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cobot
12-02-2006, 05:34 AM
What role will contractors play in future COIN ops? Will their role increase, stay the same or decrease relative to the role they play today? I don't see their role doing anything but increasing given the success they are meeting in current ops. Streamline the vetting and regulating processes and almost everybody is happy.

SWJED
12-02-2006, 11:13 AM
What role will contractors play in future COIN ops? Will their role increase, stay the same or decrease relative to the role they play today? I don't see their role doing anything but increasing given the success they are meeting in current ops. Streamline the vetting and regulating processes and almost everybody is happy.

I'm not sure what you mean re the bolded text above. Are you saying that PMC's are conducting successful COIN operations? I'd like to hear a few examples - more than say - a tactical success here and there...

cobot
12-02-2006, 02:35 PM
Afghanistan, Iraq... Contractors are playing a big role-need I say more?

SWJED
12-02-2006, 02:54 PM
Afghanistan, Iraq... Contractors are playing a big role-need I say more?

Your original post implied success rather than a matter of necessity or convince. Just because PMC’s are being utilized in these COIN operations does not – by a long stretch – indicate that they might be part of the solution rather than part of the problem.

Of course, if your definiton of success is "bottom-line" profit, you have a point...

Moreover - please look around here before assuming the Council has not discussed the pros and cons of PMCs in a COIN environment (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=629&highlight=blackwater). Our search capability is just that - a capabilty.

Bill Moore
12-02-2006, 03:12 PM
SWJED I agree the contractors have largely failed (meaning they have created more harm than good) in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, some professional outfits such as Executive Outcomes and ICI have done fanastic work throughout Africa. EO made a huge dent in the violence in Sierra Leone when nations couldn't act, but they were asked to leave (long story). I think there are select cases where contractors can be effective (must be professional, vetted organizations that operate within a prescribed legal framework) and cost effective financially and politically.

SWJED
12-02-2006, 04:08 PM
SWJED I agree the contractors have largely failed (meaning they have created more harm than good) in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, some professional outfits such as Executive Outcomes and ICI have done fanastic work throughout Africa. EO made a huge dent in the violence in Sierra Leone when nations couldn't act, but they were asked to leave (long story). I think there are select cases where contractors can be effective (must be professional, vetted organizations that operate within a prescribed legal framework) and cost effective financially and politically.

Bill,

Could not agree more. I just take exception to sweeping generalizations about the "value" of PMCs beyond specific tactical actions and tasks in a U.S. COIN enviornment that conventional wisdom says the solution is 80% political and 20% military. PMCs are not going to give us the 80% - at least not now or in the near future. Maybe later once we sort all this out...

Unity of effort - sometimes called unity of command - is critical and we can't get that right amongst the military and much less amongst the military and our own interagency partners. Anyone who thinks we can maintain unity of effort with PMCs playing a major role is blowing smoke.

Dave

CaptCav_CoVan
12-02-2006, 06:26 PM
SWJED:
I could not agree more. Most are trained for security work and have no interest or motive for prosecuting a true "hearts and minds" counterinsurgency operation that is 80% political and 20% military. We need to move towards a CORDS-type command structure that pulls all of the miltary, economic, poltical, justice and agricultural operations under one command quickly if we are to have any hope of success in Iraq and before we even think of integrating the PMCs..

cobot
12-02-2006, 09:18 PM
You have assumed, but not demonstrated, that the use of PMCs was a failure. If you can "show me the meat", your contention might hold more weight.

Ray Levesque
12-02-2006, 10:51 PM
The use of contractors will continue to grow for the following reasons:
1. High-tech: for tech contractors the government can no longer compete on the open market. High-tech contractors are rare within military ranks today, and are rare even within civil service.
2. Perception of decreased cost: although the short term cost of a contractor is high, the government doesn’t have to worry about keeping on a long-term employee, especially one that requires retirement. (I use the word “perception” because there’s still a debate about whether contractors are cheaper than regular employees.
3. Contractors vs. military: this administration does not want to increase the end-strength of the US military so it has to use contractors for all kinds of work, from info-tech to security.
4. Contractors create less of a PR problem if they are killed or captured: using contractors for all kinds of security duties means you don’t need to put soldiers. And if a contractor is killed or captured, it’s no big deal to the public at large. (Remember that there are still three US contractors being held by the FARC in Colombia – how many Americans know or care? But if they were soldiers, politicians would make an issue of it periodically.

I don’t think the issue of “success” or “failure” is a big factor. In the end I think cost, public perception, and politics will trump “success” or “failure” because there are no standardized measurable criteria to make a valid determination – people have opinions generally based on anecdotes. In situations like that politics, public perception, and cost drive all.

SWJED
12-02-2006, 11:04 PM
You have assumed, but not demonstrated, that the use of PMCs was a failure. If you can "show me the meat", your contention might hold more weight.

Begin by providing examples ("meaty" and "weighty" would be best) of PMC success stories in Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, read my lips, this site is not about winning a battle here and there - PMCs can kick in doors with the best of them - it is all about winning small wars. Think more operational and strategic rather than tactical - that might help.

cobot
12-03-2006, 01:31 AM
Well it was a surprise to me to hear people say that the use of contractors was a failure-especially in Iraq. Yes we've all heard (and heard and heard) in the press about the isolated problems, i.e. 4 BW guys getting killed in Fallujah, etc. But to define the use of contractors to be a failure on the basis of these incidents is very curious from my perspective. Typically you don't hear about contractors' daily positive (and usual) accomplishments-supplies they delivered, people they've trained, etc. However, when something does go wrong it gets plastered all over the press and it makes the people back home think that everything is falling apart over there with respect to the contractors. And things do go wrong in a war zone-nobody totally eludes the fog of war. But to define contractors' efforts as a failure, on the basis of a relatively few highly publicized events, is a mistake from where I stand. Having said that, I joined this forum because of its good rep as a place to engage in intelligent discussion about issues that interest me; so enlighten me if you think I'm wrong about the contractors in the mideast-especially Iraq. I'm certainly not omniscient. BTW, I don't deny that work needs to be done in terms of oversight, etc. but that will come with time.

Jedburgh
12-03-2006, 05:35 AM
What role will contractors play in future COIN ops? Will their role increase, stay the same or decrease relative to the role they play today? I don't see their role doing anything but increasing given the success they are meeting in current ops. Streamline the vetting and regulating processes and almost everybody is happy.
The highlighted bit above is a gross generalization. Your perspective on the existence of substance behind that statement would be appreciated.

Afghanistan, Iraq... Contractors are playing a big role-need I say more?
Yes, you do need to say much more. The simple presence of contractors in numbers does not equate to operational success. If you are able, illuminate the specific positive impacts (beyond simple mission execution) that contractors have had in current COIN ops.

You have assumed, but not demonstrated, that the use of PMCs was a failure. If you can "show me the meat", your contention might hold more weight.
Hello, Pot calling Kettle, do you read me Kettle? You have assumed even more egregiously on your side of the equation.

In fact, Bill is the only one who mentioned "failure", and it was certainly not in the form of an assumption. He stated clearly that the contractors have largely failed (meaning they have created more harm than good) in Iraq and Afghanistan, while going on to positive reflections of PMC impacts in other arenas.

