What we support and defend

[ganulv]

Try to subjugate all what the English oppressed by the end of the 19th century and you'd see real quick that the super power U.S.A. is much better at breaking things and killing people than at forcing people.

All real empires mastered at all three disciplines.

By those criteria the British Empire wasn’t even an empire, what with indirect rule (https://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/Crowder%E2%80%94Indirect%20rule.pdf) an’ all that.


http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3d/British_Empire_in_the_East%2C_1919.png (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princely_state)

[Fuchs]

Indirect rule merely means that the lower and medium level bureaucracy are hired foreign personnel. The English were still in control and able to extract wealth - and the net transfer was likely bigger with indirect rule than with direct rule.
English soldiers were more expensive than Sepoys.

The Americans never really mastered this indirect rule and the setup of effective indigenous sepoy-like forces either.


Only true empires that mastered the "empire" business get true empire benefits.

The problem is of course that the whole "empire" thing has never benefited more than a tiny faction of the people. See Gracchus reforms (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gracchus_Reforms), or the fact that England was already wealthier than the continent long before it built an empire thanks to the availability of maritime trade and rich natural resources (back then).

Extraction of wealth from others is a stupid path, preferable to incompetents and simple minds.
High productivity, near-full employment, balanced trade, long-term policies and a good distribution of income (7:3 for income from capital : labour in a developed country, with moderate top management incomes) is the way to go. You don't need to care about how much you pay for imported crude oil if your economy is doing its job just fine.

[ganulv]

Indirect rule merely means that the lower and medium level bureaucracy are hired foreign personnel.

From p. 199 of the article previously linked (https://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/Crowder%E2%80%94Indirect%20rule.pdf):


While the British were scrupulous in their respect for traditional methods of selection of chiefs, the French, conceiving of them as agents of the administration, were more concerned with their potential efficiency than their legitimacy. We need not wonder then that as a young French administrator, after serving in Senegal and Dahomey, M. Robert Delavignette should have been astonished, on his way to duty in Niger, to find that the British political officer in Kano actually called on the Emir when he had business with him and paid him the compliment of learning Hausa so that he could speak to him direct.

Which is to say that there was more to administration of the British Empire than compliance from the natives; there was also cooperation with. To say that the British were the more powerful party in the indirect rule relationship is stating the sort-of obvious (“sort-of” because the when of the relationship[s] as well as the scale do matter) but that didn’t put the British in complete control of their Empire in any other–than–simplified sense.

[carl]

The Romans are misjudged. They conquered and subdued but many of the places they conquered and subdued became Rome. Gaul, Iberia, Britain, North Africa, Italy, they fit this pattern. And those places fought to remain Rome, losing in the end.

The benefits to being Roman were enormous. The pattern of town construction in Celtic areas and Gaul I believe show this clearly. Before the Romans, hilltop fortified towns. During the Roman times, towns in the valleys where the water was. After the Romans, back to hilltop fortified towns.

The Romans did pay at the end when the empire was weak. But that was when the empire was weak. When it was strong, for the most part, they killed you if you bothered them. Which leads us to how did the empire get so weak. Goldsworthy argues that it essentially destroyed itself through continuous civil war over centuries. I think that is a good argument. Others have different ideas.

[carl]

Ganulv:

I have a question. I think that for an empire to endure and be truly successful, like the British and Roman, for example, they have to bring some benefits to the subjects. It can't all be just suppressing and taking. That doesn't cut it over the long run. The empire has to benefit the subject people in some way, internal peace and order, increased opportunity for trade, suppression of suttee, things like that. I also think that is why Isreal, which runs a mini-empire, has continuous trouble. All they offer the subject people is suppression and humiliation. There is no great benefit.

What do you think?

[Bob's World]

Empires always rationalized their behavior by the very real benefits they brought, and then typically fall unable to understand why people might prefer ineffective freedom to effective control.

The US does not run an "empire." We pay retail, we do not demand tribute, etc. We do attempt to excessively control political outcomes though, and in the modern era, even that degree of manipulation is unacceptable and unsustainable.

[carl]

Empires always rationalized their behavior by the very real benefits they brought, and then typically fall unable to understand why people might prefer ineffective freedom to effective control.

The US does not run an "empire." We pay retail, we do not demand tribute, etc. We do attempt to excessively control political outcomes though, and in the modern era, even that degree of manipulation is unacceptable and unsustainable.

The key phrase is "the very real benefits they brought." And in the case of Rome, those places I mentioned became Rome.

Perhaps people may prefer ineffective freedom to effective control. The idealistic young probably do. But the older ones with families to feed, maybe not so much. I think the appeal of the various independence movements was not "We won't do as good a job but it is us, not them doing it." I think the appeal was more along the lines of "We will do a better job than they do."

I don't know if the modern era has much to do with a high degree of manipulation being unsustainable. Perhaps that is just a function of the relative power of states waxing and waning as the years pass.

[Fuchs]

Ganulv, your example is from a region where there was almost nothing to extract and thus very little effort on part of the English.
They were much more involved in places with natural riches and decent possibilities for their transportation.

[ganulv]

Ganulv:

I have a question. I think that for an empire to endure and be truly successful, like the British and Roman, for example, they have to bring some benefits to the subjects. It can't all be just suppressing and taking. That doesn't cut it over the long run. The empire has to benefit the subject people in some way, internal peace and order, increased opportunity for trade, suppression of suttee, things like that. I also think that is why Isreal, which runs a mini-empire, has continuous trouble. All they offer the subject people is suppression and humiliation. There is no great benefit.

What do you think?

there are no guarantees (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ExWfh6sGyso). :p From the stuff I can claim either a good (American Indian relations with the British, French, and U.S. & Latin American relations with the Spanish) or passing (West African relations with the French and British) knowledge of my impression is that at some point the folks in the periphery are going to expect comity of treatment or reasonable privileges. One does have to wonder about the good faith of empires in general given how many of them stood on principle rather than renegotiate the status quo. What would it have cost the British Empire to have really and truly extended political enfranchisement to the Founding Fathers? What would it have cost the French to have extended liberté, égalité, and fraternité worth calling such to the Arab inhabitants of Algeria?

[ganulv]

Ganulv, your example is from a region where there was almost nothing to extract and thus very little effort on part of the English.
They were much more involved in places with natural riches and decent possibilities for their transportation.

So your telling me that going to the effort to consult with local leaders indicates lack of involvement? That makes no sense to me.

On the other hand the British had a notoriously uncooperative relationship with the Pashtun. What exactly were they extracting resource-wise from their territories?

[davidbfpo]

Ganulv posted:
On the other hand the British had a notoriously uncooperative relationship with the Pashtun.

That is not my reading of history. The Pashtuns could respect the British, yes there was conflict and a lack of cooperation at times.

[ganulv]

Ganulv posted:

That is not my reading of history. The Pashtuns could respect the British, yes there was conflict and a lack of cooperation at times.

That’s fair. In the same sense, any blanket ahistorical statement that the British and the French are allies or that the French and the Germans are enemies glosses over a lot of history.

[Dayuhan]

Vast amounts of American capital are currently held by Middle Eastern royals and Asian businesses who owe their liberty and protection to America. Do we get Hyundai's at half price? Oil at cost? No.

At some point we will wake up and realize these "friends" were never friends at all and wonder why they do not help us in our hour of need as we helped them.

The US will protect others if it sees that action as in its own interest. It's not done out of charity. The idea, for example, that the US protected Saudi Arabia from Iraq and thus the Saudis owe us something is pretty far fetched. The US didn't intervene to protect the Saudi royals, they intervened to assure that all that oil wouldn't be taken over by people who would use it as a weapon against us. We'd do the same thing if Iran threatened to take over additional oil-producing areas. That has nothing to do with protecting anyone but ourselves, any protection extended is purely incidental and a quirk of transient overlapping interests. They know that, so do we. They do throw us a few favors (like buying all their arms from us, though better deals can be had elsewhere), but business is still business.

Comparing the US to classic empires seems a bit silly to me, as the US is not an empire, unless we stretch the definition of "empire" way beyond the breaking point.

[Fuchs]

So your telling me that going to the effort to consult with local leaders indicates lack of involvement? That makes no sense to me.


In some other places, they took the chieftain's land (usually the most fertile around), required everyone to pay taxes and made sure the only way to get cash was to work at low wages on the new plantation.
People who didn't cooperate were beaten, people who resisted were shot.


Yeah, to discuss with traditional elites means a relative lack of involvement.

[Dayuhan]

They were much more involved in places with natural riches and decent possibilities for their transportation.

I actually wonder how profitable the Empire was to the British exchequer. I suspect that much of the profit accrued to private business, while the exchequer carried much of the cost needed to maintain the conditions that were conducive to that business. A rather good deal for the businessmen, of course. It would be interesting to see actual figures on how much was earned from the whole system on the public and private sides, both with and without the opium trade, an enormously profitable enterprise that would tend to skew the overall picture. Has to be remembered as well that the British working class was practically a colonized populace in its own right for much of the imperial period. Colonies provided cheap raw materials and extensive markets; a thoroughly oppressed low-cost manufacturing labor force kept costs down on the home front. Profitable, certainly, but in no sense replicable today... though the Chinese might be in the process of trying!


One does have to wonder about the good faith of empires in general given how many of them stood on principle rather than renegotiate the status quo.

I think there was often a quite acute sense of being heavily outnumbered, and a belief that any sign of "weakness" or willingness to negotiate might wake the natives up, with awful consequences. Of course the awful consequences arrived anyway. If you read the literature of the day, there was often a great deal of tension between home-front reformers who thought conditions needed to change to avoid revolution (or for humanitarian reasons) and those who saw the "reformers" as unrealistic faint-hearted do-gooders and believed that any change in the system (or their privileges) would be giving the wogs the inch that would lead them to take a mile.


What would it have cost the British Empire to have really and truly extended political enfranchisement to the Founding Fathers? What would it have cost the French to have extended libert, galit, and fraternit worth calling such to the Arab inhabitants of Algeria?

The British Empire in America dealt with a quite unique situation in that those who became rebellious were the colonists, rather than the colonized. Doesn't really compare well to situations in which an empire dealt with a colonized population.

[carl]

Comparing the US to classic empires seems a bit silly to me, as the US is not an empire, unless we stretch the definition of "empire" way beyond the breaking point.

That may be true but when out in one of lands of the Hesco barrier, it sure is fun to say you are calling from your little spot on the imperial frontier.

[Fuchs]

Dayuhan, the last quote isn't mine.


It would be interesting to see actual figures on how much was earned from the whole system on the public and private sides, both with and without the opium trade, an enormously profitable enterprise that would tend to skew the overall picture.

The easiest way to look at it is to look at the goods trade balance of the UK in the late 19th century.
The human capital export was no doubt considerable, but that human capital was -once exported- sustained (fed) by foreigners, so this could be treated like migration.


Germany - which only colonised the poor countries which were left by the late 19th century save for Abyssinia - had a clearly negative cost/benefit result. The colonies costed many times as much as they generated income.
We got rid of at least some assholes, though.

[Dayuhan]

Military action kept South Korea, South Korea.

This is true, and the precedent will be worth considering if any of today's communist states set out to conquer anyone. That remains quite hypothetical at this point.


The Philippines aren't communist. Thailand ain't either

Not through any doing of ours. If we'd kept Marcos in power any longer, the Communists might well have got in... as in some other places, the guy we thought was keeping the commies out was in fact the best thing that ever happened to them.


So I what I see is Commies in=mass murder and suffering. Commies out=a lot less mass murder and suffering. I am not a sophisticated guy but that seems a simple choice.

Like most choice, it's simple when we make it for ourselves. Make the choice for somebody else, and it gets less simple.


I have made it clear in this thread and the other about the South China Sea what I mean when I say not letting them shove allies around. But I will say it again. For starters make it clear that Taiwan stays Taiwan unless there is a free decision by the Taiwanese to subject themselves to Red Chinese authority. Any sort of violence or coercion to effect that outcome is a no go. The South China Sea stays an open sea. Any claim of soveriegnty (sic) by anybody is a no go. How's that?

Sounds like a bunch of blustering words that aren't likely to be backed up by action. What's the "or what" that goes with "no go"? What do we do if the Chinese repond (though they probably wouldn't, they don't show much sense of irony) that US military intervention in the Middle East is a "no go"?

Supposing you do say this, what do you expect to be the result? You know, of course, that they will have to come up with an aggressive, even belligerent response. No choice there, to do anything else would be to look weak in the eyes of their own people and their neighbors. Probably they won't actually attack anyone, since they really don't want to do that... so maybe fire off some missile tests, big naval exercises too close to others, harass a few ships... then we go back to the status quo ante. So what have you achieved, other than to make yourself feel good? You've empowered the most militarist factions on the Chinese side and made it a little easier for them to build some nationalism and a sense of oppression among their own people, which as always will garner support for their government (about the only thing that will get Chinese to support their government is criticism of that government by the US)... so I suppose you could feel good about that, if you really want to.

I realize that you fear and loathe communists in general and Chinese communists in particular. My point, which I may be communicating badly, is that fear and loathing are neither a policy nor a strategy, nor do they get us any closer to a policy or a strategy... like most strong emotions, they make a poor basis for policy and strategy.


The Reds may not be able to fully control that large number of sophisticated people but they have been doing well enough so far. I see no weakening of party control. I see that blind guy was genuinely concerned when word was passed that somebody might beat his wife to death. Seems a pretty strong police state to me.

Have you been paying attention to Chinese internal affairs at all? The signs of stress are easy enough to see. Yes, the crackdowns are still brutal, and getting more frequent. That brutality is not a sign of strength. If a police state is strong, they don't have to crack down, because nobody dares to challenge them.


Whipping trouble with foreigners is time honored way for police states to distract their people from internal problems. To go along with that it is time honored for some of those foreigners to say if we just avoid making them mad at us that effort will fail. I am skeptical of that.

