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MikeF
01-01-2012, 11:38 AM
This one is up on the frontpage, but have at it down here in the trenches boys:D.

1. Great powers (and the US is certainly one) tend to privilege stability or order over justice or just relations. To maintain order and stability the US has supported dictators and regimes that if we had privileged justice we would not have supported. We know the argument that one does what is possible. But justice deferred becomes a festering sore and source of instability eventually. So rather than having to choose between inappropriately interfering in the life of another country or being isolationist and concentrating only on ourselves, how do we creatively engage the larger world so as to increase justice?

2. What can the United States actually do to restore order to the world without having to engage in either global policing or nation-building?

3. Are their gaps and disconnects between what the United States says and what it does, how it wants to be perceived, and how it is perceived?

4. What should be the United States military role in foreign policy?

5. Outside of the United States mlitary, what other institutions MUST be fixed in order for the United States foreign policy to be successful?

6. What reforms are needed within the United States military?

Jack_Gander
01-01-2012, 03:04 PM
1. Great powers (and the US is certainly one) tend to privilege stability or order over justice or just relations. To maintain order and stability the US has supported dictators and regimes that if we had privileged justice we would not have supported. We know the argument that one does what is possible. But justice deferred becomes a festering sore and source of instability eventually. So rather than having to choose between inappropriately interfering in the life of another country or being isolationist and concentrating only on ourselves, how do we creatively engage the larger world so as to increase justice?

I attended a very interesting presentation at Brookings last year on innovation. There was a panel discussion with CEOs from GE, AT&T, etc… One of the CEOs noted that large trans/multinational corporations have a great deal of influence in global stability. I am not an economist but it would appear that with the current state of the global economy, TNCs could be leveraged to improve conditions that may undermine regional stability. The track record of TNCs has been not been great if you consider BP in Iran and others but I think there is potential in this area.

Another consideration of how to address this issue can be found in the Y Narrative (http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/A%20National%20Strategic%20Narrative.pdf). I realize it is light on recommendations but there certainly are some issues worth considering in light of your question. I’ve heard the authors speak at NDU and they provide an excellent argument that goes far beyond what is in the paper.


3. Are their gaps and disconnects between what the United States says and what it does, how it wants to be perceived, and how it is perceived?

This question directly relates to other discussions on the power of the state. The internet and other forms of IT are changing the way large masses of people around the globe communicate, daily. Your question is not as relevant today as it was during the Cold War since individuals and groups around the world are communicating daily. America's strategic communications are being conducted by our citizens despite of what the USG says or does. Consider in 04/05 when the USG was attempting to gain coalition support for OIF and US organizations and individuals were sending the message of immediate withdrawal to a global audience.

Two good references on this topic are:

The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (http://www.amazon.com/New-Public-Diplomacy-International-Relations/dp/0230535542)

The Digital Disruption (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66781/eric-schmidt-and-jared-cohen/the-digital-disruption)


5. Outside of the United States mlitary, what other institutions MUST be fixed in order for the United States foreign policy to be successful?

I know others, such as American Pie, have differing opinions on how to define US National Security but I like the simple definition offered by George Kennan (although I haven‘t been able to find the original reference):

"the continued ability of the country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers"

Bergen and Garrett from Princeton offer an excellent follow-on discussion (http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/conferences/reports/fall/sstt_exec.pdf)of this definition.

“George Kennan's definition of national security has became a starting point for deliberations on the meaning of national security. However, transnational threats and globalization force us to broaden the categories of sources of "serious interference" in our "internal life" beyond rival states.

U.S. national security policy operates to secure primary public goods that are at the heart of the social contract between the people and its government: economic prosperity, governance continuity, ideological sustainability, military capability, population well-being, and territorial integrity. The environment that influences the production of these primary public goods is critical, and the United States must understand how radically different the context for producing these goods is in the 21st century compared to the Cold War. The structure and dynamics of Cold War international politics have given way to the “networked anarchy” of globalization.”

IMO the Critical Infrastructure (http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1189168948944.shtm)model (not to be confused with the DHS program) may provide a useful starting point to examine what “internal life” may look like.

"Critical infrastructure are the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof."

I provide this information to get to the actual response to your question. I think Foreign Policy is just a small component of a larger system that needs to be overhauled. National Security provides an umbrella term to capture many of the sub-components, national defense, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomacy and homeland security. EO 13434 (http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/07-2570.pdf) was an excellent initiative that would have brought these communities of practice together but was bogged down by the federal bureaucracy. The USG must take a more balanced investment approach in the entire national security enterprise. Of course, in the current era of fiscal austerity this may mean less $$$ for DoD. Any effort to decrease funding will result in myriad of responses of why this line of reasoning is flawed and why we must preserve the present system.

AmericanPride
01-01-2012, 03:58 PM
1. Your question implies there is a distinction between 'stability' and the US' perception of 'justice'. As is often the case, the big fish considers the devouring of the little fish as justice because it needs to do so to survive. So, the question really is: can the US "creatively engage" the world to "increase justice" while maintaining its superpower status?

2. The instability in the international system is not rooted in either security or political imbalances, but in a gross economic inefficiency in the structural formation of the entire global regime. The United States must restore effective regulatory controls over financial capitalism, reinvigorate the American middle class and its productive capacity, and ensure that nationalism and patriotism triumph over elite profiteering. This, of course, assumes that the nation-state is the preferred method of the distribution of political power and legitimacy.

3. Absolutely. But this is a consequence of operating in a global real-time media environment monitored by a global politically active liberal middle class in Europe and the United States. There will always be political opposition to every decision and every interest. The real problem in my opinion is the disconnect between the public interest and private political interests, which leads back to my commentary in the previous point about financial capitalism.

4. To supplement diplomatic initiatives in the pursuit of national interests.

5/6. The US must restore the draft. The draft will create an immediate stake in America's foreign policy for all classes. The decision for war will face much higher scrutiny by the public and will require a higher level of legitimation. The defense economy will be required to make readjustments to its structure and relations in order to properly train and equip a conscript force within limited means (even though those means nearly match all other countries combined). The large influx of a diverse population in skills, languages, and background will break the southern Christian messiah complex taking root in the services (at least in the Army) and provide a robust roster of people capabilities to use. Lastly, it would be the only institution in which all citizens participate (except the Superbowl), channelizing public energy and identity into a national union. It is my firm belief that national service is the only long-term viable means to preserve the American way of life, its democracy, and its role in the world.

Fuchs
01-01-2012, 04:12 PM
This one is up on the frontpage, but have at it down here in the trenches boys:D.

1. Great powers (and the US is certainly one) tend to privilege stability or order over justice or just relations. To maintain order and stability the US has supported dictators and regimes that if we had privileged justice we would not have supported. We know the argument that one does what is possible. But justice deferred becomes a festering sore and source of instability eventually. So rather than having to choose between inappropriately interfering in the life of another country or being isolationist and concentrating only on ourselves, how do we creatively engage the larger world so as to increase justice?

Deal with what you cannot change and don't be an obstacle to the sovereignty and freedom of foreign people.




2. What can the United States actually do to restore order to the world without having to engage in either global policing or nation-building?

Don't lead by bad example, don't break and disrespect the rules which you agreed to yourself. Don't be an aggressor. Don't threaten others (prohibited by UN Charter), so they don't feel compelled to build up arms, rhetoric and nukes.




3. Are there gaps and disconnects between what the United States says and what it does, how it wants to be perceived, and how it is perceived?

You joking?




4. What should be the United States military role in foreign policy?

Push for 25% primary + secondary sector share of U.S. GDP in order to make the domestic quality of life sustainable if not better. This requires a trade policy shift away from lobbyist-led corporation-pleasing towards being actually concerned about domestic output and jobs.




5. Outside of the United States military, what other institutions MUST be fixed in order for the United States foreign policy to be successful?

K Street, State Department




6. What reforms are needed within the United States military?

First and foremost: Drug withdrawal.
(Reduce military + foreign intelligence spending total to half of the current DoD budget in one administration period.)

DJL
01-01-2012, 04:34 PM
Mike,

Great questions to set our orientation as we pass the artificial line of departure known as the New Year...


1. The powerful protect their own power, and the powerful protect the powerful. What you have to do is to convince the powerful that their position of power is unsustainable in the near term unless significant changes are made - you must create the sense of urgency that comes from a belief that crisis is imminent unless change is made. Perhaps this is done my adding preconditions to your cooperation that "nudge" those behaving badly in a specific direction, but I think the most effective way to do this is to convince them that the internal forces in their own system won't support the status quo much longer, and that they won't be able to keep their selfish and hypocritical practices out of the public eye any longer, no matter what the US says or does. And I think you have to clearly spell out limits to what you can look the other way on - there's no way we could support Saudi Arabia if they were doing what the Syrian government is doing to their people on a similar scale...

2. Even counterinsurgency done imperfectly sends a huge message - you don't want to be the next country that Uncle Sam stumbles into. That said, a full occupation with 3-24 doctrinal counterinsurgent ratios isn't necessarily needed to put a former leader in the docket or in the streets with those he formerly crushed with impunity, as we've seen recently. Each situation is specific and unique in a complex world. But the US can't "restore" an order that hasn't emerged yet, it can only help to steer bottom up movements in certain directions, and occasionally take some steps that apply pressure from the top down. No blanket answers for this one - the proper orientation going into the problem is more important than specific recommendations ahead of time.

3. Yes. This is an almost inevitable product of our internal political processes and reward systems even more than it is from our external policies. There are always overlapping priorities in play along different timelines and levels of scale - we like to pretend that we can present a unified coherent set of policies that address all of our interests at the same time, but in practice this is impossible. Half is how well you manage the balancing act, the other half is how well you spin the balance you've chosen to various audiences with different interests.

4. In general, it must provide a credible and capable threat to impose physical force in a wide range of scenarios. We must maintain the reputation we've earned as a professional, capable force that you don't want to tangle with force on force, and you think twice about engaging with assymetrically, and do so because it's your only realistic option.

5. By asking to "fix" institutions, you're suggesting that we understand the "problems" in the first place, and also that a fix in one will solve problems from that perspective without causing a whole lot more from other perspectives. As above, it's a balancing act in which you can "never do one thing", and in the real world, it's not a matter of "fixing" so much as it is managing the balance as best you can by "nudging" the system with the levers of influence available to you.

6. There is no real reform in a bureaucracy until the reward systems change - the current status quo of funding and rewarding (i.e. promoting) the services in separate bins has created some useful overlaps and variety that has helped the joint force cope with various unforeseen contingencies, but with the coming austerity such surplus and replication will be unsustainable. I'm not even getting into the mix between the DoD, Congress, and special interests here...The question is this: will real change, which means change in the fundamental DoD bureaucracy, come before or after a significant crisis? Can we all agree that the "boom" is coming so we can act to the left of it, or will we play the same "musical chairs" game that our government is playing on a larger scale, betting that we can get what we need to serve our own parochial interests before the "music" stops, and we realize that more than one chair got yanked while we were running circles around each other?

In closing, I'd like to say that it's a very good sign for 2012 that there are people out there like you who are asking these questions on the morning of Jan 1st instead of nursing their hangovers. Thanks for creating this forum, and staying continuously "on watch" even as others celebrate (and recover from) the freedom that we hope to preserve with the insights you're seeking here.

Cheers, and Happy 2012 to the entire SWJ community,

Sugar

StrykerCavScout
01-01-2012, 06:17 PM
1)
I can't imagine how we could engage the world in a way which increases justice without also increasing violence. We have to ask ourselves if it is worth conflict to not support a regime. For example, if we choose to oppose regime X because of its treatment of its citizens we can either isolate it or push for regime change, but these both have costs - and often high ones. If we take to pushing for regime change for nation X then what of nations Y and Z? Do they accommodate us or further repress their populations IOT remain in power? WE can isolate nations who fail to provide adequate justice, but that depends on the willingness of all global powers to behave similarly. A repressive regime doesn't necessarily need us but, but we might need them. For example, oil producing countries must remain as stable as possible IOT keep the cost of oil down. Even if we don't get our oil from country X, instability there still effects global prices which in turn enrich those who oppose us (Russia, Venezuela, etc.) and potentially reduce global availability - which in turn can lead to conflict as global powers race to secure what they need.

So I guess the short answer is we promote justice always through soft power and setting an example (as best we can anyway), but before using "tougher" methods, we evaluate the overall cost...

2)
I don't think we have an order to restore - the system is more like a poorly maintained machine which requires significant repairs but which we cannot live without long enough to do more than quick field repairs.

I don't think America can do much outside of direct, costly, and painful interventions short of trying to play by the rules and working to maintain fairness in the way resources are extracted and then distributed or things are manufactured and then sold.

3)
Yes. The United States wants to be seen as Captain America but I think in many cases is perceived more as a Jekyll and Hyde. At best, we are probably perceived as being mildly schizophrenic and at worst, severely so with a dose of megalomania added in for fun. I'm not certain those perceptions are valid - but I can understand where they come from.

4)
To be the big stick. Sticks don't talk - they just sit in a corner and look imposing.

That's an oversimplification of my view I suppose - I support the use of the military for humanitarian ends when necessary. Sometimes we can just get there more quickly than anyone else.

5)
I don't know Mike - I'd like to see more money invested in State and I'd like to see more options for officers and state to go to each other's professional schools, but that's only going to help them work better together. The real problem is, I think anyway, that all of these organizations view each other as rivals for parts of the same pie; and we contribute to waste by having a system which determines budgets based on what you spent the year before. If we resolve the turf and budget conflicts, we can probably start making real progress towards fixing the rest of the problems. Until then though, I think institutions are going to dig in and resist change for fear they'll also lose influence and money.

6)
I've thought about this alot... and I don't think I have a good answer, or at least not a defensible one so I'll leave this question alone for now.

MikeF
01-02-2012, 10:25 AM
Fuchs,

Should the US pull all military bases out of Europe and redeploy home?

Fuchs
01-02-2012, 12:10 PM
Fuchs,

Should the US pull all military bases out of Europe and redeploy home?

Maybe some depots for (old) equipment in Western Poland (~Reforger) would be a good thing, as well as U.S. personnel in NATO institutions and as liaison or exchange personnel.

Everything else is needlessly expensive in my opinion.


The presence in the Mediterranean should go simply in order to largely prohibit entanglements in BS that happens there.

I don't think that "redeploy home" is a good idea. The forces have to shrink. head first, then logistics, then transition of active formations to reserve or NG.
A big military tells politicians that they have a big stick, and history shows that they become bullies who begin needless brawls since they believe that they'll win the fight easily.

Dayuhan
01-04-2012, 09:53 AM
1. Great powers (and the US is certainly one) tend to privilege stability or order over justice or just relations. To maintain order and stability the US has supported dictators and regimes that if we had privileged justice we would not have supported. We know the argument that one does what is possible. But justice deferred becomes a festering sore and source of instability eventually. So rather than having to choose between inappropriately interfering in the life of another country or being isolationist and concentrating only on ourselves, how do we creatively engage the larger world so as to increase justice?

I think it's a mistake to assume, as we often do, that order and stability are the same thing. A stable social system often has to allow for a certain amount oi disorder, with citizens allowed open dissent and the opportunity to press for change. Order may cover up dangerous pent-up tensions. Where these tensions have been pent up for extended periods, for example when a long-term dictatorship falls, a period of disorder may be necessary to vent that tension and restore a viable equilibrium. Trying to restore order too quickly may actually endanger long-term stability.

I'm not sure that increasing or defining "justice" anywhere outside our borders is something we should try to do.


2. What can the United States actually do to restore order to the world without having to engage in either global policing or nation-building?

How do we restore order to a world that has never been orderly? Again, order isn't necessarily desirable in all environments. We might better ask how necessary change and disorder can be managed to minimize and contain harmful effects. This is not something we should be trying to do ourselves.



3. Are their gaps and disconnects between what the United States says and what it does, how it wants to be perceived, and how it is perceived?

Yes. Big gaps.


4. What should be the United States military role in foreign policy?

Among others... when no actual conflict exists, to provide honest and straightforward counsel to policymakers on what military force can and cannot reasonably be expected to accomplish accomplish.


5. Outside of the United States mlitary, what other institutions MUST be fixed in order for the United States foreign policy to be successful?

It's tempting to say DoS, and certainly changes there are needed... but ultimately DoS is an implementer of policy, not a maker of policy, and what most needs fixing is the process of selecting and defining policy objectives, which takes place at the executive and legislative levels. Screw that up and everything else goes wrong.


6. What reforms are needed within the United States military?

I'm not in a position to comment on that.

Ken White
01-04-2012, 04:04 PM
"1. ...how do we creatively engage the larger world so as to increase justice?"That's a dangerous and leading question. How do we American xenophobes, insulated as we are, determine or even have the right to talk about increasing justice? Moot question. Our political system will provide answers (multiple) that not every one will like...US domestic political concerns rule and the players change constantly. That is by design and it generally works acceptably if not well for us. It almost never works well for the others in the world.
...

'Justice' elsewhere as envisioned by the question posed depends thus totally on US domestic politics and there will be no constantcy. All things considered, our mixed record on this score will continue and we will probably continue to do a bit more good than harm -- hopefully recalling that when we decide to do harm, we often get carried away. We just need to develop a bit of restraint...
"2. What can the United States actually do to restore order to the world without having to engage in either global policing or nation-building?"Aside from the raw arrogance of the question, from the fact that it is NOT our job to 'restore' such order -- I question that it has ever existed... -- and from the naivete disclosed by the question, it serves as an exemplar of why the answer to question 1 and particularly to question 3 are resigned chuckles. Unfortunately, that naivete is shared by far too many in the domestic political arena and in the Foreign Policy establishment -- not to mention the Armed Forces. That naivete combined with overlarge egos and arrogance in those establishments are the factors that drive us to inconsistency in many things, to dumb interventions we did not need to undertake and fuel resistance to changes in the budgeting system which cause us to stay off balance much of the time.

