Military Totemism and its Impact on Small Wars

[120mm]

Marcus, I have an interest in the History of Military Technology as a form of "totemism". I strongly suspect that mil tech development is driven as strongly by cultural reasons as practical reasons, but am having trouble finding traction in actually approaching this from a research standpoint. Are there some "good" overview texts out there that would get me started?

Also, are there some schools with noteworthy PhD producing programs in this subject area? I am well-connected with Iowa State University's History of Technology and Science department, but for reasons of my own, I want to go elsewhere for my "sheepskin" if I can....

[marct]

Hi 120mm,


Marcus, I have an interest in the History of Military Technology as a form of "totemism". I strongly suspect that mil tech development is driven as strongly by cultural reasons as practical reasons, but am having trouble finding traction in actually approaching this from a research standpoint. Are there some "good" overview texts out there that would get me started?

Good overview texts? That's tricky. Probably the best one is by Claude Levi-Strauss, Totemism (I have the translation by Rodney Needham, 1963 Beacon Press). I think you could get some traction on it by making a somewhat broader argument along the following lines:

military organizations are collections of "lineages" (para kinship networks)
lineages draw their validity from "eponymous ancestors"; this includes foundation myths, tribal "gnosis" (i.e. tribe specific knowledge), and culural patternings for using technology.
lineages have mythic "arrangements" with their founders, stories and, also, have sterotype myths of "proper conduct", both fictive and real (i.e. the "should" and the "would").
in order to sell to a lineage, a product or story must fit that lineages myths, including all of its patternings.


There's probably a couple of lines of logic I've left out, but I think that would ground your argument, especially since military organizations tend to be fairly "conservative".


Also, are there some schools with noteworthy PhD producing programs in this subject area? I am well-connected with Iowa State University's History of Technology and Science department, but for reasons of my own, I want to go elsewhere for my "sheepskin" if I can....

The best person I could recommend is a friend of mine, Philip Thurtle, at the University of Washington (http://faculty.washington.edu/thurtle/). Phil taught at Carleton for a couple of years and is both brilliant and, at the same time, a really nice guy open to new ideas. He teaches in the Comparative History of Ideas program (http://depts.washington.edu/chid/).

He would certainly be a good person to contact for information on a Ph.D. program (tell him I sent you :)).

Marc

[Steve Blair]

If you want to see a good example of the technology totem idea, I'd recommend looking at the Air Force in particular. Their entire history has been centered around a number of technology totems.

[jcustis]

My senior thesis as an undergrad covered this exact subject, in the Air Force context, and how the development of the B-2 was an example. I didn't make a connection to totemism though.

I'll be interested in how this comes out for you 120mm.

[Steve Blair]

I copied these from the RFI forum because I think this is a topic that's well worth discussing in the history and education forum. My main personal interest here is the Air Force because of its obvious ties to technology as a totem and its consequent impact on its ability to function in a small wars environment, but there are other examples as well.

Marc's post sets some of the theoretical background for us, but I'd propose some additional ideas for discussion:

1) How do the totems of each specific service help or hinder their Small Wars practice?

2) How can we identify these totems?

3) When a totem has a negative influence here, what are some ways to work around that influence?

These are just some starting points for discussion. I find this area quite interesting.

[Steve Blair]

Within the framework of the Air Force, I think their reliance on the technology totem (to the point of cutting people to retain programs...so long as they're "high tech") really cripples them when it comes to Small Wars practice. The AF has always been tied at a very basic level to technology (the airplane, the doctrine of strategic bombing that became their bedrock idea for many years), and this reliance is especially hard to break in their case. It is furthered by the cult of the bomber and high-speed fighter to (in some cases) the exclusion of all else.

The application of bombers and fighters to small wars is limited, although precision close air support is always welcome. What is really needed is a robust capability for airlift, both of personnel and supplies. With its totem bombers and fighters, the AF is weak in transport and has been for the majority of its existence. This limits their ability to participate in the full spectrum of small wars operations. Instead of working to correct this, the AF simply denies the viability of small wars or insists that a fleet of B-2s is more useful for stopping insurgents in the Horn of Africa than C-17s would be for providing logistical lift into those areas.

By supporting its totems through denial, the AF also shortchanges the ability of its people to make a difference in Small Wars. It also hurts their ability to provide good advisors, since true believers in the twin totems would not necessarily be prepared to view each small war as unique and provide the necessary unique advice. Instead they might try to "mirror image" the AF.

And that's my rather half-baked thought for Tuesday....:)

[Tom Odom]

Concise not half-baked, Steve

I have a friend now a senior officer in the Air Force SOF and he would echo what you said. As a user on the ground, airlift not bombs was what I needed most and in the case of Goma got--but it was a tremendous effort and one that stressed airlift assets both military and contract.

In the realm of CAS, the saga of the A-10 speaks volumes in that it is still here. As a 1stLT in the Officer Advanced Course in 1980 I visited Davis Monthan with my class and we talked to the 'Hog squadron there. Plans to phase out the A-10 were already on the table. 26 years later the A-10 is getting a new comms suite.

But we are not alone in this arena. French airlift in the Congo/Zaire could not meet the demands of lifting a 2500 man force and sustaining it; the answer was contract former Soviet airlift, complete with poor maintenance and near suicidal semi-drunk crews. The sight of an AN124 nearly groundlooping at Goma after losing 2 engines was only surpassed by watching the inebriated crew stagger into the airport bar while French ground crew helped the crew chief replace/repair blown tires from the heavy landing. And in running this composite airlift, the French drained much of Africa's airports of fuel because they lacked a refueling capacity to sustain it.

Best
Tom

[selil]

"Totemism" interesting... New one on me...

For PhD in Technology there are only a few places on the planet that aren't in the business school or located in computers or something....

Purdue has a new PhD Technology program if that is what you're interested in.

[120mm]

Right now I am intensely studying Russian tank developments post-Desert Storm.

They have found ways to make armor more and more impenetrable, but still, their tanks are not designed to fight on the modern battlefield. They still lack the ability to depress the main gun, which confines their fighting to exposed positions. The tank is just too compact to allow for the amount of electronic gear required to compete. The autoloader is still inferior to a human loader, but they are convinced they can make it work.

And countries like India are buying their stuff hand over fist.

Israel's armor forces reached "totem" status quite awhile ago, and it appears that they may be rethinking that, post Lebanon 2006.

I first had the kernel of an idea when studying Romania's military last year. They have a very pragmatic military technical development history, mainly because they are poor and cannot afford much more than pragmatism. They have done a very good job of using other nations' cast offs and improving them in order to get a battlefield-worthy weapon system.

Oddly enough, almost universally, the Romanians I meet are incredibly negative on their military's ability to cope with military threats. They see their MBT, the TR85M1 as crap, and desire to have newer, shinier toys, like the Leo II and M1A2. Despite no real demonstrated need for either one in any imaginable defense scenario.

[120mm]

I woke up last night, thinking about this topic. As far as Small Wars are concerned, the "rebel" leaders, since the mid-60s or so, have taken to using the Avtomat Kalashnikov as a "totem". And since the 80s, the Krinkov variation has supplanted the venerable "AK" as the "totem of choice".

The symbolism is quite important. Especially with the Krinkov, as they represented a "captured" weapon, used only by the "elite" soldiers. It lent the person posing with it a derivative manhood. The AK also symbolizes the Mao-style of warfare to a certain degree.

The video that went around with al Zarqawi struggling to make the M249 SAW work was actually very good IO. His inability to figure out how to make a relatively simple captured weapon work did much to peel away his persona, and since that time, the image that Zarqawi was actually just a wannabe who was never very important in the movement has gained serious traction.

Various form of SOF/SF "kit" have also gained totem status. Children and even adults around the world have taken to purchasing chest rigs, "para" helmets and knee pads, along with legally owned firearms as well as airsoft guns in order to run around in the woods and in abandoned houses, pretending to be various incarnations of the SOF/SF culture in their spare time.

Incidences of posing as genuine "operators" has reached epidemic proportions, even among bona fide members of the US military.

Among the actual "operators", the term "gear queer" is gaining common usage. SOF/SF soldiers are adopting and discarding various arrangements of gear based on looks and fashion/groupthink as much as on utility and practicality.

The ubiquitous M16/CAR15/M4 has morphed beyond recognition, with various mounting systems being filled with a myriad of sights, grips, lights, lasers and stock options. To be sure, a lot of these options increase capability, but many of the capabilities do not match practical reality and all that stuff adds weight and makes the weapon rather cumbersome.

Some tactical methods are highly totemic. The "Airborne" mania sucks up a lot of resources with very little to show in results. My colleagues and I snicker about the 173d Airborne Brigade's "Combat Jump Behind Friendly Lines" in 2003 quite often.

One could go on and on.

Thoughts?

[Steve Blair]

The Italian Red Brigades back in the 1970s and 1980s took on the P-38 (if memory serves) as their totem of sorts, and the IRA was well-known for preferring Armalites (AR-15s and M-16s) during the same time frame.

