Mass Insanity: Latest Trend in Army Doctrine

[Bob's World]

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2011/09/mil-110902-arnews01.htm

Phoncon (slightly modified for dramatic effect):

Smart old SOF Action officer (SOSAO): "I like this slide that shows the relative roles of SOF to Conventional forces across a spectrum of activities, and understand why you have placed "Unconventional Warfare" on the far right end of the scale where it is primarily "SOF enabled by GPF," but you're showing "Stability Operations" as the far left end of the scale for "GPF enabled by SOF." We need to add "Major Combat Operations" to the left end to recognize high end, state on state warfare, and then slide these IW mission set farther over into the SOF led realm."

Brilliant young Army major (BYAM): "Sir, 'Major Combat Operations" is no longer a doctrinal term."

SOSAO: "You have to be F'n kidding me. What do you use to describe war"?

BYAM: "Sir, 'war' is no longer a doctrinal term."

SOSAO: "Come on! Get out your F'n doctrine! We need to tell a complete picture here, and this slide fails to tell a complete picture because we are only recognizing one end and aspect of a broad spectrum of war and conflict."

BYAM: (incredulously) "Sir, did you just say 'F Doctrine'?

SOSAO: "No, damn it, I didn't use it as a F as a verb, I used it as an adjective. Are you going to tell me now that using 'F' as a universal military adjective is no longer in military doctrine either?

BYAM: "Sir, I've been in Afghanistan. In modern doctrine the army has recognized that our focus on Major Combat Operations left us unprepared to deal with the realities of the modern battlefield. Now we have "Unified Land Operations" (ULO) that cover all situations, and within that there are only "Combined Arms Maneuver" (CAM) and Wide Area Support (WAS). (Goes on to list a long list of doctrinal cites and direct quotes from memory).

SOSAO: Look, I appreciate that Senior Army Leadership is under tremendous pressure as we enter an era of constricting budgets, withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, and the most recently released Strategic Guidance from the President, SecDef and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The shift away from the 65 year old European mission and the demise of the Cold War land threats that demanded we sustain a large ground force; and the clear guidance that we will no longer resource the military for massive "COIN" operations such as we conducted recently in Iraq and Afghanistan puts the Army in a hard spot to justify force structure, but we need to be intellectually honest here."

BYAM: "Sir, you're killing me. First you tell me to F-off, then you accuse me of being intellectually dishonest! I've been in Afghanistan, you know."

SOSAO: (resisting urge to say 'thanks son, is your mommy or daddy home'?) "Relax, you know that isn't what I said. Now, lets get to the business at hand. We just received two high-level documents describing a major shift in strategic guidance and direction. We need to focus on how we work together to implement this guidance to best effect."

BYAM: "Sir, my guidance is focus on Lessons Learned from the past 10 years."

SOSAO: "So, besides rendering Major Combat Operations obsolete, what else have we learned"?

BYAM: "We have learned that conventional forces can do SOF operations, but that we need SOF trainers to prepare us at home station first so that we can go out and do their mission down range."

SOSAO: "Really."

BYAM: "Yes, sir. But we need to work together as fused teams as well, and to avoid the confusion that caused so much ineffectiveness over the past ten years we need to get to unity of command."

SOSAO: "Fascinating, so how do you propose we get to unity of command, when the conventional force has a physical mission, tied to terrain and threats, while the SOF commander has a functional mission tied to specific niche operations conducted across multiple BSO's area of operations"?

BYAM: "We provide forces to the GCC. The Theater SOF Commander (1-2 stars) must go to the Army Service Component Commander (3-4 stars) and coordinate all of his theater activities prior to taking them to the GCC. They will determine who has lead. So, if it is very SOF, like CT or UW, SOF would lead; otherwise it should be led by the Conventional Force Commander.

SOSAO: "This is what we've learned over the past 10 years"?

BYAM: "Yes sir!"

SOSAO: "Does anyone see it as problematic that this is a "lesson" directly derived from Iraq and Afghanistan; and that the new strategy is explicitly clear that we will work to avoid such operations in the future, and will not resource to them either"??

BYAM: "Sir, I've been in Afghanistan. The Strategy can say we need to avoid these types of conflicts, but it cannot guarantee they will not occur."

SOSAO: "Indeed. Not to be overly technical, but you realize these are not "lessons" learned at all, but rather are Army-centric solutions to lessons learned. This might be a more effective conversation if we peeled the onion back a bit and focused on the actual lessons that, for example, led the Army to divine that rotating conventional forces into SOF missions, such as FID, does not work well unless those forces are first trained by SOF forces, and then fused with SOF forces for execution. It sounds like the real lesson learned is that 'Conventional Forces are not trained, organized or equipped to conduct SOF operations; but in extremis, with special training and leadership, can be an effective supplement.'

BYAM: "Sir, are you calling me intellectually dishonest again? This lesson learned came straight from the Center for Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth. It does not say what you are suggesting at all."

SOSAO: "Ok, I've got to get back to work, but I want to make sure I'm clear: War and Major Combat Operations are obsolete; Army lessons learned from 10 years of operations trumps the current POTUS, SecDef, CJCS strategy telling us to avoid the same in the future through the application of new, less expensive and invasive approaches; and conventional forces are the new SOF?

BYAM: "I think you are starting to get it sir!"

[sappeur]

"Not to be overly technical, but you realize these are not "lessons" learned at all, but rather are Army-centric solutions to lessons learned."

[Starbuck]

This would work better as an Xtranormal video. In fact...

