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carl
01-22-2014, 11:27 PM
Yea, me.

JMA
01-23-2014, 08:39 AM
We have the green light for joint Title 50 (CIA and other intel agencies) - Title 10 (DoD) operations. The questions go to the wisdom of when and where to use them - and how much.

Exactly!

When, where, HOW and on what scale.

The how requires more than a little bit of 'skill and cunning' ;)

jmm99
01-24-2014, 05:13 PM
Woops; you're ahead of me - thanks - Preventing AQ Expansion (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=19947)

Could you copy these posts over to the new thread ?

These posts in this thread, Syria under Bashir Assad: crumbling now?

## 456 through 461

These posts in the thread, Kashmir: a simmering, sometimes brutal small war

## 61 through 65

Then everyone can present their views on what I think is very important topic.

Regards

Mike

Moderator adds: Copying done and original posts endorsed (ends).

Dayuhan
01-25-2014, 07:11 AM
Let's be 'rude', and bring it to the bottom line. Or few, 'really important', bottom lines:

That's not rude, that's considerate... and on this thread, quite unprecedented. Thank you.


1.) In Syria, there's a population of 20+ million, 90% of which is younger than 60% and 80% younger than 30. That means: either one leaves something like 15 million of youngsters there to the mercy of all the possible extremists, and then pays the price for the next 40-50 years (unless they all either run out of steam or kill themselves in various suicide terrorist attacks), or there is an interest to 'do something' to prevent that from happening.

Feel free to pick your choice.

Are you suggesting that if America doesn't rescue Syria, all those young Syrians will become suicide bombers, or that we have to rescue the Syrians so they won't hate us down the line? That sounds a very speculative proposition. For one thing, the assumption that US involvement would improve the situation in Syria or conjure up a favorable resolution is speculative at best. Your apparent assumption that the FSA is an ideal proxy and would win if given money is speculative at best. We have heard this sort of stuff before: there’s always a faction around that somebody things would make everything better if only the US would throw a lot of money at them. Needless to say, it doesn’t generally work out that way. I see very little reason to suspect that this problem can be solved by throwing American money at it. “It will be a terrible mess if you don’t get involved” is a very poor argument unless it goes along with a very persuasive argument that it will not become an equally large mess if we do get involved. I don’t see that persuasive argument being presented here. The track record of efforts to improve messes by throwing money at them is not impressive, to say the least.


2.) Syria might not swim in oil, but it's got some, and there is gas too (supposedly, there is a lot of both of it there, but it's so deep and there is no infrastructure to exploit it, it would cost some to get it; so, 'never mind'). Plus, a) the country is a 'hole' in the pipeline spanning all the countries around the Mediterranean, and b) it lies on the possible route for pipelines between specific other places (some say Iraq, but who can know...), and the EU. Under the present regime, that's never going to change, or if (i.e. say, the regime survives and then finally constructs that pipeline), then 'even that' oil/gas source, plus the pipeline in question is going to end in Russian hands. ...

...Perhaps I'm just simply mixing plenty of things. Who knows? Whatever... provided I'm not, this all might mean: hey, there could be something called 'economic interest' to 'do something' too?!?

But perhaps that with 'economic interest' is something we should better leave to the Russians... or Chinese?

Yes, you’re just mixing plenty of things. It’s called clutching at straws.

Oil, gas, and pipelines always work their way into these conversations, usually invoked by conspiracy theorists convinced that the US is eagerly seeking an excuse to intervene. In Syria, (as in Afghanistan, where conspiracy theorists uised to invoke pipelines as a casus belli on an almost daily basis), claims of energy interests just don’t stand up to examination.

Syria isn’t swimming in oil; it’s not even wading in oil. Reserves and production are nowhere near enough to be worth getting involved in a fight over. The US has also learned from Iraq that getting into the fight doesn’t mean American companies get the oil contracts: even if there was enough oil to be worth fighting over, that doesn’t mean intervention would assure any kind of economic payoff for the US.

Syria is in no way essential to any pipeline plans, other than the loosely proposed Iran-Iraq-Syria “friendship pipeline”, which is not something the US would be terribly interested in promoting. BTC and TANAP run through Turkey. Nabucco was planned to run through Turkey. A Qatar-Iraq pipeline doesn’t need to run through Syria; it can just as easily go direct to Turkey… if the Saudis approve it, which they probably won’t. There was a minor pipeline from Kirkuk going through Syria, but it’s been out of commission for years and nobody seems terribly interested in rehabilitating it. Syria is a hole in the pipeline network for a reason: it’s irrelevant. Nobody needs or wants to go through it. For Central Asian output the route through Turkey is more direct and more politically stable, no need to mess with Syria. In any event the threat to Russian control of Central Asian oil and gas exports doesn’t come from pipelines running west, it comes from the much larger eastbound pipelines that the Chinese are building. That of course means little or nothing to the US; it’s something for China, Russia, and the Central Asian states to thrash out.

If you want to talk about economic interests, you need to look at cost/risk/benefit equations, and in the case of Syria there’s just not enough prospective benefit to justify the cost and risk. No major or even significant economic interests are at stake.


3.) I think there used to be one thing 'important' for the USA, in the 'good ol' times', called 'free trade'...

But, who knows? Perhaps the good ol' USA are not interested in such things like free trade and commerce any more...

Please, tell me that's so, and I'll surely feel better.

You can feel better. Whether or not the Syrian economy is free is a matter of near zero significance to the US. Of course there’s always a mild preference for free trade, but not enough to get mixed up in a proxy war over. Again, costs and benefits: the economic benefit to the US of regime change in Syria are too hypothetical and too small to justify a proxy war.

Dayuhan
01-25-2014, 07:12 AM
4.) I know that Assad regime was 'popular' because it was proven as 'no danger' for Israel. And that there are enough talkin'heads who would always prefer him to any kind of extremist- but especially any kind of 'pluralist/democratic' administration in Syria (imagine there being no threat for Israel coming from Syria any more... geek!) So, such a development might be 'bad' for big defence business....

...It might be of some significance - I don't know, teach me please - that they'll have to buy all the equipment and arms for these... And in connection with that about free trade and then the point 5 (see below), well, perhaps that might make the country interesting...?

No? Ok, then not. :rolleyes:

No. Just… no. Not even close to being part of the equation.


5.) Another positive effect of such a development would...no, I'm daydreaming again, and I'm not specific enough... but well, I'll complete this thought as well, you like it or not... could be the Iranian loss of influence in the area, especially safe 'land-' (after airborne via Iraq and Turkey) connections to the Hezbollah. Some say that this would be good in preventing Hezbollah - an organization that might be on a few lists of 'terrorist organizations' around the world, who can know? - from getting even more arms than it already has. Perhaps this is in some sort of US and/or Western interest too?

Ah, that's NOT interesting any more? Oh, then sorry for such a stupid idea.


This is the Saudi argument: we have to get involved to stick it to Iran and Hezbollah. That of course goes back to fallacy #1: the assumption that a viable proxy exists that would be capable of sticking it to Iran and Hezbollah. That remains very much uncertain. While seeing Iran and Hezbollah take one in the chops might be a favorable outcome, it remains a very hypothetical outcome and by no means the most likely one. Proxy wars in general are not very attractive, because the outcome depends largely on matters outside your control, mainly on your proxy. Going into a matter as serious as war with so little control over the outcome is not a very attractive proposition. You could take this argument to the US Government and propose that in a best case scenario you could do significant damage to Iran and Hezbollah. They’d note that, and ask you about the outcomes, probabilities, and consequences of less than best case scenarios. You’d need a pretty persuasive answer. Bottom line: while the US might want to see Iran and Hezbollah hurt in Syria, it doesn’t need to see that outcome. It is not a vital or even a pressing interest. Going to war, by proxy or otherwise, is not something to be done just because there’s a chance of hurting someone you dislike.


6.) Last but not least, I've heard there are not few people crazy enough to think that the US help for Syrian insurgents would recover the US image between such of its 'allies' like KSA, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar etc. - most of which meanwhile (some since longer) actually consider the USA an enemy (if for no other reason then because they concluded that Washington has sold the 'Arab Iraq' to 'Iranian Shi'a takfirs').

Ah yes... sorry: since when do USA care any more about their image in the world?

There might be a few people crazy enough to think that, but not many. Arming American proxies and sending them out to fight Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Qatari proxies (yes, our proxies and theirs would fight each other, probably just as energetically as they fight the regime) seems hardly calculated to enhance American standing in any of those countries.
Those concerned with America’s “image in the world” will reflect that involvement in foreign wars, by proxy or otherwise, has traditionally diminished, rather than enhanced, the American image in the eyes of the world. Our propensity for diving into other people’s fights is one of the single largest factors driving our rather lousy image in the world. Getting involved in yet another one is not likely to enhance that image. Certainly the Saudis would like to see the US slap Assad and the Iranians for them, but the Saudis need to understand that we are not their attack dog.


Excuse me for disturbing you with all of this, dear Americans. Never mind. After writing all of this down, it's crystal even to such a stupid like me that the USA _cannot_ - repeat: cannot - have any kind of 'vital', even less so any kind of 'important' reasons, and definitely no chance of ever finding any kind of 'objectives' of getting involved there... :rolleyes:

It’s not disturbing at all. It’s almost amusing. There’s nothing new or original here, and nothing very convincing. The reasons are weak, and the objectives remain unspecified.

Put yourself in the shoes of an American President trying to sell the populace on a proxy war using these arguments. Would you even try?

Obviously these are my own opinions. You don’t have to look very hard, though, to observe that the US government and populace perceive no vital or pressing US interest at stake in Syria. There is absolutely no evidence of any significant support base for involvement, directly or by proxy. The Democrats aren’t interested. The Republicans aren’t interested. The Tea Party and the left are not interested. The polls show no interest. The media, the commentators, the pundits report no interest. It’s just not there… and at the end of the day, American interests are determined and defined by Americans. If they don’t think there are vital interests at stake, there aren’t.

Dayuhan
01-25-2014, 07:16 AM
Bill, using proxies is one thing but using them effectively is quite another.

What we see is another example of rank incompetence by all except the Russians (who once again have the measure of the US).

So the method is...

Accuse everyone of incompetence. Offer no suggestion of what the competent would have done.

If asked what a competent response would be, speak in broad generalities that offer no hint of what you think should be done or have been done.

If anyone points out that the broad generalities offer no hint of what you think should be or should have been done, retreat behind a thin haze of juvenile ad hominem remarks.

Undignified, but predictable.

JMA
01-25-2014, 10:45 AM
Again an example of puerile high school debating style.

To identify an obvious cock-up is sufficient - there is no requirement to offer an alternative or a solution.

Are you of the lunatic opinion that if an alternative is not offered then the cock-up is acceptable?

(Been through this debating Afghanistan where the school yard retort of "you do better then" was often tossed out by the blind loyalists to a lost cause. As I said then and I will say now that free of White House policy insanity you give me access to the intel and country background - importantly the religo-cultural stuff - and I will put together a better solution using a platoon of 20 year old officer cadets with no previous military experience as my planning staff.)

The obvious foreign policy incompetence of this US Administration can't be blamed on Bush as there is no overlap as in Afghanistan. Unless some Obama sycophant is prepared to suggest that the disintegration of the Syrian state, the death of 150,000 odd people, millions of displaced and refugees was considered to be an acceptable outcome by the clowns in the White House.

This outcome is in US interests? LOL...

I am quite happy to discuss options but - I'm afraid - I can't be bothered with an ex-Peace Corps agricultural whatever. So I won't be bothering explaining anything to you, sorry.

Go play with Crowbat ... I suggest you have limited time left there until Crowbat also tires of your game.



So the method is...

Accuse everyone of incompetence. Offer no suggestion of what the competent would have done.

If asked what a competent response would be, speak in broad generalities that offer no hint of what you think should be done or have been done.

If anyone points out that the broad generalities offer no hint of what you think should be or should have been done, retreat behind a thin haze of juvenile ad hominem remarks.

Undignified, but predictable.

CrowBat
01-25-2014, 12:17 PM
Are you suggesting that if America doesn't rescue Syria, all those young Syrians will become suicide bombers, or that we have to rescue the Syrians so they won't hate us down the line? That sounds a very speculative proposition. For one thing, the assumption that US involvement would improve the situation in Syria or conjure up a favorable resolution is speculative at best.Another childish answer. You know, the word 'future' has that one issue: EVERYTHING is 'speculative'.

Unless one starts doing something about it.


Your apparent assumption that the FSA is an ideal proxy and would win if given money is speculative at best.I didn't mention 'FSA' with a single word. That's your imagination at work here.


I see very little reason to suspect that this problem can be solved by throwing American money at it. “It will be a terrible mess if you don’t get involved” is a very poor argument unless it goes along with a very persuasive argument that it will not become an equally large mess if we do get involved.Oh, but sure.

A simple question here: what did the USA do in Afghanistan of the 1990s?


Yes, you’re just mixing plenty of things. It’s called clutching at straws.

Oil, gas, and pipelines always work their way into these conversations, usually invoked by conspiracy theorists convinced that the US is eagerly seeking an excuse to intervene. In Syria, (as in Afghanistan, where conspiracy theorists uised to invoke pipelines as a casus belli on an almost daily basis), claims of energy interests just don’t stand up to examination.Another childish answer. I must be no 'conspiracy theorist' to know:

a) that Clinton's admin was (seriously) negotiating with Taliban over a possible gas pipeline over Afghanistan, back in the mid-1990s, but foremost

b) that there are quite a lot of US businessmen with very serious interest in Syria. Now, surely: the problem they have is that they are simply not influential enough, primarily because they're neither of the sort screaming 'AQ is everywhere', nor of the sort screaming 'that's not our business'.

But, that's not making such like you right. On the contrary, your lack of knowledge about relevant issues is nothing else but your, very own, failure - and also a reason why do you come to the idea to babble that the US have 'no interest' in Syria. The situation is rather that most of the US is exactly like you: entirely clueless about Syria.


Syria is in no way essential to any pipeline plans...Here we go, Mr. 'I have no clue about Syria': it doesn't matter what is your perception, but what is the perception of people who did their homework and are convinced the country is important (and, and explained above, it's not really the fault of the people in question that they're neither screaming 'AQ is everywhere' nor 'that's not our business').


blah-blah about different pipeline projects etc....
...There was a minor pipeline from Kirkuk going through Syria, but it’s been out of commission for years and nobody seems terribly interested in rehabilitating it.And more of childish answers. Here just one example over one issue which is the easiest to counter. The - in your words - 'minor' pipelineS (the K, T and H pipelines) constructed by the British in the 1930s were crucial for future development of most of adjacent areas (just check the development of all the towns/cities, airfields/air bases, highways etc. ever since). Contrary to you, the people living there know about this very well. And, no matter how long out of commission (officially since the quarrel between the Iraqi and Syrian Ba'athists, in the 1960s), the K+T pipelines were easily returned to service by Iraqis and Syrians in the 1990s, when Assads were curious in earning handsome profits from smuggling Iraqi oil out of the country.

What stopped this practice, i.e. why are these pipelines not in service nowadays? Well, 'certain' invasion from 2003, and continuous insistence on survival of Assadist regime.

Should that mean they are 'inoperational', or 'out of commission'?

Hahahahaha...

So, we're back to the same conclusion like before: no matter how eloquent you might be in regards of wonderful wording of your answers (really, you've got an 'A' from me here), you simply have no clue about the situation 'in situ'.


Syria is a hole in the pipeline network for a reason: it’s irrelevant.Once again you're providing ample evidence of lacking qualifications necessary to discuss this topic in any kind of useful fashion.

Alone the fact that you obviously have no clue about all the efforts related to the EAM pipeline back in the 2000s (spoiled through 'intervention' by Stroytransgaz on behalf of 'somebody else'), shows that quite nicely. Otherwise you would never come to such a silly idea as to declare this for 'nobody needs or wants it' (sorry, but no matter how funny I found your answer: alone thinking the way you do - not to talk about stating such nonsense in written form and in public - is plain dumb).

...not to talk that you, like so many others, are simply unable to 'connect the dots' and put all of what I mentioned into a single context: why doing that when it's 'much more important' to 'win' a pissing contest on some internet forum...? :D


If you want to talk about economic interests, you need to look at cost/risk/benefit equations...For your info: I'm living from doing exactly that, on weekly basis, and the answer is always crystal clear. A reason more to conclude your argumentation for 'ranging from childish to naive'.


You can feel better. Whether or not the Syrian economy is free is a matter of near zero significance to the US.No, I can't. Whether you like it or not, whether you agree with it, or not (and no matter whether I like and agree with it or not): from the standpoint of US business establishment, 'free trade' is starting with 'free energy supply trade'. This is non-existing in Syria, and therefore your argumentation is simply failed. Now go and try teaching 'them' that 'they are wrong'. :D

CrowBat
01-25-2014, 12:35 PM
No. Just… no. Not even close to being part of the equation.Aha. So, just one example: it doesn't matter and is 'no part of the equation' that the Lockheed Martin was gauging how many F-16s is it going to sell to 'rebuilt Iraq' already as of November 2002?

Such things are 'no part of the equation' - for whom? For people as clueless and as naive as you?


This is the Saudi argument: we have to get involved to stick it to Iran and Hezbollah.Aha. That is a 'Saudi argument'?

ROFL! I'm now - finally - in tears. From laughing.


There might be a few people crazy enough to think that, but not many. Arming American proxies and sending them out to fight Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Qatari proxies (yes, our proxies and theirs would fight each other, probably just as energetically as they fight the regime) seems hardly calculated to enhance American standing in any of those countries....and this is beyond 'childish': it's outright laughable.

Do you want to seriously discuss this topic, or are you all the time simply trying to entertain me, Dayuhan?

If latter: you're extremely successful. You're about to become my absolute favourite, right after Benny Hill and Dave Martin, of course. :D


Those concerned with America’s “image in the world” will reflect that involvement in foreign wars, by proxy or otherwise, has traditionally diminished, rather than enhanced, the American image in the eyes of the world......I just hit the table with my forehead again. From laughing...

This was a joke of the day. Perhaps of the week too. Now I can't stop laughing any more... can hardly type...you're really THAT funny. :D


<snip>
Obviously these are my own opinions. You don’t have to look very hard, though, to observe that the US government and populace perceive...In a moment between two laughs, I can only reply that except to the US government and populace, nobody that really matters cares about opinions of either. Which is making the entire issue completely surplus: neither the US government, nor the populace, are decisive. Only money is. And with money, one can buy both, the government and the populace.

But, it was - really - a very funny read, very entertaining, so much is sure. I'm still laughing and my wife is having that 'what the hell' expression on her face. Well done, Joker. :D

CrowBat
01-25-2014, 12:46 PM
So the method is...

Accuse everyone of incompetence.Not 'everyone' - just you.

And the reason is that every single of your sentences is pointing at you being incompetent - when it comes to Syria. You are excellent in providing eloquently worded discussion (should I ever need a 'spokesperson', you'll get a well-paid job, that's 1000% sure, don't worry).

But, the content of what you say (at least in this thread) is superficial and often bordering on nonsense (sorry, you've provided too much evidence for this, but for me to express it in any other way), simply because you have no clue about Syria - but are 'still' sternously convinced that you do.

The problem people like you pose is the folowing: you're - really, I'm not exaggerating here - so clueless, that countering every single sentence you posted here would require people like me to write an entire book (literaly), just in order to provide people like you with something like 'similar' (even though still insufficient) depth of perception. Others are at least asking questions, asking for explanations, checking if what they've read 'somewhere' is anywhere near reality or not. But not you: you are 100% convinced about something you have proven not to have clue about.

It's ironic - and tragic at the same time - that the internet is providing a 1st-class platform for such like you. See here with what kind of negative consequences in the case of Syria:

'Sex Jihad' and Other Lies: Assad's Elaborate Disinformation Campaign (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/assad-regime-wages-pr-campaign-to-discredit-rebels-a-926479.html)

Syrian President Assad's regime is waging a PR campaign to spread stories that discredit its rivals and distract from its own crimes. Aided by gullible networks and foreign media, it has included tales of rebels engaging in "sex jihad" and massacring Christians.

In the wake of the poison gas massacre on Aug. 21, the regime in Damascus has launched a major PR offensive. Beyond the official line of propaganda, though, there is a second campaign: a secret and elaborately staged effort to sow doubt and confusion -- and divert attention away from the Syrian government's own crimes. Like many of these bogus news stories, the sex jihad tales aim to convince supporters at home and critics abroad of the rebels' monstrous depravity.

No other leader in the region -- not Saddam Hussein in Iraq, nor Moammar Gadhafi in Libya -- has relied as heavily on propaganda as Assad. His PR teams and state media are churning out a steady stream of partially or completely fabricated new stories about acts of terror against Christians, al-Qaeda's rise to power and the imminent destabilization of the entire region. These stories are circulated by Russian and Iranian broadcasters, as well as Christian networks, and are eventually picked up by Western media.

