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JMA
04-21-2012, 09:37 AM
When I came across Karl Marlantes' book 'What it is like to go to war' in a bookstore I was thrilled to find a discussion on how Marlantes - a Vietnam veteran - was trying to come to terms with his war experiences (both on a personal and a broader level).

I was looking for a more recent equivalent of the earlier seminal work of Lord Moran 'The Anatomy of Courage' covering his WW1 experiences. Marlantes' work does not rank alongside Moran's work but its valuable nevertheless in that it is written by one who has experienced actual warfare - was awarded the Navy Cross - even if for only a year.

A study of both Moran's and Marlantes' works - in tandem - would, I believe, benefit those who have been exposed to combat to try to 'make sense of it all'... and help those who have not to understand the effect this most horrific pursuit of man has on the soldiers themselves through the accounts of people who have personally 'been there'.

The work of those who have written about the effects of war but not personally experienced it - such as Keegan, Holmes, Bourke, Beevor, even Grossman and others - have their place. There are no doubt other works by those who have experienced combat and written about it - J Glenn Gray, James R Mcdonough, Tim O'Brein, Philip Caputo, Michael Herr, etc - which no doubt will also contribute to a greater understanding.

Marlantes and Moran focus specifically on the effect of war on the participants.

Marlantes' first chapter - The Temple of Mars - displays perhaps the American tendency to over analyze a situation and maybe find something which may not be there - reminds of Shay's book 'Achillies in Vietnam' where he compares 'the soldiers of Homer's "Iliad" with Vietnam veterans' - and therefore is more of a distraction than IMHO a valuable contribution. I will skip it... but others who read it differently may choose otherwise.

Chapter two - Killing - deals with what has been discussed in a thread here:

How soldiers deal with the job of killing (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13523). Some may wish to reopen discussion on this aspect.

As I commented in the other thread: "I am involved with a compilation of narratives by individuals who served in my regiment during my little war." Here is an extract from one account from the oral history project:


... Literally the minute we hit the ground the $hit hit the fan. All hell broke loose and a long and fierce fire fight took place. I experienced just about everything a soldier could expect to face in a lifetime in the army. There were airstrikes that nearly hit us, a terrorist threw and hit me with an empty AK magazine, two of my friends Kevin and Kim were seriously injured and flown out, and I had my first kill. I have never forgotten that moment….18 years old and I took another human beings life. Raised as a Catholic this had a severe impact on me. The worst was to come. At the end of the day we had to retrace our movements and collect all the bodies and drag them to a pick up point. The sight of the fatal injuries were horrific, limbs shattered, huge holes everywhere, exposed internal organs and brains oozing and falling adrift from the bodies. The yellow fat, the flies and the stench of death was gut retching. No training could have prepared me for this... "

To him it was the aftermath that got to him. What he probably misses is that his training prepared him to kill - which he did without hesitation - and while the first significant exposure to combat is traumatic to many this kid found himself as one of two FNGs in my troop where the older troopies probably told him/the two of them ... 'that was f***-all, just you wait'. There are a lot of head games played at that level the effect of which officers and NCOs need to monitor.

Of course the junior troopies get to move the dead around ... the older troopies just go through the pockets to see if there is any cash ;)

carl
04-21-2012, 05:09 PM
JMA:

I have to get my copy and re-read those chapters, but I am interested in your opinion on two things.

First, in the account of the troopie you cited he seemed to have been troubled by the shattered bodies. Do you think young men who have previously worked with livestock and had been exposed to shattered bodies of animals would be less troubled on first exposure to shattered bodies of humans? If that were true, could that be incorporated into training?

Also, have you read Red Badge of Courage? That was written by a guy who wasn't there. Do you think that particular book has some value in the way that Marlantes' and Moran's books do?

Stan
04-21-2012, 10:33 PM
Do you think young men who have previously worked with livestock and had been exposed to shattered bodies of animals would be less troubled on first exposure to shattered bodies of humans? If that were true, could that be incorporated into training?


Hey Carl,
As a kid I hunted, shot and slaughtered both farm and wild animals for dinner. That never bothered me, and it also never prepared me for my experiences in Africa. Just my opinion, but nothing can prepare one for exposure to human death.

JMA
04-22-2012, 06:42 AM
JMA:

I have to get my copy and re-read those chapters, but I am interested in your opinion on two things.

First, in the account of the troopie you cited he seemed to have been troubled by the shattered bodies. Do you think young men who have previously worked with livestock and had been exposed to shattered bodies of animals would be less troubled on first exposure to shattered bodies of humans? If that were true, could that be incorporated into training?

Carl, I grew up as a city boy and had no experience of human death, never saw a dead person. Saw some road kill and then a few times on my uncles farm saw incidences of chickens, ducks, sheep getting slaughtered (but not much). So one could say I was wholly unprepared for death on the battlefield.

I started off as a troopie and my first dead enemy were two who were dispatched by the lead tracker with two pairs of double-taps when he walked into them filling their water bottles from a stream. As the junior troopie on that day I had pull them out of the water (getting my legs wet) while the others waited dry on the bank. I remember at first just staring at the first body - he had two in the chest, eyes open, mouth open and the slow moving water was red with his bleed out - until the 'older' troopie gently said something like 'lets get on with it' and got me to pass him the arms so he could pull the body out of the water. The corporal was less understanding and told me to 'get your ass into gear'. It the first one was washed 'clean' the second had had the top of his head lifted off (7.62 NATO does that) and was an a more ugly sight. I had a more gentle introduction to death than the troopie I quoted above (and compared to some in other wars we both had a gentle intro as the bits of bodies and the 'crispy critters' were to come later for me).

I hear what Stan says below and tend to go along with that (in the absence of other opinion) and would see the logistics of exposing recruits to death, blood and gore by walking them through a morgue or slaughterhouse for big armies would be daunting.

That troopie was a conscript and no more than a troopie throughout his service (who now is a senior teacher at a high school in New Zealand) would not have realized then or even now (perhaps) that what was important to us was that he reacted as taught in contact even when our side had taken casualties - his school mates - and done well. We had no training geared to prepare the leaders or troopies for the debris of battle they saw. They just got on with it, they had to, we had to.

Is there any effort anywhere to prepare troopies for this?

I suggest we each carry our own memories in this regard and some handle them better than others. The difficult times are when we need to deal with our own dead and wounded. My unit worked mainly with close chopper support so were able - which was good for morale - to get the wounded CASEVAC'd in minutes and secondly we had great depth in medical training where every troopie was repeatedly required to insert a drip, give an injection of sterile water (for morphine) and seal off a sucking chest wound and of course all the minor stuff. We had few MA3 medics (equivalent to your corpsmen I believe) but many lesser trained medics to the extent that we went down to one per stick of four and he carried a decent medic pack and could use it. And while waiting for call outs we trained, trained, trained (and not only for medical). Later when the Brits went to the Falklands I was horrified that the troopies went into battle armed only with a FFD (First Field Dressing) in their pockets and only the most rudimentary 1st aid training (couldn't call it medical).

I mention the medical training for two reasons being that it was good for morale that the troopies knew help and CASEVAC was close at hand should they get hit. This for the regular soldiers who were around for years was especially important as it was just a matter of time before their number came up and they would need help from their mates. Second because we needed the wounded to be 'stabilized' and cleared from the scene quickly and effectively so we could get on with the fight and while waiting it is better for their mates to be in a position to help rather than just hold his hand and maybe pray. (A lot of people tend to volunteer to stay with the wounded) Also a wounded man with his wounds neatly dressed waiting for the chopper in comfort is also a lot better for morale than the chaos one sees on some of that war footage out of Vietnam (looking more like scenes from Napoleons retreat from Moscow).

A long reply but perhaps it should be considered that during the post contact drills when the contact area is being cleared and the bodies and equipment sorted out the troopies are coming down from the high of battle and perhaps they are hyper aware of what they are doing at that time - dragging bodies around - this is better than having the new troopies out on the perimeter thinking too much about what just happened. Strange thoughts tend to enter idle minds... so keep them busy. Officers and NCOs will be kept busy organising others. We need to watch the 'others' (as some get the post contact shakes) and always put the troopies out in pairs - new with old, never two NFGs together... where in the best Brit tradition they can brew up (make tea) and come down gently.

I will say that all armies must be aware that full brain development - control of reasoning and impulses - only is achieved by age 25. As wars progress the age of those doing the actual fighting declines - Marlantes notes that at 22 he was the second oldest in his Marine company in Vietnam (the company commander being 23). To be brutally honest we need to keep it simple (KISS) and clear for this age group in training. This why my whole thrust or argument (in other threads) has been for the academic training to take place at the Capt/Major level for officers (and not directly out of school). This issue is seldom taken into account.


Also, have you read Red Badge of Courage? That was written by a guy who wasn't there. Do you think that particular book has some value in the way that Marlantes' and Moran's books do?

Read it so long ago I can't remember it clearly.

As a novel it aims to entertain and maybe if a skilled instructor is able to extract parts from it for a structured discussion then it would have instructional/academic value beyond being merely entertaining. (Like has been done with the movie 'Twelve O'Clock High')

While Moran and Marlantes talk about different things what they do comes from personal experience. They are both highly educational. Marlantes is more of my age group and while I don't agree with all Marlantes relates he helps us to make better sense of our war experiences... and if serving soldiers can do so they will be in a improved position to better prepare the next generation for war (in the psychological and emotional senses).

Stan
04-22-2012, 09:21 AM
I hear what Stan says below and tend to go along with that (in the absence of other opinion) and would see the logistics of exposing recruits to death, blood and gore by walking them through a morgue or slaughterhouse for big armies would be daunting.

Mark,
A trip to the morgue or slaughterhouse is not sufficient - we do it all the time with new and old technicians and LEOs. The absence of blood and disgusting smell makes the morgue a walk in the park. Even physically shooting a cow in the head and then cutting it open to bleed out is no big deal.

Let's say you watched and helped remove over 4,000 dead people a day in Goma in 40 degree temps. Totally disgusting, but nothing you take personally. Now, come in to work at 0600 and find a young Marine with a single .357 round to the head - a young man you personally knew - that picture never leaves your mind.

No book nor training can prepare a soldier for that day. In 91 they sent us a shrink from Brazzaville to see if we were dealing with the situation. I retrieved him in our Boston Whaler and in true form, the Zairois were blazing rounds in every direction. I think I made it half way across when the shrink insisted I take him back :D

My hat is off to medics and firefighters.