[AdamG]

This would work better as an Xtranormal video. In fact...

I'll go make some popcorn.

[Ken White]

Phoncon (slightly modified for dramatic effect):

BYAM: "I think you are starting to get it sir!":eek: OMG!!!... :rolleyes:

[Fuchs]

Is this new or extraordinary?

To me, U.S.Army doctrine stuff looked about like this ever since Shinseki panicked about "relevance" in '99 in the aftermath of the race to Pristina.

[Bob's World]

:eek: OMG!!!... :rolleyes:

Minor exaggerations for dramatic effect, but yeah, I'm scared as well. We've been working down the slippery slope of drawing far too much from the "lessons learned" from the past 10 years as an oracle of the future. We've watched Irregular Warfare, Security Force Assistance, and now Unified Land Operations (ULO) with Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Support (WAS) all under a unified Mission Command (MC).

Frankly I think we have expanded "war" to mean so much that really isn't war at all, that to write a new definition for war that covered it all looked so rediculous that it was easier to just delete it and kick it under the carpet.

This effort to delete "war" and "Major Combat Operations" is mused upon in the The CCJO Activity Concepts in the first highlighted section below. We have stopped defining the term, but persist in using it throughout doctrine regardless. We may be outsmarting ourselves a bit on this one. I’m on the current CCJO writing team, so we will need to add this quirk to the agenda.

Most dangerous will remain the higher end, which will apparently remain nameless for now (perhaps we can just give it a symbol, like “the singer formerly known as Prince” used to use.) A symbol would take up much less room than writing out “the conflicts formerly known as war.”

Cheers!

Bob



2. THE NATURE OF COMBAT
Combat is organized action to defeat an armed enemy through the application of force to kill, destroy, or capture by all available means.4
4 Organized here means that the actions are not random, but rather have some rational aim, involve some level of planning, are conducted by combat forces (though not necessarily regular forces) assembled specifically for that purpose, and are conducted according to some tactical system. Defeat is defined as: “A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander’s will and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces.
Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use.” U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-90, Tactics (Washington: Department of the Army, 2001), Glossary-9.
CCJO Activity Concepts v1.0
JCC-4
Combat seeks to destroy an enemy or by threatening destruction to compel capitulation. In practice, however, combat can support a variety of political objectives short of that. Moreover, the mere demonstration of credible combat power may deter a potential aggressor. For U.S. joint forces, therefore, the first requirement of combat is that its conduct conforms to the strategic objectives. At the same time, an understanding of the requirements and limitations of combat as a strategic instrument should inform the political decision to resort to combat.
Combat can assume a variety of forms and occur in a variety of circumstances, both in war and during times of nominal peace. It may take place on land, on and under the seas, in the air, and increasingly in space and cyberspace.5 It can range in scale and duration from limited, isolated strikes or raids lasting hours or days to major campaigns involving large land, naval, and air formations lasting months or years.6 It can vary in form from brutal close combat at distances of mere meters using basic individual weapons, sometimes improvised, to standoff combat from distances of thousands of miles using advanced long-range weapons and platforms, often controlled remotely.
Even when conducted with advanced weaponry, combat remains ultimately an intensely human activity, taking a physical and The current version of JP 3-0 does not define combat or discuss its nature or dimensions, although it mentions the term frequently. Under the section titled “Nature of Warfare,” it discusses “traditional warfare” and “irregular warfare,” but it does not discuss a mixing of forms. The final draft revision of JP 3-0 dated 15 July 2010 incorporates the constructs, future environment and precepts from the CCJO, including a discussion of the four categories of activity. JP 3-0, I-5 to I-6; U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations Revision Final Coordination (Washington: Department of Defense, July 15, 2010), I-20 to I-23.
5 Space: “A medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall be conducted to achieve U.S. national security objectives.”
Cyberspace: “A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.” Cyberspace operations: “The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Such operations include computer network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid.” All definitions from U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary for Military and Associated Terms (Washington:
Department of Defense, 2010); available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/index.html. (Hereafter cited as JP 1-02.) U.S. Executive Branch, National Security Strategy 2010 (Washington: White House, 2010), 22. (Hereafter cited as NSS 2010.)
6 Examples of the former include Operation Urgent Fury, the U.S.-led intervention in Grenada from 25 October-2 November 1983, and Operation El Dorado Canyon, the punitive U.S. air strike against Libya on 15 April 1986. Examples of the latter include the campaigns of the Second World War, the Korean War and the Vietnam War.
CCJO Activity Concepts v1.0
JCC-5
psychological toll on those who experience it and requiring arguably greater stores of fortitude, stamina, and strength than any other human endeavor. Although the CCJO argues that joint forces must be adaptive in all situations, this is truest of combat, which entails competing with a hostile and intelligent enemy who also will adapt.
Combat power may be applied against various targets, including enemy fighting forces, the political leadership that directs those forces, the economic or other institutions that create and sustain them, or the population from which they are drawn. Combatants might restrict themselves, for moral, cultural, legal, or strategic reasons, from attacking certain targets in particular situations, but these are self-imposed restrictions not intrinsic to combat. For example, the United States and many other nations reject the targeting of noncombatants, whereas some combatants intentionally target civilians.7 Finally, combat may vary in the forces and fighting methods used.
On one hand, it may be conducted by or against the regular military forces of a national government, who wear uniforms, are more or less regulated by law and custom, and are equipped and sustained by the national industrial base. Those representing modern states typically operate in identifiable combined-arms formations using advanced land, sea, and air-fighting platforms designed solely for that purpose.
Increasingly, many also operate in space and cyberspace. Some possess air and maritime power-projection capabilities. All tend to employ dedicated military command-and-control and logistics systems that are distinguishable from their civilian counterparts.
On the other hand, combat may be conducted by or against irregular forces, whether paramilitaries in aid of a nation’s regular military forces, the combatant arm of an insurrection, a terrorist organization, or outright criminals. Lacking ready access to a national industrial base and thus materially disadvantaged in relation to regular forces, irregular combatants tend to employ guerrilla warfare and terror tactics, often in violation of established laws and customs of warfare.Because they tend to blend into the larger population and subsist, at least in part, on the civilian infrastructure, attacking them may well risk collateral damage and increased popular disaffection.
As they have in the past, future combat challenges most likely will present a mix of these forms, whether involving an essentially irregular force enjoying some of the advanced capabilities of regular forces, such
7 Note however that the United States has not always taken that view. In the latter stages of World War II, both the United States and Great Britain conducted massive bombing raids against populated areas intended to break German and Japanese morale.
CCJO Activity Concepts v1.0
JCC-6
as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, or an essentially regular force that employs irregular combatants and methods to complement its regular operations, as the North Vietnamese did during the Vietnam War. Moreover, the form that combat takes in any prolonged military contest likely will change over time. Future joint forces must be able to defeat such evolving hybrid threats whatever their complexion.