One prime example is the legend of orgies with terrorists: The 16-year-old presented on state TV comes from a prominent oppositional family in Daraa. When the regime failed to capture her father, she was abducted by security forces on her way home from school in November 2012. During the same TV program, a second woman confessed that she had submitted to group sex with the fanatical Al-Nusra Front. According to her family, though, she was arrested at the University of Damascus while protesting against Assad. Both young women are still missing. Their families say that they were forced to make the televised statements -- and that the allegation of sex jihad is a lie.

An alleged Tunisian sex jihadist also dismissed the stories when she was contacted by Arab media: "All lies!", she said. She admitted that she had been to Syria, but as a nurse. She says she is married and has since fled to Jordan.

Two human rights organizations have been trying to substantiate the sex jihad stories, but have so far come up empty-handed. It appears that the Tunisian interior minister had other motives for jumping on this rumor: Hundreds of Islamists have left his country and traveled to Syria, and he is apparently trying to stem the tide by discrediting these fighters. Furthermore, Sheikh Mohammad al-Arifi, the man who is allegedly behind the sex jihad fatwa, denies everything. "No person in their right mind would approve of such a thing," he says.
...

This also includes the myth of the beheading of a bishop -- a story also spread by Assad in an interview with SPIEGEL. The fact of the matter is that a jihadist from Dagestan killed three men in this way, but they weren't Christians. After getting the stamp of approval from the official news agency of the Vatican, such rumors generated by Assad's propaganda machine are circulated around the world as bona-fide new stories.

The facts were twisted in a similar manner when an image of a woman tied to a pillar in Aleppo appeared on the LiveLeak video portal in mid-September. The website claimed that the woman was a Christian from Aleppo who had been abducted by al-Qaida rebels. In reality, although the photo was taken in Aleppo, it dates back to a period when Assad's troops still controlled the entire city. A video of the scene, posted on YouTube on June 12, 2012, shows regime-loyal militias berating the woman.

The regime also concocted the legend of the destruction of the Christian village of Maaloula. In early September, rebels belonging to three groups, including al-Nusra, attacked two military posts on the outskirts of town held by members of the local Assad-loyal Shabiha militias. Then the rebels withdrew. But the regime's version, which even managed to become an Associated Press story, was as follows: Foreign terrorists looted and burned down churches -- and even threatened to behead Christians who refused to convert to Islam.

This didn't match with reports from the nuns of the Thekla convent in Maaloula and the Greek Orthodox patriarch of Antioch. They said that nothing had been damaged and no one had been threatened on account of their beliefs. A reporter from the satellite news network Russia Today unwittingly cleared up the confusion. While accompanying the Syrian army, he filmed the tank attack on Maaloula -- in which the local monastery was shelled.

This ongoing reinterpretation of events reflects a conscious policy -- and bending the truth is much easier now that Syria has become such a confusing and chaotic theater of war. Most news publications shy away from the risks and efforts of verifying stories on the ground. Actual events, such as when jihadists burned down a church in the northern Syrian town of Rakka, are mixed together with trumped-up atrocities staged to sway global opinion.
...

After the poison gas attack in August, though, the propaganda cover-up failed. Inundated by a global wave of indignation, the regime floundered in its attempts to explain the situation. First, Assad said that nothing had happened. Then state television showed images of an alleged rebel hideout containing a barrel with the blatantly obvious label: "Made in Saudia." The TV report maintained that this was sarin gas from Saudi Arabia for "terrorists" who had inadvertently gassed themselves to death.

The source of the story was a little known news website called Mint Press, based in the northern US state of Minnesota. One of the authors later denied having anything to do with the research. The other, a young Jordanian who writes under a number of pseudonyms, merely responded to queries by saying that he was currently studying in Iran.
...

Dayuhan
01-27-2014, 10:18 AM
Not 'everyone' - just you.

The actual reference was:


What we see is another example of rank incompetence by all except the Russians (who once again have the measure of the US).

Somehow I don't think "all except the Russians was meant to mean me. I don't even think the Russians have done all that well at this one: they are attached to a dictator facing what's likely to be a prolonged and intractable insurgency, which is never a congenial place to be. The best outcome they can hope for is to restore the status quo ante, which is neither a significant gain for them or a significant loss for the US. They have something to lose and very little to gain, hardly evidence of "having the measure" of anyone.


See here with what kind of negative consequences in the case of Syria

Yes, there's a great deal of ham-handed propaganda going around. So what? What does that have to do with US involvement or non-involvement, and of what is it supposedly a "consequence"? How is the citation in any way relevant to the matter under discussion?

Dayuhan
01-27-2014, 10:26 AM
To identify an obvious cock-up is sufficient - there is no requirement to offer an alternative or a solution.

Very true. But if you wish to attribute that cock-up to a specific cause, that claim has to be supported. For example, a claim that the situation in Syria is a complete cock-up can stand on its own as self-evident. A claim that the situation in Syria is a specifically American cock-up would require some sort of supporting logic or evidence to be taken seriously, as the US has no natural or inherent responsibility for events in Syria. If you could credibly claim that the US was a primary cause of the situation in Syria, you might have something... but that seems a pretty remote "if".


Unless some Obama sycophant is prepared to suggest that the disintegration of the Syrian state, the death of 150,000 odd people, millions of displaced and refugees was considered to be an acceptable outcome by the clowns in the White House.

This outcome is in US interests? LOL...

Only a concern if it's an outcome of American action or inaction... and to claim the the latter case, there would have to be a credible argument that action would have produced a more desirable outcome. If Syrians decide to kill other Syrians, that's Syrian business, not American business. The outcome you cite may not be ideal, but it's not ours. There are worse ones out there: like the same mess with the US up to its eyeballs in it.

Dayuhan
01-27-2014, 01:33 PM
Another childish answer. You know, the word 'future' has that one issue: EVERYTHING is 'speculative'.

Unless one starts doing something about it.

"Doing something about it" doesn't make it any less speculative, because you don't know what the outcome of your action will be. You might pretend you know, you might even believe you know, but you still don't know. For any proposed action there's a wide range of possible outcomes. Many of them are undesirable. The only certainty is that once you start "doing something about it" you are henceforth in it, with all that entails. A problem that was once other people's has become yours. That's already an undesirable outcome, unless there's a very strong reason to believe that "doing something" is going to have a positive outcome. No compelling evidence has presented to support that idea.


I didn't mention 'FSA' with a single word. That's your imagination at work here.

Free Syrian Army... or had you another ideal proxy to propose? Same dog by any acronym. The question is does the dog hunt, or more to the point, does the dog hunt well enough to justify an infusion of American cash and all the risk and mess inherent with adopting a proxy. The Oboama administration's answer to that question is apparently "no". They certainly have information that we don't have, but even based on what's publicly available that seems a reasonable conclusion.


I must be no 'conspiracy theorist' to know:

a) that Clinton's admin was (seriously) negotiating with Taliban over a possible gas pipeline over Afghanistan, back in the mid-1990s

Yes, we all know this. The conspiracy theorists blew it into some vast game-changing geostrategic imperative, which of course it never was. It was a reasonable bit of bait to throw the Taliban in an effort to get them to drop bin Laden and move a little bit closer to the other side... didn't work, but was worth a try. It was never something of vast importance to the US, and it was certainly never anything worth going to war over.


b) that there are quite a lot of US businessmen with very serious interest in Syria. Now, surely: the problem they have is that they are simply not influential enough, primarily because they're neither of the sort screaming 'AQ is everywhere', nor of the sort screaming 'that's not our business'.

Get a grip. Pipeline proposals are a dime a dozen, and there are American businessmen all over the place. That doesn't create a vital national interest, and it certainly doesn't create a reason to get involved in a war.

What you don't seem to grasp is that Syria is not necessary for the flow of oil gas from any point to any other point. It's not necessary to get gas from Qatar to Europe, or Iran to Europe, or the Caspian basin to Europe. Somebody might talk about a route through Syria, or even make a deal if the terms on offer were good. They would not need Syria. If Syria doesn't work out, there are alternate routes. That doesn't mean no business would ever be done, but it absolutely means that business does not constitute anything even vaguely resembling a vital national interest for the US. Threatening to take Turkey out of the pipeline grid might be a vital national interest to some European states, and a pressing (though not vital) interest to the US, but Syria is not Turkey. Not even close.

In general the importance of Central Asian hydrocarbons to the US is way overstated in many quarters. Geography dictates that Central Asian output is not going to flow to the US. Where it does flow is not of much significance to Americans, as long as it comes onto the market. Ten years ago a desire to bring Central Asian reserves out of the Russian transit net might have been a matter of concern (though hardly a vital national interest), but even that concern has faded: the Chinese have accomplished that goal more effectively than the US ever could have.

Not to say that Central Asian energy resources are of no importance at all to the US, but not important enough to go to war over. There are many interests that are not vital or pressing. Business going on is not a cause to go to war, by proxy or otherwise, unless the business in question is of great importance. In Syria, it's just not.


But, that's not making such like you right. On the contrary, your lack of knowledge about relevant issues is nothing else but your, very own, failure - and also a reason why do you come to the idea to babble that the US have 'no interest' in Syria. The situation is rather that most of the US is exactly like you: entirely clueless about Syria.

Youi don't seem to have a clue about what a vital national interest is, because the things you're proposing aren't even remotely close to important enough to go to war over, whether directly or by proxy.


all the efforts related to the EAM pipeline back in the 2000s (spoiled through 'intervention' by Stroytransgaz on behalf of 'somebody else')

Like I said, pipeline proposals are a dime a dozen. Most of them never get off the ground. That most often isn't about any cloak and dagger skullduggery, it's more often because they couldn't get financing, they couldn't lock in supply sources, or they had transit rights issues, or the consortium had internal issues, and on and on and on. Of course there's always somebody out there who will speculate about dirty work, and there's always someone out there who believes the speculation.


...not to talk that you, like so many others, are simply unable to 'connect the dots' and put all of what I mentioned into a single context:

I'm trying to point out to you that you're seeing dots that don't exist. A fruitless effort, probably, if you honestly believe the off chance that a pipeline might someday pass through Syria could possibly constitute a significant enough interest to justify taking sides in the Syrian civil war.


For your info: I'm living from doing exactly that, on weekly basis, and the answer is always crystal clear.

The output of your cost-benefit evaluation will depend on the assumptions you put in. Based on what I'm seeing here, I'd imagine yours to be derived from the realm of fantasy. You of course are entitled to believe that those who fail to share your fantasies and connect the imaginary dots that pass before your eyes are ignorant, but that doesn't the fantasies or the dots real. You will notice, perhaps that your conclusions do not appear to be shared by any western government. Is that because they are all ignorant... or is it perhaps because they see something you don't: that jumping into this mess is a fools errand with minimal probability of gain and very substantial probability of loss?


No, I can't. Whether you like it or not, whether you agree with it, or not (and no matter whether I like and agree with it or not): from the standpoint of US business establishment, 'free trade' is starting with 'free energy supply trade'. This is non-existing in Syria, and therefore your argumentation is simply failed. Now go and try teaching 'them' that 'they are wrong'. :D

I don't even know who "they" are, but I know that you are wrong. Not about the lack of free energy supply trade in Syria, that's obvious. What you're wrong about is the idea that anyone cares, or needs to. It's not important enough to go to war over, because, again, Syria just isn't that important to international energy trade. Its reserves are minor, and it's not a necessary transit route... not to say that it might never be a transit route, but it's not a necessary one. If Syria falls apart, nobody in the energy trade will lose: the flow will just move around Syria. No different than the proposed Afghan pipeline. It wasn't built, nobody cares. Turkmenistan found other places to sell their gas. India and Pakistan found other suppliers... they still occasionally talk about building the pipeline, but it will probably never happen, because the Turkmen would rather deal with the Chinese (logically enough) and India and Pakistan can buy more easily from the Gulf and Iran.

It's just not that big a deal. Not worth getting involved in a war over. Not even close.

Dayuhan
01-27-2014, 01:52 PM
Aha. So, just one example: it doesn't matter and is 'no part of the equation' that the Lockheed Martin was gauging how many F-16s is it going to sell to 'rebuilt Iraq' already as of November 2002?

Such things are 'no part of the equation' - for whom? For people as clueless and as naive as you?


Let me put this as simply as possible. Lockheed Martin sells airplanes. The US government makes US foreign policy decisions. They are not the same thing. Expecting the US to get involved in a proxy war on the off chance that maybe our proxy wins and maybe if they do they will buy airplanes from Lockheed Martin is just beyond ridiculous. If Syria ever stabilizes and decides to buy airplanes, the US government might very well lobby for Lockheed Martin. They are not going to get involved in a war to try to get a government in place that will buy planes from Lockheed Martin. Not even a remote consideration.

In the darkest fantasies of the Chomsky crowd, the US goes to war to open up markets for American defense manufacturers. In reality, they don't.


Aha. That is a 'Saudi argument'?

Yes. Like it or not, it is. The US government seems disinclined to serve as attack dog for the Saudis, or to place Saudi interests ahead of American interests. The Saudis fond this offensive. They need to learn to deal with it.


ROFL! I'm now - finally - in tears. From laughing.

This was a joke of the day. Perhaps of the week too. Now I can't stop laughing any more... can hardly type...you're really THAT funny. :D

When you finish laughing, recall that you have to go back to Korea to find a foreign war that enhanced the international image of the United States. You might also reflect that the chorus of global voices urging the US toward involvement in Syria is deafeningly nonexistent, suggesting that stepping into that mess would not exactly win any vast reserve of approval. You might also recall that only complete lunatics would contemplate getting involved in a war in the hope that it might make somebody somewhere like them more. Going to war requires, again, that a vital national interest be at stake, and that is not one by even the remotest stretch of the imagination.


I can only reply that except to the US government and populace, nobody that really matters cares about opinions of either. Which is making the entire issue completely surplus: neither the US government, nor the populace, are decisive. Only money is. And with money, one can buy both, the government and the populace.

What government or populace do you propose to buy? The Saudis have money to burn, but they haven't been able to persuade the Syrian, Russia, or American governments to do their bidding, though they have tried in each case. If it's money that does the talking in the US, you have to assume that those with the money share the opinion of the government and populace: getting involved in Syria is just not worth the trouble. You may disagree, but you're going to need a way better argument if you want anyone to listen.

davidbfpo
01-27-2014, 10:30 PM
A fascinating explanation or an assessment whether the two 'enemies' are in fact 'friends':http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/with-friends-like-these-al-qaeda-and-the-assad-regime/

A rather pithy final sentence, which does not convince me:
Instead, the West will look to the Syrian opposition and their supporters, who in the service of a just cause found the temptation of jihadi shock troops too much to resist.

davidbfpo
01-30-2014, 05:48 PM
A lengthy interview, which some diligent watchers have welcomed, of:
Ake Sellstrom, Chief UN weapons inspector in Syria, tells Gwyn Winfield
about the challenges of doing a CWA inspection in the twenty-first century

Link:http://www.cbrneworld.com/_uploads/download_magazines/Sellstrom_Feb_2014_v2.pdf

Within is the cautionary note only 5% of the regime's chemical stockpile has been removed, so the deadline will be missed.

CrowBat
01-30-2014, 09:50 PM
Yes, there's a great deal of ham-handed propaganda going around. So what? What does that have to do with US involvement or non-involvement, and of what is it supposedly a "consequence"? How is the citation in any way relevant to the matter under discussion?
You really need even 'most elementary basics' explained?

That's beyond laughable... :rolleyes:

Is it beyond your ability to comprehend that loads of such PRBS - whether related to inner- or foreign policy of Syria since something like 70 years - loads of such PRBS about oil and gas reserves of Syria, about that country being 'unimportant' for oil/gas flow, loads of such PRBS about insurgency in Syria, about presence and influence of 'Islamist extremists' in Syria, about the nature of the Assadist regime, etc., etc., etc. are creating such images of that country like yours: 'not important', 'not our problem' etc.?

You're complaining I have no clue about this or that, while it's you who so obviously has absolutely no trace of clue at least about importance of the area known as 'Syria' for 300+ millions of Arabs (plus 50 million Shi'a Iranians and then various others)?!?

But of course 'not', because you're so well-informed that you even come to the ideas to say nonsense of the following kind:

Lockheed Martin sells airplanes. The US government makes US foreign policy decisions. They are not the same thing. Expecting the US to get involved in a proxy war on the off chance that maybe our proxy wins and maybe if they do they will buy airplanes from Lockheed Martin is just beyond ridiculous. If Syria ever stabilizes and decides to buy airplanes, the US government might very well lobby for Lockheed Martin.Dayuhan, baby: back in the 1950s it was certain - much smaller and far less influential - corporation named 'United Fruits' that brought the USA to launch an intervention in Guatemala. But, you're going to explain me that nowadays corporations like LM are 'not important' and 'not interested' in cases like Iraq, Syria etc.?

After seeing that, I'm not the least surprised you have 'skilfully' ignored my question about 'what did the USA do in Afghanistan of the 1990s'?

Obviously, you have no clue about the answer about such 'unimportant' things. So, I'll not insist. But, in another place, you're quasi-asking me 'what government and what populace' do I suggest to buy?

Is that your serious? Do I now need to explain you the basics of how the USA function - too?

Or do you 'just' prefer to ignore that? Perhaps you want to imply that no US government, and no dozens of thousands of votes have ever - ever, ever, ever - been bought in the history of the USA, whether by various corporations or private interests?? Would you like to say that no corporations and no private interests have any kind of influence upon the US government? Congress? US domestic and foreign policy?

Dayuhan, considering the....ho-hum.... 'quality'... of what you post here, I'll end this one with a multiple choice question suitable for your level. You are either
a) fresh out of elementary school? Or
b) first time on planet Earth, fresh from a 15-light years trip from one of planets circling Gliese 876?

***********


A fascinating explanation or an assessment whether the two 'enemies' are in fact 'friends':http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/wit...-assad-regime/

A rather pithy final sentence, which does not convince me...
He is drawing some really strange conclusions in the 'centre' of that piece too.

For example, he's explaining how the 'suggestion that an ISIS-Assad alliance is plausible is not evidence that an explicit relationship actually exists'. Then he's mentioning that some of links were 'ideological' (which ones, please?), while not emphasising the 'criminal' side of this affair strongly enough.

Problem: I already mentioned how the smuggling of Libyan Islamists via Syria worked. That was purely a 'commercial/criminal' enterprise. It had absolutely nothing to do with 'ideology', only with 'making money'.

Now, some here might recall the terminus 'Shabiha' - probably from the early days of this uprising in Syria. Precisely: this is a well-established criminal network run by members of wider Assad family - often in conjunction with various intelligence services - already decades before the uprising in Syria began. Shabiha could be seen on the streets of Syria already in the 1970s. Sure, Shabihas were no 'one smuggling network', but dozens of them. Foremost they were THE smuggling network in Syria. They were omnipresent and incredibly powerful, controlling much of Syrian cigarettes-, cell-phones-, DVDs-, fire-arms-, and even some of fuel market in the 1990s and 2000s. The government not only 'could not do anything against them': it was directly cooperating with them and profiting from Shabiha activities because they were sharing their profit with Assads.

Specific example: street markets in Damascus of the 2000s were full of piratized copies of various Western 'block-buster' movies, printed on DVDs. One could buy them extremely cheaply (less than 50 Cents apiece). 'However': no such movies would have been permitted for spread in the Syrian public (whether in cinemas or as DVDs) without the consent of the Unit 255 of the General Intelligence (or 'Security') Directorate (Idarat al-Amn al-Amn), or 'SSI'. Actually, most of movies in question were originally purchased by members of intelligence services abroad, then copied by the Unit 255 SSI and then distributed to Shabiha (of course, they had to pay 'royalties' for every single DVD) 'for sale' on street markets.

Therefore, the regime was actively involved in supporting 'smuggling' circles. And since 2011, the Shabiha are paying back their dues: they are not only actively deployed to suppress protesting (as a sort of para-military force), but also to maintain links to the ISIS, existing from the 'good ol' mid-2000s'.

Then, the author writes:

The further claim that the Assad regime does not target ISIS territory, despite being a common talking point among opposition figures, is thus far empirically unsubstantiated.Well, it's kind of hard to provide 'empiric evidence' - for something that's neither existing nor happening, isn't it?

Or:

While absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, there is no public smoking gun that Assad is collaborating directly with ISIS.Oh really? So, because the author does not know that Assadist regime is buying oil directly from the ISIS - which is in control of most important Syrian oilfields, and much of the relevant pipeline (ending in Homs, i.e. parts of Homs under regime control) - 'there is no smoking gun'?

Makes one wonder: what is, or should be one?

In other place, he's monitoring this conflict the way Dayuhan does:

Likewise, Ahrar al-Sham has traditionally portrayed itself as a Salafi organization focused only an Islamic state in Syria, which has facilitated strong ties to the Gulf states such as Qatar and Kuwait. But, the group’s leadership, most notably Abu Khalid al-Suri, has longstanding ties to al-Qaeda leaders and recently announced that he considers himself following their path....and it's 'entirely impossible', I guess, that corresponding statements by al-Suri could be related to promises of even more money, arms, ammo and equipment, if he would say precisely something of that kind?

