PDA

View Full Version : Setting up effective, local security forces



davidbfpo
07-02-2009, 12:22 PM
Moderator's Note

A new thread, which is fully explained in Post No.4.(ends)

SWJ Blog on July 1st '09 had an odd title 'Call in the Cavalry' linking contemporary issues of recruiting and managing locally recruited irregulars to a book written in 1845, in the Imperial Indian period, for an irregular cavalry: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/call-in-the-cavalry/. The linked article:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/30/call_in_the_calvary?new and had three sub-titles or themes - incentivize, live and let live and go native.

From my armchair it seemed odd for a journalist to reach that far back for lessons learnt, especially trying to apply in Afghanistan. Secondly there are far better books (see http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7442) and of course the books, articles etc cited in many threads.

Looking through many of the FID threads the focus was on Iraq, so now the US is sending more troops etc to Afghanistan, it seemed appropriate to see if SWC needed to examine and debate the issues.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
07-02-2009, 02:01 PM
From my armchair it seemed odd for a journalist to reach that far back for lessons learnt, especially trying to apply in Afghanistan. Secondly there are far better books (see http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7442) and of course the books, articles etc cited in many threads.


From this armchair as well. My fear is that there's a whole lot of folk plundering their way through military history, with some trend spotting in mind.

Might be good if folk actually read Calwell and Gwynn, instead of just quoting them.

Steve Blair
07-02-2009, 02:31 PM
From this armchair as well. My fear is that there's a whole lot of folk plundering their way through military history, with some trend spotting in mind.

Might be good if folk actually read Calwell and Gwynn, instead of just quoting them.

I would contend that there are trends, but that they lie in how organizations react to certain types of perceived threats. For example, the US Army's continual shedding of its counterinsurgency experience is one of those historical trends, and one that should be learned from. History is also a better source for understanding what DIDN'T work in a particular situation than it is for predicting future events.

The danger I usually see is one of polar constructs. We either ignore history entirely (or cherry-pick the appealing bits) or turn to it expecting a crystal ball into the future. Neither approach is especially helpful.

davidbfpo
07-14-2012, 06:38 PM
Fuchs rightly posted on a separate thread, with my emphasis:
The Americans never really mastered this indirect rule and the setup of effective indigenous sepoy-like forces either.

Yes such forces would appear to be mercenaries and history shows that money was one factor in a sometimes complex equation. If the British in the imperial period could raise irregular units in the NW Frontier Province and FATA, with very few examples of mutiny or disloyalty, can this not be replicated? More recently and in a non-imperial context there were local units in Borneo, Oman, Namibia etc.

Are there not American examples post-1945? i am sure there are pre-1939.

ganulv
07-14-2012, 06:56 PM
Fuchs rightly posted on a separate thread, with my emphasis:

Yes such forces would appear to be mercenaries and history shows that money was one factor in a sometimes complex equation. If the British in the imperial period could raise irregular units in the NW Frontier Province and FATA, with very few examples of mutiny or disloyalty, can this not be replicated? More recently and in a non-imperial context there were local units in Borneo, Oman, Namibia etc.

Are there not American examples post-1945? i am sure there are pre-1939.

The U.S./Montagnard (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Degar#History) relationship, perhaps. I don’t know that the comparison isn’t apples and oranges, though. The imperial/provincial dynamic is distinct from the dynamic between a hegemon and an admittedly less powerful but nevertheless sovereign state. Mark Danner’s book The massacre at El Mozote (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50017/kenneth-maxwell/the-massacre-at-el-mozote-a-parable-of-the-cold-war) (one of my favorite books of any stripe) is a good case study in the latter.

Dayuhan
07-15-2012, 12:19 AM
Fuchs rightly posted on a separate thread, with my emphasis:


The Americans never really mastered this indirect rule and the setup of effective indigenous sepoy-like forces either.

Yes such forces would appear to be mercenaries and history shows that money was one factor in a sometimes complex equation. If the British in the imperial period could raise irregular units in the NW Frontier Province and FATA, with very few examples of mutiny or disloyalty, can this not be replicated? More recently and in a non-imperial context there were local units in Borneo, Oman, Namibia etc.

Are there not American examples post-1945? i am sure there are pre-1939.

Actually the US did exactly that, reasonably effectively, in the Philippines during their colonial enterprise there. Given that the American "sepoys" in the Philippines never staged an equivalent of the sepoy rebellion (though of course they weren't around as long) you could argue that the US did it more effectively. Of course the US didn't pursue that strategy on as wide a scale, because they didn't have as many colonies. It's not a strategy that translates accurately to the post-colonial proxy wars, in which the role was largely taken over by the national armed forces of our proxies.

davidbfpo
07-21-2012, 01:06 PM
On another thread I posted a week ago 'An option overlooked' after Fuchs rightly posted his succinct observation, with my emphasis:
The Americans never really mastered this indirect rule and the setup of effective indigenous sepoy-like forces either.

This is an issue which has always interested me and IMO deserves its own thread. As always this opening post will drop down when other, earlier posts are copied here.

I am very aware that for the USA there has been a long history of involvement in setting up such local forces; post-1945 it became an SOF responsibility and in various modes is undertaken today.

The big difference in this thread is 'sepoy-like', so I mean locally recruited with expatriate officers and NCOs. Not advisory teams, embedded and more recent descriptive terms.

Fuchs
07-21-2012, 01:30 PM
The Montagnards were fighting for their 'tribe', not for the Americans. I believe this doesn't count in this context.

The Filipinos come more close, but at least the WW2-period Filipino troops were motivated by a promise of independence and thus again fighting for their people, not really for the Americans AFAIK.
__________________________________________________ _________

What's remarkable in the case of U.S. troops is that they don't form U.S.Army units with 80-90% foreigners from the region. It's really not that hard, as evidenced by the ease of how European powers did this during Imperialism times. See the German Askaris; German officers surely had no experience in creating such a force, yet built a formidable one in East Africa with IIRC initially Sudanese warriors.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Askari#German_colonies

Just imagine; rotation would be limited to about 20% of the total force, deployed U.S. personnel could be cut by two thirds and the actual force available in-theatre would still be larger and have enough boots on the ground to dominate most of the places that are now effectively without Western control.
Well-performing and reliable soldiers could be identified and promoted, with gradual replacement of U.S. troops over the span of maybe six years.


I suspect the U.S. has a misleading perception of the quality of its own troops. Most of their qualities are of little consequence in small wars and other characteristics are outright problematic. This also applies to Western mercenaries.
A critical little bit more optimism about the utility of foreign culture troops (done right, not the ridiculous ANA approach) could serve very well.



hmm, why do I pay attention to it? It's small wars stuff.
The only consequence for great war stuff here is the use of foreign culture troops as manpower akin to the French practice of employing black troops in Europe. The success of this was mixed at best.
We don't need foreign manpower for Europe's security (contrary to hysterical demography doom-sayers) and the Roman experience with culturally foreign auxiliaries in the long term is not a promising example.

ganulv
07-21-2012, 02:13 PM
The Montagnards were fighting for their 'tribe', not for the Americans. I believe this doesn't count in this context.

The Filipinos come more close, but at least the WW2-period Filipino troops were motivated by a promise of independence and thus again fighting for their people, not really for the Americans AFAIK.

It’s hardly news that individuals working within a colonial structure are often primarily motivated by local concerns. I would assume that is the norm, actually.

There are a couple of anthropologists—Gerald Hickey (https://www.lib.washington.edu/SouthEastAsia/vsg/org/Gerald%20Hickey.htm) and Oscar Salemink (http://anthropology.ku.dk/staff/beskrivelse/?id=403491)—whose work directly addresses the ties between Montagnard ethnic identity, the colonial endeavor, and Vietnamese nationalism.


I suspect the U.S. has a misleading perception of the quality of its own troops.

There is a tendency amongst Americans to talk themselves up, but I assure you that it is neither a universal amongst us nor exclusive to us.

