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View Full Version : Vote: have we lost in Iraq?



Fabius Maximus
11-22-2006, 05:38 AM
As of today, is the outcome inevitable? If so, what outcome? Please explain why you believe this is so.

I have written 20 articles on the Iraq War, going back to Summer 2003. Initially pessimistic, like Lind and Prof. van Creveld, moving to gloomy, then certain that we've lost. The only remaining questions are when we'll give up, and how much we will have lost in blood, money, and influence.

My articles are at DNI. Here is the latest, with links to the others at the end:
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_iraq_sitrep_11-2006.htm

What are your views?

bspeer
11-22-2006, 12:51 PM
"Contributed to Defense and the National Interest by Fabius Maximus, an amateur military historian."

Well, I skimmed your article.....

...your analysis is vastly flawed and filled with inaccuracies...
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Starting off on SWC with your first post being a personal attack is not a good thing.

Since you clearly disagree with FM's linked material, then the appropriate reply is to post a substantive statement addressing the perceived weaknesses of the other's material.
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Fabius Maximus
11-22-2006, 01:40 PM
my forecasts -- however gloomy -- have proven fairly accurate. Certainly more accurate than those of the War's proponents. Perhaps that is more important than the external details you mention.

Also, my comments are not unique or distinctive. The A-team writers on DNI, the real experts, seem to share my views: Lind, van Creveld, etc.

So, bspeer, why not share your views. Correct our facts, give us your analysis and forecasts!

jcustis
11-22-2006, 01:41 PM
bspeer,

(moderator hat on) If you have a deeper axe against what Fabius has written and linked to, please take it to PMs. Otherwise, feel free to expand on your thoughts by outlining any believed inaccuracies, so others can reflect as well.

Ray Levesque
11-22-2006, 03:03 PM
Although I did vote, the question brings up the issue of how do we define success in Iraq? What is a win or what is a loss? Are we talking about a military win or a political win?

Personnally I believe that wars are fought to achieve political goals (shades of Clausewitz). Therefore any win in Iraq must be based on the political goal, which is a liberal democracy. The military is part of the solution and the military strategy should help lead to the political goal.

Sooooo....the point is.....in any discussion about whether we're winning or not we each may have our own definition of what the "win" is.

Just a random thought..

Ray

Fabius Maximus
11-22-2006, 03:11 PM
Great point. Here is an excerpt from Part 2 of my Sitrep on Iraq (posting later this week):

"Victory will be the day when the Iraqis solve their political problems and are up and running with respect to their own government, and when they're able to provide for their own security."
Vice President Cheney interview in Time Magazine, October 30,2006

Victory would mean producing in Iraq "a government that can defend, govern and sustain itself."
President Bush, the day after the election

I suspect President Bush means or intends for the Iraq gov't to be allied with us. Would a gov't headed by bin Laden meet his vicotry criteria?

These statements are far more modest than our two previous goal statements.

First there was, according to Bob Woodward, a top-secret National Security Presidential Directive signed August 29, 2002 entitled "Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy.”

Second there was the “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” announced by President Bush on November 30, 2005.

Ray Levesque
11-22-2006, 04:05 PM
Yeah, my problem with the 2006 comments are that they represent a political change to the definition of victory. As you noted, they are "more modest." If you move the goal posts far enough you can claim Vietnam was a victory for the U.S.

Not that moving the goal posts isn't common -- after all, we tend to forget that the reason we went to war against Germany in WWII was because of their invasion of Poland (oh, and the Russians invaded, too). Yet, in the end, Poland was still an occupied state -- occupied by one of the original invaders.

Ray

Tom Odom
11-22-2006, 05:03 PM
I would say that it is not only a question of defining victory. It is inherently at this stage also a question of defining defeat. Both of those issues were either poorly defined (victory) or not addressed at all (defeat). In a regional context and a local context, they play against us, heavily. The opposition--again another one of those ill-defined concepts that has as we all know evolved over the past several years--does not have to define victory. They simply have to avoid losing, that being defined as their destruction and/or the mobilization of what constitutes an "Iraqi society" at this stage--yet another ill-defined concept to say the least.

And at the risk of saying I have said this before, the truly operative defintions are those set by the "Iraqi" people. If they first redefine themselves along ethnic and sectarian lines then they are very much altering the right and left limits of what we discuss as victory or defeat. And that paradigm also affects how they define their own victory. When it was a case of insurgency, then as I said above victory for the insurgents was a case of the insurgents not losing. Victory for the remainder of Iraqis was determinable by how they aligned themselves in that fight. For the majority as is the case in most insurgencies victory was simple survival in the hopes of betterment for their lives. In the situation now with ethnic and sectarian fault lines grating, victory and defeat for the "Iraqi" people is no longer truly operative. Victory and defeat are according to group and that is a zero sum game--the classic dillema in such conflicts--because any win means that somebody lost and lost big. In that case they can no longer hope to win by avoiding defeat; they have to win in absolute terms, knowing the alternative is absolute defeat.

best

Tom

bspeer
11-22-2006, 05:12 PM
I am sorry if my comments were viewed as a personl attack. My point is and always will be that posting in anonymity is not the way legitimate historians approach issues, especialyl if they expect serious discussion of their points.

Once again, I apologize.

bs

Culpeper
11-23-2006, 01:17 AM
Even so far, both sides in play.