Probably because the author never heard of something of this kind happening ever - ever, ever, ever - in Syria before....? :rolleyes:

Namely, and perhaps I'm an exception: I do recall the times when al-Suri - who is a Salafist, no doubt, but definitely no Wahhabist - was ridiculing certain Mauritanian Wahhabist preachers for calling for Jihad in Syria, and publicly refusing the idea of inviting Saudi Wahhabists to come fighting in Syria. That's making one wonder: how comes he changed his mind about this issue, i.e. what's usually having such effect like making people change their opinions...?

Finally:

Regardless of the precise extent of Assad’s relationship with ISIS, the more important story about the rise of al-Qaeda in Syria is that the opposition and their supporters made the tragic strategic blunder of tolerating and sometimes enabling al-Qaeda linked organizations. That does not vindicate or validate Assad, who is a murderous criminal that deserves to be overthrown, but it must not be ignored lest other organizations and countries make similar mistakes.Perhaps the author would like to learn more about Syrians, especially their ->> 'culture of being friendly' described by Ake Sellstrom in that interview linked by David...?

Specifically: 'The culture is very friendly, they are chronically friendly and it is within their religion to be friendly to foreigners and take care of people...'

Dayuhan
01-31-2014, 12:37 AM
Is it beyond your ability to comprehend that loads of such PRBS - whether related to inner- or foreign policy of Syria since something like 70 years - loads of such PRBS about oil and gas reserves of Syria, about that country being 'unimportant' for oil/gas flow, loads of such PRBS about insurgency in Syria, about presence and influence of 'Islamist extremists' in Syria, about the nature of the Assadist regime, etc., etc., etc. are creating such images of that country like yours: 'not important', 'not our problem' etc.?

Take a deep beath. Recite your mantra, if required. Achieve calm. Now remind yourself: you set out to demonstrate that the US has vital or even pressing national interests at stake in Syria. So far, that effort is an epic fail. Try again if you will, but please try harder.

Despite the desperate ravings of the conspiracy theory crowd, nothing happening in Syria is "all about oil". Syria's proven reserves are unexceptional and most production is consumed domestically. There might be some potential for exploration, but nowhere near enough to constitute a meaningful national interest for the US or a reason for getting involved in the war.

Syria is also not all that important to oil or gas transit, certainly not important enough to justify involvement in a civil war. If Syria drops out of the pipeline grid, oil and gas will still flow. They just won't flow through Syria, and of course they don't have to: there are plenty of other options. There is no proposed pipeline route through Syria that couldn't be replaced by an alternate route if needed. Nothing there worth getting involved in a war over. Not even close.

If we're looking for any vital or pressing US interest, we can safely eliminate hydrocarbon reserves or transit as issues.


You're complaining I have no clue about this or that, while it's you who so obviously has absolutely no trace of clue at least about importance of the area known as 'Syria' for 300+ millions of Arabs (plus 50 million Shi'a Iranians and then various others)?!?

The question on the table is whether it's sufficiently important to Americans to justify involvement in a civil war. Its importance to Arabs is quite peripheral to that question.


back in the 1950s it was certain - much smaller and far less influential - corporation named 'United Fruits' that brought the USA to launch an intervention in Guatemala. But, you're going to explain me that nowadays corporations like LM are 'not important' and 'not interested' in cases like Iraq, Syria etc.?

We all know what happened in the 1950s. We also all know the 1950s are history.

I do not know whether or not Lockheed Martin is interested in Syria. It is, however, abundantly clear that the US Government is not interested in getting involved in the Syrian Civil War. That leaves 2 possibilities.

1. Lockheed Martin wants the US to get involved, but doesn't have the influence to make it happen.

2. Lockheed Martin has the influence, but doesn't care enough to use it to force US involvement.

If Lockheed Martin had both the interest and the influence to drive US involvement in Syria, the US would be involved. Since the US is not getting involved in any significant way, we know that Lockheed Martin lacks either the involvement or the interest to drive involvement, very likely both.


After seeing that, I'm not the least surprised you have 'skilfully' ignored my question about 'what did the USA do in Afghanistan of the 1990s'?

I answered it, but you apparently weren't paying attention. The US offered a pipeline deal tot he Taliban. This was essentially bait, an effort to bribe the Taliban to drop bin Laden and establish a business relationship with Western interests. It didn't work, but it was worth a try. The pipeline could have been a matter of some significance to Afghanistan, but it had little to know significance to the US other than as a lever on the Taliban. The only payoff to the US would have been a contract for Unocal.

We can see this pretty clearly: the pipeline was never built, and may never be built... has anyone been negatively affected, other than Afghanistan? Turkmenistan is still exporting its gas, and it doesn't matter to the US whether it goes to China or to Pakistan and India. Pakistan and India buy their gas elsewhere. Unocal got bought out by Chevron. The proposal failed in its intended purpose, and was shelved. No big deal. It was never an issue worth going to war over.


Or do you 'just' prefer to ignore that? Perhaps you want to imply that no US government, and no dozens of thousands of votes have ever - ever, ever, ever - been bought in the history of the USA, whether by various corporations or private interests?? Would you like to say that no corporations and no private interests have any kind of influence upon the US government? Congress? US domestic and foreign policy?

They have influence, but not control. Their influence is mixed in with other influences. Their influence is also not unanimous: corporations and private capital lobby for and pursue their own interests, and they aren't always consistent. On the subject of Syria, however, there is a remarkable amount of unanimity in the US: nobody, anywhere, shows any sign of seeing a vital or pressing US interest. There's no pressure from the corporate sector to get involved. The oil and gas industry isn't pressing for involvement. Neither is anyone else.

As with Lockheed Martin, if you're going to argue that corporate interests control the US, you have to assume that corporate interests are not interested in getting involved in the Syrian Civil War, because if they had control and wanted involvement, there would be involvement.

Now, would you like to try to explain what vital or pressing US interest you believe exists in Syria that could be a reasonable motive for involvement?

CrowBat
01-31-2014, 07:31 AM
Take a deep beath. Recite your mantra, if required. Achieve calm....Except for laughing all the time (while reading your posts), I'm perfectly calm, thanks. :D

Actually, my only problem is that I'm lacking time to have even more fun with you.


Syria is also not all that important....And even if you repeat it 150 times - a 'proven' tactics when it comes to Syria, no doubt - it's not going to become truth. So, the only 'epic fail' I see here is your own argumentation. As so often, it's based on nothing else but ignorance.


The question on the table is whether it's sufficiently important to Americans to justify involvement in a civil war. Its importance to Arabs is quite peripheral to that question.Thanks! First you babble about 'US image is ruined' ('already since Korean War'), and then - in response to my explanation about ruined US image in the Arab world and explanation that there is a need to change this, and about importance of Syria for Arabs - you come back to tell me that 'importance of Syria to Arabs is quite peripheral to that question'...?

You're so preocuppied distorting my statements in order to prove me wrong, that you're meanwhile contradicting yourself. But you wonder why am I all the time laughing about you? :D


We all know what happened in the 1950s. We also all know the 1950s are history.Aha. So, that's 'history', so you must insist you CAN'T learn anything from that? But Syria is 'future', which you can't influence (or which is unimportant, and 'pure guessing'), eh?

I'm running out of smileys...


I answered it, but you apparently weren't paying attention.No, you didn't. You were more than happy to start babbling about the issue on Clinton admin's negotiations with Taliban. :D

Or, would you like to say that this was all the USA did in Afghanistan in the 1990s?


They have influence, but not control.Wait, wait, wat: so, 'they' do have 'influence'?!? Wow! Eureka! If you keep on getting it in this fashion, you might manage to understand the system and what I'm talking about all thet time - in only about some 15-16 years from now.

So, how do 'they' maintain that influence? By having nice eyes - or by bribing.... oh damn, sorry: I used that word again.... 'lobbying' the political sector?


Now, would you like to try to explain what vital or pressing US interest you believe exists in Syria that could be a reasonable motive for involvement?
OK. So, you're back to insisting on ignoring everything that's said to you? No problem. Go few posts back and _read_ what I wrote. After _reading_ what I wrote, try also to _understand_ what I wrote.

If there is something that's unclear to you, and provided you do not suffer from dyslexie (if so, let me know: then I'll stop laughing, that's a promise), you'll 'get it', sooner or later: just go back and re-read what I posted.

JMA
01-31-2014, 10:47 AM
You're so preocuppied distorting my statements in order to prove me wrong, that you're meanwhile contradicting yourself. But you wonder why am I all the time laughing about you? :D

Crowbat that happens around here with him and on the Journal with some others.

It is a major distraction which seems to be tolerated. Strange.

My position on this type of contribution is simple - the moderators should insist that HE provides an alternative rather merely seeking to irritate other contributors with incessant nit-picking. I wonder why they don't.

It appears I have had a few posts deleted - which is irritating in itself.

jmm99
01-31-2014, 03:05 PM
It appears I have had a few posts deleted - which is irritating in itself.

Deleted or moved ?

If a moderator were to tell JMM what style of response to use, I'd tell him to go to hell.

-------------------------------------

Generally (not directed at Mark), as to this thread, the constant back and forth ad hominems and snarks destroy whatever value the substantive messages contain.

Regards

Mike

Dayuhan
02-02-2014, 12:35 AM
First you babble about 'US image is ruined' ('already since Korean War')

What I said was that involvement in foreign wars, directly or by proxy, has generally damaged the US image, rather than improving it. That does not equate to a "ruined image", as war is not the only thing the US does.


and then - in response to my explanation about ruined US image in the Arab world and explanation that there is a need to change this, and about importance of Syria for Arabs - you come back to tell me that 'importance of Syria to Arabs is quite peripheral to that question'...?

The importance of Syria to Arabs is in itself a weak to nonexistent argument for US involvement in Syria. Even if you could present a reasonable argument to suggest that US involvement in Syria would improve the US image with Arabs, which you haven't, improving your image with anyone doesn't even begin to be a viable reason to get involved in a war. It is certainly not a vital or even pressing national interest.


Aha. So, that's 'history', so you must insist you CAN'T learn anything from that? But Syria is 'future', which you can't influence (or which is unimportant, and 'pure guessing'), eh?

You can learn what happened. If you want to claim that it's still happening, you have to demonstrate that, not assume it.


No, you didn't. You were more than happy to start babbling about the issue on Clinton admin's negotiations with Taliban. :D

Or, would you like to say that this was all the USA did in Afghanistan in the 1990s?

In order by approximate date, and very briefly:

'90-'96: Very little

'96-'98: Sporadic negotiation offering various carrots and sticks to try to persuade the Taliban to cough up bin Laden, and move toward a more pro-western stance.

'98 (post embassy bombings)- 2001: Drive-by shootings via cruise missile, followed by sanctions (which of course terminated any pipeline plans by US companies).

Overall the Clinton administration treated Afghanistan as a minor annoyance and a matter of minimal importance. Watching the Nasdaq was a lot more fun than watching Afghanistan in those days.

So what?


Wait, wait, wat: so, 'they' do have 'influence'?!? Wow! Eureka! If you keep on getting it in this fashion, you might manage to understand the system and what I'm talking about all thet time - in only about some 15-16 years from now.

If you're going to come along with some variation on the old "the corporations run America" thing, don't bother. It's old, it's boring, we've all heard it before, and it's not worth anyone's attention. Beyond occasional examination of the concept's enduring appeal to the small minded and the closed minded, it's not an idea worthy of attention.


OK. So, you're back to insisting on ignoring everything that's said to you? No problem. Go few posts back and _read_ what I wrote. After _reading_ what I wrote, try also to _understand_ what I wrote.

Maybe you should try reading and understanding, because you are contradicting your own argument. Look at the points you are trying to make.

First you suggest that corporate America has pressing reasons to get the country involved in Syria.

Then you suggest that corporate America controls the government.

If that's the case, why is the US not involved in Syria? More to the point, why is there zero enthusiasm from any sector in the US for involvement in Syria? Actual observed fact: US corporations are not pushing for involvement in Syria. Not at all... as in zero effort. They don't care. There's no evidence that any organized sector in the US political landscape wants to get involved.

Obviously your perceptions of US corporate interest are not shared by any of the various sub-sectors in the US corporate world, and I suspect that their evaluation of their own interests is more credible than your evaluation of their interests. US corporations may or may not have the power to get the US involved in Syria... we'll never know, because they aren't trying to get the US involved.

What we actually see is a rare unanimous conclusion across the US political spectrum: the US has no national interest at stake in Syria that justifies the expense and risk of involvement in the Syrian Civil War, directly or by proxy. If you want to contest that conclusion, you'll need to produce a much more convincing argument than those you've presented so far.

JMA
02-02-2014, 06:41 AM
You are right Mike, I need to remind myself to ...

http://www.keepcalm-o-matic.co.uk/p/keep-calm-and-don-t-feed-the-troll-22/



Deleted or moved ?

If a moderator were to tell JMM what style of response to use, I'd tell him to go to hell.

-------------------------------------

Generally (not directed at Mark), as to this thread, the constant back and forth ad hominems and snarks destroy whatever value the substantive messages contain.

Regards

Mike

Bill Moore
02-02-2014, 08:23 PM
http://www.debka.com/article/23627/Israeli-officer-With-30-000-Al-Qaeda-fighters-in-Syria-Israel-re-evaluates-its-neutrality-in-civil-war

Israeli officer: With 30,000 Al Qaeda fighters in Syria, Israel re-evaluates its neutrality in civil war


speaking on condition of anonymity, reported that more than 30,000 al-Qaeda-linked fighters are active in Syria, a huge increase over the 2,000 jihadis present there two years ago. With jihadis in control of Syrian territory on Israel's northern borders, the high-ranking officer said “many discussions are taking place behind closed doors about the possibility of rethinking its strategy” of neutrality in the Syrian civil war.


Israel’s recourse to military action against the jihadist threat from Syria would require learning US military tactics for combating terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The IDF has no experience of this kind or scale of warfare. It would have to re-write its war doctrine and retrain substantial commando forces in preparation for long years of close-up combat against the jihadist enemy.
Israel would also need to carefully weigh the pros and cons of a military campaign against al Qaeda’s Syrian deployment, taking into consideration that resorting to a campaign against al Qaeda would ease the pressure on the Assad regime and its allies, Iran and Hizballah. That is a hard call to make.

carl
02-03-2014, 05:48 AM
Bill:

Oh man will things get complicated now. But of course, we can console ourselves with the knowledge that the chem weapons are out of circulation...maybe.

Dayuhan
02-03-2014, 10:03 AM
Israel’s recourse to military action against the jihadist threat from Syria would require learning US military tactics for combating terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The IDF has no experience of this kind or scale of warfare. It would have to re-write its war doctrine and retrain substantial commando forces in preparation for long years of close-up combat against the jihadist enemy.

I don't doubt that the Israelis might fight some way to get involved if they perceived a significant threat, but would they go to the extent of "close-up combat against the jihadist enemy" within Syria? How would the Syrian Government/Iran/Hezbollah crowd react to that? Common enemy, yes, but a very improbable set of allies who would be looking for any possible way to backstab each other.

Not impossible I guess, but potentially very messy. I would expect the Israelis to be quite hesitant about getting ground forces involved in any lasting deployment, but as always we will see...

Bill Moore
02-04-2014, 06:25 AM
http://www.smh.com.au/world/alqaeda-breaks-ties-with-syrian-affiliate-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-the-levant-20140204-hvb26.html

Al-Qaeda breaks ties with Syrian affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant


The break between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, announced on jihadist websites, served both sides, said William McCants, a scholar of militant Islam at the Washington-based Brookings Institution.

Al-Qaeda cut ties with a group that was besmirching the al-Qaeda name among other militants, while ISIL bolstered its image as a force to reckon with.

davidbfpo
02-04-2014, 01:14 PM
http://www.debka.com/article/23627/Israeli-officer-With-30-000-Al-Qaeda-fighters-in-Syria-Israel-re-evaluates-its-neutrality-in-civil-war

Israeli officer: With 30,000 Al Qaeda fighters in Syria, Israel re-evaluates its neutrality in civil war

Bill,

I always have m' doubts over Debka as a reliable source.

In contrast to Debka's report is the documented Israeli humanitarian aid across the DMZ on the Golan Heights, primarily in providing medical treatment to civilians and less certainly injured others. IIRC this has appeared in this thread before.

Nor would I describe Israel's stance as 'neutral', especially given the limited number of air strikes on suspected supplies from the Syrian regime to Hezbollah, an active participant in the civil war.

CrowBat
02-07-2014, 02:21 PM
The matter with 'al-Qaida breaking with Syrian affiliate', aka ISIS (or Da'ash, as Syrians call it; this nick is supposedly making the ISIS Jihadists especially mad), is nothing new. Because of their attrocities and unpopularity between the population and outside, Zawahiri was in deep troubles with them since months, ordering them all the time out of Syria. They simply wouldn't listen...

But, I must wonder about Israeli figures. Together with a French chap, I've spent the last two weeks scrounging all possible sources of open source INT for details about 'foreign Jihadists' in Syria. One of conclusions was that - perhaps - it was so that up to some 12,000, perhaps even 15,000 ('overoptimistic' if I'm to ask) foreigners (non-Iraqis and non-Syrians) might have joined the ISIS inside Syria over the last year or so. But, many of them have left ever since, or were simply KIA, and a big part (at least 800) defected to join the JAN, recently.

Similarly, we couldn't find evidence but for about 7,000-8,000 'Jihadists' with the ISIS in Syria presently (including about 2,000 'Europeans'). Furthermore, and although it meanwhile enforced allegiance with various Syrian tribes, this organisation includes perhaps 500 Syrians (definitely less than 5% of its total force).

Obviously, such a small 'force' can't really control such huge swats of Syria as it does (namely from the town of Azzaz, and especially the thermal power plant east of Aleppo, all the way to Dayr az-Zawr). But, a part of this 'problem' is solved by their savage brutality against any kind of opposition.

Still, I understand this as an indication that there 'might' be more of them. The question is only: where? I.e. where have the Israelis found this ballance of 20,000+?

davidbfpo
02-07-2014, 06:16 PM
Two reports on media reporting, one from Chatham House (UK) and the second from USIP (US), which reviews social media reporting - which I have not read.

Chatham House's report has some very pithy passages:
The ensuing conflict has become a ‘war without real people’ in the eyes of most westerners, who now regard the Syrian civil war as an Alien vs Predator-type contest, complete with severed heads, flayed skins and bitten hearts, in which Al-Qaeda competes with the regime as centre stage for Western fears. They seem to be winning. The regime, for all its ruthless and blood-soaked cruelty, is beginning to look the lesser of two evils in the eyes of foreign nations.

(Ends with) It would be an even greater shame if through the absence of independent reporting in Syria, we now choose to forget such people exist, normal Syrians, and believe instead the cardboard cut-out image of a war fought between rebel thugs, extremist hoods and regime goons.

Link:http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/archive/view/197195?dm_i=1TY5,2648W,BHZJVN,7UFSC,1

Link to USIP report:http://www.usip.org/publications/syria-s-socially-mediated-civil-war

CrowBat
02-08-2014, 01:23 PM
Sad but true - even more so because monitoring developments in Syria on day-to-day basis can get a true 'popcorn cinema'.

Take the situation in Aleppo of the last few days:

Because of cease-fires agreed with several of insurgent pockets in Rif Dimashq area (Barzeh, Moadamiyeh), the regime was free to move significant reinforcements from there to Aleppo. After travelling via Kfar Nasser and al-Safira, these - including SSNP's Guard, Arab Guard, and of course all the possible Iranian-supported Hezbollahi militias - are usually converging on Nayrab AB/Aleppo IAP, from where they are pushing into eastern outskirts and the Old City of Aleppo. In this fashion they are attempting to cut off the FSA and Ahrar ash-Sham units that are hodling southern and eastern parts of this city. The corridor between the insurgent-held areas north of Aleppo and insurgents inside the city - held by the Liwa Tawhid Brigade - is meanwhile only 5km wide. And Liwa Tawhid has not only to stop this regime advance, but also attacks from the ISIS.

Namely, after securing much of NE Syria, a major ISIS force is trying to reach the NE Aleppo through an advance via al-Raay and Akhtarin. It was somewhere in this area that an ISIS column opened fire on a village populated by Syrian Turks, and then on Turkish border forces, to which the Turkish military responded with artillery and tank fire, and then with an air strike of its F-16s, which should have destroyed one ISIS pickup and a bus, on 2 February. But, because Turkish military operation remained limited, this advance had to be stopped on 3 Febraury by a counterattack of Kurdish Jabhat al-Akrad militia on Manbij (reminder: Jabhat al-Akrad is PYD's proxy, providing the excuse of 'Kurds fighting together with insurgents against the regime'; seems the PYD's standpoint is that one simply can never know about the outcome of this war...).

