The Afghanistan National Police (ANP)

[Jedburgh]

Recently published by the OIGs of State & Defense:

Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness (http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/76103.pdf)

Key Judgments
• The U.S.-funded program to train and equip the Afghan National Police (ANP) is generally well conceived and well executed. However, long-term U.S. assistance and funding, at least beyond 2010, is required to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program.

• The U.S. Ambassador is responsible for policy guidance; the Commander, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) executes the police program through the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). The senior embassy and military leaders have excellent relations and work together well to administer and improve the police program.

• Building the Afghan National Police (ANP) requires a comprehensive, integrated approach that encompasses leadership training, sustaining institutions and organizations, and oversight and internal control mechanisms. As it has rapidly evolved, police readiness requirements have expanded beyond training to include sweeping institutional reform of the ANP through the Ministry of Interior.

• Nevertheless, ANP’s readiness level to carry out its internal security and conventional police responsibilities is far from adequate. The obstacles to establish a fully professional ANP are formidable. Among them are: no effective field training officer (FTO) program, illiterate recruits, a history of low pay and pervasive corruption, and an insecure environment.

• The mentoring program is a key component to effect institutional change and build a capable, self-sustaining national police force. To reach its full potential, the mentoring program should be expanded and better managed to achieve program objectives.

• Management of the police training contract is problematic and requires more effective coordination between State Department contract managers and CSTC-A, which is responsible for executing ANP training programs.

• The procurement pipeline to Afghanistan for ANP equipment is slow, but is improving. There is inadequate accountability for equipment after it is turned over to the ANP, because the ANP logistics system is not yet effective. The ANP needs to establish and implement an effective end-to-end internal controls process.

• Until the Afghan criminal justice system, including law enforcement, judiciary, and corrections, has matured and is synchronized and coordinated from the national to the local level such that laws are standardized and uniformly applied, the ANP will function more as a security force than as a law enforcement organization.

• The U.S. and international effort for standing up the ANP is not limitless; therefore, transitioning full responsibility and authority to the MoI needs greater emphasis.

• Building an effective ANP program will require a long-term commitment from coalition and international partners. Premature withdrawal from this commitment will compromise the progress already accomplished and put at risk the U.S. goal to establish a professional police force embracing the values and practices of community policing and the rule of law.
The full report makes for an interesting read.

[tequila]

Cops or Robbers: The Struggle to Reform the Afghan Police (http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=&task=doc_download&gid=523) (pdf file) - Andrew Wilder, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit



...
If police reform is to succeed in Afghanistan, and the big increase in resources to reform the ANP is not to be wasted, the major actors —

especially the government, the US, and the EUPOL mission — will need to address five key issues.


1. Develop a shared vision and strategy for the ANP


The most fundamental issue that must be resolved
for police reform efforts to succeed in Afghanistan is the need for a shared vision of the role of the ANP, and a shared strategy on
how to achieve that vision. In particular, there is a need to reconcile the “German vision” of the police as a civilian law and order force, and
the “US vision” of the police as a security force with a major counter-insurgency role ...


2. Replace SSR pillars with an integrated and comprehensive rule of law strategy.


The failure of the government and the international community to develop and implement an effective strategy for reforming and strengthening
the judicial sector is a potentially crippling flaw of current police reform efforts. A civilian police force, no matter how well trained and
equipped, will have little ability to uphold and promote the rule of law in the absence of a functioning judicial system ...


3. Make donor assistance conditional on comprehensive MoI reform.

The most consistent theme that emerged in interviews for this paper was that without comprehensive reform of the MoI, police reform efforts will fail and the money spent on reform will be wasted. The MoI is notoriously corrupt, factionalised, and an increasingly important actor in Afghanistan's illegal drug economy ...


4. Prioritise quality of police over quantity.


There has been a damaging tendency to let immediate issues, such as the presidential elections and the growing Taliban insurgency, result in “quick fix” solutions that prioritise the quantity of police over the quality. A recent example was the 2006 decision to create the ANAP to assist
in counter-insurgency operations. Such measures to quickly increase police numbers are undermining the longer-term objective of creating
an effective police force ...


5. Prioritise fiscal sustainability of the security sector.


It is widely recognised that in the foreseeable future Afghanistan will not have the resources to independently sustain the security sector institutions that are currently being developed. Despite this knowledge, few concrete measures are being taken to address the problem, and
few decisions are being made to bring security sector costs more in line with what Afghanistan can afford ...

A massive amount of info about the Afghan police in this document. Very interesting reading, whether you agree with the recommendations or not.

[Jedburgh]

ISN Security Watch, 30 Jul 07: Afghanistan's Embryonic Police (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17920)

In what is becoming a dolefully familiar pattern in the ongoing fighting in Afghanistan, the Taliban are increasingly targeting the fledgling Afghan police force. According to Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior, around 350 Afghan police officers have been killed since the beginning of 2007, the highest police death toll they have seen since the Taliban were routed out of Kabul in 2001....

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 30 Aug 07: Reforming Afghanistan's Police (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/138_reforming_afghanistan_s_police.pdf)

Policing goes to the very heart of state building, since a credible national institution that helps provide security and justice for the population is central to government legitimacy. However Afghanistan’s citizens often view the police more as a source of fear than of security. Instead of emphasising their coercive powers, reform should focus on accountability, ethnic representation and professionalism, along with an urgent need to depoliticise and institutionalise appointments and procedures. It is counter-productive to treat police as an auxiliary fighting unit in battling the insurgency, as has been happening with increasing frequency in the troubled south. Afghanistan, like any other democracy, requires police service more than police force.

The state of the Afghan National Police (ANP) nearly six years after the fall of the Taliban reflects the international community’s failure to grasp early on the centrality of comprehensive reform of the law enforcement and justice sectors, despite similar hard-learned lessons in other countries attempting to emerge from years of armed conflict. President Karzai’s government still lacks the political will to tackle a culture of impunity and to end political interference in appointments and operations. Attempts to shortcut institution building are compounded by an exploding narcotics trade – partly symptomatic of the state of policing but even more clearly a major corrupting influence on attempted reforms. At the same time, the challenges of a growing insurgency are pushing quick fixes to the fore....
Full 35 page report at the link.

[Jedburgh]

...I'm posting this here rather than in the dedicated Afghan Drug thread because of the focus on the Police:

Transcripts from the 4 Oct 07 hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia:

Counternarcotics Strategy and Police Training in Afghanistan (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov:80/110/sch100407.htm), Thomas A. Schweich, Acting Assistant Secretary, DoS Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan.

Counternarcotics Strategy and Police Training in Afghanistan (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov:80/110/schn100407.htm), Mark L. Schneider, Senior Vice President, International Crisis Group.

[tequila]

Death rate for Afghan police force 'staggering' (http://www.thestar.com/News/World/article/262109)- Ottawa Star, 1 Oct.



KANDAHAR–In rural Panjwaii and Zhari districts, Afghan cops are being killed faster than they can be replaced, says one of their Canadian mentors.

That terrifying fact stands as a huge roadblock to Canada's efforts to turn over security in these troubled regions to the fledgling police force.
"The rate at which they're losing policemen can never be replenished, unfortunately," RCMP Cpl. Barry Pitcher said.

In Panjwaii district alone – an insurgent hotbed west of Kandahar – police officers recently had six trucks destroyed in a 20-day period through roadside bombs and ambushes.

In July, 71 police officers were killed in regional command south, a territory that includes Kandahar province. Nationwide, 650 officers were killed from March 2006 to March 2007. Government officials say another 500 have been killed since then ...

[Rex Brynen]

Canadians pay to bolster Afghan security (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.

20071009.afghan09/BNStory/Afghanistan/home), Globe and Mail, 9 October 2007.


KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — Canada has decided to sidestep the corrupt Afghan government and ensure the safety of Canadian soldiers by paying Afghan police directly, in cash.

It's an attempt to buy stability in the dangerous districts west of Kandahar city, where Canadian soldiers stake their lives on the reliability of their Afghan allies.

“This is brand new,” said Brigadier-General Guy Laroche, Canada's top commander in Afghanistan, during an interview Monday. “We're going to make sure our people eat.”

Good idea, although it is a sad commentary on capacity and corruption problems in the Ministry of Interior:


“The money did not get to these guys,” Gen. Laroche said. “Somebody is taking 10 per cent here, 10 per cent there, and at the end the poor guy is left with nothing. Would you stay in a place like that without being paid? I mean, c'mon.”

US police mentors are doing the same.

[Jedburgh]

Eurasia Insight, 20 Nov 07: Afghanistan: A Law Enforcement Success Story in Kabul (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112007.shtml)

..."Corruption is rooted in economics, and so is violence. Give me the equipment, the men and the money and I can turn this force into one that can clean the crime off these streets in a matter of months. Until then, I do my best with what I have.".....

[slapout9]

Eurasia Insight, 20 Nov 07: Afghanistan: A Law Enforcement Success Story in Kabul (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112007.shtml)


Great article Jed, thanks for posting.

[tequila]

Afghan Police Struggle to Work a Beat in a War (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/world/asia/13afghan.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print)- NYTIMES, 13 January.


Many of the problems frustrating Afghanistan’s efforts to secure its dangerous eastern and southern provinces were evident in the bizarre tour of duty of Shair Mohammad, a police officer who spent 18 months in an isolated swath of steppe.

Until December, when a colonel arrived to replace him, Mr. Mohammad, 30, had been the acting police chief in the Nawa district of Ghazni Province. The job gave him jurisdiction over hundreds of square miles near Pakistan that the Taliban (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=nyt-org) had used as a sanctuary since being ousted from power in 2001.

But his ability to police his beat was severely compromised.

Mr. Mohammad had no rank, no money for food and not enough clothing or gear to operate in cold weather. Two of his six trucks were broken. The ammunition the Pentagon provided him came in cardboard boxes that immediately crumbled, exposing cartridges to the elements on his storeroom’s dirty floor.

Compounding his woes, the possibility of mutiny was on his mind. It was a natural worry, he said, because since April none of his men had been paid.
“My commanders always just give me promises,” he said. “They never send the money ...”

[Jedburgh]

18 Jun 08 testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs regarding Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice Sector in Afghanistan:

U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability (http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080618133007.pdf), Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director, International Affairs and Trade, GAO

Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan (http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080618133043.pdf), Frank Ward, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, DoS

Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice Sector in Afghanistan (http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080618133207.pdf), David Johnson, Asst Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, DoS

Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan (http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080618133250.pdf), Bobby Wilkes, Dpty Asst Secretary of Defense for South Asia, OSD

Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan (http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080618133326.pdf), Mark Ward, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Asia Bureau, USAID

Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan (http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080618133352.pdf), Bruce Swartz, Dpty Asst Attorney General, Criminal Division, DoJ

[Ken White]

GAO -- who would not have a job if they found nothing wrong -- found things wrong. Okay.

Three DoS, One DoD, one USAID and One DOJ type all commented on the wrongs GAO found -- and added couple to show they were concerned. Okay.

A part of the reported problem is failure to adequately equip the ANP. No mention is made of the part played by our ridiculous procurement laws and regulations -- most at the behest of the Congress that is conducting this 'hearing' -- which are almost certainly primarily responsible for that flaw. Okay.

Another part is that the Afghans works on a different timetable and have different mores than we would like. Okay.

Could the excessive bureaucracy herein displayed also play a part in the failure of the ANP to walk on water?

Oh, wait; not too much water there...

We can save money if we store this and release it again a year from now; save the cost of another hearing to discover little real change. Or we could say no such hearing until 2012 and give things a chance to get fixed...

Not to disparage your posting Jedburgh, I appreciate it and your postings. It's just every now and then, my mind really boggles at how utterly ridiculous and overweight we've become. Verily, I have vented... :mad:

[Ron Humphrey]

GAO -- It's just every now and then, my mind really boggles at how utterly ridiculous and overweight we've become. Verily, I have vented... :mad:

It's good to let it out, you don't need the added hyper tension:wry:

[Jim Rodgers]

A long, and fairly interesting, article in the WaPo today - it's below, and linked from the 6 Aug roundup as well. Not detailed enough to really assess how things are going, but it does seem to illustrate the challenges\frustrations.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/05/AR2008080503503.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2008080503531&pos=

[DaveDoyle]

Only had time to read the first 16 pages of the Wilder paper and the Washington Post article. Haven’t scanned the posts on our government’s approach to the problem. I do suspect that what we (the U.S. government) expect, as a standard for police work may be divorced from what is necessary and effective. That definition will certainly change over time as well.

Getting to the point –

If Taliban are targeting police, and they are, it is because they see the immediate threat. Police, not military, have the ability to effectively limit the Taliban control over the population. Establishing the “profession” of police work is going to be the biggest challenge to a society that distrusts authority. Young Afghans may aspire to be in the military, but at this point not many aspire to protect and serve as a member of the police force, local or national. How does one build on the idea of the importance of the police? Seems like it is going to take a lot of local work first. Work in the districts and villages like the Post article describes.

Thoughts?

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 18 Nov 08: Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/b85_policing_in_afghanistan___still_searching_for_ a_strategy.pdf)

Police reform in Afghanistan is receiving more attention and resources than ever before, but such increased efforts are still yet to be matched by significant improvements in police effectiveness and public confidence. Too much emphasis has continued to be placed on using the police to fight the insurgency rather than crime. Corruption and political appointments are derailing attempts to professionalise the force. The government and the international community need to reinforce the International Policing Coordination Board (IPCB) as the central forum for prioritising efforts and drive forward with much greater unity of effort. Tangible steps such as appointing a career police commissioner and establishing community liaison boards will build professionalism and wider outreach. A national police force able to uphold the rule of law is crucial to statebuilding and would help tackle the root causes of alienation that drive the insurgency.......

[Old Eagle]

In an insurgency, police are caught in the middle. How they are trained and equipped, who controls them, what their missions are, etc. pose massive problems for the counterinsurgent.

Ordinary crime and corruption are problems in Afghanistan (as is traffic control), so traditional police would have their hands full under any circumstances. In fact, the German training program was initially targeted on this mission set.

Then come the organized drug bosses and quickly overwhelm traditional police.

Then come the Taliban, AQ, whoever else and realy overwhelm the police. Remember -- the insurgent is not the counter-soldier, he is the counter-policeman. He doesn't want to win battles, he wants to impose control.

So now the police tend to become something that they didn't start out to be -- paramilitary forces, and in the process, lose the ability to do traditional policing functions.

Well, of course the army can fight insurgents, but there's also a problem with that: we don't want the military to be domestic enforcers. Posse commitatus and all that.

Now my head is starting to hurt.

But wait there's more. When I was working in the Afghan MOD, the senior leadership came in and started the "gotcha" round --
"didn't you say that unity of command is a principle of war?"
"yes..."
"so we need command and control of the police, not the MOI."
'now wait -- the ANA will eventually be an externally directed traditional military force, and police are not part of the military function"
"Are you nuts? We have a huge insurgency inside our borders...(gotcha!)"

Well, you get the idea.

In short, there are not clean cut solutions. Wish there were.

[Ken White]

ever pragmatic Dutch have at least a partial solution. Won't work for and in the US but it might work for some nations and for Afghanistan. The Marechaussee LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Marechaussee) and the Gendarmerie LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Gendarmerie) concepts are also widely copied in the ME. Iran for example, in the days of the Shahs had two police forces; the totally civilian National Police who performed all standard police functions in the towns and cities and the paramilitary Gendarmerie who policed rural areas AND provdiced the border Guard and a paramilitary force (which coincidentally served as a counterweight and coup deterrent to the Armed Forces).