Who defines "order?" What are the parameters; what happens if it is achieved to the satisfaction of 'A' then 'B' dies and the system tilts to unstable...

A better question is 'What can the United States actually do to adapt to and mesh with the world without engaging in either global policing or nation-building?'

We can best adapt to the world if we get ourselves squared away -- for a variety of reasons, we need some changes in a good many respects and areas of endeavor. We can improve our capabilities and our image if we do that. We are perceived as hypocritical because we advocate sweetness and light and yet launch assaults here and there. We can do better. we can stop trying -- and trying is appropriate -- we do not do nation building or global policing, we do selective things along those lines that suit us and those not well...

We are big, we are powerful and we are truly our own worst enemy.Those are two things we do not do at all well, do not need to do and with which we continue to play even though both are proven inimical to our interests almost always. Again, that naivete and the budget process are along with egos the culprits.
"3. Are their (sic) gaps and disconnects between what the United States says and what it does, how it wants to be perceived, and how it is perceived?"Fuchs and Dayuhan have it right. We're a joke in the eyes of many...
...

That said, as noted in the comment on question 1, above, our political system is inimical to world norms today. I would not change it so I believe we have to accept we will always be perceived as reactionary, slow off the mark, prone to indecision and, as reality does not accord with the soaring rhetoric of our Politicians who tailor their speeches to the domestic audience and forget -- or ignore -- the potential misunderstanding of foreign audiences. I might add that I've had a number of foreign acquaintances over the years comment that our domestic media and entertainment industry are part of the problem. The portrayals and the media do not sit well with many and tend to make us look like a collection of clowns. There's a lot of misperception due to all those things and there's little we can do to fix it -- short of draconian political fixes and those are not going to happen.

We'll just have to keep plugging along and try to more good than harm -- most in the world will grudgingly admit we do that...
"4. What should be the United States military role in foreign policy?"To advise the NCA and DoS (and it incumbent upon those folks to listen to that advice. As an aside, they might be more prone to do so if we'd slow down our rotation of key personnel a bit).

Get the CoComs out of the arena. They are overly involved in foreign policy because Goldwater-Nichols gave them the ability to do that and our totally dysfunctional budgeting system so beloved of Congress to buy votes force feeds them more money than they need and it is to their advantage to enhance that flow. There's a bit of hyperbole in that but just a tiny bit.
"5. Outside of the United States mlitary (sic), what other institutions MUST be fixed in order for the United States foreign policy to be successful?The US electorate.
6. What reforms are needed within the United States military?That they can control: More selectivity in accessions for fewer but better quality people; Improve initial entry training, Officer and Enlisted, all services; work with Congress to improve the personnel system, reduce grade creep, refine pay, stop allowances, vest retirement earlier, encourage active and reserve crossover service, slow the rotation cycles; reduce the stifling bureaucracy; relearn how to trust and delegate -- we seem to have forgotten how to do those things...

The Armed Forces of the US basically know everything I just wrote. The question should be why aren't they doing something to correct the wrongs of which they are generally aware...

ADDED for this post on the Council:

I strongly disagree with American Pride's responses to questions 5/6. National Service is a terrible idea. Aside from the questions of involuntary servitude and 'addressing problems' that are generally transitory, the complexity and cost of administering such a program in peacetime and with lack of an existential threat is monumental. The Armed Forces need to be smaller, not larger...

Steve Blair
01-04-2012, 05:09 PM
I strongly disagree with American Pride's responses to questions 5/6. National Service is a terrible idea. Aside from the questions of involuntary servitude and 'addressing problems' that are generally transitory, the complexity and cost of administering such a program in peacetime and with lack of an existential threat is monumental. The Armed Forces need to be smaller, not larger...

Couldn't agree more. National Service has always been a historical "blip" for the US. Our Army has historically been a small, volunteer force. Where things started to go seriously south (personnel system, for example) can be tied almost directly to the creation of a conscript army to fight large overseas wars. We went further off the rails when we tried to maintain a conscript-size army without conscription.

AmericanPride
01-04-2012, 08:20 PM
The military is dying institution.

First, the chief problem with the military is economic. It is not the size of the force, which is constantly shrinking (that in itself will become a problem in the future in the current trend), but the cost per man/unit to train, equip, and maintain, which continues to balloon. There is substantial literature describing the gross inefficiencies of the defense economy. The knee-jerk reaction currently flooding the literature in light of this libertarian kick America's right-wing seems to be on is to simply reduce the size of the force and its budget and retreat into a make believe return of isolationism. That is treating the symptoms, not the causes. And, quite frankly, in order for the US to maintain its privileged economic and political position in the world, it requires a large, well-equipped force capable of operating anywhere in the the world under complex conditions. America's strategic focus will continue to shift towards East and Southeast Asia and Africa; environments which will require completely different approaches and assets.

Second, and this problem is partly related to the first, the politicization of the military continues to undermine its objectivity and focus on strategic priorities and global security trends. The military is itself invested in the outcomes and relationships of the inefficient defense economy, and therefore corrupts the policy-making process. This also has produced an acquiescent military leadership that is incapable of challenging its own assumptions. The self-selecting recruitment, evaluation, and promotion process will preserve this problem to the bitter end.

Third, the military is becoming increasingly isolated from the culture it defends and (claims to) represent. This is partly due to the self-selecting recruiting, but also because its the shrinking middle class that is picking up more of the service burden. There is also the problem of public perception, which to some degree views the military as automatons incapable of independent thought. And this is not helped when the military culture actively promotes itself as the nation's top 1%, etc despite higher rates of suicide, domestic violence, divorce, drug abuse, and so on.

Quickly, to recap, the military is becoming more expensive to maintain for a lesser amount of combat power, the leadership has no incentive to change course, and it is having a great strain on military personnel and the public's relationship with them. This will lead to military, and perhaps political, disaster.

None of these issues are "transitory". They are structural and permanent and are trending downwards.

Why is national service a viable answer? It will force reformation of the defense economy and legitimation of political decisions to use force by creating an immediate and direct stake in those decisions for every single American. It will also infuse the military with the diverse skills and backgrounds of the American people. This will become increasingly necessary in a complex, Eastern-izing world. Lastly, it will re-focus American energy and innovation on nation-building at home, where education, healthcare, and infrastructure continue to decline.

National service is a part of the American tradition; from the original colonies into the 20th century. It should not be the right or obligation of a tiny minority to contribute to this nation's defense and prosperity.

Ken White
01-04-2012, 10:52 PM
The military is dying institution.What was it Mark Twain said..
First, the chief problem with the military is economic.... the cost per man/unit to train, equip, and maintain, which continues to balloon.And IMO should be perhaps a bit higher per person if anything. The problem is not what's spent per capita but is instead that on which it is spent. Our priorities are terribly skewed. Partly the fault of the military, no question -- but even more the fault of Congress.

One should not forget that the US armed Forces are a reflection of the society from which they come and that the Congress controls -- often hidden -- strings that reach everywhere.
The knee-jerk reaction currently flooding the literature in light of this libertarian kick America's right-wing seems to be on is to simply reduce the size of the force and its budget and retreat into a make believe return of isolationism.That's a long recurring thread in the American polity; it generaly works out okay. Only the Left gets upset when the Right slews that way. Later, when the left does the same thing as they did in the 80s, for example -- the Right can get upset. We are an equal opportunity upsetter...
And, quite frankly, in order for the US to maintain its privileged economic and political position in the world, it requires a large, well-equipped force capable of operating anywhere in the the world under complex conditions.I agree with all but the 'large.' ;)

I'll also point out that 'large' is difficult to transport and supply and will likely not do well under complex conditions if history is any guide. Been there, done that...:(
America's strategic focus will continue to shift towards East and Southeast Asia and Africa; environments which will require completely different approaches and assets.Quite true and also a correct focus for us at this time. Consider that large forces we could field in that area will never be able to mach others there quantitatively...
Second, and this problem is partly related to the first, the politicization of the military continues to undermine its objectivity and focus on strategic priorities and global security trends ... The self-selecting recruitment, evaluation, and promotion process will preserve this problem to the bitter end.I broadly agree but likely differ considerably on specifics. Regardless, it is a problem and the Forces need to grapple with it.
Third, the military is becoming increasingly isolated from the culture it defends and (claims to) represent ... And this is not helped when the military culture actively promotes itself as the nation's top 1%, etc despite higher rates of suicide, domestic violence, divorce, drug abuse, and so on.Agree with the last part. The first is correct as a statement but I've seen that isolation far more pronounced in earlier times. I do not see it as an earth shaker unless someone wishes to make it so for domestic political purposes.
Quickly, to recap, the military is becoming more expensive to maintain for a lesser amount of combat power, the leadership has no incentive to change course, and it is having a great strain on military personnel and the public's relationship with them. This will lead to military, and perhaps political, disaster.A little hyperbolic but not much. I totally agree the leadership must change its focus or things will get worse, not better.
None of these issues are "transitory". They are structural and permanent and are trending downwards.Agree with the trend, do not agree that they aren't transitory. I've seen all the things that concern you in far worse shapes than they are today. The year 1958 was not a good one even with the then extant national service... :wry:

And 1949 was far worse...
Why is national service a viable answer? It will force reformation of the defense economy and legitimation of political decisions to use force by creating an immediate and direct stake in those decisions for every single AmericanInteresting theory. It did not hold true in earlier times when we drafted -- recall also that the vaunted post WW II Mil-Industrail complex got going while that draft existed. Big forces drew big bucks -- and provided big bucks...
It will also infuse the military with the diverse skills and backgrounds of the American people. This will become increasingly necessary in a complex, Eastern-izing world. Lastly, it will re-focus American energy and innovation on nation-building at home, where education, healthcare, and infrastructure continue to decline.We had those diverse skills and background aboard in earlier times. I recall no significant advantage, perhaps this time could be different but I'm skeptical. I will note that those who are concerned about our state of training should be wary of a decline if national service persons are inducted into the Armed Forces. Mother's of volunteers may complain about conditions and treatment; Mothers of inductees WILL complain.

And Congress will listen...

Nor do I see where there will be a "re-focus" -- unless you propose that some national service persons will be involved in all those areas admittedly in decline. If so, could you tell me how they will integrate and work with the AFT / NEA and various college faculty associations...

Also interesting would be who, precisely, in this Federal Republic with its government / commercial mix of services would employ, administer and direct the Health Care and Infrastructure workers.

Oh, and where will they sleep?
National service is a part of the American tradition; from the original colonies into the 20th century. It should not be the right or obligation of a tiny minority to contribute to this nation's defense and prosperity.That "tradition" bit is not totally correct as you well know. As for the right and / or obligation of the 1% (±), we successfully navigated the world for 190 plus of our ~ 230 years (depending on when one starts the counts) with that approximate percentage of voluntary service persons. I see no major problem in continuing that until there's a need for national service in an existential situation.

I think that means the odds are not on your side... :wry:

Steve Blair
01-04-2012, 10:58 PM
I would contend that the Army today is much less political than it was in the period after the Civil War (say 1870 through 1890 or so). If you look at service publications (and the Army and Navy Journal) from that time you'll find any number of political rants, fears about worker uprisings, and other bits and bobs. The Army also found itself entangled in a number of civil uses during that time (riot control and the like) that would not be tolerated today. The Army of that time also recruited from what were considered the "dregs of society," with a fair percentage of the enlisted ranks being of foreign birth (Irish and German mostly, but with a good sample of the other waves of immigrants from that time). It was also physically and socially isolated from American society of the time, and often (at least in the officer ranks) believed that it was superior to that society in terms of conduct, morals, and general bearing. What we're seeing could be taken in some ways as the Army (unwittingly, perhaps) returning to its real roots.

National service is not part of the national tradition by any means. It's always been viewed as a desperation or crisis measure. I think you may be confusing the state troops or militia movements with national service. Those were in theory mandatory but in practice were usually anything but. And in any case, it was always expected that a standing military would exist to provide officer cadre and other support to any "minute man" army. Conscript armies might have been part of the national landscape during the early Cold War and through Vietnam, but they have never been a part of the nation's history on a larger scale. To suggest otherwise really misses the point and leads to a tragic misstatement of the US's military history.

Dayuhan
01-05-2012, 12:58 AM
The knee-jerk reaction currently flooding the literature in light of this libertarian kick America's right-wing seems to be on is to simply reduce the size of the force and its budget and retreat into a make believe return of isolationism.

A reduction in military force does not necessarily equate to a retreat into isolationism: there are all kinds of options for engagement that do not involve military force.

How large a force do we really need? For the last few years our forces have been stretched, but they've been stretched in wars of choice: Iraq was purely a war of choice, and while our initial engagement in Afghanistan was arguably necessary, it also did not involve large force commitments. Those came with the decision to occupy, which was entirely a choice.

If our military is being stretched to capacity in wars of choice, do we need more force or better choices?

AmericanPride
01-05-2012, 03:25 AM
If our military is being stretched to capacity in wars of choice, do we need more force or better choices?

That is the origin of the problem. Despite increased military spending, the output has sharply declined. Estimates of the War on Terrorism range from three trillion dollars up to eight trillion (if we are to include annual defense budgets, homeland security expenditures, etc). In comparison, the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan cost the United States 3.5 trillion dollars (when adjusted for inflation). The inability to produce favorable outcomes in so-called "small" wars (the costs and consequences are anything but) is a clear indicator of institutional failure. The usual obsession with training quality and high-tech weapons systems dismisses the failure to properly identify threats and trends, leverage the appropriate resources, and implement an effective strategy. The military is being "stretched to capacity" because it is declining in strategic effectiveness despite the nearly asymmetric advantage in tactical capabilities. America is disarming itself because the defense economy is consuming the country's fiscal health.


How large a force do we really need?

A military is not useful in only destroying and deterring enemies, but depending on the circumstances, can be effective in building national capacity and engaging in the domestic economy. On a small scale, this is true for the National Guard and the Corps of Engineers. My point here is not to offer a specific number, but instead to suggest that there are multiple internal advantages in addition to the obvious external uses of a military. The problem is not defense participation in economic activities, but the presumption that governments must operate like businesses or households. The military can potentially train people in valuable skills in trades or services, promote education, provide widespread employment, and coalesce increasingly fractured elements of society.


I would contend that the Army today is much less political than it was in the period after the Civil War (say 1870 through 1890 or so). If you look at service publications (and the Army and Navy Journal) from that time you'll find any number of political rants, fears about worker uprisings, and other bits and bobs. The Army also found itself entangled in a number of civil uses during that time (riot control and the like) that would not be tolerated today. The Army of that time also recruited from what were considered the "dregs of society," with a fair percentage of the enlisted ranks being of foreign birth (Irish and German mostly, but with a good sample of the other waves of immigrants from that time). It was also physically and socially isolated from American society of the time, and often (at least in the officer ranks) believed that it was superior to that society in terms of conduct, morals, and general bearing. What we're seeing could be taken in some ways as the Army (unwittingly, perhaps) returning to its real roots.

I would offer that the military has never been as quite apolitical as presumed by the general public, and although in the past military leadership has been more outspoken, today such public display is not practical nor desirable. Defense assets constitute approximately 70% of all federal property. We all know the immense size of the budget and the profit (and waste) of defense companies. Both parties are a part of this system. Prominent members of Congress have millions invested into these contractors. Senior leaders often retire to join the ranks of these companies as consultants and advisers. What need is there for a public display of politics when the military is complicit in the biggest play in town? Politicking and profiteering might be tolerable were it not directly resulting in the slow decline of America's ability to defend itself.

The military is in need of substantial reform. I believe that inviting the participation of the American public in that reform would deliver the most desirable outcomes. The current trends are not sustainable and the poor outcomes and high costs during the War on Terrorism are severely negative indicators of our declining military capabilities. I do not think it is because Americans can't "do" counter-insurgency, but that the structure in place is incapable of adapting to meet pressing national security requirements.

wm
01-05-2012, 12:26 PM
http://dilbert.com/dyn/str_strip/000000000/00000000/0000000/100000/40000/7000/700/147745/147745.strip.gif
As others have noted, the underlying assumptions of the survey exemplify overweening pride, aka hubris. Dilbert's pointy-haired boss has a lot in common with what seems to undergird the subject survey's questions.

I'd also like to remark on the following:

National service is a part of the American tradition; from the original colonies into the 20th century. It should not be the right or obligation of a tiny minority to contribute to this nation's defense and prosperity.
The idea of national service as a duty of citizenship is fundamentally at odds with the principles that led to the formation of America, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence. That document identified rights as fundamental, not duties. If the nation's principle value set is based on rights, which logically implies that one is free (not obliged), then obligatory national service is fundamentally unfair and unjust. I make this last assertion because 1. an obligation limits one's rights to life, liberty, and pursuing happiness, and 2. justice and fairness define each other.

Fortunately for the US of A, enough of its residents seem to believe and act on the the concept that "freedom isn't free," that sometimes obligations are more important than permissions. I fear that the pool of folks who hold this belief may be shrinking too quickly, fueled by the rise in entitlements that started with the spoils system of Andrew Jackson's administration, built up a massive head of steam with the New Deal, and has continued to mushroom since the Kennedy administration.

MikeF
01-05-2012, 01:07 PM
WM,

To add to your post, I think the best thing at SWJ for me has been Ken's wisdom reminding us that these things come in cycles :eek:

AmericanPride
01-05-2012, 02:37 PM
The idea of national service as a duty of citizenship is fundamentally at odds with the principles that led to the formation of America, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence. That document identified rights as fundamental, not duties. If the nation's principle value set is based on rights, which logically implies that one is free (not obliged), then obligatory national service is fundamentally unfair and unjust. I make this last assertion because 1. an obligation limits one's rights to life, liberty, and pursuing happiness, and 2. justice and fairness define each other.