Ken White
07-21-2012, 03:25 PM
The Montagnards were fighting for their 'tribe', not for the Americans. I believe this doesn't count in this context.That's incorrect, most of the Montagnards were in the go along and get along mode until recruited by and paid by the US. You can and will of course believe what you wish.
What's remarkable in the case of U.S. troops is that they don't form U.S.Army units with 80-90% foreigners from the region...Difference in national traditions and self-perceptions. *
I suspect the U.S. has a misleading perception of the quality of its own troops. Most of their qualities are of little consequence in small wars and other characteristics are outright problematic. This also applies to Western mercenaries.
A critical little bit more optimism about the utility of foreign culture troops (done right, not the ridiculous ANA approach) could serve very well.In reverse order for the last assertion, see * above.

On the first three statements, totally true but Ganulv answers it far better than I :

"There is a tendency amongst Americans to talk themselves up, but I assure you that it is neither a universal amongst us nor exclusive to us."

Fuchs
07-21-2012, 03:58 PM
That's incorrect, most of the Montagnards were in the go along and get along mode until recruited by and paid by the US.

I don't consider this in conflict with what I wrote.
Propaganda and other means shape perceptions, and Montagnards knew that defeat would cause repercussions for their people once they had joined the 'anti-communist' cause.

Most conscripts of European armies were in a "go along and get along mode" shortly before being sent to war. So what?

TheCurmudgeon
07-21-2012, 04:08 PM
Difference in national traditions and self-perceptions. *

An interesting observation. I think there is a contradiction in the way American's view themselves in relation to non-western foreign militaries. We do not want to see ourselves as imperialists conquering and subjugating the locals. Therefore we do not like the idea of mixed, Sepoy style forces.

Yet we are a hierarchical culture. We believe that people make their own success and if you are in the gutter you are there based on your own failures. Therefore we still view people in parts of the world as somehow "lesser". You see it in the way we mock their systems as inferior to ours.

It sets up a condition where we do not want to build combined unite with them because that would be colonialist yet we refuse to accept that they can do the job as well as us so we continue to treat them as if they are our subjects.

It is our problem and I don't think we are likely to fix it any time soon.

Fuchs
07-21-2012, 04:24 PM
There might also a lack of long-term strategy play into this.

I have two pet theories about how to handle small wars as the one in AFG:

(1) As described, build foreigners into the force till it turned foreign completely, shedding the too technicized TO&E components in the process.

(2) Send your troops, but set a withdrawal table from day one and tell the locals about it. Also tell them that for every WIA you take two replacements will arrive and for every KIA you take ten replacements will arrive - so violence against your personnel will have a perverted effect and be discouraged strongly. This approach is supposed to buy a calm period, for whatever purpose that's required.


Both could be combined, but (2) would lose effectiveness in such a combination.


Meanwhile, the standard Western approach under U.S. leadership is to send relatively few occupation troops, rotate them and reinforce them if politicians get too much under pressure by poor news about the occupation.
In parallel, indigenous puppet regime forces are being built from scratch, perform rather poorly and are unreliable for many reasons.

Ken White
07-21-2012, 04:39 PM
I don't consider this in conflict with what I wrote.You rarely do see such conflicts. On the rare occasions you do, you attempt to drive your bulldozer over them... :D
Propaganda and other means shape perceptions, and Montagnards knew that defeat would cause repercussions for their people once they had joined the 'anti-communist' cause.

Most conscripts of European armies were in a "go along and get along mode" shortly before being sent to war. So what?And the bearing of all this on your statement that the Montagnards were fighting for their tribes is precisely what? It would in fact seem to me that your statement they "...knew that defeat would cause repercussions for their people ..." which is true indicates a situation that would in fact deter them from fighting 'for the tribe' lacking some other incentive. As an Economist, you know money talks... :wry:

Note also that the Montagnards were neither European or conscripted -- the tribal leaders did not force their young men to fight for the Americans, they simply allowed them to do so. The men had a choice and they exercised it so that comparison is sorta specious, that's what. :cool:

Not that contradictory statements have ever deterred you, Lieber Fuchs... ;)

Ken White
07-21-2012, 04:46 PM
I have two pet theories about how to handle small wars as the one in AFG:...But what are we going to do about the politicians???
Meanwhile, the standard Western approach under U.S. leadership is to send relatively few occupation troops, rotate them and reinforce them if politicians get too much under pressure by poor news about the occupation.In the US case, that's a forced error due to our personnel system and Congressional pressure -- unfortunately, US domestic political concerns outweigh both military and foreign policy issues. That does not mean the rest of a coalition has to do the same thing; that they opt to do so is a lick on them -- or also a function of their domestic political pressures...
In parallel, indigenous puppet regime forces are being built from scratch, perform rather poorly and are unreliable for many reasons.True. Never a good idea but it seems hard to break the mold.

Fuchs
07-21-2012, 05:24 PM
which is true indicates a situation that would in fact deter them from fighting 'for the tribe' lacking some other incentive.

People can be amazingly short-sighted.

Besides, the North Vietnamese were more nationalists than communists, and nationalists are no good news for minorities.

JMA
07-21-2012, 06:37 PM
There might also a lack of long-term strategy play into this.

I have two pet theories about how to handle small wars as the one in AFG:

(1) As described, build foreigners into the force till it turned foreign completely, shedding the too technicized TO&E components in the process.

(2) Send your troops, but set a withdrawal table from day one and tell the locals about it. Also tell them that for every WIA you take two replacements will arrive and for every KIA you take ten replacements will arrive - so violence against your personnel will have a perverted effect and be discouraged strongly. This approach is supposed to buy a calm period, for whatever purpose that's required.


Both could be combined, but (2) would lose effectiveness in such a combination.


Meanwhile, the standard Western approach under U.S. leadership is to send relatively few occupation troops, rotate them and reinforce them if politicians get too much under pressure by poor news about the occupation.
In parallel, indigenous puppet regime forces are being built from scratch, perform rather poorly and are unreliable for many reasons.

The German example in East Africa (starting 1881) is a good one as was the British example across their colonies.

The critical success factor is based on all the officers and as many as possible of the NCOs being imported. Over time - many years - an NCO corps among the indigenous will being to form and the respective units will begin to form their own cultures.

The Rhodesian African Rifles example (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=133657&postcount=318) bears study as the officers were local and permanent as opposed to merely being on temporary secondment.

The principal US problem is the short attention span.

US training example in the DRC (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=122159&postcount=37)

Not sure the US model in the DRC is the correct method.

Ken White
07-21-2012, 07:05 PM
People can be amazingly short-sighted.This is even more so:
Besides, the North Vietnamese were more nationalists than communists, and nationalists are no good news for minorities.Boy, is it ever... :wry:

Ken White
07-21-2012, 07:20 PM
The principal US problem is the short attention span.Induced by size and traditions but most attributable to our political system and thus is unlikely to change. Many of the "cockups" you more or less correctly note are directly attributable to that feature. It should be considered by all 'strategists' and planners, particularly those in the US but it too seldom is. To ask that fact and feature be considered by observers is probably a step too far... :wry:

The foreign policy implications of Chine, Russia, Syria and Libya (as well as US aid in the search for Kony and the LRA...) that you surface are all examples of the fact that US domestic politics take primacy for a number of reasons, some bad, some good. Short termism r us... :o
Not sure the US model in the DRC is the correct method.It is not however it is short term (that "attention span...") adequate. The British and most of the Commonwealth as well as the Germans always strove for 'good'[ or excellence For the US, adequate has always been sufficient. So far...

davidbfpo
07-21-2012, 07:30 PM
I'd overlooked checking the forum 'FID & Working With Indigenous Forces Training, advising, and operating with local armed forces in Foreign Internal Defense':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/forumdisplay.php?f=37

So I have found a post from 2009 in which I concluded that many of the FID threads were focused on Iraq and on quick review there are no threads similar to this theme.