Again, you demand detail from others to support their point of view, but have provided absolutely no context to your own stated perceptions. Reread SWJED's post about your direction of thought.

Well it was a surprise to me to hear people say that the use of contractors was a failure-especially in Iraq. Yes we've all heard (and heard and heard) in the press about the isolated problems, i.e. 4 BW guys getting killed in Fallujah, etc. But to define the use of contractors to be a failure on the basis of these incidents is very curious from my perspective. Typically you don't hear about contractors' daily positive (and usual) accomplishments-supplies they delivered, people they've trained, etc. However, when something does go wrong it gets plastered all over the press and it makes the people back home think that everything is falling apart over there with respect to the contractors. And things do go wrong in a war zone-nobody totally eludes the fog of war. But to define contractors' efforts as a failure, on the basis of a relatively few highly publicized events, is a mistake from where I stand...
Here, you are the one making a huge assumption. If you believe the members of this board - especially individuals like Bill Moore and SWJED - are less than enthusiastic about the overall impact of contractors on ops in Iraq due to a few media stories, you are sorely mistaken.

As for myself, I am pretty much in line with the others that have responded. Not just the guns for hire, but the loggie guys, drivers, mechanics, tech geeks and other contractors in theater are there simply because we don't have the bodies in uniform to execute every necessary supporting mission in the larger op. Having people that can ably (more or less) fill those roles is a good thing - in the short term. However, the use of contractors in several of those roles raises many troubling operational issues; i.e. from my perspective, the over-reliance on contractors in many intelligence roles is doing long-term damage to the MI field, from which it will take a tremendous effort to recover. This is a significant negative impact that ripples well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.

To paraphrase what SWJED already told you - take a breath, step back from the base-line issue and look at the big operational picture. Think before you discuss.

And don't assume that the members of this board develop their perspectives from media feeds. Even in the best of interpretations, that is insulting.

cobot
12-03-2006, 05:02 PM
Wow-all I am getting is the common perspective that contractors have failed and the request that I prove otherwise. In spite of the fact that day after day, week after week and month after month, supplies are delivered, personnel are trained and security is provided. In short, in spite of the fact that contrators have largely succeeded, I'm being informed that they have failed. Again, a few highly publicized accounts of problems don't translate to a failure.


If you are able, illuminate the specific positive impacts (beyond simple mission execution) that contractors have had in current COIN ops.

You don't hear about all the successes (which in terms of quantity absolutely dwarf the failures) precisely because they aren't high profile missions. "Low level" missions like delivery of supplies, training and security all are important parts of COIN. Without "simple mission execution" COIN ops would be greatly handicapped.


In fact, Bill is the only one who mentioned "failure", and it was certainly not in the form of an assumption. He stated clearly that the contractors have largely failed (meaning they have created more harm than good) in Iraq and Afghanistan, while going on to positive reflections of PMC impacts in other arenas.

And again, my request is for some substantiation as to why he thinks the contractors' efforts could aptly be construed as "largely" a failure. Yes, there have been some sporatic problems but these haven't, to my knowledge, tainted the overall effort. If I'm missing something please enlighten me.


you are the one making a huge assumption. If you believe the members of this board - especially individuals like Bill Moore and SWJED - are less than enthusiastic about the overall impact of contractors on ops in Iraq due to a few media stories, you are sorely mistaken.

Hmmm, enlighten me again-where did I ever write this or even insinuate this?


As for myself, I am pretty much in line with the others that have responded. Not just the guns for hire, but the loggie guys, drivers, mechanics, tech geeks and other contractors in theater are there simply because we don't have the bodies in uniform to execute every necessary supporting mission in the larger op. Having people that can ably (more or less) fill those roles is a good thing - in the short term. However, the use of contractors in several of those roles raises many troubling operational issues; i.e. from my perspective, the over-reliance on contractors in many intelligence roles is doing long-term damage to the MI field, from which it will take a tremendous effort to recover. This is a significant negative impact that ripples well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.

Now we're getting somewhere-this is the level of analysis I was looking for-thank you.


And don't assume that the members of this board develop their perspectives from media feeds. Even in the best of interpretations, that is insulting.

Well if somebody has spent time there, they'd have seen the number of times things were done properly-the everyday mission successes which directly feed into the possibility of overall operational success. Again, if I'm missing something please enlighten me.

marct
12-03-2006, 06:09 PM
However, the use of contractors in several of those roles raises many troubling operational issues; i.e. from my perspective, the over-reliance on contractors in many intelligence roles is doing long-term damage to the MI field, from which it will take a tremendous effort to recover. This is a significant negative impact that ripples well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.


Now we're getting somewhere-this is the level of analysis I was looking for-thank you.

I would have to add to this that using contractors for MI is not only damaging to the field itself, but is also damaging to the reputation of the US forces globally. Many people can understand why contractors would be hred for specific support services (e.g. driving, tech support, etc.), but for something as crucial as MI and interogations? Surely this is sending a message that the administration wishes to bypass all intenational conventions surrounding prisoners - regardless of the "truth" of such a message.

Marc

Jimbo
12-03-2006, 06:28 PM
There are many problems with the use of PMC's in COIN. The first thing to consider is their motivation. They are a for profit company. Therefore, what is their motivation to see a solution? That being said soem things to be said. The PMC's are not the resurrection of Hoare and No 5 Commando in the Congo or Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone. The one attempt at contractor direct involvement, MPRI running basic training at Kirkush for the new Iraqi Army did not work. If the mission needs to change, even slightly, that involves a new contract. Therefore the PMC's lack flexibility. The PMC's do good at fixed sight security, but at a certain point you have to have the locals do this, once again we are back to making money. The use of PMC's to escort convoy's works, but they really aren't integrated into military C2. This leads to them being very heavy-handed on the local population, hence a liability in COIN. Finally, the over reliance of PMC's for technological and labor support leads to an overall eroding of a military's capabilities. The PMC's provide a valuable resource for security, but there is no transition plan for them, and due to them being outside the military there are C2 issues and "butter-fly effect" issues that manifest into large problems. So in very limited roles, PMCs are great, but they are not what was and has been done in Africa in the mercenary tales of lore. Many of the PMC folks are great guys with impressive skills and resumes, but they are not the answer in any way shape or mean to COIN, and at worst, contribute to the problem.

marct
12-05-2006, 01:13 PM
Hi Jimbo,


There are many problems with the use of PMC's in COIN. The first thing to consider is their motivation. They are a for profit company. Therefore, what is their motivation to see a solution?

I certainly have to agree with you on this. As one of my favorite armchair theoreticians said:


I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you.

Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/machiavelli-prince.html#CHAPTER%20XII)


The one attempt at contractor direct involvement, MPRI running basic training at Kirkush for the new Iraqi Army did not work. If the mission needs to change, even slightly, that involves a new contract. Therefore the PMC's lack flexibility.

This might be handleable via a flexible contract such as that of the Landsknecht in the 15th and 16th centuries, but it wouldn't deal with the political problem of hiring mercenaries.


The use of PMC's to escort convoy's works, but they really aren't integrated into military C2. This leads to them being very heavy-handed on the local population, hence a liability in COIN.

Absolutely! And, just to add to the problem, there is an insidious symbolic problem as well - "obviously the 'infidel' has no principles or strong beliefs except trying to grab all the money they can; after all, they don't even have enough volunteers to guard their trucks!". Using PMCs in field support roles may create a situation where there is a perception that the Coalition's national wills are much lower than they actually are, embolding the various insurgent groups and militias to act.


