In Afghan War, Officer Becomes a Whistle-Blower

[davidbfpo]

A British think tank contact alerted me to this NYT article 'In Afghan War, Officer Becomes a Whistle-Blower' (it is shown on today's SWJ Blog):http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/world/asia/army-colonel-challenges-pentagons-afghanistan-claims.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&sq=afghanistan&st=cse&scp=2

Slightly edited passage
How many more men must die in support of a mission that is not succeeding? No one expects our leaders to always have a successful plan...But we do expect — and the men who do the living, fighting and dying deserve — to have our leaders tell us the truth about what’s going on.

The US Army Colonel's original article was 'Truth, lies and Afghanistan' and appears in AFJ:http://armedforcesjournal.com/2012/02/8904030

He starts with:
I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.

What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.

The author has his own blogsite and awaits official permission to publish his full, unclassified report on Afghanistan and has some good photos:http://www.afghanreport.com/

This side of the Atlantic I am aware of a few serving British Army officers who have reached similar conclusions and resigned or taken early retirement. I am sure other US military have spoken out, but how many continue to serve and so far without **** falling on them?

Added: there are two SWJ Blog posts on this matter now and a cross-reference has been added: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/midlevel-officers-weigh-risk-reward-of-criticizing-army-leadership-0 and http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/truth-lies-and-afghanistan

[Entropy]

Good on him.

[carl]

From the short CV the LTC provided in the article, he may have well developed career possibilities outside the Army and he appears also to have some political connections. So big Army doesn't have so firm a grasp on his parts and he is able to speak the truth.

But that is the tragedy of the thing, in order to speak the truth, he has to have established something to protect himself from big Army for telling the truth.

[Polarbear1605]

We are hearing this over and over from different sources. Col Davis comments are not new. For example, Bing West’s comments about “benevolent counter insurgency” in his book the Wrong War. I think this raises’ the question: is the US senior military leadership adapting the strategic tapestry to survive and win on the battlefield…or are they adapting to survive the politics of Washington, DC. Viet Nam was a war where our generals could not turn tactical victories into strategy victories. The jury is still out on Iraq but it is not looking good…the same can be said of our Afghanistan War. If our strategy is so effective why have Afghan civilian casualties due to Taliban activities gone up by almost 30% per year since 2007?
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/afghanistan/story/2012-02-04/afghanistan-civilian-deaths/52957246/1

[Vojnik]

From the original AFJ article:


Much of what I saw during my deployment, let alone read or wrote in official reports, I can’t talk about; the information remains classified. But I can say that such reports — mine and others’ — serve to illuminate the gulf between conditions on the ground and official statements of progress.

Now, regardless of whether or not I agree with Davis, what sort of classified reporting is an officer for the Rapid Equipping Force writing?

I'm honestly curious.

[davidoff]

Not to show my stripes too much, but an officer involved with a developing program to provide gear to troops that are under-supplied would definitely know and write about strategic weaknesses of supply (weapons, fuel, food, and other items). This information could result in harm to U.S. forces and would be classified. If not because the items are not available, because the locations are so remote that they are hard to supply and correspondingly hard to hold. In addition, logistics shortfalls on the part of the Defense Logistics Agency, Centcom Contracting Command, or Defense Contract Management Agency would likely be considered strategic in nature, prompting classification. In short, if the U.S. military cannot get supplies to someone in a war that is information that would be worth classifying, as well as the reasons why they cannot. I could be wrong, but I had to stick up for logistics (acquisition/contracting).

[Bob's World]

For what its worth, I think it is inaccurate and unfair to accuse senior military leaders of lying about what is going on in Afghanistan.

I think much more accurately it is simply that their thinking is so narrowly canalized by a mix of military culture of not challenging policy; military doctrine that mischaracterizes the nature of this type of conflict; and the forces of inertia and duty that prompt us to never "quit" but rather to press onward to that light at the end of the tunnel. We delude ourselves of the realities around us when we get sucked into this process. It's human nature.