'Interestingly', the regime is ignoring the ISIS-held termal powerplant east of Aleppo, or ISIS advance from the NE, and the Jabhat al-Akrad, and 'instead' pushing towards north, from Naqharin on Sheikh Najjar Industrial City. Almost as 'thank you', the ISIS then car-bombed the HQs of the Tawhid Brigade and the Suqour ash-Sham Brigade in Aleppo, killing their COs and a number of high-ranking officers.

Here a video of NDF troops fighting inside Sallahaddin District of Aleppo:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P-6xlS-Es2E

Lt Gen Fahd Jassem Freij, Chief of Staff of Syrian Armed Forces visiting Aleppo, 31 January 2014:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dPf9MfMdF5U

al-Manar TV with 'SyAA troops' (read: NDF or BPM) in Karam al-Qusayr, in Aleppo:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bv42wHdjlY0

Ahrar ash-Sham's T-55 in action outside Aleppo:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tgBqohJBGKc

IF's T-62 in action (outside Aleppo?):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RwevOgBOb_8

FSyA T-55 fighting ISIS outside Aleppo:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8NT2DrJ4iQM

DIY-cannon attack on ZSU-23-4 outside Aleppo:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WPK19usv0Jk

Now, in order to ease their situation (i.e. streamline their frontlines and thus free additional forces), the IF, Ahrar ash-Sham (Anadan Brigade) and the JAN have decided to launch a new attack on Aleppo Central Prison (ACP), some 7km north of that city, on 4 February (the FSyA was apparently too busy fighting inside Aleppo). For this purpose, the JAN appears to have deployed the ex-ISIS group of about 800, led by Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir (a Belgian of Algerian origin) and Saifuallah ash-Shishani (Chechen, not to be mixed with the other Shishani). They loaded an 'armoured truck' with about 12,000kg of C-4 and Semtex and - supposedly - a Briton of Pakistani origin named Abu Suleiman al-Britani drove it against the main entrance of the ACP.

al-Britani's truck:
http://www.acig.info/forum/download/file.php?id=9038

According to pro-regime sources, this truck was hit by some 6-7 RPG-rounds while still some 100m short of its objective, and blew up in a tremendous detonation - instantly killing two regime officers that were monitoring it through their bionculars. One of several videos of the aftermath:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y84bzUfsLKs

The attack on ACP failed, and the JAN suffered extensive losses. Regime claims at least 150 'militants' KIA and 100 WIA, but some of pro-regime (http://www.syrianperspective.com/2014/02/syrian-army-triumph-at-central-prison-details-and-evidence-of-british-collusion-wile-e-coyote-moment.html) sources are now praising 'the 6th Mechanized Armoured Division' for having killed 500 'rats', supposedly 'despite' the 'ISIS' being supported by 'British (intelligence) contractors', 'equivalent of the Green Berets' that hould have overhauled 'ISIS T-62 tanks' - driven by Chechens and Saudis.

By side that there is no (and there was never any) '6th Division' in Syria, whether 'mechanized' or 'armoured' (the ACP might be held by some survivors of the former 56th Armoured Brigade)...

But, to add salt to the injury of the JAN, in their reports like this one (see below), ISIS is now complaining about taking part in this operation but being left down by practically every (insurgent) organization:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Bf0V7pYCUAA5df3.jpg

Translation:

Peace be upon you,

Firstly, god is my witness, and me down in anger if i speak falsely.

Secondly, Abu Maria Maysara Al-Jabouri proposed to Sheikh Saifallah Al-Chechani that the state [ISIS] fight alongside the rebels in Aleppo, but he staunchly refused, may he rest in peace. His pledge to ISIS could have been, were it not for his preexisting pledge to Abu Uthman Doko Omarov Emir of the Caucasus. And from there began the secret, and God only knows.

Thirdly, when the attack began today, Sheikh Saifallah and Jaish Al-Muhajireen spearheaded the attack. The news of freeing the prison was released before that of Sheikh Saifallah's martyrdom, in order to emphasize the victory we, ISIS, played a hand in alongside our brother in the other combat groups in Kuwairis.

The attack was preceded by a message to Al-Muhissni indicating a powerful operation conducted by Al-Nusra and Ahrar [Al Sham] was underway.

Fourthly, when the attack had begun. the majority of the Ahrar [Al Sham] and [Liwa] Tawhid combat groups slowly withdrew from the flank, leaving their attacking brothers targets of accurate shelling/mortar fire from the Alawites... The majority of the martyrs belonged to the Jaish Al-Muhajireen and Saifallah's combat groups.

Lastly, I have nothing to say but that Abu Omar Al-Kuwaiti has returned and recovered, as with Al-Jabouri. If an attack is contrived, prepare yourselves, and know that in victory there is much good to be gained, that is something the lords of sedition [Rebels] do not realize. As for the death of Saifallah, he was a hinderence to their [insurgent] doomed conspiracy.

Oh lord my honor is credible, were i a liar, strike me.

Note: the Central Command of Liwa Al-Tawhid though it could take advantage of the conspiracy by paying its dues, so it executed many brothers in Talrifaat... They are a people of betrayal... One conspiracy is not enough. I saw the faces of those who did not acknowledge god's might.

So, the ISIS - which is only attacking Syrian insurgents - is boasting that it has led this assault on the ACP, although at the same time explaining it refused to particpate and was then left-down by the IF and Liwa Tawhid - and the regime is 'confirming' this... :rolleyes:

This is better than if written by anybody in Hollywood.

Bill Moore
02-09-2014, 06:23 PM
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/05/syria-children-maim-torture-assad-forces-un

Syria children maimed and tortured

First point first


It was not clear what methodology for the findings was used and the summary of the report posted on the UN website did not say how investigators obtained their information.

Many more allegations in the article


While Assad's forces have used children as human shields in the fighting, the report also condemned rebels for "recruitment and use of children both in combat and support roles, as well as for conducting military operations".

Actual UN report/summary at this link, much more graphic depiction.

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47077&Cr=syria&Cr1=#.UvewW42YbIW

CrowBat
02-18-2014, 12:20 AM
'Fan's of SSMS are going to like this video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M4fokVfd7mY

Looks like CBU-version of the (Iranian-made) Fateh-110 (Teshreen in Syrian military parlance).

...and discussion of regime's deployment of BM-30 MLRS by Brown Moses Blog (http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2014/02/evidence-of-syrian-military-deploying.html) (meanwhile, there are some good photos of entire BM-30 rounds, not only empty wreckage).

In other news:

- After Ibn Sultan has organized arms shipments worth about US$1 billion for the SF and SRF (two new coalitions of ex-FSA, moderate insurgents: Southern Front, presently doing very well around Dera'a, in southern Syria; and Syrian Revolutionary Front, created in Idlib from 14 different ex-FSA brigades), and because he apparently did so on his own (i.e. without any 'amens' from the DC), the King there said he's gotta go.

Sultan was replaced by king's son, Prince Mutaib Ibn Abdullah (former Minister of the SANG):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wveJ0ZbnMlQ

Simultaneously, after Idriss insisted on getting people from other political parties (but Qatar-supported Moslem Brotherhood) into the SNC and SMC - but also after his quarrels with Ma'arouf (wealthy businessman who is chief of SF, and supported by Saudis) - he was fired too, and replaced by Col Abdel-Illah al-Bashir (al-Noeim tribe) as new chief of (what is left of) FSyA:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gyl4Kay77ug

Otherwise, there are not too many true 'news' from the battlefields. In the north, the SRF and IF have attacked ISIS-held Azzaz (last Jihadist stronghold, 35km NW of Aleppo), but apparently failed to take it.

The regime exploited this opportunity to capture the village of Sheikh Najjar: some have misunderstood this with the capture of Sheikh Najjar Industrial City, NE of Aleppo (which would indeed be a massive blow for insurgents). Liwa al-Tawhid stopped them well outside the latter (thanks to another shipment of ATGMs).

In the south, the SF is very quiet about its advance on Khirbet Ghazala and Ghariyyat al-Gharbiyah, yesterday, where they cut the highway between Dera'a and Damascus and captured a major ammo depot too. Essentially, what's left of the regime garrison inside northern Dera'a is now cut off.

davidbfpo
02-18-2014, 06:08 PM
A broad ranging review of the situation in Syria and the stance of the external players - of note excluding Israel - is provided by WoTR:http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/the-syrian-civil-war-political-and-military-state-of-play/

Yesterday on Twitter there was a new map of how Syria looks now, I will try to find a link and / or copy it here.

Bill Moore
02-21-2014, 08:10 AM
We'll see if this agreement works, at this point Assad is no longer a legitimate leader for Syria, but still major questions on what happens if his regime falls. Iran and Russia will still support Assad to pursue their own interests as will Lebanese Hezbollah, so selectively providing arms and other aids to vetted insurgent groups may not be enough to turn the tide.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-allies-agree-on-standards-for-which-opposition-groups-in-syria-will-receive-aid/2014/02/20/7b5b8b02-9a53-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html

U.S., allies agree on standards for which opposition groups in Syria will receive aid


The United States and its principal European and Arab allies have agreed on a unified way of providing Syrian rebel groups with aid, classifying them into those who should receive arms supplies and other assistance, those who are ineligible because of clear extremist ties, and those whose eligibility requires further discussion, according to U.S. and allied officials.


“The idea is that no country will act unilaterally and all will abide by the same understanding,” said one Arab official. The official called the listing a “living document” that will be constantly updated as rebel alliances shift.

Bill Moore
02-21-2014, 08:15 AM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-gerson-syrias-uncontainable-threat/2014/02/20/ab8e6966-9a58-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html

A discussion in Damascus


“We are not just fighting Assad,” says one man. “We are fighting Russia, Iran and Hezbollah.” Accurate. “The Western countries,” adds another, “are just waiting around.” True enough. Their sympathies are with the more moderate Free Syrian Army, but the radical Islamist group Jabhat al-Nusra “gives us food and assistance.” It is clear who has more resources.


From a U.S. perspective, this disaster is not just humanitarian but strategic. A Somalia-like future for Syria would be an uncontainable regional and global threat. Lebanon is already being overwhelmed, with one out of four people now a Syrian refugee, adding tension to a combustible sectarian mix. In Jordan, the influx has left public services near the breaking point. Jordanian border guards routinely intercept automatic weapons, hand grenades and bombs with remote detonators coming out of Syria. “Some are headed to sleeper cells in Jordan,” a Jordanian general told me, and “others are in transit to other countries.”


This has led some to propose a radical option: Tacitly concede defeat, accept that Assad is ascendant and engage him in a counterterrorism strategy. But that would not only reward mass atrocities, it would also be the acceptance of Russian and Iranian strategic dominance in the Middle East and the betrayal of our current friends. And it would reward mass atrocities.


More in this opinion piece, and IMO if there was ever a wicked problem with no good solutions this is it.

CrowBat
02-22-2014, 10:43 PM
Since yesterday evening, there is a regime assault on Sheik Najjar Industrial City north of Aleppo. The involved force is said to consist of a mix of about two 'task forces' in size (something like 8 companies/2 battalions), with 20 T-55s and T-72s, supported by UAVs.

Note: this attack was launched by night. Given the 'history' of nocturnal attacks on insurgents in Syria by now, this - plus involvement of UAVs - is making it crystal clear who's in charge of that operation.

For those that might be wondering about what do the Syrians 'actually' think, here a very useful report, titled Aleppo Mapping Project (https://s3.amazonaws.com/fmg_static/aleppo/Caerus_AleppoMappingProject_FinalReport_02-13-14.pdf).

My experience is that similar 'wild mix of reasons, motives etc.' can be found everywhere else around that country.

Also interesting, is this article from Israel (http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/14474#.UwkTW4XnSF_), citing quite some Hezbollah losses in Syria so far: 350 KIA and about 1,000 WIA.

Some of latest rumours I've heard are even higher (about 450 KIA and more than 1,300 WIA).

Whatever, the point is that the Hezbollah has three small brigades deployed around Qalamoun Mountain Range (along the central part of the Lebanese-Syrian border), with two inside Syria and one inside Lebanon. Since none of these is larger than about 1,200 people, that's quite a chunk of losses they have suffered in about one year of fighting.

JMA
02-23-2014, 08:59 AM
CrowBat, thank you for your informative updates, much appreciated.



Since yesterday evening, there is a regime assault on Sheik Najjar Industrial City north of Aleppo. The involved force is said to consist of a mix of about two 'task forces' in size (something like 8 companies/2 battalions), with 20 T-55s and T-72s, supported by UAVs.

Note: this attack was launched by night. Given the 'history' of nocturnal attacks on insurgents in Syria by now, this - plus involvement of UAVs - is making it crystal clear who's in charge of that operation.

For those that might be wondering about what do the Syrians 'actually' think, here a very useful report, titled Aleppo Mapping Project (https://s3.amazonaws.com/fmg_static/aleppo/Caerus_AleppoMappingProject_FinalReport_02-13-14.pdf).

My experience is that similar 'wild mix of reasons, motives etc.' can be found everywhere else around that country.

Also interesting, is this article from Israel (http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/14474#.UwkTW4XnSF_), citing quite some Hezbollah losses in Syria so far: 350 KIA and about 1,000 WIA.

Some of latest rumours I've heard are even higher (about 450 KIA and more than 1,300 WIA).

Whatever, the point is that the Hezbollah has three small brigades deployed around Qalamoun Mountain Range (along the central part of the Lebanese-Syrian border), with two inside Syria and one inside Lebanon. Since none of these is larger than about 1,200 people, that's quite a chunk of losses they have suffered in about one year of fighting.

davidbfpo
02-23-2014, 05:15 PM
Twitter is alive with confirmed reports that Abu Khaled al-Suri, senior Al-Qaeda & co-founder of Ahrar al-Sham, was killed today in Aleppo, in a suicide attack on his HQ - possibly by another Islamist faction ISIS.

Background brief:http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/zawahiris_chief_repr.php

davidbfpo
02-23-2014, 06:33 PM
A fascinating commentary on the Christian communities:http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/christian-militia-political-dynamics-syria/

It ends and this is just the first two passages:
Christian militia and political dynamics in Syria are by no means as simple as notions that all Christians side with the regime or look to the regime as their protector. As we have seen, sect affiliation and geography matter here, and divisions in alignments are particularly sharp in northeastern Syria.

However, one common thread is apparent: the rebel forces on the ground have overwhelmingly failed to attract Christian support for their cause, however many Christians may be in the opposition-in-exile. Christians on the ground look to the regime, Kurds or have formed their own independent groupings generally working with the latter while opposed to the regime, but they have not joined the various FSA-banner formations or other main rebel groupings in significant numbers.

CrowBat
02-24-2014, 10:01 AM
The 'Syrian government' is supposedly advancing on Qunaitra, according to this report (http://news.yahoo.com/syrian-troops-advance-near-golan-heights-city-154648184.html):

...The Syrian TV report, citing a military official, said troops and pro-government gunmen known as National Defense Forces captured the areas of Rasm al-Hour and Rasm al-Sad, south of the town of Quneitra. The Britain-based Syrian Observatory For Human Rights confirmed troops were on the offensive, adding that the air force was taking part in the attack.
...

Even the regime media is not talking about 'Army', but NDF now.

Meanwhile, Ahrar ash-Sham is assaulting the base of the former 61st (Independent) Brigade in Tel al-Jabiyeh, further south (this is the first time we've got to hear about this SyAA unit after nearly three years of that war; reason is that most of it defected in the meantime; indeed, a part of the 61st turned its weapons at elements of the 4th AD sent to crush its mutiny, in January 2012).

It's thus interesting to see that - concurrent with the 'regime offensives' into northern Aleppo and towards Qunaitra - a number of new entries for IRGC casualties in Syria can be found here (http://www.military.ir/forums/topic/24525-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1/page__st__1770) (pages 119-122 of that thread).

BTW, the IDF is re-shuffling its units on cease-fire lines with Syria too. According to this report (http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Amid-raging-conflict-in-Syria-IDF-deploys-new-division-to-border-342314):

...The 36th Division had been stationed in the Golan Heights for 40 years, and its move away from the Syrian border is a historic military shift that will see it become an all-purpose wartime division, designed to be sent to any combat arena, such as Lebanon or Gaza, to support other divisions.

Replacing it will be the 210th Division, which since July has been training intensively to familiarize itself with the Syrian border, and mastering the IDF's intelligence and firepower capabilities that may be needed to deal with future threats from Syria.
...
While the 36th was stationed on the Golan for 40 years, it consisted of brigades and battalions drawn from other parts of Israel. On the contrary, the 210th is a reservist unit consisting of 'regional' brigades and battalions. Summary: contrary to rumours about the West, Israelis and Saudis planning to establish a NFZ over Syria, it seems the Israelis do not expect the civil war in Syria to spill over the cease-fire lines.

JMA
02-25-2014, 02:32 PM
Came across this:

Analysis: Is Syria now a direct threat to the U.S.? (http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/07/us-syria-us-analysis-idUSBREA161NG20140207)


They're saying now that fighters are going to be trained in Syria and come back to the U.S.," he said. "We can't pretend that it doesn't have an impact on American national security interests."

davidbfpo
02-25-2014, 05:56 PM
JMA,

The cited Reuters article brings nothing new on the issues around foreign fighters, although its American emphasis is different to what we see here.

There is a SWC thread 'Foreign fighters in Syria: a crime minus a motive?', where there are differences of opinion:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=19976

CrowBat
02-26-2014, 05:49 PM
Few days ago 2-3 videos appeared on YouTube, showing British and French Jihadists (fighting in Aleppo for the JAN), stressing they'll not gonna go back.

So, some might go back, others not.

IMHO, it depends what faction in Syria they joined. If it's ISIS, then I wouldn't bet on them staying in Syria or not going to 'fight' somewhere else. If it's the JAN or Ahrar ash-Sham, they have no reason to go back, no matter what kind of links to AQ they might have.

Both of these organizations are run by native (Syrian) Salafists, not by Wahhabists. No matter how many are bunching them together or considering them 'the same', they are not the same. Although they're presently happily pocketing money from private sources in Saudi Arabia there remains plenty of antagonism between Syrian Salafists and Saudi Wahhabists. Of course, I've got no crystal ball or any sort of 'special abilities', but I expect sooner or later the relations between these two organizations and the AQ to end like those between the Libyan Salafists and AQ (concerns of that kind are probably the most likely reason for Zawahiri dropping the ISIS).

***********

BTW, the Saudi-supplied ATGMs are flooding the frontlines quite freely, and the last two days saw the NDF suffering heavy losses in armour (again). Here 'selected' examples...

In southern Syria, after capturing the base of the (former) 61st (Independent) Brigade, Ahrar ash-Sham should have overrun the base of the 90th (Independent) Brigade too, severing the Damascus-Quneitra road in the process. Here scenes from the base of the 61st:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hf6PTsF0z7A

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oPIiXHhyl4g

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Fciwecz90w Not working 10th March.

RAK-12 crew in action against Tel Jabiya (61st's base):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uqfKMH_w3B8

Regime launched a (supposedly) 'big' counteroffensive in direction of Qunaitra. Contrary to meanwhile standard practice from other parts of Syria, this was led by the conglomerate of native troops trained by the IRGC and coloquially designated the '4th Armoured Division' (read: NDF) and Iraqi Shi'a, and it run into major trouble when the Ahrar ash-Sham and SF began deploying Saudi-supplied ATGMs. This video is showing regime troops running away from Qunaitra area:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8yYAdiVS8U

Counterattack by NDF failed:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ycPpHSo8QU

2 BMPs and 1 MBT knocked out:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7qQfbydT1u4

HJ-8 vs ZSU-23-4:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNxB46g75tc

**********

Dera'a:
Army base in Nawa overrun by SF, one T-72 knocked out in the process:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dq5k-Y10JPU

HJ-8 hit another MBT:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FqEzpGiy0tU

T-55 captured:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eskV8s9aoag

Hamza Asadullah Brigade (SF) attacking Inkhil, northern Dera'a:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dab-IpeMCNM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDi-H9zixAs

**************

Similar scenes from Qalamoun/Yabroud area, where Saudi-supplied ATGMs are used by the IF against NDF- ('4th AD' again) operated armour in support of Hezbollah offensive mentioned above:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXYtAFVThFQ

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjd7R7NhCr8

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MNFcrVekbYk

On ACIG.info forum we have a lad cross-checking all such evidence and counting regime losses. His last count (covering period between 9 May 2012 and 23 February 2014), ended at:

- 276 BMP destroyed and 107 captured by rebels = 383 BMP lost
- 441 tanks destroyed and 223 captured by rebels = 664 tanks lost
- 19 ZSU-23-4 destroyed and 25 captured by rebels = 44 ZSU-23-4 lost
- 7 2S1 destroyed and 11 captured by rebels = 18 2S1 lost

Makes one wonder what's going to be the 'up-to-date' figure after this week.

flagg
02-27-2014, 05:00 AM
Interesting ambush video by the Syrian regime.

