144,000
Netherlands 914,000
Spain 1,021,000
Sweden 451,000
UK 2,869,000

The little I have read is that allmost all of the fighters stem from the male age group between 20-34, which usually makes up roughly 15% of the population. Even if we up this to 25% considering the immigration background to be on the safe side some numbers get very small indeed.

In Norways and Denmarks case we are around a pool of just 35000 and 55000 which make extreme outcomes of such rare events very likely. So no surprise that they are very far away from the mean.

This goes in doubly so for intelligence work, as they have to estimate their numbers for the whole country based on relative rare information about rare events.

This is a very tricky&hard thing to do which very likely will lead to considerable differences between the estimation process between countries even if would not take the chance factor in the relative rare informations about relative rare events into account. Even very smart guys in smart organizations will differ. Actually you can see that already to a good degree on their estimates. Some put an absolute number there, sometimes a round one, sometimes even an odd one, others have a bracket but the spread goes from roughly a 1/3 to factor 3!

To come back to the title it should be now obvious why it is a bad idea to take an extreme outcome from a small sample and to use it as base to get a 'perspective' for a nation the size of the USA.

The approach take in this short post is mostly based on Kahnemans work on 'small numbers'.

jmm99
12-03-2013, 10:06 PM
You might want to take a look at the work of Scott Atran (http://sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/home) (from the Univ of Michigan; his other job, Directeur de Recherche, Anthropologie, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris). He has a huge literature. Here are some samples, expressing the "band of brothers" approach:

Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists (http://www.amazon.com/Talking-Enemy-Brotherhood-Making-Terrorists/dp/0061344907) (2010) (on my book shelf):



Atran interviews and investigates Al Qaeda associates and acolytes, including Jemaah Islamiyah, Lashkar-e-Tayibah, and the Madrid train bombers, as well as other non-Qaeda groups, such as Hamas and the Taliban, and their sponsoring communities, from the jungles of Southeast Asia and the political wastelands of the Middle East to New York, London, and Madrid. His conclusions are startling, important, and sure to be controversial.

Terrorists, he reminds us, are social beings, influenced by social connections and values familiar to us all, as members of school clubs, sports teams, or community organizations. When notions of the homeland, a family of friends, and a band of brothers are combined with the zeal of belief, amazing things—both good and bad—are possible: the passage of civil rights legislation, the U.S. Olympic hockey team's victory in 1980, the destruction of 9/11 and the attacks on the London Underground in July 2005.

PATHWAYS TO AND FROM VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE CASE FOR SCIENCE-BASED FIELD RESEARCH (http://edge.org/conversation/pathways-to-and-from-violent-extremism-the-case-for-science-based-field-research) - Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats & Capabilities (2010):


Summary: De-radicalization, like Radicalization, is Better from Bottom Up than Top Down

When you look at young people like the ones who grew up to blow up trains in Madrid in 2004, carried out the slaughter on the London underground in 2005, hoped to blast airliners out of the sky en route to the United States in 2006 and 2009, and journeyed far to die killing infidels in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen or Somalia; when you look at whom they idolize, how they organize, what bonds them and what drives them; then you see that what inspires the most lethal terrorists in the world today is not so much the Koran or religious teachings as a thrilling cause and call to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes of friends, and through friends, eternal respect and remembrance in the wider world that they will never live to enjoy.

Our data show that most young people who join the jihad had a moderate and mostly secular education to begin with, rather than a radical religious one. And where in modern society do you find young people who hang on the words of older educators and "moderates"? Youth generally favors actions, not words, and challenge, not calm. That's a big reason so many who are bored, underemployed, overqualified, and underwhelmed by hopes for the future turn on to jihad with their friends. Jihad is an egalitarian, equal-opportunity employer (at least for boys, but girls are web-surfing into the act): fraternal, fast-breaking, thrilling, glorious, and cool. Anyone is welcome to try his hand at slicing off the head of Goliath with a paper cutter.

“Band of Brothers”: Civil Society and the Making of a Terrorist (http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol10iss4/art_3.htm) (2008):


Soccer, paintball, camping, hiking, rafting, body building, martial arts training and other forms of physically stimulating and intimate group action create a bunch of buddies, which becomes a “band of brothers” in a simple heroic cause. It’s usually enough that a few of these buddies identify with a cause, and its heroic path to glory and esteem in the eyes of peers, for the rest to follow even unto death. Humans need to socially organize, to lead and be led; however, notions of “charismatic leaders” and Svengali-like “recruiters” who “brainwash” unwitting minds into joining well-structured organizations with command and control is exaggerated. Viewed from the field, notions of “cells” and “recruitment”—and to a degree even “leadership”—may reflect more the psychology and organization of those analyzing terrorist groups than terrorist groups themselves (see Marc Sageman’s Leaderless Jihad, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

Takfiris (from takfir, “excommunication”) are rejectionists who disdain other forms of Islam, including wahabism (an evangelical creed preaching Calvinist-like obedience to the state) and most fundamentalist, or salafi, creeds (which oppose fighting between co-religionists as sowing discord, or fitna, in the Muslim community). They tend to go to violence in small groups consisting mostly of friends and some kin (although friends tend to become kin as they marry one another's sisters and cousins—there are dozens of such marriages among militant members of Southeast Asia's Jemaah Islamiyah). These groups arise within specific “scenes”: neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, and common leisure.

Regards

Mike

davidbfpo
01-13-2014, 09:18 PM
How governments should respond to foreign fighters appears to be on the public agenda - at least in the UK.

Tonight a short BBC report:
Two men from Birmingham have been arrested on suspicion of terrorism offences relating to activities in Syria, police have said.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25720887

Days ago the BBC reported:
Extremists who undertake terrorism training could face life in prison under a new government proposal. The life terms would replace current 14-year maximum sentences for activities including weapons training and making or possessing explosives.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25678300

Amongst the critics of this proposal was King's College's Dr Peter Neumann, of ICSR; which is reflected in the proposals - which emphasis prevention rather than imprisonment - being made by his associate at a parliamentary committee tomorrow:http://icsr.info/2014/01/icsr-insight-british-foreign-fighters-syria/

davidbfpo
02-07-2014, 12:32 PM
Found on a LinkedIn discussion board today and rather startling for me, as I have never heard of such numbers of Americans being involved:
The US had thousands of Muslims go to Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. Many went more than once. Even with bin Laden's rise to leadership of AQ and declared war against America we never saw any violence from the returning jihadists. But I am not saying it won't/can't happen now...

Anyone able to verify this?

davidbfpo
02-10-2014, 12:20 PM
A "lurker" familiar with the history of US-resident Muslims fighting against the Soviet-backed Afghan state has responded:
This is mostly true. There were actually many folks in the U.S. that went to Afghanistan during the 1980's to fight against the Soviets. In 'Looming Tower' by Lawrence Wright, he discusses in the first 100 pages or so how a guy in Kansas City, MO was recruited via a flyer and called a number in Peshawar which got him into the Muj pipeline.