The Turks also have a Gendarmerie. LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Gendarmerie). Note that in all cases, there's a dual chain, civilian and military and note also that the Turks are using Gendarmes in their counterinsurgency (as did the Dutch and French in their former colonies and as did the Viet Namese use their Field Police).

We have a bad tendency to believe that only US solutions are appropriate and to apply the 'not invented here' syndrome to some good ideas that others have. Of course, one argument certain to be deployed to support that ego centric American concept is that "It's hard enough to stand up one police force, much less two." To which I respond -- when you have an absolute and demonstrated NEED for two different kinds of police forces, that's not an issue, it's simply a minor impediment.

[reed11b]

ever pragmatic Dutch have at least a partial solution. Won't work for and in the US but it might work for some nations and for Afghanistan. The Marechaussee LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Marechaussee) and the Gendarmerie LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Gendarmerie) concepts are also widely copied in the ME. Iran for example, in the days of the Shahs had two police forces; the totally civilian National Police who performed all standard police functions in the towns and cities and the paramilitary Gendarmerie who policed rural areas AND provdiced the border Guard and a paramilitary force (which coincidentally served as a counterweight and coup deterrent to the Armed Forces).

The Turks also have a Gendarmerie. LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Gendarmerie). Note that in all cases, there's a dual chain, civilian and military and note also that the Turks are using Gendarmes in their counterinsurgency (as did the Dutch and French in their former colonies and as did the Viet Namese use their Field Police).

We have a bad tendency to believe that only US solutions are appropriate and to apply the 'not invented here' syndrome to some good ideas that others have. Of course, one argument certain to be deployed to support that ego centric American concept is that "It's hard enough to stand up one police force, much less two." To which I respond -- when you have an absolute and demonstrated NEED for two different kinds of police forces, that's not an issue, it's simply a minor impediment.
I am a fan of the Gendarmerie concept but I have to ask if A-stan has the $$ to support two national police forces. Even with massive stand-up support, just maintaining well equiped forces seems to be beyond A-stans reach. All the more reason why I see the mission as defeating AQ and the Taliban over standing up A-stan stability.
Reed

[Ken White]

...All the more reason why I see the mission as defeating AQ and the Taliban over standing up A-stan stability.
ReedI don't think that's possible. Suppress, control to an extent? Yes. Defeat? No -- they'll just go to ground and wait out the west.

As for this:
I am a fan of the Gendarmerie concept but I have to ask if A-stan has the $$ to support two national police forces. Even with massive stand-up support, just maintaining well equiped forces seems to be beyond A-stans reach.First, at this time, we're paying the bills, so stand up is not an issue. Second, given a cessation of western support, Afghanistan will almost certainly continue to exist and it will almost certainly have Police. Those Police will number X. Whether they're all in one agency or four different crews is of little account. Efficiency is always important -- effectiveness is usually more important.

As an aside, I'd suggest that given what I know of Afghanistan, they'd be better off with one National Gendarmerie and having the normal police functions at Province and city level -- but that's in the too hard box at this time.

[reed11b]

I don't think that's possible. Suppress, control to an extent? Yes. Defeat? No -- they'll just go to ground and wait out the west.
I would have to have better then my current knowledge of the Taliban to continue that line of discourse. If you have any suggestions on sources for that feel free to PM me with them, I am always willing to learn.



As an aside, I'd suggest that given what I know of Afghanistan, they'd be better off with one National Gendarmerie and having the normal police functions at Province and city level -- but that's in the too hard box at this time.
Sometimes it takes somebody to actually say the obvious. I agree and I am embarrassed I did not think of that right of the bat.
Reed

[Ken White]

I would have to have better then my current knowledge of the Taliban to continue that line of discourse. If you have any suggestions on sources for that feel free to PM me with them, I am always willing to learn.that's just my very strong conviction from watching a couple of dozen dissident movements over the years and reading some history. In almost all cases, if the heat gets to be too much, the broadswords and battle axes go under the roof thatch, the guns and RPGs get buried, and everyone looks peaceful for a bit -- then zap; they-y-y-r-r-e ba-a-a-a-c-c-kk.

With respect to the Taliban in particular, they're effectively doing that right now; just like the VC of old (and hundreds of other groups) they're just plain old villagers by day then at night they either group together or assist groups. Same game, different time and place.

For example, check this LINK (http://blogs.reuters.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/06/sharia.jpg) for a Reuter's photograph of a Shura in Sangin attended by some British Army folks earlier this year. While the Black headgear is not a guarantee of Taliban membership or sympathy it is generally indicative. Notice the number of them and notice also the numerous looks of love and affection or just plain old 'we're happy to be here'...

[reed11b]

that's just my very strong conviction from watching a couple of dozen dissident movements over the years and reading some history. In almost all cases, if the heat gets to be too much, the broadswords and battle axes go under the roof thatch, the guns and RPGs get buried, and everyone looks peaceful for a bit -- then zap; they-y-y-r-r-e ba-a-a-a-c-c-kk.

With respect to the Taliban in particular, they're effectively doing that right now; just like the VC of old (and hundreds of other groups) they're just plain old villagers by day then at night they either group together or assist groups. Same game, different time and place.



I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?
Reed
P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.

[Steve Blair]

I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?
Reed
P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.

Ken's old enough he's a charter member of the NSA.....

The VC's main strength was indeed broken by the Tet Offensive, and there is a fair amount of speculation that this was done intentionally on the part of the NVN government to remove them as a policy threat after the fall of the south. Local Force elements were still fairly active, but Tet had the Main Force elements dig up their buried guns and charge US and SVN gunlines. Not a productive activity if you plan to survive....

[Ken White]

I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?That the Field Police and the PRUs were in existence a number of years before Tet of '68 and operated against the VC AND the NVA before and after even though most of the main force VC were really gone by mid '66. Tet '68 just got almost all the rest but they were never totally extinguished,

Most groups of dissidents and insurgents have several degrees of effort. In VN, the two principal divisions for war fighting -- not political -- purposes were the Main Force, organized military units of professional fighters who were very competent; and the Local Force, mostly local villagers who sniped or planted mines part time, served as guides for the Main Force units and generally laid low and played supporting roles and who were mostly not too competent militarily. The split early on was about 25% Main force and 75% Local Force. By mid '66 it was about 10 or 15 to 85 or 90 and after Tet '68, about 2:98. As Steve Blair said, lot of politics involved in addition to the combat losses which were substantial.

The various Taliban groups -- and there are several -- probably in the larger crews do pretty much the same thing, Semi pro Bands with local auxiliaries.
P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.Like Steve said, I'm a plank owner. ;)

Sometimes when it seems appropriate but I don't see anything in this sub thread that I meant to be sarcastic or that seems sarcastic on a relook...???

[Rob Thornton]

While having an interesting discussion here at work about security requirements, in terms of what capabilities are required and how they might shape organization at various levels, some questions came up – there a bit random so I apologize up front:

What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve? Police in cities that have no other mechanisms to preserve order and protect the public make sense – particularly where the demographics lend themselves to the requirement – but what about elsewhere – in the fringes where there is not much variance in the demographics and outside presence in solving disputes is not taken kindly?

Does Afghanistan need a national police, or does it need some of the capabilities we normally associate with a national police, perhaps resident in the ANA? Kind of like a frontier army?

Is there other (political) value in building what might be a competing power structure?

Could some of the functions that might be desired from a national police be fulfilled from tribal constabularies? If so, could a combination of tribal constabularies and the ANA organized, trained and equipped to perform along the lines of a frontier army/constabulary meet the requirement? Could it do so with less risk?

If a national police or gendarme was the preferred COA – which model (Guardia Civil, Canadian Mounties, Australian National Police, German Border Guards, the Frontier Corps, even something along the lines of other forms of LE with national authorities such as some of the big national park rangers in places where poaching is big money and brings in well armed criminals)? What would be most suitable given the environment and conditions?

How might a national police be perceived in a place like Afghanistan? What might the enforcement of national laws in accordance with national standards mean to tribal authorities?

I’m not pointing to a yes or no, just trying to work through the consequences on a number of levels. If the solution was an organizational one, it seems there would have to be some serious work done in other areas – tribal and/or provincial buy in would seem to be critical, as well as some serious legislative pieces on the Afghan part.

While we have good reasons for our separation and distribution of authorities (and systems we’ve grown to support them), we have in the past had what we might consider a dual use military ( such as in in the 1800s where there was a lack of other types of authority).

Over time we have developed a very complex system with overlapping agencies from local to state to federal, and with discreet capabilities emerging to fill gaps. Its difficult to know if had we known exactly where we were going and had the resources that we would have been better served to put them into place all at once – there may have been a requirement to adjust in other areas to make what we have suitable to our environment. Awkward, but I heard an analogy the other day about putting 9 pregnant women in the same room does not necessarily get you a baby in one month.

It is hard to live with the idea that some things may take more time than we are comfortable with, particularly when their problem is our problem. Somehow we’ve got to reconcile expectations – not an easy task by any measure.


Best, Rob

[reed11b]

Steve said, I'm a plank owner. ;)

Sometimes when it seems appropriate but I don't see anything in this sub thread that I meant to be sarcastic or that seems sarcastic on a relook...???

I was refering to the lack of happy faces in the picture link.
Reed
P.S. Rob, I have a response for you, making sure my info is correct.

[Ron Humphrey]

For example, check this LINK (http://blogs.reuters.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/06/sharia.jpg) for a Reuter's photograph of a Shura in Sangin attended by some British Army folks earlier this year. While the Black headgear is not a guarantee of Taliban membership or sympathy it is generally indicative. Notice the number of them and notice also the numerous looks of love and affection or just plain old 'we're happy to be here'...


How come it seems like the yunguns are the only ones who didn't bother taking off their shoes?




It is hard to live with the idea that some things may take more time than we are comfortable with, particularly when their problem is our problem. Somehow we’ve got to reconcile expectations – not an easy task by any measure.


A lesson that some of us keep having to learn over and over and over, the hard way:wry:

[Ken White]

What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve?Seems to me that's a determination the Nation concerned has to make and what we think is low quality secondary.
...but what about elsewhere – in the fringes where there is not much variance in the demographics and outside presence in solving disputes is not taken kindly?Seems that could range from no police requirement through tribal or council police to elements of a national force that responds to local control.
Does Afghanistan need a national police, or does it need some of the capabilities we normally associate with a national police, perhaps resident in the ANA? Kind of like a frontier army?As I said above, IMO, a National Gendarmerie and a local Province / District element. However, that should really be up to the Afghans even if I / we disagree... ;)
Is there other (political) value in building what might be a competing power structure?Always! Keep each other honest. That's why I do not agree with a DoD, War and Navy worked fine... :D
Could some of the functions that might be desired from a national police be fulfilled from tribal constabularies? If so, could a combination of tribal constabularies and the ANA organized, trained and equipped to perform along the lines of a frontier army/constabulary meet the requirement? Could it do so with less risk?I think there are two questions there, not a follow on. First is merit of Tribal Constabularies (and how funded?); second is whither the ANA. I don't think you can answer your complex question until those two simple questions are answered. By the Afghans...
If a national police or gendarme was the preferred COA – which model ... What would be most suitable given the environment and conditions?the last question answers the first; there's a reason all those forces you cite are differently organized, equipped and focused. What does Afghanistan need; not what we think but what do they think.
How might a national police be perceived in a place like Afghanistan?I think the answer to that is known today. One reason to look at a reorganization and redirection. Many years ago the Kentucky Highway Patrol had a terrible reputation for graft, corruption and incompetence. Rather then reform it, it was disbanded in 1948 and the Kentucky State Police were activated with some quite high standards (and broader enforcement powers); today, they're one of the best in the country.
What might the enforcement of national laws in accordance with national standards mean to tribal authorities?My suspicion is they won't like it...
It is hard to live with the idea that some things may take more time than we are comfortable with, particularly when their problem is our problem. Somehow we’ve got to reconcile expectations – not an easy task by any measure.Not sure it's our problem but I get your drift, we volunteered to help -- and we should. I think we just need to remember it doesn't have to be our way to work...

That doesn't mean carte blanche and our agreement to everything; gotta sort through the local politics and capabilities but it does need to be a local, not a US arrangement.

[Bill Moore]

What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve?

Rob, I suggest you determine what security capabilities and capacities are required, then identify the gap. This isn't easy if you really think about what this entails; however, it is the easiest step.

Next you get with the experts, and those are not the Soldiers and Marines who worked in Afghanistan, they are knowledgeable, but the experts are the Afghanis. You discuss with them the most culturally appropriate and acceptable way to design the security capabilities and capacity required. It may look nothing like our police or military or the local militias in Iraq. What ever we build, it needs to survive the first light of day once we leave for it to be ultimately effective. That means it needs to look Afghani.

Bill

[Surferbeetle]

From the 12/22/08 Weekly Standard (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/922gzotm.asp) an Article by Ann Marlowe entitled Policing Afghanistan.


Again, the casualty numbers tell the story. As of mid-November, only 88 U.S. troops had been killed in action in all of Afghanistan this year, but 464 Afghan soldiers had been slain and a whopping 1,215 police. That last is an increase of 47 percent over the 2007 total. Add to that an estimated 2,600 police wounded or missing in action so far this year. Given a total Afghan National Police force of 77,000, that means 1 out of 20 cops was killed or wounded in 2008. By way of comparison, just 181 cops were killed in the line of duty in the United States in 2007, and our population is 10 to 12 times larger than Afghanistan's. If the United States were as dangerous for police as Afghanistan, we would have lost at least
12,000 cops this year.

The terms 'only' and 'just' are inappropriately associated with casualty numbers, however the article provides some insights into FID/ANP training that I do not see reported in the MSM.

[Bill Moore]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081227/ap_on_re_as/as_taliban_shadow_government;_ylt=AtLGqUYE3g_4hrLk rP_pf7qs0NUE

As Taliban nears Kabul, shadow gov't takes hold


AP – This June 26, 2008 file frame grab from television footage reportedly shows Afghan militants holding … WARDAK PROVINCE, Afghanistan – Two months ago, Mohammad Anwar recalls, the Taliban paraded accused thieves through his village, tarred their faces with oil and threw them in jail.

The public punishment was a clear sign to villagers that the Taliban are now in charge. And the province they took over lies just 30 miles from the Afghan capital of Kabul, right on the main highway.

The Taliban has long operated its own shadow government in the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan, but its power is now spreading north to the doorstep of Kabul, according to Associated Press interviews with a dozen government officials, analysts, Taliban commanders and Afghan villagers. More than seven years after the U.S.-led invasion, the Islamic militia is attempting — at least in name — to reconstitute the government by which it ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990s.

Whoever controls the populace is winning, we can continue to conduct raids, chase HVTs, use UAVs with hellfire missiles to conduct deep attacks, but if we can't control the populace it is all for naught. This principle of COIN seems to have simply been ignored in OEF-A.

In a Western society the police would be the primary force for controlling the populace, and it appears we're trying to force that model on the Afghanis based on the number of police killed in Surferbettles' post. That should be an indicator that the Taliban sees the Afghani police as their greatest threat, thus they are aggressively targeted.