JMA
04-22-2012, 11:38 AM
Mark,
A trip to the morgue or slaughterhouse is not sufficient - we do it all the time with new and old technicians and LEOs. The absence of blood and disgusting smell makes the morgue a walk in the park. Even physically shooting a cow in the head and then cutting it open to bleed out is no big deal.

Let's say you watched and helped remove over 4,000 dead people a day in Goma in 40 degree temps. Totally disgusting, but nothing you take personally. Now, come in to work at 0600 and find a young Marine with a single .357 round to the head - a young man you personally knew - that picture never leaves your mind.

No book nor training can prepare a soldier for that day. In 91 they sent us a shrink from Brazzaville to see if we were dealing with the situation. I retrieved him in our Boston Whaler and in true form, the Zairois were blazing rounds in every direction. I think I made it half way across when the shrink insisted I take him back :D

My hat is off to medics and firefighters.

OK Stan, I'm with you on this but would like to leave the door open for those with ideas for preexposure 'conditioning' to sound off.

My point is that as long as this 'exposure' does not inhibit the soldiers ability and/or willingness to engage the enemy aggressively and with purpose and that any adverse effect (if any) is felt some time after the exposure is probably why we did not bother ourselves about it.

Yes also to the difference between their dead and our dead... and civilians (with the Israeli proviso "if not combatants, certainly not civilians" considered). As you (I'm sure) appreciate it all gets rather complicated, depending on the 'who, what, when where, how'. Each of us have our own level of squeamishness in this regard... and once again does it adversely effect the soldiers ability to function and if so what (if anything) can/should be done about it?

Yes the emergency services people see some sights! Wonder if they do anything about it?

JMA
04-22-2012, 02:20 PM
Marlantes relates to death as follows (pg 16 softcover):


"When I did eventually face death - the death of those I killed and those killed around me - I had no framework or guidance to help me put combat’s terror, exhilaration, horror, guilt, and pain into some larger framework that would have helped me find some meaning in them later."

James R McDonough in 'Platoon Leader - a Memoir of Command in Combat sees it this way:


"I had to do more than keep them alive. I had to preserve their human dignity. I was making them kill, forcing them to commit the most uncivilized of acts, but at the same time I had to keep them civilized. That was my duty as their leader. They were good men, but they were facing death, and men facing death can forgive themselves many things. War gives the appearance of condoning almost everything, but men must live with their actions for a long time afterward. A leader has to help them understand that there are lines they must not cross. He is their link to normalcy, to order, to humanity. If the leader loses his own sense of propriety or shrinks from his duty, anything will be allowed. And anything can happen."

and...

"War is not a series of case studies that can be scrutinized with objectivity. It is a series of stark confrontations that must be faced under the most emotion- wrenching conditions. War is the suffering and death of people you know, set against a background of the suffering and death of people you do not. That reality tends to prejudice the already tough choices between morality and pragmatism."

and Lord Moran a generation earlier saw it in the trenches or WWI as follows (in the chapter: Death):


"In war men meet death daily and in every shape. Nevertheless it is kept from their thoughts by an intuition that so only can they win their secret battle with fear. When men's minds were obsessed with death they did not wait to meet it. This was the way of safety and youth met the threat with their own weapons, humour and mockery and such cold comfort as they could find in leaving this world before their powers began to wane. Besides war is the business of youth and no young man thinks he can ever die."

and...

"As the odds shortened, and it became plain that death was to be the common lot, I thought less of its coming until at last I saw no cruelty in its approach."

carl
04-22-2012, 02:39 PM
OK Stan, I'm with you on this but would like to leave the door open for those with ideas for preexposure 'conditioning' to sound off.

Is there any preexposure training done now anywhere that combines live fire, burning vehicles with animals in them, shattered animal bodies, explosions, simulated casualties and manuevering (sic)? I will defer to you guys if it would do any good but I am just curious if it is being done.


Yes the emergency services people see some sights! Wonder if they do anything about it?

When emergency services people show up they have something urgent to do and stay busy until it is done. When their task is completed they leave. Most of them sign up for that work because they like the action and probably have psychologically prepared themselves beforehand. That doesn't mean they won't be affected by the more extreme things but the combination of almost always having something to do on the scene and suitability for the work may be important to dealing with regular exposure to bad things.

carl
04-22-2012, 03:09 PM
JMA:

McDonough's words you cited are very important. They say that not only is the leader responsible for the men at the time he has command, he is in a sense responsible for their well being years into the future. By that I mean the ill effects of unrestrained descent into savagery may not be felt until a time in the future, maybe well into the future, and the leader can protect his men from those effects by making them comport themselves in ways they may not want to comport themselves at the time.

Is that responsibility for the future, as I see it anyway, stressed in officer training do you know?

JMA
04-22-2012, 04:09 PM
JMA:

McDonough's words you cited are very important. They say that not only is the leader responsible for the men at the time he has command, he is in a sense responsible for their well being years into the future. By that I mean the ill effects of unrestrained descent into savagery may not be felt until a time in the future, maybe well into the future, and the leader can protect his men from those effects by making them comport themselves in ways they may not want to comport themselves at the time.

Is that responsibility for the future, as I see it anyway, stressed in officer training do you know?

Under the Brit regimental system the regiment acknowledges it has a duty of care towards their fellow members. Some more so than others and young subalterns eagerly look forward to returning the their parent regiment to command a company and as a long shot command a battalion. Today's troopie or squaddie (as they call them) maybe a corporal or sergeant when the first return and if they make it to command a battalion may be a sergeant major. One should not underestimate the strength of the regimental bonds that develop within these British regiments.

They tend to look after their own.

Para quits over troop treatment (http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/475497/Lt-Col-Stuart-Tootal-Para-hero-quits-over-squaddies-treatment.html). A WAR hero Para chief is quitting the Army in disgust over the “appalling” and “shoddy” treatment of troops, it was revealed yesterday.

Then they do this stuff:

The Parachute Regiment Afghanistan Trust (http://afghanistantrust.blogspot.com/)

The Parachute Regiment Charity (http://paracharity.org/)

Note: Lt Col Tootal's action falls under the category of moral courage.

carl
04-22-2012, 11:47 PM
JMA & Stan and anybody:

One of the things Marlantes mentioned in the first chapter of his book was remote control warfare, drones shooting Hellfires and killing people while being controlled by people literally on the other side of the world. He said something about those people not having a transformative psychological experience and this causing a psychic split. Is he worrying about something that isn't there? Maybe that is as jarring an experience as infantry combat but I have never read that drone drivers suffer problems as do people in face to face combat. I don't know but do artillerymen and sailors suffer from psychological troubles as much as men who kill people they can see and see as individual people? That would be an analog to drone drivers perhaps.

He also mentioned American long range aircraft aircrew having problems because they could fly combat missions and afterward go home to their families for dinner. That concern may be from only viewing recent American experience. Almost all our air fighting has been done by expeditionary forces on a limited tour of some kind. If you look at other countries, South Vietnam for example, it was normal for pilots to live at home and while flying combat missions, for years.

(If you want to provoke a storm of letters to the editor in Stars and Stripes, run an article suggesting Nevada based drone drivers are exposed to as much stress as guys downrange.)

Fuchs
04-23-2012, 08:56 AM
One of the things you can study on a Bundeswehr university is IIRC psychology.
Maybe this combination yields some useful theories based to the Northern Afghanistan combat experiences.

JMA
04-23-2012, 10:44 AM
One of the things you can study on a Bundeswehr university is IIRC psychology.
Maybe this combination yields some useful theories based to the Northern Afghanistan combat experiences.

And access to this data is gained how?

If so will there be a language barrier?

Fuchs
04-23-2012, 11:18 AM
Psychology is a science, and this kind of mil research is unlikely to be kept a secret.

Results would sooner or later trickle to professional psychology journals. The Bundeswehr has universities, after all - not universities of applied sciences. They have a research mission, and their professors have accordingly some interest in writing papers and accumulating prestige by being cited. The usual science stuff.

Just sayin'; lots of German officers in AFG right now have a psychology degree.


Six psychology professors at the university of the Bundeswehr Hamburg alone: http://www.hsu-hh.de/PWEB/index_bAo4l0M1RG8nCsxc.html
The university of the B. in Munich has also some, but apparently they're part of a pedagogue department (lots of adult education stuff there).


About language barriers; can't help it if people learn only one language . :rolleyes:

I can read with no barriers;
* German
* English
slowly and with problems;
* French
* Spanish
enough to usually identify the info I am seeking;
* Dutch
* Swedish
It helps.

carl
04-23-2012, 03:25 PM
I started off as a troopie and my first dead enemy were two who were dispatched by the lead tracker with two pairs of double-taps when he walked into them filling their water bottles from a stream. As the junior troopie on that day I had pull them out of the water (getting my legs wet) while the others waited dry on the bank. I remember at first just staring at the first body - he had two in the chest, eyes open, mouth open and the slow moving water was red with his bleed out - until the 'older' troopie gently said something like 'lets get on with it' and got me to pass him the arms so he could pull the body out of the water. The corporal was less understanding and told me to 'get your ass into gear'. It the first one was washed 'clean' the second had had the top of his head lifted off (7.62 NATO does that) and was an a more ugly sight. I had a more gentle introduction to death than the troopie I quoted above (and compared to some in other wars we both had a gentle intro as the bits of bodies and the 'crispy critters' were to come later for me). ...

I mention the medical training for two reasons being that it was good for morale that the troopies knew help and CASEVAC was close at hand should they get hit. This for the regular soldiers who were around for years was especially important as it was just a matter of time before their number came up and they would need help from their mates. Second because we needed the wounded to be 'stabilized' and cleared from the scene quickly and effectively so we could get on with the fight and while waiting it is better for their mates to be in a position to help rather than just hold his hand and maybe pray. (A lot of people tend to volunteer to stay with the wounded) Also a wounded man with his wounds neatly dressed waiting for the chopper in comfort is also a lot better for morale than the chaos one sees on some of that war footage out of Vietnam (looking more like scenes from Napoleons retreat from Moscow).

A long reply but perhaps it should be considered that during the post contact drills when the contact area is being cleared and the bodies and equipment sorted out the troopies are coming down from the high of battle and perhaps they are hyper aware of what they are doing at that time - dragging bodies around - this is better than having the new troopies out on the perimeter thinking too much about what just happened. Strange thoughts tend to enter idle minds... so keep them busy. Officers and NCOs will be kept busy organising others. We need to watch the 'others' (as some get the post contact shakes) and always put the troopies out in pairs - new with old, never two NFGs together... where in the best Brit tradition they can brew up (make tea) and come down gently.