Finally, the over reliance of PMC's for technological and labor support leads to an overall eroding of a military's capabilities. The PMC's provide a valuable resource for security, but there is no transition plan for them, and due to them being outside the military there are C2 issues and "butter-fly effect" issues that manifest into large problems. So in very limited roles, PMCs are great, but they are not what was and has been done in Africa in the mercenary tales of lore. Many of the PMC folks are great guys with impressive skills and resumes, but they are not the answer in any way shape or mean to COIN, and at worst, contribute to the problem.

Honestly, I'm not quite sure if I would agree that "they are not the answer in any way shape or mean to COIN" - there are some possibilities, but I certainly haven't seen them take place. I certainly agree that a reliance on mercenaries, and I'm using that term rather than PMCs to highlight the propaganda problem with PMCs, would be disasterous. I also agree that the "the over reliance of PMC's for technological and labor support leads to an overall eroding of a military's capabilities"; but there is a problem here. In a number of cases, the regular forces just cannot get or hold onto the right type of technological skills (in the broad sense of technology).

At least in the case of technological mercenaries, it may be a good idea to modify their contracts such that they are also responsible for field training members of the regular forces as well as fulfilling their general contract objectives. Another problem, at least in the technology area, is that the world views of the mercenaries may be so different from the regular forces that they spend all of their time fighting each other. This was certainly the case with most Anthropologists working in WW II in the US (yes, symbolic manipulation is a technology).

Marc

Tom Odom
12-05-2006, 02:16 PM
A relevant article in the Wash Post today (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/04/AR2006120401311.html):


There are about 100,000 government contractors operating in Iraq, not counting subcontractors, a total that is approaching the size of the U.S. military force there, according to the military's first census of the growing population of civilians operating in the battlefield.

The survey finding, which includes Americans, Iraqis and third-party nationals hired by companies operating under U.S. government contracts, is significantly higher and wider in scope than the Pentagon's only previous estimate, which said there were 25,000 security contractors in the country.

It is also 10 times the estimated number of contractors that deployed during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, reflecting the Pentagon's growing post-Cold War reliance on contractors for such jobs as providing security, interrogating prisoners, cooking meals, fixing equipment and constructing bases that were once reserved for soldiers.

Official numbers are difficult to find, said Deborah D. Avant, author of the 2005 book "The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security," but an estimated 9,200 contractors deployed during the Gulf War, a far shorter conflict without reconstruction projects. "This is the largest deployment of U.S. contractors in a military operation," said Avant, an associate professor at George Washington University.

Best

Tom

sgmgrumpy
05-01-2007, 02:48 PM
Surprise?:D

http://www.fbo.gov/spg/State/A-LM-AQM/A-LM-AQM/Awards/SAQMPD07D0050-SAQMPD07D0051-SAQMPD07D0052LnIDIQ.html

LawVol
05-01-2007, 04:51 PM
Here's a sample task order for the contract:

http://fs2.fbo.gov/EPSData/State/Synopses/8786/SAQMPD06R1005/sampletaskorderrequestgpoi.doc

sgmgrumpy
05-01-2007, 07:28 PM
You can find everything from Lesson Plans to Training Scenarios here


President Bush approved the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a five-year $660 million program, on April 1, 2004. GPOI was developed to address major gaps in international peace support operations (PSO):

the number of capable peacekeepers and the ability of countries to sustain that capacity,
deployment and logistics support, and
the number of gendarme units able to participate in PSOs.
GPOI’s goals were put forth as a G-8 Sea Island Summit initiative in June 2004, where G-8 Leaders agreed to an action plan on “Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations.” This plan includes commitments to:

train and, where appropriate, equip 75,000 military PSO troops worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, through 2010
develop a transportation and logistics support arrangement to help troops deploy to PSOs and help sustain them in the field
support the Italian initiative to establish an international training center to train gendarme units to participate in PSOs, and
coordinate capacity building efforts.



Multinational Training Branch - MPAT & GPOI
http://www2.apan-info.net/mpat/index.aspx?ct=19

BronwenM
06-06-2007, 09:50 AM
I am sorry that I am responding 7 months later to this great thread but want to share some ideas I have been harboring for awhile....

My response is particularly directed to the seemingly elusive quest to find a solution to the perceived USG resource gap for the political element of COIN operations. As stated below, conventional wisdom notes that successful COIN solutions are 80% political and 20% military.


Bill,

Could not agree more. I just take exception to sweeping generalizations about the "value" of PMCs beyond specific tactical actions and tasks in a U.S. COIN enviornment that conventional wisdom says the solution is 80% political and 20% military. PMCs are not going to give us the 80% - at least not now or in the near future. Maybe later once we sort all this out...

Dave

What is not widely known in military circles is that there exists an extensive cadre of private firms that have been implementing the EXACT requirements of the political/civilian element of COIN/Stability Operations for over 30 years. But, sadly, due to interagency turf wars and a myopic understanding of the civilian capacity, this private resource is either entirely invisible to most or tends to get readily dismissed and lumped into the category of "soft" NGOs (ie. humanitarian organizations that have a deep aversion to directly coordinating and closely working with the military).

From my observations, the military policy discourse (and those of RAND and other think tanks) on the role of civilians in The Long War suffers greatly from this near sightedness. The civilian contribution seems to be framed from what "is known" or "has been in front of us" versus "what is out there" but not yet seen first hand (or misunderstood if it is seen). The usual definition of civilian contributions is it comes from either contractors from the private sector or NGOs. The definition of private sector contribution seems to be soley focused on what is known - firms that provide operational surge capacity (logistics, supply, camp ops, security) and operational support or implementation firms (engineering/construction). NGOs are all lumped as non profits that implment humanitarian programs and are a good USG resource to coordinate with at a national level through OFDA/USAID and directly within local AORs. What is missing is the inclusion of the multitude of private sector companies that provide the 80% COIN types of activities in pre-current- post conflict/war zones.

This brings me to the Who, What, Where, When, How of these companies.

WHO:

Field and headquarter staff and consultants are veteran conflict zone implementers of a variety of political/economic/social programs. Most have advanced degrees but more importantly all are chosen due to their cultural and regional expertise. Some come from USG (military agencies, State, USAID) or former UN peacekeeping staff and many got their start in Peace Corps.

Most if not all US based companies are predominately implementing partners of USAID. Yet, many have also implemented programs for the World Bank, Asia Development Bank, UN agencies, and have also been funded by the State Department to fully staff UN or OSCE civilian operations (civilian police or election administrators - not to be confused with circuit junkie election monitoring gigs).

WHAT
Services provided have been in rapid response economic development (national level and micro-finance/micro enterprise, workforce development, vocational training, private sector development), community basic services/infrastructure, governance, rule of law, democratic institution building (including civil military institutions), agriculture/natural resources, health, education, etc.

WHERE
Even prior to Iraq and Afghanistan, many private firms have been implementing critical COIN like activities in Bosnia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Kosovo, East Timor, Congo, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Mindanao, etc etc.

