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Dayuhan
01-30-2010, 04:22 AM
This little encounter...

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/01/28/10/npas-kill-5-soldiers-mt-province-ambush

Happened a few days ago a few miles from home, in an area where I often ride the bike and hike.

Certainly not notable in any way, and isn't going to change any games, just one more sporadic flare in a sporadic fight that's been going on for decades.

What I never quite understand is the predictability of it all. The NPA appear in a moderately remote village. The Philippine Army dispatches troops, invariably by land and by the most predictable route. The troops are ambushed. The NPA leave the area immediately, and long after they're gone military reinforcements descend on the place, accusing the locals of complicity and generally pissing everyone off. Right now, 3 days after it happened, I can hear a couple of UH1s clattering around over the ambush site... I can't imagine what they expect to see, you can hear them coming miles away and the guys who staged the ambush are far far away on the other side of the mountains by now.

So it goes. I'll have to ride a different trail for a while!

davidbfpo
02-03-2012, 08:18 PM
Moderator at work

I have merged a number of threads in this arena, so have locked several up: Catch All OEF Phillipines (till 2012), The US role in the Phillipines (catch all) and leaving a couple open for updates: Small War on Basilan (catch all), The Islamic Insurgents (catch all) and Communist Insurgency in the Philippines (catch all).

This thread is for updates in 2012 onwards, prompted by the next post.

davidbfpo
02-03-2012, 08:27 PM
The BBC News report:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16867193

Washington Post:http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/philippine-military-3-top-terrorist-leaders-killed-in-operation-in-southern-philippines/2012/02/02/gIQABwFdjQ_story.html


The Philippine military said it killed three of Southeast Asia’s most-wanted terrorist leaders in a U.S.-backed airstrike that significantly weakens an al-Qaida-linked network that had used islands in the southern Philippines as a hideout and training base....Malaysian Zulkifli bin Hir, also known as Marwan, a top leader of the regional Jemaah Islamiyah terror network...the leader of the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf militants, Umbra Jumdail, and a Singaporean leader in Jemaah Islamiyah, Abdullah Ali, who used the guerrilla name Muawiyah...

I note the air strike was 0300hrs by two OV10s dropping 4 x500lb bombs and no-one is being specific what the US help was.

Dayuhan
02-03-2012, 11:37 PM
I note the air strike was 0300hrs by two OV10s dropping 4 x500lb bombs and no-one is being specific what the US help was.

The Philippine Air Force does not have much recent history of night strikes or employing guided weaponry. This would seem a substantial upgrade from what they've done in the past, especially as reports suggest direct hits on the target houses.

Local speculation along two lines...

1. The US provided targeting information and has been providing equipment and training to build this capacity.

2. The US did it and said they didn't.

Take your pick, not like we'll know.

Should be noted that Marwan is presumed dead, body was not found.

Dayuhan
02-06-2012, 12:53 PM
http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Filipino-villagers-may-have-helped-kill-terrorist-3043242.php


Surviving militants suspect that villagers secretly working for the military helped track down Jumdail, said a Philippine military intelligence official who had been helping monitor the militants. The official said militants believe villagers pretending to seek medical treatment traveled to Jumdail's hideout and left some kind of sensor that the military used to target his Abu Sayyaf lair....

...The Philippine military announced that the long-hunted Marwan and his Singaporean ally Abdullah Ali, better known as Muawiyah, were killed in the air raid along with Jumdail and other Filipino extremists. But two security officials said Sunday that new intelligence shows that Jumdail was killed but that the two foreign terror suspects are still alive and were not in the Abu Sayyaf lair that was bombed.

The military continues to insist that Marwan and Muawiyah are dead and are searching for their remains. Not a single body was retrieved by police in the bombed hilly jungle lair near Lanao Dakulah village, fueling different versions of who was killed.

Dayuhan
03-06-2012, 01:17 AM
The attack referred to above is now being openly referred to as a US drone strike:

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/20123574732969894.html

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NB29Ae01.html

These are in no way impartial sources and the reports are definitely agenda-driven. They will be widely believed. They are also not entirely unbelievable: as I mentioned above, the official account of the operation does not seem at all consistent with the observed capacities of the PAF.

It's unlikely that there will be any official word on the subject, so speculation is all there is.

Bob's World
03-06-2012, 10:26 AM
This is the primary problem when one defines the problems between a government and its populace in terms of "threats" and then applies a military solution to resolve them. It leads to an excessive focus on the aspects of the "threat" that are identifiable. The organizations as a whole are simply members of the populace, so lack any special identification. But such organizations typically apply some framework of shared ideological beliefs, so we can focus on that. Such organizations also have leaders, so we can focus on them.

It is no wonder that in military headquarters, where endless daily briefings pound like a drumbeat on ideology and the names and faces of a handful of guys, that such organizations might come to convince themselves that if they could just make the ideology go away, if they could just get a red slash through some of those faces and names, that they would somehow be making progress.

The obsessive pursuit of such progress leads to growing frustrations with the obstacles to being able to bring to bear the full power and capabilities possessed by the military to achieve those purposes.

Things like the laws of the intervening country, the country where these organizations live and operate, and of the international community often get in the way of effectiveness.

Respect for the sovereignty of the country where these organizations live and operate is a major obstacle to effectiveness.

Tailoring the actions of any intervening country actions so as to not degrade the legitimacy of the government and security forces of the country where these organizations live and operate is a major obstacle to effectiveness.

But for the irritating self-imposed obstacles of concepts like "justice" "sovereignty" and "legitimacy" military forces could be far more effective in getting after the identifiable military aspects of such problems. At getting after the "threat."

In Afghanistan and Iraq the solution was easy. Call it a war, remove the host nation government, and 'bingo'! No more messy obstacles to effectiveness. What we learned, however, or should have learned, is that such efforts to improve "effectiveness" of military operations designed to defeat the symptomatic "threat" component of such problems between populaces and governments is more often than not antithetical to getting to an understanding and resolution of the true issues of the matter.

The great strength of the operations conducted with the government of the Philippines was that we constrained ourselves, that we sacrificed "effectiveness" in a recognition that when working with a friendly government one cannot simply ignore the law or their sovereignty, or act is such away as to call in question in the eyes of the populace the legitimacy of their own government. But in military headquarters those same targetable factors of leadership and ideology get briefed with the same frequency, constantly feeding feelings of frustration with those pesky obstacles to "effectiveness."

Don't blame the military for being the military and doing what militaries do. These are civil problems demanding civil solutions. Governments long used to not having to compromise on longstanding grievances with important, minority (or suppressed majorities in many cases, such as Bahrain) populaces, are going to have to realize that simply throwing these problems to the military to resolve can only restore suppression of the symptoms at best.

I don't know what happened in the Philippines. I know the Philippine security forces have the capacity to execute such an operation when supported by US forces within the rules, laws and agreements that have long defined and constrained that operation. I also appreciate the frustration of senior leaders with self-imposed obstacles to effectiveness.

Effectiveness is the enemy of true success in these types of situations. Look at night raids in Afghanistan. A masterpiece of effectiveness, yet every override of justice, sovereignty and legitimacy put in place to achieve that effectiveness serves to strengthen the Taliban movement across the populace, even as effective operations add to the score card virtually every night.

Effectiveness is the enemy of success. That is one frustrating concept to wrap your brain around as a military tasked with solving a problem. A problem that was never really a military problem to begin with. Currently the US Army is very focused on "the lessons learned of the past 10 years." Mostly, so far as I can tell, the focus is on how to be "more effective." I believe it is time to shift the focus of that study, of that conversation, to one of "how do we be more successful." But first we will need to redefine our measures of success.

Dayuhan
03-08-2012, 03:58 AM
I don't know what happened in the Philippines. I know the Philippine security forces have the capacity to execute such an operation when supported by US forces within the rules, laws and agreements that have long defined and constrained that operation.

There are actually some questions being asked about that supposed capacity. Obviously there are limits to what's known, but the strike appears to have involved very precise placement of munitions in a night strike, a capacity the Philippine air force has previously either not had or kept very quiet. Even in daytime the track record is not all that good. Whether this is a new capacity developed with US help or whether the US carried out the strike is not possible to determine with the information ublicly available.


The great strength of the operations conducted with the government of the Philippines was that we constrained ourselves, that we sacrificed "effectiveness" in a recognition that when working with a friendly government one cannot simply ignore the law or their sovereignty, or act is such away as to call in question in the eyes of the populace the legitimacy of their own government.

True enough... but the great weakness of those operations is that ultimately very little has changed. The core of the problem - the neo-feudal clan governance that prevails in the affected areas - is still in place. US intervention hasn't changed that and the Philippine government hasn't the will (or arguably the ability) to do anything about it.

Of course success or failure are relative to goals. If the US goal was to alter the pattern of recurring insurgency, we've probably not accomplished much. If the goal was to break or reduce the connection between that insurgency and international Islamist movements, there may have been some success. The connection between AQ and ASG was tenuous and fairly transient to begin with, and the JI connection is largely opportunistic. The "global Islamist" narrative has never had much traction in Mindanao; the fighting is over local concerns. Those concerns remain largely in place, but the area is a much less hospitable place for the international operatives than it once was.

Whether the operation was or is perceived to be a US strike, the impact will probably not be that great. The Als will sell it as further evidence of a global US campaign of drone-based destruction raining down on innocent Muslims. That will carry some weight in some places, but not much in the Philippines. The left will howl, but they've little real political influence. The average Christian Filipino is delighted to see Muslim militants being blown up, no matter who does it. Filipino Muslims have little exposure to the Als and will continue to have a generally positive view of US involvement, driven less by "hearts and minds" development projects than by the widespread perception that the US presence is a restraint on the Philippine military's customary and unwelcome mode of operations.

In short, more of the same. The US presence can keep the symptoms of insurgency, but it's not doing anything about the causes and the insurgency will probably re-emerge. It may be a constraint on internationalization of that insurgency, and strikes such as this one will certainly give JI people a disincentive to move here (they're here in the first place because Indonesia is no longer safe for them).

The question, of course, is how long to we want to stay in the picture.

Bob's World
03-08-2012, 12:42 PM
Agreed. OEF-P has no hope of resolving the reasons why large segments of the Philippine populace have historically been dissatisfied with their situation, and their perceptions of how the government serves to perpetuate that situation.

To continue even a very well designed and executed operation where it has no hope of true success is not smart on many levels. The one senior leaders seem to appreciate least is that where we act in ways that facilitate the development of the belief, reasonable or otherwise, that the US is somehow an obstacle to the host nation government having to listen to their people and evolve, we create the very motivation for acts of transnational terrorism against the US that led us to be there in the first place.

I doubt that 10 years ago there were 5 Pashtuns in all of Afghanistan or Pakistan who would be willing to join any AQ operation aimed at conducting an act of terrorism against America. Who believes that to be true today after 10 years of US operations aimed at forcefully subjecting the Pashtun populaces to an Afghan governance dominated by Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara? Are we creating similar lines of motivation among segments of the Philippine populace?

Its not so much about who's in charge or how they govern, it is about how the various populace groups subjected to that governance feel about it, and who they blame.

Dayuhan
03-08-2012, 10:54 PM
Agreed. OEF-P has no hope of resolving the reasons why large segments of the Philippine populace have historically been dissatisfied with their situation, and their perceptions of how the government serves to perpetuate that situation.

To continue even a very well designed and executed operation where it has no hope of true success is not smart on many levels.

"True success" would of course depend on the goals of the mission. If the goal was "resolving the reasons why large segments of the Philippine populace have historically been dissatisfied with their situation", then of course there has been no success, nor was there any hope of success. I suspect (and hope) that the goals were rather more modest than that.

If the goal was to disrupt the connection between local militant groups and the global Islamist infrastructure, that would be a qualified success. Of course that connection was always much less than it was cracked up to be. At one point US pressure actually drove a return to Islamist/terrorist principles, but subsequently there has been some real success in dismantling the connections, largely because they never spread beyond a relatively small number of individuals.

If the goal was to improve the capacity and performance of the Philippine military, perhaps qualified success as well. They've backed away from some practices that openly exacerbated insurgency, but whether that will endure beyond our departure remains to be seen. The extent to which capacity and performance have improved in any enduring sense is really not known at this point, and won't be until we leave.

If the goal was to improve governance, I'd say we've achieved little or nothing. The governing elite have been reminded that largesse is available to those who say the words and go through the motions, but I don't see any reason to think any lasting change is in the picture.


The one senior leaders seem to appreciate least is that where we act in ways that facilitate the development of the belief, reasonable or otherwise, that the US is somehow an obstacle to the host nation government having to listen to their people and evolve, we create the very motivation for acts of transnational terrorism against the US that led us to be there in the first place...

...Are we creating similar lines of motivation among segments of the Philippine populace?

Not to any visible extent, I'd say. If anything the US gets credit for being a moderating influence on the Philippine armed forces. It's worth noting that there have been no acts of "transnational terrorism against the US" emanating from Filipino-based groups. The explosives for the Bali bombs were sourced here, but that's because explosives are easy to buy and smuggle here, not because of Filipino sympathy for the agenda. A transnational terror group based in Manila planned some attacks and executed one, but they weren't Filipino and had only very tenuous connections to any local group. Kidnappings in the south were profit-driven banditry, not terrorism.

I see no significant risk that the US presence here will inflame Filipinos into attacking the US. On the other hand, I see no special gain to be achieved by staying. Staying poses some risks... the Tausug/Sama insurgency will eventually re-emerge, and we don't need to be caught up in it. We also don't want to be tempted to mess about in the Maranao/Maguindanao insurgency, even though it has more connection to global Islamic radicalism than the ASG.

We do need to be aware that the perception in much of the Philippines is that Gloria Arroyo's initial request for US assistance was orchestrated by the US in its post 9/11 moments of Bushy aggressiveness, and thus that we are here on our own initiative. Objections to that are not that widespread, but it can be a sticking point. At this point we might be well advised to announce that we believe the mission is largely accomplished, and that unless the Philippine government specifically requests that we remain, we intend to withdraw. I suspect that such a request would be made. If it wasn't and we withdrew, we'd lose nothing. If it was, there would be a new and more credible mandate.

carl
03-28-2012, 07:50 PM
Try this site also, very interesting.

http://www.morolandhistory.com/

The war in the Philippines and Moroland in the early 1900s is fascinating. I don't know if you can easily get books about that in SA but if you can I think you would find it interesting. Once upon a time, we knew how to fight small wars.

Ken White
03-29-2012, 02:27 AM
Once upon a time, we knew how to fight small wars.Mmmmm. Don't disagree, I agree with you and so does the author of "Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1902" (LINK) (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/ramsey_24.pdf) from Leavenworth. He ends:
"As the most successful counterinsurgency campaign in US history, it is the logical starting point for the systematic examination of military intervention, civic action, and pacification operations."However, before he gets there he also notes:
"When the guerrilla or ladrone problem persisted, the American Army sought to do what it was trained to do—destroy the armed insurrectos."Notably, as shown below and unlike today, with few restrictions. Also:
"As a Philippine veteran noted, “The American soldier in officially sanctioned wrath is a thing so ugly and dangerous that it would take a Kipling to describe him.”Comment similar to that were often made by other opponents -- until the mid 1970s. We used to be not noted for good behavior. Today, we're the good guys (By Order Of...). :rolleyes:

From the Wiki (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine%E2%80%93American_War):
"The use of concentration camps or "zones of protection" theoretically prevented an undue loss of civilian life that would have occurred had the US Army engaged in total war on the Filipino population. However, due to unsanitary conditions, many of the interned died from dysentery."Why were we there?
"Support for American actions in the Philippines was justified by those in the U.S. government and media who supported the conflict through the use of moralistic oration. Stuart Creighton Miller writes "Americans altruistically went to war with Spain to liberate the Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos from their tyrannical yoke. If they lingered on too long in the Philippines, it was to protect the Filipinos from European predators waiting in the wings for an American withdrawal and to tutor them in American-style democracy." (emphasis added / kw)My, my. We're still quite moral -- in that respect... :D

On Armies as servants:
"General Otis gained a significant amount of notoriety for his actions in the Philippines. Although multiple orders were given to Otis from Washington to avoid military conflict, he did very little to circumvent the breakout of war. Notably, shortly after fighting began he turned down a proposal from Emilio Aguinaldo to end the fighting, stating “fighting, having begun, must go on to the grim end.” Otis refused to accept anything but unconditional surrender from the Philippine Army. He often made major military decisions on his own, without first consulting leadership in Washington at all."Pesky servants just won't behave. Difference between then and now is that public attitudes have changed. A combination of Otis, some WW II incidents and MacArthur changed the rules.