I will say that all armies must be aware that full brain development - control of reasoning and impulses - only is achieved by age 25. As wars progress the age of those doing the actual fighting declines - Marlantes notes that at 22 he was the second oldest in his Marine company in Vietnam (the company commander being 23). To be brutally honest we need to keep it simple (KISS) and clear for this age group in training. This why my whole thrust or argument (in other threads) has been for the academic training to take place at the Capt/Major level for officers (and not directly out of school). This issue is seldom taken into account.

While Moran and Marlantes talk about different things what they do comes from personal experience. They are both highly educational. Marlantes is more of my age group and while I don't agree with all Marlantes relates he helps us to make better sense of our war experiences... and if serving soldiers can do so they will be in a improved position to better prepare the next generation for war (in the psychological and emotional senses).

Your post from which I extracted these paragraphs was all good but to a civilian these are especially good. They cover human factors that would never have occurred to me but when pointed out, they are actually the little things that would seem to make a big difference between a unit going on effectively or faltering, especially the observation about the importance of everybody having good medical training on the morale of the soldiers who had been around longer.

Churchill observed in The Malakand Field Force that ideally the British at the time would have preferred all their soldiers to be older than 25. I know ideal is impracticable but would you agree or disagree?

I read a book by an Israeli armor general about the '73 war and he had a similar observation about volunteering to stay with the wounded. Until he put a stop to it, 3 tanks would take one wounded man back to aid, the tank he was in and two others to escort that one.

JMA
04-25-2012, 10:52 AM
When emergency services people show up they have something urgent to do and stay busy until it is done. When their task is completed they leave. Most of them sign up for that work because they like the action and probably have psychologically prepared themselves beforehand. That doesn't mean they won't be affected by the more extreme things but the combination of almost always having something to do on the scene and suitability for the work may be important to dealing with regular exposure to bad things.

I suggest that one should look at what these 'emergency services' people do to people do to prepare their new guys for the sights and sounds that await them.

Remember too that there is a mix of experience in these 'teams', not all, like so many military units, are straight out of training with no operational experience.

Big difference!

carl
04-25-2012, 12:09 PM
I suggest that one should look at what these 'emergency services' people do to people do to prepare their new guys for the sights and sounds that await them.

Remember too that there is a mix of experience in these 'teams', not all, like so many military units, are straight out of training with no operational experience.

Big difference!

Great point, that I didn't think of, about the mix of experience on teams. A new police officer is paired with an experienced officer for months before they are on their own. I don't know how the fire dept and EMTs do it but I imagine they are similar.

In my limited experience the police do nothing at all specific to prepare the people for sights and sounds beyond war stories related during training.

JMA
04-25-2012, 04:40 PM
Great point, that I didn't think of, about the mix of experience on teams. A new police officer is paired with an experienced officer for months before they are on their own. I don't know how the fire dept and EMTs do it but I imagine they are similar.

In my limited experience the police do nothing at all specific to prepare the people for sights and sounds beyond war stories related during training.

Here's an example of this from the Aussies:


“In August 1942 the 39th and 53rd Battalions of the Australian Militia, composed of 18 year old conscripts, collided with a Japanese brigade advancing south across Papua New Guinea’s Kokoda Trail. The 53rd battalion turned and ran. The 39th battalion, which a few weeks earlier had received an influx of experienced officers and NCO’s, stood its ground and over the next month fought the Japanese to a standstill. This action is regarded as a test in laboratory conditions of the impact of leadership on fighting performance.” - Serve to Lead

Then from that great source of wisdom, Von Schell in the booklet 'Battle Leadership' (available from the Marine Corps Association for $9.95):


At the beginning of a war new troops will be recruited and trained in all countries and naturally will enter into combat later than the active troops - frequently months later. If we give these inexperienced troops a backbone of experienced soldiers and experienced commanders their efficiency will be tremendously increased and they will be spared heavy losses.

This is so obvious that the question must really be why it has not been addressed before everywhere.

carl
04-26-2012, 02:38 AM
You know now that I think about it, airlines do the same thing, putting experienced pilots with new guys. In fact I think there are regulations governing that, though it has been so long since I've been in the airline world I don't know for sure. You never ever put two pilots new to an airplane type or airline ops together if you can help it.

Steve Blair
04-26-2012, 02:29 PM
Another thing that can be overlooked is how you mix those new troops with veterans. There's a fair amount of evidence that doing this mixing while a unit is in combat is a bad idea if it can possibly be avoided (drawn from World War 2 comparisons of practices in Europe and the Pacific by US forces and Vietnam).

Ulenspiegel
04-26-2012, 06:12 PM
Another thing that can be overlooked is how you mix those new troops with veterans. There's a fair amount of evidence that doing this mixing while a unit is in combat is a bad idea if it can possibly be avoided (drawn from World War 2 comparisons of practices in Europe and the Pacific by US forces and Vietnam).

From German experience during WWI and WWII: A few weeks (3-6) training are enough for units, which have received their "green" replacements, to let the units regain cohesion. This training could be done near the front.
The key is to avoid a continuous influx of replacements.

Steve Blair
04-26-2012, 07:12 PM
From German experience during WWI and WWII: A few weeks (3-6) training are enough for units, which have received their "green" replacements, to let the units regain cohesion. This training could be done near the front.
The key is to avoid a continuous influx of replacements.

Quite. And that's often what happened in the Pacific. It didn't happen to the same degree in Europe. Vietnam was a mixed bag, with much often left to individual divisions to determine. Some did it well, some were ok, and others were not very good.

JMA
04-27-2012, 08:24 AM
Another thing that can be overlooked is how you mix those new troops with veterans. There's a fair amount of evidence that doing this mixing while a unit is in combat is a bad idea if it can possibly be avoided (drawn from World War 2 comparisons of practices in Europe and the Pacific by US forces and Vietnam).

If we look at Antony Beevor's book, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy, on Kindle and search 'replacements' we get 39 instances. One as follows:


Replacements joined their platoon usually at night, having no idea where they were. The old hands shunned them, partly because their arrival came just after they had lost buddies and they would not open up to newcomers. Also everyone knew that they would be the first to be killed and doomed men seen as somehow contagious. It became a self-fullfilloing prophecy, because replacements were often given the most dangerous tasks. A platoon did not want to waste experienced men."

Further, in Gen Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division, a neuro-psychiatrist, Major David Weintrob improved the manner in which "replacements" were introduced into front line units (this being part of Weintrob's pioneering work on combat stress.

Then you move on to the Pacific to get an inkling into the psychology of the group dynamic in combat units:


A rifleman, Brookes was in the line 20 days before he got his first Jap. After that, he said, he ‘felt better – like he belonged.’ Back in a rest area now, Brookes can lie on his bunk and talk and make gags with the older fellows about what happened. He’s not lonely any more. He’s a veteran. - from Pittsburgh Post-Gazette - Jun 26, 1945

Then we look at Vietnam and the FNG syndrome (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FNG_syndrome) and need to wonder if anything improved.

What of today?

JMA
04-27-2012, 11:33 AM
From German experience during WWI and WWII: A few weeks (3-6) training are enough for units, which have received their "green" replacements, to let the units regain cohesion. This training could be done near the front.
The key is to avoid a continuous influx of replacements.

Thats probably the ideal scenario in a conventional war environment.

The problem of the US was that the initial (production line) training was very basic and that of replacements was even less. This was a significant problem it itself.

You want to avoid the need for a continuous flow of replacements? Don't take the casualties. Not that easy in war. Easier if you have smart officers and tough and experienced NCOs and troops. Also not that easy.

Back to point...

...your man von Schell said back in 1933:


The German troops were young and had only undergone a short period of training. They had entered the army in October, 1915 and therefore had but three months of training behind them. However, they were intermingled with men who had already had some war experience, and who at least knew those first impressions that war brings. These veterans regarded themseleves as instructors to their young comrades; they felt a certain responsibility for them. Because of this feeling the value of the old soldiers was markedly increased,while the inexperienced men developed rapidly under their instruction. Although only one-fourth of the men were experienced , their influence was sufficient to give the entire organization a veteran character. I watched the same influence at work later in the war and it always had the same result.

Big difference in approach to that of the US.

Ulenspiegel
04-27-2012, 12:37 PM
Thats probably the ideal scenario in a conventional war environment.

The problem of the US was that the initial (production line) training was very basic and that of replacements was even less. This was a significant problem it itself.

You want to avoid the need for a continuous flow of replacements? Don't take the casualties. Not that easy in war. Easier if you have smart officers and tough and experienced NCOs and troops. Also not that easy.



I think it was considered better to let units shrink due to losses and work with these smaller units as long as possible - a depleted unit which has strong coherence was better than a larger units which lacked it - then bring them back to authorized strength when you have the opportunity to incorporate the replacements, i.e. training time is available, more a "batch" approach in contrast to the "continuous flow".

IIRC the same approach was used by the British army in the Napoleonic era.

Ken White
04-27-2012, 02:55 PM
The problem of the US was that the initial (production line) training was very basic and that of replacements was even less. This was a significant problem it itself.Was and is -- we have gotten no smarter... :mad:
Big difference in approach to that of the US.Sadly, our approach is driven by a personnel system that is designed and operated to serve itself and its operators. It does a very poor job of supporting the Army. :rolleyes:

It simply wants to produce Round Pegs, small Round Pegs, that will fit in any hole regardless of the size or shape that is an optimum fit for the hole in question. It is not solely the fault of the Personnel folks; the Army leadership and, more importantly, the Congress support, even demand, that approach. Sad...:mad:

It is noteworthy that two of the most successful Divisions in the US Army in World War II, the 3d Infantry and the 82d Airborne both ordinarily refused to accept any replacements other than Privates and Second Lieutenants, both ran excellent training programs all through the war and both were great at promoting from within -- the 82d often declined even 2LTs. There were other good Divisions -- the 88th comes to mind, pure wartime raise and fill with a large number of draftees but they generally excelled because they had exceptionally talented Commanders, not because the 'system' was designed to properly support them.

