Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Dayuhan]

The way we do it, yes. And that is probably true in some cases no matter what. But I still think that if we played the game hard enough, we could exercise much much more control than we think possible.
There are real world limits to how "hard" we are able to play, especially if playing hard means significant commitment of military or other resources. I'd submit that "playing hard" is only sensible if you have a clear, practical, and achievable goal, and I'm not at all sure we have that. I'm sure that with sufficient application of resources we could force certain events (like the fall of Assad) to happen. The extent to which we could exercise meaningful "control" of that process or its aftermath without undertaking an unacceptable commitment (occupation) remains very doubtful.


Yes but what power they have I think is really a function of what we allow them to exercise, at least in Russia's case. That doesn't make it any less real on the ground in Syria, but it is what we allow.
Have we the capacity, realistically, to disallow any Russian action? We're not going to get into a shooting incident with the Russians over Syria, and they know it, which makes bluff a pretty pointless game. It's silly to issue ultimatums or draw lines in the sand if you don't have the means and will to take real meaningful steps to back them up and enough interest at stake to justify the costs and risks of backing them up.


There are a lot of things we could do that don't involve troops on the ground. One thing that comes to mind is approving multiple LNG export terminals here in the US. That would be very bad for Russia because a few years after that, no more blackmailing the Europeans.
I don't see the US exporting enough gas to Europe to significantly reduce dependence on Russia, and the Russians know that the current US gas glut will not last, given the overall US energy equation. I doubt they'd be deterred at all.


Our Navy could be a bit of a lever too. There is lots of precedent for shoving people around, to be blunt about it, at sea without getting close to shooting.

Only works if they believe you'd be willing to escalate. We aren't willing. They know it.


Yep, to an extent. I fear ultimately our interests will be very much at stake, but I can't think of any good way, that the US leadership would actually do, to affect things.

Interests will be affected no matter what the outcome, but I don't see how intervention will make that picture any better. It could make the picture a whole lot worse. Again, the first thing you need to justify intervention is a clear, practical, and achievable goal. Have we got one?


In an ideal world, turn Syria into Malaysia, but that ain't gonna happen. Or at least keep the thing from spreading too far, prevent an AQ emirate in east Syria and west Iraq and install a regime (not PC for sure) that wouldn't slaughter too many people and cause a lot of trouble. But we ain't capable of achieving that given our leadership. So it is a moot point.

I'm not sure those are achievable with any leadership. It's easy to complain about lack of political will, but lack of the will needed to stick your tender bits into a meatgrinder seems to me eminently logical. Even the most peripheral mention of "installing" regimes should throw up a whole forest of red flags. Us getting involved is as likely to cause spillover and escalation as it is to prevent it. It's not a question of leadership. We have neither the desire nor the capacity to govern Syria, directly or by proxy, nor is it in our interests to try to govern Syria.

[SWJ Blog]

Fracture Lines: The Evaluating the Possibility of a Sectarian Future for Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fracture-lines-the-evaluating-the-possibility-of-a-sectarian-future-for-syria)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fracture-lines-the-evaluating-the-possibility-of-a-sectarian-future-for-syria) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Madhu]

Luttwak states that he thinks the entire thing is a bad idea, but some military aid is now official policy.

I thought he was just talking about vetting groups, not literally trying to recreate Anbar.


It was for several good and solid reasons that U.S. President Barack Obama's administration long resisted pressures to intervene more forcefully in Syria's civil war. To start with, there is the sheer complexity of a conflict at the intersection of religious, ethnic, regional, and global politics, as illustrated by the plain fact that the most Westernized of Syrians (including its Christians) support the Assad government that the United States seeks to displace, while its enemies are certainly not America's friends and, indeed, include the most dangerous of Muslim extremists. But no matter: After two years of restraint, the administration -- having decided to send "direct military assistance" to the rebels -- has chosen sides and is now choosing sides within sides.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/17/five_rules_for_arming_rebels_syria


It is now argued most authoritatively that U.S. President Barack Obama's failure to act decisively to remove Bashar al-Assad's regime from power in Syria is explained by internal divisions within his administration, miscalculations about the balance of power on the ground, and the president's own irresolution. There is another explanation, however: that the Obama administration is showing calculated restraint induced by bitter experience and, even more, by the overriding strategic priority of disengaging from the Islamic arc of conflict to better engage with China.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/07/leave_bad_enough_alone

One comment I've read frequently is "if only we had intervened earlier, things would be different", the moderate opposition would be the main fighters and there would be no radicals involved.

I don't see why people think that, earlier intervention doesn't preclude others arming competing groups. Once violence is unleashed, it's hard to predict the outcome.

Ken White (he hasn't posted in a while, hope he's well) used to get it just right: most of what we do overseas is almost reactionary and based on domestic politics.

[Madhu]

carl,

I'm not sure I follow your logic. I think intervention is a mistake on both humanitarian and realist grounds--I don't think I need to repeat my reasoning here--but what do you think the goal or goals should be? Proponents offer multiple and contradictory goals, at times. The things you mention have nothing to do with leadership, they are a contradictory and conflicting wish list. What is the ultimate goal, why is it the proper goal for the US, is it possible, what might be expected problems, and how much blood and treasure might be required to accomplish stated goal, it is even possible?

(I may be excessively influenced by friends from the region, many Syrian Christians.)

[wm]

I suspect Mr. Luttwak fancies himself a 21st century Herman Kahn.

I think the comparison to Herman Kahn may be a little overdrawn. As I am sure you are aware, Luttwak has written 2 books in which he tries to spell out the "Grand Strategy" of the later Roman and Byzantine Empires. Arguably, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the USA stands as a modern analog to the Roman and Byzantine empires of the 1st to the 6th centuries AD. One might consider Luttwak's recent effort as a stab at educating the latest American leadership on lessons to be learned from the failed strategies of those two former world powers. Whether Luttwak has correctly identified the strategies of the Romans and Byzantines and whether the lessons learned are really applicable to America and the world of the 21st century are probably much more fruitful ways to criticize him.

But, as pointed out, a cost benefit analysis ought to be the first order of business, with the bottom line being an answer to the question, "Does the US achieve a net gain by intervening?" I suspect a disinterested, rational calculation (one that avoids placing too much value on the need to demonstrate leadership's testosterone level) will identify a significant net loss to America.

[J Wolfsberger]

Luttwak states that he thinks the entire thing is a bad idea, but some military aid is now official policy.

After what you and wm wrote, I reread the article in (ahem) a less reactionary mode. You are both correct. :o

That said, in response to both of you, I'd suggest that the most we should or effectively can do is help provide humanitarian aide and security for safe zones where those who wish can escape the slaughter.

I think I'd also favor offering refuge to the Christian minority. No matter how this turns out, I don't foresee any future for Maronites or Chaldeans in the region.

[davidbfpo]

If there was ever a time for external US-led intervention in Syria that has passed; IIRC we discussed this two years ago, mainly in the context of imposing no-fly zones and internal safe havens.

J Wolfsberger posted just:
I'd suggest that the most we should or effectively can do is help provide humanitarian aide and security for safe zones where those who wish can escape the slaughter.

Yes we, the West, could help with humanitarian aid, although I do wonder why the rich Arab nations have not been able to sign all the cheques.

'Security for safe zones' is far more problematic. Safe zones outside Syria maybe easier, although both Jordan and Turkey have considerable numbers of refugees. Lebanon has fewer. Will 'security for safe zones' mean preventing their use as rear bases by the insurgents rather than guarding them against regime coercion?

Personally I don't think the West should undertake such a 'security' role outside or inside Syria. A UN 'blue beret' presence I expect would be opposed by Russia and China; assuming Jordan and Turkey sought that.

The Western experience in the ill-fated MNF in the Lebanon, even before the attacks on French paras & US Marine bases, is a more likely template. Oddly at least one UK analyst ignores that:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22967636

[carl]

carl,

I'm not sure I follow your logic. I think intervention is a mistake on both humanitarian and realist grounds--I don't think I need to repeat my reasoning here--but what do you think the goal or goals should be? Proponents offer multiple and contradictory goals, at times. The things you mention have nothing to do with leadership, they are a contradictory and conflicting wish list. What is the ultimate goal, why is it the proper goal for the US, is it possible, what might be expected problems, and how much blood and treasure might be required to accomplish stated goal, it is even possible?

(I may be excessively influenced by friends from the region, many Syrian Christians.)

Madhu: Read what I wrote again, carefully. Then read what you wrote above. They don't seem to be related.

[Dayuhan]

Madhu: Read what I wrote again, carefully. Then read what you wrote above. They don't seem to be related.

I see the relation, and I was about to ask a similar question. You repeatedly suggest that there are options that would be possible or practical without what you seem to suggest are leadership constraints:


The way we do it, yes.


I still think that if we played the game hard enough, we could exercise much much more control than we think possible.


I can't think of any good way, that the US leadership would actually do


Or at least keep the thing from spreading too far, prevent an AQ emirate in east Syria and west Iraq and install a regime (not PC for sure) that wouldn't slaughter too many people and cause a lot of trouble. But we ain't capable of achieving that given our leadership


If we were willing to tell the Russkis to go stuff it. If we told the Iranians they ain't seen nothing yet if they keep horsin' around. If we told Israel that the days of us dancing to their tune were over, they will survive as a state but we play the music. Same thing with the Gulf States, especially the Gulf states.


The problem is the inside the beltway elites won't do any of this stuff

All of this suggests a belief that viable options (hinted at, but never specified) exist that have a real chance of altering the state of affairs in a favorable manner, but that leaders are unwilling or unable to pursue them. I wonder what exactly those options are, and why you think they'd achieve anything.

I, and I believe Madhu, believe that the problem is not leadership, but rather the inherent undesirability of intervening in a situation where we have no realistically achievable goal and where applying force is likely to forcefully dig us into a very unpleasant hole.

[carl]

Have we the capacity, realistically, to disallow any Russian action? We're not going to get into a shooting incident with the Russians over Syria, and they know it, which makes bluff a pretty pointless game. It's silly to issue ultimatums or draw lines in the sand if you don't have the means and will to take real meaningful steps to back them up and enough interest at stake to justify the costs and risks of backing them up.

I don't see the US exporting enough gas to Europe to significantly reduce dependence on Russia, and the Russians know that the current US gas glut will not last, given the overall US energy equation. I doubt they'd be deterred at all.

Only works if they believe you'd be willing to escalate. We aren't willing. They know it.

My original narrow point regarding Russia was that Putinistan, a state with a lot of problems, punches above their weight because we ascribe to them power that they don't actually have. The above short list is a quite excellent illustration of the line of thinking that results in that.

[carl]

I see the relation, and I was about to ask a similar question. You repeatedly suggest that there are options that would be possible or practical without what you seem to suggest are leadership constraints:

All of this suggests a belief that viable options (hinted at, but never specified) exist that have a real chance of altering the state of affairs in a favorable manner, but that leaders are unwilling or unable to pursue them. I wonder what exactly those options are, and why you think they'd achieve anything.

I, and I believe Madhu, believe that the problem is not leadership, but rather the inherent undesirability of intervening in a situation where we have no realistically achievable goal and where applying force is likely to forcefully dig us into a very unpleasant hole.

You really think so? Well golly, who knew?

[Dayuhan]

My original narrow point regarding Russia was that Putinistan, a state with a lot of problems, punches above their weight because we ascribe to them power that they don't actually have. The above short list is a quite excellent illustration of the line of thinking that results in that.

My original point was that the Russians don't need to punch very hard, or to have much power, to make life difficult for any intervening power in Syria. Neither does Iran. Neither does Hezbollah. None of them are great superpowers, none of them can fight the US and win, all of them can and will make life miserable for anyone foolish enough to get bogged down in that particular quagmire. Worth noting that while the Russians are more than willing to offer material and ideological support to Assad, they don't want to put people in there either: they know where that would go, and they know that once entrenched it would be easy for their rivals to make their lives miserable.

One of the realities of quagmires is that once you're in one, your antagonists don't have to be great powers or heavyweight punchers to make your life difficult.

It's normal enough to be frustrated by the realities of American governance (democracy can be such a pain but if you're going to suggest that effective action would be possible with better leadership, you might consider clarifying what action you think would be effective and what you think those actions might achieve.

The US operates under a real constraint in Syria, the constraint being that the US electorate is in no mood to countenance another military adventure in the Muslim world, especially with no clear and immediate threat to US interests and no clear and achievable objective. I have yet to see any coherent argument against that position, and I think the US electorate is showing a good deal of sense.

PS: The "inside the Beltway" crowd is not exactly unaware that Europe would benefit from diversifying its energy sources, as evidenced here:

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf

Still, there's no reason to think that anything the US does on that score is going to change the Russian position on Syria, or act as an effective constraint on Russian action in Syria.

[JWing]

As the conflict in Syria has escalated, so has the involvement of foreign countries. Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and now the United States and England are all supporting one group or another in the war. Neighboring Iraq has also joined in the conflict. Every month there are reports about young Iraqis going to fight in Syria, usually organized by not only Shiite militant groups like the League of the Righteous or the Hezbollah Brigades, but also the country’s major political parties like the Sadrists and the Badr Organization. These organizations are now publicly acknowledging their losses in funerals and on the Internet. Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah are also recruiting, arming, and funding Iraqis. To help explain this growing flow of men and material to Syria from Iraq is Phillip Smyth. Smyth works for the University of Maryland’s Institute for Advanced Computer Studies’ Lab for Computational Cultural Dynamics. He also writes the Hizballah Cavalcade which focuses on militant Shia organizations operating in Syria, their members, ideologies, arms, funerals, and other related topics for the Jihadology website.

continued (http://www.musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-increasing-flow-of-iraqi-fighters.html)

[davidbfpo]

A report from The Guardian, citing an official Russian statement and that:
Russia has been evacuating its citizens from Syria for weeks.

With an important caveat:
...the decision to remove defence ministry personnel did not include technical experts employed by the Syrian government to train its army to use Russian-issued weapons.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/26/russia-withdraws-personnel-syria

[davidbfpo]

An excellent explanation all the way from Australia's Lowy Institute. Oddly few parallels are made in the UK with Bosnia / FRY, when intervention is mentioned:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/06/25/Why-Syria-is-not-like-Bosnia.aspx

[pcmfr]

Things are confusing on the ground in Syria. Freelance UW campaigns make them much more so: http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/27/islamists_auction_off_cars_to_buy_heat_seeking_mis siles_for_syrian_rebels#%2EUcze0F4JUpk%2Etwitter

It's difficult to see how the Agency is adequately vetting its surrogates with so many other parties in the mix.

[Bill Moore]

Not surprising but sad, are these the primates John McCain is pushing to provide support to? He claims we can vet them, during his "McCain's War" visit to Syria he was posing with a known kidnapper/terrorist (unknown to him at the time). Assayd may not be a friend of the U.S., but he kept house inside of Syria. Our nave politicians and diplomats somehow confused the Sunni uprising as a democratic movement of peace loving citizens. They weren't peace leaving citizens the last night they rose up, nor are they this time.

At the end of the article there is a link to a video of the priest being beheaded, and it is as disturbing as the article suggests, but still worth watching to capture the excitement in the crowd at this sick, murderous act.

http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/06/30/catholic-priest-beheaded-in-syria-by-al-qaeda-linked-rebels-as-men-and-children-take-pictures-and-cheer/

Catholic Priest Beheaded in Syria by Al-Qaeda-Linked Rebels as Men and Children Take Pictures and Cheer


Catholic Online is raising alarm that western nations are providing support to the rebels who have shown a proclivity toward persecuting Christians:

This should make it clear to Christians around the world what jihadists are about. Make no mistake. Catholics and Christians around the globe are under dire threat, particularly from the spread of militant Islam. Until the threat is recognized and taken seriously, martyrdoms like this will continue.

[Bill Moore]

Things are confusing on the ground in Syria. Freelance UW campaigns make them much more so: http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/27/islamists_auction_off_cars_to_buy_heat_seeking_mis siles_for_syrian_rebels#%2EUcze0F4JUpk%2Etwitter

It's difficult to see how the Agency is adequately vetting its surrogates with so many other parties in the mix.

This is a good find, thanks for sharing.

Islamists Auction Off Cars to Buy Heat Seeking Missiles for Syrian Rebels


A group of hard-line Islamists in Kuwait raised enough cash to arm 12,000 Syrian rebels this week, according to statements by the group's leaders. The next step: flood the country with guided missiles, heat-seeking missiles and tandem warheads.

With friends like this........

We can't control any of this, we opened Pandora's box when we removed Saddam with no real plan for what would follow.

Not the most popular man in American politics, but Richard Clark got it right in his book, "The Scorpion's Gate."

[Dayuhan]

The next step: flood the country with guided missiles, heat-seeking missiles and tandem warheads.

Are these weapons really that readily available? Obviously cash isn't a major constraint. If anyone who can auction a few cars can pick up a MANPADS, it's odd that more of them haven't been used for terrorist purposes.

[davidbfpo]

This is the thread's current title and perhaps should be changed now.

Aside from that Patrick Cockburn is a reporter who has been in Syria, with regime approval and writes a quite different account, as suggested by the title 'Foreign media portrayals of the conflict in Syria are dangerously inaccurate':http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/foreign-media-portrayals-of-the-conflict-in-syria-are-dangerously-inaccurate-8679937.html

[Bill Moore]

Are these weapons really that readily available? Obviously cash isn't a major constraint. If anyone who can auction a few cars can pick up a MANPADS, it's odd that more of them haven't been used for terrorist purposes.

http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/asmp/MANPADS.html

Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) Proliferation


There are an estimated 500,000 MANPADS in the world today, many thousands of which are thought to be on the black market and therefore accessible to terrorists and other non-state actors.8 MANPADS are attractive to terrorists and insurgents because they are:
•lethal—the history of MANPADS usage by guerrillas and terrorists underscores the efficacy of these weapons against both civilian and military targets. Estimates of deaths resulting from MANPADS attacks on civilian aircraft range from 500 to 1000.9 While most of these deaths were from attacks on smaller aircraft, the Congressional Research Service identified 5 cases in which large civilian turbojet aircraft were targeted. In two of the five cases, the outcome was catastrophic - all people on board were killed.10 ◦Insurgent groups seek MANPADS because they are effective against attack helicopters and other aircraft that are used in counter-insurgency operations. During the Soviet occupations of Afghanistan, rebels used U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles to damage or destroy hundreds of aircraft, degrading the threat from Soviet airpower.

http://eurasianhub.com/2013/03/23/manpads-proliferation-in-syria/

Of course the most recent proliferation of MANPADs and other arms came from the collapse of the Qaddafi Regime.

MANPADs Proliferation in Syria


Currently in Libya we are engaged in the most extensive effort to combat the proliferation of MANPADS in U.S. history. But before I talk about Libya, let me first talk a bit about why we are so focused on this threat.

http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/14/syrias_rebels_already_have_advanced_missiles_but_h ow_did_they_get_there


One of the most disturbing things about this development, according to Schroeder. is that these weapons likely smuggled into the country via the black market. The Syrian military is not believed to have had SA-24s and the sale of such weapons is supposed to be strictly regulated.


Interestingly, there are reports that SA-24s were smuggled out of Libya in during or immediately after the war to oust Muammar al Gaddafi in 2011 and ended up in the hands of militants in Gaza and Syria's Levantine neighbor, Lebanon.

http://www.ibtimes.com/libya-armed-dangerous-piles-weapons-fuel-illicit-exportation-war-1311035

Libya, Armed And Dangerous: Piles Of Weapons Fuel Illicit Exportation Of War


Some Libyan weapons went even farther afield, and MI6 officials have reportedly warned UK Prime Minister David Cameron that Libya has become a “Tesco” for terrorists. But whether the Libyan arsenal actually amounts to 1 million tons is impossible to say.

They have the weapons for those who have the money. Brothers in arms and all that, but hey there is still a profit to be made.

http://news.yahoo.com/news-summary-civilian-planes-shot-down-manpads-153105655.html

News Summary: Civilian planes shot down by MANPADS


Since 1975, 40 civilian aircraft have been hit by MANPADS, causing at least 28 crashes and more than 800 deaths around the world, according to the U.S. State Department. Here are some incidents involving commercial planes.

[Bill Moore]

Not surprising but sad, are these the primates John McCain is pushing to provide support to? He claims we can vet them, during his "McCain's War" visit to Syria he was posing with a known kidnapper/terrorist (unknown to him at the time). Assayd may not be a friend of the U.S., but he kept house inside of Syria. Our nave politicians and diplomats somehow confused the Sunni uprising as a democratic movement of peace loving citizens. They weren't peace leaving citizens the last night they rose up, nor are they this time.

At the end of the article there is a link to a video of the priest being beheaded, and it is as disturbing as the article suggests, but still worth watching to capture the excitement in the crowd at this sick, murderous act.

http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/06/30/catholic-priest-beheaded-in-syria-by-al-qaeda-linked-rebels-as-men-and-children-take-pictures-and-cheer/

Catholic Priest Beheaded in Syria by Al-Qaeda-Linked Rebels as Men and Children Take Pictures and Cheer

More recent reports refute that the Priest was beheaded, but he was murdered by Islamists. That leaves the question who were those beheaded?

http://www.aleteia.org/en/world/news/slain-syrian-priest-remembered-at-mass-in-rome-2329002

Slain Syrian Priest Remembered at Mass in Rome
Fr. Francois Mourad was murdered by rebels


According to Vatican Radio, Fr. Pizzaballa explained that when Fr. Maroud tried to defend the sisters and others from the rebels, he was shot and killed.

A few days later, a video was posted on YouTube, and shortly thereafter on Live Leak, showing three men being beheaded. Those posting the video claimed that one of them was Fr. Mourad.

The claim has since spread, having been picked up by various other media outlets later in the week.

However, a reliable Vatican source told CNA July 2 that reports of the priest being killed by beheading are “false.”

[carl]

From Catholic Online:
This should make it clear to Christians around the world what jihadists are about. Make no mistake. Catholics and Christians around the globe are under dire threat, particularly from the spread of militant Islam. Until the threat is recognized and taken seriously, martyrdoms like this will continue.

This is happening in a lot of places, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Egypt. Given the ideology it can't be stopped. So what to do? Maybe we could give special visas or something like that. They sure would be grateful and grateful people I suspect make pretty good citizens.

[SWJ Blog]

After Checkmate: The Use and Limits of the Chess Analogy Regarding Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/after-checkmate-the-use-and-limits-of-the-chess-analogy-regarding-syria)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/after-checkmate-the-use-and-limits-of-the-chess-analogy-regarding-syria) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Bill Moore]

From SWJ Round Up today

http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/defense-experts-question-joint-chiefs-chairman-s-views-on-syria-1.234210

Defense experts question Joint Chiefs chairman’s views on Syria


But several experts questioned his costs and conclusions.

Michael O’Hanlon, a security expert at the Brookings Institution, said Dempsey’s numbers “strike me as fairly high, at least once the mission is established.”

I had to see what this alleged defense expert said about Iraq, because I just knew he had to weigh in with his expertise.

http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2008/05/20/23554/ohanlon-grade-iraq/

O’Hanlon Grades Himself On Iraq: ‘I Give Myself A Score Of 7 Out Of 10′

O’Hanlon has written and said about Iraq over the years. A few highlights:


O’Hanlon today: “Prediction that the occupation/stabilization mission would be long and challenging: correct.”


– “The United States and coalition partners would win any future war to overthrow Saddam Hussein in a rapid and decisive fashion. This will not be another Vietnam or another Korea.” [9/25/02]

– “In all likelihood, the war will culminate in a battle for Baghdad starting anywhere from five days to two weeks after bombs begin to fall. The war could be over within a month. … the battle for Baghdad will almost surely not last more than a week or two.” [3/18/03]

O’Hanlon today: “I believe Ken Pollack and I have been generally proven right by events—especially since we did not overstate by arguing that Iraq was calm, or that a good outcome was within easy reach.”

Fascinating! I'm waiting for Paul Wolfowitzless to resurface somewhere and testify there is no ethnic tension in Syria and everything will be O.K.. Then I know we'll have a very positive outcome for a limited expenditure of resources. Grab your guns and CERP boys, let's go! We'll go kill some terrorists, build some schools, turn the power back on and democracy and peaceful development will simply grow beneath our feet. We'll be home by Christmas. Think I heard this story before, but since it has been over a decade now (I know, hard to believe), and of course we don't have lessoned learned, only lessons observed.

The other analysts are more reasonable and simply point out the U.S. is tired, which may or may not be true, but hopefully we're wiser too. I'll pick my military expert and it's the Chairman.

[davidbfpo]

A short podcast by Professor Scott Lucas, who drives the blogsite 'Enduring America'; listen, don't watch:http://eaworldview.com/2013/08/syria-video-analysis-why-are-the-islamists-winning-a-3-point-guide/


One of the prevailing narratives in the Syrian conflict is that Islamist factions are “winning” within the insurgency.....Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and the Islamic State of Iraq have claimed a significant presence in the opposition’s fight against the Assad regime, often clashing with other elements of the insurgency.

How have they done this?

Religion, Weapons and Organisation

[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note

This was a stand-alone thread, but today was merged into the main Syria thread. A caption has been added to each post in case they appear out of sequence (ends).


Today there are a number of reports that chemical weapons (CW) have been used in suburbs of Damascus, by the Bashir regime, known as rebel strongholds, specifically Eastern Ghouta. First a backgrounder, 36 pages, published in June 2013, by an acknowledged British academic expert via a German TV website:http://www.wdr.de/tv/monitor/sendungen/2013/0704/pdf/HSPOP_4_1.pdf

Yes the report has important caveats and takes time to read. It also refers to the external, mainly Western declaration of the use of CW as a political 'red line', which today is very, very blurred. Two passages struck me:
Two tentative conclusions are drawn. One is that the several governments which have explicitly accused the Syrian regime of using sarin nerve-gas against the rebels seem to be withholding evidence that, if disclosed, might make their charges more believable than they are. The gap in disclosure is not so much intelligence from sensitive sources or methods but is instead straightforward description for scientific audiences of the procedures that have been used for analysing physiological and environmental samples. The second conclusion is that, if the allegations are true, Syria is engaged in a form of chemical warfare whose purpose and therefore methods (small scale, pinpoint targeting, disabling) are at variance with concepts underpinning the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention

Much later:
The truth of the matter is nowhere near established yet. The present paper has shown that the reporting leaves far too many questions unanswered, and the possible dependence of at least some of the reporting on misunderstanding or on planted evidence cannot be excluded.

The second is a link to a compilation of ninety-six videos by Brown Moses; which a BBC reporter on Radio 4 says is unprecedented and wonders why CW is used when the UN inspection team is only ten miles away! I have not viewed any of them:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GUGrW-SjjbU&list=PLPC0Udeof3T4NORTjYmPoNCHn2vCByvYG&index=1

Yes the existing main thread on Syria 'Syria under Bashir Assad: crumbling now?' has covered CW before, but today's reported attack warrants a new thread. Has the previous, small-scale use of CW weakened the declaration of a 'red line' as it is not WMD?

Truly a small, bloody war with new implications today far beyond Syria.

[carl]

I don't know about the rest of the world, but we will do nothing. Nothing at all. We seem to specialize in bluff and clever rationalizations about how we didn't really have our bluff called. Those are double tough guys in Syria. They got us figured and will proceed accordingly.

[davidbfpo]

Carl,

It appears your fears and viewpoint is echoed in Australia, taken from the Lowy Institute's blog:
Three possibilities exist as to why an event such as this may have occurred at precisely this time:

1) The Assad regime is sending a message that it doesn't care about the international community and is deliberately thumbing its nose at the UN inspectors in order illustrate the UN's impotence.

2) A Syrian army local-area commander had conducted an attack without reference to higher command because he doesn't care or in the hope that the opposition will be fingered for blame.

3) The opposition (whichever sub-element) has carried out the strike to coincide with the UN inspection team's presence in order to blame the Assad regime, garner further international support and prod the West into taking more decisive action against Assad or in favour of the opposition.

And of course there is always the possibility that it never happened as described, or that the reports refer to an incident(s) that happened some time ago.

It's terrible to think that we cannot automatically apportion blame for an event of such cruelty and horror, or that the event didn't occur as described and is being used for people's own political purposes. Such are the depths to which the credibility of protagonists in the Syrian civil war have plunged that even a chemical weapons attack is open to interpretation.

Link:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/08/22/Syria-Where-even-chemical-weapons-attacks-arent-clear-cut.aspx

[davidbfpo]

The allegations of chemical weapons use this week in Damascus is currently on a separate thread: Syria: has a 'red line' been crossed?

Below are a number of recent articles, some go over familiar ground, of note all are very different.

Paul Rogers assessment:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/syria-turning-war

In a rare report Michael Weiss, previously known as a young London neo-con activist, covers what is happening in Southern Syria, which is clearly from a Jordanian viewing platform. Unlike Paul Rogers he states the secular rebels can or are making progress:http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/08/22/why_syrias_southern_front_should_give_the_west_hop e_105391.html

Mindful of Carl's gripe elsewhere this article is valuable, it actually provides a plan for the USA with the 'wicked problem' of Syria:http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/plan-syria-8924

[Dayuhan]

Fascinating! I'm waiting for Paul Wolfowitzless to resurface somewhere and testify there is no ethnic tension in Syria and everything will be O.K.. Then I know we'll have a very positive outcome for a limited expenditure of resources. Grab your guns and CERP boys, let's go! We'll go kill some terrorists, build some schools, turn the power back on and democracy and peaceful development will simply grow beneath our feet. We'll be home by Christmas. Think I heard this story before, but since it has been over a decade now (I know, hard to believe), and of course we don't have lessoned learned, only lessons observed.

Maybe Michael Ledeen can resurface with a group of Syrian exiles who will make everything alright if we just give them lots of money and put them in power. We'll call them, let's see... the Syrian National Congress?

[TheCurmudgeon]

So now things should move to the UN where the use of Chemical Weapons is generally considered the kind of thing you do at home behind closed doors but not outside where the kids can see.

Russia is at least willing to support inspectors. China not so much (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/us-talks-syria-chemical-weapons-use-allegations):


On Wednesday, the security council expressed "strong concern" and called for more "clarity" on the use of chemical weapons, but Russia and China insisted on the watering down of a tougher approach backed by the US, UK, France and 32 other governments that called on the UN investigative team already in Damascus to be allowed immediate access to the site of the attack, and to be granted greater latitude by the Syrian government to carry out their enquiries.

Red Lines, they are not just for America anymore ... ?

Meanwhile, the Israeli press (http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542849)is more skeptical.


Steve Johnson, a leading researcher on the effects of hazardous material exposure at England's Cranfield University who has worked with Britain's Ministry of Defense on chemical warfare issues, agrees that "from the details we have seen so far, a large number of casualties over a wide area would mean quite a pervasive dispersal. With that level of chemical agent, you would expect to see a lot of contamination on the casualties coming in ,and it would affect those treating them who are not properly protected. We are not seeing that here."

Additional questions also remain unanswered, especially regarding the timing of the attack, being that it occurred on the exact same day that a team of UN inspectors was in Damascus to investigate earlier claims of chemical weapons use. It is also unclear what tactical goal the Syrian army would have been trying to achieve, when over the last few weeks it has managed to push back the rebels who were encroaching on central areas of the capital. But if this was not a chemical weapons attack, what then caused the deaths of so many people without any external signs of trauma?

"One alternative is that a large concentration of riot control agents were used here, which could have caused suffocation of large numbers of people who were pressed together in a bunker or underground shelter," says Gwyn Winfield, a veteran researcher and editor of CBRNe World, a professional journal the effects of chemical, biological and nuclear warfare. While riot-control substances, mainly various types of tear gas, are usually deployed in small quantities using hand-grenades, they can be used in much larger quantities in artillery shells or even dropped in barrels from aircraft as the U.S. Army did in Vietnam, trying to flush the Vietcong out of its underground bunkers. In large concentrations, these substances can cause suffocation, especially in closed spaces where many of the Syrian families would have been hiding from the bombing.


Of course, now there are lots of casualties. None-the-less there seemed to be an interest on the part of the Israeli Defense Minister to not get involved. Not really sure that much more than prolonged discussion will occur.

[SWJ Blog]

Cordesman on Syria and U.S. Options (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cordesman-on-syria-and-us-options)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cordesman-on-syria-and-us-options) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2013/08/21/syria-rebels-obama-intervention.html

U.S. general's letter says attack options should be limited due to Syria's 'deeply rooted' conflict


"It is a deeply rooted, long-term conflict among multiple factions, and violent struggles for power will continue after Assad's rule ends," Dempsey wrote of Syria's war. "We should evaluate the effectiveness of limited military options in this context."


"The use of U.S. military force can change the military balance," Dempsey added. "But it cannot resolve the underlying and historic ethnic, religious and tribal issues that are fueling this conflict."

[Dayuhan]

The whole "red line" concept seemed like a bad idea from the start, to me. The use or non-use of chemical weapons does not change the basic calculation of intervention. There are still no vital US interests at stake. There's still no local partner we'd be comfortable cooperating with. There's still no clear, achievable, and desirable goal that leaves us a solid exit strategy. The risk of getting sucked into another quagmire remains high... but we've declared a "red line". So, if this turns out to be what it's said to be (and it's certainly not clear yet) do we go and shoot ourselves in the putz because our "red line" was crossed? Or do we just shoot off a bunch of cruise missiles and say we did something?

Never saw the point in boxing yourself into a corner.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I heard one commentator mention that any time you use a "red line" threat you may sound like you are being tough but you are actually shifting control to the other party. Now he has control over your actions and you have been boxed into a corner. You must act or you appear weak.

[jcustis]

And I've heard a commentator make the statement that the administration focus on WMD use is fairly hollow when juxtaposed against then tens of thousand of people apparently killed by conventional munitions. Even with the current videos, how many hundreds more times have we seen where post-artillery or -airstrike footage has shown similar deaths?

Why does the killing of 1,000 weigh more heavily than the slower grind of 10,000 deaths at the hand of the Syrian government?

And yes, outside of the Syrian conflict spinning off a multitude of other destabilizing conditions for the region, US national interests are not as direct as other places. Choking, blister, and nerve agents = bad, but employing military grade munitions poses a set of employment challenges that I'm not quite sure your run-of-the mill terrorist could surmount. They'll likely look at other resources.

It's like our white knuckle reaction about proliferation of man-portable surface to air missiles. Iraq was awash in SA-7 thru -18 missiles when we invaded, and we weren't directed to focus on them any more than other munitions. Has a SAM taken down a airliner in the intervening 10 years?

Furthermore, any Poli Sci grad worth their salt could tell the President that hollow threats are no bueno. He needs to fire his advisors and bring in some folks with a traditional international relations background, who are going to follow the massive body of knowledge that tells us you should not make hollow threats.

I am at least glad that the administration is not inclined to dance to the beat of Senator McCain's war drum.

[davidbfpo]

Jon,

On the main thread for Syria I posted a link to an actual plan. Amidst that was the following passage, the plan was written before the latest report of CW use:
Prepare war crimes prosecutions now—Just as U.S. forces in Iraq circulated a deck of cards identifying top regime figures, the United States and its partners should develop a working list of Syrian key regime officials, with categories of ‘target’, ‘subject’ and ‘witness’ related to personal responsibility for the wilful destruction of civilians and the use of chemical weapons. Rather than presuming indictment, this exercise should be an inducement for departure and defection of the civilian and security circle around Assad. People who abandon the regime and help the opposition should do so in expectation of separating themselves from otherwise certain culpability for crimes against humanity. Indeed, this enforcement mechanism for violation of international norms, rather than military action, should have been the administration’s tool of choice in setting the Presidential 'red line' on chemical weapons use.

Link:http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/plan-syria-8924

That is the minimum that can be done now IMHO. I am not convinced the UN will take this course, so a coalition of the willing is needed and with as many regional contributors as possible. If the terms of reference are to prosecute all parties involved, just perhaps Iran would join - after all they suffered from Iraqi use of CW awhile ago.

[carl]

It's like our white knuckle reaction about proliferation of man-portable surface to air missiles. Iraq was awash in SA-7 thru -18 missiles when we invaded, and we weren't directed to focus on them any more than other munitions. Has a SAM taken down a airliner in the intervening 10 years?

I would be a little careful with statements like that. There are missiles and there are missiles and some are pretty bad, or pretty good depending upon your point of view. There are SA-24s about now and those are very lethal. If no airliner has been shot down in the last 10 years it is because nobody has wanted to shoot down an airliner, at least in countries awash with shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles.

[carl]

Anthony Cordesman makes the argument that there may be just as many disadvantages to doing nothing, as we are mostly doing now, as there are disadvantages to doing more, only nobody is talking much about the disadvantages of doing nothing. Among the disadvantages are, the dying of innocents goes on bigger, better and longer. If Bashir wins and regains the whole country, there may be an Iranian dominated arc running from the Iranian plateau to the Mediterranean Sea. That might not be good. The country may be split, with Bashir holding a part and the insurgents holding a part. As time goes on now, the wild eyed Islamist killers dominate the insurgent ranks more and more. That is not good. And finally the insurgents may win somehow. The might be worst of all, a Syria run by wild eyed takfiri killers. Then again if we were to try and do something, given the character of our leadership, it would be tentative and fearful, a "follow me boys, sort of, if things look good but only for a bit and we must be prepared to run away" type of thing. Not so good is that.

[jcustis]

It's thread drift, but that's part of my point; no one really wants to. I'm sure there have been plenty of attempts and grand designs on the part of terrorists, but deploying/employing a MANPAD is not a lowest common denominator task.

Downing an airliner might be a horrific, most dangerous event, but it's not the most likely. That's why the obsession with countering a SAM seems misplaced. Perhaps it is just media hype.

I can't imagine anyone has studied it, but I wouldn't be surprised if a SA- variant (no matter the capability of the seaker head) couldn't damage a modern twin-engine jet enough to "bring it down". Single-engine fighters are a different proposition.

[jcustis]

Cordesman's analysis that if Assad remains in power, he will be worse of a boogeyman for Israel, is odd.

There isn't a lot in the historical record to support that, so it makes me wonder if he overstates the influence of that other regional boogeyman, Iran.

Anyone know Cordesman's position on countering or containing Iran? There may be a link.

[carl]

An A-300 was hit in 2003 by one or two of the much less capable missiles. It was God's own miracle that airplane made it onto the ground. The crew controlled it strictly with engine thrust. You have no idea how hard that is. Those guys are gods.

Two Viscounts were shot down in what was then Rhodesia by SA-7s. A TU-154 was shot down in 1993. And on and on.

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/news-summary-civilian-planes-shot-down-manpads

There is plenty of empirical evidence that shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles can kill large civil aircraft.

Those things, even the relatively primitive ones like the SA-7 and SA-7B are deadly to civil aircraft that have no defensive systems. Why the insurgents didn't kill a Gryphon flight or two I don't know, maybe they got a cut of the revenue. But they could have any time they wanted to.

[carl]

Cordesman's analysis that if Assad remains in power, he will be worse of a boogeyman for Israel, is odd.

Not so odd maybe. If Bashir survives to a large extent it will be because Iran and Hez saved him. If he wants to keep that help coming, he may have to give something back when the time comes.

[Madhu]

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2013/08/21/syria-rebels-obama-intervention.html

U.S. general's letter says attack options should be limited due to Syria's 'deeply rooted' conflict

He's got it right on the deeply rooted nature of the conflict and the three dimensional chess game of competing interests, all of which would like to use our military and our money to accomplish their goals.

What's this?

http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Pentagon-moves-ships-toward-Syria-as-US-weighs-military-options-324097

PS: GEN Mattis in his Aspen talk mentioned that he'd never seen refugees as traumatized as the Syrian refugees. This three dimensional chess game between competing Mid East interests doesn't care at all about the Syrian people, not the innocents suffering. And so many that say they are concerned turn their attention first to military matters over increasing humanitarian support to the refugees and those caring for them. Humanitarianism is now equated with no-fly zones as a first impulse. I get the impulse, can't deliver goods to war torn areas but there are refugees we CAN get at, so why isn't the main humanitarian impulse there?

[carl]

Mindful of Carl's gripe elsewhere this article is valuable, it actually provides a plan for the USA with the 'wicked problem' of Syria:http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/plan-syria-8924

David:

I read it and it seems a very good plan with some very imaginative ideas. There are a couple of glaring weaknesses though.

The first is it talks of aiding the opposition. I don't think aiding an amorphous 'opposition' is going to cut it. We would have to pick a side and back it, really back it and drive it and influence it. And if they didn't meet the standard, change it or pick another side. That is a hard thing that will take a determined heart.

Second, the takfiri killers will be an enemy at the end as much as Bashir is. If they were to win it would be quite bad, quite bad. Any kind of plan should acknowledge this. Those guys are not going to go away without a fight.

Third, the plan should come out and say, straight, that Bashir will die. No life for you. You could tie that in with some of the other aspects of the plan as written. Something along the lines of 'Bashir is dead and you don't want to be close when he goes. Nice is nice this time of year.' Following from that direct efforts to kill the man himself if the opportunity presents itself should be part of the plan.

To me, the plan is good but it is still a bit tentative if it doesn't recognize the above three things.

One thing that we need to keep in mind about the general situation is the Iranians and the takfiri killers are trying like hell to get things to go in a certain way. We would not like at all that way. It would be very unpleasant for us. Those two groups don't have much in the way of material resources but they have very determined and hard hearts and they will not be dissuaded by words or good intentions.

[jcustis]

I knew of the Viscounts, but neither they or the TU-154 are modern designs though.

I get where you are coming from, but still believe the fear of a SAM is somewhat misplaced.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Anthony Cordesman makes the argument that there may be just as many disadvantages to doing nothing, as we are mostly doing now, as there are disadvantages to doing more, only nobody is talking much about the disadvantages of doing nothing. Among the disadvantages are, the dying of innocents goes on bigger, better and longer. If Bashir wins and regains the whole country, there may be an Iranian dominated arc running from the Iranian plateau to the Mediterranean Sea. That might not be good. The country may be split, with Bashir holding a part and the insurgents holding a part. As time goes on now, the wild eyed Islamist killers dominate the insurgent ranks more and more. That is not good. And finally the insurgents may win somehow. The might be worst of all, a Syria run by wild eyed takfiri killers. Then again if we were to try and do something, given the character of our leadership, it would be tentative and fearful, a "follow me boys, sort of, if things look good but only for a bit and we must be prepared to run away" type of thing. Not so good is that.

There are other disadvantages, but they are rarely considered. The long term implications of sectarian violence is that it can be used to justify retribution at a later date anywhere in the world. Using the popular argument that the purpose of war is to make a better peace, sometimes you have to actually engage in war if you want that better peace.

Not that I am interested in jumping in, but I think we have a tendency to only look at the short term when - a trait of the corporate culture that only looks at profits to be gained in the next quarter (or next election) to make decisions.

[carl]

I knew of the Viscounts, but neither they or the TU-154 are modern designs though.

I get where you are coming from, but still believe the fear of a SAM is somewhat misplaced.