The Army in the Philippines in 1900 (and up until the mid 1960s...) believed in doing something even if it was wrong. Since Viet Nam the attitude is to do nothing; particularly if it even might possibly consider going wrong. That's not the Army, that's the society from which it springs. Picture trying to do this today:
"The shift to guerrilla warfare drove the US Army to a "total-war" doctrine. Civilians were given identification and forced into concentration camps with a publicly announced deadline after which all persons found outside of camps without identification would be shot on sight. Thousands of civilians died in these camps due to poor conditions."Hundred if not thousands more were shot for being where they would have been better off not being. We followed much the same rules in Korea and early on in Viet Nam. Different times, different rules. Can't do that or anything approaching it today.

Then there's this:
"On July 2. the U.S. Secretary of War telegraphed that since the insurrection against the U.S. had ended and provincial civil governments had been established, the office of military governor was terminated. On July 4, Theodore Roosevelt, who had succeeded to the U.S. Presidency after the assassination of President McKinley on September 5, 1901, proclaimed a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all people in the Philippine archipelago who had participated in the conflict."Oops...
Beginning with the Taraca, which occurred on April 4, 1904, American forces battled Datu Ampuanagus, who surrendered after losing 200 members of his people.[1][78] Numerous battles would occur after that up until the end of the conflict on June 15, 1913..."Took a while...:wry:

Back to the original link:
"In his 1902 annual report, Chaffee wrote of the need for language skills:

'An important duty as yet not taken seriously by the officers of the Army serving in the Division, but which ought not be longer neglected if they would meet to the full the demands which the situation requires and may be reasonably expected of them as enhancing the efficiency when serving here, is the acquirement of a workable knowledge, both oral and written, of the native dialect where stationed. . . . I believe that the interests of the government are deeply involved in this matter. . . . I recommend . . . a bonus of two hundred dollars to each officer and intelligent enlisted man who shall attain a state of proficiency in a native dialect, and one hundred dollars additional for proficiency in Spanish.' "Lot of things changed, some did not... ;)

We still know how to fight small wars -- we just aren't allowed to.

Ray
03-31-2012, 07:22 AM
I wouldn't make assumptions about sectarian conflict in the Philippines based on observations in the Middle East and South Asia, very different environment, very different conflict. The US presence in the south has been in place for over a decade and it has not in any way raised a hornet's nest or provoked more conflict. It's actually had a calming influence and has been well accepted by the local Muslim populaces, mainly due to the perception (accurate IMO) that the Philippine military and government behave better with Americans watching them. The larger Muslim groups see the US less as a rival than as a potential mediator that has in the past tried (albeit ineffectually) to persuade the Philippine government to take a less hard-line stance on many of their core issues.

It should be noted that there is not and has never been any intention to eliminate the Moros: the US forces have been scrupulously kept away from the MILF, the larger and more influential rebel group. The mission was more to disrupt one of the smaller group sand attempt to neutralize its connection to the AQ/JI trunk line, a mission that has been fairly successful, though attempts to resolve the underlying drivers of insurgency have been far less effective.



A "threat in being" to whom? Certainly not to the Chinese.

I don't see the presence in the south as a core group on which a larger force can be built on: the location and environment would be most unattractive for basing a larger force. Port and airport facilities are grossly inadequate and there'd be all manner of security/force protection issues. if the Philippine government ever decided that it was necessary to invite more Americans in, I doubt it would be built on that base, more likely they'd be positioned in completely different locations. I don't think that's very likely to happen.



Viewing external issues and indicators alone will give you a very inadequate understanding of the local issues and of why local decisions are made.



I wouldn't say the Government is idiotic, though they sometimes do idiotic things and often stray annoyingly close to idiocy. Fickle they certainly are, by design: fickleness is unavoidably built into the US political system.



I wouldn't know about India, but I don't think the Vietnamese have "aligned with the US", nor do I think they've had to sink their pride to deal with the US. They are pragmatic; they won their war and have no reason to shy away from engagement if it suits their perceived interests, whether economic or military. If it suits them they'll deal with the US or anyone else, but they'll do it for their own reasons and at their own initiative and to the extent that they see fit. They are not in the US camp, they are in their own camp.



They also have no reason or need to "take on the US and its allies".



For another thread perhaps, but it illustrates a point: just because things happen that suits the US doesn't mean that the US made those things happen. Eastern Europe and ultimately Russia rebelled against communism; that suited the US well, but it wasn't the outcome of a US strategy or of any US action. People simply got sick of submitting to a system that didn't provide for their needs and their desires. Communism didn't fall because the US brought it down, it fell because it sucks and people hate it. Similarly, people who take actions that seem to fit in with US objectives aren't necessarily pawns of US strategy, they aren't joining the US camp, or being directed by the US... they're simply following their own perceived interests, which happen, for now at least, to be at least tangentially compatible with those of the US.

Not having seen the Moro rebellion first hand, as you might have experienced being there, I would like to believe that you are right.

However, from a purely academic standpoint, it is said that Modern Muslim rebels of the southern Philippines see the Moro Rebellion as a continuing struggle against foreign rule.

As you will be well aware of the history of this area, where for a variety of reasons, the Muslims or Moro were never comfortable with the manner in which their sovereignty of the area was usurped, there is no requirement for me to elaborate.

The indicators in the open forums suggests that while the Moro Independence Movement was basically that and nothing more in earlier times, it is believed that it has been touched by the Pan Islamic fervour that has swept the world. It has also transmogrified an Independence Movement into a religious one in addition!

It is well known that Islamist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf and Rajah Sulaiman movement, have been supported by groups outside the Philippines such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda. The fact that Islam is slowly digging in and expanding in Philippines is borne out by the fact that hard core Catholics have converted to Islam, giving rise to such movement as the Rajah Sulaiman Movement. Islamic expansion should not be taken lightly because the founder of the Rajah Sulaiman movement was converted while working in Saudi Arabia and could return to convert a whole lot of other hardcore Catholics to join the folds of Islam and fight their own (before conversion)!

While the Philippines Forces maybe ruthless in their handling of the Moro rebels, if one observes that history of this area, they are not well disposed to the Americans either. In fact, history indicates how the Spanish having lost to the Americans, through a sleight of hand, handed over the area to the US, when in actuality the Spanish had a tacit understanding wherein control of the Sulu archipelago outside of the Spanish garrisons was that of the Sultan. In fact, the Bates Treaty signed by the US assigned to the US greater power than that what the Spanish exercised. The rest is history.

In so far as the US and MNLF/MILF is concerned, suffice it to say that from January 2002 until July 31, 2002, the United States committed nearly 1,300 troops to the Philippines and $93 million in military aid to assist Philippine armed forces (AFP) in operations against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the southern Philippines, on the island of Basilan southwest of Mindanao. The U.S. action was Operation Balikatan. The CRS Report to the US Congress corroborates the same.

Is the US now merely a spectator?

No Muslim group would ever think of the US being a mediator, more so in the Philippines, they having had an unfortunate history with the US in Philippines.

In so far as the issue of the US forces in the Philippines being a ‘threat in being’, taking the aggregate of US activities in the Asia Pacific Rim, any accretion anywhere is a 'threat in being' to the Chinese since it becomes an impediment to a free run on the affairs in the region.

That apart, for the Chinese to have access to the Indian Ocean if the Malacca Straits is made inaccessible to the Chinese, the other route is through the Lombok Straits of Indonesia. Philippines and Indonesia stand as sentinel over this route.

Zamboanga and Siasi have port facilities. Jolo and Zamboanga have airfields. The C-17 is designed to operate from runways as short as 3,500 ft (1,064 m) and as narrow as 90 ft (27 m). In addition, the C-17 can operate from unpaved, unimproved runways.

So, the build up is no issue.

Local issues are important, but to believe that external threats are not taken into account, would be incorrect an assessment.

All Govts appear to be fickle when they do not subscribe to one’s pet hobbyhorses.

To believe that Vietnam is the Vietnam of the Viet Cong days would be dangerously incorrect. Communism has lost its sheen. Globalisation and economic advancement has taken its place. That is the reality and that is why Vietnam is entering into commercial propositions with foreign countries, to include oil exploration, much to the chagrin of their fraternal brothers of China and even clashing militarily with them. One should not forget the role AmCham Vietnam is playing to foster US Vietnam commercial ties. The world order has changed. It is no longer ideology driven and instead is economy driven. No country is willing to be left behind in the race. What is important to note is that the World economy is US business methods based.

As you have yourself stated the Asia Pacific region is no longer alliance based. It is need based and right now, whether you accept it or not, the need is to ensure economic progress without the threat of being disturbed by hegemonic tendencies of giant neighbours. It is here where the US plays an important role. US may not appear, for the moment, anything beyond an undesirable and yet unavoidable necessity to many a country in the region, but then the US grows on you, more so, now that the US plays its role as a partner and not as the monitor of the class.

US foreign policy, after Bush, has undergone a sea change and it is to the liking of those who were averse to the US. I have seen the change in attitude towards the US in India, a country that was not comfortable to say the least, of the US!

The US is no longer the hated bogeyman of the past.

Indeed China should have no reason or need to "take on the US and its allies". And yet, there are shrill protestations from China, even when, as you say, US undergoes routine military exercises that are no threat to China. One wonders how one should reconcile the issues that while China has no reasons to take on US and its allies and yet howls with indignation when US and its allies undertake routine activities that are not aimed at China (as per you, that is!)

Dayuhan
04-01-2012, 06:57 AM
Not having seen the Moro rebellion first hand, as you might have experienced being there, I would like to believe that you are right.

I've spent some time in the affected areas. I've been interested in the conflict since living in Mindanao (79-83, more or less) and have been following it closely and digging into the history ever since, aside from going back occasionally. I've written about it now and then. It's difficult to get a handle on that conflict through Google: there's a great deal of nonsense that's been published, and without a good understanding of the context it's hard to sort out what actually fits in the picture and what's being pushed in to support somebody's agenda.


However, from a purely academic standpoint, it is said that Modern Muslim rebels of the southern Philippines see the Moro Rebellion as a continuing struggle against foreign rule.

Yes, but the "foreign rule" in question is that of Manila.


The indicators in the open forums suggests that while the Moro Independence Movement was basically that and nothing more in earlier times, it is believed that it has been touched by the Pan Islamic fervour that has swept the world. It has also transmogrified an Independence Movement into a religious one in addition!

Touched, yes, but only peripherally. it remains primarily a nationalist movement thoroughly rooted in local issues. "pan-Islamic" issues have limited traction with the leadership and virtually none with the masses; connection to the movement is seen primarily as a way of gaining support for the local cause. The connection to "pan-Islamic" movements is IMO consistently overstated by many sources, and not by accident.


It is well known that Islamist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf and Rajah Sulaiman movement, have been supported by groups outside the Philippines such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda.

Again, the extent of this support is widely overstated.

ASG is best understood as a failed attempt to develop an AQ "franchise". AQ, through Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, was directly involved in the group's founding. Almost from the start, though, there was conflict within the group between jihadi and purely criminal elements. Funding from Khalifa largely ceased after the killing of key link man Abdul Asmad in 2004, and when Abdurajak Janjalani was killed i '98 the AQ connection was severed. Janjalani's brother took over nominal control of the organization but was completely eclipsed by men like Aldam Tilao and Galib Andang. From this point on the ASG was effectively a purely criminal enterprise, receiving protection from and sharing proceeds with local government, police, and military. The group achieved its greatest notoriety during this period, and was inevitably described as "AQ-linked", despite the minimal to nonexistent connections at that time.

Ironically, the intense pressure that came on the criminal factions as the US got involved was partially responsible for an attempt to bring the group back to its jihadi roots. Military pressure effectively ended the KFR revenue stream, Tialo was killed and Andang captured and their followers largely scattered. Janjalani left the area and took refuge in MILF territory, where he made contact with RSM (more on them below) and initiated a campaign of terror attacks in the Manila area. That phase was effectively ended with the killing of Janjalani and the capture of Ahmed Santos.


The fact that Islam is slowly digging in and expanding in Philippines is borne out by the fact that hard core Catholics have converted to Islam, giving rise to such movement as the Rajah Sulaiman Movement. Islamic expansion should not be taken lightly because the founder of the Rajah Sulaiman movement was converted while working in Saudi Arabia and could return to convert a whole lot of other hardcore Catholics to join the folds of Islam and fight their own (before conversion)!

That's exaggerated. There have been conversions among Filipinos working in the Middle East, and some have recruited other converts after coming home. The number is small and there's no evidence of significant growth. Most of the conversions are opportunistic, aimed at getting or continuing employment in the Middle East. A very small number of these did emerge as radicals, and the RSM core was drawn from this group. The group was very much centered around the person of Ahmed Santos and never recovered from his capture; it's been dormant for years. There are small groups of converts in a number of locations in Luzon, but little evidence that jihadi organizers are exploiting them; it's widely (and I think accurately) believed that Philippine security forces have informers in place throughout the network.


While the Philippines Forces maybe ruthless in their handling of the Moro rebels, if one observes that history of this area, they are not well disposed to the Americans either. In fact, history indicates how the Spanish having lost to the Americans, through a sleight of hand, handed over the area to the US, when in actuality the Spanish had a tacit understanding wherein control of the Sulu archipelago outside of the Spanish garrisons was that of the Sultan. In fact, the Bates Treaty signed by the US assigned to the US greater power than that what the Spanish exercised. The rest is history.

That's a small part of the history. It is of course true that much of the territory Spain sold to the US was not under Spanish control when it was sold. (Mark Twain, among others, made the point that the sale and purchase of people was a poor basis for claimed sovereignty, but that's another issue.) It's also true that there was considerable conflict in the early years of the US occupation. By the 1930s the US had, however, achieved a quite amenable working relationship with Muslim leaders, many of whom actually asked the US not to include them in the grant of independence, which they referred to as "turning them over to the Filipinos". Even at that time rule by Manila was widely (though of courser not universally) seen as a greater danger than rule by the US.


In so far as the US and MNLF/MILF is concerned, suffice it to say that from January 2002 until July 31, 2002, the United States committed nearly 1,300 troops to the Philippines and $93 million in military aid to assist Philippine armed forces (AFP) in operations against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the southern Philippines, on the island of Basilan southwest of Mindanao. The U.S. action was Operation Balikatan. The CRS Report to the US Congress corroborates the same.

Is the US now merely a spectator?

As you say, US assistance has been focused on efforts against the ASG, not the MILF or the (now largely dormant) MNLF. The MILF has not made a major issue of this and would just as soon see the ASG dismantled, which would open the way for them to achieve a dominant position in the west... if they can overcome the legacy of internal conflict between the Maguindanao/Maranao and Tausug/Sama factions, again another story.

In actual practice, US forces have been generally well received even in the ASG areas, largely because of the perception (IMO accurate) that Philippine forces behave better when he Americans are around. That may seem contrary to some interpretations of regional history, but the observed reaction remains.


No Muslim group would ever think of the US being a mediator, more so in the Philippines, they having had an unfortunate history with the US in Philippines.

Consider this:

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20091019-230828/MILF-leaders-want-US-role-in-peace-talks

The US government, through USIP, played a significant role in drafting the Arroyo government's "peace agreement" with the MILF, which would have granted the MILF official recognition and a degree of control that many Filipinos saw as effectively establishing a Moro substate. The agreement was torpedoed by the Philippione Supreme Court and the US role in it widely criticized. The entire episode could be considered a failed attempt at mediation, failed not because the Muslim group rejected it, but because the government rejected it.

Dayuhan
04-01-2012, 07:02 AM
In so far as the issue of the US forces in the Philippines being a ‘threat in being’, taking the aggregate of US activities in the Asia Pacific Rim, any accretion anywhere is a 'threat in being' to the Chinese since it becomes an impediment to a free run on the affairs in the region.

The US has had a presence in the southern Philippines for over a decade, and this does not seem to have deterred the Chinese from asserting maritime claims. I see no evidence to suggest that the US presence has kept the Chinese from doing anything they want to do.