We want the Chinese people to be mad at their government. Their government wants them to be mad at us. How does it help us to make it easier for the Chinese government to evoke the response they want?


Opposing evil is a good thing. Not opposing it is a bad thing. But first you have to recognize that the evil exists. If you don't see it, you won't do the good thing. That is why it is important to see communism for what it is. Now once you see that, you can oppose it adroitly or maladroitly, but you gotta see it for what it is.

A response based on subjective and emotional conclusions is more likely to be maladroit. You think the Chinese are evil murdering criminals. A lot of people feel the same way about us... after all, we initiated a bloody war on very shaky grounds that many people see as an outright grab for oil resources. Of course in your opinion they are wrong and you are right, we're not really evil murdering criminals and they really are. Others have other opinions. Much of foreign affairs is recognizing and managing perception, and while your perceptions may be shared on the home front, trumpeting them overseas is as likely to harm our cause as to help it.


I know I will never stop you from characterizing concerns that you disagree with as "panic" but at least I can play around with it sometimes.)

You could try a less panicked tone. I disagree with RCJ all the time, can't recall ever suspecting him of panic.


Ultimately political change in Red China will come from within. But our actions can help maintain the status quo so as to give the system time to rot from within

Does chest-thumping bluster help maintain the status quo? Sounds a debatable proposition...

[ganulv]

In some other places, they took the chieftain's land (usually the most fertile around), required everyone to pay taxes and made sure the only way to get cash was to work at low wages on the new plantation.
People who didn't cooperate were beaten, people who resisted were shot.

Yes, in some places at some times there was a simple oppressor/oppressed relationship. But not everywhere always was the Belgian Congo. I’m not trying to be an apologist for colonialism, I’m trying to point out that things weren’t as simple as Whiggish (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whig_history) and post-colonial (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-colonial) partisans would have us believe.


Yeah, to discuss with traditional elites means a relative lack of involvement.

It sounds like more work over the long haul than lining people up against a wall, but I’ll take your word for it.

[Dayuhan]

The Soviet Union fell mostly because the economic system was hopeless. It was going to go sooner or later. It went sooner because Gorby let up on the reins in an attempt to get some productivity out of a hopeless system.

What you don't seem to recognize is that the Chinese have also been forced to modify the system enormously in order to achieve the economic success they've had. The long-term impact of those changes is difficult to assess at this point, but the populace has achieved a level of connectedness, awareness, and capacity that certainly raises doubts about the ability of the state to maintain long term control. Certainly they can do it as long as the cash rolls in at ever increasing levels, but that looks ever more doubtful.


The Eastern European Communist dictatorships were held in place by the armed might of the Red Army. Once that support was no longer certain they were doomed. Internal opposition didn't do so well against the Red Army in 1956 or 1968. Starry eyed idealism aside, if the Red Army was there, it was a no go.

The Red Army was around when the Soviet Union fell. The worst nightmare of the dictator is not the day when the white-hatted liberators from afar show up to overthrow them, it's the day when their own army decides that they suck and it's time to get rid of them.


I didn't miss any point. All that high minded idealist communist claptrap was tinsel on a murderous regime, almost always more murderous than the one replace. An awful lot of people in those various countries realized that at the time which is one of the reasons they fought them. They were right about what would ensue after the high minded commies took the joint over.

You missed the point quite spectacularly, it seems. Would you say that, for example, overthrowing Mohammed Mossadegh because the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company said he was a commie was a good idea, or that it worked out well for us in the long run? Did getting rid of popular leaders like Lumumba and Allende build our influence in the developing world? Did supporting corrupt, inept, and doomed figures like a Batista, a Somoza, a Marcos impair or assist the spread of communism? The credibility the left long enjoyed in the developing world didn't stem from what they could or did do when they took power. They recognized and seized, before us, the moral high ground and historical momentum of opposition to failing colonial powers at corrupt dictatorships. We let them do it, and played into their hands, a strategy supported by those who shared your fear and loathing for the communists. The issue is not whether that fear and loathing were justified in the abstract, the issue is whether they did or did not produce effective policy.


I don't think it is overrated. (see above) You do. We're even.

I've seen the arguments. They are not convincing, unless you really want to be convinced.


How I propose opposing the Reds now is in post 197.

If you mean this:


Well there is a long history of how to do it successfully. Among the things to do are speak up when they behave badly. Don't hold them to a lower international standard of behavior because they grouse about how badly they been treated. Stop thinking they are ten feet tall. They screw up more than most and they aren't fearless. That is bluster. They get scared just like everybody else. Remember what Grant learned at the Battle of Belmont (I think it was the Battle of Belmont). Don't let them shove around allies just because people inside the beltway are feeling windy. Don't fool yourself into thinking we can get them to like us short of complete surrender. They will propagandize their people as they please no matter what we do. It is easy to lie when you control the media completely. The most important thing though is to realize communism is a pernicious evil system that has resulted in more human death and suffering than any other. There is no good in that system, only greater and lesser degrees of evil. Realize to that they lie almost always and about everything. All those economic numbers they put out shouldn't be trusted.

that seems to me far too general to be of any real use.


Bearing in mind that internal unrest only makes a difference if the police state has been weakened and the grip thereby loosened. There is no evidence of that happening in NK or Red China yet.

Actually there's considerable evidence that it's happening, if you choose to look. Of course things are never simple... the Chinese populace is anything but happy about the rampant corruption, growing inequality, and crude brutality of the state. On the other hand they recognize that the state as currently constituted has made China strong and a power to be reckoned with for the first time in centuries, and despite their dislike for the internal workings of that state, there's a real national pride that goes with that status. The state will play that card to the extent that we can. Helping them play it is not in our interest.


[This is an aside, but it is surprising how much Soviet arms decisions were reactions to what the West did, at least in tanks. Often they did things just to beat the west just a little. The 100 mm gun had to be bigger than the 90 mm gun. The 115 mm gun had to be bigger than the 105 mm. I was surprised when I read that.]

That sounds kind of like the occasional paranoia induced by the observation that the stealth jet the Chinese are testing is bigger than the stealth jet the US is testing.

One factor that caused the Soviet Union to fall was their insistence on pursuing an arms race they really had no need to be in. That was a stupid decision on their part, a consequence of the knee-jerk thinking that holds that if they have x, we must have y, or x to the third power. That wasn't us hurting them, that was them hurting themselves. It would be most ironic if we turned around and did the same thing to ourselves...

[Dayuhan]

The Americans never really mastered this indirect rule and the setup of effective indigenous sepoy-like forces either.

The US did this fairly effectively in the Philippines, their only true imperial venture.


Only true empires that mastered the "empire" business get true empire benefits

This is true, but one also must note that "the empire business" wasn't always appropriate to powers that set out on it. US imperial profit in the Philippines, for example, was heavily constrained by political pressure from domestic agro-industrial interests who did not want to face competition from cheaper goods imported from a colony. US beet sugar producers successfully campaigned for land ownership restrictions aimed at preventing the development of a cane sugar industry in the Philippines, and domestic producers of corn and soybean oil successfully lobbied to restrict entry of coconut oil. A british cotton farmer in India or Egypt didn't have to worry about domestic competitors in Bognor Regis agitating for tariffs on goods coming in from the colonies.

The textbook colonial economic arrangement never emerged in the Philippines largely because the role of the colony was already being filled domestically by the American west and south, which had more political clout. The US really had little compelling economic motivation to colonize; the motivation was primarily political, a desire to be a world power and play the game with the big (European) players.

Of course post-WW2 that changed, but the world had changed with it and traditional empire was no longer a practical or economically viable construct. Neocolonialism proved awkward as well...

[carl]

...my impression is that at some point the folks in the periphery are going to expect comity of treatment or reasonable privileges. One does have to wonder about the good faith of empires in general given how many of them stood on principle rather than renegotiate the status quo. What would it have cost the British Empire to have really and truly extended political enfranchisement to the Founding Fathers? What would it have cost the French to have extended libert, galit, and fraternit worth calling such to the Arab inhabitants of Algeria?

Those are critical points. The Romans did extend that and their empire lasted a long time. One of the things Alaric was upset about is he didn't get the rank in the Roman Army he wanted. I read an article once that said the strongest motivation for various North African takfiri killer's antipathy toward France was they were hurt that France wasn't more accepting of them.

If you really want the empire to last, maybe you have to treat it like a club and allow anybody who wants to join and abide by the rules, to join.

[carl]

That sounds kind of like the occasional paranoia induced by the observation that the stealth jet the Chinese are testing is bigger than the stealth jet the US is testing.

One factor that caused the Soviet Union to fall was their insistence on pursuing an arms race they really had no need to be in. That was a stupid decision on their part, a consequence of the knee-jerk thinking that holds that if they have x, we must have y, or x to the third power. That wasn't us hurting them, that was them hurting themselves. It would be most ironic if we turned around and did the same thing to ourselves...

Geesh Dayuhan, you just can't leave a simple thing be simple can you. It was just a simple observation that when picking calibres for tank main guns, the Soviet powers that seemed to fixate on having a gun 10 mm bigger than the primary gun of the west's tanks, rather than looking at things like range, accuracy, penetration etc.

And the J-20 is way bigger than the F-35, approx 70' x 42' vs. 51' x 35'.

I have to get used to be called panic stricken if my concerns differ from yours. I guess I'll have to get used to being called paranoid too.

[Dayuhan]

And the J-20 is way bigger than the F-35, approx 70' x 42' vs. 51' x 35'.

Is it way better? Oh right, we don't know. We must still be very very afraid because... well, because we must. How else can we justify bankrupting ourselves to defend against the threat?


I have to get used to be called panic stricken if my concerns differ from yours. I guess I'll have to get used to being called paranoid too.

Different is different. Panic-stricken is panic-stricken. Paranoid is paranoid. Three different things, though the second two go well together.

[Ken White]

The Americans never really mastered this indirect rule and the setup of effective indigenous sepoy-like forces either.True...
Only true empires that mastered the "empire" business get true empire benefits.And I think you just responded to your own comment...;)

Carl:
Whipping trouble with foreigners is time honored way for police states to distract their people from internal problems. To go along with that it is time honored for some of those foreigners to say if we just avoid making them mad at us that effort will fail. I am skeptical of that.Not only Police States, we aren't a police state -- yet -- and we excel at and indeed need to whip up trouble with foreigners for pretty much that reason...

Take a look at most of our excursions since WW II and you'll see they generally start in economic downturns and the party incumbent in the WH is either in trouble or trying to avoid some... :rolleyes:
It was just a simple observation that when picking calibres for tank main guns, the Soviet powers that seemed to fixate on having a gun 10 mm bigger than the primary gun of the west's tanks, rather than looking at things like range, accuracy, penetration etc.That's more a function of less sophisticated engineering, metallurgy and production, it's primarily to achieve nearly the same effect as the smaller, more efficient western weapons and ammunition. They also have long produced weapons with a slightly larger caliber so they can use captured ammo stocks (poorly and inaccurately but usable...) while the reverse is not true. Their 82mm mortar versus the German (and NATO) 81mm for example, the 115mm tank versus the 105mm tank guns, 125 vs. 120 etc., the 152mm Howitzer versus the Czech and German 150mm. The 120mm Gun though was purely a function of trying to equal the capability of the German 105mm. ..
And the J-20 is way bigger than the F-35, approx 70' x 42' vs. 51' x 35'.And the more comparable F-22 of which there are far more than there are J-20s (and of which we have the capability of producing many more. Yes, I know the line is 'closed.') measures 62x44 -- and yet again, much, much better western engines, more refined techniques and metallurgy account for the only slightly smaller size. ;)
I have to get used to be called panic stricken if my concerns differ from yours. I guess I'll have to get used to being called paranoid too.Well, I don't think you're panic stricken. Over concerned perhaps but that's probably attributable to philosophic and opinion differences. Mildly paranoid a bit, perhaps -- but who isn't about something or other... :D

OTOH, it sometimes appears you think others are unconcerned about potential problems because they offer differing thoughts and opinions. That's probably as big a misperception as your being panic stricken could be.

[wm]

Geesh
And the J-20 is way bigger than the F-35, approx 70' x 42' vs. 51' x 35'.


Particularly the scene found here (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ybSzoLCCX-Y)

[Fuchs]

(...)the 152mm Howitzer versus the Czech and German 150mm. The 120mm Gun though was purely a function of trying to equal the capability of the German 105mm.

Their 152 mm gun-howitzers were actually superior to German WW2 heavy howitzers. The small difference in calibre was more about metric vs other measurement system and history than anything else. Many official "150" mm howitzers of the era were in fact 149.1 mm pieces.

The only 120 mm guns used by Russians were IIRC WWI vintage guns. The calibre was a popular calibre pre-WWI and the Russians imported the design.
Their 122 mm gun has a similarly old history, being a traditional calibre and not really related to a competition with 105 mm.
122 mm is actually a superior calibre in comparison to 105 mm if you don't need light weight. 149-155 mm is relatively if you desire smoke or frag effect, yet 122 mm is much better than 105 mm for ICM and blast effect and achieves good range more easily than 105 mm (less V0, less barrel wear).

As of today I'd prefer a new 122 mm SPG over a 155 mm SPG because range isn't that important and most countries banned DPICM.

[carl]

They also have long produced weapons with a slightly larger caliber so they can use captured ammo stocks (poorly and inaccurately but usable...) while the reverse is not true. Their 82mm mortar versus the German (and NATO) 81mm for example, the 115mm tank versus the 105mm tank guns, 125 vs. 120 etc., the 152mm Howitzer versus the Czech and German 150mm. The 120mm Gun though was purely a function of trying to equal the capability of the German 105mm.

Ken, at the risk of incurring your ire, I'll buy that with regard to mortars but not tank guns. No way. If you just look at a 105 round meant to be fired from a rifled gun vs. a 115 round meant to be fired from a smoothbore gun it just doesn't seem like there is any way. You'll have to provide some references before I'll accept that.