Modern designs are built lighter in general than old planes. They didn't know as much about strength of materials in the old days so they tended to over build, the DC-3 being a case in point. And Russian airplanes, well, they're Russian, like the IL-76 that was downed in Mogadishu in 2003. For civil aircraft, fear of shoulder fired SAMs is not misplaced. Civil airplanes just are not built to withstand the effects of a pound or so of explosives blowing up here or there. It a roll of the dice whether the aircraft lives or dies. They are a very big deal to civil airplanes.

[jmm99]

Jack has spawned two decent pieces on the legal issues regarding US intervention in Syria (air strikes & cruise missiles seem the latest leaked plan (http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/23/world/meast/us-syria-military-options/index.html)), How Administration Lawyers Are Probably Thinking About the Constitutionality of the Syria Intervention (And A Note on the Domestic Political Dangers of Intervention) (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/how-administration-lawyers-are-probably-thinking-about-the-constitutionality-of-the-syria-intervention-and-a-note-on-the-domestic-political-dangers-of-intervention/) (by Jack Goldsmith, August 24, 2013); and The Kosovo Precedent for Syria Isn’t Much of a Precedent (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/the-kosovo-precedent-for-syria-isnt-much-of-a-precedent/) (by Jack Goldsmith, August 24, 2013).

IMO: One can construct a legal argument for intervention proving that it's justifed under the Constitution, domestic law and international law - as well as tossing in morals, ethics, "just war theory", and the family cat and dog. One can also construct a legal argument against intervention using the same subheadings.

Thus, as Jack said in the first piece,


Will any of these legal issues matter to the decision to intervene in Syria? Probably not at first ...

Since legalities are not of great materiality (at least ab initio), Jack sees a more important set of questions (and I concur):


The much harder question is the other prong: What is the important national interest in intervening in Syria? No U.S. persons or property are at stake. That fact alone distinguishes most executive branch precedents.

In the Libya opinion, OLC argued that the “credibility and effectiveness” of a Security Council Resolution gives rise to an important national security interest. This is a stretch considered by itself – but in any event, there is no Security Council resolution for Syria.

Nor can OLC even invoke the “credibility and effectiveness” of a regional organization in which the USG participates (such as NATO, in Kosovo) as giving rise to an important interest that would justify the President’s use of military force.

That leaves the weakest of all interests: preservation of “regional stability” and maintenance of “peace and stability.” These interests will of course always be present when the President is considering intervention, and thus by themselves are no limit on presidential power at all.

Such interests were invoked in Libya and in earlier OLC opinions, but they were always invoked in connection with other factors (such as the consent of the nation in question) or other interests (such as the protection of U.S. persons or property, or the preservation of the U.N. Charter or a regional security treaty commitment), and never as sufficient by themselves.

To the all-important national interest question set, Amb. Bloomfield argues:


For the United States, Syria has long held strategic importance. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, President Nixon escalated the nuclear-alert level to DEFCON 3 to deter Moscow from sending Soviet troops to bolster Syrian forces fighting against Israel; Moscow was deterred. During President Reagan's intervention of U.S. Marines along with French, Italian and British forces seeking to stabilize Beirut after Israel's 1982 incursion against the PLO, Syria served as a staging ground for young Iranian fighters sent into Lebanon's Bekaa Valley to arm and train Shiite Lebanese members of the new militant Hezbollah organization, which then launched catastrophic truck-bombing attacks on U.S. diplomats and Marines in Lebanon. Kissinger's famous dictum, "No war without Egypt, no peace without Syria," is surely no less true now that Syria is engulfed in sectarian conflict.

These examples are weak tea - or somewhat nutty in the present context. Do we really want to threaten Putin with nuclear war - over Syria ?

What did Reagan do after the barracks bombing ? He concluded that Middle East politics were a nuthouse and drew back from direct overt involvement.

Finally, if Kissenger's dictum (famous or infamous) has any validity, the US will have to go to war without Egypt because right now that country has enough problems to deal with.

What Bloomfield's arguments boil down to are two points of preservation of “regional stability” and maintenance of “peace and stability”, as exemplified by his initial paragraphs:


In recent years Pentagon contingency planners have imported, from social science, the concept of the “wicked” problem—that theoretical future security crisis that defies solution. Today that future security crisis is here, and its name is Syria. How important is the eventual denouement of this catastrophic civil war? Apparently, important enough to draw major security responses from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Qatar, Shiite Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon and Sunni militant Islamists from across the Arab world.

Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan face major humanitarian relief burdens for displaced Syrian civilians, fleeing at a rate of more than five thousand per day. Iraq’s tenuous internal cohesion is being stressed by the sectarian breakup next door. France and Britain are exerting what leverage they can in domains they once controlled. Israel—after decades of fending off conventional and nuclear dangers from the regimes of Hafez al Assad and his son Bashar—now must contemplate a future northern neighbor in which Hezbollah may be further strengthened, a vengeful Sunni Muslim Brotherhood could vie for power long denied by the Alawite regime, and even jihadist Jabhat Al Nusra fighters from across the Arab world will seek a new operational base.

This argument does prove that a dozen or so countries (and any number of "groups") have expressed interest in this problem - whether "wicked" or not - by intervening directly or indirectly. So, let them solve the problem - or not solve the problem. It seems entirely plausible to me that most of Syria will end up as a parking lot. If so, I can live with that on my conscience.

Regards

Mike

[jcustis]

There are other disadvantages, but they are rarely considered. The long term implications of sectarian violence is that it can be used to justify retribution at a later date anywhere in the world. Using the popular argument that the purpose of war is to make a better peace, sometimes you have to actually engage in war if you want that better peace.

Not that I am interested in jumping in, but I think we have a tendency to only look at the short term when - a trait of the corporate culture that only looks at profits to be gained in the next quarter (or next election) to make decisions.

You bring up a great point about the long term.

Before we even begin to think about the relatively narrow matter of actually intervening in Syria of 2013 or 2014, we need to figure out if we are willing to own that problem for 5, 10, 15 years. On top of that, how far are we willing to go to keep other malign actors out of the chaos to ensue?

[jmm99]

Her current piece is The Value of Kosovo as a Non-Legal Precedent (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/the-value-of-kosovo-as-a-non-legal-precedent/) (by Ashley Deeks, August 24, 2013). She references a current NYT article, Air War in Kosovo Seen as Precedent in Possible Response to Syria Chemical Attack (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/world/air-war-in-kosovo-seen-as-precedent-in-possible-response-to-syria-chemical-attack.html?hp&_r=1&) (August 23, 2013); and her own 2012 post, Syria, Chemical Weapons, and Possible U.S. Military Action (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/12/syria-chemical-weapons-and-possible-u-s-military-action/) (by Ashley Deeks, December 10, 2012). That 2012 post outlines possible policy and legal arguments that the Obama NSC team might make to support US military action if Syria uses or threatens to use chemical weapons.

Her post today refines what the "Kosovo" argument is - and what it is not. First off, Kosovo is not a good legal precendent - she agrees with Goldsmith on that:


Jack’s post makes the point that the Kosovo precedent won’t get the U.S. government very far if it is looking for a solid international legal precedent for intervention in Syria. That seems absolutely right. But it also seems worth asking: if Kosovo isn’t a good legal precedent for Syria, how good a precedent is it in the policy, practical, and moral realms? Should the U.S. government cite Kosovo as a precedent at all?

Here is the "Kosovo" argument in a Deeks nutshell:


Enter Kosovo. The NYT today [link above] identifies that the Obama Administration is looking to the 1999 Kosovo air war as precedent for action in Syria. As many readers will recall (and as I discussed briefly here [link above]), virtually none of the NATO states that participated in the Kosovo bombings offered legal justifications for their actions. Instead, their diplomats explained why their actions were legitimate as a moral and policy matter.

This is known in some corners as the “factors” approach, the idea being that there was an unusual confluence of factors that made it imperative for NATO to intervene, but those factors were so many and so distinct that it would be difficult for states in the future to claim Kosovo as a precedent for actions seen as less desirable by the international community writ large.

The clearest statement of the factors that the U.S. found relevant in the Kosovo context can be found in a March 23, 1999 press statement by State Department spokesperson Jamie Rubin (preserved here (http://www.hri.org/news/usa/std/1999/99-03-23.std.html)). Here is the core defense of the U.S.’s role in NATO action in Kosovo ...

And here is the Deeks crystal ball:


Fast forward to Syria. A number of the Kosovo factors have clear parallels in the Syria context: serious refugee flows; the likelihood of destabilizing the region further (see Lebanon); a (likely) multi-lateral coalition supporting action; general disregard for (soft) UN Security Council Resolutions; and serious, widespread violations of international law. Some of the Kosovo factors don’t resonate (no peace agreements; the coalition that would act is not from the same geographic region in which the humanitarian crisis is taking place). But the United Nations now has what looks like pretty conclusive evidence that Assad’s regime has used chemical weapons – a factor absent in Kosovo but critical in the Syria factors column for sure.

Though the Times quotes a senior Administration official as saying, “It’s a step too far to say we’re drawing up legal justifications for an action, given that the president hasn’t made a decision,” that doesn’t actually ring true. Either the speaker was hinting at the fact that the U.S. justifications for using force in Syria are unlikely to be legal ones, or the official is being coy. Dollars to donuts says that State, Defense, Justice, and NSC lawyers are hard at work, maybe in conversations with close NATO allies, drawing on the Kosovo non-precedent precedent to shape the argument that intervention in Syria is legitimate, if not lawful.

It would not surprise me if missiles fly soon in a non-war war by a "coalition of the pi$$ed" - to borrow a Gabriella Blum term. President Obama is in something of a corner; and my mind says he is not a person who backs down readily from a moral position he has expressed. I don't like that COA, but it "feels" likely to me.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Carl suggests the following is a good strategy, I think it is a loony tunes strategy.

http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/plan-syria-8924


All lines of effort among U.S. agencies, and preferably those of cooperating allies as well, are tailored in support of clear policy goals:

A) Assad and circle removed from power;

This would be relatively simple, just as removing the Taliban and Saddam were, but the morning after will present problems we can't simply wish away.


B) Political process aimed at stabilizing conflict and protecting all communities’ interests;

With no more to go on than this, it appears to be nothing more than a dream. Who exactly would have the legitimacy to lead this political process with all parties concerns? Why would they negotiate if they believe they can achieve more of what they want through violence? Since Syria is already a proxy war for a number of states, why does the author think they'll suddenly push their proxies to cooperate with a U.S. or UN led effort to reach a political agreement that frankly won't be in their best interests.


C) Impose maximum political/reputational costs on Iran, Hezbollah, and Sunni extremists, and seek to deny them influence in post-Assad Syria;

Political costs on Sunni extremists? Having we been waging war against Sunni extremism for the past decade which includes imposing maximum political costs on them? What are we going to do? I suspect we'll hear some State Department representative publically say we seriously oppose this behavior and are initiating sanctions? What more pressure are going to put on Iran? Why wouldn't this pressure force coalitions to form that oppose our mandates?


D) Maintain constant attention to security equities of Jordan, Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq;

O.K. I'm beginning to see, we're going to work an agreement between the numerous warring parties as long as they address the security equities of the above listed countries. We assume we can ignore Russia, Iran, and others, or that they'll ignore our peace making efforts.


E) Seek maximum coordination, unity and mandate between the United States and like-minded countries for their mutual efforts toward these ends.

Seems we're already done that, and Iran, Russia and others are seeking maximum coordination with like-minded countries.

Sorry, but none of these proposed ways are likely to work. If we need to employ the military to accomplish a specific task or tasks, or even launch a punitive strike to deter Assayd from using more chemical weapons (if he in fact used them) that would be limited and feasible military task (no guarantee it will work).

[jcustis]

I dislike the author's presumption that Iran and Hezbollah would somehow be weakened if the US were to become involved and take the lead. It'ss a broad, sweeping statement, but it has no depth and frankly very little basis in reality.

I am slowly coming to appreciate that the hawks are using the same buzzwords: militant jihadists; crime of the 21st Century; Iran; Assad = blood dripping from fangs killer. The list goes on, but I think the affliction of narrow-sightedness remains consistent, and the belief that this will work itself out in the end because the US steps in, has this uncanny way of resonating over and over.

If the use of force is decided upon, the first jets to break the border need to be Turkish, Jordanian, and Saudi. Think of the coalition-building coup if Israel has a hand in it too. I know, an alliance with the Jews seems far-fetched, but if they are already getting in league with the Americans... As we strive to build partner capacity and strengthen regional relationships, we need to get a coalition formed and involve the neighbors. If they cannot be convinced, co-opted, or coerced into taking on a task that affects their security, then it isn't a task worth doing and we need to settle on other measures that don't result in the expense of deploying forces, nor the direct risk to a single servicemember.

The US needs to be ready for an Iranian counter move in the Gulf. Perhaps it will be an IRBM launched at Doha. Maybe the IRG will seed tethered mines in the chokepoint. Something cloak-and-dagger across the border in Afghanistan seems more likely. The point is the US needs to be ready to take on not only Assad, but every actor aligned with him. If the US fails to accomodate ffor those actors in any use of force, things will be screwed up from the start. Perhaps--just perhaps--the administration is planning better than ever before, and not just "pondering". I can think of a couple dozen other issues that are at stake through intervention in Syria (e.g. attacks on Israel, terrorism at home, etc.) that must be thought through before someone decides stepping in is really, really, really in the US interest.

When the Council was established, the US was already involved in Afghanistan and Iraq. It's remarkable that we've seen intervention in Libya since then, and we are now seeing the US stare down the ledge once again.

[carl]

Bill:

I said I liked the plan but it did have some weaknesses, glaring ones. Those weaknesses I mentioned are some of the same ones you cited.

As far as the opposition goes , well...they're the opposition and will oppose it.

The plan is not solely military. There are a number of non-military aspects to it and none of the individual aspects of the plan or the plan as a whole may work. It's a plan, not a guarantee. But it seems like a good starting point if it is decided that we should try to do more than stand and watch.

[Bill Moore]

Bill:

I said I liked the plan but it did have some weaknesses, glaring ones. Those weaknesses I mentioned are some of the same ones you cited.

As far as the opposition goes , well...they're the opposition and will oppose it.

The plan is not solely military. There are a number of non-military aspects to it and none of the individual aspects of the plan or the plan as a whole may work. It's a plan, not a guarantee. But it seems like a good starting point if it is decided that we should try to do more than stand and watch.

Carl,

First I'm not opposed to acting if our leadership believes it is in our national interests to do so. Those interests may not be directly related to our security, but a larger strategic interest of sustaining U.S. leadership.

My concern is that most of what the author proposed with the possible exception of A has been in the works for over a year.

It also seems many of his aspirations are based on assessing the situation, the world in general, as we desire it to be, rather than the way it really is.

Lets just hope we learned a lot from our mistakes with Iraq.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/25/us-syria-crisis-idUSBRE97K0EL20130825


Reuters) - A U.S. military response to alleged chemical weapons attacks in Syria appeared more likely on Sunday after Washington dismissed the Syrian government's offer to allow U.N. inspection of the sites as "too late to be credible."

[Dayuhan]

First I'm not opposed to acting if our leadership believes it is in our national interests to do so. Those interests may not be directly related to our security, but a larger strategic interest of sustaining U.S. leadership.

I'd be very nervous about arguments for intervention based solely or largely on a hypothetical need to exercise leadership. If "leadership" means expending blood and treasure and wading into situations without clear, practical, and achievable goals, to hell with it. If "leadership" means appointing ourselves as global police force, to hell with it. Draining our resources, strength and money to no clear and necessary purpose is a far greater risk than losing status as global leader... a status which has not gained a great deal for us in the past.

In the cited plan, this:


B) Political process aimed at stabilizing conflict and protecting all communities’ interests;


seems a major sticking point. It is simply not a practical goal. We have no means to achieve it and it seems aspirational at best, though I'd be more inclined to use the word "fantasy". Whether Assad wins or loses, Syria will be an unholy mess for a long time to come. The question for us is whether it should be our mess.

[jmm99]

as to the President, we really will have to wait and see. From Bill Moore's cited Reuters article:


Obama has been reluctant to intervene in Syria's 2-1/2-year-old conflict and U.S. officials stressed that he has yet to make a decision on how to respond. A senior senator, Republican Bob Corker, said on Sunday he believed Obama would ask Congress for authorization to use force when lawmakers return from summer recess next month.

To be clear upfront, I'd vote against the "2013 Syrian AUMF".

However, I haven't a clue about what Congress would do if given that AUMF. But, I can't think of an "AUMF" that was voted down when initially requested by a President. Yes, the Gulf of Tonkin AUMF was revoked, but years after the event.

So, my feeling that missiles will fly is still there. The unanswered question is whether we'll see unilateral Presidential action during the Congressional recess ? Or, joint Presidential-Congressional action after Congress returns ? In either case, alia jacta est.

The issues become (and the political temptations will tease), after tossing some missiles and air strikes at Assad: (1) do you remove the "bad guys" from power by serious and costly warfare ?; and, if so, (2) do you then engage in equally serious and even more costly state building to assure that the "good guys" hold onto power ?

And, of course, who in hell (Syria) are the good guys and who are the bad guys ?

So, I believe, it's heading - Lessons Learned ? I doubt it.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

This morning's lede article on Lawfare by Jack Goldsmith, General Dempsey on Syria Intervention (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/general-dempsey-on-syria-intervention/):


As at least some form of minimal military intervention in Syria now looks likely, it is worth reading carefully the letter that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey sent last Monday to Representative Eliot Engel. The letter includes this passage:


[T]here are certainly actions short of tipping the balance of the conflict [in Syria] that could impose a cost on them for unacceptable behavior. We can destroy the Syrian Air Force. The loss of Assad’s Air Force would negate his ability to attack opposition forces from the air, but it would also escalate and potentially further commit the United States to the conflict. Stated another way, it would not be militarily decisive, but it would commit us decisively to the conflict. In a variety of ways, the use of US military force can change the military balance, but it cannot resolve the underlying and historic ethnic, religious, and tribal issues that are fueling this conflict.

Syria today is not about choosing between two sides but rather about choosing one among many sides. It is my belief that the side we choose must be ready to promote their interests and ours when the balance shifts in their favor. Today, they are not. The crisis in Syria is tragic and complex. It is a deeply rooted, long-term conflict among multiple factions, and violent struggles for power will continue after Assad’s rule ends. We should evaluate the effectiveness of limited military options in this context.

From two days ago, we have Bill Moore, A voice of reason (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=148676&postcount=255). So, HT to Bill; and SWC: getting there firstest with the mostest. :)

-------------------------------------
One article and two videos from Fox - just a quick review of the weekend's events.

As Obama appears closer to Syria response, Congress now urges caution (http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/08/25/administration-now-says-very-little-doubt-assad-used-chemical-weapon-on-syrian/):


U.S. confirmation took more than four months after rebels similarly reported chemical attacks in February, though in this instance a U.N. chemical weapons team is already on the ground in Syria. Assad's government, then as now, has denied the claims as baseless.

I don't see the President waiting for 4 months, unless he decides that no military action should be taken. That would be OK with me, but not likely to be the case.

Is military action inevitable in Syria? (http://video.foxnews.com/v/2628839711001/is-military-action-inevitable-in-syria/?playlist_id=928378949001) (5 min; Homeland Security Committee Chair Rep. McCaul).

Time for the US to intervene in Syria? (http://video.foxnews.com/v/2628286815001/time-for-the-us-to-intervene-in-syria/?playlist_id=928378949001) (13 min.; Sen. Bob Corker and Rep. Eliot Engel).

Regards

Mike

PS: Added for the enjoyment of Carl and all other "the USG is full of hot air" proponents: Judge Jeanine: US gov’t full of nothing but hot air? (http://video.foxnews.com/v/2627341572001/judge-jeanine-us-govt-full-of-nothing-but-hot-air/)

[omarali50]

I am an amateur observer and dont even follow the ME too closely, but it does look like every sane person has the same questions about "what next"; what is the overall strategic objective or plan? Its hard to believe that even an amateur band of leaders would seriously go in just to "exercise leadership". So one assumes they must have some notion of what they want to achieve IN SYRIA beyond winning brownie points (a highly doubtful proposition anyway) in some popularity contest in the American media.
My feeling (and i freely admit that this is not based on direct knowledge) is that American officialdom, the people who would actually do the work in any war, are just not up to the task of being successful imperialists OR worldcops and its better if they dont even try. It didnt work in Afghanistan (where it COULD have with the US holding SO MANY cards, all Dalrymple-type BS about "the graveyard of empires notwithstanding) or in Iraq, why would it work in Syria?
The chairman JCS is right on the money and I am amazed that all this may come to pass in spite of such sage advice.
One can imagine that in the inner circles of whatever is our ruling class, there are such clever plans that we mere mortals should just shut up and let the adults work, but the evidence of the recent past is not reassuring.
But hey, one can always hope.
I could not resist adding: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WdNsltQXTVU

[jmm99]

Timing of the Attack

Here are three sources on timing of the attack, which will be preceded by publication of a public report justifying the attack - presumably with arguments from OLC (Office of Legal Counsel) under international and national law (Responsibility to Protect; and Inherent Executive War Powers).

Exclusive: Syria strike due in days, West tells opposition (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/27/us-syria-crisis-strike-timing-idUSBRE97Q0GY20130827?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&dlvrit=992637) (by Khaled Yacoub Oweis, AMMAN, Aug 27, 2013):


(Reuters) - Western powers have told the Syrian opposition to expect a strike against President Bashar al-Assad's forces within days, according to sources who attended a meeting between envoys and the Syrian National Coalition in Istanbul.

Obama orders release of report justifying Syria strike (http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57600171/obama-orders-release-of-report-justifying-syria-strike) (by Major Garrett, David Martin, August 26, 2013):


(CBS News) President Barack Obama called his national security team together Saturday to talk about the next move in Syria. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper led off the three-hour White House meeting with detailed analysis of the evidence about the chemical weapons attack, the disposition of victims and what the administration now believes is a near air-tight circumstantial case that the Syrian regime was behind it.

Obama ordered a declassified report be prepared for public release before any military strike commences. That report, top advisers tell CBS News, is due to be released in a day or two.

US ready to launch Syria strike, says Chuck Hagel (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23847839) (BBC, 27 Aug 2013):


American forces are "ready" to launch strikes on Syria if President Barack Obama chooses to order an attack, US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel says.

"We have moved assets in place to be able to fulfil and comply with whatever option the president wishes to take," Mr Hagel told the BBC.

The Public Pitch

The Obama Administration's main thrust, aimed at the general public, will be as close as they can get to Marlon Brando's performance in Apocalypse Now -

... the Horror, the Horror ... (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aNUr__-VZeQ) (Youtube)

That probably will sell well enough to drum up, at least to begin with, a majority that will agree with the intervention.

The Targets

Logically, the targets would be Syria's chemical weapons facilities - as outlined in Jack Goldsmith's clip, George Friedman on Obama’s Bluff (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/george-friedman-on-obamas-bluff/) (by Jack Goldsmith, August 27, 2013); based on Stratfor's Obama's Bluff (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/obamas-bluff) (by George Friedman, 27 Aug 2013):


The question therefore becomes what the United States and the new coalition of the willing will do if the red line has been crossed. The fantasy is that a series of airstrikes, destroying only chemical weapons, will be so perfectly executed that no one will be killed except those who deserve to die. But it is hard to distinguish a man's soul from 10,000 feet. There will be deaths, and the United States will be blamed for them.

The military dimension is hard to define because the mission is unclear. Logically, the goal should be the destruction of the chemical weapons and their deployment systems. This is reasonable, but the problem is determining the locations where all of the chemicals are stored. I would assume that most are underground, which poses a huge intelligence problem. If we assume that perfect intelligence is available and that decision-makers trust this intelligence, hitting buried targets is quite difficult. There is talk of a clean cruise missile strike. But it is not clear whether these carry enough explosives to penetrate even minimally hardened targets. Aircraft carry more substantial munitions, and it is possible for strategic bombers to stand off and strike the targets.

Even so, battle damage assessments are hard. How do you know that you have destroyed the chemicals -- that they were actually there and you destroyed the facility containing them? Moreover, there are lots of facilities and many will be close to civilian targets and many munitions will go astray. The attacks could prove deadlier than the chemicals did. And finally, attacking means al Assad loses all incentive to hold back on using chemical weapons. If he is paying the price of using them, he may as well use them. The gloves will come off on both sides as al Assad seeks to use his chemical weapons before they are destroyed.

But, and this is a big "but":


A war on chemical weapons has a built-in insanity to it. The problem is not chemical weapons, which probably can't be eradicated from the air. The problem under the definition of this war would be the existence of a regime that uses chemical weapons. It is hard to imagine how an attack on chemical weapons can avoid an attack on the regime -- and regimes are not destroyed from the air. Doing so requires troops. Moreover, regimes that are destroyed must be replaced, and one cannot assume that the regime that succeeds al Assad will be grateful to those who deposed him. One must only recall the Shia in Iraq who celebrated Saddam's fall and then armed to fight the Americans.

The President can no longer bluff; he must deliver something. Since targeting the immediate problem (chemical weapons) has serious pitfalls, and since targeting the ultimate problem (Assad) has even greater pitfalls, the likely targets will be military installations - perhaps, destroying the Syrian Air Force and its Air Defense system (as has been suggested). That would give both "adult" sides (Russia and the US) the opportunity to see how their weapons systems work against each other.

If that happens, will it end there ? We are likely to see how well President Obama resists the political temptation to follow with (1) regime removal and (2) regime change - state building.

Regardless, my little vote is unconditionally negative on all of the above.

Regards

Mike

[SWJ Blog]

Syria Special Issue of the CTC Sentinel (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/syria-special-issue-of-the-ctc-sentinel)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/syria-special-issue-of-the-ctc-sentinel) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Tukhachevskii]

...I, for one, do not understand, why the Syrian government, which has been lobbying for UN inspectors, would then use chemical weapons. I also do not understand how the possible use of said weapons is AUTOMATICALLY Assad's regime's fault. How the hell has that narrative come about let alone been accepted. Apparently, there are also WMD in Iraq. This is all just complete madness. The Americans came up with a post Cold-War strategic narraitve that lumped three areas of strategic concern (to them) together into a coherent strategic narrative that Colin Powell could the offer up to his masters. The Americans have become so blinkered by that narrative (WMD+Rouge states+terroism) that they can't see a course of action which would prevent the forces of global terrorism from gaining a foothold in Syria; back Assad. Now that narrative, whose premises where never logically nor for that matter never coherently linked, is constrining the avaliable options. You know what, this is beginning to sound like a rant. F' it.

T out.

"The evidence so far for the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian army is second-hand and comes from a biased source (http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-evidence-of-chemical-attack-seems-compelling--but-remember--theres-a-propaganda-war-on-8778918.html)"

[jmm99]

NBC News.

Military strikes on Syria 'as early as Thursday,' US officials say (http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/27/20209022-military-strikes-on-syria-as-early-as-thursday-us-officials-say?lite).


Video (10 min.) - NBC News reports that a military strike against Syria could come as early as Thursday. NBC's Jim Miklaszewski, Politico's Rebecca Sinderbrand, The Washington Post's Ed O'Keefe, and Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Calif., discuss.


Hard copy - By Jim Miklaszewski, Catherine Chomiak and Erin McClam, NBC News

The United States could hit Syria with three days of missile strikes, perhaps beginning Thursday, in an attack meant more to send a message to the Syrian regime than to cripple its military, senior U.S. officials told NBC News.

The disclosure added to a growing drumbeat around the world for military action against Syria, believed to have used chemical weapons in recent days against scores of civilians and rebels who have been fighting the government for two years.

In three days of strikes, the Pentagon could assess the effectiveness of the first wave and target what was missed in further rounds, the officials said.

U.S. military options in Syria: A briefing (http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/26/20198664-us-military-options-in-syria-a-briefing?lite).


Video (2 min.) - NBC's Richard Engel reports from the Turkish border that Syrians believe that if the U.S. does not respond with military force to what they believe are chemical attacks against citizens, it will only encourage Bashar al-Assad to strike again.


Hard copy - By Jim Miklaszewski, Courtney Kube and Erin McClam, NBC News

The crisis in Syria deepened Monday as U.N. weapons inspectors, allowed to access the area where an alleged chemical attack occurred last week, were fired on by snipers. As the situation deteriorates, military intervention becomes less of an “if” and more of a “when” — and that task would probably fall to the United States.

Regards

Mike

[graphei]

I was reading earlier today on the AP newswire a Syrian Kurd stated it wouldn't make sense for Assad to use a chem weapon that close to his stronghold. However, it would make perfect sense for rebels to use it on some civilians and point the finger at Assad. We've been saying for months chemical weapons represented a "red line" and hinted force would be used. He certainly made an interesting point. Ultimately, there is no way of knowing who set off that weapon. None. Without that information, I doubt we won't see more out of the UN than a strongly condemnation. I'm sure both Assad and the rebels will quiver in abject terror when they read it.

If Muslim nations take the lead, it may devolve into a sectarian war. Iran is focused on Western interference at the moment, so other Muslims taking the lead will throw a wrench in that. If Turkey and Saudi Arabia take the lead, I would expect to see the rhetoric change- most likely stop- and Syrian Shi'ite militias with new toys and training. It's not like they don't have decades of experience supporting proxies. I don't think boots-on-the-ground is an option for two reasons:
1. It would be political suicide at home.
2. Getting there is mighty tough with Iraq and Turkey in the way.

Extremists will say whatever Muslim country comes to help the other side is a Puppet of the West, so that's about par for the course.

[omarali50]

OK, i know this is a fantasy, but what if the US did nothing? And said "we dont want to do anything in the future either until everyone (and that means EVERYONE on the UNSC if nowhere else) gets on their knees (really, literally on their knees) and begs us to please come and sort out the place because no one else can".
Forget about the Syrian people (whose sufferings will be legendary), what harm will come to the US?
Not a rhetorical question. I am curious to know what the harm of "inaction" and "weak leadership" is supposed to be?

[davidbfpo]

This was the Moderator's Note at start of thread August 2012: The developing situation in Syria is an important strategic issue and SWC has been watching closely. We simply cannot observe only, so this new thread has been started to discuss what is happening now, not what might have happened if there had been external, coercive intervention.

The discussion on the previous thread 'Syria: a civil war' was vibrant for a long time, with over six hundred posts; alas the standard of the exchange repeatedly required Moderator action and it was closed a few days ago.

Link to previous thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=12821 (Ended)

A few minutes ago I merged the recent stand-alone thread 'Syria: has a 'red line' been crossed?' into this thread, as the situation is gathering pace and it appears something will happen. Maybe even a 'small war'. If so a new thread will undoubtedly appear.

[davidbfpo]

The title is taken from a column by James Fallows in The Atlantic. In effect he asks Americans and those in power to ponder upon:
In the face of evil we should do something, except when the something would likely make a bad situation worse.

Link:http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/before-you-conclude-that-precision-bombing-makes-sense-with-syria/279086/

In the UK little mention has been made of the Kosovo air campaign in 1999, unlike what appears via my Twitter feed from the USA. Perhaps PM David Cameron will "sing the same tune" on Thursday, as Parliament has been recalled to debate what next.

Fallows cites a linked article that looks at Kosovo, which has a telling passage:
That the NATO alliance of 780 million people eventually prevailed over Serbia, a country of ten million with a gross domestic product equal to two-thirds that of Fairfax County, Virginia, is hardly a precedent to celebrate, particularly since it proved so spectacularly that the marriage of coercive diplomacy to limited precision bombardment is a colossal failure.

From:http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/08/27/syria-in-the-crosshair/

[Wyatt]

I doubt we really care about chemical weapons use. HE has and will kill many more than any type of gas use at the end of the day. We only need this as a pretext for doing whatever it is we feel like doing.

I personally think intervention is a naive idea and from a selfish perspective, Id rather not fight in mopp gear.

[omarali50]

Tangential to the main issue: I am now old enough to start to notice another interesting pattern. Whenever the US is about to start some damn fool war somewhere, in MY neighborhood, the social media of the day (drawing room conversations in the good old days, now electronic social media) start to accumulate a certain pre-apocalyptic buzz by the day before the bombing. At first its the usual suspects (Tariq Ali fans, damn fools, other fringe elements) but then a lot of reasonably sane people start to think the sky is falling. Seeing it start up again with this Syria thing, I wrote this comment to someone on facebook
The real irony is that nothing new will happen soon enough to make anyone happy (though in the proverbial long run, the enlightenment is always winning). Amrika will waste money and goodwill and kill some people (and get blamed for killing many more) but there will no more Vietnams. Russian and Chinese spokesmen will make some cutting (and popular) remarks. Syrians will die in large numbers from all sorts of causes but very few Americans and even fewer Israelis will die, which will disappoint many people. Surrounding countries will be destabilized but no grand revolutionary victory for the forces of al-Islam or Maoism-Leninism will follow. Dreams of apocalypse and hidden imams will remain dreams. Tariq Ali's soirees will remain popular on college campuses (and his script will remain unchanged and out of touch). Aad sach, jugaad sach. Hai bhi sach, Nanak, hosi bhi sach (from Guru Nanak, paraphrase: truth is the beginning and the end. Nanak, truth is now and truth is all there will be tomorrow).

[91bravojoe]

This experienced observer thinks not:

http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/newsmakers/fears-larger-war-middle-east-180559605.html?vp=1

[Bill Moore]

I was reading earlier today on the AP newswire a Syrian Kurd stated it wouldn't make sense for Assad to use a chem weapon that close to his stronghold. However, it would make perfect sense for rebels to use it on some civilians and point the finger at Assad. We've been saying for months chemical weapons represented a "red line" and hinted force would be used. He certainly made an interesting point. Ultimately, there is no way of knowing who set off that weapon. None. Without that information, I doubt we won't see more out of the UN than a strongly condemnation. I'm sure both Assad and the rebels will quiver in abject terror when they read it.

If Muslim nations take the lead, it may devolve into a sectarian war. Iran is focused on Western interference at the moment, so other Muslims taking the lead will throw a wrench in that. If Turkey and Saudi Arabia take the lead, I would expect to see the rhetoric change- most likely stop- and Syrian Shi'ite militias with new toys and training. It's not like they don't have decades of experience supporting proxies. I don't think boots-on-the-ground is an option for two reasons:
1. It would be political suicide at home.
2. Getting there is mighty tough with Iraq and Turkey in the way.

Extremists will say whatever Muslim country comes to help the other side is a Puppet of the West, so that's about par for the course.

I for one am not certain Assad's forces employed chemical weapons and remain apprehensive we're being played by the more extremist elements of the opposition. Having seen our intelligence community fail repeatedly based on bias sources, and seeing what they want to see, plus our adversaries are more than capable of running their own deception operations. Also think it is possible that Iranian surrogates (Assad's allies) may have done it without Assad's permission for some reason that Iran thinks will support their interests. However the Assad may well have directed it, but why?

Can't help but wonder if this will be another USS Maine, Tonkin Gulf, or WMD in Iraq incident to justify some action.

I have to disagree with your two reasons for not intervening. Turkey isn't in the way, Turkey is no friend of Syria and may well support an intervention. I'm not sure where Iraq stands, but they do seem to be closer to Iran than us at times. However, we have plenty of access through Turkey, Jordan and simply coming across the beach.

It may or may not be a political disaster at home. If it goes bad and we accomplish nothing it will undo all the current administration's previous successes. However, I'm sure that will not influence the decision makers, because they're nation first, and personal interests a distant second. :D

[jcustis]

The fallacy behind a "limited strike" in Syria (and yes, Carney and Kerry and Hagel and Dempsey will call it that--just watch the lips) is that there's nothing "limited" about the Syrian problem.

No matter the first kinetic step taken, the US immediately assumes a significant problem set. I am not so sure we have enough apolitical talent to deal with the genie that some seem hell bent on letting out of the bottle. We for sure don't seem ready to handle our three wishes upon his release. :wry:

[Dayuhan]

I for one am not certain Assad's forces employed chemical weapons and remain apprehensive we're being played by the more extremist elements of the opposition. Having seen our intelligence community fail repeatedly based on bias sources, and seeing what they want to see, plus our adversaries are more than capable of running their own deception operations. Also think it is possible that Iranian surrogates (Assad's allies) may have done it without Assad's permission for some reason that Iran thinks will support their interests. However the Assad may well have directed it, but why?

Possible reasoning, if indeed Assad did initiate it:

The US doesn't want to intervene, but (unwisely IMO) committed itself to action if a "red line" is violated". Always worth making the other guy do what he doesn't want to do.

A US strike will be limited: essentially the purpose of the strike is not to have an impact on Syria, but to show that the administration backed up its "red line". The strike will thus be survivable.

A limited strike will gain the Assad regime the Muslim world street cred of being the ones fighting the Bad Americans without subjecting them to excessive risk. It also puts his antagonists in the uncomfortable position of being allied to the Bad Americans.

A US strike would give the Iranians an excuse to intervene more openly.

Not saying that's what happened (like the rest of us, I don't know what happened), only that there could be some internal logic to an Assad-sponsored chemical strike.

[Tukhachevskii]

Easy solutions? I don't think so. Binary logic is a poor basis for foreign policy; i.e Syria is part of the axis of evil, therefore anyone that fights them is ipso facto on the side of good, therefore the US (as the self-appointed Universal good guy) will support them...er, even if "they" quite like beheading people in the name of Allah (who else?)

From:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/files/2013/08/BSm0bOBCYAAAph6.jpg

[Tukhachevskii]

Support Assad (http://www.danielpipes.org/12724/support-assad)

Interesting stuff from Daniel Pipes thinking along similar lines to myself. Although, as a conservative (of the old fashioned European variety rather than the loony-toons in the US) I view Assads regime as the legitimate (de jure) government fighting exactly the same kind of fools we've been fighting in Afghanistan. The US sees only permanent enemies. I use a TEA model (came up with that myself, we Brits love our tea); threats, enemies, allies. Your threats determine your enemies and your enemies determine your allies. During the nineteenth century the French castigated the UK as perfidious Albion. We were not perfidious, we merely took each case on its merits. Today's enemies are tomorrow's allies, it's the threats that need addressing. Once the threats are dealt with we resume business as normal. The liberal universal perspective is prone to crusades against universal enemies who must either submit to the enlightened (the US) or be exterminated (a curious mirror image of Islamic universalist thought!).

Or, here (http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/345338/case-supporting-assad-daniel-pipes)

[davidbfpo]

For complex reasons the Syrian civil war has not led - yet - to a war beyond its frontiers, despite multiple, competing regional and external actors. Whether restraint has prevailed is a moot point, as some clearly prefer Syrians to die for their interests.

In a curious way the present crisis is similar to that in the Spanish Civil War, when in a nearly forgotten episode international naval action was taken to enable the free, safe passage of merchant shipping, evacuation of foreign nationals and refugees. The Nationalists being accused of "breaking the rules" by seizing and sinking merchant shipping; with German and Italian "fraternal assistance". The action was limited and as we know it did not alter the end result. See:http://rwhiston.wordpress.com/2010/02/17/1/

[omarali50]

The sage of London has spoken: http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2013/08/28/tariq-ali/on-intervening-in-syria/

I think my version of his analysis was better: http://www.brownpundits.com/2013/04/30/tariq-ali-on-pakistan/

[graphei]

So happy. Not about Syria, but that there is such great discussion here.


Having seen our intelligence community fail repeatedly based on bias sources, and seeing what they want to see

This. This a thousand times. The intelligence cycle is backwards. Politicians come up with a course of action, and then the intel weenies bend over backwards to justify it.


plus our adversaries are more than capable of running their own deception operations. Also think it is possible that Iranian surrogates (Assad's allies) may have done it without Assad's permission for some reason that Iran thinks will support their interests. However the Assad may well have directed it, but why?

I may just have to shake my Magic 8 ball at those scenarios. I find it sad that it's probably more accurate than most of the reports at this point.


I have to disagree with your two reasons for not intervening. Turkey isn't in the way, Turkey is no friend of Syria and may well support an intervention.
My reference to boots on the ground was for Iranian forces, not ours. We can get there no problem. Not to mention, Turkey has been chomping on the bit for something to happen. This is happening in their backyard and they're none to pleased about it. Iran, however, is watching a friendly state crumble and their options for support are rather limited.


I'm not sure where Iraq stands, but they do seem to be closer to Iran than us at times.
My point was I don't know how Iraq would feel about an Iranian army marching through. Tehran caused them a lot of trouble recently. Furthermore, while they are lukewarm with Iran, Iraq wouldn't risk angering Turkey, and possibly Saudi Arabia. Iraq has more to lose with those two, than they have to gain with Iran.

Is anyone else surprised by France besides me? Bueller? Bueller? I feel like I'm missing a key link here.


The fallacy behind a "limited strike" in Syria (and yes, Carney and Kerry and Hagel and Dempsey will call it that--just watch the lips) is that there's nothing "limited" about the Syrian problem.

No matter the first kinetic step taken, the US immediately assumes a significant problem set. I am not so sure we have enough apolitical talent to deal with the genie that some seem hell bent on letting out of the bottle. We for sure don't seem ready to handle our three wishes upon his release.

At some point in time, I'm going to give you a great big bear hug.

I have a bad feeling this is going to come down to sectarian war right now or sectarian war a little bit later.

[davidbfpo]

Omarali50,

Tariq Ali may speak and write well, but his views have little resonance in London, let alone the rest of the UK. His way with words and sheer audacity gained him invitations, far beyond the "international left" to speak in yesteryear.

[TV-PressPass]

In a curious way the present crisis is similar to that in the Spanish Civil War,

While we're making comparisons I would be delighted if someone could identify the "Ernest Hemingway equivalent" of the Syrian conflict then.

Just don't tell me it's Matthew VanDyke please ;)

[AdamG]

I was reading earlier today on the AP newswire a Syrian Kurd stated it wouldn't make sense for Assad to use a chem weapon that close to his stronghold. However, it would make perfect sense for rebels to use it on some civilians and point the finger at Assad. We've been saying for months chemical weapons represented a "red line" and hinted force would be used. He certainly made an interesting point. Ultimately, there is no way of knowing who set off that weapon. None. Without that information, I doubt we won't see more out of the UN than a strongly condemnation. I'm sure both Assad and the rebels will quiver in abject terror when they read it.


1. http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-backed-plan-to-launch-chemical-weapon-attack-on-syria-and-blame-it-on-assad-government/5346907

2. From July -

OE Watch Commentary: The accompanying excerpts are important reports from the Turkish press: seven suspected individuals from the al-Qaeda-linked Al Nusrah Front were captured in antiterrorist operations in Adana, Turkey, and two kilos (4,5 pounds) of sarin gas were found in their apartments. According to the accompanying reports, they were planning attacks on the Incirlik Base in Adana and in Gaziantep, a city near Turkey’s border with Syria. These reports went relatively unnoticed due to the start of massive demonstrations.

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Archives/GSW/201307/Turkey_02.html

[AdamG]

The intelligence cycle is backwards. Politicians come up with a course of action, and then the intel weenies bend over backwards to justify it.

http://img.pandawhale.com/post-25367-give-that-man-a-cookie-meme-Pu-7nU9.jpeg

[AdamG]

Relax. I'm sure our Drones will be home by Christmas.
http://video.foxnews.com/v/2628961722001/syria-a-prelude-to-a-decade-of-war-in-the-middle-east/?intcmp=obnetwork

[AdamG]

For complex reasons the Syrian civil war has not led - yet - to a war beyond its frontiers, despite multiple, competing regional and external actors. Whether restraint has prevailed is a moot point, as some clearly prefer Syrians to die for their interests.