Where the quote isn't entirely correct is the notion that all of these Americans fell into Bin Laden or Zawahiri's hands. There were many Americans that went through but then one wasn't there the entire time nor were all Americans processed through him. The same is for Zawahiri. There were many guest house in Pakistan and there's no way that all the Americans were in the grasp of bin Laden.

Azzam Had set up many guest houses and they were not all controlled by Bin Laden. I'm not aware of any of these stories about lost passports. The bottom line is that not everyone that went to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets became a member of Al Qaeda'.

If that was the American experience when fighting a Soviet-backed regime was approved of by the US government and many others across the political spectrum, it is clear that very few if any of those who returned continued to wage the violent jihad in the USA. Certainly puts the hype and fear over a possible current threat in a very different perspective.

davidbfpo
06-18-2014, 02:01 PM
A free report from The Soufan Group, the main author being Richard Barrett (Ex-SIS & UN), which has some proper insight. From the flyer:
The policy response so far has often focused more on prevention and punishment than on dissuasion or reintegration, but as the number of returnees increases, and the resources required to monitor their activities are stretched to breaking point, it will be important to examine more closely why an individual went, what happened to him while there, and why he came back. This paper attempts to provide some general context for answering those questions, and offers suggestions for policy development.

Link to the report (33 pgs):http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf

The flyer:http://soufangroup.com/foreign-fighters-in-syria/

Firn
06-23-2014, 01:01 PM
Without any hard facts I would suggest four main reasons why we have so many young Europeans fighting with Islamic extremists in Syria and now in Iraq compared to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

1) Demography or a far larger recruitment pool: There are considerable more young Muslim living in Europe nowadays then thirty years ago, at least by a factor 2-3 I guess.

2) Geography or a far more easily reached conflict

3) Globalization, especially in media terms: Social media, internet sites and various TV stations bring the conflict with far greater intensity into one's new home and mind.

4) Duration or a mix of enduring conflicts.


The danger of terrorist strikes within Europe by the new generation is also increased by an additional factor:

5) Islamic terrorism against Western targets in much more in vogue then thirty years ago with plenty of examples.

davidbfpo
07-07-2014, 11:55 PM
The actual title is 'FactCheck: what about the Britons who fight for Israel?' by Channel Four's fact checkers:http://blogs.channel4.com/factcheck/factcheck-britons-fight-israel/18448

This is an argument that appears regularly now when 'foreign fighters' are discussed, so this short article does help with some "light":
The Israeli military runs a programme called “mahal (http://www.mahal-idf-volunteers.org/)” which allows non-Israeli nationals of Jewish descent to join the ranks of the armed forces for an 18-month tour of duty.....The numbers of volunteers from the UK are small but significant: the IDF told Channel 4 News there are “around one hundred Brits currently serving” in its ranks....apparently with no legal difficulties...

davidbfpo
07-08-2014, 03:08 PM
Three different commentaries today.

First a short 30 minute Danish documentary 'European Jihadi' about a Danish citizen of Berber & Moroccan descent:
Gangster and drug dealer Abderrozak Benarabe, or Big A as he's known on the streets of Copenhagen, made a deal with God that if his brother was delivered from cancer he would redeem his criminal ways and go to fight jihad in Syria alongside his fellow foreign fighters and child soldiers under 16.... and back to Copenhagen to amass and smuggle supplies to the fighters across the Greek-Turkish borderNote the combat scenes are from 2012, gruesome in part; link:http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/jul/07/european-jihadi-danish-gangster-joined-syrian-frontline-video

Accompanying story:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/07/european-jihadi-danish-gangster-frontline-syria

A comment by a viewer, Rachel Briggs who has long studied counter-radicalisation; which ends:
There are many theories about why Europeans are travelling to Syria. As ISIS declares itself a caliphate now known as IS and its leader speaks of furthering the Muslim cause, it is worth remembering that not all those who find themselves on the frontline have this kind of focus. Many will be young men and women, bored of life in Europe, in search of adventure. And like Big A, many could be dissuaded given the right deterrents and disincentives.Link:http://rachelbriggs.wordpress.com/2014/07/08/gangsters-jihadi-paradise

A short RUSI comment 'The Four Types of the Returning Jihadi':https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C53BBDE309A3F2/#.U7vw9kCRcdX

davidbfpo
07-24-2014, 08:45 PM
One aspect of the current Gaza conflict is the role of foreign nationals serving with the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). Two US nationals died last week, IIRC both had dual nationality. It is an issue that leads to claims that those Muslims who fight in Syria currently are being treated very differently, usually by law enforcement and steps to discourage them going.

More recently two weeks during a public exchange in the UK ago we learnt that:
The Israeli military runs a programme called “mahal (http://www.mahal-idf-volunteers.org/)” which allows non-Israeli nationals of Jewish descent to join the ranks of the armed forces for an 18-month tour of duty.....The numbers of volunteers from the UK are small but significant: the IDF told Channel 4 News there are “around one hundred Brits currently serving” in its ranks....apparently with no legal difficulties...Link:http://blogs.channel4.com/factcheck/factcheck-britons-fight-israel/18448

Today a UK-based blogger, formerly a reporter in the Middle East called for those serving in the IDF to be treated as other foreign fighters:http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/july/jihad-for-israel.htm#sthash.A7Ex6YYa.ae0sZGcY.dpbs

This is a longer, broader article:http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/jihad-israel-201472272438651885.html

davidbfpo
08-28-2014, 06:48 PM
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerners-go-fight-syria-and-iraq-it-aint-half-hot-here-mum

Within this long article - with many points made - is this table:https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BwJBunkCMAMR1Xw.jpg

davidbfpo
09-12-2014, 12:23 PM
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BxUkCxaIUAEV7D9.jpg

davidbfpo
10-13-2014, 08:57 PM
Nice graphic via WaPo:http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-to-syria/2014/10/11/3d2549fa-5195-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_graphic.html?Post+generic=%3Ftid%3Dsm _twitter_washingtonpost


An estimated 15,000 militants from at least 80 nations are believed to have entered Syria to help overthrow the regime of President Bashar al-Assad according the CIA and studies by ISCR and The Soufan Group.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Bz1SbZBIEAAu7QD.png

Firn
10-14-2014, 04:19 PM
Nice graphics indeed.

davidbfpo
02-03-2015, 10:05 PM
The industrious Norwegian SME Thomas Hegghammer was interviewed on what kinds of terror attacks do we have to expect in Europe, and how dangerous are returning Foreign Fighters? Link:http://abususu.blogspot.de/2015/01/this-threat-will-stay-with-us-for-at.html

Here is one passage:
....we do know is the proportion of people who returned from previous battlefields and then plotted attacks. Before Syria, that rate was 1 out of 15 to 20. If you look at open source data about returnees from Syria who were involved in terror plots across Europe, we have so far seen about 10 plots with roughly 20 returnees involved. That is 20 out of 3000 who left to fight abroad, or 20 out of just over 1000 who have already returned, repectively. So far, it is only a small minority who have become terrorists. The question before us is: How do you stop that minority without over-reacting towards the relatively harmless majority?