The thing about exactly 10 mm was a point, IIRC, raised by the authors of the book I read.

http://www.amazon.com/Soviet-Russian-Artillery-Design-Practices/dp/1892848015/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1342466795&sr=1-4&keywords=soviet%2Frussian+armor+and+artillery+desi gn




..And the more comparable F-22 of which there are far more than there are J-20s (and of which we have the capability of producing many more. Yes, I know the line is 'closed.') measures 62x44 -- and yet again, much, much better western engines, more refined techniques and metallurgy account for the only slightly smaller size.

What works for guns doesn't work for airplanes. For your comparison to be valid the aircraft would have to be designed for the same mission and requirements. The Red Chinese haven't told us how the J-20 will be used or what its design requirements are but I strongly doubt they mirror those of the F-22. Those guys aren't stupid and the configuration of that airplane was mostly driven by what the requirements are. Less sophisticated material would only have something to do with it, not everything. That thing has an awful lot of internal volume.

Once a line is closed, that's basically it. You ain't going to get it going again in anything less than years and beaucoup bucks. The people all scatter to the four winds. The suppliers all are doing something else and their tooling may be gone. Their people are scattered to the four winds. That line isn't coming back

[carl]

Particularly the scene found here (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ybSzoLCCX-Y)

WM I think I get the point you are trying to make (something about mere sized conferring advantage) but it doesn't have much, nothing, to do with high performance aircraft, design requirements etc etc etc.

[slapout9]

I probably misunderstood you, but I don't think what you think is moral would stand the Kant's Categorical Imperative (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative) test.

Sorry for the late response. It probably wouldn't pass Kant's standard but I would regard that as a......... moral thing;)

Major Kong on moral riightness and stuff!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CRRVZqrRl0

[slapout9]

History will judge. America is undoubtedly the first Empire to pay retail.

What gets us in trouble is that we are stuck in the middle. We want to be a good guy, we think or ourself as a good guy, but we have all these bad guy urges that we keep acting out on, along with a bit of a control freak personallity that gets very insecure when others think about things differently than we do. That would be "Dr. Bob's" assessment if I had Uncle Sam on my couch. Do we blame our father for this, the good ol' British Empire? Or is it due to growing up rich and under supervised? I am sure a real shrink would have a field day.

That is moral indecisiveness and it can be deadly!

[carl]

Major Kong on moral riightness and stuff!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CRRVZqrRl0

This is the top comment for that clip.

"B-52 solving the world's problems since the late 50's."

[Ken White]

Ken, at the risk of incurring your ire, I'll buy that with regard to mortars but not tank guns. No way. If you just look at a 105 round meant to be fired from a rifled gun vs. a 115 round meant to be fired from a smoothbore gun it just doesn't seem like there is any way. You'll have to provide some references before I'll accept that.No ire, not least because I wasn't clear -- the tank guns are a question of effectiveness and engineering, not ability to use captured ammo. The 82mm Mortar and 152mm Artillery were the only ones so sized for that purpose. The 120mm Mortar which both the Germans and Russians used was not nor was the (hat tip to Fuchs) 122mm Gun and Howitzer -- that added size was to equal or surpass the German 105mm in effectiveness, which it did. So the tanks, the 120 mortar and the 122 mm had nothing to do with captured ammo.

It's also noteworthy that the primary tank gun in the USSR during WW II was an 85mm. Toward the end of the war, they want to a 100mm, both ten mm bigger than the US and German 75mm and later in the war US 90mm. The wild card is the German 88mm -- that probably killed more USSR tanks than anything, yet they didn't develop a 98mm... ;)
What works for guns doesn't work for airplanes. For your comparison to be valid the aircraft would have to be designed for the same mission and requirements..,.I know. I also know that applies equally to your comparison of the J-20 and F-35 which was my point... :D
Once a line is closed, that's basically it. You ain't going to get it going again in anything less than years and beaucoup bucks. The people all scatter to the four winds. The suppliers all are doing something else and their tooling may be gone. Their people are scattered to the four winds. That line isn't coming backNo it isn't -- but a new line with a better bird based on the old bird experience can appear given a need. Absent that need, as at the present time and in the foreseeable future, no way -- too expensive, etc. etc. . Given a need, it'll be "Hang the expense..." ;)

We do a lot of dumb stuff lazily and with little coordination and often at cross purposes -- until there's pressure. Then we still do dumb stuff, just more of it, faster and harder with adequate coordination and some real SOBs appear and are allowed to eliminate most of the cross purpose stuff. :rolleyes:

[carl]

Ken:

I see your points now but I can't agree on the re-opening the line. Things just won't work fast no matter how much money you throw at it. It takes time to train the workers, build the tooling, work out the bugs on the line and in the workers, design and integrate new parts because the old ones aren't made anymore and maybe can't be made anymore. That is just for the main line if you didn't modify the airplane to be a better model. So as far as putting the F-22 line back into production, I don't think it can happen, which is why shutting down that line was such a big deal. If the big tooling for the airframe is destroyed, putting the line back together is impossible. If it isn't it is almost impossible.

There is a better chance that exigencies, mortal, "we are going to die if we don't do something quick" exigencies would stimulate some original thinking and that might get into production with some speed. This is just wild thinking on my part but say you had to do something fast. You know an F-22 line re-opening isn't going to happen fast so you got to think of something else to protect tankers and C-17s flying to and from Guam, Japan, the Philippines over the ocean. So somebody figures to hang 25 AIM-120Ds on a 787 and come up with some kind of radar data link lash up to engage intruders out over the ocean. Something like that I could see happening fairly quick.

(That book about the Russian armor was great by the way.)

[Dayuhan]

you got to think of something else to protect tankers and C-17s flying to and from Guam, Japan, the Philippines over the ocean. So somebody figures to hang 25 AIM-120Ds on a 787 and come up with some kind of radar data link lash up to engage intruders out over the ocean. Something like that I could see happening fairly quick.

Protect them from what? From two prototypes using 80s-vintage Russian engines because the Chinese haven't got round to producing an appropriate power plant?

Earlier we spoke of how reflexive paranoia lead the Soviet Union to bankrupt themselves preparing for a hypothetical war. Would you have us do the same?

Have you ever asked yourself why the Chinese chose to release pictures of the J-20 when hey did? I think this guy has it about right on that score:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA14Ad02.html

[carl]

Protect them from what? From two prototypes using 80s-vintage Russian engines because the Chinese haven't got round to producing an appropriate power plant?

Earlier we spoke of how reflexive paranoia lead the Soviet Union to bankrupt themselves preparing for a hypothetical war. Would you have us do the same?

Have you ever asked yourself why the Chinese chose to release pictures of the J-20 when hey did? I think this guy has it about right on that score:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA14Ad02.html

Please Dayuhan, please. I was obviously commenting about the future, the future, years down the road. Things that may happen, not things that are.

The most critical planes in our inventory are the tankers, the big E aircraft and the C planes. They would be very hard to protect out over the open ocean because the open ocean is so far from land. So if, if the mission of the J-20 was to get those airplanes over water, it could do it no matter how far their engine tech lagged ours. It is a great big thing and that often means a lot of range.

Now that isn't a worry today, but in 6-8 years, it could be a big worry. Then you would need something to protect them since there won't be enough F-22s.

The comment was also a just a thought about what might be possible to do quick if the need arose. It was not an argument to go do that right now. And it was also an idea about how a very limited mission, protecting those big planes as they transited over the open ocean, could be done less expensively. Something like the 787 idea I posited wouldn't be good for much if anything else. Making something for a very limited mission can be a lot cheaper.

I have asked myself what the Red Chinese were up to by allowing the aircraft to be photographed when it was. One thing I believe is it was just good fun to stick to the big nosed Yankee. The other thing I, and others, asked is whether those were actually the first flights or just the first time they showed it. Also whether those are actually the only two flying right now. We mostly know what the Red Chinese want us to know, which I would guess isn't much.

I read the article you cited and I judged it to be more sniffing dismissiveness than not. It reminded me a little of an article in Air Progress magazine I read about the MiG-21 in 1964 or 65. That article concluded that the MiG would present little if any problem to our fighters over the DRV. The actual case was rather different. It also reminded me of some of the judgments of Japanese aircraft capabilities prior to WWII. My reading of history makes me a bit nervous when people are so cocksure that the other guy won't be able to do it.

One thing that may have been brought up before about the F-35 but needs to be kept in mind. The original title of the program was JSF, Joint Strike Fighter. Strike Fighter is a gold and silver winged zoomie code word for Light Bomber. They call it that because the zoomies would die of shame if somebody called them bomber pilots. The F-35 is primarily a light bomber, secondarily a fighter. It just doesn't have the performance for 1st class fightering. I don't really mean turn & burn performance, though I've read it doesn't have that either, I mean it isn't all that fast and can't go high. If you were up against something like a really long range MiG-31, it could not do anything about it but watch it go by. If, I say if again, the J-20 is sort of like that, the F-35 can't harm it because it isn't really reasonable to expect a light bomber to do that.

[Dayuhan]

Please Dayuhan, please. I was obviously commenting about the future, the future, years down the road. Things that may happen, not things that are.

Exactly. That's why all of this needs a does of calm, something that isn't achieved by stringing together long chains of hypotheticals aimed at the pre-ordained conclusion that we're in deep $#!t. Certainly one can imagine a situation that might require greater capacities than those now deemed affordable. One can always imagine such a situation. Acting as if those imaginings are real or likely to become real is not always advisable.


The most critical planes in our inventory are the tankers, the big E aircraft and the C planes. They would be very hard to protect out over the open ocean because the open ocean is so far from land. So if, if the mission of the J-20 was to get those airplanes over water, it could do it no matter how far their engine tech lagged ours. It is a great big thing and that often means a lot of range.

Now that isn't a worry today, but in 6-8 years, it could be a big worry. Then you would need something to protect them since there won't be enough F-22s.

Again, you're assuming a situation and assuming a set of parameters that seems designed to advance a conclusion you've already reached. What makes you think such a situation will occur? What makes you so sure there won't be enough F-22s? What convinces you that such a situation can only be managed through deployment of large numbers of fighters that are superior to what you imagine the J-20 to be?


We mostly know what the Red Chinese want us to know, which I would guess isn't much.

Are you assuming that the US has no espionage capacity whatsoever? If so, on what basis do you make that assumption? If by "we" you mean those of us here on SWJ, you're probably right, but how much does that mean?


I read the article you cited and I judged it to be more sniffing dismissiveness than not. It reminded me a little of an article in Air Progress magazine I read about the MiG-21 in 1964 or 65. That article concluded that the MiG would present little if any problem to our fighters over the DRV. The actual case was rather different. It also reminded me of some of the judgments of Japanese aircraft capabilities prior to WWII. My reading of history makes me a bit nervous when people are so cocksure that the other guy won't be able to do it.

I would be more nervous if we were overreacting and churning out newer and better weapons to meet threats that we don't need to meet. Our domestic economic problems are a greater threat to us than any foreign power, and those are not going to be improved by charging into an arms race that we don't need to be in.


One thing that may have been brought up before about the F-35 but needs to be kept in mind. The original title of the program was JSF, Joint Strike Fighter. Strike Fighter is a gold and silver winged zoomie code word for Light Bomber. They call it that because the zoomies would die of shame if somebody called them bomber pilots. The F-35 is primarily a light bomber, secondarily a fighter.

On what do you base that conclusion? I seem to recall that in its day the relatively small, single-engined F16 functioned quite capably both as a fighter and in attack configuration. Why should the F-35 not do the same?

Of course if you choose to believe all the worst possible assessments of the F-35 and all the best possible assessments of the J-20, you'll come to certain conclusions. ow realistic those conclusions are is another question. When I hear someone in the aviation industry talking up how our aircraft are lame and somebody else's are soooo much better, I hear a bid for money, usually a whole lot of it. Such things must be taken with multiple grains of salt.

In any event a lot of what makes an air force effective isn't just about the plane, as described here:

http://defensetech.org/2010/12/31/j-20-vs-f-35-one-analysts-perspective/


I would gauge a modern combat aircraft’s capabilities by looking at the following features:

1. Access to offboard space, ground, and air-based sensors, particularly a capable AEW/AWACS system with a well-trained crew and robust data links.

2. Effective sensor fusion to allow the pilot to make use of all this information, as well as information from onboard sensors.

3. An integrated EW system.

4. An AESA radar with a high level of reliability.

5. Training and doctrine necessary to make effective use of all this data and equipment. Plenty of flight hours for pilot flight training, too.

6. Powerful engines (ideally capable of supercruise), with a high mean time between overhaul and failures.

7. An airframe with low-observable characteristics.

8. A robust air-to-air refueling capability (equipment, readiness, training).

9. Sophisticated and reliable precision guided weaponry.

10. A robust software and hardware upgrade roadmap, to keep this plane effective in 5, 10, and 30 years.

11. Maintenance procedures in place to keep the plane operating with a high mission-capable rate. And of course equipment that has been designed with easy access for maintenance and easy access for electronic diagnostic tools, and ideally a sophisticated health-usage monitoring system (HUMS).

This list is not in any particular order of magnitude. And I’m sure I’ve missed quite a few other key items.

The J-20 offers one item from this list (#7). I’m not convinced that the PLAAF has any other items from this list, although China seems to be making some progress with #9.

It’s kind of fun to watch the world fixate on this one item (#7). Then again, I still enjoy air shows, too. Pugachev’s Cobra maneuver, for example. Drives the crowd wild. Relevance to modern combat? Zero.

[wm]

WM I think I get the point you are trying to make (something about mere sized conferring advantage) but it doesn't have much, nothing, to do with high performance aircraft, design requirements etc etc etc.

Actually the point has more to do with an arms race or, more accurately from the perspective of the movie, mine shaft development race, based on knee jeerk responses. You might want to read up on the so-called Bomber Gap of the mid 50s.