WHEN
The prevelant assumption is that development firms implement activities after the dust has well settled. This is not the case. In Iraq for example, through the USAID Office of Transitional Initiatives funding, a private firm (DAI) implemented quick impact essential services projects that utilized rapid employment in places such as Sadr City, Talafar, Falujah, etc. This was all done in direct coordination with the military.

How
COIN like activities are all based on Do No Harm principles which essentially is "be cognizant of local culture, history, norms, social fabric to avoid causing more conflict" and are steeped in participatory community engagement methodology. What is crucial is that the "Western" face is kept to a minimum and that local partners are engaged to assure access, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Typical engagements relevant to COIN include:


Conflict/Situational Analysis Assessments of Operating Environments (to focus on political, historical, cultural, socio-economic, social and informal governing networks);

Community Level Engagement including Quick Impact (QIP) basic services/infrastructure Projects with heavy emphasis on rapid job creation; community economic development (microfinance/enterprise/agribusiness); private sector development (vocational training, workforce development, etc)..

Public Information Campaigns through all media elements - FM, AM, Short wave radio, tv, street theatre, etc.

Small Grants and Local Subcontracting Management - for example, a QIP Iraq program totaled over $300 million in local grants/subcontractors in 2 years;

Remote implementation of programs through the use of vetted local

Rapid Response - many can deploy 72 hours after contract signature and often can cut grants within a week;


The "so what" question

Many of these private sector development firms recognize that the USG Civilian Agencies are understaffed and under-resourced and will not be able to assume the leadership required to engage at the levels required. As some of these firms have already closely coordinated with the military, many recognize the inherent need to more directly engage with the military so that the totality of the USG response is more targeted and more efficient.

Under the current situation, private companies contributions to stability operations are confined to the stove pipes of USAID and State. If and only if personalities in the field mesh, one will see seamless coordination of USAID funded programs with Regional COs and or Battalion COs or the occasional IDAs of Special Operations Forces.

My argument for direct contracting by US military agencies is based on the following:

1. The National Defense Strategy, QDR, and Directive 3000.05 point to the need of "out of box thinking for irregular warfare"

•“need to reorient our military capabilities to contend with . . . irregular challenges more effectively”
•National Defense Strategy 2005, at 3

2. Private development firms provide the services required as outlined in Directives...

•“Immediate goal . . .to provide . . . local populace with
–Security
–Restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs.”
DoD Dir. 3000.05, sec.4.2

•“Long-term goal to help develop indigenous capacity” for

–Essential services

–Viable market economy

–Rule of law

–Democratic institutions,

–Robust civil society

DoD Dir. 3000.05, sec.4.2

3. The military is moving ahead to prepare itself to address tasks when "civilians cannot". Directive 3000.05 This statement refers to the civilian agency leads - USAID and Department of State. USAID has a severe lack of officers and a continous cutback in funds so there is a hiring freeze. What many do not realize is that USAID officers themselves do not implement but they set scopes of work based on negotiations/diplo efforts. They also are the contractors that manage the administrative details. Thus, there are not enough of them to subsequently hire private development firms to implement programs. As an aside, many observers tend to think State officials and USAID officials are interchangeable. They are not. State has never been in the business of designing, contracting and managing stability operations development programs. They have had experience with funding humanitarian programs but by and large, State officials do not have the training required to oversee such a program. This is why when Bing West asked the State Department official in Iraq if they had a "economic development model" to be distributed to commanders...the response was no....they would and do not...this is not their business. Private development firms/Implementing partners have them however...

Instead of the Military re-creating the wheel, it seems to me that engaging contractors to assist in this arena makes infinite sense and makes for a more expeditious response/solution.

What is exciting is that some have already started to see the connection of the dots. As previously cited, the Quick Impact Projects in Tal Afar Iraq that targeted rapid job creation (and was implemented in lock step with the 3rd Cav) was cited as a successful model for Clear, Build and Hold in the recently released COIN Field Manual. Over 50% of the 300 million in grants in Iraq were conducted in strict coordination with the military. The program was such a success, the Commanding General (Chirelli) inquired as to how he may directly obtain the services of the private firm (DAI) to continue the important work (as USAID funding had ended). Sadly, the idea was too new to overcome bureacratic hurdles.

Look forward to hearing your thoughts.

Thanks,
Bronwen

Tom Odom
06-06-2007, 12:45 PM
What is not widely known in military circles is that there exists an extensive cadre of private firms that have been implementing the EXACT requirements of the political/civilian element of COIN/Stability Operations for over 30 years. But, sadly, due to interagency turf wars and a myopic understanding of the civilian capacity, this private resource is either entirely invisible to most or tends to get readily dismissed and lumped into the category of "soft" NGOs (ie. humanitarian organizations that have a deep aversion to directly coordinating and closely working with the military).

And what exactly would that firm (or those firms) be? KBR? Raytheon?

I served in the Stability Operations environment for 15 of those 30 years. I would be most curious to know about whom you are speaking.

Tom

BronwenM
06-07-2007, 06:09 AM
Thanks Tom for your question. SHould have included these specific names earlier...big oversight. Thanks for pointing out...

I am not sure if my previous post was successful so wanted to jot down the names of a few of the major firms again... sorry for inconvenience if repeated...

DAI - www.dai.com - econ development, agriculture, governance, conflict mitigaton/community development

Chemonics - www.chemonics.com - similiar set of services

RTI (Research Triangle Institute) - North Carolina - IR division - governance and education

IRG - International Resources Group - disaster response, governance, economic development

PADCO / AECOM - reconstruction, governance,

ARD - Associates in Rural Development - agriculture, governance, econ development

ABT - Health

Bearing Point - finance / econ growth

MSI - Management Systems International - Institutional Support / Governance

Nathans and Associates - Economic Development

PA - infrastructure / energy / governance

PAE - police and election administration deployments

Louis Berger

Creative Associates - education and governance

RONCO - in addition to mine clearing, they have been USAID partner on community development programming

There are also a few Non Profits that will enter into contracts such as CHF (community development), IFES (election administration and governance), AIR (education) and AED (education), IRD (international resources development group - community rehabilitation)

Also, IOM (International Organization of Migration) enters into contracts with the US to implement community development programming.

I was not familiar with this world when I worked in UN peacekeeping missions in the field and was surprised to find a very large parallel universe so to speak out there.

Best,
Bronwen

Mark O'Neill
06-07-2007, 07:28 AM
Hi Bronwen,

I see where you are coming from, and I agree that many of these organisations can offer an array of really useful capabilities. However, I would also offer the following observations from personal, practical experience of working with INGO and Corporate Service providers on stability and development activities:

1. Many of these organisations work best (that is, are effective) in what could only be regarded as very benign security situations.

2. If the security situation is not benign, providing security to enable them to achieve their programs can be a very taxing experience. This task is not helped by the fact that the majority of them have no collective corporate culture - you can almost guarantee that if you have three of them in your AO they will want to go three different, mutually counter -productive directions simeltaneously in order to meet their own perceptions of priority (and, frequently, their own perceptions of importance). It makes herding cats seem like a simple activity.

3. Another factor if the security situation is not so flash is that, understandably perhaps, they do not want to associate with the security forces for fear of being 'linked' to them by belligerants, and subsequently attacked. This is one of those 'no-win' situations for everyone involved.