Has it occured to you that the "Civil War" in Syria might actually be the war of AQ & Happy Funtime Friends Club spilling into Syria, like from A-stan, Libya, ad nauseum?

[AdamG]

I'll just leave this here, with some reading music -
http://youtu.be/dxkUK3SQlWI


It is not difficult to notice that the rebellion in Syria began to grow two years ago, almost at the same time as the signing of a memorandum in Bushehr on June 25, 2011 regarding the construction of a new Iran-Iraq-Syria gas pipeline… It is to stretch 1500 km from Asaluyeh on the largest gas field in the world, North Dome/South Pars (shared between Qatar and Iran) to Damascus. The length of pipeline on the territory of Iran will be 225 km, in Iraq 500 km, and in Syria 500-700 km. Later it may be extended along the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea to Greece. The possibility of supplying liquefied gas to Europe via Syria’s Mediterranean ports is also under consideration. Investments in this project equal 10 billion dollars. (1)

This pipeline, dubbed the «Islamic pipeline», was supposed to start operation in the period from 2014 to 2016. Its projected capacity is 110 million cubic meters of gas per day (40 billion cubic meters a year). Iraq, Syria and Lebanon have already declared their need for Iranian gas (25-30 million cubic meters per day for Iraq, 20-25 million cubic meters for Syria, and 5-7 million cubic meters until 2020 for Lebanon). Some of the gas will be supplied via the Arab gas transportation system to Jordan. Experts believe that this project could be an alternative to the Nabucco gas pipeline being promoted by the European Union (with a planned capacity of 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year), which doesn’t have sufficient reserves. It was planned to run the Nabucco pipeline from Iraq, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan through the territory of Turkey. At first Iran was also considered as a resource base, but later it was excluded from the project. After the signing of the memorandum on the Islamic Pipeline, the head of the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC), Javad Oji, stated that South Pars, with recoverable reserves of 16 trillion cubic meters of gas, is a «reliable source of gas, which is a prerequisite for the building of a pipeline which Nabucco does not have».It is easy to observe that about 20 billion cubic meters per year will remain from this pipeline for Europe, which would be able to compete with Nabucco’s 30 billion, but not the 63 billion from the South Stream.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-geopolitics-of-gas-and-the-syrian-crisis-syrian-opposition-armed-to-thwart-construction-of-iran-iraq-syria-gas-pipeline/5337452

[graphei]

AdamG- thanks for digging up those sources.

As far as Dr. Daniel Pipes and anything that comes out of his factory is concerned, I'm very wary. Why? I'm going to keep this as professional as possible. Unfortunately, I'm familiar with his handiwork.

In spite of his educational pedigree, I believe it evident Dr Pipes had his mind made up about Islam and the billion plus Muslims that inhabit his Earth when he started his course of study. Anyone who questions him or his findings is branded an anti-semite and added to his blacklist on Campus Watch. His academic witch-hunts are repugnant and antithetical to the spirit of free discourse.

He panders to the fears of Americans and instead of using his education to dispel ignorance, he chooses to exploit it for his own monetary gain. He uses his media empire to "warn" parents their children are being brainwashed by terrorists if they study Islam in college. He has lent enthusiastic support for advocates of internment camps for Muslim Americans. In short, he is an extremist's best friend. He plays right into their hands, and he is frequently cited in their propaganda against the US as "proof" the US hates Muslims and seeks their destruction.

Somedays, I think he's a modern day Heidegger- I take that back. It's not a fair comparison. Being and Time is still solid in spite of the author being a Nazi-####wad. I can't think of anything Dr. Pipes has published that will be that groundbreaking or last that long.

[davidbfpo]

Has it occured to you that the "Civil War" in Syria might actually be the war of AQ & Happy Funtime Friends Club spilling into Syria, like from A-stan, Libya, ad nauseum?

Yes, it is almost like the Soviet advisers with the Spanish Republicans -v- the far larger Italian military (manpower strong) and German military (with an emphasis on technology) assistance to the Spanish Nationalists.

AQ et al IIRC had little presence, let alone overt support in Syria when the protests began and it took time, with copious amounts of Gulf money, for them to get involved. Civil wars have a history of becoming bloodier and terrible the longer they last - invariably for the non-combatants, not the fighters.

I still consider this is a civil war, fought largely by Syrians.

[davidbfpo]

An interesting European viewpoint, a policy briefing by the ECFR, a body I've never heard of:http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_eight_things_to_consider_before_interve ning_in_syria

[ganulv]

Tariq Ali may speak and write well, but his views have little resonance in London, let alone the rest of the UK. His way with words and sheer audacity gained him invitations, far beyond the "international left" to speak in yesteryear.

He is bright and quick-witted, but I find his political and social analysis to be very paint by numbers.

[Dayuhan]

Has it occured to you that the "Civil War" in Syria might actually be the war of AQ & Happy Funtime Friends Club spilling into Syria, like from A-stan, Libya, ad nauseum?

'm sure they've moved in, being the opportunists that they are but I see no credible evidence suggesting that they initiated the fighting.


http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-geopolitics-of-gas-and-the-syrian-crisis-syrian-opposition-armed-to-thwart-construction-of-iran-iraq-syria-gas-pipeline/5337452

Global Research is not exactly a credible source, and the pipeline-as-casus-belli theory doesn't stand up to examination.

[Bill Moore]

This conflict may have originated from indigenous sources, but regardless its character rapidly evolved. It has quickly become a proxy war for a number of nations and part of the larger civil war between Shi'a and Sunni throughout the Muslim world.

I think the border nations are conducting a skillful balancing act to contain the effects from spreading to elements of their population, but the ability to maintain that balance could become more challenging if we launch missiles into Syria.

Both parties know this, which is why attacks have been conducted in Lebanon which I assume were deterrent warning shots directed at Hezbollah by the Sunni resistance. This conflict doesn't parallel the Spanish Civil War, but I agree there are currently many similarities. What differs is the ethnic versus ideological character of the motivation (yet there does seem to be some small elements of the resistance who have a political ideology instead of fighting for their tribes supremacy). Additionally, some of the external actors in the fighting (AQ and Hezbollah) have global networks and greater than Syria ambitions.

This may stay contained to Syria, but it will be a miracle if it does.

[ganulv]

Both parties know this, which is why attacks have been conducted in Lebanon which I assume were deterrent warning shots directed at Hezbollah by the Sunni resistance. This conflict doesn't parallel the Spanish Civil War, but I agree there are currently many similarities. What differs is the ethnic versus ideological character of the motivation (yet there does seem to be some small elements of the resistance who have a political ideology instead of fighting for their tribes supremacy). Additionally, some of the external actors in the fighting (AQ and Hezbollah) have global networks and greater than Syria ambitions.

This may stay contained to Syria, but it will be a miracle if it does.

It’s worth remembering that Syria occupied Lebanon for almost three decades (http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/elections/syria.lebanon/). And might still be doing so today if not for the ham-handed assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005.

[omarali50]

Ganulv and David, you are too kind to Tariq. I guess he seems so harmless that there is no harm in being polite. But I think the opportunity cost of his brand of "paint by numbers" is very high in the non-western world. I try not to be too courteous to him.

[jmm99]

Assad's era might be crumbling, but some other eras may fare no better. The era of international legalism may well be past - without too many tears shed by too many. But, some sacred cows (such as the UN and EU-NATO) should feel threatened. In any event, no one seems to be making strong legalistic arguments for Syrian intervention; the arguments being made are very moralistic. Take the following three pieces, for example.

First, a very straight-forward article by Ian Hurd (scarcely a rightist), Bomb Syria, Even if It Is Illegal (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/opinion/bomb-syria-even-if-it-is-illegal.html) (NYT, August 27, 2013):


EVANSTON, Ill. — The latest atrocities in the Syrian civil war, which has killed more than 100,000 people, demand an urgent response to deter further massacres and to punish President Bashar al-Assad. But there is widespread confusion over the legal basis for the use of force in these terrible circumstances. As a legal matter, the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons does not automatically justify armed intervention by the United States.

There are moral reasons for disregarding the law, and I believe the Obama administration should intervene in Syria. But it should not pretend that there is a legal justification in existing law. ...

Hurd then goes on to make Assad's legalistic case, noting at two points:


... the treaties rely on the United Nations Security Council to enforce them — a major flaw. ...
...
But the conventions also don’t mean much unless the Security Council agrees to act. It is an indictment of the current state of international law that there is no universally recognized basis to intervene.

But, of course, that is precisely how (and why) the UNSC was set up in the first place. Hurd knows that well; he wrote a recent article about it, The UN Security Council and the International Rule of Law (http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~ihu355/Home_files/un%20sc%20and%20the%20rule%20of%20law.doc) (Chinese Journal of International Politics, May 2013). Or, as he states here, Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World (http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~ihu355/Home_files/is%20hi%20legal.pdf) (2011):


The concept of humanitarian intervention has evolved as a subset of the laws governing the use of force and has very quickly come to occupy an institutional position alongside self-defense and Security Council authorization as a legal and legitimate reason for war. It is both widely accepted and yet still highly controversial.

This article considers whether humanitarian intervention is legal under international law. This is a common question but one that produces an uncertain answer: humanitarian intervention appears to contradict the United Nations Charter, but developments in state practice since 1945 might have made it legal under certain circumstances. Those who argue for its legality cite state practice and international norms to support the view that the prohibition on war is no longer what it appears to be in the Charter.

The debate suggests that humanitarian intervention is either legal or illegal depending on one’s understanding of how international law is constructed, changed, and represented. Since these questions cannot be answered definitively, the uncertainty remains fundamental, and the legality of humanitarian intervention is essentially indeterminate. No amount of debate over the law or recent cases will resolve its status; it is both legal and illegal at the same time.

Rick Pildes, Creating New International Law “Justifications” for Using Military Force Against Syria (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/creating-new-international-law-justifications-for-using-military-force-against-syria/) (Lawfare, August 29, 2013), sums up (without necessarily endorsing) the three principal moralistic arguments:


As I noted in an earlier post, the newly emerging uses of multi-lateral military force for humanitarian intervention — such as to respond to states that gas their own citizens — raise profound issues about the relationship between “the rule of (international) law” and morality/political judgment. Under existing international law, it is difficult to justify legally use of military force against Syria; there is no self-defense justification and no approval from the Security Council. And try to imagine the process of revising the governing legal text — the UN Charter — to permit force in new circumstances not contemplated when the Charter was created.

National political leaders in these situations have three options.

First, they can conclude, with tragic sorrow, that even though they believe the most compelling moral and political reasons exist for using military force, they cannot act because international law prohibits it: military force would be illegal.

Second, they (and notice, of course, the prior question of who the “they” are, or must be, to justify this) can acknowledge that they are violating international law, but that they believe their actions are justified for reasons more important than the “rule of law.” ...
...
Third, they can do what the British government now appears to be doing: turn the compelling moral reasons in which they believe into new “legal” justifications for the use of force. This creates a kind of illusion (perhaps necessary, perhaps justified) that they are complying with existing international law — when the truer account is that they are creating new legal arguments outside the framework of existing law. ...

Finally, we have Jack Goldsmith, UK Legal Position On Humanitarian Intervention in Syria (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/uk-legal-position-on-humanitarian-intervention-in-syria/) (Lawfare, August 29, 2013), taking down the UKG on its legal logic:


The UK “legal position” contains not a bit of legal analysis. It does not explain how humanitarian intervention as it describes it is consistent with the U.N. Charter’s clear prohibition on the use of force absent Security Council authorization or in self-defense. Presumably to be lawful in the face of the Charter, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention must be supported by customary international law. Yet the UK does not try to explain why it believes that humanitarian intervention as it describes it represents the general and consistent practice of states followed from a sense of legal obligation. It does not try to do this, I think, because there would be no basis for such a position. So in the end this is just a UK ipse dixit that (as the paper puts it in the end) intervention is justified as an “exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity.” I.e. the UK thinks the ends justify the means, including non-compliance with the U.N. Charter.
And so it goes.

Regards

Mike

[AdamG]

A U.N. diplomat says Russia has called for an urgent meeting of the five permanent Security Council members on the crisis in Syria.

http://www.thespec.com/news-story/4053760-update-russia-calls-urgent-meeting-of-security-council/

[jcustis]

Has anyone here seen a proclamation from AQ (outside or inside of Syria) that frames the fact its members are fighting in Syria?

I see a lot of media making the claim, referring to seeing flags and such, and all around making it sound as though every foreign fighter is by default Al-Qaeda.

I'm just talking out loud here, but when people get their panties in a twist about AQ somehow "coming to power" if Assad's regime falls, what the hell does that even mean? I'm getting a little jaded by the continued portrayal of Syria as ending up as a win for either AQ and radical Islam, or the butchery of Assad, with no room allowed for any middle ground.

Besides the story being repeated so much that it takes on a truth all its own, where is the evidence? Does some young Libyan's claim that he is down with Al-Qaeda pose any credible threat? There are a lot of knuckleheads who like to spout off about supporting an ideology, but so what?!?

Furthermore, has anyone seen rational analysis that believes AQ could gain a new base in Syria?
And why do so many presume that the if the resistance defeats Assad, AQ would come to the fore?

I think it's pretty short-sighted to assume that after Assad falls, the larger body of Syrian civiluans would put up with AQ in their midst. They aren't stupid, and know what happened with the Taliban, and what continues to happen in Yemen, and the border areas of Pakistan.

Am I missing something?

[Dayuhan]

I have no doubt that individuals and groups that are sympathetic to and consider themselves allied with AQ are fighting in Syria. Whether or not they are "AQ members"... that's another story.

I'd think the most likely outcome post-Assad is chaos, with nobody really in control of the whole and different parts under the control of different factions. Of course AQ might be able to exploit such a situation, but I can't see them taking over.

I know it's cynical, but one could argue that a stalemate is not entirely incompatible with US interests. Is it really so bad that AQ and Hezbollah are killing each other? Certainly not so good for Syrians, but it's hard to make a credible case for the proposition that a bunch of cruise missiles will make it any better.

The fear I often hear expressed is that if there is no intervention the conflict may escalate and spill over into other countries, but the intervention options I see being proposed seem to make that more likely, not less.

[Bill Moore]

Has anyone here seen a proclamation from AQ (outside or inside of Syria) that frames the fact its members are fighting in Syria?

I see a lot of media making the claim, referring to seeing flags and such, and all around making it sound as though every foreign fighter is by default Al-Qaeda.

I'm just talking out loud here, but when people get their panties in a twist about AQ somehow "coming to power" if Assad's regime falls, what the hell does that even mean? I'm getting a little jaded by the continued portrayal of Syria as ending up as a win for either AQ and radical Islam, or the butchery of Assad, with no room allowed for any middle ground.

Besides the story being repeated so much that it takes on a truth all its own, where is the evidence? Does some young Libyan's claim that he is down with Al-Qaeda pose any credible threat? There are a lot of knuckleheads who like to spout off about supporting an ideology, but so what?!?

Furthermore, has anyone seen rational analysis that believes AQ could gain a new base in Syria?
And why do so many presume that the if the resistance defeats Assad, AQ would come to the fore?

I think it's pretty short-sighted to assume that after Assad falls, the larger body of Syrian civiluans would put up with AQ in their midst. They aren't stupid, and know what happened with the Taliban, and what continues to happen in Yemen, and the border areas of Pakistan.

Am I missing something?

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-non-state-militant-landscape-in-syria


Al-Qa`ida and the Salafi-Jihadi Hardliners
Al-Qa`ida has taken a keen interest in the Syrian war. In mid- to late-2011, its Iraqi affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), helped create Jabhat al-Nusra,[39] a Syrian spinoff that declared its existence publicly in January 2012. The U.S. government listed it as a terrorist group in December 2012.[40]

In April 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra split.[41] The ISI’s amir, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, announced that he would unite the Syrian and Iraqi factions under his own command, called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).[42] Jabhat al-Nusra’s leader, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, however, rejected the decision.[43] Al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri allegedly tried to resolve the dispute through a Solomonic settlement, blaming both groups equally and ordering them to remain in their country of origin.[44] Al-Baghdadi refused the mediation, saying that this would consecrate an illegitimate colonial border.[45] Instead, the ISIL has dismissed the idea of Jabhat al-Nusra as an independent entity and portrays al-Julani as a soldier gone rogue.[46]


Of the other Salafi-jihadi factions in Syria, the most prominent has been Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa-al-Ansar. It consists of hundreds of mostly foreign fighters in the Aleppo area, led by a Chechen jihadist called Abu Omar al-Shishani who has now aligned himself with the ISIL. There are also several smaller independent jihadist groups, such as the Homs-based Jund al-Sham, which draw on militant networks in northern Lebanon.[48] A few small Syro-Lebanese networks that predate the 2011 uprising are still active, such as Fatah al-Islam and the Abdullah Azzam Battalions.[49]

[Dayuhan]

Foreign Affairs article...


How to Oust Assad
And Why the United States Should Try

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139874/michael-weiss/how-to-oust-assad?cid=nlc-this_week_on_foreign_affairs-082913-how_to_oust_assad_4-082913&sp_mid=42434740&sp_rid=c3RldmVyb2dlcnM0MkB5YWhvby5jb20S1

[jcustis]

Thank you for that Bill. Lund writes a decent article. I'd commend it as "excellent" if he'd gone to Syria vice settling for Skype and email interviews.

One point he made satands out to me though, and thus my frustration with all the "Islamist", "salafist", "hard-line", "support an Islamic state" labels. The other legacy perhaps of Bush is that the general public thinks that within every rebel who faces Mecca to pray, there is a Bin-Laden dying to get out ala' Mr. Hyde.


Ideology also plays a part, but the media narrative of a looming war between al-Qa`ida and other rebels has likely overstated the role of doctrinal issues. Western and Gulf pressure on the SMC to confront al-Qa`ida is likely to be a more important cause of such conflict, if it eventually erupts

Either way, it was funny to watch Senator McCain practically have a hissy fit last night, during an interview with Piers Morgan (:rolleyes:). But what the hell, he's been to Syria, so maybe he should formulate our policy for the way ahead (:wry:)

If Assad falls, the US is still going to need to spend billions in engagement, reconstruction, and governance-supporting activities--or cash KSA checks--to get Syria back onto a stable footing. That is an effort that State, DoD, and the surrounding state partners don't seem to have a plan for.

Foggy Bottom had better start hosting the conferences...Chandrakesan will likely have plenty of new material for the next book either way, I suppose.

[SWJ Blog]

RFE/RL Syria Roundup (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/rferl-syria-roundup)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/rferl-syria-roundup) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Kerry's "Slam Dunk"? Syria Update... (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/kerrys-slam-dunk-syria-update)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/kerrys-slam-dunk-syria-update) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Dayuhan]

I don't generally place a great deal of faith in DEBKA, but I suspect they have this one right:


Our military sources report that personnel, tanks and artillery of the Syrian Army’s 4th and Republican Guard Divisions, which are held responsible for the Aug. 21 chemical attack on civilians, were being moved into fortified shelters built last year against potential foreign military intervention.

Syrian army command centers in Homs, Hama, Latakia and the Aleppo region were also being split up and dispersed, after a tip-off to Syrian and Russian intelligence that they would be targeted by the US strike. Syria has also transferred its Air Force fighter planes, bombers and attack helicopters to fortified shelters which are armored against missile and air attack.

http://www.debka.com/article/23228/

It is certainly courteous of the US to make their intentions known so far in advance...

[SWJ Blog]

The New Policy Map: Syria and Dealing with Regional Sectarian Strife (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-new-policy-map-syria-and-dealing-with-regional-sectarian-strife)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-new-policy-map-syria-and-dealing-with-regional-sectarian-strife) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Thinking Through Military Strategy in Syria: US Military Coercion Options (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/thinking-through-military-strategy-in-syria-us-military-coercion-options)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/thinking-through-military-strategy-in-syria-us-military-coercion-options) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

I am sure Syria is 'target rich', it is just that the planners have to be creative and leave the hardware alone, artillery for example. How about fuel stocks, any factory that makes explosives, pilots quarters - unlikely to be hardened?

Syrians we are told are waiting to see what happens. Make sure their normal way of learning is disrupted, starting with regime TV and radio.

[SWJ Blog]

How Would US Attack on Syria Affect Washington's Asia Pivot? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/how-would-us-attack-on-syria-affect-washingtons-asia-pivot)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/how-would-us-attack-on-syria-affect-washingtons-asia-pivot) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Statement by the President on Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/statement-by-the-president-on-syria)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/statement-by-the-president-on-syria) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

ICG Syria Statement (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/icg-syria-statement)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/icg-syria-statement) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

U.S. Strategy in Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-strategy-in-syria)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-strategy-in-syria) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

The Ghost of Iraq Past and Syria Present (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-ghost-of-iraq-past-and-syria-present)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-ghost-of-iraq-past-and-syria-present) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Airpower Options for Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/airpower-options-for-syria)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/airpower-options-for-syria) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Ambassador Christopher Hill and General Anthony Zinni on Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ambassador-christopher-hill-and-general-anthony-zinni-on-syria)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ambassador-christopher-hill-and-general-anthony-zinni-on-syria) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

General Dempsey Lays Out Goals for Syria Attack (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/general-dempsey-lays-out-goals-for-syria-attack)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/general-dempsey-lays-out-goals-for-syria-attack) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

The Guardian has analysed UNOCHA data and produced several diagrams, which refuse to be copied as attachments:http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/interactive/2013/sep/06/syria-aid-who-gives-how-much?CMP=twt_gu

What is interesting is not who has paid the most, but those whose money has arrived - on Fig.1.


The US has boasted of being the largest donor so far - which is true - but the donations look a little different when considered as a proportion of the donor's economy. We've done the calculations and, when stacked as a percentage of GDP, Kuwait emerges as the largest donor.

[SWJ Blog]

Syria Thoughts (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/syria-thoughts)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/syria-thoughts) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

CNAS to Host Live Stream and Twitter Chat on Syria Tonight (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cnas-to-host-live-stream-and-twitter-chat-on-syria-tonight)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cnas-to-host-live-stream-and-twitter-chat-on-syria-tonight) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Remarks by President Obama on Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/remarks-by-president-obama-on-syria)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/remarks-by-president-obama-on-syria) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

No US Military Consensus on Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/no-us-military-consensus-on-syria)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/no-us-military-consensus-on-syria) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Syria Crisis Underlines Pentagon’s Move to the Back Seat (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/syria-crisis-underlines-pentagon%E2%80%99s-move-to-the-back-seat)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/syria-crisis-underlines-pentagon%E2%80%99s-move-to-the-back-seat) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

I am sure we each have our own "word cloud" for Syria, alongside a variety of human emotions and realpolitik. SWC now has several threads on Syria: 'Syria: the case for action', 'Syria: The case for inaction', 'The background to Syria, history, people and more' and 'Syria: a civil war (closed)'.

In the background are two older threads: 'Muslim Brotherhood': (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=891) and 'US policy with an ally like the Saudis':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2119

Now to the "meat" IMHO. Three interesting articles trying to make sense of the political and ideological / theological competition within Syria, in which Saudi Arabia is the leading player now.

Two short articles: 'Saudi Arabia and the Syrian Brotherhood', which ends with:
If the Saudi agenda in Syria is similar to that of Egypt and aims at bringing in a ‘Syrian el-Sisi,’ things will not go down well with many of us,” a leader of the Brotherhood said. “We do share the same short-term goals with the Kingdom,” he insisted, “but our long-term relationship is currently being reevaluated.”

Link:http://www.mei.edu/content/saudi-arabia-and-syrian-brotherhood

Then from Reuters: 'Saudi Arabia boosts Salafist rivals to al Qaeda in Syria', with one passage:
If Riyadh's aim is to thwart al Qaeda enemies by rallying local Syrian Islamists in the way Washington did with Iraq's Sunni tribal Sahwa, it may be miscalculating, said commentator Hazem Amin. Unlike the Iraqi fighters, he said, Syrian Salafists were increasingly embracing radical views close to al Qaeda.

Link:http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE9900RO20131001?feedType=RSS&irpc=932

For the really dedicated, the third link is to an on-line publication from the London-based Cordoba Foundation, whose latest issue looks at the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia:
In this edition, we analyse the Saudi state and its Salafi trends

Link:http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/publication.php?id=4&art=69

[davidbfpo]

A French article on mapping the conflict:
The cards they reflect reality? Are they an objective view of the world, its divisions, its conflicts? Nothing is less certain. They often reflect a subjective point of view and also biases. They are also part of the information war, as evidenced by the Syrian conflict.

Link:http://orientxxi.info/magazine/l-insurrection-syrienne-et-la,0397

No-one says here that a civil war is easy to understand. I suspect in the US Civil War similar maps could be produced, especially in the west.

[ganulv]

I wonder how the logistics of daily life work for the residents of that pocket in eastern Damascus?

http://orientxxi.info/IMG/jpg/divided-syria-resp560.jpg


No-one says here that a civil war is easy to understand. I suspect in the US Civil War similar maps could be produced, especially in the west.
Probably more complex, even. The area where I grew up, Southern Appalachia, was quite a patchwork. East Tennessee was nominally part of the Confederacy until 1863, but plenty of folks never bought in.

[davidbfpo]

I wonder how the logistics of daily life work for the residents of that pocket in eastern Damascus?

As I understand from some reading the people are starving. Somehow that fact and situation have slipped from the media's reporting. When the chemical incident happened only then did I realise that several eastern suburbs had been rebel-held for over a year.

[davidbfpo]

An update on Ganulv's question:
I wonder how the logistics of daily life work for the residents of that pocket in eastern Damascus?

A BBC News report:
Thousands of Syrian civilians have finally been allowed to leave the besieged Damascus suburb of Moadamiya....At least three of Damascus's suburbs - Yarmouk, Eastern Ghouta and Moadamiya - have been besieged by government forces for several months....The situation has become so desperate that earlier this month Muslim clerics issued a religious ruling allowing people to eat cats, dogs and donkeys just to survive. Those animals are usually considered unfit for human consumption in Islam.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24730536

Note the fighters in this suburb have stayed behind, one can guess what will happen now.

[ganulv]

An update on Ganulv's question:

A BBC News report:

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24730536

Note the fighters in this suburb have stayed behind, one can guess what will happen now.

Thanks for passing that one along, Dave. Earlier today I saw the BBC piece regarding the polio outbreak in Syria (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24726592). I saw cases of polio while living in Guatemala near the end of the civil war there. I have had more than one public health/medical professional tell me they refuse to believe that, an indication of how vanishingly rare the disease is outside of Pakistan and Nigeria today.

[ganulv]

The Israeli Air Force carried out an airstrike yesterday (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24767571) (01 November 2013) near Latakia against Russian-made missiles apparently intended for delivery to Hezbollah.

[davidbfpo]

A useful glimpse into the Syrian civil war, using interviews with three rebels, two of whom give up and leave:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/syria-revolution-civil-war-conflict-rivalry

[davidbfpo]

An in-depth WSJ article, subtitled:
Miscalculations by the Syrian regime, opposition groups and U.S. government left them all unprepared for the Aug. 21 gas attack.

Link:http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303914304579194203188283242

Classic we don't understand what the target speaks:
As Syrian troops battled rebel forces in the Damascus suburbs Aug. 18, U.S. eavesdropping equipment began picking up ominous signals.

A special Syrian unit that handles chemical weapons was ordered closer to the front lines, officials briefed on the intelligence say, and started mixing poisons. For two days, warning signs mounted until coded messages went out for the elite team to bring in the "big ones" and put on gas masks.

U.S. intelligence agencies didn't translate the intercepts into English right away, so White House officials didn't know what the Syrian regime was planning until the assault began.

[davidbfpo]

A simple glimpse into the reality of a civil war, a map of NW Syria towns controlled by rebels (green), regime (red) & Kurds (yellow):https://twitter.com/KureseL_hain/status/406444489549443072/photo/1/large

I wonder if the author has one for the whole country? I shall ask.

I expect parts of Western USA were like this in parts of the US Civil War.

[AdamG]

Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh has dropped yet another bombshell allegation: President Obama wasn't honest with the American people when he blamed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for a sarin-gas attack in that killed hundreds of civilians.

In early September, Secretary of State John Kerry said the United States had proof that the nerve-gas attack was made on Assad's orders. "We know the Assad regime was responsible," President Obama told the nation in an address days after this revelation, which he said pushed him over the "red line" in considering military intervention.

But in a long story published Sunday for the London Review of Books, Hersh — best known for his exposés on the cover-ups of the My Lai Massacre and of Abu Ghraib – said the administration "cherry-picked intelligence," citing conversations with intelligence and military officials

A former senior intelligence official told me that the Obama administration had altered the available information – in terms of its timing and sequence – to enable the president and his advisers to make intelligence retrieved days after the attack look as if it had been picked up and analysed in real time, as the attack was happening. The distortion, he said, reminded him of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, when the Johnson administration reversed the sequence of National Security Agency intercepts to justify one of the early bombings of North Vietnam. The same official said there was immense frustration inside the military and intelligence bureaucracy: ‘The guys are throwing their hands in the air and saying, “How can we help this guy” – Obama – “when he and his cronies in the White House make up the intelligence as they go along?”’

http://news.yahoo.com/seymour-hersh-alleges-obama-administration-lied-syria-gas-204437397.html

[davidbfpo]

Last night Twitter had a number of critics saying Seymour Hersh was wrong on significant aspects; illustrated by "Brown Moses":https://twitter.com/Brown_Moses/status/409673066994626560

(Added) Now found a number of UK-based comments. First on 'old' -v- 'new' journalism:http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2013/december/brown-moses-versus-hersh.htm#sthash.2PjvQSwq.oXCE4dAr.dpbs

Then "Brown Moses" under his real name in FP, which is about the sarin attacks aspects, with video clips:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/09/sy_hershs_chemical_misfire#sthash.YZJNwiLb.tuT6a7E r.dpbs

A wide ranging dissection by Enduring America (Scott Lucas), which concludes (in part):
Hersh’s article is based on suspect, unnamed sources and precious little examination of the evidence — the real evidence — that has accumulated since August 21.

Link:http://eaworldview.com/2013/12/syria-special-chemical-weapons-conspiracy-wasnt-seymour-hershs-exclusive-dissected/

[davidbfpo]

A grim assessment by Shashank Joshi, of RUSI, the title says:
The good guys have lost in Syria – only the bad guys are left fighting

Then in the text:
In truth, moderate rebels are being obliterated as a force. Their best units have peeled away and their foreign support is dwindling to nothing.

Link:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/shashankjoshi/100250429/the-good-guys-have-lost-in-syria-only-the-bad-guys-are-left-fighting/

[JMA]

Another strategic failure by the West.

Back when this started to come to the boil the 'smart guys' had all the smart ideas... and look where that lead to.




A grim assessment by Shashank Joshi, of RUSI, the title says:

Then in the text:

Link:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/shashankjoshi/100250429/the-good-guys-have-lost-in-syria-only-the-bad-guys-are-left-fighting/

[Bill Moore]

Another strategic failure by the West.

Back when this started to come to the boil the 'smart guys' had all the smart ideas... and look where that lead to.

I suspect this assessment is nonsense because it assumes if we provided more support to the so called moderates early in the conflict they would have triumphed and a peaceful democracy would have bloomed over Syria. Hell if you carry that myth a little further they even would have joined NATO along side Turkey in another 10 years or so.

This assessment in my view casually dismisses several factors. First, the moderates were always a majority and the opposition forces we now (Iran, Hezbollah, AQ, etc.) would still be there. At best more support to the moderate faction would have resulted in the removal of Assad, but it is highly unlikely they would be able to retain power. Iran and Hezbollah consider Syria critical to your interests, so it unreasonable to assume they wouldn't be a force to deal with even if provided support to the moderates. It is highly unlikely the moderates could defeat them. The AQ and AQ linked extremists with a relatively secure base of operations next door in Iraq would be a player regardless of whether we provided support or not. If you look at the history a rather large extremist element in Syria's population has been suppressed for decades by Assad and his father, and they're not pushing for democracy or an inclusive society. Christians, Alawites, some Kurds and other minorities would still be in considerable danger.

We clearly made mistakes in Syria by promising aid and support that never came. We gave the moderates a sense of false hope which was unethical in my opinion. However, to assume we could have changed the course of history by more than a few months I suspect is hubris.

[JMA]

We clearly made mistakes in Syria by promising aid and support that never came. We gave the moderates a sense of false hope which was unethical in my opinion.

Bill, you said it.

The poor fools did not study history... the Hungarians are still waiting for the Americans to come to their aid since the 1956 uprising.

[carl]

Bill:

What you described is Assad being backed by who you would figure, Iran and Hez. The takfiri killers are being backed by who you would figure, pious Saudi money. You would figure the moderates would be backed by the west. They are not. To say they may not have prevailed with western backing is a conjecture. It is an absolute certainty they won't prevail with the west turning its back on them. A chance or no chance at all? Our decisions insure no chance at all.

The smart guys on our side seem to figure that things are going to go our way with minimal effort. Once that effort fails, as it is bound to when up against these guys, our smart guys throw up their hands, say nothing can be done and leave, leaving people in the lurch.

Our smart guys don't seem to get that if you want to contest hard eyed killers, you got to actually try and that means backing people who will fight with weapons, and as Forrest said "fighting means killing." The silliness of our smart guys is revealed when the types of aid we openly give is told, commo equipment, body armor, vehicles etc. Anybody looking at that knows our leaders are not serious minded people.

It is not good for the Americans or the west for all those ruthless killers to know that our leaders are not serious minded people.

[Bill Moore]

Bill:

What you described is Assad being backed by who you would figure, Iran and Hez. The takfiri killers are being backed by who you would figure, pious Saudi money. You would figure the moderates would be backed by the west. They are not. To say they may not have prevailed with western backing is a conjecture. It is an absolute certainty they won't prevail with the west turning its back on them. A chance or no chance at all? Our decisions insure no chance at all.

The smart guys on our side seem to figure that things are going to go our way with minimal effort. Once that effort fails, as it is bound to when up against these guys, our smart guys throw up their hands, say nothing can be done and leave, leaving people in the lurch.

Our smart guys don't seem to get that if you want to contest hard eyed killers, you got to actually try and that means backing people who will fight with weapons, and as Forrest said "fighting means killing." The silliness of our smart guys is revealed when the types of aid we openly give is told, commo equipment, body armor, vehicles etc. Anybody looking at that knows our leaders are not serious minded people.

It is not good for the Americans or the west for all those ruthless killers to know that our leaders are not serious minded people.

If we're not smarter after Iraq then we never will be. It is much more than conjecture that the moderates would have failed. We didn't go in with minimal force in Iraq and we spent several years trying to make a doctrine that never would work lead us to victory. I agree with you wholeheartedly that war/fighting means killing, and our alternative approach of making the population the center of gravity instead of the enemy is partially why we failed. The population is an enabling factor that must be addressed, but it isn't the center of gravity. The moderates didn't stand a chance against the forces that would be brought to bear on them. Even if managed to force Assad out, to assume they could form a government that wouldn't be resisted by superior forces both external and internal to Syria is a illusionary. We would have been drug into the fight, and over time we would be blamed for the troubles. We need to pick our fights carefully, and decisively win them when we decide to fight. The COINdistas discounted the so called Powell Doctrine, but it is still valid, and if we're going to discard it we need to have to good reason to do so.

[carl]

If we're not smarter after Iraq then we never will be. It is much more than conjecture that the moderates would have failed. We didn't go in with minimal force in Iraq and we spent several years trying to make a doctrine that never would work lead us to victory. I agree with you wholeheartedly that war/fighting means killing, and our alternative approach of making the population the center of gravity instead of the enemy is partially why we failed. The population is an enabling factor that must be addressed, but it isn't the center of gravity. The moderates didn't stand a chance against the forces that would be brought to bear on them. Even if managed to force Assad out, to assume they could form a government that wouldn't be resisted by superior forces both external and internal to Syria is a illusionary. We would have been drug into the fight, and over time we would be blamed for the troubles. We need to pick our fights carefully, and decisively win them when we decide to fight. The COINdistas discounted the so called Powell Doctrine, but it is still valid, and if we're going to discard it we need to have to good reason to do so.

What does our various trials and errors in Iraq have to do with Syria? Not much I think except as an excuse not to confront things when they appear. Same thing with the Powell Doctrine. You set the minimum requirements so high that you have a dandy reason not to do anything ever. The world didn't stop when we left Iraq and things still happen that will not be good for us in the long run, like Syria.

If by being drug into the fight you mean US soldiers in Syria, that is another excuse to do nothing. There is no validity at all the the idea that if we get involved backing one side strongly that means our troops will inevitably go in. You back 'em and if they win great and if they lose we at least tried rather than having stood around feeling sorry for ourselves.

The moderates don't stand a chance against forces arrayed against them because we don't have the spine to back them as fully as Assad and the takfiri killers are backed. What do the killers have that the moderates don't? Support. And the support comes because there are people on that side who won't stop trying. Our side wrings our hands and wishes the whole thing will go away. It won't.

The killers have always believed they have firm hearts and ours are soft. No matter what our tech advantages are, they will win if what they believe is true. If they win, a lot of people who don't deserve to die, will. The slow motion, or if you are an unlucky individual, not so slow, slaughter of Christians in parts of the Muslim world is only going to get worse if we can't learn to shake things off and get on with it.

[Wyatt]

A couple thoughts. Its doubtful that many if anyone on this board knows the full extent of any support being given indirectly. If someone does it isn't being discussed with reason. So we are all working with partial information.

Second, I think its entirely predictable that after iraq and afghanistan we wouldn't touch this situation with a ten foot pole. The "moderates" may not have the ability to win simply because they are moderate. In a civil war when the participants view the struggle as an existential one, the force with the highest propensity to violence may have an advantage. Additionally, the unifying force of the desire for good government, inclusiveness and restraint is hard to turn into a stirring call to battle especially in a situation plagued by old religious and ethnic strife. Easy to turn those tensions into blind hate once you begin losing friends and family.

If we end up in a situation where we have Salafi Sunnis and the gulf states vs Assad, Hez and Iran in a war of attrition we will have a good opportunity to gather intelligence on all the above. This may not be the case but I imagine that when forces are employed in warfare they become exposed to exploitation. Im thinking along the lines of getting a better idea of existing relationships and the capabilities that hez, quds, and the saudis can bring to bear. The more active the network the more risk to make mistakes and be exposed.

My final thought is somewhat jaded. Isn't it a positive for us that we have Hezbollah, Assad forces, Quds force and Salafis all killing each other in one big party? They are mowing the grass for us. Of course the risk is that it spreads and endangers allies like the Jordanians and the Israelis.

Im new to UW and small wars so I could have made many poor assumptions.

[Dayuhan]

Another strategic failure by the West.

Back when this started to come to the boil the 'smart guys' had all the smart ideas... and look where that lead to.

We have Saudi-backed jihadis and their AQ allies and Hezbollah and Iran and their Shi'a allies pouring resources and fighters into beating the stuffing out of each other. The US, for a welcome change, has managed not to stick its face into a situation where it has no compelling national interest at stake and slim to zero chance of obtaining a favorable outcome. How exactly is that a "strategic failure"?

Syria is a completer mess. It was going to be a complete mess no matter what the US did. The US didn't create this situation and never had any reasonable option for preventing it, and it is in no way a US responsibility to "fix" it.

I'm not sure any part in the US Government can be reasonably described as "smart guys", but at least on this occasion they were able to not wade in and make the mess our mess, which shows some vestige of smartness.


I suspect this assessment is nonsense because it assumes if we provided more support to the so called moderates early in the conflict they would have triumphed and a peaceful democracy would have bloomed over Syria. Hell if you carry that myth a little further they even would have joined NATO along side Turkey in another 10 years or so.

Agreed. It's very easy to claim that if the US had done x, the outcome would have been y, but such claims are generally based on insupportable assumptions.


We clearly made mistakes in Syria by promising aid and support that never came. We gave the moderates a sense of false hope which was unethical in my opinion. However, to assume we could have changed the course of history by more than a few months I suspect is hubris.

Agree that making the promise in the first place was a huge and cringe-worthy mistake, but trying to fulfill the promise in the face of evidence that the "moderates" are not able to maintain control of what they receive would have been an even bigger one.


What you described is Assad being backed by who you would figure, Iran and Hez. The takfiri killers are being backed by who you would figure, pious Saudi money. You would figure the moderates would be backed by the west. They are not. To say they may not have prevailed with western backing is a conjecture. It is an absolute certainty they won't prevail with the west turning its back on them. A chance or no chance at all? Our decisions insure no chance at all.

Why would you assume that the US or "the West" must necessarily back anyone?


The smart guys on our side seem to figure that things are going to go our way with minimal effort. Once that effort fails, as it is bound to when up against these guys, our smart guys throw up their hands, say nothing can be done and leave, leaving people in the lurch.

Maybe the guys on our side realized that this isn't going our way in any event and we have neither compelling national interest at stake nor an available course of action with a realistic probability of a favorable outcome, and decided that this mess needn't be our mess. That realization may have been hastened by the overwhelming public disinterest in entering yet another Middle Eastern quagmire. As for "leaving people in the lurch"... well, there are people in the lurch all over the world. The US has no inherent responsibility for getting them out of the lurch and no realistic capacity to get them out of it. Appointing ourselves as saviour to the world's lurching populace is a one way road to bankruptcy and exhaustion.


Our smart guys don't seem to get that if you want to contest hard eyed killers, you got to actually try and that means backing people who will fight with weapons, and as Forrest said "fighting means killing." The silliness of our smart guys is revealed when the types of aid we openly give is told, commo equipment, body armor, vehicles etc. Anybody looking at that knows our leaders are not serious minded people.

It is not good for the Americans or the west for all those ruthless killers to know that our leaders are not serious minded people.

We have two general groups of ruthless hard-eyed killers, both of whom hate us, killing each other instead of us. Where exactly is there a necessity for us to intervene and stop them?

I wish some of the people who think the smart guys aren't smart would offer some smarter suggestions. If I saw two guys who want to kill me busily trying to kill each other, I'd be inclined to make a cup of coffee, put my feet up, and watch from a distance. Yes, that sucks for the Syrians. NOFP.

[Bill Moore]

A couple thoughts. Its doubtful that many if anyone on this board knows the full extent of any support being given indirectly. If someone does it isn't being discussed with reason. So we are all working with partial information.

Second, I think its entirely predictable that after iraq and afghanistan we wouldn't touch this situation with a ten foot pole. The "moderates" may not have the ability to win simply because they are moderate. In a civil war when the participants view the struggle as an existential one, the force with the highest propensity to violence may have an advantage. Additionally, the unifying force of the desire for good government, inclusiveness and restraint is hard to turn into a stirring call to battle especially in a situation plagued by old religious and ethnic strife. Easy to turn those tensions into blind hate once you begin losing friends and family.