I think freedom is frequently inaccurately equated with choice. In essence, freedom is the absence of coercion and fraud. While I agree that rights are natural and inalienable, this acknowledgement comes with implicit understandings. We accept traffic laws to enable freedom of travel on America's roads. We accept regulations on goods and services to protect consumers against fraud and criminal conduct. This is not a reduction of freedom because no man is endowed with a right to endanger or defraud others, which are forms of coercion. Rights are endowed, but freedom is empowered. And this is accomplished through the proper construction of government. It is not an obligation to obey the moral laws of a legitimate political authority. It is through such obedience that freedom is practiced because the citizen refrains from coercive and fraudulent activities against others. Without law, there would be anarchy. By consequence, anarchy becomes rule of the strong through coercion and fraud, and hence dictatorship. Law and obedience to it is the foundation of liberty. National service is just as well not an obligation, but an exercise in freedom.

Steve Blair
01-05-2012, 02:44 PM
I would offer that the military has never been as quite apolitical as presumed by the general public, and although in the past military leadership has been more outspoken, today such public display is not practical nor desirable. Defense assets constitute approximately 70% of all federal property. We all know the immense size of the budget and the profit (and waste) of defense companies. Both parties are a part of this system. Prominent members of Congress have millions invested into these contractors. Senior leaders often retire to join the ranks of these companies as consultants and advisers. What need is there for a public display of politics when the military is complicit in the biggest play in town? Politicking and profiteering might be tolerable were it not directly resulting in the slow decline of America's ability to defend itself.

The military is in need of substantial reform. I believe that inviting the participation of the American public in that reform would deliver the most desirable outcomes. The current trends are not sustainable and the poor outcomes and high costs during the War on Terrorism are severely negative indicators of our declining military capabilities. I do not think it is because Americans can't "do" counter-insurgency, but that the structure in place is incapable of adapting to meet pressing national security requirements.

And again none of this is new. Military officers commonly transitioned into profitable slots before the rise of Eisenhower's "military-industrial complex" (which was in no small part a direct outcome of HIS defense policies), and I could name any number of "outbreaks" and "outrages" on the Frontier during that period that were either manufactured or exaggerated by locals who wanted to profit from a military presence in their region. Contracting graft is nothing new.

If you broaden your horizon from a Cold War focus, you start to see just how many cycles there are in American history.

MikeF
01-05-2012, 02:59 PM
And again none of this is new.

And the Native Americans didn't get much choice or freedom as we pushed them into reservations.

Steve Blair
01-05-2012, 03:15 PM
And the Native Americans didn't get much choice or freedom as we pushed them into reservations.

Nor did the Cheyenne when the Sioux pushed them out of the Black Hills. Or the smaller tribes that were absorbed by the Aztecs to our south. There are precious few "good guys" in history. It's mostly a collection of gray (good intentions mixed with bad outcomes, or in some cases the reverse), with a few sparkling despots thrown in for good measure.

In terms of the military, we've been here before. Many times. And again we have a chance to change or break the cycle. The question remains...will we do so? Even when we were "isolationist," we tended to intervene if we thought it was in our interest to do so. The size of the military never really hindered this effort (and it accelerates if you view the western expansion as an actual conflict instead of some Oregon Trail-based migration). In fact, I'd contend that some of our best interventions (at least from a short term policy standpoint) were conducted with that smaller military.

MikeF
01-05-2012, 03:24 PM
Nor did the Cheyenne when the Sioux pushed them out of the Black Hills. Or the smaller tribes that were absorbed by the Aztecs to our south. There are precious few "good guys" in history. It's mostly a collection of gray (good intentions mixed with bad outcomes, or in some cases the reverse), with a few sparkling despots thrown in for good measure.

In terms of the military, we've been here before. Many times. And again we have a chance to change or break the cycle. The question remains...will we do so? Even when we were "isolationist," we tended to intervene if we thought it was in our interest to do so. The size of the military never really hindered this effort (and it accelerates if you view the western expansion as an actual conflict instead of some Oregon Trail-based migration). In fact, I'd contend that some of our best interventions (at least from a short term policy standpoint) were conducted with that smaller military.

If I can recommend one time in World/US History to study right now, it's 1866-1916

Steve Blair
01-05-2012, 03:35 PM
If I can recommend one time in World/US History to study right now, it's 1866-1916

Exactly. That's been one of my foci for some years now. There are many similarities between what we found in Afghanistan and what we found in Arizona (in general terms at least), and there are other social similarities as well.

MikeF
01-05-2012, 03:43 PM
Exactly. That's been one of my foci for some years now. There are many similarities between what we found in Afghanistan and what we found in Arizona (in general terms at least), and there are other social similarities as well.

I know. You're the one who told me to look there three years ago:D

Steve Blair
01-05-2012, 04:26 PM
I know. You're the one who told me to look there three years ago:D

Yep. I'm a bit of a single-track record sometimes...:o

Ken White
01-05-2012, 04:50 PM
I think freedom is frequently inaccurately equated with choice ... Law and obedience to it is the foundation of liberty. National service is just as well not an obligation, but an exercise in freedom.That strikes me as the classic small 'l' liberal approach. While I'm inclined to take the large 'L' liberal view, I certainly accept the fact that about 30 percent or so of my fellow Americans tend to the former persuasion and they're welcome to do so... ;)

I'm with WM on that issue. Further, from your earlier post:
The military can potentially train people in valuable skills in trades or services, promote education, provide widespread employment, and coalesce increasingly fractured elements of society.That too is a 'liberal' -- and IMO, quite dangerous -- construct. That approach has been followed several times in the past by the US and is in part cumulatively responsible for many of the flaws you decry in the Armed Forces of today; excessive Social Engineering culminating (I hope) with Robert Strange McNamara's Project 100,000 whose reverberations are still being felt today -- our terribly flawed "Task, Condition and Standard" training model derives directly from that intake and as those folks moved up in rank they significantly harmed the NCO Corps of the Army.
The military is in need of substantial reform...I totally agree. I suspect we differ significantly on just what those reforms should be -- but we can probably agree that a big financial hit is in order. :wry:
I believe that inviting the participation of the American public in that reform would deliver the most desirable outcomes.Had the educational system that existed at the end of WW II been improved instead of debilitated and prostituted in part by design, I'd agree. Since it was not improved, I suspect you'd get little of real merit from such an approach, indeed, I can make the case that such involvement over the years has greatly contributed to the malaise you note.
The current trends are not sustainable and the poor outcomes and high costs during the War on Terrorism are severely negative indicators of our declining military capabilities.While I broadly agree, I will here note the War on Terror is a political not a military construct conceived by a small 'l' liberal administration about 10 years ago (that was not a conservative admin in any sense...). That is in keeping with many of your other here stated positions which are essentially political and not militarily oriented. Nothing wrong with that, just trying to preclude confusion. :wry:
I do not think it is because Americans can't "do" counter-insurgency, but that the structure in place is incapable of adapting to meet pressing national security requirements.In reverse order, I agree; and no one can "do" counter insurgency today because it's a concept whose time has passed.

Dayuhan
01-06-2012, 01:14 AM
That is the origin of the problem. Despite increased military spending, the output has sharply declined. Estimates of the War on Terrorism range from three trillion dollars up to eight trillion (if we are to include annual defense budgets, homeland security expenditures, etc). In comparison, the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan cost the United States 3.5 trillion dollars (when adjusted for inflation). The inability to produce favorable outcomes in so-called "small" wars (the costs and consequences are anything but) is a clear indicator of institutional failure. The usual obsession with training quality and high-tech weapons systems dismisses the failure to properly identify threats and trends, leverage the appropriate resources, and implement an effective strategy. The military is being "stretched to capacity" because it is declining in strategic effectiveness despite the nearly asymmetric advantage in tactical capabilities. America is disarming itself because the defense economy is consuming the country's fiscal health.

Disagree on most points.

Defense is a burden on the economy, but that's not why the economy is shaky: there are much more important economic issues at hand.

The institutional failure I see is not on the part of the military, but on the part of those who repeatedly send military forces to accomplish that military force can't reasonably expected to accomplish (e.g. "nation building") and bite off commitments that we haven't the political will to complete. The military has been effective at the tasks it's trained and equipped to accomplish. It's been ineffective at tasks it's not trained and equipped to accomplish. This should not be a surprise. Using a hammer as a screwdriver is likely to be ineffective and messy, but that's not the hammer's fault.


The military can potentially train people in valuable skills in trades or services, promote education, provide widespread employment, and coalesce increasingly fractured elements of society.

True to some extent, but is it the most cost-effective way to accomplish these goals?


The current trends are not sustainable and the poor outcomes and high costs during the War on Terrorism are severely negative indicators of our declining military capabilities.

The poor outcomes and high costs in the "War on Terrorism" are to me indicators of bad policy decisions, rather than of declining military capabilities. Start with the whole ridiculous idea of a "War on Terrorism"...


I do not think it is because Americans can't "do" counter-insurgency, but that the structure in place is incapable of adapting to meet pressing national security requirements.

Is counterinsurgency necessarily a pressing national security requirement? I see no reason why it must or should be.

AmericanPride
01-06-2012, 04:39 PM
Defense is a burden on the economy, but that's not why the economy is shaky: there are much more important economic issues at hand.

I did not state that the defense economy is the primary or direct cause of our current economic problems, though it is a major contributor to America's gradual economic decline. For economy in general, the most important issue is the regressive tax and financial policies that have resulted in the largest transfer of wealth in American history. For the defense economy specifically, the problem is that budgets continue to grow while output and quality decrease. The GWOT has brought into sharp focus the inadequacies of the military establishment. Trillions of dollars have been spent but there are zero favorable political outcomes from the conflict. That's the bottom-line.


The institutional failure I see is not on the part of the military, but on the part of those who repeatedly send military forces to accomplish that military force can't reasonably expected to accomplish (e.g. "nation building") and bite off commitments that we haven't the political will to complete. The military has been effective at the tasks it's trained and equipped to accomplish. It's been ineffective at tasks it's not trained and equipped to accomplish. This should not be a surprise. Using a hammer as a screwdriver is likely to be ineffective and messy, but that's not the hammer's fault.

It's been the military that has been the largest proponent of "counter-insurgency" and targeting the population instead of the enemy. The political leadership empowered the military to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, which has not occurred. And so it has been the military wrestling internally about what to do next since our doctrines, technologies, wealth, and combat power is relatively ineffective. Blaming the political leadership for the "nation building" mission is a convenient defense for inviting that obligation by assuming the "counter-insurgency" mantle in the first place.


True to some extent, but is it the most cost-effective way to accomplish these goals?

Cost-effectiveness is not the only measurement of success, nor the most desirable one. I certainly think a national service program should not be limited to military service. All departments can benefit from such a program.


The poor outcomes and high costs in the "War on Terrorism" are to me indicators of bad policy decisions, rather than of declining military capabilities. Start with the whole ridiculous idea of a "War on Terrorism"...

There is no defending military ignorance on how to define the GWOT. It's fairly well understood that the intent is/was to prevent or deter another catastrophic terrorist attack on American soil and more specifically, to defeat Al-Qaeda and its allies. The military is not the sole responsible party in the GWOT, but it is the responsible party for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, neither of which have produced desirable political outcomes despite high costs in treasure and lives. The military's sole purpose is to use violence to achieve national political objectives by producing victory (i.e. defeating the adversary). This has not been accomplished. In comparison, the intelligence community, and departments of Justice and Homeland Security are doing fairly well in their mandates.


Is counterinsurgency necessarily a pressing national security requirement? I see no reason why it must or should be.

It is when the military is/was actively engaged in two simultaneous "small" wars that have profound political, economic, and security consequences.

Dayuhan
01-07-2012, 11:51 PM
The GWOT has brought into sharp focus the inadequacies of the military establishment. Trillions of dollars have been spent but there are zero favorable political outcomes from the conflict. That's the bottom-line.

To me that just highlights the inadequacies of the foreign policy establishment. We've repeatedly committed forces and resources to tasks we have no appropriate tools to accomplish, with wildly contradictory goals (such as wanting to install independent democratic governments that support US objectives). Favorable political outcomes in these conditions are so improbable that they approach impossibility. I don't blame the military for this. If the task at hand is to ride a unicycle up Mt Everest, you don't need a better unicycle, you need a more sensible task.


It's been the military that has been the largest proponent of "counter-insurgency" and targeting the population instead of the enemy. The political leadership empowered the military to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, which has not occurred. And so it has been the military wrestling internally about what to do next since our doctrines, technologies, wealth, and combat power is relatively ineffective. Blaming the political leadership for the "nation building" mission is a convenient defense for inviting that obligation by assuming the "counter-insurgency" mantle in the first place.

We are ineffective because the task is absurd. It was recognized from the start that full defeat of the Taliban required the development of a fully functioning Afghan government, broadly recognized as legitimate and capable of governing. The military task was to suppress the Taliban long enough for this to occur. The problem is that we can't make it occur, so we're stuck with eternal suppression. This is a fool's errand, and a mission that should never have been assigned. The political leadership is absolutely responsible for the "nation building" mission. That mission is implicit in the entire concept of "installing democracy", and that was the centerpiece of the goal the political establishment adopted.

Certainly the military side of the picture has been flawed, and there were many things that could have been done differently or better. At root, though, the critical flaw in the entire effort is on the policy side: the lack of goals that are practical, realistic, and achievable with the time and resources we are willing to commit.


Cost-effectiveness is not the only measurement of success, nor the most desirable one. I certainly think a national service program should not be limited to military service. All departments can benefit from such a program.

Disagree for many reasons, but a national service program is probably a subject for another thread.


There is no defending military ignorance on how to define the GWOT.

The responsibility to "define GWOT" lies with those who declared it. Of course they can't define it, because nobody can; it's an absurd concept to begin with. Terrorism may be called a tactic or a strategy, but it isn't an actor, and you can't declare war on a strategy or a tactic.


The military is not the sole responsible party in the GWOT, but it is the responsible party for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, neither of which have produced desirable political outcomes despite high costs in treasure and lives.

Since when has the military been responsible for the decision to go to war? The first step in achieving desirable outcomes is the selection of reasonable and achievable goals and the application of suitable tools. This is not the job of the military. If the military is assigned to pursue an unachievable goal that is totally inappropriate to pursuit by military means, is it their fault if the effort is unsuccessful.

For example: the defeat of Saddam's armed forces was a task suited to accomplishment by the military. It was efficiently and expeditiously achieved. Asking a military force to stabilize Iraq and install a functioning government was like asking an engineer to perform neurosurgery. Of course the outcome wasn't good. Why would anyone expect otherwise?


The military's sole purpose is to use violence to achieve national political objectives by producing victory (i.e. defeating the adversary). This has not been accomplished.

It hasn't been achieved because the objectives in question require a great deal more than simply defeating an adversary. Much of what those objectives require could not be achieved through military force, and a lot of it probably can't be achieved at all. If you bite off more than you can chew, you're likely to choke on it. That's not the fault of your teeth.


It is when the military is/was actively engaged in two simultaneous "small" wars that have profound political, economic, and security consequences.

I don't see how either of those wars is a "pressing national security requirement".

AmericanPride
01-09-2012, 03:18 AM
To me that just highlights the inadequacies of the foreign policy establishment. We've repeatedly committed forces and resources to tasks we have no appropriate tools to accomplish, with wildly contradictory goals (such as wanting to install independent democratic governments that support US objectives). Favorable political outcomes in these conditions are so improbable that they approach impossibility.


We are ineffective because the task is absurd. It was recognized from the start that full defeat of the Taliban required the development of a fully functioning Afghan government, broadly recognized as legitimate and capable of governing. The military task was to suppress the Taliban long enough for this to occur. The problem is that we can't make it occur, so we're stuck with eternal suppression. This is a fool's errand, and a mission that should never have been assigned. The political leadership is absolutely responsible for the "nation building" mission. That mission is implicit in the entire concept of "installing democracy", and that was the centerpiece of the goal the political establishment adopted.

Certainly the military side of the picture has been flawed, and there were many things that could have been done differently or better. At root, though, the critical flaw in the entire effort is on the policy side: the lack of goals that are practical, realistic, and achievable with the time and resources we are willing to commit.

Once committed to conflict, the role of the "foreign policy establishment" is very minimal, and reduced mostly to capitalizing on the gains of the military effort. But this effort has not produced any measurable or suitable gains to be used to forward America's political interests abroad. Occupation is a military function in the absence of a capable political authority in the defeated country. By most measures, the military failed in this regard in both Afghanistan and Iraq, precipitating the emergence of a durable resistance and the blunting of American goals.

When Bush addressed the country on 07 October 2001, he stated the goals of military operations in Afghanistan were to: "disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime." He made no mention of nation-building. The ultimatum to the Taliban government prior to the invasion made no demand of conversion to democracy, but insisted that the Taliban "close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals." On the same day, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that the aim in Afghanistan "is to create conditions for sustained anti-terrorist and humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan..." to "make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operations." CENTCOM's website lists the goals in Afghanistan as "clear", to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies and to set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries like the ones al-Qaeda enjoyed there prior to 9/11." If there is confusion in the ranks, it's not because the political leadership did not communicate it properly to the military leadership. It's because the military leadership did not effectively translate the political mandate into an understandable and workable military strategy.


The responsibility to "define GWOT" lies with those who declared it. Of course they can't define it, because nobody can; it's an absurd concept to begin with. Terrorism may be called a tactic or a strategy, but it isn't an actor, and you can't declare war on a strategy or a tactic.