[wm]

So somebody figures to hang 25 AIM-120Ds on a 787 and come up with some kind of radar data link lash up to engage intruders out over the ocean. Something like that I could see happening fairly quick.


Nice idea, provided you could get all the 787 sub-assemblies that are made all around the world--France, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, and Sweden to Washington state to build more once the initial fleet was shot up by opponents with longer range systems than the 100 miles or so that a Slammer has. BTW, the AIM-120D costs about $700K/missile. Pretty hefty price tag. An opponent could surely spend a lot less money to equip some patrol boats (or even old freighters) with SAMs and send them out under the expected orbits that your protection force would need to fly to cover the tankers etc. That 787 would be unable to do much to counter that threat other than to use LAIRCM (another price item to add to the cost of your quick fix) and other devices to try to protect itself from the SAM threat.

[carl]

Nice idea, provided you could get all the 787 sub-assemblies that are made all around the world--France, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, and Sweden to Washington state to build more once the initial fleet was shot up by opponents with longer range systems than the 100 miles or so that a Slammer has. BTW, the AIM-120D costs about $700K/missile. Pretty hefty price tag. An opponent could surely spend a lot less money to equip some patrol boats (or even old freighters) with SAMs and send them out under the expected orbits that your protection force would need to fly to cover the tankers etc. That 787 would be unable to do much to counter that threat other than to use LAIRCM (another price item to add to the cost of your quick fix) and other devices to try to protect itself from the SAM threat.

So I take that an off the wall idea I considered for about 10 seconds to illustrate the kind of thinking that might have to be done in an emergency should become an immediate national defense priority then do you. And here I thought I'd get a six figure consultants job out of it. Darn.

You got any ideas?

[carl]

Actually the point has more to do with an arms race or, more accurately from the perspective of the movie, mine shaft development race, based on knee jeerk responses. You might want to read up on the so-called Bomber Gap of the mid 50s.

Your explanation this time, I understand. When you tried to illustrate it by tying aircraft effectiveness to simple size difference, I didn't.

I read about the bomber gap once. What we got out of that were lots of B-52s we used over and over again over the past 50 and more years. Very useful they've been.

[carl]

Exactly. That's why all of this needs a does of calm, something that isn't achieved by stringing together long chains of hypotheticals aimed at the pre-ordained conclusion that we're in deep $#!t. Certainly one can imagine a situation that might require greater capacities than those now deemed affordable. One can always imagine such a situation. Acting as if those imaginings are real or likely to become real is not always advisable.

Too bad life forces you to make decisions about things before they become certain. Because often when things become certain it is too late to do anything about it.


Again, you're assuming a situation and assuming a set of parameters that seems designed to advance a conclusion you've already reached. What makes you think such a situation will occur? What makes you so sure there won't be enough F-22s? What convinces you that such a situation can only be managed through deployment of large numbers of fighters that are superior to what you imagine the J-20 to be?

I don't know anything WILL occur. That is the problem with the future. You don't know it yet. So that being the case, you have to figure what might happen. And if you really wanted to hurt us, hitting those planes out over the ocean where they would be hard to protect might be a good way to do it. If little ol' me can figure that, the rest of the world figured it long ago. So if they thunk it, it might be wise to think about how to counter it. That is called looking ahead and being prepared by me. You, I know, call it something different.

There are only 183 or so F-22s. The line is closed. There won't be any more. In a serious conflict with a big nation, 183 of anything won't be enough. 183 St. Michaels complete with flaming sacred swords wouldn't be enough.

What convinces me that the situation can only be handled with large numbers of superior fighters? Well, it won't be because we won't have large numbers of superior fighters. We'll have to figure another way if we can, which was the point of my idea (horribly bad as it was, see WM's opinion above). But as far as large numbers of superior fighters handling such situations goes...let's see 1914 was when airplanes started shooting at each other and that's been...98 years of aviation history convinces me that large numbers of superior fighters are good for handling such situations.


Are you assuming that the US has no espionage capacity whatsoever? If so, on what basis do you make that assumption? If by "we" you mean those of us here on SWJ, you're probably right, but how much does that mean?

I don't assume we have no spy capability whatever. I just assume that what we do have is, in total, inferior. Historically our human intel capability has been terrible, despite the CIA types hinting about great successes they can't tell us about. Our satellites and commo intercept stuff is pretty good. But satellites are predictable and all you have to do is cover something with a tarp when it comes overhead to frustrate that. Watch what you say to the extent practicable or use land lines may do a lot to frustrate the sigint stuff. Iran has done a very good job of mystifying and bedazzling us as to what they are up to so I figure, assume if you will, that the Red Chinese are even better at it.


I would be more nervous if we were overreacting and churning out newer and better weapons to meet threats that we don't need to meet. Our domestic economic problems are a greater threat to us than any foreign power, and those are not going to be improved by charging into an arms race that we don't need to be in.

Your nervous about that and I'm nervous when people are cocksure about what the other guy can't do. Together our neurotic concerns cover all there is to worry about.


On what do you base that conclusion? I seem to recall that in its day the relatively small, single-engined F16 functioned quite capably both as a fighter and in attack configuration. Why should the F-35 not do the same?

If you remember that then you also remember that the USAF always used F-15s as the primary air to air fighters. F-16s were used to supplement when needed but were/are primarily bombers. The F-35 will not be a top flight fighter because it was doesn't have the flight performance needed and it doesn't have the flight performance needed because it is designed primarily to be a light bomber. I thought I already said that.


Of course if you choose to believe all the worst possible assessments of the F-35 and all the best possible assessments of the J-20, you'll come to certain conclusions. ow realistic those conclusions are is another question. When I hear someone in the aviation industry talking up how our aircraft are lame and somebody else's are soooo much better, I hear a bid for money, usually a whole lot of it. Such things must be taken with multiple grains of salt.

I guess so. But numbers are numbers and air molecules always act the same way. The F-35 ain't got the performance. Wasn't designed to. So it could be just a bid for money. It might also be a bid to get something that will compete with the opposition.


In any event a lot of what makes an air force effective isn't just about the plane, as described here:

http://defensetech.org/2010/12/31/j-20-vs-f-35-one-analysts-perspective/

Another article of the sniffing dismissal school. "This is what they need. They ain't got it. They won't get it. I have spoken." You might want to read some of the over 200 comments that went with that article, many of which disagreed somewhat.

[wm]

So I take that an off the wall idea I considered for about 10 seconds to illustrate the kind of thinking that might have to be done in an emergency should become an immediate national defense priority then do you. And here I thought I'd get a six figure consultants job out of it. Darn.

You got any ideas?

I gave you an alternative in my response. If it would work for an opponent uit would work for us. Use a bunch of cheap shipping (not sure whether the mothball fleets still exist, if they do they'd be a source for the platforms) equipped with SAMs to provide a seabased AD umbrella as the equivalent of a CAP for the mission aircraft transitting/orbitting overhead. Much easier to protect the KC fleet than the basic C- aircraft as they tend to fly in fixed orbits vice long laps. Mix this with combat aircraft that attack the bad guys tanker fleet to limit the ranges at which US aircradft would need to be protected by the shipping. BTW, the AD assets on the freighters also provide self-protect from attack by enemy aircraft. Give them some anti-ship missiles and maybe a few cruise missiles (modified SLCMs) and you have a multithreat platform for both attack and defense. Prtobably won't float though as who wants to resurrect an old rust bucket when they could spend a bunch of bucks on some more Aegis cruisers.

[slapout9]

I gave you an alternative in my response. If it would work for an opponent uit would work for us. Use a bunch of cheap shipping (not sure whether the mothball fleets still exist, if they do they'd be a source for the platforms) equipped with SAMs to provide a seabased AD umbrella as the equivalent of a CAP for the mission aircraft transitting/orbitting overhead. Much easier to protect the KC fleet than the basic C- aircraft as they tend to fly in fixed orbits vice long laps. Mix this with combat aircraft that attack the bad guys tanker fleet to limit the ranges at which US aircradft would need to be protected by the shipping. BTW, the AD assets on the freighters also provide self-protect from attack by enemy aircraft. Give them some anti-ship missiles and maybe a few cruise missiles (modified SLCMs) and you have a multithreat platform for both attack and defense. Prtobably won't float though as who wants to resurrect an old rust bucket when they could spend a bunch of bucks on some more Aegis cruisers.

That basic idea was one of the original concepts(1960's) for USMC deployment of the Harrier Aircraft. It had and has a lot of merit I thought but as you say it is very economical so it went KIA:eek:

[carl]

WM:

That's not a half bad idea. Both it and my terrible idea depend on the capability being built into the weapon and having a lot of shots available. That is one of the things I believe ADM Greenert might have been getting at in his recent article. Both ideas would require the sea be held. Neither could tolerate hostile surface vessels hanging about.

I still like my idea but yours would be much better for protecting the tanker orbits, specific spots. The ocean is rather large so it may be to big to establish a really long BAR-CAP kind of thing. I like my idea for protecting the cargo airplanes though because you could fly them in groups, convoys sort of, and change the routing around to make it harder for the bad guys. A big missileer kind of plane could stay with them and only fly when escort was needed. That would complicate the enemy's task a lot.

The British did the sort of thing you suggest in the Falklands I believe and more recently the Malaysian Navy bought some container ships and armed them for anti-piracy work. 20,000 to 40 or 50,000 tons container ships with reasonable speed might be just the ticket. My displacement estimate was just a guess. What kind of speed would be useful, around 20 knots?

[Fuchs]

It's also noteworthy that the primary tank gun in the USSR during WW II was an 85mm. Toward the end of the war, they want to a 100mm, both ten mm bigger than the US and German 75mm and later in the war US 90mm. The wild card is the German 88mm -- that probably killed more USSR tanks than anything, yet they didn't develop a 98mm... ;)

85 mm was only important in late '43 to '45. most of the time the Soviets used much more of several 76.2 mm gun types (interchangeable ammo tank <-> field gun) and the 76.2 mm calibre remained very important until post-war (no wonder with more than 100,000 guns built!).

The Soviet 100 mm (D-10) proved to be superior to even the L/71 88 mm in post-War tests. the long 88 couldn't take on a T-54 frontally with an acceptable chance of success.
The U.S. insistence on 76 mm for a long time after the war was likely a result of the British great success with the 17 pdr gun (~77 mm IIRC) which equalled the German long (L/70) 75 mm gun in performance which in itself was almost identical to the early war (L/56) 88 mm in penetration. So basically the U.S. was stupid enough to stick for a decade with a gun that couldn't defeat an IS-2 or T-44 head-on and had at most adequate HE effect. South Korea would probably be gone if the North Koreans had had T-44's instead of T-34/85s in 1950. The normal (60mm) Bazookas were inadequate against T-44's from almost all angles.


About 98 mm; funny story. Due to the modern arms limitations treaty (forget the abbreviation, but it restricted all ordnance 100 mm or bigger), there are now a couple 98 mm mortars which are perfectly in between 81.4/82 mm and 120 mm in mortar bomb weight...
This makes as much sense as did all the Washington Treaty light cruisers; 10,000 tons but only 6" guns... :wry:

[ganulv]

The British Empire in America dealt with a quite unique situation in that those who became rebellious were the colonists, rather than the colonized. Doesn't really compare well to situations in which an empire dealt with a colonized population.

The distinction you are making is that of settler colonialism and colonialism. It may have been a first at the time but the Brits were destined to deal with it again (in Israel and Rhodesia, right off the top of my head).

[davidbfpo]

The distinction you are making is that of settler colonialism and colonialism. It may have been a first at the time but the Brits were destined to deal with it again (in Israel and Rhodesia, right off the top of my head).

Yes, the British dealt with each in curiously similar ways, we left Palestine after a rather grim attempt to "keep the peace" between Arab and Jew; in Rhodesia we left the population to resolve "majority rule" themselves - which they did bloodily - and not to overlook Rhodesia was a self-governing colony.

You could add Ireland too; with the dispute over the Protestant minority wishing to remain British in Northern Ireland after Ireland achieved independence. This time we fought several campaigns, the longest being 1969-1998 'The Troubles', until the communities were able to make a compromise that gave peace (very short summary).

[ganulv]

[I]n Rhodesia we left the population to resolve "majority rule" themselves - which they did bloodily - and not to overlook Rhodesia was a self-governing colony.

Algeria wasn’t a colony at all, of course, but the French were faced there with the same unenviable task as the British with Rhodesia—conflict with a settler population in the context of an anti-colonial struggle. Fun stuff. :(


You could add Ireland too; with the dispute over the Protestant minority wishing to remain British in Northern Ireland after Ireland achieved independence. This time we fought several campaigns, the longest being 1969-1998 'The Troubles', until the communities were able to make a compromise that gave peace (very short summary).

This story (http://www.npr.org/2012/07/15/156811081/who-killed-jean-mcconville-a-battle-for-ira-secrets) is on my radar screen because of its relevance to anthropological research. Apart from that, though, I have been curious as to whether it spells trouble primarily for Gerry Adams or for the sectarian situation in Northern Ireland more broadly. Any insights or opinions?

[Ken White]

85 mm was only important in late '43 to '45.True -- but that's when WW II was 'decided.' ;)
The U.S. insistence on 76 mm for a long time after the war was likely a result of the British great success with the 17 pdr gun (~77 mm IIRC) which equalled the German long (L/70) 75 mm gun in performance which in itself was almost identical to the early war (L/56) 88 mm in penetration. So basically the U.S. was stupid enough to stick for a decade with a gun that couldn't defeat an IS-2 or T-44 head-on and had at most adequate HE effect.Uh, no. That's rather incorrect...

