Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police

[Jedburgh]

Recently published by the OIGs of State & Defense:

Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness (http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/76103.pdf)
Key Judgments
• The U.S.-funded program to train and equip the Afghan National Police (ANP) is generally well conceived and well executed. However, long-term U.S. assistance and funding, at least beyond 2010, is required to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program.

• The U.S. Ambassador is responsible for policy guidance; the Commander, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) executes the police program through the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). The senior embassy and military leaders have excellent relations and work together well to administer and improve the police program.

• Building the Afghan National Police (ANP) requires a comprehensive, integrated approach that encompasses leadership training, sustaining institutions and organizations, and oversight and internal control mechanisms. As it has rapidly evolved, police readiness requirements have expanded beyond training to include sweeping institutional reform of the ANP through the Ministry of Interior.

• Nevertheless, ANP’s readiness level to carry out its internal security and conventional police responsibilities is far from adequate. The obstacles to establish a fully professional ANP are formidable. Among them are: no effective field training officer (FTO) program, illiterate recruits, a history of low pay and pervasive corruption, and an insecure environment.

• The mentoring program is a key component to effect institutional change and build a capable, self-sustaining national police force. To reach its full potential, the mentoring program should be expanded and better managed to achieve program objectives.

• Management of the police training contract is problematic and requires more effective coordination between State Department contract managers and CSTC-A, which is responsible for executing ANP training programs.

• The procurement pipeline to Afghanistan for ANP equipment is slow, but is improving. There is inadequate accountability for equipment after it is turned over to the ANP, because the ANP logistics system is not yet effective. The ANP needs to establish and implement an effective end-to-end internal controls process.

• Until the Afghan criminal justice system, including law enforcement, judiciary, and corrections, has matured and is synchronized and coordinated from the national to the local level such that laws are standardized and uniformly applied, the ANP will function more as a security force than as a law enforcement organization.

• The U.S. and international effort for standing up the ANP is not limitless; therefore, transitioning full responsibility and authority to the MoI needs greater emphasis.

• Building an effective ANP program will require a long-term commitment from coalition and international partners. Premature withdrawal from this commitment will compromise the progress already accomplished and put at risk the U.S. goal to establish a professional police force embracing the values and practices of community policing and the rule of law.
The full report makes for an interesting read.

[tequila]

Cops or Robbers: The Struggle to Reform the Afghan Police (http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=&task=doc_download&gid=523) (pdf file) - Andrew Wilder, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit

...
If police reform is to succeed in Afghanistan, and the big increase in resources to reform the ANP is not to be wasted, the major actors —
especially the government, the US, and the EUPOL mission — will need to address five key issues.


1. Develop a shared vision and strategy for the ANP

The most fundamental issue that must be resolved
for police reform efforts to succeed in Afghanistan is the need for a shared vision of the role of the ANP, and a shared strategy on
how to achieve that vision. In particular, there is a need to reconcile the “German vision” of the police as a civilian law and order force, and
the “US vision” of the police as a security force with a major counter-insurgency role ...

2. Replace SSR pillars with an integrated and comprehensive rule of law strategy.

The failure of the government and the international community to develop and implement an effective strategy for reforming and strengthening
the judicial sector is a potentially crippling flaw of current police reform efforts. A civilian police force, no matter how well trained and
equipped, will have little ability to uphold and promote the rule of law in the absence of a functioning judicial system ...

3. Make donor assistance conditional on comprehensive MoI reform.
The most consistent theme that emerged in interviews for this paper was that without comprehensive reform of the MoI, police reform efforts will fail and the money spent on reform will be wasted. The MoI is notoriously corrupt, factionalised, and an increasingly important actor in Afghanistan's illegal drug economy ...

4. Prioritise quality of police over quantity.


There has been a damaging tendency to let immediate issues, such as the presidential elections and the growing Taliban insurgency, result in “quick fix” solutions that prioritise the quantity of police over the quality. A recent example was the 2006 decision to create the ANAP to assist
in counter-insurgency operations. Such measures to quickly increase police numbers are undermining the longer-term objective of creating
an effective police force ...

5. Prioritise fiscal sustainability of the security sector.


It is widely recognised that in the foreseeable future Afghanistan will not have the resources to independently sustain the security sector institutions that are currently being developed. Despite this knowledge, few concrete measures are being taken to address the problem, and
few decisions are being made to bring security sector costs more in line with what Afghanistan can afford ...

A massive amount of info about the Afghan police in this document. Very interesting reading, whether you agree with the recommendations or not.

[Jedburgh]

ISN Security Watch, 30 Jul 07: Afghanistan's Embryonic Police (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17920)
In what is becoming a dolefully familiar pattern in the ongoing fighting in Afghanistan, the Taliban are increasingly targeting the fledgling Afghan police force. According to Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior, around 350 Afghan police officers have been killed since the beginning of 2007, the highest police death toll they have seen since the Taliban were routed out of Kabul in 2001....

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 30 Aug 07: Reforming Afghanistan's Police (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/138_reforming_afghanistan_s_police.pdf)
Policing goes to the very heart of state building, since a credible national institution that helps provide security and justice for the population is central to government legitimacy. However Afghanistan’s citizens often view the police more as a source of fear than of security. Instead of emphasising their coercive powers, reform should focus on accountability, ethnic representation and professionalism, along with an urgent need to depoliticise and institutionalise appointments and procedures. It is counter-productive to treat police as an auxiliary fighting unit in battling the insurgency, as has been happening with increasing frequency in the troubled south. Afghanistan, like any other democracy, requires police service more than police force.

The state of the Afghan National Police (ANP) nearly six years after the fall of the Taliban reflects the international community’s failure to grasp early on the centrality of comprehensive reform of the law enforcement and justice sectors, despite similar hard-learned lessons in other countries attempting to emerge from years of armed conflict. President Karzai’s government still lacks the political will to tackle a culture of impunity and to end political interference in appointments and operations. Attempts to shortcut institution building are compounded by an exploding narcotics trade – partly symptomatic of the state of policing but even more clearly a major corrupting influence on attempted reforms. At the same time, the challenges of a growing insurgency are pushing quick fixes to the fore....
Full 35 page report at the link.

[Jedburgh]

...I'm posting this here rather than in the dedicated Afghan Drug thread because of the focus on the Police:

Transcripts from the 4 Oct 07 hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia:

Counternarcotics Strategy and Police Training in Afghanistan (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov:80/110/sch100407.htm), Thomas A. Schweich, Acting Assistant Secretary, DoS Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan.