Yes there is a thread on foreign fighters, but IMHO what Hegghammer says has few equals.

Bill Moore
02-04-2015, 02:22 AM
It was a good interview and he didn't minimize the threat. The current numbers mean little, which is why he didn't focus on numbers. Sleeping cells can sleep, but more importantly those that return can build there their own networks in their home country much like JI did in Indonesia. The threat is serious and there is no reason it will reside in 10 years. It has already existed over 20 years. We need to find the sweet spot between over and under reacting.

Bob's World
02-04-2015, 10:15 AM
Europe used to celebrate their heritage of going off to be foreign fighters in the Levant - they called it "The Crusades."

There was major civil war and unrest when those fighters returned as well. Radical Christians were far more disruptive than radical Muslims have been to date.

But then as now, the real problem was not that people went off to fight for religiously motivated causes, nor that they returned with military skills and a global perspective. The problems stemmed from the perceived state of governance they returned to and an enhanced determination not to put up with it any more.

A very similar effect occurred in the US with the African American population after WWII.

Europe is evolving culturally, and no amount of neo Nazism is going to change that fact. Many emigrants perceive themselves discriminated against, Muslims in particular, and no amount of rationalization by those who consider themselves true citizens is going to change that.

Ten years? Only if the people and governments get serious about addressing perceived discrimination and accept the fact that once again, Europe is in an era of major cultural evolution.

Blaming those calling for radical action is natural, but it is little different than blaming the civil rights movement in the US on men like Dr. King and Malcolm X. They just "saw a parade and leapt in front. We need to think more honestly about why these types of "parades" form

Bill Moore
03-22-2015, 02:14 AM
WarPorcus,

I'm not sure what statistics you're looking for, but I'll do a search through my computer tomorrow and see what I have for foreign fighter flow from Southeast Asia. A few reports point to several foreign fighters being disillusioned by ISIL's extreme behavior, so hopefully that trend continues. As for Indonesia and the Philippines (similar but still very different), JI and ASG's initial core were foreign fighters from Afghanistan during the USSR occupation. The vast majority of fighters returning that conflict didn't engage in terrorism, but it only takes a handful to have a strategic impact.

We can't compare this to the Crusades where Christians go out and fight and return to their Christian homes, nations that were already somewhat extremist on the Christian side. Fighters today are returning to countries that don't embrace their extreme (and illegitimate) beliefs, so some seek to impose their views via violence. Indonesia from what I can gather from a few short trips there, discussions with experts, and reading is that the government is doing a relatively good job of addressing the concerns of their people (within reason in a developing country), so people aren't fighting because they're being discriminating against. They're fighting to impose their extreme and unpopular beliefs. We're talking Martin L. King freedom marches here (lol).

The Philippines is another issue altogether, since their government does discriminate against their Muslim population. The government does little to address the concerns of their Muslim population, and while President Aquino has a been light of hope, his time is getting short, and not unlike our system their Congress is corrupt and eager to undo much of the progress he has made. I project the situation will devolve for the worse in the Philippines.

Regardless of the conditions on the ground, the terrorists in these countries will reconnect, or strengthen their existing links with global terrorist networks based on foreign fighter flow to support ISIL. That points to a bigger challenge for security forces. I also think those who were repulsed by ISIL may find al-Qaeda more attractive if they're still looking a group to affiliate with. Reportedly, the jihadist websites/blogs in Indonesia contain a fierce internal debate between jihadists on whether to support ISIL or AQ.

For one, I see no reason this will go away in 10 years, but hopefully it can be contained to a manageable level.

OUTLAW 09
03-22-2015, 07:42 AM
WarPorcus,

I'm not sure what statistics you're looking for, but I'll do a search through my computer tomorrow and see what I have for foreign fighter flow from Southeast Asia. A few reports point to several foreign fighters being disillusioned by ISIL's extreme behavior, so hopefully that trend continues. As for Indonesia and the Philippines (similar but still very different), JI and ASG's initial core were foreign fighters from Afghanistan during the USSR occupation. The vast majority of fighters returning that conflict didn't engage in terrorism, but it only takes a handful to have a strategic impact.

We can't compare this to the Crusades where Christians go out and fight and return to their Christian homes, nations that were already somewhat extremist on the Christian side. Fighters today are returning to countries that don't embrace their extreme (and illegitimate) beliefs, so some seek to impose their views via violence. Indonesia from what I can gather from a few short trips there, discussions with experts, and reading is that the government is doing a relatively good job of addressing the concerns of their people (within reason in a developing country), so people aren't fighting because they're being discriminating against. They're fighting to impose their extreme and unpopular beliefs. We're talking Martin L. King freedom marches here (lol).

The Philippines is another issue altogether, since their government does discriminate against their Muslim population. The government does little to address the concerns of their Muslim population, and while President Aquino has a been light of hope, his time is getting short, and not unlike our system their Congress is corrupt and eager to undo much of the progress he has made. I project the situation will devolve for the worse in the Philippines.

Regardless of the conditions on the ground, the terrorists in these countries will reconnect, or strengthen their existing links with global terrorist networks based on foreign fighter flow to support ISIL. That points to a bigger challenge for security forces. I also think those who were repulsed by ISIL may find al-Qaeda more attractive if they're still looking a group to affiliate with. Reportedly, the jihadist websites/blogs in Indonesia contain a fierce internal debate between jihadists on whether to support ISIL or AQ.

For one, I see no reason this will go away in 10 years, but hopefully it can be contained to a manageable level.

Bill--will give you a short story on just how shortsighted the US government, the US IC and just about the entire senior military leadership has been since 1993 when it comes to guerrilla warfare and Islamic insurgents.

Back in 1991-1993 when the US Army had a light infantry fighting division the 7th they came to our Reserve Intel Center near the Presidio and asked if we could design a "guerrilla/insurgent scenario" for them to train all non intel types in their BN staffs for the whole division--they picked this as it was similar to their Panama mission and their general outlook on how they were going to be used in the future.

And presto the 7th "disappeared" after the training was completed as we were in the "peace dividend drawdown" and there were going to be "no future needs for a light infantry division focused on UW/guerrilla warfare".