If we end up in a situation where we have Salafi Sunnis and the gulf states vs Assad, Hez and Iran in a war of attrition we will have a good opportunity to gather intelligence on all the above. This may not be the case but I imagine that when forces are employed in warfare they become exposed to exploitation. Im thinking along the lines of getting a better idea of existing relationships and the capabilities that hez, quds, and the saudis can bring to bear. The more active the network the more risk to make mistakes and be exposed.

My final thought is somewhat jaded. Isn't it a positive for us that we have Hezbollah, Assad forces, Quds force and Salafis all killing each other in one big party? They are mowing the grass for us. Of course the risk is that it spreads and endangers allies like the Jordanians and the Israelis.

Im new to UW and small wars so I could have made many poor assumptions.

I agree it is a positive in some regards that AQ related and Iran sponsored groups are killing each other. If the Iran groups win it will return to the former we're back to where we were, and if the AQ groups win Christians, Alawites, etc. will be displaced and slaughtered. We never could separate the so called moderate Sunnis from the radicals, and as you stated once family and friends start dying the character of the conflict changes at a personal level. John McCain was nave enough to pose with AQ linked extremists during his visit to Syria, if our intelligence organizations couldn't steer him straight I think that is an indicator we have no business pumping arms into the country that will (not may) go into the hands of our enemy.

Iran is a threat to the region, but Iran is a rational actor despite their rhetoric. Sunni Extremists are a threat to the region and the U.S., and they're not rational actors. Assad and his father kept the extremists at bay. Saddam did the same, and Saddam balanced Iranian influence. I'm having a hard time rationalizing the world is a safer place without strong (suppressive) Sunni leadership in Iraq. Like most I'm gland Saddam and his sons are dead, but I think we erred strategically when we pushed for democracy as soon as we did. I think the AQ threat coming out Iraq combined with the increased Iranian influence in the region threatens our interests at least as much as Saddam did.

If the purpose of committing to a war is a better peace, I'm not sure what the end state in Syria would be if we decided to intervene that would result in a better peace? Just offering to give assistance that we may or may not be giving the resistance has simply prolonged the conflict and may have resulted in a chronic conflict that will continue for decades. I would like to know how the strategic thinkers in Israel view this, do they think it would be to their advantage if the West supported the moderates? Are do they think leaving Assad in place with the best of the bad options?

Posted by Carl


What does our various trials and errors in Iraq have to do with Syria? Not much I think except as an excuse not to confront things when they appear.

Quite frankly it has quite a bit to do with it, just as the results of the Vietnam War limited our willingness to engage in other conflicts for years which in some cases was probably best, in others not so much. We don't do a good job of thinking in time, and the so called human domain at home is more important than the human domain in the conflict zone. We're a democracy, wars have to be justified and ends met, or we will lose our political will (time after time). When we know this is true then I think we have to consider the moral consequences of getting involved when victory or a better peace appears elusive unless it is a direct threat to our country. Never say always, never say never, but we do need to think this through. Our political will is already damaged by a badly run war in Iraq, adding another one to our list could paralyze us further.

I'm not opposed to covert aid to someone we consider an alley, but anymore covert aid tends to be reported on a regular basis on Fox and CNN news, so that option is only viable if people in the know can keep their mouths shut. If covert was happening we wouldn't be debating it because we wouldn't know about it. If we know we are or aren't, then we're talking about something else.

[Dayuhan]

If the Iran groups win it will return to the former we're back to where we were, and if the AQ groups win Christians, Alawites, etc. will be displaced and slaughtered.

I doubt that things will ever go back to the way they were. Assad and his allies may well win, but they are likely to be faced with a running insurgency fueled by persistent external support and safe havens over several borders. A clean and decisive "win" by the AQ/Islamist groups is equally unlikely, for many of the same reasons. Extensive killings and displacements are likely outcomes no matter who wins, or if nobody does: ugly truth, but still truth.


Like most I'm gland Saddam and his sons are dead, but I think we erred strategically when we pushed for democracy as soon as we did. I think the AQ threat coming out Iraq combined with the increased Iranian influence in the region threatens our interests at least as much as Saddam did.

True on all counts IMO, but there are real-world constraints on US policy posed by domestic and international opinion. For better or worse, the US is expected to follow the dismissal of a dictator with a transition to something that Americans can call "democracy". Installing a compliant general as the new dictator is no longer acceptable. That may not make sense in all cases, but the constraint remains, and has to be built into the exit strategy calculation from the start.


I would like to know how the strategic thinkers in Israel view this, do they think it would be to their advantage if the West supported the moderates? Are do they think leaving Assad in place with the best of the bad options?

It would be interesting to know what the Israeli inner circle thinks of it, but I doubt that we ever will. I don't expect they'd see any realistically probable outcome as positive, but I'd guess they see a continued Assad presence, especially an Assad presence constrained and weakened by long term internal conflict, as liveable.

It's important, I think, to recognize that this is not "about us" and is not (and never was) a case where we are going to control or dictate the outcome. That's not to say we couldn't dictate the outcome, but trying to do so would require a commitment of resources and an acceptance of risks that are totally out of proportion to the US interests at stake.

[Bill Moore]

I doubt that things will ever go back to the way they were. Assad and his allies may well win, but they are likely to be faced with a running insurgency fueled by persistent external support and safe havens over several borders. A clean and decisive "win" by the AQ/Islamist groups is equally unlikely, for many of the same reasons. Extensive killings and displacements are likely outcomes no matter who wins, or if nobody does: ugly truth, but still truth.

True, I should have clarified that more. I doubt Syria will enjoy a relative peace again for decades which is sad, my intent with that poorly worded claim is that a rational state actor would remain in control of Syria that Israel, Jordan, and Turkey could manage more effectively than the alternative.

In my mind there is no doubt that Assad's incompetent response to some disgruntled youth acting out resulted in a war that shouldn't have happened, but it is too late to rewrite history. I suspect he was excessively paranoid based on the Arab Spring events throughout the region and cracked down out of fear. He probably would have been more effective if he followed the King of Morocco's approach.


True on all counts IMO, but there are real-world constraints on US policy posed by domestic and international opinion. For better or worse, the US is expected to follow the dismissal of a dictator with a transition to something that Americans can call "democracy". Installing a compliant general as the new dictator is no longer acceptable. That may not make sense in all cases, but the constraint remains, and has to be built into the exit strategy calculation from the start.

Perhaps, but based on our recent experience our national leadership and our people may be more receptive to other forms of governance. Democracy works for us, but clearly it does not work in some nations. We can always state our ultimate aim is to help that nation evolve into a democracy over the years, but our first goal is enable an appropriate form of government control to prevent a humanitarian disaster.


It's important, I think, to recognize that this is not "about us" and is not (and never was) a case where we are going to control or dictate the outcome. That's not to say we couldn't dictate the outcome, but trying to do so would require a commitment of resources and an acceptance of risks that are totally out of proportion to the US interests at stake.

I have mixed feelings on this, I think this conflict is much larger than Syria, it involves the larger Shia-Sunni conflict taking place in the Muslim world, it also involves local state actors, and state actors beyond the region (principally Russia, China, and the U.S.) It certainly isn't about us, but we do have interests in how this turns out. We did a more job of responding to this also. I suspect Kerry's response would have been more seasoned and practical than Clinton's, but that is only speculation.

[carl]

A couple thoughts. Its doubtful that many if anyone on this board knows the full extent of any support being given indirectly. If someone does it isn't being discussed with reason. So we are all working with partial information.

Second, I think its entirely predictable that after iraq and afghanistan we wouldn't touch this situation with a ten foot pole. The "moderates" may not have the ability to win simply because they are moderate. In a civil war when the participants view the struggle as an existential one, the force with the highest propensity to violence may have an advantage. Additionally, the unifying force of the desire for good government, inclusiveness and restraint is hard to turn into a stirring call to battle especially in a situation plagued by old religious and ethnic strife. Easy to turn those tensions into blind hate once you begin losing friends and family.

If we end up in a situation where we have Salafi Sunnis and the gulf states vs Assad, Hez and Iran in a war of attrition we will have a good opportunity to gather intelligence on all the above. This may not be the case but I imagine that when forces are employed in warfare they become exposed to exploitation. Im thinking along the lines of getting a better idea of existing relationships and the capabilities that hez, quds, and the saudis can bring to bear. The more active the network the more risk to make mistakes and be exposed.

My final thought is somewhat jaded. Isn't it a positive for us that we have Hezbollah, Assad forces, Quds force and Salafis all killing each other in one big party? They are mowing the grass for us. Of course the risk is that it spreads and endangers allies like the Jordanians and the Israelis.

Im new to UW and small wars so I could have made many poor assumptions.

I figure that if enough support to make a difference were being given by us or other Western countries it probably could not be easily hidden. The secret squirrel stuff that was small enough to be kept secret would be too small to be of consequence...to the Syrians. It is very useful for Americans politicians, civilian and military, who want to be seen to be 'doing something'.

That is a very good point about moderates being shy of violence. But I think being personally moderate is a very different thing from being politically moderate. There is no reason a person who is a strong advocate of the rule of law, religious toleration and the other things we associate with 'moderate' polities can't be a hell on wheels fighter. The US military is full of people like that. The Mexican Revolution of 100 years ago resulted in a government that was fairly moderate given what it could have been and evolved into a pretty good example of a western polity now. Those guys fought quite hard. Menachem Begin was a killer and Israel (if you're not Palistinian) is quite the moderate place politically. Those moderates in Syria, moderates being defined as people who will run a gov that will more acceptable to us than the two leading contenders at this time, could probably fight as well as Menachem or the Mexicans if the had the stuff and money to fight with.

People seem to like the idea of our enemies over there killing each other. Your idea about getting intel is the first time I've heard that one. The problem is that this conflict won't go on forever. Somebody is going to win. And when they do, the way it is shaping up now, we ain't gonna like it. The people that backed the winning side will be that much stronger, and we won't like that either. Then we will really need that intel.

[Dayuhan]

In my mind there is no doubt that Assad's incompetent response to some disgruntled youth acting out resulted in a war that shouldn't have happened, but it is too late to rewrite history. I suspect he was excessively paranoid based on the Arab Spring events throughout the region and cracked down out of fear. He probably would have been more effective if he followed the King of Morocco's approach.

I think you're right, but as you say, water under the bridge.


Perhaps, but based on our recent experience our national leadership and our people may be more receptive to other forms of governance. Democracy works for us, but clearly it does not work in some nations. We can always state our ultimate aim is to help that nation evolve into a democracy over the years, but our first goal is enable an appropriate form of government control to prevent a humanitarian disaster.

Our experience with installing non-democratic governments has not been very good either. Ideally we would be able to avoid situations that would require us to install a government or force us to make decisions about how others should be governed... but that is perhaps too much to ask.


I have mixed feelings on this, I think this conflict is much larger than Syria, it involves the larger Shia-Sunni conflict taking place in the Muslim world, it also involves local state actors, and state actors beyond the region (principally Russia, China, and the U.S.) It certainly isn't about us, but we do have interests in how this turns out. We did a more job of responding to this also. I suspect Kerry's response would have been more seasoned and practical than Clinton's, but that is only speculation.

Agree that this is part of a broader Sunni-Shia conflict. How it turns out will inevitably affect our interests, but I don't see that we have a clear interest in any specific outcome that we have any ability to promote. I don't think wading in and getting involved, in the absence of any clear and reasonably achievable exit strategy, is going to do us any good.


The secret squirrel stuff that was small enough to be kept secret would be too small to be of consequence...to the Syrians. It is very useful for Americans politicians, civilian and military, who want to be seen to be 'doing something'.

If it's secret, it's not going to help anyone who wants to be seen "doing something"... secrets are by definition not seen. That's probably why it's not secret.


That is a very good point about moderates being shy of violence. But I think being personally moderate is a very different thing from being politically moderate. There is no reason a person who is a strong advocate of the rule of law, religious toleration and the other things we associate with 'moderate' polities can't be a hell on wheels fighter. The US military is full of people like that. The Mexican Revolution of 100 years ago resulted in a government that was fairly moderate given what it could have been and evolved into a pretty good example of a western polity now. Those guys fought quite hard. Menachem Begin was a killer and Israel (if you're not Palistinian) is quite the moderate place politically. Those moderates in Syria, moderates being defined as people who will run a gov that will more acceptable to us than the two leading contenders at this time, could probably fight as well as Menachem or the Mexicans if the had the stuff and money to fight with.

I don't see any problem with moderates being able to fight. I suspect that there is a bit of a problem defining who exactly these "moderates" are, and how moderate they are, and who else they're associated with. I'm not convinced that there's a clear and discrete moderate faction that provides a partner that we can work with. I'm sure lots of people will fall all over each other trying to tell us what we want to hear, but that doesn't mean they are really our buddies.


People seem to like the idea of our enemies over there killing each other. Your idea about getting intel is the first time I've heard that one. The problem is that this conflict won't go on forever. Somebody is going to win. And when they do, the way it is shaping up now, we ain't gonna like it. The people that backed the winning side will be that much stronger, and we won't like that either. Then we will really need that intel.

Somebody might or might not win. It's entirely possible that there might be no clear winner. In the Iran/Iraq war our policy was to assure that neither party emerged as a clear winner... cynical, but not unreasonable. It doesn't solve the problem, but it doesn't make it worse... and is there any really credible alternative that does not involve choosing a side and sticking our collective putz into the meatgrinder?

[davidbfpo]

A few weeks ago I had a conversation with two local Muslims who had been to Syria - on a humanitarian mission - whose description of the situation was far more graphic than what I've read.

It was clear that they could not understand how the UK had welcomed the first signs of 'Spring' in Syria and then when a violent response took hold how little influence the West actually had. Their preference was H2P, neither had heard of R2P. H2P is Help to People (copyright pending).

Whatever happens in Syria I have considerable doubts whether it will have much public impact in the UK. It maybe different in those countries that have far stronger links, France and Turkey come to mind. Yes there will be some regrets - for the suffering the people endured.

How the 'Arab World' will react is very unclear and I don't mean the states, rather the public. Shame maybe, bewilderment and IMHO an acceptance that so much of their aspirations and lives are far beyond their personal influence, let alone control.

[JMA]

We have Saudi-backed jihadis and their AQ allies and Hezbollah and Iran and their Shi'a allies pouring resources and fighters into beating the stuffing out of each other. The US, for a welcome change, has managed not to stick its face into a situation where it has no compelling national interest at stake and slim to zero chance of obtaining a favorable outcome. How exactly is that a "strategic failure"?

Well I was hoping I would not have to explain this...

Take what was said and promised at the start of all this (Google is your friend) and compare that with what transpired. Simple as that really.


Syria is a complete mess.

Yes, another failure.


It was going to be a complete mess no matter what the US did.

No, no, no. That does not follow.


The US didn't create this situation and never had any reasonable option for preventing it, and it is in no way a US responsibility to "fix" it.

The US meddled ... go back and see (Google is your friend), the US and the West contributed to the resulting cock-up.

As the US had a hand in what has developed it DOES have a responsibility to help fix it.


I'm not sure any part in the US Government can be reasonably described as "smart guys", but at least on this occasion they were able to not wade in and make the mess our mess, which shows some vestige of smartness.

In their own minds they certainly see themselves as being 'smart-guys'.

[jmm99]

The Obama administration, apparently realizing that its moderate Syrian allies were getting nowhere fast; e.g., per Robert Ford (http://www.aawsat.net/2013/11/article55322473):


Q: Moving to the situation on the ground inside Syria, in your assessment, how much territory does the Syrian regime continue to hold control over?

I have never seen a definitive number of how much of the Syrian geography is controlled by the regime and how much is controlled by the opposition. What I can tell you is that lines of control have only shifted a little bit week to week. The regime has made some advances outside of Aleppo, but the regime also lost a very big supply depot in Homs and they have also lost ground in Dera’a. And so this war continues without either side being able to deliver a decisive blow. ...

is flopping about, looking for a new dancing partner.

Take your pick from these weekend news article.

Reuters: Syrian Islamist rebels to meet U.S. officials: opposition sources (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/14/us-syria-crisis-rebels-idUSBRE9BD08D20131214) (by Mariam Karouny and Dasha Afanasieva, BEIRUT/ISTANBUL Sat Dec 14, 2013):


(Reuters) - Syrian rebel commanders from the Islamic Front which seized control of bases belonging to Western-backed rebels last week are due to hold talks with U.S. officials in Turkey in coming days, rebel and opposition sources said on Saturday.

The expected contacts between Washington and the radical fighters reflect the extent to which the Islamic Front alliance has eclipsed the more moderate Free Syrian Army brigades - which Western and Arab powers tried in vain to build into a force able to topple President Bashar al-Assad.

The talks could also decide the future direction of the Islamic Front, which is engaged in a standoff with yet more radical Sunni Muslim fighters from the al Qaeda-linked Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

A rebel fighter with the Islamic Front said he expected the talks in Turkey to discuss whether the United States would help arm the front and assign to it responsibility for maintaining order in the rebel-held areas of northern Syria.

He declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the talks, and gave no further details. Diplomatic sources in Turkey said that U.S. Syria envoy Robert Ford was expected in Istanbul soon but his schedule was not yet confirmed.

The Islamic Front, formed by the unification of six major Islamist groups last month, seized control a week ago of weapons stores nominally under the control of the Free Syrian Army's Supreme Military Command (SMC). ...

Please note that the Islamic Front is a coalition of Islamist groups.

CSM (via Gulf News): US mulls aiding Islamist groups - Islamists have zoomed past the moderate rebel forces in organisation and control of territory (http://gulfnews.com/news/region/syria/us-mulls-aiding-islamist-groups-1.1266884) (by Howard la Franchi, Christian Science Monitor, December 14, 2013):


Damascus: The gradual collapse of Syria’s moderate rebel forces is forcing the US to consider extending its support to the Islamist groups it has long rejected but which are steadily rising to become the Al Assad regime’s principal opponents.

The irony, as some of Syria’s forlorn moderate rebels are noting, is that the US may have unwittingly aided in the demise of moderate forces because it for so long held off extending lethal and nonlethal aid to them – out of fear that some of that aid might fall into the hands of Islamists.

Now it’s the Islamists who, without any US assistance, have zoomed past the moderate rebel forces in organisation, control of territory, and staying power.
...
... The US envoy to Syria, Robert Ford, met last month with leaders from the recently formed Islamic Front – a coalition of seven groups fighting for a strict Islamic state in Syria.

Ambassador Ford could continue those discussions in the coming days as part of a trip to London and Turkey to meet with Syria’s political opposition and its international supporters.

US officials and other members of the international Friends of Syria group have privately fretted for more than a year about the eclipse of the moderate rebels by Islamist factions, which include groups the US has designated as terrorist organisations.

The reversed fortunes of Syria’s rebel coalitions burst into the open last weekend when fighters from the Islamic Front overran the northern Syria base of the moderate, US-backed Supreme Military Council (SMC). The Islamists took control of the base’s warehouses of US-supplied nonlethal material, including pickup trucks, communications equipment, medicines, and thousands of ready-to-eat meals.

The US, joined by Britain, quickly suspended all nonlethal aid to the rebels. US officials insist the suspension is only temporary and could end soon, especially if the Islamic Front returns the seized material as the US is demanding.

But the episode showcases both the weak state of Syria’s moderate rebels – and the disarray in America’s Syria policy. ...

The Observer: Growing strength of Syria's Islamist groups undermines hopes of ousting Assad - The west is being forced to rethink its support for rebel alliance in civil war as forces linked to al-Qaida gain ground (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/14/syria-islamist-militants-growing-strength) (Peter Beaumont, The Observer, 14 December 2013):


The Bab al-Hawa crossing post sits under a low ridge on the Syrian-Turkish border, not far from the Turkish town of Reyhanli. There is a concrete canopy and a handful of buildings. It is important because of what lies not far away in the village of Babisqa – one of the main storage depots for the supreme military council of the Free Syrian Army including weapons and other equipment.

In the Syrian conflict, who controls crossings like Bab al-Hawa and depots like Babisqa is crucially important.

On the evening of 6 December, a series of events began, with ramifications threatening to be far-reaching. They point to a development many observers have been fearing: a dangerous new fracture opening within the fragmented ranks of Syria's opposition fighters, which threatens to pit the FSA against a powerful Islamist coalition. The ideological frontiers on the map of Syria's civil conflict are shifting.

Accounts are confused and contradictory. But according to one version, members of a powerful new alliance of Islamist groups – the Islamic Front, which includes among its seven core groups some which in the past have co-operated with the al-Qaida-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra – took control of the warehouses at gunpoint, claiming they were defending them from an attack, and later the Bab al-Hawa crossing.

Within days, the US and the UK announced they had "suspended" all deliveries of non-lethal materials to the supreme military council through Turkey, which has included sophisticated communications equipment. ...

Debka: US explores ties with Syrian Islamist rebels, possibly Assad too - for a lineup to fight al Qaeda (http://www.debka.com/article/23528/US-explores-ties-with-Syrian-Islamist-rebels-possibly-Assad-too---for-a-lineup-to-fight-al-Qaeda) (DEBKAfile Special Report December 15, 2013):


The Obama administration is again doubling back on its Syrian war policy, this time engaging in a secret approach to the Islamic Front, the most powerful force now battling the Assad regime. Recently set up by six Muslim militias with 40-50,000 fighting men, the new front is led by Hassan Aboud Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi and his Ahrar al Sham militia. Debkafile’s counter-terrorism forces report that, although its Salafist members aspire to impose Sharia law on Syria, in common with Al Qaeda, they are against its methods of warfare.

On Dec. 11, fighters of the Islamic Front seized Free Syrian Army headquarters, the Syrian Military Council, and weapons warehouses, as well as the Bab al-Hawa crossing from northwestern Syria into Turkey. This was a devastating setback for FSA, once the leading rebel force against Bashar Assad, and virtually extinguished the group as an effective fighting force after its recent setbacks.

It was bad enough for its commander, Brig. Gen. Salim Idris, to flee to Qatar. Despite protestations to the contrary, he is unlikely to return to Syria in the hurry.

Announcing the cut-off of “non-lethal assistance to the opposition in northern Syria,” Washington more or less turned its back on the FSA and launched an approach to its vanquisher.

Robert Ford, former ambassador to Syria through whom the US has maintained contact with Syrian rebel militias, was dispatched to Turkey to start talks with the Islamist Front leader Al Hamawi. ...

The rest of the Debka report, though interesting, may or may not have credence.

IMO: US policy in the Middle East has been in disarray since this romantic 1945 event:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ac/FDR_on_quincy.jpg

because it has fluctuated with the fortunes of either the Saudi Lobby or the Israeli Lobby to purchase and/or intimidate the USG. Neither lobby resonates in America's Heartland (aka "flyover country"); and neither lobby cares - so long as it resonates in the Beltway and furthers the interests it represents.

So, if you really want the US to intervene in the Middle East (or anywhere else in the World), be careful what you wish for - it might not be what you expect.

In the meantime, I've a Bactrian camel I want to sell; a low maintenance beast with a pedigree (certificate on bond paper !) from a herd of President Karzai's brother. Any offers ?

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

[QUOTE=JMA;151039]Well I was hoping I would not have to explain this...

Yes, another failure.

Another failure for who? Another way to look at it as another failure for us was avoided.


No, no, no. That does not follow.

Contraire, it follows perfectly as we have experienced (but apparently not learned) many times before.


The US meddled ... go back and see (Google is your friend), the US and the West contributed to the resulting cock-up.

As the US had a hand in what has developed it DOES have a responsibility to help fix it.

Ethically you can make that argument and to some extent I agree, but that isn't how we work in the U.S. We meddle and F up a lot of places and don't assume responsibility for it. Just because Powell made an argument that if you break it you own it after we invaded Iraq doesn't mean its true. Bush wanted to stay, so the argument was convenient, another President could have told Powell to pound sand.

Politicians will make the decision on whether we get involved or not, and they will based that decision largely on perceived support of the American people to do so, and that element is not there. Right, wrong, or indifferent, that is just the way it is. The only time politicians will violate that is if critical American interests are really at risk that the American people may not understand.


In their own minds they certainly see themselves as being 'smart-guys'

Since I occasionally interact with some of these policy advisors your statement is true for some of them, while others are as frustrated as everyone else and are open to a solution. You and Carl calling for intervention is not a solution. Intervene to do what exactly, and what is the probability our intervention will work? What will our intervention put at risk? Is it worth the risk? Saying we should intervene is quite simple, but without a plan for doing so effectively no leader in his/her right mind is going to sign up for it.

posted by jmm99


The Obama administration is again doubling back on its Syrian war policy, this time engaging in a secret approach to the Islamic Front, the most powerful force now battling the Assad regime. Recently set up by six Muslim militias with 40-50,000 fighting men, the new front is led by Hassan Aboud Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi and his Ahrar al Sham militia. Debkafile’s counter-terrorism forces report that, although its Salafist members aspire to impose Sharia law on Syria, in common with Al Qaeda, they are against its methods of warfare.

Part of the President's desired goal for Syria regardless of the outcome was that minorities would be protected, those minorities are principally the Alawites, Christians, and moderate Sunnis. I'm not sure what the Islamic Front's objectives are post Assad, but I suspect they won't be anymore interested in protecting religious minorities than the Muslim Brotherhood were in Egypt.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25362244


It's not a thought being openly voiced by the US State Department or the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but a week ago the highly respected former US diplomat Ryan Crocker told the New York Times that it was time "to start talking to the Assad regime again".

"As bad as he is," Mr Crocker said, "he is not as bad as the jihadis who would take over in his absence."

AMB Crocker is not a liberal who is opposed to the use of military force, and while I think he may have been a tad too optimistic on Afghanistan, he seems to adopted a realist view on Syria.


Mike Rogers, the Republican chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, has spoken about his anxiety over an unprecedented pooling of al-Qaeda fighters in Syria.


Against this backdrop, President Assad starts to look indispensable again. A man who can deliver up his country's chemical weapons and, perhaps, take on and defeat the hardliners of the Nusra Front and ISIS.

I think we're all somewhat frustrated with reality, but you can't wish it away.

[carl]

Since I occasionally interact with some of these policy advisors your statement is true for some of them, while others are as frustrated as everyone else and are open to a solution. You and Carl calling for intervention is not a solution. Intervene to do what exactly, and what is the probability our intervention will work? What will our intervention put at risk? Is it worth the risk? Saying we should intervene is quite simple, but without a plan for doing so effectively no leader in his/her right mind is going to sign up for it.

Bill, if you mean by intervention I figure on US troops-absolutely not. I mean aid for the people we call moderates, actual realistic makes a difference aid. I also don't buy that if we do that it inevitably means US troops to follow. It may be moot though. That crew who is running things, at the very top, that crew, are so hopeless that we are on the verge of maybe deciding which group we should support, takfiri killers or Alawite killers. This is great. We're going to have a lot of credibility in the world with this one. We back Assad and we line up with Iran, the Quds force and Hez. That is going to play well in the rest of the world, and Israel. We back the takfiri killers and we line up with AQ, Taliban and the Pak Army/ISI (oh wait, we already dance to whatever tune the Pak Army/ISI plays, dead American soldiers notwithstanding). That is going to play well in the rest of the world too, and Israel. This kind of thing is unbelievable! But it is happening, to us, to my country and yours. Not to mention that CIA op in Benghazi that went bad and got an ambassador killed.

Tell those guys on high you interact with to get a backbone and open up their mouths and take their firing like men. Or resign with honor and open up their mouths. If they have the nerve to try, maybe something will change. Their pensions and careers can't be worth that much.

[Bill Moore]

Bill, if you mean by intervention I figure on US troops-absolutely not. I mean aid for the people we call moderates, actual realistic makes a difference aid. I also don't buy that if we do that it inevitably means US troops to follow. It may be moot though. That crew who is running things, at the very top, that crew, are so hopeless that we are on the verge of maybe deciding which group we should support, takfiri killers or Alawite killers. This is great. We're going to have a lot of credibility in the world with this one. We back Assad and we line up with Iran, the Quds force and Hez. That is going to play well in the rest of the world, and Israel. We back the takfiri killers and we line up with AQ, Taliban and the Pak Army/ISI (oh wait, we already dance to whatever tune the Pak Army/ISI plays, dead American soldiers notwithstanding). That is going to play well in the rest of the world too, and Israel. This kind of thing is unbelievable! But it is happening, to us, to my country and yours. Not to mention that CIA op in Benghazi that went bad and got an ambassador killed.

Tell those guys on high you interact with to get a backbone and open up their mouths and take their firing like men. Or resign with honor and open up their mouths. If they have the nerve to try, maybe something will change. Their pensions and careers can't be worth that much.

Carl,

Realpolitik isn't limited by principle, its scope is confined to pragmatism. I get your points loud and clear, but to some degree I think you overstate the case. It was pragmatic for us to back some dictators during the Cold War, and that didn't win us favor with the local populace in those countries. We provided military aid to those dictators so they could oppress their population in exchange for remaining aligned to the "free world." The Philippines comes to mind as an example, but the people there as a whole still admire America. How they have come to reconcile this history and still embrace us is beyond my understanding, but I'm glad they do, and I suspect this is true in other parts of the world. This doesn't undermine your morality argument, but it does call into question your assessment about how the people will feel about us years from now. Obama won't be in office forever, and they know several politicians wanted to help them. Also, we can't assume that we're not provided aid, maybe we actually can keep things on the low?

When you frame your arguments do you also consider that many countries aligned with Saudi are donating quite a bit of money and weapons (I suspect) to the Islamists and maybe the moderates if we have any influence at all? Not sure who Turkey is supporting, if anyone, but they don't love Assad. The point is we're not the only power in this multipolar world that is a player in Syria, so I'm not convinced, and admittedly I could be wrong, that our aid would be decisive.

[carl]

Carl,

Realpolitik isn't limited by principle, its scope is confined to pragmatism. I get your points loud and clear, but to some degree I think you overstate the case. It was pragmatic for us to back some dictators during the Cold War, and that didn't win us favor with the local populace in those countries. We provided military aid to those dictators so they could oppress their population in exchange for remaining aligned to the "free world." The Philippines comes to mind as an example, but the people there as a whole still admire America. How they have come to reconcile this history and still embrace us is beyond my understanding, but I'm glad they do, and I suspect this is true in other parts of the world. This doesn't undermine your morality argument, but it does call into question your assessment about how the people will feel about us years from now. Obama won't be in office forever, and they know several politicians wanted to help them. Also, we can't assume that we're not provided aid, maybe we actually can keep things on the low?

When you frame your arguments do you also consider that many countries aligned with Saudi are donating quite a bit of money and weapons (I suspect) to the Islamists and maybe the moderates if we have any influence at all? Not sure who Turkey is supporting, if anyone, but they don't love Assad. The point is we're not the only power in this multipolar world that is a player in Syria, so I'm not convinced, and admittedly I could be wrong, that our aid would be decisive.

Bill my argument goes beyond morality. It is mostly about real consequences of our insanity...well the insanity...no, that ain't right...the juvenile inability to see reality and understand that the world won't let you take things back of our very top leaders. It comes out as insanity so I guess it is a distinction without a difference.

Anyway these actions will result in real things happening that we won't like, and there are 3 more years left in this administration. A lot can happen in 3 years, like 1942 to 1945. I mentioned Israel twice for a reason. Those guys, if they lose confidence in us are quite likely to go off half cocked with God only knows what consequences for the world. So now they see us picking between takfiri killers who want to wipe them off the face of the earth and the Iranians and Hez who say they want to wipe them off the face of the earth. We are supposed to be able to restrain Israel now? Fat chance. There are not only the Israelis but the takfiri killers. Those guys are not going to be discouraged in the least by our weepy ineffectualness. They will be encouraged beyond imagining, not only are we weak sisters we are stupid beyond bounds previously imagined. The same with the Iranians. Those thoughts will have consequences, lethal ones. The big thing with (boy do I hate this word) realpolitik is they don't have to love you but they have respect/fear you. What reason do all those two legged beasts have to respect or fear us, a drone may get them if they aren't good boys? Right.

We did make alliance with some very unsavory characters during the Cold War. But we are choosing now between guys who are our active enemies and try to kill us when they can. We may have tried to play the Soviets and Red Chinese off against one another but I don't remember us trying to figure which one we should aid.

Not only all of the above but every potential enemy in the world is watching and learning from this, as is every ally or potential ally. And they are all figuring what they may do. I can't think how this can get worse but I guess a guy with an Ivy League education can figure a way. Maybe if this keeps up we'll get to a point where we'll be hunting some takfiri killer for killing our people in one place only to find him popping up in Syria whereupon we give him some weapons and ammunition because he has suddenly been transformed-Poof! as if by magic-into an ally.

God save us.

[jmm99]

I only know what I read about the Islamic Front; so as to this:


Part of the President's desired goal for Syria regardless of the outcome was that minorities would be protected, those minorities are principally the Alawites, Christians, and moderate Sunnis. I'm not sure what the Islamic Front's objectives are post Assad, but I suspect they won't be anymore interested in protecting religious minorities than the Muslim Brotherhood were in Egypt.

my impression is that the Islamic Front would be more repression than extermination; depends how salafist-takfirist they are at heart. My guess will be worst than yours about their heart lines.

BTW, Debka (http://www.debka.com/article/23528/US-explores-ties-with-Syrian-Islamist-rebels-possibly-Assad-too---for-a-lineup-to-fight-al-Qaeda) speculation does consider Assad as one possibility of three:


The administration is examining three hard options:

1. The Islamic Front is backed, funded, armed and supplied with intelligence by Saudi Arabia. By beating the FSA, the Front has awarded Riyadh high Syrian points against Washington. However, the Obama administration is deeply committed to joint steps in Syria with Moscow and Tehran, the sequel to the six-power nuclear accord forged in Geneva last month, to which Saudi Arabia is flatly opposed. President Barack Obama would therefore prefer to ignore the Saudi success in Syria.

2. For the second option, Ambassador Ford was empowered all the same to offer the Islamist Front a seat at Geneva II, the conference on a political solution of the Syrian civil conflict taking place in Montreux on Jan. 22. American military and financial assistance would also be on tap. This would be a bitter pill for the Washington to swallow, since the Islamic Front is led by commanders who quit other militias in protest against US failure to deliver promised arms.

3. The third option would be to heed voices rising now in Washington to start talking to the Syrian ruler Bashar Assad and admit that the US and the West fell down badly in underestimating his durability and military edge in the course of the three-year civil war.

Ryan Crocker, former US ambassador to Baghdad and an eminent influence on US Middle East policy in the past decade, was the first prominent voice to advocate this course: “We need to start talking to the Assad regime again…,” he wrote in an article. “ It will have to be done very, very quietly. But bad as Assad is, he is not as bad as the jihadis who would take over in his absence.”

He was echoed by former CIA and NSA director Adm. Michael Hayden, who said: “The sectarian bloodbath in Syria is such a threat to regional security that a victory for Bashar al-Assad's regime could be the best outcome to hope for.”

Talking to the annual Jamestown Foundation conference of terror experts on Dec. 11, Hayden said that a rebel win was not one of the three possible outcomes he foresees for the conflict: "Option three is Assad wins. And I must tell you at the moment, as ugly as it sounds, I'm kind of trending toward option three as the best out of three very, very ugly possible outcomes."

To be honest, my advice to the USG comes from our old favorite poster:

http://images2.wikia.nocookie.net/dragonball/images/f/fb/Shut_the_hell_up.gif

In other words, quit digging the hole deeper.

Here's an anecdote about our Middle East policy that I learned from looking at the FDR-ibn Saud photo.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ac/FDR_on_quincy.jpg

I wondered who the kneeling Marine was.

Turns out he was Bill Eddy, Marine-OSS, Arab linguist, FDR's envoy to ibn Saud and the interpreter at the meeting. Here's the story (Eddy had a major role before and after the meeting), Today in History – King Abdulaziz and President Roosevelt Meeting (http://susris.com/2011/02/14/today-in-history-king-abdulaziz-and-president-roosevelt-meeting/) (Published: February 14, 2011). Eddy wrote a 1954 monograph, FDR Meets ibn Saud (http://www.social-sciences-and-humanities.com/pdf/FDR_Meets_Ibn_Saud.pdf).


Colonel William A. Eddy, U. S. Marine Corps, Retired, is the only person alive who knows exactly what was said between F.D.R. and Ibn Saud, as he was sole interpreter throughout.

He was born in Sidon (Lebanon) in 1896, the son and grandson of Presbyterian missionaries who lived and died in Syria.

He received his Litt.B. from Princeton University, 1917; PhD., 1922.

Professor of English, American University at Cairo, 1923-28; Dartmouth College, 1928-1936.

President of Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 1936-1941.

U.S. Naval Attache, American Legation, Cairo, 1941.

Chief of OSS in North Africa, 1942-43.

First U.S. Minister Plenipotentiary of Saudi Arabia, 1944-1946.

Consultant to Arabian-American Oil Co., 1947-1952.

Consultant also to Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Co., since 1952.

Holder of Navy Cross, the Distinguished Service Cross, The Silver Star (2), the Purple Heart (2), The Legion of Merit. Wounded in battle of Belleau Woods, 1918.

Ibn Saud was convinced that FDR had promised, as a binding commitment on the US, that the Arabs would have a veto as to the Palestine-Jewish "question". But, FDR only lasted a few months more; and then came Harry Truman. As Eddy wrote:


MR. TRUMAN

The historic conference had an anticlimax at the White House which has never been reported.

The first week in October, 1945 [1946?], the Secretary of State recalled four chiefs of U. S. Missions simultaneously to have them testify as a group to Mr. Truman regarding the deterioration of American political interests in the Near East: the U.S. Ministers in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria (jointly), Saudi Arabia, and the Consul-General to mandated Palestine.

The four arrived for a White House appointment which had been scheduled for about October 10.

The four were kept idle in Washington four weeks, away from their posts and with no duties whatsoever, because the White House advisors, including David K. Niles, persuaded the President that it would be impolitic to see his Ministers to Arab countries, no matter how briefly, prior to the November ongressional elections.

After the elections, the Director of the Near East Office of the Department of State was allowed to bring the four in for a private conference with Mr. Truman. The spokesman for the group, George Wadsworth, presented orally an agreed statement in about twenty minutes. There was little discussion and the President asked few questions in the meeting whose Minutes have been carefully guarded in the Department of State.

Finally, Mr. Truman summed up his position with the utmost candor: “I’m sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.”

And, so US policy has swung back and forth ever since, based on political expediency and the relative force of the two opposing lobbies.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

[QUOTE]
Another failure for who? Another way to look at it as another failure for us was avoided.

Syria is a failure. Yes there were many players who stuck their oar in. Just stating the obvious.


Ethically you can make that argument and to some extent I agree, but that isn't how we work in the U.S. We meddle and F up a lot of places and don't assume responsibility for it. Just because Powell made an argument that if you break it you own it after we invaded Iraq doesn't mean its true. Bush wanted to stay, so the argument was convenient, another President could have told Powell to pound sand.

Yea, lets stick to the ethical argument.


Politicians will make the decision on whether we get involved or not, and they will based that decision largely on perceived support of the American people to do so, and that element is not there. Right, wrong, or indifferent, that is just the way it is. The only time politicians will violate that is if critical American interests are really at risk that the American people may not understand.

OK but you do realize that you forgot to mention that American Presidents seem to reserve the right to break promises and desert their allies when the wind changes direction. Then Americans are surprised at the rising anti-American feelings in the world.


You and Carl calling for intervention is not a solution.

No, what I say is that you need to do what you say. This was a repeat of the Hungary 1956 debacle. The US said, rise up and we will support you... then never did.


Intervene to do what exactly, and what is the probability our intervention will work? What will our intervention put at risk? Is it worth the risk? Saying we should intervene is quite simple, but without a plan for doing so effectively no leader in his/her right mind is going to sign up for it.

Bill it starts with an objective/aim then the plan forms around that.

Personally I suggest that when Russia and China stood up to the US your president's bottle went and he collapsed like a wet paper bag. There lies your problem. The US military is capable for most tasks, it is your politicians - from the President down (and not just this administration) - who are the problem. You elect them ... your problem - and the world suffers as a result.

[Dayuhan]

OK but you do realize that you forgot to mention that American Presidents seem to reserve the right to break promises and desert their allies when the wind changes direction.

Not reserved at all. There isn't a government on this planet that would hesitate to break a promise if they though it wasn't in their interest to keep it. The powerful do it more than anyone... how do you think Britain earned the name "perfidious Albion"?

I certainly agree that American leaders make way too many poorly considered promises, many of which are downright stupid. The solution to that problem is fewer stupid promises, not keeping stupid promises. The only thing stupider than making a stupid promise is trying to keep the promise even when it's clear that doing so will almost certainly do more harm than good to everyone concerned.


Then Americans are surprised at the rising anti-American feelings in the world.

If you actually listen to the anti-American sentiments, they aren't about failure to keep promises, they're a product of the almost pathological American insistence on meddling in everybody else's business. Intervention or upgraded engagement in Syria, promised or no, would exacerbate those sentiments, not alleviate them. If we want to alleviate anti-American sentiment, our best move would be to open a big can of STFU and try minding our own business.


No, what I say is that you need to do what you say. This was a repeat of the Hungary 1956 debacle. The US said, rise up and we will support you... then never did.

I'm sure the Hungarians are to this day disappointed that they were deprived of the opportunity to serve as ground zero for World War III... and no, we don't know that would have happened. We also don't know it wouldn't have happened. Mutual Assured Destruction did have a way of generating fairly conservative assessments of risk, especially when messing in the other guy's front yard. That cut both ways, as we saw in Cuba a few years later.


Bill it starts with an objective/aim then the plan forms around that.

Absolutely. More specifically, you need an objective that's consistent with perceived national interests, and a plan that has a reasonable probability of achieving that objective without leaving you up to your eyeballs in the scheisse. What that objective and that plan might be in this case nobody seems able or willing to say. "Arm the moderates" might have something in it, if there was a discrete group of reliable moderates clearly capable of keeping their hands on what's given them and of using it to good effect. Those conditions do not appear to be in place, and choosing to support an unreliable partner leaves you with a substantial probability that you'll be forced to choose between admitting a mistake and walking away or clinging to a sinking ship. The US has been in this position way too often.


Personally I suggest that when Russia and China stood up to the US your president's bottle went and he collapsed like a wet paper bag. There lies your problem. The US military is capable for most tasks, it is your politicians - from the President down (and not just this administration) - who are the problem. You elect them ... your problem - and the world suffers as a result.

Personally I suggest that this is a complete load of bollocks. If you allow an external party to dissuade you from doing something that you wanted and intended to do, you lack bottle. If you allow yourself to be maneuvered into doing something you never wanted or intended to do because you're afraid of what someone might think, you lack brains. There's no evidence to suggest that the US administration (or any substantial part of the political opposition) ever wanted or intended to get seriously involved in Syria. Reluctance to get involved in a situation where there is no compelling national interest at stake, zero popular support, and no available course of action that seems even remotely likely to generate a favorable outcome is common sense, not lack of bottle. There was a reference above to the US looking for a new dancing partner. If the music sucks and the prospective partners are pig ugly, what is so unreasonable about deciding to sit this dance out?