I'm sure our response will be more Afghani Commandos and a bigger ANA. It is the American way, if a little stupid doesn't work, try "more" stupid, because we're obviously not applying enough stupid to the problem. I wonder what metrics our EBO bubbas are using to paint a rosey picture?

Pardon my frustration. Must be a post Christmas hangover. If you haven't had chilled lemonchillo, then I highly recommend it, but in moderation.

[Surferbeetle]

If we do not follow the proposed police-model for Afghanistan what other models are available which will meet the need/desire to reduce the disruptive components of Taliban influence in Afghanistan? I am going to look to Latin America for answers, conduct a DIME based analysis for a couple of hours, and share what I find with the group.

Paramilitary Groups (1) have been used by various actors in Latin America in the countries of Colombia (2), El Salvador (3), Guatemala (4), Nicaragua (5), and Mexico (6). Paramilitary groups have been used for such varying needs as Land Reform (7) and what is termed Corporate Counterinsurgency (8). The effectiveness or appropriateness of Paramilitary Groups in supporting legal governments has been questioned by a variety of sources. (9) It is noteworthy, however, that Paramilitary Groups have been/are widespread in Latin America.

The D in DIME stands for Diplomacy. The US has had diplomatic relations with Colombia for over one hundred years (10). El Salvador sought admission to the US after the break up of the United Provinces of Central America in 1838 and later declared independence in 1841. (11) (12). The US-DOS describes US relations with Guatemala as close though on occasion strained. (13) Rafael Carrera was the Guatemala’s first dictator in 1838. (14) Mexico’s relationship with the US has characterized as a ‘love-hate’ one since it’s independence in 1810. (15) US-Nicaragua relations since it’s independence in 1821 have been turbulent. (16) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs for Paramilitary Groups appear to have a deeper history in Africa than they do in Latin America. (17) (18) (19) (20). Our diplomatic efforts in the region have been characterized as uneven and this may in part be due to Latin America accounting for less than 6 percent of US trade. (21)

The I in DIME stands for Information/Intelligence. As can be seen from my list of references there seems to be no shortage of information on Paramilitary Groups in Latin America and so I will leave it at that.

The M in DIME stands for Military and I will limit my analysis to a partial catalog of Paramilitary Groups in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Mexico. Colombia is home to the FARC, ELN, and AUC. (22) (23) El Salvador was home to the FMLN, FDR, ERP, RN and PRTC during the 1970’s and the FMLN participates in the Government today. (24) (25) Guatemala was home to the ESA (Secret Anti-communist Army), La Mano Blanco, URNG (comprised of the EGP, ORPA, FAR, and PGT). (26) Nicaragua was home to the Contras (a group which included the FDN) and the FSLN both of which participate(d) in the countries government. (27) (28) (29) Mexico is home to the EZLN and it can be argued that the countries Paramilitary Drug Cartels desire some level of political control of the country. (30) (31) (32)

The E in DIME stands for Economics. Since I am running out of steam on this two-hour sprint tonight I will limit my analysis to the statement that Paramilitary Groups require money to function. Consider that the CRS reports “In the United States, wholesale illicit drug sale earnings estimates range from $13.6 to $48.4 billion annually.” This same report goes on to state that Mexico “…is the main foreign supplier of marijuana and a major supplier of methamphetamine to the United States.” (33)

Paramilitary Groups have an extensive and checkered history in Latin America. Perhaps Paramilitary Groups are an answer to the problems in Afghanistan(34), but their use will certainly result in a bumpy ride. It is my hope that Agricultural Development (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6427) and Security Development (in particular that of the ANP (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=61674&postcount=39) and their derivatives), will be the main effort in Afghanistan. Time will tell.

(1) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitary
(2) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitarism_in_Colombia
(3) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(4) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_Civil_War
(5) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua#Sandinistas_and_the_Contras
(6) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zapatista_Army_of_National_Liberation
(7) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(8) http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2008/horizon08.html
(9) Chomsky, N. (2000). Rogue States, The Rule of Force in World Affairs Cambridge MA: South End Press
(10) http://countrystudies.us/colombia/97.htm
(11) http://countrystudies.us/el-salvador/5.htm
(12) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(13) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm
(14) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(15) http://countrystudies.us/mexico/93.htm
(16) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(17) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disarmament,_Demobilization_and_Reintegration
(18) http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php
(19) http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/search_results.php?search=1&full_term=Full+search&subject_id=1520&title_term=Search+by+title&region_id=0&author_term=&country_id=0&search.x=17&search.y=3
(20) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3582160.stm
(21) http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl895.cfm
(22) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4528631.stm
(23) http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/colombia/links.html
(24) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(25) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farabundo_Mart%C3%AD_National_Liberation_Front
(26) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_Civil_War
(27) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FSLN
(28) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua#Sandinistas_and_the_Contras
(29) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Democratic_Force
(30) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zapatista_Army_of_National_Liberation
(31) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_Drug_War
(32) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf
(33) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf
(34) http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/afghanistan604/


And now for the hunt for the scotch...

[Surferbeetle]

From the SWJ (http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/miredinmount.htm) Reference Library-Afghanistan website


The Sarandoy served as a national police force, but their armaments surpassed the traditional police arms of pistol, baton and shotgun. The Sarandoy constituted a third ground force within the DRA. They had heavy armaments, armored personnel carriers and a separate command and control system. The DRA Army, KHAD and Sarandoy often worked together out of necessity, but they were separate, rival systems designed to counterbalance one another and prevent regime ouster. It was not an efficient, or particularly effective design, but the DRA was designed for regime survival, not efficiency or effectiveness. Furthermore, the DRA leadership saw their chief threat as internal subversion within the communist party instead of the rural Mujahideen.

From the Illinois Institute of Technology (http://www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/NationalSecurity.html) website


The general ineffectiveness and unreliability of the Afghan army led the Kabul regime to organize a number of paramilitary internal security forces. Probably the most important of these in the mid-1980s was the Sarandoy (Defenders of the Revolution), an armed body under the control of the Khalqidominated Ministry of Interior. It was an outgrowth of the Daoud-era Gendarmerie that before 1978 had comprised about 20,000 men. The November 1985 issue of Jane's Defence Weekly gave approximately the same figure for the size of the Sarandoy in 1985. It was organized into six brigades or regiments, numbering around 6,000 men and based in Qandahar, Badakhshan, Baghlan, and Parvan provinces and in Kabul, which had two Sarandoy units; there were also 20 operational and mountain battalions, with an additional 6,000 men; personnel attached to the national and 28 provincial headquarters of the Sarandoy, numbering around 3,000 men; and other personnel attached to the Sarandoy Academy and to administrative, construction, and maintenance units. These totaled a further 4,000 men. Established in early 1981, the force played an active role in offensives against the mujahidiin, though its effectiveness was hampered by the rivalry between Parchamis and Khalqis. Sarandoy relations with Parcham-dominated KHAD were tense.

From wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KHAD)


There was a bitter rivalry between Najibullah and Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi. Gulabzoi, a Khalq sympathizer, was Minister of the Interior and commander of Sarandoy ("Defenders of the Revolution"), the national gendarmerie. Gulabzoi was one of the few prominent Khalqis remaining in office in a Parcham-dominated regime.

[Jedburgh]

JFQ, 1st Qtr 09: Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned: Reforming the Afghan National Police (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/15.pdf)

.....While most Afghan governing institutions had long been viewed with suspicion by the people, the Afghan police were especially distrusted as a result of their lengthy history of corruption, cronyism, and incompetence. Furthermore, these same police officers served as the real face of the Afghan government for average citizens, as they were the representatives of the government most likely to interact with the local people on a routine basis. So in keeping with the basic tenets of our counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and the irregular warfare (IW) joint operating concept, we would have to fix the Afghan police—and the government agencies administering them—as a critical step toward convincing the people to support the popularly elected government instead of the Taliban alternative. This article describes the scope and challenges of these major stability operations missions, while highlighting relevant elements of our new COIN doctrine—central to the IW concept—as they relate to operationalization, or using the COIN doctrine as the basis for specific action plans.....

[Bill Moore]

thanks Jedburgh, this is a very relevant post.


Force Structure Mismatches with Mission Requirements. Stability and reconstruction operations usually require a variety of skills and resources that do not routinely reside within the U.S. military.

I hope all those working on the irregular warfare Joint Integrating Concepts and Security Force Assistance read this article. There is a wealth of informaton here that inform the process and help clarify what are capability and capacity gaps are.


At the same time, the civilian police mentors hired by the State Department to provide civilian law enforcement expertise to the developing Afghan police forces do not have the flexibility to deploy into the areas where they are needed the most, for reasons of force protection and nonpermissive threat conditions. Nor do they typically bring a Soldier’s mindset to the tasks at hand. As a result, there is a real mismatch between the force structure needed to carry out the Afghan police development mission and the resources available on the ground.

I have commented negatively before on my impressions of State Department funded police training in a combat zone. These police advisors definitely have a role to play, as the expertise they bring is essential for the bread and butter law enforcement skills, but they are not capable of teaching the counterinsurgency/constabulary skills needed.

As the author stated they are not allowed to conduct combat advising/ mentoring due to outdated Department of State rules, which indicates that for these programs to be effective they will probably require a DoD lead, but with whole of government participation. Doing more of the same that has led to failure to this point is not the right answer. We really do need a sea change in our whole of government approach to building partner capacity, which is why we must get the security force assistance concept right, it is absolutely critical.


Upon taking responsibility for police development, the United States initially replaced this focus on quality with an emphasis on quantity. That approach, while fielding individual police at a far higher rate, did nothing to address the ineffectiveness of the police leadership at the district level, or in the administration of the police forces at the national or provincial levels. Instead, leaders must take a holistic approach—or systems perspective on the operational environment approach—if there is to be any chance of
overcoming the wholesale political, organizational, and societal challenges of creating a functioning and professional institution. The scope of the problem includes economics, cultural norms, family issues, pay, basic means of
identification, illiteracy, and a range of other major challenges.

This is a case where the turtle beats the hare in the race. We must be prepared to fill the security role until we can implement an effective security force assistance program. There will be an uncomfortable gap where we need an interim capability, which may be able to be filled with local militias working for the coalition and other unconventional options. Locals must play a role as soon as possible, but at the same time we can't afford to stand up a "police" force too quickly, which could undermine its credability for a long time to come.

[Surferbeetle]

The article linked by Jedburgh is well written, interesting, captures the 'ground reality' found upon COIN battlefields and I agree with much of what is stated. I would, however, like to focus upon this quote:


At the same time, the civilian police mentors hired by the State Department to provide civilian law enforcement expertise to the developing Afghan police forces do not have the flexibility to deploy into the areas where they are needed the most, for reasons of force protection and nonpermissive threat conditions. Nor do they typically bring a Soldier’s mindset to the tasks at hand.

Further examination of the 'why' behind the above quote may have some interesting lessons for those of us who focus upon the 'soldiers approach'. It's my opinion, based upon the close observation of policemen who have been on my teams, that there is a valuable distinction between a 'policeman's approach' and a 'soldier's approach' to certain recurring situations in the COIN environment. Soldiers are trained to rapidly and decisively escalate a situation in order to overwhelm and destroy/subdue opposition. Policemen are also able to take a different tack in that in appropriate situations they are able to consistently deescalate and bring conflict to an 'acceptable' resolution. This observation does not discount the 'fighting' abilities of Police. Instead I often use the Mixed Martial Arts analogy for COIN because I believe that the use of more than just one method is vital to success, and ANP training needs to take this into account.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Entropy; a summary of where the ANP are today and at a national level: http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/07/crippling-obamas-counterinsurgency-strategy---richard-sale.html

Yes, it is depressing and IMHO suggests our strategy is built on 'shifting sands".

davidbfpo

[Entropy]

Thanks David!

Here's another decent article (http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47871) on the subject:


The strategy of the major U.S. and British military offensive in Afghanistan's Helmand province aimed at wresting it from the Taliban is based on bringing back Afghan army and police to maintain permanent control of the population, so the foreign forces can move on to another insurgent stronghold.

But that strategy poses an acute problem: The police in the province, who are linked to the local warlord, have committed systematic abuses against the population, including the abduction and rape of pre-teen boys, according to village elders who met with British officers.

Anger over those police abuses runs so high that the elders in Babaji just north of Laskgar Gah warned the British that they would support the Taliban to get rid of them if the national police were allowed to return to the area, according to a Jul. 12 report by Reuters correspondent Peter Graff.

Associated Press reporters Jason Straziuso and David Guttenfelder, who accompanied U.S. troops in Northern Helmand, reported Jul. 13 that villagers in Aynak were equally angry about police depredations. Within hours of the arrival of U.S. troops in the village, they wrote, bands of villagers began complaining the local police force was "a bigger problem than the Taliban".

[IntelTrooper]

Thanks David!

Here's another decent article (http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47871) on the subject:
Dumb, dumb, dumb. Time to rotate these guys to some mandatory Blackwater, I mean, "Xe" training time and replace them with the ANCOP (Afghan National Civil Order Police) for a few months.

[Jedburgh]

USIP, 10 Aug 09: Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform (http://www.usip.org/files/resources/afghanistan_police.pdf)

Summary

• In seven years, the Afghan National Police forces have grown to 68,000 personnel, with a target end strength of 86,000. The ANP includes the uniformed police force, which is responsible for general police duties, and specialized police forces, which deal with public order, counternarcotics, terrorism, and border control.

• Despite the impressive growth in numbers, the expenditure of $10 billion in international police assistance, and the involvement of the United States, the European Union, and multiple donors, the ANP is riddled with corruption and generally unable to protect Afghan citizens, control crime, or deal with the growing insurgency.

• The European Union has replaced Germany as the lead partner for police reform, but the United States has the largest police program, which is directed by the U.S. military. Putting soldiers in charge of police training has led to militarization of the ANP and its use as a counterinsurgency force.

• Using improperly trained, equipped, and supported ANP patrol men as “little soldiers” has resulted in the police suffering three times as many casualties as the Afghan National Army. Police are assigned in small numbers to isolated posts without backup and are targeted by the insurgents.

• Beyond funding the Taliban, the explosion in Afghan narcotics production fueled widespread corruption in the Afghan government and police. Drug abuse by police officers became increasingly common as did other forms of criminal behavior.

• Challenges facing the ANP were further compounded by a proliferation of bilateral police assistance programs that reflected the policing practices of donor countries. These efforts often were not coordinated with the larger U.S. and EU programs, creating confusion for the ANP.

• The Obama administration has acknowledged the importance of the police and announced its intentions to expand and improve the ANP as a key part of its plan for stabilizing Afghanistan. It should do this as part of a broader international community approach to police assistance that embraces a comprehensive program for security sector reform and rule of law.

[IntelTrooper]

USIP, 10 Aug 09: Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform (http://www.usip.org/files/resources/afghanistan_police.pdf)

I think this is a good summary, with some caveats:

The Obama administration’s strategy for the Afghan police is to
increase numbers, enlarge the “train and equip” program, and engage the police in the fight against the Taliban. This approach has not worked in the past, and doing more of the same will not achieve success. It is also inconsistent with the stated intention of the new U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, to make protecting Afghan civilians the first priority of American forces and to adjust U.S. military tactics accordingly. Brig. Gen. Lawrence Nicholson said his [M]arines in Helmand province would protect Afghan civilians from the Taliban and help restore government services rather than mount hunt-and-kill missions against insurgents. Certainly, the ANP should receive the same assignment.
The ANP are not "mount[ing] hunt-and-kill missions against insurgents." They're just not really doing anything in particular, and at the district level there aren't enough of them to really do anything, anyway. The ANP should have primary responsibility in developing informant networks and arresting low-level Taliban in addition to their normal law enforcement duties. Petty crime is pretty rare so if they're getting paid to carry weapons they should at least be contributing somehow.