Counternarcotics Strategy and Police Training in Afghanistan (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov:80/110/schn100407.htm), Mark L. Schneider, Senior Vice President, International Crisis Group.

[tequila]

Death rate for Afghan police force 'staggering' (http://www.thestar.com/News/World/article/262109)- Ottawa Star, 1 Oct.


KANDAHAR–In rural Panjwaii and Zhari districts, Afghan cops are being killed faster than they can be replaced, says one of their Canadian mentors.

That terrifying fact stands as a huge roadblock to Canada's efforts to turn over security in these troubled regions to the fledgling police force.
"The rate at which they're losing policemen can never be replenished, unfortunately," RCMP Cpl. Barry Pitcher said.

In Panjwaii district alone – an insurgent hotbed west of Kandahar – police officers recently had six trucks destroyed in a 20-day period through roadside bombs and ambushes.

In July, 71 police officers were killed in regional command south, a territory that includes Kandahar province. Nationwide, 650 officers were killed from March 2006 to March 2007. Government officials say another 500 have been killed since then ...

[Rex Brynen]

Canadians pay to bolster Afghan security (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.

20071009.afghan09/BNStory/Afghanistan/home), Globe and Mail, 9 October 2007.

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — Canada has decided to sidestep the corrupt Afghan government and ensure the safety of Canadian soldiers by paying Afghan police directly, in cash.

It's an attempt to buy stability in the dangerous districts west of Kandahar city, where Canadian soldiers stake their lives on the reliability of their Afghan allies.

“This is brand new,” said Brigadier-General Guy Laroche, Canada's top commander in Afghanistan, during an interview Monday. “We're going to make sure our people eat.”

Good idea, although it is a sad commentary on capacity and corruption problems in the Ministry of Interior:

“The money did not get to these guys,” Gen. Laroche said. “Somebody is taking 10 per cent here, 10 per cent there, and at the end the poor guy is left with nothing. Would you stay in a place like that without being paid? I mean, c'mon.”

US police mentors are doing the same.

[Jedburgh]

Eurasia Insight, 20 Nov 07: Afghanistan: A Law Enforcement Success Story in Kabul (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112007.shtml)
..."Corruption is rooted in economics, and so is violence. Give me the equipment, the men and the money and I can turn this force into one that can clean the crime off these streets in a matter of months. Until then, I do my best with what I have.".....

[slapout9]

Eurasia Insight, 20 Nov 07: Afghanistan: A Law Enforcement Success Story in Kabul (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112007.shtml)


Great article Jed, thanks for posting.

[tequila]

Afghan Police Struggle to Work a Beat in a War (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/world/asia/13afghan.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print)- NYTIMES, 13 January.

Many of the problems frustrating Afghanistan’s efforts to secure its dangerous eastern and southern provinces were evident in the bizarre tour of duty of Shair Mohammad, a police officer who spent 18 months in an isolated swath of steppe.

Until December, when a colonel arrived to replace him, Mr. Mohammad, 30, had been the acting police chief in the Nawa district of Ghazni Province. The job gave him jurisdiction over hundreds of square miles near Pakistan that the Taliban (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=nyt-org) had used as a sanctuary since being ousted from power in 2001.

But his ability to police his beat was severely compromised.

Mr. Mohammad had no rank, no money for food and not enough clothing or gear to operate in cold weather. Two of his six trucks were broken. The ammunition the Pentagon provided him came in cardboard boxes that immediately crumbled, exposing cartridges to the elements on his storeroom’s dirty floor.

Compounding his woes, the possibility of mutiny was on his mind. It was a natural worry, he said, because since April none of his men had been paid.
“My commanders always just give me promises,” he said. “They never send the money ...”

[Jedburgh]

18 Jun 08 testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs regarding Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice Sector in Afghanistan:

U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability (http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080618133007.pdf), Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director, International Affairs and Trade, GAO

Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan (http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080618133043.pdf), Frank Ward, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, DoS

Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice Sector in Afghanistan (http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080618133207.pdf), David Johnson, Asst Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, DoS

Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan (http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080618133250.pdf), Bobby Wilkes, Dpty Asst Secretary of Defense for South Asia, OSD

Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan (http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080618133326.pdf), Mark Ward, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Asia Bureau, USAID

Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan (http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080618133352.pdf), Bruce Swartz, Dpty Asst Attorney General, Criminal Division, DoJ

[Ken White]

GAO -- who would not have a job if they found nothing wrong -- found things wrong. Okay.

Three DoS, One DoD, one USAID and One DOJ type all commented on the wrongs GAO found -- and added couple to show they were concerned. Okay.

A part of the reported problem is failure to adequately equip the ANP. No mention is made of the part played by our ridiculous procurement laws and regulations -- most at the behest of the Congress that is conducting this 'hearing' -- which are almost certainly primarily responsible for that flaw. Okay.

Another part is that the Afghans works on a different timetable and have different mores than we would like. Okay.

Could the excessive bureaucracy herein displayed also play a part in the failure of the ANP to walk on water?

Oh, wait; not too much water there...

We can save money if we store this and release it again a year from now; save the cost of another hearing to discover little real change. Or we could say no such hearing until 2012 and give things a chance to get fixed...

Not to disparage your posting Jedburgh, I appreciate it and your postings. It's just every now and then, my mind really boggles at how utterly ridiculous and overweight we've become. Verily, I have vented... :mad:

[Ron Humphrey]

GAO -- It's just every now and then, my mind really boggles at how utterly ridiculous and overweight we've become. Verily, I have vented... :mad:

It's good to let it out, you don't need the added hyper tension:wry:

[Jim Rodgers]

A long, and fairly interesting, article in the WaPo today - it's below, and linked from the 6 Aug roundup as well. Not detailed enough to really assess how things are going, but it does seem to illustrate the challenges\frustrations.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/05/AR2008080503503.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2008080503531&pos=

[DaveDoyle]

Only had time to read the first 16 pages of the Wilder paper and the Washington Post article. Haven’t scanned the posts on our government’s approach to the problem. I do suspect that what we (the U.S. government) expect, as a standard for police work may be divorced from what is necessary and effective. That definition will certainly change over time as well.

Getting to the point –

If Taliban are targeting police, and they are, it is because they see the immediate threat. Police, not military, have the ability to effectively limit the Taliban control over the population. Establishing the “profession” of police work is going to be the biggest challenge to a society that distrusts authority. Young Afghans may aspire to be in the military, but at this point not many aspire to protect and serve as a member of the police force, local or national. How does one build on the idea of the importance of the police? Seems like it is going to take a lot of local work first. Work in the districts and villages like the Post article describes.