There was one thread 'Reaching back to learn?' with three posts in 2009, which I have now merged to this one.

JMA
07-21-2012, 07:36 PM
Induced by size and traditions but most attributable to our political system and thus is unlikely to change. Many of the "cockups" you more or less correctly note are directly attributable to that feature. It should be considered by all 'strategists' and planners, particularly those in the US but it too seldom is. To ask that fact and feature be considered by observers is probably a step too far... :wry:

The foreign policy implications of Chine, Russia, Syria and Libya (as well as US aid in the search for Kony and the LRA...) that you surface are all examples of the fact that US domestic politics take primacy for a number of reasons, some bad, some good. Short termism r us... :oIt is not however it is short term (that "attention span...") adequate. The British and most of the Commonwealth as well as the Germans always strove for 'good'[ or excellence For the US, adequate has always been sufficient. So far...

Ken, you know this limitation but how many of the currently serving US soldiers do? If they do - and accept it - then they can figure out a work around for the inherent weakness.

A good first step would be to refuse to train locals under the current system because:

* it is a given that at some point (determined by the vermin in DC) they will be abandoned to their fate, and/or

* there is no telling how long it will be before they change sides taking with them the supplied weapons and their new skills.

davidbfpo
07-21-2012, 08:22 PM
Other relevant threads in my opinion are:

Within this thread is a must read on Levies, the name used for such units in the British Empire, Small Wars pre-1914: Canadian input:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13854

JMA has referred to the Germa campaign in East Africa, often linked to their general Von Lettow Vorbeck; this is a short thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=651

Staying with WW1 there is 'TE Lawrence: a merged thread':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5330

The 'small war' in Oman has a thread 'Oman campaign: catch all' where the British and others followed this approach is on:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=11106

'South Africa's COIN war in SWA/Namibia/Angola' as it includes the South African experience with ex-FNLA fighters forming 32 Buffalo Battalion and the police unit Koevoet: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10859

Not to overlook the political aspect, which is covered in 'The Role of the British Political Officer on the North West Frontier':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7518

I am sure Steve Blair and others will know of the American historical experience.:wry:

Ken White
07-21-2012, 11:38 PM
Ken, you know this limitation but how many of the currently serving US soldiers do? If they do - and accept it - then they can figure out a work around for the inherent weakness.My impression is that many know but feel powerless to effect change (the belief in civilian control is carried to a fault on some occasions), many know and take advantage of it for personal or parochial reasons (it can provide advantages to those willing to use the system for less than beneficial to the nation reasons) and too many sort of know but fail to consider it in planning.

Hope is not a plan... :wry:
A good first step would be to refuse to train locals under the current system because:

* it is a given that at some point (determined by the vermin in DC) they will be abandoned to their fate, and/or

* there is no telling how long it will be before they change sides taking with them the supplied weapons and their new skills.Your two points are accurate however, the last is defeated by the short termism; "Let's fix the problem now and let others worry about that later..." The first suffers from the same syndrome plus the venality of most politicians.. Or is that verminicity? :rolleyes:

Regrettably, refusal is unlikely due to the strong tradition of civilian control. The really smart Flag Officers will stall and prevent a lot of harm but are confronted with others, usually unduly ambitious, who want to pleas the Pols. Our foray into Kosovo and the saga of competing Generals on the employment of Apaches is an example. In that case the smart guy won -- doesn't always work out that way. Viet Nam is an example of that...

Dayuhan
07-22-2012, 12:57 AM
The Filipinos come more close, but at least the WW2-period Filipino troops were motivated by a promise of independence and thus again fighting for their people, not really for the Americans AFAIK.

True of the WW2 period, but well before independence was promised the US was training Filipino units and deploying them for internal security functions, just as most imperial powers did.


What's remarkable in the case of U.S. troops is that they don't form U.S.Army units with 80-90% foreigners from the region. It's really not that hard, as evidenced by the ease of how European powers did this during Imperialism times. See the German Askaris; German officers surely had no experience in creating such a force, yet built a formidable one in East Africa with IIRC initially Sudanese warriors.

Just imagine; rotation would be limited to about 20% of the total force, deployed U.S. personnel could be cut by two thirds and the actual force available in-theatre would still be larger and have enough boots on the ground to dominate most of the places that are now effectively without Western control.

What you're missing here is that the whole idea of recruiting locals directly into the armed forces of a foreign power is only possible is the foreign power rules the area. You can't do it if there's an even nominally sovereign local government in the picture. The US could and did form such units in its colony in the Philippines. It couldn't and didn't and hasn't in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan because these are not direct imperial ventures where the US is setting up to rule, they are nominally sovereign states with their own governments and armed forces.

Either you're a colonial power, in which case you can and will take direct control of indigenous armed forces, or you're not, in which case you can't and won't. Can't have it both ways.

Bill Moore
07-22-2012, 02:26 AM
What you're missing here is that the whole idea of recruiting locals directly into the armed forces of a foreign power is only possible is the foreign power rules the area. You can't do it if there's an even nominally sovereign local government in the picture. The US could and did form such units in its colony in the Philippines. It couldn't and didn't and hasn't in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan because these are not direct imperial ventures where the US is setting up to rule, they are nominally sovereign states with their own governments and armed forces.

Either you're a colonial power, in which case you can and will take direct control of indigenous armed forces, or you're not, in which case you can't and won't. Can't have it both ways.

Exactly, that is why trying to compare the U.S. foreign capacity building to European foreign conscripts lead by Europeans is futile exercise. If we integrated foreign troops into our logistic, C2, medical, fires and intelligence systems and led them with U.S. officers and senior NCOs we could rapidly employ relatively effective forces that were largely composed of foreign troops. However, in a FID scenario that just isn't possible.

Other comments were not accurate either. Our political patience is rarely the problem. It doesn't take 10 plus years to develop a relatively effective fighting force. It may or may not take 10 plus years to stomp out an insurgency, but that is a different issue.

Where I think we go wrong (and this is just a start):

- We try to develop forces that mirror the U.S. force structure and tell them to employ our doctrine. It is generally too sosphisticated for most in developing nations to replicate, culturally inappropriate, and fiscally unsustainable.

- Department of State has responsibility for security assistance and frankly they don't know what they're doing. They have a long track record of throwing millions of dollars at these challenges with little understanding of what is actually required. The worst part is they do not develop a logistics system for the supported nation that is sustainable (if they develop one at all). If Americans had a better appreciation of how much Dept of State spent on these efforts and what little they have to show for it, I suspect more authorities would shift back to the military. State should own policy and have a veto vote, but once a decision is made to execute they need to enable and stop impeding.

- If it is a security assistance Mobile Training Team U.S. forces do not have the authority to combat advise, only to train and equip. Without mentoring them in combat it is very difficult for those trained to transition from the classroom and range to the battlefield. Mentors in the field instill confidence and can make on the spot corrections and identify shortfalls in training that need to be addressed. As that military matures over time these lessons are incorporated in their doctrine (not U.S. doctrine with their country's name stamped over it) and taught in their schools.

- Not surprisingly, when forces that are actually trained to build partner security forces like U.S. Special Forces have the resources and authorities to do so like they did in Iraq and Afghanistan they developed some very capable partner Special Forces units. Much better than the sepoys and numerous other forces developed by the Europeans during the colonial years. The point is the U.S. can do this if we have the right people in charge it enabled with the right authorities and resources. We have a proven track record. We have a dysfunctional bureaucracy and disparate authorities that make effective execution difficult at best, impossible at worst.

Dayuhan
07-22-2012, 03:04 AM
Where I think we go wrong (and this is just a start):

I would add that we're inclined to assume that the nominal partner government and its security forces share our goals and objectives and our ideas on how those goals and objectives are best achieved, an assumption that is not always valid... to put it mildly.

Fuchs
07-22-2012, 04:02 AM
What you're missing here is that the whole idea of recruiting locals directly into the armed forces of a foreign power is only possible is the foreign power rules the area. You can't do it if there's an even nominally sovereign local government in the picture.