[davidbfpo]

Not sure of the interviewee's background and this is supplied in the opening:


Lieutenant General Abdul Hadi Khalid was the Afghan first deputy minister of the interior for security from May 2006 to late June 2008. Specializing in counter-narcotics, border policing and internal security, he announced the largest drug seizure in history.

He lost his post after a dispute with President Hamid Karzai's administration last year, but remains one of Afghanistan's leading thinkers on regional ethno-political dynamics and transnational criminal networks.

Interview covers more than the ANP and is most interesting on relatiosn with Afghanistan's neighbours: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI23Df02.html . Note this appeared first two weeks ago on the Jamestown website.

davidbfpo

[IntelTrooper]

Not sure of the interviewee's background and this is supplied in the opening:



Interview covers more than the ANP and is most interesting on relatiosn with Afghanistan's neighbours: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI23Df02.html

davidbfpo

The Americans are soldiers that do not understand the fundamentals of policing communities and feel the ANP should be proper security forces. We had Germans who were training our police [the German Police Project Office] at the Kabul Police Academy several years ago but they did not do a good job because they put too many limitations on their mandate. They could train police inside the police academy but not outside of it in real situations.
He's right on about this, for sure.

[davidbfpo]

Posted on another OEF thread: A variety of links and some will be cross-posted on other threads i.e. ANA & ANP. Not in order of priority.

1) Britain calls for mini-surge in Afghanistan to help train army. Of note is the claim the UK can deploy only 3k of the 9k troops in Helmand and that the ANA now have 8k deployed in Helmand (which I simply find incredible) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6851607.ece

2) http://www.captainsjournal.com/ has some amazing reports on the ANA and ANP. This is the longest, citing many sources (many on SWC I'm sure) and covers both the ANA and ANP: http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...national-army/

3) A Canadian OMLT veteran (from Kandahar Province) on the ANA, including literacy, training and more: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

The BBC News reports:
Five British soldiers have been shot dead in Helmand Province, in an attack the UK military blamed on a "rogue" Afghan policeman.

And a comment from an ex-UK commander:
It will undermine trust, certainly in the short term, until we establish exactly what happened. And it wouldn't at all surprise me now if there aren't a lot of soldiers, British soldiers in Afghanistan, with their fingers very firmly on the trigger when they're around Afghan police and military.

See:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8341659.stm and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8341825.stm

Not good news for Afghanisation and training the Afghans.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A few more details in follow-up reporting, notably the attack was within a compound: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6504375/Killing-of-five-British-soldiers-casts-doubt-on-Afghanistan-strategy.html

Commentary and links on:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/11/murder.html

davidbfpo

[Firn]

A terrible day. Murderous treachery is the basest crime of all. Sadly this is soft spot with a angle of attack which is very difficult to deal with.

Firn

[jmm99]

is this article in the Independent, 'Most of them were corrupt and stoned on opium (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/most-of-them-were-corrupt-and-stoned-on-opium-1814785.html)':


'Most of them were corrupt and stoned on opium'
A senior serving soldier reveals how the Afghan policemen in Helmand are often a danger to the British forces they work with
Thursday, 5 November 2009

When I heard the news this morning, I thought "Christ, five in one go..." I was shocked and saddened – but I was not surprised that it had happened. I'm surprised it took this long.

We went out to Helmand to mentor the Afghan National Police without understanding the level they were at. We thought we would be arresting people, helping them to police efficiently. Instead we were literally training them how to point a gun on the ranges, and telling them why you should not stop cars and demand "taxes".

Most of them were corrupt and took drugs, particularly opium. The lads would go into police stations at night and they would be stoned; sometimes they would fire indiscriminately at nothing.

I particularly interested in this comment:


The Afghan army are a lot more switched on. They have started to stand up for themselves. But the police have not had the same investment. There is no point in pushing the army through to clear ground if you leave a void behind with the police.

The primary problem in Astan is not military, but that of civil administration (part of the political effort, which is near FUBAR).

Uncheerful

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Amidst the follow-up articles to the five deaths is this BBC report:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8344648.stm and a more general review of the ANP: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8343133.stm

Note one of the five UK soldiers is the Grenadier Guards Regimental Sergeant Major (Warrant Officer 1); probably the most senior NCO to die to date. Plus the UK's most senior officer in Afghanistan comments:
It's not the first time that an Afghan policeman or an Afghan soldier or indeed soldiers of other nations in other theatres have carried out this sort of atrocity. And regrettably I think we have to say it probably won't be the last. But it is a very rare event.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

This thread was called 'Interagency Assessment of the Afghan Police' and has steadily become the main thread on the ANA, so the title has been changed to reflect what it contains.

Undoubtedly some posts on the ANA are elsewhere.

[davidbfpo]

This morning's BBC Radio 'Today' programme had an interview with two-star General Nick Carter, the regional ISAF (South) commander, in Kandahar, and whilst a few papers have picked up a comment on it was safer to use the roads under the Taliban; see: http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=11503.

I noticed this in response to the interviewer's comment on the appalling reputation of the ANP, when he challenges the General - will the people put their faith in the ANP?
The challenge we have is to create a local, Pashtun police force (my bold), that is as respected as the army (ANA). Ultimately it will be a local police force that makes the population feel secure...

From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8392000/8392231.stm and there is a short recorded interview. His bio is: http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/bio/rc_s/carter.html

Yes, that will be a challenge and where will the Afghans who want to serve in this way come from? Or do I see warlord militias in uniform soon?

[davidbfpo]

Police reform by RUSI, a Whitehall think tank:http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N4B0D427DD18DD/ which links to the actual report; which I did skim read a week ago and was un-impressed (oh yes, I'm a member of RUSI).

[davidbfpo]

I missed this report, so thanks to NATO CIMIC's newsletter:
UK press reports that on 29 November, an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer shot dead six fellow officers at a checkpoint in southwest Afghanistan. This is the second such event in the last two months.

He was later found and killed by the ANA / ANP.

[jmm99]

on the Astan civil and criminal justice system, including the sorry state of the ANP, can be found at Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program (http://www.jssp-afghanistan.com/publications.asp) (JSSP).

CNN reporter Michael Ware (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Ware), for the last couple of nights, has been talking about making local security arrangements with local Pashtun tribal leaders, warlords and governors (often the same person ?) in the south and east.

We'll see what the actions are.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

A long article by Nir Rose, not a writer I am familiar with: http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.1/rosen.php Somewhat dated as incidents were in July 2009, but ample illustrations of the issues we are aware of.

[Ken White]

Here's one: LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4988&highlight=Nir+Rosen). A search will turn up a couple of others.

[tequila]

BR does a nice little roundup of opinion on Afghanistan based off Rosen's article from Andrew Exum, Syed Saleem Shahzad, Aziz Hakimi, Andrew Bacevich, and J. Alexander Thier here (http://bostonreview.net/BR35.1/ndf_afghanistan.php).

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to an article by Christina Lamb in 'The Spectator', in a scathing IMHO review of the UK presence in Afghanistan.

Link: http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/5482223/more-troops-will-just-mean-more-targets.thtml

Amidst was this illustration of how the ANP behave:
A recent report from the (US) Institute of War details how British forces took the district of Nad Ali last year, losing a number of soldiers. They then handed control over to the Afghan police, who set about raping young boys. Eventually the people got so fed up that they asked the Taleban to come back to protect them.

The citation comes from a report by a US think tank and a slightly fuller account:
The Afghan Police did not maintain a significant presence in the area (Nad Ali). Those who were present prior to September 2008 were distrusted by the local population. According to villagers in the area, “the government’s police force was so brutal and corrupt that they welcomed the Taliban as liberators.” According to accounts from local villagers, the ANP’s exploits included beatings, robbery and rape. Locals stated that police would practice “bachabazi” (sex with pre-pubescent boys); “if the boys were out in the fields, the police would come by and rape them… you can go to any police base and you will see these boys. They hold them until they are finished with them and then let the child go.

Link:http://www.understandingwar.org/files/SecuringHelmandPDF.pdf

I put this account recently to a UK Minister at a talk 'Why are we in Afghanistan' and it caused him to pause.

The think tank has several others reports on the war, a more recent one is on Kandahar and the ANSF. Note the founder is Kimberley Kagan, a name that has appeared on SWC before.

[William F. Owen]

David. Thanks for this, but I would disregard the Lamb item.


Hat tip to an article by Christina Lamb in 'The Spectator', in a scathing IMHO review of the UK presence in Afghanistan.

Lamb is a journalist, and a nice lady by all accounts. She has lived there and has done time on the ground, but her "poisonous" account of the 16 Air Assault ambush makes it patently clear she has no understanding of what she is seeing, and she seems to only be interested in the human and emotional stories - with entertainment value.
What Lamb believes about military operations in A'Stan is interesting but irrelevant.
Sit in a UK mess with Officers who have been on the ground, and they simply do not reference any journalistic opinion, except to point out 99% is wrong.
I submit, we should all cease doing it as well. By various collect means, we do have access to the real facts, worthy of analysis.


The citation comes from a report by a US think tank and a slightly fuller account:

Link:http://www.understandingwar.org/files/SecuringHelmandPDF.pdf
Thanks - this I will read!

[davidbfpo]

Found on a Afpak watcher's website: http://watandost.blogspot.com/2010/02/training-afghan-police-failing-project.html that cites a NYT article on 2/2/10: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/world/asia/03afghan.html?pagewanted=1.

Opens with:
ABUL, Afghanistan — The NATO general in charge of training the Afghan police has some tongue-in-cheek career advice for the country’s recruits. “It’s better to join the Taliban; they pay more money,” said Brig. Gen. Carmelo Burgio, from Italy’s paramilitary Carabinieri force.

NYT article ends with:
These guys wear the uniform of a policeman, but that is all that is police about them.

No wonder there is caution about building up the ANP and the Afghan people themselves know far more what the ANP provides.

[Bill Moore]

How long will it take for our government to revamp the laws the govern security force assistance? Our SECDEF has stated this will be our primary effort and the means to a sustainable victory, yet almost 9 years into the fight we're still having turf battles over who should control the training and serious resource constraints. Based on the enclosed article the coalition does a poor job of training these forces (several factors involved, but maybe if we would stop trying to make them look like western police forces and train to their level we would make some progress?), we do a poor job of equipping the forces, we don't pay them well, and if you believe the article the only metric we value is the number trained.

We should either drop the security forces assistance myth and do it ourselves, or we should fix the security forces assistance process. The Cold War legacy method is not adequate. I hear the call for Gramm-Rudman Act to fix the interagency (would be nice), but most pressing is a Gramm-Rudman Act to fix our ability to build partner capacity (the 5 meter fight we're in today). If the consensus is this is the way to win, then we need to resource the winning strategy with the right authorities, funding, and apply the right approach to ensure it is done effectively.

[SWJED]

The Afghan National Police: Turning a Counterinsurgency Problem into a Solution (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/02/turning-a-coin-problem-into-a/) – Naval Postgraduate School Master of Science thesis by Major David J. Haskell, U.S. Army.

[Sylvan]

Here is an article by Sean Naylor, also from this past summer.http://www.afji.com/2009/07/4231017/

90% of local complaints about police in my AO turned out to be false. Amazing how an Afghan will walk up and make a claim, and Westerners instantly assume its the god's honest truth.

[davidbfpo]

A wide ranging article, citing a UK infantry colonel and headlined so:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7801459/Afghanistan-police-corruption-is-fuelling-insurgency.html


He said that the local force was "the reason for the insurgency" in the Nad-e-Ali district of Helmand and that the corruption meant the local population was more distrustful of coalition troops and less likely to be loyal to the Afghan government.

But more worryingly incidents of police "bad behaviour" were encouraging young men to join the Taliban, said Lt Col Walker, the commanding officer of the Grenadier Guards. "They were most often cited by people as the reason why there was a problem or a reason why people joined the Taliban."

An accompanying article I missed (added 19/6):http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/03/afghanistan-police-fuel-taliban-recruitment

[huskerguy7]

As we all have seen, the Afghan National Police (ANP) has undergone several issues and is not as effective as ISAF wants it to be. Issues include corruption, unwilling to fight, lack of proper training, and many others.

With the Taliban insurgency still at large, ISAF has primarily been training the ANP in paramilitary skills. This has resulted with military advisers showing ANP units how to patrol, how to detect roadside bombs, how to maneuver in firefights, and so on. There is no doubt that these skills are needed; the Taliban are a very skilled enemy. By obtaining this kind of training, the ANP are more capable of fulfilling the "hold" section in ISAF's "clear, hold, and build." Essentially, they possess the capacity to conduct minimal military operations, which is useful.

However, paramilitary training leaves out basic law enforcement skills. These include handling evidence, conducting an investigation properly, enforcing the law properly, and building the right ties with the community. If these skills are obtained and used properly, then in the long term, the judicial situation in Afghanistan is likely to be better. But, ANP that are more focused towards enforcing the law are more prone to attacks from insurgents.

Clearly, there is no right answer. Heck, trying to straighten up such a large police force is already a large enough task. What approach should the ANP take? Or is there another one that I missed?

[slapout9]

Huskerguy,
Just exactly what Law do they enforce? How is a population that is reported to be 80% illiterate become informed of the Law to be enforced? What do they use for a Criminal Code?

[huskerguy7]

Huskerguy,
Just exactly what Law do they enforce? How is a population that is reported to be 80% illiterate become informed of the Law to be enforced? What do they use for a Criminal Code?

I am no expert in law, but I'm sure some form of "custom" law exists. Custom law never gets complex, but its "strong" enough to identify theft, trespassing, murder, etc; basically main "popular" crimes. I am sure that the Afghans understand some of this, so the police could possibly enforce some of these basic laws.

I also used to get hung up on the fact that many Afghans can't read; it makes the job difficult for us. However, I had a conversation with Dr. Kilcullen and my thinking change. Here's what he said:


We need to get more innovative and creative about the ways we train these guys...These guys aren’t stupid, they just can’t read

The last sentence is the biggest part: Afghan's aren't stupid, they just can't read. Therefore, it isn't impossible to teach them, but we just need to approach it a different way.

[slapout9]

I am no expert in law, but I'm sure some form of "custom" law exists. Custom law never gets complex, but its "strong" enough to identify theft, trespassing, murder, etc; basically main "popular" crimes. I am sure that the Afghans understand some of this, so the police could possibly enforce some of these basic laws.

I also used to get hung up on the fact that many Afghans can't read; it makes the job difficult for us. However, I had a conversation with Dr. Kilcullen and my thinking change. Here's what he said:



The last sentence is the biggest part: Afghan's aren't stupid, they just can't read. Therefore, it isn't impossible to teach them, but we just need to approach it a different way.


I see in your Bio you are a High School student and you took the trouble to talk to Dr. Killcullen about the ANP. For someone your age to even know who Killcullen is, is a major achievement. Keep up the good work, you will figure it out for all us someday.;)

[jcustis]

Amen.