Thoughts?

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 18 Nov 08: Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/b85_policing_in_afghanistan___still_searching_for_ a_strategy.pdf)
Police reform in Afghanistan is receiving more attention and resources than ever before, but such increased efforts are still yet to be matched by significant improvements in police effectiveness and public confidence. Too much emphasis has continued to be placed on using the police to fight the insurgency rather than crime. Corruption and political appointments are derailing attempts to professionalise the force. The government and the international community need to reinforce the International Policing Coordination Board (IPCB) as the central forum for prioritising efforts and drive forward with much greater unity of effort. Tangible steps such as appointing a career police commissioner and establishing community liaison boards will build professionalism and wider outreach. A national police force able to uphold the rule of law is crucial to statebuilding and would help tackle the root causes of alienation that drive the insurgency.......

[Old Eagle]

In an insurgency, police are caught in the middle. How they are trained and equipped, who controls them, what their missions are, etc. pose massive problems for the counterinsurgent.

Ordinary crime and corruption are problems in Afghanistan (as is traffic control), so traditional police would have their hands full under any circumstances. In fact, the German training program was initially targeted on this mission set.

Then come the organized drug bosses and quickly overwhelm traditional police.

Then come the Taliban, AQ, whoever else and realy overwhelm the police. Remember -- the insurgent is not the counter-soldier, he is the counter-policeman. He doesn't want to win battles, he wants to impose control.

So now the police tend to become something that they didn't start out to be -- paramilitary forces, and in the process, lose the ability to do traditional policing functions.

Well, of course the army can fight insurgents, but there's also a problem with that: we don't want the military to be domestic enforcers. Posse commitatus and all that.

Now my head is starting to hurt.

But wait there's more. When I was working in the Afghan MOD, the senior leadership came in and started the "gotcha" round --
"didn't you say that unity of command is a principle of war?"
"yes..."
"so we need command and control of the police, not the MOI."
'now wait -- the ANA will eventually be an externally directed traditional military force, and police are not part of the military function"
"Are you nuts? We have a huge insurgency inside our borders...(gotcha!)"

Well, you get the idea.

In short, there are not clean cut solutions. Wish there were.

[Ken White]

ever pragmatic Dutch have at least a partial solution. Won't work for and in the US but it might work for some nations and for Afghanistan. The Marechaussee LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Marechaussee) and the Gendarmerie LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Gendarmerie) concepts are also widely copied in the ME. Iran for example, in the days of the Shahs had two police forces; the totally civilian National Police who performed all standard police functions in the towns and cities and the paramilitary Gendarmerie who policed rural areas AND provdiced the border Guard and a paramilitary force (which coincidentally served as a counterweight and coup deterrent to the Armed Forces).

The Turks also have a Gendarmerie. LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Gendarmerie). Note that in all cases, there's a dual chain, civilian and military and note also that the Turks are using Gendarmes in their counterinsurgency (as did the Dutch and French in their former colonies and as did the Viet Namese use their Field Police).

We have a bad tendency to believe that only US solutions are appropriate and to apply the 'not invented here' syndrome to some good ideas that others have. Of course, one argument certain to be deployed to support that ego centric American concept is that "It's hard enough to stand up one police force, much less two." To which I respond -- when you have an absolute and demonstrated NEED for two different kinds of police forces, that's not an issue, it's simply a minor impediment.

[reed11b]

ever pragmatic Dutch have at least a partial solution. Won't work for and in the US but it might work for some nations and for Afghanistan. The Marechaussee LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Marechaussee) and the Gendarmerie LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Gendarmerie) concepts are also widely copied in the ME. Iran for example, in the days of the Shahs had two police forces; the totally civilian National Police who performed all standard police functions in the towns and cities and the paramilitary Gendarmerie who policed rural areas AND provdiced the border Guard and a paramilitary force (which coincidentally served as a counterweight and coup deterrent to the Armed Forces).

The Turks also have a Gendarmerie. LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Gendarmerie). Note that in all cases, there's a dual chain, civilian and military and note also that the Turks are using Gendarmes in their counterinsurgency (as did the Dutch and French in their former colonies and as did the Viet Namese use their Field Police).

We have a bad tendency to believe that only US solutions are appropriate and to apply the 'not invented here' syndrome to some good ideas that others have. Of course, one argument certain to be deployed to support that ego centric American concept is that "It's hard enough to stand up one police force, much less two." To which I respond -- when you have an absolute and demonstrated NEED for two different kinds of police forces, that's not an issue, it's simply a minor impediment.
I am a fan of the Gendarmerie concept but I have to ask if A-stan has the $$ to support two national police forces. Even with massive stand-up support, just maintaining well equiped forces seems to be beyond A-stans reach. All the more reason why I see the mission as defeating AQ and the Taliban over standing up A-stan stability.
Reed

[Ken White]

...All the more reason why I see the mission as defeating AQ and the Taliban over standing up A-stan stability.
ReedI don't think that's possible. Suppress, control to an extent? Yes. Defeat? No -- they'll just go to ground and wait out the west.

As for this:I am a fan of the Gendarmerie concept but I have to ask if A-stan has the $$ to support two national police forces. Even with massive stand-up support, just maintaining well equiped forces seems to be beyond A-stans reach.First, at this time, we're paying the bills, so stand up is not an issue. Second, given a cessation of western support, Afghanistan will almost certainly continue to exist and it will almost certainly have Police. Those Police will number X. Whether they're all in one agency or four different crews is of little account. Efficiency is always important -- effectiveness is usually more important.

As an aside, I'd suggest that given what I know of Afghanistan, they'd be better off with one National Gendarmerie and having the normal police functions at Province and city level -- but that's in the too hard box at this time.

[reed11b]

I don't think that's possible. Suppress, control to an extent? Yes. Defeat? No -- they'll just go to ground and wait out the west.
I would have to have better then my current knowledge of the Taliban to continue that line of discourse. If you have any suggestions on sources for that feel free to PM me with them, I am always willing to learn.