I will also note that this officer offers no keen insights of his own as to how we might do better. Kind of like telling a drowning man he isn't swimming properly. Thanks for that.

[carl]

Mr. Jones:

Nope. Lying is lying. It is not an excuse that the military as an institution is so distorted that they can't tell the difference between what is and what isn't anymore. That is just a further indictment.

LTC Davis does offer a keen insight about how to improve the situation. Just because it is simple doesn't mean it isn't acute. He advised the military to tell the truth. That is pretty profound.

[Entropy]

For what its worth, I think it is inaccurate and unfair to accuse senior military leaders of lying about what is going on in Afghanistan.

Fair point. Lying implies intent to deceive which we can't prove and we shouldn't simply assume. Maybe gross negligence is fairer? It would actually be better if they were lying - it's much easier to cull a few dishonest bad apples than it is to fix a system which promotes mediocrity and shallow thinking.


I will also note that this officer offers no keen insights of his own as to how we might do better. Kind of like telling a drowning man he isn't swimming properly. Thanks for that.

I think your analogy is wrong. It's appropriate to tell a drowning man he isn't swimming if the drowning man not only believes he's swimming, but also believes he's winning a race. The first step is to get the drowning man to realize his actual circumstances.

As for not offering insights, well, the essay was 2300 words as it stands.

[Polarbear1605]

The descriptor “lying” maybe to strong…maybe not if you are trying to get the attention of a drowning man…”Spin”, as in political spin, might be a better word. The question, however, still stands. Why is the Combat Commander adapting military strategy to politics instead of adapting his strategy to the enemy and the battlefield? Especially, in light of the fact, the COIN debate has been going on for all most a decade and the skeleton’s, with stars still pined to their collars, litter US Afghanistan headquarters.

[Ken White]

Big Whoop. Senior leaders cherry pick 'facts' to support their assigned and implied tasks. Who knew... :rolleyes:

(Not that I would ever mention that all of us tend to do that or that the Media can misconstrue and misreport almost anything, they just don't pay much attention to those of us who aren't senior or publicly exposed)

LTC Davis has written a public 'expose.' Good for him. I think he overstates things a bit (shades of those senior leaders) and I agree with comments elsewhere that he makes some sweeping conclusions based on short term appearance that a deeper look might show deserved modifications to the 'conclusions' derived. However, I really saw nothing in his report that I have not heard from folks who were there, who spent far more time actually doing things instead of looking at others doing them. In short, Ho Hum, what else is new... :wry:

Also, Carl:
Nope. Lying is lying. It is not an excuse that the military as an institution is so distorted that they can't tell the difference between what is and what isn't anymore. That is just a further indictment.It is an indictment and it's a fair charge. However, in addition to not being an excuse, it IS a problem that is quite real. It has been noted by many, including me and thee, however, none of us have been able to come up with a remedy. This:
He advised the military to tell the truth. That is pretty profound.Have to agree with Bob Jones, Davis provided no recommendations of substantive merit. His advice may be profound but it isn't the answer to, as you say "the difference between what is and what isn't anymore." That's not a military problem, not even, it's a national and societal problem, it affects all our politicians from both parties and much of our Media and the Entertainment industry as well as academia. To point out that it exists in a pejorative holier than thou tone is okay I guess but it's unlikely to solve the problem. Pointing fingers rarely achieves much. Davis points fingers bur he won't achieve much. With respect to either lying or distorted views, you're also doing that, so what's the solution?