I together with a great Order of battle Tech (which "disappeared as well) then took the NEO for the Philippines and designed a complete 10 day scenario around no other than Abu Sayyaf who many at that time had heard not much from--we built then a robust guerrilla scenario focusing on driving staff functions designed to first detect what actually was ongoing, define the players and human terrain, design a info war messaging and then design a robust military response using light fighters coupled with Philippino military while protecting the civilian populations as much as possible.

After 10 days the staffs were exhausted but they had developed into a solid C-UW thinking team and had now a far deeper understanding of guerrilla warfare than when they came to us.

Fort Huachuca wanted a complete copy of the scenario and over 3000 messages as this was the day of the 289 computers and all was done by hand and typewriter.

THEN suddenly after they reviewed it--came the following "we anticipate no future guerrilla warfare or UW conflicts" and thanks for the efforts and it was canned somewhere in the depths of Ft. H.

Now 23 years later we are facing again what and where?? What a wasted 23 years when some truly saw what was coming at us over the horizon and the political and military leadership felt "peace was forever".

Remember it was the Philippines where we lost a truly great former SF officer/VN POW COL Rowe (remember this was 1989) in an out right assassination- who by the way knew it was coming as he called his wife the evening before to check on "legal things "and said goodbye something he had never done--and by the way that assassination was never fully investigated and had it's ties to the Islamic side of the house and some say the KGB. They had fired into what was later proven to be the only weak point in the armored glass which reflected someone knew our armored glass production and deficiencies.

It was there in 1993 for all to see--just no one wanted to seriously connect the dots to include the IC.

This fight has been with us since the very early 80s and it is not going away any time soon and the guesses of within the next 20 years is also wrong since the fight has been on since 1979 beginning with the name called Khomeini.

Bill Moore
03-22-2015, 12:02 PM
Outlaw 09,

I have painful memories of the 90s, and it wasn't just the conventional military that ignored the hard lessons related to irregular warfare. Special Forces officers were falling over themselves to demonstrate to their senior leaders that they were more conventional than the conventional army, because unconventional warfare was dead. Officers that today claim they always supported unconventional warfare, were the same ones fighting to kill our advanced HUMINT training (why would we need that?), kill our advanced urban warfare training, a few were even advocating killing our sniper program and SERE training (which actually taught you a lot about modern warfare), they killed our operations and intelligence course, which as you know was key was key to developing our future team sergeants (backbone of the ODA), got read of the Assistant Operations Sergeant position, in exchange for a specialized intelligence sergeant, they quit sending guys to advanced demolitions training, and on and on. Fortunately a few diehards resisted the dumbest proposed changes, but it didn't serve their careers well.

This mind set was based on the perceived need to conventionalize SF because UW was dead. It took a war and few years of it to get our heads right. Speaking of great leaders, I remember COL Nick Rowe well (I had the honor of him appointing me just before he went to the Philippines). He was one of the great ones, and his field of expertise went well beyond SERE. SF is making a come back, but it took a lot longer than it should have. Now that the wars have ended :D, we may be at risk of turning the clock back to 1994 or so.

OUTLAW 09
03-22-2015, 02:35 PM
Outlaw 09,

I have painful memories of the 90s, and it wasn't just the conventional military that ignored the hard lessons related to irregular warfare. Special Forces officers were falling over themselves to demonstrate to their senior leaders that they were more conventional than the conventional army, because unconventional warfare was dead. Officers that today claim they always supported unconventional warfare, were the same ones fighting to kill our advanced HUMINT training (why would we need that?), kill our advanced urban warfare training, a few were even advocating killing our sniper program and SERE training (which actually taught you a lot about modern warfare), they killed our operations and intelligence course, which as you know was key was key to developing our future team sergeants (backbone of the ODA), got read of the Assistant Operations Sergeant position, in exchange for a specialized intelligence sergeant, they quit sending guys to advanced demolitions training, and on and on. Fortunately a few diehards resisted the dumbest proposed changes, but it didn't serve their careers well.

This mind set was based on the perceived need to conventionalize SF because UW was dead. It took a war and few years of it to get our heads right. Speaking of great leaders, I remember COL Nick Rowe well (I had the honor of him appointing me just before he went to the Philippines). He was one of the great ones, and his field of expertise went well beyond SERE. SF is making a come back, but it took a lot longer than it should have. Now that the wars have ended :D, we may be at risk of turning the clock back to 1994 or so.

Bill--the best school I had in SF in 1966 was the lock and key course at Fort Holabird as a part of O&I and then it was onto the worst misery--six weeks at the Jungle School Panama (although only a few worn the Jungle Warfare patch in those days)--the second best was night navigation in Tunisia with no compass and just the stars.

Advanced demo/ADM I got at Bragg before leaving for Berlin and while in Berlin I thought I had joined OSS from 1945 when it came to advanced demo techniques.

We bit the bullet and did all the courses in those days as it was part and parcel of SF then following the mantra you never know when you will need it as SF in those days was truly UW focused---the changes starting hitting SF in late 72 early 73 as the draw down from VN as ongoing and the conventional mindset was still there when I came back in 1986 on a volunteer tour until 1991. Face it in 1972/73 the Conventional Forces senior leadership were literally gunni
ng to do in SF for once and for all times.

With one exception--COL Jesse Johnson the 10th Commander allowed me to run a C-UW mission set during the last Reforger in Germany before the Wall came down using the Soviet counter SF doctrine that I had been privy to while in Berlin. He was seriously interested in could a Soviet counter SF doctrine actually work and we proved the point that it could.

I had a Ranger Company and infantry support to control the largest Reforger AO and using Soviet doctrine complete with dogs and speaker teams--the one that gave Noriega a hard time in the Vatican embassy-- we held out extremely well against 10 SOF teams from various services and countries until told to surrender the AO.

So while guerrilla warfare is old and proven and really only the technology changes--wish people would fully understand that when talking about Russian/Chinese/Iranian non linear warfare--there are some serious surprises that need to be looked at.

davidbfpo
03-22-2015, 04:01 PM
The Soufan Group publish a free e-newsletter and so far they have been of interest. This week came this short comment:http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-local-war-on-global-jihad/

The opening two passages:
As the tragedy in Tunis shows, the realities of the new terror spectacular of low-scale attacks with large-scale reactions—carried out by malevolent actors driven by motivation as much as affiliation—have pushed away the responsibility of effective counterterrorism from national agencies down to local police and security The age of large-scale international intervention into conflict areas has passed for the moment and the battlefield is shifting back from war zones to disaffected neighborhoods—forcing intelligence agencies to work extremely closely with local police to disrupt known wolves of terror instead of documenting their crimes after the fact


I do think the era of containment overseas maybe evolving, although without any clear direction. Just whether staying alert at home and simply being better pre-attack intervention is a moot point.