I disagree. Most governments easily tolerate when their citizens/subjects become mercenaries for another power. Austria is one of the very few exceptions AFAIK.

Furthermore, I mentioned the possibility to integrate the foreign troops, promote some, disband the too technicized parts of the TO&E and then allow the foreign culture troops to take over the entire force. In the end, the host nation would inherit a competent brigade.
The only reason to oppose this that I see is that the host nation's corrupt elite would expect difficulties regarding the extraction of money or power from this force. Aside from that the mixed force should be no less tolerable than a 100% alien force.

Dayuhan
07-22-2012, 04:27 AM
I disagree. Most governments easily tolerate when their citizens/subjects become mercenaries for another power. Austria is one of the very few exceptions AFAIK.

As long as they go somewhere else to do their fighting.


Furthermore, I mentioned the possibility to integrate the foreign troops, promote some, disband the too technicized parts of the TO&E and then allow the foreign culture troops to take over the entire force. In the end, the host nation would inherit a competent brigade.

The only reason to oppose this that I see is that the host nation's corrupt elite would expect difficulties regarding the extraction of money or power from this force. Aside from that the mixed force should be no less tolerable than a 100% alien force.

A government that allowed its own citizens to enlist in the armed forces of a foreign occupying power - even if it calls itself a foreign assisting power - for domestic service would lose even the most tattered facade of sovereignty or legitimacy. It would no longer be able to even pretend to be a government.

The idea that the US could recruit, say, Afghan units into the US military to serve in Afghanistan is perhaps an interesting speculation, but hardly relevant to any real-world situation.

Fuchs
07-22-2012, 11:04 AM
A government that allowed its own citizens to enlist in the armed forces of a foreign occupying power - even if it calls itself a foreign assisting power - for domestic service would lose even the most tattered facade of sovereignty or legitimacy. It would no longer be able to even pretend to be a government.

Well, hardly more so than a puppet government that allows an occupying force to act as police, to shoot at everyone who closes in with their checkpoints, to bomb obscure vehicles from the air, to hire local militias of young gunmen, to employ foreign mercenaries who behave utterly disrespectful and value the countries' civilian's lives very lowly and which grants legal immunity to said foreigners.

So where exactly is my pet approach worse in regard to puppet government legitimacy than the generally practised one?

JMA
07-22-2012, 11:14 AM
Well, hardly more so than a puppet government that allows an occupying force to act as police, to shoot at everyone who closes in with their checkpoints, to bomb obscure vehicles from the air, to hire local militias of young gunmen, to employ foreign mercenaries who behave utterly disrespectful and value the countries' civilian's lives very lowly and which grants legal immunity to said foreigners.

So where exactly is my pet approach worse in regard to puppet government legitimacy than the generally practised one?

With all respect you are allowing yourself to be needlessly distracted.

There are many permutations on how this sepoy/askari system could be put in place and developed. It needs an open mind ... in fact a military mind that has studied the employment of such forces under different (governmental) circumstances and varying cultural milieux.

JMA
07-22-2012, 12:48 PM
Our political patience is rarely the problem.

I suggest it is, especially when it changes mid stream (as it is apt to happens with politicians) and the military have to rapidly rejig the process. That's when the compromises on quality start.


It doesn't take 10 plus years to develop a relatively effective fighting force. It may or may not take 10 plus years to stomp out an insurgency, but that is a different issue.

That depends on the quality of your enemy in that instance. If you are drawing your manpower from the same pool as the enemy then it all will come down to their training and leadership. This is what your command cadre will have to deal with when they take the unit operational.


Where I think we go wrong (and this is just a start):

- We try to develop forces that mirror the U.S. force structure and tell them to employ our doctrine. It is generally too sosphisticated for most in developing nations to replicate, culturally inappropriate, and fiscally unsustainable.

That's a problem with who gets to be put in charge of this training and these units. If they come from a rigidly structured environment they will probably not have the faintest idea how to go about it and will resort to what they know.

To be honest the US doctrine is too sophisticated for the US military to adopt across the whole military itself.


- Department of State has responsibility for security assistance and frankly they don't know what they're doing. They have a long track record of throwing millions of dollars at these challenges with little understanding of what is actually required. The worst part is they do not develop a logistics system for the supported nation that is sustainable (if they develop one at all). If Americans had a better appreciation of how much Dept of State spent on these efforts and what little they have to show for it, I suspect more authorities would shift back to the military. State should own policy and have a veto vote, but once a decision is made to execute they need to enable and stop impeding.

You know, I know that State is dysfunctional and for the most part incompetent. Is that going to change anytime soon?


- If it is a security assistance Mobile Training Team U.S. forces do not have the authority to combat advise, only to train and equip. Without mentoring them in combat it is very difficult for those trained to transition from the classroom and range to the battlefield. Mentors in the field instill confidence and can make on the spot corrections and identify shortfalls in training that need to be addressed. As that military matures over time these lessons are incorporated in their doctrine (not U.S. doctrine with their country's name stamped over it) and taught in their schools.

Who would these mentors be? I suggest that if they were have to be drawn from your most combat experienced soldiers with the proviso that they have the aptitude and emotional disposition to do this sort of work.


- Not surprisingly, when forces that are actually trained to build partner security forces like U.S. Special Forces have the resources and authorities to do so like they did in Iraq and Afghanistan they developed some very capable partner Special Forces units. Much better than the sepoys and numerous other forces developed by the Europeans during the colonial years. The point is the U.S. can do this if we have the right people in charge it enabled with the right authorities and resources. We have a proven track record. We have a dysfunctional bureaucracy and disparate authorities that make effective execution difficult at best, impossible at worst.

Special forces don't only have to train special forces. A special forces training team can and should be able to train anything from a village militia to a HVT hit squad. I know they seem to only want to do the sexy stuff but that is where military discipline comes in.

The problem is that there is a squeeze from both ends... from the politicians on one side and from the grunt level on the other who have all the answers... and it seems those in the middle don't have the balls to push back.

See an example from the current Australian infantry problems. (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=137814&postcount=19)

Bob's World
07-22-2012, 04:48 PM
The real question is, are we attempting to build a security force to protect a government that we think is best from its own populace; or, are we attempting to help a government that its own populace wants protect them from some rogue threat (internal or external). If internal, does that "rogue" threat have any legal, trusted and certain options for engaging its government, or are they forced to resort to illegal / violent arguments?

This is a fine line, and it is one where the perceptions applied matter. Our perceptions as the intervening power are the ones that matter least, and one can rest assured that the perceptions of the government in question will be heavily biased to the preservation of their own status quo.

I am happy to argue to any audience that in Afghanistan we attempt to do the former and that more than any other factor is why we are still there slogging away after all this time and why the security force can't seem to become a competent, self-sufficient organization. GIRoA is a Northern Alliance monopoly. We think that is the right answer, and GIRoA seeks to preserve the monopoly. The excluded segment of the populace have no trusted, legal and certain means avialable to them, so they act out illegally. We brand them all "Taliban" with little regard to which are revolutionary actors seeking to force GIRoA to break their monopoly, and which are resistance actors who are simply weary of our foreign occupation of their home and the violence we bring to them on behalf of GIRoA.

Such approaches were the model for both Colonialism and for Containment as well. In the modern era, however, the pursuit of such approaches is demanding ever increasing energy and producing ever decreasing effects. It is also a major driver of the motivations that lead young men frustrated with the governance of their own country to not only join nationalist insurgency movements, but to also volunteer to support trans-nationalist terrorist organizations such as AQ.

Sometimes there may still be times and places where creating and sustaining artificial systems of security designed to protect and preserve some government against the express insurgent will of its own populace. I suspect those cases are rare.

Increasingly we are better served by employing our influence to bring those governments and populace to the table to work out new guards for their future security, and be willing to work with whatever and whomever emerges from such a process.