[Fuchs]

(...)
as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, or an essentially regular force that employs irregular combatants and methods to complement its regular operations,


What's irregular about that?
It's merely not the American Way of War with trillions of tons of ammunitions and fuel.


Even snatching some hostile soldiers as captives is totally regular; even the U.S.Army did it all the time, usually for interrogations.

[Bob's World]

Trust me, if I could start tossing things into a doctrinal dust bin, "Irregular Warfare" would go in first, and "Security Force Assistance" would be hot on its heels. Then I would take all of the "IW" missions like FID, UW and COIN that have been so vigorously massaged to reflect current whims and good ideas, and rescrub the entire family to get back to basics, filter out the colonial / cold war biases, and clean up the overlaps and gaps.

This ULO, CAM, WAS, MC business I'd have to look at a bit, but I think it could go in as well with no loss to national security.

[slapout9]

I am trying to find a link but I just saw on the news another new Doctrine trend. I am serious I really saw this on TV. The new Army fitness instructor doctrine requires Male instructors to wear fake Pregnancy outfits to learn what it is like to be a Pregnant Female soldier taking PT or Fitness training whatever the Army is calling it now:eek::eek::eek: Is it time to just go ahead and disband the Army? they are just loosing it completely!


Found it!!! Here is the link.

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/02/17/army-has-soldiers-wear-pregnancy-suits-in-training-course/

[carl]

Smart old SOF Action officer (SOSAO): "I like this slide that shows the relative roles of SOF to Conventional forces across a spectrum of activities, and understand why you have placed "Unconventional Warfare" on the far right end of the scale where it is primarily "SOF enabled by GPF," but you're showing "Stability Operations" as the far left end of the scale for "GPF enabled by SOF."

The word slide means powerpoint which means the whole thing was doomed before it started.

[Bob's World]

Carl,

Agree that PowerPoint is a mixed blessing, but it was the least of the problems in this case. Our "understanding" of the past 10 years has sent our doctrine into a death spiral of well-intended bad ideas that have all fed on each other until we are now entering a true crisis of doctrine. The spin being applied by the services currently to preserve their self-interests in the budget crunch may well be what pushes us over the edge, as now bad ideas are being twisted by worse motivations, and the results are predictably sad.

I deal with this at some level almost every day, but even I had not realized how far gone we were until the good major and I had our little chat...

[Entropy]

It is pretty strange that unlike many other endeavors, we feel the need to constantly recreate a taxonomy of warfare.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob,


Trust me, if I could start tossing things into a doctrinal dust bin, "Irregular Warfare" would go in first, and "Security Force Assistance" would be hot on its heels. Then I would take all of the "IW" missions like FID, UW and COIN that have been so vigorously massaged to reflect current whims and good ideas, and rescrub the entire family to get back to basics, filter out the colonial / cold war biases, and clean up the overlaps and gaps.

The entire IW issue since 9/11 has been a less than honest effort to transform the force to deal with what is probably better categorized as low intensity warfare, but all categorizations will miss key elements. IW was used by the services and other elements to justify historical roles. The definition was locked in stone by the former SECDEF, and somehow we managed to describe it as encompassing five our doctrinal missions (CT, COIN, FID, UW, and Stability Operations). Since we were stuck with that to begin with, there was really no need to exert further effort into IW, since we already had doctrine for each of these categories. We missed an opportunity to look at the world from a more holistic view.

As for SFA, I don't follow your resistance against the desire to fix the massive shortcomings in our polices to effectively build partner capacity. SFA is not the same as FID as some (to include some senior SOF officers) frequently claim it is. The fact of the matter is we have bureaucratic processes, laws, and policies that prevent the effective execution of building partner capacity that need to get fixed. It is the right thing to do for the nation, because if we get it fixed we'll actually save billions of dollars over time, and the money we do invest in this endeavor will actually result in partner capacity being developed. We have very few examples of success in this area, especially in recent years. There is much more to it than laws and policies, we need to learn to get away from creating forces and force structure that mirror U.S. forces, but that will be easier if we minimize, not remove, GPF's role in many cases. GPF does what it does, and that is build large and expensive bureaucracies. The return on investment is questionable. In my view we have to get SFA fixed, I don't care what we call ultimately call it, as long as people realize it is larger than FID.