Steve Blair
04-27-2012, 03:46 PM
It is noteworthy that two of the most successful Divisions in the US Army in World War II, the 3d Infantry and the 82d Airborne both ordinarily refused to accept any replacements other than Privates and Second Lieutenants, both ran excellent training programs all through the war and both were great at promoting from within -- the 82d often declined even 2LTs. There were other good Divisions -- the 88th comes to mind, pure wartime raise and fill with a large number of draftees but they generally excelled because they had exceptionally talented Commanders, not because the 'system' was designed to properly support them.

There was also the conscious decision taken to simply leave divisions in the line. The 82nd was by its nature pulled out of the line often, giving it time and space to train in addition to the policies you mention.

In contrast (in part due to the nature of the Pacific Theater), the Marine Corps preferred whenever possible to pull divisions out of action and give them a refit period. In most cases (with the exception of the botched refit of the 1st Marine Division before Peleliu) this policy seemed to work pretty well. Marine basic training at that time wasn't all that much better than the Army's; the difference was in the training that took place during those refit periods.

Vietnam is difficult to compare because there was a great deal of what I'd call unit-level autonomy, sometimes extending all the way down to battalion level. The 11th ACR by all accounts seems to have had a good system for dealing with new troops, while outfits like the Americal, some elements of the 4th ID, and some Marine units simply dumped new guys into units. You came in through two major processing centers and then were "chopped" wherever the clerks thought you were needed.

And FNG syndrome wasn't unique to Vietnam. It originated with burned-out divisions in the ETO and continued through to Korea. Vietnam's is simply more commonly known. There are even signs of something similar (Green Apples) going back to the Civil War.

Ken White
04-27-2012, 04:06 PM
Hoiwever, training during combat is important and several Divisions other than the 3d were good at it. Most of the Armored Divisions did it. The 1st Mar Div in Korea had an excellent combat training, and NCO training program once the line stabilized and they were rigorous in sending people to those programs.

As you note, in Viet Nam it was far more discretionary at unit level. The 1st Bde of the 101st as a Separate Brigade in 1965-67 had in-country training and an NCO course also. It can be done -- should be done -- and good units will do it in spite of the impediments or lack of an overarching system plan.

JMA
04-27-2012, 04:48 PM
I think it was considered better to let units shrink due to losses and work with these smaller units as long as possible - a depleted unit which has strong coherence was better than a larger units which lacked it - then bring them back to authorized strength when you have the opportunity to incorporate the replacements, i.e. training time is available, more a "batch" approach in contrast to the "continuous flow".

IIRC the same approach was used by the British army in the Napoleonic era.

OK, I'm essentially in agreement on this... but lets make sure we agree on the semantics.

First, don't introduce new troops (FNGs) directly into battle. Rather attach a full platoon or company from an experienced unit the unit can be rotated for training and the assimilation of replacements in a structured manner.

If one waits for a unit to rotate out of the line before replacements are brought in then only a batch (or the required number of replacements) system can work.

In the COIN context of Rhodesia in the RLI we trained our own recruits throughout and fed them into the operational subunits as each course was completed. These replacements were for National Servicemen (conscripts) standing down, replacing regular soldiers whose contracts were up, and of course for casualties. This was a continuous trickle feed - in the sense that every two months we had ins and outs. Seldom would a troop (platoon) receive more than one or two on these occasions. These would be placed with the sergeant and the senior corporal but importantly 'buddied up' with an experienced troopie who was tasked to 'teach him the ropes'. They were also termed 'fresh-pussy' (or words to that effect) until they had been in a contact and done well and then another new guy or pair of new guys arrived - when they shed the 'fresh pussy' title and bought the troop a crate of beers (24) when like Brookes (in the article quoted above) they became full (and trusted) members of the group (like how I mentioned some time ago boys get membership of the club house built in a tree). It a troopie did something stupid later he would be 'fined' a crate of beers by the other troopies. There was never any shunning or ostracism of the 'fresh pussy' as it was in our interests to get them to the level of being able to be relied upon by their mates. As the troop commander for three years I saw this first hand many times.

To assimilate new replacements in ones and twos per platoon is pretty simple in this particular scenario. This is what I see as continuous flow - when it really is a couple of guys in and out of each platoon every few months.

JMA
04-27-2012, 05:05 PM
Hoiwever, training during combat is important and several Divisions other than the 3d were good at it. Most of the Armored Divisions did it. The 1st Mar Div in Korea had an excellent combat training, and NCO training program once the line stabilized and they were rigorous in sending people to those programs.

As you note, in Viet Nam it was far more discretionary at unit level. The 1st Bde of the 101st as a Separate Brigade in 1965-67 had in-country training and an NCO course also. It can be done -- should be done -- and good units will do it in spite of the impediments or lack of an overarching system plan.

YES!

Train, train, train.

We rotated back for 10 days every six weeks and wanted to let the troopies have maximum time off so we worked the training in whilst on ops when a troop was in reserve or waiting to be called out (on Fire Force). Troopies being troopies (at 18/19) still needed a sgts size 9 on the ass to motivate them for the training from time to time ;)

Fuchs
04-27-2012, 05:06 PM
First, don't introduce new troops (FNGs) directly into battle. Rather attach a full platoon or company from an experienced unit the unit can be rotated for training and the assimilation of replacements in a structured manner.

IIRC a successful approach was to give easy missions to green troops first. A battalion would do the job of a platoon, a company would do the job of a platoon and finally platoons would be expected to do their job. Not sure about the first step, though.
Anyway, the idea was to create confidence and experience under most favourable conditions - an acclimatisation to battle.

JMA
04-27-2012, 05:28 PM
It is noteworthy that two of the most successful Divisions in the US Army in World War II, the 3d Infantry and the 82d Airborne both ordinarily refused to accept any replacements other than Privates and Second Lieutenants, both ran excellent training programs all through the war and both were great at promoting from within -- the 82d often declined even 2LTs. There were other good Divisions -- the 88th comes to mind, pure wartime raise and fill with a large number of draftees but they generally excelled because they had exceptionally talented Commanders, not because the 'system' was designed to properly support them.

Sounds good.

How long were these formations in theatre in which war?

Back to vietnam... I would appreciate your comment an this article:
Vietnam War: The Individual Rotation Policy (http://www.historynet.com/vietnam-war-the-individual-rotation-policy.htm)

JMA
04-27-2012, 05:39 PM
IIRC a successful approach was to give easy missions to green troops first. A battalion would do the job of a platoon, a company would do the job of a platoon and finally platoons would be expected to do their job. Not sure about the first step, though.
Anyway, the idea was to create confidence and experience under most favourable conditions - an acclimatisation to battle.

Interesting. Do you have examples of which war and which armies?

I know Bill Slim used this with the XIV Army against the Japanese as a means to overcome the myth of Japanese military invincibility in Burma (in WW2). (Defeat into Victory page 189, paperback)

Steve Blair
04-27-2012, 05:50 PM
Sounds good.

How long were these formations in theatre in which war?

Back to vietnam... I would appreciate your comment an this article:
Vietnam War: The Individual Rotation Policy (http://www.historynet.com/vietnam-war-the-individual-rotation-policy.htm)

The 82nd was first committed to Sicily in 1943 and then Normandy in 1944. Most US airborne units remained in strategic reserve until they were committed to major operations (Market-Garden being one). The 3rd ID started in North Africa in late 1942. Ken's talking about their WW2 service in both cases, I believe.

The original idea for rotations, if I recall correctly, started in Korea (except it was point-based). The Vietnam policy grew in part based on the original TDY nature of the conflict (advisors were considered on temporary duty and too many military cultures are creatures of habit). There were a number of rationalizations for the officer rotation policy, but I think at the end of the day it can really be attributed to the "need" for officers to have their combat command ticket punched. The draft played a role on the EM side, as the linked article points out, although I do think the article's "keep your head down for your year" mantra became much more common after 1968. And "90 day wonders" and "shake and bake" NCOs (not mentioned in that article) were also common in World War II.

But I think the basic answer was that no one in a policy position realized that the war could go on for 6+ years (I measure that in terms of major US ground unit commitments). They developed a system to deal with what was believed to be a short-term commitment and then couldn't adjust the system once it dawned on some of them that it might be harder than first thought.

Fuchs
04-27-2012, 07:28 PM
Interesting. Do you have examples of which war and which armies?

The Germans did it in WW2 on the Eastern Front if possible, but it wasn't possible most of the time.
The Eastern Front 1942-1944 on German side is a long and bloody story about the difference between insight and practical ability.

Ken White
04-27-2012, 10:12 PM
How long were these formations in theatre in which war?Both were in North Africa, Sicily / Italy and then northwest Europe in WW II. The 3d Infantry Division was there from Nov 42 until Feb 46, the 82d from May 43 until Jan 46.
Back to vietnam... I would appreciate your comment an this article:
Vietnam War: The Individual Rotation Policy (http://www.historynet.com/vietnam-war-the-individual-rotation-policy.htm)Thanks for the link. Interesting article, I had not seen it before. It is IMO quite accurate, if anything it understates the damage done by that policy though it does seem to have caught all of them. It was indeed the most flawed personnel policy ever -- and note, we're now rotating units instead of people, so we did learn a little in Viet Nam. Very little. Steve is essentially correct in that the 6 month Officer rotations were for ticket punching purposes though it was as the article saed justified by saying it gave more 'combat experience.' I could never figure how bei8ng the Exchange Officer in Da Nang was combat experience...

JMA
04-28-2012, 06:49 AM
The original idea for rotations, if I recall correctly, started in Korea (except it was point-based).

Please elaborate on 'point-based'.

JMA
04-28-2012, 08:18 AM
Interesting article, I had not seen it before. It is IMO quite accurate, if anything it understates the damage done by that policy though it does seem to have caught all of them. It was indeed the most flawed personnel policy ever -- and note, we're now rotating units instead of people, so we did learn a little in Viet Nam. Very little. Steve is essentially correct in that the 6 month Officer rotations were for ticket punching purposes though it was as the article saed justified by saying it gave more 'combat experience.' I could never figure how bei8ng the Exchange Officer in Da Nang was combat experience...

It is of course difficult to believe that the top echelon of general staff (who probably did WW2 and Korea) can prove to be so inept in either/or/both military policy decision making and/or dealing with politicians. Then of course once the freight train starts rolling not much can stop it so the insane rotation of 6-month of platoon commanders continues... as they say like the great Mississippi just keep rolling along.

OK, so were are we now?

SO we agree that deployments should be by unit... but for how long and what size units (by brigade or by battalion)?

Then do we agree that the formation/unit's stateside base provides the replacements?