I don't see either side even reaching their goals. Both sides are losing. One side has to win while the other side only doesn't have to lose. So far, my vote is the Lone Ranger on this poll. The Coalition isn't exactly winning the hearts and minds of the population in the hot spots and the insurgency is going overboard by disregarding the hearts and minds of the population through Murder Incorporated. And to top it all off there is no single insurgency. Their collective plan and performance, for a lack of better words, is worse than ours! Not only are they dealing with the war against the Coalition they are fighting each other as well.

BTW, I posted first then read through the thread. There are some outstanding posts in this thread.

ssfeldjager
11-23-2006, 02:33 AM
...after all, we tend to forget that the reason we went to war against Germany in WWII was because of their invasion of Poland (oh, and the Russians invaded, too). Yet, in the end, Poland was still an occupied state -- occupied by one of the original invaders. Ray

"We went to war"? Who is the "we" in this context? The US? The UK? France? Remember, the US didn't have a war with Germany until after 7 Dec 1941, when Germany declared war against the US; the US didn't declare against Germany first. It was reciprocal.

Fabius Maximus
11-23-2006, 03:22 AM
You raise a great point -- which I deliberately omitted from the question to keep the discussion focused. We may be losing, but that does not mean anyone is winning! War is not a zero sum game -- everyone loses if "Chaos" wins.

Culpeper
11-23-2006, 05:26 AM
"We went to war"? Who is the "we" in this context? The US? The UK? France? Remember, the US didn't have a war with Germany until after 7 Dec 1941, when Germany declared war against the US; the US didn't declare against Germany first. It was reciprocal.

Welcome to the forum.

I took it meaning "we" as in "World" War. It doesn't change the context. Poland still ended up behind the Iron Curtain, the world considered WWII a victory, we lost an ally in that war and gained an enemy throughout the Cold War. The "we", is the United States, Britain, and France, et al. I understood the premise of the post without going down the road heading towards FDRs "Europe First", Churchill's unlikely chill up his back on 7-Dec-41, and the look on de Gaulle's face knowing he would have to take a back seat because the Americans were now totally involved. The end to the mean was a victory for the allies. Including the USSR. The so-called mindset of today would consider the outcome of Europe after WWII a major screw up. But that doesn't make it so. The world generally looks upon the end of WWII as a victory. That would also include Germany, Italy , and Japan that was rebuilt. They certainly are no longer our enemies. The only people grumbling about it might be certain Middle Eastern countries/cultures that loved Hitler and hated Churchill. Which bring us to such dealings with fascist Baathists and today's newest battles following Word War II's footsteps. Historically speaking, not much as changed since the first world war. Except the people, places, and things. The first and second world wars were victories, Korea a stalemate still going on today, Vietnam may have been a defeat until it too dies on the vine, and so on but they can all be tied together one way or the other. The victorious war to end all wars ended up creating more wars. "We" win some and "we" lose some but there is always the next one.

Danny
11-23-2006, 07:17 AM
"bspeer," I cannot imagine what you have done to "offend" anyone. Good Grief! Much harder criticism is proferred to my posts on my own web site. Warfare is hard and emotional business. Concerning Iraq, we have not lost it yet. The future has not yet happened, and as argued on my web site thematically, "force projection" is the key.

Do we have the collective will as a nation? That is another story. Our children will tell it to their children.

Jones_RE
11-23-2006, 04:43 PM
I think the relevant questions are: how do our enemies define defeat and victory?

Specifically: how to Sunni insurgents define them? Al Qaeda in Iraq? The Mahdi Army and Badr Brigades? Run of the mill criminals? We've got five enemies out there in Iraq right now - and what they're after tells us a lot about what we need to do.

I'd venture that the Sunni insurgents define victory as: a retreat by US occupation forces from Iraq, dominance of at least the Sunni triangle, and enough of the oil revenues to stay in business. They'd define defeat as an unresisted occupation by US or Iraqi government forces (i.e. the local population turning to the US as the legitimate authority), economic privation through loss of oil money, and political or military domination by Shiites.

Al Qaeda in Iraq would define defeat as the crippling of their operational cells in Iraq at an acceptable cost to "the West." Note that crippling may not mean shooting everyone or putting them in jail - if they run out of useful targets or get run out of the country by the locals that's as much of a defeat. Victory (against the US) would consist of driving US troops out of the region on a permanent basis. Everything else is a means to that end.

The Badr Brigades and Mahdi Army are seeking a government of Iraq based in Shiite Islam, revenge for Sunni atrocities and control of oil revenue. Note that this is a goal local to their organization. They don't want oil revenue for Shiites, they want it for their members. They are subnational entities which command a patriotic loyalty from their membership. The Mahdi Army additionally does not wish to full under foreign occupation, so they've got to get rid of the US at some point. Defeat would consist of an oil sharing deal that favors Sunnis, or the inability of their armed and political wings to operate effectively.

Garden variety criminals simply want to turn a profit and remain alive and out of jail. Defeat is anything that interferes with those goals.

Thus far, I'd hazard a guess that the Sunni insurgency is headed towards defeat. It's only a matter of time before the weight of numbers begins to tell and the Shiites rip them to shreds.

slapout9
11-23-2006, 05:41 PM
JONES RE, that is a pretty sharp analysis of the internal situation. What are your thoughts on the impact of Syria and Iran??

SWJED
11-24-2006, 09:34 AM
24 November Los Angeles Times - Iraq Strategy Takes Page from Vietnam Playbook (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-na-vietnam24nov24,0,3471507.story?coll=la-home-headlines) by Peter Spiegel.


New tactics favored by U.S. commanders in Iraq borrow heavily from the end of another war that might seem an unlikely source for a winning strategy: Vietnam.