[Bob's World]

One critical question that we rarely truthfully and wisely address is "capacity to do what?"

The preservation in power of those who we believe will support our interests, but who ride significant segments of their own populace hard, and who offer no true means for the same to legally address their concerns with governance is bad business.

We delay the inevitable and make enemies of populaces all at once, and those populaces then become rich recruiting grounds for those who would conduct acts of transnational terrorism against us.

Now, if this capacity we seek to build is to employ against as a hedge against some aggressor state? Sure. Lets lend a hand to a friend. But if it is capacity to suppress and oppress one's own populace? That is a mission we need to start working our way out of.

We need to ask: "Are we here to liberate the oppressed? Or are we actually here to strengthen the oppressor?" Too often we are the latter, and while that used to be a reasonable way for a powerful state to secure its interests abroad, I believe it is now due for a belated retirement. We look for smart ways to assess security force capacity. What we really need is a smarter way to assess the nature of the grievance between the government and the segment(s) of their populace they intend to use that capacity against.

Times are changing. We need to change as well. But the changes that we've been working into doctrine over the past 10 years are largely headed in the wrong direction.

[Fuchs]

We look for smart ways to assess security force capacity. What we really need is a smarter way to assess the nature of the grievance between the government and the segment(s) of their populace they intend to use that capacity against.


Germany has had a foreign policy which included civil society support abroad;

Student exchanges, free university studies here for foreigners - to bring some 'western' liberal ideas into the world

Goethe Institute - basically cultural embassies which teach German language (good for trade, direct investment), promote German arts etc

Supporting intellectuals and opposition parties (in part even meeting them on a visit by the chancellor) by recognising them and speaking with them.


It's all very secondary and low-key, but it might be worth a look at. After all, it may have worked fine. Germany ranks really well whenever the BBC or another source asks world-wide about favourability ratings for countries.

--------------
Imagine Obama launching a student exchange program with Saudi-Arabia; I bet the domestic political reactions would not be very "mature".

[Morgan]

I think Bob is DoctrineMan.

[Bill Moore]

Where our views diverge is you see SFA as a mission, which isn't necessarily incorrect, but I prefer to look at it as a capability to accomplish a task which is build whatever partner capability that the policy dictates. I think that when we decide to do it, that we need to be able to it effectively, and off line I can offer examples of how our flawed security assistance and title 10 programs fall short, and we end up spending millions (if not billions) and get little return on our investment because of it.


Now, if this capacity we seek to build is to employ against as a hedge against some aggressor state? Sure. Lets lend a hand to a friend. But if it is capacity to suppress and oppress one's own populace? That is a mission we need to start working our way out of.

The first point isn't open to debate, and of course we do lend a helping hand to our friends to help them protect themselves against hostile states. The second issue is a loaded with controversary. Should our national strategy be focused on liberating the oppressed? In that case should we undermine our economic interests that are intermingled with China's to help liberate Tibet? Our is China right, that Tibet is living in the past and they are trying to bring them into the future and liberate them from old and oppressive religious ideas? Is helping to professionalize the Philippine security forces detrimental to the citizens of the Philippines, or does it benefit them? It has been my observation that forces that are better equipped and trained are less likely to abuse their citizens than the poorly equipped, paid and trained security forces that are more thug like than security force like. I suspect we have no idea how the situation will turn out in Libya, will the new government and its security forces oppress its people? Will we mitigate that risk by training them? Is the risk greater that extremists will take over if we don't develop their security forces? There are no black and white answers to your final point, it is policy dependent, and we can only hope that policy is sound.

[slapout9]

Doctrine writers are still thinking in terms of the Enemy as a country or an Army as opposed to the Enemy as a System. Until we begin to truly understand and accept that....there is no fix to our doctrine. The 4GW guys were on to something.

[Bob's World]

I think Bob is Doctrine Man.

LMFAO. I like Doctrine Man's stuff. I follow the D-Man on Facebook. But I don't even know who he is.

My boss does call me a heretic ("Heretic: a professed believer who maintains religious opinions contrary to those accepted by his or her church or rejects doctrines prescribed by that church")

I guess in a way that makes me the opposite of Doctrine Man. "Anti-Doctrine Man" perhaps.

The Naval Services loves tradition and are bound by it. The Army loves Doctrine, and is bound by it. The Army loves to Write, Read, Memorize, Change, Apply, Assess with, Employ, Quote, etc, etc, etc, Doctrine. 15 years ago Bob and Doctrine Man were both probably a great deal like BYAM in this little saga. Hell, I got "the white brief case" at CGSC and was #1 in my Advanced Course Class. I was BYAM. Nothing wrong with that, it is the Army way.

But the world is changing far faster than BYAMs can write and memorize doctrine. In many ways doctrine is becoming as much a part of our problem as it is part of our solution. As an example, at a recent session to update the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, a document that is likely to be a statement of the Chairman's vision and intent for how the military approaches this rapidly evolving world do you know what the Army's primary input was??? "You can't make this too different from the old vision because we just got doctrines X Y and Z signed, and this would force us to have to change them again!" We need to get back to where doctrine is a guide for thought, not a prescriptive checklist for action. Soon.

[Fuchs]

I saw some incredibly irrelevant U.S: field manuals. There's for example on about Distributed Operations (USMC). I wanted to read it because I was interested in learning about DO and there was absolutely nothing of interest in it. Page after page irrelevant bureaucratic stuff, it sounded like a "make up work for the hierarchy and staffs" paper, not like a paper about dispersed small team actions. -.-

Well, that's what I remember about it, maybe I'm unfair.