[Seahorse]

For years now I have heard the constant rhetoric regarding how corrupt the ANP are, and how many problems are associated with their buildup. But the information available from several independent polls over the last five years strongly differs. Polls regarding Afghan perceptions of ANP trustworthiness, corruption, professionalism etc. certainly lag ANA results, but are still as high as 80%. (I'm sure some of our own police forces would be similarly viewed in specific cities.) However this urban legend of a totally corrupt and untrustworthy ANP paints a much more pessimistic picture and is almost self-reinforcing. Allied soldiers almost universally decry ANP professionalism, and claim ANP corruption as significant problems. These same officers also universally reject poll results because they don't agree with their perceptions. The old adage, expectation leads performance, applies to this situation and supports the lack of priority and effort towards the ANP.

A main source of this problem, from my perspective, is the over emphasis on our (western) buid up of the ANA to the detriment of what should be the primary security force for Afghans, the ANP. The ANA provide a false sense of mission progress because of the potential to have them support our exit strategy. We blindingly pursue a goal of building an Afghan Army which can stand in for our forces, conduct a relief-in-place, and facilitate a transition to the GIROA becoming responsible for its own security. But soldiers' contribution to the Afghan mission are limited to security operations and even then fairly narrowly.

I often ask people who they would rely on to address security issues in their own country, and the universal answer is - police forces. It is the police which are required to address the broader security to establish, promote and sustain: rule-of-law, governance, justice, the economy and development.

Carl Eikenberry, when serving as the Commander CFC-A in Kabul, was even quoted as saying something to the effect, 'ten effective Afghan police were better than 100 Afghan soldiers, however one corrupt policeman was worse than ten insurgents.' So why do we focus on the soldiers and the insurgents? Is it simply because - that's what armies do?

We need to stop complaining about the problems with the ANP and address the real priorites in their recruitment, development, mentorship and establishment; and not just as a secondary effort to building the ANA.

The whole debate regarding the requirement for some form of tribal militia(s) is a symptom of the lack of ANP. Let's not neglect the ANP and continue to reinforce this urban legend.

[IntelTrooper]

Seahorse -- I would go further and say that the ANP in most places should simply be dissolved. They are too few in number, too poorly equipped and supported, and too representative of an intrusive, victimizing government to be effective. One ANP station I visited claimed not to have received their pay for three months. How do you think they were making ends meet in the mean time?

[Rex Brynen]

And on this issue, another new report from the folks at CSIS:

Anthony H. Cordesman, Afghan National Security Forces: What It Will Take To Implement the ISAF Strategy (http://csis.org/files/publication/100719_ANSF.pdf), draft, 12 July 2010.

The report also covers the ANA.

[huskerguy7]

For years now I have heard the constant rhetoric regarding how corrupt the ANP are, and how many problems are associated with their buildup. But the information available from several independent polls over the last five years strongly differs. Polls regarding Afghan perceptions of ANP trustworthiness, corruption, professionalism etc. certainly lag ANA results, but are still as high as 80%. (I'm sure some of our own police forces would be similarly viewed in specific cities.) However this urban legend of a totally corrupt and untrustworthy ANP paints a much more pessimistic picture and is almost self-reinforcing. Allied soldiers almost universally decry ANP professionalism, and claim ANP corruption as significant problems. These same officers also universally reject poll results because they don't agree with their perceptions. The old adage, expectation leads performance, applies to this situation and supports the lack of priority and effort towards the ANP.

A main source of this problem, from my perspective, is the over emphasis on our (western) buid up of the ANA to the detriment of what should be the primary security force for Afghans, the ANP. The ANA provide a false sense of mission progress because of the potential to have them support our exit strategy. We blindingly pursue a goal of building an Afghan Army which can stand in for our forces, conduct a relief-in-place, and facilitate a transition to the GIROA becoming responsible for its own security. But soldiers' contribution to the Afghan mission are limited to security operations and even then fairly narrowly.

I often ask people who they would rely on to address security issues in their own country, and the universal answer is - police forces. It is the police which are required to address the broader security to establish, promote and sustain: rule-of-law, governance, justice, the economy and development.

Seahorse, I respect your opinion, but disagree. According to the reports I've seen and the polls that have been released, people are more confident with the ANA rather than the ANP. Also, I have had the chance to talk to some people very familiar with the conflict and they share the same opinion. Why? There are several factors, but there is one main point that I'm going to elaborate on. They (the ANA) focus on national interests rather than local (such as the ANP).

I know that is important to understand the local interests. However, when you have a soldier or police officer in an area that they are very familiar with, some problems can occur. They will be more prone to manipulation by the population in the district and will be more prone to corruption, especially in a country with an insecure environment like Afghanistan. So, when you bring in an outside force like the ANA, he's not going to know what's going on. However, he will know that he needs to accomplish _____ objective. Locals won't be able to threaten his home or his family because he's not from the area.

Do not get me wrong: it's important to have people familiar with the area to because of obvious reasons (intelligence, better understanding, etc). In fact, the ANP has been criticized for bringing in foreign Tajiks to Pashtun areas. It's just a matter of having a mix with local and outside forces; have enough to understand the situation.


Carl Eikenberry, when serving as the Commander CFC-A in Kabul, was even quoted as saying something to the effect, 'ten effective Afghan police were better than 100 Afghan soldiers, however one corrupt policeman was worse than ten insurgents.' So why do we focus on the soldiers and the insurgents? Is it simply because - that's what armies do?

We need to stop complaining about the problems with the ANP and address the real priorites in their recruitment, development, mentorship and establishment; and not just as a secondary effort to building the ANA.

The whole debate regarding the requirement for some form of tribal militia(s) is a symptom of the lack of ANP. Let's not neglect the ANP and continue to reinforce this urban legend.

Also, that quote (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/22/how_to_whip_the_afghan_army_into_shape) from Eikenberry is incorrect. It is ""Ten good police are better than 100 corrupt police, and 10 corrupt police can do more damage to our success than one Taliban extremist." The main focus of his comments was on training strong leaders and how quality is better than quantity, which I agree with.

Recently, the ANP has encountered some success with "Combined Action" teams, so ISAF is currently pushing for that. However, I think the focus should be changed.

As mentioned in my earlier post, the ANP are being trained to act like a military force rather than law enforcement, which I don't agree with. I agree with you that it's important for police to establish a rule-of-law and justice system. Despite the lack of a strong justice system in Afghanistan, a very basic legal system does exist, and could possibly be enforced. The focus of the ANP should be shifted from combating the Taliban to enforcing the law. If this is done correctly, then the situation will hopefully improve.

Another thought: As I think about the ANP's difficult situation, they seem comparable to America's "Wild West" years. During this time in history, law enforcement in secluded small towns would be outnumbered by the gangs. As a result, they would either fight and die, do nothing, or join their efforts-just like the ANP today. How did these towns survive? I'm currently examining that and am curious if it could apply to Afghanistan.

Hopefully ISAF tackles the ANP issue in the future and corrects it.

[slapout9]

Another thought: As I think about the ANP's difficult situation, they seem comparable to America's "Wild West" years. During this time in history, law enforcement in secluded small towns would be outnumbered by the gangs. As a result, they would either fight and die, do nothing, or join their efforts-just like the ANP today. How did these towns survive? I'm currently examining that and am curious if it could apply to Afghanistan.



You may be right. A Marshall Service may be more appropriate than a Police Service. We talked about such a thing a while back. Jedburgh our master Intel guy found a Rand Study that suggested the same thing. Use the search option and you may be able to find it. How they survived (The Marshalls) was by raising Posses...instant militias. A power they still hold to this day,so do some County Sheriff's in some states.

[Steve Blair]

You may be right. A Marshall Service may be more appropriate than a Police Service. We talked about such a thing a while back. Jedburgh our master Intel guy found a Rand Study that suggested the same thing. Use the search option and you may be able to find it. How they survived (The Marshalls) was by raising Posses...instant militias. A power they still hold to this day,so do some County Sheriff's in some states.

Dangerous analogies in some ways. You're right, Slap, with the suggestion about a marshal service (it also gave the Federal government a "hand in the game" in the territories, but was also subject to patronage appointments), but the law enforcement situation in the West was much more complex than "Marshal Dillon outnumbered by gangs." Often the local lawman found himself torn between political poles in a particular town or region (Tombstone - the region, not the move - is especially, and exaggeratedly, instructional here), and even the marshals found themselves undermanned and underpaid in most cases.

The typical Western small town wasn't quite as violent as the movies hint, and there was also the "Miners' Council" aspect to most of them. Most mining towns were established under somewhat collectivist principles, and part of that was the formation of the Council (usually any able-bodied male resident in the area). Such Councils served as 'police' and court, and could order banishment, forfeiture of a claim, and so on. Some of them took on very vigilante overtones (Virginia City, MT, is one example). There were pockets of wanton lawlessness to be sure, but it tended to come in cycles and was often controlled by local interests.

[slapout9]

Dangerous analogies in some ways. You're right, Slap, with the suggestion about a marshal service (it also gave the Federal government a "hand in the game" in the territories, but was also subject to patronage appointments).

It still is that way. All US Marshals are appointed. Most of the time when you see a Marshall he is a Deputy Marshal.

[huskerguy7]

I see in your Bio you are a High School student and you took the trouble to talk to Dr. Killcullen about the ANP. For someone your age to even know who Killcullen is, is a major achievement. Keep up the good work, you will figure it out for all us someday.;)

I just saw this and wanted to say thanks. However, I have a long ways to go and need to learn from others, which is why I participate at SWJ


You may be right. A Marshall Service may be more appropriate than a Police Service. We talked about such a thing a while back. Jedburgh our master Intel guy found a Rand Study that suggested the same thing. Use the search option and you may be able to find it. How they survived (The Marshalls) was by raising Posses...instant militias. A power they still hold to this day,so do some County Sheriff's in some states.

I've searched, and I don't think I found the report (I messaged Jedburgh though). However, I found some interesting stuff (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/haskellthesis.pdf)along the way that discussed a similar idea. Having someone with "popular support" in the area they are patrolling may work better and might possibly prevent some corruption.


Dangerous analogies in some ways. You're right, Slap, with the suggestion about a marshal service (it also gave the Federal government a "hand in the game" in the territories, but was also subject to patronage appointments), but the law enforcement situation in the West was much more complex than "Marshal Dillon outnumbered by gangs." Often the local lawman found himself torn between political poles in a particular town or region (Tombstone - the region, not the move - is especially, and exaggeratedly, instructional here), and even the marshals found themselves undermanned and underpaid in most cases.

The typical Western small town wasn't quite as violent as the movies hint, and there was also the "Miners' Council" aspect to most of them. Most mining towns were established under somewhat collectivist principles, and part of that was the formation of the Council (usually any able-bodied male resident in the area). Such Councils served as 'police' and court, and could order banishment, forfeiture of a claim, and so on. Some of them took on very vigilante overtones (Virginia City, MT, is one example). There were pockets of wanton lawlessness to be sure, but it tended to come in cycles and was often controlled by local interests.

It's good to hear from someone who is knowledgable on the Wild West. Having officers work with the tribal "councils" may yield better results. But will this decentralize the government to much?

[slapout9]

Huskerguy7, may want to check out Army FM 22-6 Guard Duty. Towards the back is small section on how critical Mobile Guard units are in what they called Counter Guerrilla Warfare in those days early 1970's.

[huskerguy7]

Huskerguy7, may want to check out Army FM 22-6 Guard Duty. Towards the back is small section on how critical Mobile Guard units are in what they called Counter Guerrilla Warfare in those days early 1970's.

Thanks for the idea; I found some interesting information on "Exterior Guards". I also examined FM 90-8 which discusses counter guerrila operations.

This really makes you wander how a police force could function in an insurgency environment against guerrillas. Reacting to an ambush, whether it's a lightly armed law enforcement agent or a heavily armed US Army Ranger, is very difficult. It's no surprise that you see ANP units taking casualties in many ambushes. It's a very difficult problem that needs to be solved.

I'm throwing it out there, but would having small "law enforcement" ANP patrols supplemented by a heavier paramilitary ANP quick reaction force work? Yes, ANP soldiers would still take losses, but they may possibly be able to enforce some law in the local area. It would be similar to a sheriff and his deputies with access to Federal Marshall assistance?

[Red Rat]

This really makes you wander how a police force could function in an insurgency environment against guerrillas.

This quote is taken from the UK's ongoing Iraq Inquiry (Geoffrey Cooper UK Chief Police Advisor 18 Mar 08 – 7 Apr 09) Iraq Inquiry (http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/statements.aspx) (IPS - Iraqi Police Service)


However coalition military commanders perhaps naturally considered the primary role of the IPS to be security provision, and as a result envisaged (and trained) the IPS largely as a paramilitary force. The primary role of policing in a stabilised environments is not security but provision of criminal justice.

What I think this quote highlights is that the role of the police in stabilised environments is very very different from those in COIN environments.

So what do we want the ANP to do? Provide security (primarily) with a little bit of law enforcement, or vice versa? I think at the moment we need security in order to enable (down the line) effective law enforcement. This means the ANP should be trained and equipped for security duties, but with the ability to transition (in due course) to law enforcement duties.

What does this mean? Well we can train them now very much like the ANA, but have a considerably tighter vetting process, regular drugs testing and an internal programme of education (literacy and numeracy) so that they can transition over time as/when/if the situation allows, to law enforcement.



I'm throwing it out there, but would having small "law enforcement" ANP patrols supplemented by a heavier paramilitary ANP quick reaction force work? Yes, ANP soldiers would still take losses, but they may possibly be able to enforce some law in the local area. It would be similar to a sheriff and his deputies with access to Federal Marshall assistance?

Or you train an effective civilian police force whose primary focus is law enforcement. In areas where they are unable to carry out their policing duties they are escorted by ANA to provide the force protection. The UK did this in N Ireland. High threat areas saw the police escorted by the army, low threat areas the police did it themselves. It meant the police were trained and equipped to be police and did not have to turn into a paramilitary force.

The other issue is what type of police force does Afghanistan require? The UK police model would probably not work in Afghanistan, and a Middle East model would probably be more appropriate.

Last but not least, a police force is only the tip of the spear. How effective is the rest of the Afghan judicial system?

[huskerguy7]

Or you train an effective civilian police force whose primary focus is law enforcement. In areas where they are unable to carry out their policing duties they are escorted by ANA to provide the force protection. The UK did this in N Ireland. High threat areas saw the police escorted by the army, low threat areas the police did it themselves. It meant the police were trained and equipped to be police and did not have to turn into a paramilitary force.

General Scaparotti in regional east has been promoting an idea called Combined Action (you may have heard of it). CA has 4 components: the ANA, the ANP, ISAF, and the Afghan Government. CA allows the Afghan government to reach out to the environment while being protected while the ANA monitors the ANP and ISAF has their resources available to provide backup. So far, CA has been very successful. I do like the idea of having ANA patrol with the ANP because they'll keep the ANP from peroforming corrupt activities and will offer a "security arm."


Last but not least, a police force is only the tip of the spear. How effective is the rest of the Afghan judicial system?

This is very true. The overall system is very fragile.

The US government should consider establishing some sort of civilian police force that can deploy abroad to help in situations like Afghanistan. The Italians have one, the French have theirs, so it is possible.

[Steve Blair]

It still is that way. All US Marshals are appointed. Most of the time when you see a Marshall he is a Deputy Marshal.

I know, Slap. Back then it was much more political than it is today, and many of the deputies were about as worthless as their political boss. This wasn't always the case, of course, but the trained Deputy U.S. Marshal is very much a modern phenomenon.