Now we get to:

Army Unit Cohesion in Vietnam: A Bum Rap (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA515790)

Some interesting stuff there.


"Prolonged tours during World War II had a devastating effect on
troop morale and the neuro-psychiatric health of infantrymen in particular.
Combat in North Africa and in Italy clearly indicated that psychiatric
breakdown in combat units was not a question of who but when, a con-
clusion later substantiated in France and Germany. Based on European
theater casualty rates, postwar researchers determined that 180 days of
combat represented the "burn-out point" for infantry and other front-line
troops. Of equal note was the discovery that after 180 days the neuro-
psychiatric casualty rate of the survivors exceeded that of untested
replacements."

and

"Since a soldier could easily reach burn-out within a year, it
was detrimental to unit efficiency to subject individual personnel to long
tours. Not surprisingly there were 927,307 cases of "battle fatigue" in
World War II, of whom 320,000 were discharged. This exceeded the number
of combat deaths (292,131) ..."

and importantly:

"In contrast to critics of individual rotation in Vietnam, World War II writers considered such tours to be the only solution to high levels of neuro-psychiatric casualties. They did not regard it as detrimental to unit cohesion because in their experience the infantry population of European theater units had been in constant flux anyway. Such units suffered casualties equal to their total personnel authorizations every 85 to 100 days in combat! This meant that the typical infantry unit was "destroyed" at least twice a year. Fifth Army casualty rates, which were average for the European theater, substantiate this estimate. Its infantry battalions possessed less than 18 percent of their original soldiers after 180 days, the majority of whom were cooks, clerks, and other support personnel. Thus there was no point to rotating units because the originals had long ceased to after even one year."

As to the last quote I do realise that casualty rates as mentioned are no longer the norm so that argument probably falls away.

JMA
04-28-2012, 08:19 AM
The Eastern Front 1942-1944 on German side is a long and bloody story about the difference between insight and practical ability.

Please tell me more.

Fuchs
04-28-2012, 08:58 AM
Please tell me more.

long off-topic story; see PM

JMA
04-28-2012, 01:39 PM
long off-topic story; see PM

Received, thanks... maybe a little off topic but still valuable in terms of learning that the under resourced and over stretched German military from 1942 on still gave the allies a run for their money. I think you should consider posting that in open forum.

If only the world could get over the Nazi connotations and also find a way to overcome the language challenge for english speakers to access German military writing then military scholars will find a new 'world' of military education open up for them. Anyone got a spare few million to start a translation project?

davidbfpo
04-28-2012, 02:44 PM
Quoting JMA:
If only the world could get over the Nazi connotations and also find a way to overcome the language challenge for english speakers to access German military writing then military scholars will find a new 'world' of military education open up for them. Anyone got a spare few million to start a translation project?

I thought there was a considerable effort at translating German documents, during the war and on a much larger scale after 1945? Plus a whole series of oral history interviews, a few of which became books later.

I would be surprised if training material was excluded.

Perhaps all the documents are too old, not indexed on Google and in filing cabinets in long forgotten places?

Ken White
04-28-2012, 02:50 PM
SO we agree that deployments should be by unit... but for how long and what size units (by brigade or by battalion)?Combat wise, I'd say Bns -- but the personnel and training systems and organizations would have to be re-tooled to support that. Right now we're really structured and organized to do it by Division but have actually gone to a by-Brigade model, creating in effect a hybrid -- and not totally satisfactory -- situation.
Then do we agree that the formation/unit's stateside base provides the replacements?I don't think it must the unit's home station; a central replacement system works well enough.
Some interesting stuff there.It is that and brings to mind a thought. As a result of that WW II experience and the concomitant major combat induced personnel turnover and the psychiatric casualty effect we also had a one year individual tour effort in Korea. However, there were four significant differences. In my order of importance they were:

1. In Korea, most of the Officers above Lieutenant (and even many of them) and almost all NCOs above Sergeant had WW II experience and most also engaged in constant mentoring and training of subordinates. That included newly arriving units and most individual replacements through the end of the war. Not only was the experience factor lacking in Viet Nam, there was all too often a strange drop in mentoring and in unit training...

2 There was no six-month rotation of Officers to 'broadening assignments.'

3. There was no Infusion program. This program, so far as I know, was a Viet Nam era aberration that was designed to place 'experienced ' soldiers, NCOs and Officers in newly arriving units during the 1966-67 buildup of forces. It entailed taking some all rank persons in varying percentages from units in country and assigning them to newly arrived units to provide a leavening of experience and to insure the entire unit did not rotate at tour end as a body. At the same time, taking some newly arriving units and assigning them to units already in-country (assuring that the new guys would be labeled as FNG at best...). Unfortunately, there was IMO little coherence to who came and / or went where; no 'sister' or affiliated unit -- it was done on an individual basis and the swaps were NOT always rank / job for same rank / job. It was not a well designed plan and it was also poorly implemented in an unduly bureaucratic mode. As you can envision, it created major havoc in units. I believe that program did far more damage than the six month rotation of Officers. It also I think was the most significant reason for the lack of mentoring / in unit training. What it obviously did was destroy unit cohesion at a critical time and the knock on effects continued after the build up period. ... :mad:

4. The Korean 'experience' of rotation, replacement and combat performance essentially lasted from July 1950 through July 1953, thus there were effectively only three 'rotations' (though there were actually more due to far higher early casualties as compared to other, later wars). Further, by July 1951 an effective stalemate existed and the war of movement ceased to be replaced by the tedium but still dangerous though relatively stabilized trench warfare effort -- two very different wars in one, In any event, the short span insured the deleterious effects of time did not evince themselves as they did in Viet Nam. Whether the system would have continued to work reasonably well cannot be known. My guess is it would have been at least slightly superior to that of Viet Nam due to the first three reasons above.

So we did learn a little and have since wisely opted for unit rotations. :wry:

To return to your earlier query on tour length, I'd personally opt for indefinite and aim for 18-36 months, type and intensity of combat defined. However, I doubt most democratic legislatures would support that and I think a year is a marginally acceptable compromise -- with the caveat that it be done a whole lot smarter than we did it in Afghanistan and Iraq. Return to the same area of operations should have been the norm but it was deliberately avoided to prove the 'modular' concept would work -- and for other obscure reasons (like too much work for Planners who also rotated at year or so intervals and thus had no memory of what came before...)

I also believe that type of combat makes a major difference in how units are rotated and employed. In a COIN / FID effort, unit stability and continuity are important, casualties will be generally lower and leaving the unit in place and rotating people (in line with some of your suggestions) can be done -- if the legislatures do not interfere too badly. In higher intensity conflict OTOH, a major war of movement against a peer, that continuity is not necessary and the frequent rotation of units in and out of combat can lessen the psychiatric casualty problem; replacements can be received, training undertaken and rest obtained.
As to the last quote I do realise that casualty rates as mentioned are no longer the norm so that argument probably falls away.Yes but casualty rates are very much a function of each individual war and the current "norm" can be quickly replaced by one that approaches Viet Nam -- or Korea, even WW II.

No easy answers...

Fuchs
04-28-2012, 02:56 PM
If only the world could get over the Nazi connotations and also find a way to overcome the language challenge for english speakers to access German military writing then military scholars will find a new 'world' of military education open up for them. Anyone got a spare few million to start a translation project?

By anyone else I'd have assumed that this was sarcasm...


There were in fact such efforts till the late 50's "foreign military series", documents, for example.

Ken White
04-28-2012, 03:13 PM
I thought there was a considerable effort at translating German documents, during the war and on a much larger scale after 1945? Plus a whole series of oral history interviews, a few of which became books later...I would be surprised if training material was excluded...Perhaps all the documents are too old, not indexed on Google and in filing cabinets in long forgotten places?The US Army made extensive use of former German Officers in documenting their experiences:

LINK (http://www.google.com/search?q=US+Army+military+history+German+expereicn e+in+World+War+II&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&channel=fflb#hl=en&client=firefox-a&hs=a&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&channel=fflb&sa=X&ei=KQScT4fRN4Lc2gXhu7DzDg&ved=0CBsQvwUoAQ&q=US+Army+military+history+German+experience+in+Wo rld+War+II&spell=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=fe2819027d67eb6c&biw=1110&bih=924).

LINK (http://www.google.com/search?q=US+Army+military+history+German+expereicn e+in+World+War+II&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&channel=fflb#q=US+Army+German+Report+Series&hl=en&client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&channel=fflb&prmd=imvns&ei=IgecT4O4JoSA2gWCwNWTDw&sqi=2&start=10&sa=N&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=fe2819027d67eb6c&biw=1110&bih=924)

The series was quite extensive and quite beneficial. At one time I had a couple of shelves full of the pamphlets, perhaps 20-30 inches worth. The series ran the gamut from Squad to the writings of von Rundstedt and Mannstein among others and specifically for the project.

Fuchs
04-28-2012, 03:19 PM
Then again, it was estimated that more than half of the world's military literature was in German (from Germany or Austria-Hungary) during the late 19th century and the prelude to the First World War.

It did not help that much, the decisive new tactics still had to be developed on the job, under fire.
(You cannot imagine how much this frustrates me!)

JMA
04-28-2012, 04:46 PM
By anyone else I'd have assumed that this was sarcasm...

There were in fact such efforts till the late 50's "foreign military series", documents, for example.

Happily you realised I was being serious.

The same applies to writings in French and probably others as well ... and an effort to translate some of the American works into plain English would be appreciated as well. (that's what is called a 'dig' ;)

I suppose it would help if people who knew where already translated works can be found in the public domain could indicate url.

Fuchs
04-28-2012, 05:04 PM
What's really needed is a section in the Gutenberg project (http://www.gutenberg.org/) that includes ALL public domain publications on military stuff. All. Period.

Sort it by
Land / Sea /Aerospace / general,
with language subdivisions,
followed by era subdivisions (such as pre-blackpowder era, blackpowder era, early smokeless powder era, WWI till End of Cold War era, post-Cold War)

JMA
04-29-2012, 05:42 AM
What's really needed is a section in the Gutenberg project (http://www.gutenberg.org/) that includes ALL public domain publications on military stuff. All. Period.

Sort it by
Land / Sea /Aerospace / general,
with language subdivisions,
followed by era subdivisions (such as pre-blackpowder era, blackpowder era, early smokeless powder era, WWI till End of Cold War era, post-Cold War)

OK, until that happens maybe you can suggest which classic German military works are available in translated edition and what each covers and what specific lessons can be learned? Perhaps on a book of the month basis?