When totems become most dangerous is when they take on a life of their own (like the AF's addition to high tech or the navy's battleship fixation in the 1920s, although to the navy's credit they shook their totem fetish in - for an institution - pretty quick order) and start interfering with clear thinking and operational practices. Your comments on the "airborne" mantra are a good example of this, 120mm. The 173rd was used in the same way in the early stages of Vietnam, pulling off a "combat drop" of questionable value during the early stages of Operation Junction City in 1966. There was also a push in the same time frame to have an entire brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) airborne-qualified. This died under the pressures of combat and keeping the 82nd jump-ready.

Totems can be useful things (and I would call the USMC "globe and anchor" a totem in this sense), but one needs to be careful just the same.

As an aside, it's been my opinion that one of the reasons (aside from its roots) that the AF has become such a technology totem service is the way it constantly casts aside unit lineages. While preserving unit heritage is an obsession with the Marine Corps (and to a lesser degree the Army - I say this because of the wanton reflagging that goes on from time to time), the AF spins up and decommissions squadrons and entire Air Forces with amazing regularity. Many of the units that gained fame during World War 2 or Vietnam can no longer be found, or if they are it's through some convoluted "heritage" system that really provides no real connection to the historical unit.

[Tom Odom]

In the current mantra/dogma concerning transformational theory, strategic speed is a central totem; the theory that lighter, "higher capacity" forces must be able to get anywhere in a nano-second.

I say this is a "totem" because it is hardly transformational; the idea of strategic mobility has been central to military strategy for centuries. What has changed are our reference points on what constitutes speed.

But in the current mantra, transformational "speed" is very much a bandaid for intellectual sluggishness. The idea that we have to get anywhere fast to confront various crises begs the question about anticipating such crises in the first place. Moreover the assumption that speed is the answer assumes that the same sluggish decisionmaking apparatus will make the correct decision on using such highly deployable forces in the first place. Desert Shield to me remains an excellent example of where adequate strategic mobility delivered the proper forces into theater at a rate consonant with decisionmaking capacities. And for those who still point to the "long build up" for Desert Storm, I merely point to the fact that those same forces were largely home inside 18 months.

There are other historical examples: the debate between the US and the Brits over invading France rapidly versus pursing Churchill's pet theory about a "soft under belly" of fortified Europe is one. Another would be the force mixtures and decisionmaking that sent ultra-light forces into Somalia and then refused to reinforce them when a need for heavier forces was apparent.

And yes the theory and practice of airborne warfare remains a central front in the struggle to define strategic, operational, and tactical speed. It applies not only to those who use parachutes; it applies equally to vertical envelopment with rotary, fixed, or soon to be in use tilt wing aircraft.

The central reality in the debate over speed is often overlooked: getting there quickly or even just getting there are less important than deciding what you are going to do there in the first place.

Best

Tom

[slapout9]

120MM and Steve Blair,talk about a mantra have you ever heard Ridgeway-Taylor-Gavin being referred to as the "The Airborne Mafia." However I would disagree about the Air Cav. I think the Airborne portion died mostly because they were in Nam and it was hard to maintain an Airborne Brigade and fight the war at the same time.

Tom Odom,very much agree on your concept of what the Airborne should be and was meant to be. "Move like lighting, strike like Thunder"

[zenpundit]

"Among the actual "operators", the term "gear queer" is gaining common usage. SOF/SF soldiers are adopting and discarding various arrangements of gear based on looks and fashion/groupthink as much as on utility and practicality."

I have to ask. Has this trend reached the point where there are catalogs/advertising dedicated to -err -"fashion" for military professionals?

[Steve Blair]

Actually if you look at Stanton's work on the 1st Cav, the need to keep the 82nd on full jump status, along with elements of the 101st and the 173rd had more to do with the 1st Air Cav losing its airborne brigade than anything else. There just weren't enough paratroopers in the pipeline. The 173rd's casualties alone drained troopers that would have gone to the 1st Cav's brigade. They had enough trouble getting enough jump-qualified people just to deploy to Vietnam.

And Tom, I agree about the whole theory of vertical envelopment. It has a certain mantra all its own. Gavin in particular argued that it was just a continuation of the old cavalry doctrine, which in the European military tradition (at least for light cavalry) focused on speed.

[Steve Blair]

I have to ask. Has this trend reached the point where there are catalogs/advertising dedicated to -err -"fashion" for military professionals?

Oh, I think so. The US Cavalry catalog in particular has been going in this direction for some time.

[marct]

Hi Steve,


As an aside, it's been my opinion that one of the reasons (aside from its roots) that the AF has become such a technology totem service is the way it constantly casts aside unit lineages. While preserving unit heritage is an obsession with the Marine Corps (and to a lesser degree the Army - I say this because of the wanton reflagging that goes on from time to time), the AF spins up and decommissions squadrons and entire Air Forces with amazing regularity. Many of the units that gained fame during World War 2 or Vietnam can no longer be found, or if they are it's through some convoluted "heritage" system that really provides no real connection to the historical unit.

To my mind, I honestly don't think that's an aside :). Totemism appears to have originally been tied directly into kin group lineages as a system of both genetic control and a way of parcelling out the rights to access resources (which were controlled by kin groups, aka lineages).

So, let's look at the Regimental system or "unit heritage" if you will. What does it actually do? Well, for one thing, it places people into an historical timeline that stretches back to well before they were born and will exist after they die. In very important ways, it also allows members of that unit to "commune with" the spirits of the dead and the yet to be born. Okay, that probably sounds nuts, but think about how the traditions of a military unit with a continuous heritage take on certain idiosyncratic reactions. Think about how many people become attached to those traditions and feel an "empathy" (the techincal term is communitas) with those who have gone before them and with past unit actions. It's really a process of intense emotional attachment to the stories and values of that unit.

As an aside, the stories of the unit, it's heroes and villains, are passed down to new members entering the unit. Those stories are the collective "wisdom" or "knowledge" that have been collected and stored by that unit (technically, it's the "tribal gnosis" refering to "experiential knowledge). Sometimes, these stories are marked with specific sigils - medals, sashes, etc., etc. Sometimes they are marked by particular unit-specific events.

Commenting on the AF's lack of unit lineage: I'm more than a touch worried about that, since it doesn't give them any historical depth or sense of continuity. It's very "Protestant", in the extreme, early Calvinist sense - there is nothing between you and "God" (technology). This is unlike regimental traditions, where the regiment is more "Catholic" - it stands between you and "God".

I'm starting to use theological analogies because one of the most important observations, and it was pretty confusing early on to Anthropologists, was the idea that totemsm was a "religion". In actuality, it both is and isn't. depending on how you define religion. Personally, I use a definition developed by Clifford Geertz (The Interpretation of Culture, 1973, Basic Books, New York). For Geertz, religion is


(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.

One of the reasons I like this definition is that it is actually very practical, at least to someone who analyzes "religions". Which brings me to a comment you made earlier, Steve.


Totems can be useful things (and I would call the USMC "globe and anchor" a totem in this sense), but one needs to be careful just the same.

Yupper :D. Technically, the Globe and Anchor is a sigil - it stands for the totem, which is the "spirit" of the USMC. Actually, the German term volksgeist would probably be better than "spirit". Anyway, think of it as a sigil that has the power to evoke a sense of, hmmm, "Godhood" maybe? The sense that there is a sacred "being" that is the focal point of all those, living and dead, who have served in the Corps. Sorry, guys, this is hard to explain without being able to use vocal tonality <wry grin>. Maybe I'll just leave it by saying that this "spirit" is the living, emotional link to that which is greater than any individual.

BTW, if anyone wants historical examples, think of the Eagles of the Roman Legions or the Patron Saints of the medieval Guilds.

Marc

[jcustis]

So, let's look at the Regimental system or "unit heritage" if you will. What does it actually do? Well, for one thing, it places people into an historical timeline that stretches back to well before they were born and will exist after they die. In very important ways, it also allows members of that unit to "commune with" the spirits of the dead and the yet to be born. Okay, that probably sounds nuts, but think about how the traditions of a military unit with a continuous heritage take on certain idiosyncratic reactions. Think about how many people become attached to those traditions and feel an "empathy" (the techincal term is communitas) with those who have gone before them and with past unit actions. It's really a process of intense emotional attachment to the stories and values of that unit.

Spot on here...I've long hoped for a Regimental system in the Marine Corps, to some degree.

[marct]

Spot on here...I've long hoped for a Regimental system in the Marine Corps, to some degree.

"There's no place like home....." :)

That's really what a regimental system does. On the downside, they can easily be hidebound and resistant to change. Still, in the balance, I think they are more than worth it.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Regimental systems are very solid mechanisms for preserving unit heritage, history, and traditions that might otherwise disappear into the mix of "corporate values" or whatever passes for same within an organization. I've seen the strength of them with some Army cavalry regiments, and the dysfunction that comes from a total lack of same with the Air Force. You can't manufacture the "sense of being" that comes from a good regimental-type system.

Jcustis, I think the Marines have this to a limited extent within some units (notably the components of the First Marine Division, though there is always that overarching "Marine" sense that can eclipse individual unit ties. The Navy tries (with some success) to duplicate this with ship ties and the continuation of squadron and carrier wing histories and traditions.

And Marc, I would agree that division and regimental crests are really no different than the old Imperial Eagles (both Roman and Napoleonic). While the flag may not be flown to the same degree (and often is not), the sense of unit pride that can spring up in a division patch, red and white markings on a vehicle, or the globe and anchor, are direct relatives of that old eagle. This is something that leaders ignore or trivialize at their own peril.