Zamboanga and Siasi have port facilities. Jolo and Zamboanga have airfields. The C-17 is designed to operate from runways as short as 3,500 ft (1,064 m) and as narrow as 90 ft (27 m). In addition, the C-17 can operate from unpaved, unimproved runways.

These are extremely basic facilities even by developing world standards. They are adequate for the US to maintain a very limited level of operations in the Philippines, completely inadequate as a base for regional force projection.


To believe that Vietnam is the Vietnam of the Viet Cong days would be dangerously incorrect. Communism has lost its sheen. Globalisation and economic advancement has taken its place. That is the reality and that is why Vietnam is entering into commercial propositions with foreign countries, to include oil exploration, much to the chagrin of their fraternal brothers of China and even clashing militarily with them.

China and Vietnam have never been anything remotely like fraternal brothers, even at the peak of Communist rule.


One should not forget the role AmCham Vietnam is playing to foster US Vietnam commercial ties. The world order has changed. It is no longer ideology driven and instead is economy driven. No country is willing to be left behind in the race. What is important to note is that the World economy is US business methods based.

I'm not sure capitalist business methods are "US" by definition, but even if they are, the mere use of the methods doesn't mean the US is in control of those using them. Many people outside the US are using capitalist methods as effectively as the US, if not more effectively.


As you have yourself stated the Asia Pacific region is no longer alliance based. It is need based and right now, whether you accept it or not, the need is to ensure economic progress without the threat of being disturbed by hegemonic tendencies of giant neighbours. It is here where the US plays an important role. US may not appear, for the moment, anything beyond an undesirable and yet unavoidable necessity to many a country in the region, but then the US grows on you, more so, now that the US plays its role as a partner and not as the monitor of the class.

I'd say interest based, rather than needs based. Certainly the nations in the region see a role for the US, but they certainly aren't interested in having the US "call the shots", nor do they want to join a US-dominated camp. They'll manage relations according to their own perception of their interests, which will change with time.


US foreign policy, after Bush, has undergone a sea change and it is to the liking of those who were averse to the US. I have seen the change in attitude towards the US in India, a country that was not comfortable to say the least, of the US!

That's largely true, but I don't think it's only because US policies have changed. Asian nations are also increasingly confident in their own capabilities, especially on the economic side, and more confident of their own ability to enter into peer-to-peer relations with larger countries.


Indeed China should have no reason or need to "take on the US and its allies". And yet, there are shrill protestations from China, even when, as you say, US undergoes routine military exercises that are no threat to China. One wonders how one should reconcile the issues that while China has no reasons to take on US and its allies and yet howls with indignation when US and its allies undertake routine activities that are not aimed at China (as per you, that is!)

The ritual of exercise and protest, provocation and resolution, has been going on a long time... just because media are paying more attention now doesn't mean it's a recent development. It's not about anyone "taking on" anyone else, just a bit of chest thumping; everybody involved reminding everybody else that they are around and they've made claims. Nobody wants to relinquish the claims, but nobody's in a big hurry to fight over them either. It's not an entirely calm situation, but it's not nearly as threatening or as unstable as some are cracking it up to be

Ray
06-03-2012, 07:05 PM
Very interesting.

The situation thicken.

Wonder why after such a strident support for the benign activities of China, old Panetta is asking Vietnam to allow the US ports in Vietnam.

Dayuhan
06-04-2012, 01:10 AM
Wonder why after such a strident support for the benign activities of China, old Panetta is asking Vietnam to allow the US ports in Vietnam.

When has Panetta given "strident support" for any activities of China?

To be accurate, Panetta has not asked Vietnam "to allow the US ports in Vietnam", he's asked Vietnam to allow occasional US access to ports in Vietnam. These are two very different things.

Dayuhan
07-25-2012, 10:06 AM
Good study from ICG on the often overlooked impact of local politics on peacemaking in the OEF-P area of coverage:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/225-the-philippines-local-politics-in-the-sulu-archipelago-and-the-peace-process

I agree that a peace agreement won't be reached unless the local overlords are brought into the picture. At the same time, it has to be recognized that these overlords are in themselves the central obstacle to any kind of justice or economic development. A peace agreement doesn't necessarily bring peace. The conundrum here is the local elites will derail any peace agreement that doesn't protect their interests, but at the same time their interests are antithetical to the kind of long term progress that could produce lasting peace.

Dayuhan
08-03-2012, 02:22 AM
I relocated this from the "Communist Insurgency" thread, thinking the discussion had strayed into matters better suited here...


Bill and Dayuhan,

Your comments remind of the the meeting we had with MILF spokesman Moqtadar Iqbal a few years ago. As we discussed the conflict in Mindanao he made two points that were very interesting. First he said you Americans can solve the problem in Mindanao by forcing the Philippine government to give in to the MILF political and ancestral domain demands. (I think he misreads US power and influence and he was in effect telling us we should step all over Philippine sovereignty for his benefit!)

But more germane to both your points and one with which I do agree is that he said the Philippine and US governments and military forces can do all the development they want, the MILF is happy to receive development aid but he said, if the political problems are not solved the insurgency will continue. Development is useful as Bill says but it is certainly not the key to conflict resolution or the end of or even prevention of insurgency unless there are acceptable political accommodations that can made (acceptable to both sides). Otherwise regardless of the ability to physically suppress the insurgency the seeds of conflict will remain to be germinated later.

That's almost funny, and I can well imagine him saying that. Of course it isn't true... even if the US could force the Philippine Government to give in to the MILF political and ancestral domain demands, it wouldn't solve the problem.

There's a tendency in some quarters to see the Central Mindanao conflict as a fight between the MILF and the government, and to conclude that it could be resolved by an agreement between those two parties. That completely overlooks the role of the well armed and well connected Visayan settler communities, who actually outnumber the Muslims in much of the area in question. Failure to consider the interests and capacities of this group effectively doomed the MOA/AD process from the start.

Central Mindanao is less about the need for peace between the government and the MILF than the need for peace between the MILF and the settlers. In theory the government could referee this process, but the perceived interests of those two groups are very far apart and neither trusts the government, which lost credibility with the Muslims by taking the settler side in the 70s conflict and lost credibility with the settlers by trying to railroad the MOA/AD process. I really don't see much hope for progress in the near future. Any deal with the government that satisfies the MILF will be anathema to the settlers, who have the capacity to politically and judicially derail a deal, and to resort to armed conflict as well.

Dayuhan
10-07-2012, 06:17 AM
Announced today, with much fanfasre but no hint of what's been agreed, a new agreement between the MILF and the Philippine Government:

http://www.rappler.com/nation/13750-ph-govt,-milf-reach-agreement-bangsamoro-soon-on-map


Govt, MILF reach deal

A new autonomous political entity (NAPE) called "Bangsamoro" will soon be part of the Philippine political map, as the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) conclude negotiations on a Framework Agreement in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on Sunday, October 7.

MindaNews first broke news that the two sides were able to finish working on the Framework Agreement that would pave the way for the NAPE.

Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Teresita Deles confirmed that the two sides have reached an agreement.

Aquino's comments, largely in Tagalog, here:

http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/13752-agreement-paves-way-for-enduring-peace-in-mindanao

It will be interesting to see what the agreement contains, and, more important, how the settler population of Mindanao, which has long seen any kind of agreement with the MILF as a sellout of its interests, will react.

It's not likely that the agreement will have a major impact on the OEF/P area of operations, looks likely that it's focused on the core MILF areas in Central Mindanao. Hard to say until the text is published.

Dayuhan
10-07-2012, 09:28 AM
Draft agreement is here:

http://pcdspo.gov.ph/downloads/2012/10/GPH-MILF-Framework-Agreement-10062012.pdf

Will try to have a closer read and post some comments tomorrow, but initial reactions...

It's not all all clear how this is meant to differ from the ARMM, beyond some territorial revisions.

The reaction of the Mindanao settler population will be critical, and remains to be determined. This population is politically potent, has widespread support among the non-Mindanao populace, has derailed a previous agreement, and generally sees accommodation with the MILF as antithetical to its interests.

It's not clear that the Tausug, Yakan, and Sama populations of Basilan, Jolo and associated islands (where the ASG has been rooted and the core operational area of OEF/P) will accept an agreement negotiated by the predominantly Maguindanao/Maranao leadership of the MILF.

They're talking about a signing on the 15th, it will be interesting to see what reactions emerge.

Bob's World
10-08-2012, 10:08 AM
http://www.rappler.com/nation/13750-ph-govt,-milf-reach-agreement-bangsamoro-soon-on-map

President Aquino is saying all the right things in this press release. Based on the strategic perspective of insurgency that I regularly promote on this venue, this current effort by the government of the Philippines is spot on. I agree with how they are defining the problem as well as how they are describing the intended effects of this new legislation.

Revolutionary and Resistance insurgencies are much more illegal politics than war, and are endeavors taken on by populaces who have come to believe that their current system is intolerable and that they have no legal recourse to address the same. Recognizing the reasonable perceptions of such populaces and dedicating the entire system of governance to evolve to address those most critical perceptions is key.


"The ARMM is a failed experiment. Many of the people continue to feel alienated by the system, and those who feel that there is no way out will continue to articulate their grievances through the barrel of a gun. We cannot change this without structural reform," he said.

"This framework agreement is about rising above our prejudices. It is about casting aside the distrust and myopia that has plagued the efforts of the past; it is about learning hard lessons and building on the gains we have achieved," the President said.

These critical perceptions form a figurative "circle of trust" that individuals and populace groups either feel that they are within or without; that they are empowered to effect legally or only illegally. Managing the circle of trust is a critical function of governance everywhere, be it formal or informal in nature. Trust is hard to build and easy to destroy, so this is not easy task and will take time, but the journey must begin with the first step.

It is worth remembering that we continue our own journey on this path in the US as we continue to work to overcome the prejudices that affect good governance within our own borders. The saving grace for the US is that the people by and large still believe they have some modicum of ability to legally address, or at least express, their concerns with both governance and government. We should be more diligent in protecting and improving the important aspects of what makes our own society reasonably stable, but I really don't think most appreciate the nuance of what is truly important. That tends to get lost in the noise of what is crurrently urgent.

The devil is in the details, and it is easier to say one is going to rise above their prejudices than it is to actually do so. In my opinion this effort provides a strategic framework for getting to a more stable situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well. I wish the people of the Philippines well on this latest course change to address this ancient problem. They may be 100 years from achieving what we in the US see as reasonable stability, but our perceptions matter little, and I for one believe they are on the right track.

Dayuhan
10-09-2012, 01:20 AM
I am less sanguine, as one might expect. If it was possible to pigeonhole the conflict as "oppressed Muslim populace vs centralized imperial government", then an autonomous government might help, but the conflict is a lot more complicated than that.

After reading it a few times, I will say this much: despite the lack of specifics, much of which will have to be resolved in the "basic law" for the region that is still to be formulated, this is probably about as much as the Philippine Government could have brought out of peace talks with the MILF. That said, it will not solve the problem. It may create a window of opportunity during which the real problems could be addressed, but whether or not that will happen remains to be seen. Precedents are not encouraging.

Effectively what the agreement does is carve out a largely (not entirely) Muslim-majority area and designate it "Bangsamoro", literally "Moro Nation" but applicable to either a territory or a populace. The territory is slightly larger than the old ARMM (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao) and the degree of autonomy is somewhat greater. Both the territory and the degree of autonomy are substantially less than what would have been provided in the monumentally flawed MOA/AD (Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain) that was shot down by the Supreme Court several years ago.

What the agreement does not address is the scourge of big man politics, the single greatest obstacle to peace and prosperity in Mindanao. In some ways the autonomous status of the region may even exacerbate that scourge, as any effort by central government to bring local big men within the rule of law will be presented by those threatened as constraints on local governance.

The immediate conflict set up by the agreement is between the former rebels who aspire to positions in the new autonomous government and the Muslim big men who have been cooperating with government and occupying political positions in the old ARMM and the other areas included in the autonomous region. The rebel leaders have some credibility for having fought and for having forced an agreement, but the existing political elite have a lot of money (gained through exorbitant corruption) and well established patronage networks. Even in their base areas in Central Mindanao it's not in any way clear that MILF leaders can displace the seasoned political operators of the dominant clans, even with the Ampatuans out of play to a large extent.

The most likely outcome, in my cynical view, is a mad scramble for advantageous places at the feeding trough offered by the new governmental entity. That will be accompanied by a decrease in organized "rebel vs government" violence, but an uptick in "candidate vs candidate" violence. Once the places are grabbed, those who get in will move to build patronage and cement their positions, those on the outside will accuse them of corruption and other assorted evils. The losers will end up on the periphery, disgruntled, angry, and prime candidates for recruitment by more radical groups.

Previous efforts at autonomy have foundered not because they were not autonomous enough, but because they were ruled through an antiquated and destructive "big man" system that effectively created feudal lords with absolute power in their turf. The central government typically cut deals with the feudal powers, effectively trading off immunity from law for guaranteed votes and assurances that the feudal lords would suppress rebellion in their territory (latter promise often not pursued with any great vigor). Those deals had a pretty pernicious effect and are not conducive to long term peace or development.

The problem is how to grant the politically necessary autonomy while still trying to control the rapacious and feudal local elites that are such a burden on the region. This agreement is not going to solve that problem, but it's not certain that any agreement would. What could have a really positive impact would be a decisive effort by central government to arrest and prosecute some of the worst offenders in the fields of corruption, collusion with criminal elements, human rights violations, etc, and deliver the message that it's serious about bringing its own people within the rule of law... but that is not going to happen.

This agreement will probably have little impact in the OEF/P area of operations, for the most part outside core MILF territory. It would IMO be a good excuse for the US to reduce the commitment and announce a plan for eventually phasing it out. There needs to be an end to every operation and I think this one is past the point of diminishing marginal returns... not that cooperation shouldn't continue, but I think scaling down the deployment in the conflict area in the south makes good sense at this time.

Dayuhan
10-25-2012, 04:26 AM
I'm not sure that it's as bad as this, but some of the points are valid:

http://opinion.inquirer.net/39388/aquino-milf-pact-a-curse-on-the-nation


Aquino-MILF pact a curse on the nation

Rather than a legacy of peace, President Aquino’s pact with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front contained in the “Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro” will be his curse on the nation. The consequences of the pact, renewed violence in Mindanao and even terrorist attacks in urban centers, will outlive his term, and will be one of the biggest headaches of the next president.

We have to disabuse ourselves of the naive, sappy “give-peace-a-chance” mentality that peace accords always lead to the silencing of guns...

Bill Moore
10-25-2012, 06:00 AM
Dayuhan,

I don't know if it is as bad as the author makes out, but I do agree if the peace deal goes bad it will likely lead to another surge in fighting/killing. The younger members of the MILF are not as interested in peace as the senior leaders of MILF whose time is probably short. A lot of potential spoilers on both sides of the fence.


We have to disabuse ourselves of the naive, sappy “give-peace-a-chance” mentality that peace accords always lead to the silencing of guns. From Neville Chamberlain’s 1938 Munich Agreement with Adolf Hitler, to the 1973 Paris Peace Accords that led to the fall of Saigon, to the 1995 Dayton Agreement that ended the Bosnian War but led to the “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo, ill-conceived peace pacts in the world’s history have often led to greater hostilities. Violence after failed peace pacts intensifies as the parties claim that they were betrayed, infuriating their fighters to fierceness.

This quote, also from the article you linked to is disappointing if true:


The military brass weren’t even invited to the ceremony attended by over 100 MILF commanders. An Army general in the field lamented: “That omission struck deep in the heart of our soldiers. No credit was given for the AFP’s vital role in creating the conditions for peace talks to proceed. Mr. Aquino praised the efforts of the MILF but not the AFP, as if our soldiers were the aggressors, not the noble defenders of our land. ”

How deadly has the conflict been?

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/milf.htm


On 07 October 2012 it was announced that the Philippine government had reached a preliminary peace agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the country's largest Muslim rebel group, to end the four decade long insurgency that had killed more than 120,000 people.

relevant history:


Formal peace talks between the MILF and the government began in April 2004, when a peace deal was scheduled to be signed in September 2006. In 2008, when both parties were in the very last throes of hashing out a Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) agreement, the Philippine high court called some provisions unconstitutional and this sparked a rebellion within the MILF that left hundreds dead and hundreds of thousands displaced.