As an aside, I'd suggest that given what I know of Afghanistan, they'd be better off with one National Gendarmerie and having the normal police functions at Province and city level -- but that's in the too hard box at this time.
Sometimes it takes somebody to actually say the obvious. I agree and I am embarrassed I did not think of that right of the bat.
Reed

[Ken White]

I would have to have better then my current knowledge of the Taliban to continue that line of discourse. If you have any suggestions on sources for that feel free to PM me with them, I am always willing to learn.that's just my very strong conviction from watching a couple of dozen dissident movements over the years and reading some history. In almost all cases, if the heat gets to be too much, the broadswords and battle axes go under the roof thatch, the guns and RPGs get buried, and everyone looks peaceful for a bit -- then zap; they-y-y-r-r-e ba-a-a-a-c-c-kk.

With respect to the Taliban in particular, they're effectively doing that right now; just like the VC of old (and hundreds of other groups) they're just plain old villagers by day then at night they either group together or assist groups. Same game, different time and place.

For example, check this LINK (http://blogs.reuters.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/06/sharia.jpg) for a Reuter's photograph of a Shura in Sangin attended by some British Army folks earlier this year. While the Black headgear is not a guarantee of Taliban membership or sympathy it is generally indicative. Notice the number of them and notice also the numerous looks of love and affection or just plain old 'we're happy to be here'...

[reed11b]

that's just my very strong conviction from watching a couple of dozen dissident movements over the years and reading some history. In almost all cases, if the heat gets to be too much, the broadswords and battle axes go under the roof thatch, the guns and RPGs get buried, and everyone looks peaceful for a bit -- then zap; they-y-y-r-r-e ba-a-a-a-c-c-kk.

With respect to the Taliban in particular, they're effectively doing that right now; just like the VC of old (and hundreds of other groups) they're just plain old villagers by day then at night they either group together or assist groups. Same game, different time and place.



I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?
Reed
P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.

[Steve Blair]

I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?
Reed
P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.

Ken's old enough he's a charter member of the NSA.....

The VC's main strength was indeed broken by the Tet Offensive, and there is a fair amount of speculation that this was done intentionally on the part of the NVN government to remove them as a policy threat after the fall of the south. Local Force elements were still fairly active, but Tet had the Main Force elements dig up their buried guns and charge US and SVN gunlines. Not a productive activity if you plan to survive....

[Ken White]

I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?That the Field Police and the PRUs were in existence a number of years before Tet of '68 and operated against the VC AND the NVA before and after even though most of the main force VC were really gone by mid '66. Tet '68 just got almost all the rest but they were never totally extinguished,

Most groups of dissidents and insurgents have several degrees of effort. In VN, the two principal divisions for war fighting -- not political -- purposes were the Main Force, organized military units of professional fighters who were very competent; and the Local Force, mostly local villagers who sniped or planted mines part time, served as guides for the Main Force units and generally laid low and played supporting roles and who were mostly not too competent militarily. The split early on was about 25% Main force and 75% Local Force. By mid '66 it was about 10 or 15 to 85 or 90 and after Tet '68, about 2:98. As Steve Blair said, lot of politics involved in addition to the combat losses which were substantial.

The various Taliban groups -- and there are several -- probably in the larger crews do pretty much the same thing, Semi pro Bands with local auxiliaries.P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.Like Steve said, I'm a plank owner. ;)

Sometimes when it seems appropriate but I don't see anything in this sub thread that I meant to be sarcastic or that seems sarcastic on a relook...???

[Rob Thornton]

While having an interesting discussion here at work about security requirements, in terms of what capabilities are required and how they might shape organization at various levels, some questions came up – there a bit random so I apologize up front:

What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve? Police in cities that have no other mechanisms to preserve order and protect the public make sense – particularly where the demographics lend themselves to the requirement – but what about elsewhere – in the fringes where there is not much variance in the demographics and outside presence in solving disputes is not taken kindly?

Does Afghanistan need a national police, or does it need some of the capabilities we normally associate with a national police, perhaps resident in the ANA? Kind of like a frontier army?

Is there other (political) value in building what might be a competing power structure?

Could some of the functions that might be desired from a national police be fulfilled from tribal constabularies? If so, could a combination of tribal constabularies and the ANA organized, trained and equipped to perform along the lines of a frontier army/constabulary meet the requirement? Could it do so with less risk?

If a national police or gendarme was the preferred COA – which model (Guardia Civil, Canadian Mounties, Australian National Police, German Border Guards, the Frontier Corps, even something along the lines of other forms of LE with national authorities such as some of the big national park rangers in places where poaching is big money and brings in well armed criminals)? What would be most suitable given the environment and conditions?

How might a national police be perceived in a place like Afghanistan? What might the enforcement of national laws in accordance with national standards mean to tribal authorities?

I’m not pointing to a yes or no, just trying to work through the consequences on a number of levels. If the solution was an organizational one, it seems there would have to be some serious work done in other areas – tribal and/or provincial buy in would seem to be critical, as well as some serious legislative pieces on the Afghan part.

While we have good reasons for our separation and distribution of authorities (and systems we’ve grown to support them), we have in the past had what we might consider a dual use military ( such as in in the 1800s where there was a lack of other types of authority).

Over time we have developed a very complex system with overlapping agencies from local to state to federal, and with discreet capabilities emerging to fill gaps. Its difficult to know if had we known exactly where we were going and had the resources that we would have been better served to put them into place all at once – there may have been a requirement to adjust in other areas to make what we have suitable to our environment. Awkward, but I heard an analogy the other day about putting 9 pregnant women in the same room does not necessarily get you a baby in one month.

It is hard to live with the idea that some things may take more time than we are comfortable with, particularly when their problem is our problem. Somehow we’ve got to reconcile expectations – not an easy task by any measure.


Best, Rob

[reed11b]

Steve said, I'm a plank owner. ;)

Sometimes when it seems appropriate but I don't see anything in this sub thread that I meant to be sarcastic or that seems sarcastic on a relook...???

I was refering to the lack of happy faces in the picture link.
Reed
P.S. Rob, I have a response for you, making sure my info is correct.

[Ron Humphrey]

For example, check this LINK (http://blogs.reuters.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/06/sharia.jpg) for a Reuter's photograph of a Shura in Sangin attended by some British Army folks earlier this year. While the Black headgear is not a guarantee of Taliban membership or sympathy it is generally indicative. Notice the number of them and notice also the numerous looks of love and affection or just plain old 'we're happy to be here'...


How come it seems like the yunguns are the only ones who didn't bother taking off their shoes?



It is hard to live with the idea that some things may take more time than we are comfortable with, particularly when their problem is our problem. Somehow we’ve got to reconcile expectations – not an easy task by any measure.