[Tom Odom]

Marc,

I will say that as a UN "moving target" in Lebanon I worked closely with Canadian officers for the first (not the last) time.

Bar none, there was no bigger morale issue for them than the Canadian forces decision --one later reversed--to go uni-service in uniforms because they felt they had lost their roots. PPLCI is a proud regiment and they did not enjoy looking the same as a Canadian air force pilot or a Canadian boat driver.

As for the US Army, we give lip service to the concept of regiments and we move flags and switch patches like traders at a flea market. That's why we keep inventing ribbons--the worst being in my experience, the Army service ribbon that says, "ta da" I am in the Army. The best decision I believe we have made on uniforms in the past 30 years was to go back to blues as service dress and formal dress. As for battlle dress, BDUs, Desert Cammies (chocolate chip, etc etc) and now DCUs it all gets rather silly.

Witness the use of velcro on a field uniform...

Tom

[marct]

Hi Tom,


Marc,

I will say that as a UN "moving target" in Lebanon I worked closely with Canadian officers for the first (not the last) time.

Bar none, there was no bigger morale issue for them than the Canadian forces decision --one later reversed--to go uni-service in uniforms because they felt they had lost their roots. PPLCI is a proud regiment and they did not enjoy looking the same as a Canadian air force pilot or a Canadian boat driver.

God! The "Jolly Green Jumper!" Sinclair Stevens, the minister who rammed that through, lost his bid for leadership of the Conservative Party as a result of that move.

I remember a friend of mine who was at the Nicosea airport in Cyprus when the Turks were launching their armoured strike. They invited a Turkish officer in to view the positions before any "accidents" could happen. The Turkish officer asked why, if the Canadians were there as part of the UN, they weren't wearing their Blue Berets (aka Blue Berries) but, rather, had on red berets. The reply was quite and simple "we won't die in those things!"


As for the US Army, we give lip service to the concept of regiments and we move flags and switch patches like traders at a flea market. That's why we keep inventing ribbons--the worst being in my experience, the Army service ribbon that says, "ta da" I am in the Army. The best decision I believe we have made on uniforms in the past 30 years was to go back to blues as service dress and formal dress. As for battlle dress, BDUs, Desert Cammies (chocolate chip, etc etc) and now DCUs it all gets rather silly.

Witness the use of velcro on a field uniform...

VELCRO?!?! Yeah Gods, that's nuts!

Most of the Canadian Regiments have managed to keep their regimental histories intact at least. My grandfather's regiment has both a unit "club", actually a private club, a library, etc. The other thing I've noted about a number of the Canadian Regiments, at least the pre-WWII ones, is their ties into the Masonic order. I think that that has helped keep the lineages alive during the Jolly Green Humper era <wry grin>.

Marc

[selil]

I have to ask. Has this trend reached the point where there are catalogs/advertising dedicated to -err -"fashion" for military professionals?

You obviously haven't seen a Gall's catalog. http://www.galls.com/

[selil]

Most of the Canadian Regiments have managed to keep their regimental histories intact at least. My grandfather's regiment has both a unit "club", actually a private club, a library, etc. The other thing I've noted about a number of the Canadian Regiments, at least the pre-WWII ones, is their ties into the Masonic order. I think that that has helped keep the lineages alive during the Jolly Green Humper era <wry grin>.

I was arguing with a US Military Academy professor a couple years back. I have a habit of doing that :D . We were talking and he said that the Quakers (pacifists) had never served in any wars. I told him that was wrong and the argument became heated. Of course any of the army guys who've been out to Ft. Carson in Colorado Springs have seen the statue to General Palmer on his Horse. He was a Quaker and led a regiment of Indiana Quakers in the Civil War.

From the discussion totems(ism) seem to be related to entrenched ideas where their validity is not necessarily related to the facts or reality of a situation. Like the kind Major I argued with his disrespect and mistrust of those who would not go to war was not balanced by the reality that a conscientious objector might be making selective informed moral decisions. The basis of the current ideas seem to enthrall and new information is rejected based on the preponderance of previous information rather than the validity of new information.

If totems(ism) is related more to familiar and emotion rather than reality and logic what would that say about managerial styles and choices made within the confines of that kind of thinking? When teaching we sometimes run across cognitive dissonance where the emotional appeal of an idea is much stronger than the logical reality of an idea. I've told my fellow faculty that there is a big difference between misperception and misconception.

[jcustis]

I think the Marines have this to a limited extent within some units (notably the components of the First Marine Division, though there is always that overarching "Marine" sense that can eclipse individual unit ties. The Navy tries (with some success) to duplicate this with ship ties and the continuation of squadron and carrier wing histories and traditions.

You're exactly right. I've spent my operational tours as an officer within the 1 MARDIV, and my preference would be to return there for the simple fact that it is what it is. For those who fought under Gen Mattis when he as the commanding general, many of them would probably tell you that if he said, "the enemy is at the bottom of this cliff, and I want you to jump off of it and kill them," they would do so unhesitatingly. It's an exaggeration, but that's the sense of bond he built within the unit.

In a Regimental system, reputation stands at the forefront, because you "came up through the ranks", and even if you leave for a stint elsewhere, upon your return there will be folks who remember you. I think that is empowering from a leadership standpoint, because subordinates have a better grasp of your background, capabilities, and past performance. If you were known to be good for your word and led well, subordinates will have more confidence in your orders to them, even if theyve yet to be tested in combat. I'd say this is dramatically so in formations like the Ranger Regiment and SFOD-D.

As for sigils, they are indeed powerful. The 3d Light Armored Recon Bn goes by the tactical callsign of "Wolfpack", and in OIF I, every vehicle bore a wolf's head on its turret, as well as a a symbol for its respective company. Folks knew who we were just from a quick glance, and our Marines tended to walk with a perceptible swagger.

[taillat]

As a french teacher in History and both officer in Troupes de Marine's Operational Reserve and student in political science, I would like to stress your attention about a book by Paul Edwards. It's title, Closed world. Computers and the politics of discourse in Cold War America, emphasizes a constructivist approach of technological discourse in military matters. Indeed, Edwards says that Computer (and cyborg alike) is a metaphor of a closed world (i.e. an horizontal world of individuals) built for a total control of men's society. In his point of view, technological discourse doesnt describe reality, rather it create it.In this case, social scientists and techno scientists, working for DoD through think tanks, created a military and social paradigm around computers and communication (the famous C4ISR in our times), ultimately leading to "national security state" as US national identity. Altough i think this position to be very excessive, I'm currently using it at a startpoint to work on a pre-thesis on urban warfare and its evolution through times. I don't believe the evolutionnist-technological discourse to be true, i.e. that warfare changes by a combination of technological innovations and economic structural changes (like for preindustrial wars, industrial wars of attrition, third generation wars and so on). My primary argument is that modifications occure by cultural means, whether from a normative discourse or an interactive one. For example, french victory in Valmy remains incomprehensible if one doesn't look at the cultural gap between Prussia and Revolutionnary France (a "professionnal army" relying on drill-training and tactical mastery vs "national army" whose strenght was ideological). This is what i labelled "the ontological asymetric law". In the last ten years, western armies were confronted with newly urban warfare against asymetric foe. The differential not only rely upon military capabilities, but upon cultural conceptions. In this perspective, studying what you named "totem" (in structuralist way) is as crucial to understand actual developments (and to predict future ones) than it is to understand war as a whole human activity, profoundly rooted in human nature. Technology in military thinking appears to me as a "totem" whose function is to cancel uncertainty and indecision as well as to conceal violence, death given and death received. In a further way, it allows to improve "cohesion" ("integration" in a durkheimian point of view) and creates collective and individual identities. At last, technology seems to me as a powerful tool to shape military society.
I hope i was clear (my english is "french-infected"). As an officer and a scholar, i pay a great attention to what is lived in frontline by your soldiers in Iraq. I feel concerned about this war (not condemning it) because it can teach us numerous things about warfare and warfighting in self-called "post-modern" and "post-heroic" societies.
Sous-lieutenant (r) St&#233;phane TAILLAT
Agr&#233;g&#233; de l'Universit&#233;
master sciences politiques s&#233;curit&#233; et relations internationales
IEP de Toulouse

[Tom Odom]

Merci bien, Stephane

Your English is better than my French to put it mildly. I taught military history at Ft Leavenworth for 3 years and served as a thesis advisor for some 5 or 6 officers in that time. Part of the process was the oral examinations at the end of the term for our thesis students. We used the same questions each year because we were seeking to confirm our students were approaching history in an analytical sense, not in an emprical, data memorization exercise.

A key question was always: explain the historical relationship between doctrine and technology, the classic which came first the chicken or the egg question. We would require students to support their analysis with historical examples; this did much to eliminate simple answers. But that said, it was interesting to me because my thesis students were often foreign, usually African or Arab and both groups tended to look at doctrine as being purely driven by technology. They did not see the linkage between doctrinal imperatives and their influence on technological developments. Simply stated they believed that greater complexity translated into greater capability.

I saw this same trend play out across the Middle East and much of Africa. Countries like Sudan had enormous graveyards on Soviet equipment and we were adding our own section to it (lesser numbers but better equipment :D ).