They'd have to have had some pretty good Int by the looks of things:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amD-CTwPVkI

carl
02-27-2014, 04:48 PM
Interesting ambush video by the Syrian regime.

They'd have to have had some pretty good Int by the looks of things:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amD-CTwPVkI

What kind of weapon hit those guys?

Dayuhan
02-28-2014, 12:25 AM
What kind of weapon hit those guys?

And what were they doing lined up out in the open? I wonder if that was a refugee group; it's hard to imagine even the most confident insurgent unit exposing themselves like that.

jcustis
02-28-2014, 01:43 AM
If you look carefully, the video is taken with a medium-quality thermal camera (FLIR). The personnel moving on the ground could have been moving single file for a number of reasons, such as through a breach in a minefield or similar obstacle, to avoid IEDs, or because they were trying to infiltrate to a specific point and then assault a fixed position.

They don't appear to be refugees because they seem to be of a uniform height, and all seem to be moving at the same rate of speed. That's not something you'd see with women, children, and old men shuffling along.

As for the ordnance? Anybody's guess. Could be simple HE from mortars or artillery. If it was, government forces had that pre-registered target laid in very well.

CrowBat
02-28-2014, 10:36 AM
There is plenty of confusion and controversy over this entire issue, and there are several videos meanwhile, indicating the possiblity of there being two such ambushes: one in Qalamoun, and the other in Eastern Ghouta areas (geographically, both are in Rif Dimashq Province, but the Qalamoun range is stretching from 70km NE of Damascus towards north, while Eastern Ghouta is encirling southern and eastern suburbs of Damascus).

Anyway, in hope I might have more luck with posting videos than the last time (see above for a botch-up attempt), here some additional ones with scenes from that ambush and after (WARNING: most are GRAFFIC!!!):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dF4qKxDSlhk

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r9FdlOXS1RA Requires sign in to confirm age.

Now, the pro-regime sources are claiming it was an IED set up by Hezbollah that, according to the SOHR, killed '152 rebels from Jabhat an-Nusra and other brigades', outside Otaiba (Eastern Ghouta). Seven injured insurgents should have been taken prisoners.

The AJE Arabic-language service reported that it was actually a column of civilians escorted by 'FSyA fighters' underway to pick up food for besieged civilians:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R1dvvgsQK2U Requires sign in to confirm age.

Curiously, this is not what AJE English-language service is reporting, as can be read here (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/02/syria-army-ambush-kills-scores-near-damascus-2014226133514423912.html).

Frankly, the JAN might be 'AQ-linked extremists', but for them to walk in the open like this... well, that would require an incredible dose of stupidity. Namely, car bombs and IEDs are a matter of everyday life in all of Syria since at least two years. But: artillery shellings and air strikes of any kind of concentrations of 'non-regime people' - even more so.

CrowBat
02-28-2014, 10:55 AM
'In other news'...

As usually when it comes to Middle East affairs, one must all the time keep on 'connecting dots', and 'reading between the lines'. For example, few weeks ago we've seen those 'pro-regime demos' supposedly held in Dera'a (ho-hum), and Damascus (indeed). Subsequently it turned out these were staged to 'pre-empt' anti-regime demos by nobody else but Assad's 'very own' - Alawists, primarily held in Tartus (only to get quickly squashed by 'security services'). There is plenty of unrest between Alawists, because of their heavy casualties in this war so far.

That's making one curious about the actual reasons for the (completely regime-controlled) Syrian media, and then all the media of all of regime's allies so happily reporting about this 'ambush' now. Namely, when one considers some of things mentioned in report The Crucial Syria Battles You’re Not Hearing About (SPOILER: Assad seems in trouble) (http://levantoday.com/2014/02/25/the-crucial-syria-battles-youre-not-hearing-about-spoiler-assad-seems-in-trouble/) things are anything but 'developing ah so well' for the regime:

...Two weeks into a furious Syrian government assault on Yabroud, the largest remaining rebel-held town in the Qalamoun mountains, rebels are on a surprising offensive.
...
On Monday, the pro-opposition Qalamoun Media Foundation reported that, despite heavy shelling and the Syrian air force’s use of barrel bombs on rebel-held positions, Free Syrian Army-affiliated combatants and Islamist brigades, including Jabhat a-Nusra and the Islamic Front, had eliminated regime forces in the Rima farms, in eastern Yabroud.
...
The advance comes a day after the Islamic Front and others announced they had seized control of the village of a-Sahel, northeast of Yabroud, forcing a retreat of Syrian government troops and their Hezbollah reinforcements.
...


Let's go a step further, and check the report Regime forces inch closer to Aleppo (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Feb-26/248516-regime-forces-inch-closer-to-aleppo.ashx#axzz2uSpE117I), by Lebanese Daily Star (leaning 'pro-Regime').

Not only that 'Regime forces inch AROUND Aleppo' would be a better title, but this contains some interesting details too:


...In Aleppo, the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitoring group said that government troops, backed by National Defense paramilitary forces and officers from Lebanon’s Hezbollah, advanced against rebel groups near Aleppo’s airport, and close to the Army’s 80th Division headquarters.

At least 17 rebels, including some non-Syrians, were killed in the fighting, the Observatory said.

It said that regime troops were now one kilometer away from the neighborhood of Tariq al-Bab, which has been targeted repeatedly by regime airstrikes and barrel bombs in recent weeks.

The Observatory said the government troops, backed by paramilitary forces, seized a factory in the Sheikh Said area of Aleppo while rebels, backed by the jihadist Nusra Front, disabled a regime vehicle in Sheikh Najjar, adding that the regime side sustained casualties in the clashes.
...


The NDF has certainly reached the area in question, as can be seen from this video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1oni5tm55nI

'But', the same report is also stating:

...The commander of an Islamist militia was killed in clashes outside Yabroud, the Observatory said, as government artillery struck targets around the town, along with the nearby region of the Rima Farms, and the nearby towns of Maaloula and Seidnaya.

...
The latest battles raged in the Rima Farms region, where the latest attempt by Hezbollah and the Syrian Army to achieve a breakthrough against rebel defenses failed, activists said.
...

etc.

This is imposing the quesiton: if the regime has claimed to have captured the Rima Farms already a week ago, why should it now have to shell that area, and fight for it?

The answer implies that the regime is - as usually - lying. Which then implies nothing good about regime's report about that 'ambush' either.

**********

On the lighter side: fans of the regime shouldn't miss a visit to the FB page of nobody else but Brig Gen Essam Zaher ad-Deen (or 'Zahreddine'), a Druze and a former CO of the 104th Mechanized Brigade of the RGD, appointed the CO of Aleppo Garrison in late summer last year:
https://www.facebook.com/general.issam.zaheraldeen

This 'bad-ass' guy, who supposedly survived several assassination attempts by 'Jihadist rats', has appeared in Dayr az-Zawr, few days ago, where insurgents made some advances back towards the local air base. Here you can see him visiting the local 'Syrian Arab Army' units (read: NDF):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6u2dStG9Moc

Experiences from three years of this war are teaching us: if Zaher ad-Deen is appearing somewhere, the situation (from the regime's POV) is 'close to catastrophe'. But also: there is a high probability that the regime (read: IRGC, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi'a, PFLP etc., etc., etc., followed by the NDF, BPM etc., etc., etc.) migh launch a major offensive operation in the given area, within 1-2 months.

CrowBat
02-28-2014, 12:15 PM
Almost forgot to post this one:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vAopr8vIIIA

Excellent PBS Frontline documentary about the emergence of Ma'arouf's SRF in Idlib and Aleppo provinces (first half), and their assault on ISIS-held Atareb, in mid-January 2014, and then a report on 'every day life' of kids in insurgent-held parts of Aleppo.

davidbfpo
02-28-2014, 04:25 PM
http://www.the-american-interest.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/syria_battlelines.png

Note the number of enclaves still held by the regime, which I can only assume are airfields and rely on external supplies. They must be quite lonely outposts being far from the regime's heartland.

http://www.the-american-interest.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/syria_religious.png

The large empty space is desert and virtually uninhabited. The few spots I assume are towns.

flagg
02-28-2014, 07:31 PM
What kind of weapon hit those guys?

I would guess a daisy chained bank of claymore-type mines or IEDs.

flagg
02-28-2014, 07:36 PM
And what were they doing lined up out in the open? I wonder if that was a refugee group; it's hard to imagine even the most confident insurgent unit exposing themselves like that.

Maybe it's a question of training/discipline amongst insurgents?

Trained soldiers in a military with decent discipline/leadership, TTPs, and equipment would ensure appropriate spacing between individuals and between subunits day or night.

But there's also the question of traveling at night.

The lower the ambient light, likely the shorter the distance between folks traveling in single file if they don't have individual issue NVE/NVG.

jcustis
03-01-2014, 12:55 AM
They were traveling at night, hence the FLIR. Not at all unreasonable that they expected to be able to do so undetected if regime night vision/thermal capabilities are poor or unknown.

They just got sloppy either way and paid for it.

Remember that they were crossing open ground. Sometimes speed IS security, and the file is an appropriate to maintain speed...unless some knucklehead is watching and waiting.

jcustis
03-01-2014, 01:07 AM
I watched several of the insurgent posted videos for the first time in a while last night.

Good lord what a largely undisciplined band of effing clownshoes. The one chubby guy who likes to step out and shoot RPGs without using the sights, and one-handed, might as well be throwing gang signs as he struts back behind cover. I want to punch him in the head everytime I see his goofy mug show up.

That they are holding their own at all is remarkable, but their donkey's rear end brethren in Iraq put up a similar fight and sometimes fared well too. A good all-out frontal assault by disciplined infantry might surprised the regime in terms of how effective it could be. But we've seen the quality they have as well.

Risk aversion prolongs things. Sometimes folks just need to tuck in the chin and get down to business. Syria is an existential threat for both parties involved, and they are fighting it like some sandlot game at times.

carl
03-01-2014, 02:34 AM
I would guess a daisy chained bank of claymore-type mines or IEDs.

Thank you sir. That appears to make the most sense.

JMA
03-01-2014, 10:41 AM
With Syria, Diplomacy Needs Force (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/opinion/with-syria-diplomacy-needs-force.html?_r=0)


"If the president already owns the deadly consequences of inaction, it is only prudent now to back diplomacy with force so that the consequences do not become deadlier still."

CrowBat
03-02-2014, 11:08 PM
http://www.the-american-interest.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/syria_battlelines.png

Note the number of enclaves still held by the regime, which I can only assume are airfields and rely on external supplies. They must be quite lonely outposts being far from the regime's heartland.That map contains few mistakes.

For example: Idlib City is not really 'cut off and surrounded'. The regime is holding a corridor along the road from Idlib to Ariha (south of Idlib) and Jishr ash-Shughour (west of Ariha) towards Lattakia.

Further south (still inside Idlib Province), there is another pocket held by the regime, stretching from Camp Wadi ad-Dayf (SE of Ma'arat an-Numaan) to Khan Sheykhun.

Then, the ISIS pocket NW from Aleppo - the town of Azzaz - is not existing since few days: the ISIS withdrew from there towards the East. Here a relevant report:
ISIL jihadists retreat from parts of north Syria, says monitor (https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/nowsyrialatestnews/537293-isil-jihadists-retreat-from-parts-of-north-syria-says-monitor)

...The jihadist Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham has begun withdrawing from parts of northern Syria ahead of a deadline set by a rival group, a monitor said Thursday.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said the group was retreating east towards its stronghold in the city of Raqa.

The withdrawal comes four days after the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Nusra Front issued ISIS an ultimatum to go before an Islamic court for mediation or face being forced from Syria altogether.

The deadline expires on Saturday.

"ISIS has withdrawn from Aazaz, its most important bastion in Aleppo province, as well as the Minnigh military airport, the Mayer region and the villages of Deir Jamal and Kafin," the Observatory said.

"Aleppo region is their weakest link, so they fear being attacked there" by Al-Nusra and other rebels after the deadline expires, Observatory director Rami Abdel Rahman told AFP.

"ISIS is heading to areas that neighbor Raqa province where it has its main stronghold in the city of Raqa," he said.
...

Azzaz is now under combined, IF/SRF control.

Then, the insurgent-held pocket 'east of Homs' was recently overrun by the regime. The insurgents are still holding few neighbourhoods in the NE of that city, which are connected with the large pocket between Houla and Rastan.

The insurgent-held area in Qalamoun Range received a sizeable 'dent' on its northern side, since the start of SyAAF & NDF-supported Hezbollah offensive on that area, two weeks ago.

And finally (between others), the insurgent-controlled area along armistice lines with Israel is stretching all the way up to Qunaitra, i.e. much further north than marked on that map.


The large empty space is desert and virtually uninhabited.'Sparselly populated' would be a better description. This is no 'sand sea' as often imagined by foreigners (and shown in various Hollywood movies), but an area characterized by low rolling hills, covered by gravel, lavender bush and actually quite a lot of grass (except in summer and autumn, of course). There are plenty of roads in that area too (two each connecting Damascus and Homs with Palmyra, for example), and all of these are effectivelly under regime control (indeed, the regime can still push entire supply convoys all the way from Damascus via Palmyra to Dayr az-Zawr).

jmm99
03-04-2014, 06:05 PM
This story, Times of Israel, Syrian Christians sign treaty of submission to Islamists - Threatened by al-Qaeda-affiliated extremists, community in northern city of Raqqa chooses ‘dhimmitude’ over conversion or death (http://www.timesofisrael.com/syrian-christians-sign-treaty-of-submission-to-islamists/) (by Elhanan Miller, February 27, 2014); and Haaretz, Under threat, Syria's Christians sign accord with Islamists - While Christians opt for a medieval-style 'protection agreement' and tax over conversion or death, Assad bolsters standing as the preferred option in Syria (http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/.premium-1.577608) (by Zvi Bar'el, 3 Mar 2014).

http://cdn.timesofisrael.com/uploads/2014/02/AP151319862248-635x357.jpg


This undated file image posted on a militant website on Tuesday, Jan. 14, 2014 shows fighters from the al-Qaeda linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) marching in Raqqa [JMM: Raqqa Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ar-Raqqah)], Syria (photo credit: AP).

has been gaining traction over the last week or so. That being said, my purpose here is not to launch into a discussion of Raqqa's military history (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Callinicum) (an interesting subject), dhimmitude under Sharia law (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhimmi) (a subject of interest to comparative lawyers), or of the ISIS troopers' marching style.

Instead, I'd like to discuss one apparent legal implication of Raqqa to larger issues in US foreign policy (one global, one Syrian in scope), which arose out of the events briefly described in these snips from the "dhimmitude" articles:


Times: Earlier this month, al-Qaeda’s central command distanced itself from ISIS, saying it was “not a branch of al-Qaeda.”

Haaretz: The response from rival groups has not been long in coming. Al-Nusra Front, led by Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, issued an ultimatum to ISIS warning that if its people do not cease their attacks on the front, and if they don't sign a reconciliation agreement, they are in for “a dreadful battle.”

Al-Nusra became Al-Qaida’s official representative in Syria after ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi defied an order by Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri to dismantle the front's forces in Syria and go back to fighting in Iraq. This blatant defiance led Al-Zawahiri to openly disavow ISIS, but this does not seem to have impressed the ISIS leader much, as he continues to spearhead an independent front within Syria.

It was Al-Bahgdadi's forces, in fact, who assassinated Abu Khalid al-Suri, a close friend of Osama bin Laden and a top Al-Qaida official, who worked alongside Al-Joulani. Friendship with Bin Laden is no longer a reliable insurance policy, apparently.

The power struggles between the two radical groups that have seized partial control of some Syrian towns and villages is forcing the Free Syrian Army to take a stand. The paradoxical result is that the Al-Qaida stand-in – Al-Nusra – is now considered a more desirable ally of the rebels than ISIS because it relies largely on Syrian support, while ISIS has recruited many volunteers from Arab and Western countries.

That story has also been discussed in posts above (primarily by Crowbat), which obviously have military and political implications.

Lawfare's Jack Goldsmith has been following the legal implications of the AQ-Base and ISIS rupture, in two pieces. The first, The ISIS Expulsion and the AUMF (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/02/the-isis-expulsion-and-the-aumf/) (by Jack Goldsmith, February 11, 2014), deals with the "reported fact" that the Obama administration considered the US to be at war with ISIS, and with al-Nusar in an earlier admission:


Karen DeYoung and Greg Miller report in the WP [Al-Qaeda’s expulsion of Islamist group in Syria prompts U.S. debate (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al-qaedas-excommunication-of-islamist-group-in-syria-prompts-high-level-us-debate/2014/02/10/339d8654-8f4e-11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story.html?hpid=z2)] that Al-Qaeda’s recent expulsion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has raised questions about whether the AUMF “still applies” to ISIS. “According to some administration lawyers and intelligence officials,” they report, “the expulsion of ISIS removes the group from the short list of al-Qaeda ‘associates’ that the president has virtually unlimited powers to strike under a law passed days after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.”

These statements imply that the administration had determined, prior to the ISIS expulsion, that the AUMF authorized the President to use force against this group that operates in Syria. That is news to me, and it highlights the non-transparent method by which the Executive determines with whom we are at war.

Does Congress know that the Executive branch had determined that the AUMF authorized force against ISIS? Did the Senate Arms Services Committee know? (When DOD officials suggested at a SASC hearing last May that the AUMF authorized force against the Nusra Front in Syria, many Senators on the SASC expressed surprise (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/congress-must-figure-out-what-our-government-is-doing-in-the-name-of-the-aumf/#.UvoYsWJdWSo).)

The WP article claims the WH's targeted group list is now down to four AQ "affiliates" (obviously not including Astan and Pstan):


The unofficial list of al-Qaeda affiliates is now down to four: the powerful offshoots in Yemen and North Africa, Somalia-based al-Shabab, and Jabhat al-Nusra, an ISIS rival within the Syrian opposition to President Bashar al#-Assad.

All of this goes to Jack's main point:


The main point of the story is the increasing fragility of the AUMF. Zawahiri’s expulsion of ISIS, by calling into question its status as an AQ associate, makes it more difficult as a legal matter for the USG to use force against ISIS. DeYoung and Miller report that some in the administration “think ISIS can still be targeted because of its long-standing al-Qaeda ties and parallel ambitions.”

But this would probably be stretching the AUMF too far, leaving the President either to act under Article II if ISIS presented a serious threat, or not act at all. In that connection, DeYoung and Miller also report that “Obama remains leery of justifying drone strikes and other types of military action with constitutional powers he accused his predecessor, George W. Bush, of overusing” – namely, inherent Article II powers.

It has always puzzled me why President Obama is leery of using Article II in counterterrorism operations where U.S. safety and security are at stake, but not in humanitarian operations as in Libya and the threatened action in Syria.

Actually, I doubt that Jack is puzzled; he is well aware of the forceful advocacy of Susan Rice and Samantha Power when it comes to liberal-progressive humanitarian interventions.

At the time Jack wrote this, his concerns about the AUMF and Article II powers were theoretical. But, within two weeks, we got what seems a real world example.

- to be cont.-

jmm99
03-04-2014, 06:49 PM
Turning now to Jack's most recent article, What is the Domestic Legal Basis for Planned Cyberattacks in Syria? (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/02/what-is-the-domestic-legal-basis-for-planned-cyberattacks-in-syria/) (by Jack Goldsmith, February 25, 2014):


David Sanger reports [NYT: Syria War Stirs New U.S. Debate on Cyberattack (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/world/middleeast/obama-worried-about-effects-of-waging-cyberwar-in-syria.html?hp&_r=0)] that the Pentagon and the NSA planned a sophisticated cyberattack aimed at “the Syrian military and President Bashar al-Assad’s command structure” that “would essentially turn the lights out for Assad.”

He also reports that President Obama declined to go forward with the attacks then or since because of uncertainty about the proper role of offensive cyber weapons and worries about retaliation. Sanger suggests that the use of these weapons in Syria is now back on the table.
...
A final note. Sanger says: “Because he has put the use of such weapons largely into the hands of the N.S.A., which operates under the laws guiding covert action, there is little of the public discussion that accompanied the arguments over nuclear weapons in the 1950s and ′60s, or the kind of roiling argument over the wisdom of using drones, another classified program that Mr. Obama has begun to discuss publicly only in the past 18 months.”

I am not sure what this means. The NSA does not always operate under the covert action statute, but assuming it is here, that statute is no bar to public discussion. Rather, that statute says that if the President intends an action abroad to remain unacknowledged, he has to follow certain procedures (like making a finding, reporting, and the like).

The covert action statute is not why programs like the one Sanger discusses cannot be talked about publicly. What prevents public discussion of such programs is classified information rules backed by criminal and administrative sanctions—rules and sanctions, one should note, that were ignored by the people who spoke to Sanger for this story.