We need to evolve.

davidbfpo
07-22-2012, 06:42 PM
I wonder whether the impact of increasing urbanisation across the world will have an impact here. To date much of the counter-AQ and counter-AQ partners has been in relatively isolated / remote / extreme climates / rural locations.

The scale of FID could well increase. Imagine if Nigeria or Egypt was the setting.

The French experience in Algeria for example, where the French at one point had security forces of 500k IIRC and this included a not insignificant local element. At that time Algeria was split evenly between rural and urban IIRC; today it is very urbanised.

Bill Moore
07-22-2012, 09:02 PM
Posted by Davidbfpo


I wonder whether the impact of increasing urbanisation across the world will have an impact here. To date much of the counter-AQ and counter-AQ partners has been in relatively isolated / remote / extreme climates / rural locations.

The scale of FID could well increase. Imagine if Nigeria or Egypt was the setting.

The French experience in Algeria for example, where the French at one point had security forces of 500k IIRC and this included a not insignificant local element. At that time Algeria was split evenly between rural and urban IIRC; today it is very urbanised.

I think increasing urbanization already has had an impact on military operations, and I'm not sure why you appear to be dismissing the rather large urban CT operations in Baghdad, Tikrit, Falujah, Mogadishu, Kandahar, etc.

On the other hand I think your point is still interesting, it does seem AQ affiliates/partners generally establish strong holds in rural areas (where in theory they should be easier to target). I suspect part of the reason their activity is limited in the larger urban areas is due to security concerns. A lot of citizens watching and reporting, so unless they could establish control in an urban area this will likely remain the norm (of course there will also be exceptions that we may to respond to). I don't think too many people in the world, even the Muslim world view AQ as liberators, so I suspect AQ will generally be at greater risk in larger urban areas and forced to work in a traditional underground cellular in these areas for security.

FID encompasses a broad range of activities and actors, and if the scale of the AQ presence and activity in an urban areas is, the appropriate response is generally small scale security assistance composed mainly of personnel from intelligence, special operations, and contractors with speciality skills. This is often enough to enable the affected state to defeat/suppress this threat.

Bob's World
07-22-2012, 09:16 PM
Bill,

The Soviets promoted a worker's movement, focused in the Cities. Mao tried that and it fell flat, so they shifted to rural areas where their message of land reform resonated more effectively in their agrarian society. Bottom line is, as an insurgent leader go with what works, not with what the book says. Actually that is some damn good advice for our COIN gurus as well...

There can be many reasons why more activity happens outside a city rather than in, some as simple as the old rule of not defecating where one eats.

Most of the insurgency we see inside of Afghanistan is the resistance (small t taliban) against the US forces, and the populaces with the most reason for resisting the US/NATO forces are in the rural areas where we have been operating.

Similarly, the revolutionary aspect of the insurgency (coming out of Pakistan where the Big T Taliban take sanctuary) primarily targets the low hanging fruit of GIRoA governance, and it is much easier to take out a police outpost or disrupt traffic on some remote highway than it is to storm the Provincial HQ.

davidbfpo
07-22-2012, 09:17 PM
Bill,

That will teach me to post on a Sunday afternoon after gardening. How could I overlook Baghdad and Basra?

I would disagree with you and this is not the subject of this thread:
I suspect part of the reason their activity is limited in the larger urban areas is due to security concerns. A lot of citizens watching and reporting, so unless they could establish control in an urban area this will likely remain the norm...

Citizens do not always watch, let alone report. I do still wonder if AQ & partners switched to an urban area, let alone a huge metropolis, how external FID would work today. In Iraq AQ was not the main enemy, rather a local coalition.

Bill Moore
07-22-2012, 09:42 PM
David,

Agree part of this is not on topic, but still necessary to put things in context. There are few places that AQ would be welcome in urban areas. You can't compare them to the Leninists, but people do inappropriately compare them to the Maoists, so you can't win in that regard.

The Brits had to deal with a very tough IRA problem that appeared to those of watching from the outside to be mostly urban. From that problem set a number of useful urban fighting tactics (not to be confused with strategy) we're propogated throughout the West (and perhaps beyond). We now have our own lessons that we can teach in this regard, but the key in my mind is not to confuse teaching tactics with helping the partner get their strategy right.

Long way of saying I think we're quite capable of helping a nation through FID with urban security problems (especially AQ), but we haven't overcome our own deficiencies in getting the strategy right. This generally seems to be area of friction. A local government may have the right strategy, but the wrong tactics, and we show up and often teach good tactics, but push the wrong strategy based on our view of how the world works. Probably taking this down a path you don't want to this thread to go down, but I think it is relevant. If we get the strategy right (more accurately those we're assisting get the strategy right), and communicate it effectively, is likely the forces we help train will fight more effectively. There are a lot of reasons those we train often don't fight well, and one of the intangibles is they often don't believe in the cause and method. The whole world can see it on u-tube, Frontline, National Geographic, and other news specials where the media accompanies our guys into battle with their Afghan counterparts. The most interesting parts of those shows are when they translate the discussions between the Afghan forces and the locals and the Afghan forces apology for the tactics, but say right now they're being forced by the coalition to act this way. We're not good at listening, so I doubt many in our nation focus on those cues, but instead focus on the boastful U.S. NCO or officer explaining how inept the Afghan security forces are because they don't act like us.

Back to your point, what significant change and challenges do you think we would face with our FID doctrine if the focus shifted from the rural to the urban? I think I'm still missing your point.

Dayuhan
07-22-2012, 10:48 PM
There are few places that AQ would be welcome in urban areas.

Perhaps not welcome, but urban areas can be a very hospitable place for them. It really depends on what they're trying to do. For an individual or small cell that's lying low, hiding out or building a terror plot with a limited contact cell a city is ideal: you have anonymity, freedom of movement, easy access to communication, banking, etc. For the aspiring insurgent trying to win recruits and spread the message, the city is a lot more dangerous, especially if the local security services are at all competent: the message you preach will be heard in many places, and the same anonymity that can be a shelter to a small cell makes it very difficult to fully vet new recruits.

I personally suspect that AQ and similar groups maintain a quite substantial urban apparatus... of course they would be trying very hard not to draw attention to themselves, and you'd expect them to have little or no contact with local militant groups other than with a few trusted individuals.

Dayuhan
07-22-2012, 10:53 PM
So where exactly is my pet approach worse in regard to puppet government legitimacy than the generally practised one?

It loses the distinction between us and them.

You can speculate over your pet approach if you like, but realistically it isn't going to happen, and I don't see how you can draw a meaningful comparison between the establishment of "sepoy-like forces" in imperial settings (which Americans did as well as anyone else) and what you're proposing.

Your initial contention:


The Americans never really mastered this indirect rule and the setup of effective indigenous sepoy-like forces either

still seems somewhat dubious to me, both for the misplaced comparison referred to above and in the implicit assumption that "indirect rule" is the desired end state.

Fuchs
07-22-2012, 11:24 PM
still seems somewhat dubious to me, both for the misplaced comparison referred to above and in the implicit assumption that "indirect rule" is the desired end state.

Seriously, I would never advocate foreign rule, and thus never advocate indirect rule.

The context of the quote was me explaining why the U.S. isn't enough of an empire to reap the benefits of imperial arrogance.

Dayuhan
07-23-2012, 01:01 AM
The context of the quote was me explaining why the U.S. isn't enough of an empire to reap the benefits of imperial arrogance.

Or the penalties of that arrogance.

Either way, I don't see how that particular set of imperial methods is really applicable to today's non-imperial small wars.

ganulv
07-23-2012, 01:01 AM
There can be many reasons why more activity happens outside a city rather than in[.]