[Bob's World]

I saw some incredibly irrelevant U.S: field manuals. There's for example on about Distributed Operations (USMC). I wanted to read it because I was interested in learning about DO and there was absolutely nothing of interest in it. Page after page irrelevant bureaucratic stuff, it sounded like a "make up work for the hierarchy and staffs" paper, not like a paper about dispersed small team actions. -.-

Well, that's what I remember about it, maybe I'm unfair.

You are probably being kind.

Here's an example:

In "On War" a guy named Carl von Clausewitz briefly discusses a broad concept to help commanders focus on what is most important in a battle or campaign. He calls it a "center of gravity" (or whatever the German for that is, I defer to you on that)

In Army doctrine we adopt this concept and write a half a page or so to describe it. Then guys like Dr. Strange at the USMC university started to do some really fascinating work on various ways to dissect and analyze the concept. Soon the doctrine evolved to be nearly an entire chapter prescribing a rigid set of bins one must fill in a set order, etc. Any thinking on COG from that point forward was either "doctrinal" (followed the prescription) or "non-doctrinal" (dares to actually apply a little creativity and color outside the lines a bit). CvC would roll over in his grave.

I never did well in Kindergarten art class. I just couldn't color inside the lines very well.

[Fuchs]

You don't seem to understand the extent of the stupidity surrounding the CoG stuff in the USMC...

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/01/schwerpunkt-and-center-of-gravity.html
:eek:

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World,


But the world is changing far faster than BYAMs can write and memorize doctrine. In many ways doctrine is becoming as much a part of our problem as it is part of our solution.

I don't know if the world is changing faster now than before. I think as you have frequently commented that the Cold War created a temporary freeze frame bi-polar world from a strategic perspective, but once the Wall came down the world rapidly resumed its normal level of geopolitical unpredictability.

If the world is changing too quickly for our doctrine writers, then I think an argument can be made we're making doctrine overly prescriptive. Prescriptive processes and suggestions should be restricted to TTP manuals (which are not doctrine) and unit SOPs. Doctrine should be rather broad, but provide enough structure for the services to determine how to organize, equip, and train in general terms. However, doctrine shouldn’t prevent commanders from making whatever changes they need to make to organizations, processes, etc. when they employ, but we all know it does.

The worst part about doctrine despite the claims to the contrary is that it does tell its adherents how and “what” to think, which is one reason “group think” is so prevalent in our forces. We don’t go to military professional development schools to liberate our thinking, but to get indoctrinated, which are why our officers that go to Harvard, Yale, etc. frequently outperform graduates of our military colleges in so called complex environments.

Doctrine provides paradigms, and paradigms provide restrictive constructs that limit our view of a situation to fit within the paradigm. It is an endless cycle, because new ideas that create paradigm shifts evolve into their own paradigms over time, so in the end it is something we have to be aware of take efforts to mitigate the negative impact on our thinking process. Doctrine still serves a purpose, as does tradition, but they should serve as enablers not a inhibitors.

[Ken White]

...once the Wall came down the world rapidly resumed its normal level of geopolitical unpredictability.True dat.
If the world is changing too quickly for our doctrine writers, then I think an argument can be made we're making doctrine overly prescriptive.Absolutely correct!!!
Prescriptive processes and suggestions should be restricted to TTP manuals (which are not doctrine) and unit SOPs.This is my minor quibble -- I wouldn't even go that far because if it's in a book, many will assume it is the only way (whether for career enhancing or staying alive...) to do things. I strongly believe most current manuals and even some from WWII when a rapidly changing Army needed more prescriptive literature are entirely too prescriptive. That inhibits flexibility of thought at best and stifles initiative at a moderate level and is prone to get regurgitated and expanded as the Manual is rewritten at worst.
Doctrine should be rather broad, but provide enough structure for the services to determine how to organize, equip, and train in general terms. However, doctrine shouldn’t prevent commanders from making whatever changes they need to make to organizations, processes, etc. when they employ, but we all know it does.True again -- and transmutation of doctrine to manuals exacerbates the problem...:mad:

Agree with the rest of your post.

[Surferbeetle]

I don't know if the world is changing faster now than before. I think as you have frequently commented that the Cold War created a temporary freeze frame bi-polar world from a strategic perspective, but once the Wall came down the world rapidly resumed its normal level of geopolitical unpredictability.

Heh...the military is all about controlling and minimizing variables in the pursuit of defined objectives while the World has always and ever been about 'complexity'.

Recall that most do not buy into the 'fully controlled and minimized variables' paradigm/schtick...how many of our peers (recalling that all men are created equal) really read and believe 'doctrine'? How many of us have met Murphy in his various guises in various parts of the world? :wry:


The worst part about doctrine despite the claims to the contrary is that it does tell its adherents how and “what” to think, which is one reason “group think” is so prevalent in our forces. We don’t go to military professional development schools to liberate our thinking, but to get indoctrinated, which are why our officers that go to Harvard, Yale, etc. frequently outperform graduates of our military colleges in so called complex environments.

Self reliance, personal responsibility, and an open mind are what made this country great.

Expensive schools provide access to expensive networks and are a way to allow others to control one via debt if care is not taken.

Knowledge, however, is accessible to anybody via online, state, or elite 'delivery vehicles'....the GI Bill or other options await those who have the strength and courage to grasp them. Not easy, not painless, but always worth the trip...