4. Many (that is, 99%) of them cannot be trusted with intel related material. This can be a major problem when attempting coordination. Apart from the ones that inadvertently leak information and intel like a sieve, I am aware of other actors who have , for reasons often best known to themselves, deliberately compromised missions.

5. INGOs, despite themselves, often act in a way that is counterintuitive to what they should be achieving. I have personally seen examples that range from minor issues like poor personal examples being set by overpaid and immoral expatriate staff through to corruption, overt criminal activity and payment of 'protection' to militias and criminal gangs. All of which is the antithesis of what should be happening in a COIN/ Stability environment.

6. Some organisations have a disproportionate number of incompetent staff. They sail from conflict zone to conflict zone, leaving chaos in their wake. Many are 'found out' and have to move on because of this, but they invariably are attracted back to the next conflict because they become addicted to either the money (no one else would pay them that much) or the ego trip. They always get a job because 1) there is an effective 'old boys' ( or girls) net, or 2) Many people of ability are not willing to accept either the risks or compromises that these people are.

7. Many organisations are ultimately only there to make money. This can lead to dodgy actions. One well known organisation that provided 'services' to a humanitarian project I was once associated with provides a ready example. During the work year, when donors turned up for inspections, everything was 'roses' - they were only too willing to parade their success with the indigenes we were training. Then, every year when contract renegotiation time came around - lo and behold, everything was 'disaster' and would require more time, money and services. We got jack of this and undertook an independent audit -only to find out that things were fine. This example is just one of many I am aware of where commercial firms routinely rort hard won humanitarian funds in order to satisfy their bottom line.

Summing up, INGO and corporates can be very useful and do great good. However the rosy 'pollyanna' - like picture that you depict defies reality.

Just like Government Agencies and Militaries, there is a fair bit of room for improvement of their performance in a range of activities. They are not a panacea, rather a useful part of the response mix that needs to continually improve its game in concert with state actors and agencies.

Cheers,

Mark

tequila
06-07-2007, 07:56 AM
Just of note, the British national who was kidnapped along with 4 GardaWorld private security contractors from the Interior Ministry in Baghdad was a Bearing Point contractor (http://www.globalservicesmedia.com/sections/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=199703804).

wm
06-07-2007, 10:32 AM
And what exactly would that firm (or those firms) be? KBR? Raytheon?

I served in the Stability Operations environment for 15 of those 30 years. I would be most curious to know about whom you are speaking.

Tom
Tom,

Check out the companies posting jobs at this link to get an idea.

http://www.developmentex.com

Tom Odom
06-07-2007, 01:15 PM
Hi Bronwen,

I see where you are coming from, and I agree that many of these organisations can offer an array of really useful capabilities. However, I would also offer the following observations from personal, practical experience of working with INGO and Corporate Service providers on stability and development activities:

1. Many of these organisations work best (that is, are effective) in what could only be regarded as very benign security situations.

2. If the security situation is not benign, providing security to enable them to achieve their programs can be a very taxing experience. This task is not helped by the fact that the majority of them have no collective corporate culture - you can almost guarantee that if you have three of them in your AO they will want to go three different, mutually counter -productive directions simeltaneously in order to meet their own perceptions of priority (and, frequently, their own perceptions of importance). It makes herding cats seem like a simple activity.

3. Another factor if the security situation is not so flash is that, understandably perhaps, they do not want to associate with the security forces for fear of being 'linked' to them by belligerants, and subsequently attacked. This is one of those 'no-win' situations for everyone involved.

4. Many (that is, 99%) of them cannot be trusted with intel related material. This can be a major problem when attempting coordination. Apart from the ones that inadvertently leak information and intel like a sieve, I am aware of other actors who have , for reasons often best known to themselves, deliberately compromised missions.

5. INGOs, despite themselves, often act in a way that is counterintuitive to what they should be achieving. I have personally seen examples that range from minor issues like poor personal examples being set by overpaid and immoral expatriate staff through to corruption, overt criminal activity and payment of 'protection' to militias and criminal gangs. All of which is the antithesis of what should be happening in a COIN/ Stability environment.

6. Some organisations have a disproportionate number of incompetent staff. They sail from conflict zone to conflict zone, leaving chaos in their wake. Many are 'found out' and have to move on because of this, but they invariably are attracted back to the next conflict because they become addicted to either the money (no one else would pay them that much) or the ego trip. They always get a job because 1) there is an effective 'old boys' ( or girls) net, or 2) Many people of ability are not willing to accept either the risks or compromises that these people are.

7. Many organisations are ultimately only there to make money. This can lead to dodgy actions. One well known organisation that provided 'services' to a humanitarian project I was once associated with provides a ready example. During the work year, when donors turned up for inspections, everything was 'roses' - they were only too willing to parade their success with the indigenes we were training. Then, every year when contract renegotiation time came around - lo and behold, everything was 'disaster' and would require more time, money and services. We got jack of this and undertook an independent audit -only to find out that things were fine. This example is just one of many I am aware of where commercial firms routinely rort hard won humanitarian funds in order to satisfy their bottom line.

Summing up, INGO and corporates can be very useful and do great good. However the rosy 'pollyanna' - like picture that you depict defies reality.

Just like Government Agencies and Militaries, there is a fair bit of room for improvement of their performance in a range of activities. They are not a panacea, rather a useful part of the response mix that needs to continually improve its game in concert with state actors and agencies.

Cheers,

Mark
Bronwen,

What Mark said, especially on security and reliabilty.

FYI I had RONCO working for me in Rwanda and I have seen many of the firms you list in the field. As I suspected, you are confusing a stability/support operation with COIN. Most of these firms are ill-suited to doing the "armed civil affairs" that is necessary for COIN. In fact, the security threat against such firms in Goma was a major headache for all of us dealing with the issue.

Others like NGOs are agenda driven -- that of proving they are needed in the case of NGOs or for commercial firms the almighty dollar. IN COIN--as Rob Thornton has said in discussing advisors--the ideal is to work oneself out of a job. I have yet to meet an NGO who truly has that as a goal. Don't get me wrong, NGOs do good work; it is however work that must have set goals and limits otherwise it is a self-licking ice cream cone.

Best

Tom

goesh
06-07-2007, 02:30 PM
"1. Many of these organisations work best (that is, are effective) in what could only be regarded as very benign security situations"

There has been a tendency in some agencies to adopt a quasi anti-American mentality through which to better identify with elements of the host nation. I saw some of this with the Peace Corps and USAID in W. Africa though by no means was this official doctrine/policy. The polite term would be to say some of the people were not professionally objective. The reluctance of many Humanitarian missions to partner with the military should not be surprising because their principal success is based on relative security and that alone IMO, yet elements within said agencies regard the military as the sole problem. That's hard to overcome and I can't imagine the nightmare involved in trying to provide security for such divergent and numerous civilian groups and I wonder how tense it gets at times between the military and private security contractors? ...been any throw-downs with Halliburton??

With 100K contractors in Iraq, no wonder war funding gets passed. I had no idea there were that many there yet the Public certainly isn't getting this message. It contradicts the picture of total chaos and bloodshed.

tequila
06-07-2007, 02:45 PM
I think you are confusing the vast majority of private contractors in Iraq with NGOs. Most are personnel doing things that would have been done by soldiers in the past - i.e. driving supply trucks, clerking at the PX, serving food, etc. The contractor population, if they counted as a member of the coalition, have suffered far more casualties (http://icasualties.org/oif/Civ.aspx)than any other member of our coalition of the willing.