The days of an urban cadre in the Guatemalan civil war with which I am familiar were numbered indeed (and s/he knew it). On the other hand, I suspect that during the darkest days of the conflict guerrillas in the hills slept more soundly than did civilians in the cities and pueblos (http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/guatemala/police/index.htm). Something like a third of the Guatemalan population was urban at that time, as compared to about two-thirds of the contemporary Iraqi population. And in Iraq, outside of the north there isn’t much in the way of highlands to abscond to. And of course the stability of governance in Iraq in 2007 didn’t approach that in Guatemala in 1983. So, as you say, lots of reasons.

Bill Moore
07-23-2012, 01:31 AM
Posted by Dayuhan


I personally suspect that AQ and similar groups maintain a quite substantial urban apparatus... of course they would be trying very hard not to draw attention to themselves, and you'd expect them to have little or no contact with local militant groups other than with a few trusted individuals.

Re-read my comments, I said as much and agree, but these are not strong holds where they live in the open and control the area. The urban area is generally hostile territory to overt (even clandestine) terrorists.


I suspect part of the reason their activity is limited in the larger urban areas is due to security concerns.

That comment was not intended to mean AQ is not active in the urban area, heck the urban areas are their targets. I suspect there are tens of AQ cells in London, New York, Paris, and elsewhere throughout the world, and they are very dangerous. However, this doesn't require the deployment of general purpose forces (like it did in Iraq, Algeria, etc.).

Which is why I wrote:


and if the scale of the AQ presence and activity in an urban areas is (dropped my thought, so completing it here in bold) relatively small and clandestine, then the appropriate response is generally small scale security assistance composed mainly of personnel from intelligence, special operations, and contractors with speciality skills. This is often enough to enable the affected state to defeat/suppress this threat.

In sum I agree with you. What I am not getting is why it would be that much tougher for us to assist a partner with an Urban insurgency versus rural insurgencies (though in reality most are blended)? Urban areas are a tough battlefield, but so are the mountains and jungles, so regardless you have to adapt.

If we occupy (not do FID) a country and try to control the populace ourselves then I agree that "may" (still situationally dependent, wasn't exceptionally tough in Germany or Japan) be brutal.

My fault for failing to better clarify my intent.

Mike in Hilo
07-23-2012, 01:44 AM
Regret (1) I stumbled onto this belatedly and (2) the sidetrack
Nevertheless, Fuchs, to clarify: Both sides made ample use of Montagnards. We even had a name for the ones on the other side: "VCM." Their collaboration and guidance (literally) were essential to allowing NVA units to pop up "out of nowhere," as it were--on the coastal plain in northen Binh Dinh....

A couple of the main ethnic groups from which US recruited, the Rhade and Jarai, were easy to attract because they feared and hated lowland Vietnamese---whether communist or GVN....and had formed FULRO, their own independence "Front." They saw an association with the US as a counterbalance to the hated ARVN. Their anti-Vietnamese sentiment did not play entirely into US hands, as they also sought strength from a noted, local, anti-Viet force--namely, the Khmer Rouge.....An interesting side note is the fact that Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot's personal guard unit was, from the '60's until his end, composed solely of Jarai.

Cheers,
Mike.

ganulv
07-23-2012, 02:01 AM
A couple of the main ethnic groups from which US recruited, the Rhade and Jarai, were easy to attract because they feared and hated lowland Vietnamese---whether communist or GVN....

I know a fellow in my hometown who worked with Montagnards during the war and he told me one of his best guys had been with the ARVN until an in broad daylight incidence in which he turned his rifle on fellow ARVN—ethnic Kinh who wouldn’t leave off yelling various takes on “####ing Montagnard!” at him from across the street. Possibly a stolen and/or invented story, but indicative of a more general truth, I’m sure…

Bill Moore
07-23-2012, 02:32 AM
Posted by Mike in Hilo


Both sides made ample use of Montagnards. We even had a name for the ones on the other side: "VCM."

Interesting comments on the Montagnards. I'm currently reading Black Ops by Tony Geraghty "The Rise of SF in the CIA, the SAS, and Mossad" (jury is still out on the book).

Mike if you have any insights on the following please share.

In the Vietnam chapter he explains the ARVN disarmed the Montagnards in the late 50s and were not too happy we armed them again. He described a couple of situations where the program was transfered over to ARVN and it rapidly broke down because the Vietnamese didn't trust them; a pattern that widely repeated itself. The Vietnamese tried to reclaim their weapons, refused to go on patrol with savages, etc. All this I was aware of, but one bit of history I wasn't (or I forgot about) is that in September 1964 there was a Montagnard armed uprising. At one site they disarmed and detained their SF advisors and declared a rebellion against Saigon. At another site they killed 15 Vietnamese team leaders, at another site 11 Vietnamese SF soldiers were killed.

These surrogate operations are generally dicey, but especially so when those we are arming and training are opposed to the government we're trying to keep in power. The expedient choice is not always the right choice.

Dayuhan
07-23-2012, 04:22 AM
In sum I agree with you. What I am not getting is why it would be that much tougher for us to assist a partner with an Urban insurgency versus rural insurgencies (though in reality most are blended)? Urban areas are a tough battlefield, but so are the mountains and jungles, so regardless you have to adapt.


I realize that we mostly agree; I was mostly trying to underscore the differences between dealing with an "AQ-type" group and with an insurgency... two quite different things. If the local security services have any level of competence, they shouldn't need much help beyond intel to roll up a network of terrorist cells. An actual insurgency would be a quite different proposition, and the need for outside help, the desirability to an outside power of moving against the insurgency and the type of help that might be useful would depend entirely on the specific characteristics of the insurgency and the situation.

Urban areas are of course highly visible to the media and offer abundant potential for collateral damage, factors that have to be considered.

Bill Moore
07-23-2012, 07:13 AM
I'm guilty of conflating AQ terrorist cells and insurgencies, that wasn't my intent, but felt the need to address both. Of course it isn't unheard of for AQ to co-opt an insurgency (Iraq) and to a lesser extent Afghanistan. By the way we also dealt with an urban insurgency that utlized terrorist cells in Vietnam.

As challenging as this may be, I still don't think it compares to the true hybrid challenges our forces faced in Vietnam (fighting NV regulars, insurgents, suicide bombers "the sappers", electronic warfare, high end anti-aircraft weapons, major state actor support from Russia and China, etc.).

Our biggest challenge today isn't the enemy, it is ourselves. We went into this fight with unrealistic goals, adapted a doctrine that is deeply flawed, etc. This is a scenario where we actually could do more with less.

Bob's World
07-23-2012, 09:47 AM
Our biggest challenge today isn't the enemy, it is ourselves. We went into this fight with unrealistic goals, adapted a doctrine that is deeply flawed, etc. This is a scenario where we actually could do more with less.

A statement that should draw loud "Amen, brother!" from the chorus AND the congregation.

Challenge is getting to some degree of agreement on what less looks like. We are much better at making things bigger in ways that don't make much sense or work that well, but when things go south when one does less people feel like you just aren't trying hard enough.

Dayuhan
07-23-2012, 12:35 PM
A statement that should draw loud "Amen, brother!" from the chorus AND the congregation.

You'll get one from me, especially on the "unrealistic goals"...


Challenge is getting to some degree of agreement on what less looks like.

Before we even think about how to do more with less, we have to think about what we want or need to do. That seems to get overlooked a lot...

davidbfpo
07-23-2012, 01:07 PM
My reply to Bill Moore's question (Post 37):
what significant change and challenges do you think we would face with our FID doctrine if the focus shifted from the rural to the urban?

I was not thinking of just the USA intervening and my SWC reading does not make me familiar with US FID doctrine. Caveats aside here goes.

An urban setting for an insurgency / terrorist campaign absorbs manpower like a sponge, so using and adapting a local security element to the 'sepoy model' makes a lot of sense. You referred to 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland (1969-1998), at one stage the UK had 30k soldiers there - Operation Motorman, when police primacy had not been reached. Nearly all of them in two cities, Belfast & Londonderry.