Khan Academy (http://www.khanacademy.org/)


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Doctrine still serves a purpose, as does tradition, but they should serve as enablers not a inhibitors.

Everything has it's place, while 'rules' are sometimes/often meant to be broken...:D

[slapout9]

The Army as an organization is obsolete(and so are the other services except SF and Marine Corps,but Marines are going in wrong direction) until that is fixed doctrine isn't going to matter much. It's the better operating manual for the crew of the Titanic.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Surferbettle,


Heh...the military is all about controlling and minimizing variables in the pursuit of defined objectives while the World has always and ever been about 'complexity'.

Read something recently in an unclassified SOCOM publication related to your comment that prompted an aha momement, since it brought a lot of thoughts together coherently (something I can rarely do without help).

Apparently it was extracted from Francois Jullien's book A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking:http://www.amazon.com/Treatise-Efficacy-Between-Western-Thinking/dp/0824828305/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1329687314&sr=1-4 . He writes a truly skilled strategist makes a careful study of a complex situation to ascertain the natural inclination of the system (that will make slapout happy), then uses this knowledge to put himself in a position of strength. They use a river analogy to describe: Identify how the river naturally surges and moves and then use these powerful forces. Once others seek to act further downstream, the flow of the situation and power of the river becomes irresistible.

The Chinese supposedly seek to transform the situation and not act to reach goals, as western thinking does. We definitely try to achieve goals/effects, and spend a lot time trying to measure if we're succeeding, when in reality the trend is the trend (or the river is the river) and we're only fooling ourselves with our efforts to "force" change. Chinese logic states to continue any effect DO NOT link it to force, force is temporary in nature, as compared to the natural tendency of the situation. The more one merges with the natural proclivity of the situation, the more effective one is.

No truer words were ever written, and we have demonstrated that our attempts to force change have almost always failed. There are limits to military power (as most of us know, unfortunately our politicians don't get it). We can and should use force to kill terrorists that threaten the homeland, if removing Saddam was really in our interest, then using force to do so was appropriate; however, using force to transform the Iraqi, Afghan, and Vietnamese societies was and is a futile effort, we were rowing against the tide.

This gets to Bob's point about not using control as a strategy (I think); however, population control for temporary periods of time can be an effective tactical tool to achieve limited objectives. The key to clear, hold, build being successful is enabling the trend, if we're pushing against the trend we'll only clear and hold as long as we apply force, as soon as we stop, the trend will assume its course.

Funny how people with Phds, Graduate degrees, etc. can't grasp this. Higher education is effective for those that can liberate their thinking from the assumptions others have proposed and can think independently, for others it is a piece of paper that checks the block.

[Ken White]

The Army as an organization is obsolete(and so are the other services except SF and Marine Corps,but Marines are going in wrong direction) until that is fixed doctrine isn't going to matter much. It's the better operating manual for the crew of the Titanic....and Submarines... ;)

[Bob's World]

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/index.html

Type in "War" and see what comes up.

(For those who can't wait: 111 results, but no actual definition for "war" itself. With the advent of Irregular warfare, which covers many area that are clearly not "war" I suspect it just to the point where to write a definition for war that included everything that the DOD wants to include under that umbrella it simply became to embarrassingly ridiculous to publish. Easier to just delete it and let everyone merrily go on making virtually anything and everything "war."

After all, if we actually live in an era of 'forever war" or "perpetual conflict" as some dark souls proclaim, I guess war is everything, and everything is war. Cool. (not!)

Someone needs to turn this donkey cart of doctrine around before the good idea fairly drives it off a cliff.

If you are really feeling adventurous type in "insurgency"

insurgency
(DOD) The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.
Source: JP 3-24

Seems semi-reasonable, but has been heavily shaped to fit recent US operations. Consider the Army's definition from 1962 in comparison:

"Insurgency is a condition of subversive political activity, civil rebellion, revolt, or insurrection against a duly constituted government or occupying power wherein irregular forces are formed and engage in actions, which may include guerrilla warfare, that are designed to weaken and overthrow that government or occupying power."

While I have a couple minor quibbles with the 1962 version, it is a very workable understanding of insurgency. The current version? That is simply our perspective of Iraq and Afghanistan, and forces our thinking into a narrow little box.

[Surferbeetle]

He writes a truly skilled strategist makes a careful study of a complex situation to ascertain the natural inclination of the system (that will make slapout happy), then uses this knowledge to put himself in a position of strength. They use a river analogy to describe: Identify how the river naturally surges and moves and then use these powerful forces. Once others seek to act further downstream, the flow of the situation and power of the river becomes irresistible.

Bill,

Appreciate your well thought out comment, and the river analogy.

So if we were to accept that the Army is a channelized river, and that much time, effort, blood, sweat, and tears were spent to make it so...what can we do to help our beloved river as we watch it silt up, become increasingly saline, experience decreased dissolved oxygen content, and experience volume reductions?

How to get it back to running wild and true?

Dismantling the myriad intellectual dams which choke it, might be a place to start. A damning/hoarding of ideas has obvious security benefits however it obviously leads to a intellectual stagnation cost. So far we have been able to a maintain a balance that allows for a hegemony that's in our nation's favor, but it's a common theme among many in the field - dissatisfaction with the status quo.