Bob's World
10-25-2012, 12:01 PM
What President Aquino is attempting is the most strategic bit of COIN I have seen by any government in the past 12 years. Will it work? Well, there are a 1000 ways it could go bad, but it starts with a strategic level of understanding of the nature of insurgency in general and the nature of this particular problem they are attempting to address. It takes ownership on the part of government to evolve to better address the reasonable concerns of a segment of the populace that has always been treated separately, but not equally.

This is a model we should adopt for Afghanistan. It is the model that the government of Yemen should adopt. It is the model that makes the most sense for the growing challenges Egypt has in the Sinai. Obviously each would need to be tailored to the realities of their specific situation.

As to the author of the article that Dayuhan shared the link on: While that piece surely recommends the majority position on these types of conflicts, I would only offer that the record of the majority is hardly one to brag about...

Thinking about revolutionary insurgency as war is perhaps the least appropriate and least effective way to solve these types of problems that lead to revolution. Yes one can suppress or defeat the insurgent, but invariably the insurgency grows from the process, coming back again and again until something changes in governance or the people prevail.

This is not resistance, this is revolution, and that is a very different type of conflict. The relationship between the parties and the primary purposes for action are the key criteria for framing these types of problems. Ideology applied or tactics employed are interesting at the tactical level, but have little place in a strategic discussion geared to understanding and framing the problem. We in the West are trapped in a world of tactics and one that sees governments as victims in such conflicts. We need to evolve, and this is a great guide for that evolution.

jmm99
10-25-2012, 08:28 PM
but, it sure as hell isn't the model that:


from BW
"... we should adopt for Afghanistan.

Regards

Mike

Dayuhan
10-26-2012, 12:28 AM
What President Aquino is attempting is the most strategic bit of COIN I have seen by any government in the past 12 years. Will it work? Well, there are a 1000 ways it could go bad, but it starts with a strategic level of understanding of the nature of insurgency in general and the nature of this particular problem they are attempting to address. It takes ownership on the part of government to evolve to better address the reasonable concerns of a segment of the populace that has always been treated separately, but not equally.

Possibly a bit overrated. In substance this isn't all that different from the model Marcos used to disable the MNLF: offer a nominal autonomy, get senior rebel leaders into lucrative positions in the new autonomous government, and get them inside the tent pissing out instead of outside the tent pissing in. The people, of course, still get pissed on, and those left out in the cold become prime bait for recruitment by more radical or violent groups, just as those left out in the cold in the MNLF settlement were ripe for recruitment by the Abu Sayyaf.

This kind of settlement is not a solution. It can provide a window of opportunity within which a solution to the real problems can be pursued, but unless those problems are recognized and confronted, that isn't likely to happen. There's little evidence that this is happening.


This is not resistance, this is revolution, and that is a very different type of conflict.

That would depend on perspective. Many Muslims in the souith (and many of the indigenous groups in the north) do see Manila's military and the settlers as an occupying force, and might consider themselves to be a resistance.


I don't know if it is as bad as the author makes out, but I do agree if the peace deal goes bad it will likely lead to another surge in fighting/killing. The younger members of the MILF are not as interested in peace as the senior leaders of MILF whose time is probably short. A lot of potential spoilers on both sides of the fence.

The author of the article is in the camp of the previous administration, and has a vested interest in opposing the agreement, but the points he raises are repeated by many who don't like the idea. In many cases the reflexive reaction is that the agreement is an act of appeasement toward terrorists. How the deal will fare in the legislative brance or the courts is difficult to predict, but the administration does have a fair degree of influence in both.

For me the biggest problem with the agreement is that it treats the problem purely in terms of political structure, with no acknowledgement of the degree to which political culture has obstructed all efforts at development and peacemaking. As long as the culture of corruption, abuse, and elite impunity continues, structural approaches will have limited impact. Manila's problem, as ever, is less how to bring the rebels within the rule of law than how to bring its own agents within the rule of law.

Bob's World
10-26-2012, 02:14 AM
but, it sure as hell isn't the model that:



Regards

Mike

Mike,

No arguments. After 12 years ISAF / US is only just now starting to truly get serious about recognizing Afghan sovereignty. And we wonder why we can't seem to get in front of that problem. We are also just starting to realize that what we have thought was important is not at all what the current government of Afghanistan thinks is important.

So, yes, this is a model the government of Afghanistan should adopt. I actually think it is much more likely that they will do something along these lines as we begin to pull out than it is for ISAF switching to such an approach.

cheers,

Bob

Dayuhan
10-27-2012, 12:51 AM
The relationship between the parties and the primary purposes for action are the key criteria for framing these types of problems.

Talking about "the relationship between the parties" oversimplifies and misrepresents the situation, because in fact there are multiple parties involved, often with widely divergent interests. It's not just the MILF and the Government. The Christian settler bloc and the Muslim traditional politicians that have been allied with Government haven't openly opposed the agreement, but will be trying to manipulate it to serve their interests. MNLF factions have expressed displeasure, less with the agreement than with their exclusion from the negotiating process. The ASG has little political influence but will do what it can to disrupt. There are sub-factions within each of these groups, and within the MILF and the Government. It's messy.

SWJ Blog
01-03-2013, 11:13 AM
Philippines: Bangsamoro, A Triumph of Western Diplomacy? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/philippines-bangsamoro-a-triumph-of-western-diplomacy)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/philippines-bangsamoro-a-triumph-of-western-diplomacy) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

Dayuhan
02-18-2013, 02:55 AM
Brief description of ongoing incident:

http://www.interaksyon.com/article/55196/ph-seeks-peaceful-resolution-of-sabah-standoff


The Philippines on Saturday called for a peaceful resolution to a tense stand-off between Malaysian forces and a group of gunmen claiming to be followers of the heir of a former Borneo sultan.

The group, estimated at 200 with dozens believed to be armed, landed by boat near the Borneo town of Lahad Datu in Malaysia's Sabah state from the neighboring Philippines on Tuesday.

Police say the group has declared itself followers of a former Philippine-based Islamic sultanate that once controlled parts of Borneo, including the standoff site, and is refusing to leave Malaysian territory.

Further coverage:

http://www.interaksyon.com/article/55265/philippine-sultan-says-followers-wont-leave-borneo


Followers of a Philippine sultan who crossed to the Malaysian state of Sabah this month will not leave and are reclaiming the area as their ancestral territory, the sultan said Sunday amid a tense standoff.

Sultan Jamalul Kiram said his followers -- some 400 people including 20 gunmen -- were resolute in staying despite being cornered by security forces, with the Kuala Lumpur government insisting the group return to the Philippines.

"Why should we leave our own home? In fact they (the Malaysians) are paying rent (to us)," he told reporters in Manila.

"Our followers will stay in (the Sabah town of) Lahad Datu. Nobody will be sent to the Philippines. Sabah is our home," he said....


Little background:


The southern Philippine-based Islamic sultanate once controlled parts of Borneo, including the site of the stand-off, and its heirs have been receiving a nominal yearly compensation package from Malaysia under a long-standing agreement for possession of Sabah.

The Sultan leased the area to the British in perpetuity for a nominal annual payment, which independent Malaysia has continued to pay. There's been occasional agitation for a Philippine claim to Sabah based on the assumption that when the Sultanate ceased to exist as a sovereign entity the claim was absorbed by the Philippine Government, but this incursion does not appear to be sanctioned by Manila.

The connection to the recent peace agreement:


Kiram said he was prompted to send the group to Sabah after the sultanate was left out of a framework agreement sealed in October between Manila and Filipino Muslim rebels, which paves the way for an autonomous area in the southern Philippines that is home to the Muslim minority of the largely-Christian nation.

There's some talk that other groups intend to follow, but the Malaysian Navy says they won't let them approach the shore. Malaysia says the group will be deported, the group says they won't go. Unclear how it will all work out. Also unclear whether the Sultan's family seriously thinks they can settle people in Sabah or whether they're looking for some money to get them to stop making trouble. An increase in the nominal rent has been occasionally mentioned by the Sultan's family, and ignored by the Malaysians.

Another recent development that may be an unexpected consequence of the peace agreement is that the MNLF has recently gone after some ASG units, quite aggressively:

http://www.sunstar.com.ph/zamboanga/local-news/2013/02/08/mnlf-continue-assault-vs-abu-sayyaf-267276

The attacks were not sanctioned or expected by the Government and the reasoning behind them is not entirely clear. Part of the reason may be an MNLF effort to push their way back into a place at the negotiating table.

New news, the group in Sabah wants to leave, but first wants to meet with "certain personalities", whcih the Malaysians refuse:

http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Malaysia/Story/A1Story20130218-402657.html

And a bit more, bit of a hint of how Malaysians see the whole idea:

http://thestar.com.my/columnists/story.asp?col=onemansmeat&file=/2013/2/18/columnists/onemansmeat/12724974&sec=One%20Man%27s%20Meat

We shall see...

Dayuhan
02-18-2013, 11:42 AM
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/02/18/world/asia/malaysia-philippines-standoff/


Filipinos' standoff in Borneo linked to peace deal with Muslim rebels

...The members of the sultanate's royal family, although riven by internal disputes over who the rightful sultan is today, appear to have felt isolated by the provisional accord signed in October by the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which has fought for decades to establish an independent Islamic state in southern Philippines.

Malaysia, a mainly Muslim country, helped facilitate the agreement.

Kiram was cited by AFP as saying that the sultanate's exclusion from the deal, which aims to set up a new autonomous region to be administered by Muslims, prompted the decision to send the men to Sabah this month.

Dispatching the boat loads of followers to Lahad Datu served to make the sultanate's presence felt, according to Wadi.

"The whole aim is not to create conflict or initiate war, it is just to position themselves and make governments like Malaysia and the Philippines recognize them," he said....

Dayuhan
02-22-2013, 03:52 AM
This:

http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/02/20/910908/p-noy-smells-sabotage-peace-talks

Raises an interesting question... who's paying for the so-called "sultan's army".

Dayuhan
08-30-2013, 12:58 AM
Got two MG520s (Philippine Air Force variant of the AH-6) shooting up the ridge just north of here, can see them from the upstairs window. There was an encounter yesterday morning one ridge over, 2 reported wounded from a police counterinsurgency unit. It would be surprising if the NPA unit was still in the area, but I guess possible that they could have been lying low in the mossy forest (easy place to hide, hard to move).

Just on the edge of too close for comfort...

jcustis
08-30-2013, 02:27 AM
Yeah, that is close!

Dayuhan
08-30-2013, 10:18 AM
This is how it hit the news:

http://www.interaksyon.com/article/69712/air-force-mounts-rocket-strikes-vs-npa-in-sagada

That's kind of over-dramatized, it wasn't really that close to villages. I was out there yesterday morning and it seemed like half the village was out watching. School was effectively out, the kids were all out checking out the helicopters. Didn't see anyone cowering in terror, though it does make people uneasy. They weren't shooting at "suspected lairs" of the NPA; it's a place they pass through, not a place they stay.

It's near and at the same time not so; that are is just north of us and the fighting generally moves away north into the wild country, not south into the town. That area is a junction of main trails running through the mountains and linking a number of areas; it's always a focus of attention after any kind of encounter, as the routes the NPA take to get out splinter off from there. I have some doubts about whether this morning's strikes were actually hitting anyone. They were shooting at a fairly open ridgetop with loose pine cover. The main trail runs right through it but it's hard to imagine an NPA unit moving through such exposed country in broad daylight the day after an encounter with helicopters known to be in the area. Normally they'd scoot at night or through heavy cover. Guess anything's possible though.

This one, late June, was more of a worry. Farther away, but south, which means the access/egress route was really close:

http://manilastandardtoday.com/2013/06/29/npa-rebels-ambush-cop-trainees-1-killed-9-hurt/

It's not really getting worse, or better, just seems to ebb and flow. NPA is strongest in Abra, north of here, but they come over the mountain and stage an ambush now and then, I think largely to show they are a presence, and in hope that the military will get out into the villages and piss people off. The populace is pretty sympathetic and generally thinks better of the rebels than of the military (consequence of past abuses), but also prefers not to have the NPA around, as when they show up the military shows up too, and nobody wants the soldiers around.

AdamG
08-31-2013, 04:43 AM
You allowed privately owned small arms?

Dayuhan
08-31-2013, 07:47 AM
Small arms can be legally owned here, with a fair number of restrictions. Illegal arms are commonplace. The NPA is of course illegal by definition. The citizenry is fairly well armed, though discreetly so. A bit northeast of here it's pretty common to see illegal arms openly displayed; here they are generally kept stashed. Police and military are aware of this but generally don't want to mess with it; they stirred up the hornet's nest once before and it didn't go well. The populace mostly stays neutral in the NPA/military fighting; they are (largely, not entirely) sympathetic to the NPA but not to the extent of going out to fight for them in the absence of any direct threat to their clan, village, or tribe.

As elsewhere in the Philippines, the main source of illegal arms and ammunition is leakage from police and military stocks.

Bill Moore
08-31-2013, 08:26 AM
Dayuhan,

Hope the troubles have ceased, it is bad enough when you're there my yourself, but the concerns obviously increase exponentially when your family is with you. Having fire arms to defend yourself from criminals makes sense, but not sure it would be wise to openly display a weapon in front of NPA militants. It could simply and unnecessarily escalate the situation, since the NPA normally don't target civilians. Trust you know their modus operandi in your area and can make judgment call based on that knowledge.

Interesting article on illicit gun trafficking in the Philippines.

http://opinion.inquirer.net/44717/illicit-gun-trade-thriving-in-philippines


Philippine Customs data monitored by UN Comtrade and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers show that the Philippines imported 265,149 guns valued at $90.9 million from 2000 to 2010. These are dwarfed by the sales documents of exporting countries that show the Philippines actually importing 434,999 guns valued at $182.9 million from 1996 to 2010.

The discrepancy, 169,850 firearms costing $92 million, leaks into the grey market. The corresponding loss of revenue is quite significant.

Dayuhan
09-01-2013, 12:19 AM
I don't see the NPA as a personal security threat at all; if I did I wouldn't be here. Of course you're right; having a weapon in the house isn't going to do a whole lot of good if a dozen guys with assault rifles come calling. Only real threat is the possibility of crossfire or just loose rounds flying around, but there hasn't been fighting that close to town here since the early 90s. Main personal impact is that when these things happen there are places I can't go for a while, some trails become dodgy and the wilderness area north becomes a good place to stay out of.

For the town, it's a concern because they make a fair bit of money from tourism and having a bunch of soldiers around is not good for the tourist trade. It's also awkward for locals when they are out doing things they do in the mountains and run into military patrols; the questioning is often quite aggressive and threatening, and people don't like it.

The whole dynamic of insurgency in the Philippines is very different from place to place, even in places that are quite close together. In some ways you have to look at it as a bunch of micro-insurgencies, each with its own characteristics (I suspect that the same applies to many other cases of what is generally perceived as "national" insurgency). In this immediate neighborhood it's heavily influenced by the reality that the tribes really do have full control over their land and resources, and don't need to ally with the NPA to fight off unwanted central government intrusion (as they did in the 70s/80s). In Abra province, a day's walk north of us, it's quite different.

In the 12 years I've been here I haven't felt personally threatened by any of it, hasn't been more than mildly unsettling. If things went back to the way they were from late 80s to early 90s, we'd move.

Dayuhan
09-10-2013, 10:36 AM
Almost a year back I wrote this...


MNLF factions have expressed displeasure, less with the agreement than with their exclusion from the negotiating process.

Last month Nur Misuari, the leader of one such faction "declared independence", and claimed a new republic consisting of Mindanao, Palawan, the Sulu archipelago, and Sabah and Sarawak.

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/08/14/13/misuari-declares-independence

Misuari doesn't have the influence he had back in the 90s, and has been one of those most notably peeved at being left out of the peace agreement with the MILF. The declaration was not taken terrible seriously.

This week, an MNLF force believed to be loyal to Misuari attacked Zamboanga. The situation remains ongoing, several districts of the city are effectively occupied, hostages have been taken. Today there were reports of fighting very close to City Hall. The initial goal was allegedlyu to hoist the MNLF flag at City Hall.