Bill Moore
03-22-2015, 04:28 PM
The Soufan Group publish a free e-newsletter and so far they have been of interest. This week came this short comment:http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-local-war-on-global-jihad/

The opening two passages:


I do think the era of containment overseas maybe evolving, although without any clear direction. Just whether staying alert at home and simply being better pre-attack intervention is a moot point.

I read the short article and frankly was disappointed that so many senior analysts could come to this conclusion.


The age of large-scale international intervention into conflict areas has passed for the moment and the battlefield is shifting back from war zones to disaffected neighborhoods—forcing intelligence agencies to work extremely closely with local police to disrupt known wolves of terror instead of documenting their crimes after the fact.

Before and since 9/11 there have been several terrorist attacks outside war zones, so to assume the recent attack in Tunisia represents a turning point seems a bit odd. To assume there are no longer any war zones discounts the major war zones in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria, and Libya. I see little new in the character of Islamist terrorism other than its mindless escalation in violence, especially violence directed against other Muslims. Countering the threat will continue to require military, diplomatic, law enforcement, and informational efforts.

davidbfpo
03-22-2015, 07:53 PM
Bill,

I did wonder if the Soufan conclusion reflected their own expertise as a commercial provider of expertise.

Citing that one passage again:
The age of large-scale international intervention into conflict areas has passed for the moment and the battlefield is shifting back from war zones to disaffected neighborhoods—forcing intelligence agencies to work extremely closely with local police to disrupt known wolves of terror instead of documenting their crimes after the fact.

It would have made more sense if had stated:

The age of large-scale Western international intervention into conflict areas has passed for now, unless an attack akin to 9/11 happens. Instead of a battlefield where the West dominates the emphasis will be on local and regional responses to violence. In many places violence occurs in less governed spaces e..g. the Sahel and for many societies the competition with jihadists is in their disaffected urban neighborhoods. The identification of attackers, whether 'lone wolves' or groups, will come from the joint work of intelligence agencies and local police. Retaining community support is vital - they may even help!

OUTLAW 09
03-23-2015, 06:20 AM
LTG (R) Mike Flynn @MTPFLYNN

Should Islam Be Reformed; So says a former Muslim who believes the religion she's rejected is completely corrupted.

http://www.newsmax.com/t/newsmax/article/631746

davidbfpo
03-26-2015, 11:00 AM
LTG (R) Mike Flynn @MTPFLYNN
Should Islam Be Reformed; So says a former Muslim who believes the religion she's rejected is completely corrupted.

http://www.newsmax.com/t/newsmax/article/631746

Ayaan Hirsi Ali was on the BBC last night explaining her stance. It is hard to think of a person less likely to be listened to by Muslims than her, an openly declared atheist and awhile ago a Muslim who recanted her faith. Being a best-selling author, appearing on TV and courting controversy is IMHO hardly a recipe for Muslims to listen.

OUTLAW 09
03-27-2015, 03:49 PM
Ayaan Hirsi Ali was on the BBC last night explaining her stance. It is hard to think of a person less likely to be listened to by Muslims than her, an openly declared atheist and awhile ago a Muslim who recanted her faith. Being a best-selling author, appearing on TV and courting controversy is IMHO hardly a recipe for Muslims to listen.

But her book carries a massive statement centered on the Muslim community as a whole.

There has been coming out of Sisi in Egypt a similar plea lately.

OUTLAW 09
03-27-2015, 03:52 PM
Bill M--someone is seeing the light finally in the Philippines.

Philippine President Benigno Aquino called on lawmakers Friday to pass a bill endorsing a pact aimed at ending a decades-long Muslim separatist rebellion, warning them they would otherwise start counting "body bags".

Aquino had wanted the bill, which would give autonomy to the majority Catholic nation's Muslim minority in the south, passed this month.
But Congress suspended debates on the proposed law in the face of public outrage over the killings of 44 police commandoes by Muslim guerrillas in a botched anti-terror raid in January.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which signed a peace deal a year ago Friday, had said its members fired in self-defence at the commandoes, who passed through a rebel camp while going after Islamic militants.

"This is the crossroads we face: we take pains to forge peace today, or we count body bags tomorrow," Aquino said in a nationwide television address.
"Perhaps it is easy for you to push for all-out war," he said, hitting out at critics who have condemned the peace deal with the MILF.
"But if the conflict grows, the number of Filipinos shooting at other Filipinos will grow, and it would not be out of the question that a friend or loved one be one of the people who will end up inside a body bag."

The rebellion for a separate state or self-rule has claimed nearly 120,000 lives and cost billions of dollars in economic losses, according to government estimates.
Under a peace deal signed with the MILF, the 10,000-member group pledged to disarm while the Philippine government vowed to pass an autonomy law in Muslim areas of the south.

"The Bangsamoro basic law is one of the most important proposed bills of our administration. It answers the two most pressing problems of our countrymen: poverty and violence," Aquino said Friday.
He warned it would be difficult to restart peace talks if the current process failed and the MILF leadership lost its influence among its members to more radical elements.
Aquino is required by the constitution to stand down in mid-2016 after serving a single six-year term.

The January police raid sought to capture or kill two men on the US government's list of "most wanted terrorists" who were living among Muslim rebels in southern Philippine farming communities.
One of the men, Malaysian national Zulkifli bin Hir who had a $5-million bounty on his head, was reported killed.
But the other, Filipino Abdul Basit Usman, escaped as rebels surrounded and killed the police commandoes.

davidbfpo
03-27-2015, 10:35 PM
But her book carries a massive statement centered on the Muslim community as a whole.

There has been coming out of Sisi in Egypt a similar plea lately.

Outlaw09,

Calls for Islam to be reformed from outside maybe listened to by some within. I doubt many will listen to Ayaan Hirsi Ali and a good number will regard General Sisi's statements as self-serving, as he tries to reduce the impact "political Islam" has on Egyptians.

davidbfpo
05-17-2015, 05:22 PM
Medhi Hassan has a long commentary on this call, in part raised by non-Muslims, notably the atheist Ayaan Hirsi Ali (cited before):http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/17/islam-reformation-extremism-muslim-martin-luther-europe?

Here are two passages:
Don’t get me wrong. Reforms are of course needed across the crisis-ridden Muslim-majority world: political, socio-economic and, yes, religious too. Muslims need to rediscover their own heritage of pluralism, tolerance and mutual respect – embodied in, say, the Prophet’s letter to the monks of St Catherine’s monastery....