The tactics — an influx of military advisors and a speeded-up handover to indigenous forces followed by a gradual U.S. withdrawal — resemble those in place as the U.S. effort in Vietnam reached its end.

In historical assessments and the American recollection, Vietnam was the unwinnable war. But to many in the armed forces, Vietnam as a war actually was on its way to succeeding when the Nixon administration and Congress, bowing to public impatience, pulled the plug: first withdrawing U.S. combat forces and then blocking funding and supplies to the South Vietnamese army.

If they hadn't, the South Vietnamese army, which had been bolstered by U.S. advisors and a more focused "hearts and minds" campaign in the later stages of the war, could have been able to fend off the communist North, many leading military thinkers have argued.

In their view, progress was undermined by President Nixon's decision to begin withdrawing U.S. troops in 1969 in the face of political pressure at home, despite military objections that the South Vietnamese army was not ready to go it alone. Another key U.S. mistake, they contend, was the deep cuts Congress made to military aid to Saigon beginning in 1974.

For many in the military, the lessons of Vietnam are clear: Maintain public support, and be patient...

Tc2642
11-24-2006, 12:11 PM
For many in the military, the lessons of Vietnam are clear: Maintain public support, and be patient...

Trouble with that analysis is that public support was lost in Vietnam and has been lost in Iraq, pretty much game set and match for the insurgents. I am sure the military would have wanted to keep the conflict going, but without the support of the people it's a moot point. The Hearts and mind's strategy was needed at the beginning of the (Iraq) conflict, while it may have some small impact now, I think its a case of shutting the gate after the horse has bolted.

Fabius Maximus
11-24-2006, 03:09 PM
Thanks for posting a link to this fascinating article. The Iraq War run as boomer nostalgia, that's something to consider.

But what is this "Iraq" they speak of? A brightly colored space on the map, certainly. A State, with a government capable of weilding an army -- not likely. A nation-state, certainly not now (or "no more", or perhaps "not yet").

How many wars hve been lost through small but critical false assumptions, like this?

SWJED
11-24-2006, 03:22 PM
24 November Chicago Sun-Times commentary - Dividing Iraq Might Multiply Problems (http://www.suntimes.com/news/otherviews/148075,CST-EDT-REF24A.article) by Jaroslav Tir and Paul F. Diehl.


... Our research indicates that the best time to divide a country along ethnic or religious lines is before tensions escalate to civil war or large-scale violence. Since 1900, mini-states that emerge from peaceful breakups of countries have a 95 percent success rate in avoiding militarized confrontations with each other.

The bad news is that the optimal time to partition Iraq has passed. The months soon after Saddam Hussein's removal from power in 2003 -- that is, before Iraqi politics came to be dominated by extremist leaders advocating sectarian violence -- provided a window of opportunity for dividing the Iraqi state...

The partition scenario that now faces Iraq is not as desirable as it once was, but neither is it hopeless. A partition designed to stop a civil war runs the risk of transforming the conflict into an international battleground between the mini-states (e.g., the 1998 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea).

One might similarly worry about Sunni and Shiite states clashing in the future. Based on past cases of partition carried out after civil war, this is a 50-50 proposition. There is also the risk that the new states will fall prey to future civil wars, but this occurs only a third of the time. Thus, there is reason to hope that a divided Iraq could avoid future problems, but several risks loom on the horizon.

Given that the Kurdish northern part of Iraq is generally stable and that there is relatively little violence between the Kurds and other major groups, the separation of the Kurds from Iraq could reinforce peace in the north. Yet, this could also activate a potentially dangerous territorial dispute with Turkey, which has a large and rebellious Kurdish population within its own southeastern borders. Any attempts to expand a nascent Kurdish state could ignite a war with Turkey (and perhaps with Iran and Syria as each has significant Kurdish populations). Securing Turkish cooperation for any plan is essential.

The more problematic scenario is presented by the potential Sunni-Shiite separation. The present sectarian violence suggests that the Shiite and Sunni states would not only be predisposed to fight each other after the separation, but also to experience future civil wars within their own mini-states...

SWJED
11-24-2006, 03:29 PM
4 December issue of the Weekly Standard - We Can Put More Forces in Iraq - and they Would Make a Difference (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/994zsofb.asp) by Frederick Kagan.


Many months into the debate over finding a new strategy in Iraq, two myths continue to cloud the discussion. The Washington Post recently proclaimed: "The United States and its allies in Iraq would need at least 500,000 and perhaps more than 1 million troops" to bring order to the country. Incoming House majority leader Steny Hoyer declared: "As a practical matter, there are no troops to increase with." Neither of these statements is true. The persistence of these myths forecloses serious consideration of the only option likely to bring peace to Iraq.

Relevant historical examples do not support the notion that hundreds of thousands more troops are needed to improve security in Iraq. A study of post-conflict operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and elsewhere conducted by Ambassador James Dobbins showed that success in those operations--characterized by severe ethnic and sectarian violence--required force ratios of 1 soldier per 100 inhabitants. Iraq poses challenges that are in some respects more severe, at the moment, but it also offers its own rules-of-thumb. Successful clear-and-hold operations in Tal Afar required a force ratio of around 1 soldier (counting both U.S. and Iraqi troops) for every 40 inhabitants. On the other hand, in 2004 Major General Peter Chiarelli suppressed a widespread uprising in Sadr City (an area inhabited by about 2.5 million Shiites) with fewer than 20,000 U.S. soldiers--a ratio of about 1 to 125.