It's a considerable escalation, as Zamboanga has long been fairly peaceful. Hard to know where it will go. The number of sub-leaders loyal to Misuari and the number of troops they control is not accurately known; estimates vary widely. I've read figures from under 1000 to 4000, don't think anyone really knows. These figure can change rapidly as local leader shift alliances.

It's widely suspected in Manila that the whole thing is an effort to distract from a huge ongoing corruption scandal involving major political figures; there may or may not be something to that. It does illustrate the difficulty of negotiating peace, and the number of potential spoiler groups involved.

Reportage on the Zamboanga situation:

http://www.philstar.com/nation/2013/09/09/1190051/zamboanga-city-shut-down-mnlf-men-attack-its-villages

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/484401/mnlf-storms-zamboanga-city-leaves-6-dead

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/09/09/13/mnlf-wants-flag-hoisted-zamboanga-city-hall

Dayuhan
09-14-2013, 10:02 AM
Fighting still ongoing in Zamboanga...

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/14/us-philippines-rebels-idUSBRE98D02V20130914


Fighting intensified on Saturday in the southern Philippines between government troops and rogue Muslim separatists, shattering a ceasefire almost immediately as it was to go into effect and leaving many residents running low on supplies.

The army said 53 people had been killed in the fighting, now in its sixth day in the port city of Zamboanga, known as the city of flowers.

Dozens have been wounded and more than 60,000 people displaced, with hundreds of homes razed and a hospital still in flames. Rebels have fired on government positions and seized civilians to use as human shields.

Bill Moore
09-14-2013, 05:56 PM
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/09/15/1212021/indonesia-wants-peaceful-resolution-zamboanga-conflict

Indonesia wants peaceful resolution of Zamboanga conflict


Natalegawa said Indonesia is always ready, at the request of stakeholders, to contribute to the restoration of normalcy in southern Philippines.

The European Union also expressed concern over the conflict in Zamboanga as it called on the Misuari-led faction of the MNLF to release the civilian hostages without preconditions.

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/487263/govt-misuari-agree-on-ceasefire-starting-saturday-midnight-says-binay


MANILA, Philippines—After five days of heavy fighting, Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Chair Nur Misuari and Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin have agreed to observe a ceasefire and discuss a “peaceful settlement” of the crisis in Zamboanga City, Vice President Jejomar Binay said Friday night.

http://mnlfnet.com/Articles/Editorial_12Sept2013_Aquino%20Govt%20Have%20No%20R espect.htm

From the MNLF website


CAUSES OF THE SUDDEN ERUPTION OF FILIPINO-MORO WAR IN ZAMBOANGA CITY

The Filipino-Moro war raging now in Zamboanga City between the colonial Philippine occupation soldiers and the Bangsamoro freedom fighters of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) could not have occurred if the present Aquino government respected only the September 2, 1996 MNLF-OIC-GRP Jakarta Peace Agreements.

break


Thus, once the MNLF leadership was informed by the OIC of the tactical move of the Aquino regime to terminate the peace process with the Moro National Liberation Front, the MNLF Chairman in consultation with the various MNLF leaders decided to prepare a revolutionary government constitution towards the establishment of the United Federated States of Bangsamoro Republik (UFSBR) during last week of July, 2013. -

Dayuhan
09-14-2013, 10:50 PM
Indonesia hasn't been much involved so far; the Malaysians have been trying to act as a broker, but of course there's a fair bit of mistrust on the Philippine side, given the Sabah claim (fairly dodgy, but many Filipinos remain emotionally attached to it) and the history of Malaysian support for the MNLF in the 70s. It might be possible for Indonesia to play a role, but it's hard to see what they could do about this incident.


MANILA, Philippines—After five days of heavy fighting, Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Chair Nur Misuari and Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin have agreed to observe a ceasefire and discuss a “peaceful settlement” of the crisis in Zamboanga City, Vice President Jejomar Binay said Friday night.

Gazmin denied this soon after, and the fighting went on unabated. The Vice President belongs to the opposition party, and may have been trying to grab a bit of TV time.


CAUSES OF THE SUDDEN ERUPTION OF FILIPINO-MORO WAR IN ZAMBOANGA CITY

The Filipino-Moro war raging now in Zamboanga City between the colonial Philippine occupation soldiers and the Bangsamoro freedom fighters of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) could not have occurred if the present Aquino government respected only the September 2, 1996 MNLF-OIC-GRP Jakarta Peace Agreements.

The MNLF really has only themselves to blame: after the '96 agreement they descended into factionalism and the leaders who were able to gain official positions were too busy at the feeding trough to look after the mass base, much of which splintered away to the MILF, ASG etc. Now of course the MNLF sees themselves being boxed out of the process and they want to push their way back in. While they have degraded to a large extent they still have sufficient force to make a mess, and if they get money they can raise more... sub-leaders and their troops in the region change allegiance very easily and will follow the money.

Where the money comes from is another question. There are strong suspicions that the fighting is related to events in Manila, where a huge corruption scandal has been unfolding. A number of those in the center of the scandal are core opposition members, including some figures who have been at or near the center of events for a long time. Some of these individuals are known to have been involved in coup plots in the past, some are well connected in both the military and the rebel movements.

There's suspicion that the Kiram incursion in Sabah was actually staged to embarrass Aquino (it succeeded) and diminish his hold on government (less successful), and there are suspicions that this incident in Zamboanga is a shot across the bow: lay off the untouchables or more of the same will follow.

Interesting times...

Bill Moore
09-14-2013, 11:24 PM
Indonesia hasn't been much involved so far; the Malaysians have been trying to act as a broker, but of course there's a fair bit of mistrust on the Philippine side, given the Sabah claim (fairly dodgy, but many Filipinos remain emotionally attached to it) and the history of Malaysian support for the MNLF in the 70s. It might be possible for Indonesia to play a role, but it's hard to see what they could do about this incident.

Gazmin denied this soon after, and the fighting went on unabated. The Vice President belongs to the opposition party, and may have been trying to grab a bit of TV time.

The MNLF really has only themselves to blame: after the '96 agreement they descended into factionalism and the leaders who were able to gain official positions were too busy at the feeding trough to look after the mass base, much of which splintered away to the MILF, ASG etc. Now of course the MNLF sees themselves being boxed out of the process and they want to push their way back in. While they have degraded to a large extent they still have sufficient force to make a mess, and if they get money they can raise more... sub-leaders and their troops in the region change allegiance very easily and will follow the money.

Where the money comes from is another question. There are strong suspicions that the fighting is related to events in Manila, where a huge corruption scandal has been unfolding. A number of those in the center of the scandal are core opposition members, including some figures who have been at or near the center of events for a long time. Some of these individuals are known to have been involved in coup plots in the past, some are well connected in both the military and the rebel movements.

There's suspicion that the Kiram incursion in Sabah was actually staged to embarrass Aquino (it succeeded) and diminish his hold on government (less successful), and there are suspicions that this incident in Zamboanga is a shot across the bow: lay off the untouchables or more of the same will follow.

Interesting times...

Sadly, all you suspicions are quite possible, and while some like to say all politics is local that is far from practice in the real world. Internal national level politics in Manila may ultimately be more important than local politics in the south. I'm not venturing any guesses on the future in this case, because this event can play out as a catalyst for second and third order effects in a variety of ways (both for the better and worse). Three steps forwards, two backwards, that is the nature of these conflicts.

Dayuhan
09-15-2013, 10:16 AM
I wouldn't say the national level is more important, just that it's a factor. Manila factions can't just conjure up tension or trouble in the south, but they can manipulate existing local tension to some degree, especially when money is involved it usually is). It's been likely for a long time that the MNLF would emerge as a spoiler in the Government-MILF talks, but the timing of this incident, and that of last February's eccentricity, suggest that a Manila hand may be stirring an already frothing pot.

Bill Moore
09-15-2013, 09:20 PM
I wouldn't say the national level is more important, just that it's a factor. Manila factions can't just conjure up tension or trouble in the south, but they can manipulate existing local tension to some degree, especially when money is involved it usually is). It's been likely for a long time that the MNLF would emerge as a spoiler in the Government-MILF talks, but the timing of this incident, and that of last February's eccentricity, suggest that a Manila hand may be stirring an already frothing pot.

Fair enough, but you cannot get to a sustainable solution without Manila. It is all interconnected in many ways.

Dayuhan
09-16-2013, 02:27 AM
Fair enough, but you cannot get to a sustainable solution without Manila. It is all interconnected in many ways.

Manila might be part of a solution if it chose to be, but the will isn't there.

Mindanao's problems are irretrievably connected to the scourge of big man politics, and to the effective exemption from law enjoyed bu those who represent the state. The real challenge for Manila is not bringing the rebels and bandits within the rule of law, it's bringing its own agents within the rule of law.

Unfortunately, Manila and it's many factions generally don't want to do this (whether or not they could even if they wanted to remains a matter of some doubt, but we won't know unless they find the will). The big men are useful. When you need a trusty baron to deliver 165% of the votes in his jurisdiction to your cause, you look to Mindanao and make a deal (ask Gloria Arroyo about that). When you need to make trouble for your political antagonists, you make a deal in Mindanao. Manila leaders have generally found the status quo to be something they can manage to their own interest, and over generations of that the Mindanao political culture has taken on a life of its own and will be no easy thing to stamp out.

On the matters referred to above, we now have this:

http://www.tribune.net.ph/index.php/headlines/item/19082-disgruntled-forces-surface-say-crucial-decision-made

That's an open threat to Aquino: lay off on the corruption cases, or else.

SWJ Blog
12-09-2013, 06:32 PM
Five Myths About Helping the Philippines (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/five-myths-about-helping-the-philippines)

Entry Excerpt:



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Dayuhan
02-28-2014, 06:02 AM
Just back from some time in Lanao del Sur, one of those places the Embassy tells you to never ever even think about going. Wasn't there for research, or to reach any deep conclusions, but there was a bit of casual observation...

Awake early one morning, before dawn, up on a hill watching lights come on down on the plateau in the town of Wao. Inevitably the scratchy loudspeaker as the muezzin emerges with morning prayers, followed by a series of community announcements... and after that, a rousing if distorted recording of Lady Gaga doing Bad Romance. Muslim Filipinos are still Filipinos, and if anyone in Saudi Arabia is sending money to bring that particular mosque over to Wahhabi austerities, they aren't getting their money's worth.

Wao isn't really typical of anything, but in Central Mindanao the atypical is typical. The town occupies a corner of Lanao del Sur, between Bukidnon (dominated by Christian settlers) and Muslim-dominated North Cotabato. It's cut off from the heavily MILF-dominated easterm portion of Lanao del Sur by a densely forested mountain range. The once dominant Muslim Maranao are now about 30% of the population. The other 70% is an ethnolinguistic halo-halo of settlers from around the country and a few thoroughly downtrodden remnants of indigenous hill tribes.

Local officialdom is quick to claim an exception to the rule, with Christian settlers and Muslims living peacefully side by side. They still think it necessary to supply outsiders with armed escorts; in our case a dozen or so militiamen. Their fondness for alcohol was a bit disturbing, but at least they didn't have the magically bullet-proofing amulets and glazed over stares I've seen elsewhere. I don't know if they were there because the officials thought them necessary or because they thought we thought them necessary... they did not seem to be expecting trouble, and their presence seemed pretty perfunctory.

Muslims and Christians lived in geographically distinct neighborhoods in town, in separate villages in the countryside. Some visible blending, but still a very distinct separation at the most basic level. Local officials were pretty diplomatic, but the militiamen were pretty blunt about the perception that the place is peaceful because they (the Christian settlers) are warriors who take no $#!t from the Muslims and keep them in line.

I did slip the leash and get into town alone at one point. I tried to open some conversations with Muslim vendors and in a Halal eatery. Usually that's not too difficult; people are naturally curious about a white guy who speaks languages. The people I talked to seemed very reserved and even a bit suspicious; it was hard to get them even into the small talk stage, let alone relax things to a point where conversation could be directed... hence little observation of perception in that quarter.

The most visible dichotomy was not between Muslim and Christian, but between rich and poor. The area is extremely fertile: rolling plateau dominated by large fields of pineapple, corn, sugar cane, and rubber. One of the few places in the Philippines where I've seen large tractors and other agricultural equipment deployed on a large scale. Very little food production for local consumption, and rather low efficiency: no intercropping in rubber plantations, reject pineapples left to rot in the fields, etc. Despite substantial agricultural resources, the large majority that does not own land live in really abject poverty, a pretty dramatic contrast to the egalitarian, highly intensive, and hyper-efficient production up here in the northern tribal country.

In short, while the observations and conversations were generally casual, the impression I came away with was of a place where the inherent potential for tension between the many dirt-poor landless laborers and the few relatively affluent landowners is re-directed into enduring tension between indigenous Muslims and Christian settlers. As is the case in much of Mindnaao, this is encouraged by local elites on their sides, who would rather see their people directing fear and suspicion at "the other" than questioning the extreme economic inequalities that prevail within their own social groups.

Could say much more, but that's already probably too much...

Bob's World
02-28-2014, 03:01 PM
Great report and insights. I've never been there (sounds beautiful, if tragic), but this rings very accurate.

Dayuhan
03-14-2014, 07:10 AM
This group:

https://www.facebook.com/BASSAKAO

Is entirely local, and has received little local and no foreign press coverage that I've seen. Today, though, they are doing the unthinkable and saying the unsayable. This afternoon, March 14, there will be a local citizens rally in the town of Jolo demanding an end to kidnapping and other crimes, which are increasingly targeting local residents. The rally will go on despite discouragement and thinly veiled threats (will you take responsibility if there's a bombing?") from local officials.

What makes this historic is that the group is openly declaring what everyone has long known but nobody, until now, has been willing to say: that local government and security officials are complicit in and directly involved with these activities and the groups, including the ASG, that pursue them. It is fascinating that this wall of silence is being finally broken not by the Manila government, not by the US leaders who have surely known about this for years, but by fed-up local citizens.

Where it goes remains to be seen, but I wish them luck, and hope they stay safe: what they are doing is very, very dangerous.

Dayuhan
03-15-2014, 08:10 AM
Yesterday's Jolo rally concluded peacefully, although, as one participant put it:


During the Duration of the Indignation Rally: No Electricity, No Cable TV, No Radio Stations, No TV, Low Cellphone Signal. No Open Business Establishments! Do we really look like dreaded terrorists?

Hopefully nobody moves against individual leaders and participants, and they can press on and gather some political momentum.

Dayuhan
03-28-2014, 01:08 AM
There is officially a deal:

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/354395/news/nation/historic-peace-deal-with-milf-begins-rough-road-to-law-and-order

Where that leads is another question altogether: no shortage of spoilers and and many doubts even among suppoerte3rs of those represented. Still, it's an opportunity.

Dayuhan
06-27-2014, 03:01 AM
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/world/asia/us-will-disband-terrorism-task-force-in-philippines.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0


U.S. Phasing Out Its Counterterrorism Unit in Philippines

An elite American military counterterrorism unit that has been operating in the southern Philippines for more than a decade is being phased out, the Pentagon’s Pacific Command said Thursday...

About time, IMO: the effort has accomplished as much as it was ever going to accomplish. Hasn't solved the problem, but only the Philippine government can do that in any case.

SWJ Blog
06-27-2014, 03:40 AM
U.S. Phasing Out Its Counterterrorism Unit in Philippines (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-phasing-out-its-counterterrorism-unit-in-philippines)

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Dayuhan
08-07-2014, 07:13 AM
The GRP/MILF peace process always looked to have some serious issues, but it's looking more and more as if it may be sunk before it really gets started, a casualty of Manila politics. Basically, Manila is at a point where anything associated with the current President is being put through the wringer by well connected political opponents. The plan as agreed might have gotten through the legislature and survived the Supreme Court at the peak of Aquino's power. Today it probably won't. In an effort to make it palatable the administration seems to be trying to water it down, predictable incurring the wrath of the MILF negotiators, who expect to be accused of selling out their own people.

Some coverage:

https://ph.news.yahoo.com/philippine-peace-deal-jeopardy-muslim-rebels-cry-foul-063640481.html

The comments section of the article is revealing: it's a fair representation of public opinion among the Christian majority, much of which opposes any concession to the Muslims.