An added thought

I will also note that many years ago I became aware that a number of Congressional Staffers doing armed forces related work were victims of 'up or out' promotion policies or Reductions In Force. A few also had tried to but failed to enter a service. These folks seemed to harbor some serious resentments toward their former or would have been service -- and often, far less actual knowledge of what was reality then they seemed to believe they possessed (Tags: 'Hell hath no fury like a rejectee,' 'A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.' 'Ex is a has been, a spurt is drip of water under pressure.') :eek:

[Entropy]

Ken,

You're right there is nothing new in what LTC Davis says except that this is an officer who is "breaking ranks" to say what many others have said in private or anonymously. It also comports with the last two Afghanistan NIE's and, as you note, many others who have direct experience in Afghanistan. For people who've followed Afghanistan closely since the invasion, all this is yet more of the Groundhog Day that this war has become. It therefore seems kind of sad that LTC Davis is going to get sacked for stating what most people who know anything about Afghanistan already know.

Also, he's got an unclassified formal report he can't publish pending Army PAO approval and also a classified version he's sent to Congress. I think we should wait and see what this report says (assuming the Army lets him publish it) before suggesting he has no recommendations of substantive merit and is just pointing fingers.

[carl]

Also, Carl:It is an indictment and it's a fair charge. However, in addition to not being an excuse, it IS a problem that is quite real. It has been noted by many, including me and thee, however, none of us have been able to come up with a remedy.

If we don't come up with a remedy, one will be imposed upon us from without. We will be defeated in the next big conflict. We look like incompetent fools in these small wars and we should use that as a wake up call. If we don't, we will be in the position of Prussia after the first losses to Napoleon, only we won't have the English and the Russians available to help us effectuate our reforms.


This:Have to agree with Bob Jones, Davis provided no recommendations of substantive merit. His advice may be profound but it isn't the answer to, as you say "the difference between what is and what isn't anymore." That's not a military problem, not even, it's a national and societal problem, it affects all our politicians from both parties and much of our Media and the Entertainment industry as well as academia. To point out that it exists in a pejorative holier than thou tone is okay I guess but it's unlikely to solve the problem. Pointing fingers rarely achieves much. Davis points fingers bur he won't achieve much. With respect to either lying or distorted views, you're also doing that, so what's the solution?

That is a commonly used argumentative technique to disarm someone who points out what is wrong, "well if you don't have the answer to the problem, don't complain." That is not a valid argument. The flaw still exists whether or not the person who reports it is able to come up with a detailed solution to the problem (especially in an internet point-counterpoint limited to x characters). When the farmer tells the miracle seed salesman that the seeds aren't so miraculous, the seeds aren't miraculous; even if the farmer doesn't have a clue how to make them miraculous.

Isn't saying the complaint is made in a pejorative holier than thou tone, pejorative?

The simple solution is to the problem of lying is to stop. There is no simple solution to the cultural belief that truth isn't sacred. You're right, I don't know how to solve that by my little old self except by pointing out when it isn't being told whenever I can.

As far as the military goes, I do have one suggestion. Close all the military academies. They are institutions that teach from the very beginning, that accomplishment and talent are must yield to seniority, and that rank must not be questioned no matter how stupid it acts.

[slapout9]

As far as the military goes, I do have one suggestion. Close all the military academies. They are institutions that teach from the very beginning, that accomplishment and talent are must yield to seniority, and that rank must not be questioned no matter how stupid it acts.

What an idea.....like I have been saying it is not Communism or Terrorism that will do us in..... it College Degree-ism!!!!! that is the real threat to all Mankind:eek: They have all kinds of degrees but their.... Moms didn't give em no Schoolin....as we say down South.

[Ken White]

If we don't come up with a remedy, one will be imposed upon us from without.True.
That is a commonly used argumentative technique to disarm someone who points out what is wrong, "well if you don't have the answer to the problem, don't complain." That is not a valid argument.We can disagree on that point.
The flaw still exists whether or not the person who reports it is able to come up with a detailed solution to the problem (especially in an internet point-counterpoint limited to x characters).That much of what you're contending is true. But:
Isn't saying the complaint is made in a pejorative holier than thou tone, pejorative?Absolutely.