Then there's the question of the size of the population to be pacified. Most of Iraq is relatively calm. Instances of violence in the Kurdish north and the Shia south are rare. No responsible analyst advocates sending large numbers of troops into either area--they are not needed and would not be welcomed. Disarming the Shia militias is a process that must be undertaken only after the Sunni Arab insurgency is under control, and it cannot be undertaken primarily by American forces directly confronting the Shiite population. Using all of Iraq's 27 million people as a baseline for estimating force ratios is, therefore, an invalid approach.

The U.S. command repeatedly and correctly points out that about 80 percent of the violence in Iraq occurs within a 35-mile radius of Baghdad, among a population of perhaps 10 million. Baghdad itself has roughly 6.5 million inhabitants, including the 2.5 million Shiites in Sadr City. These figures provide the basis for a more realistic estimate of the force levels needed. Applying the high-end ratio used in Tal Afar over the entire metropolitan Baghdad area would generate a requirement of 250,000 troops--both U.S. and Iraqi. There are currently about 100,000 Iraqi army troops that the U.S. command considers trained and ready. There are almost 150,000 American troops in Iraq now, including perhaps 70,000 combat troops. Conducting Tal Afar-type operations across the entire capital region all at once would require concentrating all available forces in the area and a "surge" of about 80,000 U.S. soldiers--a large number, to be sure, but very far from the "hundreds of thousands" or even "millions" generated by the use of specious historical examples.

But the situation is not even this dire. Not all areas of the capital region require such an intensive deployment. Indeed, previous successful operations even in Baghdad did not require such high force ratios. What's more, skillful military planners conduct operations in phases, and that is exactly how this one should be prepared and executed. The recent unsuccessful effort to secure Baghdad, Operation Together Forward II, was broken into a series of phases. U.S. and Iraqi troops working together succeeded in clearing the neighborhoods they entered one after the other. But that is not why the operation failed. The problem, according to much anecdotal evidence and the recent testimony of the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Michael D. Maples, is that the U.S. military command did not leave American forces behind in the areas that had been cleared. That mistake allowed insurgents to reinfiltrate those neighborhoods and begin the cycle of violence again.

There is every reason to believe that a reformulated operation, proceeding in phases to clear Baghdad neighborhood by neighborhood, but with sufficient force levels to leave significant American troops behind in the cleared areas, would be much more successful...

Much more at the link...

Culpeper
11-24-2006, 06:18 PM
The U.S. command repeatedly and correctly points out that about 80 percent of the violence in Iraq occurs within a 35-mile radius of Baghdad, among a population of perhaps 10 million. Baghdad itself has roughly 6.5 million inhabitants, including the 2.5 million Shiites in Sadr City.

Well than for crying-out-loud, let them kill each other in that radius until they had enough. We're not talking about the entire country of Iraq. It's a 35 mile radius. What we have here is a riot taking place. Send in the LAPD advisors.

SWJED
11-25-2006, 01:10 AM
25 November The Australian - U.S. Didn't Have Enough Troops in Baghdad (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20817543-601,00.html) by Kate Legge.


Australia's Commander-in-Chief, Governor-General Michael Jeffery, believes a lack of troops on the ground in the weeks after the US-led coalition went into Iraq hampered efforts to secure Baghdad.

In an interview with The Weekend Australian Magazine, Major General Jeffery contrasted early tactics in Iraq with the counter-insurgency campaign he led in Phuoc Tuy province during the Vietnam War. "We were charged with winning the hearts and minds of local people and ensuring they were safe, which is the antithesis of what's happening in Baghdad. People aren't safe," he said.

Major General Jeffery served in Borneo, Malaya, Papua New Guinea and Vietnam during a 40-year military career.

As Commander-in-Chief he receives regular briefings from the defence chiefs on troop deployments, not policy.

He will not say whether Australia's involvement in Iraq is right or wrong because he won't comment on operational matters. However, he defends Australia's intervention in Vietnam.

"Going in there was right," said Major General Jeffery, who was awarded the Military Cross.

Reflecting on the initial phase of the Iraqi conflict, in March 2003, the Governor-General said: "There weren't enough soldiers to seal Baghdad off."

"Because that didn't take place everything went counter to the way the coalition and the Iraqi Government were hoping.

"A lack of troops, a lack of police, the structures weren't there, the numbers weren't there and this is a vitally important time immediately after the first battles."...

Steve Blair
11-25-2006, 02:01 AM
Once again they rehash the obvious. Of course more troops should have been there. They were not. We can't turn back time and change that.

I also agree with Jones_RE about victory. How we define our victory may be meaningless in the context of our enemies' view of victory. The US often seems adrift when victory is something other than (to paraphrase Conan) "to crush our enemies, see them driven before us, and hear the lamentations of their women." If we're pushed out of the total victory plane, we suddenly become clueless.

Methinks yet again we're spending too much time looking at our definition and not enough looking at that of our enemies.

SWJED
11-25-2006, 03:18 PM
25 November Baltimore Sun - U.S. Tests Indirect Approach in Iraq (http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.advisers25nov25,0,1707735.story?coll=bal-home-headlines) by David Wood.


Tens of thousands of American troops are shifting from combat operations against insurgents to training, advising and supporting Iraqi security forces in what military officials say will require a long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq.