Secondly by time FID is deployed the host nation will have lost considerable control and governance will be weakened. Think of the favelas in Rio and some "no go" areas elsewhere. Citizen involvement in providing information to the state will be low, especially if intimidation is prevalent - not necessarily violent nor observable. In one period in 'The Troubles' Loyalists used cameras without film to intimidate; imagine the impact today of mobile-phones.

F3EA will be problematic until many other factors act as enablers: informants, intelligence, surveillance etc. Enough time may not be given.

Pinpoint accuracy of weapons systems, especially the use of explosives, will be limited in densely occupied spaces. They might not even be allowed by the host.

Finally image is important, even crucial. Not for the 'armchair" observers, but the people affected by the presence of FID-users. It simply is a very different image if the security forces appear similar, even if with a few expatriate officers & NCOs.

davidbfpo
07-23-2012, 04:49 PM
Abu M has a comment on urban operations today, prompted by a David Kilcullen article and the footnotes point to a SWJ article.

So first the link to AbuM:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2012/07/city-system.html#comments

Then the Kilcullen piece:http://gt2030.com/2012/07/18/the-city-as-a-system-future-conflict-and-urban-resilience/

The SWJ article 'Command of the Cities: Towards a Theory of Urban Strategy':http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/command-of-the-cities-towards-a-theory-of-urban-strategy

davidbfpo
07-23-2012, 04:52 PM
A number of posts, including my own, have been on a related topic of future 'Small Wars' moving from the rural to the urban setting and may sit better in their own thread. Later I will try to identify previous threads on the theme.

Bill Moore
07-24-2012, 06:03 AM
My reply to Bill Moore's question (Post 37):

I was not thinking of just the USA intervening and my SWC reading does not make me familiar with US FID doctrine. Caveats aside here goes.

An urban setting for an insurgency / terrorist campaign absorbs manpower like a sponge, so using and adapting a local security element to the 'sepoy model' makes a lot of sense. You referred to 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland (1969-1998), at one stage the UK had 30k soldiers there - Operation Motorman, when police primacy had not been reached. Nearly all of them in two cities, Belfast & Londonderry.

Secondly by time FID is deployed the host nation will have lost considerable control and governance will be weakened. Think of the favelas in Rio and some "no go" areas elsewhere. Citizen involvement in providing information to the state will be low, especially if intimidation is prevalent - not necessarily violent nor observable. In one period in 'The Troubles' Loyalists used cameras without film to intimidate; imagine the impact today of mobile-phones.

F3EA will be problematic until many other factors act as enablers: informants, intelligence, surveillance etc. Enough time may not be given.

Pinpoint accuracy of weapons systems, especially the use of explosives, will be limited in densely occupied spaces. They might not even be allowed by the host.

Finally image is important, even crucial. Not for the 'armchair" observers, but the people affected by the presence of FID-users. It simply is a very different image if the security forces appear similar, even if with a few expatriate officers & NCOs.

I agree with this, the urban environment definitely presents its unique challenges. When I refer to foreign internal defense (FID), I'm generally refering to a few (maybe a couple hundred) advisors and trainers, so in theory it wouldn't be our guys dealing "directly" with these challenges. That is why I said it wouldn't be that much harder for "us".

As for future wars moving ever more into the urban domain it definitely seems probable.

Mike in Hilo
07-24-2012, 06:38 AM
1) The 1964 episode received wide publicity through National Geographic Mag, which featured it in the January 1965 issue of the magazine. The story focused on successful US Army SF efforts to defuse the situation, without which events would likely have spun out of control.

2) Re: those we're arming and training being opposed to the government we're trying to keep in power: Sounds like Sunni Sons of Iraq and their relationship with the Maliki government....

Cheers,
Mike.

Bill Moore
10-04-2015, 06:24 PM
The following article challenges our baseless assumption that through, by, and with others is always the best approach. History indicates otherwise, and recent history simply reinforces that this approach has its limitations and only works in select situations. Where it does work, the results are fantastic. I suspect it is our desire to replicate those fantastic results in situations where the conditions don't exist for it to work that compel us to generally view this as the approach of choice. That is wrong headed, proven to be wrong headed, and this blind assumption causes Congressional leadership to threaten to pull money from all UW/FID programs. Not all are wrong headed, but since we fail to honestly assess what works and what doesn't we are simply going kill the approach across the board.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-foreign-troops-cant-fight-our-fights/2015/10/02/7f569ba2-66d5-11e5-9ef3-fde182507eac_story.html

Why foreign troops can’t fight our fights


The programs rest on a theory embraced across the U.S. government: Sometimes direct military interventions do more harm than good, and indirect approaches get us further. The theory briefs well as a way to achieve U.S. goals without great expenditure of U.S. blood and treasure. Unfortunately, decades of experience (including the current messes in Iraq and Syria) suggest that the theory works only in incredibly narrow situations in which states need just a little assistance. In the most unstable places and in the largest conflagrations, where we tend to feel the greatest urge to do something, the strategy crumbles.


It fails first and most basically because it hinges upon an alignment of interests that rarely exists between Washington and its proxies.


Second, the security-assistance strategy gives too much weight to the efficacy of U.S. war-fighting systems and capabilities, assuming that they alone are enough to produce desired outcomes for both our foreign proxies and ourselves.


The third problem with security assistance is that it risks further destabilizing already unstable situations and actually countering U.S. interests.


A more humble approach is needed. We must think about security assistance the same way we think about long-term alliances, looking for alignments of interests, not convenience.

This author's critique is valid, yet it doesn't invalidate FID and UW, it simply points to the fact, that for it to work, it is bigger than train and equip. Train and equip is a small subset of a greater whole that must be congruent. For example, diplomats must set realistic goals/expectations agreed upon by our partner. These goals need to focus it on mutually agreed ends. Once this hard task is out of the way, the assistance should be tailored to support those ends. It is worth revisiting the IDAD concept, and ensure our efforts are properly aligned and sustainable by the partner. More and more, both FID and UW is getting dumbed down to train and equip programs with no associated strategy on our end, and all to often no strategy mutually agreed upon with our partner.

davidbfpo
07-12-2017, 10:34 AM
This quote is from an academic conference on 'War and Peace' @ Leeds University recently and one paper appears very relevant:
Nir Arielli (Leeds) gave a fascinating paper on the role played by Italian colonial troops in the suppression of anti-Italian colonial revolt. The key forces in the brutal repression of the revolt against Italian rule in Libya were in fact Eritrean (and Somali) Ascari. The question of the part which colonial forces have played in small wars and counter-insurgency operations is one which has been little studied and which offers the potential for new insights into social and political dynamics of empire as well as military structures...Link:https://defenceindepth.co/2017/07/12/conference-report-two-day-conference-in-war-and-peace-studies-school-of-history-university-of-leeds-15-16-june/

The author is a Professor @ Leeds University and his bio indicates this article contains more:
'Colonial soldiers in Italian counter-insurgency operations in Libya, 1922-32', British Journal for Military History, 1, no. 2 (2015), pp. 47-66.Link:https://www.leeds.ac.uk/arts/profile/20030/943/nir_arielli

The BJMH paper is available free via and will be read soon:http://bjmh.org.uk/index.php/bjmh/article/view/29/21

Note Italian recruited Ascari (Askari) also featured in the 1936 invasion of Abysinia and the opposition to the 1941 Allied invasion of Abysina (Ethiopia), Eritrea and Italian Somailand; as covered in the book reviewed in:An obscure 'small war' in WW2 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=24597)

There is a reverse aspect, the violent suppression in Abyssinia of opposition to Italian occupation and a new book covers that. From the publisher's summary:
In February 1937, following an abortive attack by a handful of insurgents on Mussolini’s High Command in Italian-occupied Ethiopia, ‘repression squads’ of armed Blackshirts and Fascist civilians were unleashed on the defenceless residents of Addis Ababa. In three terror-filled days and nights of arson, murder and looting, thousands of innocent and unsuspecting men, women and children were roasted alive, shot, bludgeoned, stabbed to death, or blown to pieces with hand-grenades (est. 19k died). Meanwhile the notorious Viceroy Rodolfo Graziani, infamous for his atrocities in Libya, took the opportunity to add to the carnage by eliminating the intelligentsia and nobility of the ancient Ethiopian empire in a pogrom that swept across the land.Link:http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/addis-ababa-massacre/

davidbfpo
08-11-2017, 05:06 PM
Spotted via Twitter a contribution from an Australian soldier, an infantry captain, who explains near the start:
The following tips are based on my experiences working with security forces in the South Pacific, as well as with other nations during exercises in Australia throughout my career. I can’t claim to be a skilled advisor, but I have been privileged to work with many skilled advisors and this article aims to accumulate my observations and lessons, reinforced during a recent two-year posting to the Defence Cooperation Program in Papua New Guinea, in an accessible aide-memoire. These tips should not be considered a template solution for every situation. They do however contain themes and skill sets which are universal and should be applied when working alongside foreign security forces, both within the region and globally.