The single exception to it was in Rwanda where the new army first identified what it needed to do as a military force, organized itself to fight accordingly, and then sought the technology to achieve its desired end state.

My favorite example of this was during a survey of Rwandan military facilties we had already identified a need for patrol boats for Lake Kivu. And we went to look at the unit that had that responsibility along the Lake; the brigade commander became a good friend. But as we arrived, I noticed that he had several soldiers swimming in circles in what was quite cold water at the time. I asked him about it and he grinned as he said, "Colonel Tom, I wanted you to know I expect my soldiers to be able to swim before I give them a boat."

Best

Tom

[marct]

If totems(ism) is related more to familiar and emotion rather than reality and logic what would that say about managerial styles and choices made within the confines of that kind of thinking? When teaching we sometimes run across cognitive dissonance where the emotional appeal of an idea is much stronger than the logical reality of an idea. I've told my fellow faculty that there is a big difference between misperception and misconception.

I've had the same problems at times. I've also been caught doing it myself :D

Sure, totemism is more related to the "familiar" and the "emotional" but that doesn't say anything about the content. It is quite possible to make "constant change" part of the "familiar". It is also quite possible to embed logic and analysis into the content - the Dominicans and the Jesuits both did that.

Marc

[taillat]

Thanks Tom for your indulgence,
Teaching is a great adventure, whether it is in a violent suburb of Paris (those which burned last year) or for TRADOC (though for my part, i am now teaching to rural pupils in southwestern France, eating foie gras every time i want:D ).
When i was studying History, my teacher always said that one must understand historical events and men of the past through a comprehensive way. Today, my words would be the same: our ancestors are now as far from us as if they lived on Mars, but they were human beings. Thus is one able to understand them. But in the other way, one must study deeply their weltanschauung. Culture is a good startpoint to study History. I think this is true for now too.
The link between doctrines imperatives and technological innovations in warfare is an evidence to me. Furthermore, no true change in men's history can occur without mentality change. This assertion is a constructivist one. So, technology as a whole is an output of the structural change. However, there are invariants in human nature. So, these changes, whether we admit them as politicaly-oriented or neutraly-occured, occur in a familiar framework to us. I mean that doctrine itself is profoundly rooted in a civilisation. There would be exist civilisationnal way of warfare inside which technological approaches would be viewed in differents ways. For example, China invented gunpowder but was unable to use it efficiently before Europeans. What is really new today is the growing interplay between our way of warfare and that of other. My theory is that the constant acceleration of changes in western warfare are more caused by these interplay (because of the "ontological asymetry law" i defined in my first post) than by internal cultural change. In an other way, these internal changes have not disappeared: these are the results of our increasing belief in "science" (which is technoscience and not galilean science, i.e. natural philosophy) and the correlated trust in social and techno scientist (whom we believe to be able to find every solution to every problem). So, RAM would be the expression of subjective needs (cultural and/or social ones) and not only objectives needs (military). Precisely, military needs would be rooted themselves in cultural (or political in Edwards' view) needs and beliefs.
Best
Stéphane

[120mm]

Thanks for weighing in, Taillat. Good analysis, and my only difficulty in reading your posts was not your English, it is in translating your academic terminology.

It reminds me of how far I actually need to go before I am ready to make the next step.

I don't think that military technology "transforms" anything. Even crazy stuff like "cloaking" technology is just a different kind of shield. And pulse-lasers are just a new form of bow and arrow.

On lineage: 15 years ago, I built a military museum on Schweinfurt's "Conn Barracks" dedicated to the 4th Cavalry. It included several static vehicles, and one working half-track, a very large mural depicting the battles of the regiment, and a hall with a collection of militaria, including the punch bowl, which we had to have forcibly removed from a midwestern museum which acquired it from an illicit source.

I discovered a couple of months ago, that the unit there had been reflagged as the 1-91 CAV in the RSTA process. Quite a disappointment, but hardly surprising.

Totems aren't necessarily a "bad" thing. For a country which desires a symbolic military, it is important to understand what "symbols" will satisfy it. Knowing that could quite possibly allow political/military figures to acquire the appropriate symbols and get down to the more serious issue of actual defense. If buying "hollow" M1A2s makes Egypt feel better about itself, and as long as the price is affordable, good for them. Iran is particularly infamous for "viz-modding" it's equipment to make it look more "high-tech" and "Western". The cost of putting a tail section on an F5 to make it look like an F-22 cannot be that high, and welding sheetmetal on an M60 to make it look like an M1 makes the Iranian public feel more pride in their country's military, that is okay, too. Unless some politician gets it in his head that the "looks" equate to capability and then decides to go use it..

Smithsonian Institute is sponsoring a conference next July/August in Copenhagen on this very subject. I've been asked to submit, but like I said earlier in the post, I do not have the horsepower, academically, yet.

[Steve Blair]

You worked on the 1/4 Cav museum, 120mm? I did some time working for the museum at Ft Riley and heard a few things about the "illicit source" for that punchbowl (among other things).

Personally I think that reflagging is one of the dumbest things that the army does. For some reason they seem to assume that lineage and heritage is something that you can pack in a truck and move from place to place without regard for the PEOPLE who have to buy into that lineage in order to make it work. I would put some of this on a personnel system that doesn't leave officers in place long enough for some of them to get a handle on the whole idea of unit spirit, let alone what goes into it. The 1/4 Cav has been blessed over the years with a number of commanders who DO understand this idea, and I can bet that many of them were not in the least happy about this whole reflagging idea.

[marct]

Hi Stéphane,

Welcome aboard :).


The link between doctrines imperatives and technological innovations in warfare is an evidence to me. Furthermore, no true change in men's history can occur without mentality change. This assertion is a constructivist one. So, technology as a whole is an output of the structural change.

Interesting assertions. While I am a social constructionist in some senses, I don't think I'd go quite this far - more along the lines of technological "production" (including invention and innovation) being conditioned but not determined by structural conditions and vectors. I would certainly agree that most technological adoptions are strongly determined by structural conditions, while also arguing that how they are employed is also so determined. A good example of this is the early deployment of the telephone which, when first installed in Vienna, was used as the equivalent of a community centre or bulletin board and was only changed to the individualist model we now use after three years.


However, there are invariants in human nature. So, these changes, whether we admit them as politicaly-oriented or neutraly-occured, occur in a familiar framework to us. I mean that doctrine itself is profoundly rooted in a civilisation.

The Husserl/Scutz/Luckmann argument? Hmmm, I was never that much of a Calvinist <wry grin>. I do like the term "rooted", and I agree that specific doctrines arise out of soci-cultural and historical roots but I'm enough of a believer in "free will" to argue that it is possible to change interpretive schemas. I think my position comes out of a belief that some individuals are capable of transcenfing their immediate "civilization" (habitus to use Bourdieu's term).


There would be exist civilisationnal way of warfare inside which technological approaches would be viewed in differents ways. For example, China invented gunpowder but was unable to use it efficiently before Europeans. What is really new today is the growing interplay between our way of warfare and that of other. My theory is that the constant acceleration of changes in western warfare are more caused by these interplay (because of the "ontological asymetry law" i defined in my first post) than by internal cultural change.

You could be right :). Personally, I think there is more of an interactive feedback loop going on that sometimes reinforces while at other times destablizes the cultural schemas. For example, the French invasion of Italy in 1495 totally destabilized the entire social milleau of the Italian states and started a new discourse on the development of professional citizen armies.


In an other way, these internal changes have not disappeared: these are the results of our increasing belief in "science" (which is technoscience and not galilean science, i.e. natural philosophy) and the correlated trust in social and techno scientist (whom we believe to be able to find every solution to every problem). So, RAM would be the expression of subjective needs (cultural and/or social ones) and not only objectives needs (military). Precisely, military needs would be rooted themselves in cultural (or political in Edwards' view) needs and beliefs.

I think that a discussion of how science has replaced religion in the social role of provider of salvation would go well beyond the word limit allowed here :D .

Actually, I've been looking at that link pretty closely in North America in the context of the rise of the new religious movements. One of the things I found that truly fascinated me was that there was more of a "scientific" mindset, in the natural philosophy sense of the term, amongst modern witches and magicians than there was amongst more first year undergraduates <wry grin>.

Marc

[slapout9]

Do you think this is coming from the concept of a modular force where they think they can just plug and play units, without regard to unit morale and cohesion?

[Steve Blair]

I think it predates that, actually, slapout. I would take it back to Root's changes in the personnel system around the turn of the 20th century as well as the expansion that we undertook for both world wars. Root's changes created the trend toward modular manning (individual replacements and the generalist officer) that we see now, and the expansion for both world wars saw men shuffled around as cadre and filler for new units as they were created. Someone also figured out that it's "cheaper" to move a flag rather than an entire unit when it comes time for station changes and the like.

There were certainly some downsides to the regimental system as it was practiced by the Army prior to 1900 (an ossified promotion system was one of its biggest downfalls). I'm not sure, though, that the new system is much better. What we gain in flexibility and supposedly more skilled officers (although I'm not a huge fan of either "up or out" or "generalist" officers who are incompetent or at best semi-skilled in a number of areas but really knowledgeable in none) we more than offset by a loss in unit cohesion and tradition that can serve as a good service totem for our troops.