Senior military leadership has never requested for clarification on their role and mission. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have made public their intentions in the GWOT, and more specifically, in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's a convenient lie to claim ignorance in defense of the military's failure to produce favorable conditions in either country. This is awfully similar to another country's "stab-in-the-back" theory and is just as laughable.


Since when has the military been responsible for the decision to go to war? The first step in achieving desirable outcomes is the selection of reasonable and achievable goals and the application of suitable tools. This is not the job of the military. If the military is assigned to pursue an unachievable goal that is totally inappropriate to pursuit by military means, is it their fault if the effort is unsuccessful.

I never claimed the military was "responsible for the decision to go to war". Labeling the task as "unachievable" is another convenient ruse to excuse the failure of the military to accomplish its mission. I frequently hear how the US military is the best in the world. It is certainly the best equipped, best funded, and best trained; so how exactly are the objectives stated by Bush, Rumsfeld, and CENTCOM, "unachievable"? The military was admittedly unprepared for the initial requirements in Afghanistan, and to some extent Iraq, but that was ten years ago. Ignorance of the goals and an inability to meet them are not excuses that last ten years.


I don't see how either of those wars is a "pressing national security requirement".

President Bush saw differently, as did the entirety of the national security establishment through numerous public statements, publications, and actions. Only in 2008 with the change in administration and the virtual collapse of the economy did priorities shift. The GWOT consumed twice as much treasure as WW2 when adjusted for inflation. Are you claiming that such spending is not an indicator of a national security priorities?

Ken White
01-09-2012, 04:11 AM
... By most measures, the military failed in this regard in both Afghanistan and Iraq, precipitating the emergence of a durable resistance and the blunting of American goals.That's true
If there is confusion in the ranks, it's not because the political leadership did not communicate it properly to the military leadership. It's because the military leadership did not effectively translate the political mandate into an understandable and workable military strategy.That is not true.

The political mandate was and is unachievable, the military responded as they always do with 'Yes, Sir' and moved out; the American tradition of trying to make it work took over and the services merely did what they could given state of training and overall capabilities provided -- and directed -- by the political establishment. There's plenty of egg for everyone's face in these debacles. The Armed Forces are not blame or error free admittedly but neither is the political establishment -- and they are the ones who committed to those very specious 'missions.''
I frequently hear how the US military is the best in the world...It isn't, it's just big, not totally incompetent, is good at some things and has a bunch of stuff and, fortunately, a few really good people. :wry:
It is certainly the best equipped, best funded, and best trained... None of that is totally true. We have a lot of stuff but it isn't always the best of class; even the "best funded" is a trifle suspect given the tremendous waste and terrible inefficiencies in allocation by DoD and an overly prescriptive Congress; We have aspects of training that are quite good and aspects that are marginal to poor. Our initial entry training in the basics of the trade (it's a trade, not a profession) for Officers and Enlisted persons is quite poor in comparison to almost all the Commonwealth nations and to others.
so how exactly are the objectives stated by Bush, Rumsfeld, and CENTCOM, "unachievable"? The military was admittedly unprepared for the initial requirements in Afghanistan, and to some extent Iraq, but that was ten years ago. Ignorance of the goals and an inability to meet them are not excuses that last ten years.Sclerosis in the training bureaucracy; A flawed personnel system design that is not able to cope with long duration operations due to politically dictated rotation polices; total authorized end strength was and is inadequate to missions assigned; political determination to enter a second 'war' over the objections of the forces before finishing the first. All those are only slightly the fault of the services who would change many things if they could but all are absolutely politically directed by the Congress -- even DoD and the various SecDefs have had little effect on those issues. Congress ignores the Constitution unless it suits them, it suits them to cite the fact that they and they alone 'raise Armies...'
Are you claiming that such spending is not an indicator of a national security priorities?Dayuhan can answer that but I'll say it is not. Much of that spending is due to a profligate Congress forcing money on certain expenditures that generally benefit the Congroids more than they benefit the nation. The Defense budget is an overflowing trough for them (as is DHS...), both parties. We have developed a 'system' that requires military effort and adventurism or a 'threat' of some sort in order for the economy to not sputter too badly. That is totally, absolutely, blatantly political -- and wrong.

You're correct that the Armed Forces aren't as competent as they could or should be -- but they are not solely to blame. Not by a long shot, far from it, in fact... :mad:

wm
01-09-2012, 12:15 PM
When Bush addressed the country on 07 October 2001, he stated the goals of military operations in Afghanistan were to: "disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime." He made no mention of nation-building. The ultimatum to the Taliban government prior to the invasion made no demand of conversion to democracy, but insisted that the Taliban "close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals." On the same day, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that the aim in Afghanistan "is to create conditions for sustained anti-terrorist and humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan..." to "make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operations." CENTCOM's website lists the goals in Afghanistan as "clear", to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies and to set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries like the ones al-Qaeda enjoyed there prior to 9/11." If there is confusion in the ranks, it's not because the political leadership did not communicate it properly to the military leadership. It's because the military leadership did not effectively translate the political mandate into an understandable and workable military strategy.
It seems to me that the first set of Presidential goals you list above have been pretty much achieved in some form or other. I will note that the first goal is rather amorphous--no specific amount of disruption nor any timeframe or duration of disruption was designated. The second, more specific goals, are a different matter. However, I suspect that the Taliban (or any other organization fo that matter) would find it hard to "close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals" since they had lost their authority as a governing force in Afghanistan." The point here, is that, as both Ken White and Dayuhan note, the missions/goals set by the executive were unattainable. They were and are unattainable in part because they are contradictory. How can one exercise the effective control need to close training camps when those same camps are being actively disrupted? It is like you telling me to put out the fire inside my house as you keep throwing incendiaries into the building, turn off the water, and break all my fire extinguishers.


The GWOT consumed twice as much treasure as WW2 when adjusted for inflation. Are you claiming that such spending is not an indicator of a national security priorities?
I think that this is a false measure. Compared to today, the US had much less "national treasure" to spend in the 1940s, I believe. What percentage of the nation's total economic output was used to prosecute WWII? Comparing that percentage to the percentage of GNP/GDP used for GWOT activities is a more appropriate measure IMHO.

Dayuhan
01-09-2012, 11:25 PM
Once committed to conflict, the role of the "foreign policy establishment" is very minimal, and reduced mostly to capitalizing on the gains of the military effort.

Sometimes the role of the foreign policy establishment once committed to conflict is to shift the goalposts and creep the mission. Thus it was in this case, much to our detriment. Once the goal of installing stable democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan was adopted - and I don't think that goal was selected by the military - we were in unachievable territory.


But this effort has not produced any measurable or suitable gains to be used to forward America's political interests abroad.

I don't think there was ever much clarity on what interests were meant to be advanced, and how.


Occupation is a military function in the absence of a capable political authority in the defeated country. By most measures, the military failed in this regard in both Afghanistan and Iraq, precipitating the emergence of a durable resistance and the blunting of American goals.

Occupation is a military function. The creation of a "capable political authority" is not a military function, and that's where we've failed. That means occupation has to be more or less eternal, which of course will produce durable resistance. The initial error was the assumption that we could install a capable political authority when in fact we could not. That was an error on the civilian leadership side.


When Bush addressed the country on 07 October 2001, he stated the goals of military operations in Afghanistan were to: "disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime." He made no mention of nation-building. The ultimatum to the Taliban government prior to the invasion made no demand of conversion to democracy, but insisted that the Taliban "close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals." On the same day, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that the aim in Afghanistan "is to create conditions for sustained anti-terrorist and humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan..." to "make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operations." CENTCOM's website lists the goals in Afghanistan as "clear", to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies and to set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries like the ones al-Qaeda enjoyed there prior to 9/11." If there is confusion in the ranks, it's not because the political leadership did not communicate it properly to the military leadership. It's because the military leadership did not effectively translate the political mandate into an understandable and workable military strategy.

If those were the goals, how did we end up trying to install governments and build nations? I don't blame the military for being confused over that question. Mission creep is a bitch. It's easy to say words like "set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries", but somebody has to define what those conditions are to be. That definition comes from civilian leadership, and in this case it was set at an unreasonable level that could not be achieved by military force or by any other means at our disposal.


It's a convenient lie to claim ignorance in defense of the military's failure to produce favorable conditions in either country. This is awfully similar to another country's "stab-in-the-back" theory and is just as laughable.

Whether that mission as practical and achievable or not depends on what "favorable conditions" the military was expected to produce. Armies don't install stable governments. They break things. That's what they're trained and equipped to do.


President Bush saw differently, as did the entirety of the national security establishment through numerous public statements, publications, and actions. Only in 2008 with the change in administration and the virtual collapse of the economy did priorities shift. The GWOT consumed twice as much treasure as WW2 when adjusted for inflation. Are you claiming that such spending is not an indicator of a national security priorities?

Whoa, the goalposts just shifted. Earlier you were talking about "pressing national security requirements" Now you speak of priorities. Requirements and priorities are very different things. Removal of the government of Iraq may have been a priority, but I can't see how it was ever a requirement. I don't see that installing new governments in Iraq or Afghanistan was ever a requirement. If priorities don't match requirements, questions need to be asked about the setting of priorities.

AmericanPride
01-10-2012, 01:05 PM
Sometimes the role of the foreign policy establishment once committed to conflict is to shift the goalposts and creep the mission. Thus it was in this case, much to our detriment. Once the goal of installing stable democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan was adopted - and I don't think that goal was selected by the military - we were in unachievable territory.

Occupation is a military and political function, where the armed forces of the occupying country assume control and authority of the governance of the occupied territory. Once the former governments were removed, the default goal became to install new governments. International law establishes the legal conditions for the occurrence of military occupation. This is not "mission-creep" but the logical progression of the original objective of removing the government of Iraq from power. The military did not anticipate the requirements for this objective, and failed to prevent the resurgence of armed resistance that deterred the formation of stable government. The military leadership failed to do the appropriate analysis and planning that would have determined actions with the onset of military occupation and anticipate the consequences of removing a government from power. That is the role of the senior leadership.


It's easy to say words like "set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries", but somebody has to define what those conditions are to be.

That's the role of the senior military leadership, which should either detail its intent (since they understand the political mandate as "clear"), or in the event of confusion, request clarification. The fact that CENTCOM lists the military objectives underscores that the senior military leadership understands what their objectives to be. If they do not, then they failed as leaders by not requesting guidance.


Armies don't install stable governments. They break things. That's what they're trained and equipped to do.

Then it's the fault of the senior military leadership for not properly training the force and providing the strategy to conduct military occupation with the intent of facilitating stable governments. The military assumes de facto and legal responsibility for an occupied territory when the territory passes into the military's control. Stable government cannot be established with the presence of a powerful, popular resistance. The military has not successfully defeated armed resistance. That is not the fault of the political leadership but the failure of military strategy. The goals given by the political leadership were not unattainable. The military strategy was inadequate for the desired end-state.


I think that this is a false measure. Compared to today, the US had much less "national treasure" to spend in the 1940s, I believe. What percentage of the nation's total economic output was used to prosecute WWII? Comparing that percentage to the percentage of GNP/GDP used for GWOT activities is a more appropriate measure IMHO.

That reveals a large part of the problem. WWII engaged the better part of America's manpower and industrial output but still only was about half the cost of the GWOT. WWII was fought against two major industrial powers whereas Iraq and Afghanistan are considered "small" wars. WWII set the foundations for a post-war economic boom. Yet the GWOT has significantly contributed to the financial emergency facing this country. This is because of the gross inefficiencies of the defense economy; particularly the high financial inputs and the low acquisition and mission outputs. This trend is not sustainable, which is why the SECDEF has already acknowledged the downgrade of America's military capabilities to now be only able to fight one major theater war at a time. We could barely sustain two "small" wars. The continued reduction in military capabilities is a direct result of poor financial management.

Ken,

I agree with you that the military is not solely to blame. I should clarify that I mean senior military leadership since they have a foot in both the political and military worlds and are ultimately responsible for the maintenance of military capabilities and the development and execution of strategy.

Ken White
01-10-2012, 04:27 PM
I agree with you that the military is not solely to blame. I should clarify that I mean senior military leadership since they have a foot in both the political and military worlds and are ultimately responsible for the maintenance of military capabilities and the development and execution of strategy.Yes, the senior military leadership has been and is remiss, no question. The important thing is that everyone realize that while they have not done some things at all well, they are captives of a system that is both civilian politically and societally induced. They have significant impediments to better performance only some of which they perpetuate themselves...

Society will effectively fix itself or not, not too much one can do about that. The civilian political problem will not fix itself unless it is forced to do so -- that can be achieved by continually voting out incumbents until it penetrates that things need changing. The senior leadership will not change their ways, they're on short final; the only hope is that new leaders rise and find ways to circumvent the systemic problems.

Key to that is a radical revamp of the archaic Personnel System and disestablishment of HRC -- it is a major contributor to the systemic problems and it takes its cues almost equally from the senior leadership and the Congress (much by Statutory requirement, much by barely concealed and not too subtle fund sequestration and blackmail). Second most important is replacement of the terribly flawed BTMS Task, Condition and Standard foolishness with outcome based training and evaluation. We must improve initial entry training, Officer and Enlisted and that will be difficult as both the system and Congress are ill disposed toward more competent Soldiery and Junior Officers, they tend to be too much trouble,

A better and more practically educated public could and would fix all of that but we are not likely to see that in my lifetime. With a little luck, perhaps in yours that can be realized. Basically, I'm not optimistic barring a major existential problem...

Steve Blair
01-10-2012, 05:30 PM
And our system has never been especially good at basic military training (which wasn't even really formalized until the mid-1880s). It was somewhat possible to work around this when personnel rotation was minimal (read unit-based training at the company or regimental level), but once that stability was removed it brought the initial training flaws to the fore (where it was promptly ignored). We have from time to time tried to improve the system, with varying degrees of success or failure. I'd contend that the personnel system tends to act against the development of a good training system, simply because no one is in place long enough to really put weight behind the need.

Dayuhan
01-10-2012, 11:55 PM
Occupation is a military and political function, where the armed forces of the occupying country assume control and authority of the governance of the occupied territory. Once the former governments were removed, the default goal became to install new governments. International law establishes the legal conditions for the occurrence of military occupation. This is not "mission-creep" but the logical progression of the original objective of removing the government of Iraq from power.

Just because the rules say you have to do it doesn't mean that you can do it.

The rules say you have to provide a new government. American politics require that the new government be recognizable to Americans as democratic. Nothing short of divine intervention could produce a government in Iraq or Afghanistan that would meet those criteria with anything approaching stability. These are inherently unstable societies not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force, and fledgling democracy is an unstable system even under ideal conditions.

This contradiction was implicit from the moment the goal of removing and replacing the governments in question was set. Trying to perform the same task in two places at once was just the icing on a thoroughly inedible cake. I agree with the points made by Ken and Steve, but I also don't think any level of training or quality of leadership would have made that set of goals achievable. They were just stupid goals, especially since they were thoroughly unnecessary: the US had no pressing need to remake Iraqi governance or to transform Afghanistan into a democracy.


That's the role of the senior military leadership, which should either detail its intent (since they understand the political mandate as "clear"), or in the event of confusion, request clarification. The fact that CENTCOM lists the military objectives underscores that the senior military leadership understands what their objectives to be. If they do not, then they failed as leaders by not requesting guidance.

Understanding a goal doesn't make it achievable. There's a certain institutional resistance to saying "that can't be done"... and didn't the military request more troops for Iraq, pointing out that while the force allotted was sufficient to defeat the Iraqi military, it was not sufficient to secure a post-invasion Iraq? That request was turned down, IIRC.


Then it's the fault of the senior military leadership for not properly training the force and providing the strategy to conduct military occupation with the intent of facilitating stable governments.

Facilitating stable governments?? Are you serious?? Are stable governments simply going to appear from thin air with a bit of facilitation? That's a completely unrealistic expectation that was never going to be met.

Civil war was a likely feature in any post-Saddam scenario that didn't involve an equally ruthless dictator. Afghans were going to fight for the spoils in any post-Taliban environment These were givens from the start, and our error was in the absurd hubris of believing that these conditions could be conjured away or suppressed. The goals were poorly selected and the challenges grotesquely underestimated at the time the mission was set. Certainly there were errors in execution, but the fundamental error lay in the selection of missions that were inconsistent with our capacities and interests.

wm
01-11-2012, 06:36 PM
That reveals a large part of the problem. WWII engaged the better part of America's manpower and industrial output but still only was about half the cost of the GWOT. WWII was fought against two major industrial powers whereas Iraq and Afghanistan are considered "small" wars. WWII set the foundations for a post-war economic boom. Yet the GWOT has significantly contributed to the financial emergency facing this country. This is because of the gross inefficiencies of the defense economy; particularly the high financial inputs and the low acquisition and mission outputs. This trend is not sustainable, which is why the SECDEF has already acknowledged the downgrade of America's military capabilities to now be only able to fight one major theater war at a time. We could barely sustain two "small" wars. The continued reduction in military capabilities is a direct result of poor financial management.

I think you are still missing my point. Your numbers are absolute rather than comparative. GWOT may have cost more than WWII in terms of total dollars spent, but I doubt the the same can be said in terms of percentage of dollars available to be spent.

BTW, both GWOT campaigns were/are fought in a theater farther from the US than either of the two major WWII theaters. Thus, cost to get stuff to the fight is higher due to the distances involved. I submit that the maintenance support needs of the GWOT forces are significantly greater due to the more advanced sophistication of the weapons systems currently in use compared to those in use during WWII--chewing gum and a piece of aluminum foil might be able to patch the bullet holes in a P51 that had rolled off the assembly line 6 months prior--not so easy to maintain an F16 that has been flying for 10 years or more already. I don't know how much of the GWOT costs are due to little more than fair wear and tear on an aging fleet of equipment, but I bet it is rather significant.