JMA
04-29-2012, 07:15 AM
Comprehensive response, thank you.


Combat wise, I'd say Bns -- but the personnel and training systems and organizations would have to be re-tooled to support that.

SO let me understand here. The whole battalion trains together prior to deployment, deploys (fresh) together, stays together and then leaves all together... after a year or so?

From that paper:


"Personnel would return to the United States upon serving 12 months in Vietnam regardless of one's proximity to the fighting. Several factors, mostly bureaucratic, influenced this modification of Korean War policy (where tour length had been flexible, depending on type of assignment)."

Different tour lengths would complicate matter beyond the ability of most planners/schedulers.

What should we be concerned about? Apart from tropical diseases perhaps that 180 days of combat represented the "burn-out point" for infantry? What represents '180 days of combat'? Sitting in Khe Sanh for 180 days straight qualify? Being stationed at Cam Rahn?


I don't think it must the unit's home station; a central replacement system works well enough.

This is probably the simplified system that would probably have to be used when numbers in the hundreds of thousands are being deployed. A bit like a quality 'lucky-dip' in that you don't know what you are getting, especially when it comes to officers and NCOs.

Not sure how the Brits are working this in Afghanistan but presume with the smaller numbers they are able maintain the rear link to their regimental structures in the UK?

If they came through the same regimental system the troopies would probably share at least the same training point of departure, had the same instructors or at least knew them and were able to share similar horror stories about the wrath of the training sergeant major. In other words the new guys arrive at the same standard the older guys were at the same time, with the new guys lacking only in experience and can learn quickly if attached to an older troopies for mentoring.


It is that and brings to mind a thought. As a result of that WW II experience and the concomitant major combat induced personnel turnover and the psychiatric casualty effect we also had a one year individual tour effort in Korea.

This 'round figure' of a year being settled on despite evidence that it is not time in theatre that is the problem but rather combat exposure that has a deleterious effect on soldiers?


However, there were four significant differences. In my order of importance they were:

1. In Korea, most of the Officers above Lieutenant (and even many of them) and almost all NCOs above Sergeant had WW II experience and most also engaged in constant mentoring and training of subordinates. That included newly arriving units and most individual replacements through the end of the war. Not only was the experience factor lacking in Viet Nam, there was all too often a strange drop in mentoring and in unit training...

Not surprising... how do inexperienced soldiers mentor others?


2 There was no six-month rotation of Officers to 'broadening assignments.'

One wonders who the bright sparks are who think up these ideas?


3. There was no Infusion program. This program, so far as I know, was a Viet Nam era aberration that was designed to place 'experienced ' soldiers, NCOs and Officers in newly arriving units during the 1966-67 buildup of forces. It entailed taking some all rank persons in varying percentages from units in country and assigning them to newly arrived units to provide a leavening of experience and to insure the entire unit did not rotate at tour end as a body. At the same time, taking some newly arriving units and assigning them to units already in-country (assuring that the new guys would be labeled as FNG at best...). Unfortunately, there was IMO little coherence to who came and / or went where; no 'sister' or affiliated unit -- it was done on an individual basis and the swaps were NOT always rank / job for same rank / job. It was not a well designed plan and it was also poorly implemented in an unduly bureaucratic mode. As you can envision, it created major havoc in units. I believe that program did far more damage than the six month rotation of Officers. It also I think was the most significant reason for the lack of mentoring / in unit training. What it obviously did was destroy unit cohesion at a critical time and the knock on effects continued after the build up period. ...

One understands that even with the best intentions mistakes can be made. The trick is to fix the mistakes and move on. What would have worked better?


4. The Korean 'experience' of rotation, replacement and combat performance essentially lasted from July 1950 through July 1953, thus there were effectively only three 'rotations' (though there were actually more due to far higher early casualties as compared to other, later wars). Further, by July 1951 an effective stalemate existed and the war of movement ceased to be replaced by the tedium but still dangerous though relatively stabilized trench warfare effort -- two very different wars in one, In any event, the short span insured the deleterious effects of time did not evince themselves as they did in Viet Nam. Whether the system would have continued to work reasonably well cannot be known. My guess is it would have been at least slightly superior to that of Viet Nam due to the first three reasons above.

So we did learn a little and have since wisely opted for unit rotations.

Ok so so maintaining unit integrity is the key. How would one be able to extend tour lengths without compromising unit cohesion?


To return to your earlier query on tour length, I'd personally opt for indefinite and aim for 18-36 months, type and intensity of combat defined.

And (as per my earlier question) how does one maintain unit cohesion and what replacement system does one use?


However, I doubt most democratic legislatures would support that and I think a year is a marginally acceptable compromise -- with the caveat that it be done a whole lot smarter than we did it in Afghanistan and Iraq. Return to the same area of operations should have been the norm but it was deliberately avoided to prove the 'modular' concept would work -- and for other obscure reasons (like too much work for Planners who also rotated at year or so intervals and thus had no memory of what came before...)

Yes, there is no accounting for what politicians get up to.

Yes and the military general staff as well... I mean if troops were to return to areas where they had operated before it would mean they would have some local knowledge. Can't have that now can we? I'm telling you between the politicians and the general staff they are 100 times more effective in screwing up the intervention than the Taliban could ever be. What is the definition of treason again?


I also believe that type of combat makes a major difference in how units are rotated and employed.

Absolutely.


In a COIN / FID effort, unit stability and continuity are important, casualties will be generally lower and leaving the unit in place and rotating people (in line with some of your suggestions) can be done -- if the legislatures do not interfere too badly.

Yes again.


In higher intensity conflict OTOH, a major war of movement against a peer, that continuity is not necessary and the frequent rotation of units in and out of combat can lessen the psychiatric casualty problem; replacements can be received, training undertaken and rest obtained.Yes but casualty rates are very much a function of each individual war and the current "norm" can be quickly replaced by one that approaches Viet Nam -- or Korea, even WW II.

yes again... (three in a row)


No easy answers...

Not sure about that Ken, what you have summarised in this post would go a long way to making the Afghanistan deployment more effective for starters.

Fuchs
04-29-2012, 09:11 AM
OK, until that happens maybe you can suggest which classic German military works are available in translated edition and what each covers and what specific lessons can be learned? Perhaps on a book of the month basis?

Most big ones are available in English. Pick up a copy of any old Eike Middeldorf (author) book you find (the best one should be called "handbook of tactics"). I saw an ad in one of his later books that claimed an earlier book of his was translated in 3 languages, so there's almost certainly some English book of his around, and I'd spend 100+ bucks on it if I hadn't have it already. German copies are easily found, didn't ever find an English one in google. maybe library networks know more.


must have:
The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West by Karl-heinz Frieser and John T. Greenwood (Hardcover - Nov 10, 2005)


the classic "TF":
On the German Art of War: Truppenfhrung: German Army Manual for Unit Command in World War II by Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki (Paperback - Dec 17, 2008)


this one might fit your interests:
Gefechtsfeld Mitteleuropa: by Franz Uhle-Wettler ~1980. Not sure if it was ever translated, though.


should have:
The German Infantry Handbook 1939-1945: by Alex Buchner (Hardcover - Apr 1, 1991) It's not meant to provide general lessons, but there are still plenty. A newer English edition may exist, for a newer German edition exists.


depending on taste:
Panzer Tactics: German Small-Unit Armor Tactics in World War II by Wolfgang Schneider (Paperback - Nov 30, 2005) About life and skills of German armour crews in WW2, very different from other armour-related books.


That's all German stuff from my 'favourite' stack of books that's available in English.


Maybe sometime some wealthy army will spend something on translating "Kriegsnah ausbilden", but don't hold your breath on this. Google will probably translate it earlier.

JMA
04-29-2012, 10:33 AM
this one might fit your interests:
Gefechtsfeld Mitteleuropa: by Franz Uhle-Wettler ~1980. Not sure if it was ever translated, though.

This one perhaps?

Battlefield Central Europe ;: Danger of overreliance on technology by the armed forces / by BG Franz Uhle-Wettler ; translation approved by Franz Uhle-Wettler (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Battlefield-Central-Europe-overreliance-Uhle-Wettler/dp/B0007BHKKK/ref=sr_1_8?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1335693937&sr=1-8)


Bundeswehr General Uhle-Wettler’s paper discusses the problems of overreliance on mechanized forces at the expense of foot-mobile infantry. Wehrmacht armored units during WWII were supported by large numbers of marching infantry units. Who will support the modern Bundeswehr when it moves to a completely mechanized force? Who will protect the flanks and rear? Who will fight in built-up areas and execute those difficult infantry-specific tasks?

Will keep an eye out for it.

Fuchs
04-29-2012, 11:35 AM
Yes, it's a bit dated and some of his ideas were a bit more extreme than necessary (such as using agricultural tractors to pull towed howitzers in reserve brigades), but he's really good at convincing one that infantry was being neglected.

The Bundeswehr accepted the book, promoted him once more - but ultimately it only shrugged its shoulders, knowing that a good infantry coverage of the Central European frontier would require more reservists and budget than politicians would allow. Cold War talks were about missiles, aircraft, helicopters, tanks, artillery ordnance - not about the ability to block forest roads with infantry.
Luckily, the post-WW2 Red Army structure was rather weak on actually available infantry as well - a consequence of bleeding white in 41-45.

Interestingly, the Bundeswehr neglected its motorised rifle (Jger) units even more during the 90's and 00's (drawing down to almost only mountain, mechanised and airborne infantry), trying to keep a decent quantity of highly visible big equipment (AFVs). Eventually, it had to admit that more infantry is needed. The draft for the new army structure ("Heer 2011") has a most strange mix in some brigades:

1x HQ Coy
1x Armour Bn
1x Mech Infantry Bn
1x Motorised Rifle Bn
1x Recce Bn
1x Armoured Engineer Bn
1x Supply Bn

Looks like a one-size-should-fit-all-rotation-schedules structure.
The entire brigade has only a single 120 mm mortar platoon (which is an infinite improvement over the earlier structure), that's how much organic indirect fires are being neglected. The designation of this as armour brigade instead of mech infantry brigade is strange as well, but the earlier Heeresstruktur wasn't consistent in this regard either.


I'd know more about their reasoning if some phone was manned at the centre for transformation of the Bundeswehr for a change. I kept calling them for a while, but there's never an answer. Even the PR officer is apparently rarely if ever at his desk - even during early afternoon on work days.