A lesson that some of us keep having to learn over and over and over, the hard way:wry:

[Ken White]

What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve?Seems to me that's a determination the Nation concerned has to make and what we think is low quality secondary....but what about elsewhere – in the fringes where there is not much variance in the demographics and outside presence in solving disputes is not taken kindly?Seems that could range from no police requirement through tribal or council police to elements of a national force that responds to local control.Does Afghanistan need a national police, or does it need some of the capabilities we normally associate with a national police, perhaps resident in the ANA? Kind of like a frontier army?As I said above, IMO, a National Gendarmerie and a local Province / District element. However, that should really be up to the Afghans even if I / we disagree... ;)Is there other (political) value in building what might be a competing power structure?Always! Keep each other honest. That's why I do not agree with a DoD, War and Navy worked fine... :DCould some of the functions that might be desired from a national police be fulfilled from tribal constabularies? If so, could a combination of tribal constabularies and the ANA organized, trained and equipped to perform along the lines of a frontier army/constabulary meet the requirement? Could it do so with less risk?I think there are two questions there, not a follow on. First is merit of Tribal Constabularies (and how funded?); second is whither the ANA. I don't think you can answer your complex question until those two simple questions are answered. By the Afghans...If a national police or gendarme was the preferred COA – which model ... What would be most suitable given the environment and conditions?the last question answers the first; there's a reason all those forces you cite are differently organized, equipped and focused. What does Afghanistan need; not what we think but what do they think.How might a national police be perceived in a place like Afghanistan?I think the answer to that is known today. One reason to look at a reorganization and redirection. Many years ago the Kentucky Highway Patrol had a terrible reputation for graft, corruption and incompetence. Rather then reform it, it was disbanded in 1948 and the Kentucky State Police were activated with some quite high standards (and broader enforcement powers); today, they're one of the best in the country.What might the enforcement of national laws in accordance with national standards mean to tribal authorities?My suspicion is they won't like it...It is hard to live with the idea that some things may take more time than we are comfortable with, particularly when their problem is our problem. Somehow we’ve got to reconcile expectations – not an easy task by any measure.Not sure it's our problem but I get your drift, we volunteered to help -- and we should. I think we just need to remember it doesn't have to be our way to work...

That doesn't mean carte blanche and our agreement to everything; gotta sort through the local politics and capabilities but it does need to be a local, not a US arrangement.

[Bill Moore]

What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve?

Rob, I suggest you determine what security capabilities and capacities are required, then identify the gap. This isn't easy if you really think about what this entails; however, it is the easiest step.

Next you get with the experts, and those are not the Soldiers and Marines who worked in Afghanistan, they are knowledgeable, but the experts are the Afghanis. You discuss with them the most culturally appropriate and acceptable way to design the security capabilities and capacity required. It may look nothing like our police or military or the local militias in Iraq. What ever we build, it needs to survive the first light of day once we leave for it to be ultimately effective. That means it needs to look Afghani.

Bill

[Surferbeetle]

From the 12/22/08 Weekly Standard (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/922gzotm.asp) an Article by Ann Marlowe entitled Policing Afghanistan.

Again, the casualty numbers tell the story. As of mid-November, only 88 U.S. troops had been killed in action in all of Afghanistan this year, but 464 Afghan soldiers had been slain and a whopping 1,215 police. That last is an increase of 47 percent over the 2007 total. Add to that an estimated 2,600 police wounded or missing in action so far this year. Given a total Afghan National Police force of 77,000, that means 1 out of 20 cops was killed or wounded in 2008. By way of comparison, just 181 cops were killed in the line of duty in the United States in 2007, and our population is 10 to 12 times larger than Afghanistan's. If the United States were as dangerous for police as Afghanistan, we would have lost at least
12,000 cops this year.

The terms 'only' and 'just' are inappropriately associated with casualty numbers, however the article provides some insights into FID/ANP training that I do not see reported in the MSM.

[Bill Moore]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081227/ap_on_re_as/as_taliban_shadow_government;_ylt=AtLGqUYE3g_4hrLk rP_pf7qs0NUE

As Taliban nears Kabul, shadow gov't takes hold

AP – This June 26, 2008 file frame grab from television footage reportedly shows Afghan militants holding … WARDAK PROVINCE, Afghanistan – Two months ago, Mohammad Anwar recalls, the Taliban paraded accused thieves through his village, tarred their faces with oil and threw them in jail.

The public punishment was a clear sign to villagers that the Taliban are now in charge. And the province they took over lies just 30 miles from the Afghan capital of Kabul, right on the main highway.

The Taliban has long operated its own shadow government in the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan, but its power is now spreading north to the doorstep of Kabul, according to Associated Press interviews with a dozen government officials, analysts, Taliban commanders and Afghan villagers. More than seven years after the U.S.-led invasion, the Islamic militia is attempting — at least in name — to reconstitute the government by which it ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990s.

Whoever controls the populace is winning, we can continue to conduct raids, chase HVTs, use UAVs with hellfire missiles to conduct deep attacks, but if we can't control the populace it is all for naught. This principle of COIN seems to have simply been ignored in OEF-A.

In a Western society the police would be the primary force for controlling the populace, and it appears we're trying to force that model on the Afghanis based on the number of police killed in Surferbettles' post. That should be an indicator that the Taliban sees the Afghani police as their greatest threat, thus they are aggressively targeted.

I'm sure our response will be more Afghani Commandos and a bigger ANA. It is the American way, if a little stupid doesn't work, try "more" stupid, because we're obviously not applying enough stupid to the problem. I wonder what metrics our EBO bubbas are using to paint a rosey picture?

Pardon my frustration. Must be a post Christmas hangover. If you haven't had chilled lemonchillo, then I highly recommend it, but in moderation.

[Surferbeetle]

If we do not follow the proposed police-model for Afghanistan what other models are available which will meet the need/desire to reduce the disruptive components of Taliban influence in Afghanistan? I am going to look to Latin America for answers, conduct a DIME based analysis for a couple of hours, and share what I find with the group.

Paramilitary Groups (1) have been used by various actors in Latin America in the countries of Colombia (2), El Salvador (3), Guatemala (4), Nicaragua (5), and Mexico (6). Paramilitary groups have been used for such varying needs as Land Reform (7) and what is termed Corporate Counterinsurgency (8). The effectiveness or appropriateness of Paramilitary Groups in supporting legal governments has been questioned by a variety of sources. (9) It is noteworthy, however, that Paramilitary Groups have been/are widespread in Latin America.