[Tom Odom]

Smithsonian Institute is sponsoring a conference next July/August in Copenhagen on this very subject. I've been asked to submit, but like I said earlier in the post, I do not have the horsepower, academically, yet.

There is "horsepower" and there is "horsepower." Doctorates are great things and deserve respect. Experience is also a great thing and a combination of academia and experience is hard to beat.

If a "learned" audience is unable to grasp ideas you may have to offer, I repeat Mama Gump's rule in reverse, "Stupid does because Stupid is," because they may be learned but they remain stupid.

In sum don't sell yourself short. I do not have a doctorate; I have 2 masters and they served me well. I don't dismiss the effort or the recognition deserved for a doctorate. Most doctorates in my fields of specialization don't have my experience and many in my experience feel somewhat threatened by it. I first ran into this early in my time in the history department at Leavenworth when I set out to write an LP. The nay-sayers were the insecure PhDs; I was eating from their rice bowls. My biggest supporters were PhDs who mentored and challenged me to produce something worthwhile. They also produced; the nay sayers never have to this day.

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

There is "horsepower" and there is "horsepower." Doctorates are great things and deserve respect. Experience is also a great thing and a combination of academia and experience is hard to beat.

If a "learned" audience is unable to grasp ideas you may have to offer, I repeat Mama Gump's rule in reverse, "Stupid does because Stupid is," because they may be learned but they remain stupid.

In sum don't sell yourself short. I do not have a doctorate; I have 2 masters and they served me well. I don't dismiss the effort or the recognition deserved for a doctorate. Most doctorates in my fields of specialization don't have my experience and many in my experience feel somewhat threatened by it. I first ran into this early in my time in the history department at Leavenworth when I set out to write an LP. The nay-sayers were the insecure PhDs; I was eating from their rice bowls. My biggest supporters were PhDs who mentored and challenged me to produce something worthwhile. They also produced; the nay sayers never have to this day.

Best

Tom

Agree completely, Tom. Simply because people know the names for some high-powered theories doesn't mean that they have "horsepower." They may just have the ability to remember those names. I'd say go ahead with a submission, 120mm. If nothing else you'll learn something from the experience, and that's invaluable.

[marct]

Hi 120mm,

Let me second Tom's comments.


In sum don't sell yourself short. I do not have a doctorate; I have 2 masters and they served me well. I don't dismiss the effort or the recognition deserved for a doctorate. Most doctorates in my fields of specialization don't have my experience and many in my experience feel somewhat threatened by it.....

Okay, I do have a doctorate, but that just means that I have first hand experience in how mind numbing the process can be and how locked into jargon some Ph.D.'s can be.

Let me give you some advice I give my students:

Everyone is ignorant about most things: There is so muuch "knowledge" available that nobody can possibly know everything. So waht, we all have our failings, the key question is whether we admit our ignorance in areas that are important to us and ask for help. "I am the wisest man I know, for I know I know nothing" Socrates.
Nobody writes alone: one of the biggest myths in academia is that of the lone scholar producing brilliant work (preferably in a comfortable garret; ideally with a bottle of claret or brandy). Bull. Every academic that I have any respect for talks their ideas out with their friends, colleagues, students, family, etc. (my wife hates it when I do this, but she does put up with it). It is also really common to send out drafts of papers for comments, critiques, advice, etc.

So, given this, if you want to present a paper, don't you think it might be a nice idea to post a draft here and let your friends comment on it? Hmm? Think of the people who are on this council: what a fantastic group in terms of both experience and academic "horsepower".

Marc

[120mm]

You worked on the 1/4 Cav museum, 120mm? I did some time working for the museum at Ft Riley and heard a few things about the "illicit source" for that punchbowl (among other things).

Personally I think that reflagging is one of the dumbest things that the army does. For some reason they seem to assume that lineage and heritage is something that you can pack in a truck and move from place to place without regard for the PEOPLE who have to buy into that lineage in order to make it work. I would put some of this on a personnel system that doesn't leave officers in place long enough for some of them to get a handle on the whole idea of unit spirit, let alone what goes into it. The 1/4 Cav has been blessed over the years with a number of commanders who DO understand this idea, and I can bet that many of them were not in the least happy about this whole reflagging idea.

It started as a 4-4 CAV museum. Then we reflagged to 3-4 CAV. I left prior to the 1-4 CAV iteration.

Frankly, 3-4 CAV was the fun one. They are one of the most historic Battalion-sized units in the US army. The color-bearer had to be a great big ape to carry all the battle streamers, esp. in a high wind.

[120mm]

Hi 120mm,

Let me second Tom's comments.



Okay, I do have a doctorate, but that just means that I have first hand experience in how mind numbing the process can be and how locked into jargon some Ph.D.'s can be.

Let me give you some advice I give my students:

Everyone is ignorant about most things: There is so muuch "knowledge" available that nobody can possibly know everything. So waht, we all have our failings, the key question is whether we admit our ignorance in areas that are important to us and ask for help. "I am the wisest man I know, for I know I know nothing" Socrates.
Nobody writes alone: one of the biggest myths in academia is that of the lone scholar producing brilliant work (preferably in a comfortable garret; ideally with a bottle of claret or brandy). Bull. Every academic that I have any respect for talks their ideas out with their friends, colleagues, students, family, etc. (my wife hates it when I do this, but she does put up with it). It is also really common to send out drafts of papers for comments, critiques, advice, etc.

So, given this, if you want to present a paper, don't you think it might be a nice idea to post a draft here and let your friends comment on it? Hmm? Think of the people who are on this council: what a fantastic group in terms of both experience and academic "horsepower".

Marc

I need 300 words by Dec 31st. Let me find the symposium announcement and some ideas I've had. If I don't "chicken out" first.

[120mm]

Social History of Military Technology at ICOHTEC
Location: Denmark
Call for Papers Date: 2006-12-31
Date Submitted: 2006-10-25
Announcement ID: 153420

We are again organizing a symposium on “The Social History of Military Technology” for ICOHTEC 2007, the annual meeting of the International Congress of the History of Technology in Copenhagen (Denmark), 14–18 August 2007. This new effort follows the highly
successful military technology symposium at ICOHTEC 2006 in Leicester. For more information on ICOHTEC, see the organization’s homepage: <http://www.icohtec.org/> For more on the Copenhagen meeting, see below. The history of military technology has usually been conceived in terms of weaponry, warships, fortifications, or other physical manifestations of warfare, with emphasis usually on their construction and workings. It has also assumed a strictly utilitarian basis for military technological invention and innovation. However indispensable such approaches may be, they largely ignore some very important questions. What is the context of social values, attitudes, and interests that shape and support (or oppose) these technologies? What is the structure of gender, race, and class, to say nothing of other aspects of the social order, in which military technology exists and changes? Or, more generally: How do social and cultural environments, within the military itself or in the larger society, influence military technological change? and, How does military technological change affect society? For this symposium, we propose to cast a wide net, taking a very broad view of technology that encompasses toys as well as weapons, ideas as well as hardware, organization as well as materiel. We seek papers that range widely in time and space to explore how social class, race, gender, culture, economics, and/or other extra-military factors have influenced the invention, r&d, diffusion, or use of weapons or other military technologies, and/or how such
technologies have reshaped society and culture. Your proposal should include: (1) your name and email address, (2) a short descriptive title, (3) a concise statement of your thesis, (4) a brief discussion of your sources, and (5) a summary of your major conclusions. In preparing your paper, remember that presentations are not full-length articles. You will have no more than 20 minutes to speak, which is roughly equivalent to 8 double-spaced typed pages. Contributors are encouraged to submit full-length versions of their papers after the conference for consideration by ICOHTEC’s journal ICON. Proposals, preferably electronic, must reach the
organizers no later than 31 December 2006. Please send all proposals to: Bart Hacker: <hackerb@si.edu> We will submit all material in a single proposal, so you need not register your abstract separately. For further details on the Copenhagen meeting, see the
ICOHTEC 2007 homepage: http://www.icohtec2007.dk/

Bart Hacker
NMAH-4013
Smithsonian Insitution
Phone: (202) 633-3924
Email: hackerb@si.edu
Visit the website at http://www.icohtec2007.dk/

One of the first ideas that pops into my mind, is how the concept of "elite" and "special forces" lends a certain machismo to those who practice the trade. I could explore how those within the various elite military communities use "combat fashion" to reinforce these ideas (to include the Special Forces "Truths".) I could also explore how others imitate the "combat fashion" to borrow their mystique; how both children and adults pose as SF in gameplay (airsoft and paintball) and how adults "pose" as SF personnel, even those adults with legitimate military careers, as well as those who have never been in the military, to the point of breaking the law in order to be mistaken as a SF "operator."

I would also love to do a piece on modern Russian R&D/marketing of their military technology. As I stated earlier, I believe that some Russian combat equipment is fatally flawed in modern combat terms, but they persist in attempting to build and sell the best "kitchen toilet" in the world. And, amazingly, some countries are actually buying them....

Unfortunately, I do not know if I have the time and resources to do that one. References would be tough, I fear.