The US had adopted the 90mm as Standard A in late 1943, production started on the 90 mm M3 towed antitank gun, on the M36 Tank Destroyer and on the M24 Tank. All were in full production when the war ended. The lines were closed at Congressional insistence -- that meant reliance on the many still around but now obsolete M4A3E8s with the 76 up until early in Korea when M24 / M26 production was restarted and by mid '52, the M4s were history.
South Korea would probably be gone if the North Koreans had had T-44's instead of T-34/85s in 1950. The normal (60mm) Bazookas were inadequate against T-44's from almost all angles.Not likely, most NK Tanks in 1950 were destroyed by Aircraft. The 2.36" / 60mm Rocket launchers were not effective against the T34 unless the Launcher gunner was less than 100 meters away due more to inaccuracy of the weapon than anything else, though few RLs work against any real degree of frontal armor with a decent slope -- glacis plates are thick for a reason. Both better training and the arrival of the 3.5" / 89mm Rocket Launcher (relatively accurate to about 200 m) fixed that by early to mid 1951. In the interim, after September of 1950 when they arrived in theater, after being pulled out of storage, those 90mm Towed AT guns were used with Tungsten hyper shot and they would literally blow a T34 apart.
About 98 mm; funny story. Due to the modern arms limitations treaty (forget the abbreviation, but it restricted all ordnance 100 mm or bigger), there are now a couple 98 mm mortars which are perfectly in between 81.4/82 mm and 120 mm in mortar bomb weight...
This makes as much sense as did all the Washington Treaty light cruisers; 10,000 tons but only 6" guns... :wry:Very little makes much military sense -- too much political involvement... :rolleyes:

[Fuchs]

True -- but that's when WW II was 'decided.'

In the American world view ... because they showed up too late to play a role in the widely recognized turning point battles...


;)Uh, no. That's rather incorrect...

The US had adopted the 90mm as Standard A in late 1943, production started on the 90 mm M3 towed antitank gun, on the M36 Tank Destroyer and on the M24 Tank.

Aside from the M24 being equipped with a 76 mm* (based very much on the first quick-firing gun ever; a rather weak calibre comparable to the T-34 M1940's gun) and 90 mm guns playing no role in U.S. WW2 mediums, I think you read a bit more into "insistence" than I meant to.
The U.S. kept 76 mm as a calibre in the M41 and in some post-war prototypes, and the ~76 mm-equipped Shermans were the almost exclusive medium tank of the U.S. until the Korean War wartime production mode kicked in.

*: I think you meant M26, which saw WW2 only in prototype-like quantities.

[Dayuhan]

Yes, the British dealt with each in curiously similar ways, we left Palestine after a rather grim attempt to "keep the peace" between Arab and Jew; in Rhodesia we left the population to resolve "majority rule" themselves - which they did bloodily - and not to overlook Rhodesia was a self-governing colony.

You could add Ireland too; with the dispute over the Protestant minority wishing to remain British in Northern Ireland after Ireland achieved independence. This time we fought several campaigns, the longest being 1969-1998 'The Troubles', until the communities were able to make a compromise that gave peace (very short summary).

You might also cite Australia, new Zealand, and Canada as cases where "settler colonialism" made an orderly transition to independence. One lesson that a historian might deduce is that orderly transition is easier when the indigenous population is either exterminated or utterly marginalized. That's not a guarantee of orderly transition (didn't work with the US) but it seems conducive to orderly transition.

Fortunately settler colonialism is no longer in vogue, so there's nobody left to apply that particular lesson!

[ganulv]

You might also cite Australia, new Zealand, and Canada as cases where "settler colonialism" made an orderly transition to independence. One lesson that a historian might deduce is that orderly transition is easier when the indigenous population is either exterminated or utterly marginalized. That's not a guarantee of orderly transition (didn't work with the US) but it seems conducive to orderly transition.

but in my view there has been a real effort by the Canadian federal government to not marginalize native peoples (4% of their population, which to me as someone who grew up in a native community in the States seems like a relatively large percentage). Nunavut (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nunavut) is something of an experiment in indigenous self-rule, and in 2008 Stephen Harper (of all people!) made what I felt was a substantive and non-pandering public apology for the Canadian residential school policy (http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/205172-1). The idea that there are and will continue to be different kinds of Canadians is central to contemporary confederation. Part of the work of Canadian governance is dealing with the legacy of not just one but rather two settler societies. There have been some less–than–orderly patches to navigate related to that fact more recently than a lot of Americans may realize (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_Crisis).

[Dayuhan]

Too bad life forces you to make decisions about things before they become certain. Because often when things become certain it is too late to do anything about it.

That's a poor reason to bankrupt yourself over a distant hypothesis.


And if you really wanted to hurt us, hitting those planes out over the ocean where they would be hard to protect might be a good way to do it. If little ol' me can figure that, the rest of the world figured it long ago. So if they thunk it, it might be wise to think about how to counter it. That is called looking ahead and being prepared by me. You, I know, call it something different.

The rest of the world also knows that we have asymmetrical options at hand that do not require direct threat-to-threat engagement. We can, for example, cut off the economic lifeline of the offending party without coming anywhere near the effective range of their military forces. Why would you prepare to fight someone where they are strongest when you can fight them where they are weak? Unless, of course, you need to justify spending a whole lot of money.

Of course once you start with the premise that China is our enemy and we must prepare to fight them, you automatically bias yourself in a certain direction.


There are only 183 or so F-22s. The line is closed. There won't be any more. In a serious conflict with a big nation, 183 of anything won't be enough. 183 St. Michaels complete with flaming sacred swords wouldn't be enough.

There are only 2 J-20s, of uncertain capability. We don't even have an accurate assessment of where that program really is, what bugs and problems it's encountered, etc... "we" meaning you and I, that is, I expect some others on our side know a lot more about that than we do.


What convinces me that the situation can only be handled with large numbers of superior fighters? Well, it won't be because we won't have large numbers of superior fighters. We'll have to figure another way if we can, which was the point of my idea (horribly bad as it was, see WM's opinion above). But as far as large numbers of superior fighters handling such situations goes...let's see 1914 was when airplanes started shooting at each other and that's been...98 years of aviation history convinces me that large numbers of superior fighters are good for handling such situations.

Look at the state of our economy, our public sector deficit, and the cost of large numbers of superior fighters, and recall that these are known factors, not hypotheticals. Do those realities convince you of anything?


I don't assume we have no spy capability whatever. I just assume that what we do have is, in total, inferior.

Basis for that assumption?


Your nervous about that and I'm nervous when people are cocksure about what the other guy can't do. Together our neurotic concerns cover all there is to worry about.

You're worried about something that might happen in the future based on certain assumptions. I'm worried about the present reality of what we can and cannot afford to spend. There's a difference.


If you remember that then you also remember that the USAF always used F-15s as the primary air to air fighters. F-16s were used to supplement when needed but were/are primarily bombers. The F-35 will not be a top flight fighter because it was doesn't have the flight performance needed and it doesn't have the flight performance needed because it is designed primarily to be a light bomber. I thought I already said that.

Yes, you did say it. I'm just not convinced that it's an accurate statement.

What is it, exactly, that you propose to do?

[Dayuhan]

but in my view there has been a real effort by the Canadian federal government to not marginalize native peoples (4% of their population, which to me as someone who grew up in a native community in the States seems like a relatively large percentage).

Some people I know would argue over the extent and sincerity of that effort. I'd be more inclined to point out that the effort came well after the orderly transition, and that it's mostly an attempt to compensate for and potentially reverse the marginalization of the past.

How much influence did indigenous people have over Canada's current political structure and its relationship with its former colonial master?

[ganulv]

Some people I know would argue over the extent and sincerity of that effort. I'd be more inclined to point out that the effort came well after the orderly transition, and that it's mostly an attempt to compensate for and potentially reverse the marginalization of the past.

How much influence did indigenous people have over Canada's current political structure and its relationship with its former colonial master?

I know less about how natives shaped Canada than I do about the shape of the relationships between the various parties to Canadian governance and individual First Nations. Indigenous affairs are on a nation-to-nation basis in Canada with the monarch as intermediary. A non-trivial quirk: Canadian federalism works in such a way that the Crown is so-to-speak “divided” amongst the provinces. You have issues stemming from nations within (or is it surrounded by?) a larger nation, including but not limited to issues of citizenship. You have other issues, too, of course…

[carl]

That's a poor reason to bankrupt yourself over a distant hypothesis.

Or it is a good reason to name the first chapter of a history of some possible future, hopefully never fought, war "How we lost before it started."


The rest of the world also knows that we have asymmetrical options at hand that do not require direct threat-to-threat engagement. We can, for example, cut off the economic lifeline of the offending party without coming anywhere near the effective range of their military forces. Why would you prepare to fight someone where they are strongest when you can fight them where they are weak? Unless, of course, you need to justify spending a whole lot of money.

You're right. Why, I hadn't thought of that. We do what you suggest and just give up supplying various islands by air until the Red Chinese cry uncle. Or better yet, we move Guam about a thousand miles to the east and after the Red Chinese say "I give", we can move it back again. They'll never expect that.


Of course once you start with the premise that China is our enemy and we must prepare to fight them, you automatically bias yourself in a certain direction.

Or you can bias yourself in the other direction, and be certain that if the time ever came, we weren't prepared.


There are only 2 J-20s, of uncertain capability. We don't even have an accurate assessment of where that program really is, what bugs and problems it's encountered, etc... "we" meaning you and I, that is, I expect some others on our side know a lot more about that than we do.

How many times do I have to explain that I am not talking about today, I am talking about 6-8-10 years in the future. I expect there will be a few more by then.

You go right ahead and believe the crafty powers that be on our side actually know a lot about what the Red Chinese are up to. I stopped believing completely they know much about anything right after I finished reading "Blind into Baghdad."


Look at the state of our economy, our public sector deficit, and the cost of large numbers of superior fighters, and recall that these are known factors, not hypotheticals. Do those realities convince you of anything?

The reality I'm convinced of is you ignore the substance of a question and answer in order to do some preaching. You asked "What convinces you that such a situation can only be managed through deployment of large numbers of fighters that are superior to what you imagine the J-20 to be?" I answered "Well, it won't be because we won't have large numbers of superior fighters." I then followed that up with the observation that "...98 years of aviation history convinces me that large numbers of superior fighters are good for handling such situations."

But if that isn't a good springboard for a preach, "You go ahead and do what you think is best Ned." (1000 points that can be exchanged for nothing to whomever knows what movie that line is from.)


Basis for that assumption?

How about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction for a starter. All those bombers and missiles we thought the Soviets had. Surprise! India just tested a nuke. Basically, history. But I already said that. "You go ahead and do what you think is best Ned."


You're worried about something that might happen in the future based on certain assumptions. I'm worried about the present reality of what we can and cannot afford to spend. There's a difference.

Geesh guy. Lighten up. I write a throwaway line in order to get a small laugh (I thought it was funny). You respond with an arch comment about a "difference." Has it been raining a lot where you are? A lot of rain always gets to me.


Yes, you did say it. I'm just not convinced that it's an accurate statement.

Oh, okay. Well can't do much about that. Mach numbers are mach numbers and height capability is what it is.


What is it, exactly, that you propose to do?

Go back and read all that I've written on this thread and the South China Sea one for an answer. I'm not going to do your homework for you.

[jmm99]

The 4% = Canada's "Total Aboriginal identity population" of 1,172,790. That breaks out to:

"North American Indian single response" of 698,025;

"Metis single response" of 389,785;

"Inuit single response" of 50,480;

"Multiple Aboriginal identity responses" of 7,740;

"Aboriginal responses not included elsewhere" of 26,760.

Source: Statistics Canada (http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Rp-eng.cfm?LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=0&GID=837928&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=89122&PRID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2006&THEME=73&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=).

The two major groupings, "North American Indian" and "Metis", are treated differently legally. Within the "North American Indian" grouping, there are "registered" ("status") and "non-registered" ("non-status") Indians - with very, very different rights under the Indian Act (Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Act); Text of Act (http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/I-5/page-1.html)), especially the 1985 C-31 Amendment (from the Wiki):


Under this amendment, full status Indians are referred to as 6–1. A child of a marriage between a status (6–1) person and a non-status person qualifies for 6–2 (half) status, but if the child in turn married another 6–2 or a non-status person, the child is non-status. If a 6–2 marries a 6–1 or another 6–2, the children revert to 6–1 status. Blood quantum is disregarded, or rather, replaced with a "two generation cut-off clause". ... According to Thomas King, around half of status Indians are currently marrying non-status people, meaning this legislation accomplishes complete legal assimilation in a matter of a few generations.

Thomas King, The Truth about Stories (http://www.amazon.com/The-Truth-About-Stories-Indigenous/dp/0816646260) (2003).

In practical Canadian politics (where votes in the Commons count - and the Crown don't), Labrador has one Innu (not Inuit), Peter Penashue (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romeo_Saganash) (Conservative); and Quebec, an Innu, Jonathan Genest-Jourdain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonathan_Genest-Jourdain) (NDP) and a Cree, Romeo Saganash (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romeo_Saganash) (NDP). Canadian "North American Indian" politics are scarcely a monolith.

Is the view better looking from Turtle Mountain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtle_Mountain_Indian_Reservation) to north of the border - or, vice versa - or, are both views equally clouded in different ways ? Bonita Lawrence (http://people.laps.yorku.ca/people.nsf/researcherprofile?readform&shortname=bonital) (a Mi’kmaw) sees both the US and Canadian systems as part of the same problem:


Abstract

The regulation of Native identity has been central to the colonization process in both Canada and the United States. Systems of classification and control enable settler governments to define who is "Indian," and control access to Native land. These regulatory systems have forcibly supplanted traditional Indigenous ways of identifying the self in relation to land and community, functioning discursively to naturalize colonial worldviews. Decolonization, then, must involve deconstructing and reshaping how we understand Indigenous identity.

Gender, Race, and the Regulation of Native Identity in Canada and the United States: An Overview (http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/hypatia/v018/18.2lawrence.html) (2003).