The US government should consider establishing some sort of civilian police force that can deploy abroad to help in situations like Afghanistan. The Italians have one, the French have theirs, so it is possible.

I think a modified version of the Deputy U.S. Marshal system/service is about the best you could get. The FBI doesn't really do this sort of thing well, and the marshal service is about the closest the U.S. gets to a national police force model. You might be able to copy some of the state police/highway patrol models, but that's about it.

[Red Rat]

General Scaparotti in regional east has been promoting an idea called Combined Action (you may have heard of it). CA has 4 components: the ANA, the ANP, ISAF, and the Afghan Government. CA allows the Afghan government to reach out to the environment while being protected while the ANA monitors the ANP and ISAF has their resources available to provide backup. So far, CA has been very successful. I do like the idea of having ANA patrol with the ANP because they'll keep the ANP from peroforming corrupt activities and will offer a "security arm."

I have not heard of CA, but it sounds like common sense. The police police, the army provides security and ISAF provide the overwatch and specialist capabilities. Is the role of the ANA to mentor, monitor or protect the ANP?


The US government should consider establishing some sort of civilian police force that can deploy abroad to help in situations like Afghanistan. The Italians have one, the French have theirs, so it is possible.

One of the lessons we learnt in the UK from Iraq was our lack of a deployable policing capability. The US Army's Military Police branch is however much larger then its UK equivalent, and with a much broader scope (rear area security) so it is more useable to fill the identified gap.

As far as I can make out the ANP is little more then a local protection force at the moment, and not what we would regard as a police force. Does AFG want the ANP to provide a policing service or an internal security service? Perhaps what we should be looking at is rolling out a paramilitary security service (the ANP) with limited policing expertise (and powers) and a separate more specialised policing branch. Many developed countries have a policing service and then a paramilitary 'knock heads' service (the French CRS, elements of the Italian Carabineri and the Spanish Civil Guard all spring to mind) with the balance weighted towards the policing. Perhaps in an unstable country we want to reverse polarity, with the majority of the policing being of the paramilitary type and a smaller civil policing / investigative branch?

[slapout9]

I think a modified version of the Deputy U.S. Marshal system/service is about the best you could get. The FBI doesn't really do this sort of thing well, and the marshal service is about the closest the U.S. gets to a national police force model. You might be able to copy some of the state police/highway patrol models, but that's about it.

Although for a short time there was a Special Forces MP Company which may be what really need....soldiers that can stand up a Police Force as a Police Force not just a modified Infantry company. Where is W.E. Faibairn when you need him:rolleyes:

[Seahorse]

Another thought: As I think about the ANP's difficult situation, they seem comparable to America's "Wild West" years. During this time in history, law enforcement in secluded small towns would be outnumbered by the gangs. As a result, they would either fight and die, do nothing, or join their efforts-just like the ANP today. How did these towns survive? I'm currently examining that and am curious if it could apply to Afghanistan.


First, I agree with many of your comments and appreciate the correction to the quote.

I have often depicted the Afghan situation as the 'Wild West' to friends and aquaintances and mused myself about examining the turnaround and its factors. For Canada, what effect did the RCMP federal police services, or the US Marshall's have in your country?

Another parallel if I may, what significant event contributed to the reconstruction and development of our national governments in the time of the wild west? I believe the national railway was very significant in the west's national identity, unity and fostered security, governance, reconstrution and development. I believe the building of a national railway could foster such a change in Afghanistan and the idea merits serious consideration. It would provide national transportation for security personnel movements, reliable public transportation and migration, linking of education and medical facilities, foster trade and goods exchange, facilitate industrialization, and in the interim, represent a significant source of jobs. If it isn't militarized, then insurgents should ignore or tolerate it's presence since they would benefit from it as much as others. Just a thought.

[Steve Blair]

Another parallel if I may, what significant event contributed to the reconstruction and development of our national governments in the time of the wild west? I believe the national railway was very significant in the west's national identity, unity and fostered security, governance, reconstrution and development. I believe the building of a national railway could foster such a change in Afghanistan and the idea merits serious consideration. It would provide national transportation for security personnel movements, reliable public transportation and migration, linking of education and medical facilities, foster trade and goods exchange, facilitate industrialization, and in the interim, represent a significant source of jobs. If it isn't militarized, then insurgents should ignore or tolerate it's presence since they would benefit from it as much as others. Just a thought.

MikeF should have warned you that I like to compare Afghanistan (in general, not in some of the particulars) to Arizona between 1860 or so and 1876. The similarities are fascinating, including a transition from preparation for a high-intensity conflict to more Small Wars-style operations, muddled command arrangements after 1865, and a number of competing interest groups (to include a local government that profited from Indian wars, a number of different tribal groups, Federal government representatives, and the Army often caught in the middle).

As for the development of the West, the railroad was certainly an important factor, but possibly not the decisive one. It wasn't reliable or truly national for some years (the whole "Golden Spike" thing aside), and its impact was limited until the mid to late 1880s outside of its main corridors. I would contend that industrialization had a bigger impact, to include the national thirst for precious metals (something we had in common with the Spanish Empire not that long before us). Prospecting, and later deep rock mining, drove a great deal of the settlement and development in many areas of the West (miners have to eat, and they have specie to buy goods). There was also a great deal of displacement going on, even among the new Anglo arrivals.

And I don't know if you could count on insurgents ignoring a railroad. Railroads bring outside influences, modernization, and any number of assorted things they might not appreciate or welcome. Also, if it makes it easier for Government forces to concentrate it becomes a target for that reason alone.

Just some thoughts in response to your thoughts.

[OfTheTroops]

We do this.... Police mentor teams
and they have that ANCOP
just hasnt always been the priority

[OfTheTroops]

Texas Rangers

[Red Rat]

We do this.... Police mentor teams
and they have that ANCOP
just hasnt always been the priority

But most police mentor teams have a limited policing capability and focus on the security aspect of work. Who is mentoring the the afghan police on scenes of crime work (which is still applicable in the Afghan judicial system even if it consists only in taking a photograph or suspect with evidence at crime scene or video recording the suspect re-enacting the crime, both acceptible, indeed preferred by Afghan courts). Who is mentoring the Highway Police on how to ensure vehicles are roadworthy under Afghan regulations?

The ANCOP (Afghan Civil Order Police) appear to be an Afghan version of the French CRS, a highly specialised public order capability, possibly with some specialised anti-terrorist capability as well.

We appear to be focusing on the ANP as a security force and not a police force. Working on the Combined Action principle as alluded to earlier in this thread I think we can and should be playing things smarter.

I think there is merit in a centrally based investigative arm.

The issue hinges on what role do we expect police forces to play in society, and in a society in conflict. Once you know what you want then you look at a suitable mechanism for carrying out that role, then you can look (in Afghanistan) at the plan and TTPs needed to grow that capability in conflict.

[IntelTrooper]

But most police mentor teams have a limited policing capability and focus on the security aspect of work.

Not to mention limited time to spend with each district's ANP, meaning plenty of time for them to get back into their bad habits.



Who is mentoring the the afghan police on scenes of crime work (which is still applicable in the Afghan judicial system [...] Who is mentoring the Highway Police on how to ensure vehicles are roadworthy under Afghan regulations?

Also, who is teaching them the value of the rule of law in the first place? We teach them tactics, but not how to determine the correct situations to use them, or even why.



Once you know what you want then you look at a suitable mechanism for carrying out that role, then you can look (in Afghanistan) at the plan and TTPs needed to grow that capability in conflict.
Exactly -- we are confused about what the ANP should be doing and therefore so are the ANP.

[Red Rat]

Speaking to people in Helmand, it is apparent that in parts of Helmand Province the ANP is now turning out in greater numbers and proving more reliable then the ANA.

A combination of several factors. The Helmand Police Training Centre is now up and running (and well resourced), and is turning out formed cohesive sub-units of ANP (who are local to Helmand). The emphasis is still on the ANP as a primarily security force, but if that is what is needed...

Interestingly, like Iraq it has taken us some time to focus on the police, and yet when we do focus effort and resources there we find that the dividends are quick and the police can change from being part of the problem to part of the solution, especially with the overlap between criminality and insurgency in most COIN situations.

Perhaps next time we should focus on building up the police first, recognising that in a COIN situation police provide the bedrock element of security and intelligence and that a police force is more likely to provide a pervasive destabilising influence then the army which generally remains free of insurgent and criminal elements for longer.

[OfTheTroops]

The problem is that there are not enough Military police who can do this partnering/advising quite effectively and everyone else thinks they can do it just as well. If its the sexiest part of the fight or where the action is then that is where all of the maneuver( non-LE ROL ) types do not wanna be on the FOB...or they want the civilian surge.......And of course Civi Police do not flock to warzones out of camoflauge in droves... and Contractors perpetuate their contracts.... and uh oh i am complaining... Repeal posse Comitatus and establish the Military Police as the proponent for stability policing units DSCA and FID/SFA. Thats our bag.

[huskerguy7]

I have not heard of CA, but it sounds like common sense. The police police, the army provides security and ISAF provide the overwatch and specialist capabilities. Is the role of the ANA to mentor, monitor or protect the ANP?

CA is a great idea (the ANA both protect and monitor the ANP), but as you can imagine, setting it up can be difficult; you're working with four different groups. My point is that we shouldn't rely on it.



(From Red Rat:As far as I can make out the ANP is little more then a local protection force at the moment, and not what we would regard as a police force. Does AFG want the ANP to provide a policing service or an internal security service? Perhaps what we should be looking at is rolling out a paramilitary security service (the ANP) with limited policing expertise (and powers) and a separate more specialised policing branch. Many developed countries have a policing service and then a paramilitary 'knock heads' service (the French CRS, elements of the Italian Carabineri and the Spanish Civil Guard all spring to mind) with the balance weighted towards the policing. Perhaps in an unstable country we want to reverse polarity, with the majority of the policing being of the paramilitary type and a smaller civil policing / investigative branch?

I really like this idea. I think that that we should consider establishing a new organization that focuses on enforcing the law, not providing security. The ANP is clearly made to do the latter. This is nice, but who's going to enforce the law? Yes, the judicial system isn't very strong, but it may get somewhere if it is enforced properly. I'm looking at images of the ANP and they are patrolling with heavy PKM MGs. This just supports the assertion that they are a security force. In my opinion, this should change.



Another parallel if I may, what significant event contributed to the reconstruction and development of our national governments in the time of the wild west? I believe the national railway was very significant in the west's national identity, unity and fostered security, governance, reconstrution and development. I believe the building of a national railway could foster such a change in Afghanistan and the idea merits serious consideration. It would provide national transportation for security personnel movements, reliable public transportation and migration, linking of education and medical facilities, foster trade and goods exchange, facilitate industrialization, and in the interim, represent a significant source of jobs. If it isn't militarized, then insurgents should ignore or tolerate it's presence since they would benefit from it as much as others. Just a thought.

This is a good suggestion that definitley should be considered. However, I think that securing it would be incredibly difficult, if not impossible. It's comparable to the construction of power lines in Afghanistan. Electricity can benefit both civilians and enemy combatants. However, the Taliban ignored this and continuously attacked the powerlines rendering them useless. Neither the contractor's PMCs or the contingent of the ANP could secure the lines until a couple hundred ANA and ISAF forces assisted. My point is that despite the benefits, it would be to difficult to secure.


But most police mentor teams have a limited policing capability and focus on the security aspect of work. Who is mentoring the the afghan police on scenes of crime work (which is still applicable in the Afghan judicial system even if it consists only in taking a photograph or suspect with evidence at crime scene or video recording the suspect re-enacting the crime, both acceptible, indeed preferred by Afghan courts). Who is mentoring the Highway Police on how to ensure vehicles are roadworthy under Afghan regulations?

The ANCOP (Afghan Civil Order Police) appear to be an Afghan version of the French CRS, a highly specialised public order capability, possibly with some specialised anti-terrorist capability as well.

We appear to be focusing on the ANP as a security force and not a police force. Working on the Combined Action principle as alluded to earlier in this thread I think we can and should be playing things smarter.

I think there is merit in a centrally based investigative arm.

I completely agree. Modifying the ANP from a paramilitary security force to a law enforcement group would be to difficult. Thus, I think we should investigate establishing a new organization that focuses strictly on law enforcement.


Speaking to people in Helmand, it is apparent that in parts of Helmand Province the ANP is now turning out in greater numbers and proving more reliable then the ANA.

A combination of several factors. The Helmand Police Training Centre is now up and running (and well resourced), and is turning out formed cohesive sub-units of ANP (who are local to Helmand). The emphasis is still on the ANP as a primarily security force, but if that is what is needed...

Interestingly, like Iraq it has taken us some time to focus on the police, and yet when we do focus effort and resources there we find that the dividends are quick and the police can change from being part of the problem to part of the solution, especially with the overlap between criminality and insurgency in most COIN situations.

Perhaps next time we should focus on building up the police first, recognising that in a COIN situation police provide the bedrock element of security and intelligence and that a police force is more likely to provide a pervasive destabilising influence then the army which generally remains free of insurgent and criminal elements for longer.

I like this idea alot. If there is a "next time", the invading country should have the capacity to provide security, so they should invest their resources into stabilizing the whole legal system starting with law enforcement.

[Red Rat]

I was at a briefing on the Afghan legal system a couple of months ago, given by European and Afghan experts on the (Afghan) legal system. To put into context some of the issues regarding the ANP I have included below some of the points that I picked up.

Background

Following his European Tour in the 1920s King Amanullah reformed the Afghan legal system introducing amongst other things a more liberal interpretation of women's rights. However this immediately ran into opposition from mullahs and tribes. Throughout the 1940s and 50s there remained no countrywide organised, formal legal system. Most justice remained local and religious, based on a local interpretation of the Koran and sharia law and having no reference to Afghan state or written law. Later on the mullahs were brought somewhat more into the fold through the payment of mullahs of a government salary, giving the government a degree of leverage on them. Historically penetration of the countryside by the (formal) law system was weak.

In the 1970s and 1980s the law was reformed again, this time modelled on the Soviet legal system. Under this system much more emphasis is placed on the role of the Prosecution Service or Attorney General's office. The office actively seeks to enforce compliance and will embed people in Ministries to enforce compliance. Certainly in Kabul this allows it a great deal of political influence. Many of the people now occupying roles in the Afghan judical system will have been trained under the Soviet system, and the corporate memory of this era remains strong.

Current

Afghanistan now has a proper constitution and one that protects Human Rights. However all laws must be in conformity with Islam and where an area is not covered by statute then Islamic law is to be applied. This was highlighted by the student blasphemy trial in Mazar - e - Sharif where the defendant was sentenced to 20 years for blasphemy, despite the fact there is no blasphemy statute on the books (this was presumably the technicality that saw the student released under western (donor) government pressure to the Karzai government…)

The Afghan constitution remains weak on judicial review and the Afghan Supreme Court functions more as a court of higher appeal then what we would regard as a Supreme Court in the western model. There is no concept of Habeas Corpus in Afghanistan and the Supreme Court has no power to judge the constitutional validity of legislation.

There is a national Justice Strategy, but it is probably correct to say that we need to focus more on getting desks chairs and telephones out to courts and staff in the short to medium term and educating judges into the concept of human rights in the longer term.