As for throwdowns, not many but one or two examples have surfaced (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8178606/).

Jedburgh
09-28-2007, 12:44 PM
Brookings Institution, 27 Sep 07:

Can’t Win With ‘Em, Can’t Go To War Without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency (http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/research/singer200709.pdf)

The use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq. Even worse, it has created a dependency syndrome on the private marketplace that not merely creates critical vulnerabilities, but shows all the signs of the last downward spirals of an addiction. If we judge by what has happened in Iraq, when it comes to private military contractors and counterinsurgency, the U.S. has locked itself into a vicious cycle. It can’t win with them, but can’t go to war without them.

The study explores how the current use of private military contractors:

• Allows policymakers to dodge key decisions that carry political costs, thus leading to operational choices that might not reflect public interest.

• Enables a “bigger is better” approach to operations that runs contrary to the best lessons of U.S. military strategy.

• Inflames popular opinion against, rather than for, the American mission through operational practices that ignore the fundamental lessons of counterinsurgency.

• Participated in a series of abuses that have undermined efforts at winning “hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people.

• Weakened American efforts in the “war of ideas” both inside Iraq and beyond.

• Reveals a double standard towards Iraqi civilian institutions that undermines efforts to build up these very same institutions, another key lesson of counterinsurgency.

• Forced policymakers to jettison strategies designed to win the counterinsurgency on multiple occasions, before they even had a chance to succeed.
Complete 26 page paper at the link.

SteveMetz
09-28-2007, 01:11 PM
Brookings Institution, 27 Sep 07:

Can’t Win With ‘Em, Can’t Go To War Without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency (http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/research/singer200709.pdf)

Complete 26 page paper at the link.

If there's any interest in discussing this I'll see if I can convince Peter to weigh in himself.

Tom Odom
09-28-2007, 01:42 PM
If there's any interest in discussing this I'll see if I can convince Peter to weigh in himself.

Sure! I agree with his points as listed by Jed.

Tom

goesh
09-28-2007, 02:14 PM
I wonder what the estimate is for the percentage of Iraqis that buy into the private contractor system and actually like them, aside from earning money because of them that is? Probably even more difficult to ascertain would be the impact PCs have on the number of Coalition KIAs/WIAs , either plus or minus on the continum. Each side of fence on this icomplex issue could make their case without citing examples of abuse as mentioned in this report and things like Abu Ghraib, Haditha and errant bombs to bolster their case.

Steve Blair
09-28-2007, 02:19 PM
10 characters...

huskerguy7
05-20-2010, 04:46 AM
Hello everyone,

I am currently working on a journalism project discussing ways to strengthen the Afghan National Army (ANA). Throughout my research, it's become evident that the lack of Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs)/Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) has hindered the development of the ANA. NATO and the US have recognized this and have put forth a considerable effort to supplying more troops to fulfill these positions, but still there are many positions available.

One possible solution I have been contemplating is outsourcing some OMLT/ETT positions to private military contractors (PMCs). Within the past 1.5-2 years, I've learned a great deal about PMCs and am fairly familiar with them. My previous research has showed me that many PMCs provide a large array of resources, enough to conduct these kinds of operations. Even though PMCs have never conducted such an operation, I strongly believe that they have a capabilities.

Of course, PMCs do have some negatives and there would be some obstacles to implement this policy successfully. If unregulated with no oversight, the US would be taking a gamble. Also, some are worried about the idea of arming and paying civilians (an anonymous official familiar with the industry said that in such an operation, the ROE would likely be restricted to self defense). Lastly, as PMCs have never done such an operation, they would really change how ETTs run and possibly how PMCs and the US Armed Forces act together.

There just isn't enough OMLTs. Plus, if the ISAF is able to reach their high recruitment expectations, they need someone to train the recruits. PMCs do have the resources and are qualified; a firm that I interviewed said that over 50% of their operatives have military experience. After diving deeper into the specific responsibilities of OMLTs/ETTs (partly thanks to the expansive library at SWJ :-) ), I am convinced that PMCs have the capabilities to do the task. If their complete interactions with the Afghans are worked out and the oversight is present, I think that it could work.

What are your thoughts? Will this have a positive/negative effect on COIN? A person that I discussed this issue with suggested that I bring the debate here.

Thanks

SWCAdmin
05-20-2010, 11:10 AM
If their complete interactions with the Afghans are worked out and the oversight is present, I think that it could work.
This is one of the long poles in the tent. What exactly is oversight and where is it coming from? What are those complete interactions? Aren't they a lot like the purposeful application of armed violence, which by all our sensibilities is supposed to be the monopoly of the state and we're now going to sublet? It is a different situation with the ANA than, e.g., a deadly force situation in a law enforcement role (though some of those contractors are sworn LE officers).

It is easy to handwave a hell no, particularly in the Blackwater / Xe aftermath. It is also easy to neuter the role of an ETT to some sort of garrison Title X organize, train, and equip +/- debrief for which there are clear contractor roles, and then fall in love with this outsourcing idea.

With regard to the sticky part of the tip-of-the-spear combat advisor -- what are the precedents, issues, and sacred cows that you feel are most relevant? Is that role going to be at the root of the future ANA ETT?

Schmedlap
05-20-2010, 10:26 PM
Have you looked into how the military was professionalized in the 1960s/1970s? Military academy slots were valued and given to sons of prominent individuals. Universal conscription was acquiesced to, perhaps because service in the military was not a horribly low-paying job compared to the value that the young men could provide to their family through their labor on the family land. Officers were sent abroad to the Soviet Union for professional education. Obviously, recreating that system might be difficult, but there might be lessons that can be gleaned from the old system.

huskerguy7
05-21-2010, 01:23 AM
This is one of the long poles in the tent. What exactly is oversight and where is it coming from? What are those complete interactions? Aren't they a lot like the purposeful application of armed violence, which by all our sensibilities is supposed to be the monopoly of the state and we're now going to sublet? It is a different situation with the ANA than, e.g., a deadly force situation in a law enforcement role (though some of those contractors are sworn LE officers).

Interactions: I believe that if PMCs were contracted, operators deployed would have military and/or law enforcement experience, plus their additional training from their companies. These operators would help train and mentor their ANA counterpoints. Training activities would include things like teaching soldiers how to properly maintain their weapons, providing solutions to questions that ANA soldiers may have, and assisting their ANA counterparts with strategic decisions during firefights. They would also provide and mentor the ANA officers.

In these contracts, PMCs would not act as an "offensive force." I would disagree with that; it makes it a completely different situation. Thus, they would only use their weapons in self defense roles, if they are even armed. As an anonymous official familiar with the industry told me said "in a mentoring role they would use their weapons in self defense, if they were indeed carrying any." An OMLT consists of 13-30 members for a batallion. These contractors would likely be spread throughout the batallion anyways; they wouldn't be a special unit attached with more capabilities.

Oversight: This is the more challenging issue. History has shown that sometimes, when PMCs are left unattended with no authorization, they don't act how they are contracted to. When I think of oversight for this kind of operation, two ideas come to mind: evalulating the work performed and placing someone to watch over (or even command) the civilian OMLTs. The ISAF could investigate the civilian OMLT operations to determine if the contractors performed like they should. However, I think it would be better to have one person affiliated with the US government in place and in charge. This could be either someone from the DoD, or could be an officer from the Army or Marines. Depending on the contract, this officer would be in a position to command or just monitor the civilian OMLTs.