Rather than allowing American troops to withdraw to the sidelines, the new campaign will keep them directly in the violent middle ground between Iraq's warring factions, as increasing numbers of soldiers and Marines embed as combat advisers with Iraqi army and paramilitary police units. Already, some 6,000 Americans serve as advisers with Iraqi police units, for instance, in high-risk operations similar to those that have killed 4,000 Iraqi police officers over the past two years.

The latest strategic phase, which began this fall and will accelerate in the months ahead, may even require a short-term increase from the 141,000 U.S. troops currently serving in Iraq, senior commanders have said.

In addition to the advisers, thousands of other U.S. troops are directly supporting Iraq's security forces with communications, logistics and transportation expertise, running convoys and maintenance depots, and providing air support and other assistance the Iraqi units need to operate.

To protect all these American military personnel - the final numbers aren't yet determined - a sizable "force protection package" will be required in Iraq: quick-reaction combat forces, search and rescue teams, and attack and transport helicopters and strike fighters. These U.S. forces, in turn, will require their own maintenance, logistics, medical, administrative and other support...

Bill Moore
11-25-2006, 04:00 PM
I hope this strategy works, but I still don't think the main issue is the ability of the Iraqi security forces to fight, rather it is their will. To borrow John Robb's phraseology from his global guerrilla website, the Iraqi people have converted to primary loyalties based on tribe, not nation. Perhaps our embeded advisors will encourage them to fight for Iraq. In a short period of time I guess we'll see.

Jedburgh
11-25-2006, 05:01 PM
... I still don't think the main issue is the ability of the Iraqi security forces to fight, rather it is their will. To borrow John Robb's phraseology from his global guerrilla website, the Iraqi people have converted to primary loyalties based on tribe, not nation...
I agree 100%. The "lack of will" applies to loyalty to the nation of Iraq taking second place to sectarian/ethnic loyalty among members of the security forces. Unfortunately, with the continuing descent into ever more bitter sectarian conflict, this tendency will continue to expand and fragment the security forces.

There is no easy solution - we are damn near being caught in a Catch-22.

Culpeper
11-25-2006, 06:21 PM
I agree 100%. The "lack of will" applies to loyalty to the nation of Iraq taking second place to sectarian/ethnic loyalty among members of the security forces. Unfortunately, with the continuing descent into ever more bitter sectarian conflict, this tendency will continue to expand and fragment the security forces.

There is no easy solution - we are damn near being caught in a Catch-22.

That goes back to my adage I posed somewhere else on the forum that this is "Counter-Mess" warfare where Catch-22 is the bible and only doctrine. Actually, since the majority of the violence is occurring within about a 35 mile radius I'm beginning to look at this as a major violent riot and perhaps LAPD advisers along with military tactics would be better served. I read somewhere the other day that Iraqi forces sat by and watched as several Sunni Iraqis had petro poured on them and they were set on fire alive. I'm going to assume that the Iraqi forces watching were Shiites. And the violence is increasing in the area. You would think that sooner or later they would get tired of this lifestyle. But what can you do? The Shiites were beat up on for a long time and now these Sunnis are still attacking them. I'm surprised the Shiites haven't been organized enough to create a single majority atrocity similar in nature to Rwanda. There must be some type of security going on to prevent this? I don't know. Saddam certainly was able to create Rwanda style action.

Steve Blair
11-25-2006, 08:36 PM
Saddam also had several years to get his system running, and I think he did inheirit a functional system of repression. It's rather like Yugoslavia under Tito. He had his "machine" in place by the end of World War II and then kept it clamped down. Once he died, the hands fell away from the levers and things came apart. So with Saddam, even though he's not dead.

Fabius Maximus
11-25-2006, 09:28 PM
I find this is all bit puzzling. Much of the Iraq Army will not fight for the Iraq State, so the US Army sends "advisors."

What kind of advisors? Philosophers? Mullahs, priests and ministers?

Who can give men the willingness to die for others? Do we have such people as officers and NCOs in the Army?

Bill Moore
11-25-2006, 10:00 PM
Fabius your logic appears correct to me and it seems we're back to the old adage of the definition of insanity is doing the same behavior and expecting a different outcome. In this case we simply need to do more of the same behavior. If it wasn't so tragic it would be a great comedy.

I guess we put the skill set of Mullah, Priest, Persuader, etc. in the rucksack of the strategic corporal. I can see it now, the politicians in the executive branch are lining up the stars, so they can blame this mess on the military.

Reference the violence being restricted to Baghdad, this is a spin piece. While the majority of violence is taking place in the vicinity of Baghdad, there is plenty of violence taking place to far to the North and and far to the West, and more to come if Baghdad implodes. The internally displaced person problem that the violence in Baghdad will lead to additional problems far from Baghdad.

We're shouting at driver who is about to drive his car off the cliff, but the driver has his windows up and his stereo blasting, so he can't hear our warning shouts and he just keeps going toward the abyss. We feel helpless, he (Iraq) is about to die and there is nothing left we can do. We can wake everyone up in the house and have them shout (send more trainers), but he still can't hear us.

Furthermore insurgency is a form of democracy, as is civil war, it is the people taking collective action for change. We can't stand in front of it, either the Iraqi government provides for the masses, or the masses will replace the government. There are no good guys to support. We feel guilty because we created the conditions that led to this mess, but it is their fight now. What else can we do at this point?

Sarajevo071
11-25-2006, 10:40 PM
I find this is all bit puzzling. Much of the Iraq Army will not fight for the Iraq State, so the US Army sends "advisors."

What kind of advisors? Philosophers? Mullahs, priests and ministers?