How about an American solution? IMHO Harvard Business Review (http://hbr.org/magazine) is worth regular review. Business Model Innovation was addressed in the January - February 2011 edition (http://hbr.org/archive-toc/BR1101) and along the lines of dismantling intellectual dams the following articles were quite interesting:


When your Business Model is in Trouble, by Rita Gunther McGrath



Reinvent Your Business Before It's Too Late by Paul Nunes and Tim Breene



How to Design a Winning Business Model by Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Joan E. Ricart



New Business Models in Emerging Markets by Matthew J. Eyring, Mark W. Johnson, and Hari Nair



The CEO's Role in Business Model Reinvention by Vijay Govindarajan and Chris Trimble


These particular articles are built upon the article, in the same issue, How to Fix Capitalism (Creating Shared Value (http://hbr.org/2011/01/the-big-idea-creating-shared-value/ar/1)) by Michael Porter & Mark Kramer. It's my sense that Davos, Washington DC and other concentrations of power are still discussing it....but that one has to go elsewhere to find people who are strong enough/concerned enough to try and implement the concept :wry:

If this looks like too much reading, underlining, highlighting, note taking, reflecting, and discussing with friends and peers how about a concept we learned all about way back in high school...one that the whole world uses to advance knowledge?

Peer Review (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer_review) by wikipedia


Professional peer review focuses on the performance of professionals, with a view to improving quality, upholding standards, or providing certification. Professional peer review activity is widespread in the field of health care, where it is best termed Clinical peer review.[6] Further, since peer review activity is commonly segmented by clinical discipline, there is also physician peer review, nursing peer review, dentistry peer review,[7] etc. Many other professional fields have some level of peer review process: accounting,[8] law,[9][10] engineering (e.g., software peer review, technical peer review), aviation, and even forest fire management.[11] In academia, peer review is common in decisions related to faculty advancement and tenure. Peer review is used in education to achieve certain learning objectives, particularly as a tool to reach higher order processes in the affective and cognitive domains as defined by Bloom’s Taxonomy. This may take a variety of forms, including closely mimicking the scholarly peer review processes used in science and medicine.[12]


It has been suggested that traditional anonymous peer review lacks accountability, can lead to abuse by reviewers, and may be biased and inconsistent,[39] alongside other flaws.[40][41] In response to these criticisms, other systems of peer review with various degrees of "openness" have been suggested.

Starting in the 1990s, several scientific journals (including the high impact journal Nature in 2006) started experiments with hybrid peer review processes, often allowing open peer reviews in parallel to the traditional model. The initial evidence of the effect of open peer review upon the quality of reviews, the tone and the time spent on reviewing was mixed, although it does seem that under open peer review, more of those who are invited to review decline to do so.[42][43]

Throughout the 2000s first academic journals based solely on the concept of open peer review were launched (see e.g. Philica). An extension of peer review beyond the date of publication is Open Peer Commentary, whereby expert commentaries are solicited on published articles, and the authors are encouraged to respond.

[J Wolfsberger]

In Army doctrine we adopt this concept and write a half a page or so to describe it. Then guys like Dr. Strange at the USMC university started to do some really fascinating work on various ways to dissect and analyze the concept. Soon the doctrine evolved to be nearly an entire chapter prescribing a rigid set of bins one must fill in a set order, etc. Any thinking on COG from that point forward was either "doctrinal" (followed the prescription) or "non-doctrinal" (dares to actually apply a little creativity and color outside the lines a bit). CvC would roll over in his grave.


What you are describing is representative of our current cultural mania for "process." It has a great appeal to bureaucrats in that you can measure how well you're filling up bins and checking boxes without ever being held accountable for achieving a goal.

Which is where the great problem with "metrics" comes from. Think about how often you've seen organization or activity measured against achieving a goal, versus the number of times you've seen them measured by all the little stepping stones associated with the goal. e.g. 'We dug x wells, handed out y blankets, and distributed z MREs, culturally suitable," but not 'The region has been pacified.' The former is, of course, trivially simple to measure, while the latter - which is the real goal or why the hell are we there - is notoriously difficult, which is, equally of course, the reason bureaucrats prefer the former.

[Bob's World]

It's not just doctrine that is becoming overly prescriptive and overly influenced by what we believe the "lessons learned" of the past 10 years to be; we have an equally dangerous situation developing in the area of plans and planning.

Plans are managed by geographic combatant commanders in large part. Regional perspectives on regional issues. But what, in today's emerging environment, is truly "regional"?

Increasingly, regional problems demand global perspectives and solutions; equally, regional actions can have global implications. GCCs and GCC-driven planning do not serve this emerging reality very well. Similarly, a "plan" tends to lock one into a certain perspective and sequence of events. Particularly when those doctrine-loving Army boys break out their sequentially numbered phases and start filling in the blanks.

How then, do we evolve in how we think about and write doctrine and plans?? This is a question we need to put some serious energy into. If we are to evolve to be as effective as we need to be, and equally as quick, flexible and agile as we need to be, we must first address how we think about the things we do or believe we might do; and how we balance the need for detailed preparation with the need for flexible execution.

[Fuchs]

I never thought of doctrine as something for the very high levels, such as theatre command.

Doctrine or 'similar lines of thinking' are good for company to corps command, where there are great benefits to be found in having trust and reduced frictions because officers know that other officers think alike (just imagine Guderian working with a chief of staff or subordinate division commander who's of the French artillery school!).
(Another example, from small wars: Think of one battalion CO following a rough cordon + search + demolish + arrest approach while the next CO in the rotation follows a hearts + minds + indigenous militia approach. It won't work, it wouldn't work even if both approaches were correct!)


You better get your doctrine right and be ready for quick adjustments if much of your officer corps thinks along its lines, of course.