Ken White
04-29-2012, 02:17 PM
SO let me understand here. The whole battalion trains together prior to deployment, deploys (fresh) together, stays together and then leaves all together... after a year or so?I think that's the best compromise -- and virtually all solutions to the issue have to be compromises...:(
What should we be concerned about? Apart from tropical diseases perhaps that 180 days of combat represented the "burn-out point" for infantry? What represents '180 days of combat'? Sitting in Khe Sanh for 180 days straight qualify? Being stationed at Cam Rahn?Obviously that last shouldn't count and should be avoided if at all possible. Using the Khe Sanh model is probably militarily effective but also probably bureaucratically and mechanically not possible. That entails another compromise -- some units are just going to have it tougher than others and little can be done about it. The truly exceptional can be catered for, minor excursions will have to be tolerated and what constitutes "minor" will change from war to war,
This is probably the simplified system that would probably have to be used when numbers in the hundreds of thousands are being deployed. A bit like a quality 'lucky-dip' in that you don't know what you are getting, especially when it comes to officers and NCOs.True, yet another compromise.
If they came through the same regimental system the troopies would probably share at least the same training point of departure, had the same instructors or at least knew them and were able to share similar horror stories about the wrath of the training sergeant major. In other words the new guys arrive at the same standard the older guys were at the same time, with the new guys lacking only in experience and can learn quickly if attached to an older troopies for mentoring.All true and probably achievable. The better features of the Regimental system can be adopted without picking up some of its less desirable ideas. As an old RSM once said, that system is at one time the strength and the bane of the British Army.
This 'round figure' of a year being settled on despite evidence that it is not time in theatre that is the problem but rather combat exposure that has a deleterious effect on soldiers?IIRC, there was some sense to it. Tours were variously 16 months, 13 months, and 10 months dependent upon various factors such as the type of unit, probably exposure to the stress of combat -- in a 10 month tour, less than 200 days of actual combat would generally be accrued (and I believe the WW II derived figure was 200 days, not 180). That proved to be both politically untenable (Mothers complained to Congress of unfairness if their son was in a unit that hit the 16 month window while a neighbor's was in a 10 month unit...) and too complex for administration when the casualty rates varied dependent upon operational efforts so a year was settled upon as a compromise -- one the politicians could live with...

One interesting note on Korean War casualties, the US / UN rate varied with the quality of the unit in direct opposition and that was true during the war of movement and the static phase. I believe that was also true in WW II but have not seen much about that factor.
Not surprising... how do inexperienced soldiers mentor others?That is certainly true but there were other factors as well.
One understands that even with the best intentions mistakes can be made. The trick is to fix the mistakes and move on. What would have worked better?Unit rotation. We've done that. Now to improve how we do that... :wry:
Ok so so maintaining unit integrity is the key. How would one be able to extend tour lengths without compromising unit cohesion?I think that is very much particular war and operational methods driven; the largest impediment being casualty or other attrition rates.. In Viet Nam and Korea, casualties were the largest number of forced replacement (fewer psychiatric than in WW II), I've heard that currently, human factors (family illnesses or deaths, other personal issues) and physical problems not necessarily combat induced rival and occasionally exceed casualty numbers as a driver of replacements or personnel departures -- many are not replaced because the numbers aren't that high when taken by unit. It'll vary. The key, as you wrote is to adjust, adapt and move on -- bureaucracies are notoriously poor at that. Yet, they're like women; can't live with 'em, can't live without 'em... :wry:
And (as per my earlier question) how does one maintain unit cohesion and what replacement system does one use?Not to be sarcastic but -- only with great difficulty and best according to METT-TC and the particular war.
Not sure about that Ken, what you have summarised in this post would go a long way to making the Afghanistan deployment more effective for starters.Yes but implementing all that would / will not be easy due to those Politicians and that General Staff... :mad:

JMA
04-29-2012, 02:35 PM
Yes but implementing all that would / will not be easy due to those Politicians and that General Staff... :mad:

OK, but know we all know where the problem lies.

JMA
04-29-2012, 03:04 PM
I think that is very much particular war and operational methods driven; the largest impediment being casualty or other attrition rates.. In Viet Nam and Korea, casualties were the largest number of forced replacement (fewer psychiatric than in WW II), I've heard that currently, human factors (family illnesses or deaths, other personal issues) and physical problems not necessarily combat induced rival and occasionally exceed casualty numbers as a driver of replacements or personnel departures -- many are not replaced because the numbers aren't that high when taken by unit. It'll vary. The key, as you wrote is to adjust, adapt and move on -- bureaucracies are notoriously poor at that. Yet, they're like women; can't live with 'em, can't live without 'em... :wry

Talking about unit cohesion I suggest this piece by Henderson is worth study: Cohesion: the Human Element in Combat (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/cohesion/index.htm)

IMHO any action taken by the bureaucracy that damages unit cohesion is criminal. I'm serious... with one stroke of a pen these staff bureaucrats can wreak more havoc in a second than the enemy in a year.

JMA
05-01-2012, 06:43 AM
One interesting note on Korean War casualties, the US / UN rate varied with the quality of the unit in direct opposition and that was true during the war of movement and the static phase. I believe that was also true in WW II but have not seen much about that factor.That is certainly true but there were other factors as well.

OK I can understand that but the quality of the own forces will also have an effect on own forces casualties and the like?

This thesis looks at it from that angle:

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COHESION AND CASUALTY RATES: THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION AT INCHON AND THE CHOSIN RESERVOIR (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a429076.pdf)

I quote:


The 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions fought two campaigns in Korea between September and December 1950. These divisions’ levels of unit cohesion prior to and during their employment affected the number of men who became casualties during the three and one-half months of combat. Casualty rates can be affected by friendly-enemy force ratios and tactical advantages, but this historical analysis shows that units opposing similar enemies in similar tactical situations still have markedly different casualty rates that are not attributable to enemy numbers and disposition.

Then importantly in the context of our discussions in this thread:


Programs such as the Selective Service and the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA), originally designed to help combat units, ultimately destroyed any hope for cohesion that the 7th Infantry Division might have had.

I'm sure that unit cohesion is a critical success factor - along the lines of Napoleons quote re the moral being as to the physical (and I would add the technical) as 3:1. As long as the tail is wagging the dog this will not be addressed. Time for someone to crack the whip?

Ken White
05-01-2012, 03:37 PM
All known -- and all too frequently disregarded; often for inane or insane reasons.

Obviously, own unit quality has an effect on casualties and all other factors of warfare. The vagaries of that fact are a principal cause of the military propensity for overstrength and perhaps excessive redundancy. Regrettably, legislature, bureaucracies and poor leaders refuse to accept or understand that with obvious failures attributable to that refusal.

As a point of minor interest, I don't believe that the Selective Service issue, the Draft, contributed heavily if at all to a lack of unit cohesion not only in the 7th ID up north but in that Army in Korea as an entity. The KATUSA program was definitely an adverse impactor and a detriment to unit capability and performance (one the Marines refused to accept due to that fact regardless of the political desirability and the practical benefits to the Koreans) but poor Army personnel and training policies of the day contributed far more heavily to unit failures in Korea than did the Draft.

Those personnel and training policies are a little better today still leave quite a bit to be desired... :mad:

I'm not at all sure that there's a decent solution to the problem of maintaining unit cohesion over the long term. Good or better cohesion will not always be possible but I believe it could be achieved far more often than not if units were properly organized, equipped and trained and if they were properly led -- and employed. That not least by the political leadership who do not do the employment thing well and who would not like the costs of such units... :wry:

We are stuck with the simple fact that good units develop and maintain unit cohesion under adverse conditions. The solution is to simply have more good units and that can be done by more selective recruiting followed by more effective training and by better selection of Commanders. Not really that hard -- but very difficult in an egalitarian democracy that is perhaps overly concerned with 'fairness.'

Fuchs
05-01-2012, 04:06 PM
Not really that hard -- but very difficult in an egalitarian democracy that is perhaps overly concerned with 'fairness.'

I think you mix up poor decisionmaking with the phony justifications of the poor decisionmakers.

Ken White
05-01-2012, 05:58 PM
I think you mix up poor decisionmaking with the phony justifications of the poor decisionmakers.That there is poor decision making is without doubt -- that some of that is forced by our Congress' insistence on 'fairness' and 'objectivity' in the recruiting, selection and promotion processes should not be doubted by anyone. Add to that Congress' long standing reluctance if not flat refusal to fund much of anything to do with mobilization and the Army's belief that it must have in place work arounds to provide for that eventuality and you have a personnel system that is not only fails to be conducive to good decisions, it is inimical to them.

Road to hell, good intentions and all that...

Red Rat
05-05-2012, 09:06 AM
Not sure how the Brits are working this in Afghanistan but presume with the smaller numbers they are able maintain the rear link to their regimental structures in the UK?


The regimental system has changed considerably in the last few years, away from a geographic and familial basis and more towards a capbadge centric basis.

That said a rear link to UK regimental structures is still retained. When a unit deploys it leaves an element behind within its Rear Operations Group (ROG) for Battle Casualty Replacements. The size and composition of this element depends on the operational analysis of prevailing casualty rates. The BCR (indeed the ROG) is not at the expense of the deploying element, but additional to it and the unit is uplifted with manpower in the months preceeding a deployment. The BCRs have largely conducted Mission Specific Training with the unit over the preceeding 6 months and the rank range is from Major through to private.

Personnel within the BCR cohort are at differing Notice To Moves. As casualties incur in theatre reinforcements flow out to theatre, moving in to a theatre based BCR pool where they conduct acclimatisation and in theatre training prior to being called forward. There is always a pool in theatre ready to be called forward immediately. I do not know how long people spend on average within the in-theatre pool before being called forward, but it is generally a minimum of 10-14 days. While in-theatre they are administered and trained by their parent unit.

JMA
05-06-2012, 09:43 AM
Another recent thread discussed the merits of conscription.

Napoleon had this view:


Conscription forms citizen armies. Voluntary enlistment forms armies of vagrants and good-for-nothings. The former are guided by honour; mere discipline controls the latter. - Napoleon

Well its all about selection isn't it. If you sit in a static recruiting office waiting for strays to walk in off the street then that is what you get.

Both conscripts and volunteers need to be selected for. No army seems to do that well... they just take what they get and the system for selection never improves because of the insane belief that the military make-up must reflect society. If that is good for the military then why does it not apply to NASA, atomic energy, academia and all other specialist occupations? You select the right person for the job right? Wrong, when it comes to the military it seems.