High OPTEMPO also has a big impact on the stuff one uses. I doubt the WWII OPTEMPO was ever anything close to that of our GWOT forces (with the possible exception of transportation used to move supplies forward across Western Europe from July 44-Dec 44, at which point the advanced slowed again, allowing time for rest and refit of much of the support infrastructure while the Bulge was reduced and Allied forces figured out how to slug through the West Wall and get across the Rhine).

America today could sustain a much larger war effort, given the political will to do so. WWII saw that will manifested. GWOT, not so much--letting troops in uniform board planes ahead ogf the everyday vaction traveler doesn't come close to accepting rationing of sugar and gasoline by the folks at home. Cutting payroll taxes while increasing the amount of time one can draw unemployment compensation is rather at odds with sustaining any kind of increase in spending by the federal government on other than entitlement-like programs.

AmericanPride
01-13-2012, 09:55 PM
The rules say you have to provide a new government. American politics require that the new government be recognizable to Americans as democratic.

Americans were quite content with friendly relationships with illiberal and non-democratic regimes for the sixty years prior and to this day. So I very much doubt the assertion that "American politics" somehow requires any new government to be "recognizable" as democratic.


These are inherently unstable societies not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force, and fledgling democracy is an unstable system even under ideal conditions.


Civil war was a likely feature in any post-Saddam scenario that didn't involve an equally ruthless dictator. Afghans were going to fight for the spoils in any post-Taliban environment These were givens from the start, and our error was in the absurd hubris of believing that these conditions could be conjured away or suppressed.

That certainly smacks of Orientalism. What features of North African, Arab, and Central Asian societies make them "not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force"?


the US had no pressing need to remake Iraqi governance or to transform Afghanistan into a democracy.

I never made any assertion to the contrary. My argument has consistently been that the US military has failed accomplish the mission given to it. I'm not concerned with their necessity; though once committed to action, achieving a favorable outcome regardless of the original cause(s) becomes a necessity.


Understanding a goal doesn't make it achievable. There's a certain institutional resistance to saying "that can't be done"... and didn't the military request more troops for Iraq, pointing out that while the force allotted was sufficient to defeat the Iraqi military, it was not sufficient to secure a post-invasion Iraq? That request was turned down, IIRC.

Then that's a problem of military culture, which is influenced by the senior military leadership. General Shinseki testified to Congress that "hundreds of thousands" of troops would be needed for Iraq. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz disagreed. It can't be determined who was right because the military plan that was executed was itself painfully inadequate, wasting precious time between the collapse of the Hussein regime and the re-establishment of order.


Facilitating stable governments?? Are you serious?? Are stable governments simply going to appear from thin air with a bit of facilitation? That's a completely unrealistic expectation that was never going to be met.

I suppose it is when you assume that these countries "are inherently unstable societies not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force." Transfers of power occur frequently. Machiavelli discussed it in some detail hundreds of years ago. There was some serious error in planning for not anticipating that a new government will need to be established after demolishing the old one. Since you agree that stable governments do not "appear from thin air", why didn't the military anticipate and plan for a transfer of power? The political leadership made such preparations, including the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the facilitation of Iraqi government working groups. But the military did not provide the necessary security measures to assist the political process. Why?

wm,

The absolute comparison is more relevant because we are more likely to see limited and "small" wars in a globalizing international environment dominated 24-hour real time media, all-volunteer armies, and the growing "distance" between the civilian population and the country's wars. The distinct advantages of an all-volunteer force is that it requires less political support to deploy and obeys orders even in the absence of popular support. But what has happened in the United States is that the defense economy is now wildly inefficient, with significantly higher costs for substantially less output. "Small" wars now cost more than "big" wars. How much are "big" wars going to cost and can we afford them if we're already bankrupted by "small" wars? This has been labelled the "defense death spiral" where the procurement and replacement cycle continues to require more investments but fields less equipment per generation. This is particularly true for aircraft and warships. And this in turn pressures cuts in personnel and training, reducing combat power all around. Not to mention competition with other domestic agendas and social programs.

Steve Blair
01-13-2012, 10:09 PM
wm,

The absolute comparison is more relevant because we are more likely to see limited and "small" wars in a globalizing international environment dominated 24-hour real time media, all-volunteer armies, and the growing "distance" between the civilian population and the country's wars. The distinct advantages of an all-volunteer force is that it requires less political support to deploy and obeys orders even in the absence of popular support. But what has happened in the United States is that the defense economy is now wildly inefficient, with significantly higher costs for substantially less output. "Small" wars now cost more than "big" wars. How much are "big" wars going to cost and can we afford them if we're already bankrupted by "small" wars? This has been labelled the "defense death spiral" where the procurement and replacement cycle continues to require more investments but fields less equipment per generation. This is particularly true for aircraft and warships. And this in turn pressures cuts in personnel and training, reducing combat power all around. Not to mention competition with other domestic agendas and social programs.

You're really cherry-picking points here. We, for instance, haven't been fighting "small" wars as we have in the past. Our entire procurement and development system was geared for "big" wars, and developed its habits in rehearsals for wars that never came. It also has a great deal to do with our insistence on revolutionary weapon development as opposed to something more gradual (limited number of test systems evolving from something that worked as opposed to extended "super system" development cycles that produce wildly expensive systems that are focused on one or two specific, usually big war missions that may not be relevant by the time the system is fielded). Does everything have to be mutil-role or stealth? Likely not, but that's how development works these days.

All-volunteer armies are the norm for the United States. This shouldn't be hard to grasp. Would a conscript force actually contain adventurism? People always say so, but I'm not aware of any real studies that demonstrate this. It's nice to say, but the policy class will still see a tool as a tool and would certainly structure any conscription system to exempt their peers (need we remember that "universal health care" isn't really universal, as Congress and others still retain their own, superior systems).

Ken White
01-13-2012, 10:47 PM
Americans were quite content with friendly relationships with illiberal and non-democratic regimes for the sixty years prior and to this day. So I very much doubt the assertion that "American politics" somehow requires any new government to be "recognizable" as democratic.Not totally correct. There have always been objections that 'friendliness,' they've just grown more voluble, strident and prevalent in the last decade or two to the point where the government of the day now has to pay more attention to those objections. The Mom-ization of America continues...:wry:
That certainly smacks of Orientalism. What features of North African, Arab, and Central Asian societies make them "not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force"?As one who has spent almost an equal amount of time in the near east and the far east -- the Orient -- the features that most impact are the Tribal nature of most ME populations and, even more so, the deeply embedded habit of Taarof in the region. :eek:
...I'm not concerned with their necessity; though once committed to action, achieving a favorable outcome regardless of the original cause(s) becomes a necessity. Perhaps. However if the action to which the force is committed is based on unattainable goals due to the ignorance of the civilian policy makers who ordered that commitment success is improbable, necessary or not...
...The political leadership made such preparations, including the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the facilitation of Iraqi government working groups. But the military did not provide the necessary security measures to assist the political process. Why?Why? Inadequate troop strength due to decisions by the political leadership (not to mention really serious infighting among said 'leaders'); inadequate training of the force for the mission assigned. There's more but there's plenty of egg for a whole lot of faces and as many or more were senior civilian AND military leaders over several administrations.

Recall that the CPA was an afterthought, an Ad-hoc thing conjured up in May 2003 (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalition_Provisional_Authority) (when, I believe, George W. Bush realized he'd been sold a bill of goods and had an attack of Christian conscience...) and that replaced the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), itself almost an afterthought as it was born in January of 2003. The civilian policy establishment was guilty of as many or more errors than the Army.:rolleyes:
And this in turn pressures cuts in personnel and training, reducing combat power all around. Not to mention competition with other domestic agendas and social programs.Not necessarily so on what those pressures dictate. You may be correct on what happens and likely are but it does not have to be that way, we have choices...

As for competition with domestic agendas and social programs, your are correct and that's reality -- but that also does not have to be that way. We have choices...

We continue to make bad choices -- and that is Political, period.

Ken White
01-13-2012, 10:55 PM
...but the policy class will still see a tool as a tool and would certainly structure any conscription system to exempt their peers (need we remember that "universal health care" isn't really universal, as Congress and others still retain their own, superior systems).Both Korea and Viet Nam were fought with conscripts / draftees; both had far larger deployed forces than have the recent actions and both had (and caused...) far, far more casualties. Both, in terms of percent of GDP expended and including current VA expenditures also cost more...

National service will just provide larger forces enabling larger commitments and which will get more people killed in more dumb wars -- which, like all our wars, the Armed Forces do NOT start...

AmericanPride
01-13-2012, 11:58 PM
We, for instance, haven't been fighting "small" wars as we have in the past. Our entire procurement and development system was geared for "big" wars, and developed its habits in rehearsals for wars that never came. It also has a great deal to do with our insistence on revolutionary weapon development as opposed to something more gradual (limited number of test systems evolving from something that worked as opposed to extended "super system" development cycles that produce wildly expensive systems that are focused on one or two specific, usually big war missions that may not be relevant by the time the system is fielded). Does everything have to be mutil-role or stealth? Likely not, but that's how development works these days.

I know. And I'm saying that it's not sustainable. Unless we are willing to release the political controls on America's monetary policies, the defense budget will continue to eat up larger portions of scarce financial resources, producing fewer and less combat-ready/relevant systems, at the cost of America's overall defense readiness. We are spending more money for less amount of equipment (which are more delicate than previous generations and therefore require more maintenance) at the expense of personnel end-strength. This translates directly into reduced combat power, which constrains America's strategic options, which in turn endangers American national security.


All-volunteer armies are the norm for the United States.

Conscription is a regular feature of America's military experience; a part of every major war since the War of Independence. Furthermore, non-military conscription remains an accepted feature of American society, including youth education and jury duty. What is unique to the United States is the maintenance of a small "peace-time" military (not that the US has known many years of peace). But the inefficient defense economy means that the all-volunteer force cannot be sustained under even limited conditions.

Dayuhan
01-14-2012, 01:23 AM
Americans were quite content with friendly relationships with illiberal and non-democratic regimes for the sixty years prior and to this day. So I very much doubt the assertion that "American politics" somehow requires any new government to be "recognizable" as democratic.

You're missing the point. If the US is going to install a new government in a conquered country, Americans expect at least an effort to make that government recognizably democratic. Past involvement with dictatorships has left a lot of bad feeling and resentment, our people know that, and they don't want to see it repeated. Certainly in Iraq the "easiest" way to provide immediate governance would have been to leave the army intact, find a reasonably amenable dictator, and let him have at it. Not so long ago we'd have done exactly that. Can't do it today because it's not politically acceptable on the home front.

This has nothing to do with whether or not we are willing to deal with or work with non-democracies. The question is whether it would have been domestically acceptable to install a non-democratic government in a conquered territory. The simple answer is "no".


That certainly smacks of Orientalism. What features of North African, Arab, and Central Asian societies make them "not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force"?

I said nothing generic about "North African, Arab, and Central Asian societies". I referred to Iraq and Afghanistan. I think even a quick look at their recent histories and built-in ethnic/sectarian issues will explain why setting out to provide stable governance in either was a silly task to take on.


I never made any assertion to the contrary. My argument has consistently been that the US military has failed accomplish the mission given to it. I'm not concerned with their necessity; though once committed to action, achieving a favorable outcome regardless of the original cause(s) becomes a necessity.

The forst step in accomplishing a mission and providing a positive outcome is assigning a realistic, practical mission that's achievable with the resources and time we're willing to commit. Fail there, and everything else down the line will reflect that failure. We failed there, big time.


Then that's a problem of military culture, which is influenced by the senior military leadership. General Shinseki testified to Congress that "hundreds of thousands" of troops would be needed for Iraq. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz disagreed. It can't be determined who was right because the military plan that was executed was itself painfully inadequate, wasting precious time between the collapse of the Hussein regime and the re-establishment of order.

Hindsight is 20:20. Certainly mistakes were made, but the task of "restoring order" was also quite predictably much more difficult than civilian leaders, many of whom seemed convinced that Iraqis would be dancing in the streets, welcoming us into Baghdad, and jumping on board our program, wanted to believe.


I suppose it is when you assume that these countries "are inherently unstable societies not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force." Transfers of power occur frequently. Machiavelli discussed it in some detail hundreds of years ago. There was some serious error in planning for not anticipating that a new government will need to be established after demolishing the old one. Since you agree that stable governments do not "appear from thin air", why didn't the military anticipate and plan for a transfer of power? The political leadership made such preparations, including the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the facilitation of Iraqi government working groups. But the military did not provide the necessary security measures to assist the political process. Why?

Plans were made. The plans made were completely unrealistic, based on absurd assumptions passed down from above.

Whether or not stable governments can evolve in these societies is a moot point. Of course they can. The question is whether an outside power can impose stable government, and the simple answer is "no". The act of imposing governance and the presence of an occupying power in environments like this effectively guarantees instability and resistance. Efforts to "build a nation" instead of recognizing that nations and governments have to grow through a gradual organic process assure resistance and failure. We couldn't install stable governments, neither could anyone else. It was an idiotic task that should never have been taken on.

The question that needs to be asked is not why the mission failed, but why the mission was undertaken in the first place.

AmericanPride
01-14-2012, 02:27 AM
If the US is going to install a new government in a conquered country, Americans expect at least an effort to make that government recognizably democratic. Past involvement with dictatorships has left a lot of bad feeling and resentment, our people know that, and they don't want to see it repeated. Certainly in Iraq the "easiest" way to provide immediate governance would have been to leave the army intact, find a reasonably amenable dictator, and let him have at it. Not so long ago we'd have done exactly that. Can't do it today because it's not politically acceptable on the home front.


The question is whether it would have been domestically acceptable to install a non-democratic government in a conquered territory. The simple answer is "no".

"Democracy" means many different things and comes in numerous shapes and sizes. After 9/11, Americans would have been content with anything so long as Al-Qaeda was destroyed. And quite frankly, Americans have a short memory, little patience, and aren't particularly concerned with nuanced details (like Iraqi civilian casualty numbers) so I think you are over-estimating the liberal compassion of the American people. Either way, the military did not anticipate the obvious necessity of transferring power from one government to another, and what security measures would be necessary to facilitate it.


I think even a quick look at their recent histories and built-in ethnic/sectarian issues will explain why setting out to provide stable governance in either was a silly task to take on.

No, go ahead and explain it.


Certainly mistakes were made, but the task of "restoring order" was also quite predictably much more difficult than civilian leaders, many of whom seemed convinced that Iraqis would be dancing in the streets, welcoming us into Baghdad, and jumping on board our program, wanted to believe.

At least the civilian leadership gave it some thought. The military did not even consider it. Little effort was made in anticipating and preempting the fallout of demolishing Hussein's government. The military was obsessed with chasing the ghosts of the defeated Hussein regime instead of identifying the emerging threats and destroying them when they were most vulnerable. The military allowed for the conditions of insurgency to develop and persist until such point the momentum of resistance required the next seven years to turn around. In the same time frame, the political leadership established the Coalition Provisional Authority and worked to expeditiously transfer sovereignty to a legitimate Iraqi government. The political leadership is not liable for the inability of the military leadership to exercise forethought in the execution of their duties.


The question is whether an outside power can impose stable government, and the simple answer is "no". The act of imposing governance and the presence of an occupying power in environments like this effectively guarantees instability and resistance. Efforts to "build a nation" instead of recognizing that nations and governments have to grow through a gradual organic process assure resistance and failure. We couldn't install stable governments, neither could anyone else. It was an idiotic task that should never have been taken on.

Stability is a function of political violence. The window for establishing stability was very short immediately following the collapse of the Hussein government. By all accounts, the CPA moved fairly quickly in organizing an Iraqi government. But the military did not anticipate the emergence of an insurgency and therefore failed in its task to create the necessary security conditions. The political leadership is not responsible for the resistance's transition from uniformed professionals of the former Iraqi army into a formidable, organized insurgency. That is the fault of the military for failing to anticipate changing conditions and attacking the new threat before it materialized. You say hindsight is 20/20. History provides a considerable amount of hindsight to use. So why didn't the military, knowing that "efforts to "build a nation" instead of recognizing that nations and governments have to grow through a gradual organic process assure resistance," anticipate the emergence of said resistance and do anything to deter or prevent it? Or, are they just clueless automatons blindly following orders from on high?

The question is why did the mission failed because that's the question I've been asking and answering.

Ken White
01-14-2012, 03:02 AM
Conscription is a regular feature of America's military experience; a part of every major war since the War of Independence.True, but...