The real constraint on American action in Syria, beyond the lack of a practical objective consistent with perceived interest and a plan with a reasonable chance of success (neither lack has proven much of a constraint in the past) is not the Russians or the Chinese, but the Americans: American leaders do have to maintain some awareness of public sentiment (one of those peculiar quirks that goes with democracy), and in the current domestic environment the prospect of diving into yet another Middle East quagmire is politically about as toxic as a proposition can get.

[jmm99]

Looks like someone is listening to Ryan Crocker and Mike Hayden if this story pans out. In any event, thorough analysis of the political spectrum on your part.

Reuters, Exclusive: West signals to Syrian opposition Assad may stay (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/17/us-syria-crisis-assad-idUSBRE9BG18E20131217?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&dlvrit=992637) (by Khaled Yacoub Oweis, AMMAN, Dec 17, 2013):



(Reuters) - Western nations have indicated to the Syrian opposition that peace talks next month may not lead to the removal of President Bashar al-Assad and that his Alawite minority will remain key in any transitional administration, opposition sources said.

The message, delivered to senior members of the Syrian National Coalition at a meeting of the anti-Assad Friends of Syria alliance in London last week, was prompted by rise of al Qaeda and other militant groups, and their takeover of a border crossing and arms depots near Turkey belonging to the moderate Free Syrian Army, the sources told Reuters.

"Our Western friends made it clear in London that Assad cannot be allowed to go now because they think chaos and an Islamist militant takeover would ensue," said one senior member of the Coalition who is close to officials from Saudi Arabia.

Noting the possibility of Assad holding a presidential election when his term formally ends next year, the Coalition member added: "Some do not even seem to mind if he runs again next year, forgetting he gassed his own people."

The shift in Western priorities, particularly the United States and Britain, from removing Assad towards combating Islamist militants is causing divisions within international powers backing the nearly three-year-old revolt, according to diplomats and senior members of the coalition. ... (much more in story)

Regards

Mike

[carl]

Mike:

After reading that story you linked to, I am more certain than ever the Geneva talks will be very fruitful and everyone will participate honestly, sincerely and forthrightly.:cool:

That story also contained this statement:

"If the opposition rejects such a deal, they will lose most of the West and only have Saudi Arabia, Libya and Turkey left on their side."

the deal being accepting that Assad will hang on.

I figure Saudi Arabia, Libya and Turkey are all they need judging by the results so far. Gee, imagine not having the feckless Americans backing you. The horror.

[jmm99]

From Today's Zaman, Turkey offered Biden ‘Yemen model' for Syria (http://www.todayszaman.com/news-334351-turkey-offered-biden-yemen-model-for-syria.html) (18 December 2013, DENİZ ARSLAN, ANKARA)


Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç had brought up the “Yemen model” as an inspiration for a solution for war-torn Syria during his meeting with US Vice President Joe Biden at the White House last month, Today's Zaman has learned from a source who is intimately familiar with the content of the conversation. ...

This proposal sounds nuts to me; but why not let the inmates run the asylum ? Everything else seems to be on the table.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

A source to be taken with several grains of salt, but I expect they are not far off on the Saudi position (somewhat exaggerated in the headline)...

http://rt.com/news/saudi-arabia-syrian-policy-464/

'With or without West': Saudi Arabia ready for unilateral action on Syria


The kingdom’s ambassador to London, Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, said that the Western approach to the region is a “dangerous gamble” that jeopardizes stability in the Middle East.

Instead Riyadh, a geopolitical rival of Iran and Syria, wants to independently arm the Syrian insurgents, saying the country “cannot remain silent, and will not stand idly by,” Abdulaziz wrote in a New York Times commentary.

The prince accused the US coalition of allowing “one regime to survive and the other to continue its program for uranium enrichment, with all the consequent dangers of weaponization."

Of course it's no secret that the Saudis would like to have the US do the dirty work and get Assad and the Iranian regime out of the picture for them. Whether acting as hired muscle for the Saudis is or is not in the interests of the US is another question altogether.

[SWJ Blog]

Syrian Refugees & Why Realists Are The Real Ethicists (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/syrian-refugees-why-realists-are-the-real-ethicists)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/syrian-refugees-why-realists-are-the-real-ethicists) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/dec/27/how-al-qaeda-changed-syrian-war/


A Syrian with close ties to Turkish officials told me that the Turks pass the buck: “the third countries let them leave so why should we stop them?” Last month, perhaps in a sign of the mounting pressure, Turkey reported that it had kicked out 1,100 European fighters. At points it has seemed upset at the foreign fighters, closing the border this fall when ISIS took over nearby areas. Still, Ankara seems reluctant to clamp down on ISIS in areas where it has battled the Kurdish PYD, whose growing strength is a threat to Turkey. (The PYD has close ties to the PKK, the militant Kurdish group in Turkey which Ankara is now trying to make peace with.)


If rebel commanders are reluctant to be openly critical of ISIS, their subordinates are less so. “They are foreigners occupying our land,” one fighter for Ahrar al-Sham, a large Salafist network, told me. “They ban people from smoking straight away—not even a doctor would prescribe that!” another rebel fighter, a nineteen-year-old from Aleppo, said. ISIS has also changed Syrians’ view of the war. “If the choice is between ISIS and Assad, I’ll take Assad,” says a Syrian friend who enthusiastically supported the protests.

It is a long and well written article, another interesting paragraph or two talks about ISI's increasing control of the border with Turkey, which is if an intentional part of their strategy it seems sound since they can control the aid coming in from the West to the resistance.

[carl]

Bill M:

The article mentions ISIS's quick rise in Syria. That suggests to me sponsorship by a nation state. Which one do you think it is?

ISIS is a bit spooky right now but I wonder about their long term viability. There seem to be a lot of foreigners in their ranks and they are quite extreme, both of which anger the locals. That doesn't seem to be a formula for success.

[Bill Moore]

Bill M:

The article mentions ISIS's quick rise in Syria. That suggests to me sponsorship by a nation state. Which one do you think it is?

ISIS is a bit spooky right now but I wonder about their long term viability. There seem to be a lot of foreigners in their ranks and they are quite extreme, both of which anger the locals. That doesn't seem to be a formula for success.

Carl,

I guess that could be true, and any number of the Middle Eastern states that feel threatened by Iran such Saudi, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, etc. could be providing financial and other support directly or indirectly to ISIS. Just as likely is the fact that ISIS and other Sunni groups had well established clandestine cell networks established in Western Syria to fight us when we were in Iraq, so I think it can be assumed they were well postured to respond quickly when the opportunity emerged. Lots of variables and all speculation on my part.

[CrowBat]

Bill M:

The article mentions ISIS's quick rise in Syria. That suggests to me sponsorship by a nation state. Which one do you think it is?
I'm sorry if the following might appear 'rough', even 'unfriendly', but I find attempts at monitoring conflicts like this one in Syria in this fashion for utterly failed.

Firstly, the ISIS didn't 'rise quickly' in Syria. Early attempts of various Salafists and Wahhabists to call for 'jihad' in Syria, from back in summer 2011 for example (let me know if you need any references), were directly ridiculed - and this foremost by practically all Syrian Salafists. Nobody in Syria (except the regime) called the al-Qaida for help, and certainly not to come and fight there.

Even once the ISIS did start to go into Syria (in summer 2012), it managed to do so only with help of bribing regime's commanders of specific parts of the country. (This in turn prompts the question if the regime was not actually very, very, very keen to get the ISIS into the country and that way 'obtain' the enemy it was all the time [i.e. right from the start of mass civilian protesting] claiming to be facing.)

It took nearly two years for the ISIS to get itself organzied there and even now it can sustain itself in place only with help of terror comparable to that of the Assadist regime (i.e. the same terror with help of which the Assadist regime is maintaining itself in power since 40+ years). Plus, until just a few days ago, the number of cases where the ISIS battled the regime could be counted on fingers of one, perhaps two hands (at most). And the cases in question were limited to various of ISIS idiots voluntering to drive suicide-bombs into entrances of specific bases held by regime loyalists, to open way for other (native Syrian) insurgents...

On the contrary, the ISIS is exclusivelly excelling at attacking native insurgent groups and taking over the areas that these have liberated. Until few days ago, not one of ISIS cliques got involved in any kind of a 'major armed clash' with the regime (and when this happened, an entire 'brigade' - read: approx a reinforced company - of Iraqi Wahhabists from Falluja was overrun by an Iranian-run Mahdi Army front group, in al-Jufra, outside Dayr az-Zawr).

It's not without the reason that the Syrians in liberated areas are not only 'sceptic' but outright anti-ISIS, and that the ISIS is forced to react with brutality and terror to frequent protests against it (in turn, this brutality and terror are the reasons we hardly get to hear about this: the ISIS is beheading any journos it can put its hands upon). And it's not the least surprising that there are only 2-3 Syrian Salafist clans that have sided with them. Essentially, and no matter how much they're attempting to present themselves as 'being welcomed by Syrians', that's all the 'native' and 'genuine' support the ISIS is getting in Syria.

Secondly, after all the US experiences with al-Qaida, I find it astonishing that anybody still comes to the idea that groups like ISIS 'must be sponsored by a nation state'. If al-Qaida of the 1990s didn't show that one needs no 'nation state' to sponsor such groups, but rather 'few enterprising businessmen', I don't know what else might ever help you?

Gentlemen, let me remind you: we're not talking here about the KSA during the famine of 1942, but countries - like such US 'allies' like KSA, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar... erm, even Iraq, etc. - where there are thousands of influential people literally swimming in billions of dollars and euros. And we're talking about bitterly poor Syria, where one can buy a week-worth of food for an entire family of 4-6 for 'two bucks'. Just to think there are not enough 'sheiks', 'private enterpreneurs', 'NGOs' etc. that can easily sponsor such bands like the ISIS, is 'naive', to put it mildly.

Regarding 'ISIS is a bit spooky': not the least. They are present in the mass media. Actually, thanks to our stupid and lazy media, they are overrepresented.

That's a direct result of the ISIS striving to present itself as a widespreadly-supported, popular and even 'Syrian' movement, that is - essentially - 'the leading force' behind the Syrian uprising. Of course, this is BS, but it's because of this effort that an image is created of the ISIS as 'omnipresent' in Syria, and the only force fighting the regime.

Actually, the ISIS is presenting various of its 'units' as 'native' or 'allied' movements, while they are anything but that. Examples are numerous: the ISIS presents the notorious Jaish al-Muharijeen wa al-Ansar (actually the 'Northern Group ISIS') as its 'allies', while this is actually the main body of the ISIS' fighting force in Syria, yet consisting exclusively of foreigners. The ISIS declared the Lions of the Caliphate Battalion for some sort of 'native insurgent group' in Lattakia, while this is ISIS' 'elite' fighting force in Syria, including only 2-3 Syrians. The Jamiat Jund ash-Sham is presented as 'Syrian', while it's actually an ISIS-run unit of Lebanese Salafists. ISIS bands of foreign Jihadists in Dayr az-Zawr area - like Tajamu Mujahidee al-Qaqaa and Liwa al-Qaqaa - are purposedly misreported as at least 'allies' of such native Islamist groups like Ahfad ar-Rasoul, or even as parts of these (at least as 'fighting in cooperation with...'), just in order to present native groups as 'al-Qaida allies' to the Western public, and no matter of that fact that such groups like Ahfad ar-Rasoul are directly at odds with the ISIS.

So, ask yourself: why is that gang so 'spooky' as it appears to you, and why would the ISIS need to do all of this if this would be 'truth'?

That all said, there is at least one thing where we do agree: yes, 'thanks Allah', that's definitely no formula for a lasting success in Syria.

[carl]

CrowBat:

If the result of you being 'rough' or even 'unfriendly' is cogent analysis and a useful laying out of history that I didn't know, please abandon all notions of being 'nice' and get meaner, kick a few puppies even.

The reason I asked about sponsorship by a government is because I remember back in the 90s when people seemed a bit mystified about the rise of the Taliban. Later it turned out the answer was to a large extent the Pak Army/ISI. I figured maybe something similar was happening here.

Besides, ISIS has only been around for a little while, since the summer of 2011 say. That is not very long. AQ central has been around rather longer. One of the reasons they have lasted so long is they have had, if not the sponsorship of nation states, at least been given sanctuary by nation states, Afghanistan and the Pak Army/ISI...oh, err...Pakistan. It will be interesting to see how long they can hang on. (It may be true but I hate using that construction 'will be interesting' when we are talking about innocent people being murdered.)

The ISIS may not be spooky to you but it is to me and I'll bet to the people under their control. In the long run they probably can't last but in the short run they have a lot of money and no apparent shortage of manpower. That can give them a lot of local power, not a good thing for anybody. Do you think they can be ejected before one side or another actually wins in Syria? Do the local clans have enough power on their own to throw them out? I ask because in Iraq, the local clans didn't have the power to do that. They had to throw in with the Army and Marines to get it done. There doesn't appear to be anybody in the ISIS controlled areas to help the local clans.

[Bill Moore]

CrowBat,

I actually agree with parts of your post, despite your twisting of the facts to fit your narrative.


Firstly, the ISIS didn't 'rise quickly' in Syria. Early attempts of various Salafists and Wahhabists to call for 'jihad' in Syria, from back in summer 2011 for example (let me know if you need any references), were directly ridiculed - and this foremost by practically all Syrian Salafists. Nobody in Syria (except the regime) called the al-Qaida for help, and certainly not to come and fight there.

They actually did rise quickly once they started operating there. Of course both sides will accuse the other of supporting AQ since the local population is beginning to hate them for good reason. I find it doubtful that the regime supports them, but not completely without merit. Assad made stupid decisions from day one, so this could be just be another stupid decision my some members in the administration, but it doesn't fit well the over arching conflict between Sunni's (Al-Qaeda) and Shia (Iran sponsored). Still possible, but much more likely they're funded by Sunnis outside of Syria.


It took nearly two years for the ISIS to get itself organzied there and even now it can sustain itself in place only with help of terror comparable to that of the Assadist regime (i.e. the same terror with help of which the Assadist regime is maintaining itself in power since 40+ years). Plus, until just a few days ago, the number of cases where the ISIS battled the regime could be counted on fingers of one, perhaps two hands (at most). And the cases in question were limited to various of ISIS idiots voluntering to drive suicide-bombs into entrances of specific bases held by regime loyalists, to open way for other (native Syrian) insurgents...

This part is where I think you are playing with the facts. Assad and his father certainly established a dictatorship and employed harsh techniques in the past when the Sunni fundamentalists stuck their head up, but to compare that to the tactics ISI is using was a stretch until this current conflict where admittedly Assad lost all moral legitimacy with the way he responded. There is the rest of the story that must be considered to provide needed context, and that is the Muslim Brotherhood and other fundamentalist Sunnis were not fighting for the Syrian people, only the Sunnis, so other groups are fighting for their very survival. Our media and Congress initially focused on the FSA which created this vision of good guys and bad guys, which was not an accurate portrayal of the conflict. I do think many in the FSA were good guys based on our value system in the West, but it never was "only" about them and the Assad regime. The other actors were there, mobilizing to take advantage of the situation. As to your other comments about ISI's strategy of consolidating their positions in rebel held territory and avoiding confrontation with the Syrian forces until now, well as much as I hate the ISI I have to agree that is pretty sound strategy on their part.


I find it astonishing that anybody still comes to the idea that groups like ISIS 'must be sponsored by a nation state'.

I agree with you here, they have been sponsored by wealthy individuals for years as you pointed out, but I also don't find it unreasonable that some states could sponsor them based on the Sunni-Shia civil war, especially if they a position of operational advantage. Furthermore, if ISIS is controlling the borders as stated in the article, they may simply be grabbing the weapons, money, etc. coming in that was destined for other groups.


And we're talking about bitterly poor Syria, where one can buy a week-worth of food for an entire family of 4-6 for 'two bucks'. Just to think there are not enough 'sheiks', 'private enterpreneurs', 'NGOs' etc. that can easily sponsor such bands like the ISIS, is 'naive', to put it mildly.

If you're talking about today after a few years of war you're absolutely right, but if you're talking about Syria prior to the conflict it was far from bitterly poor. In fact their economy was growing rapidly and steadily, even during the global recession, and the middle class was expanding. Germany and other countries found Syria to be one of, if not the fastest, growth market for their luxury cars. Of course not all benefited from this growth, just like most countries in the West, to include the wealthiest we have large pockets of poverty.


That's a direct result of the ISIS striving to present itself as a widespreadly-supported, popular and even 'Syrian' movement, that is - essentially - 'the leading force' behind the Syrian uprising. Of course, this is BS, but it's because of this effort that an image is created of the ISIS as 'omnipresent' in Syria, and the only force fighting the regime.

I don't know how they're presenting themselves to the Syrian people, but they seem to be an organization incapable of learning, and I agree the only way they maintain control is through terrorism, which will once again backfire on them.


So, ask yourself: why is that gang so 'spooky' as it appears to you, and why would the ISIS need to do all of this if this would be 'truth'?

Since when isn't the truth the first victim of any conflict? Deception has always been a principle line of effort in war, so we shouldn't be surprised by any of this.

You obviously have strong feelings about this conflict, which is understandable. In your view if there are any good guys who are they? Do they have a snowball's chance in succeeding even if the West provides them support? My concern is our indecisive support will simply drag the conflict on longer and more and more innocent people will continue to suffer.

[CrowBat]

Carl,
just a few days ago I've had a discussion with several Austrian and German mil officers, and one of them came up with a similar comparison between the emergence of ISIS and that of the Taliban.

Call it 'hair-splitting', but that's just not the same. The Taliban were set up by Pakistanis; but: al-Qaida was not. As such, the al-Qaida was in Afghanistan even before the Taliban were a twinkle in Musharaf's eye.

Also, if the ISIS was set up by any 'nation', then by the Assadist regime. If you wonder why: so it can confidently say exactly what all the Western public LOVES to hear now, 'here you are, it's an uprising of al-Qaida, not of some Syrians that might not like us'.

(Note: I was following the situation in Afghanistan all through the 1990s, and was all the time reporting that the Taliban were set up by the Pakistanis: NOBODY wanted to listen back then, not even in 2003-2004, when the first US Army officers came back from the Af-Pak border to tell how the Pak army was sipping Tchay while the Taliban were running 'business as usual'. Wouldn't it be that my blog from those times was hacked to pieces in 2003, I wouldn't be as outraged now, then it would be easy to point you there...)

ISIS is around 'for a little while' - but in Iraq, not in Syria. And it was nowhere to be seen in Syria before September 2012. It appeared in the Dayr az-Zawr Province and then moved closer to Aleppo shortly after the insurgent offensive there stalled.

How long can it hang around? Very long. Again: Syria is piss poor. Anybody with a bank account of anything like US$ 1 million is 'super rich' there. That's why anybody with any kind of - foremost commercial, of course, but also political and religious - interest in influencing the future of that country has it easy to buy entire 'armies' there. I said it already back in September 2012, and it seems I can't say it often enough: Washington could've bought all these groups that are now declaring themselves for 'Islamic Front', for 10 million or so, back then (of course, it didn't for one million of reasons which you'll get expertly explained by Dayuhan, just for example, and which actually have nothing in common with 'realpolitik').

Again: back in summer 2011 it was various idiotic wannabes from such 'spiritual and respected pi..-holes' like Mauritania and wherever else, that were calling for 'Jihad' in Syria. And it was the Syrian Salafists - first and foremost - that were telling them, 'go to hell, we neither need nor want you here'. Back then, they - the Syrian Salafists - were telling even the Saudi Salafists to go f. themselves.

Call it 'hairsplitting', but that's so because 'Salafist' and 'Salafist' is not the same (not even 'Muslim Brotherhood' and 'Muslim Brotherhood' is the same): Syrians are a bunch of different ethnic and religious groups living together since some 6,000 years. Like Germans and Japs learned that fighting wars is a stupid idea, so also the Syrians learned that inter-ethnic and inter-religious strife is at least as dumb. Only the Assadists yielded profits from emergence of inter-ethnic/religious strife and emergence of the ISIS, nobody else - and even Syrian Salafists were aware of this, right from the start of the uprising (that's why they, plus the Syrian MOBs were as quiet as a grave back then, and for much of the time afterwards).

That's just one of reasons why Syrian Salafists are 'different', but it's also why other 'Islamist' insurgent groups there can't understand how comes Washington pinned the JAN (Jabhat an-Nusra) on the 'list of terrorist organizations', and why they say, 'if they're terrorist, we're all JAN', and why the JAN neither agreed to merge, nor can really work with the ISIS any more....

Of course, the situation is gradually getting different. But, it's still nowhere near as far as all the possible talkingheads in the West are explaining, like that 'it would be better to stay with Assads', or that the ISIS is 'taking over the moderate Syrian insurgency'. Even if all the European wannabe-Jihadis would go to Syria tomorrow in the morning, they'd still wouldn't get out with more than 20% of men the other insurgent groups have under arms.

So, what kind of incredibly stupid creatures are preparing some of 'assessments' we've got to hear in recent weeks... well, that's beyond my ability to comprehend...


The ISIS may not be spooky to you but it is to me and I'll bet to the people under their control. In the long run they probably can't last but in the short run they have a lot of money and no apparent shortage of manpower. That can give them a lot of local power, not a good thing for anybody. Do you think they can be ejected before one side or another actually wins in Syria?The ISIS is like a very aggressive sort of cancer: due to their sadism and brutality, and because nearly all of native Syrian insurgent groups are too busy fighting the regime, they can spread. If nothing is undertaken against them, they'll continue to spread until they really collapse all the other insurgent movements - plus themselves.

Now, I do not expect this to happen, but that's how it functions.


Do the local clans have enough power on their own to throw them out? I ask because in Iraq, the local clans didn't have the power to do that. They had to throw in with the Army and Marines to get it done. There doesn't appear to be anybody in the ISIS controlled areas to help the local clans.It's all a question of money: the one with deeper pockets can buy more people.

AFAIK, and no matter how absurd it sounds, but we can all thank 'Allah' (and I'm a convinced atheist!), the Saudis jumped in and - literally - did what the West should've done two years ago, i.e. started buying all the groups that are now fighting as 'Army of Islam/Islamic Front'. It's 'good' that they had 15 billion reasons (invested by Saudis in Syria in the last 10 years, primarily out of fear from a possible al-Qaida staged uprising at home!) to do so. And good because that corrupt, alcohol- and Ukrainian-prostitutes-vasting bunch in Riyadh (better known as al-Saud family) is at odds with al-Qaida.

Yup, ladies and gentlemen: that lovely and pluralist regime is going to do the job the 'freedom and democracy loving' West should've done.

Oh, just don't get surprised if, once they finish it (and they'll certainly do so, don't worry), Syria is going to be anything else but 'freedom and democracy loving'.

[CrowBat]

Bill,
if you have to, 'blame' me for overusing hyperboles or 'summarizing in quite a rough fashion' (i.e. without going into all the details that people like you might find necessary), but surely not for 'twisting facts to twist my narrative'.

For reasons I explained above, the ISIS didn't have it easy - and is still not having it easy - in Syria, and therefore didn't rise anything as quickly as anybody is trying to explain. Even now, nearly a year and a half since they appeared there, their position is shaky - at best. Just for example, when Ahrar ash-Sham overrun one of their positions (actually, it was a gas station run by one of pro-ISIS Syrian clans), they needed 3 days to get bunch together enough of their stupids to launch a counterattack (which miserably failed, what a surprise). If you really need more examples, let me know: the list is very long.

Re. Assad and stupid decisions: I know that the concentration capability and memory of most of observers in the West is meanwhile rather comparable with that of fish, but Assadist regime should actually be renown for establishing and running terrorist organizations as and when it needed any.

Want to hear one of (genuine) Syrian jokes about Assadists, from back around 2003-2004? Let me remind you, that was the time when Qusay Bush was bunching Assads into the 'Axis of Evil' etc. So, scared shi.-less they would be the next (after Saddam), the Assads rushed to create 'their own' al-Qaida already back then: the bunched together a group of stupids from various prisons and have left them launch a series of 'bombing attacks' on banks etc. in Damascus. And, imagine: all these 'extremist Islamists' were then 'shot by their glorious security authorities', what a surprise, eh...?

The ISIS is precisely THE kind of 'enemy' the Assadists are claiming to be fighting against right since the first public unrest in Syria, in February-March 2011. Trouble is only: there was no ISIS, nor any other kind of 'genuine' Salafist/Wahhabist terror organisation in Syria back then.

So, why would it be 'twisting facts' if I come to the idea that it's perfectly reasonable to conclude the Assadists helped the ISIS establish itself in Syria?


This part is where I think you are playing with the facts. Assad and his father certainly established a dictatorship
<snip>
but to compare that to the tactics ISI is using was a stretch until this current conflict where admittedly Assad lost all moral legitimacy with the way he responded.Please, Assad never had anything like 'moral legitimacy'; and sadist ISIS' cut-throats even less so.


There is the rest of the story that must be considered to provide needed context, and that is the Muslim Brotherhood....J, Bill...

Specifically: in the first 1 1/2 years of this uprising, the Moslem Brotherhood in Syria didn't fight with anybody. That's why all the Syrian merchants didn't close their shops (as was hoped for, and which was - at earlier, pre-Assad times - the first sight of 'really deep trouble' for any regime in Syria), and didn't join the insurgency: because they are predominantly supporters of the MOBs. And where are all of them and on which side are they now... only Allah knows that (I guess).

...and regarding other what you call 'fundamentalist Sunnis': they didn't start the ethnic strife. That was the regime. During the first 1 1/2, nearly 2 years of the civil war, the regime was purposely recruiting people from one ethnic group and paying them to attack another ethnic group. It was such groups - recruited by the regime - that launched first attacks on Syrian Christians. It was such groups that prompted the emergence of such insurgent groups like 'Jesus, Son of Mary...' and similar battalions. And now comes the best part: do you know that quite a bunch of such Christian, Assyrian, Turkic, even Kurdish etc. native insurgent groups have sided with the Islamic Front meanwhile? How comes?

Perhaps you don't know, and let's say I'm a completely clueless idiot: but, hell, do you think they don't know who was attacking them and why they took on arms to fight the regime?


Our media and Congress initially focused on the FSA which created this vision of good guys and bad guys, which was not an accurate portrayal of the conflict.Yup, the usual, 'FSA this, and FSA' that story.

FSA was an idea. Never a coherent movement. I discussed this to death only some 30 times by now. Sorry if I don't go into this again.


As to your other comments about ISI's strategy....well as much as I hate the ISI I have to agree that is pretty sound strategy on their part.Definitely so, then - as we've seen in al-Jufra - they're walked over 'even' by the Mahdi Army...


I agree with you here, they have been sponsored by wealthy individuals for years as you pointed out, but I also don't find it unreasonable that some states could sponsor them based on the Sunni-Shia civil war...Stop right here, please. Yes, you're talking about Salafists/Wahhabists, and yes, they're 'more disciplined' and 'more structured' than the rest of the Sunni-World. And yes, even sparrows on my roof-top know that the wife of former Saudi ambassador to the USA was sponsoring al-Qaida from her own pockets....But heaven... no, their idea of Umma was never sponsored by any 'nation/state' as such. Sorry.


Furthermore, if ISIS is controlling the borders as stated in the article, they may simply be grabbing the weapons, money, etc. coming in that was destined for other groups.No, no, and no. Because there is something called 'geography', and this is described in something called 'maps', and the maps and geography of Syria are teaching us that the 'border crossings' in question is one border crossing on the border to Iraq, which is under attack by the PYD from Syrian, and a (very successful) Iraqi Army offensive from Iraqi side. And if 'they' want to see any other 'border crossings' there, then there is only one, on the border to Turkey, meanwhile held by the IF (the IF's take-over of that crossing - from FSyA - was then used by Washington as excuse to stop the flow of aid to Syria from Turkey).

That all aside, and seriously: we're not talking here about the US-Mexican border in Texas, but about an empty desert with poorly-demarcated border-line between Iraq and Syria, large parts of which are out of anybody's control since only a few mileniums. Anybody volunteering to declare this border as something like 'inpenetrable', i.e. to insist that the ISIS 'needs border crossings for survival'....?


If you're talking about today after a few years of war you're absolutely right, but if you're talking about Syria prior to the conflict it was far from bitterly poor. In fact their economy was growing rapidly and steadily, even during the global recession, and the middle class was expanding. Germany and other countries found Syria to be one of, if not the fastest, growth market for their luxury cars. Of course not all benefited from this growth, just like most countries in the West, to include the wealthiest we have large pockets of poverty.Bill,
one of the reasons I'm so mad about all the insanely wrong reporting about 'spread of al-Qaida in Syria' is that I've been around that country so much, and have met and talked so many people there. Combined, I've spent something like a year there, back in the 2000s.

Sure, German luxury cars, the 'Four Seaons' Hotel, Russian-built (Saudi sponsored) refinery in Dayr az-Zawr, plus all the Saudi investment in infra-structure by side... Sufficient to say: the 'not all benefited from this growth' included only something like 90% of the population. Yes, sure, in 2005, the state doubled the pay of all of its employees (depending on estimate, between 35% and 70% of the workforce), but already the Lebanon War of 2006 hit the economy very hard (simply because all the Syrians were so scared, they stopped spending). Subsequently came a draught, and then various other problems (one of them was caused by the EU's decision to buy-up all the palm-oil for years in advance; this destroyed the waffle-manufacturing industry in Syria because - also due to various embargos - it couldn't find any other source of palm-oil anywhere else) etc. All of this hit the country so hard, it didn't start recovering even as of 2010...

I saw this all with my own eyes. No matter where it comes from, everything else is 'guestimate' in my ears.


In your view if there are any good guys who are they?There are nearly 18 millions of - potentially - good guys there. All provided one has got the money to pay them. I don't have that money. But even if somebody comes to the idea he/she has got it, the decision-maker in question oughts to keep in mind that the other bidder now is nobody else but al-Sauds (it might not be that way 'physically', but 'metaphorically', 'ash-Sham' (Syria) is the hearts and minds of Saudis; saudis are provincials, literal analphabets from the empty desert; for them, 'Dimashq' is 'the' place to go; water, green gardens, culture, everything....one can't really describe what kind of prize is that country for Saudis) - and the IRGC.

Guess that might mean quite a fierce competition there.


My concern is our indecisive support will simply drag the conflict on longer and more and more innocent people will continue to suffer.Well, that already happened. Without Iranian intervention in February-June this year, the Assadist regime would've collapsed. They even managed to run themselves out of fuel before Iranians came to save them (actually, the Republican Guards Division - or the two mech brigades which are all that is left of it - was out of fuel until few weeks ago).

It's simply too late - and out of our control - now.

[Bill Moore]

Also, if the ISIS was set up by any 'nation', then by the Assadist regime. If you wonder why: so it can confidently say exactly what all the Western public LOVES to hear now, 'here you are, it's an uprising of al-Qaida, not of some Syrians that might not like us'.

Great theory, but I think it is void of any factual underpinning. You may be right, but I don't think so. Also, Al-Qaeda has been active in Syria for years (small scale, small scale is enough to provide a clandestine infrastructure they can use later), and had well established networks there. I think there is more on going on than you point out, and while I agree AQ does not need state support, there is no reason to believe they're not receiving it. At the end of the day states make decisions based on perceived interests.

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/03/05/070305fa_fact_hersh?currentPage=all

This article is informative, and it was written in 2007.

The Redirection

Is the Administration’s new policy benefitting our enemies in the war on terrorism?

http://landdestroyer.blogspot.com/2012/10/nato-using-al-qaeda-rat-lines-to-flood.html

NATO Using Al Qaeda Rat Lines to Flood Syria With Foreign Terrorists


2007-2008 US West Point reports reveal Al Qaeda network behind NATO's so-called "freedom fighters." Extremists in Syria were behind Iraq War foreign terrorist influx, not Syrian government.


What Fares actually revealed however, was an invisible state within Syria, one composed of Saudi-aligned, sectarian extremism, operating not only independently of the government of President Assad, but in violent opposition to it. This "state-within-a-state" also so happens to be directly affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, the leading forces now fighting in Syria with significant Western-backing against the Syrian government.

The documented details of this invisible terror state were exposed in the extensive academic efforts of the US Army's own West Point Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). Two reports were published between 2007 and 2008 revealing a global network of Al Qaeda affiliated terror organizations, and how they mobilized to send a large influx of foreign fighters into Iraq.

Nasr compared the current situation to the period in which Al Qaeda first emerged. In the nineteen-eighties and the early nineties, the Saudi government offered to subsidize the covert American C.I.A. proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Hundreds of young Saudis were sent into the border areas of Pakistan, where they set up religious schools, training bases, and recruiting facilities. Then, as now, many of the operatives who were paid with Saudi money were Salafis. Among them, of course, were Osama bin Laden and his associates, who founded Al Qaeda, in 1988.

This time, the U.S. government consultant told me, Bandar and other Saudis have assured the White House that “they will keep a very close eye on the religious fundamentalists. Their message to us was ‘We’ve created this movement, and we can control it.’ It’s not that we don’t want the Salafis to throw bombs; it’s who they throw them at—Hezbollah, Moqtada al-Sadr, Iran, and at the Syrians, if they continue to work with Hezbollah and Iran.”


“This goes back to Iran-Contra,” a former National Security Council aide told me. “And much of what they’re doing is to keep the agency out of it.” He said that Congress was not being briefed on the full extent of the U.S.-Saudi operations. And, he said, “The C.I.A. is asking, ‘What’s going on?’ They’re concerned, because they think it’s amateur hour.”

http://www.debka.com/article/23558/US-and-Iran%E2%80%99s-First-Joint-Military-Venture-Fighting-al-Qaeda-in-Iraq

US and Iran’s First Joint Military Venture: Fighting al Qaeda in Iraq


In this topsy-turvy scenario, Washington and Tehran share another surprising motive: to save the Assad regime in Damascus from Al Qaeda’s long arms.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted approvingly on Dec. 26: “Attitudes are changing in Western countries; they are becoming more realistic in their approach towards the Syrian crisis. The threat of terrorism in Syria, of jihadists coming to power, of creating a caliphate with extremist laws, these are the main problems.”

Since the Syrian chemical issue was addressed in September, Russian-Iranian-American collaboration is going strong. The joint US-Iranian war on al Qaeda is strengthening Tehran’s grip on Iraq as well Syria. It gives Russian President Vladimir Putin hope for keeping al Qaeda away from the Winter Olympics at Sochi – an ever-present menace as a female suicide bomber, a Dagestan national, demonstrated Sunday, Dec. 29, by blowing up the railway station at the southern Russian city of Volgograd, killing up to a score of people.

The other incentive for US President Barack Obama is the hope of transposing his collaboration with Tehran and Moscow to improve US chances of a reasonable accommodation in the Afghanistan arena.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/syria-undercover/what-is-al-qaeda-doing-in-syria/

What Is Al Qaeda Doing in Syria?


They still have the ability to operate through Syria. That’s important because those logistics lines can be reversed and, if they need to, they will be able to move into Syria just as they have been able to move people from Syria into Iraq.


But in Syria, the tone is very, very different. It’s very aggressive. It’s very much calling for violence in immediate terms and participating in the wider fight. … Al Qaeda, as an organization and as a movement, are a bunch of media whores. Right now the world is looking at Syria, so that’s where they want to be. …

[The question is] whether they have any luck in a Syrian environment trying to win over a wider constituency than they were able to in Iraq. I don’t think they will.


This is a depressing thing because it will cloud what’s happening in Syria. The fundamental story is that there are brave people standing up to a tyrannical government. … There are lots of factions in Syria that agree on the need for the Assad regime needs to go. But there’s likely to be extraordinary disagreement among those various factions over what should come next. …

There’s going to be a threat from Al Qaeda in Syria. I do not think Al Qaeda is going to dominate the rebellion there.

[CrowBat]

Great theory, but I think it is void of any factual underpinning. You may be right, but I don't think so. Also, Al-Qaeda has been active in Syria for years (small scale, small scale is enough to provide a clandestine infrastructure they can use later), and had well established networks there. I think there is more on going on than you point out, and while I agree AQ does not need state support, there is no reason to believe they're not receiving it. At the end of the day states make decisions based on perceived interests.

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/03/05/070305fa_fact_hersh?currentPage=all

This article is informative, and it was written in 2007.Help me catch it, then I do not understand something here: except for explaining all the possible 'perceived interest' (including that day-dream on the 'Shahab-...erm...99', as a 'three-stage, three-warhead Iranian intercontinental missile that can hit Europe, oh yeah'), where is this article 'documenting' something like 'al-Qaida network built up in Syria'?

Then, the next article you linked,
http://landdestroyer.blogspot.co.at/2012/10/nato-using-al-qaeda-rat-lines-to-flood.html

...Firstly, the author lost me already with this statement:

This "state-within-a-state" also so happens to be directly affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, the leading forces now fighting in Syria with significant Western-backing against the Syrian government.This is nonsense. Like in Egypt back in 2011, the MOBs were 'waiting to see' what's going to happen. Some of MOBs went to arms only early this year, and then nearly half of them sided with the regime.

And I already explained above what I think about anybody stating that the 'MOBs and al-Qaida are now leading forces fighting...against the Syrian government'. That's simply nonsense.

One of things you cited from that article caught my eye too:

2007-2008 US West Point reports reveal Al Qaeda network behind NATO's so-called "freedom fighters." Extremists in Syria were behind Iraq War foreign terrorist influx, not Syrian government.
Yeah, and the report in question cited that West Point report about 'al-Qaida's Libyan Islamic Fighting Group'....:rolleyes:

Nonsense of this kind is one of about a million of reasons why I said above, that monitoring the conflict in Syria in this fashion is an 'utter fail'.

1.) Already years before that report was written (2007), the LIF distanced itself from al-Qaida (the Libyans concluded the al-Qaida for 'too extremist').

2.) It is bordering on stupid, and definitely showing an inherent lack of understanding for local circumstances, to come to the idea to expect the (former) axis Libya-Syria-Iran to 'support al-Qaida'. I thought it's meanwhile well-known that this product of Qusay Bush admin's imagination should be sorted in the same file with 'Iraqi WMDs'. Apparently, this is not the case, so let me add 'few details' here.

Syria and Libya maintained close military and security cooperation since the early 1970s. In some regards this cooperation was so close that entire squadrons of Libyan Air Force were staffed by Syrians (to a degree where some called it 'Syrian Air Force West'). Later on, this cooperation became tripartite, through inclusion of Iran (see Libya selling SA-2s, T-72s and Scuds to Iran via Syria, an Iranian pilot test-flying a Libyan MiG-25 etc., in mid-1980s). When Libya was under various embargoes, in the 1990s, it was Iranians and Syrians that maintained its air force (that's one of reasons why the SyAAF nowadays has 'at least 1 Su-24 too much': this was donated to it by Libya, as 'thanks' for help in maintenance). Thus, connections on military level were well-established already since ages, and used extensively by all three sides.

Over the times, some of involved people understood that such connections can be exploited in a very profitable fashion... 'Profitable' in sense of really 'stuffing money into your pockets, hon'.

Now, as of around 2004, after the first wave of 'euphoria' about 'let's go fighting GIs in Iraq' was over, somebody in Libya came to the idea to do his holy brother leader a favour and start exporting local Islamists to Iraq, literally. Like Syrian regime, so also the Libyan was actively prosecuting, torturing and executing Islamists since ages (while Assads had a problem with the MOBs, Gathaffists had a problem with Senussis).

And so one nice morning one of Libyan mukhbarat chiefs in Benghazi contacted one of his pals in command of Lattakiya bureau (for those with problems with geography: Benghazi is in Libya, Lattakiya is the largest port in Syria). The latter was in contact with somebody from the Syrian customs, this in contact with somebody running bus business etc. And so the idea was born to - through charging the Islamists they transported to Iraq - earn a handsome income. Which they did.

However, and no matter how 'politically-' or 'religion-coloured' various Western intelligence services have seen the resulting 'operation of Libyan and Syrian intelligence services', this was no 'operation of Libyan and Syrian intelligence services', but a commercial enterprise of several influential Libyan and Syrian characters.

That aside, it neither reached proportions of similar Saudi-run (and based) enterprises (all of 'private' nature, of course, even though seeing involvement of countless 'Princess', i.e. members of the ruling family), nor was ever based on any kind of official, political decisions.

Let me guess: as next you're going to say that this should be 'impossible', because Libya and Syria are such 'dictatorships', and neither Gathaffi nor Assad would have left such things to happen while they were in control?

Well, sorry: but no 'dictatorship' has total control over all the cliques upon which it depends for retaining itself in power. On the contrary, most of dictatorships very much depend to let such cliques do whatever they like, in order to keep them happy, and receive their support in return.

Instead of that, ask yourself: why should have Syria and Libya angered their ally Iran through endangering its influence in Iraq by supporting the deployment of their (fiercely anti-Iran/Shi'a) Salafists there? Only somebody as clueless as the US military and political decisionmakers could come to such ideas. The entire operation was a purely commercial enterprise, resulting in involved intelligence-officers-cum-businessmen pocketing handsome sums. That is: until the Libyan Islamists have spoiled the party and 'divorced' themselves from al-Qaida, accusing its ideology of mindless brutality that stood in no relation to religion etc. That then created such a problem, that Gathaffi began handing them out to the CIA...

So, no matter whether it's 'West Point' or not, and no matter how serious, some reports simply stand in no relation with reality. Simply because the people writing them are sitting much too far away from the scene, and neither know nor understand the actual situation. All they get is a 'rough', very rough picture, and that leads to drawing useless conclusions.

How about another example...?

Remember that attack by US Army AH-64s on 'al-Qaida terrorists in Syria', launched with explanation that the family in question was launching attacks on US troops inside Iraq, from few years ago? Supposedly, the family had 'al-Qaida links', and was able to - after each attack on US troops in Iraq - flee over the border to safety of Syria, where the regime was 'harbouring' them.

Well, the family/clan in question did do so, but had no al-Qaida links, which is why the regime couldn't care less about them. Actually, it was staunchly Communist-Marxist (yup, you read that right: Communist-Marxist). But, they were declared 'al-Qaida' by the US military, because a) nobody knew that (about their Communist orientation), b) nobody would come to the idea that 'anybody else but al-Qaida' would come to the idea to go fighting US troops in Iraq, and c) declaring them 'al-Qaida' was obviously more opportune: imagine Pentagon having to explain it's risking provoking a war with Syria in order to hit a family that's attacking its troops inside Iraq, and that's 'communist' by political orientation, but not al-Qaida linked. All the glorious journos would fall from their chairs from laughing. Nobody would buy it, simply because the public opinion is that 'anti-communist wars are a matter of history'.

As usually, that's 'hairsplitting', but that's Syria, gentlemen: there are villages of staunch Salafists right next to villages of extremist Christians, right next to villages of convinced Communists, right next to villages of Sunni Kurds, right next to villages of Salafist Kurds, rights next to villages of moderate Sunnis, right next to villages of Islamist Sunnis, right next to villages of Alawites etc., etc., etc. They live like that at least since the Mongol invasion in the 13th Century. That's why 'understanding Syria' requires a sort of 'micro-knowledge': to understand what's going on there, to 'know it', one needs to know precisely what is what family, clan, village, interest group (because there are big differences between interests of Syrian peasants and Syrian intellectuals, for example) etc. thinking, what is its primary, what is its secondary etc. interest, how is it politically and religiously oriented etc., etc., etc.