The D in DIME stands for Diplomacy. The US has had diplomatic relations with Colombia for over one hundred years (10). El Salvador sought admission to the US after the break up of the United Provinces of Central America in 1838 and later declared independence in 1841. (11) (12). The US-DOS describes US relations with Guatemala as close though on occasion strained. (13) Rafael Carrera was the Guatemala’s first dictator in 1838. (14) Mexico’s relationship with the US has characterized as a ‘love-hate’ one since it’s independence in 1810. (15) US-Nicaragua relations since it’s independence in 1821 have been turbulent. (16) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs for Paramilitary Groups appear to have a deeper history in Africa than they do in Latin America. (17) (18) (19) (20). Our diplomatic efforts in the region have been characterized as uneven and this may in part be due to Latin America accounting for less than 6 percent of US trade. (21)

The I in DIME stands for Information/Intelligence. As can be seen from my list of references there seems to be no shortage of information on Paramilitary Groups in Latin America and so I will leave it at that.

The M in DIME stands for Military and I will limit my analysis to a partial catalog of Paramilitary Groups in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Mexico. Colombia is home to the FARC, ELN, and AUC. (22) (23) El Salvador was home to the FMLN, FDR, ERP, RN and PRTC during the 1970’s and the FMLN participates in the Government today. (24) (25) Guatemala was home to the ESA (Secret Anti-communist Army), La Mano Blanco, URNG (comprised of the EGP, ORPA, FAR, and PGT). (26) Nicaragua was home to the Contras (a group which included the FDN) and the FSLN both of which participate(d) in the countries government. (27) (28) (29) Mexico is home to the EZLN and it can be argued that the countries Paramilitary Drug Cartels desire some level of political control of the country. (30) (31) (32)

The E in DIME stands for Economics. Since I am running out of steam on this two-hour sprint tonight I will limit my analysis to the statement that Paramilitary Groups require money to function. Consider that the CRS reports “In the United States, wholesale illicit drug sale earnings estimates range from $13.6 to $48.4 billion annually.” This same report goes on to state that Mexico “…is the main foreign supplier of marijuana and a major supplier of methamphetamine to the United States.” (33)

Paramilitary Groups have an extensive and checkered history in Latin America. Perhaps Paramilitary Groups are an answer to the problems in Afghanistan(34), but their use will certainly result in a bumpy ride. It is my hope that Agricultural Development (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6427) and Security Development (in particular that of the ANP (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=61674&postcount=39) and their derivatives), will be the main effort in Afghanistan. Time will tell.

(1) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitary
(2) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitarism_in_Colombia
(3) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(4) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_Civil_War
(5) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua#Sandinistas_and_the_Contras
(6) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zapatista_Army_of_National_Liberation
(7) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(8) http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2008/horizon08.html
(9) Chomsky, N. (2000). Rogue States, The Rule of Force in World Affairs Cambridge MA: South End Press
(10) http://countrystudies.us/colombia/97.htm
(11) http://countrystudies.us/el-salvador/5.htm
(12) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(13) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm
(14) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(15) http://countrystudies.us/mexico/93.htm
(16) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(17) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disarmament,_Demobilization_and_Reintegration
(18) http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php
(19) http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/search_results.php?search=1&full_term=Full+search&subject_id=1520&title_term=Search+by+title&region_id=0&author_term=&country_id=0&search.x=17&search.y=3
(20) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3582160.stm
(21) http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl895.cfm
(22) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4528631.stm
(23) http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/colombia/links.html
(24) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(25) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farabundo_Mart%C3%AD_National_Liberation_Front
(26) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_Civil_War
(27) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FSLN
(28) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua#Sandinistas_and_the_Contras
(29) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Democratic_Force
(30) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zapatista_Army_of_National_Liberation
(31) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_Drug_War
(32) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf
(33) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf
(34) http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/afghanistan604/


And now for the hunt for the scotch...

[Surferbeetle]

From the SWJ (http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/miredinmount.htm) Reference Library-Afghanistan website

The Sarandoy served as a national police force, but their armaments surpassed the traditional police arms of pistol, baton and shotgun. The Sarandoy constituted a third ground force within the DRA. They had heavy armaments, armored personnel carriers and a separate command and control system. The DRA Army, KHAD and Sarandoy often worked together out of necessity, but they were separate, rival systems designed to counterbalance one another and prevent regime ouster. It was not an efficient, or particularly effective design, but the DRA was designed for regime survival, not efficiency or effectiveness. Furthermore, the DRA leadership saw their chief threat as internal subversion within the communist party instead of the rural Mujahideen.

From the Illinois Institute of Technology (http://www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/NationalSecurity.html) website

The general ineffectiveness and unreliability of the Afghan army led the Kabul regime to organize a number of paramilitary internal security forces. Probably the most important of these in the mid-1980s was the Sarandoy (Defenders of the Revolution), an armed body under the control of the Khalqidominated Ministry of Interior. It was an outgrowth of the Daoud-era Gendarmerie that before 1978 had comprised about 20,000 men. The November 1985 issue of Jane's Defence Weekly gave approximately the same figure for the size of the Sarandoy in 1985. It was organized into six brigades or regiments, numbering around 6,000 men and based in Qandahar, Badakhshan, Baghlan, and Parvan provinces and in Kabul, which had two Sarandoy units; there were also 20 operational and mountain battalions, with an additional 6,000 men; personnel attached to the national and 28 provincial headquarters of the Sarandoy, numbering around 3,000 men; and other personnel attached to the Sarandoy Academy and to administrative, construction, and maintenance units. These totaled a further 4,000 men. Established in early 1981, the force played an active role in offensives against the mujahidiin, though its effectiveness was hampered by the rivalry between Parchamis and Khalqis. Sarandoy relations with Parcham-dominated KHAD were tense.

From wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KHAD)

There was a bitter rivalry between Najibullah and Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi. Gulabzoi, a Khalq sympathizer, was Minister of the Interior and commander of Sarandoy ("Defenders of the Revolution"), the national gendarmerie. Gulabzoi was one of the few prominent Khalqis remaining in office in a Parcham-dominated regime.