In all those wars where it was used -- Civil, WW I, WW II, Korea and Viet Nam, a net of 31 years or so out of 224 or about 14% -- it's been universally unfair in application, gamed and not nearly as effective as one might think. The only benefit is to provide mass and we have no need for that at this time. Au contraire...:cool:
Furthermore, non-military conscription remains an accepted feature of American society, including youth education and jury duty.I'll give you education, which is kinda pathetic and a worse misuse of talent than is military service but comparing a week or so of Jury Duty with a few months of military service is really stretching things...:D
What is unique to the United States is the maintenance of a small "peace-time" military (not that the US has known many years of peace).Not so. The British have even more years of doing that than do we. The Continental Europeans have always since the French Revolution pretty much opted for conscription -- but we are far different folks than those good people. Further, it should be noted that just as Europe is dismantling the social democratic welfare state while we are trying to enhance ours, they are also ditching conscription and going to all volunteer forces. Thus like our current administration you seem determined to copy policies that the originators of said policies are now realizing they couldn't afford or that were not effective...:wry:
But the inefficient defense economy means that the all-volunteer force cannot be sustained under even limited conditions.Very much arguable. Boils down to politics -- which in essence is what this thread is degenerating to. ;)

As an aside, the entire US economy, not just the defense portion, is inefficient. The US government is inefficient. Inefficiency isn't all bad. Ineffectiveness OTOH is bad -- but it would be a big mistake to equate the Afghan-Iraq episodes admitted relative ineffectiveness (which had many parents, not all in uniform nor even all human) on the part of the Armed Forces with a generic case of all round ineffectiveness...
By all accounts, the CPA moved fairly quickly in organizing an Iraqi government.After first disbanding the Iraqi Army and Police, putting a couple of hundred thousand armed men on the street, broke and unemployable. Absolutely flipping brilliant -- and totally political. Caught the US Army by surprise, too.
The question is why did the mission failed because that's the question I've been asking and answering.As several have pointed out, it did not quickly achieve all objectives due to failures in execution. It's too early to say it failed, let's give it another 10 to 15 years, then we may be able to tell and my suspicion is that it'll be declared a flawed effort with an ultimately generally successful outcome. We'll have to wait and see. It had some strategic merit and it was not a waste but the execution was flawed and both the Army and the politicians erred and did so repeatedly.

You have not been answering your own question, you have been providing your perspective. Very different things.

Compost
01-14-2012, 07:07 AM
It is depressing to read posts on this thread that seem resigned to the inevitability of more small wars destined to end in failure. Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed ?

The US military is known to generally stress a need for obedience, and also subordination of the armed forces to the political administration of the day. Both those may be all well and good but an essential role for senior military officers is to provide pertinent and objective advice without fear or favour. If unable to do that or if such advice is routinely rejected or ignored, then one alternative is to resign. That course of action is rarely followed even though every senior officer knows that another responsibility is to develop able subordinates and hence potential successors as opposed to fairly competent or even incompetent placeholders.

An alternative but less acceptable action is to go public. The last US senior officer to semi-effectively condemn and repudiate political direction as impractical and mis-directed was General Stanley McChrystal. But his reaction lacked impact because it was informal and could be depreciated because it was fuelled in part by alcohol. It would have been more effective to have resigned and later when out of uniform to announce and elaborate on the reasons for resignation at a public forum such as a press conference.

So repeating the initial question: Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed (with an all-volunteer force) ?

And secondly: At what level are US officers required to provide forthright confidential advice direct to the political administration?

And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?

MikeF
01-14-2012, 08:53 AM
So repeating the initial question: Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed (with an all-volunteer force) ?

Why are you limiting your question to pre-determine a U.S. military solution to solving other states problems?

What evidence do you have to suggest that a better war theory or better resourced military could in fact provide the solution that you are seeking?

In my mind, the question itself is inherently lacking sophistication or any sense of creativity.


An alternative but less acceptable action is to go public. The last US senior officer to semi-effectively condemn and repudiate political direction as impractical and mis-directed was General Stanley McChrystal. But his reaction lacked impact because it was informal and could be depreciated because it was fuelled in part by alcohol. It would have been more effective to have resigned and later when out of uniform to announce and elaborate on the reasons for resignation at a public forum such as a press conference.


Really? Is this an early attempt at historical revisionism? McChrystal is currently on speaking tours getting paid handsomely for his thoughts.


And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?

General Officers have a duty to tell the truth.

Ken White
01-14-2012, 05:39 PM
It is depressing to read posts on this thread that seem resigned to the inevitability of more small wars destined to end in failure. Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed ?This thread may lead to that perception but the bulk of comment on this Board trends to suggesting we avoid those 'small wars' that entail large troop commitments and instead use better Intelligence, diplomacy and Special Forces in small numbers to intervene early. I think that may equate to your "small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed."

The reason for avoiding the commitment of large forces is the historic probability of a lack of success due to flawed policy maker perceptions of the problem, US national traits of impatience and our electoral cycle which can -- and usually does -- undermine political will. Almost no one asserts "do not do this," rather most say avoid large commitments if at all possible.
So repeating the initial question: Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed (with an all-volunteer force) ?Makes sense to me -- the issue then becomes how to do that and how to avoid those that likely cannot be properly "structured" -- or adequately fought. The rub in that is such decisions will almost always be based on less than full information and for the US on domestic politics rather than the international situation or pure foreign policy concerns. That last item is quite important and often not understood by observers, domestic and foreign... :wry:
And secondly: At what level are US officers required to provide forthright confidential advice direct to the political administration?Too much variance to answer succinctly but at the level you probably mean, by US law, only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is at that level. Practically speaking, the service Chiefs are generally involved in providing such advice. On occasion, for specific issues, a four star Combatant or Geographic Commander may also weigh in. In the recent strategy sessions in Washington, all those were apparently involved.
And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?Such resignations are essentially a European construct, US tradition differs and here such resignations are extremely rare. The rationale is that if one resigns in protest, the Administration will simply keep asking people until it finds one who will do what is desired and thus, if one disagrees with a policy, it is better to stay and try to ameliorate the potential damage. There is also the factor that US tradition places strong emphasis on loyalty and adherence to the civil power, more so than is the norm in most nations.

It would be easy to say such an approach is self serving and less honorable than a resignation in protest, both arguably true. It is even more true that the rationale for not resigning is correct and the powers that be will simply keep going down the well until they find a turtle that will do what's wanted. IMO the American solution is more practical if less praiseworthy in the eyes of some.

davidbfpo
01-14-2012, 06:36 PM
Ken as always comments wisely and whilst noting there are differences between the European and US approach to WM's question:
And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?

It is quite clear, even for someone not within, that a good number of British Army officers have taken another way out - resignation, often after a tour in operational command. A good number have commented in public, usually in carefully phrased media interviews.

Some I expect have other reasons than the political directions given and the military command's response.

Ken White
01-14-2012, 10:48 PM
It is quite clear, even for someone not within, that a good number of British Army officers have taken another way out - resignation, often after a tour in operational command. A good number have commented in public, usually in carefully phrased media interviewsIt will be interesting in the next few years to see how much the monolithic entity that is Defence / Defense changes in response to such resignations. Or to the current US grumbling within the ranks

I think we can all agree that turning Elephants is hard work. Rewarding, perhaps but difficult... :wry:

jmm99
01-15-2012, 05:21 AM
from Compost
It is depressing to read posts on this thread that seem resigned to the inevitability of more small wars destined to end in failure. Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed ?

First off (to Compost), I can suggest "small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed." So also can a whole bunch of other people here ! As an example, I'd say "regime removal" - you want him taken out, the US "can do". The totally different "small war" of "regime change" is another story.

One material question in this thread is what constraints should be applied to a given state (not the USA, necessarily). Everything I post about "COIN" should have the disclaimer "try this at home first". ;)

Another question (which is wholly individual) is what restraints should be applied to foreign interventions.

You use the word "failure". That is obviously different from "victory" (or is it ? - a good case can be made for a USAian "failure" at San Juan Hill, etc.)

But, is "failure" different from "defeat" and "disaster" ? Well, "yes" and "no" - and consider the following resources (I have read them):

British Military Defeats (http://www.friedgold.co.uk/battles.html)

The French Military as Contrasted with the English since 1500: Proud Traditions or a Badge of Shame? (http://wesulm.bravehost.com/history/french_vs_british_military.htm)

Wiki - List of military disasters (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_disasters)

Regan, Great Military Disasters: A Historical Survey of Military Incompetence (http://www.amazon.com/Great-Military-Disasters-Historical-Incompetence/dp/0871315378)

Lind on U.S. Military Failures during the Cold War (http://faroutliers.wordpress.com/2005/06/25/lind-on-us-military-failures-during-the-cold-war/)

Lind on Nixon’s Strategic and Tactical Failures (http://faroutliers.wordpress.com/2005/06/25/lind-on-nixons-strategic-and-tactical-failures/)

Michael Lind, Vietnam, the Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military Conflict (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0684842548/) (Simon & Schuster, 1999)

William R. Corson, Consequences of Failure (http://www.amazon.com/Consequences-Failure-William-R-Corson/dp/0393054926/) (W W Norton , 1973)

David MacIsaac, Of Victories, Defeats, and Failures (http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1974/nov-dec/macisaac.html) (Air University Review, 1974)


Bill Corson’s Consequences of Failure bears little resemblance to the Loory or Chodes books. Where Loory speaks of defeat, Corson treats of what he prefers to call failure; where Chodes uses history he tends to invent it whereas Corson’s grasp of historical perspective is what lends to his analysis its particular cogency. Corson, a retired Marine colonel, is well known to readers of military literature, particularly for his scathing indictment of search-and-destroy tactics in The Betrayal, which appeared in 1968. In the more recent book Corson ranges well beyond I Corps in an attempt to “evaluate the consequences of America’s failure in Vietnam in terms of its observable effects upon the United States and its institutions.” (p. 17)

Corson begins by reminding us to understand that we have not experienced a defeat in Vietnam but a “military failure” - defined as the nonperformance of something required or expected - a phenomenon with distinct characteristics and by no means an uncommon experience in the life of a nation. Such failures have been less studied than victories and successes, even though “failure is as much a determinant of future political behavior as is success.” Corson fervently believes that we will repeat our failure in Vietnam elsewhere unless we as a nation immediately acknowledge the fact of failure and undertake a rigid examination of our collective conscience. (pp. 15-18)

By means of a series of historical case studies, Corson sets out to illustrate how the violating or ignoring of certain principles of “limited war” strategy contributes to the failure of a great power in any conflict that does not affect its national existence. Starting with the Dacian and Parthian campaigns of the Emperor Trajan (A.D. 98-117), he moves through the catastrophic involvement of Spain in its war in the Netherlands during the sixteenth century to the British problems on this continent during the eighteenth century. Then, in somewhat more detail, he treats Britain’s military failure in Ireland between 1916 and 1922. From these examples Corson derives a number of general principles that need be applied (and others that need be omitted) if a great power is to avoid encountering military failure. (pp. 28-30, 72-73)

In essence, these boil down to abandoning—for limited wars not affecting national survival—MacArthur’s definition of victory in favor of Clausewitz’s rather more complex idea that winning means either to achieve one’s objectives by offensive action or, defensively, to thwart the enemy’s intentions; that losing is defined simply as the failure to achieve one’s objectives even though one’s forces are undefeated and still able to engage the enemy. Or, to quote Secretary of State Kissinger on Vietnam, “In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win."

Bill Corson started out with a huge concept - to distinguish "failure" from "defeat" and "disaster"; but then got lost in the immediate situation - the close of the Vietnam War. As Ken says: Wait for 40 years. In any case, we should be looking not only to "victory" and "defeat"; but also to "failure" and (I'd say) "success" (a state less than "victory").

OK, SMG White, Can we now start ? Like, who really "won" (or "succeeded in") the SE Asian War (and Non-War) Games ? And, where did Indochina fit into that picture (if at all) - yes, I know Dayuhan has a possible oar in that boat.

BLUF at end: There is a long history to "Small Wars"; but it has to be explored very carefully with discernment as to "constraints" (which are set by the environment) and "restraints" (which are set by each of us).

For my large rugby-playing friend from That Place on the Hudson, I'd suggest your pick of eras is appropriate to understand the "beginnings". Owen Fiss called 1888-1910 the "Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State (http://www.amazon.com/Oliver-Wendell-History-Supreme-Hardback/dp/052186027X/ref=/ref=cm_cd_f_pb_t)" (Holmes Devise History of SCOTUS; too expensive unless you are a Con Law scholar - find a library copy - or come up to Northern Michigan and read it - that's a real invite, BTW :)).

I've been in the same era for the last year or so - re: the most important issue - what are the reasonable limits of USAian force projection ??

Regards

Mike

MikeF
01-15-2012, 09:26 AM
For my large rugby-playing friend from That Place on the Hudson, I'd suggest your pick of eras is appropriate to understand the "beginnings". Owen Fiss called 1888-1910 the "Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State (http://www.amazon.com/Oliver-Wendell-History-Supreme-Hardback/dp/052186027X/ref=/ref=cm_cd_f_pb_t)" (Holmes Devise History of SCOTUS; too expensive unless you are a Con Law scholar - find a library copy - or come up to Northern Michigan and read it - that's a real invite, BTW :)).

That's actually probably the perfect book for me right now. I want to explore Plessy v. Ferguson and the resulting Wilmington, NC rebellion in 1898.

The Ghosts of 1898
WILMINGTON’S RACE RIOT AND THE RISE OF WHITE SUPREMACY (http://media2.newsobserver.com/content/media/2010/5/3/ghostsof1898.pdf)

And, I may have to get up to Michigan some day to say hello:D

By the way, Josephus Daniels, the publisher of the N&O at the time, is better known as SECNAVY and responsible for the phrase "cup of joe" after he forced prohibition on the fleet :)

Compost
01-15-2012, 10:36 AM
Why are you limiting your question to pre-determine a U.S. military solution to solving other states problems?

You seem fixated on a US solution and fail to consider any form of coalition.

My initial question was/is consistent with this thread which is focused on prospective US involvement in future small wars. US foreign policy is likely to continue on established lines. As a result its military is certain to be periodically committed in attempts to solve other states problems: as in failed states, failing states and states degraded by various forms of conflict, and importantly small states that are behaving in a manner deemed unacceptable to US and probably also other nations interests and concerns. Change the last to a large or powerful state and the issue probably changes to become a future large war.

But in the small war context no-one said or should assume the US effort has to be solitary. It is instead likely to be joined in a combined or coalition effort with other like-minded nations. And not exclusively western nations. The US with the best resourced and largest homogeneous joint force will often be the largest contributor. Hence the US – regardless of recent examples of poor political and military decision-making in regard to Iraq and Afghanistan - may also take or be ceded leadership.


What evidence do you have to suggest that a better war theory or better resourced military could in fact provide the solution that you are seeking?

In my mind, the question itself is inherently lacking sophistication or any sense of creativity.

Concepts such as a ‘better war theory’ and a ‘better resourced military’ are entirely your creations. Try turning my actual question around:
Why not also the other small wars that are poorly structured and/or poorly resourced ?

It truly is a no-brainer. Or at least should be for anyone who has completed Joint Force Planning 101. But since Vietnam the US political/military nexus seems to have had great difficulty working out and accepting what is and is not practicable in a small war contingency.

One essential pre-requisite for successful involvement in a small war is a realistic set of political objectives and constraints. The complementary needs are a responsive military strategy, an applied concept of operation and adequate resources for implementation. That is a small war structured to succeed. In the preliminary stage - once requirements and attributes have been agreed - it is then necessary to determine the scalar factor and the actual resources to be assigned.

The only ‘better war theory’ that I understand is to go early rather than late and to build up rapidly rather than in a trickle. However that was not the case in either Iraq 2003 or Afghanistan 2001 and later. Some political objectives – such as establishing a functioning democratic state - may be unachieveable in a useful timeframe. Also constraints may be similarly impracticable rather than just bothersome. US forces already have enough total manpower and materiel resources to influence any small war with a high probability of success. But the proportion of those resources made available is subject to political approval.

If the military hierarchy assess that the objectives and constraints are impractical or the assigned resources are inadequate then changes should result. If that does not happen then members of that military hierarchy can grin and bear it, resign, or do whatever else seems appropriate at the time. Hence my second question.

At what level are US officers required to provide forthright confidential advice direct to the political administration ?

Group think is a natural and serious problem within the military that is inculcated to be loyal and responsive to command. However senior officers especially have divisive responsibilities to provide loyalty both upwards and downwards. My expectation is that every member of the joint chiefs plus the relevant theatre commander and the joint force commander are able to provide non-interruptible independent dissenting advice, with a concurrent advisory to all other such officers. (By confidential in this context I mean/meant not outside that hierarchy.) But that expectation is un-informed and it would be interesting to learn what if any arrangements do apply.


Really? Is this an early attempt at historical revisionism? McChrystal is currently on speaking tours getting paid handsomely for his thoughts.

Do you really believe that a senior officer wants to be prematurely retired and then paid handsomely for spoken thoughts that probably fail to cause a single ripple inside the Washington beltway ? Well better to be paid handsomely rather than not at all.

Revisionism is a foolish concept. However, it is odds-on that General McChrystal would have preferred to continue leading and directing coalition forces in Afghanistan provided they were permitted to wage a well structured and adequately resourced campaign.


General Officers have a duty to tell the truth.

That was your response to my third question: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?

What if nothing eventuates other than possibly some kind of counselling session ? There are several choices. One: plead mea culpa for the unwarranted intrusion. Two: march happily into the future content to know that a truthful view was submitted but thought to be invalid, irrelevant or otherwise unimportant. Three: submit a letter of resignation and thereafter publicly explain the reason for such action. Four: employ a better structured version of General McChrystal’s indirect approach.

It would be interesting to read views on these and other possible courses of action.

Here’s an ancillary suggestion. After telling such a truth it would be adviseable to have a letter of resignation in the other pocket as a ready response to any subsequent request for resignation ?

MikeF
01-15-2012, 10:42 AM
Revisionism is a foolish concept.

All history is revisionism as told from the mind of the author :eek:


Well better to be paid handsomely rather than not at all.

Perhaps, but that is dependent on one's value system.

davidbfpo
01-15-2012, 12:31 PM
I know Major General Andrew Mackay and Commander Steve Tatham have appeared before on SWC / SWJ:http://smallwarsjournal.com/search/node/tatham

As if by magic after my last post here 'Obedience and then resignation' (Post No.51) The Scotsman has an article about their new book Behavioural Conflict: 'Why Understanding People and Their Motivations Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict':http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/ministry_of_defence_is_systematically_incompetent_ says_former_general_1_2057051

The book was published in November 2011, with one review on US & UK Amazon sites:http://www.amazon.com/Behavioural-Conflict-Understanding-Motives-Decisive/dp/1780394683/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1326634374&sr=1-1 and http://www.amazon.co.uk/Behavioural-Conflict-Understanding-Motives-Decisive/dp/1780394683/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1326634554&sr=1-1

From a linked article, I cite only one passage:
When Mackay had returned to Scotland after his posting, he had sent the MoD the standard debriefing report, which is usually a dull document summarising the events of the tour. Mackay's, by all accounts, was a scorching criticism of numerous aspects of the British operation in Helmand – especially the capacity of the military to spend money on winning hearts and minds as well as battles. Colleagues had advised him that, for the good of his career, he should tone it down, but he delivered it anyway.