Who can give men the willingness to die for others? Do we have such people as officers and NCOs in the Army?

When you talking about “Iraqi Army” or “Iraqi Government” or “Iraqi Police” you don’t count WHO those Iraqis ARE!? Shias? Sunni? Maybe not important to you or to hard to find the difference but it is VERY important to them… That’s reason why Iraqi government, police and army are failing… They are majority Shia, involved one way or another in killing Sunnis right now. Plus Shia majority want they state, in which US led invasion help allot I may say. They don’t want to fight for US “dream” state or “Iraqi state”… For me that is core problem.

Sadly, I will say it is too late to reverse all those bad decisions and mistakes, or willingly made steps, that bring Iraq in such a bloody state of affairs.

Fabius Maximus
11-25-2006, 11:01 PM
Good points, with which I agree.

When we look at units of the US Army, we no longer sort them by loyalty. New Yorkers over there! Catholics over there! Afro-americans there! Of course, it took generations to lose those loyalties, but even at the founding there was loyalty to the nation-state.

Without that greater loyalty, building an army becomes difficult. Esp. an army whose primary task is to fight and kill “their” own people -- a vital note usually overlooked in these discussions.

Unfortunately it is worse than just Shiite vs. Sunni. There are equally strong ethnic divisions in Iraq.

I believe the only national Army indigenous to Iraq is the Kurdish Peshmerga. Many or most accounts of effective fighting by the “Iraq Army” are no such thing, but by the Peshmerga fighting Arabs and Turkman. I doubt they are fighting for an “Iraq” state.

Ray Levesque
11-25-2006, 11:07 PM
Trouble with that analysis is that public support was lost in Vietnam and has been lost in Iraq, pretty much game set and match for the insurgents. I am sure the military would have wanted to keep the conflict going, but without the support of the people it's a moot point. The Hearts and mind's strategy was needed at the beginning of the (Iraq) conflict, while it may have some small impact now, I think its a case of shutting the gate after the horse has bolted.

First I think we'd both agree there's more than one factor in winning or losing, and that "public opinion" is only a single factor. However, sticking to the "public opinion" factor -- I do agree that it's down, but I also believe it can be regained. The problem is that there is a perceived lack of success in Iraq and the administration's primary message for the last six-eight months has been "stay the course." (Yes, I know the phrase has been deleted from the administration’s vocabulary, but the reality is that an alternative to "stay the course" has yet to be articulated.

In order to regain public opinion a new strategy has to be identified, so people can believe change is coming, and we need to play the "information war" better. There are bright spots, and the reality is that the violence is mostly confined to 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces IIRC.

However, as long as we don't change the way we do business and as long as anecdotal evidence without context is presented as reality in the press, we will continue to have a public opinion problem.

Fabius Maximus
11-25-2006, 11:22 PM
[QUOTE=Ray Levesque;6217]However, sticking to the "public opinion" factor -- I do agree that it's down, but I also believe it can be regained. The problem is that there is a perceived lack of success in Iraq and the administration's primary message for the last six-eight months has been "stay the course." ... In order to regain public opinion a new strategy has to be identified, so people can believe change is coming, ...QUOTE]

"Perceived lack of success"? Quite an optimistic formulation!

I agree that a new strategy is needed. Here is the opening for part II of my Iraq Sitrep (now in the hands of the DNI editing team, as they munch leftover turkey in the secret bunker) Comments greatly appreciated!

How can we tell that we have lost in Iraq?

* The cost in money? Perhaps a trillion dollars, including the costs of not only the war but also the long tail of post-war costs – in essence, borrowed from the Central Banks of Asian and OPEC nations.

* The cost in blood? Almost four years of war have resulted in thousands of Coalition dead, hundreds of thousands of dead Iraq civilians, and countless more wounded and disabled.

Neither are reliable indicators. More significant is the total disconnect between our tactics and strategy. That is, our daily actions in Iraq produce no good long-term outcome – and the war’s proponents have no reasonable ideas how to achieve victory.

Sarajevo071
11-26-2006, 12:16 AM
The “best” solution for US (if you pay attention I am saying for US, not Iraq or everybody) would be to divide Iraq in 3 parts for easier control and conquer. But, that’s not what Some Iraqi wants. Division will just lead to more war after… Plus, I do believe neither Iran neither any other nation around wish for division of Iraq (no matter how much some of American Congress would prefer to see “Balkan Solution”).

But, Middle East and Iraq it’s a different game… That’s cradle of civilization and source of Islamic dream for great Islamic Caliphate (was true and not a dream in one point of time). Going in without those knowledge of history, religious or ethnicity/tribe customs and differences was big mistake… Mistake that US lead coalition made but Iraqi paying with they lives enough brutal and bloody that many now saying it was better under Saddam!?

Bill Moore
11-26-2006, 12:27 AM
Ray you could sell ice to Eskimos, I loved your approach "the insurgency is only in 14 of 18 provinces". So the insurgency is "only" in 78% percent of Iraq's provinces?

I'm not convinced that the American people should support a conflict without a viable strategy. As stated above the dollar cost is astronomical, and we're sacrificing America's finest to no end.

I think at the moment we have two options. Option one: Prepare for the loss of central government in Iraq and start planning on how to mitigate the negative effects on our allies and our national interests. What does that mean to our allies in the region and beyond the region? How do we help them? I can't help but think some of this radicalism will cross the borders into Saudi. Saudi has actually done a decent job lately on cracking down on their extremists, now they have severe border problem. NASA we have a problem, most of the world's oil supply is exposed to extremist attacks now, or in extremist hands in the case of Chavez in S. America. This option allows us to focus our military efforts on other important areas where we can make progress. Since AQ is reportedly moving into N. Africa next, we should be there waiting for them as one example.