[Jedburgh]

JFQ, 1st Qtr 09: Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned: Reforming the Afghan National Police (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/15.pdf)
.....While most Afghan governing institutions had long been viewed with suspicion by the people, the Afghan police were especially distrusted as a result of their lengthy history of corruption, cronyism, and incompetence. Furthermore, these same police officers served as the real face of the Afghan government for average citizens, as they were the representatives of the government most likely to interact with the local people on a routine basis. So in keeping with the basic tenets of our counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and the irregular warfare (IW) joint operating concept, we would have to fix the Afghan police—and the government agencies administering them—as a critical step toward convincing the people to support the popularly elected government instead of the Taliban alternative. This article describes the scope and challenges of these major stability operations missions, while highlighting relevant elements of our new COIN doctrine—central to the IW concept—as they relate to operationalization, or using the COIN doctrine as the basis for specific action plans.....

[Bill Moore]

thanks Jedburgh, this is a very relevant post.

Force Structure Mismatches with Mission Requirements. Stability and reconstruction operations usually require a variety of skills and resources that do not routinely reside within the U.S. military.

I hope all those working on the irregular warfare Joint Integrating Concepts and Security Force Assistance read this article. There is a wealth of informaton here that inform the process and help clarify what are capability and capacity gaps are.

At the same time, the civilian police mentors hired by the State Department to provide civilian law enforcement expertise to the developing Afghan police forces do not have the flexibility to deploy into the areas where they are needed the most, for reasons of force protection and nonpermissive threat conditions. Nor do they typically bring a Soldier’s mindset to the tasks at hand. As a result, there is a real mismatch between the force structure needed to carry out the Afghan police development mission and the resources available on the ground.

I have commented negatively before on my impressions of State Department funded police training in a combat zone. These police advisors definitely have a role to play, as the expertise they bring is essential for the bread and butter law enforcement skills, but they are not capable of teaching the counterinsurgency/constabulary skills needed.

As the author stated they are not allowed to conduct combat advising/ mentoring due to outdated Department of State rules, which indicates that for these programs to be effective they will probably require a DoD lead, but with whole of government participation. Doing more of the same that has led to failure to this point is not the right answer. We really do need a sea change in our whole of government approach to building partner capacity, which is why we must get the security force assistance concept right, it is absolutely critical.

Upon taking responsibility for police development, the United States initially replaced this focus on quality with an emphasis on quantity. That approach, while fielding individual police at a far higher rate, did nothing to address the ineffectiveness of the police leadership at the district level, or in the administration of the police forces at the national or provincial levels. Instead, leaders must take a holistic approach—or systems perspective on the operational environment approach—if there is to be any chance of
overcoming the wholesale political, organizational, and societal challenges of creating a functioning and professional institution. The scope of the problem includes economics, cultural norms, family issues, pay, basic means of
identification, illiteracy, and a range of other major challenges.

This is a case where the turtle beats the hare in the race. We must be prepared to fill the security role until we can implement an effective security force assistance program. There will be an uncomfortable gap where we need an interim capability, which may be able to be filled with local militias working for the coalition and other unconventional options. Locals must play a role as soon as possible, but at the same time we can't afford to stand up a "police" force too quickly, which could undermine its credability for a long time to come.

[Surferbeetle]

The article linked by Jedburgh is well written, interesting, captures the 'ground reality' found upon COIN battlefields and I agree with much of what is stated. I would, however, like to focus upon this quote:

At the same time, the civilian police mentors hired by the State Department to provide civilian law enforcement expertise to the developing Afghan police forces do not have the flexibility to deploy into the areas where they are needed the most, for reasons of force protection and nonpermissive threat conditions. Nor do they typically bring a Soldier’s mindset to the tasks at hand.

Further examination of the 'why' behind the above quote may have some interesting lessons for those of us who focus upon the 'soldiers approach'. It's my opinion, based upon the close observation of policemen who have been on my teams, that there is a valuable distinction between a 'policeman's approach' and a 'soldier's approach' to certain recurring situations in the COIN environment. Soldiers are trained to rapidly and decisively escalate a situation in order to overwhelm and destroy/subdue opposition. Policemen are also able to take a different tack in that in appropriate situations they are able to consistently deescalate and bring conflict to an 'acceptable' resolution. This observation does not discount the 'fighting' abilities of Police. Instead I often use the Mixed Martial Arts analogy for COIN because I believe that the use of more than just one method is vital to success, and ANP training needs to take this into account.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Entropy; a summary of where the ANP are today and at a national level: http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/07/crippling-obamas-counterinsurgency-strategy---richard-sale.html

Yes, it is depressing and IMHO suggests our strategy is built on 'shifting sands".

davidbfpo

[Entropy]

Thanks David!

Here's another decent article (http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47871) on the subject:

The strategy of the major U.S. and British military offensive in Afghanistan's Helmand province aimed at wresting it from the Taliban is based on bringing back Afghan army and police to maintain permanent control of the population, so the foreign forces can move on to another insurgent stronghold.

But that strategy poses an acute problem: The police in the province, who are linked to the local warlord, have committed systematic abuses against the population, including the abduction and rape of pre-teen boys, according to village elders who met with British officers.

Anger over those police abuses runs so high that the elders in Babaji just north of Laskgar Gah warned the British that they would support the Taliban to get rid of them if the national police were allowed to return to the area, according to a Jul. 12 report by Reuters correspondent Peter Graff.

Associated Press reporters Jason Straziuso and David Guttenfelder, who accompanied U.S. troops in Northern Helmand, reported Jul. 13 that villagers in Aynak were equally angry about police depredations. Within hours of the arrival of U.S. troops in the village, they wrote, bands of villagers began complaining the local police force was "a bigger problem than the Taliban".

[IntelTrooper]

Thanks David!

Here's another decent article (http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47871) on the subject:
Dumb, dumb, dumb. Time to rotate these guys to some mandatory Blackwater, I mean, "Xe" training time and replace them with the ANCOP (Afghan National Civil Order Police) for a few months.

[Jedburgh]

USIP, 10 Aug 09: Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform (http://www.usip.org/files/resources/afghanistan_police.pdf)
Summary

• In seven years, the Afghan National Police forces have grown to 68,000 personnel, with a target end strength of 86,000. The ANP includes the uniformed police force, which is responsible for general police duties, and specialized police forces, which deal with public order, counternarcotics, terrorism, and border control.

• Despite the impressive growth in numbers, the expenditure of $10 billion in international police assistance, and the involvement of the United States, the European Union, and multiple donors, the ANP is riddled with corruption and generally unable to protect Afghan citizens, control crime, or deal with the growing insurgency.

• The European Union has replaced Germany as the lead partner for police reform, but the United States has the largest police program, which is directed by the U.S. military. Putting soldiers in charge of police training has led to militarization of the ANP and its use as a counterinsurgency force.