The rest of Jack's article takes up each of the possible bases for Presidential cyberaction and shoots all of them down, except one (of which, I was not aware). Here are his points, base by base.

Article II Authority


[If] the attacks lack congressional authorization ..., the case for the President’s inherent Article II authority to order such attacks in this context is weak, even under Executive branch precedents. The argument is weak for many of the same reasons the planned missile attacks in Syria last summer were weak. I laid out my views on that issue here (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/how-administration-lawyers-are-probably-thinking-about-the-constitutionality-of-the-syria-intervention-and-a-note-on-the-domestic-political-dangers-of-intervention/#.Uwx0keNdWSo) and here (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/opinion/what-happened-to-the-rule-of-law.html?_r=0). I will not repeat those points in detail, except to say that even under the Executive branch’s view of Article II, the President must articulate a strong national interest before using force.

And as I said in another post (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/why-doesnt-president-obama-seek-congressional-approval-for-syria/) last summer, it is a stretch to say that the United States has an adequate national interest justification under prior executive branch opinions because


“(1) neither U.S. persons nor property are at stake, and no plausible self-defense rationale exists; (2) the main non-self-defense U.S. interest that the Commander in Chief has invoked since the Korean War to justify unilateral uses of force – upholding the integrity of the U.N. Charter – appears . . . to be disserved rather than served by a military strike in Syria; and (3) a Syria strike would push the legal envelope further even than Kosovo, the outer bound to date of presidential unilateralism, which at least implicated our most important security treaty organization commitments (NATO).”

I would add that the Stuxnet cyberattack in Iran is not much of a precedent for a cyberattack on Assad’s forces because the President’s Article II powers are robust when it comes to self-defense, and the self-defense argument in Iran is colorable but against Assad is not. For this reason, I think the cyberattack in Syria that Sanger describes could not be justified under Article II without exceeding the scope of presidential war power beyond past Executive branch precedents – at least the precedents we know about.

AUMF and Title 50 Statutes


But need the President rely on Article II? Might there be statutory authority? The AUMF cannot help in this context.

Nor, I think, can the President rely on the covert action statute, 50 U.S. Code § 413b (http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Covert-Action-Statute.pdf) for authority to conduct these attacks. There is a rarefied debate about whether and under what circumstances Section 413b provides independent authority for the use of force abroad. It certainly says nothing on its face about independent authority to use force, and my own view is that it could not independently support the significant use of force that Sanger describes.

(If it does provide such support, then Congress has given the President super-broad authority to start wars covertly against nations that do not directly threaten us.) There is also the tricky issue whether the covert action statute would even apply in this context , since the operation might be a “traditional military activity” excluded from the definition of covert action by Section 413b(e) of Title 50.

One might also think that the President could glean the authority for the Syrian cyberattacks from 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a [JMM: Section 403–4a (http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/403-4a), comprising section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, was editorially reclassified as Section 3036 of Title 50 (http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3036)], which includes the CIA’s famous “fifth function.”


(d) Responsibilities
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall—
...
(4) perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the Director of National Intelligence may direct.

I doubt that provision would suffice here on its own terms, but in any event it is at best an authorization to the CIA and Sanger says this operation is [was to be] done by DOD and NSA.

NDAA 2012


But the President need not rely on these statutes. Instead, in planning this attack, his lawyers probably relied heavily on § 954 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ81/pdf/PLAW-112publ81.pdf), which provides:

Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to—

(1) the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and

(2) the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.).

This seems to me the best statutory hook for the planned Syrian cyberattacks, especially since it “affirms” that the President may conduct “offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and Interests.” That is a broad authorization indeed.

A "broad authorization" indeed; and one of which I was blissfully ignorant.

Not to claim complete Pollyannahood, I've always believed that, if the situation required it, the Presidents during my lifetime have acted (or in hypothetical situations would have acted) as though Congress had actually given them this "make believe" authority:


Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations throughout the World to defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to—

(1) the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and

(2) the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.).

Of course to me (as I said repeatedly last summer), Syria is not such a situation - as to which, others differ (and we can fight politically on that point).

Regards

Mike

SWJ Blog
03-04-2014, 10:30 PM
Intervention in Syria and the Myth of the “Exit Strategy” (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/intervention-in-syria-and-the-myth-of-the-%E2%80%9Cexit-strategy%E2%80%9D)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/intervention-in-syria-and-the-myth-of-the-%E2%80%9Cexit-strategy%E2%80%9D) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

CrowBat
03-04-2014, 10:58 PM
To be frank, I'm getting sick and tired of all the talk about the ISIS, JAN and their connection to the AQ, and what and whether the USA should or should not. It's beyond retarded... simply utter stupidity to babble about the JAN as 'enemy there', and about removal of the ISIS from AUMF. Even the JAN is such a tiny group, with no intentions on waging a global war of terror, nor killing anybody who is an 'infidel' in their definition. Contrary to the ISIS, they are fighting on their own turf, and have never attacked any Americans.

So all this babbling about legal positions of one or the other is so insane, and such an offense for the predominant majority of Syrians that are fighting a murderous regime (and every sane person supporting them), I'm simply lacking words.

That's on the same level (i.e. below any level) like half the California going ape about two stupids mentioned here:
Los Angeles ‘gangsters’ claim to be fighting rebels (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Mar-03/249032-los-angeles-gangsters-claim-to-be-fighting-rebels.ashx#axzz2uvIwPsK4).

Hand at heart: except for 'discussing sensations' and all the empty babbling of this kind, or selling the country to Iran, the USA are doing nothing for Syrians (except for getting hysterical about irrelevant topics of this kind and preventing insurgents from getting aid they urgently need), and plenty of people - like certain characters on this forum - are doing their best to keep it that way, no matter the cost (not only for Syrians, but far beyond that too).

So, beg your pardon, but: really, who to hell cares?

But 'OK'... and since there was talk about 'Raqqa': the SOHR reported today that regime forces are pushing out of the 'Base 93' (main camp of the former 93rd Brigade) and out of 'Base 17' (main camp of the former 17th Division), and fighting the ISIS in surrounding areas. The NDF reported to have secured Ayn Isa (a town outside Raqqa) and to be advancing in direction of the other base.

Furthermore, the regime forces should have captured the village of al-Huyajah al-Mai'ya, next to the Dayr az-Zawr AB. Here a photo of Maj Gen (advance in rank recently) Essam Zahr ad-Deen (or Zahreddine), putting up a flag there:
https://twitter.com/TahrirSy/status/440643619335049216/photo/1

So, with ISIS - which has had one and a half year to completely destroy all the activist- and insurgent networks in areas under its control - in tatters, the Iran-sponsored regime is arriving to take over control of these places.

To 'protect Christians', eh...? :rolleyes:

jmm99
03-05-2014, 03:30 AM
Regards

Mike

carl
03-05-2014, 05:29 AM
Mike:

Crowbat has a good point, a very good point. When you strip the matter down to the essence, we can't get anything done. We can talk on forever about many things but we can't seem to actually do anything. This is bad because there are some things that really need doing.

CrowBat
03-05-2014, 07:27 AM
Damn me and my ranting if you have to, and as much as you like. But, with 8 million of Syrians uprooted and forced to flee their homes (surely, all but 2 million that managed to reach Turkey and Jordan are extremely successful at evading attention of international community and media), with most of Homs and Aleppo in ruins and large parts of Idlib and Dera'a ethnically cleansed (do I need say more?), with Americans blissfully ignorant of Syria's importance for the entire Arab world, and with that regime continuing to insist on destroying the slightest trace of resistance, any discussions about 'Jihadists in Syria' are as pointless as if Obama would make a press conference about Superbowl 10 minutes after DC was vapourised by somebody's nukes..

When one takes a look at publications by various US think-tanks and various 'military' forums around the USA, people are cheering - CHEERING - Hezbollah for 'killing Jihadists' in the Qalamoun range and building airports in eastern central Lebanon. And everybody who only can is insisting on ignoring the fact that it's the IRGC's al-Qods - yes, the same al-Qods that turned the (already failed) US efforts in Iraq into a total failure, and which killed thousands of US troops - that's running the show there.

Can that get any more insane?

You know what? Like in Afghanistan of 1990s, the USA and the West are so much excelling at setting all our hair on fire in Syria, I'm almost looking forward for the moment they come to the idea to call for help in extinguishing it. :rolleyes:

jmm99
03-05-2014, 12:24 PM
You and Crowbat believe that the US should be doing something about Syria. I believe that the US should not be. I also believe that, if the US is not going to do something, it should keep its big mouth shut. Lofty USG rhetoric without action, whether re: Ukraine or Syria, does more harm than good - IMO.

Crowbat:


Damn me and my ranting if you have to, and as much as you like.

I don't damn you (the messenger); nor, for that matter, your ranting (your message). In that particular case, I thought your ranting (the message) was largely incoherent.

The following is not incoherent:


But, with 8 million of Syrians uprooted and forced to flee their homes (surely, all but 2 million that managed to reach Turkey and Jordan are extremely successful at evading attention of international community and media), with most of Homs and Aleppo in ruins and large parts of Idlib and Dera'a ethnically cleansed (do I need say more?), with Americans blissfully ignorant of Syria's importance for the entire Arab world, and with that regime continuing to insist on destroying the slightest trace of resistance, any discussions about 'Jihadists in Syria' are as pointless as if Obama would make a press conference about Superbowl 10 minutes after DC was vapourised by somebody's nukes.

but it does miss the point of what I presented.

Starting in the Bush administration and continuing into the Obama administration with more sharpness, a high-level debate has been going on as to what policies should be followed by the USG in the so-called "GWOT". Part of that debate has involved the legal parameters, which of course are set by policy.

One aspect of that debate (running through drones, JSOC direct actions and USG interventions in a number of countries) has been whether the claimed threat is global (where it probably could impact the US) or local (where it probably would not) - In broad terms, a Globally Jihadist AQ vs. "local jihadists"; but also whether the USG should apply 99% "solutions" to what are in fact 1% problems.

You and Carl are humanitarian interventionists. I'm not. Now, I'll just leave so that you can emote or not without outside intervention.

Regards

Mike

carl
03-05-2014, 02:35 PM
Mike:

I can't say I'm not a humanitarian intervenntionist, but only to a certain extent in that I realize that depending upon the time and place, there is only so much you can do. And in some places at some times it is more than that, such as in this case.

If Syria now were just Syrians killing each other, I'd regret it but not do much about it. But I isn't. The way things are shaping up could have very profound effects upon the middle-east, the Arab world and the world. The Iranians and the ISIS have made this about much more than just Syria. For that reason I think we must act. That doesn't mean American regular forces on the ground. There are plenty of Syrians who want to fight. But it does mean money, weapons and training. Those things we can provide. I think the situation warrants a try anyway.

There is a larger point though. We can't seem to get anything done, anywhere. The best illustration of this is our record in Afghanistan. We have known for years that the key to resolving that conflict is the actions of th Pak army/ISI, but we can't seem to bring ourselves to actuaaly do anything about it. We have talk about it a lot, but not done anything. This does not bode well for the future.

CrowBat
03-06-2014, 09:35 AM
Mike,
I do not 'believe', I'm convinced that not only the USA, but the entire West should - urgently - 'do something' about Syria. Even more so, meanwhile I'm convinced that - sooner or later - they'll be FORCED to 'do something' about Syria. For plethora of reasons (let me know if you want to hear at least a few of them).

The situation in Syria is meanwhile the same like that in former Yugoslavia as of, say, 1993-1994. Difference back then was that the Europeans said to the USA, 'let us do it, we can', then they were proven wrong, and the US intervened. In the case of Syria, nobody (except Gulf Arabs) did anything, and we can see where is that leading: Bashar is meanwhile little else but an Iranian marionette, but still more than good in terrorizing and oppressing his population.

Frankly, I'm not the least curious to see anybody getting involved 'in another military intervention'. But, there is 'that situation' in Syria, and you - and whoever else with similar POV - can tell me whatever you like, but surely not that it's in anybody's interest (not even in that of Iranians, and not the least that of Syrians) to see Syria being turned into another (Shi'a style) 'Islamic Republic' of the Iranian kind.

But, that's what's presently going on.

Under the pretext of 'fighting CIA-supported al-Qaida insurgency', the IRGC/Failaq al-Quds-commanded and -controlled forces - colloquially declared for 'SAA', or 'regime forces' - are exercising immense pressure upon insurgents of the IF, SRF and other alliances in Aleppo area. If they get through the Sheik Najjar IC - and they are just a small step away from that - they'll surround the insurgent-held parts of eastern and southern Aleppo, and put them under a siege. How such sieges are usually ending, is - I hope so - well-known to everybody, and what a blow for insurgency this would be needs not be explained.

A similar mix of forces is assaulting the town of Yabroud in the northern part of Qalamoun range too. After suffering heavy losses in fighting for Rima Farms (which are stretching into Yabroud), one of Hezbollah brigades has been withdrawn and replaced by mechanized elements of the Republican Guards Division consisting of IRGC and Iraqi Shi'a (at least 'IRGC/al-Quds commanded Iraqi Shi'a militia). Yabroud is meanwhile surrounded from three sides. If the regime gets through there (not easy, but perfectly within abilities of forces under the command of IRGC/al-Quds Maj Gen Suleimani), the entire Qalamoun pocket is likely to collapse, with tragic results not only for insurgents, but also much of the population in that area.

The cumulative result of two such defeats cannot be properly put into words. Should this happen, the insurgency might collapse all together, being left in control of hard-to-defend parts of Dera'a and Aleppo provinces, and in control of the Idlib province though without the provincial capital.

That's the 'most important news' from the battlefields of Syria, Mike. And NOTHING AT ALL of all of this has anything to do with the ISIS, AQ, or whatever other sorts of nonsense.

Bottom line: the West is blissfully ignorant of the IRGC insistence on ascertaining survival of the Assadist regime, and massively underestimating the Iranian preparedness to invest as much as needed to ascertain that survival. Because of this - and because of all of this empty and out-of-place babbling about AQ, ISIS, and JAN - no comparable aid is provided to insurgents.

Example: I've posted a series (or two) of videos showing the effectiveness of ATGMs recently provided by Saudis to insurgents of the IF, SF and SRF. They have caused heavy losses to the regime. They didn't use them to attack Americans, Israel or whoever else. Period.

Frankly, I doubt the insurgents would have put any type of MANPADS to as effective use. But, their availability would have lessened the tremendous pressure the SyAAF is exercising upon insurgents in Aleppo and Qalamoun. Foremost it would prevent the Syrian fighter-bombers and helicopters from flying low to hit targets with unguided weapons: it would force them to fly high, and deploy PGMs. Means, it would make this war even more expensive for IRGC clique in Tehran.

Correspondingly, denying MANPADS to insurgents (not to talk about denying them so much of other kind of help they could need) is an obvious mistake. It's as simple as that.

And I could extend this list much, much further...

jmm99
03-06-2014, 06:03 PM
No, I don't want to hear your reasons why the Entire West (to include the US) "should - urgently - 'do something' about Syria." If you are convinced that the boys and girls of "Haxbach, Schnurliland" should march off to Syria - and if you have the votes - so be it; off to Syria, you can send them and they will march.

From your statement in your post, you were similarly convinced that the boys and girls of "Haxbach, Schnurliland" should march off to the "former Yugoslavia as of, say, 1993-1994" - and you had the vote of Bill Clinton and his NSC to join your march. At that time, I was (and am still) convinced that the boys and girls of Hancock, Michigan should not march off to the "former Yugoslavia"; but I and every other citizen of the US sent them there once the WH decision was made.

At the present time, I'm convinced that the boys and girls of Hancock, Michigan should not march off to Syria; and it seems for now that enough votes exist to prevent that - although the lessons of unilateral presidential action, taught us by Bill Clinton, should loom large in the eyes of every American citizen. The switch can be flipped by any American president, without him or her being "forced" - and without seeking a vote in Congress (much less from the US people - the political elite rule, we drool - at least in their eyes).

I'm not telling the people of "Haxbach, Schnurliland" what they should or should not do with respect to the "Former Yugosalvia", Syria, Iran, ad infinitum. Hell, I'm just a little retired guy who lives in Hancock, Michigan. Nuff said; and much more than I intended - I probably should have signed off after the first sentence.

Regards

Mike

carl
03-06-2014, 08:36 PM
Mike:

There are few if any advocating US troops in Syria. least of all me. Having a try though can encompass rather a lot more things than that.

jmm99
03-06-2014, 11:11 PM
Not even one JSOC operator - that's both a statement and a question.

Regards

Mike

CrowBat
03-06-2014, 11:48 PM
Mike,
I've got no problem your POV.

It's just so that boys (and girls) from 'Hancock, Michigan', are far more likely (actually: 'between very likely and almost sure') to find themselves on the receiving end of boys from 'Tehran, Iran' - than anybody from 'Haxbach, Schnurliland' (and thanks: the boys from Haxbach marched off to Yugoslavia, and are still there).

If in no other fashion, then one reminiscent of this case:
http://i.imgur.com/oyZAKmI.jpg

But never mind. Please feel free - 'and every other citizen of the US' too - to spend few additional light years with highly scientific and deeply eloquent discussions about iuridical consquences of the ISIS being kicked out from al-Qaida.

The last time I recall similar discussions, it was 'not our business' too.

Such discussions ended on 9/11.

jmm99
03-07-2014, 12:41 AM
Of course, you have a problem with my POV - just as I have a problem with yours - otherwise, you wouldn't have said so in four posts, including the last. In sending messages to me, disingenuity is not needed and simply cheapens the message.

Regards

Mike

carl
03-07-2014, 02:23 AM
Not even one JSOC operator - that's both a statement and a question.

Regards

Mike

Lot of ways I could go with that one. First would be, do you have a need to know? Second would be, smart aleck version, those guys live for things like that, I wouldn't want to frustrate them needlessly. Third, the American Volunteer Group were not members of the US military when they went to China to fight the Japanese, and it was only an accident that we were at war with Japan when they went into action. Fourth, CIA people, who could be anybody, even specops types temporarily detached/attached. Fifth, contractors. Lots of different ways.

But regardless of the way, if you needed any of those you would need many, especially if they were good. But failing all that a lot can be done with money, weapons and training outside the border.

jmm99
03-07-2014, 02:48 AM
Yes, there are lots of subterfuges (deceits used in order to achieve one's goal) - both of us know the ways. We also know that proxies exist, etc.; and that we have ops covert and clandestine, etc. All are covered by Title 10 and/or Title 50 in one way or another; and all are one form of intervention or another - including money, weapons and training outside the borders. We did all of that with El Salvador (with minimal numbers, etc.); and have been doing it in any number of places since 9/11 via direct actions, drone strikes and targeted FID projects.

Anyway, I've spent more time on this collateral Syrian side alley tour than I spent on the Jack Goldsmith and Ashley Deeks IL articles, and checking their sources . So, if you two will excuse me, I'm going to get on to other things that I owe other people in other places.

Regards

Mike

jcustis
03-07-2014, 06:06 AM
Bottom line: the West is blissfully ignorant of the IRGC insistence on ascertaining survival of the Assadist regime, and massively underestimating the Iranian preparedness to invest as much as needed to ascertain that survival. Because of this - and because of all of this empty and out-of-place babbling about AQ, ISIS, and JAN - no comparable aid is provided to insurgents.

The folks who need to know- and make policy from what they know--in the UK, US, and other parts of NATO are fully aware of what is going on with Iran's aspirations in the green crescent. What they choose to do about it may be a different story, but we are informed enough.

CrowBat
03-07-2014, 07:19 AM
Must be some interesting folks, then the ones from whom I get to hear are clueless.

Well, then I'll satisfy myself with hope that this time the info is better than at the times everybody was 'sure', that 'Iranian F-14s are non-operational'...

************

For the others, here an interesting review, The new face of the Syrian rebellion (http://the-arab-chronicle.com/new-face-syrian-rebellion/#).

CrowBat
03-09-2014, 07:07 PM
Well no, I can't feel 'safe' after all.

Just back from quite an interesting meeting... Don't ask me about the 'source' of the following: you can be 1000% sure I'll never talk about it.

The point is this... By side the fact that Putin's reaction to events in the Ukraine resulted in another 'Pearl Harbour' for the US intel community, but sorry, NO: the people J seems to be talking about have got no clue at all about what's going on in Syria. Like Mike above, they're rather preoccuppied with iuridical issues of the ISIS being kicked out of AQ. (and, knowing about 'quality', 'awareness' and POVs of their advisers, I'm not the least surprised). :eek:

Actually, except for bitterly complaining about the NATO being a 'powerless joke', the last few days they were preoccuppied with outright science fiction. Between others, 'somebody there' came up with the idea of hoping that the Israelis would 'solve' the situation in Crimea - with help of their air force, of course, and in cooperation with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan....

I am - and this is dead serious - expecting one of them as next to suggest deployment of the United Stars Ship Enterprise (whether NX-1 or whichever of subsequent variants) to Syria or Ukraine. Hollywood would surely be delighted to provide help.