Not clear yet how it will sort out, but there's little basis for optimism. If this agreement is ditched it will be the second time: several years ago the MILF reached an agreement with the Government only to see it shot down by the Supreme Court. If that happens again the credibility of the moderate, negotiation-oriented factions in the insurgency is going to be largely gone, and the radicals will presumably take advantage.

Dayuhan
10-13-2014, 09:11 PM
This hit the social media mill yesterday, in the news today:

www.nytimes.com/2014/10/14/world/asia/member-of-us-military-questioned-in-death-of-filipino.html?smid=pl-share&_r=0


OLONGAPO CITY, Philippines — The Philippine police and United States Navy officials are investigating whether a member of the United States military killed a 26-year-old Filipino cross-dresser in a hotel over the weekend, the police said Monday.

Superintendent Pedrito Delos Reyes of the Philippine police said Monday that the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service was questioning a member of the United States military in connection with the death on Saturday of the Filipino, Jeffrey Laude, a resident of Olongapo City.

Additional coverage:

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/10/13/14/us-warships-stay-ph-after-transgender-murder

Apparently the US Navy has stopped the departure of the ships, suggesting that there is something to it all:

www.rappler.com/nation/71882-uss-peleliu-olongapo-murder


US Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Locklear III ordered to put on hold the scheduled departure of US ships pending the investigation on the murder of a transgender that tagged an American serviceman.

The incident, no matter how it plays out, will be gleefully received by the left and will be a substantial embarrassment to the Philippine government, which has just negotiated an expanded military access agreement.

These things happen every so often, and the publicity is always huge and damaging... in 2005 a Marine named Daniel Smith was convicted of raping a girl he picked up in a bar, to enormous attendant outcry. The conviction was reversed by a higher court, after the victim recanted her testimony... a few weeks later she got a shiny new US visa, so you can figure what happened. On the basis of evidence presented, if he'd done the same thing in the US he'd have unquestionably been convicted.

What completely baffles me is why they keep letting these guys to hit the town and hit the booze. Given the nature of the alcohol/testosterone mix, that's a guarantee that sooner or later someone is going to step in the scheisse . I know everyone remembers the bad old days in Subic and how much fun it all was, but those days are gone and mistakes now have consequences. All they have to do to prevent these incidents is keep the boys on the boat or at least under supervision, and keep them off the booze and the hookers. If they can do it in Afghanistan they can do it in the Philippines... but they don't, and this is the result.

To me the only available option is to turn the guy over to the local justice system, let the embassy monitor proceedings, sail away and dump him. There's going to be all kinds of commotion over having him detained and questioned by Americans, and that's understandable. I would also hope that there are some kind of consequences for whoever made the stupid-ass decision to let him off the leash in the first place, because these incidents are totally preventable.

/rant

WGEwald
10-13-2014, 11:30 PM
Captain Cook would have had the sailor given 12 lashes and continued on.

Anyways

Philippines–United States Visiting Forces Agreement (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/107852.pdf)

Dayuhan
10-14-2014, 01:51 AM
Captain Cook wouldn't have had the incident all over the global media.

Last April the US and the Philippines signed an "Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement" providing the US a substantially higher level of military access than the original VFA granted. The agreement was politically controversial and generated some hostility in the Philippines, partly from the left and partly from social conservatives and religious groups who retain distasteful memories of Angeles and Olongapo back in the day. There are organized groups eagerly waiting to make maximum political capital out of any possible incident, and they just got one that was beyond their wildest dreams.

Now you have an international incident, a huge embarrassment, two ships held up pending the outcome of an investigation, a Pacific Fleet Commander and a US Ambassador on the hot seat and (I'm sure) royally pissed off... all because nobody realized that a curfew and a no-alcohol order might have prevented a whole lot of trouble.

Dayuhan
01-26-2015, 05:02 AM
This story is still evolving and details are sketchy, but...

Apparently a Manila-based team from the Philippine National Police Special Action Force (sort of a combined SWAT/Hostage Rescue/Counterterrorist unit) went to a deeply rural section of Central Mindanao, an area under MILF/BIFF control, and tried to arrest two wanted JI terrorists, Marwan and Basit Usman. In the process, and in the middle of the night, they either directly attacked or stumbled into a camp of the MILF 105th Brigade, a unit closely associated with breakaway BIFF Leader Umeril Umbra Kato. The details are shaky, but apparently at least 30 of the police team were killed, some reports from the field saying over 50, along with much smaller numbers of BIFF and/or MILF. The difference between those is often shaky. An acquaintance from the area with MILF connections comments:

In that area, almost all major commanders from different factions are inter related by blood. An invasion force of 50 or 60 commandos is not enough to take on a heavily armed community. What is AFP going to do? Complain at the IMT? By now, the area is reinforced with different groups not controlled by the MILF. It is a blood feud, rido.

The size of the PNP team is not clear at this point, and few details of the actual mission are public (a sanitized version is probably being concocted). It does appear that there was no coordination with Philippine Army units in the area, and that when things went wrong the police team had nobody to call for help. There are still questions: the fighting apparently went on for some time; there are significant army and air force assets in the area, and it is not entirely clear whether there was any attempt to assist the group, or if not, why not.

The PNP is claiming that Marwan was killed in the fighting, but he's been killed several times before and always seems to reanimate.

This area is nominally covered by the Government/MILF peace negotiations, under which each side are expected to advise the other of operations. That clearly did not happen.

A lot more information will emerge, much of it probably distorted to serve various views. The peace negotiations, which already seems to be dead in the water, are a likely casualty.

Bill Moore
01-26-2015, 11:25 AM
That is a pretty dire analysis Dayuhan, but if the report is correct I agree it certainly falls into the realm of the possible. I hope the report of the PNP losing large numbers of officers is inaccurate, since they are some the Philippine's best. As for coordinating with the Army, you're damned if you do and damned if you don't. Too many people in the Army won't hesitate to make a cell phone call to X who will call Y, and the operation is compromised.

In hindsight, if the report is accurate, there are certainly indications of planning not supported by the larger intelligence picture. If the Filipinos are listening to us, they may have lost the ability to look at the larger picture. This is a result of the misleading HVI focus, where security forces tend to look at the world through a soda straw focused on HVIs. HVIs may actually be important, but that doesn't mean you can ignore the larger context. This time they focused on Marwan (I think he has been killed at least 5 times now), and may have failed to see the larger picture. Marwan certainly needs to die, but even if all the HVIs in the Philippines were killed it won't change much. Waging war focused on HVIs doesn't work, and more than a decade of doing this we still fail to recognize this. Killing HVIs is a supporting tactical operation, not a strategy.

For now, just hoping this report is greatly exaggerated. Also hoping Marwan is actually dead.

davidbfpo
01-26-2015, 11:29 AM
The BBC's report, no doubt compiled at a distance:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-30978014

Dayuhan
01-27-2015, 02:01 AM
The reports do not appear to be exaggerated. Official counts vary but range around 50 dead. The MILF is saying 64 PNP dead have been recovered:

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/668150/milf-64-cops-were-killed

There is very little clarity on the mission planning, the actual sequence of events, or why they were not able to extract or reinforce the unit. Reports indicate that the fighting went on for 12 hours, starting pre-dawn on Sunday morning and lasting all day. Some reports say that Army reinforcements were sent but encountered opposition, others say no help arrived. Air assets were apparently not deployed.

A lot of what is being said now sounds like people desperately scrambling to cover their backsides.

The area in question is badland, about as bad as it gets. It is absolutely ungoverned space with a heavily armed and highly disaffected populace, many of whom have been fighting all their lives. Both MILF and BIFF units operate in the area, but the distinction is nominal at best: all of them are linked by tribal and blood relations and they will all fight together against an intruder. The MILF position is that they could have kept their people out of the fight if there had been coordination as required under the current truce, but that may or may not be the case. The area is marshland and heavily overgrown, with few roads. Vehicles cannot operate off road and movement is very slow. The ground is flat with few vantage points or reference points and it is very easy to get lost in the marshes. Even if you know where you are, if you aren't familiar with the ground it is very hard to move around. There's a lot of deep water, deep mud, heavy brush.

Some reports say the PNP unit raided a BIFF camp and stumbled into an MILF camp during an attempted retreat. That is very much unconfirmed and I don't think any reliable account of the encounter exists. Some social media reports from the area say that the group was seen moving in on Saturday, in plain clothes and unmarked vehicles but in those towns it would be virtually impossible to move in any numbers without people noticing.

Why they chose a direct raid into the hornet nest is not clear. The last time they had a location on Marwan they put a JDAM through the roof... they didn't get him, but they didn't kill 50+ policemen either. There is speculation that the reward was an issue or that a high profile arrest was sought, also that inter-service rivalry may have come into play. That of course is entirely speculative at this point. Whether or not truth will emerge is another story. I imagine there are a bunch of classified US communications flying around at this point that would be very interesting to see. There is a lot of confusion on the Government side; it appears that even senior police officials were not aware of the operation until it was in progress.

I agree that the strategic value of targeting these individuals is limited, though catching would be a propaganda coup and the reward may have been a factor.

As for the peace process... it was already in deep trouble, and at this point it has about the survival prospects of a snowball in a Mindanao marsh. Maybe when this all dies down it can be revived, but those who opposed it a along, and there are many of them, are having a field day and will not let this go any time soon.

davidbfpo
03-03-2015, 08:42 PM
After 13 years of providing operational advice and support, the U.S. special operations mission in the Philippines, which was set up to help the Philippine military fight an Islamic militancy in the country’s south, is officially coming to a close....[/URL]. According to local reports, U.S. JSOTF-P personnel joined their Philippines counterparts in a flag-raising ceremony in Zamboanga City to symbolize the conclusion of the U.S. mission.
Link:[URL]http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/us-concludes-special-operations-task-force-in-the-philippines/? (http://news.usni.org/2015/02/27/u-s-officially-ends-special-operations-task-force-in-the-philippines-some-advisors-may-remain)

Bill Moore
03-22-2015, 02:14 AM
WarPorcus,

I'm not sure what statistics you're looking for, but I'll do a search through my computer tomorrow and see what I have for foreign fighter flow from Southeast Asia. A few reports point to several foreign fighters being disillusioned by ISIL's extreme behavior, so hopefully that trend continues. As for Indonesia and the Philippines (similar but still very different), JI and ASG's initial core were foreign fighters from Afghanistan during the USSR occupation. The vast majority of fighters returning that conflict didn't engage in terrorism, but it only takes a handful to have a strategic impact.

We can't compare this to the Crusades where Christians go out and fight and return to their Christian homes, nations that were already somewhat extremist on the Christian side. Fighters today are returning to countries that don't embrace their extreme (and illegitimate) beliefs, so some seek to impose their views via violence. Indonesia from what I can gather from a few short trips there, discussions with experts, and reading is that the government is doing a relatively good job of addressing the concerns of their people (within reason in a developing country), so people aren't fighting because they're being discriminating against. They're fighting to impose their extreme and unpopular beliefs. We're talking Martin L. King freedom marches here (lol).

The Philippines is another issue altogether, since their government does discriminate against their Muslim population. The government does little to address the concerns of their Muslim population, and while President Aquino has a been light of hope, his time is getting short, and not unlike our system their Congress is corrupt and eager to undo much of the progress he has made. I project the situation will devolve for the worse in the Philippines.

Regardless of the conditions on the ground, the terrorists in these countries will reconnect, or strengthen their existing links with global terrorist networks based on foreign fighter flow to support ISIL. That points to a bigger challenge for security forces. I also think those who were repulsed by ISIL may find al-Qaeda more attractive if they're still looking a group to affiliate with. Reportedly, the jihadist websites/blogs in Indonesia contain a fierce internal debate between jihadists on whether to support ISIL or AQ.

For one, I see no reason this will go away in 10 years, but hopefully it can be contained to a manageable level.

OUTLAW 09
03-22-2015, 07:42 AM
WarPorcus,

I'm not sure what statistics you're looking for, but I'll do a search through my computer tomorrow and see what I have for foreign fighter flow from Southeast Asia. A few reports point to several foreign fighters being disillusioned by ISIL's extreme behavior, so hopefully that trend continues. As for Indonesia and the Philippines (similar but still very different), JI and ASG's initial core were foreign fighters from Afghanistan during the USSR occupation. The vast majority of fighters returning that conflict didn't engage in terrorism, but it only takes a handful to have a strategic impact.

We can't compare this to the Crusades where Christians go out and fight and return to their Christian homes, nations that were already somewhat extremist on the Christian side. Fighters today are returning to countries that don't embrace their extreme (and illegitimate) beliefs, so some seek to impose their views via violence. Indonesia from what I can gather from a few short trips there, discussions with experts, and reading is that the government is doing a relatively good job of addressing the concerns of their people (within reason in a developing country), so people aren't fighting because they're being discriminating against. They're fighting to impose their extreme and unpopular beliefs. We're talking Martin L. King freedom marches here (lol).

The Philippines is another issue altogether, since their government does discriminate against their Muslim population. The government does little to address the concerns of their Muslim population, and while President Aquino has a been light of hope, his time is getting short, and not unlike our system their Congress is corrupt and eager to undo much of the progress he has made. I project the situation will devolve for the worse in the Philippines.

Regardless of the conditions on the ground, the terrorists in these countries will reconnect, or strengthen their existing links with global terrorist networks based on foreign fighter flow to support ISIL. That points to a bigger challenge for security forces. I also think those who were repulsed by ISIL may find al-Qaeda more attractive if they're still looking a group to affiliate with. Reportedly, the jihadist websites/blogs in Indonesia contain a fierce internal debate between jihadists on whether to support ISIL or AQ.

For one, I see no reason this will go away in 10 years, but hopefully it can be contained to a manageable level.

Bill--will give you a short story on just how shortsighted the US government, the US IC and just about the entire senior military leadership has been since 1993 when it comes to guerrilla warfare and Islamic insurgents.

Back in 1991-1993 when the US Army had a light infantry fighting division the 7th they came to our Reserve Intel Center near the Presidio and asked if we could design a "guerrilla/insurgent scenario" for them to train all non intel types in their BN staffs for the whole division--they picked this as it was similar to their Panama mission and their general outlook on how they were going to be used in the future.

And presto the 7th "disappeared" after the training was completed as we were in the "peace dividend drawdown" and there were going to be "no future needs for a light infantry division focused on UW/guerrilla warfare".

I together with a great Order of battle Tech (which "disappeared as well) then took the NEO for the Philippines and designed a complete 10 day scenario around no other than Abu Sayyaf who many at that time had heard not much from--we built then a robust guerrilla scenario focusing on driving staff functions designed to first detect what actually was ongoing, define the players and human terrain, design a info war messaging and then design a robust military response using light fighters coupled with Philippino military while protecting the civilian populations as much as possible.

After 10 days the staffs were exhausted but they had developed into a solid C-UW thinking team and had now a far deeper understanding of guerrilla warfare than when they came to us.

Fort Huachuca wanted a complete copy of the scenario and over 3000 messages as this was the day of the 289 computers and all was done by hand and typewriter.

THEN suddenly after they reviewed it--came the following "we anticipate no future guerrilla warfare or UW conflicts" and thanks for the efforts and it was canned somewhere in the depths of Ft. H.

Now 23 years later we are facing again what and where?? What a wasted 23 years when some truly saw what was coming at us over the horizon and the political and military leadership felt "peace was forever".

Remember it was the Philippines where we lost a truly great former SF officer/VN POW COL Rowe (remember this was 1989) in an out right assassination- who by the way knew it was coming as he called his wife the evening before to check on "legal things "and said goodbye something he had never done--and by the way that assassination was never fully investigated and had it's ties to the Islamic side of the house and some say the KGB. They had fired into what was later proven to be the only weak point in the armored glass which reflected someone knew our armored glass production and deficiencies.

It was there in 1993 for all to see--just no one wanted to seriously connect the dots to include the IC.

This fight has been with us since the very early 80s and it is not going away any time soon and the guesses of within the next 20 years is also wrong since the fight has been on since 1979 beginning with the name called Khomeini.

OUTLAW 09
03-27-2015, 03:52 PM
Bill M--someone is seeing the light finally in the Philippines.

Philippine President Benigno Aquino called on lawmakers Friday to pass a bill endorsing a pact aimed at ending a decades-long Muslim separatist rebellion, warning them they would otherwise start counting "body bags".