What they don’t need are lazy calls for an Islamic reformation from non-Muslims and ex-Muslims, the repetition of which merely illustrates how shallow and simplistic, how ahistorical and even anti-historical, some of the west’s leading commentators are on this issue. It is much easier for them, it seems, to reduce the complex debate over violent extremism to a series of cliches, slogans and soundbites, rather than examining root causes or historical trends; easier still to champion the most extreme and bigoted critics of Islam while ignoring the voices of mainstream Muslim scholars, academics and activists.

davidbfpo
06-16-2015, 06:00 PM
A short detailed rebuttal of the arguments of Ayaan Hirsi Ali from Will McCants @ Brookings, which IMHO is devasting. Here is his opening paragraph:
Ayaan Hirsi Ali is correct that darker passages of Islamic Scripture endorse violence and prescribe harsh punishments for moral or theological infractions. And she is right that in many Muslim countries, too many citizens still think it is a good idea to kill people for apostasy, stone them for adultery, and beat women for disobedience just because Scripture says so. But Hirsi Ali is profoundly wrong when she argues that Islamic Scripture causes Muslim terrorism and thus that the U.S. government should fund Muslim dissidents to reform Islam.
Link and not behind a paywall:https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-06-16/islamic-scripture-not-problem

davidbfpo
02-29-2016, 09:46 PM
From ICSR a short commentary after an official German publication, which they explain as:
The German security authorities recently published a new study that brings together information on 677 individuals who departed Germany for Syria or Iraq before June 30, 2015.

The analysis is based on data provided by the German police and domestic intelligence agencies both at the federal and state level. It was jointly conducted by the Bundeskriminalamt (the Federal Criminal Police Agency), the Bundesamt fr Verfassungsschutz (the Federal Domestic Intelligence Service), and the Hessian Centre of Information and Expertise on Extremism, and released by the Permanent Conference of the Ministers of the Interior of the Lnder.
According to the German authorities, more than 800 people have left Germany for Syria or Iraq since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, though it is not possible to verify that they all reached the region. Around one third of the departees is known or assumed to have returned to Germany, of whom 70 are thought to have experienced armed combat with Islamic State, or at least undergone military training. About 130 Islamists from Germany are presumed to have been killed in the conflict.
This ICSR Insight highlights some of the other findings.
Link:http://cache.nebula.phx3.secureserver.net/obj/RDJFOUQyRjZCMjNERkFEMjA4MkE6Y2Y2YTZhMjRkNzRjMTY4Zj k0Y2NkMDdhMTZhMmJkYmY6Ojo6

davidbfpo
06-18-2016, 10:13 PM
In part prompted by recent "lone wolf" and other terrorist attacks, this wide-ranging thought piece by Raffaello Pantucci is worth a read:https://raffaellopantucci.com/2016/06/18/terror-threat-grows-more-random-by-the-day/

Azor
06-19-2016, 12:33 AM
I am responding to your 2 most recent posts from this week...

I broadly agree that the solution to Islamic terrorism is not a Western-originated top-down reform of Islamic texts and practices. Certainly there are texts in Judaism and Christianity that can be used to justify aggressive violence against non-Christians and Christians deemed heretical. Moreover, the Christian Reformation and Counter-Reformation were not struggles for tolerance and peace, but violent struggles driven by fanatics.

Yet we must also acknowledge that people identifying as Muslims and acting on behalf of Islam are committing atrocities in Western countries against non-Muslims. Taken into a global context, the statistics indicate that wherever Muslims and non-Muslims exist in the same country, there is inter-communal violence. Nor do non-Muslim minorities in Muslim-majority countries ever not face oppression, whether in the 8th Century or 21st Century.

In the United States, since 9/11, Muslim terrorists have killed 105 people and wounded hundreds. Yet Muslim Americans constitute only 1% of the population. In comparison, anti-Muslim attacks have killed 17, of which 10 were non-Muslims mistakenly identified. We hear about Islamophobia, but if non-Muslim and Muslim Americans had the same propensity toward violence toward one another, we would see either much greater anti-Muslim killings or far less killings by Muslims.

We are told that diversity enriches Western countries, yet I fail to see what good Islam gives us that cannot be gained from other non-Muslim immigrants. As for the bad, well, that is what keeps the FBI, MI5, et al, up at night.

The problem is Islamic Supremacism. It does not matter whether it is endorsed in the Quran or by the local Imam, or not. Individuals and groups of individuals are drawn to it either due to their cultural backgrounds or because of its anti-Western revolutionary counter-culture "credentials", as it seems to have supplanted the lure of Fascism and Revolutionary Socialism.

Unlike in Northern Ireland, where the political solution involved the deconstruction of Loyalist Protestant supremacy, and equality rather than independence or union with Ireland, I fail to see what political solution is possible for Islamic Supremacism.

Supposedly Muslims are entitled to freedom of religion, but what about freedom of ideology, which is all religion is? We don't allow "practising Nazis", now do we?

slapout9
06-19-2016, 06:22 PM
I am responding to your 2 most recent posts from this week...

I broadly agree that the solution to Islamic terrorism is not a Western-originated top-down reform of Islamic texts and practices. Certainly there are texts in Judaism and Christianity that can be used to justify aggressive violence against non-Christians and Christians deemed heretical. Moreover, the Christian Reformation and Counter-Reformation were not struggles for tolerance and peace, but violent struggles driven by fanatics.

Yet we must also acknowledge that people identifying as Muslims and acting on behalf of Islam are committing atrocities in Western countries against non-Muslims. Taken into a global context, the statistics indicate that wherever Muslims and non-Muslims exist in the same country, there is inter-communal violence. Nor do non-Muslim minorities in Muslim-majority countries ever not face oppression, whether in the 8th Century or 21st Century.

In the United States, since 9/11, Muslim terrorists have killed 105 people and wounded hundreds. Yet Muslim Americans constitute only 1% of the population. In comparison, anti-Muslim attacks have killed 17, of which 10 were non-Muslims mistakenly identified. We hear about Islamophobia, but if non-Muslim and Muslim Americans had the same propensity toward violence toward one another, we would see either much greater anti-Muslim killings or far less killings by Muslims.

We are told that diversity enriches Western countries, yet I fail to see what good Islam gives us that cannot be gained from other non-Muslim immigrants. As for the bad, well, that is what keeps the FBI, MI5, et al, up at night.

The problem is Islamic Supremacism. It does not matter whether it is endorsed in the Quran or by the local Imam, or not. Individuals and groups of individuals are drawn to it either due to their cultural backgrounds or because of its anti-Western revolutionary counter-culture "credentials", as it seems to have supplanted the lure of Fascism and Revolutionary Socialism.

Unlike in Northern Ireland, where the political solution involved the deconstruction of Loyalist Protestant supremacy, and equality rather than independence or union with Ireland, I fail to see what political solution is possible for Islamic Supremacism.

Supposedly Muslims are entitled to freedom of religion, but what about freedom of ideology, which is all religion is? We don't allow "practising Nazis", now do we?