Link:http://www.scotsman.com/news/kenny_farquharson_lost_prize_in_fight_for_afghan_h earts_1_1362194

MikeF
01-15-2012, 12:43 PM
Flawed by Design:The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (http://www.amazon.com/Flawed-Design-Evolution-CIA-JCS/dp/080474131X)
by Amy Zegart


In this provocative and thoughtful book, Amy Zegart challenges the conventional belief that national security agencies work reasonably well to serve the national interest as they were designed to do. Using a new institutionalist approach, Zegart asks what forces shaped the initial design of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in ways that meant they were handicapped from birth.

Ironically, she finds that much of the blame can be ascribed to cherished features of American democracy—frequent elections, the separation of powers, majority rule, political compromise—all of which constrain presidential power and give Congress little incentive to create an effective foreign policy system. At the same time, bureaucrats in rival departments had the expertise, the staying power, and the incentives to sabotage the creation of effective competitors, and this is exactly what they did.

Historical evidence suggests that most political players did not consider broad national concerns when they forged the CIA, JCS, and NSC in the late 1940s. Although President Truman aimed to establish a functional foreign policy system, he was stymied by self-interested bureaucrats, legislators, and military leaders. The NSC was established by accident, as a byproduct of political compromise; Navy opposition crippled the JCS from the outset; and the CIA emerged without the statutory authority to fulfill its assigned role thanks to the Navy, War, State, and Justice departments, which fought to protect their own intelligence apparatus.

Not surprisingly, the new security agencies performed poorly as they struggled to overcome their crippled evolution. Only the NSC overcame its initial handicaps as several presidents exploited loopholes in the National Security Act of 1947 to reinvent the NSC staff. The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years—i.e., throughout the Cold War—and the CIA’s pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing picture: the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so.

MikeF
01-15-2012, 12:49 PM
Ministry of Defence is ‘systematically incompetent’, says former general (http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/ministry_of_defence_is_systematically_incompetent_ says_former_general_1_2057051)
By Richard Bath


“We tried to shove democracy down their throats when the last thing Afghanistan needed was democracy. What it needed was security,” says Mackay. “We need to engage with the Afghans, but when we bring them democracy or emphasise women’s rights, we’re bringing them our values system. That’s something that we continually get wrong.

Ken White
01-15-2012, 06:05 PM
Flawed by Design:The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (http://www.amazon.com/Flawed-Design-Evolution-CIA-JCS/dp/080474131X)
by Amy ZegartInteresting. I'll have to get that one, she says what I've believed and said for years. The governmental process which I would not wish changed is the culprit. The domestic politics which dictate our foreign policy also have hobbled our efforts to create organs of government. This quote from the excerpt:

"The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years—i.e., throughout the Cold War—and the CIA’s pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing picture: the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so."(emphasis added /kw)

Is IMO correct with the exception of the fact that the JCS is still ineffective and Goldwater-Nichols is / was no help. The designed inefficiency of the US governmental processes should never have been transferred to agency design, the CIA should have been structured and required to be apolitical an operate without Congressional control (but with oversight, not the same thing) as should the Defense establishment -- I've never been convinced DoD was a good idea, the separate Departments worked well enough. The NSC probably doesn't need to exist at all...

Fuchs
01-15-2012, 06:11 PM
Lacking effectiveness is one thing, the ridiculous budgets are another.
Some countries maintain an army, an air force and a navy for the price of the U.S. "intelligence" apparatus.

Ken White
01-15-2012, 09:01 PM
Lacking effectiveness is one thing, the ridiculous budgets are another.
Some countries maintain an army, an air force and a navy for the price of the U.S. "intelligence" apparatus.Too much money. Breeds and attitude of 'throw more money at it' rather than a real effort to get things on track as cheaply and effectively as possible.

That said, none of those nations -- nor several of them -- come near the capability. Carrier battle groups, Nuclear submarines and worldwide requirements (and ability) all cost big money. Some say the worldwide requirement is self imposed and that's correct to an extent -- but a number of nations including yours want some form of commitment... ;)

Fuchs
01-15-2012, 09:13 PM
I am under the impression that the German desire for an alliance with the U.S. and the German desire for U.S. engagement in Europe is more related to avoiding open rivalry (by being official allies) than about securing against other powers.

There are some dumb politicians who buy into everything, even into the myth that the BMD program protects Europe because the bases are in Europe (it doesn't). Those fools believe what they want, but the actual political leaders rather leave the impression on me that they're pro status quo, contra experiments. Allowing the U.S:to turn away from Europe would be an experiment - and our politicians are too lazy, too unimaginative and too unskilled in 19th century-style alliance gaming for this.


I couldn't tell how U.S. military power would contribute to European national security in any way; the Russian army is down, the disunited Arabs have no real armies right now and are beyond the Med and the Turks are still allied (and not going to take on Europe anytime soon again).
I do on the other hand see how U.S. military power degrades European national security, namely its employment in action. I blame most of the (still tiny) Jihad in Europe mess on the militarised U.S. Mid East foreign policies.

There is an obligation in the North Atlantic Treaty about how all members need to deal with international crisis peacefully and in harmony with UN rules. This obligation has a much stronger wording than the actual collective defence obligation, but somehow the U.S., UK and France managed to make almost everyone forget about it.

Ken White
01-15-2012, 09:21 PM
Regardless of the validity, the desire exists and we tend to support it for our own reasons. ;)

Good luck with that peace and harmony wish and the UN in general... :D

Compost
01-16-2012, 10:45 AM
Too much variance to answer succinctly but at the level you probably mean, by US law, only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is at that level. Practically speaking, the service Chiefs are generally involved in providing such advice. On occasion, for specific issues, a four star Combatant or Geographic Commander may also weigh in. In the recent strategy sessions in Washington, all those were apparently involved.Such resignations are essentially a European construct, US tradition differs and here such resignations are extremely rare. The rationale is that if one resigns in protest, the Administration will simply keep asking people until it finds one who will do what is desired and thus, if one disagrees with a policy, it is better to stay and try to ameliorate the potential damage. There is also the factor that US tradition places strong emphasis on loyalty and adherence to the civil power, more so than is the norm in most nations.

It would be easy to say such an approach is self serving and less honorable than a resignation in protest, both arguably true. It is even more true that the rationale for not resigning is correct and the powers that be will simply keep going down the well until they find a turtle that will do what's wanted. IMO the American solution is more practical if less praiseworthy in the eyes of some.

There is the certainty that the CJCS will sometimes like every narrow conduit inadvertently act as an information cutout, upward and or downward. So all-in strategy sessions will hopefully become the norm.

But despite any all-in sessions it would be appropriate for every member of the joint chiefs plus the relevant theatre commander and the joint force commander to be able/encouraged to provide non-interruptible independent dissenting advice in written form, with a concurrent advisory copy to all other such officers.

The European or more accurately the British method of resignation as described in post 51 seems preferable, especially for ABCANZ forces. Any senior resignation closely followed by a public explanation - preferably delivered in forthright language - could be productive. And even a short conga line of resignees would likely be decisive.



Revisionism is a foolish concept.
All history is revisionism as told from the mind of the author Agree all history may be re-visionism. But prefer dictionary definition such as “the academic discipline of understanding or interpreting past events”.

My comment that “revisionism is a foolish concept” was predicated upon its alternate use as a pejorative term by communists and socialists squabbling over orthodoxy. It is annoying to have a useful word subsumed by idealogues.

But on reflection such people should be encouraged to make frequent and energetic use of the word. So correcting myself: “revisionism can be useful concept” .



Well better to be paid handsomely rather than not at all. Perhaps, but that is dependent on one's value system. Yes but many of yesterday’s active folk have already lost too many teeth to be paid peanuts. :D
________________________________________

MikeF
01-16-2012, 10:55 AM
Yes but many of yesterday’s active folk have already lost too many teeth to be paid peanuts. :D

Very true:cool:

I think, when we look at McChrystal down the road, we'll see two stories,

1. The amazing organizational changes that he overcame (1990-2009) to build a small, elite force. I wished that the story stopped there:mad:.

2. Being overwhelmed trying to implement his micro-level changes on the macro-level. Mintzberg provides a good guide to affecting change in the bureaucracy. Charismatic leaders are one way, but it takes time.

Ken White
01-16-2012, 04:05 PM
There is the certainty that the CJCS will sometimes like every narrow conduit inadvertently act as an information cutout, upward and or downward. So all-in strategy sessions will hopefully become the norm.Unlikely. Entirely too dependent on circumstances versus personalities in place at the time. A continued mix will probably be the case. All in has its disadvantages in both the group-think and weak consensus variants. We'll continue to muddle along -- as do most other nations.
But despite any all-in sessions it would be appropriate for every member of the joint chiefs plus the relevant theatre commander and the joint force commander to be able/encouraged to provide non-interruptible independent dissenting advice in written form, with a concurrent advisory copy to all other such officers.That currently happens in a sense but it is still subject to being ignored or over ruled by a particularly strong CJCS or, far more likely, by the civilian policy makers with whom ultimate decisions rest *. The ideal solution, of course is to always have informed and sensible civilian policy makers. Since those people are always politicians, that's an impossibility...:rolleyes:


The European or more accurately the British method of resignation as described in post 51 seems preferable, especially for ABCANZ forces. Any senior resignation closely followed by a public explanation - preferably delivered in forthright language - could be productive. And even a short conga line of resignees would likely be decisive.We can disagree on that. I've seen little evidence that your assertion is true and have seen evidence in both Britain and Canada that such actions accomplish virtually nothing. Canadian resignations and very forthright protestations over the 1964 unification of Canadian Forces, for example, resulted only in the loss of some very good people. It changed nothing. My recollection of similar actions in Britain and Australia is that little real change occurred in such cases. :wry:

In any event, the traditions differ and are unlikely to change. :cool:

* US examples include both Viet Nam and Iraq, military advice was ignored by Kennedy and Bush 43 and the various policy wonks hired by those two. Interestingly, amid much pressure from Congress and the media to intervene earlier in Viet Nam, then President Eisenhower listened to the then Army Chief of Staff General Ridgeway and refused to commit troops to Viet Nam. Much as George H.W. Bush listened in 1991 to his military advisers with reference to not entering Iraq. The key is an informed and sensible decision maker. Hard to find and retain...

FWIW I agreed with Eisenhower on Viet Nam, it was a stupid and unnecessary war in which I partook. However I disagreed with Bush 41 on Iraq. I was only peripherally involved in that one but it was obvious that we were going to leave a festering wound that would require later action -- it would have been difficult in 1991 but still far easier than it worked out to be in 2003.

Dayuhan
01-17-2012, 01:06 AM
It is depressing to read posts on this thread that seem resigned to the inevitability of more small wars destined to end in failure. Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed.

Again, for me this comes back to decisions on where and when to engage.

For a war to succeed, large or small, the goals have to be clear, specific, practical, and - with the resources and time we are prepared to commit - achievable. We have to be clear on what we propose to achieve, how we propose to achieve it, and why it's important. That last point is critical, because even if resources are available, the will to allocate them will quickly fade if the conflict is not seen as essential.

If we chose to involve ourselves only where and to the extent that we really have to, we'd avoid a lot of problems, and a lot of wars.

You hear a lot of talk these days about complexity, and the mantra holds that the world and its conflicts have become more complex than they used to be. I'm not sure that's the case at all. A lot of the supposed "complexity" is something we impose with our own uncertain, vacuous, and ephemeral goals and limited commitment to those goals, which in turn is a function of the perception that those goals are not critically important to us as a nation. If you're not sure what you're trying to achieve or why or whether it makes any difference, everything looks complex. When you're messing in a situation you don't understand and where your need to be there is doubtful, things suddenly seem complex. If you know exactly what you want and why, the same situation becomes simpler.

One of the reasons we find these fights challenging and our opponents so resilient is simply the difference between involvement and commitment. We all know the old saying about the difference. Think of bacon and eggs: the chicken is involved, the pig is committed. We're the chicken, they're the pig. We can walk away with no great loss; they can't. This is not implicit in the situation, it's a function of where, when, and how we choose to involve ourselves.

Certainly there's infinite space for better strategy, better tactics, better understanding of the situation and the antagonist... but ultimately the first step toward getting small wars right is in re-evaluating the decision to get involved and the selection of the goals to be pursued. Get those wrong and it will be very difficult to dig out of the hole.

Compost
01-17-2012, 02:33 PM
You use the word "failure". That is obviously different from "victory" (or is it ? - a good case can be made for a USAian "failure" at San Juan Hill, etc.)

But, is "failure" different from "defeat" and "disaster" ? Well, "yes" and "no" - and consider the following resources (I have read them):

...... booklist ......

Bill Corson started out with a huge concept - to distinguish "failure" from "defeat" and "disaster"; but then got lost in the immediate situation - the close of the Vietnam War. As Ken says: Wait for 40 years. In any case, we should be looking not only to "victory" and "defeat"; but also to "failure" and (I'd say) "success" (a state less than "victory").
Have read several of the books on your list but not as yet Consequences of Failure by Corson. Here somewhat late is a carefully written reply to your question.

Sun Tzu and Clausewitz were each achievers and renowned military scholars and original thinkers. Like to believe that both would have preferred the cadence of pipes and drums to the stridency of a brass band.

Sun Tzu wrote mainly in the context of military success and failure rather than victory and defeat. That can be seen especially in his frequent mention of threatened and conceivable use of military force as a means to influence the general psyche and preparedness, and the specific planning and actions of an actual or potential adversary. The following interpretation uses more modern language and is based mainly on the views of Clausewitz, Liddell Hart and Wylie.

Military campaigns and armed conflict are said to be politics pursued by other means. Ignoring electoral campaigns and party politics, the politicians in power at any time are generally concerned with the success and failure of their policies. Sun Tzu’ perspective correlates better with those concerns than could any discussion predicated on victories and defeats.

So what is success ? In the simplest case success can be the achievement of a single objective. And that objective might be a negative, as in defensively preventing an adversary from achieving – or deterrently dissuading him from seeking - something that is potentially or actually damaging to one’s own or an allied concern.

Generally it is good practice to objectively plan to achieve success and avoid failure rather than to focus on victory and avoidance of defeat. In other words it is better to think about how to structure or re-structure a contest so as to move it onto favourable ground. Put more simply to get beyond a bound rather than how to get onto it and when there to think about what to do next. That sounds a lot like a Wylie version of Liddell Hart’s indirect approach. And that’s essentially what it is. And also what is commonly needed: an analytic rather than a blunt force approach to problem solving. Hence good practice ....

So what distinguishes the tactical from the operational, and in turn the operational from the strategic level of conflict ? At the tactical level: freedom of action may often be constrained and sometimes demand a short sighted focus on victory at a specific location. At the operational level: freedom of action will sometimes be constrained but it is always appropriate to plan for success rather than victory. At the strategic level: it is necessary to use cumulative and sequential techniques and to carefully pursue success for all politically and militarily determined objectives.

This interpretation is pretentiously brief but it can serve as a skeleton of reasons for always using the terms success and failure in preference to victory and defeat. Am looking forward to reading critical and contrary comments.

MikeF
01-17-2012, 02:38 PM
Have read several of the books on your list but not as yet Consequences of Failure by Corson. Here somewhat late is a carefully written reply to your question.

Sun Tzu and Clausewitz were each achievers and renowned military scholars and original thinkers. Like to believe that both would have preferred the cadence of pipes and drums to the stridency of a brass band.

Sun Tzu wrote mainly in the context of military success and failure rather than victory and defeat. That can be seen especially in his frequent mention of threatened and conceivable use of military force as a means to influence the general psyche and preparedness, and the specific planning and actions of an actual or potential adversary. The following interpretation uses more modern language and is based mainly on the views of Clausewitz, Liddell Hart and Wylie.

Military campaigns and armed conflict are said to be politics pursued by other means. Ignoring electoral campaigns and party politics, the politicians in power at any time are generally concerned with the success and failure of their policies. Sun Tzu’ perspective correlates better with those concerns than could any discussion predicated on victories and defeats.

So what is success ? In the simplest case success can be the achievement of a single objective. And that objective might be a negative, as in defensively preventing an adversary from achieving – or deterrently dissuading him from seeking - something that is potentially or actually damaging to one’s own or an allied concern.

Generally it is good practice to objectively plan to achieve success and avoid failure rather than to focus on victory and avoidance of defeat. In other words it is better to think about how to structure or re-structure a contest so as to move it onto favourable ground. Put more simply to get beyond a bound rather than how to get onto it and when there to think about what to do next. That sounds a lot like a Wylie version of Liddell Hart’s indirect approach. And that’s essentially what it is. And also what is commonly needed: an analytic rather than a blunt force approach to problem solving. Hence good practice ....

So what distinguishes the tactical from the operational, and in turn the operational from the strategic level of conflict ? At the tactical level: freedom of action may often be constrained and sometimes demand a short sighted focus on victory at a specific location. At the operational level: freedom of action will sometimes be constrained but it is always appropriate to plan for success rather than victory. At the strategic level: it is necessary to use cumulative and sequential techniques and to carefully pursue success for all politically and militarily determined objectives.