[CrowBat]

Here something more about origins of 'inter-ethnic/religious strife' in Syria, plus the 'miraculous' recovery of the Assadist regime during 2013. The following article is a very long read (11 pages) and does contain some of usual errors, but in regards of Suleimani it's 'quite on the money':

The Shadow Commander (http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_filkins?currentPage=1)

...Last February, some of Iran’s most influential leaders gathered at the Amir al-Momenin Mosque, in northeast Tehran, inside a gated community reserved for officers of the Revolutionary Guard. They had come to pay their last respects to a fallen comrade. Hassan Shateri, a veteran of Iran’s covert wars throughout the Middle East and South Asia, was a senior commander in a powerful, élite branch of the Revolutionary Guard called the Quds Force.
...
Shateri had been killed two days before, on the road that runs between Damascus and Beirut. He had gone to Syria, along with thousands of other members of the Quds Force, to rescue the country’s besieged President, Bashar al-Assad, a crucial ally of Iran. In the past few years, Shateri had worked under an alias as the Quds Force’s chief in Lebanon; there he had helped sustain the armed group Hezbollah, which at the time of the funeral had begun to pour men into Syria to fight for the regime. The circumstances of his death were unclear: one Iranian official said that Shateri had been “directly targeted” by “the Zionist regime,” as Iranians habitually refer to Israel.

At the funeral, the mourners sobbed, and some beat their chests in the Shiite way. Shateri’s casket was wrapped in an Iranian flag, and gathered around it were the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, dressed in green fatigues; a member of the plot to murder four exiled opposition leaders in a Berlin restaurant in 1992; and the father of Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah commander believed to be responsible for the bombings that killed more than two hundred and fifty Americans in Beirut in 1983. Mughniyeh was assassinated in 2008, purportedly by Israeli agents. In the ethos of the Iranian revolution, to die was to serve. Before Shateri’s funeral, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country’s Supreme Leader, released a note of praise: “In the end, he drank the sweet syrup of martyrdom.”
...
Kneeling in the second row on the mosque’s carpeted floor was Major General Qassem Suleimani, the Quds Force’s leader: a small man of fifty-six, with silver hair, a close-cropped beard, and a look of intense self-containment. It was Suleimani who had sent Shateri, an old and trusted friend, to his death.
...
Suleimani took command of the Quds Force fifteen years ago, and in that time he has sought to reshape the Middle East in Iran’s favor, working as a power broker and as a military force: assassinating rivals, arming allies, and, for most of a decade, directing a network of militant groups that killed hundreds of Americans in Iraq.
...
The early months of 2013, around the time of Shateri’s death, marked a low point for the Iranian intervention in Syria. Assad was steadily losing ground to the rebels, who are dominated by Sunnis, Iran’s rivals. If Assad fell, the Iranian regime would lose its link to Hezbollah, its forward base against Israel. In a speech, one Iranian cleric said, “If we lose Syria, we cannot keep Tehran.”

Although the Iranians were severely strained by American sanctions, imposed to stop the regime from developing a nuclear weapon, they were unstinting in their efforts to save Assad. Among other things, they extended a seven-billion-dollar loan to shore up the Syrian economy. “I don’t think the Iranians are calculating this in terms of dollars,” a Middle Eastern security official told me. “They regard the loss of Assad as an existential threat.” For Suleimani, saving Assad seemed a matter of pride, especially if it meant distinguishing himself from the Americans. “Suleimani told us the Iranians would do whatever was necessary,” a former Iraqi leader told me. “He said, ‘We’re not like the Americans. We don’t abandon our friends.’ ”
...
Last year, Suleimani asked Kurdish leaders in Iraq to allow him to open a supply route across northern Iraq and into Syria. For years, he had bullied and bribed the Kurds into coöperating with his plans, but this time they rebuffed him. Worse, Assad’s soldiers wouldn’t fight—or, when they did, they mostly butchered civilians, driving the populace to the rebels. “The Syrian Army is useless!” Suleimani told an Iraqi politician. He longed for the Basij, the Iranian militia whose fighters crushed the popular uprisings against the regime in 2009. “Give me one brigade of the Basij, and I could conquer the whole country,” he said. In August, 2012, anti-Assad rebels captured forty-eight Iranians inside Syria. Iranian leaders protested that they were pilgrims, come to pray at a holy Shiite shrine, but the rebels, as well as Western intelligence agencies, said that they were members of the Quds Force. In any case, they were valuable enough so that Assad agreed to release more than two thousand captured rebels to have them freed. And then Shateri was killed.

Finally, Suleimani began flying into Damascus frequently so that he could assume personal control of the Iranian intervention. “He’s running the war himself,” an American defense official told me. In Damascus, he is said to work out of a heavily fortified command post in a nondescript building, where he has installed a multinational array of officers: the heads of the Syrian military, a Hezbollah commander, and a coördinator of Iraqi Shiite militias, which Suleimani mobilized and brought to the fight. If Suleimani couldn’t have the Basij, he settled for the next best thing: Brigadier General Hossein Hamedani, the Basij’s former deputy commander. Hamedani, another comrade from the Iran-Iraq War, was experienced in running the kind of irregular militias that the Iranians were assembling, in order to keep on fighting if Assad fell.
...
Late last year, Western officials began to notice a sharp increase in Iranian supply flights into the Damascus airport. Instead of a handful a week, planes were coming every day, carrying weapons and ammunition—“tons of it,” the Middle Eastern security official told me—along with officers from the Quds Force. According to American officials, the officers coördinated attacks, trained militias, and set up an elaborate system to monitor rebel communications. They also forced the various branches of Assad’s security services—designed to spy on one another—to work together. The Middle Eastern security official said that the number of Quds Force operatives, along with the Iraqi Shiite militiamen they brought with them, reached into the thousands. “They’re spread out across the entire country,” he told me.

A turning point came in April, after rebels captured the Syrian town of Qusayr, near the Lebanese border. To retake the town, Suleimani called on Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, to send in more than two thousand fighters. It wasn’t a difficult sell. Qusayr sits at the entrance to the Bekaa Valley, the main conduit for missiles and other matériel to Hezbollah; if it was closed, Hezbollah would find it difficult to survive. Suleimani and Nasrallah are old friends, having coöperated for years in Lebanon and in the many places around the world where Hezbollah operatives have performed terrorist missions at the Iranians’ behest. According to Will Fulton, an Iran expert at the American Enterprise Institute, Hezbollah fighters encircled Qusayr, cutting off the roads, then moved in. Dozens of them were killed, as were at least eight Iranian officers. On June 5th, the town fell. “The whole operation was orchestrated by Suleimani,” Maguire, who is still active in the region, said. “It was a great victory for him.”
...


...and then there comes the best part (page 7):

...Suleimani’s campaign against the United States crossed the Sunni-Shiite divide, which he has always been willing to set aside for a larger purpose. Iraqi and Western officials told me that, early in the war, Suleimani encouraged the head of intelligence for the Assad regime to facilitate the movement of Sunni extremists through Syria to fight the Americans. In many cases, Al Qaeda was also allowed a degree of freedom in Iran as well. Crocker told me that in May, 2003, the Americans received intelligence that Al Qaeda fighters in Iran were preparing an attack on Western targets in Saudi Arabia. Crocker was alarmed. “They were there, under Iranian protection, planning operations,” he said. He flew to Geneva and passed a warning to the Iranians, but to no avail; militants bombed three residential compounds in Riyadh, killing thirty-five people, including nine Americans.

As it turned out, the Iranian strategy of abetting Sunni extremists backfired horrendously: shortly after the occupation began, the same extremists began attacking Shiite civilians and the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government. It was a preview of the civil war to come. “Welcome to the Middle East,” the Western diplomat in Baghdad told me. “Suleimani wanted to bleed the Americans, so he invited in the jihadis, and things got out of control.”
...

[CrowBat]

And in the following case, the title is entirely misleading, but the below-cited content is interesting. It shows how the ISIS is 'taking over' the Syrian insurgency, and why do I compare its reign of terror with that of Assadists:
The Islamist Enemy of Our Islamist Enemy (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/31/the_rise_of_syrias_islamic_front_al_qaeda#sthash.k i5mFFjR.dpbs)

...
When he was a fighter with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), waging war against President Bashar al-Assad's forces in the northern economic hub of Aleppo, Abu Muhannad's confidence verged on presumptuousness. He spent 2012 and part of 2013 fighting alongside his comrades in the Martyrs' Swords battalion and, upon their return from the front lines, the young fighters would gather to reflect on their most recent victory as they smoked arguileh and drank cups of bitter tea.

The Free Syrian Army, the loose-knit, Western-backed rebel umbrella group, eventually succumbed to irrelevance due to poor funding and lack of cohesiveness. Abu Muhannad's small battalion disbanded and he found himself stranded, without the safety afforded by membership into a group. Still, he chose to remain in his home country, hoping to find himself a place among the new rebel realignments.

Then, a few weeks ago, he sat down for tea with a young French fighter.

The Frenchman was a member of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), an al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Their conversation devolved into a heated argument -- the French jihadist felt that Abu Muhannad, a devout Muslim, was too focused on fighting for the liberation of Syria rather than waging a global jihad. He chided Abu Muhannad for calling the country Syria instead of bilad al-sham, an expression favored by global jihadists that refers to the entire Levant, which they believe should be the focal point of a new Islamic state.

"It was a fight over terminology," said Abu Muhannad, who was reached via Skype in the Turkish city of Antakya where he has been staying with a friend. "He accused me of being secretly secular because I was being patriotic instead of referring to the country as an Islamic emirate. I told him he wasn't here to teach me about my own religion."

The French fighter walked away in the middle of the argument. The following day, Abu Muhannad's friends informed him that ISIS was planning to assassinate him. Abu Muhannad claimed the al Qaeda-linked group had tried to kill him once before, and that he had narrowly escaped. Shortly after Abu Muhannad fled to Turkey, ISIS captured his younger brother, a citizen journalist, who remains imprisoned to this day. Abu Muhannad suspects the group is holding his brother indefinitely to lure him back to Syria.

This is not the first time that an FSA fighter finds himself driven out of the country by ISIS. The extremist group has repeatedly clashed with not only FSA rebels, but also with like-minded Islamist brigades, often over petty disputes. An undercurrent of tension pervades the relationship between ISIS, which ultimately seeks to establish and Islamic emirate in Syria, and the constellation of moderate Sunni fighters who simply want to oust Bashar al-Assad from power.

The experience of being exiled from his own country by foreign Jihadists has left Abu Muhannad as livid at ISIS as he is at the Syrian regime.

"They have these disgusting, smelly beards. They won't even comb their hair. If I knew the revolution would bring them here, I swear I would never have participated in it," he said. "Did I rebel against the regime to end up in hiding? And who am I running away from? Chechens? European fanatics? Who are those people? They have overstayed their welcome."
...

[AdamG]

A sophisticated recruiting campaign conducted openly on social media, including Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, seems to have played a large role in drawing the estimated thousands of foreign fighters who have come to Syria to fight for two Al Qaeda-linked rebel factions, Al Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and other Sunni Islamist groups.

http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-syria--foreign-fighters-20140102,0,3288393.story#ixzz2pG5s3Tim

[carl]

The Quds force leader said this "‘We’re not like the Americans. We don’t abandon our friends.’ ”.

That is quite an indictment. If he thinks that, others in the world think that so things may go hard for us in the future.

[Dayuhan]

The Quds force leader said this "‘We’re not like the Americans. We don’t abandon our friends.’ ”.

That is quite an indictment. If he thinks that, others in the world think that so things may go hard for us in the future.

Did the US ever have a friend to abandon in Syria?

[carl]

Did the US ever have a friend to abandon in Syria?

Did you ever actually state a position with a plain statement?

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Crowbat


And I already explained above what I think about anybody stating that the 'MOBs and al-Qaida are now leading forces fighting...against the Syrian government'. That's simply nonsense.

I don't think anyone claimed AQ was leading the fight, but claims have been made that AQ is rapidly gaining more influence in this ever evolving conflict.


Nonsense of this kind is one of about a million of reasons why I said above, that monitoring the conflict in Syria in this fashion is an 'utter fail'.

1.) Already years before that report was written (2007), the LIF distanced itself from al-Qaida (the Libyans concluded the al-Qaida for 'too extremist').

2.) It is bordering on stupid, and definitely showing an inherent lack of understanding for local circumstances, to come to the idea to expect the (former) axis Libya-Syria-Iran to 'support al-Qaida'. I thought it's meanwhile well-known that this product of Qusay Bush admin's imagination should be sorted in the same file with 'Iraqi WMDs'. Apparently, this is not the case, so let me add 'few details' here.

I didn't realize you were in a position to know so much more than our intelligence community, or our soldiers on the ground actually fighting the foreign fighters from Libya. As for West Point's assessment, there is always the risk it won't be as accurate as classified information, but the opposite is also true since the intelligence community can move into group think or be deceived by a clever adversary. The CTC at West Point does a better job than most making sense of the available information. Could it be wrong? You bet it can.

Where you got Libya-Syria-Iran axis supporting AQ beats me, one thing Assad and the U.S. had/have in common is a mutual dislike for AQ. Iran on the other hand may use them as proxy for limited operations, but I don't think they would form a coalition with them. They know AQ is responsible for the slaughter of Shia.


Syria and Libya maintained close military and security cooperation since the early 1970s. In some regards this cooperation was so close that entire squadrons of Libyan Air Force were staffed by Syrians (to a degree where some called it 'Syrian Air Force West').

The Libyans supporting AQ were not supported by Qadaffi, they hated him, just like they hated Assad, Saddam, the House of Saad and any other dictator in the region. The governments of Libya and Syria were state sponsors of terror, but not AQ. Both states trained communist terrorists from Europe and the IRA, along with some Palestinian groups. Almost all, if not all, the groups they supported were secular in nature, therefore easy to control.


Later on, this cooperation became tripartite, through inclusion of Iran (see Libya selling SA-2s, T-72s and Scuds to Iran via Syria, an Iranian pilot test-flying a Libyan MiG-25 etc., in mid-1980s). When Libya was under various embargoes, in the 1990s, it was Iranians and Syrians that maintained its air force (that's one of reasons why the SyAAF nowadays has 'at least 1 Su-24 too much': this was donated to it by Libya, as 'thanks' for help in maintenance). Thus, connections on military level were well-established already since ages, and used extensively by all three sides.

Like I said, states are rational actors, and any state will work with a lesser enemy if they help them challenge the greater enemy. It has been that way throughout history. You can't apply the same logic to non-state actors that are motivated by religious extremism.


Over the times, some of involved people understood that such connections can be exploited in a very profitable fashion... 'Profitable' in sense of really 'stuffing money into your pockets, hon'. Of course, markets are the third stage of social/political development.


Now, as of around 2004, after the first wave of 'euphoria' about 'let's go fighting GIs in Iraq' was over, somebody in Libya came to the idea to do his holy brother leader a favour and start exporting local Islamists to Iraq, literally. Like Syrian regime, so also the Libyan was actively prosecuting, torturing and executing Islamists since ages (while Assads had a problem with the MOBs, Gathaffists had a problem with Senussis).

Almost sounds like we're in agreement here. Qadaffi and Assad both prosecuted Islamists. Like most states they can't control their entire population, and it may have made sense to them to let their radicals go to Iraq and die.


However, and no matter how 'politically-' or 'religion-coloured' various Western intelligence services have seen the resulting 'operation of Libyan and Syrian intelligence services', this was no 'operation of Libyan and Syrian intelligence services', but a commercial enterprise of several influential Libyan and Syrian characters. Um, that sounds like a non-state network that was established, which earlier you denied existed?


Let me guess: as next you're going to say that this should be 'impossible', because Libya and Syria are such 'dictatorships', and neither Gathaffi nor Assad would have left such things to happen while they were in control?

Contraire, it happens in our country, and although we're not a dictatorship we probably have more layers and more effective security forces, so I would be surprised if it didn't happen there.


Well, sorry: but no 'dictatorship' has total control over all the cliques upon which it depends for retaining itself in power. On the contrary, most of dictatorships very much depend to let such cliques do whatever they like, in order to keep them happy, and receive their support in return.

No need to apologize, everyone who visits SWJ and has even an elementary knowledge of reality realizes this.


Instead of that, ask yourself: why should have Syria and Libya angered their ally Iran through endangering its influence in Iraq by supporting the deployment of their (fiercely anti-Iran/Shi'a) Salafists there? Only somebody as clueless as the US military and political decisionmakers could come to such ideas. The entire operation was a purely commercial enterprise, resulting in involved intelligence-officers-cum-businessmen pocketing handsome sums. That is: until the Libyan Islamists have spoiled the party and 'divorced' themselves from al-Qaida, accusing its ideology of mindless brutality that stood in no relation to religion etc. That then created such a problem, that Gathaffi began handing them out to the CIA...

I give your argument partial credit for sounding credible, but they were hardly a serious threat to Iran's interests in Iraq, and in fact the civil war was in Iran's interest, it created enough chaos for them to establish more influence, and with the vast majority of the population being Shia who was going to be victorious was never in doubt, so I don't think they turned on Iran.


So, no matter whether it's 'West Point' or not, and no matter how serious, some reports simply stand in no relation with reality. Simply because the people writing them are sitting much too far away from the scene, and neither know nor understand the actual situation. All they get is a 'rough', very rough picture, and that leads to drawing useless conclusions.

Some people sitting far away have a lot of contacts up close and personal.


Well, the family/clan in question did do so, but had no al-Qaida links, which is why the regime couldn't care less about them. Actually, it was staunchly Communist-Marxist (yup, you read that right: Communist-Marxist). But, they were declared 'al-Qaida' by the US military, because a) nobody knew that (about their Communist orientation), b) nobody would come to the idea that 'anybody else but al-Qaida' would come to the idea to go fighting US troops in Iraq, and c) declaring them 'al-Qaida' was obviously more opportune: imagine Pentagon having to explain it's risking provoking a war with Syria in order to hit a family that's attacking its troops inside Iraq, and that's 'communist' by political orientation, but not al-Qaida linked. All the glorious journos would fall from their chairs from laughing. Nobody would buy it, simply because the public opinion is that 'anti-communist wars are a matter of history'.

Can't speak for the rest of the military, but we were very much aware of the Leninist groups trying to get established in Iraq, but for obvious reasons they didn't garner much of a following.


As usually, that's 'hairsplitting', but that's Syria, gentlemen: there are villages of staunch Salafists right next to villages of extremist Christians, right next to villages of convinced Communists, right next to villages of Sunni Kurds, right next to villages of Salafist Kurds, rights next to villages of moderate Sunnis, right next to villages of Islamist Sunnis, right next to villages of Alawites etc., etc., etc. They live like that at least since the Mongol invasion in the 13th Century. That's why 'understanding Syria' requires a sort of 'micro-knowledge': to understand what's going on there, to 'know it', one needs to know precisely what is what family, clan, village, interest group (because there are big differences between interests of Syrian peasants and Syrian intellectuals, for example) etc. thinking, what is its primary, what is its secondary etc. interest, how is it politically and religiously oriented etc., etc., etc. Same as its ever been.

[Dayuhan]

Did you ever actually state a position with a plain statement?

I'll try:

1. The Quds force doesn't care what we say about them, and we don't need to care what they say about us.

2. The US can't possibly "abandon its friends" in Syria, because the US has no friends in Syria to abandon. Refusing to be played by those who pretend to be our friends in order to gain access to our favor and largesse is not abandonment.

3. Nations don't have friends, they have allies. Allies are those with whom a nation has common interests. Interests change, and so do alliances. That's not abandonment, that's change.

[CrowBat]

Bill,
the IF just launched a 'major' offensive on the ISIS in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces. First reports indicate heavy losses on both sides, but also the IF overrunning several ISIS bases.

Bottom line: whether the ISIS is even only 'gaining', as some say, or (already) 'leading', as other say, they're not the same like even the JAN, not to talk about the IF, and thus all polemic in this direction (including the one about 'we've got no friends there') is simply surplus.

Regarding LIFG and that WP report (from 2007): Perhaps the CTC-guys should've read the LIFG entry on Wikipedia to get themselves informed? No clue, and I neither have the time to search you various sources of reference that appeared 'even' on the internet in the last 15 or so years, nor can care less any more (nothing personal: it's a decision I've taken nearly 15 years ago), but their report about LIFG-al-Qaida cooperation was definitely 'obsolete' the moment it was published. No surprise: just another of so many fails from that period of time.


Where you got Libya-Syria-Iran axis supporting AQ beats me, one thing Assad and the U.S. had/have in common is a mutual dislike for AQ. Iran on the other hand may use them as proxy for limited operations, but I don't think they would form a coalition with them. They know AQ is responsible for the slaughter of Shia.Don't know whether it's my 'subtle' sarcasm, but we're simply not at the same level of information and understanding (not even after I posted you a link that would offer you an answer regarding the Iranian involvement in this business).

Anyway, perhaps my memory is 'entirely wrong', but I very much do recall the times when DC couldn't put enough blame upon Tehran 'supporting al-Qaida' (I definitely do recall chatting with quite a number of 'Colonels+', all of whom were 'convinced' this was the case 'because intelligence said so').

As explained above (well, I did try), it was so that specific circles in Libya and Syria found it opportune to 'export' Islamists to Iraq and Afghanistan - for purely commercial reasons; perhaps the LIFG - as such - wouldn't have gone there. Who can know now... Anyway, the Iranians (that is: Khamenei, and, on his order, al-Qods too), found that idea 'not bad', though for other reasons (causing troubles for the USA in Iraq). Eventually, the idea back-fired (upon Iraqi Shi'a), with well-known consequences. But, and that's the point: this 'cooperation' was never born out of 'preference' or anything like political decisions to 'support al-Qaida', whether in Tehran, Tripoli or Damascus, in Qom, Benghazi, Dernah or anywhere else.


The Libyans supporting AQ...Not even 'Islamist extremist' Libyans (not to talk about 'Q') have ever 'supported' al-Qaida: they established their own organization, the LIFG, and attempted cooperating with al-Qaida. Then they found out what al-Qaida is, and 'divorced'. That's the essence of the - grey, as usually (i.e. no 'black & white') - story I told you above.


Um, that sounds like a non-state network that was established, which earlier you denied existed?Where did I do that? The last I recall I was wondering how can anybody come to the idea to expect there 'must' be a 'state-sponsored network' in the back of the ISIS....


Some people sitting far away have a lot of contacts up close and personal.Few people certainly do. Especially those who have spent years taking walks far away on the other side of the border. The rest has meanwhile graduated at Princeton and similar places, and thinks it has 'lots of contacts up close and personal' because nowadays there is something called 'internet'...


Can't speak for the rest of the military, but we were very much aware of the Leninist groups trying to get established in Iraq, but for obvious reasons they didn't garner much of a following....which didn't prevent anybody to declare some of these 'Leninist' groups for 'al-Qaida', whenever opportune.

Anyway, gotta rush and get this one (http://www.casematepublishing.com/title.php?isbn=9781909982390) to the publisher. Hope to have more time next week again.

[carl]

I'll try:

1. The Quds force doesn't care what we say about them, and we don't need to care what they say about us.

2. The US can't possibly "abandon its friends" in Syria, because the US has no friends in Syria to abandon. Refusing to be played by those who pretend to be our friends in order to gain access to our favor and largesse is not abandonment.

3. Nations don't have friends, they have allies. Allies are those with whom a nation has common interests. Interests change, and so do alliances. That's not abandonment, that's change.

That's much better. But you missed the point.

It is important that we listen and note what they say about us for what they say can reveal what they think about us and what we may do. And that, that affects what they may do. Not only Iran either. If the Iranians have come to the conclusion that we are not to be relied upon, others are likely to have come to the same conclusion. That is important because it affects who will line up with us in a fight. If people think you aren't to be counted upon to stand by them, they aren't going to stand by you. That is not a good thing.

And when people trot out the old 'Nations don't have allies, just interests.' or 'Nations don't have friends, just allies.' or whatever the trope of the day is, those other countries have reason to suspect the constancy of the utterer. Those are facile barely concealed pre-rationalizations for bugging out on somebody whenever the whim strikes us, or so it is perceived by those potential allies or friends. Yeah right, they're gonna believe us if we say 'We'll stick by you.' followed by the 'interests, allies, no friends' or whatever bit.

Let's see. You said " Allies are those with whom a nation has common interests." Now in Syria our interests include getting rid of Assad and keeping the takfiri killers out. There are a whole lot of Syrians who are interested in getting rid of Assad and keeping the takfiri killers out. So it would seem that we could or should be allies. Hmm.

[Bill Moore]

CrowBat, I agree we have information asymmetry here, but I'm not saying who is at the disadvantage. :D While not my intent, I suspect this post is going to make you want to pull your hair out. You may have a much better understanding of nuances of who's who and what group is more dominant, but there is little in the media to support your counter arguments, at least as I understand them. It does seem based on your comments I am misreading some of your posts, so my apologies if I'm misconstruing your intent. Using media sources I'm going to attempt to make a link between AQ affiliated groups in Libya and AQ affiliated groups in in Syria.

I'll will digress to Libya briefly, and then back to Syria. I'll caveat the following statements with first I agree with your comment that this is all gray, never black and white. I'll add it is my observation (my perception) that the relationships between these groups and its members change frequently. It is a bloody kaleidoscope, and if you focus on day to day reporting instead of the trends it is beyond comprehension. I think the trends are currently positive for AQ, but I also think AQ will pull defeat out of the jaws of victory in short order like they always do because the bottom line is no one really wants their form of oppressive governance. It still leaves open the question in my pea brain on how they're so successful in exploiting these existing conflicts and rapidly gaining a dominant position, even if it is ephemeral.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/05/libyan-islamic-fighting-group-leaders

The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group – from al-Qaida to the Arab spring
The Libyan anti-Gaddafi group with past links to al-Qaida has been the focus of British intelligence interest for 20 years


Founded in 1990 in eastern Libya and accused of attempting to kill Gaddafi three times – according to unconfirmed claims with help from MI6 – the LIFG was effectively defeated on its home turf by 1998. Its cadres fled first to Sudan and Afghanistan and Iraq where hundreds joined al-Qaida. It was officially disbanded in 2010.


Other top ex-LIFG figures remain in al-Qaida. Its chief of operations, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, a Libyan, was killed two weeks ago in a CIA drone strike. His likely successor, Abu Yahya al-Libi, is also Libyan.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8407047/Libyan-rebel-commander-admits-his-fighters-have-al-Qaeda-links.html

Libyan rebel commander admits his fighters have al-Qaeda links
Abdel-Hakim al-Hasidi, the Libyan rebel leader, has said jihadists who fought against allied troops in Iraq are on the front lines of the battle against Muammar Gaddafi's regime.

In my opinion there are clear links between many Libyans and Al-Qaeda, and some Libyans actually became part of Al-Qaeda core. Now I'll transition to linking them to Syria.

The following article on AQ is actually worthy of its own thread, so I'll probably start one focused on this article without focusing on Syria, but a couple of excerpts to facilitate the promised transition from this article are helpful.

http://www.eurasiareview.com/26122013-three-versions-al-qaeda-primer/

The Three Versions Of Al Qaeda: A Primer



Ansar al Sharia in Libya: 2012 – 2013

In the wake of Muammar al Gaddafi’s fall, the security vacuum in Libya not only enabled the rise of AQIM in the Sahel but also freed previously suppressed extremist elements in the country. Ansar al Sharia, a grassroots extremist group sharing the name of AQAP’s insurgent organization in Yemen, emerged in the former bastions of eastern Libya previously home to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and known for supplying numerous foreign fighters to Iraq. The group rose to international prominence after being connected to the 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, killing a U.S. ambassador, among others. The group has been challenged locally but appears a natural conduit for al Qaeda activities in Libya.


Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham in Syria: 2011 – 2013

No battlefield presents a greater opportunity to al Qaeda than Syria. Syria’s revolution has endured for two years allowing a small group of al Qaeda-connected extremists to emerge as a dominant force against the Assad regime. To date, the Syrian jihad has likely produced the largest migration of foreign fighters in history, eclipsing the supplies of both Afghanistan in the 1980s and Iraq and Afghanistan during the 2000s. Jabhat al Nusra initiated the first jihadist effort in Syria but has since been matched by a creeping al Qaeda in Iraq that has challenged both Nusra and al Qaeda’s leader Zawahiri by creating the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in an attempt to take control of the jihad in Syria. This public rift provides the only buffer to a jihadist movement unmet by Western counterterrorism efforts.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/10/social_media_jihad_ansar_al_sh_1.php

Social Media Jihad: Ansar al Sharia Libya's new Twitter feed


Ansar al Sharia Libya, the al Qaeda-linked group that was involved in the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist attack in Benghazi, has a new Twitter feed. The Twitter page, which can be found here, was apparently launched in the last 24 hours. The group announced its new Twitter presence on its Facebook page.

SITE reports:


Although the Facebook posts did not document the content of the speeches or reading materials passed out at the event, the group's past publications and statements have resolutely rejected democracy and praised al Qaeda. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the group is helping to funnel foreign fighters to Syria where they link up with al Qaeda's affiliates there.

http://freebeacon.com/u-s-al-qaeda-linked-group-behind-benghazi-attack-trains-jihadists-for-syrian-rebel-groups/

U.S.: Al Qaeda-linked Group Behind Benghazi Attack Trains Jihadists for Syrian Rebel Groups

Ansar al-Sharia running training camps in Benghazi and Darnah


U.S. intelligence agencies believe Libya has produced more jihadist rebels for the Syrian conflict than any other outside nation. Some 20 percent of foreign jihadists in Syria came from Libya and that several hundred are currently in the country.

Over 100 Libyans were reported killed in Syrian fighting for such rebel groups as Al-Nusra Front, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Umma Brigade, Muhajirin Brigade, and Ahrar al-Sham, an Al-Nusra offshoot.

Now some good news as you pointed out above.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25606370

Al-Qaeda-linked Isis under attack in northern Syria


Isis is fighting Free Syrian Army groups as well as the Islamic Front, a coalition of Syrian rebel factions which also wants to build an Islamic state in Syria.


Other rebel groups say Isis has attempted to hijack their struggle for its own ends.

This makes perfect sense since the U.S. and other nations will put pressure on foreign donors to limit support to the resistance if it is perceived to be linked to, or dominated by AQ. Killing off the ISIS operatives in Syria may open the flood gates for effective military aid to the resistance.

I'll end with a commentary from the Washington Post today.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-slow-motion-conflagration-around-syria/2014/01/04/d8691ac0-748e-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_story.html

The slow-motion conflagration around Syria


STATE DEPARTMENT officials have been warning for nearly two years that Syria’s civil war, if not brought to a prompt end, could blossom into a regional conflagration that consumes Iraq and Lebanon and threatens vital U.S. interests. Their predictions have been coming true, but in slow motion, enabling those who hope to ignore the growing danger — notably President Obama — to remain complacent.

This week brought another potential wake-up call, in the form of a disturbing escalation of terrorist violence in both countries. In Iraq, al-Qaeda launched an offensive to take control of two cities, Fallujah and Ramadi, that U.S. troops sacrificed heavily to clear of terrorists between 2004 and 2008. In Lebanon, a car bomb exploded in a Hezbollah-controlled suburb of Beirut just days after a prominent critic of the Shiite movement was assassinated in another bombing.

[carl]

It still leaves open the question in my pea brain on how they're so successful in exploiting these existing conflicts and rapidly gaining a dominant position, even if it is ephemeral.

I wonder if is mostly an effective PR campaign that allows them to scratch the itches of three groups of people, the rich Gulf Arabs who feel guilty about not being pious enough, the frustrated young men who want some action but also need to feel pious when they get it and the wild eyed true believers who again need to feel pious. AQ it seems to me relies very heavily on the idea that supporting them make one more Muslim than thou. That self-conferred religious imprimatur is vital to their success. It underlies everything. If they didn't have it, they would just be another group of soreheads trying to gain power.

When they do get power for a time in a local place, that image they rely on falls away quickly. Beheading people for eating the wrong kind of salad tends to sour the locals on their rule. The reality quickly overshadows the promise and they get kicked out, or have been and hopefully will be again. But even if that happens, that image of piety is still there and so the money and the men keep coming.

I hope they will get kicked out again. But is it certain they will be? That is really a rhetorical question but there have been some regimes whose rule is as bad as that of AQ would probably be that have lasted a long time, the Kim dynasty in North Korea being a good example.

[Dayuhan]

That's much better. But you missed the point.

It is important that we listen and note what they say about us for what they say can reveal what they think about us and what we may do. And that, that affects what they may do.

If we react to their statements, they will calibrate their statements to produce the reactions that they want. That gives them power over us. Why would we want to do that?


If the Iranians have come to the conclusion that we are not to be relied upon, others are likely to have come to the same conclusion.

The Iranians and others can come to the conclusion that we are not about to stick our meat in the grinder just because the Saudis want us to. Of course they will try to taunt us into doing something stupid, at which point they will turn around and accuse us (justly) of being hired muscle for the Saudis. Any particular gain in falling into that trap?

Those who wish to reach conclusions can reach the conclusion that we act in accordance with our own perceived interests. What other conclusion would we want?


That is important because it affects who will line up with us in a fight. If people think you aren't to be counted upon to stand by them, they aren't going to stand by you. That is not a good thing.

Who gains more by lining up with us in a fight? Us, or the people we line up with? We are being played by people who want our help, and want us to put their interests above ours. Get it? Why would we walk into a quagmire that we haven't a snowball's chance in hell of resolving just because a few people want to be our "friends"... you know, the kind of "friends" that want a lot and offer nothing but trouble.


And when people trot out the old 'Nations don't have allies, just interests.' or 'Nations don't have friends, just allies.' or whatever the trope of the day is, those other countries have reason to suspect the constancy of the utterer.

Good. It's about time people figured that out. The only consistency anyone can expect from us or any other nation is consistent pursuit of our own perceived interests. Anyone who can't deal with that needs to find a different world to live in. If we promise you help and you show you can't use the help effectively, the help will stop. We can be generous, but we aren't stupid. How is that a wrong message?


Those are facile barely concealed pre-rationalizations for bugging out on somebody whenever the whim strikes us, or so it is perceived by those potential allies or friends. Yeah right, they're gonna believe us if we say 'We'll stick by you.' followed by the 'interests, allies, no friends' or whatever bit.

Of course "we'll stick by you" is never going to be unconditional. Nobody can be expected to sink with someone else's ship. It's always limited, and it's always conditional.


Let's see. You said " Allies are those with whom a nation has common interests." Now in Syria our interests include getting rid of Assad and keeping the takfiri killers out. There are a whole lot of Syrians who are interested in getting rid of Assad and keeping the takfiri killers out. So it would seem that we could or should be allies. Hmm.

Ok, so who are these people? Are they organized? Have they capacity? Can they assure that if we send them guns and/or money the guns and money will go to the fight, and not somewhere else? Have we any evidence to suggest that the people who want our help are not just playing us for whatever they can get? Not like we haven't been there and done that #IraqiNationalCongress.

You missed the most important interest we have in Syria: keeping us out. That is and should be (IMO) at the top of the objectives list by a substantial margin. Ain't nuthin' there for us but mess we don't need.

[Bill Moore]

I wonder if is mostly an effective PR campaign that allows them to scratch the itches of three groups of people, the rich Gulf Arabs who feel guilty about not being pious enough, the frustrated young men who want some action but also need to feel pious when they get it and the wild eyed true believers who again need to feel pious. AQ it seems to me relies very heavily on the idea that supporting them make one more Muslim than thou. That self-conferred religious imprimatur is vital to their success. It underlies everything. If they didn't have it, they would just be another group of soreheads trying to gain power.

When they do get power for a time in a local place, that image they rely on falls away quickly. Beheading people for eating the wrong kind of salad tends to sour the locals on their rule. The reality quickly overshadows the promise and they get kicked out, or have been and hopefully will be again. But even if that happens, that image of piety is still there and so the money and the men keep coming.

I hope they will get kicked out again. But is it certain they will be? That is really a rhetorical question but there have been some regimes whose rule is as bad as that of AQ would probably be that have lasted a long time, the Kim dynasty in North Korea being a good example.

I think your hypothesis has some merit. I their narrative/ideology has a powerful attraction, and it doesn't hurt to actually have a bad government or occupying powers to leverage your narrative against. If they weren't such a simple bunch of thugs who with very limited religious education in most cases who felt entitled to pass judgment and impose cruel punishments for the stupidest and pettiness of perceived wrong doings they might even become effective. Instead they keep repeating the same dumb mistakes, and people begin to see them for who they really are. I don't want to champion Pakistan here, but when the Pakistani Taliban took over a relatively peaceful and moderate part of Pakistan and imposed their stupidity upon that population the population was aching for the military to toss them out. A Pakistani military officer said that was the plan to begin with, let the people see whose these Taliban really are for a couple of weeks, and then they'll assist the government tossing them out which they did.

As to your rhetorical question, who knows. I am seeing a lot of reports of the locals in Fallujah preparing to fight Al-Qaeda there. While they have no love affair with the Shia government it appears they hate AQ even more which is telling.

[ODB]

I am playing catch up on Syria and Iraq as my focus has been elsewhere for some time now; however I would like to pose a few questions to those who have been focused on the situations.

My first questions involve a couple of names who have not been mentioned in some time: Mahammad Yunis al-Ahmad (MYA) and 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri. I wonder how much of a hand these two have in the fighting taking place in Syria and Iraq? I pose they are more involved in Iraq than Syria due to their ties with the Assad regime and having been in hiding in Syria for years. Do they simply want to reinstate the Ba'ath Party in Iraq and/or was there a falling out with the Assad regime? Doing some research on Google al-Douri (thought to have died) has reemerged http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10065919/Izzat-Ibrahim-al-Douri-the-King-of-Clubs-is-back-and-he-may-yet-prove-to-be-Saddam-Husseins-trump-card.html. Interesting he plays on the "Persian" aspect. MYA has remained out of the spotlight as I cannot find any recent open source information regarding MYA's activities. I cannot overlook these two as having a role in the current situation in both countries and would appreciate other's opinions regarding their role.

I ultimately wonder who the wizard behind the curtain is playing puppet master in Syria and the desired end-state?

Lastly, regarding the reemergence of AQ I pose this question, has AQ grown that strong or is it the USG simply applying labels which are incorrect. I have seen this many times over the years, the mislabeling of groups or individuals to meet agendas.

[CrowBat]

So, the stuff is 'in the box', early, so here few additional things...


CrowBat, I agree we have information asymmetry here, but I'm not saying who is at the disadvantage. :D While not my intent, I suspect this post is going to make you want to pull your hair out. You may have a much better understanding of nuances of who's who and what group is more dominant, but there is little in the media to support your counter arguments, at least as I understand them.There is usually next to nothing or only directly contradicting information to mine, 'in the media'.

If you like a classic example: when I co-authored Iranian F-14 Units in Combat (https://www.amazon.co.uk/Iranian-Tomcat-Units-Combat-Aircraft/dp/1841767875), some 12-13 years back, people couldn't ridicule me enough because 'everybody knows that Iranian Tomcats are non-operational since 1979'. Guess that's life, and so I ceased pulling my hair long, long ago. Trust me, the life is better then. ;-)


...It is a bloody kaleidoscope, and if you focus on day to day reporting instead of the trends it is beyond comprehension. I think the trends are currently positive for AQ, but I also think AQ will pull defeat out of the jaws of victory in short order like they always do because the bottom line is no one really wants their form of oppressive governance. It still leaves open the question in my pea brain on how they're so successful in exploiting these existing conflicts and rapidly gaining a dominant position, even if it is ephemeral.Yes, it's a 'bloody' kaleidoscope, in all shades of grey. It's a very grey zone, primarily because - and despite strenuous attempts to present itself as such - AQ is no homogenous group. Actually, it's easier for them to bunch together various idiots from Western Europe, than 'originals' from such different places like Algeria, Egypt and Pakistan...

Though, certain things always depend on your definitions of words 'successful', 'rapidly' etc.


In my opinion there are clear links between many Libyans and Al-Qaeda, and some Libyans actually became part of Al-Qaeda core.No doubt about 'some Libyans' - including a few from the LIFG. But, not the 'LIFG' (as such).


This makes perfect sense since the U.S. and other nations will put pressure on foreign donors to limit support...Doubt the US can do anything about this. It's not only about 'too late' or all the possible lack of will to get involved there. But, hell, the Sauds wouldn't let the FBI investigate 9/11 inside the KSA: you seriously expect them to let 'dumb Americans that empowered Fars in Iraq and Syria' to exercise pressure upon any private persons (whether in the KSA or anywhere else within the Persian Gulf, and especially those with any kind of links to local royals)?


U.S.: Al Qaeda-linked Group Behind Benghazi Attack Trains Jihadists for Syrian Rebel Groups (http://freebeacon.com/u-s-al-qaeda-linked-group-behind-benghazi-attack-trains-jihadists-for-syrian-rebel-groups/)...Over 100 Libyans were reported killed in Syrian fighting for such rebel groups as Al-Nusra Front, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Umma Brigade, Muhajirin Brigade, and Ahrar al-Sham, an Al-Nusra offshoot....The author lost me the moment he declared Ahrar ash-Sham (wonder when are they going to 'discover' there are such things like 'Moon letters' in Arabic?) an 'offshot' of the JAN...

For easier understanding:
- JAN (Jabahat an-Nusra) is JAN, so much is clear, I hope...

Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islami is an own organization, a coalition of Syrian Islamists and Salafists led by people released from prisons by regime in 2011 (out of hope they might create a badly-needed 'AQ off-shot in Syria'?), and a powerful, well-organized and armed ally of the IF, not some 'offshoot' of the JAN. Surely, the ISIS declared that the JAN and three of ISIS bands in Dayr az-Zawr area (Tajamu Mujahidee al-Qaqaa, Liwa al-Qaqaa, and Habib al-Mustafa Brigade) would be 'cooperating' with the Ahrar ash-Sham's battalion deployed there, but that's really nonsense (if Ahrar would've cooperated with them, they wouldn't let that band of Iraqi Salafists from Falluja, operating as Habib al-Mustafa Brigade, get overrun by the Mahdi-Army-offshoot, in al-Jufra, a week ago). Furthermore, contrary to the ISIS, Ahrar is not beheading western journos, but saving them from regime's claws, just for example (on the contrary, it had one of its brigade COs beheaded by the ISIS, few weeks ago).

Anyway, considering even Iranians are complaining the Ahrar killed 'a Saudi ringleader of the ISIL (ISIS)' (http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13921015000743), it could be so that the author might want to learn a little bit more about situation in Syria.

- 'Umma Brigade'? Guess he means the Liwa'a al-Umma, that Libyan unit led by the guy from Ireland... They're inside Aleppo since more than a year and fighting the ISIS as much as the regime, all of that time.