Of course, to realize Ms Lawrence's "decolonization" (by political means), you have to have the votes in "Commons".

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

In the American world view ... because they showed up too late to play a role in the widely recognized turning point battles...Which, aside from Kursk was really what? :wry:
Aside from the M24 being equipped with a 76 mm* (based very much on the first quick-firing gun ever; a rather weak calibre comparable to the T-34 M1940's gun) and 90 mm guns playing no role in U.S. WW2 mediums, I think you read a bit more into "insistence" than I meant to.
The U.S. kept 76 mm as a calibre in the M41 and in some post-war prototypes, and the ~76 mm-equipped Shermans were the almost exclusive medium tank of the U.S. until the Korean War wartime production mode kicked in.

]*: I think you meant M26, which saw WW2 only in prototype-like quantities.I did indeed mean the M26 -- that should also have been M26 and M46 with reference to Korea.. I'm old... :D

The M26 was indeed only in theater in small quantities but it did see combat and was headed for major production runs when the war ended and Congress stopped the procurement

The M24 didn't have a 76, it had a 75. The M41 did have a 76 but both were light tanks, scouting tanks to some and were not intended to engage other nations main battle tanks -- that was the job of the M26, 46, 47,(90s) 48, 60 (90 / 105) and 1 (105 / 120). We both agree that the Sherman was the principal de facto US tank until mid 1952 -- but that was because there was no war and, in the view of Congress, no need to produce more powerful tanks until then. Korea obviously changed that but still, once again, the US Army went to war with obsolete gear from the last war. My point was and is that is true but it was NOT because the Army wanted it that way and no one was stupid about it -- except Congress.

Nothing new in that.

[Steve the Planner]

I, for one, enjoyed flipping the turrets off of all of those little tanks with 105s and 152s (M60A1s and A2s) at Hohenfels.

Another Old Guy, I guess.

[ganulv]

The two major groupings, "North American Indian" and "Metis", are treated differently legally. Within the "North American Indian" grouping, there are "registered" ("status") and "non-registered" ("non-status") Indians - with very, very different rights under the Indian Act (Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Act); Text of Act (http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/I-5/page-1.html)), especially the 1985 C-31 Amendment (from the Wiki):

My friend Sarah’s dissertation (http://udini.proquest.com/view/performing-heritage-metis-music-pqid:1890340241/) gets into the whys and hows of some of that.


In practical Canadian politics (where votes in the Commons count - and the Crown don't), Labrador has one Innu (not Inuit), Peter Penashue (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romeo_Saganash) (Conservative); and Quebec, an Innu, Jonathan Genest-Jourdain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonathan_Genest-Jourdain) (NDP) and a Cree, Romeo Saganash (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romeo_Saganash) (NDP).

Canadian electoral politics are only one aspect of native affairs, of course. And the Crown does have a dog in the broader fight.


Labrador has one Innu (not Inuit)

Just say Montagnais. :D


Is the view better looking from Turtle Mountain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtle_Mountain_Indian_Reservation) to north of the border - or, vice versa - or, are both views equally clouded in different ways ? Bonita Lawrence (http://people.laps.yorku.ca/people.nsf/researcherprofile?readform&shortname=bonital) (a Mi’kmaw) sees both the US and Canadian systems as part of the same problem:

The situations are homologous, with roots in British colonial policy. As is the existence of the FATA (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federally_Administered_Tribal_Areas) in Pakistan, amongst others.

[jmm99]

Montagnais excludes Naskapi. So, Innu (http://www.innu.ca/) is the more accurate term (http://www.innu.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10&Itemid=7&lang=en).

Admittedly, such issues are often more theoretical than real (as are many of the issues we "support and defend"). A Turtle Mountaineer might well say (cuz some have): Go north of the border and you're a Metis. Come back to Turtle Mountain and you're an Ojibwe.

And, human nature and "somebodies" being what they are, we even find allegations of corruption in Innuland (Nitassinan) - link (http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/07/13/innu-nation-angry-as-former-chief-paid-1m-in-two-years/) and link (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2012/07/16/nl-716-innu-protests-development-company-continue.html).

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

I, for one, enjoyed flipping the turrets off of all of those little tanks with 105s and 152s (M60A1s and A2s) at Hohenfels.

Another Old Guy, I guess.How you think an M4A3E8 Gunner and an M41 TC feel... :o

Not long before I retired, I was a Controller in an exercise and watched one 60A2 knock out two platoons of A1s (with MILES, of course)... :wry:

[Fuchs]

Which, aside from Kursk was really what? :wry:

Turning points of European WW2:

El Alamein for Commonwealth guys.
D-Day for Americans.
Stalingrad for everyone else.


The war was lost by Germany by late '41, though.
Almost nobody is going to discuss the loss of motor vehicles and quality horses in fall '41 as the final failure that made defeat inevitable, that's too complicated. Most people prefer simple battles (symptoms) as turning point markers.




Fig leaf for on-topic-ness:

The U.S. military expanded, and I see a couple main reasons for why it's not going to shrink to anything similar as envisioned 200+ years anytime soon:
(1) A childish belief that you can go to a war of choice and be better off afterwards than you would be without

(2) An exaggerated intolerance for distant phenomenons (no matter what size; only a handful distant phenomenons have the attention, and it's about the same attention no matter Red Army or a bunch of guys with fertiliser bombs)

(3) Bureaucratic self-preservation instinct

(4) Congressional corruption of the system (exploitation of budgets as a means to funnel money to the own district/state and donors)

(5) True conservatism that prefers the status quo over the experiment of not getting involved in so much (coupled with wild fantasies about the indispensability of U.S. military power)

[Dayuhan]

Or it is a good reason to name the first chapter of a history of some possible future, hopefully never fought, war "How we lost before it started."

You're right. Why, I hadn't thought of that. We do what you suggest and just give up supplying various islands by air until the Red Chinese cry uncle. Or better yet, we move Guam about a thousand miles to the east and after the Red Chinese say "I give", we can move it back again. They'll never expect that.

Have you forgotten, or do you choose to ignore, the place that deterrence has in this calculation? The point is not to prepare to counter any possible move a hypothetical antagonist might make, that is the way to insanity and bankruptcy. You have to ensure that the hypothetical antagonist has more to lose than to gain from starting anything.


Or you can bias yourself in the other direction, and be certain that if the time ever came, we weren't prepared.

Do you propose to prepare for every conceivable eventuality, no matter how improbable? That's going to be quite a task, given the budgetary realities involved.


How many times do I have to explain that I am not talking about today, I am talking about 6-8-10 years in the future. I expect there will be a few more by then.

There would have to be a whole lot more, and a fairly rarefied chain of events that would offer numerous opportunities for preemption and intervention, for what you fear to come to pass.


You go right ahead and believe the crafty powers that be on our side actually know a lot about what the Red Chinese are up to. I stopped believing completely they know much about anything right after I finished reading "Blind into Baghdad."

Of course there's a lot we don't know, though of course as well most of what we do know isn't going to be revealed. there's also a lot they don't know. They don't know, for example, how we might respond to a whole range of eventualities. They can't possibly know, because we don't even know. Strategic ambiguity is a useful thing.


Oh, okay. Well can't do much about that. Mach numbers are mach numbers and height capability is what it is.

The article previously referenced made the point that the performance of individual aircraft is only one part of what makes something effective: we don't do WW2-style dogfights any more.


Go back and read all that I've written on this thread and the South China Sea one for an answer. I'm not going to do your homework for you.

I have seen nothing there about what we might do. I've seen a few references to things we might say, which looked to me unlikely to achieve any positive outcome. Saying isn't doing. In any event, making bold declarations about what we will or won't tolerate is not going to change any particular balance of force, except for the worse: belligerent talk on our side is likely to lead them to spend more faster, and it won't give us the capacity or the will to do the same.

[Bob's World]

While the discussion of weapon bore's is fascinating, I noticed that no one answered these questions from a few pages back (though several took shots at each in the posts pror to my request):


What I find myself very frustrated with, however, are the following questions for my fellow Americans:

1. When did the Constitution become irrelevant?

2. When did the Declaration of Independence become inconvenient?

3. When did the thinking of our historic leaders, such as Washington and Lincoln become "illegitimate"?


To discount these things has become a ready arguement by those who seek to rationalize why America must engage the world in the manner it has adopted in recent years. I personally believe we are better served by tuning our current approaches to our former national doctrine than we are by tuning our former national doctrine to our current approaches, but I can't believe I am alone in that position.

[wm]

Turning points of European WW2:

El Alamein for Commonwealth guys.
D-Day for Americans.
Stalingrad for everyone else.


The war was lost by Germany by late '41, though.
Almost nobody is going to discuss the loss of motor vehicles and quality horses in fall '41 as the final failure that made defeat inevitable, that's too complicated. Most people prefer simple battles (symptoms) as turning point markers.



WWII was lost for all intents and purposes when Public Law 77-11, the Lend-Lease Act, was signed on 11 Mar 1941. After that, it was just a matter of time before the limited access to the natural resources need to fuel German industrial capability was swamped by the, for all practical purposes, unlimited access available to the US industrial base, which, BTW, was impervious to attack by the Axis powers. A second milestone in the path to victory was the establishment of the Persian Corridor and the deposing of the Shah in 1942 to ensure the path stayed open. The Arctic route to Murmansk/Archangel was open to attack by Germany naval forces and land-based aircraft. Even though the route Vladivostok accounted for over 50% of lendlease shipments to Russia, it was realitively open to interdiction by Japan (had Germany and Japan chosen to cooperate in the war against Russia). The route through Iran was out of the reach of both Japan and Germany.

[wm]

I still like my idea but yours would be much better for protecting the tanker orbits, specific spots. The ocean is rather large so it may be to big to establish a really long BAR-CAP kind of thing. I like my idea for protecting the cargo airplanes though because you could fly them in groups, convoys sort of, and change the routing around to make it harder for the bad guys. A big missileer kind of plane could stay with them and only fly when escort was needed. That would complicate the enemy's task a lot.

The British did the sort of thing you suggest in the Falklands I believe and more recently the Malaysian Navy bought some container ships and armed them for anti-piracy work. 20,000 to 40 or 50,000 tons container ships with reasonable speed might be just the ticket. My displacement estimate was just a guess. What kind of speed would be useful, around 20 knots?

Not sure that speed is all that important as I viewed the ships as being relatively fixed. You might want to consider the following map http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ee/SPAFR-1916-1942.jpg with regard to AIR LOC. The physical geography hasn't changed much since the 1940s so these are probably the same routes to be used in a future West Pacific centered conflict.

BTW, I think your approach would require an AWACS or equivalent to provide your 787 with early warning and targeting vectors. Mine might be able to benefit from OTHR sites or something like the Cobra Judy to provide the early warning for targeting air threats. Costs a bunch to fly/maintain those AWACS, not so much for land or sea-based long range detection systems

[Steve Blair]

Fig leaf for on-topic-ness:

The U.S. military expanded, and I see a couple main reasons for why it's not going to shrink to anything similar as envisioned 200+ years anytime soon:
(1) A childish belief that you can go to a war of choice and be better off afterwards than you would be without

(2) An exaggerated intolerance for distant phenomenons (no matter what size; only a handful distant phenomenons have the attention, and it's about the same attention no matter Red Army or a bunch of guys with fertiliser bombs)

(3) Bureaucratic self-preservation instinct

(4) Congressional corruption of the system (exploitation of budgets as a means to funnel money to the own district/state and donors)

(5) True conservatism that prefers the status quo over the experiment of not getting involved in so much (coupled with wild fantasies about the indispensability of U.S. military power)

3 and 4 are the ones that are on-target.

[Ken White]

3 and 4 are the ones that are on-target.Sadly...

[Fuchs]

Ain't it funny how you like the only two options that absolve you of responsibility for the issue?

[Ken White]

While the discussion of weapon bore's is fascinating, I noticed that no one answered these questions from a few pages back (though several took shots at each in the posts pror to my request):

What I find myself very frustrated with, however, are the following questions for my fellow Americans:

1. When did the Constitution become irrelevant?To Congress, I think about 1802 -- been downhill ever since...

Congress, due to power of the purse, influences, generally adversely, everything else in the US Government -- including DoD, the US Army and USSOCOM.

The rest of the country doesn't think it's irrelevant but they sure do have about 200M interpretations of what it means; that's not irrelevance, that's disagreement on semantics and other things. The very expensive legal system exists to sort out those variations but its decisions are frequently watered down by the aforementioned Legislative body. We all hate it when others do not share our wisdom and see things our way -- but I'm afraid we're stuck with that.
2. When did the Declaration of Independence become inconvenient?To many but not all people when it suggests their desired behavior is inconsistent with its principles.
3. When did the thinking of our historic leaders, such as Washington and Lincoln become "illegitimate"?That's the easy one -- in 1960 when we began electing excessively venal persons to the Presidency and allowed them to hire sycophants and charlatans for 'advisors.' That also has been downhill ever since.

All the above are only slightly tongue in cheek, those answers are too close to absolute truth for comfort...
To discount these things has become a ready arguement by those who seek to rationalize why America must engage the world in the manner it has adopted in recent years. I personally believe we are better served by tuning our current approaches to our former national doctrine than we are by tuning our former national doctrine to our current approaches, but I can't believe I am alone in that position.You're not alone in the position. However, others may not totally share your view of precisely what "our former national doctrine" was and / or what "our current approaches" really are. Thus many, to include even some in positions of power may share your broad conclusions but differ over details and processes of implementation. To be repetitious thus boring without bores: "We all hate it when others do not share our wisdom and see things our way -- but I'm afraid we're stuck with that". ;)

[Ken White]

Ain't it funny how you like the only two options that absolve you of responsibility for the issue?Neither Steve nor I said the others weren't true; they are true to one extent or another -- but 3 and 4 drive those others. Thus what we wrote is correct, it just does not address the other factors. Mostly because they didn't merit a comment IMO... :wry:

Your response to our comments is interesting because your presumption of our dismissal of your wisdom and issuing a gratuitous pejorative comment speaks volumes -- not to mention that in any event, neither he nor I are remotely responsible for any of those things.:rolleyes:

[slapout9]

I noticed that no one answered these questions from a few pages back (though several took shots at each in the posts prior to my request):

I don't believe there is some exact date, more like a slow chipping away. IMO opinion it started with the Wilson presidency and has continued on since then. But we have forgotten the purpose of the Constitution more than anything, we get hung up on this law,article or whatever instead of seeing the problem or situation through the lens of original purpose which is contained in the Preamble not the individual pieces.