Lord Moran in his seminal work 'The Anatomy of Courage' (in the chapter on selection) says at the time six-months after WW1:


The clear, war-given insight into the essence of a man has already grown dim. With the coming of peace we have gone back to those comfortable doctrines that some had thought war had killed. Cleverness has come into its own again. The men who won the war never left England.; that was where the really clever people were most useful.

Well this is what happens (seemingly) all the time... armies do not learn through experience. Once the particular war is over they clear away all the wartime clutter and get back to real soldiering. Everytime a coconut.



PS: I thank Fuchs for the heads-up on this article:

Why Is Getting Out of the U.S. Army So Tough? (http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2012/05/04/why-is-getting-out-of-the-u-s-army-so-tough/#more-73282)

Ken White
05-06-2012, 02:21 PM
Take a really difficult and dangerous job and allow anyone that walks in the door to apply and serve, no matter their capability.

Insane -- but that's the way of it. That should really be changed. As you write, no Army really seems to do that totally well and the larger ones will have more problems. :(

That linked article you provide from Fuchs is IMO correct in its principal point -- there should be a trial period where one could leave if one discovered that military service was not one's cuppa. That would do several things; get rid of some malcontents (there'[ll always be a few of them about), force the services to put good people in charge of initial entry training instead of just assigning those one doesn't want in an operational unit or whose turn it happens to be (amazing number of designated 'trainers' who are totally unsuited for and do not want the job...) and improve a lot of things to retain people who aren't just trapped in a system (forced contractual servitude even when voluntarily entered is still forced servitude... ;)).

As an aside, the author cites no field training in Basic training. US practice is to minimalize that training in the generic, 'this is the Army (or Marine Corps, whatever...)' basic phase and save it for Advanced Individual Training which is job specific. That is a really poor and flawed approach. It is being changed but far too slowly and timidly. There's pressure to not change it on cost grounds -- though IMO, that's specious. Done right, it could be cheaper -- and it could also serve as a weeding-out effort.

He mentions the Canadian system of easy movement from reserve to active status with varying degrees of commitment. I've long thought we should do that better than we do -- though we are a lot better at that today than we used to be.

Fuchs told me the Bundeswehr volunteer has a six week trial period in which he or she can leave at any time. That's really smart -- we need to do that. It would be far cheaper (and far less disruptive) than trying to board them out later...

I suspect he also proves the point that the average intelligent, advanced degree holding person is far happier as a reservist Captain in a small community and tradition oriented Army than they would be as a younger Private in a large, impersonal active Army that treats people as -- and calls them -- 'assets.'... :D

Red Rat
05-06-2012, 07:16 PM
The British Army recruit has the option of discharging himself as well in the first few weeks of training. While that may weed out some the reality is that the British Army suffers very high wastage rates in training, primarily due to homesickness...:o

British Army recruits go through an extensive selection process once they have volunteered for service, including psychometric and physical evaluation; but there's no cure yet for homesickness.

Interestingly (worryingly) defence recruitment in the UK has just been outsourced. Understandably there are a number of concerns with this...:eek:

Fuchs
05-06-2012, 08:00 PM
I've never seen a homesick boy whom I'd have considered promising for the military. Homesick boys are typically very dependant.

JMA
05-09-2012, 02:35 PM
I've never seen a homesick boy whom I'd have considered promising for the military. Homesick boys are typically very dependant.

Not sure I buy this as being the greatest problem facing recruits joining European armies.

But Fuchs is correct... if mommy's little darling can't stand a few weeks of separation then the army should not keep him. Send him home to mommy.

That said if the psychological tests are worth anything then the excessively dependent should not even get to the point of starting the training.

JMA
05-09-2012, 03:03 PM
The British Army recruit has the option of discharging himself as well in the first few weeks of training. While that may weed out some the reality is that the British Army suffers very high wastage rates in training, primarily due to homesickness...:o

The British army has always had a problem with recruiting... (read the chapter 'Scum of the Earth' in Richard Holmes' book 'Redcoats'.)

As with my comments of officer selection (in another thread) the same applies to wastage on recruit courses. Its all about selection.

Your man Moran (in his book 'The Anatomy of Courage') covers this aspect well in his chapter on selection. Not to be read... but rather to be studied!


British Army recruits go through an extensive selection process once they have volunteered for service, including psychometric and physical evaluation; but there's no cure yet for homesickness.

Then the news is bad... meaning the selection process (as with officers) is not as good as one would like to think.


Interestingly (worryingly) defence recruitment in the UK has just been outsourced. Understandably there are a number of concerns with this...:eek:

Its a horrific thought. Once again the unblooded civilians are tasked with selecting people for duties requiring characteristics beyond their understanding. The certainty is that its bound to fail.

JMA
05-12-2012, 05:20 AM
As an old RSM once said, that system is at one time the strength and the bane of the British Army.

Thats classic British for you. A statement making it possible to be in both camps (for and against) at the same time. ;)

I would be interested to learn more of these supposed negatives but perhaps they are conjured up by those having no regimental system of note as some form of justification for their own position?

Meantime I refer to Sydney Jary from his delightful book '18 Platoon':


Infantry warfare is a wretched business. It makes the physical and the emotional demands on participants that run contrary to all human instinct. The strong minority must quietly help the weak majority. To me that is the essance of good team work and that jewel in the crown of the British Army, the regimental system, is the strong foundation upon which we all, knowingly or unknowingly, relied.

Then of course sage advice from an expected quarter:


Remember tradition does not mean that you never do anything new, but that you will never fall below the standard of courage and conduct handed down to you. Then tradition, far from being handcuffs to cramp your action, will be a handrail to guide and steady you in rough places. - Field Marshal Sir William Slim

...oh yes, and before the academics and those who have never fired a shot in anger start to get involved in this matter:


Only infantry officers are qualified to express opinions on this subject. - Lieut.-Colonel B.E. Ferguson, D.S.O., O.B.E., The Black Watch, "The Case for the Regimental System," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XCVI, February to November 1951

JMA
03-15-2014, 04:00 PM
David,

Did I ever ask you if you could get a copy of this?

Lieut.-Colonel B.E. Ferguson, D.S.O., O.B.E., The Black Watch, "The Case for the Regimental System," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XCVI, February to November 1951

davidbfpo
03-15-2014, 04:26 PM
JMA,

No, not that I recall. Should be able to get a copy soon.:)

JMA
03-15-2014, 04:53 PM
JMA,

No, not that I recall. Should be able to get a copy soon.:)

Appreciate it if you are able.

carl
03-15-2014, 10:33 PM
Me too.

JMA
03-25-2014, 11:15 PM
David,

Received... Many thanks.

Bernard Fergusson (should be double s) was an outstanding officer and war time commander. I wanted to read this to get his view from 1951 as we discussed some of this stuff in various threads here a few years ago. Happy to say I was (inadvertently) in step with his thinking on the matter.

You should circulate this on your Brit network including our friend Red Rat.

Thanks again for going to all the trouble.
Mark



David,

Did I ever ask you if you could get a copy of this?

Lieut.-Colonel B.E. Ferguson, D.S.O., O.B.E., The Black Watch, "The Case for the Regimental System," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XCVI, February to November 1951

davidbfpo
03-26-2014, 12:09 AM
If anyone else would like a copy of the article please ask via PM and supply an email address.

Currently it is over 3Mb so cannot be attached here.

JMA
03-31-2014, 08:25 PM
Came across this book on subject:

The Things They Cannot Say: Stories Soldiers Won't Tell You About What They've Seen, Done or Failed to Do in War (http://www.amazon.com/Things-They-Cannot-Say-Soldiers/dp/0061990523/ref=sr_sp-atf_title_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1396291465&sr=1-1&keywords=the+things+they+cannot+say+by+kevin+sites )

Available on Kindle.

It has received good ratings... but for me IMHO it is written to entertain which for me is a distraction (somewhat like Bing West's 'The Village'). But nevertheless a welcome contribution.

Another book: Soviet Afghanistan Veterans Share Their Stories, Make Predictions. Comparison of Soviet (1979-1989) and American battlefield experience in Afghanistan (Warfare in Afghanistan: Now and Then) [Kindle Edition] (http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00B5YFS66/ref=rdr_kindle_ext_tmb)

Short and sweet and worth the few dollars for the Kindle version.

Comparing their experience to what they see ISAF/NATO doing:


Andrei : “This is my personal view. Compared to our military campaign in Afghanistan, they’re effectively just maintaining presence. They don’t carry out any large-scale operations, like we did. They don’t even fight drug trafficking.”

Andrei has a point.

JMA
05-25-2014, 08:28 AM
Found this on TED.com and thought I would share it here:

Sebastian Junger: Why veterans miss war (http://www.ted.com/talks/sebastian_junger_why_veterans_miss_war)

I believe he covers the difference between 'friendship' and 'brotherhood' well to provide those who have not shared their most vulnerable moments in combat with others a glimpse into this reality.

Michael Norman - in his book These Good Men: Friendships Forged from War (http://www.amazon.com/These-Good-Men-Friendships-Forged/dp/0517559846/ref=sr_sp-atf_title_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1401002056&sr=1-1&keywords=These+Good+Men%3A+Friendship+Forged+from+ War)-sums it up pretty well:


“One knows why men who have been to war yearn to reunite. Not to tell stories or look at old pictures. Not to laugh or weep. Comrades gather because they long to be with the men who once acted their best, men who suffered and sacrificed, who were stripped raw, right down to their humanity.
I did not pick these men. They were delivered by fate. But I know them in a way I know no other men. I have never given anyone such trust. They were willing to guard something more precious than my life. They would have carried my reputation, the memory of me. It was part of the bargain we all made, the reason we were so willing to die for one another.
I cannot say where we are headed. Ours are not perfect friendships; those are the province of legend and myth. A few of my comrade’s drift far from me now, sending back only occasional word. I know that one day even these could fall to silence. Some of the men will stay close, a couple, perhaps, always at hand.
As long as I have memory, I will think of them all, every day. I am sure that when I leave this world, my last thought will be of my family and my comrades...such good men.” --Michael Norman in These Good Men: Friendships Forged in War

and also:

Wes Moore: How to talk to veterans about the war (http://www.ted.com/talks/wes_moore_how_to_talk_to_veterans_about_the_war)

The key part is from 8:05 to 10:30.