However, it's not holier than thou. There's nothing wrong and there are many things right with pointing out errors of omission or commission. Not many including me can or will object to that but I personally don't have much use for condescending or sanctimonious tones in so doing. That's a personal thing and admittedly it entails subjective judgement on my part but I don't think it's at all helpful to use such an approach and I think it can take an important message and cause it to be ignored because the delivery method, choice of words or tone obscured the message.
The simple solution is to the problem of lying is to stop. There is no simple solution to the cultural belief that truth isn't sacred. You're right, I don't know how to solve that by my little old self except by pointing out when it isn't being told whenever I can.In order, you're right about the lying and there being no simple solution -- it's a people thing, not a military thing. One can expect the armed forces to be above that -- but one can also expect priests, preachers, teachers, doctors, judges and cops to be above a lot of things. One can be disappointed a lot...

Nothing wrong with pointing it out. However, as someone once said, "There's no sense in being one of those folks who can pi$% people off when he give 'em a ten minute break...":wry:
As far as the military goes, I do have one suggestion. Close all the military academies. They are institutions that teach from the very beginning, that accomplishment and talent are must yield to seniority, and that rank must not be questioned no matter how stupid it acts.Works for me and I agree. How you and I can get that done is another matter. And I suspect most of the Academy grads who read this will put both you and I down as folks to be ignored... ;)

Sort of harsh messages can grate on readers or listeners, people home in on the slam effect and miss the broader, more important message which, in this case is:

The need for immediate, unthinking obedience served a valid military purpose for many centuries but it has become a harmful anachronism in the last 100 or so years.

[Ken White]

I think we should wait and see what this report says (assuming the Army lets him publish it) before suggesting he has no recommendations of substantive merit and is just pointing fingers.He may or may not have some excellent recommendations -- however, my comment addressed his article and it contained no hints that I saw of any such. As you say, we'll see.

As I wrote just above "There's no sense in being one of those folks who can pi$% people off when he give 'em a ten minute break..." I fear his publication may negate any p[otential good he might have in the reports.

[carl]

What an idea.....like I have been saying it is not Communism or Terrorism that will do us in..... it College Degree-ism!!!!! that is the real threat to all Mankind:eek: They have all kinds of degrees but their.... Moms didn't give em no Schoolin....as we say down South.

Slap! I was wondering where you'd gone to. Glad to see you back.

[carl]

Not many including me can or will object to that but I personally don't have much use for condescending or sanctimonious tones in so doing. That's a personal thing and admittedly it entails subjective judgement on my part but I don't think it's at all helpful to use such an approach and I think it can take an important message and cause it to be ignored because the delivery method, choice of words or tone obscured the message.


However, as someone once said, "There's no sense in being one of those folks who can pi$% people off when he give 'em a ten minute break...":wry

I can see merit in what you say. I do have trouble with being forceful without my delivery being offputting. But I can only write like I can write. I will try to be conscious of that though, because as you say below:


Sort of harsh messages can grate on readers or listeners, people home in on the slam effect and miss the broader, more important message which, in this case is:

The need for immediate, unthinking obedience served a valid military purpose for many centuries but it has become a harmful anachronism in the last 100 or so years.

Your point is a vital one and I would like to help get it across.

Do you think some of the principles of cockpit resource management might be persuasive on that point? Air safety has improved immensely because of the that, the prime idea being that the captain is not an infallible god, just the man in charge of making sure that the capabilities of all the crew members are used to their fullest extent in order to insure the safe completion of the flight.

[Entropy]

He may or may not have some excellent recommendations -- however, my comment addressed his article and it contained no hints that I saw of any such. As you say, we'll see.

As I wrote just above "There's no sense in being one of those folks who can pi$% people off when he give 'em a ten minute break..." I fear his publication may negate any p[otential good he might have in the reports.

Ok, but most of it is pretty self evident. His main charge is that the senior military leadership are not telling the "truth" about our lack of success in Afghanistan - they are, at best, being overly optimistic. I don't think he needs to give an explicit recommendation for that because it's pretty obvious what he wants to change.