- 'Muhajirin Brigade'? Guess the author means the Jaish al-Muharijeen wa al-Ansar? If yes, it's no 'Brigade', but 'Northern Front', i.e. the CORE of the ISIS in Aleppo Province (despite several statements about its 'separation' from the ISIS). If not... well, let's see...perhaps he means the Tajamu Mujahidee al-Qaqaa brigade, ISIS group fighting in Dayr az-Zawr...? Who can say...


The slow-motion conflagration around Syria (http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-slow-motion-conflagration-around-syria/2014/01/04/d8691ac0-748e-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_story.html)...STATE DEPARTMENT officials have been warning for nearly two years that Syria’s civil war, if not brought to a prompt end, could blossom into a regional conflagration that consumes Iraq and Lebanon and threatens vital U.S. interests. Their predictions have been coming true, but in slow motion, enabling those who hope to ignore the growing danger — notably President Obama — to remain complacent.
Seriously: this is THE statement of the day, perhaps even the week.

Anyway, here something else - related to 'tactical' issues and 'surprising vitality' of an air force declared dead about two years ago:
Syria and Her Recently Upgraded Su-24MKs, Part 1 (http://spioenkop.blogspot.co.at/2013/11/syria-and-her-recently-upgraded-su-24s.html)

Syria and Her Recently Upgraded Su-24MKs, Part 2 (http://spioenkop.blogspot.co.at/2014/01/syria-and-her-recently-upgraded-su-24s-2.html)

[davidbfpo]

A short explanation by an expert:http://2paragraphs.com/2014/01/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-syrian-chemical-weapons-destruction/

I noted the size of the chemical stockpile expected to be moved (1300 tonnes) and incineration at various commercial sites, plus one US ship.

The BBC has reported on two Scandinavian warships involvement, with reporters being welcome at first and then ejected at the OPCW & BUN's insistence - so I read with interest this:
However, the biggest challenge is getting the CW and precursors to the Port of Latakia on the Syrian coast to be picked up by Scandinavian cargo ships guarded by Russian, Chinese, Norwegian, Danish and British warships.

(Added) Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25547203

A curious flotilla. The Chinese navy have been in the Med before, including a "friendship" visit to Israel, this I expect is the PLAN's first combat mission.

[CrowBat]

Guess, the developments in Syria of the last few days are going to make many of those who are trying to track them - cry. Reason: this war really 'went ape'.

Where shall I start...?

Let's try it in this fashion...

The Western point of view regarding Syria is 'simple': 'If you're tollerating al-Qaida, even welcoming it, you're supporting al-Qaida, and therefore: you're a terrorist'.

Syrian point of view is much more complex. Also because of all the isolation that country experienced in the last 60 or so years. Foremost, there is that issue of 'welcoming the guest', mentioned in one of articles I cited above. Traditionalists and conservative as they are, generally, the Syrians can't ignore the guest, or turn against him/her. They must welcome a guest.

Now, they'll not go as far as to offer him their wife, like in some other parts of the world, but a guest is always going to get a cup of tchay or coffee, a place to sleep if needed, and the host is going to patiently listen and talk with him/her. Sometimes the guest might have a diametrly opposite opinion, for whatever reasons, but that's going to be tollerated.

So, from their standpoint, when the AQ - aka ISIS - arrived there and said it's going to fight the regime, it was 'welcome' to do so. When the ISIS began to spread within liberated areas, in turn making insurgent units free to move to the frontlines of the war with the regime, it was 'welcome' too. And when it began to impose its dictatorship to these areas, it was still 'tollerated', although causing much dissent. Many of various native insurgent commanders experienced major problems while trying to get their fighters to move against the ISIS. Not few paid the ultimate price for this, which in turn caused plenty of concern between the others. Eventually, nobody trusted himself to make the first move...

So, now, the Saudis first created that Islamic Front (IF), last October. But, they couldn't move plenty of involved commanders against the ISIS, i.e. people that concluded that the ISIS has 'overstayed the welcome'. Eventually, they had to turn to what was left of the FSyA and various other - say 'moderate to Islamist' - groups, and group these into the Jaysh al-Mujahideen (JAM)...

On 2 January this year, the JAM and the FSyA launched a major offensive against the ISIS (or 'D'ash', in local parlance) in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces, and within the following three days overrun most of D'ash's HQs and check-points there, killing more than 200 (including several top commanders) and arresting around 100 of Jihadists. The ISIS reacted with panic (including complaints about 'excessive jamming of its telecommunications'), withdrawal and plenty of car-bombs (as usually, they can't 'fight'). Most of the IF and its allies spent the first two days just 'sitting and watching' what's going on. But then also groups like Jabhat al-Akrad, Liwa'a al-Tawhid and finally even Ahrar ash-Sham joined the fight - primarily because the ISIS began attacking them (apparently because it couldn't organize a counterattack against the JAM). Although they are not 100% precise, the two maps below are illustrating the results of their work... (hope, the links are going to work)

http://www.acig.info/forum/download/file.php?id=8885

http://www.acig.info/forum/download/file.php?id=8884

While this is going on, the regime exploited the near-collapse of the ISIS to rush several of (supposed) 'Syrian Arab Army' (SyAA) units into Aleppo and re-capture large swats of the city from the ISIS. 'Problem': although the units in question used to be parts of the SyAA (especially so various former special forces/airborne/ranger battalions), nowadays they are assigned to the NDF and not wearing their usual designations any more, but names like 'The Shield of Assad' and similar. With other words, and as mentioned several times so far, there is no 'SyAA' any more, rather a conglomerate of ex-SyAA units now run by the NDF and the Ba'ath Party Militia (in collusion with the IRGC, of course).

At the same time... 'in the lands beyond, beyond'...

Well, the JAM-FSyA-IF coalition from Aleppo and Idlib Provinces functions 'quite well'. But, it's limited to that area. Namely, in the Hassakah Province, in NE Syria, the ISIS, JAN and several IF groups or allies (like Ahrar ash-Sham) have launched a counteroffensive against the major Kurdish armed group, the YPG (military wing of the PYD), and have yesterday recovered the town of Tel Hamis. Reason: the YPG/PYD do not want to fight native insurgent groups, so they withdrew.

To make matters more complicated: the YPG's proxy in Aleppo, Jabhat al-Akrad, is fighting with the JAM and the IF against the ISIS (and the regime) and have forced it out of Manbij and Jarabulus...

[Bill Moore]

Well, the JAM-FSyA-IF coalition from Aleppo and Idlib Provinces functions 'quite well'. But, it's limited to that area. Namely, in the Hassakah Province, in NE Syria, the ISIS, JAN and several IF groups or allies (like Ahrar ash-Sham) have launched a counteroffensive against the major Kurdish armed group, the YPG (military wing of the PYD), and have yesterday recovered the town of Tel Hamis. Reason: the YPG/PYD do not want to fight native insurgent groups, so they withdrew.

Not crying yet, but this paragraph points something out that I addressed in other forums. It appears the only unifying factor for these numerous groups is the ISIS and Assad, once they're gone what will unify them? The group that has the largest coalition and garners the most support from external actors will be the strong group as long as it can retain that position, but I bet they can't and the sands will constantly shift. Doesn't bode well for a stable democracy if Assad falls.

[CrowBat]

...and the Kurds, obviously.

The Assyrians are probably the next on the list, then the Syriac Union Party's Military Council apparently joined the YPG, yesterday...

The point about the ISIS in NE Syria is quite simple: except for local oilfields, they've got only a few important places there, and thus didn't get an opportunity to kill and torture activists and oppositionals as they did in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces. Because of this, nobody there minds them.

We'll see if the car-bomb they set off in al-Mayadin (Dayr az-Zawr) yesterday might change anything.

It's entirely different in Aleppo, and even in Raqqah. Meanwhile, the ISIS is entirely out of Aleppo (the IF+FSyA have captured the ISIS HQ in the city, yesterday, and instantly found a mass grave with 100+ bodies), and was pushed - by Ahrar ash-Sham - out of Raqqah too (there the IF+FSyA liberated about 50 hostages, including scores of activists, journos and doctors). Because the ISIS meanwhile withdrew from Kweres AB, their only remaining stronghold in that province now is Azzaz.

Further east, the Jihadists are still holding out in Tel Abyad and east of Raqqah, but I do not expect them to survive there for very much longer.

(Guess, Zawahiri must be throwing up right now: he was calling for the ISIS to get the hell out of Syria since months...)


...once they're gone what will unify them?Nothing. There are, like there always were, big differences between merchants, urban population and rural population in Syria. Like there are always differences between various segments of population in practically every other country on this spacecraft named 'Earth'. This is a matter of fact, and an issue that simply has to be respected.

Of course, you're right that the party with strongest support from abroad is likely to get most powerful. With most of support presently arriving from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, it's obvious we can't expect a lot there in regards of 'democracy'.

But, exactly that is the sad story here: because the West missed a great opportunity and the Syrians are unlikely to forget who has left them down, it's 'us' (West) who are going to be the biggest losers in this brawl.

[davidbfpo]

Citing Crowbat's last post's fin al paragraph:
But, exactly that is the sad story here: because the West missed a great opportunity and the Syrians are unlikely to forget who has left them down, it's 'us' (West) who are going to be the biggest losers in this brawl.

Yes what has happened to Syria for a long time has been a sad story, even if dictatorial rule had some material benefits and for the West (even Israel) Assad gave a strong element of stability - even if he was a "rejectionist".

The protests and the civil war that followed never gave the West 'a great opportunity' to effect change.

Who forgot the Syrians and let them down? Yes, the West did, but far greater damage may affect China, Iran and Russia plus Hezbollah. The big caveat is - who wins in the end (which is far away). If I was a Syrian who fled I would be angry that all those rich Arab nations were singularly absent from caring for them in the camps; instead they financed the war and factions that appear to be mainly not Syrians.

The biggest losers are first the Syrian people, then all its neighbours and then others further away - including the West.

[Dayuhan]

But, exactly that is the sad story here: because the West missed a great opportunity and the Syrians are unlikely to forget who has left them down, it's 'us' (West) who are going to be the biggest losers in this brawl.

A "great opportunity" to do what, exactly... and when did this "opportunity" arise?

[CrowBat]

A "great opportunity" to do what, exactly... and when did this "opportunity" arise?
The same like in Libya, for example, and there was more than enough opportunity during 2012.

Perhaps even less: with enough money, weapons and supplies on hand, the insurgents could've finished the Assadist regime already by late 2012 - in turn preventing the spread of the ISIS. And even later on: as of early 2013 they were still advancing and by April last year the regime was really within weeks of collapse. Instead, the West did nothing, offering the regime - i.e. the IRGC - more than enough time to organize (Iranian) intervention.

[carl]

Not crying yet, but this paragraph points something out that I addressed in other forums. It appears the only unifying factor for these numerous groups is the ISIS and Assad, once they're gone what will unify them? The group that has the largest coalition and garners the most support from external actors will be the strong group as long as it can retain that position, but I bet they can't and the sands will constantly shift. Doesn't bode well for a stable democracy if Assad falls.

The Mexican revolution of 100 years ago was pretty messy for a long time too, so this isn't very unusual. It eventually worked out. A difference then was that Mexico was sort of out of the way and not too many outside actors poured a lot of money in as they, some of them, are doing in Syria.

I should mention that lots and lots of innocent people got killed while it was working itself out.

[Dayuhan]

The same like in Libya, for example

The geography of Libya is very different from that of Syria, as was the geography of the conflict, with a discrete rebel territory and capitol well separated from the forces of the dictator. The decision to intervene was made white the dictator's forces were crossing the desert, providing a discrete target highly vulnerable to air attack and an opportunity to reverse the momentum of the conflict. Syria's air defenses are much more sophisticated tan Libya's and would ave taken a much more intensive effort to degrade. And on, and on... but in short, apples and oranges. Te Libyan "solution" was never going to be applicanle in Syria.


Perhaps even less: with enough money, weapons and supplies on hand, the insurgents could've finished the Assadist regime already by late 2012

Highly speculative conclusion at best.

Even in the (unlikely, IMO) event of an Assad collapse, what's the most likely scenario? Look at Libya today. If Syria were in the same condition, we'd see exactly what we're seeing now: Iranian and Saudi proxies duking it out for control. It sure as hell wouldn't be the US or "the west" calling the shots, though of course if the US or "the west" were perceived as having removed Assad, they'd be held accountable for the outcome despite being unable to control it. Does that sound an attractive position to be in?

The only opportunity that I can see "the west" missing in Syria is the opportunity to embroil itself in yet another irresolvable Middle Eastern quagmire.

[Firn]

All those factions and their seemingly ever changing forms, coalitions and names made me think about passages I have read in 'Homage to Catalonia' (http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0201111.txt) by George Orwell.


When I came to Spain, and for some time afterwards, I was not only uninterested in the political situation but unaware of it. I knew there was a war on, but I had no notion what kind of a war. If you had asked me why I had joined the militia I should have answered: 'To fight against Fascism,' and if you had asked me what I was fighting for, I should have answered: 'Common decency.' I had accepted the 'News Chronicle-New Statesman' version of the war as the defence of civilization against a maniacal outbreak by an army of Colonel Blimps in the pay of Hitler. The revolutionary atmosphere of Barcelona had attracted me deeply, but I had made no attempt to understand it. As for the kaleidoscope of political parties and trade unions, with their tiresome names--P.S.U.C., P.O.U.M., F.A.I., C.N.T., U.G.T., J.C.I., J.S.U., A.I.T.--they merely exasperated me. It looked at first sight as though Spain were suffering from a plague of initials.

I knew that I wasserving in something called the P.O.U.M. (I had only joined the P.O.U.M. militia rather than any other because I happened to arrive in Barcelona with I.L.P. papers), but I did not realize that there were serious differences between the political parties. At Monte Pocero, when they pointed to the position on our left and said: 'Those are the Socialists' (meaning the P.S.U.C.), I was puzzled and said: 'Aren't we all Socialists?' I thought it idiotic that people fighting for their lives should have separate parties; my attitude always was, 'Why can't we drop all this political nonsense and get on with the war?' This of course was the correct 'anti-Fascist' attitude which had been carefully disseminated by the English newspapers, largely in order to prevent people from grasping the real nature of the struggle.

But in Spain,especially in Catalonia, it was an attitude that no one could or did keep up indefinitely. Everyone, however unwillingly, took sides sooner or later. For even if one cared nothing for the political parties and their conflicting 'lines', it was too obvious that one's own destiny was involved. As a militiaman one was a soldier against Franco, but one was also a pawn in an enormous struggle that was being fought out between two political theories. When I scrounged for firewood on the mountainside and wondered whether this was really a war or whether the News Chronicle had made it up, when I dodged the Communist machine-guns in the Barcelona riots, when I finally fled from Spain with the police one jump behind me--all these things happened to me in that particular way because I was serving in the P.O.U.M. militia and not in the P.S.U.C. So great is the difference between two sets of initials!

Obviously every civil war is unique due to it's circumstances and but at least a good deal of the logic persists. It is just tempting to put the names 'Syria' and 'confusing names' in the place of Spain and 'its plague of consonats'.

The Inter-party struggle (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZbY9uU3kQc0) continues today, an anybody in your camp with does not follow the party orthodoxy can quickly become a more important target then the common enemy. It is quite amazing if you repeat the mental experiment and replace the islamic phrases of that ISIN (or ISIL or who knows) man with communist ones like 'counterrevolutionary trotzkyists' instead of 'heretic apostolates'.

[CrowBat]

T[h]e Libyan "solution" was never going to be applicanle in Syria.
<snip>

Even in the (unlikely, IMO) event of an Assad collapse, what's the most likely scenario? Look at Libya today....
My two sentences were within the same context, i.e. belonged together, and as such no proposition for a 'military intervention', but an argumentation 'pro' strong and clear support of revolutionaries-cum-insurgents in Syria.

Anyway, if you like to go back to Libya: I find it really boring you're still insisting on media's notion that the 'country is falling apart', 'sinking into anarchy' etc. Yup, no doubt, if we're listening to our media, this is indeed that way. Just, as explained to you somewhere else on this forum already a month or two ago, something entirely else is the case, and the troubles that are there (like those with militias that are refusing to disarm, 'unacceptable' politicians etc.), are nothing but 'normal' for a country in such a situation. Absolutely nothing unexpected (well, except for people like you, of course). Actually, the situation in Libya, and the mod of Libyans, as well as that of the local economy, is quite good and slowly - but certainly - improving. Foremost, the country is staunchly pro-West (let me know if you need any citations from various polls).


If Syria were in the same condition, we'd see exactly what we're seeing now: Iranian and Saudi proxies duking it out for control. It sure as hell wouldn't be the US or "the west" calling the shots, though of course if the US or "the west" were perceived as having removed Assad, they'd be held accountable for the outcome despite being unable to control it. Does that sound an attractive position to be in?That simply wouldn't happen (all provided there was timely reaction, of course). I explained why, to the length already. Would you be so kind to re-read my older posts to this topic, or do you want me to repeat it again, and again, and again?


The only opportunity that I can see "the west" missing in Syria is the opportunity to embroil itself in yet another irresolvable Middle Eastern quagmire.Fine. If it's by your predilection, Dayuhan, much of Texas would still be a big quagmire too (whether because of original geography or because of all the issues over it with Mexico). Just because it's so much better to let a quagmire remain a quagmire - than to dry it out?

But never mind: it's not like the West created that quagmire in the Middle East, right? Ah no, that's a standpoint that only 'revisionists' can represent. :rolleyes:

************

EDIT: sigh... if nothing else, people like Dayuhan could finally start learning about at least one, crucially important thing about 'extremist Islamists'.

Whenever and wherever they establish themselves something like 'in power' - be that Afghanistan, Yemen, Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, you name it, there is no exception - they always spoil that with their sadism and brutality. They are so successful at this, that even Zawahiri can't stop calling various of his supposed 'leutenants' around the world for tolerance and modesty. I guess that stupid must have major stomach problems meanwhile.

So, what are you actually afraid of? AQ taking over some place?

Haha! As sarcastic as it might sound, and as tragic as it certainly is for the people living at the piece of real estate in question (wherever and whenever it might be, doesn't matter now), the AQ couldn't do the West any bigger favour than trying to 'take over'.

[carl]

Whenever and wherever they establish themselves something like 'in power' - be that Afghanistan, Yemen, Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, you name it, there is no exception - they always spoil that with their sadism and brutality. They are so successful at this, that even Zawahiri can't stop calling various of his supposed 'leutenants' around the world for tolerance and modesty. I guess that stupid must have major stomach problems meanwhile.

Me and Bill Moore were wondering about this a few posts back. The takfiri killers can never stay in a place long because they are such nasty people. But, they always seem to be able to establish themselves. I've been thinking about this. I opined before that part of their appeal is they have sold themselves as being Muslimer than thou. Maybe part of that appeal IS the sadistic and cruel behavior.

Figure it like this. You are a whiskey swilling gulf sheik or the wife of a whiskey swilling, womanizing gulf sheik and you are worried about getting to paradise. So you give to somebody who is really strident about being a pious Muslim to better your chances of getting to paradise. Part of that stridency is them saying that if those kaffirs don't submit, we'll make them. I figure that would appeal to that whiskey swilling sheik because it is a theoretical to him, a theoretical that makes him feel holier. He doesn't have to live it or look at the severed heads on the ground, all he has to do is feel good about giving money to really pious, militant guys.

When those guys get kicked out. It is no big deal. That whiskey swilling sheik can still say I did my part, I'm pious. And after he has drunk another case of Johny Walker and abused another Russian hooker he will need to buy another chance at paradise and will be quite willing to give money to the next takfiri killer who comes calling. So the next country or area has to endure the coming of the killers. From the standpoint of the whiskey swilling sheik it is much more satisfying to give to those guys than some reasonable imam who says sensible things. ( http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/07/the-show-me-sheikh/304053/ )

(The above article is all I know about that sheikh. But it conveys what I am getting at.)

Additionally, that sadistic cruelty might be a, God help us, recruiting tool. There are people in the world in whom, for some reason, the beast lives a little closer to the surface. I think the role of takfiri killer appeals to them more than being a mere anti-Assad rebel.

So there exists the means to constantly restart the thing. The key is the donations. If we could stop those...

[Dayuhan]

Anyway, if you like to go back to Libya: I find it really boring you're still insisting on media's notion that the 'country is falling apart', 'sinking into anarchy' etc. Yup, no doubt, if we're listening to our media, this is indeed that way. Just, as explained to you somewhere else on this forum already a month or two ago, something entirely else is the case, and the troubles that are there (like those with militias that are refusing to disarm, 'unacceptable' politicians etc.), are nothing but 'normal' for a country in such a situation. Absolutely nothing unexpected (well, except for people like you, of course). Actually, the situation in Libya, and the mod of Libyans, as well as that of the local economy, is quite good and slowly - but certainly - improving. Foremost, the country is staunchly pro-West (let me know if you need any citations from various polls).

Libya may be neither as badly off as mainstream media claim nor as well off as you suggest, but the reality remains that a post-Assad Syria would inevitably see extensive external intervention by Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and their proxies. A few others would likely be in the mix as well. The US would have no capacity at all to control or even significantly influence the outcome. Placing yourself in a position where you are going to be held responsible for an outcome you cannot control is thought to be undesirable.


That simply wouldn't happen (all provided there was timely reaction, of course). I explained why, to the length already. Would you be so kind to re-read my older posts to this topic, or do you want me to repeat it again, and again, and again?

You don't know what would have happened. Discussion of "what might have happened if..." is not explanation, it's speculation.


Fine. If it's by your predilection, Dayuhan, much of Texas would still be a big quagmire too (whether because of original geography or because of all the issues over it with Mexico). Just because it's so much better to let a quagmire remain a quagmire - than to dry it out?

"Dry it out"... that's worked ever so well in the past. What did we spend in our efforts to "drain the swamp" in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what did we gain? What makes you think that the US or "the West" has the capacity to dry out the Syrian quagmire without sinking into it?


But never mind: it's not like the West created that quagmire in the Middle East, right? Ah no, that's a standpoint that only 'revisionists' can represent.

The west contributed to the evolution of the Middle Eastern quagmire: "created" would be an exaggeration. That doesn't mean the West has any useful role to play in ending it: generally our attempts to make it better end up making it worse. Over-intervention in pursuit of our own interests contributed to the evolution of the current situation, but we aren't going to "fix" the problem with more intervention.

Might be instructive to look at Southeast Asia and Latin America in the 70s and 80s. US intervention in those places at those times contributed to the development of massive instability and institutionalized violence. When the Cold War ended and the US ratcheted back involvement, the situation improved dramatically. We may have helped create the mess but we didn't fix it. We got out of the way, tried the radical step of minding our own business, and the locals fixed it themselves.

EDIT: sigh... if nothing else, people like Dayuhan could finally start learning about at least one, crucially important thing about 'extremist Islamists'.

Whenever and wherever they establish themselves something like 'in power' - be that Afghanistan, Yemen, Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, you name it, there is no exception - they always spoil that with their sadism and brutality. They are so successful at this, that even Zawahiri can't stop calling various of his supposed 'leutenants' around the world for tolerance and modesty. I guess that stupid must have major stomach problems meanwhile. [/QUOTE]

Yes, we all know this already.


So, what are you actually afraid of? AQ taking over some place?

No, I'm afraid of the US getting involved in another situation it can't manage or control, and that intervention will lead to full scale US involvement in a conflict where the US has no vital national interest at stake, no clear, practical, and achievable goal and no exit strategy.


Haha! As sarcastic as it might sound, and as tragic as it certainly is for the people living at the piece of real estate in question (wherever and whenever it might be, doesn't matter now), the AQ couldn't do the West any bigger favour than trying to 'take over'.

So why does the US need to get involved?

What do you think the US should do, or should have done? Specifically, please.

[carl]

The US would have no capacity at all to control or even significantly influence the outcome.


Why?


Placing yourself in a position where you are going to be held responsible for an outcome you cannot control is thought to be undesirable.

Why would we be held responsible? Why wouldn't all those other countries be held responsible?

[Bill Moore]

All those factions and their seemingly ever changing forms, coalitions and names made me think about passages I have read in 'Homage to Catalonia' (http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0201111.txt) by George Orwell.


Obviously every civil war is unique due to it's circumstances and but at least a good deal of the logic persists. It is just tempting to put the names 'Syria' and 'confusing names' in the place of Spain and 'its plague of consonats'.

The Inter-party struggle (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZbY9uU3kQc0) continues today, an anybody in your camp with does not follow the party orthodoxy can quickly become a more important target then the common enemy. It is quite amazing if you repeat the mental experiment and replace the islamic phrases of that ISIN (or ISIL or who knows) man with communist ones like 'counterrevolutionary trotzkyists' instead of 'heretic apostolates'.

This was a relevant and outstanding find, thanks for posting. Wish it was mandatory reading for all the sabre rattling Congressmen who think U.S. intervention would result in something for the U.S. and the region as a whole. Then again that is probably asking too much . Politician embrace their soapboxes and reject the need to demonstrate character. Careerists will simply spout uninformed presumptions that are intended to hurt the other political party, so they can preserve their political careers. We worry rightfully about toxic leadership in the military, but we ignore it in Congress. Which one is a greater risk to our nation?

[Dayuhan]

Why?

Even with occupying armies in place the US has been unable to shape outcomes to our liking in Iraq and Afghanistan. What earthly reason is there to suppose that we could shape an outcome to our liking in Syria?


Why would we be held responsible? Why wouldn't all those other countries be held responsible?

The hypothetical proposition was that "western" (meaning American) intervention could have been the decisive factor in removing Assad. If you're the decisive factor in making something happen, you will be blamed for the outcome, whether you deserve it or not... and of course folks in that part of the world (and in many other parts) are always more than ready to hold the US accountable for any damned thing, given even a fraction of a reason, or sometimes even without one.

[CrowBat]

Dayuhan,
I'm sorry, but I can't read your post without ROFL any more. We used to have some interesting exchanges of opinions in the past, but when it comes to your argumentation regarding Syria, it really looks to me as if you're hard at trying to make me laugh.

You insist on ignoring what I posted about Syrians and their POVs regarding whom would they like to support them (in struggle against Assadists and Iranians), who is actually supporting them, and what repercussions this has for their POV regarding the West.

You insist on explaining me what would a 'post-Assad Syria' look like - and as next explain me I can't know what would happen?

And just when one might expect that you wouldn't try to make yourself ridiculous, you come with an explanation that contains a description of what is ALREADY NOW going on in Syria (namely, 'external intervention by Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and their proxies') - in a predominantly pro-West Arab country - as an argument 'against' US/Western attempts to meddle.... :p

As a 'desert', I guess, you serve the argument contra-US-interventions by citing a number of cases where the US either imposed a dictatorship (often after crumbling a nascent democracy), or (literally) went in, screwed up, and then run away.

Considering how much money the US has burned for such - utterly failed - interventions, I'm really surprised you can't come to the idea that investing anything into Syrian insurgency might be a useful solution?

That's mindboggling, and comparable only with ideas of certain European leftists who think (literally) that the sun is shining because Obama is US pres. :D

********

Gosh, I've got to sort myself out now: if this goes on like this, I'll need a consultation of my MD, and a nurse to take care of me. In worst case they'll lock me up in some lovely, soft and all-white place.

********

Sigh...I'll try to continue without laughing and descending to sarcasm all the time.

Let me remind you first and foremost, that the situation in Syria right now is a direct result of the US decision (primarily US decision; French, for example, were just a step short of launching a direct military intervention), NOT to meddle, but to let the Arabs sort out the matters for themselves. Summarized, the US excuse was something like 'I don't want to fight for al-Qaida'.

This is in utter ignorance of several important, 'bottom line', facts.

1.) The fact that exactly the same would have happened in Libya - and that is 100% certain - if the US/West would have refused to 'meddle' there too.

Why?

Because without Western intervention there (with support from specific Arab countries, of course), the Libyan regime would have managed to maintain itself in power for a while longer (because revolutionaries there were as disorganized as those in Syria), and in turn buy time for Islamist extremists to gain a foothold there too.

2.) The fact that the AQ in Syria is NOT representing even 10% of Syrian insurgency (whether qualitatively and especially not quantitatively); that the AQ in Syria is NOT fighting against the regime, but against insurgency (meanwhile I'm at least not alone with this standpoint, see here (http://www.todayszaman.com/news-336175-syrian-regime-isil-secret-partners-says-turkish-fm-davutoglu.html)); and even of the fact that the AQ actually ordered the ISIS to dissolve and get to hell out of Syria, etc., etc., etc.

...actually, it's getting boring to explain this all to you for 15th or so time. I simply don't see a reason why to repeat myself? Feel free to come back with lengthy explanations and your usual 'counter argumentation' but, please: have some mercy with my stomach muscles.

**********

Finally, you're wondering, 'what should the US do'?

Let's see: Tehran is maintaining the Assadist regime in place with help of about US$1 billion in cash a month, plus deliveries of fuel (partially from Venezuela via Egypt) worth another US$500 million, and about 15,000 fighters consisting of approx. 3,000 IRGC, 4,000 Hezbollah, and balance of various Iraqi, Azerbaijani and Shi'a from elsewhere. These forces have proved crucial for stabilizing regime's situation in 2013. Although the regime is claiming to have about 100,000 people under arms, the fact is a) that this is not truth (simply because there are no indications for presence of as many pro-regime combatants), and b) that the above-mentioned, Iranian-sponsored forces are meanwhile bearing the brunt of the fighting and have proved something like 15 times more effective than regime's Syrian forces.

Wow!

This makes the answer very hard to even think about...isn't it?

But, let me try: the insurgents have at least 35,000-40,000 organized within the IF; another 50,000 in various other groups. So, one needs no ground troops. Hunting all the various pro-regime groups with high-tech weapons is like shooting sparrows with guided missiles. So, there is no use of military intervention.

What's left....?

Hey, how about that with providing money for insurgents? Ah yes, the 'counter argumentation' is that some of this 'might end in wrong hands'.

But right now Syrian insurgency is ending in 'right hands'?

Don't make me laugh again, please.

[JMA]

You are of course absolutely correct and your man will respond that intervention is never ever justified. The only value his posts here have is too make sure one covers the need for the intervention in ones posts for completeness… which he will nit-pick anyway.



The same like in Libya, for example, and there was more than enough opportunity during 2012.

Perhaps even less: with enough money, weapons and supplies on hand, the insurgents could've finished the Assadist regime already by late 2012 - in turn preventing the spread of the ISIS. And even later on: as of early 2013 they were still advancing and by April last year the regime was really within weeks of collapse. Instead, the West did nothing, offering the regime - i.e. the IRGC - more than enough time to organize (Iranian) intervention.

[JMA]

Dayuhan,
I'm sorry, but I can't read your post without ROFL any more.

[snipped for brevity]

Don't make me laugh again, please.

You have got him neatly summed up.

[Firn]

This was a relevant and outstanding find, thanks for posting. Wish it was mandatory reading for all the sabre rattling Congressmen who think U.S. intervention would result in something for the U.S. and the region as a whole.

Glad you liked it. Maybe it helps to put some things into perspective, and I'm certain other conflicts are also full of lessons. While I do not advocate any policy a hard look at the history of civil wars and especially those with US involvement should give a strong baseline which can be modified by specific nature of the current conflict. Basically if most US efforts so far failed it is more likely that the current will fail too and if the specific civil war situation worse then the norme then the chances of success are not likely.


To begin with, gratitude to Russia for the arms and the fact that the
Communist Party, especially since the arrival of the International
Brigades, looked capable of winning the war, immensely raised the
Communist prestige. Secondly, the Russian arms were supplied via the
Communist Party and the parties allied to them, who saw to it that as
few as possible got to their political opponents.* Thirdly, by
proclaiming a non-revolutionary policy the Communists were able to
gather in all those whom the extremists had scared. It was easy, for
instance, to rally the wealthier peasants against the collectivization
policy of the Anarchists.

There was an enormous growth in the membership of the party, and the influx was largely from the middle class-shopkeepers, officials, army officers, well-to-do peasants, etc., etc. The war was essentially a triangular struggle. The fight against Franco had to continue, but the simultaneous aim of the Government was to recover such power as remained in the hands of the trade unions. It was done by a series of small moves--a policy of pin-pricks, as somebody called it--and on the whole very cleverly. There was no general and obvious counter-revolutionary move, and until May 1937 it was scarcely
necessary to use force. The workers could always be brought to heel by an argument that is almost too obvious to need stating: 'Unless you do this, the war will be lost'

The financial muscle to arm a faction is still influential and was said to drive many moderates in the arms of more Islamist groups which enjoyed Gulf money. The big difference of course is the direct political control by that sponsor over a strong faction of the rebels, which is clearly lacking today. The whole movement seems to me far more fractured and be involved in considerable more vicious infighting.

[Dayuhan]

You are of course absolutely correct and your man will respond that intervention is never ever justified.

I thought the initial US intervention in Afghanistan was justified, and even sensible... at least until prolonged occupation and "nation-building" crept into the picture.

I do think that to justify American intervention the following must be demonstrated:

- A vital (or at least pressing) American interest
- A clear, practical, achievable goal
- In the case of a proxy or indirect intervention, a viable partner must be present
- A viable plan. Yes, I know plans often go awry, but there needs to be one there at the start that is at least marginally convincing.
- An exit strategy
- Awareness and consideration of potential or probable adverse unintended consequences (likelihood of ####up).
- The political will to finish what's started

I've yet to see any evidence of any of these in the arguments presented so far for intervention in Syria.


The only value his posts here have is too make sure one covers the need for the intervention in ones posts for completeness

I've yet to see anyone "cover the need" for intervention in Syria, or even make a credible argument that intervention in Syria is a "need". I understand that some people want to intervene, but want and need are two different things.

[Dayuhan]

You insist on ignoring what I posted about Syrians and their POVs regarding whom would they like to support them (in struggle against Assadists and Iranians), who is actually supporting them, and what repercussions this has for their POV regarding the West.

I don't think any of us have reliable information on what Syrians think or want.


You insist on explaining me what would a 'post-Assad Syria' look like - and as next explain me I can't know what would happen?

I didn't "explain what a post Assad Syria would look like", I offered an opinion, which like all opinions on the future is speculation, not explanation. And no, you can't "know what would happen".

Given that there has never been a dominant leader or faction in the resistance to Assad, the resistance is highly fragmented, the disparate groups have widely divergent agendas, the Syrian military is Allawite-dominated and was never likely to turn against Assad in numbers, etc, ect... I see very little basis to assume that the resistance was ever likely to generate a clean win or a clear winner. That is speculative, but I've yet to see a credible argument to the contrary.


you come with an explanation that contains a description of what is ALREADY NOW going on in Syria (namely, 'external intervention by Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and their proxies') - in a predominantly pro-West Arab country - as an argument 'against' US/Western attempts to meddle....

How is that an argument for intervention? Everybody;s in the mess, we have to be there too? Even if we don't have a clear national interest at stake, even if we don't have clear goals, even if there is close to zero support for intervention on the home front?


you serve the argument contra-US-interventions by citing a number of cases where the US either imposed a dictatorship (often after crumbling a nascent democracy), or (literally) went in, screwed up, and then run away.

Yes, US intervention has a poor track record. How is that an argument for intervention?


Considering how much money the US has burned for such - utterly failed - interventions, I'm really surprised you can't come to the idea that investing anything into Syrian insurgency might be a useful solution?

That would depend on what you plan to invest, in whom you plan to invest it, what specific goals you propose to achieve, etc. I have yet to see anybody lay out anything even vaguely resembling a coherent and plan for intervention.


Let me remind you first and foremost, that the situation in Syria right now is a direct result of the US decision (primarily US decision; French, for example, were just a step short of launching a direct military intervention), NOT to meddle, but to let the Arabs sort out the matters for themselves. Summarized, the US excuse was something like 'I don't want to fight for al-Qaida'.

No, the US reason was more like "we have no vital national interest at stake, no clear goal to achieve, no viable partner to work with, no plan that looks to have even a marginal chance of success, and zero political support for getting into another conflict in the Middle East.

What reason do we have to think that US intervention would have made the situation any better? Is it not just as likely that it would still be a mess, only it would be our mess? US intervention really does not have a stellar track record for making things better, why would you expect a positive outcome in this case?


1.) The fact that exactly the same would have happened in Libya - and that is 100% certain - if the US/West would have refused to 'meddle' there too.

And you are now... Nostradamus? There is not one person on this planet who can state with 100% certainty what would have happened in Libya if there had been no intervention. I do not think that Hezbollah and Iran would be involved in Libya to the extent that they are in Syria.


Because without Western intervention there (with support from specific Arab countries, of course), the Libyan regime would have managed to maintain itself in power for a while longer (because revolutionaries there were as disorganized as those in Syria), and in turn buy time for Islamist extremists to gain a foothold there too.

That's possible. It's also possible that the Libyan regime might have crushed the rebellion and stayed firmly in power. We don't know.


2.) The fact that the AQ in Syria is NOT representing even 10% of Syrian insurgency (whether qualitatively and especially not quantitatively); that the AQ in Syria is NOT fighting against the regime, but against insurgency (meanwhile I'm at least not alone with this standpoint, see here (http://www.todayszaman.com/news-336175-syrian-regime-isil-secret-partners-says-turkish-fm-davutoglu.html)); and even of the fact that the AQ actually ordered the ISIS to dissolve and get to hell out of Syria, etc., etc., etc.

So what? How is that an argument for US intervention?


Finally, you're wondering, 'what should the US do'?

No, I'm wondering what you think the US should do. Different thing.

Let's see: Tehran is maintaining the Assadist regime in place with help of about US$1 billion in cash a month, plus deliveries of fuel (partially from Venezuela via Egypt) worth another US$500 million, and about 15,000 fighters consisting of approx. 3,000 IRGC, 4,000 Hezbollah, and balance of various Iraqi, Azerbaijani and Shi'a from elsewhere. These forces have proved crucial for stabilizing regime's situation in 2013. Although the regime is claiming to have about 100,000 people under arms, the fact is a) that this is not truth (simply because there are no indications for presence of as many pro-regime combatants), and b) that the above-mentioned, Iranian-sponsored forces are meanwhile bearing the brunt of the fighting and have proved something like 15 times more effective than regime's Syrian forces.

Wow!

This makes the answer very hard to even think about...isn't it?

But, let me try: the insurgents have at least 35,000-40,000 organized within the IF; another 50,000 in various other groups. So, one needs no ground troops. Hunting all the various pro-regime groups with high-tech weapons is like shooting sparrows with guided missiles. So, there is no use of military intervention.

What's left....?

Hey, how about that with providing money for insurgents? [/QUOTE]

To whom do you propose sending money? "The insurgents"? Which ones?

Do you really believe that simply sending money would have significantly altered the course of events to date?


But right now Syrian insurgency is ending in 'right hands'?

As long as it's not in our hands...

I'm a bit disappointed in the advocates for intervention here. We've heard "support the moderates" and "send money to the insurgents". On another thread I saw "flood the place with small arms". If those are the best plans the advocates for intervention can come up with, is it really very surprising that there's not much enthusiasm for intervention?

[Bill Moore]

Dayuhan,

A well reasoned argument, which is something lacking from the advocates for intervention. Their argument is little more than we should just go, and Americans are rightfully leery of that approach. Seems we thought we could predict the future with a high degree of accuracy many times in the past only to be disappointed. Not too many American leaders would commit U.S. troops to a conflict they didn't think they could win in unless it was truly self-defense where they had no choice.

An excerpt from the following article hits home to me, most of our interventions have simply made the situation worse, regardless of whether the intervention was direct or indirect. I think we need to go back and review the few successes we did have in our history and focus on what we did right, instead of the endless focus of what we did wrong. It is too difficult to see what we'll do wrong in foresight, but if we can at least focus on the underlying principles that lead to success then maybe we can increase our odds of determining where our intervention would at least have a decent chance of making the situation better.

http://www.latimes.com/opinion/commentary/la-oe-bacevich-failed-wars-20140112,0,5920178.story#axzz2qBUvtx1q


The truth is something few people in the national security establishment are willing to confront: Confusing capability with utility, the United States knows how to start wars but has seemingly forgotten how to conclude them. Yet concluding war on favorable terms — a concept formerly known as victory — is the object of the exercise. For the United States, victory has become a lost art. This unhappy verdict applies whether U.S. forces operate conventionally (employing high-tech "shock and awe" tactics) or unconventionally ("winning hearts and minds").

As a consequence, instead of promoting stability — perhaps the paramount U.S. interest not only in the Islamic world but also globally — Washington's penchant for armed intervention since the end of the Cold War, and especially since 9/11, has tended to encourage just the opposite. In effect, despite spilling much blood and expending vast amounts of treasure, U.S. military exertions have played into the hands of our adversaries, misleadingly lumped together under the rubric of "terrorists."

Bold print is mine for emphasis

[CrowBat]

As said, it's getting boring, so this will be my last post in reply to you.

See here:

...
How is that an argument for intervention?...
...
How is that an argument for intervention?
Go back and read my post from September or October, when I told you that it's much too late for an 'US intervention' - i.e. an intervention through military means.

I'm not argumenting FOR any such intervention since long any more. Can you please finally realize that?


And you are now... Nostradamus? There is not one person on this planet who can state with 100% certainty... But sure: turn off the logic and everything's 'crystal clear' about what would have happened there. :D


To whom do you propose sending money? "The insurgents"? Which ones?Sigh... explained this some 10-12 times so far, only. Seems the art of organizing such operations got lost in the USA of the last, say, 50 or so years?

OK: yup, to 'insurgents'. It doesn't matter which. Pick up a group, get them to a training camp, explain them what you expect from them in return for your aid, train them, arm them, etc., do the same that various Islamists from KSA, Qatar, UAE and (especially) Kuwait are doing: make them so powerful, disciplined, well-armed, -fed, and -led, that insurgents from other groups are defecting in order to join such groups.

It so obviously works with all the possible other insurgent organizations in Syria, just not with the one group _supposedly_ supported by the 'West': even a blind must see this.

So, where is your problem actually? You're argumenting for the sake of insisting on your POV?


Do you really believe that simply sending money would have significantly altered the course of events to date?Didn't the Saudi, Kuwaiti, Qatari and Emirati money change anything?

If you think it didn't - or US or any sort of 'Western' money wouldn't - then you should explain me: where would the Syrian insurgency be by now without all the support it's receiving from different corners in the Arab world?


I'm a bit disappointed in the advocates for intervention here.... Holy Mao Tse Tung... Again: I'm not advocating an 'intervention' in sense of 'military intervention', 'bombing' etc., but in terms of (literaly) buying one of parties between Syrian insurgent groups and then developing it into THE group that matters there, that's important on the battlefield, and thus gaining political influence (in the future).

Is that really that much 'impossible', 'out of mind', or do you simply prefer to wait until it's going to be too late even for that?

Or wait: perhaps you prefer a Syria that's under the control of whatever sort of extremists, so that Israel can continue declaring itself for 'under existential threat', and thus get more monetary and aid in terms of most modern technology and arms - and all of this because 'USA have no common history with Syria', 'they're no friends of us, but Israelis are'...?