The Informal System

There has been some speculation about focusing more on the informal system of justice (jirgas and shuras) in Afghanistan as a means of enabling the delivery of justice. The two main problems with the informal system are:


The system is geared towards conflict resolution and not for delivering justice.
There is no fair and transparent means of appeal


The Stabilising Influence of Justice

Afghan encounters with the State are very often negative with violence, corruption and limited forms of redress commonplace. The British experience in India (including what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh) was the provision of a transparent and fair legal system was very popular. Whatever the perceived iniquities of the colonial system by the Indians, they recognised that the judicial system benefited them more so then previous local systems, and this made the imposition of (British) government rule much more palatable. How the British introduced their legal system in their colonies and the role it played in maintaining an acceptance of British rule is worthy of greater study.

[huskerguy7]

I was at a briefing on the Afghan legal system a couple of months ago, given by European and Afghan experts on the (Afghan) legal system. To put into context some of the issues regarding the ANP I have included below some of the points that I picked up.

Who is in charge of constructing a judicial system? Is it still Italy? If so, what exactly are they currently doing about it? Are "useless" written reports still being produced in Rome or are there actual personel in Kabul working on this.

Initially, when the new government was put into power, Italy was tasked with forming a judicial system. There were simply no results as little work had been done (I read somewhere that a handful of people were sent to Afghanistan to interact with judges and lawyers). That's why I'm curious if they're still in charge of this task, and if so, are they putting forth more effort?

[Red Rat]

I am not sure who is in charge of the judicial reform now. The consensus at the conference was the model currently being used by the British as part of their counter-narcotics effort whereby they select, train and fund a complete judicial system (police, jails, judges and prosecutors) specifically for counter-narcotics is working reasonably well.

The Italians had a good plan based on their experience of running a judical system that can cope with pervasive organised crime, but it was under-resourced and there was no impetus to get it established.

Whether the British counter-narcotics system could be expanded further, perhaps to deal with anti-corruption is another matter. Certainly the British have found it very difficult to keep their counter-narcotics stovepipe clean and untainted.

[Rex Brynen]

A gloomy observation on Afghan training (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/asia-pacific/a-gloomy-observation-on-afghan-training/article1854883/)
SUSAN SACHS
KABUL— From Saturday's Globe and Mail
Published Friday, Dec. 31, 2010 6:56PM EST


In the nine months he worked as senior adviser to the chief of the Border Police, John Brewer relied on a local translator to navigate Afghan culture. Yet the Canadian Mountie spent as much time trying to interpret the actions of foreign forces to equally puzzled Afghans.

Why, they asked him, did Germany provide their training base with drug-sniffing police dogs but not dog food or kennels? Why would the Americans build a brand new border police headquarters on land with no water? And what should be done with the thousands of donated European radios that do not operate on the same frequency as the Afghan ones?

His polite response was to suggest that Afghans speak up for themselves and that NATO officers listen to them more. Still, the plain-spoken Superintendent Brewer will admit to some frustration with the waste of time and money through miscommunication. “A lesser man,” he says, “would say it’s pissing in the wind.”

...

[SWJ Blog]

Copied here for reference.

Police Mentoring in Afghanistan 2007-2009 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/01/police-mentoring-in-afghanista/)

Entry Excerpt:

Police Mentoring in Afghanistan 2007-2009 (http://www.cna.org/research/2010/police-mentoring-afghanistan-2007-2009) by Dr. William Rosenau, Center for Naval Analyses, Strategic Studies Solution Center.


The role of the police is an important but largely overlooked aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency and stability operations. Although academic and policy specialists have examined the role of police in post-conflict environments, the question of how police should be organized, trained, and equipped for counterinsurgency campaigns has received little systematic attention.
Similarly, US military doctrine and the professional military literature, while not ignoring the subject entirely, do not consider it in any systematic way. This gap is particularly ironic, given the prominent role that soldiers and Marines have played in training indigenous police and other security forces in counterinsurgency campaigns from Vietnam to Afghanistan.
If the broader topic of police and counterinsurgency is under-examined, the subject of mentoring—that is, advising and training—foreign police forces is even more neglected. American Marines, soldiers, and other military personnel preparing to deploy to Afghanistan for the police mentoring mission have few sources of information and analysis available to them.
This monograph addresses that gap. Using a series of ten vignettes, this report examines in depth the experiences of individual American and British soldiers and Marines who served as mentors in Afghanistan during the 2007-2009 period.Police Mentoring in Afghanistan 2007-2009 (http://www.cna.org/research/2010/police-mentoring-afghanistan-2007-2009) by Dr. William Rosenau, CNA.



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/01/police-mentoring-in-afghanista/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Abu M, who commends this article from Harpers Magazine, December 2009:
What are the trade-offs for using a character like Col. Raziq? (On the one hand, he is seen as being effective, but on the other hand ... well, anyone who has not yet read the 2009 Matthieu Aikins profile of Raziq for Harper's should.)

Link:http://www.harpers.org/archive/2009/12/0082754

The article is about the Afghan Border Police and I have not searched to see if Col. Raziq is still in place.

[Pol-Mil FSO]

General Raziq remains the Warlord of Spin Boldak. His right hand man was killed in an 07 Jan 2011 suicide bombing in a Spin Boldak bath house that also killed 16 civilians. Per the request of the Governor of Kandahar, Raziq's men have been participating in clearing operations in the Arghandab District (outside of the ABP's normal AO) and also possibly Zhari District. (I've seen one media report mentioning the latter but have not been able to confirm it.)

[davidbfpo]

Originally posted in the daily news round-up and worth adding here:http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/top-cop-purge/

[Jedburgh]

International Peacekeeping, Feb 11: Paramilitarization and Security Sector Reform: The Afghan National Police (http://web.me.com/dmlast/Research/Military_&_Police_files/IP_ANP_CF.pdf)

An accelerating trend to establish paramilitarized security forces has been occurring in peace operations to help fill security gaps. But the practice is problematic from a security sector reform (SSR) point of view, because SSR aims at distinguishing between the military and the police and at promoting civilian policing. This article shows that while the SSR concept leaves room for paramilitarization, it demands much caution. The paramilitarization of regular police forces is incompatible with even a flexible interpretation of SSR principles. The US-driven paramilitarization of the Afghan National Police (ANP), reflecting a search for quick fixes, is a dramatic case in point.

[davidbfpo]

CIMIC has published an open source based review of the Afghan Local Police (ALP), alas it is too large to upload and is behind a registration "wall". Anyone who is interested please PM with an email address or register on CIMIC: https://www.cimicweb.org

The actual title is 'Village Defence: Understanding the Afghan Local Police (ALP)' and has links to sources.

[jcustis]

David, was there an executive summary to the review that could be summarized here? I imagine that it probably blows some sunshine in some regards and has sire warnings in others, like most of them do, but I am curious nonetheless.

[davidbfpo]

Jon,

The CIMIC report's conclusion hopefully answers your quest:
The ALP is the latest attempt to establish a local defence force to help foster security throughout Afghanistan. The force is designed with particular recruitment and vetting procedures that are intended to keep local strongmen and former insurgents from infiltrating the ALP. However, the implementation of these procedures in rural village environments throughout Afghanistan has proven and will continue to prove difficult. Deploying this arbakai-based force throughout Afghanistan is a challenge. A long-standing tradition of arbakai exists only in certain parts of the country, and attempting to appeal to local population groups by establishing militias under the guise of a traditional structure is problematic. To date, some, though not all, communities have met local police efforts with distrust and scepticism, potentially exacerbating the pre-existing divide between the state and the citizenry in parts of the country. However, there are signs that this incarnation of a local police force is having some success in combating insurgents ultimately providing improved security for rural communities. Despite these successes, descriptions of misconduct by local defence initiatives are common. Navigating the blurry line between legitimate community safe-keepers and rogue militias will prove a major challenge and priority for the ALP and its overseers in the Afghan MoI and international community.

My summary: an idea that might work well and is beset with difficulties.

[120mm]

Arbakai/ALP I think is one of the least understood and most abused concept by pundits.

The base of the problem is the insane concept of a National Police force. There is no good example of a functioning national police force in the world, that is not involved in enforcing tyranny. None. The centralized control of the ANP means that they are largely irrelevant to localities. It takes the Minister of Justice to approve filling a truck with fuel, and if he is on vacation his Deputy cannot sign the paperwork, the district ANP just sit and do nothing for lack of fuel.

The only effective police forces NEED to be locally generated and responsible to their localities.

Currently, none of the ALP are being paid, because the good folks in GIRoA are apparently stealing all their pay and sending it out of the country. In addition, the Afghans do not understand the program, and/or are using it to their own ends, because the US and ISAF lacks the will to actually enforce conditions on the money we give the the criminal filth that runs Afghanistan

Arbakai pretty much singlehandedly pushed Taliban out of those districts in the north of Afghanistan, and because they are not Pashtun butt-buddies of Karzai and his fellow criminals who run GIRoA, those districts are being allocated either little or no ALP. This is after those Arbakai have been by and large promised positions AS ALP. One of the selling points of ALP from the beginning was to bring a certain amount of those Arbakai under government control and forcing them to answer to the government. Now you have lots of armed men who haven't been paid for 9 months wandering the countryside, getting money through usher, which is basically demanding money from people they meet. While I'm on the concept of usher, who in hell is supposed to pay for security? The population, which is fundamentally communistic and socialist in viewpoint, seems to think they don't have to pay for anything and the government/foreigners will magically provide for security, jobs and all sorts of things. Why NOT force the people to pay for their own damned security? The Taliban taxes them in the same fashion, so it is basically a wash for the populace.

Problem is, Karzai IS the government, and there is no real democracy. As long as Karzai appoints his fellow criminals to provincial, district and city positions, there is no real hope for security. Real security involves local people determining who the mayor of their city, district and province are, and making them answerable to maintaining security.

This means that so-called "warlords" are going to dominate localities. And power will be taken from the overcentralized nightmare of criminals that include and surround Karzai. The question I ask then, is "So what?" There is no doubt in my own mind that local criminals will do a much, much better job of running localities than centralized criminals in Kabul. Afghanistan NEEDs warlords right now, on the local level. They sure as hell do not have a central government to speak of. I also think that building local governments, with the acquiescence of local power brokers will minimize the probability of the upcoming Civil War that noone wants to talk about.

Funny thing about so-called "warlords". If they are Pashtuns in the south, they are "tribal leaders". If they are Tajik or Uzbek in the north, they are "warlords." I for one am getting sick and tired of the Pashtun plurality (NOT a majority, and if there ever were to be a census, I would bet they are actually a TRUE minority) being coddled and kowtowed to. Currently, the Pashtun plurality is living in the past and have wrapped themselves with an undeserved mantle of entitlement and really not contributing anything to Afghanistan.

Time to divide this critter into it's constituent parts, and if they can make Federalism work at a later date, fine. Also time to quit funnelling money to the central government, imo.

[120mm]

It's also time for the effeminate, neutered Eurotrash and hypersensitive overeducated Northeast US intellectuals get over their fear of the term "militia".

Militias have been instrumental in true nationbuilding since the beginning of time.

Afghanistan is like medievel England; Robber barons and militias were a phase necessary to advance the society to where it is today. If Afghanistan is to have any hope at all of suceeding long term, and I am not sure it does do to geographical issues, it will have to move out of this phase on it's own.

I do not think it is possible to force a country into a mold such as we are currently attempting.

[Infanteer]

The base of the problem is the insane concept of a National Police force. There is no good example of a functioning national police force in the world, that is not involved in enforcing tyranny. None.

Perhaps our definitions of "National Police Forces" differ, but in Canada we have the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, a national body that handles federal, provincial and municipal policing.

As for the rest of your post, couldn't agree more. From my experience, the Afghan village is the beginning and end of politics. There are a few trans-village officials, such as the mirow, a man selected by all villages affected by a specific waterway to manage it on behalf of all of them, but that's about it.

Village-based policing is definately the ideal solution, with a force such as the ANA between the villages to keep the peace as villages, even side-by-side, are often of a different qawm and may or may not get along. A small mentoring force for these ANA will bolster their abilities and keep them honest.

A large, mechanized Western Army sprinkled about the area, drawing insurgents like moths to a flame, is most definatly not the solution. Have a small Fire Brigade in KAF on hand to deal with things when the roof gets blown off.

[120mm]

Perhaps our definitions of "National Police Forces" differ, but in Canada we have the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, a national body that handles federal, provincial and municipal policing.

As for the rest of your post, couldn't agree more. From my experience, the Afghan village is the beginning and end of politics. There are a few trans-village officials, such as the mirow, a man selected by all villages affected by a specific waterway to manage it on behalf of all of them, but that's about it.

Village-based policing is definately the ideal solution, with a force such as the ANA between the villages to keep the peace as villages, even side-by-side, are often of a different qawm and may or may not get along. A small mentoring force for these ANA will bolster their abilities and keep them honest.

A large, mechanized Western Army sprinkled about the area, drawing insurgents like moths to a flame, is most definatly not the solution. Have a small Fire Brigade in KAF on hand to deal with things when the roof gets blown off.

Just to clarify, are you telling me there is no other municipal or higher police force than the RCMP? That the RCMP is out writing parking tickets and directing traffic on city streets?

How about when someone is killed or something is stolen in Montreal? Does the RCMP do the investigating and arresting?

Every country has "some" form of National Police. RCMP works well, I am told, in the less inhabited areas, but I was unaware they were doing the day to do street cop work in other parts of Canada.

[Infanteer]

Just to clarify, are you telling me there is no other municipal or higher police force than the RCMP? That the RCMP is out writing parking tickets and directing traffic on city streets?

How about when someone is killed or something is stolen in Montreal? Does the RCMP do the investigating and arresting?

Every country has "some" form of National Police. RCMP works well, I am told, in the less inhabited areas, but I was unaware they were doing the day to do street cop work in other parts of Canada.

The RCMP will do all policing to fill any void that exists.

In, say, Ontario there is a provincial police force that handles all provincial policing and a city like Toronto will have its own municipal force as well.

But, the province of British Columbia has the RCMP do much of its provincial and municipal policing. Aside from a few cities with their own municipal forces (which you can count on your hands) the RCMP is the sole policing agency for a Province of 4,000,000 people. They police areas ranging from small villages in the north to large urban cities like Burnaby and Surrey that are close to 1 million residents.

So yes, in many areas, they are out investigating murders, writing traffic tickets and handling motor vehicle accidents.

[120mm]

The RCMP will do all policing to fill any void that exists.

In, say, Ontario there is a provincial police force that handles all provincial policing and a city like Toronto will have its own municipal force as well.

But, the province of British Columbia has the RCMP do much of its provincial and municipal policing. Aside from a few cities with their own municipal forces (which you can count on your hands) the RCMP is the sole policing agency for a Province of 4,000,000 people. They police areas ranging from small villages in the north to large urban cities like Burnaby and Surrey that are close to 1 million residents.

So yes, in many areas, they are out investigating murders, writing traffic tickets and handling motor vehicle accidents.

And they are doing so for lack of population density, right? And they report directly, in a stovepiped organization to a single minister of RCMP?

My point is, the ANP is run in an extremely stovepiped organization, on a centralized national level that CANNOT work. Yet we, the international community continue to syphon money to this ineffective and corrupt organization and then throw up our hands when it comes to oversight because "it's their country".

How about we tell them to fix their ####, because it's "our money". Huh?

The time has come to force them to decentralize, and to democratize at the lower levels or to just pull the heck out, especially our money.