Aquino had wanted the bill, which would give autonomy to the majority Catholic nation's Muslim minority in the south, passed this month.
But Congress suspended debates on the proposed law in the face of public outrage over the killings of 44 police commandoes by Muslim guerrillas in a botched anti-terror raid in January.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which signed a peace deal a year ago Friday, had said its members fired in self-defence at the commandoes, who passed through a rebel camp while going after Islamic militants.

"This is the crossroads we face: we take pains to forge peace today, or we count body bags tomorrow," Aquino said in a nationwide television address.
"Perhaps it is easy for you to push for all-out war," he said, hitting out at critics who have condemned the peace deal with the MILF.
"But if the conflict grows, the number of Filipinos shooting at other Filipinos will grow, and it would not be out of the question that a friend or loved one be one of the people who will end up inside a body bag."

The rebellion for a separate state or self-rule has claimed nearly 120,000 lives and cost billions of dollars in economic losses, according to government estimates.
Under a peace deal signed with the MILF, the 10,000-member group pledged to disarm while the Philippine government vowed to pass an autonomy law in Muslim areas of the south.

"The Bangsamoro basic law is one of the most important proposed bills of our administration. It answers the two most pressing problems of our countrymen: poverty and violence," Aquino said Friday.
He warned it would be difficult to restart peace talks if the current process failed and the MILF leadership lost its influence among its members to more radical elements.
Aquino is required by the constitution to stand down in mid-2016 after serving a single six-year term.

The January police raid sought to capture or kill two men on the US government's list of "most wanted terrorists" who were living among Muslim rebels in southern Philippine farming communities.
One of the men, Malaysian national Zulkifli bin Hir who had a $5-million bounty on his head, was reported killed.
But the other, Filipino Abdul Basit Usman, escaped as rebels surrounded and killed the police commandoes.

Dayuhan
03-31-2015, 04:48 AM
someone is seeing the light finally in the Philippines.

Philippine President Benigno Aquino called on lawmakers Friday to pass a bill endorsing a pact aimed at ending a decades-long Muslim separatist rebellion, warning them they would otherwise start counting "body bags".

This has been an ongoing effort for some time, but at this point has about a snowball's chance on Taft Avenue in April of passing. Legislators have lined up against it since the Mamasapano incident, and it has become a political football, with prominent legislators lining up to tap the anti-Muslim sentiment that prevails among the majority population and turn the agreement into a nationalist issue. With an election coming up in 2016 that is likely to continue. Aquino has taken a beating; the incident was quickly and effectively exploited by his political rivals blaming him for the outcome and claiming that he's in league with Islamic radical separatist terrorists. It's becoming a bit of a circus, but the outcome looks likely to be a rejected agreement and very likely a return to open conflict.

Bill Moore
03-31-2015, 10:41 AM
This is what happens when targeting individuals becomes the strategy versus an action that supports the strategy. I think they were close to a strategic victory, but based on what you said, victory is no where in sight now.

Bob's World
03-31-2015, 11:59 AM
All good, effective, durable COIN begins with civil leaders creating and good laws and policies that offer a viable political alternative to the aggrieved population that insurgent groups emerge from or exploit. The US Civil Rights laws that allowed the US to turn the corner on the growing instability and violence of the Civil Rights movement is a great example. The British decision to give up colonial political control over Malaya and to pass laws granting suffrage and equal opportunity to the entire population as the military created time and space is another great example. The government of the Philippines has a chance to follow in those footsteps with Bangsamoro. I hope they do not blink and miss this opportunity.

Some of the darkest illegal violence of the civil rights movement occurred after the laws were passed. These types of human drama can not be turned on (by ideology) or off (by law) like a switch. They build over time as trust is violated, and must wane over time as well as trust is restored.

Maybe if the US took the bounty off the heads of these men it would help give peace a chance.

Dayuhan
04-01-2015, 12:09 AM
This is what happens when targeting individuals becomes the strategy versus an action that supports the strategy. I think they were close to a strategic victory, but based on what you said, victory is no where in sight now.

I agree on the issue of targeting individuals. In this case the individual concerned may have been of less value than some believe, as argued by Sidney Jones, one of the more credible analysts coverings SE Asian Jihadis:

http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2015/03/IPAC_17_Killing_Marwan_in_Mindanao.pdf

How close victory was is open to question. The agreement may or may not have brought peace (there were formidable obstacles to come in the implementation) but was at least a step in that direction. Even if it had passed the legislature, though, there were already strong indications that the Supreme Court would shoot it down, partly because the Court is dominated by Manila-centric individuals determined to preserve the prerogatives of "imperial Manila", partly because the Court has an adversarial relationship with Aquino and would be only too happy to torpedo one of his signature initiatives. Politics are always with us.

Aquino might have been able to get an agreement through earlier in his tenure, when he still had more pull with the legislature and the Court. As it is, with coalitions fracturing and individuals lining up their alliances for the 2016 election, there is little chance of getting an inherently unpopular piece of legislation through even the legislature, let alone the Court. Aquino has made powerful enemies among the traditional politicians and the Catholic Church, and they are lining up to chop him down now that he's vulnerable. His own manner has at times made their job easier.

If the peace can be held up that long, it is arguably possible that the process could be revived under a new administration, but that seems a slim hope, as 2016 looks likely to be a step backward on multiple fronts. It is hard to be optimistic, and it looks likely, if not desirable, that we will become interesting again.

Bill Moore
04-01-2015, 12:41 AM
If the peace can be held up that long, it is arguably possible that the process could be revived under a new administration, but that seems a slim hope, as 2016 looks likely to be a step backward on multiple fronts. It is hard to be optimistic, and it looks likely, if not desirable, that we will become interesting again.

On the other side of the equation, I can't help but wondering if the younger MILF leaders emerging will be willing to abide by the draft agreement. Seems ISIS has already regenerated a new wave of radicalism far beyond Syria and Iraq. As Colin Gray titled one of his more recent books, it will be another bloody century.

Dayuhan
04-10-2015, 01:52 AM
On the other side of the equation, I can't help but wondering if the younger MILF leaders emerging will be willing to abide by the draft agreement. Seems ISIS has already regenerated a new wave of radicalism far beyond Syria and Iraq. As Colin Gray titled one of his more recent books, it will be another bloody century.

I don't see ISIS as a major factor... certainly the more radical factions (not all of them young) identify with ISIS, but if ISIS wasn't there they'd identify with something else. If this agreement falls apart, as seems likely, I do expect some significant changes in the MILF and in the separatist movement in general, with the radicals and those who see negotiation as pointless gaining traction and the negotiation-minded factions losing traction. This will be the second time that the negotiators have signed an agreement only to have the Philippine government reject it; if negotiation does not bring results it's hard to see why they would continue on that course.

The problem at root is that while some Philippine leaders are willing to negotiate, the majority of the populace remains heavily Islamophobic and regards any concession as a betrayal. It's an easy soapbox to get up on, it wins broad approval, and it's supported by a heavily Manila-centric judiciary.

Dayuhan
05-01-2015, 07:53 AM
A bit up this thread I posted some observations from time spent in Wao, Lanao del Sur, a town with a Cristian settler majority and Maranao Muslim minority, at the edge of the Central Mindanao conflict zone.

A few days ago this story broke, from the same place:

http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2015/04/26/7-killed-7-wounded-in-wao-village-attacks-mayor-parish-priest-call-for-sobriety/

In short: 3 kids, from the Christian settler community were tending water buffaloes. Men wearing "bonnets" (generally a balaclava-type hat covering the face) stole the buffaloes. Two of the kids, ages 13 and 15, were killed with machetes, the 15 year old may have been raped as well. The youngest kid escaped and reported that the killers had left in the direction of a Maranao village.

Early the next morning a large contingent of armed men arrived in that village and shot the place up, killing a number of residents, including at least one pregnant woman, and injuring others. Quantities of 5.56mm and 7.62mm casings were recovered, and 40mm grenades were employed.

According to the official story, all the officials in the picture are urging calm and sobriety and promising to track down and arrest all of the various perpetrators. Whether they do so in time remains to be seen, as there are reports on the ground of armed men arriving from surrounding areas to support their respective relatives and allies.

I made some inquiries among people I know in that area, and got sent this account, from an unnamed source:

On April 25, 2014 at exactly 4:30 dawn, twelve Maranao residents at Sitio Magampong of Wao, Lanao del Sur were massacred by the men of Wao Municipal Mayor Balicao and the private army of the mayor's son, brgy chairman Balicao with the protection of the Batallion Commander of the 6 IB of the AFP assigned in the area.

A day before the incident, a girl and one man were killed by two Christian men of the municipal mayor covering their faces with bonnet and rustled their two cows. The son of the municipal mayor who is the barangay chairman together with his private army informed all the Maranao residents to hide their arms if they have because the AFP men is going to conduct search and seizure in their houses. Taking heed to the information, the residents hid their arms. But in the early dawn, upon instruction of the Mayor and his son who is the barangay chairman in the sitio went to the houses of the Maranao residents and met a certain pregnant Maranao woman along the way and shot her mercilessly to death. They proceeded to the houses and more than 70 of them in number fired at the houses where there were sleeping residents causing the death of 5 residents. The son of Balicao with his BAR went upstairs and shot those who were still alive to death. One of the victims who has the .38 caliber shot the culprit causing him to jump out from the house. While he was downstairs, he ordered his private army and the closed in body guards of the mayor to fire at them until there was sound of silence. They left the area causing 5 dead and 7 seriously wounded. When they left, they were shouting with joy and laughing louder proceeding to the houses of the Balicaos rendering their reports.

The victims who were seriously wounded were brought to the nearby hospitals.

On Sunday 26 April 2015, Gov. Bombit Adiong went to the area and called a meeting with Mayor Balicao and his son to discuss the incident. It was clearly implied in all the statements of the mayor that his men and private army of his son were the ones who massacred the innocent Maranao civilians.

I am NOT saying the above is true: it could easily be embellished or invented. There are many inconsistencies between this account and the published accounts, but that is normal in these incidents, and each source often has a different account. It's significant, though, because it is circulating among the Muslim side and is being widely accepted as fact. People act on what they believe, not what is true.

My own take... I am not convinced that the initial crimes were a deliberate provocation. That area has a significant drug problem, mainly crystal meth. A buffalo is a quick money theft, and that kind of theft and the gratuitous violence that accompanied it could easily be a straight crime with no political overtone... or not, of course.

The revenge killings could very easily have involved approval of or even cooperation by local officials... in fact it's hard to believe that a raid on that scale could be organized and carried out without their knowledge, as they keep their armed groups under fairly close control. The habit of collective punishment, and responding to a crime by attacking the village the criminals are believed to come from is well entrenched. I can't say that it definitely was the work of local officials, but it seems entirely possible to me. The habit of blaming the other is well entrenched, and if the suspects were seen heading in the direction of a village that would be interpreted by many as sufficient cause for a raid.

The involvement of the military is possible but doubtful; the (Christian settler) local militias would have sufficient men and weapons to carry out the raid on their own. These are groups of semi-trained local men that are paid and armed by the government, nominally under military command but in practice typically under control of local elites and officials. The distinction between these militias and the "private armies" of these elites and officials is spotty at best.

Where it goes from here remains to be seen. On both sides you have official forces, the MILF and the Philippine Army, who would prefer to avoid wider conflict. You also have heavily armed irregular militias on both sides who are out for revenge and spoiling for a fight. It could blow up into a serious clash, or it could calm down and become just one more in a long history of smaller flare-ups.

Likely it will go nowhere, but it remains of interest, I think, as an illustration of how conflict can spark in a polarized community with a strong "us vs them" polarization, a history of violence, and a lot of loose arms.

davidbfpo
07-20-2015, 03:10 PM
Coming up The Frontline Club, London on Friday and the meeting will be added on their YouTube page shortly afterwards:
The southern Philippines has a long history of conflict, with armed groups including Muslim separatists, communists, clan militias and criminal groups all active in the area. Most of the conflict in the south has taken place in the remote and flowering islands of central Mindanao. Adjani Arumpac is a Filipina filmmaker whose ancestors lived in the troubled region of Mindanao, where Muslim insurgents have waged war against the central government for four decades.
Arumpac’s film War is a Tender Thing reveals the aftermath of decades of war in the Philippines through stories recounted by the filmmaker’s family. Arumpac grew up in the battlefield of the ‘Land of Promise’ or Mindanao. Digging deep into the history of the integration of cultures brought together by state-sponsored land resettlement in the 1930s, Arumpac arrives at the root of the longstanding conflict — the massive migration within the country wherein ancestral Muslim and indigenous peoples’ lands were given by the Philippine government to Christian settlers from the capital.
Link:http://www.frontlineclub.com/screening-war-is-a-tender-thing-qa/

SWJ Blog
10-10-2015, 12:56 PM
Two Soldiers I Served With Died In The Philippines. They Didn’t Have To. (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-soldiers-i-served-with-died-in-the-philippines-they-didn%E2%80%99t-have-to)

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SWJ Blog
10-10-2015, 12:56 PM
Two Soldiers I Served With Died In The Philippines. They Didn’t Have To. (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-soldiers-i-served-with-died-in-the-philippines-they-didn%E2%80%99t-have-to)


Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-soldiers-i-served-with-died-in-the-philippines-they-didn%E2%80%99t-have-to) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).

SWJ Blog
04-07-2016, 03:12 AM
U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-special-operations-forces-in-the-philippines-2001%E2%80%932014)

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SWJ Blog
04-07-2016, 03:12 AM
U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-special-operations-forces-in-the-philippines-2001%E2%80%932014)


Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-special-operations-forces-in-the-philippines-2001%E2%80%932014) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).

Moderator adds: this SWJ Blog post has been copied here, in part as an update, but also as the exchange there supplements this thread.

AdamG
04-12-2016, 05:03 PM
Found while looking for something else, from 2013 -

Zamboanga siege: Tales from the combat zone

One year since the bloody siege of Zamboanga City, Rappler sits down with soldiers of the Light Reaction Battalion who have stories to tell and lessons to share

http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/68885-zamboanga-siege-light-reaction-battalion

Muslim Rebels Attack Philippine Towns
http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2013/09/muslim-rebels-attack-philippine-towns/100589/

SWJ Blog
04-13-2016, 02:11 PM
TSG Intel Brief: The Philippines Battles Abu Sayyaf (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/tsg-intel-brief-the-philippines-battles-abu-sayyaf)

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SWJ Blog
04-13-2016, 02:11 PM
TSG Intel Brief: The Philippines Battles Abu Sayyaf (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/tsg-intel-brief-the-philippines-battles-abu-sayyaf)

I have copied the one comment made via Dave Maxwell, from a Filipino contact:
I have a great deal of respect for Ali Soufan and the Soufan Group. Their report is accurate. I remain concerned about the acts of the Abu Sayyaf Group. BUT I temper that with some context. They are vastly reduced in size of actual hard members. They still get wide assistance from family and relationship based ''supporters.'' Those people are not necessarily ideological supporters but aid in some way due to social obligations. The ASG is largely confined to Basilan and Jolo. They don't have core reach the way they used to have. None of the groups in that region do. As the central government has improved schools, elections, roads to markets, and other governance issues the support for these people has withered. ASG's claim of allegiance to Daesh is still unclear as to scope, meaning and impact. Which way does money flow? We're not really sure. What fighters have gone to,Stria etc for training? We're not clear. Soufan raises good points, but I'm not raising my blood pressure. Yet.

SWJ Blog
04-14-2016, 08:44 PM
ISIS's Alarming Inroads in the Southern Philippines (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/isiss-alarming-inroads-in-the-southern-philippines)

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davidbfpo
04-25-2016, 08:11 PM
A sad update:
Canadian hostage John Ridsdel, a former mining executive, has been killed by Abu Sayyaf militants in the Philippines (http://www.theguardian.com/world/philippines), a Canadian government official has confirmed.
(At the end) Abu Sayyaf is also holding other foreigners, including one from the Netherlands, one from Japan, four Malaysians and 14 Indonesian tugboat crew.
Link:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/25/canadian-hostage-beheaded-by-islamist-militants-in-philippines

davidbfpo
06-13-2016, 12:35 PM
A Canadian hostage held by the militant group Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines has been killed, media reports say. Robert Hall was kidnapped in September along with three other hostages from Canada, the Philippines and Norway.Mr Hall was killed on Monday after a deadline for a ransom expired...It is still holding several captives, including a Dutch birdwatcher taken in 2012.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36517524

Bill Moore
07-10-2016, 12:36 AM
http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/philippine-president-blames-us-for-middle-east-violence-1.418247?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+starsandstripes%2Fgeneral+%28 Stars+and+Stripes%29

Philippine president blames US for Middle East violence


The new Philippine president blamed U.S. intervention for the bloody conflicts in Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries in his latest criticism of Manila's closest security ally.