Well said!

davidbfpo
06-21-2016, 10:31 AM
I think this article by a SWC member fits here:http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-myth-empowers-islamic-terrorism-16409

SWJ Blog
09-10-2016, 11:41 AM
Flow of Foreign Fighters Plummets as Islamic State Loses its Edge (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/flow-of-foreign-fighters-plummets-as-islamic-state-loses-its-edge)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/flow-of-foreign-fighters-plummets-as-islamic-state-loses-its-edge) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
11-02-2016, 09:34 PM
David Wells writes on CT, after government service, and advocates an amnesty:https://counterterrorismmatters.wordpress.com/2016/10/31/why-europe-should-consider-a-foreign-fighter-amnesty-scheme/#more-1031

Why? In part:
Which is why now might be the time for governments to consider a more proactive approach to shaping the foreign fighter outflow – specifically through a foreign fighter ‘amnesty’ or plea bargain scheme. Its broad aim would be to repatriate those foreign fighters disillusioned with the jihadist cause and keen to return home, but prevented from doing so by fear of a long prison sentence or their inability to leave the Middle East.
(He ends with) But given the risk and resource implications of the status quo, even the removal of a small number of foreign fighters from the battlefield would be worthwhile. And with Europe and much of the West facing a generation-long struggle (http://www.wsj.com/articles/mosul-offensive-highlights-risk-of-fighters-fleeing-to-europe-1476727809) against this threat, any scheme that makes countering it easier is surely worth considering.

By coincidence the free e-journal Perspectives on Terrorism has an article, from a more academic writer, and the Abstract says:
This article considers the implications of criminalised Muslim Diaspora community members from the West travelling to the Middle East and becoming involved in the terrorist activities of the Islamic State (IS), and ultimately returning from whence they came. It also reflects on the differences over time amongst the profile of recruits that have taken place since the time of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, to the ascendancy of IS. Recent research indicates both terrorist and organised crime groups draw recruits from the same Diaspora communities, a position supported in this article. While the focus of law enforcement and media attention appears to be on the potential of Islamic State Middle East veterans committing terrorist acts in the West on returning from conflict zones, there may well be a pervasive danger of them bringing significant risk to their countries of origin through enhanced participation in organised crime. The views of a selection of recently retired police professionals were gathered, and were found to support concerns around this potential significant and dangerous outcome of homecoming foreign fighters.
Link:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/541/1073
I am skeptical any government could pursue an amnesty, even if they participate in organized crime. At least outsiders are giving the issues some thought.

davidbfpo
11-05-2016, 03:05 PM
A Dutch riposte:
The arguments made in favour of such a strategy – such as getting formers to denounce IS – are not strong enough to offset the need to punish those who joined a barbaric terrorist group and supported a campaign of death and destruction not just in the Levant but across the West. Countries where amnesties have worked took place in divided nations: this is not the case for foreign fighters. There are no “populations” where significant support for IS and IS fighters existed: hence no need for an amnesty to “clear the air” and help societies move on. Amnesty for IS fighters is thus probably a non-starter in the West.
Link:https://icct.nl/publication/should-governments-offer-amnesty-to-returning-foreign-fighters/

SWJ Blog
12-09-2016, 11:17 AM
Then and Now: Comparing the Flow of Foreign Fighters to AQI and the Islamic State (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/then-and-now-comparing-the-flow-of-foreign-fighters-to-aqi-and-the-islamic-state)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/then-and-now-comparing-the-flow-of-foreign-fighters-to-aqi-and-the-islamic-state) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog
04-19-2017, 06:12 PM
Returning Foreign Fighters in the Caribbean: Issues and Approaches (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/returning-foreign-fighters-in-the-caribbean-issues-and-approaches)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/returning-foreign-fighters-in-the-caribbean-issues-and-approaches) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog
05-26-2017, 08:46 AM
Philippines Says Foreign Fighters Have Joined IS-Linked Militant Group (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/philippines-says-foreign-fighters-have-joined-is-linked-militant-group)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/philippines-says-foreign-fighters-have-joined-is-linked-militant-group) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
06-18-2017, 06:17 PM
Three, if not four SWJ Blog links merged just.

davidbfpo
06-18-2017, 06:30 PM
Thanks to a "lurker" for the pointer to this four pg report:https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/balkan-foreign-fighters-syria-ukraine (http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_20_Balkan_foreign_fighters.pdf)

A few passages:
Only with the emergence of Balkan jihadists fighting for Daesh did the question of foreign fighters come under the spotlight in the region.
None of the countries has been efficient at producing counter-narratives whether through main-stream media or via Internet and social media channels.
Ukrainian fighters remain just ‘ordinary extremists’. The lack of political will to tackle and condemn right-wing extremism is more than evident.

davidbfpo
07-28-2017, 01:06 PM
A UN report (60 pgs) co-authored by Richard Barrett (ex-SIS) and Professor Hamed el-Said (Jordanian academic & UK citizen). Unusual as they interviewed forty-three fighters, most of them in jail in seven nations. A good literature review (ICSR, Soufan Group and others) and more within.


The 43 FTFs interviewed for the project represent 12 different nationalities. Of these, 33 (77 per cent) reached Syria, while ten (23 per cent) were either intercepted by their own authorities before departing their country of residence, or stopped by the authorities of a transit country while en route to Syria.Later:
FTFs have many different motives for joining armed groups, but the idea of establishing a Caliphate does not appear to be prominent among them.Link:http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/assets/img/Report_Final_20170727.pdf

The main thread is:Today's Wild Geese: Foreign Fighters in the GWOT (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/Today's Wild Geese: Foreign Fighters in the GWOT)

davidbfpo
08-01-2017, 05:51 PM
Id'd via Twitter a Manual 'Responses to Returnees: Foreign Terrorist Fighters and their families' by the Radicalisation Awareness Network, an EU-funded project, 102 pgs.

Short of time just check pgs. 6 & 7, for graphics.

Link:https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf

davidbfpo
10-23-2017, 07:43 AM
A lengthy BBC article by a SME, Lorenzo Vidino, which tries to describe and assess the problem many countries face.

For the UK he writes:
The head of the UK security service MI5 said this week that fewer than expected of the 800 Britons who joined IS had returned recently (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-41655488) and that at least 130 had been killed....The UK Home Office, for example, disclosed last year that of the 400 British foreign fighters who had returned from Syria and Iraq, only 54 were convicted (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/only-1-in-8-british-jihadists-returning-to-uk-from-iraq-and-syria-prosecuted-a7042306.html).
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-41679377

davidbfpo
10-23-2017, 07:47 AM
Rory Stewart is a junior UK minister, for international development, but is very media savvy and has experience in Afghanistan & Iraq (he even has his own thread at:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10832 ).