If so, I could perfectly understand you advocating a hand-over of Syria to Iran and Hezbollah. Or the AQ. (As it there would be difference for Syrian population?). But then, the 'quality' of such behaviour is the same like when that duck with 'Iran buying 270 Su-27s' was launched, few years ago, just in order to find argumentation for selling F-35s to Israel and F-15s to Saudi Arabia. :rolleyes:

[carl]

I don't think any of us have reliable information on what Syrians think or want.

That construction is meant to close off argument because there are three words in there that are by definition, in this context, indefinite: reliable, thing and want. They can never be definitely known. The way you arguing they must be definitely known in order for any conclusion to be drawn. It's circular. We must know for sure things that can't be known for sure before we can decide and we can't decide unless we know for sure things that can't be known for sure. Or at least that is how it seems to me.

Hey I got a question. Are you ever going to stop picking sentences apart and write some paragraphs with arguments that don't consist of open ended, rhetorical questions, or at least not so often?

[carl]

Bill Moore:

That article by Mr. Bacevich was good but he missed his own most important point. The point he missed is WE, the US, the Americans, the US military, the Army, the Air Force, the Marines, the Navy (I'll leave the puddle pirates out of it), the CIA, the NSA, the DIA, Specops, we don't know how to win. He states that most clearly in his analogy about the home improvement contractor that has all the best tools but can't do anything right. The point is about the contractor's incompetence, not that it isn't worthwhile to redo the kitchen or the bathroom or fix the rood when a tree falls on it, the point is this particular contractor can't do anything. Later on in the article he gets all metaphysical about how force isn't useful in today's world but that's nonsense. The people we are contesting, some of them seem to use it pretty good. WE, us, we don't seem to be able to do it anymore. He's right. We've forgotten how to win.

This has very great importance that bodes ill for the future, very ill for the future. We don't know how to fight and win. Any nation, great or small, that doesn't know how to fight and win is a victim in waiting. Mr. Bacevich's isn't a new observation. I remember years ago Abu Muqqwana said in response to something about how we can't do or didn't get small war or coin or whatever, he said maybe it isn't that, maybe what it is we don't get or can't do war at all anymore. That is what I am thinking too.

[JMA]

[snip]

I've yet to see any evidence of any of these in the arguments presented so far for intervention in Syria.

[snip]

I've yet to see anyone "cover the need" for intervention in Syria, or even make a credible argument that intervention in Syria is a "need". I understand that some people want to intervene, but want and need are two different things.

I am trying to understand why anyone needs to satisfy your demands in this regard. Who exactly are you to make such a demand?

[Bill Moore]

Bill Moore:

That article by Mr. Bacevich was good but he missed his own most important point. The point he missed is WE, the US, the Americans, the US military, the Army, the Air Force, the Marines, the Navy (I'll leave the puddle pirates out of it), the CIA, the NSA, the DIA, Specops, we don't know how to win. He states that most clearly in his analogy about the home improvement contractor that has all the best tools but can't do anything right. The point is about the contractor's incompetence, not that it isn't worthwhile to redo the kitchen or the bathroom or fix the rood when a tree falls on it, the. oint is this particular contractor can't do anything. Later on in the article he gets all metaphysical about how force isn't useful in today's world but that's nonsense. The people we are contesting, some of them seem to use it pretty good. WE, us, we don't seem to be able to do it anymore. He's right. We've forgotten how to win.

This has very great importance that bodes ill for the future, very ill for the future. We don't know how to fight and win. Any nation, great or small, that doesn't know how to fight and win is a victim in waiting. Mr. Bacevich's isn't a new observation. I remember years ago Abu Muqqwana said in response to something about how we can't do or didn't get small war or coin or whatever, he said maybe it isn't that, maybe what it is we don't get or can't do war at all anymore. That is what I am thinking too.

Carl

The military doesn't get a pass on this, yet on the other hand I am not aware of battles the military lost over the past 10 years. My point is what does winning look like? Some would argue a better peace is achieved, which I have little faith our government would achieve in Syria. Why would it turn out differently than Iraq? The military objective in Iraq was to remove Saddam. It was accomplished. Political objectives beyond that were not. Neither the military or political objectives were achieved in afghanistan as of now. I think you are too quick to point the finger at our military as the sole source of our failures, and give the
the policy makers and influencers like Wolfowtz a pass. Our military can accomplish most military tasks. If you want them to more give them the authority of State in the war zones, and fire all the stary eyed policy mskers who confuse dreams with reality.

[carl]

Bill:

The object is to win wars not battles. Who cares if you win every single battle? It is not Major League Baseball where you tote up the games won and lost to determine the champion. You got to win the war.

I haven't given the policy makers a pass. I said us, we, the Americans. But I should have been more clear and said more specifically the American leadership class, both civilian and military. They are the guys who give the big orders and they don't know how to win. Guys like you know how to win and guys like Col. McFarland, McMaster, Carter Malkasian, Carl Prine and thousands of others know how to win, but for some reason the guys at the top don't know and don't care that they don't know. That poses the most extreme danger to our country and to all the young men I know.

For the military to believe that its military task only extends to beating the opposing military is amateurish. It is like the Imperial Japanese Navy only thinking about big battles and forgetting about convoys and fighting submarines. It's a kids idea of what the role of the military is. Occupation and pacification is as much the role of the military as hitting the beach. There is nothing else that can do it. The military didn't whine after WWII about having to occupy all the countries that it occupied. That was a military task, as was the occupation of the South after the Civil War and the Philippines and Puerto Rico and on and on. A military that can't handle occupations or doesn't think it is a military task is just a bunch of well organized pirates.

My point isn't about Iraq or Afghanistan, it is about the Americans not knowing how to fight to win anymore. It is obvious that the civilian elites are feckless believers in magical thinking as witnessed by our relationship with the Pak Army/ISI over the years, but our multi-star officer corps should be a brake on that. Most all civilians think they are, but they are not. They may not believe the cant but they ain't got the nerve to tell the emperor why he is feeling so cold. This is a grave danger to our country.

[Dayuhan]

That construction is meant to close off argument because there are three words in there that are by definition, in this context, indefinite: reliable, thing and want. They can never be definitely known. The way you arguing they must be definitely known in order for any conclusion to be drawn. It's circular. We must know for sure things that can't be known for sure before we can decide and we can't decide unless we know for sure things that can't be known for sure. Or at least that is how it seems to me.

Exactly. Since we can't know for sure what "the Syrians" want, we can't use "the Syrians want us to intervene" as an argument for intervention. It would make a poor argument even if we could know, because the US government is supposed to do what the Americans want, not what the Syrians want.


Are you ever going to stop picking sentences apart and write some paragraphs with arguments that don't consist of open ended, rhetorical questions, or at least not so often?

If you really want me to explain why I think getting involved in the Syrian civil war would be a bad choice for the US, I'll do it... but it seems a bit repetitive.


Any nation, great or small, that doesn't know how to fight and win is a victim in waiting.

"Winning" is achieving your objective. Is it not possible that the American issues with "winning" could stem largely from the selection of objectives that are nebulous, ephemeral, and all but impossible to achieve with the tools we dispatch to pursue them? Asking an army to "do nation-building" makes as much sense as asking a demolition team to build a skyscraper.

If we aren't clear on what our goals are, if we shift our goals midstream, if we select unrealistic goals, and if we mismatch goals with the tools used to pursue them, we are going to have a hard time achieving our goals, and hence a hard time "winning". Is that a problem with not knowing how to win, or a problem with not knowing how to select goals, and with not knowing how to stay out of situations where goals are unclear or unrealistic.?

When the US military is assigned objectives that are clear, realistic, and compatible with what they are trained and equipped to do, they seem able to achieve the objectives quite expeditiously: e.g. "dismantle Saddam's military and remove him from power" or "remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan". Our problem is that we insist on morphing those objectives into nebulous concepts like "nation-building" or "installing democracy", which are simply beyond our (or anyone's) capacity to achieve. That sets us up for losing, or at least for not winning.

[Dayuhan]

I am trying to understand why anyone needs to satisfy your demands in this regard. Who exactly are you to make such a demand?

Where did you see a demand?

Is it unreasonable for any participant here to request those who advocate US involvement is Syria to explain why they think involvement is necessary or appropriate, what the goals of the proposed involvement would be, how they propose to achieve those goals, and how they propose to avoid adverse unintended consequences? Is it unreasonable to expect more than a superficial answer to those questions?

If that's unreasonable, the discussion is not going to be much of a discussion.

[Dayuhan]

A well reasoned argument, which is something lacking from the advocates for intervention. Their argument is little more than we should just go, and Americans are rightfully leery of that approach. Seems we thought we could predict the future with a high degree of accuracy many times in the past only to be disappointed. Not too many American leaders would commit U.S. troops to a conflict they didn't think they could win in unless it was truly self-defense where they had no choice.

Thank you... I wish I could make the same point that concisely!

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Carl


For the military to believe that its military task only extends to beating the opposing military is amateurish. It is like the Imperial Japanese Navy only thinking about big battles and forgetting about convoys and fighting submarines. It's a kids idea of what the role of the military is. Occupation and pacification is as much the role of the military as hitting the beach. There is nothing else that can do it. The military didn't whine after WWII about having to occupy all the countries that it occupied. That was a military task, as was the occupation of the South after the Civil War and the Philippines and Puerto Rico and on and on. A military that can't handle occupations or doesn't think it is a military task is just a bunch of well organized pirates.

My point is I think many in the military are willing to step up to the plate, but leadership in the different agencies, principally CIA and Dept of State push back and protect their supposed lanes, even after repeatedly demonstrating they're inept in some areas. The CIA is occasionally held accountable, the State Department never seems to be held accountable for their errors, and it often their errors that lead to failures that is then seen as a military failure.

Do you think we got it right in Panama?

Some hold up El Salvador as an example of victory, but at most we held the communists from achieving a victory, they weren't defeated, and they didn't quit until the USSR collapsed.

Grenada? An overall success, but several serious tactical blunders that led to further reform acts.

Desert Storm? I think it was a complete success up to a point. President Bush appropriately scoped the mission into something that was doable, and sustainable politically. At the end he then encouraged the Shia and Kurds to rise up, and let them get slaughtered by the Iraqi security forces. Not sure what that accomplished except a bunch of hard feelings for the US.

Korea? Partial success, yet North Korea is still one the worst countries on the planet when it comes to human rights abuses. Amazingly we turn a blind eye to the atrocities their while the media continues to beat the drum about human rights issues and suffering in Sudan and Somalia (previously). Political correctness over the professional reporting, got it, but still sad.

Vietnam? Not touching it tonight.

Lebanon intervention in the early 80s?

Iran-Contra?

Shock and awe baby, the more I think about it the more in awe I am.

[Dayuhan]

Go back and read my post from September or October, when I told you that it's much too late for an 'US intervention' - i.e. an intervention through military means.

I'm not argumenting FOR any such intervention since long any more. Can you please finally realize that?

Neither are you explaining what you think could have been done, beyond a very generic "send money", and why you think that would have had a significant impact on the evolution of the civil war.


But sure: turn off the logic and everything's 'crystal clear' about what would have happened there. :D

I wouldn't know about that. Turning off logic and achieving crystal clarity on hypothetical events seems more your specialty.


Sigh... explained this some 10-12 times so far, only. Seems the art of organizing such operations got lost in the USA of the last, say, 50 or so years?

What got lost is the illusion that "the art of organizing such operations" ever existed.


It doesn't matter which. Pick up a group, get them to a training camp, explain them what you expect from them in return for your aid, train them, arm them, etc., do the same that various Islamists from KSA, Qatar, UAE and (especially) Kuwait are doing: make them so powerful, disciplined, well-armed, -fed, and -led, that insurgents from other groups are defecting in order to join such groups.

A training camp run by whom? Do you propose to send American trainers into Syria?

"...explain them what you expect from them" is almost mind-boggling. Do you really think they are going to simply submit before our overpowering Americanness and do our will like good subservient little non-Western folks? Holy Gunga Din, Batman, what century are you living in? More likely they will take our money and our stuff, tell us whatever they think we want to hear, and do whatever they want, not what we want. What on earth makes you believe that the US can simply select a group at random and transform them into instruments of our policy? If that's the plan, don't expect anyone to salute when you run it up the flagpole.


It so obviously works with all the possible other insurgent organizations in Syria, just not with the one group _supposedly_ supported by the 'West': even a blind must see this.
If the Saudis are doing it and it's working for them, why do we need to be involved? Because everybody else is? Do you seriously think the Saudis will be able to control their proxies?


So, where is your problem actually?

My problem is that... first, you're not explaining why you want all this done. You're not explaining what vital or even pressing American interest is served. Ypu're not explaining what you want or expect to achieve by picking and supporting a side in someone else's fight. Also, the plan seems, frankly, as full of holes as the aforementioned Gunga Din after his little bout of serving the western meddler.


Didn't the Saudi, Kuwaiti, Qatari and Emirati money change anything?

If you think it didn't - or US or any sort of 'Western' money wouldn't - then you should explain me: where would the Syrian insurgency be by now without all the support it's receiving from different corners in the Arab world?

We don't know where the Syrian insurgency would or wouldn't be in any hypothetical event. We also don't know why you think the US needs or would want to pick a side in that particular mess. What would you hope to achieve?


I'm not advocating an 'intervention' in sense of 'military intervention', 'bombing' etc., but in terms of (literaly) buying one of parties between Syrian insurgent groups and then developing it into THE group that matters there, that's important on the battlefield, and thus gaining political influence (in the future).

Taking sides is the first step toward direct intervention. What do you do when your side doesn't win? What do you do when you send more money and stuff and your side still doesn't win? All too often, the answer has been "send advisers and trainers"... and it doesn't stop there.

The idea that the US can simply pick a faction, any faction and, purely by an infusion of money and weapons, transform them into the dominant faction seems beyond speculative.


Or wait: perhaps you prefer a Syria that's under the control of whatever sort of extremists, so that Israel can continue declaring itself for 'under existential threat', and thus get more monetary and aid in terms of most modern technology and arms - and all of this because 'USA have no common history with Syria', 'they're no friends of us, but Israelis are'...?

US intervention would in no way assure that Syria stays out of the hands of extremists... and how the Israelis manage their relations with Syria is and should be their own affair.


If so, I could perfectly understand you advocating a hand-over of Syria to Iran and Hezbollah. Or the AQ. (As it there would be difference for Syrian population?). But then, the 'quality' of such behaviour is the same like when that duck with 'Iran buying 270 Su-27s' was launched, few years ago, just in order to find argumentation for selling F-35s to Israel and F-15s to Saudi Arabia. :rolleyes:

Nobody needs a threat-based argument to sell F-15s to Saudi Arabia or F-35s to Israel. US factories make good money on the planes, and they need to generate volume on the F-35 to keep unit cost under control. They would sell them even if the greatest threat on the other side was a Sopwith Camel. Of course the Saudis and Israelis might not be as willing to buy them, but they don't need the US to tell them whether or not they are threatened.

The US is not in a position to "hand over" Syria to anyone. Possibly you hadn't noticed, but it's not ours to hand over. If a bunch of people who want to kill us are busy killing each other over the question of who gets to run the place, is that really something the US needs to get involved in?

[carl]

So I says to Dayuhan, I says "Are you ever going to stop picking apart sentences?" Nope I sees. Then I says, I says "Are you ever going to stop arguing via open ended rhetorical questions?" Nope I sees again. I should a said "Are you ever going to address the point at hand instead of ignoring it and bringing something completely different and pretending it addresses the original point?" Nope, I would a seen. Then I says, I says "That's a circular argument." And he says 'Yep it is, and it proves this.' Ain't that remarkable.

[carl]

My point is I think many in the military are willing to step up to the plate, but leadership in the different agencies, principally CIA and Dept of State push back and protect their supposed lanes, even after repeatedly demonstrating they're inept in some areas. The CIA is occasionally held accountable, the State Department never seems to be held accountable for their errors, and it often their errors that lead to failures that is then seen as a military failure.

Do you think we got it right in Panama?

Some hold up El Salvador as an example of victory, but at most we held the communists from achieving a victory, they weren't defeated, and they didn't quit until the USSR collapsed.

Grenada? An overall success, but several serious tactical blunders that led to further reform acts.

Desert Storm? I think it was a complete success up to a point. President Bush appropriately scoped the mission into something that was doable, and sustainable politically. At the end he then encouraged the Shia and Kurds to rise up, and let them get slaughtered by the Iraqi security forces. Not sure what that accomplished except a bunch of hard feelings for the US.

Korea? Partial success, yet North Korea is still one the worst countries on the planet when it comes to human rights abuses. Amazingly we turn a blind eye to the atrocities their while the media continues to beat the drum about human rights issues and suffering in Sudan and Somalia (previously). Political correctness over the professional reporting, got it, but still sad.

Vietnam? Not touching it tonight.

Lebanon intervention in the early 80s?

Iran-Contra?

Shock and awe baby, the more I think about it the more in awe I am.

My opinion differs from yours. Many in the military are willing to step up and do what it takes. The problem is the multi-stars aren't and they are the movers and shakers. If they don't or won't win, you and the others don't much matter. Those guys are infected with the same virus that afflicts State, the intel agencies and every other leprous collection of inside the beltway organizations.

You are at times confusing perfection with good enough. WWII was sure as hell not perfection but it was good enough. Heck, you even said the commies quit in El Salvador. That was good enough but you seem to think good enough wasn't good enough. A lot of South Koreans benefited hugely from a good enough, for them, outcome in the peninsula.

I don't think political correctness has anything to do with reporting or lack of it on North Korean barbarity. What limits exist exist because nobody can get in there and there isn't much prospect the situation is going to change.

Then there were the things that weren't even good enough. Two cases in point, Iraq 1991 and Vietnam. Both of those in my view exemplify our inability to win when winning was possible. We never tried to cut the Trail and we just sat on our hands while a thoroughly defeated Iraqi army slaughtered people. We don't do war well.

[JMA]

Excellent response Carl.

Saved me firing off a response to Bill's sad apology for political and - top level - military incompetence. (The grunts do the business and the generals screw it up.)





Bill:

The object is to win wars not battles. Who cares if you win every single battle? It is not Major League Baseball where you tote up the games won and lost to determine the champion. You got to win the war.

I haven't given the policy makers a pass. I said us, we, the Americans. But I should have been more clear and said more specifically the American leadership class, both civilian and military. They are the guys who give the big orders and they don't know how to win. Guys like you know how to win and guys like Col. McFarland, McMaster, Carter Malkasian, Carl Prine and thousands of others know how to win, but for some reason the guys at the top don't know and don't care that they don't know. That poses the most extreme danger to our country and to all the young men I know.

For the military to believe that its military task only extends to beating the opposing military is amateurish. It is like the Imperial Japanese Navy only thinking about big battles and forgetting about convoys and fighting submarines. It's a kids idea of what the role of the military is. Occupation and pacification is as much the role of the military as hitting the beach. There is nothing else that can do it. The military didn't whine after WWII about having to occupy all the countries that it occupied. That was a military task, as was the occupation of the South after the Civil War and the Philippines and Puerto Rico and on and on. A military that can't handle occupations or doesn't think it is a military task is just a bunch of well organized pirates.

My point isn't about Iraq or Afghanistan, it is about the Americans not knowing how to fight to win anymore. It is obvious that the civilian elites are feckless believers in magical thinking as witnessed by our relationship with the Pak Army/ISI over the years, but our multi-star officer corps should be a brake on that. Most all civilians think they are, but they are not. They may not believe the cant but they ain't got the nerve to tell the emperor why he is feeling so cold. This is a grave danger to our country.

[JMA]

Who said anything about US involvement? Not I.

With the Keystone Cops antics of the White House and the Pentagon it would just be another cock-up. The US military must not get within 1,000 miles of Syria.

I've said it before … use proxies.





Where did you see a demand?

Is it unreasonable for any participant here to request those who advocate US involvement is Syria to explain why they think involvement is necessary or appropriate, what the goals of the proposed involvement would be, how they propose to achieve those goals, and how they propose to avoid adverse unintended consequences? Is it unreasonable to expect more than a superficial answer to those questions?

If that's unreasonable, the discussion is not going to be much of a discussion.

[Dayuhan]

Who said anything about US involvement? Not I.

With the Keystone Cops antics of the White House and the Pentagon it would just be another cock-up. The US military must not get within 1,000 miles of Syria.

I've said it before … use proxies.

Involvement by proxy is still involvement.

Who would you suggest as an appropriate proxy?

[Firn]

It seems that there area certainly a lot of proxies involved in this very messy and foggy conflict. What surprised me after is the sheer amount of videos coming out of the war, some of it clearly recorded to show all the great things are done for the cause x. In some cases they even say thanks, for example to gracious donors around the Gulf. The vast spread of digital cameras and the increasing penetration of the Internet plus platforms like YT make it possible.

[JMA]

Involvement by proxy is still involvement.

Who would you suggest as an appropriate proxy?

Is this '20 Questions'?

[Bill Moore]

Before this debate gets too heated for no reason, we already have proxies. We're supporting to some degree the FSA. The level of support we're providing is probably classified so we can't really debate it. Iran, Turkey, Saudi, and others also have their proxies. The bottom line is when you review our history of using proxies we don't have a good track record using proxies to achieve decisive effects. Unless we have the dominant proxy force we'll just prolong the fight and maintain some level of influence, but beyond that what exactly? If all we want is influence then good enough.

[Dayuhan]

Is this '20 Questions'?

Only one... but no worries if you can't answer it. Seems nobody else can either.


Before this debate gets too heated for no reason, we already have proxies. We're supporting to some degree the FSA. The level of support we're providing is probably classified so we can't really debate it. Iran, Turkey, Saudi, and others also have their proxies.

I'm sure we have provided some support to the FSA, but others probably have as well, and I'm not sure the support is sufficient to make them "our" proxy.


The bottom line is when you review our history of using proxies we don't have a good track record using proxies to achieve decisive effects.

Amen. Does anyone else have a consistently good track record of using proxies?


Unless we have the dominant proxy force we'll just prolong the fight and maintain some level of influence, but beyond that what exactly? If all we want is influence then good enough.

Very true... having a proxy gets you nowhere unless your proxy wins. One of our problems in the past has been a tendency to escalate support when they don't win, eventually leading to boots on the ground.

Even if a proxy does win, our sponsorship is no real guarantee of influence. Proxies do not always do as they are told... especially if they've won. The idea that we can just choose a group, make them into winners, and control them seems fanciful at best.

The missing piece here remains "why"? What vital US interest is at stake? What goals would we being trying to achieve by taking sides in this conflict? If winning is achieving your objective, how do we win if the objective isn't clear from the start?

[jcustis]

I just read the CNN story about everyone getting worked up over the UN inviting Iran to the next round of talks.

Without Iran's involvement, there won't be a sustainable arrangement to clean up the mess. Although the UN created more work, I hope we can get past any dramas, knuckle down, and just do the extra work required rather than planting a guidon because we don't want to expend the effort.

The Kingdom, Qatar, Turkey, and Jordan might as well be factored in also because this a a multidimensional problem spanning resources, arms, borders, refugees, and on.

If the talks aren't inclusive enough, lingering issues will we just waiting to throw a wrench in things. Is the US trying to steer this to a Alawite and FSA-only dance?

[jcustis]

The missing piece here remains "why"? What vital US interest is at stake? What goals would we being trying to achieve by taking sides in this conflict? If winning is achieving your objective, how do we win if the objective isn't clear from the start?

Although it won't be articulated all that simply, the objective is a stable Syria and a stable region. It might not mean that the current opposition "wins" this, because it cannot be a simple zero sum game. Iran won't stand for it, and unless we are ready to throw down with Iran right now, the best approach is going to be a negotiated settlement which addresses Alawite and Iranian concerns. Bashir doesn't need to stay, but putting all the Alawites and the Sunni Syrians who have supported Assad out on their assses will definitely make a deeper mess.

This isn't a proposition of winning and I think anyone who is thinking like that in the beltway is delusional.

[CrowBat]

Before this debate gets too heated for no reason, we already have proxies. We're supporting to some degree the FSA....the USA _supported_ the FSyA, and then with a little bit of 'non-lethal' aid: this was never enough to turn it into a true 'army' (in sense of what I described above), and stopped a few weeks ago. And since it's non-lethal aid, it shouldn't be 'classified'.

Measured by amount, AFAIK, Kuwait is providing most of support for insurgency, followed by Saudi Salafists (though not Wahhabists; these two are not the same), then Qataris etc.

But anyway, the FSyA was - in theory - a perfect proxy: non-religious, multi-ethnic, tollerant. The problem is (and remains), that its damn, stupid, non-religious, multi-ethnic and tollerant elements inside Syria, do not want to hear any kind of commands from a bunch of ex-Jihadi Moslem Brothers, various ex-political-oppositionals- (including quite a few ex-Leninists) cum-businessmen or ex-regime-members-cum-very-clever-talkingheads (with accounts on Austrian and Swiss banks, of course), that gathered outside of Syria in the last 40+ years. Simply because majority of these dumb revolutionaries that groupped within the FSyA have neither ever heard of these, nor do they find any useful reason for listening to their advice. So, if they didn't sell themselves already to the first idiotic Wahhabi from such an important place like Mauritania that run across their way, why should they sell themselves to anybody else?

That is a true 'bomb surprise', then this is what the revolutionaries have said right from the start - but, hell, that's the reason why such fine, 'freedom, liberty, democracy and free trade' loving nations like the USA can't cooperate with the FSyA, because those stupids do not want to accept a government they do not consider 'their'... :rolleyes:

Sigh... when I think of the content of the last paragraph alone, I'm not surprised any more there are people like Dayuhan. Buddy: you simply cannot even imagine ever coming to the wet dream of cooperating with such people like the FSyA. You can't buy them, you can't bribe them, once you've given them the arms and money, you can't even control them. :p

OK, so instead of you demanding from me a detailled plan for how to instal a US-proxy in Syria, you'll get me to forget about this idea of mine.

I sincerely hope, you're felling better now, then your ideas have been proven 'correct' - beyond any doubt.


Unless we have the dominant proxy force we'll just prolong the fight and maintain some level of influence, but beyond that what exactly? If all we want is influence then good enough.For a country that's maintaining military presence (or any kind of 'military installations') in more territories than there are members of the UN, you all sound very confused to me. :P

Let's be 'rude', and bring it to the bottom line. Or few, 'really important', bottom lines:

1.) In Syria, there's a population of 20+ million, 90% of which is younger than 60% and 80% younger than 30. That means: either one leaves something like 15 million of youngsters there to the mercy of all the possible extremists, and then pays the price for the next 40-50 years (unless they all either run out of steam or kill themselves in various suicide terrorist attacks), or there is an interest to 'do something' to prevent that from happening.

Feel free to pick your choice.

2.) Syria might not swim in oil, but it's got some, and there is gas too (supposedly, there is a lot of both of it there, but it's so deep and there is no infrastructure to exploit it, it would cost some to get it; so, 'never mind'). Plus, a) the country is a 'hole' in the pipeline spanning all the countries around the Mediterranean, and b) it lies on the possible route for pipelines between specific other places (some say Iraq, but who can know...), and the EU. Under the present regime, that's never going to change, or if (i.e. say, the regime survives and then finally constructs that pipeline), then 'even that' oil/gas source, plus the pipeline in question is going to end in Russian hands.

Given there are (very influential) people in the USA who have invested billions into getting oil and gas from Central Asia, and (less influential) people very curious to screw up the Ruskies and break their monopoloy on gas exports to the EU (thank you, Schrder!)... given there (also 'less influential', but definitely 'clever') people curious to screw up both the Saudis and the Ruskies, and export Qatari gas via Iraq and Syria to the EU too (no matter how much the Saudis insist on controlling such exports and Qataris say they've got enough liquid gas carriers to export their gas for the next 50 or so years).... Guess, that's got something to do with something called 'competition'. They say such 'things' might be of quite some importance in the USA... or was it that way in Albania?

Perhaps I'm just simply mixing plenty of things. Who knows? Whatever... provided I'm not, this all might mean: hey, there could be something called 'economic interest' to 'do something' too?!?

But perhaps that with 'economic interest' is something we should better leave to the Russians... or Chinese?

3.) I think there used to be one thing 'important' for the USA, in the 'good ol' times', called 'free trade'. Correct me if I'm wrong, but it could be the USA fought one of their first wars ever precisely for the purpose of being able to run the free trade in the Med (it might be a hear-say, but rumour has it the affair was called something like 'Barbary Wars' or something of that kind...). Under Assads, there was no free trade in Syria: the entire economy was controlled by the rulling clique. A country of 20+ mil people in urgent need of complete reconstruction might therefore be interesting for investment, construction business - even tourism (consider how much was there to see, before the war, and hoping it's still going to be there when the war is over) etc.

But, who knows? Perhaps the good ol' USA are not interested in such things like free trade and commerce any more...

Please, tell me that's so, and I'll surely feel better.

4.) I know that Assad regime was 'popular' because it was proven as 'no danger' for Israel. And that there are enough talkin'heads who would always prefer him to any kind of extremist- but especially any kind of 'pluralist/democratic' administration in Syria (imagine there being no threat for Israel coming from Syria any more... geek!). So, such a development might be 'bad' for big defence business. But guess, they would never in their wildest dreams come to such ideas like to create some sort of an imaginary threat - like few weeks ago when explaining to the Emiratis that they must buy plenty of additional F-16s, because Iran's getting S-300s from Russia (but sure!).

So, well, perhaps they wouldn't buy the F-16s or F-35s, but it could be... it is at least 'distantly imaginable'... that once they get themselves free from Assadists, Iranians and Hezbollah, the Syrians might come to the idea to rebuild their military and security services. It might be of some significance - I don't know, teach me please - that they'll have to buy all the equipment and arms for these... And in connection with that about free trade and then the point 5 (see below), well, perhaps that might make the country interesting...?

No? Ok, then not. :rolleyes:

5.) Another positive effect of such a development would...no, I'm daydreaming again, and I'm not specific enough... but well, I'll complete this thought as well, you like it or not... could be the Iranian loss of influence in the area, especially safe 'land-' (after airborne via Iraq and Turkey) connections to the Hezbollah. Some say that this would be good in preventing Hezbollah - an organization that might be on a few lists of 'terrorist organizations' around the world, who can know? - from getting even more arms than it already has. Perhaps this is in some sort of US and/or Western interest too?

Ah, that's NOT interesting any more? Oh, then sorry for such a stupid idea.

6.) Last but not least, I've heard there are not few people crazy enough to think that the US help for Syrian insurgents would recover the US image between such of its 'allies' like KSA, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar etc. - most of which meanwhile (some since longer) actually consider the USA an enemy (if for no other reason then because they concluded that Washington has sold the 'Arab Iraq' to 'Iranian Shi'a takfirs').

Ah yes... sorry: since when do USA care any more about their image in the world?

Excuse me for disturbing you with all of this, dear Americans. Never mind. After writing all of this down, it's crystal even to such a stupid like me that the USA _cannot_ - repeat: cannot - have any kind of 'vital', even less so any kind of 'important' reasons, and definitely no chance of ever finding any kind of 'objectives' of getting involved there... :rolleyes:

[davidbfpo]

A joint CNN-Guardian story, based on a single defector who provided fifty-five thousand images of dead detainees and the report by experienced war crimes investigators, sponsored by Qatar, appeared this evening and just in time for the diplomatic dance over a Geneva conference. Timing aside what do we have?

From the investigator's report:
The inquiry team was mandated to determine the credibility of a defector from Syria whose occupation prior to his defection was in the service of the military police of the Syrian government. In that capacity, for many years, he had been in the military police and in that role it fell to him to photograph scenes of crimes. With the onset of the civil war the nature of his occupation changed. His duties, and those of his colleagues, now were to photograph and document the bodies of those brought from their places of detention to a military hospital.

The bodies he photographed since the civil war began, showed signs of starvation, brutal beatings, strangulation, and other forms of torture and killing.

The defector who was code-named “Caesar” by the inquiry team had, during the course of his work, smuggled out some tens of thousands of images of corpses so photographed by his colleagues and himself. Other similar images have been smuggled out by other people. In all, approximately fifty-five thousand (55,000) images have, to date, been made available outside Syria by these processes. As there were some four or five photographs taken of each body this approximates to there being images of about eleven thousand (11,000) dead detainees.

Graphic images. Link to report:http://http://static.guim.co.uk/ni/1390226674736/syria-report-execution-tort.pdf

The CNN report:http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/20/world/syria-torture-photos-amanpour/index.html and The Guardian report:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/20/evidence-industrial-scale-killing-syria-war-crimes

A short reminder how the civil war began when President Bashir Assad made a speech to the parliament:http://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/the-speech-that-changed-syria

[Firn]

It is of course difficult to know to which extent the report is true, but there can hardly be a doubt that the regime tortured and killed a considerable amount of it's captured opponents. The material seems to indicated that it was done systematically on a considerable scale with orders from high above. Sadly the level of brutality does not surprise, nor the cynicism of calling strangulations and so forth 'breathing problems'.

Under U.S. Pressure, U.N. Withdraws Iran’s Invitation to Syria Talks (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/world/middleeast/syria.html?hp&_r=0).


WASHINGTON — Under intense American pressure, the United Nations on Monday withdrew an invitation to Iran to attend the much-anticipated Syria peace conference, reversing a decision announced a day earlier.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, whose decision to invite Iran had threatened to unravel the Syria talks less than 48 hours before the scheduled start, issued a statement on Monday rescinding the invitation. The United States had said it was surprised by the invitation because Iran had not agreed to conditions for the talks, to be held on Wednesday in Montreux, Switzerland.


It is rather difficult to see what the conference can achieve, even more so now as perhaps the most important player on the side of Assad is not part of it.


The United States’ longstanding position has been that Iran, a major backer of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, must publicly endorse the mandate of the conference, which is outlined in a communiqué from a 2012 meeting in Geneva. That mandate says that the conference’s purpose is to negotiate the establishment of a transitional administration that would govern Syria by the “mutual consent” of Mr. Assad’s government and the Syrian opposition.

[CrowBat]

The entire exercise with 'Geneva II' is just a vaste of time. It's a search for an excuse in form of, 'well, we did try to bring them to negotiating table'.

Talking about future of Syria without Iran is useless. If for no other reason then because people like Soleimani (CO IRGC-Qods) said they'll never abandon their friends. And when Soleimani says such things, then it's actually Khamenei who's speaking, then in regards of such affairs like Syria, Soleimani can't open his mouth without Khamenei's permission.

Other than this, it's important to note that a large part of the SNC is never going to negotiate with Assad; they said so only some 98 times so far (of which about 70 times already back in 2011), and thus it's no surprise they have separated from the rest of the SNC (few days ago) and are not going there.

Anyway, the following has finally underwent the 'from rumours to headlines' process:
Syria's Assad accused of boosting Al-Qaeda with secret oil deals (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10585391/Syrias-Assad-accused-of-boosting-Al-Qaeda-with-secret-oil-deals.html)


Western intelligence suggests Bashar al-Assad collaborating with jihadists to persuade West the uprising is terrorist-led

...
The Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad has funded and co-operated with al-Qaeda in a complex double game even as the terrorists fight Damascus, according to new allegations by Western intelligence agencies, rebels and al-Qaeda defectors.

Jabhat al-Nusra, and the even more extreme Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS), the two al-Qaeda affiliates operating in Syria, have both been financed by selling oil and gas from wells under their control to and through the regime, intelligence sources have told The Daily Telegraph.

Rebels and defectors say the regime also deliberately released militant prisoners to strengthen jihadist ranks at the expense of moderate rebel forces. The aim was to persuade the West that the uprising was sponsored by Islamist militants including al-Qaeda as a way of stopping Western support for it.
...
Intelligence gathered by Western secret services suggested the regime began collaborating actively with these groups again in the spring of 2013. When Jabhat al-Nusra seized control of Syria’s most lucrative oil fields in the eastern province of Deir al-Zour, it began funding its operations in Syria by selling crude oil, with sums raised in the millions of dollars.
...


Just don't tell me I didn't tell you...

[JMA]

Only one... but no worries if you can't answer it. Seems nobody else can either.


I am not sure why you believe people need to respond to your questions?

Who do you think you are?

[Dayuhan]

I am not sure why you believe people need to respond to your questions?

Of course you don't need to answer the question. I don't expect you to, because I don't think you can.


Who do you think you are?

Just another person commenting on this forum, no different from you.

On might just as easily ask why you think your statements should go unquestioned.

[CrowBat]

Dayuhan,
you've got answers to all of your questions, several times already. You keep on asking 'what vital and pressing interests' should the USA have in Syria. I listed these already three times - and you still come back with the same question. Do you think you'll get different answers if you ask the same question for the 4th time? :confused:

It's your problem - or, better said: your insistence - on ignoring answers you get. What do you expect to get in response? 'Respect'? 'Understanding'?

In other cases you ask silly questions. Apparently, you think that if you ask them and then ignore plainly obvious answers, that's going to imply you have clue what are you talking about, while 'your opponents' don't?

Lookie here:

If the Saudis are doing it and it's working for them, why do we need to be involved?
This is such a childish question, that one can only laugh while answering it. :rolleyes:

But OK, if you need it, here you are: because if somebody else - in this case the Saudis - 'do it', they'll do it 'their way', and not the way that is our interest. In the case of Saudi Arabian involvement in Syria, that translates into a creation of another Wahhabist state. Why? Not because I've got it from any sort of crystal ball, but because it's a matter of fact that Saudi Arabia is a state where Wahhabism is official religion. It's also a matter of fact that the Saudis preach religious intollerance already to their kids in the school. So, provided you decide to engage more than two cells of your brain, the only logical conclusion is that by letting the Saudis 'reshape' Syria, you're automatically leaving them to reshape it the only way they can, which is the Wahhabist way. And that with all the possible negative consequences - for all of us - foremost including something you appear not to have ever heard about, named 'militant extremism'.

So, if you now tell me that you're from ground school and have no clue where to look for Middle East on the map, or have never heard about what repercussions Saudi-supported militant extremism can have for your very own backside too...no problem: keep on asking such questions.

I'll be pleased to explain you few things about an affair they call '9/11' too.

But otherwise, get down from your ivory tower.

[JMA]

Of course you don't need to answer the question. I don't expect you to, because I don't think you can.


LOL... child psychology. Is that the best an ex-Peace Corps can offer?

[JMA]

Dayuhan,
you've got answers to all of your questions, several times already. You keep on asking 'what vital and pressing interests' should the USA have in Syria. I listed these already three times - and you still come back with the same question. Do you think you'll get different answers if you ask the same question for the 4th time? :confused:

It's your problem - or, better said: your insistence - on ignoring answers you get. What do you expect to get in response? 'Respect'? 'Understanding'?


He is lonely out there in the boonies... just trying to play devil's advocate to entertain himself.

[JMA]

Before this debate gets too heated ... we already have proxies.

Bill, using proxies is one thing but using them effectively is quite another.

What we see is another example of rank incompetence by all except the Russians (who once again have the measure of the US).

[CrowBat]

Actually, one should not depend for wrong-titled media reports (like the following one) to 'know' the USA 'have proxies' in Syria: the proxies in question are those of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as can be understood when paying attention at important pieces of text:

US secretly backs rebels to fight al Qaeda in Syria (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10588308/US-secretly-backs-rebels-to-fight-al-Qaeda-in-Syria.html)

...According to two sources – one whose brother was at the meeting: "They talked about the fighting with ISIS, and the Americans encouraged the commanders to attack."

The Syrian Revolutionary Front, whose main commander, Jamal Maarouf, is allied to Saudi Arabia, and the Army of Islam, a new coalition of the moderate rebels sponsored by Qatar, have continued to liaise with the CIA and Saudi and Qatari intelligence, others close to meetings said.

These groups received a boost in arms supplies. According to a source who facilitates governments' lethal and non-lethal aid to Western-friendly groups: "Qatar sent arms first. Saudi Arabia didn't want to be out done, so one week before the attack on ISIS, they gave 80 tons of weaponry, including heavy machine guns".
...

'Encouraging' somebody is not making him/her anybody's proxy. Only direct support does.

[JMA]

A joint CNN-Guardian story, based on a single defector who provided fifty-five thousand images of dead detainees and the report by experienced war crimes investigators, sponsored by Qatar, ... [snip]


I wonder why people are surprised by the torture and murder of Syrian anti-government dissidents in custody?

Because the western world freaks out over what THEY define as war crimes and atrocities how does that connect to the Syrians - all Syrians - as to what they feel bound by or are prepared to carry out?

There is a fine line between naivety and stupidity... I believe that line has been crossed.

Churchill understood the situation well:

"A prisoner of war is a man who tries to kill you and fails, and then asks you not to kill him."
- Sir Winston S. Churchill, 1952.

[JMA]

'Encouraging' somebody is not making him/her anybody's proxy. Only direct support does.

It is how it is done.

Too many examples (in the past) of lone or small teams of CIA operatives attempting to direct the opposition forces in exchange for weapons and other support where these CIA individuals are woefully unqualified militarily together with this a near total lack of knowledge of the complexities of the situation on the ground. Sadly pathetic.

The one consistent aim of the US since 9/11 has been to go after Al Qaeda and prevent their expansion. In terms of Syria this has been a spectacular failure.

[jmm99]

The one consistent aim of the US since 9/11 has been [1] to go after Al Qaeda and [2] prevent their expansion. In terms of Syria this has been a spectacular failure.

The US has been consistent in going after AQ Base - we have killed a lot of them via direct actions and drones.

We should have a discussion somewhere other than in this thread - a SWC thread may already exist - on "preventing AQ expansion". An ounce of prevention now may free a pound of care later.

Moderator adds: a new thread was started 24th January 2014 at:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=19947

But, having said that, US "prevention" efforts generally have been less than "shock and awe"-inspiring. Our "state building" operations in Iraq and Astan were certainly intended to prevent AQ expansion. Now, thousands of lives and just south of $ 2 trillion later, we have basically nada - those two "state building" efforts have been the "spectacular failures".

A subsidiary issue for that separate discussion is how far afield does the US go in preventing the expansion of AQ "franchises" (as opposed to hitting AQ Base). In short, the feasibility and the costs of mounting those operations (whatever they might be) may well be prohibitive with respect to local "AQ" groups.

In retrospect from 9/11, the US has been successful in small direct actions and drone strikes against AQ Base and the leadership of closely-tied franchises on an international scale. The US has also been successful within CONUS in prosecuting hundreds of AQ inspired local terrs - with only one shootout (Detroit MI) that I know of.

Finally, this past situation should not exist today:


Too many examples (in the past) of lone or small teams of CIA operatives attempting to direct the opposition forces in exchange for weapons and other support where these CIA individuals are woefully unqualified militarily together with this a near total lack of knowledge of the complexities of the situation on the ground. Sadly pathetic.

We have the green light for joint Title 50 (CIA and other intel agencies) - Title 10 (DoD) operations. The questions go to the wisdom of when and where to use them - and how much.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

JMM99 asked (just):
We should have a discussion somewhere other than in this thread - a SWC thread may already exist - on "preventing AQ expansion". An ounce of prevention now may free a pound of care later.

I don't think there is such a thread, although the theme has IIRC appeared in discussions. I did search thread titles using intervention and prevention, finding nothing suitable. So I shall ponder creating a new thread.:)

[jmm99]

Regards

Mike