[marct]

Social History of Military Technology at ICOHTEC

One of the first ideas that pops into my mind, is how the concept of "elite" and "special forces" lends a certain machismo to those who practice the trade. I could explore how those within the various elite military communities use "combat fashion" to reinforce these ideas (to include the Special Forces "Truths".) I could also explore how others imitate the "combat fashion" to borrow their mystique; how both children and adults pose as SF in gameplay (airsoft and paintball) and how adults "pose" as SF personnel, even those adults with legitimate military careers, as well as those who have never been in the military, to the point of breaking the law in order to be mistaken as a SF "operator."


Hollywood goes to war: Fad, Fashion and the Star system in today's American Elite Units

Abstract: Strating in the 1920's, Hollwood produced a system of role-emulation. "the Star system", that was designed to draw in movie goers. This social system has since exapted out from Hollywood and has become a staple in American culture. One example of this, is the increasing prevalence of imitation of Elite military units - the "stars" of the military. From "the Green Berets" of the 1960s to "THe Unit" of today, the star system has had a profound effect on how the military is viewed.

Something like that? Actually, it's a really neat idea which has, to my mind, some interesting effects. For one thing, the focusing on "Elite" units comes at the expense of "non-Elite" units. I'm thinking here about the concept of "pride" which goes back to our discussions on regimental heritage. Another corollary is that the Star system has had a nasty tendancy to produce an amost superhero-esque set of expectations, which is antithetical to the sense of "dutiful individualism" that used to be a hallmark of both the US and all Anglo-derived cultures.

There are also some other interesting spin-offs. For example, there is a time expectation inherent such that the "stars" should be able to do the impossible in a couple of days. Another spin-off is in the almost knee jerk reaction to new problems - let's create a "new" elite unit to handle this particular problem (didn't the Nazi's do that in WWII?).

At any rate, that could be a really interesting paper.


I would also love to do a piece on modern Russian R&D/marketing of their military technology. As I stated earlier, I believe that some Russian combat equipment is fatally flawed in modern combat terms, but they persist in attempting to build and sell the best "kitchen toilet" in the world. And, amazingly, some countries are actually buying them....

Unfortunately, I do not know if I have the time and resources to do that one. References would be tough, I fear.

<wry grin>. Jane's would probbaly be your best source, at least for something that might approach an objective standard. At the same time, however, it would also be useful to take a look at the costs. After all, if I can get 5 T72's for the price of 1 M1A and I'm using them mainly against people armed with AKs, what the frak? The T72's will certainly do the job.

Marc

[selil]

An interesting point on the media and Hollywood aspects is that Audie Murphy was a real hero who leant his credibility ot the big screen based almost completely on his military record. A similar thread is the literally unknown service of James Stewart as a General in the Airforce. Then there is the analogous and infamous colonel in Apocalypse Now supposedly based on David Hackworth. These three examples show specific threads of social acceptance, and credibility.

[Steve Blair]

The Germans/Nazis didn't get into the creation of elite units per se[, although you did see them spring up as more of a component of internal political infighting (the Heer has one, so the Kriegsmarine must have one too...Goering's Luftwaffe was especially bad in this regard).

I would argue that the transitory nature of the Army's unit heritages these days, combined with constant personnel rotation, tends to make the elite units more stable and thus more available for mass media portraits. One example I can think of off the top of my head was the TV series "Tour of Duty." It started by following the activities of a line platoon in Vietnam, but once it went past a couple of seasons the unit found itself moved to SOG duties. Reasons? I think it had a great deal to do with wanting to keep the core cast together, which really couldn't be done in a normal Vietnam-type setting (with the 'tour of duty' the show was named for coming into effect). It was easier to move to SOG, where voluntary extensions were common along with repeat tours.

If you go back a bit further and look at the Frontier Western, you'll see that the cavalry units shown in John Ford's works (though never clearly identified by regiment) always had a backbone of long-serving personnel. It was clear that the characters had history with each other...something you see in the elite units shown on TV but do not see in the regular forces these days. You also saw this same effect in Combat, where the characters were there "for the duration."

It's hard from a writing standpoint to frame a good character study (which at the end of the day is what most good military movies and series turn into) when you KNOW that your entire cast will turn over after X amount of time. I'm not saying that the "star" factor doesn't exist, but rather putting out another, possibly parallel, explanation for the focus on elite units. By way of illustration, weren't "Rat Patrol" and "Combat" on during roughly the same time period? Good example of star versus line, I'd say...

[marct]

Totemism and the A. E. F.
Ralph Linton
American Anthropologist, New Series,Vol. 26,No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1924), pp. 296-300

Available at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-7294%28192404%2F06%292%3A26%3A2%3C296%3ATATAEF%3E2 .0.CO%3B2-H if you have JSTOR access

Marc

[Tom Odom]

Hollywood goes to war: Fad, Fashion and the Star system in today's American Elite Units

Abstract: Strating in the 1920's, Hollwood produced a system of role-emulation. "the Star system", that was designed to draw in movie goers. This social system has since exapted out from Hollywood and has become a staple in American culture. One example of this, is the increasing prevalence of imitation of Elite military units - the "stars" of the military. From "the Green Berets" of the 1960s to "THe Unit" of today, the star system has had a profound effect on how the military is viewed.

Something like that? Actually, it's a really neat idea which has, to my mind, some interesting effects. For one thing, the focusing on "Elite" units comes at the expense of "non-Elite" units. I'm thinking here about the concept of "pride" which goes back to our discussions on regimental heritage. Another corollary is that the Star system has had a nasty tendancy to produce an amost superhero-esque set of expectations, which is antithetical to the sense of "dutiful individualism" that used to be a hallmark of both the US and all Anglo-derived cultures.

There are also some other interesting spin-offs. For example, there is a time expectation inherent such that the "stars" should be able to do the impossible in a couple of days. Another spin-off is in the almost knee jerk reaction to new problems - let's create a "new" elite unit to handle this particular problem (didn't the Nazi's do that in WWII?).

At any rate, that could be a really interesting paper.



<wry grin>. Jane's would probbaly be your best source, at least for something that might approach an objective standard. At the same time, however, it would also be useful to take a look at the costs. After all, if I can get 5 T72's for the price of 1 M1A and I'm using them mainly against people armed with AKs, what the frak? The T72's will certainly do the job.

Marc


Look at Roger Beaumont's book on Military Elites for ideas

See this CSI report as a start: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csir_4/csir_4.asp


Best

Tom

[marct]

Look at Roger Beaumont's book on Military Elites for ideas

See this CSI report as a start: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csir_4/csir_4.asp


Best

Tom

Thanks, Tom. The CSI report is an interesting vignete and it certainly fits into both the star system and the (much) older stratified warrior system.

Marc

[carl]

As an example of military technical development being driven as strongly by cultural as by practical reasons I submit as a prime example the SINGLE SEAT F-22.

A large portion of the Air Force believes that a real fighter is flown by a single fighter pilot. If it is operated by a crew of two it can't be a real fighter. The F-22 was designed to be an air to air fighter so it would only have one seat and that was that.

So we have the most expensive, most complicated fighter in history; with the most extensive set of systems, sensors and weapons ever installed on a fighter and with previously unimagined aerodynamic perfomance being operated by one pilot. That pilot has fly the airplane, keep track of all the data, operate the systems and watch the world around him all at once and all by himself. When the day comes when the enemy makes it through to visual contact with the F-22 the pilot won't even have someone there to look out the back for him.

The airplane would be vastly more effective and have more potential for growth if it was a two seater. But, then it wouldn't really be a fighter.

[marct]

Good example, Carl!

[Steve Blair]

Carl, the AF has a history of this sort of behavior going back many years. The F-22 is just the latest example of this sort of totemic behavior on the part of the AF. It's a good example, as is the quest for the next strategic bomber (B-3, anyone?).

[marct]

Carl, the AF has a history of this sort of behavior going back many years. The F-22 is just the latest example of this sort of totemic behavior on the part of the AF. It's a good example, as is the quest for the next strategic bomber (B-3, anyone?).

<wry grin>So, I guess we should add in a dimension that considers how "discarnate" the totem is, with the AF rating fairly high, and the older British regiments rating fairly low.

Marc

[120mm]

Just got to thinking, and rereading the paper requirements and realized that we've "left the reservation" on the military technology aspect of the conference.

I've also been thinking along a line with which I am familiar: How about, What Color Is Your Kalashnikov? Military Small Arms as Art, and Art on Military Small Arms This paper would explore the history of fashion built into small arms' design as well as the decorations soldiers have put on their personal firearm throughout it's history.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v342/stephen_101st/Gear/Bushmasterreborn.jpg

Tons of references, and I don't think there is a monograph, yet, that addresses it directly.

Of course, I think a paper on web gear could be effectively sold to the conference based on it's cultural v. practical basis. And the US SF angle is reflected in their webbing. Queer Eye for the Army Guy Anyone?

[marct]

Hi 120mm,


I've also been thinking along a line with which I am familiar: How about, What Color Is Your Kalashnikov? Military Small Arms as Art, and Art on Military Small Arms This paper would explore the history of fashion built into small arms' design as well as the decorations soldiers have put on their personal firearm throughout it's history.

Tons of references, and I don't think there is a monograph, yet, that addresses it directly.