Option two: We don't want to lose Iraq because it will destablize the entire region, but sending more trainers won't fix it. It is a training problem, they won't fight period for this government, so we need to get rid of the government. Hopefully there is an ambitious Iraqi General who wants to save his country, and we need to turn a blind eye to any coup attempts (it is Iraqi business, not ours). I know it isn't PC, but this is a war. I also know it goes contrary to the neocon dream of one big happy democracy in Iraqi that would then spread throughout the Middle East. We need to get over it, and focus on our real national security interests, not democratizing the Middle East. In return for allowing a strong arm government (perhaps military) to take the lead we may get a reasonably stable Iraq that doesn't threaten its neighbors and helps stabilize our (the West, India, China) access to oil. We probably need to pull out shortly after the coup, because the way they are going to stabilize the country won't fall in line with our ROE.

I'm sure smarter guys will come up with other options, but my simple mind has narrowed it down to chaos which equals regional instability or a strong arm government that brutally restores order. Saddam? No, another butthead. Doing a little bad to do a lot of good.

In time we could work with the government and attempt to direct them towards democracy, but first and foremost security, then economic development, then we'll talk about the government.

Ray Levesque
11-26-2006, 05:01 PM
Ok, first, I'm a gonna' slap myself in the head...I meant to say that 14 of 18 provinces are insurgent free for the most part....darn, I hate it when I do that. :-)

As for the strategy thing and keeping in mind that I was only discussing the issue of "public opinion"....I definitely agree we need a new strategy. As I mentioned, the "stay the course" strategy is a failure. If we continue doing the same we can expect the same results. If we want different results, we have to do something different.

As for the 4 of 18 provinces with serious insurgent problems....I don't want to minimize the issue, but not all the provinces require the same "strategy" or the same number of troops.

I do believe the bottom line is this -- unless the people of Iraq feel secure; unless they feel they can support the government today without having to worry about the radicals taking revenge on them tomorrow any strategy will fail. It is about security. The military must have the numbers required to provide a security screen behind which the government can provide social services, insfrastructure development, power, safe shopping, garbage disposal, etc.

Unfortunately this is not easy. The government must provide security 24x7 and you can't do this with raids and short term military actions.

Fabius Maximus
11-26-2006, 05:41 PM
unless the people of Iraq feel secure; unless they feel they can support the government today without having to worry about the radicals taking revenge on them tomorrow .

What radicals?

Iraq has ethnic divisions. Arab vs. Kurd vs. Turkman. It has religious division, obviously. But whatis the basis for assuming that the fighters are not mainstream representatives of these groups?

There are foreign elements, which I agree can be considered "radical", but most sources consider them marginal at this point (although perhaps important in setting Iraq afire).

Also, what is this Iraq "government" of which you speak?

Unfortunately, there is no longer an Iraq polity, no political structure holding the allegiance of Iraq army and police. There are only regional, ethnic, and/or religious leaders.

The Green Zone placeholders pretending to be a government are mostly either representatives of these groups or colonial satraps. We pretend that there is an Iraq government so that we have something through which to implement our policies.

The US can give Prime Minister al-Maliki air power, but not what he most needs: legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraq people.

There may no longer even be either an Iraq State or Nation, just a brightly colored space on our maps.

Reassembling its shards is a task for Iraq’s people; doing so is beyond our power and ability. Hoping for Iraq to reappear is a dream, not a strategy.

Culpeper
11-26-2006, 06:27 PM
They [radicals] are self sustaining through illegal activities such as smuggling, kidnapping, corrupt charity, counterfeiting, and so forth. I find it hard to believe that you think Iraq has a pretend government when countries like Syria and Iran are holding summits with it. Not to mention that the United Nation has recognized it. But you can't approach this problem with a flair of history and op/ed aspersion. No offense.

Fabius Maximus
11-26-2006, 07:00 PM
Diplomatic recognition means little. There are many instances in history of States treating with “faux” governments as equals, esp. colonial governments.

As for the UN recognition as an indicator of legitimacy, the USSR had three seats: Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine. The last 2 were of course diplomatic illusions.

Let’s look instead at reality. Governments have specific characteristics, the more of these they possess, the stronger. Just to hit the high points…

· Control of armed force
· The ability to levy and collect taxes
· An administrative mechanism to execute its policies
· Territory in which it is the dominant political entity.
· Control of borders
· Legitimacy (not love) in the eyes of its people

The “government” of Iraq has, by most reports, none of these.

“I am now prime minister and overall commander of the armed forces yet I cannot move a single company without Coalition approval…”
Nuri al-Maliki, Prime Minister of Iraq, interview with Reuters on October 26, 2006

It lives on oil revenue and US funding.

The ministries are owned by ethnic and religious groups, parceled out as patronage.

The only territory it controls is the Green Zone.

Etc, etc.

Sarajevo071
11-26-2006, 07:32 PM
What radicals?

Iraq has ethnic divisions. Arab vs. Kurd vs. Turkman. It has religious division, obviously. But whatis the basis for assuming that the fighters are not mainstream representatives of these groups?

Don't forget Persians. Iranians/some Shia in Iraq are not Arabs.