[Bob's World]

Reports on the growth of the ANA and ANP; expansion of VSO sites and ALP growth; numbers of HVTs taken in night raids and drone strikes, areas "cleared", development projects completed, rises or drops in numbers of various types of attacks, etc, etc are all reported with what I believe is good faith honesty.

My gripe is that we focus on and measure the wrong things. We are making tremendous progress, but that does not equate necessarily to success. As the old saying goes, "we don't know where we're going, but we're making good time!" I have my own opinion on how to succeed in Afghanistan, and it is a minority one. The one held by senior leaders in country is a majority one in military circles. It is reasoanble, though I believe, misguided.

Some believe success demands hard action against Pakistan. Military leaders can't do much about that.

Some believe success demands hard pressure on Karzai to reform governance to better include those not affiliated with the old Northern Alliance. Military leaders can't do much about that either.

We have a flawed fundamental understanding of the problem, we have an inflated perspective on the dangers of the problem, and we have an overall strategic design shaped by those two miscalulations. That we are off track is to be expected, and no amount of hard military effort can fix that. This is all exacerbated by a military organization caught up in the inertia of its own doctrine, history and sense of "what works."

I agree that this conflict is not going well, but also recognize that until generals are willing to go to the White House and argue for a radical change of policy, rather than minor changes of manning and tactics, that is unlikely to change. We don't need a MacArthur who can only see success in expanding the fight; but rather a Roberts (Great Britain, 1880), who recognizes that the greatest success comes from simply walking away and being willing to work with whoever happens to be incharge if something important should happen to come up at some point in the future.

My advice to President Obama? Listen to General Roberts. For those unfamiliar with that advice:

"We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan,
and the best thing to do is to leave it as
much as possible to itself. It may not be very
flattering to our 'amour propre', but I feel
sure I am right when I say that the less the
Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us.

Should Russia in future years attempt to
conquer Afghanistan, or invade India
through it, we should have a better chance
of attaching the Afghans to our interest if
we avoid all interference with them in the
meantime." Lord Frederick “Bobs” Roberts of Kandahar, 1880

[Polarbear1605]

http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2012/02/08/35169/#more-35169
isn't there something I usually say about new ideas and old books???;)

[Entropy]

http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2012/02/08/35169/#more-35169
isn't there something I usually say about new ideas and old books???;)

Interesting. The same site also has a letter from LTC Davis with additional information:
(http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2012/02/07/35159/)


Scott Shane from the New York Times will publish a story on the actions I’ve taken, and the Armed Forces Journal will simultaneously publish an article i’ve written explaining why I submitted a Department of Defense Inspector General complaint against select senior leaders of the Armed Forces for so being so deceptive to the US Congress and American people that the truth is no longer recognizable — and the biggest bill-payer for this deception has been the lives and bodies of America’s service men and women.

and


Part of my AFJ article includes a link to a web site I set up for the purpose of hanging the unclassified report for everyone to see (the AFJ article is only 2,400 words, while the unclassified report is 86 pages; the classified report is 58 pages). However, there is a battle within the Army Public Affairs on releasing the document, which I submitted for review on 20 January – the same day I disclosed to the Army’s senior leaders and my chain of command what was coming. Officers from the Army Media Relations department tried to pry it loose on Friday because they believe it is the right thing to do, but someone – they didn’t tell me who – overruled them and said it would take longer still…

more at the link.

[Ken White]

Do you think some of the principles of cockpit resource management might be persuasive on that point? Air safety has improved immensely because of the that, the prime idea being that the captain is not an infallible god, just the man in charge of making sure that the capabilities of all the crew members are used to their fullest extent in order to insure the safe completion of the flight.Given the issue: "The need for immediate, unthinking obedience served a valid military purpose for many centuries but it has become a harmful anachronism in the last 100 or so years" and a need to adjust to more thoughtful methodologies, cockpit management techniques can be helpful but it is a really knotty problem -- if it weren't, it would not still be a problem 100 years later...:o

In armed combat, there are always multiple opposing factors at play:

- A need for instant response versus a need to assess and respond thoughtfully.