Of course, I think a paper on web gear could be effectively sold to the conference based on it's cultural v. practical basis. And the US SF angle is reflected in their webbing. Queer Eye for the Army Guy Anyone?

I certainly think that would "sell" :).

Marc

[120mm]

Here is a summary of some thoughts I've had. I'm a little unclear on standards for references; most of my references will be through product catalogs, gov't documents, interviews, personal experiences and stuff I will dig up later.

What Color is Your Kalashnikov? Style, Fashion and Art In the Modern Military

A Paper designed to explore how culture influences the development and selection of individual military gear, to include small arms, in the modern military.

Historically, military weapons, armor and supporting gear has reflected society’s norms and fashions to varying degrees. The amount of organization and standardization has allowed greater and lesser degrees of individual style and fashion, depending on each society. Whereas a Frankish warrior’s arms and armor varied immensely in substance and style, a Roman legionnaire was more or less standard in appearance, even though there were uniform items which were culturally driven.

Beginning with industrialization and rationalization of forces in modern times, national military forces have become more and more monolithic in style. The pinnacle of standardization can be generalized in the US military forces in WWII, where soldiers were similarly equipped to a point where only a minority of special purpose personnel could be distinguished from the overall force. Starting with non-state actors since WWII, as well as the US Army in Viet Nam, standardization and uniformity in individual uniforms and gear has decreased in prevalence.

For those outside of the military subculture, modern military forces appear to be monolithic in style and pragmatic in substance, but in reality, modern military forces’ individual equipment is driven by style, fashion, culture and fads. The pursuit to look and be “in fashion” is strong within the military, and for some outside the military, imitation of these trends is very popular as well. Military personnel spend significant amounts of time and money to appear “up-to-date”, to the point of actually discarding useful equipment with slightly dated, or unpopular designs or camouflage patterns.

Individual weapons are equipped with a multitude of accessories and camouflage painting has reached the level of fine art. Entire internet forums exist for the sole purpose of showing off the accessorizing and camouflage painting of individual weapons.

References for the paper will include personal experience, interviews with producers of military personal equipment, product catalogs, end users of that equipment, as well as unclassified government documents.

Feel free to make suggestions.

[Tom Odom]

Queer Eye for the Army Guy

Go no farther than the French form fitting jump suit, especially the Legion/Naval Infantry variant (could be local modification), which features mid to high thigh length "shorts," complete with a tight crotch for that added je ne sais quois. Tres chic, n'est pas?

Tom

[marct]

Hi 120mm,

I think that looks really good. If you can actually access time stamped discussion forum threads about a particular fashion trend, then you would be able to actually show the negotiations going on, which would be really nice.

One minor quibble, and it's the academic in me :)


Beginning with industrialization and rationalization of forces in modern times, national military forces have become more and more monolithic in style.

Don't the beginings of "modern" military units go back to William the Silent in the late 16th century? Most units were highly standardized before the industrial revolution and, from my reading, all industrialization did was to make them drabber and "cheaper"; at least the combat uniforms.

You may want to distinguish between "combat fashion" and "dress fashion" as well - it looks to me like you are concentrating on "combat fashion". I have a feeling that the separation of combat from dress fashion will probably be crucial to your overall argument at some point.

Marc

[slapout9]

Tom, under the Future Warrior program (Natick Labs)the US soldier of the future will have an "Ensemble" of uniforms to wear for the the battlefield of the future. Some how an "Ensemble" of uniforms just doesn't sound very Army to me.

[jcustis]

120mm,

You're going to get the A/S crowd over at LF so mad at you...Let me know what reinforcing fires I could provide, as I love the idea! :D

[Jedburgh]

...I've also been thinking along a line with which I am familiar: How about, What Color Is Your Kalashnikov? Military Small Arms as Art, and Art on Military Small Arms This paper would explore the history of fashion built into small arms' design as well as the decorations soldiers have put on their personal firearm throughout it's history....
Here's one for you, a "personalized" AK from Jalalabad, Afghanistan:

http://img297.imageshack.us/img297/9754/jalalabadgirlyakdetailss9.jpg (http://imageshack.us)

[slapout9]

As we speak, here is a link from strategy page. Title Air force uniforms have fashion problems.



http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htinf/articles/20061221.aspx

[Steve Blair]

Don't get me started on the AF uniforms!:eek:

[Tom Odom]

Don't get me started on the AF uniforms!:eek:

Would that be the McPeak airline pilot uniform? :D :D

Tom

[Steve Blair]

That or the "new" Mosley specials...one with the Old Army high collar in a fetching blue (the Billy Mitchell 'heritage' model) or the one that looks like something Leisure Suit Larry got rid of in 1977 (the Hap Arnold 'heritage' model with stunning wide lapels just like a leisure suit).

[Bill Moore]

You guys are killing me on this thread. I actually got a couple of good belly laughs reading through some of this material. Perhaps we should start a "on the lighter side" category where we can let our hair down a little and share a few more laughs?

Bill

[120mm]

120mm,

You're going to get the A/S crowd over at LF so mad at you...Let me know what reinforcing fires I could provide, as I love the idea! :D

Remember, jcustis, Sacred Cows make the Best Burgers. I just about got fed my own guts over comments regarding the Airborne merit badge mafia.

And, as you surmised, Lightfighter is the inspiration for this "possible paper."

The thing that blows my mind, is how many real SF guys will actually discard a bit of kit, because they have seen pictures of teenagers dressing up in it for fun.

Marc - The point about historic uniformity you brought up is one of the things that makes me less than comfortable. My academics are not as strong as I'd like just yet; my idea is to float just enough of a summary to get me accepted, and then dig like hell to back it up with actual "knowledge" and "analysis".

And I was focusing primarily on "combat fashion", so it is an excellent point you bring up about "dress" versus "combat". I mean, when did lapels quit being a way to regulate for temperature and start being a style?

The problem I'm having now, is deciding whether to write an omnibus paper very shallowly, or drilling deep on one aspect.

[Rob Thornton]

120mm
You might consider how when a "trend" gets pushed down form an elite, it is sometimes accepted as being useful by the greater community at large, even at the extent of sacrificing mobilty, or comfort. I know we got issued a bunch of stuff in our RFI that is now collecting dust. I've found that simple is better, especially when your pushing 40 and occassionally have to replicate what you did in your 20s. It'd also be useful to know how much both the soldier and the insitution spends on "accessorizing":rolleyes:

[marct]

Hi 120mm,


Marc - The point about historic uniformity you brought up is one of the things that makes me less than comfortable. My academics are not as strong as I'd like just yet; my idea is to float just enough of a summary to get me accepted, and then dig like hell to back it up with actual "knowledge" and "analysis".

That's a tactic that many of us use, so I wouldn't worry about it. It's also why many of us will send out preliminary drafts of our papers to friends and colleagues - so that they can point out the holes in the arguments :). I've found that, most of the time, I get some really great feedback from my own network (including some of my undergrad students).

I realy think that your summary is good - I'd go for it :D


And I was focusing primarily on "combat fashion", so it is an excellent point you bring up about "dress" versus "combat". I mean, when did lapels quit being a way to regulate for temperature and start being a style?

The problem I'm having now, is deciding whether to write an omnibus paper very shallowly, or drilling deep on one aspect.

Personally, if I were you, I would drill down to about middlin' level but place that is it's broader context.


The thing that blows my mind, is how many real SF guys will actually discard a bit of kit, because they have seen pictures of teenagers dressing up in it for fun.

Okay, being an Anthropologist, I'd wonder if you asked them why they did it? This type of observation is "data", and their responses are another type of data. If you write about "what is" rather than about "theory says..." you will, to my mind, end up doing a much better conference paper. Any theory necessary can be alluded to in the presentation and written in later in the publication.

Marc

[marct]

Hi Rob,


You might consider how when a "trend" getspushed down form an elite, it is sometimes accepted as being useful by the greater community at large, even at the extent of sacrificing mobilty, or comfort. I know we got issued a bunch of stuff in our RFI that is now collecting dust. I've found that simple is better, especially when your pushing 40 and occassionally have to replicate what you did in your 20s. It'd also be useful to know how much both the soldier and the insitution spends on "accessorizing":rolleyes:

Really good points! There was some pretty good work done on this in a consumer / civilian context back in the 1960's in Sociology if I remember correctly. So, a new question that 120mm could pose at the end of his paper is "When does an accessory become a necessity?"

Richard Dawkins had an article in the late 1980's or 1990's (it's early in the morning and my mind isn't awake yet) where he talks about people taking on additional burdens to show how strong they are - the "peacock effect". I think that this may be playing out in some of he equipment issues that you are mentioning.

Marc

[Uboat509]

The thing that blows my mind, is how many real SF guys will actually discard a bit of kit, because they have seen pictures of teenagers dressing up in it for fun.



I have not seen this. I have seen a lot of guys get rid of kit that was issued to them because whoever procured it, did so without actually talking to an operator. There is a certain amount of institutional arrogance in SF but I have never seen anyone discard good kit over something like that.

SFC W

[slapout9]

1-120mm, you might also consider the fact that military fashion has an impact on the civilian world, with stores like "Banana Republic" and "The Urban Gorilla" that take military fashion and alter it slightly to sell to the general public.