The current government cannot work. In no way shape or form. And it's time to stop wasting blood and treasure until they make real steps to instituting a form of governance that CAN work.

[Bob's World]

Infanteer,

To state the obvious (particularly to you), Canada is not Afghanistan. Better neighbor (of late, or at least pre-GWOT) for one thing. But you know what I mean. Also, it is a long way from BC to Ottawa, but Karzai is just one degree of separation from every ANP chief of police in Afghanistan.

For us in the US used to local, county, state, and federal police; the idea of having all of the above disbanded and replaced by a national police force that only answers to one man selected for us by some powerful foreign nation is not a situation for which many Americans would stand idle and accept. Same if that applied to our political leaders at those levels as well. Yet that is what we enabled for Afghanistan when we allowed the current "centralized" government under the Constitution we helped shape there.

120 is right, "militia" is not a 4-letter word. It is a critical component of local and national security in developing and developed nations alike. We focused on banning what we feared, and turned a blind eye to the greater evils we created in the process.

These are reversible mistakes, but only if we first recognize how critical they are. VSO is great, as is ALP; but under the current top-cover they can only delay the inevitable.

[Bill Moore]

These are reversible mistakes, but only if we first recognize how critical they are. VSO is great, as is ALP; but under the current top-cover they can only delay the inevitable.

This is my fear, a lot of great activity taking place that is generating real, but unfortunately transient results.

I don't know if Karsai is as corrupt as the media makes him out to be. Maybe he is, maybe he isn't, but we are all aware that it is easy for the media to paint someone as guilty and criminal with little supporting evidence. Perhaps he operates the way he does because he doesn't feel he can trust enough folks to power down and decentralize. Regardless, if he doesn't decentralize I agree with 120mm his centralized approach won't hold water for long, and unfortunately we're funding it (but who knows for how much longer, I'm sure the the bill that comes out of Congress will have an impact on this also, maybe for the better).

[TDB]

Forgive me for not reading through the entire thread. Regarding the ALP, serveral sources I've seen have lamented about the issues surrounded this latest attempt to establish some form of local police. It seems the biggest issue is that the ALP aren't being paid on time, or at all and so are taxing the locals. It's just a little bit of history repeating itself. Corrupt government/security forces tax and abuse the locals, locals dislike/distrust the GoIRA and so the Taliban can use this to gain influence. Corruption within the state poses a greater threat to COIN in Afghanistan than the Taliban do.

[120mm]

Forgive me for not reading through the entire thread. Regarding the ALP, serveral sources I've seen have lamented about the issues surrounded this latest attempt to establish some form of local police. It seems the biggest issue is that the ALP aren't being paid on time, or at all and so are taxing the locals. It's just a little bit of history repeating itself. Corrupt government/security forces tax and abuse the locals, locals dislike/distrust the GoIRA and so the Taliban can use this to gain influence. Corruption within the state poses a greater threat to COIN in Afghanistan than the Taliban do.

You are reading good stuff.

Add to this that GIRoA and its minions has repeatedly said that ALL Arbakai would become ALP, which is patently false, and led them on. The responsible ISAFians have done little to nothing to disabuse this notion, even when it is repeatedly pointed out to them. I do not know why ISAF is so stupid about this or what they do not "get".

Also, several GIRoA subentities have combined reintegration with the ALP and reintegrated intact Taliban units by giving them ALP jobs. While giving the local Arbakai, some of which have fought the Taliban for years, the cold shoulder.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Free Range International (FRI) for identifying a new source on Afghan personalities:http://www.afghan-bios.info/

FRI commented:
Most of the content on the site seems to be provided by Afghans themselves, and although it’s quite biased sometimes, I have found most of the entries to be mostly accurate.

To illustrate I've chosen General Raziq:http://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=1489&task=view&total=2230&start=1657&Itemid=2

[TDB]

You are reading good stuff.

Add to this that GIRoA and its minions has repeatedly said that ALL Arbakai would become ALP, which is patently false, and led them on. The responsible ISAFians have done little to nothing to disabuse this notion, even when it is repeatedly pointed out to them. I do not know why ISAF is so stupid about this or what they do not "get".

Also, several GIRoA subentities have combined reintegration with the ALP and reintegrated intact Taliban units by giving them ALP jobs. While giving the local Arbakai, some of which have fought the Taliban for years, the cold shoulder.

I think this sums up the ISAF/US approach in Afghanistan, after the invasion they backed anti-Taliban militias and the NA wholeheartedly and without question. This lead to people who had been hard done by under the Taliban regime exacting revenge on those who had wronged them, they then joined the Taliban. So as you say we have whole Taliban units joining the ALP given the venere of legitemacy so anything they do will be seen as an act of government. While there is a need to be bring current Talibs back into the fold this is not the way to do it, you pay them but you can't buy them. More to the point you aren't tackling the root of the reason they joined the Taliban in the first place.

[120mm]

I think this sums up the ISAF/US approach in Afghanistan, after the invasion they backed anti-Taliban militias and the NA wholeheartedly and without question. This lead to people who had been hard done by under the Taliban regime exacting revenge on those who had wronged them, they then joined the Taliban. So as you say we have whole Taliban units joining the ALP given the venere of legitemacy so anything they do will be seen as an act of government. While there is a need to be bring current Talibs back into the fold this is not the way to do it, you pay them but you can't buy them. More to the point you aren't tackling the root of the reason they joined the Taliban in the first place.

I actually support backing powerbrokers in the north. They are powerbrokers for a reason.

The Ibrahimi brothers are criminals and quite thuggish, but they are good for Imam Sahib and the surrounding districts. Instead of targeting them by GIRoA driven investigations, I say let them run their fiefdoms.

We "jumped the shark" when we backed Karzai's play to remove Ismael Khan, imo. Ismael Khan is good for Herat, and Herat has NOT improved under GIRoA tutelage.

Basically ISAF/US has backed the big criminals in GIRoA against the smaller criminals in the North and West.

[Infanteer]

And they are doing so for lack of population density, right? And they report directly, in a stovepiped organization to a single minister of RCMP?

Not sure on what you mean by the population density bit. As for reporting, each province is a "Division" that reports to the National Headquarters (with a Commissioner) that is responsible to the Minister of Public Safety.


Infanteer,
To state the obvious (particularly to you), Canada is not Afghanistan.

I should say the same to you when the topic of Constitutionalism comes up....;)

But yes, that's obvious - I was simply responding to 120mm's statement that there are no centralized police forces that exist without the mandate of enforcing tyranny. I think the RCMP may be a model that proves the statement wrong, unless 120mm and myself have different conceptions of "national police force".

Cheers,

Infanteer

[Bob's World]

I doubt many Canadians see the RCMP as the tool of an illegitimate government with a primary purpose of suppressing any opposition to the same. Sadly the ANP is exactly that more often than not.

As to Razziq, his tribe has always controlled the border on the road from Kandahar through Spin Boldak to Qetta. The only difference is that with all the money associated with the coalition efforts the money amounts have gone up in recent years. This is classic Afghanistan and will not change because we find it offensive, nor is it a major issue in who wins or loses in Afghanistan. If GIRoA falls and the Taliban rise to power, Razziq or some other strong man he has nurtured to replace him from his tribe will still be guarding that gateway and taking tolls. We delude ourselves if we think otherwise.

[120mm]

Not sure on what you mean by the population density bit. As for reporting, each province is a "Division" that reports to the National Headquarters (with a Commissioner) that is responsible to the Minister of Public Safety.

I should say the same to you when the topic of Constitutionalism comes up....;)

But yes, that's obvious - I was simply responding to 120mm's statement that there are no centralized police forces that exist without the mandate of enforcing tyranny. I think the RCMP may be a model that proves the statement wrong, unless 120mm and myself have different conceptions of "national police force".

Cheers,

Infanteer

On the surface, Germany has a "national police force" as well, but if you look more closely, it is really a series of regional police forces that have different rules and social mores, adapted to the region they are policing.

I am assuming the RCMP also has a different M.O. and culture for each region.

Not so much with the ANP. They send that Hazara Captain to Kandahar and tell him to "enforce the peace". :confused:

And they send that Pashtun officer to Herat and tell him to do likewise.

There is "some" attempts to localize the ANP, but most of those are window-dressing, based upon my observations.

[Dayuhan]

The Philippines has a national, centrally led police force, and I wouldn't exactly say its mandate is enforcing tyranny, though it is certainly corrupt. At one time the police were under the control of municipal, provincial, and city governments, and city governments, but they quickly became in many cases little more than government-paid thugs working for mayors and governors, with a definite mandate to enforce tyranny. That still happens, but at least the central authority has the ability to shuffle the deck and transfer officers that get too cozy with local authority... even if that ability isn't always used, or is used too late. Very much imperfect, but better than it was in the days of local control.

How that would work in Afghanistan I don't know... probably not very well, like everything else. There is no system that will not be corrupted if the people running it are corrupt. I'd only point out that a central police force isn't necessarily or at all times a worse or more tyrannical alternative. I guess that would depend on where the loci of tyranny - especially that tyranny that affects the common people - really are. Local governments can be every bit as tyrannical, within their bailiwicks, as central ones.

[davidbfpo]

A commentary on FRI, which opens with:
This week, I’d like to address one of the biggest threats to those of us in the Kabul expat community: the Afghan government security apparatus. I was inspired to write this up after hearing that the Ministry of Interior is now insisting that all PSC’s in Kabul, whether foreign or not, must submit weekly movement plans to them for approval. Apparently, it just went into effect. If this policy was instituted by any other government, I would probably agree with it, but I guarantee this is just another ridiculous Afghan policy designed to harass foreigners. The primary harassers will be the ANSF, as always.

Link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=4346#comments

Apart from the mention of the ANP I think the comment on the NDS is of note.

[120mm]

I've been rolled up by the NDS twice. They were professional to a point, but still; you do not want to be rolled up by the NDS.

Your tax dollars at work, though. This is what happens when you pretend a puppet state is actually a sovereign nation. They act out in really stupid and self-defeating ways.

[Infanteer]

I visited the NDS compound a few times during my tour. My ANA counterpart did not look comfortable when I dragged him in - the second time he wouldn't even go.

They seem to be a bunch of shady dudes with pistols that know the whereabouts of every insurgent and talk to them frequently....

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den a pointer to a Human Rights Watch report on the Afghan Local Police (ALP).

Comment:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2011/09/new-afghan-local-police-units-failing.html

Cited HRW report:http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0911webwcover.pdf

One chapter is entitled:
The Afghan Local Police:“Community Watch with AK-47s"

[Jedburgh]

CNA, 15 Jan 12: What do Afghans want from the Police? Views from Helmand Province (http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/What%20Afghans%20want%20from%20the%20Police%20D002 6181.A2.pdf)

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community expect the Afghan police to play a crucial role in maintaining stability in Afghanistan as international troops withdraw. With foreign police trainers, mentors, and advisors remaining in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, the question of what sort of force they should be training is of increasing importance. The ANSF Development Division (C10) at RC (SW) requested this study to examine what government officials, community leaders, and ordinary residents in Helmand want from the police, so that police mentors will know where they should focus their efforts. RC (SW) leaders recognized that, unless the Afghan government, community leaders, and public want the type of police force the international community is training, the police force will not be maintained after international forces withdraw....

...Residents of Helmand find it difficult to imagine a police force as found in Western countries because Afghanistan has never had community police. Although Westerners consider it self-evident that police should be professional, provide security, assist with law enforcement, and respond to the public's calls for assistance, the view from Helmand is more nuanced. It does not appear that residents of Helmand want the type of police force that is familiar to small-town Americans.

[davidbfpo]

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) have a place within his thread and the below comment is from a SWJ article, the author being:
I am here for an eight month tour as a Tribal and Political Engagement Officer



Many of the strategies I've seen used in Afghanistan are (1) use warlords, (2) direct action missions, (3) lots of clearing operations, (4) importing security forces from outside the area. The funny thing is, the Afghan Local Police program we are using in many parts of the country has a mix of many of these strategies but the real enduring one, the one that I am seeing work with my own eyes in Uruzgan at present enlists the community in its own defense, recruits vetted and registered police through a local shura, is trained by SOF, is defensively oriented, nested into the Afghan National Police, and blends civil and military approaches relatively seamlessly. Uruzgan has the most mature ALP program in the country and we are winning.

Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reflections-from-the-valley%E2%80%99s-edge-a-year-with-the-pashtuns-in-the-heartland-of-the-taliban

[davidbfpo]

The Afghan police charged with maintaining security in their own country as coalition troops begin to pull out within months are still "endemically corrupt" and riven with problems including nepotism and drug abuse, internal government documents have revealed.

Foreign Office (FCO) papers obtained by The Independent on Sunday disclose official concerns about the fate of Afghanistan and its chances of holding the Taliban at bay, if its leaders fail to "root out corruption" throughout the ranks of the Afghan National Police (ANP).

A confidential report on the performance of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the nation's major law-enforcement body, observed in October: "Unless radical change is introduced to improve the actual and perceived integrity and legitimacy of officers within the AUP, then the organisation will continue to provide an ineffective and tainted service to citizens … for decades to come."

Salutary reminder of the realities crept in, not from the FCO paper(s) methinks:
ANP officers, who are usually at the front line of the security forces' dealings with the public, have to endure lower pay and fatality rates twice as high as their counterparts in the Afghan army.

What a surprise! Must have been to the FCO, not the Afghan public.

Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/taliban-preys-on-afghanistans-corrupt-police-force-8430111.html

[davidbfpo]

The ANP have not gone away, but maybe before they do:rolleyes: Hurst have published 'Policing Afghanistan: The Politics of the Lame Leviathan' by Antonio Giustozzi and Mohammed Isaqzadeh.

The publishers blurb:
This book is a rare in-depth study of a police force in a developing country which is also undergoing a bitter internal conflict, further to the post-2001 external intervention in Afghanistan. Policing Afghanistan discusses the evolution of the country’s police through its various stages but focuses in particular on the last decade.

The authors review the ongoing debates over the future shape of Afghanistan’s police, but seek primarily to analyse the way Afghanistan is policed relative to its existing social, political and international constraints. Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh have observed the development of the police force from its early stages, starting from what was a rudimentary, militia-based police force prior to 2001. This is a book about how the police really work in such a difficult environment, the nuts and bolts approach, based on first hand research, as opposed to a description of how the Afghan police are institutionally organised and regulated.

A review by a British academic, Alice Hills:
This is the first serious, comprehensive and convincing account of how policing in Afghanistan really works. Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh’s impressive study of the political dynamics of Afghan policing extends the police-studies agenda and is essential reading for anyone interested in the political economy – or reform – of policing.

Usual price 47 UK Pounds, currently special offer 35 UK Pounds; hardback, 240 pgs.

[davidbfpo]

Hardly a surprising headline for a BBC TV Panorama programme being broadcast tonight, Afghan police accused of corruption and child abuse is a report by Ben Anderson, whose documentaries are always excellent:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21547542

Citing USMC Major Steuber, an ANP adviser:
Try doing that day in, day out, working with child molesters, working with people who are robbing people, murdering them. It wears on you after a while.

Ben Anderson's final comment says it all:
...from what I saw, corruption and criminality are widespread among the police in Sangin. This is exactly the kind of behaviour that led many Afghans to welcome the Taliban when they swept to power in 1996. Is this what all the fighting and bloodshed has been for?