In the preamble it establishes 6 core missions in order to accomplish the original purpose of America.
1-form a more perfect union
2-establish justice
3-insure domestic tranquility
4-provide for the common defense
5-promote the general welfare
6-secure the blessings of liberty for now and the future

Now explain to me how giving tax breaks to rich people and installing laws and treaties that make it possible to send jobs and technologies (paid for with tax dollars) overseas is constitutional. Under citizens united AQI or the Communist Chinese can form a PAC and give money to get people elected:wry:

[Fuchs]

Neither Steve nor I said the others weren't true; they are true to one extent or another -- but 3 and 4 drive those others. Thus what we wrote is correct, it just does not address the other factors. Mostly because they didn't merit a comment IMO... :wry:

Your response to our comments is interesting because your presumption of our dismissal of your wisdom and issuing a gratuitous pejorative comment speaks volumes -- not to mention that in any event, neither he nor I are remotely responsible for any of those things.:rolleyes:

Hmm, "responsibility" was probably not the best choice of a word. How about "sharing the same defect"?


I had a couple moments lately where seemingly somewhat reasonable Americans wrote so extremely telling things that I am basically re-evaluating the idea that entire nations may have gone stupid.

SWC provided one of those moments, here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16104).
The most obvious things, treated as wise (wo)man's valuable insights - a decade after it should have been self-evident to have those thoughts without a bloody multi-year experiment or even two.


I've become (even) more sceptical about the wisdom of people who write about national security-related topics in English. Too many of 'em have worked hard and long to erode my presumption their group's of intelligence.

[Steve Blair]

Neither Steve nor I said the others weren't true; they are true to one extent or another -- but 3 and 4 drive those others. Thus what we wrote is correct, it just does not address the other factors. Mostly because they didn't merit a comment IMO... :wry:

Your response to our comments is interesting because your presumption of our dismissal of your wisdom and issuing a gratuitous pejorative comment speaks volumes -- not to mention that in any event, neither he nor I are remotely responsible for any of those things.:rolleyes:

Correct. The other things existed before the large standing army, so have nothing directly to do with that standing army. 3 and 4 are the root causes for the large Army in American history (which is a recent creation...as in post 1945). You've stated before, Fuchs, that you're not an American history scholar, so that might explain why you don't see the impact of 3 and 4 on the normal size of ground forces in this country or how that relates to the traditional view of the military (in terms of size and status) within American society. As for the rest of your last post...

[carl]

Not sure that speed is all that important as I viewed the ships as being relatively fixed. You might want to consider the following map...with regard to AIR LOC. The physical geography hasn't changed much since the 1940s so these are probably the same routes to be used in a future West Pacific centered conflict.

BTW, I think your approach would require an AWACS or equivalent to provide your 787 with early warning and targeting vectors. Mine might be able to benefit from OTHR sites or something like the Cobra Judy to provide the early warning for targeting air threats. Costs a bunch to fly/maintain those AWACS, not so much for land or sea-based long range detection systems

WM:

That is a first class map. Nowadays you would have to add routes to and from Japan and Taiwan.

Why would an airborne missileer type airplane not be able to use cueing from ground based long range radars? I am not being argumentative (for once), I just don't see why they couldn't benefit.

The AWACS planes are going to be flying all the time all over anyway so I don't see that as something extra that would be needed. Maybe a big missileer could provide escort for that as well. It wouldn't need the tanker support fighters would require.

I think you might be able to get 20 knots in a container ship for free. The cursory reading I did on those ships seems to indicate that is around the base speed for those things. It wouldn't have to go that fast all the time but the speed would be very useful at times.

This kind of brainstorming is great fun, though I suspect people who actually know about these things are crossing their eyes in frustration at my ignorance.

This is turning into a heck of a discussion. We have WWII, high performance fighter tech, tank guns, Canadian Indians vis a vis the Canadian gov, French and British patterns of colonial administration, Dr. Strangelove, the changing political views of the Constitution and Declaration of Independence plus other things I forgot.

Good luck, David, with untangling this.

[carl]

To many but not all people when it suggests their desired behavior is inconsistent with its principles.

I like this combined with what Slap said about Wilson. A political philosophy has developed that sees "good government" as trumping the strictures of the founding documents. The problem of course is "good government" changes with the wind. There is no longer any recognition of the sin of pride anymore either. One of the founders, Adams I think, talked about how he had to fight that, not always successfully but at least he knew it was bad. There is no recognition that it exists let alone that it is bad anymore I think. If you don't recognize the sin of pride there is no internal brake on willfulness. Combine all this with the de-facto separation of the political classes from the rest of the citizenry and we have a rather large problem.

I hope I have explained this clearly. Probably not though.

[carl]

Have you forgotten, or do you choose to ignore, the place that deterrence has in this calculation? The point is not to prepare to counter any possible move a hypothetical antagonist might make, that is the way to insanity and bankruptcy. You have to ensure that the hypothetical antagonist has more to lose than to gain from starting anything.

Not at all. In fact that is what drives my opinion. Two of the things that make for a believable deterrent are having the tools and having the other guy believe that you will indeed use them if needed. Of course you can't counter any possible move, but to suggest that you should if fallacious. It is sort of a straw man and the fallacy of the false alternative rolled into one, counter everything or counter nothing. At least that is the way I am seeing you present it.

Your last sentence sort of implicitly contradicts that though because you say the antagonist must lose more than gained if there is a tussle. In order to do that you must make some decisions about what is most likely to happen and counter that. But some decisions must be made because you can't counter everything. If you try, you counter nothing and the antagonist sees that, hence, no deterrent.


Do you propose to prepare for every conceivable eventuality, no matter how improbable? That's going to be quite a task, given the budgetary realities involved.

Obviously not. To suggest otherwise is to set up a straw man to be knocked down at your convenience.


There would have to be a whole lot more, and a fairly rarefied chain of events that would offer numerous opportunities for preemption and intervention, for what you fear to come to pass.

That is your opinion. Mine differs. But at least you are talking about the future too.


Of course there's a lot we don't know, though of course as well most of what we do know isn't going to be revealed. there's also a lot they don't know. They don't know, for example, how we might respond to a whole range of eventualities. They can't possibly know, because we don't even know. Strategic ambiguity is a useful thing.

Strategic ambiguity is a useful thing to a point. We left things ambiguous in Korea and Kuwait and things didn't work out so well. It is best to leave them pretty sure if they cross a line something will probably happen and there should be a clear line. Ambiguous maybe in how many of brick will fall on their heads but no doubt that they will fall.

I would bet that the chances of them knowing what is happening in the upper level of our gov and what the actual true mood of our people is, is a whole lot greater than our knowing that about them, the result of a relatively free vs a totalitarian state.


The article previously referenced made the point that the performance of individual aircraft is only one part of what makes something effective: we don't do WW2-style dogfights any more.

They didn't so many WWII style dogfights in WWII. Most kills were lethal passes and were made against victims that never saw what killed them. Performance mattered. It matters as much as ever. The SR-71 is the classic example of that. All the fighters and SAMs that tried to get it ended up just watching it go by. The article referenced also seemed pretty darn sure that the Red Chinese will never do the other stuff. Being cocksure that the other guy can't, is unwise. Like the man said, "Well, don't you bet your life on it." (from the same movie as before.)


I have seen nothing there about what we might do. I've seen a few references to things we might say, which looked to me unlikely to achieve any positive outcome. Saying isn't doing. In any event, making bold declarations about what we will or won't tolerate is not going to change any particular balance of force, except for the worse: belligerent talk on our side is likely to lead them to spend more faster, and it won't give us the capacity or the will to do the same.

Look harder. Bold declarations and belligerent declarations are part of the escalation of force continuam (sic). You don't go straight from passive inaction to wild violence. You work up to that. What you call belligerent talk I call warnings, especially when backed up by preparation.

You act as if they have no agency. Almost as if they are insects that just react to stimuli. I don't think that is true. They get scared just like everybody else.

I apologize for my crack about moving Guam 1000 miles east. I should have been more gentlemanly. My point was that even if we choose to fight as best we can where we have the greatest advantage, their are preexisting positions and things we have to defend. If we don't defend those positions, however difficult that is, we may end up losing anyway.

[davidbfpo]

Carl commented:
Good luck, David, with untangling this.

Yes this thread has gone in so many directions I fear untangling it is impractical. To date I have only seen one point that deserves a separate thread, so may create that one day.

When a thread does this I prefer to copy posts to older appropriate threads.

Meantime my mother-in-law duties are calling, so off to support her.:wry: She rarely needs defending.:eek:

[Bob's World]

On Fuch's list: A line of truth through all your points, but some are more symptomatic, than causal - a ride down the slippery slope if you will. Hard to sort out where these things begin, as the symptoms take a while to manifest. This is also why so much COIN targets symptoms rather than root causes. Both roots are deep in government action, and government counter action to fix government action that is harming the country tends to be hard for governments to do. As I tell people, "governments are made up of Politicians and bureaucrats - and politicians generally don't take responsibility for the negative effects of their actions, and bureaucrats seek to preserve the status quo. Makes change hard.

The existence of a large, war-fighting military (rather than an appropriate war-deterring/commerce supporting military) has indeed facilitated a shift of power to the executive. While I don't agree with many of her examples, her blaming of conservatives for this (liberal and conservative/ democrat-republican share equally), Rachael Maddow explores this important issue in her current book "Drift." But why do we think we need such a large military?

Go to the National Security Strategy to find that answer. Post-Cold War Republican and Democratic Presidencies have built and expanded a line of "logic" that it is a vital national interest of the US to "lead" the world and to spread US values (as currently defined in our populace and culture) and US-brand democracy to the rest of the world in order to preserve peace and make everyone better off.

Sounds nice, kind of like a big fuzzy stuffed bunny. That is nice - until someone is stuffing that big fuzzy bunny down your throat.

Over at DoD, an organization that I don't think has ever volunteered to get smaller, this is powerful specified rationale for maintaining a large military designed to execute these "bunny stuffing" missions around the globe. To do otherwise would be to disobey a direct order from the President. So they hold themselves harmless in this debate. (Though I cannot think of a more powerful statement, or an act that could do more to put American back on track to being a safer, stronger, more secure enterprise than for the SecDef and the Chairman to appear before a joint session of the Congress and return a check for $ 1 Trillion Dollars, demanding that Congress make equal cuts across the budget, to include social programs. This would make the military even more respected by the populace and would shame the Congress and Presidency to action)

So how do we fix this? Take Washington's final farewell address. The US was not "isolationist" under Washingtonian vision, we engaged the world in our commerce and were an example to the world in our quest for personal liberty and liberal governance. We simply did not believe it was healthy to go about getting caught up in the political affairs of a system of permanent "friend" and "enemies" - better to attempt to stay healthy with all and seek opportunities to advance our own interests rather than go about seeking to support or deny the interests of others.

Then take our current National Security Strategy. Go through the NSS and strike everything that is not consistent with Washington's address. Then take everything that was stricken and seriously ask "do we really need this"? The answer will be "no" in most cases. Delete those sections.

Next, review all of our treaties, roles in organizations, polices for diplomacy, size and design of our military, etc and re-tune all to reflect this new, less intrusive approach. New treaties and new organizational roles will become necessary. Design and Implement those things.

We would need a bold, visionary leader to make such changes. But one who is also humble and willing to allow others to act and think differently than he does and simply be "different" and not "wrong" for doing so. Where is such a leadrer??

The world will continue to get smaller, we will all continue to become more interconnected, but how we approach those changes would become far more tolerable to those around us, less provocative of state and popular violence against the US and our interests, and in no way downgrade the "leadership" of the US. It would just make us more of the type of leader we all like to follow, rather than those leaders we were forced to follow against our will.

[wm]

I don't believe there is some exact date, more like a slow chipping away. IMO opinion it started with the Wilson presidency and has continued on since then. But we have forgotten the purpose of the Constitution more than anything, we get hung up on this law,article or whatever instead of seeing the problem or situation through the lens of original purpose which is contained in the Preamble not the individual pieces.

In the preamble it establishes 6 core missions in order to accomplish the original purpose of America.
1-form a more perfect union
2-establish justice
3-insure domestic tranquility
4-provide for the common defense
5-promote the general welfare
6-secure the blessings of liberty for now and the future



Concur with this. In fact I wrote pretty much the same thing way back at post 60 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=136764&postcount=60)of this thread when I characterized the Declaration and Constitution as basicly an Op Plan for establishing the US government with the Preamble being the Mission statement for that operation.

I like to view the two framing documents as something like an operations order for Operation USA. The Declaration of Independence is Paragraph 1 of that Op Order: Situation. A significant (and I think greatly overlooked) piece of the Constitution is its Preamble. I view this as the Mission statement for Operation USA. The remainder of the basic document constitute the opord's remaining three paragraphs while the various amendments serve as fragos that modify the operation due to changes in the situation. The various laws of the US Code might well be viewed as the various specialized Annexes that turn most opords into such ponderous works.

If you like this analogy, then reflect that never has the Preamble been modified. In other words, we the people of the United States still have a mission to "form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Doing that is what "supporting and defending the Constition" meant to me when I took my oath and is what that phrase still means to me today.