From his radio interview yesterday, which officials said was in line with government policy:
They are absolutely dedicated, as members of the Islamic State, towards the creation of a caliphate. They believe in an extremely hateful doctrine which involves killing themselves, killing others and trying to use violence and brutality to create an 8th Century, or 7th Century, state. So I'm afraid we have to be serious about the fact these people are a serious danger to us, and unfortunately, the only way of dealing with them will be, in almost every case, to kill them.Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-41717394

davidbfpo
10-24-2017, 06:23 PM
The Soufan Group and another group led by Richard Barrett (ex-SIS & UN CT) have published an updated report (41 pgs) 'Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees'. There is a five point summary on pg.5.

Link:http://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017.pdf

Short of time? Try this:https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/isis-jihadis-have-returned-home-by-the-thousands

Or this podcast interview (3 mns) of Richard Barrett:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1R-coL2dFlY&feature=youtu.be

A graphic via Twitter below:

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DNDa298WAAE1F92.jpg

davidbfpo
10-28-2017, 09:13 PM
A free article from the Journal of Forensic Sciences, part of the EU-funded PRIME project on Lone Actors by some academic experts. Which I have not read.

The Abstract:
This article provides an in-depth assessment of lone actor terrorists’ attack planning and preparation. A codebook of 198 variables related to different aspects of pre-attack behavior is applied to a sample of 55 lone actor terrorists. Data were drawn from open-source materials and complemented where possible with primary sources. Most lone actors are not highly lethal or surreptitious attackers. They are generally poor at maintaining operational security, leak their motivations and capabilities in numerous ways, and generally do so months and even years before an attack. Moreover, the “loneness” thought to define this type of terrorism is generally absent; most lone actors uphold social ties that are crucial to their adoption and maintenance of the motivation and capability to commit terrorist violence. The results offer concrete input for those working to detect and prevent this form of terrorism and argue for a re-evaluation of the “lone actor” concept.Link:http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1556-4029.13676/full

davidbfpo
11-14-2017, 07:00 PM
Richard Barrett of The Soufan Group, had another article three weeks and the focus is on the UK.
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/30/britain-isis-returnees-killingislamic-state

Recently Max Hill, the UK's Independent Reviewer of CT Law, became controversial to some over his reported remarks on how to deal with returnees, in essence not all of them can be prosecuted so we must have other options. He was recently at a conference and the next article summarises his contribution.
Link:https://www.connectfutures.org/kill-jihadis-re-integrate-max-hill-qc-explains-legal-options-professor-lynn-davies/

davidbfpo
12-23-2017, 03:21 PM
Recommended by Professor Bruce Hoffman via Twitter. First a long Buzzfeed report on the smuggling along the Turkish border:
US officials say most of ISIS fighters have died on the battlefield. Smugglers along the Syria-Turkey border say many have escaped.Link:https://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/how-isis-members-fled-the-caliphate-perhaps-to-fight?

Secondly, a wider international viewpoint on the "hot potato" by a NDU staffer; which opens with an editorial passage:
As the Caliphate collapses, many of its foreign volunteers are fleeing Iraq and Syria. A lot of ink has been spilled (some by me, in fact) on the problem of foreign fighters returning home. However, some of these fighters end up in a third country—not in the Caliphate, but not home either—that is not prepared for the problem.Link:https://lawfareblog.com/foreign-fighter-hot-potato

davidbfpo
01-16-2018, 10:04 AM
I rarely spot anything from Stratfor these days, but this one landed today. It is a point of view and ends with:
Without combatting their narrative assertions about the legitimacy of western legal systems and processes, much of our military success could be nullified.Link:https://marcom.stratfor.com/horizons/fellows/clint-arizmendi/15012018-returned-foreign-fighter-justice-preventing-propaganda

davidbfpo
02-06-2018, 06:53 PM
Two reports on returning foreign fighters, the first from a Belgian think tank, published as an Egrmont Paper covers Belgium, Netherlands and Germany (79 pgs.).

Summary:
Some 5000 men, women and children have travelled from Europe to Syria and Iraq since 2012. An estimated 1500 of these foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) have returned so far. Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands represent a third of European FTF and returnees. This report looks into the evolution of policies on returning foreign fighters in these three countries, comparing responses with regard to fighters that are still in the conflict zone, policies to deal with returnees in prison and attitudes towards the children of foreign fighters. It is the very first systematic and in-depth study into national approaches and policies vis--vis returnees. Its added value lies in the wealth of data, including data that has not been published before, and in the comparative angle.
Link:http://www.egmontinstitute.be/returnees-assessing-policies-on-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-in-belgium-germany-and-the-netherlands/

The second report (116 pgs.) is from the GW Program on Extremism 'The Traveler: American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq' and the summary refers to:
Hundreds of Americans have been drawn to jihadist organizations fighting in Syria and Iraq. Many were arrested while attempting to make the journey. The 64 individuals identified in this study all reached their destinations. This study, released in February 2018, sheds light on the motivations, methods, and threats posed by these travelers.
Link:https://extremism.gwu.edu/travelers

AdamG
02-09-2018, 02:06 PM
Many of the Americans who traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the group wound up coming back because “life in jihadist-held territory did not live up to their expectations,” according to a new study from George Washington University’s Program on Extremism that provides a sweeping look at their experiences.
These Americans had seen “an idealized version of reality” in online propaganda they consumed, but that contrasted unfavorably with the harsh living conditions, infighting and menial assignments that greeted them, the report found. For Americans like Khweis — who later insisted he was not part of the group and only wanted to see the situation in Syria for himself — household chores could lead to their decisions to abandon the fight.

*

(Far more people left Europe to join the Islamic State — estimates range from 5,000 to 6,000, the report says — though that flow of volunteers also plummeted as the group lost territory.)

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/young-men-left-america-to-join-isis-they-ended-up-cooking-and-cleaning-for-the-caliphate/ar-BBISqtF?ocid=spartandhp


From link above (in bold)



But Neumann and others said the decline in Islamic State recruiting figures — which has come almost as quickly as the rise following leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate in June 2014 — is hardly an unmitigated success for the United States and its allies.
Instead, it may be the beginning of a new stage, one in which would-be fighters choose to carry out attacks at home rather than travel abroad, and battle#hardened veterans seek out new lands for conflict.
“It’s like after the Afghanistan war in the 1980s,” said Neumann, citing the period after Soviet troops withdrew in 1989 and legions of foreign fighters formed a diaspora of radicalized veterans that subsequently fueled the rise of al-Qaeda. “They’ll be asking themselves, ‘What’s next?’ ”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/flow-of-foreign-fighters-plummets-as-isis-loses-its-edge/2016/09/09/ed3e0dda-751b-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html?utm_term=.d1f210b32af1