So, to paraphrase J: 'the folks who need to know - and make policy from what they know...' etc. etc., etc., should actually read 'the folks who need but do not know - and make policy from what they think to know but have no clue about...'

jcustis
03-09-2014, 07:54 PM
That all pretty much speaks to the tail end of my post above.

CrowBat
03-09-2014, 11:16 PM
Here's the 'knowledge' of the people who know':
https://news.yahoo.com/latest-victory-assad-won-war-111500116.html

...Former U.S. ambassador to Syria Robert Ford said as much at a March 1 speech at Tufts University.

“You have one Al Qaeda faction fighting another Al Qaeda faction. That’s how fractured this is. One sharp sliver fighting another sharp sliver. I bring no good news to you tonight about Syria. The Syrian opposition itself has done a miserable job distinguishing itself from the Al Qaeda elements. There are some really bad people in Syria right now, on the opposition side. Can the opposition show that it is willing to reach out and figure out a way security-wise and politics-wise to reunify across that sectarian divide?"
...

Namely, somebody like Ford should know MUCH better than this. But, he simply doesn't (hope, I need not explaining why? It would be at least 4th time I would tell the same story). And he doesn't, because people like him are insistent on insurgents accepting the SNC as some sort of top political leadership (which all of insurgents are stubbornly refusing since nearly two years), and conditions everything on that one factor. I.e. from their standpoint, 'either you're with SNC or you're al-Qaida', which is nonsense par excellence: that's making it clear that it's not only advisers of people like him who are simply clueless and getting involved in producing science fiction, but the policy-makers are actually living in a parallel universe.

To make it more ridiculous: even Francis is BS-itting with his declaration that Assad has 'won' the war. He 'won' yes - but a victory against US diplomacy (considering all of his failures so far, Obama's policy regarding Syria can only be described as an 'unmitigated disaster' - which in turn is 'absolutely no surprise', given all I'm explaining here).

Firstly, Yabroud is surrounded from three sides - not encircled - and still in insurgent hands. Actually, Suleimani had to withdraw one of Hezbollah brigades (due to attrition) and replace it by IRGC-operated elements of the RGD. I doubt he would have done so just for fun...

Secondly, the place that actually fell was az-Zara, a town nearly 100km north of the Qalamoun Range. Unless something happened the last 2-3 hours about which nobody else knows (like insurgents withdrawing from Yabroud), Francis is mixing az-Zara with Yabroud, because it was az-Zara where the regime is now claiming a 'strategic victory' (see the videos below).

Now, az-Zara is close to the Lebanese border, no doubt, but it's simply no Yabroud. Plus, the NDF refused to assault az-Zara even when situation was crystal clear, and this despite all the possible support from artillery and SyAAF (at least they refused to do so without Hezbollah leading the way). Eventually, Suleimani was forced to bring in one of SSNP units to launch the final attack... Of course, once inside, the NDF was fast to bring in journos so they can claim the victory for themselves:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CWB9RFP1cw

To me it rather seems that Francis is eagerly buying the PRBS sold by this multi-star broom, who's babbling about 'strategic victory' (though still related to az-Zara, and not to Yabroud):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvnta_Il7Pc

In total: sorry gents, you simply haven't got the picture.

JMA
03-10-2014, 11:56 AM
In total: sorry gents, you simply haven't got the picture.

Crowbat,

Let me start with this quote:


If a man is offered a fact, which goes against his instincts, he will scrutinize it closely, and unless the evidence is overwhelming, he will refuse to believe it. If, on the other hand, he is offered something, which affords a reason for acting in accordance to his instincts, he will accept it even on the slightest evidence. The origin of myths is explained in this way. – Bertrand Russell

Add to this the requirement to show 'loyalty' - no matter how misguided - to (in this case) the US system through a denial of incompetence.

All this is standard and - please - not to be allowed to distract you from posting the information flow as you are doing.

jcustis
03-10-2014, 02:17 PM
Crowbat,

You're not listening to what I'm saying, or maybe you are and just blowing it off.

We know Iran's aspirations in the crescent. When can pull in the threat stream information pretty easily.

What folks are doing at the level of ambassadors, policy-makers, and anyone who has a stump on which to try to frame the situation are going in a certain direction for a certain reason. Some of it is to manage public opinion. Some of it is to shape policy in other areas. It is rarely consistent, but the agendas are based on specific aims that may support a guess, belief system, what-have-you.

You'll find me commenting here in the past that folks use the AQ boogeyman dynamic way too easily. In Syria, it's probably because the media has gotten much wrong and pushed out the AQIS narrative and the US didn't counter the inaccuracies early on. That is unfortunately commonplace and you'll get no argument from me there.

The AQIS issue is not the IRGC issue, and what we know of the latter is pretty clear. Again, what folks choose to do with that information is always the area of debate, gnashing of teeth, and histories written in a few years.

JMA, I'm surprised you are still stooping so low as to visit the Council to share your immense span of knowledge and commentary with folks here. For a guy so frustrated with "loyalties", you spend an awful lot of time, mental energy, and posts, saying the same stuff over, and over, and over. Have a nice day sir, and a pint of STFU.

davidbfpo
03-10-2014, 03:22 PM
hat tip to War on the Rocks (WOTR) for an article 'What we know about Aleppo - and what we wish we knew' and in effect a RFI or simple help in improving understanding:http://warontherocks.com/2014/03/what-we-know-about-aleppo-and-what-we-wish-we-knew/

The fuller report, with maps:https://www.firstmilegeo.com/case_studies/aleppo

CrowBat
03-12-2014, 01:09 PM
Thx, JMA. See below for more.

And J,
few days back I started writing quite a long reply to your post.

Frankly, sometimes my English is not enough to follow all of what you say, or I understand the context only. But, what I do understand (especially that about 'preoccuppied') sounds strangely similar to something I've heard already back in 2004 or so.

Eventually decided neither to complete nor to post what I started writing. Repeating myself for xth time with explaining at least the 'tip of iceberg' of problems caused by the lack of expertise (and purposed ignorance) in the USA is not only not making any sense to me any more, but distracting from the actual topic too.

Therefore, you'll get only my recommendation to read these two OPEDs:

- In the case of this one - Russia Experts See Thinning Ranks’ Effect on U.S. Policy (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/europe/american-experts-on-russia.html?hp&_r=1) - please replace 'Russia' with 'Syria' to understand what I mean, and

- in the case of this one - The Ukraine crisis: A Middle East perspective (http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/ukraine-crisis-middle-east-persp-20143612561064362.html) - try your luck by connecting dots on your own (especially if you might be able to connect the dots between that report, the one I linked above, and then recent reports about Abdullah sacking Bandar, the SNC/SMC sacking Idriss etc., etc., etc.).

***********

On the battlefields of Syria...

Maj Gen Suleimani's offensive against the northern side of insurgent-held Qalamoun Range (running parallel to the central part of Lebanese-Syrian border) is reaching its culmination. His forces have encircled the town of Yabroud from three sides, have secured most of Rima Farms and the Industrial Zone on the NE side of Yabroud, and are shelling the place to smitherness. Yabroud is under near constant artillery- and MLRS-barrage, and insurgent sources have counted five air strikes by SyAAF fighter bombers and ten by SyAAF helicopters two days ago.

There appear to be no new videos of insurgents deploying (Saudi supplied) ATGMs to knock out regime MBTs since a few days, which is probably indicating that the fighting is now joined at close quarters.

What is interesting in this battle is the - meanwhile 'characteristical' - composition of regime forces. There should be one Hezbollah brigade still involved (about 1,500-2,000 combatants; the other was withdrawn about a week ago, apparently due to exhaustion and losses); one armoured or mechanized brigade of the 8th 'Najaf' Armoured Division IRGC (driving T-72AVs and T-72 TURMS-T MBTs, and BMP-2s of the RGD), probably reinforced by one of Iraqi Shi'a militia brigades; then there should be three 'task forces' of the regime's NDF (each about battalion in size, each consisting of one armoured or mechanized company from the 4th AD, plus a company or two each from the former 3rd, 7th, and 10th Divisions); the 155th Artillery Brigade (equipped with BM-21s, Failaq-2 and similar MLRS'); plus one of four SSNP brigades (predominantly Christian 'Syrian Socialist National Party', with ideology similar to that of German Nazis from the 1930s-1940s). That's about 10,000-12,000 'regime combatants' in total.

They're facing about 2,000 insurgents (my assessment) that are still inside Yabroud, primarily consisting of groups alledging alliance with the FSyA, and the IF: the JAN has had its local 'Emir' injured in fighting, two days ago, and seems to be withdrawing from (what is left of) the town.

JMA
03-12-2014, 08:00 PM
JMA, I'm surprised you are still stooping so low as to visit the Council to share your immense span of knowledge and commentary with folks here. For a guy so frustrated with "loyalties", you spend an awful lot of time, mental energy, and posts, saying the same stuff over, and over, and over. Have a nice day sir, and a pint of STFU.

You are such a nice man.

JMA
03-13-2014, 07:24 AM
Controlled by Iran, the deadly militia recruiting Iraq's men to die in Syria (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/12/iraq-battle-dead-valley-peace-syria)

CrowBat
03-14-2014, 09:38 AM
^^Interesting to see that The Guardian (i.e. one of its editors) found there is a 'story' in reporting about Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

I do not understand though: why are they claiming them something like 'the' Iran proxy sent to fight in Syria?

After all, the Iranians (that is: al-Qods/IRGC) are operating a bunch of Iraqi Shi'a assets in Syria, including Kata'ib Sayyid ash-Shuhada, Liwa al-Youm al-Mawud (successor to Moqtada as-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi), Failaq al-Badr, Liwa Ammar Ibn Yassir, Liwa al-Imam al-Hassan al-Mujtaba... etc., etc., etc.,... and the LAFA (Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade), and most of them are better financed (i.e. 'sponsored with more money from Tehran') than the Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

Furthermore, I am yet to hear from anybody there that the Asaib Ahl al-Haq is sending its troops to fight for the LAFA; the latter something like discredited itself already during its early presence in Syria, because of lack of discipline (including 'too much presence on the internet'), quarels and several cases of opening fire at other Iraqi Shi'a and even IRGC units deployed in Syria. That was the reason why it was kicked out of Sayida Zainab Shrine and split into two parts: the 'original' LAFA is ever since protecting Damascus IAP, while a newly created, 'moderate' part of the LAFA is now operatinal as the Liwa al-Zulfiqar and is responsible for the defence of the Sayida Zainab Shrine.

************

Anyway, the Hezbollah (the 'original' from Lebanon) was in the process of assaulting the 1st defence line of insurgents in Yabroud, two days ago - when snow fell and stopped all the fighting.

So, instead of more photos like this one, showing the Hezbollah taking away one of 76 JAN combatants they claimed to have captured while assaulting that 1st line of defence:
http://www.acig.info/forum/download/file.php?id=9165

...and more videos like this one (from al-Manar TV), showing Hezbollah infantry fighting somewhere in outskirts of Yabroud:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BFcBcoyjyY0

...we're now getting to see photos like this one, showing Hezbollah artillery pieces (hell, the regime obviously lacks troops to man even these!) covered by snow:
http://www.acig.info/forum/download/file.php?id=9163

JMA
03-14-2014, 02:27 PM
Crowbat,

What do we know about this guy?

In Syria, rebel with a cause (http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-in-syria-a-rebel-with-a-cause/2014/03/13/ccaaec8e-aaeb-11e3-adbc-888c8010c799_story.html)

CrowBat
03-15-2014, 12:15 AM
I would describe him as a 'typical protege of Prince Bandar': a Syrian businessman, first and foremost, with good, business-style links to Saudis. Same style like Bashar Zoubi, the leader of the (Saudi Supported) Southern Front which is recently so successful in the Dera'a Province.

Both are classy examples of the genuine Syrian revolution: business- and money-oriented, not related to old ideologies (or religion), opposing the regime and desinterested in extremists of all sorts, but also all the possible politicians in diaspora (they grew up without any connections to all of these sorts, so why should they care about them?).

It's ironic that as such they found support from 'conservative' al-Sauds, and ended in clinch with (supposedly) 'progressive' Qatar (major financier of the ISIS and the JAN), but also the Brotherhood (and thus with Turkey and the USA). Even more so because the Saudis were - until Obama once again came in between (obviously following advice from his ah-so-clever Princeton-graduates) - organizing support for their groups in a very clever fashion: buying weapons from Croatia, ammo and spares for which are available from Croatia only too. (For those in rearmost rows, this means: should anything of that stuff end in wrong hands - like those of the ISIS or JAN - it can't be reloaded or replaced, and has got an expiry date...)

Anyway, since even the JAN (not only the ISIS) has both of them on its 'to do list', we should hope neither might fall to one of so many assassination attempts (like the one that recently nearly killed Col al-Assad, the originator of the FSyA).

More importantly (and since it's sure that - all provided they get enough money - Maarouf and Zoabi can make it), we should hope that Obama - and all of his Virginia rabbits - might stay preoccupied with the Ukraine issue for a while longer, and thus mix into Saudi deals with Maarouf and Zoubi in least imaginable fashion.

I know, sigh, chances are slim. But, if you don't mind an example: it's simply stupid - plain dumb, nothing less - to deny them the MANPADs and another load of ATGMs, just because they've got groups within their alliances that used to cooperate with the JAN. Nearly all of Syrian insurgent groups did so (many still do), more or less, for longer or shorter periods of time, and usually because the Syrians are Syrians, and because 'welcoming a guest' - including the most retarded Saudi Wahhabist one can imagine, the sort of which is actually despised by any decent Syrian Salafist (including founders of the JAN), not to talk about all the other Syrians - is an elementary part of being a Syrian.

So the only problem can be somebody in Amman - i.e. from DC, and with 'strong influence in Riyad' - thinking that because two out of some 70 different 'brigades' from Zoabi's Southern Front used to 'cooperate more closely' with the JAN than the others did, 'he' (people like Maarouf and Zoabi) isn't trustworthy enough...

(Even more so because the simple truth is that had anybody from Amman - i.e. DC & Riyad - paid the Syrians on time [for example back in summer 2012], nobody would ever come to the idea to cooperate with the JAN [or ISIS], and even the JAN would've probably never come to the idea to declare itself 'AQ'.)

CrowBat
03-15-2014, 08:39 AM
Seems that defences in Yabroud all but collapsed the last night.

Contrary to earlier reports, the JAN didn't withdraw, but others began withdrawing in direction of Rankus, so that the JAN was the last to fight inside the town. Latest reports (from around the midnight) indicated that the Hezbollah has reached the local Catholic Church, Police Station and the National Hospital, and is working itself through several underground tunnel systems.

There should be numerous groups of insurgents and civilians withdrawing via Rankus, Ras M'arah and Hawsh 'Arab in direction of Arsal in Lebanon. All of these places are already under artillery fire and there are reports about mines and ambushes. This is going to be ugglier than the withdrawal from Qusayr...

Insurgents (the few that are in a position to do so) are bitterly complaining about the lack of action from the SNC/SMC: while the Hezbollah and the IRGC were able to rotate their units in and out of battle, they were fighting for 30+ days without a break - and since the start of this battle they didn't receive a single bullet, not even a message of support from their supposed 'leaders'. Pro-regime side is yubilant of course, like if they won this one, not the Hezbollah and Iranians, and Hezbollah is already considering what to do about Arsal...

JMA
03-15-2014, 09:47 AM
... until Obama once again came in between (obviously following advice from his ah-so-clever Princeton-graduates)

I have raised this issue before of 'inspired amateurs' making grown-up decisions at a massive cost to the recipient country concerned in terms of blood and whatever treasure they may have had. There are no consequences for this incompetence.

Don't know about Princeton but Susan Rice from Stanford at 30 was in a position - in the Clinton administration - to contribute (through sheer incompetence) to the deaths of 800,000 people in the Rwandan genocide. No consequences... she is now the US National Security Advisor.

Now this same bunch of clowns are directing US policy in Afghanistan, Syria and the Ukraine.

Crowbat, you can't make this s**t up.

JMA
03-15-2014, 09:59 AM
Seems that defences in Yabroud all but collapsed the last night.

Your figures were 10,000-12,000 against 2,000 so not surprising.

An aside, if I were Israel I would be getting concerned about the combat experience Hezbollah is picking up in Syria as this will be used against them in due course.

CrowBat
03-16-2014, 01:17 AM
I have raised this issue before of 'inspired amateurs' making grown-up decisions at a massive cost to the recipient country concerned in terms of blood and whatever treasure they may have had. There are no consequences for this incompetence.

Don't know about Princeton but Susan Rice from Stanford at 30 was in a position - in the Clinton administration - to contribute (through sheer incompetence) to the deaths of 800,000 people in the Rwandan genocide. No consequences... she is now the US National Security Advisor.You're too kind to Rice. Really. Nobody can be that incompetent.

Besides, at those times she was a noob, nobody in comparison with any of figures I mentioned here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=151861#post151861). Of course, I have no doubts that she did earn herself a handsome retirement from Scowcroft Group, Kissinger Associates or Roger Winter, some nice day - just like all of such conglomerates, think-tanks and other sorts of 'consulting and investment companies' have earned (and are still earning) from imposing RPF/RPA rule over all of Rwanda and Congo.

That's also why they're presently involved in running a combined PMC/SOCOM op against the rest of the FDLR in the Kivus, instead of doing something that would really make sense to such laymen like you or me - like destroying the M23 or hanging Kagame at the nearest lantern.

Ah, the niceties of geo-politics....

**********

But back to Syria...

My concerns about safety of people like Ma'arouf and Zoubi were 'right on the money'. Four days ago, Ahmad Meshe'el, one of Ma'arouf's top commanders (really a skillfull military tactician), was hijacked (either by ISIS or - more likely - by the JAN).

Sigh... today they've found his body... RIP.

This happened just about when the local ex-FSyA, ex-IF etc. insurgents began openly declaring themselves the SRF in delight over recent victories against the ISIS. What's worse: I know of no serious replacement in sight...

But, I was wrong with Yabroud: insurgents there are still holding out.

That is, the Hezzies have faked a major attack from the West, yesterday evening, but then attacked from the East, breaching defences there and reaching the centre of the town. When the insurgents turned to counterattack, the Hezzies swept in from West and North 'too'...

(This is like reading IDF reports about their battles against Hezzies, from back in the 1990s.)

The following is not confirmed, but it appears the insurgents have managed to re-establish something like a new frontline and are still holding out in the west and south of Yabroud. Supposedly this is where the frontlines are as of today (hope, the link's gonna function):
http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=33.962049&lon=36.648846&z=16&m=b&gz=0;366352415;339535770;253841;169161;194619;1292 98;185391;101536;227020;92993;245902;112747;272081 ;125917;256417;169516;192902;128407;184533;100467; 92909;47787;183248;71903;179597;92281;177667;95306 ;90335;49210;208997;81871;120592;130634;44631;4947 8;0;18510;15878;0;97416;46631;223159;68701;208139; 79379;208139;83649;223159;66921&search=Yabroud

CrowBat
03-16-2014, 01:31 AM
An aside, if I were Israel I would be getting concerned about the combat experience Hezbollah is picking up in Syria as this will be used against them in due course.
I'm actually surprised they (Israel) are as quiet.

They opened fire at two Hezzies that approached the cease-fire line in Qunaitra area but...there is an entire Quds Force/IRGC battlefield management system, including plenty of top Quds Force/Hezbollah commanders and a mass of hardware, running around Yabroud - all of that well inside the range of stand-off-PGMs in service on IASF's F-15s and F-16s (even if these would be circling over the Med Sea, i.e. outside the Lebanese airspace, although most of the time their pilots can't care less about 'sovereignty' of something called Lebanon) - and outside the air defence umbrella around Damascus... yet, the Israelis didn't attack even once.

Makes me wonder: how much longer do they want to wait - or do they seriously think the Hezzies and the IRGC are going to return all the T-72s, heavy artillery and MLRS of the RGD to Bashar...?

Bashar might consider himself happy if the IRGC keeps him as its marionette in Damascus for a while longer: makes me think there will be not many 'better opportunities in the future'.

CrowBat
03-16-2014, 11:28 AM
It's official now: Yabroud fell early this morning, Hezbollah is mopping up the town, and even the NDF is now entering it (as always, 'to secure'):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pm2GltbuK0g

Of course, the Lebanese and now even regime media is abuzz with news of this 'glorious victory', and regime fan-boys are so happy there was no door-to-door fighting, because - so they think - this means the insurgents are cowards.

Actually, when one is left without ammo, there's no point in continuing the fight.

Anyway, the SyAAF is bombing the entire area between Yabroud and Lebanese border, this morning. They even flew several air strikes on Arsal - which is an insurgent stronghold inside Lebanon.