[wm]

That is a first class map. Nowadays you would have to add routes to and from Japan and Taiwan.
Generally I worry about the use of an air bridge as the primary means of supplying a major conflict. Additionally, the air routes to Korea (which you didn't mention), Taiwan/Formosa and the Japanese Archipelago could be threatened by potential opposition land-and sea-based IADS. So without having first won the SEAD campaign, I'd worry about aerial strategic resupply that far forward.



Why would an airborne missileer type airplane not be able to use cueing from ground based long range radars? I am not being argumentative (for once), I just don't see why they couldn't benefit. The AWACS planes are going to be flying all the time all over anyway so I don't see that as something extra that would be needed. Maybe a big missileer could provide escort for that as well. It wouldn't need the tanker support fighters would require.
Didn't say they couldn't, but they would still need a controller (Airborne Warning and Control System, remember), the other function that the AWACS provides to airborne assets.



I think you might be able to get 20 knots in a container ship for free. The cursory reading I did on those ships seems to indicate that is around the base speed for those things. It wouldn't have to go that fast all the time but the speed would be very useful at times.

I don't see speed for such a platform as a key performance parameter, more as a nice to have.

[slapout9]

Concur with this. In fact I wrote pretty much the same thing way back at post 60 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=136764&postcount=60)of this thread when I characterized the Declaration and Constitution as basically an Op Plan for establishing the US government with the Preamble being the Mission statement for that operation.

Yes, I have posted it before on other threads, but what I like about your version is viewing it as an Op Plan (of course to me it is a system:D)which is what it is but is not generally taught that way. There is to much focus on it being a supreme legal document as opposed to it being a plan!! And how it can be useful to accomplishing our purpose as a nation.

[slapout9]

of course but this is an excellent video on how we(USA) got this way. It was made in 1965 for NBC television with reporter John Chancellor, also has various CIA heads and former heads and Congressman Eugene McCarthy.
The whole thing is about modern adaption of the Constitution, Morals and War against Invisible Governments without involving Congress. Decision making by the CIA and the Executive branch alone. It drags in places but it is quite a history lesson.

Link to "The Science Of Spying" 1965 NBC Special with reporter John Chancellor

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fi710fkvLwQ&feature=related

[carl]

Generally I worry about the use of an air bridge as the primary means of supplying a major conflict. Additionally, the air routes to Korea (which you didn't mention), Taiwan/Formosa and the Japanese Archipelago could be threatened by potential opposition land-and sea-based IADS. So without having first won the SEAD campaign, I'd worry about aerial strategic resupply that far forward.

Good point about the various air routes. It is an intrinsic part of our way of working which is one reason I think those big planes are so critical.

You reminded me of something. We don't have very many shipyards. If something like this ever got started, please God don't let it, a lot of ships would be sunk and need to be replaced. They may be able to do that more easily than we.

I thought about mentioning Korea but let it go for the reason you said, airplanes might be too easy to stop and you would be better off with lots of small ships making the passage.

[Dayuhan]

Not at all. In fact that is what drives my opinion. Two of the things that make for a believable deterrent are having the tools and having the other guy believe that you will indeed use them if needed. Of course you can't counter any possible move, but to suggest that you should if fallacious. It is sort of a straw man and the fallacy of the false alternative rolled into one, counter everything or counter nothing. At least that is the way I am seeing you present it.

Your last sentence sort of implicitly contradicts that though because you say the antagonist must lose more than gained if there is a tussle. In order to do that you must make some decisions about what is most likely to happen and counter that. But some decisions must be made because you can't counter everything. If you try, you counter nothing and the antagonist sees that, hence, no deterrent.

The point is that you're focusing entirely on countering what they might, in a very improbable situation, do to us. Deterrence is more about what you can do to the other guy. If you're threatening my hand with a knife and I have a shotgun in your crotch, the core of the issue isn't your knife, and I don't need to be shopping for a kevlar glove. The shotgun is what makes the difference.


That is your opinion. Mine differs. But at least you are talking about the future too.

I think what you miss is that like the Cold War, and hypothetical conflict between the US and China is almost certainly going to be fought by proxy, through influence, and at a low, drawn-out level. Mutual Assured Destruction is a strong deterrent to large scale open conflict, on both sides.


Strategic ambiguity is a useful thing to a point. We left things ambiguous in Korea and Kuwait and things didn't work out so well. It is best to leave them pretty sure if they cross a line something will probably happen and there should be a clear line. Ambiguous maybe in how many of brick will fall on their heads but no doubt that they will fall.

We're not in a position to draw meaningful long-term lines, because everybody knows the lines change every 4 years. Ambiguity is what we've got, even to ourselves. It's built into our system. Might as well make the most of it.


The article referenced also seemed pretty darn sure that the Red Chinese will never do the other stuff. Being cocksure that the other guy can't, is unwise.

I read it as a suggestion that the enormous amount of money that would be spent on entirely new aircraft designs would be better spent on maintaining and extending the advantage we have on "the other stuff". That makes sense to me, especially given the reality of limited resources. I also doubt that the F35 is as bad as its detractors say, or as good as it's proponents say. Nothing ever is.


Look harder. Bold declarations and belligerent declarations are part of the escalation of force continuam (sic). You don't go straight from passive inaction to wild violence. You work up to that. What you call belligerent talk I call warnings, especially when backed up by preparation.

I just can't see what, on a specific level, such talk would achieve. What is certain is that we'd hand a significant propaganda and political advantage to the most militarist factions in China, give their military a step up in the domestic power struggles, and probably cause an increase in military spending on their side. How does that help us? They would also have to make a belligerent and assertive response. No choice there, they can't let themselves look weak, so they'd have to rattle their saber right back. Then we have to choose between rattling ours louder or backing down. How does it help us to go down that road?

Not even mentioning that the idea of lordly Americans drawing lines in the sand and telling others what they may and may not do doesn't resonate well with much of the world, even those who are in no way enchanted with China. Our little venture in Iraq didn't improve our position in that regard.


You act as if they have no agency. Almost as if they are insects that just react to stimuli. I don't think that is true. They get scared just like everybody else.

Scared people do dumb things. Often they do dumb aggressive things. How is that helpful?


I apologize for my crack about moving Guam 1000 miles east. I should have been more gentlemanly. My point was that even if we choose to fight as best we can where we have the greatest advantage, their are preexisting positions and things we have to defend. If we don't defend those positions, however difficult that is, we may end up losing anyway.

Even if you could move Guan 1000 miles east, what good would it do you? Who says you have to fight over Guam?

In the very unlikely event of outright war with China, the key would be to target their vulnerability. That's not on our west coast: sure, they do a lot of business with the US and Canada and cutting that business off would hurt them very badly, but we don't need military force to do that. Their key vulnerability lies in their access to the merchandise exports and commodity imports that sustain their economic growth, which in turn allows them to maintain domestic order. Dominating the Indian Ocean and the Middle East is more important to our position re China than dominating the western Pacific.

[carl]

The point is that you're focusing entirely on countering what they might, in a very improbable situation, do to us. Deterrence is more about what you can do to the other guy. If you're threatening my hand with a knife and I have a shotgun in your crotch, the core of the issue isn't your knife, and I don't need to be shopping for a kevlar glove. The shotgun is what makes the difference.

It is prudent to be aware of what the other guy might do to you, otherwise you tend to get surprised. Being surprised is bad. Deterrence is about what the other guy is pretty sure you can do to him. If he thinks he can surprise you, and he will if you don't figure what he can possible do to you, he will figure that his surprise will vitiate your power and there goes your deterrence. Also generally doing to him means doing it with something. If you don't have the tools, you can't deter. Like having that shotgun. If you ain't got the shotgun and just stick your finger gun in the other guys crotch, they will arrest you for being a pervert after you get out of the hospital. So I would like to have things in place to deter the Red Chinese, even if it does make them cross.

I would advise not actually placing the muzzle of the weapon against the opponents body in most cases. If he has practiced he will disarm you or turn the muzzle away from his body before you can react. Then if he has a knife he will cut and maybe kill you. Better to stand some feet back.


I think what you miss is that like the Cold War, and hypothetical conflict between the US and China is almost certainly going to be fought by proxy, through influence, and at a low, drawn-out level. Mutual Assured Destruction is a strong deterrent to large scale open conflict, on both sides.

What if it doesn't? Then what? And doesn't being prepared for the eventuality help keep it from happening, like in the Cold War?


We're not in a position to draw meaningful long-term lines, because everybody knows the lines change every 4 years. Ambiguity is what we've got, even to ourselves. It's built into our system. Might as well make the most of it.

We have drawn meaningful long term lines vis a vis Japan since the end of WWII and Taiwan since not too long after that. We have drawn a meaningful long term line about freedom of navigation, in cooperation with the Royal Navy, for much longer than that. I think you are wrong.

Ambiguity is mostly a recipe for uncertainty and that makes conflict more likely. It has its uses to a point though.


I read it as a suggestion that the enormous amount of money that would be spent on entirely new aircraft designs would be better spent on maintaining and extending the advantage we have on "the other stuff". That makes sense to me, especially given the reality of limited resources. I also doubt that the F35 is as bad as its detractors say, or as good as it's proponents say. Nothing ever is.

Oh. I read it different.


I just can't see what, on a specific level, such talk would achieve. What is certain is that we'd hand a significant propaganda and political advantage to the most militarist factions in China, give their military a step up in the domestic power struggles, and probably cause an increase in military spending on their side. How does that help us? They would also have to make a belligerent and assertive response. No choice there, they can't let themselves look weak, so they'd have to rattle their saber right back. Then we have to choose between rattling ours louder or backing down. How does it help us to go down that road?

I don't buy that the Red Chinese propagandists are dependent upon the Americans saying the wrong thing then whoa! watch out all hell will break loose. Nor do I believe that their is some kind of domestic power struggle between the mean aggressive Red Chines military and the peace loving Party in which what the Americans say this week is going to tip the balance.

But it was a beautifully crafted straw man you constructed and it must have been fun to knock him down.


Not even mentioning that the idea of lordly Americans drawing lines in the sand and telling others what they may and may not do doesn't resonate well with much of the world, even those who are in no way enchanted with China. Our little venture in Iraq didn't improve our position in that regard.

Ah yes, that old reliable "you arrogant Americans, now nobody likes you!" argument.


Scared people do dumb things. Often they do dumb aggressive things. How is that helpful?

You know how when you played crack the whip, the kid on the end went flying off? The same thing happens with extremely tangential responses and I'm the kid on the end.


Even if you could move Guan 1000 miles east, what good would it do you? Who says you have to fight over Guam?

In the very unlikely event of outright war with China, the key would be to target their vulnerability. That's not on our west coast: sure, they do a lot of business with the US and Canada and cutting that business off would hurt them very badly, but we don't need military force to do that. Their key vulnerability lies in their access to the merchandise exports and commodity imports that sustain their economic growth, which in turn allows them to maintain domestic order. Dominating the Indian Ocean and the Middle East is more important to our position re China than dominating the western Pacific.

I am a very dense fellow and it took me awhile to get there, but this response brought me to the final destination. If there was a war between the US and Red China, please God don't ever let that come to pass, it wouldn't matter much what the US wanted to do in some cases. We would have to react to what the Red Chinese did in addition to our preferred courses of action. All those air log routes would be vulnerable to interdiction and would have to be defended even if we preferred to swan about in the Indian Ocean until they cried Uncle. This has been pointed out repeatedly but you just won't acknowledge it. I only just realized that. Not such a great destination considering how long it took to get there.

[Dayuhan]

It is prudent to be aware of what the other guy might do to you, otherwise you tend to get surprised. Being surprised is bad. Deterrence is about what the other guy is pretty sure you can do to him. If he thinks he can surprise you, and he will if you don't figure what he can possible do to you, he will figure that his surprise will vitiate your power and there goes your deterrence. Also generally doing to him means doing it with something. If you don't have the tools, you can't deter.

Are you suggesting that we don't have the tools to interdict the vast majority of Chinese merchandise exports and commodity imports without ever coming within their effective military range?


What if it doesn't? Then what? And doesn't being prepared for the eventuality help keep it from happening, like in the Cold War?

If it doesn't you make do with what you've got, which happens to be the best-funded military force in the world by a substantial margin, and which has regional allies with substantial capacity of their own. Look at the actual balance of military power. Add Japan, Korea, Taiwan and look again. Do you suggest that this equation invites Chinese aggression? Not even mentioning that the status quo is being reasonably kind to them and they've little reason to rock the boat.


We have drawn meaningful long term lines vis a vis Japan since the end of WWII and Taiwan since not too long after that. We have drawn a meaningful long term line about freedom of navigation, in cooperation with the Royal Navy, for much longer than that. I think you are wrong.

Ambiguity is mostly a recipe for uncertainty and that makes conflict more likely. It has its uses to a point though.

Those lines have always been to an extent ambiguous, as the Somali pirates well know. There's never any way to be certain of what level of infringement will draw a response. There really can't be a way, because what is needed to draw a response is a factor of domestic politics and even we can't predict those. The specific threats you want us to make are meaningless in any lasting sense; they accomplish nothing and can easily become a liability... which of course is why they won't be made, regardless of what we say here.


I don't buy that the Red Chinese propagandists are dependent upon the Americans saying the wrong thing then whoa! watch out all hell will break loose. Nor do I believe that their is some kind of domestic power struggle between the mean aggressive Red Chines military and the peace loving Party in which what the Americans say this week is going to tip the balance.

Not dependent, but any propaganda weapon we hand them will be used to the fullest. What have we to gain from handing them such weapons?

There are certainly domestic power struggles within China... not necessarily between anyone you'd classify as good guys or bad guys, but some are more compatible with our interests than others.


Ah yes, that old reliable "you arrogant Americans, now nobody likes you!" argument.

It's not an argument, it's a real-world perception that we have to deal with when we go about trying to rally allies, build coalitions, impose economic sanctions, etc.