2-When you say combat fashion does that include web gear? How web gear has changed both for the good and the bad is a hobby of mine. I have a lot of material on it if you ever think you need it.

3-I don't have any college degrees but I have been called a 3rd degree Red neck. And Slapout,Alabama is the cultural center of the Universe, according to Bubba anyway.

[Rob Thornton]

http://www.airsoftcanada.com/gallery/showphoto.php?photo=4202

Saw this along with some other "Bob" humor.

[SWJED]

Saw this along with some other "Bob" humor.

Thanks for the belly laugh :)

[120mm]

This continues to be a great topic - unfortunately, I am seriously wavering on whether to go through with the paper, or not.

I am in arrears in my ILE course, and need to focus on it. I also need to do some fundamental "Catch up for the 10 years I failed to study" and "decide what the hell I'm going to do with my life" stuff.

I have enough to float a proposal. I'll decide for sure later this week if I'm going to do it or not.

Thanks for all the help and ideas. This may just need to be put off until next year.

[AdamG]

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v342/stephen_101st/Gear/Bushmasterreborn.jpg

Tons of references, and I don't think there is a monograph, yet, that addresses it directly.

Of course, I think a paper on web gear could be effectively sold to the conference based on it's cultural v. practical basis. And the US SF angle is reflected in their webbing. Queer Eye for the Army Guy Anyone?

Needs earrings.

[120mm]

And a bitchin' pair of high heels.

[Steve Blair]

And a bitchin' pair of high heels.

But ONLY if they have speed-zips on 'em and come in that fetching unbuffed desert tan. Then we're talkin'...:cool:

[Rifleman]

Back to topic.

Totem - 1. a. An animal, plant or natural object serving as the emblem of a clan or family by virtue of an asserted ancestral relationship. b. A representation of this being. 2. A venerated symbol.

It seems the Marine Corps' technological totem would have to be "The Rifle."

The Army, being a large organization without a singular culture, doesn't have a service wide technological totem that I can think of. I doubt the Army wide wear of the black beret has changed that since my day. The beret wouldn't be a technological totem anyway.

In my unit our technological totem would have been the static line parachute. The regimental crest and the maroon beret wouldn't be technological totems.

Now I'd say my unit's technological totem is the pistol. The comparison isn't perfect, badges and handcuffs fit in somepace, but the pistol is technological and for most cops it probably tops the badge as a venerated symbol anyway.

[marct]

One of the things that always interested me about the British Regimental system, which Canada uses, is the existence of "Honourary" Colonels. With this in mind, CBC posted an interesting story:



That's Col. Rick to you: Mercer gets a military gig
Last Updated: Wednesday, January 24, 2007 | 5:25 PM ET
CBC News

In a post sometimes reserved for business executives or minor royalty, Rick Mercer may be the first professional comedian to serve as honorary colonel of a Canadian air force unit.

Mercer, who is younger than some of the aircraft in 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron, says he is "probably an unconventional choice" for the unpaid ceremonial gig. "But I'm happy that it's the guys with the Sea Kings because I always root for the underdog," he told CBC News Online on Wednesday as word of his appointment spread. "And I've always felt perfectly safe riding in Sea Kings."

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/01/24/mercer-colonel.html)


Marc

[Steve Blair]

The US Army had this as well, although I suspect it was strongest with the cavalry regiments. Now...who knows what happened to it.

[marct]

Hi Steve,


The US Army had this as well, although I suspect it was strongest with the cavalry regiments. Now...who knows what happened to it.

Didn't the US version come from the militias via the state legislatures? If that's the case, then I expect it disappeared with them. I'm pretty sure that our version came out of the Napoleonic Wars' reorganization of regiments and the association with a military rank and social status; things like buying a commission in an inactive regiment or BTN. I know that my Great Grandfather had to do this to maintain his social standing.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Not originally. The honorary colonel system came into use as a way to preserve unit heritage, and was really in vogue after World War I, if memory serves. It continued on with fits and starts through the last re-org, and I don't know where it stands now. Under the old system the honorary colonel had to have served as an active officer with the regiment in question.

What you're thinking of, Marc, was the system used to create officers for militia and volunteer units during the Civil War (it was used in other conflicts, but obviously saw its greatest use during the Civil War). Typically if a person put up the money to raise and equip a unit, he was given command of that unit and the rank to go with it. So if a guy funded the "Livingston Light Rifle Company," he'd get the rank of captain or major from the state legislature to go with his unit. Many of those units also elected officers and NCOs, with often comical results. It was a purchase system, in a way, but also a way to show political patronage and clout.

After a year or so of war, most units abandoned the election process, but you would still see regimental commanders appointed by politicians. If they were idiots, they were fired or (if the clout was too strong) shifted to an assignment where they would cause little damage.

[marct]

Hi Steve,


Not originally. The honorary colonel system came into use as a way to preserve unit heritage, and was really in vogue after World War I, if memory serves. It continued on with fits and starts through the last re-org, and I don't know where it stands now. Under the old system the honorary colonel had to have served as an active officer with the regiment in question.

Hunh, I never knew that. It's totally different from our system, then.


What you're thinking of, Marc, was the system used to create officers for militia and volunteer units during the Civil War (it was used in other conflicts, but obviously saw its greatest use during the Civil War). Typically if a person put up the money to raise and equip a unit, he was given command of that unit and the rank to go with it. So if a guy funded the "Livingston Light Rifle Company," he'd get the rank of captain or major from the state legislature to go with his unit. Many of those units also elected officers and NCOs, with often comical results. It was a purchase system, in a way, but also a way to show political patronage and clout.

Actually, I was thinking of the war of 1812 rather than your civil war, and the later militia land grabs in the west - the Indian Wars, etc. I think it was a little looser, i.e. you didn't have to actually pay for the unit itself to get the rank. Didn't Jackson say something about that regarding the Georgia militias?


After a year or so of war, most units abandoned the election process, but you would still see regimental commanders appointed by politicians. If they were idiots, they were fired or (if the clout was too strong) shifted to an assignment where they would cause little damage.

Yeah, I can see that. That type of system wouldn't have worked well in your civil war.

Marc

[One_of_the_Strange]

I thought I'd break my posting duck by pointing out some UK views of combat fashion. The aim for the soldier concerned is to be seen as "ally", that difficult to define blend of professionalism and style. It's trying hard to appear as though you've made no effort. It varies from conflict to conflict - Falklands "ally" was very different to Herrick (Afghanistan) "ally".

http://www.arrse.co.uk/cpgn2/Forums/viewtopic/t=46346.html

http://www.arrse.co.uk/cpgn2/Forums/viewtopic/t=53077.html

Failure results in being labelled as a "walt", as in Walter Mitty. But that's a whole new topic all by itself.

[Stan]

Hey 120mm,

While an OTT to Aberdeen, MD to introduce ground forces weapons to the Estonian military as potential FMF sales, the Estonian NCO and his Colonel were offered to try various weapons on the range and at the end of the day, both seemed to favor the M-14 over any other weapon.

Turns out, one of the NCO's distant relatives was part of an Estonia sniper unit trained by the Germans in the early 1900s. The unit then and today is know as the Kuperjanov Single Infantry Battalion. Formed as a partisan troop in 1918 by 1LT Julius Kuperjanov, their enemies often referred to them as a death squad.

Kuperjanov's battalion lacking sufficient ammo to sustain a long firefight, would simply wait hiden in a dense growth of trees for an adorn officer and use a single 7mm round.

The Kuperjanov battalion today still practice the one round-rule, but now use US-donated M14s.

Regards, Stan

[marct]

The PPCLI announced a new Honourary Colonel last week, and the CBC story has some interesting observations about the role.

Former GG assumes honorary role for regiment
Last Updated: Saturday, March 17, 2007 | 6:19 PM ET
CBC News

Canada's former governor general has been given an honorary regimental position usually reserved for members of the Royal Family.

Adrienne Clarkson, who was the Queen's representative in Canada, became the first Canadian to be appointed colonel-in-chief of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, in a ceremony on Saturday in Edmonton.

She succeeds Lady Patricia Brabourne, Countess Mountbatten of Burma, who has been colonel-in-chief for 32 years.

"It gives me a sense of great comfort and joy that we now have such a perfectly splendid successor, and I retire in the knowledge that the Patricias will be as well looked after as I was able to do," Lady Patricia said.

The position was first held by Lady Patricia Ramsay, a granddaughter of Queen Victoria, from whom the regiment gets its name.

According to the regiment, Clarkson was chosen because she meets all of the criteria for the position, including having visited Canadian troops overseas while governor general, and has a personal connection to the regiment because her husband, John Ralston Saul, is the son of a regiment officer.

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/03/17/clarkson-princess.html)

Marc

[goesh]

My wife is an honorary Kentucky Colonel. She threatens on a regular basis to send me to Anbar provence.

[marct]

My wife is an honorary Kentucky Colonel. She threatens on a regular basis to send me to Anbar provence.

LOLOL. Maybe I'm luckier - my wife only threatens me with Gehenna (or the Kitchen; whichever is worse) :D.

Marc

[AFlynn]

I seem to recall a great passage in The Guns of August about the bright red pants the French troops wore in the years running up to WWI, and the furious fight against changing it. But if I recall it was resisting a change, rather than keeping up with fashion.