It is easy to handwave a hell no, particularly in the Blackwater / Xe aftermath. It is also easy to neuter the role of an ETT to some sort of garrison Title X organize, train, and equip +/- debrief for which there are clear contractor roles, and then fall in love with this outsourcing idea.

Yes, as we have seen, despite their successful operations (that are sometimes overlooked), some companies aren't responisible enough to conduct PMC operations. However, some companies have demonstrated success. For example, Northrop Grumman has been training the Saudi National Guard and many militaries of third world jobs-they've done a good job.

This part is the "business" part, you need to weigh not only the price, but the moral's of your "partner." This is where knowledge of PMC's employees, history, experience, leaders, and culture is important. The US has encountered bad press with PMCs simply because it has failed with this part.


With regard to the sticky part of the tip-of-the-spear combat advisor -- what are the precedents, issues, and sacred cows that you feel are most relevant? Is that role going to be at the root of the future ANA ETT?

I apologize if I misunderstood your question here. I believe that there are two main issues with the idea of civilian OMLTs. First, the reactions of these groups when their ANA "Kandak" does come under fire. Will they take control and turn into an elite unit or will they help their counterparts with advice? Hopefully the latter, but if this did happen, the oversight in place would catch it and the PMC would be disciplined. Second, how these PMCs will interact with ISAF forces. Some of the tasks performed by OMLTs includes medevacs, acting as FACs, and calling in airstrikes. Only some PMCs minimally possess the capabilities to perform some of these tasks. Thus, it will be necessary to insure clear communication between the "pilots" and operators.


Have you looked into how the military was professionalized in the 1960s/1970s? Military academy slots were valued and given to sons of prominent individuals. Universal conscription was acquiesced to, perhaps because service in the military was not a horribly low-paying job compared to the value that the young men could provide to their family through their labor on the family land. Officers were sent abroad to the Soviet Union for professional education. Obviously, recreating that system might be difficult, but there might be lessons that can be gleaned from the old system.

I have not looked into this and am not familiar with it. It is definitley something I would be interested in learning more about.

Pete
05-21-2010, 08:38 PM
PMCs could conduct training on weapons, tactics and the operation and maintenance of equipment at Afghan military installations, but I doubt that they could accompany Afghan units during field operations or function as a de facto chain of command in the field. When contractors are participants in military operations it introduces a new organizational interface, with the military and its civil servants on one side and the contractors on the other. Sometimes when a contractor does what needs to be done to accomplish the mission it can create awkward situations after the fact if each action they take has not been explicity requested in writing by a contracting officer or his representatives.

In 1998 I attended a preproposal briefing conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Branch for the Balkans peacekeeping force support contact--Brown & Root was the incumbent and they also won the recompete. The contracting officer, a retired USAF O-5 from HQ, U.S. Army Europe in Heidelburg, told us we were not to fulfill any request for support unless it had been authorized by him or his subordinates in writing. He said division commanders and their staffs would periodically visit their brigades deployed overseas and tell contractors verbally to do various things--put linoleum on the floor of a dining facility or to pave a parking lot, things like that--thereby driving costs through the roof. Officers had no authority over contractors, he said; only contracting officers and their designated representatives did. You can imagine the resentment that policy caused at the grass-roots working level. "I'm in the Army, you're a contractor, and I just told you what to do. Don't give me any double-talk. Am I making myself clear?"

I worked in DoD support contracting as a technical writer in the DC area for 16 years. As I see it, DoD only likes contractors at the colonel and above level because they provide a quick augmentation to their work forces. At the worker-bee level, most military personnel and DoD civilians despise contactors and regard them as being overpaid rip-off artists.

John T. Fishel
05-21-2010, 11:46 PM
MPRI trained the Croation Army under contract to the GOC (but with the approval of the USG) in the 1990s. Their trainees were successful. MPRI had a USG contract in Colombia that was less successful as was one in Iraq. In Iraq, the MPRI leader was COL (ret) Jim Steele who had run the USMILGP in El Salvador and the Military Support Group in Panama. So, it is possible to use contractors who, depending on the circumstances, may or may not be effective.

Another partial precedent is found in the PRTs where contractors (from other agencies) arefully integrated into the teams and follow the orders of the PRT chief. Applicable law differs between USG agencies.

I see few conceptual problems with the approach used in the PRTs although there may be legal ones for DOD. I do see a major conceptual problem in the MPRI approach where we turn over to a private corporation decisions that are properly those of the USG. No reflection on the patriotism etc of MPRI princiaps or employees but they are not responsible to the govt or the people of the US for actions that may be necessary but are not spelled out in the contract (see Pete's post).

cheers

JohnT

IntelTrooper
05-22-2010, 03:16 AM
In my neck of the woods, Blackwater provided what was basically a PMT to finalize training of Afghan Border Police, including actual work in the field. One brigade commander welcomed their participation and in an AO suffering from severe manpower and asset shortages, they filled a vital role in actioning our intel (that is, they were the only entity in our battalion AO that could/would move on time sensitive targets). The mentors seemed to make sure the training was adequate beforehand that they could mostly hang back and let the ABP officers do the op with limited interference, offering advice or guidance where necessary.

After a new brigade RIPd in with a more... risk averse commander, the Blackwater mentors were essentially confined to their remote COP and only allowed to hold that ground. From what I hear, 4th ID had to do a lot of clean up after they replaced that brigade due to the inaction of a year...

I don't know all the details of what exactly their contract dictated, but they seemed to fill the mentor role without serious incident. As far as command and control, the AO commanders were still in charge with USFOR-A elements often providing communications support in case air or other assets became necessary.

Entropy
05-22-2010, 03:46 AM
IMO PMC's should only be used, if at all, for training the basics in garrison. They should not accompany ANA out on any operations because then they de facto become an offensive force.

Regardless, the solution to manpower shortages is to get more manpower. Mentoring the ANA is supposed to be one of our primary tasks - if we don't have the military manpower for it then we don't have our priorities straight.

IntelTrooper
05-22-2010, 04:03 AM
Regardless, the solution to manpower shortages is to get more manpower. Mentoring the ANA is supposed to be one of our primary tasks - if we don't have the military manpower for it then we don't have our priorities straight.

Absolutely agreed.

huskerguy7
05-24-2010, 11:48 PM
Wow, these are some great responses. Lots of good, insightful material on here; it's definitley SWJ Material ;)


PMCs could conduct training on weapons, tactics and the operation and maintenance of equipment at Afghan military installations, but I doubt that they could accompany Afghan units during field operations or function as a de facto chain of command in the field. When contractors are participants in military operations it introduces a new organizational interface, with the military and its civil servants on one side and the contractors on the other. Sometimes when a contractor does what needs to be done to accomplish the mission it can create awkward situations after the fact if each action they take has not been explicity requested in writing by a contracting officer or his representatives.