This interpretation is pretentiously brief but it can serve as a skeleton of reasons for always using the terms success and failure in preference to victory and defeat. Am looking forward to reading critical and contrary comments.

Here's two complimentary ideas.

1. We (military) need to operationalize and codify what we did right over the last ten years (Techniques at clearing and pacification top the list).

2. We (Americans) should stop trying to counter colonial insurgencies and start trying to understand revolution as a process not an event.

AmericanPride
01-17-2012, 02:54 PM
2. We (Americans) should stop trying to counter colonial insurgencies and start trying to understand revolution as a process not an event.

Revolutionary conflict is a byproduct of the relentless advance of globalizing capital, which erodes traditional political and cultural boundaries. This is driven by the raw and limitless desire for "prosperity", which translates directly into unending resource consumption. Dorronsoro's analysis of the Afghan conflict in Revolution Unending implies that interventions to support globalist-compliant regimes will be a mainstay of future policies. Afghanistan has at least $1 trillion in raw materials and transit access to the Caspian basin's energy resources for resource hungry Pakistan and India, bypassing, China, Iran, and Russia. The Taliban government was an anomaly in the international system; isolated from the modernizing force of globalism due in part to ideology, regional political circumstances, and Afghanistan's civil war. As global consumption increases, the competition will only become more bitter.

MikeF
01-17-2012, 03:02 PM
Revolutionary conflict is a byproduct of the relentless advance of globalizing capital, which erodes traditional political and cultural boundaries. This is driven by the raw and limitless desire for "prosperity", which translates directly into unending resource consumption. Dorronsoro's analysis of the Afghan conflict in Revolution Unending implies that interventions to support globalist-compliant regimes will be a mainstay of future policies. Afghanistan has at least $1 trillion in raw materials and transit access to the Caspian basin's energy resources for resource hungry Pakistan and India, bypassing, China, Iran, and Russia. The Taliban government was an anomaly in the international system; isolated from the modernizing force of globalism due in part to ideology, regional political circumstances, and Afghanistan's civil war. As global consumption increases, the competition will only become more bitter.

You don't wrestle with a pig in the mud b/c the pig likes to get dirty:eek:

There are better ways

Stan
01-17-2012, 04:18 PM
On the other hand, Mike...

If you accept the fact that you will wrestle with a pig and know you are going to get dirty, you are less likely to be surprised.

But, because we naively think we can go to the wrestling match with our rules we are doomed to fail and get really dirty.

Jungle rules apply :D


You don't wrestle with a pig in the mud b/c the pig likes to get dirty:eek:

There are better ways

MikeF
01-17-2012, 04:20 PM
On the other hand, Mike...

If you accept the fact that you will wrestle with a pig and know you are going to get dirty, you are less likely to be surprised.

But, because we naively think we can go to the wrestling match with our rules we are doomed to fail and get really dirty.

Jungle rules apply :D

I think a wise old man quotes this one,


There are very few problems, which cannot be solved by the suitable application of High Explosives

MikeF
01-17-2012, 04:40 PM
A preview to my forthcoming contribution to Foreign Policy Magazine next month, 17. True or false: Americans are safer today than when Obama took office.

True, but this is a false choice. Worrying about being safe is simply fear and insecurity. It is time to stop pondering safety and security and start dreaming about living again. When my daughter goes to sleep at night, I don’t ask her what she fears most. I ask her to imagine what she will be doing in twenty years. Will she be the first woman to land on Mars? Will she travel deep into the heart of the Congo researching some undiscovered plant that will provide a cure for cancer? Will she write the next great American novel? This is the type of thinking that we desperately need. These are the type of questions that we must ask our children. It is time for us to overcome the fear and the hurt and the pain from 9/11 and move on with life.

Fuchs
01-17-2012, 04:54 PM
It takes posts such as yours to remind me again that people re still under the after-effects of an event which happened a decade ago and killed 1/100,000th of the population. That is, less than all annual flu waves (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/disease/us_flu-related_deaths.htm)!

Dayuhan
01-17-2012, 10:51 PM
Revolutionary conflict is a byproduct of the relentless advance of globalizing capital, which erodes traditional political and cultural boundaries.

That's an absolute statement and completely unjustifiable. Revolutions emerge for lots of reasons, and people are as likely to revolt because they feel government is keeping them out of the global economy as they are because the government is pushing them into it. Each revolution has to be understood for what it is, and blanket statements about a global cause for revolution are pointless.

It's become fashionable in certain circles to see "revolution" generically as a conservative backlash against imposed change, but historically revolution has more often been a tool people use to achieve change and modernization when governments obstruct it.

AmericanPride
01-17-2012, 11:18 PM
Revolutions emerge for lots of reasons

Sure they do. But we're not talking about the liberal/nationalist revolutions of the 19th century or the national wars of liberation in the 20th. We're focused on contemporary revolutionary conflicts for the next, say, 10 - 30 years, and really only those that interest the United States, which narrows the field further. Right now there exists a global regime governed by the "laws" of capitalist relations and dominated by the West who are challenged by the leaders of the developing world. These relationships are largely determined by Western institutions; i.e. the United Nations, World Bank Group, IMF, and so on which augment the West's political, economic, and military power. Islamism is one of the few half-way viable alternatives, though its political and economic foundations are weak because it does not have appeal in any of the great or secondary powers. As a political organizing principle, it challenges the Western conception of power directly, rearranging (or destroying) the relationships established by the West. That is the definition of revolution, whatever concrete event triggers it. You say such a universal understanding of revolution is "pointless". On the contrary, it provides just the context needed for understanding the security implications of global political economy: revolutionary conflict is inevitable and the US must be prepared to engage in it on one side (i.e. anti-Mubarak forces in Egypt) or the other (preserving the status quo in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Kingdoms).

Fuchs
01-18-2012, 05:55 PM
I got a comment on my blog; it had this link:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGpXHYtkOS8


Seriously, what's wrong there? How can warmongering, on other occasions also executions and the like, be cheered for? Isn't it about time to reign in here and stop this insanity?
There gotta be some levers for civil society to reign in against such inhuman extremism.

I could make some really, really shameful comparisons to really, really bad governments / political cultures who never managed to produce such a warmongering crowd response in absence of a world war.
This crowd even decided to go pro-warmongering AGAINST the speaker!


In my book, the U.S. should immediately forget (what little it knows) about the rest of the world and clean up the domestic mess ASAP. It really needs a dozens of Baceviches as national pundits RIGHT NOW.

jmm99
01-18-2012, 06:32 PM
Herra Majuri Karhu; wait till it gets really partisan ! :D It's all part of our Quadrennial Freak Show. Surely, you've watched American politics before.

And then we have the leadoff comment to the video:


Half the crowd probably belong to the KKK or decedents from them

Yup, that's the new threat posed to the US by Fox - half live KKK; and half KKK zombies. Three fingers pointing down; one head pointed up.

Thanks for the unintentional humor.

Mike

Dayuhan
01-18-2012, 10:10 PM
Sure they do. But we're not talking about the liberal/nationalist revolutions of the 19th century or the national wars of liberation in the 20th. We're focused on contemporary revolutionary conflicts for the next, say, 10 - 30 years, and really only those that interest the United States, which narrows the field further.

Unless somebody here has crystal balls, any assessment of what revolutions will be like or which revolutions the US will be concerned with for the next 10-30 years is purely speculative.


Right now there exists a global regime governed by the "laws" of capitalist relations and dominated by the West who are challenged by the leaders of the developing world.

I don't see the capitalist system being challenged by the developing world at all. I see most of the developing world trying to push into the tent and get a piece of the action.


Islamism is one of the few half-way viable alternatives, though its political and economic foundations are weak because it does not have appeal in any of the great or secondary powers. As a political organizing principle, it challenges the Western conception of power directly, rearranging (or destroying) the relationships established by the West. That is the definition of revolution, whatever concrete event triggers it.

Islamism may have revolutionary aspirations, but there's no current evidence to suggest that it can transform those aspirations into significant political action. I wouldn't assume that Islamism will be a dominant cause of revolution or even a dominant US antagonist in the future.


You say such a universal understanding of revolution is "pointless". On the contrary, it provides just the context needed for understanding the security implications of global political economy: revolutionary conflict is inevitable and the US must be prepared to engage in it on one side (i.e. anti-Mubarak forces in Egypt) or the other (preserving the status quo in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Kingdoms).

I'll correct myself and say that attempting to deduce a "universal understanding of revolution" is not just pointless, it's downright counterproductive. Once we assume a "universal understanding", we try to shove events into that box whether or not they fit there, and that can lead to dangerous misinterpretations. Revolutions aren't universal, they are specific, and each has its own causes. The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and the current struggle in Syria, had and have nothing to do with global capitalism; they were and are reactions to specific local governance conditions. Future revolutions are likely - though in no way certain - to be the same.

The fewer preconceived notions we have when approaching and attempting to understand a revolution or revolutionary aspirations, the better. Understand it for what it is, based on local knowledge, don't try to cram it into some preconceived box of "universal understanding".

Ken White
01-18-2012, 11:25 PM
Unless somebody here has crystal balls, any assessment of what revolutions will be like or which revolutions the US will be concerned with for the next 10-30 years is purely speculative.Not that, that's totally correct even if many seem to have difficulty grasping the point -- OTOH this:
The fewer preconceived notions we have when approaching and attempting to understand a revolution or revolutionary aspirations, the better. Understand it for what it is, based on local knowledge, don't try to cram it into some preconceived box of "universal understanding".is too hard for too many; better in their view to have a straitjacket to put on problems so they all look alike and to have a one size fits all hat for a 'problem solver' ..:rolleyes:

Ken White
01-18-2012, 11:39 PM
Seriously, what's wrong there? How can warmongering, on other occasions also executions and the like, be cheered for? Isn't it about time to reign in here and stop this insanity? There gotta be some levers for civil society to reign in against such inhuman extremism.Nope, we're Americans, evil to the core...
In my book, the U.S. should immediately forget (what little it knows) about the rest of the world...You're right about the little but we can agree on the forgetting a lot of that... :cool:
and clean up the domestic mess ASAP. It really needs a dozens of Baceviches as national pundits RIGHT NOW.While I agree on the domestic clean up, for the rest, sheesh, what a thought. Scary, that. Haven't you noticed that part of our problem is that we have way, way too many pundits, people who have no responsibilities but a lot of abstruse opinions... :eek:

Fortunately, we're diverse enough that while there's probably someone that listens to each of them, we tend to collectively ignore most of them. As we should because, in the end, they express merely a generally ill informed opinion, nothing more...

To paraphrase the old saying, Europe is Europe and America is America and never the twain shall meet...:D

Speaking of pundits and twains, old 'uneducated' Mark Twain was a better pundit than most of today's, smarter than most including Doctor Colonel Professor Bacevich... ;)

Dayuhan
01-19-2012, 12:09 AM
In my book, the U.S. should immediately forget (what little it knows) about the rest of the world and clean up the domestic mess ASAP.

That's a piece of advice that might be given to Europe as well.

AmericanPride
01-19-2012, 12:39 AM
Unless somebody here has crystal balls, any assessment of what revolutions will be like or which revolutions the US will be concerned with for the next 10-30 years is purely speculative.

That's why it's called predictive analysis...


I don't see the capitalist system being challenged by the developing world at all. I see most of the developing world trying to push into the tent and get a piece of the action.

That's part of it, but that's mostly driven by Brazil, China, India, etc. But none of them are no more committed to maintaining the Western capitalist system any more than the US was committed to maintaining the European colonial system. How that transfer of power will proceed remains to be seen, if it ever comes to pass.


Islamism may have revolutionary aspirations, but there's no current evidence to suggest that it can transform those aspirations into significant political action.

Rewording what I said and using it as a reply is not productive communication.


I'll correct myself and say that attempting to deduce a "universal understanding of revolution" is not just pointless, it's downright counterproductive. Once we assume a "universal understanding", we try to shove events into that box whether or not they fit there, and that can lead to dangerous misinterpretations. Revolutions aren't universal, they are specific, and each has its own causes. The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and the current struggle in Syria, had and have nothing to do with global capitalism; they were and are reactions to specific local governance conditions. Future revolutions are likely - though in no way certain - to be the same.

And those "specific local governance conditions" exist within a larger and specific international context of global capitalism. The Middle East is not experiencing any pan-Arab nationalist revolution as was seen in the final decades of European imperialism or a religious revolution like in Iran or Afghanistan. The revolutions are attributable to exposed elites vulnerable to the political, economic, and cultural forces of globalism. This does not imply that some magical hand is flying around the world tipping over tin-pot dictatorships -- the people are harnessing the ideas, technologies, and material powers to enact revolution. This is a direct consequence of the global regime in place.

Dayuhan
01-19-2012, 01:10 AM
That's why it's called predictive analysis...

Another word for speculation.


That's part of it, but that's mostly driven by Brazil, China, India, etc. But none of them are no more committed to maintaining the Western capitalist system any more than the US was committed to maintaining the European colonial system. How that transfer of power will proceed remains to be seen, if it ever comes to pass.

They're committed to joining and profiting from the global economy. Many others in the developing world are doing the same with equal or greater success, though being smaller they get less attention. I see nothing revolutionary about that... evolution perhaps, but not revolution.


The revolutions are attributable to exposed elites vulnerable to the political, economic, and cultural forces of globalism. This does not imply that some magical hand is flying around the world tipping over tin-pot dictatorships -- the people are harnessing the ideas, technologies, and material powers to enact revolution. This is a direct consequence of the global regime in place.

The revolutions are attributable to to exposed elites hung on their own corruption, ineptness, and ossified social structures, and to increasingly frustrated populaces who want more. The Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan elites didn't inspire revolt because they were exposed to the forces of "global capitalism", they inspired revolt because they sucked at governing. That's nothing unusual: dictatorships tend to lose their mojo over time, and eventually the rot goes terminal and the people take to the streets. Not all that different from Paris in 1789 when you get right down to it. The hypothetical connection to "global capitalism" seems strained well beyond the breaking point.

AmericanPride
01-19-2012, 03:06 AM
Another word for speculation.

Yep. And there's entire professions dedicated to it so your condescension towards speculation is very much irrelevant to this discussion.


They're committed to joining and profiting from the global economy.

So long as they are powerless to change the conditions to better suit their interests. The world looks different when you're on top of it.


The revolutions are attributable to to exposed elites hung on their own corruption, ineptness, and ossified social structures, and to increasingly frustrated populaces who want more.

That's what I said... "exposed elites...," "the people harnessing the ideas, et.al...," So what "more" do the people want and from where do they draw their enablers, motivations, and ideals? What ideological language are they speaking? Are they speaking the language of nationalism or Islamism? No, they are speaking the language of liberalism, democracy, and human rights. These things were not suddenly invented in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.


The Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan elites didn't inspire revolt because they were exposed to the forces of "global capitalism", they inspired revolt because they sucked at governing.

I did not say exposure to global capitalism "inspired" revolution in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia. I stated that the elites were vulnerable to the "political, economic, and cultural forces" of global capitalism. The elites did not necessarily "suck" at governing -- they did what governments are designed to do: maintained the privileges of those in control of it. But that position is not tenable in the international context of democracy, liberalization, modernization, and human rights. So a Tunisian lit himself on fire because he was tired of being beat up by the police -- what was the system in place that compelled him into that situation, and what alternatives exist? Did the Tunisian mob invent democracy? Liberalism?

wm
01-19-2012, 12:59 PM
I think American Pride's understanding of the cause of revolution can be expressed quite succinctly: "The Man is keeping me down." "The Man" in this case is the 1% who are the leaders of Western Capitalism (whatever that is). While this may be true, it is rather unenlightening because of its generality.

A few days back this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=131040&postcount=10) by Bill Moore appeared on the Musa Qala thread. I think that the first quoted line, replacing the place name (Helmand) with just about any other place name where reaction to the status quo is occurring or has occurred, captures American Pride's desired causal nexus much better than some appeal to a global movement against the current forces of Western Capitalism.

The Tip O'Neil quote that is the subject of this post says about as much on the causes of revolts and other popular upraising and outcries as the historical evidence of such events seems to support.

Steve Blair
01-19-2012, 02:29 PM
that's a piece of advice that might be given to europe as well.

+1

Dayuhan
01-19-2012, 11:57 PM
Yep. And there's entire professions dedicated to it so your condescension towards speculation is very much irrelevant to this discussion.

Yes, fortune-tellers abound. Whether or not there's much point in listening to those who claim the ability to predict the future is another story, unless there's some concrete reason to believe that they actually can. Speculation may be entertaining but it makes a poor basis for policy, and I don't see a great deal that's analytical about it... especially when, as is so often the case, it derives primarily from ideologically driven preconceptions.


That's what I said... "exposed elites...," "the people harnessing the ideas, et.al...," So what "more" do the people want and from where do they draw their enablers, motivations, and ideals? What ideological language are they speaking? Are they speaking the language of nationalism or Islamism? No, they are speaking the language of liberalism, democracy, and human rights. These things were not suddenly invented in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.

They're tired of being kicked around and they perceive vulnerability on the part of those doing the kicking. I see no connection to "the forces of global capitalism". These are local events driven by local issues.


The elites did not necessarily "suck" at governing -- they did what governments are designed to do: maintained the privileges of those in control of it.

They did it badly and they failed at it, ergo they sucked at it.


But that position is not tenable in the international context of democracy, liberalization, modernization, and human rights. So a Tunisian lit himself on fire because he was tired of being beat up by the police -- what was the system in place that compelled him into that situation, and what alternatives exist? Did the Tunisian mob invent democracy? Liberalism?

Revolts against aging, vulnerable despots have occurred ever since aging, vulnerable despots appeared as a feature of human social organization. I see no special connection to these "forces of global capitalism".