- A need for tasks to be completed versus a desire to live through the effort.

- A need for obedience to orders versus a requirement for sensible demurral.

- A need for subordination to team goals versus the necessity of individual moral strength.

There are a few, anyone could name a dozen others. Those dichotomies led to the European (among others...) hearth style of 'unthinking' obedience to orders and total loyalty to the Crown, cause or force. Both those factors have merit and are sometimes -- even quite often -- militarily desirable -- however, thoughtful non compliance and deviation form a directed course are also frequently desirable and that loyalty has to be strong enough to speak truth to power. Good commanders instinctively know and cultivate these ideas and manage the conflicts to lead successful units. So it would seem the or certainly 'a' solution is to simply select 'good' commanders. That, however, is not possible for a variety of reasons.

One reason is the number required. There may not be an adequate pool of persons available so some less than stellar souls may have to command. Another is the variability of humans and circumstances; Good Company Commanders do not always do well at Battalion Command (Conversely a poor Battalion Commander may turn into an excellent Brigade or higher commander). Peace versus war bring out some interesting contrasts. Yet another are societal or statutory pressures or requirements (of which the US Army is prime example...). All sorts of things can impact the ability to select only the best as Commanders. So the 'system' has to be designed to cope with that shortfall. That pushes for extreme loyalty upward but not so much downward and for obedience.

In my view, combat requirements should dictate response in all things. I sadly discovered many senior people in the Armed Forces did not share that view -- then I even more sadly discovered that our elected leaders were even less supportive of that idea -- they wanted Armed Forces that were 'representative' of society and that operated with policies that were fair and criteria that were 'objective.' Who could argue with that? Many could, few did -- so that's the way we operate. Combat capability is not a major issue with most politicians. So the 'system' has to cope with that shortfall. That emphasizes form over function...

Given those and other such shortfalls, the Troops have to be a meld of thinking persons and rapidly responding automatons. Surprisingly, they do that fairly well and if we eliminate our terribly flawed Task, Condition and Standard based training process (which literally demands unthinking adherence to someone's idea of what a condition might be and what standard one might derive under those conditions), they are capable of doing so much more than we now allow them to do.

The terrible thing is that the Army in the late 1950s and early 1960s was actually, as a result of World War II and Korean experience, in the process of developing thinking combat oriented self discipline as a counter to the old lock step methods. Unfortunately, along came Robert Strange McNamara with his management by objectives, total adherence to the party line approach and Viet Nam. After Viet Nam in an effort to cope with the McNamara-Johnson dictated Project 100,000 (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_100,000) debacle, the Army decided to go to an industrially based civilian training process which was great for training assembly line workers but lousy for training soldiers. It is noteworthy that the training process was being discarded by industry as not adequately responsive to changing needs for thinking workers just as the Army moved to adopt it. :rolleyes:

It is also noteworthy that the adverse impacts of Project 100,000 both through the flawed BTMS training process and personnel policies are still affecting the Army today and the knock on effect impact the other services.

So. After all that, the answer, I think is that, yes, Cockpit Management Techniques as a model would be beneficial because it is Outcome Based Training and Education. OBTE emphasizes desired end results and not getting 'Goes' on mundane tasks that no one knows how to integrate and that therefor insist on non-thinkers. The Army has made much noise about teaching people "how to think and not what to think." They may eventually get around to actually doing that. Firing all the senior civilians at TRADOC might help...

The real issue is that such 'discipline' was necessary to get people to put up with the privations and perils imposed by combat in earlier eras. As I said, 100 years we knew that was no longer valid -- yet we're still using old methods and models mostly due to legalistic and societal pressures. Those old methods do work -- not well, but marginally and military forces are conservative, they are reluctant to cast aside things that work, no matter how poorly, because changes may not work as well...