Culpeper
11-26-2006, 07:52 PM
Fabius

That is not true considering that that most of the violence is occurring in a 35 mile radius and the rest of the country seems to be progressing. You're taking 35 miles and making it an entire nation. You're doing exactly what a insurgency wants to hear. You're giving them more credit than they are worth. And you're giving absolutely no credit to the opposition. You seem to think that the insurgents have the Iraqi government hostage. I'm not trying to convince you otherwise but just pointing out the slant in your analysis. The only credit I give the current insurgencies in Iraq is that they are settling old scores, while not the best of plans, and the Coalition and Iraq are dealing with multiple problems that any country in the same situation would be facing and dealing with. Now, if you're micromanaging your analysis than that is fine but you should limit it to what is occurring around the "Green Zone" itself and not including the entire country. Unless you want to do a compare and contrast analysis, which you are not doing presently, and would be a contradiction. In fact, I'm afraid that any analysis could become obsolete rather quickly considering what is actually happening in-country. al-Sadr may have a strong Mahdi Army today and in a few months he may have a dead Mahdi Army. But that is up to him, isn't it? The Mahdi Army had a peaceful parade yesterday. Does that make the current Iraqi government powerless? The bottom line is that the various insurgencies, for a lack of better words, has gone beyond just having to not lose any longer. They have to win. According to counterinsurgency doctrine that is actually a win for the counterinsurgency.

Fabius Maximus
11-26-2006, 08:44 PM
You might be right (I question the DoD data, but that is another issue), but you miss my point. Most of your characterizations of my argument do not reflect what I am saying. You are debating a straw man.

There is no insurgency in the Kurd regions, but that does not mean that the central gov't rules there. It means that the Kurd insurgency has won. They control the Army (Peshmerga), run a gov't, levy taxes, etc.

Similar, there is little presence of the Central gov't in the southern regions, as power has devolved to local entities.

If you believe there is a "real" government, take a moment and list its attributes. If you do not like my list, you might work from the traditional list -- sovereignty, authority, and legitimacy.

Culpeper
11-26-2006, 11:13 PM
You see, that is what I meant by if you made a compare and contrast it would be a contradiction.


There is no insurgency in the Kurd regions, but that does not mean that the central gov't rules there. It means that the Kurd insurgency has won. They control the Army (Peshmerga), run a gov't, levy taxes, etc.

There is no need for me to argue because the United Nations has accepted the current Iraqi government into the world community and further legitimizing it by overseeing its elections. You are presenting a nihilistic view of the new Iraqi government and that is fine because you only need to present an opinion or hypothesis. But total rejection of established laws and institutions doesn't make it so.

Fabius Maximus
11-28-2006, 12:31 AM
Thanks for catching the grammatical error! It is not a contradiction, of course.

More formally I should have said “There is no insurgency in the Kurd regions, but that does not mean that the central gov't rules there. It means that the Kurd insurgency has won. They (the Kurds) now control an Army (Peshmerga), run a gov't, levy taxes, etc.”

Culpeper
11-28-2006, 12:43 AM
Thanks for catching the grammatical error! It is not a contradiction, of course.

More formally I should have said “There is no insurgency in the Kurd regions, but that does not mean that the central gov't rules there. It means that the Kurd insurgency has won. They (the Kurds) now control an Army (Peshmerga), run a gov't, levy taxes, etc.”

No problem :)

You have to be careful on this forum. All of us have already taken all the prerequisites.

RTK
12-29-2006, 08:43 PM
As of today, is the outcome inevitable? If so, what outcome? Please explain why you believe this is so.

I have written 20 articles on the Iraq War, going back to Summer 2003. Initially pessimistic, like Lind and Prof. van Creveld, moving to gloomy, then certain that we've lost. The only remaining questions are when we'll give up, and how much we will have lost in blood, money, and influence.

My articles are at DNI. Here is the latest, with links to the others at the end:
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_iraq_sitrep_11-2006.htm

What are your views?

Upon further review of your posts, do you use SWJ to bolster readership on another site? If so, doesn't that violate some of the premise of SWJ? Additionally, why not fill out a little bio information to give your positioning some credibility and relevance?

If you've written 20 articles in three years, that's about one every two months. Do you travel to and from Iraq regularly and embed with units in theater? Where do you get your info? Or are you a blogger who has no operational context to place things in?

These are honest questions, since your history of starting posts in the last 6 months seems to suggest an intentional bias not to discuss and suggest, but to take the perverbial baseball bat to the beehive for personal gain.

What's the deal?

Uboat509
12-29-2006, 09:27 PM
Upon further review of your posts, do you use SWJ to bolster readership on another site? If so, doesn't that violate some of the premise of SWJ? Additionally, why not fill out a little bio information to give your positioning some credibility and relevance?

If you've written 20 articles in three years, that's about one every two months. Do you travel to and from Iraq regularly and embed with units in theater? Where do you get your info? Or are you a blogger who has no operational context to place things in?

These are honest questions, since your history of starting posts in the last 6 months seems to suggest an intentional bias not to discuss and suggest, but to take the proverbial baseball bat to the beehive for personal gain.

What's the deal?


+1

Many of your posts are dripping with a combination of sarcasm, condescension and arrogance. There is a great deal of knowledge and experience on this board and these guys don't respond well to anyone who talks down to them. It is one thing to have a differing opinion but quite another to state that "The number of votes for "brilliant, useful" suggests that America is doomed. I recommend that we all get dual citizenship with some refuge nation, perhaps an isolated communist State up in the hills. Like Albania, or Berkeley." That's not the way to get your point across. It is however a good way to turn people off.

SFC W