The new President appears ready to walk his own path. Very direct, and not relying on conventional wisdom. In some ways he seems to have some pragmatic ideas, and in other areas he appears to be grasping at straws. It could be another interesting few years in the Philippines.


They forced their way to Iraq ... look at Iraq now, look what happened to Libya, look what happened to Syria," he told the Muslim community in southern Davao city in a ceremony marking the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. "People are being annihilated there including children."

The former Davao mayor has said he would be a leftist president who would chart a foreign policy not dependent on the United States.

He has pointed out the benefits of nurturing friendly relations with Beijing, including a Chinese offer of financing railway projects in the Philippines. The country has had frosty ties with China under Duterte's predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, who bolstered security ties with the U.S. to deter China's assertiveness in the disputed South China Sea.

SWJ Blog
08-30-2016, 08:42 PM
Philippines Peace Process: Duterte Playing For High Stakes (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/philippines-peace-process-duterte-playing-for-high-stakes)

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SWJ Blog
09-12-2016, 02:42 PM
Philippine's President Duterte to US Troops: Leave Mindanao or Abus Will Kill You (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/philippines-president-duterte-to-us-troops-leave-mindanao-or-abus-will-kill-you)

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AdamG
09-16-2016, 09:35 AM
(CNN)The Philippines top diplomat has told a forum in Washington that his country "cannot forever be the little brown brothers of America."
Philippines Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay made the comments after a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington Thursday, during which he described the US relationship with the Philippines as cooperative and symbiotic.
http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/16/asia/little-brown-brother-philippines-us/

davidbfpo
10-04-2016, 09:56 AM
A critical commentary on the 'Panic about IS in the Philippines', with the Abu Sayyaf group being the focus:https://theconversation.com/panic-about-is-in-the-philippines-masks-a-very-real-war-in-the-country-65196? (https://theconversation.com/panic-about-is-in-the-philippines-masks-a-very-real-war-in-the-country-65196?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20 for%20October%203%202016%20-%205733&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20f or%20October%203%202016%20-%205733+CID_c09c2340a3986ff21323c0d2643ca66f&utm_source=campaign_monitor_uk&utm_term=Panic%20about%20IS%20in%20the%20Philippin es%20masks%20a%20very%20real%20war%20in%20the%20co untry)

"More of the same" the author concludes:
For now, the spectre of IS in South-East Asia is a case of an awful lot of smoke and very little fire. And as Duterte joins in the hyperbole, many of the Philippines’ same old mistakes are already being repeated.

AdamG
10-27-2016, 11:31 PM
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, during a visit to Japan, told Japanese and Philippine business leaders Wednesday that he wants foreign troops -- read U.S. troops -- out of his country, possibly within two years.

https://www.airforcetimes.com/articles/philippine-president-wants-us-troops-out-of-his-country

AdamG
02-20-2017, 01:30 PM
MANILA, Philippines (AP) — Gunmen attacked a Vietnamese cargo ship off the Philippines' southern tip, killing a Vietnamese crewman and abducting six others including the vessel's captain, the Philippine coast guard and the ship's owner said Monday.
Coast guard spokesman Armand Balilo said the Vietnamese coast guard reported that the MV Giang Hai, with 17 crewmen on board, was attacked by pirates Sunday night about 20 miles (31 kilometers) north of Pearl Bank in Tawi-Tawi, the Philippines' southernmost province.
Personnel of the Philippine coast guard, police and marines found the ship had drifted near the province's Baguan Island. Upon boarding the vessel, they found 10 Vietnamese sailors alive and one dead.

Pham Van Hien, head of the safety department of Pham Hai shipping company, the owner of the cargo ship based in Vietnam's northern port city of Hai Phong, said the captain was among those abducted. The attack occurred while the vessel was transporting 4,500 tons of cement from Indonesia to the Philippines, he said.
The gunmen destroyed some of the ship's equipment, but the 10 remaining crew members managed to sail the ship, Hien said.
He said the company had informed the IMB Piracy Reporting Center in Malaysia to seek its help in securing the return of the kidnapped crew members.
Balilo said pursuit operations are underway, but the location of the abducted crewmen and the identity of the attackers remain unknown.
Abu Sayyaf militants and allied gunmen are suspected of being behind previous sea assaults in the area, including an attack last November on another Vietnamese cargo ship whose captain and five crewmen were also kidnapped. They are believed to be held by the militants in the southern province of Sulu, where the kidnappers are holding at least 20 foreign and local hostages in different jungle locations.
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/26b86a6f1b3f451d95e8d2cad27c068b/philippines-vietnamese-ship-attacked-1-dead-6-abducted

davidbfpo
03-30-2017, 09:42 AM
Piracy is a perennial problem in the waters around the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia known as the Sulu-Celebes Sea; with irregular Western media reports on kidnappings. This BBC report is an update, with a focus on multilateral action or inaction.

http://ichef-1.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cpsprodpb/6340/production/_95280452_1e4f34ff-9817-411d-ab88-067b0fc63f00.jpg
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39252503

AdamG
05-24-2017, 01:10 AM
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte cut short a visit to Russia and imposed martial law on the island of Mindanao on Tuesday after a fierce bout of fighting erupted during a raid by security forces at a hideout of Islamic State-linked militants.
Two soldiers and a policeman were killed and 12 wounded amid chaos in Marawi, a predominantly Muslim city of about 200,000 people, where members of the Maute militant group took control of buildings and set fire to a school, a church and a detention facility.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-philippines-martiallaw-idUKKBN18J2AE

SWJ Blog
06-01-2017, 02:19 PM
Philippines Struggles to Suppress ISIS-Linked Rebels as Foreign Fighters Found (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/philippines-struggles-to-suppress-isis-linked-rebels-as-foreign-fighters-found)

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SWJ Blog
06-01-2017, 02:19 PM
Philippines Struggles to Suppress ISIS-Linked Rebels as Foreign Fighters Found (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/philippines-struggles-to-suppress-isis-linked-rebels-as-foreign-fighters-found)

A SWJ Blog link to a WSJ report on the fighting with an ISIS affiliate in Marawi; which has several comments on veteran observers and our own local observer Dayuhan - worth a read.

SWJ Blog
06-14-2017, 11:07 PM
Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force In Philippines Ended Too Soon, Mattis Says (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/joint-anti-terrorism-task-force-in-philippines-ended-too-soon-mattis-says)

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SWJ Blog
06-16-2017, 12:05 PM
Interview With COL David Maxwell on US Special Operations Troops Advising Philippines Forces on Insurgents (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/interview-with-col-david-maxwell-on-us-special-operations-troops-advising-philippines-forces-on)

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davidbfpo
08-25-2017, 10:03 AM
An Australian commentary, which reminds us that:
Some 12 weeks later, the fighting continues and the toll in death and destruction climbs inexorably, much to the dismay and embarrassment of the Philippine military.Link:https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/battle-marawi-isis-southeast-asia/

SWJ Blog
09-13-2017, 06:10 PM
ISIS Recruits Fighters for the Philippines Instead of Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/isis-recruits-fighters-for-the-philippines-instead-of-syria)

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SWJ Blog
09-27-2017, 07:43 PM
ISIS in Mindanao: A Threat to the U.S.? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/isis-in-mindanao-a-threat-to-the-us)

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AdamG
10-22-2017, 11:22 AM
An Australian commentary..

I don't see where the author has any experience outside of Academia.

In any event, SWJ needs to look at Marawi as a MOUT case study.


Why it took 5 months to end Marawi siege
By: Allan Nawal - Correspondent / @inqmindanao
Philippine Daily Inquirer / 07:02 AM October 22, 2017


MARAWI CITY — Soldiers lacked training and equipment for urban warfare which stretched the military campaign to rid the city of Islamic State (IS) followers to five months, according to a key ground commander here.
Col. Romeo Brawner Jr., deputy commander of the military’s Joint Task Group Ranao, said officers had to improvise in terms of deploying troopers, equipment and using tactics to defeat members of homegrown terror groups Abu Sayyaf and Maute, who had tried to establish an IS base in this predominantly Muslim city.
The government had declared the liberation of the city from IS, although fighting continued to finish off what the military now refers to as “stragglers,” or remnants of Abu Sayyaf and Maute, still holed up in the city


http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/939746/marawi-siege-mindanao-martial-law-islamic-state-romeo-brawner-jr-task-force-ranao-abu-sayyaf-maute-group-marawi-stragglers-abdullah-maute-madie-maute-omarkhayyam-maute-isnilon-hapilon#ixzz4wEfCzzch




Philippine troops on Sunday were battling a final group of about 30 pro-Islamic State group militants who were surrounded in one building with all their hostages gone as a nearly five-month siege neared its end in southern Marawi city, a military official said.
Army Col. Romeo Brawner said troops were aiming to end the crisis before midnight Sunday. He said the remaining gunmen, who include some Indonesian and Malaysian fighters, have the option of surrendering, or they can either be captured or killed.
"Our government forces will try to do everything to finish the firefight today," Brawner said in a news conference in Marawi. He said the battle area centered in a two-story building near Lake Lanao where the firefight continued to rage at noon.
"It's either they all get killed, because they're determined to die inside, or we capture them or they surrender," he said.
A gradual withdrawal of military forces was underway with the easing of the fighting, which has left at least 1,131 people dead, including 919 militants and 165 soldiers and policemen. Troops continued to ask the gunmen, who are leaderless and running low on ammunition, to surrender by using loudspeakers, Brawner said.

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/filipino-troops-battling-final-30-linked-gunmen-50641224

AdamG
10-22-2017, 12:14 PM
Piracy is a perennial problem in the waters around the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia known as the Sulu-Celebes Sea; with irregular Western media reports on kidnappings. This BBC report is an update, with a focus on multilateral action or inaction.

http://ichef-1.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cpsprodpb/6340/production/_95280452_1e4f34ff-9817-411d-ab88-067b0fc63f00.jpg
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39252503

Islamic State in the Philippines
http://www.agathocledesyracuse.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Philippines-Islamic-State.jpg

SWJ Blog
10-23-2017, 06:11 PM
ISIS Threat in Philippines Spreads in Remote Battles (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/isis-threat-in-philippines-spreads-in-remote-battles)

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davidbfpo
10-25-2017, 04:43 PM
Hat tip to WoTR for this US SF veteran's commentary on the situation, alongside some history.
Link:https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/for-the-philippines-more-money-and-arms-is-not-the-answer/

SWJ Blog
11-09-2017, 02:50 PM
Filipino Troops Credit U.S. Intelligence, Training for Helping Them Beat ISIS in Marawi (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/filipino-troops-credit-us-intelligence-training-for-helping-them-beat-isis-in-marawi)

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AdamG
12-10-2017, 05:27 AM
Liberated Philippines city lies in ruins, and its people seethe
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/liberated-philippines-city-lies-in-ruins-and-its-people-seethe/ar-BBGrrb8?li=AA4Zpp&ocid=spartandhp


Beyond earshot of officials and soldiers, people wonder why the army was so quick to pummel their predominantly Muslim city. They are also suspicious of the role played by U.S. Special Forces.
With Islamic State fighters losing ground in Iraq and Syria, men and money may shift to Southeast Asia, experts have said. They will find in the southern Philippines an angry and vulnerable population, institutions racked by war, and a government, led by President Rodrigo Duterte, that sees shooting as a way to solve social problems.
In other words: prime recruiting grounds.
In that sense, what happened in Marawi is not the success that Duterte claims but a lesson in the limits of fighting extremism with force alone.

AdamG
01-23-2018, 03:13 PM
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte told the army and police to shoot him if he becomes a dictator or stays beyond his term.
The firebrand leader made the solemn warning on Monday to eliminate speculation that he ordered loyalists in Congress to change the constitution.
His critics have raised concerns about the possible introduction of a federal system which would let him stay in power beyond 2022 when his single term ends.
'If I overstay and wanted to become a dictator, shoot me, I am not joking,' Duterte told soldiers during an army base visit.



http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5298277/Philippine-President-Rodrigo-Duterte-makes-stark-warning.html#ixzz551MNH7Nn

AdamG
02-18-2018, 11:47 AM
Twenty-seven sailors aboard the Philippines ship MV Kudos stopped 12 pirates trying to board the ship in the Basilan sea, by splashing the armed men with the concoction of hot water and oil.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-02-18/ship-crew-repels-pirates-using-medieval-siege-techniques/9459238

AdamG
03-09-2018, 02:17 PM
MANILA (Reuters) - A U.N. special rapporteur, a former Philippine lawmaker and four former Catholic priests are among more than 600 alleged communist guerrillas the Philippines wants declared “terrorists”, according to a government petition filed in court.
The justice ministry last month said it wanted a Manila court to declare the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), “terrorist” bodies, but made no mention of individuals it would also target.
The petition, a copy of which was seen by Reuters, suggests President Rodrigo Duterte is following through on his threats to destroy a movement he now regards as duplicitous.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-rebels/philippines-seeks-terrorist-tag-for-600-alleged-communist-guerrillas-idUSKCN1GK0DO

AdamG
06-30-2018, 04:36 PM
Battle Of Marawi Intense Combat Compilation Of The Philippine Army Battling Terrorists.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bCeVVoKI5hE

davidbfpo
07-01-2018, 09:06 AM
This seems to be a clearer and in places different version:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x5vELx3ie9I

AdamG
01-15-2019, 04:30 AM
File this under 'extraordinarily bad ideas'


Malacañang said it sees no problem with the idea of a Chinese firm with proven track record taking over the debt-saddled Hanjin Philippines after a former Navy official warned against the shipyard falling into "wrong hands."

"Kung Chinese company naman na dati na nating ka-deal at wala namang problema eh di walang isyu. Kung hindi natin kilala eh di siyempre we have to vet para malaman natin," presidential spokesperson Salvador Panelo said in a news conference.

Panelo also said talks about which company will take over Hanjin Philippines remains a speculation at this point.

https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/money/companies/681366/palace-sees-no-problem-with-chinese-firm-take-over-of-hanjin-philippines/story/?fbclid=IwAR2qfpOf9AyfyvpyOwnfmwuJb4k97HWxXjho4ycy BuaYB7XVtXCuzNfNltU

davidbfpo
02-08-2019, 09:33 PM
A rare UK report on the Philippines, albeit by an academic at Oxford University CCW. In summary:
This blog article presents the latest actor dynamics in the Philippines' Moro conflict where two previously contentious separatist groups, namely MILF and MNLF, are now willing to cooperate. This is a momentum that should be carefully and timely seized by the Philippine government to bring some measure of peace to the country's troubled south.
Link:https://conflictplatform.ox.ac.uk/article/fausto-belo-ximenes-the-changing-actor-dynamics-in-the-philippines-moro-conflict

davidbfpo
03-09-2019, 08:13 PM
Worth a peek. Two ex-militants who joined ISIS @ Marawi.
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/09/they-fooled-us-the-men-who-left-isis-in-the-philippines? (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/09/they-fooled-us-the-men-who-left-isis-in-the-philippines?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other)

davidbfpo
03-14-2019, 05:57 PM
Via an Israeli website:
On March 12, 2019, sources in the Philippines reported on two days of fighting between Philippine army forces and ISIS-affiliated operatives on the island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines. The Philippine government ordered its citizens to evacuate several villages. Nine ISIS operatives and one Filipino soldier were killed (benarnews.org, March 12, 2019). Later in the day four more people were reported dead, as well as an ISIS operative killed in an exchange of fire (Philippine News Agency, March 12, 2019). ISIS’s East Asia Province claimed responsibility for killing 10 Filipino soldiers and wounding 10 others (Shabakat Shumukh, March 12, 2019).
Link:https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-global-jihad-march-7-13-2019/