We could do and be so much better...

[slapout9]

The terrible thing is that the Army in the late 1950s and early 1960s was actually, as a result of World War II and Korean experience, in the process of developing thinking combat oriented self discipline as a counter to the old lock step methods. Unfortunately, along came Robert Strange McNamara with his management by objectives, total adherence to the party line approach and Viet Nam. After Viet Nam in an effort to cope with the McNamara-Johnson dictated Project 100,000 (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_100,000) debacle, the Army decided to go to an industrially based civilian training process which was great for training assembly line workers but lousy for training soldiers. It is noteworthy that the training process was being discarded by industry as not adequately responsive to changing needs for thinking workers just as the Army moved to adopt it. :rolleyes:




You said a mouthful there!

[Entropy]

LTC Davis' unclassified report, courtesy of Rolling Stone (http://www1.rollingstone.com/extras/RS_REPORT.pdf)(PDF File).

[Ken White]

Read and being digested... ;)

Initial impression, much truth -- most really known to the cognoscenti -- some over statement and some excessive simplification (Taliban and US casualty issues both in that category).

Broad take: Well, yeah -- but he's attacking the symptoms not the problem. People are doing what society and the system indicate they should be doing. Societal change is extremely difficult, system change only a little easier...

We'll see.

[Entropy]

Thanks Ken. I haven't had a chance to read it yet - will get to it this weekend.

[davidbfpo]

I have read the report and it does make some key observations, notably on the Sunni Awakening and Afghanistan.

It is marred sadly by some strange editing and formatting errors, notably when tables are used.

Worth reading? Yes. I expect the themes will resonate far more in the USA.

[omarali50]

Many people far more capable than me can suggest many better alternatives, but even someone like me can see that the better alternatives involve too much readjustment in worldview and habit to be likely.
What is likely is this:
1. Nobody wants to be defeated in a rout. So the top priority will be to find some way to make a deal with the Taliban/ISI that permits the US to leave in good order and to announce victory on their way out.
2. Such a deal will be very hard to make and step by step the negotiators will accept outlandish compromises that even professional bureaucrats would have considered unacceptable and dishonorable at the git go.
3. Even though it will be impossible to get anywhere close to the "this" that was imagined in "lets call this a victory" in 2011 planning sessions, some pathetic facsimile will be labelled thus and the US will get out.
4. THEN the fun will begin in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
5. Even though promises of money and UN this and EU that will have been made and there will be strong incentive to pretend that the US is in love with its helpful friend and ally, once the place starts to fall apart, Pakistan will suddenly become public enemy number one and all promises of help and eternal friendship will be broken from the US side as well. The event will be presented as the sudden discovery of some new unimaginable betrayal and will be grossly unfair and even untrue in that narrow sense.
6. GHQ will not even get one year to enjoy "strategic victory".
THis is, of course, a somewhat Pakistani POV. From the US POV, the sooner the whole mess becomes a distant memory, the better.
I am not having a good day.
On other days, I am more optimistic.

[jmm99]

The title of the unclassified report is Dereliction of Duty II (http://www1.rollingstone.com/extras/RS_REPORT.pdf).

Is there a "Dereliction of Duty I" ?

Use of the UCMJ term "Dereliction of Duty" is ironic in light of what we've just had "settled" for us.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

LINK (http://www.amazon.com/Dereliction-Duty-Johnson-McNamara-Vietnam/dp/0060929081/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1328995569&sr=1-1)

Good book.

Clever author, that Davis fellow...

[jmm99]

McMaster's "Dereliction of Duty" is an outstanding book, ideally suited for lovers of the Johnson-McNamara couplet.

I was just checking to make sure that Davis didn't have a "Dereliction of Duty I" - usually the first in a mutiple part series is better than the successor(s). ;)

Regards

Mike