The list concludes:
Advising is a difficult business; every advisor is placed in a position of trying to influence people they have no authority over, perhaps to do things that may not be in their nature, all whilst trying to implement Australian policy and answer for Australian government decisions over which they have no control. This is all conducted in a culturally diverse, developing and potentially troubled nation. If you can adopt the skills of rapport development, build your cultural confidence and competence, communicate clearly and understand your part in the big-picture you will find success as an advisor. Embrace the opportunity that an advisor posting or deployment presents; it will be one of the most challenging, interesting, memorable and enriching missions you will complete.
Link:http://groundedcuriosity.com/aide-memoire-advising-and-mentoring-foreign-militaries/

Granite_State
08-12-2017, 03:22 PM
Nice find David.

davidbfpo
08-21-2017, 08:00 PM
Hat tip to WoTR for this commentary cum book review of Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron Client Relations in Counterinsurgency (https://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Front-Patron-Client-Relationships-Counterinsurgency/dp/1316621804/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1502968475&sr=8-1) (Cambridge University Press, 2017):
The King’s College London professor takes direct aim at FM 3-24, and the West’s thinking on counterinsurgency, specifically its naiveté that the patron and client will share common political goals if the patron is doling out large sums of cash to the client.
(Later) Ladwig shines a bright light on some of the deficiencies in counterinsurgency literature and the United States’ naiveté about its relationship with its clients. His goal is to improve the West’s performance in future counterinsurgency battles.Link:https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/hope-and-hype-advising-foreign-forces-in-the-middle-of-a-counterinsurgency-campaign/

davidbfpo
10-15-2017, 07:07 PM
I only rarely catch Modern War Institute @ West Point articles, but this one aroused my interest. As the opening passage says:
The United States has invested more than $100 billion (https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-17-62-LL.pdf) in training and equipping security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past sixteen years. The result? ISIS swiftly defeated the Iraqi Army in 2014, securing large swaths of land, and requiring international intervention. Since the US presence began decreasing in Afghanistan in 2015, the Taliban have steadily forced the Afghan Security Forces out of rural areas, gaining control of vast portions of the country. An additional 3,500 US service members will soon be en route to reverse this trend. The $100 billion spent to date is a milestone, not a final bill.It lists five lessons:
Lesson 1 – Effective advisory missions rely on high-caliber, well-trained, and committed individuals who demonstrate competence as advisors; furthermore, the advisory mission must endure long enough to ensure success.
Lesson 2 – The advisory force cannot be general purpose—it must be tailored for the specific environment into which it will deploy.
Lesson 3 – The highest degree of competence and effectiveness that an advised force can achieve when operating independently is better than any level of readiness that relies on US assets (to a degree).
Lesson 4 – On a larger scale, the advisory mission cannot rely solely on military and security forces.
Lesson 5 – Like all military endeavors, the advisory mission must be undertaken with a clear objective in mind, with consistent and reasonable intermediate metrics to determine effectiveness over time.Link:https://mwi.usma.edu/fourth-time-charm-armys-chance-get-advisory-operations-right/

Elsewhere on SWJ Blog there is an article on Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) and the MWI article asks:
The current evolution of the SFAB generally marks the fourth attempt at tackling the advise-and-assist mission set since the early years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/first-security-force-assistance-brigade-may-deploy-in-four-months

JHR
10-15-2017, 10:48 PM
The current issue (10/17) of the Marine Corps Gazette has an article pertinent to the West Point study. The Godfather Doctrine by LtCol. Douglas Luccio calls for more organized and committed security force assistance training including generating a publication similar to The Small Wars Manual, updated and focused on today's conflict locations.

davidbfpo
10-16-2017, 06:43 AM
The current issue (10/17) of the Marine Corps Gazette has an article pertinent to the West Point study. The Godfather Doctrine by LtCol. Douglas Luccio calls for more organized and committed security force assistance training including generating a publication similar to The Small Wars Manual, updated and focused on today's conflict locations.

The article cited in the Gazette is behind a registration / payment wall, but an earlier edition (29 pgs.) is available via:http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1037564

davidbfpo
02-25-2018, 06:47 PM
An excerpt from a book and here is a "taster":
Yet the U.S. track record for building militaries in fragile states is uneven at best. The United States generally approaches the problem of building militaries in fragile states by emphasizing training and equipment, and by distancing itself from key political issues. This method wastes time, effort, and resources. Examples spanning Europe, Asia, and the Middle East illustrate the flaws in the traditional way of working with foreign militaries.Link:https://taskandpurpose.com/book-excerpt-building-militaries-fragile-states-challenges-us/

Curious that one example is the success in Greece post-1945, which is rarely covered and IIRC there is a thread in the Historians arena. It is on the insurgency, not n the US mission:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2463

No reviews yet:https://www.amazon.com/Building-Militaries-Fragile-States-Challenges/dp/0812249267/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1516895027&sr=1-1&keywords=mara+karlin

davidbfpo
03-19-2018, 08:42 AM
Another set of lessons and memories from an Australian team on a visit to a Papua New Guinea infantry battalion, which is not only long established they are allies and friends - so no "over watch" needed.

There is a short blog from the team IC, which ends with:
I would follow the same principles – being a good human – and make sure I take the best possible team, but being adaptive and flexible is part of the journey. It’s the personal relationships that allowed us to be responsive. It was being humble and respectful that ensured my Team earned equal respect and allowed us to support our regional partner, to crouch down side by side, and help achieve their missions and their goals, and share their successes.
Link:https://www.cove.org.au/adaptation/article-eating-humble-pie-how-going-to-the-wrong-objective-tells-a-story-about-mentoring/

Plus a longer report (sixteen pgs):
with more detail about the exercise, and views from a number of members of the Mentoring Training Team. Importantly, the report includes tips and advice from some of the more junior members of the team.
Link:https://www.cove.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Mentoring-Lessons-Learnt-Papua-New-Guinea.pdf

davidbfpo
12-08-2018, 08:56 PM
Not sure what to make of this. It is a short Q&A with the brigadier that mainly concerns leadership and selection.
Link:https://thearmyleader.co.uk/specialised-infantry-leadership/

davidbfpo
01-28-2019, 02:10 PM
Thanks to MWI @ West Point for the pointer to this article in JFQ and from MWI's pointer:
This highlights a substantial problem with Western SFA: it is too focused on building an army in the absence of a viable state that has the institutional capacity and political willpower to sustain that army.
Link:https://mwi.usma.edu/cant-build-army-state-cant-sustain-one-explaining-americas-problem-security-force-assistance/

Link to JFQ:https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1738248/getting-american-security-force-assistance-right-political-context-matters/fbclid/IwAR2vqs7zl0D2_c6jBpHCVqJO2ao6-U-YCFqAiyy7WHaIKfgdp0w4FR7UKGk/

davidbfpo
01-28-2019, 02:22 PM
A small number of threads, many stand alone posts, have been merged here. Several threads refer to the theme, but have been left alone.