In 1998 I attended a preproposal briefing conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Branch for the Balkans peacekeeping force support contact--Brown & Root was the incumbent and they also won the recompete. The contracting officer, a retired USAF O-5 from HQ, U.S. Army Europe in Heidelburg, told us we were not to fulfill any request for support unless it had been authorized by him or his subordinates in writing. He said division commanders and their staffs would periodically visit their brigades deployed overseas and tell contractors verbally to do various things--put linoleum on the floor of a dining facility or to pave a parking lot, things like that--thereby driving costs through the roof. Officers had no authority over contractors, he said; only contracting officers and their designated representatives did. You can imagine the resentment that policy caused at the grass-roots working level. "I'm in the Army, you're a contractor, and I just told you what to do. Don't give me any double-talk. Am I making myself clear?"

I worked in DoD support contracting as a technical writer in the DC area for 16 years. As I see it, DoD only likes contractors at the colonel and above level because they provide a quick augmentation to their work forces. At the worker-bee level, most military personnel and DoD civilians despise contactors and regard them as being overpaid rip-off artists.

Since OMLTs are smaller teams (around 13 soldiers) and they would be spread throughout the battalions (they likely wouldn't be grouped together to act as a special fire squad), I don't think that the organization would be horrific. It would require some problem solving, but I don't think it would be as bad as you think.

You also make an interesting point about how contractors can put military personal in awkward situations. This can sometimes be good, but can easily be bad. Thus, when writing the contract, it would be important to provide a detailed and clear list of guidelines for the PMCs. If it's in the contract, which is there paycheck, they will follow it.

I understand the occasional rift between contractors and military personal. It can be very frustrating. However, it's important to remember that a large portion of PMC operators were "cut out" of the Armed Forces in the 1990s when the USSR fell; the US didn't think it needed such a large force.

You made some good comments.


MPRI trained the Croation Army under contract to the GOC (but with the approval of the USG) in the 1990s. Their trainees were successful. MPRI had a USG contract in Colombia that was less successful as was one in Iraq. In Iraq, the MPRI leader was COL (ret) Jim Steele who had run the USMILGP in El Salvador and the Military Support Group in Panama. So, it is possible to use contractors who, depending on the circumstances, may or may not be effective.

Another partial precedent is found in the PRTs where contractors (from other agencies) arefully integrated into the teams and follow the orders of the PRT chief. Applicable law differs between USG agencies.

I see few conceptual problems with the approach used in the PRTs although there may be legal ones for DOD. I do see a major conceptual problem in the MPRI approach where we turn over to a private corporation decisions that are properly those of the USG. No reflection on the patriotism etc of MPRI princiaps or employees but they are not responsible to the govt or the people of the US for actions that may be necessary but are not spelled out in the contract (see Pete's post).

cheers

JohnT

MPRI is an interesting firm. They specialize in consulting and training and are very good at it; your examples nailed some of their successes. However, I don't think MPRI would fit the OMLT role. As odd as it sounds, it appears that MPRI specializes in "higher quality" training; they don't put guys in combat zones. They're training programs tend to be more long term focused, expensive, and complex. Don't get me wrong, they do a great job, but I don't think they would correctly fit the role. For example, IMHO MPRI would be better off training a collapsed army that is stabilized than training a collapsed force that is constantly engaging the enemy.

You also hit another point: how much decision making should be left into the hands of PMCs. "Good quality" PMCs (see my post above) that care about the US can be trusted. However, some PMCs I don't trust; it depends on who you contract. Good post, way to bring up MPRI.


In my neck of the woods, Blackwater provided what was basically a PMT to finalize training of Afghan Border Police, including actual work in the field. One brigade commander welcomed their participation and in an AO suffering from severe manpower and asset shortages, they filled a vital role in actioning our intel (that is, they were the only entity in our battalion AO that could/would move on time sensitive targets). The mentors seemed to make sure the training was adequate beforehand that they could mostly hang back and let the ABP officers do the op with limited interference, offering advice or guidance where necessary.

After a new brigade RIPd in with a more... risk averse commander, the Blackwater mentors were essentially confined to their remote COP and only allowed to hold that ground. From what I hear, 4th ID had to do a lot of clean up after they replaced that brigade due to the inaction of a year...

I don't know all the details of what exactly their contract dictated, but they seemed to fill the mentor role without serious incident. As far as command and control, the AO commanders were still in charge with USFOR-A elements often providing communications support in case air or other assets became necessary.

Interesting story, it shows that PMCs can be utilized; if you try working with them, some good things can come up. Good post.


IMO PMC's should only be used, if at all, for training the basics in garrison. They should not accompany ANA out on any operations because then they de facto become an offensive force.

Regardless, the solution to manpower shortages is to get more manpower. Mentoring the ANA is supposed to be one of our primary tasks - if we don't have the military manpower for it then we don't have our priorities straight.

You bring up a good point, and I agree; PMCs aren't the best offensive force. Bringing out 50 operators is an offensive force. However, OMLTs are much smaller and spread thin (13 operators). One ANA "Kandak" (battalion) is around 600 soldiers. 13 operators spread throughout 600 soldiers is going to keep the PMCs in a mentoring role. On top of that, if they are given a restrictive ROE, or if they are even allowed to be fully armed, they won't be an offensive force. This problem can be solved.

ISAF doesn't lack garrison trainers, they lack OMLTs. According to a RAND report, OMLTs provide ANA units with much experience and advice that they need to succeed. Thus, OMLTs are important, but they lack in numbers.


Absolutely agreed.

I do to, however, as we have seen the manpower is limited. Currently, the US is focused on offensive operations and eliminating Taliban influence. Thus, the responsibility for OMLTs rests upon the other members of ISAF However, they aren't to thrilled about the conflict and their support is limited (but appreciated).

Presley Cannady
09-28-2014, 10:53 AM
Big Bill's getting a lot of flak (https://www.google.com/search?q=mercenaries+o%27reilly&hl=en&gl=us&authuser=0&biw=2055&bih=1283&source=lnt&tbs=sbd%3A1%2Ccdr%3A1%2Ccd_min%3A09%2F20%2F2014%2C cd_max%3A09%2F27%2F2014&tbm=nws) for his suggestion (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cpdeQ4Bmr_U) that the Allies bankroll a standing force of contractors to deal with threats like ISIL. By a lot of flak, I mean most of it is coming from the left-wing snark machine (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/26/colbert-bill-oreilly-isis-video_n_5888010.html?ir=Comedy). However, very little time (arguably none at all) has been spent actually discussing the proposal's feasibility.

So, discuss amongst yourselves.

davidbfpo
09-30-2014, 05:08 PM
Presley,

This KoW piece parallels your post 'The Acme Co. Army?', which opens with:
In this one we confront the seemingly never-ending debate: Do we need a private army to do our dirty work? As domestic politics further complicate the use of own troops in defense of interests but not threat and conflicts seem to demand rapid response, the appeal of the privatization of force grows again. Although of less importance in this latest age of state war, armies for hire are not new to the battlefield. Whether this is wisdom or wishful thinking is another matter. Enjoy the post and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOWThe author poses four questions for the exchange the readers have on Twitter:
In an age of wars of choice, do ‘private armies’ offer states a better option for armed intervention than traditional armed forces?
Can PMSCs be of use in the fight against ISIL, and in which capacities?
What are the most significant challenges to their use from a military practitioner’s perspective?
How can PMSC-military cooperation be improved?
Link:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2014/09/the-acme-co-army/?