• Using improperly trained, equipped, and supported ANP patrol men as “little soldiers” has resulted in the police suffering three times as many casualties as the Afghan National Army. Police are assigned in small numbers to isolated posts without backup and are targeted by the insurgents.

• Beyond funding the Taliban, the explosion in Afghan narcotics production fueled widespread corruption in the Afghan government and police. Drug abuse by police officers became increasingly common as did other forms of criminal behavior.

• Challenges facing the ANP were further compounded by a proliferation of bilateral police assistance programs that reflected the policing practices of donor countries. These efforts often were not coordinated with the larger U.S. and EU programs, creating confusion for the ANP.

• The Obama administration has acknowledged the importance of the police and announced its intentions to expand and improve the ANP as a key part of its plan for stabilizing Afghanistan. It should do this as part of a broader international community approach to police assistance that embraces a comprehensive program for security sector reform and rule of law.

[IntelTrooper]

USIP, 10 Aug 09: Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform (http://www.usip.org/files/resources/afghanistan_police.pdf)

I think this is a good summary, with some caveats:
The Obama administration’s strategy for the Afghan police is to
increase numbers, enlarge the “train and equip” program, and engage the police in the fight against the Taliban. This approach has not worked in the past, and doing more of the same will not achieve success. It is also inconsistent with the stated intention of the new U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, to make protecting Afghan civilians the first priority of American forces and to adjust U.S. military tactics accordingly. Brig. Gen. Lawrence Nicholson said his [M]arines in Helmand province would protect Afghan civilians from the Taliban and help restore government services rather than mount hunt-and-kill missions against insurgents. Certainly, the ANP should receive the same assignment.
The ANP are not "mount[ing] hunt-and-kill missions against insurgents." They're just not really doing anything in particular, and at the district level there aren't enough of them to really do anything, anyway. The ANP should have primary responsibility in developing informant networks and arresting low-level Taliban in addition to their normal law enforcement duties. Petty crime is pretty rare so if they're getting paid to carry weapons they should at least be contributing somehow.

[davidbfpo]

Not sure of the interviewee's background and this is supplied in the opening:

Lieutenant General Abdul Hadi Khalid was the Afghan first deputy minister of the interior for security from May 2006 to late June 2008. Specializing in counter-narcotics, border policing and internal security, he announced the largest drug seizure in history.

He lost his post after a dispute with President Hamid Karzai's administration last year, but remains one of Afghanistan's leading thinkers on regional ethno-political dynamics and transnational criminal networks.

Interview covers more than the ANP and is most interesting on relatiosn with Afghanistan's neighbours: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI23Df02.html . Note this appeared first two weeks ago on the Jamestown website.

davidbfpo

[IntelTrooper]

Not sure of the interviewee's background and this is supplied in the opening:



Interview covers more than the ANP and is most interesting on relatiosn with Afghanistan's neighbours: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI23Df02.html

davidbfpo

The Americans are soldiers that do not understand the fundamentals of policing communities and feel the ANP should be proper security forces. We had Germans who were training our police [the German Police Project Office] at the Kabul Police Academy several years ago but they did not do a good job because they put too many limitations on their mandate. They could train police inside the police academy but not outside of it in real situations.
He's right on about this, for sure.

[davidbfpo]

Posted on another OEF thread: A variety of links and some will be cross-posted on other threads i.e. ANA & ANP. Not in order of priority.

1) Britain calls for mini-surge in Afghanistan to help train army. Of note is the claim the UK can deploy only 3k of the 9k troops in Helmand and that the ANA now have 8k deployed in Helmand (which I simply find incredible) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6851607.ece

2) http://www.captainsjournal.com/ has some amazing reports on the ANA and ANP. This is the longest, citing many sources (many on SWC I'm sure) and covers both the ANA and ANP: http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...national-army/

3) A Canadian OMLT veteran (from Kandahar Province) on the ANA, including literacy, training and more: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

The BBC News reports:Five British soldiers have been shot dead in Helmand Province, in an attack the UK military blamed on a "rogue" Afghan policeman.

And a comment from an ex-UK commander:It will undermine trust, certainly in the short term, until we establish exactly what happened. And it wouldn't at all surprise me now if there aren't a lot of soldiers, British soldiers in Afghanistan, with their fingers very firmly on the trigger when they're around Afghan police and military.

See:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8341659.stm and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8341825.stm

Not good news for Afghanisation and training the Afghans.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A few more details in follow-up reporting, notably the attack was within a compound: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6504375/Killing-of-five-British-soldiers-casts-doubt-on-Afghanistan-strategy.html

Commentary and links on:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/11/murder.html

davidbfpo

[Firn]

A terrible day. Murderous treachery is the basest crime of all. Sadly this is soft spot with a angle of attack which is very difficult to deal with.

Firn

[jmm99]

is this article in the Independent, 'Most of them were corrupt and stoned on opium (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/most-of-them-were-corrupt-and-stoned-on-opium-1814785.html)':

'Most of them were corrupt and stoned on opium'
A senior serving soldier reveals how the Afghan policemen in Helmand are often a danger to the British forces they work with
Thursday, 5 November 2009

When I heard the news this morning, I thought "Christ, five in one go..." I was shocked and saddened – but I was not surprised that it had happened. I'm surprised it took this long.

We went out to Helmand to mentor the Afghan National Police without understanding the level they were at. We thought we would be arresting people, helping them to police efficiently. Instead we were literally training them how to point a gun on the ranges, and telling them why you should not stop cars and demand "taxes".

Most of them were corrupt and took drugs, particularly opium. The lads would go into police stations at night and they would be stoned; sometimes they would fire indiscriminately at nothing.

I particularly interested in this comment:

The Afghan army are a lot more switched on. They have started to stand up for themselves. But the police have not had the same investment. There is no point in pushing the army through to clear ground if you leave a void behind with the police.

The primary problem in Astan is not military, but that of civil administration (part of the political effort, which is near FUBAR).

Uncheerful

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Amidst the follow-up articles to the five deaths is this BBC report:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8344648.stm and a more general review of the ANP: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8343133.stm

Note one of the five UK soldiers is the Grenadier Guards Regimental Sergeant Major (Warrant Officer 1); probably the most senior NCO to die to date. Plus the UK's most senior officer in Afghanistan comments:It's not the first time that an Afghan policeman or an Afghan soldier or indeed soldiers of other nations in other theatres have carried out this sort of atrocity. And regrettably I think we have to say it probably won't be the last. But it is a very rare event.

davidbfpo