[slapout9]

(that will make slapout happy):):):)


Systems rule .....BUT Systems Engineering can get you into a lot of trouble when you try to apply Engineering against Biology.

[Surferbeetle]

Slap,

On the lighter side of the fusion of biology and engineering...Cyborgs :wry: If they actually pull that one off there will be trouble:

Pentagon’s Project ‘Avatar’: Same as the Movie, but With Robots Instead of Aliens (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/02/darpa-sci-fi/), By Katie Drummond Email Author February 16, 2012 | 4:51 pm, Danger Room


In the agency’s $2.8 billion budget for 2013, unveiled on Monday, they’ve allotted $7 million for a project titled “Avatar.” The project’s ultimate goal, not surprisingly, sounds a lot like the plot of the same-named (but much more expensive) flick.

According the agency, “the Avatar program will develop interfaces and algorithms to enable a soldier to effectively partner with a semi-autonomous bi-pedal machine and allow it to act as the soldier’s surrogate.”

Apollo 11 Tech - Kalman Filtering (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalman_filter), systems control via prediction, observation, and correction. Still high tech for '80's era hedge funds, now run on home computers. :wry:

[Bill Moore]

Systems rule .....BUT Systems Engineering can get you into a lot of trouble when you try to apply Engineering against Biology.

Mankind has always done that, remember the 6 Million Dollar Man :D

That is closer to reality everyday, and now we're able to map genes and even execute genetic engineering. Nanotechnology and artificial intelligence will take into a brave new world that could in fact dominate biological systems. We missed it, but our grand kids may be turn out to be super warriors (cyborg types), or they may all get killed do to the development a superinfection that is created in a lab in someone' garage.

Tying it back to the thread, there is a serious danger of missing the boat when you tie your future doctrine and force structure based on the last 10 years of warfare.

[Bob's World]

In the SecDef's most recent strategic guidance there is a section on large scale coin operations that directs us to capture the lessons learned from the past 10 years from these operations (as in, don't just flush the experience, write it down so we don't do this process again); but then in italics makes it very clear that we will not resource the force for these types of operations as we move forward.

I think the Army is working hard to leverage that statement on lessons learned to validate force structure into the coming cuts. I also think they are reading the strategy in a light most favorable to them (as are SOCOM and all the Services), but are picking the wrong missions and the wrong "lessons" to hang their hopes upon. God knows there are few men who have spent more time dedicated to waging the current fight than the current Army Chief. He's earned his bias. But we still need to get to the force we need with the focus we need; and in most cases that is not the force we want with the focus we want.

[Fuchs]

But we still need to get to the force we need (...)

"Foreign policy" recently had an article about the perceived #1 threat to the United States; Iran with 32% in the poll.
That basically means there's no real-world threat at all.

Wrong continent, small 1970's coastal navy, worn-out 1970's air force, an army that's technologically largely stuck in the 1960's, much smaller economy and population, little technology base, no nuclear weapons and no nuclear weapons program (according to Mr. Panetta!), no missiles that reach even halfway tot eh United States, no history of attacking other countries for centuries, no history of attacking other countries for even more histories if you discard a case where a foreign ruler did it.

The force you need is the National Guard...you'll get way more than you need, no matter how the doctrine and budget discussions in Washington end.

[gute]

I just finsihed reading this article in the March/April edition of Military Review and by the time I was done I had a headache. IMO opinion this new doctrine looks like it written up by a bunch of attorneys:eek: This is the same kind of crap I see in my job. Have you guys every read the Federal crimnal code statutes - put it by the toilet and give it a look see next time you make a visit. You will either sh** a pink twinkie or get constipated.

See Post 43 for working link (Added by Moderator)

[Bill Moore]

Gute, the link didn't work, and furthermore I can't get the image of a pink twinkie spinning round and round in the bowl, but refuses to go down even after multiple flushes. Thanks for the nightmare image. :D

[Bob's World]

The Army is VERY focused on capturing and applying "the lessons learned from the past 10 years." Not at the strategic level, so as to better understand the types of threats we have been facing, or better design the operations we have applied so as to be more effective and less expensive. Those are assumed to be proper (to do otherwise would be to call into question senior leader decision making over that same period)

No, it is a very focused effort on how they could have made the BCTs more effective at the missions they were sent out to accomplish in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Things like BSOs having greater control over the IA, NGO and SOF forces operating with their space. It is almost as if we want to absolutely ensure we fight the next war just like the last.

My suggestion is that most of these tactical lessons learned will be of little value in virtually any other type of conflict that we are more likely to become involved in. Also, that once we actually do take a hard look at how we understand these threats and how we could better design operations for an appropriate military role in addressing them, we will find that it in not very war-like, and that the previously derived tactical lessons learned no longer have much merit.

[gute]

Try this link to the contents page of the March/April 2012 edition of Military Review, then click on Unifed Land Operations

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/repository/MilitaryReview_201204300001-MD.xml

[Jrizzuto77]

The change in Army doctrine is a manifestation of 11+ years of conflict and the need to capture lesson learned and reinvest in core competencies. We could debate if the past decade was worth its price in treasure but we cannot debate revolution in thought and lessons learned. Now we are challenged; we must fuse the lessons of the conflicts, the nature of the evolving threats and nuanced changes in domains by rewriting our doctrine. The Army is the quintessential learning organization and unlike reactive adjustments, these tweaks in doctrine are a natural manifestation to our great learning organization.
**The views expressed in this are those of MAJ Rizzuto, Command and General Staff College, and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of the Army, DoD or the US Government. **