Guess that Obama & CO are congratulating each other now: the place fell because it had a significant JAN presence, and thus couldn't be trusted to receive any kind of support. This 'threat' (for whom?) has now been 'removed'. It doesn't matter if this removal was organized, run and completed by two organizations quite high on the FBI's list of terrorist organizations... :rolleyes:

**********

Back to the SRF...a very good documentary about them taking over whatever the ISIS used to hold in Idlib and Aleppo provinces can be seen here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sSiUWPAdSWw

davidbfpo
03-16-2014, 12:08 PM
Interesting end to the video, as the SRF leave to possibly fight for a Christian village, beyond which lies a regime-held village, their leader makes a clear statement on the place of Christians amongst them. Tolerance, respect and justice.

I wonder how the Jihadist PR machine will cope with such videos.

Yes, the proof of his words will come another day.

JMA
03-16-2014, 02:01 PM
Crowbat,

The sad thing is that the US really does have competent people (and plenty of them) but their democracy - the one they keep trying to force on the world - is failing. They get the Presidents and Congress they elect and the quality is pitiful.

What we are witnessing is the last kicks of a dying 'horse' only this horse ain't kicking only making a lot of noise.

Putin has called Obama's bluff and we will see.



You're too kind to Rice. Really. Nobody can be that incompetent.

Besides, at those times she was a noob, nobody in comparison with any of figures I mentioned here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=151861#post151861). Of course, I have no doubts that she did earn herself a handsome retirement from Scowcroft Group, Kissinger Associates or Roger Winter, some nice day - just like all of such conglomerates, think-tanks and other sorts of 'consulting and investment companies' have earned (and are still earning) from imposing RPF/RPA rule over all of Rwanda and Congo.

That's also why they're presently involved in running a combined PMC/SOCOM op against the rest of the FDLR in the Kivus, instead of doing something that would really make sense to such laymen like you or me - like destroying the M23 or hanging Kagame at the nearest lantern.

Ah, the niceties of geo-politics....

JMA
03-16-2014, 02:12 PM
Yes remarkable restraint.

Sooner or later the Hez Brigade will offer a concentrated target Israel will not be able to ignore.



I'm actually surprised they (Israel) are as quiet.

They opened fire at two Hezzies that approached the cease-fire line in Qunaitra area but...there is an entire Quds Force/IRGC battlefield management system, including plenty of top Quds Force/Hezbollah commanders and a mass of hardware, running around Yabroud - all of that well inside the range of stand-off-PGMs in service on IASF's F-15s and F-16s (even if these would be circling over the Med Sea, i.e. outside the Lebanese airspace, although most of the time their pilots can't care less about 'sovereignty' of something called Lebanon) - and outside the air defence umbrella around Damascus... yet, the Israelis didn't attack even once.

Makes me wonder: how much longer do they want to wait - or do they seriously think the Hezzies and the IRGC are going to return all the T-72s, heavy artillery and MLRS of the RGD to Bashar...?

Bashar might consider himself happy if the IRGC keeps him as its marionette in Damascus for a while longer: makes me think there will be not many 'better opportunities in the future'.

JMA
03-16-2014, 02:14 PM
...
Anyway, the SyAAF is bombing the entire area between Yabroud and Lebanese border, this morning. They even flew several air strikes on Arsal - which is an insurgent stronghold inside Lebanon.

And Lebanon just rolls over on this breach of their territorial integrity?

CrowBat
03-17-2014, 09:28 AM
Interesting end to the video, as the SRF leave to possibly fight for a Christian village, beyond which lies a regime-held village, their leader makes a clear statement on the place of Christians amongst them. Tolerance, respect and justice.

I wonder how the Jihadist PR machine will cope with such videos.They can't cope with this; that's why the ISIS eventually left.

But anyway, yes, that's the way even Syrian Salafists I happen to know see their future, not only 'moderate Sunnis' (and is also the reason why I say that it's dumb to consider them for 'Islamist extremists', or describe this war as one between AQ and a laicist regime).


Crowbat,

The sad thing is that the US really does have competent people (and plenty of them)...No doubt. But, they are too few and not influential enough (partially because they are considered 'not politically correct').

That aside, keep in mind that 'power corrupts' - already anyone who only thinks about starting to exercise power.

***********

After the fall of Yabroud, Suleimani appears to have rotated his forces (again): Hezbollah and the IRGC/RGD are either withdrawn or given rest, while the NDF - primarily elements of the former 3rd and 11th Armoured Divisions, plus the 156th Missile Brigade - and the SyAAF are sent into pursuit.

There are more reports about the SyAAF bombign Arsal, though also about negotiations related to locals refusing to accept the influx of additional Syrian insurgents and the JAN. Seems they're affraid of even more attacks by the SyAAF - and then also by the Hezbollah. Though, if I'm to ask, the Hezbollah might attack Arsal only if they became keen to launch a new civil war in Lebanon.

CrowBat
03-19-2014, 11:48 AM
For whatever it still matters (considering recent developments in regards of USA-Saudi Arabia-Moslem Brotherhood-Hamas-Qatar-Iran relations), here a very interesting story on The Northern Storm Brigade: It’s History, Current Status, and Why It Matters (http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/northern-storm-brigade-history-current-status-matters-chris-looney/).

If anybody wonders why:

...In many ways, the story of the NSB parallels the story of the revolution. Originally formed to combat the regime, internal funding interests impeded the group from actively coordinating with others, hurting the cohesiveness of the rebellion. The influx of foreign fighters and extremists would later weaken the NSB to the point where it ceased to be a factor on the ground. In the wake of the uprisings against ISIS, it now sees the opportunity to reestablish itself. But the road ahead will not be easy, and in a large part depends on securing foreign support.
...

JMA
03-19-2014, 04:50 PM
Israel bombs Syrian posts over Golan attack on its troops (http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/us-israel-syria-idUSBREA2I06320140319)

Syria claims one dead and a handful wounded... interested in what the target was or the true casualty figures.

AdamG
03-20-2014, 05:29 PM
BEIRUT (AP) — Syrian troops captured a famous Crusades-era citadel Thursday near the border with Lebanon after days of intense clashes against opposition fighters, the latest victory by government forces in the border area, state media and officials said.

Lebanese private broadcaster Al-Mayadeen TV aired live footage of Syrian troops raising the national flag on the towering hilltop perch of the Crac des Chevaliers. The structure appeared intact and cracks of celebratory gunfire could be heard as troops moved around the sprawling area.

"Our efforts, those of the Syrian Arab Army and the National Defense Forces, were crowned today by raising the Syrian flag on the Crac des Chevaliers," an unnamed Syrian army colonel told Al-Mayadeen.

Syrian state television said troops "wiped out terrorists who were entrenched in the castle." Syrian authorities refer to opposition fighters as terrorists.

http://news.yahoo.com/syrian-troops-capture-crusades-era-citadel-133037581.html?__fssrc=1

davidbfpo
03-22-2014, 12:33 PM
The map is produced using information from the Syria Needs Analysis Project (SNAP) as well as other geographical information from humanitarian groups and Google maps. SNAP uses a wide variety of sources, including humanitarian organisations, the Syrian government, opposition groups, the media and key informants.

Mapping territorial possession is made more difficult by the tactics employed by the various rebel groups. They operate as highly mobile guerrilla forces, and when threatened by government troops will not defend territory but rather tactically withdraw with the aim of preventing losses.

http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/news/special/panels/14/mar/syria_control/img/graphic_1394727729.gif

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22798391

JMA
03-23-2014, 04:49 PM
Erdogan Says Turkey Shot Down Syrian Warplane Near Border (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-23/erdogan-says-turkey-f-16s-shot-down-syrian-warplane-near-border.html)


“A Syrian plane violated our airspace,” Erdogan said during an election rally in Kocaeli province, east of Istanbul. “Turkish F-16s took off and shot it down.”

davidbfpo
03-24-2014, 09:13 PM
An interesting backgrounder:
Hezbollah’s open intervention in its neighbour’s civil war has from the outset posed many questions and provoked not a little anxiety. What exactly are Hezbollah’s aims in Syria? In light of the reprisals that have been conducted by its Syrian foes and their sympathizers in areas sympathetic to the group or under its control, doesn’t it have more to lose than to gain? Finally, and in particular, does Hezbollah risk losing its popular base and its pre-eminence on the national level in Lebanon?

Link:http://www.lobelog.com/hezbollah-winning-in-syria-at-what-price/

There is an odd passage - my emphasis, perhaps an exaggeration:
..the first units were members of local self-defense forces that formed spontaneously in the increasingly conflicted zone along the border. Having never been precisely demarcated, the border between northeast Lebanon and Syria constitutes a large area that is home to some 30 villages actually inhabited by Lebanese — mainly Shiite — citizens, all of whom, however, are subject to Syrian sovereignty. Given their sectarian character, these villages were targeted early on by Sunni jihadi groups linked to the opposition.

JMA
03-26-2014, 02:11 PM
In Syria, the United States is learning the lessons of inaction (http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-gerson-in-syria-the-united-states-is-learning-the-lessons-of-inaction/2014/03/24/fb688f8c-b387-11e3-8cb6-284052554d74_story.html)

He ends thus:


There are limits to U.S. power, which must be factored into policy choices. But a predisposition to passivity has costs — to U.S. interests, to nervous friends and allies and to the victims of ongoing atrocities. And these should be factored in as well.

CrowBat
03-26-2014, 07:13 PM
An interesting backgrounder:

Link:http://www.lobelog.com/hezbollah-winning-in-syria-at-what-price/

There is an odd passage - my emphasis, perhaps an exaggeration:
The area is actually nicely demarcated already since the times of the French Mandate, 1920-1946. The French used to be very pedantic over such issues, so this rather sounds like first Hezbollah claims over specific parts of Syria.

The rest depends on what does he mean with 'early on'?

First Hezbollah units (few videos of them in action appeared on YouTube, back then) became involved in fighting insurgents already in early 2012, shortly after Zabadani (former HQ of the II Corps Syrian Army) became the first city in Syria liberated from Bashar's regime.

Strictly speaking, 'Civil War' as such was only some 6 months old at that time.

Problem is that around that time the JAN was still only in the process of being organized, and that this process was run inside southern suburbs of Damascus, about 40km away from the given area. And: that was 'only' some eight months before the ISIS entered Syria... which makes one wonder: what kind of 'Sunni jihadi groups' have they seen there...?

***********

BTW, the SyAAF jet fighter shot down by Turks two days ago was a MiG-23. Sub-variant remains unclear. The pilot, Thabet Abdo Ismail, ejected safely. He said that he was seven kilometres inside Syria when shot down: certainly enough, a Turkish TV team that filmed his downing from about 1km away was about 2km inside Turkey...

Anyway, 'air power enthusiasts' might find it interesting that this was already the second kill scored by the THK F-16s using AIM-9X Sidewinders (first was the Syrian Mi-17, shot down last year) - and the first AIM-9X-kill against a fighter jet, ever.

The area over which this MiG was shot down is a scene of an excellently prepared, high-profile, PR-operation launched by units from the Islamic Front and the JAN, with the aim of distracting the regime (and especially Maj Gen Suleimani) from ops in Qalamoun area, but also from the insurgent offensive that has overrun parts of NW Aleppo and pushed NDF forces out of the Sheikh Najjar Industrial City, NE of Aleppo, in turn putting the regime garrison of ACP under siege again. More importantly, this operation reportedly caused another quarrel between Bashar and Suleimani: for fourth time in less than one year, Suleimani was kind of 'overruled' by Bashar and had to stop one of his offensives in order to protect politically important targets. Reason: Bashar - or better said: his Alawi brethren - is seemingly finding it 'unacceptable' to lose any parts of Lattakiya Province. Could cost him the rest of their support.

Given he's meanwhile little else but an Iranian puppet, his countermanding of Suleimani's orders might soon cost him his head too (at least I hope so).

Back to Kasab: after the capture of Kasab border crossing, two days ago, this offensive into Lattakiya culminated with insurgents - supported by IF-operated T-55s - assaulting the nearby Hill 44 (with an important 'observation post') and reaching the sea. Yesterday, after receiving reinforcements that arrived all the way from Damascus and with strong support from the SyAAF (seems, they do dare flying over Kasab again; guess, the SyAAF moved one of its SA-17 sites into the zone), the NDF launched an all-out counterattack and supposedly overrun the insurgents. Combined reported casualties are meanwhile reaching about 600.

Suleimani is presently busy sorting out the mess created by the NDF and SSNP during their attacks into Moarek: this town is some 25km north of Hama, on the road to Ma'arat an-Numan, and some 10km south of Khan Sheikhoun. The latter town is held by the insurgents, but under siege by regime forces, which in turn are under siege by by insurgents... (typical Syrian story, I know), and it seems that Suleimani would like to either box the regime forces out of encirclement, or reinforce them and assault Khan Sheikhoun. But, because of Bashar's insistence on moving reinforcements to Lattakiya, and because of the lack of fuel... well, he could only deploy a part of forces necessary for this task (plus, he didn't manage to finish the insurgents in southern part of the Qalamoun range, where the 104th Brigade RGD is assaulting Rankus since 4 weeks, but didn't gain an inch of ground yet).

The NDF and SSNP are investing Moarek since about 25 days, and have lost a similar number of MBTs and IFVs, plus about 200 KIA/WIA in the process. Suleimani apparently dispatched his combined IRGC/Hezbollahi (Iraqi Shi'a) unit operating T-72s and BMP-2s of the former 105th Brigade RGD there.

Will be an interestin' battle...

davidbfpo
03-27-2014, 12:05 AM
A short article in LRB by Prof. Peter Neumann, of Kings ICSR. It starts with:
Three years ago, it was hard to find anything significant about Syria in books about al-Qaida. Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower, which many consider the definitive history of al-Qaida, contains only five references, while Fawaz Gerges’s The Rise and Fall of al-Qaida mentions Syria just once, as the home of Osama bin Laden’s mother. Today, by contrast, Syria is widely – and correctly – seen as the cradle of a resurgent al-Qaida: a magnet for jihadist recruits, which offers the networks, skills and motivation needed to produce a new generation of terrorists. How did this happen? And why did it happen so quickly.

For Bashar al-Assad, the blame lies with outsiders – especially Turkey and the Gulf monarchies – who have used their money and influence to sponsor the uprising, arm the rebels and supply foreign recruits. This is certainly the case, but it’s only part of the story. In the years that preceded the uprising, Assad and his intelligence services took the view that jihad could be nurtured and manipulated to serve the Syrian government’s aims. It was then that foreign jihadists first entered the country and helped to build the structures and supply lines that are now being used to fight the government. To that extent Assad is fighting an enemy he helped to create.

Link:http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n07/peter-neumann/suspects-into-collaborators

CrowBat
03-27-2014, 09:14 PM
To that extent Assad is fighting an enemy he helped to create.
Halleluja. Blessed be Neumann.

Can't believe that somebody is finally stating this in the public.

*************

Reports from battlefields in Syria were 'funny' today. Well, kind of: I guess they were not the least funny for involved commanders, primarily not those on the regime side. IMHO, if Suleimani's hair wouldn't already be grey, it would've get that colour today.

Since two days YouTube is buzzing with videos showing spoils of insurgent offensive into NW and NE parts of the city (plus effects of another Saudi-supplied batch of ATGMs), such like these:

- 1 MBT ko in Sheikh Najjar IC (the NDF was forced to withdraw from this place):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HDsLkKcC4cA

- 2 MBTs and a BMP captured in Aziza:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3MdJJhy3uo
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3MdJJhy3uo

- Another T-55 captured:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aIwrQSolYF4

If this goes on like this, and provided he might get enough fuel for such a manoeuvre, Suleimani might want to rush his IRGC/Hezbollahi force all the way north again. I'm surprised the NDF is doing that well in losing all that the Iranians gained for it in November and December: at earlier times, the Syrian Arab Army was kind of renowed for its staunch and relatively skillfull defence of well-fortified positions...

Now they can't do even that properly, and this despite training and leadership by the IRGC. Perhaps all the losses the NDF suffered so far are 'biting' after all...?

***********

Lattakiya
Pro-regime sources are all in delirium. Despite mass panic that broke out in Lattakiya (City) ever since the insurgent BM-21 attack on the local NDF HQ (which marked the start of the insurgent offensive on Kasab, and - apparently - killed two of Bashar's cousins including one of leading Shabihas), they are full of claims for hundreds of 'terrorists' killed in counterattacks on the latter town. Correspondingly, Kasab is under heavy artillery bombardment since yesterday. Reportedly, the regime is attempting to prevent insurgents from digging in; others say it is already in the process of 'softening' their positions before going in. SyAAF should be involved too, but there are no reports about specific sorties: just that there is 'relentless bombardment' of the place.

For their part, the insurgents are claiming to still be on advance: they should have captured Jabal Tshalma (highest point around Kasab), and Qasal Ma'af (supposedly killing 120 and capturing 25 regime troops in the process).

The regime meanwhile confirmed that it has lost 50 KIA in fighting there so far, SOHR puts the casualties at around '100 fighters on each side'.

***********

Hama
Still no breakthrough for Suleimani in Moarek, only videos documenting additional regime's armour losses, including 2 here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s_jEzksMQ8

...1 here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nPE_TXOJR50

...plus 1 here (could be the same like one from a video showing four regime's T-55s knocked out two days ago):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZNPTPEpdrsI

Videos taken in Khan Sheikhoun area, some 20 clicks further north, indicate the insurgents are in the process of breaking the regime's siege of that place. They have definitely overrun at least a battery of M54 guns (130mm) and captured several MBTs, including at least one T-72:
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=117_1395865808

***********

Qalamoun
Regime is reporting the death of CO Qalamoun Military Council and that of the CO Liwa Saif al-Haq (IF), in Rankus. It's hard to gauge, but it seems this was some sort of 'special forces operation' launched by either the Hezbollah or (more likely) the IRGC, few days ago (probably around 22 March) with the aim of crushing insurgent resistance in this area.

Otherwise, the NDF has re-launched its attempts to capture the village of Falita, one of two last Syrian villages short of the Lebanese border. But, contrary to what was expected just a week ago, and despite all the delirious announcements by regime supporters, 'they' still didn't manage to push the withdrawing insurgents back to the Lebanese border...

Meanwhile, the insurgents in Rankus area are learning to drive T-72M1s...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Gx7ciEvvzU

...and T-72AVs captured from the 104th Brigade RGD...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MSi17FtVdj8

***********

Dera'a
After the fall of the so-called 'Silo Barrier', two days ago...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JXrWkusgnVM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ye8nVzoXX2k

...it's a kind of 'roll over' there. See these two videos showing some 10 BMPs and 2 MBTs captured by insurgents:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xer5pPiUDQ0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUFv3TTjjdE

Outside that city, it's very much the same:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2fexIUZYqDI

Gauging by the last known size of the regime's garrison in Dera'a (from about 2-3 months ago) - which was about 30 MBTs and BMP-1s in total, plus about 1,500 combatants - this means something like that the mechanized component of the force in question has been annihilated.

***********

Overall, the media is full of news from Kasab, while entirely ignoring events elsewhere. Unsurprisingly, various talking heads are therefore concluding that the regime is about to win this war. :rolleyes:

In reality, my 'best guess', if you like, is that the situation is imposing a dilemma on Suleimani (and Bashar): let the NDF troops in Khan Sheikhoun get overrun or invest (and suffer even more) into a break-through at Moarek? Ignore all of this (accepting significant losses) and let Bashar cheer for achieving nothing in northern Lattakiya... or go and save Aleppo (again)? And how to finish off insurgents in Qalamoun, not to talk about what to do about Dera'a?

We'll see what the coming days (if not weeks) are going to bring. But, somehow, I doubt he's got enough troops and fuel for all of this. And doing it one by one is going to take months.

JMA
03-27-2014, 09:30 PM
We'll see what the coming days (if not weeks) are going to bring. But, somehow, I doubt he's got enough troops and fuel for all of this. And doing it one by one is going to take months.

So right now an effective strike on Suleimani's HQ - taking him out - could tip the balance, yes?

CrowBat
03-28-2014, 07:18 AM
Hard to say.

On one side, he's not the only highly-experienced IRGC general in Syria. Maj Gen Hamadani (former C-in-C Basiji Corps) is in charge of the NDF, and Brig Gen (possibly advanced to Maj Gen, recently) Jamali (former CO Kerman Security Council with extensive experience in fighting against Afghan and Pakistani drug dealers and asymmetric warfare), is in charge of the entire Syrian intelligence network (including the National Security Bureau, the Air Force Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Directorate/Department of Military Intelligence, General Intelligence Directorate and Political Security Directorate, which in turn are operating their own militias too).

Suleimani is actually under the command of Vahid Haganian, who is a link between Khamenei and the top of the IRGC (and thus the Failaq al-Quds/Quds Force): means, Suleimani has to do what Vahid tells him Khamenei said he should do (in systems of this kind, this is making Vahid more powerful than either, Suleimani or Khamenei).

So, 'technically', I doubt his loss would make that big difference. Nobody, no matter in what function or where, is 'irreplacable'.

But sure, Suleimani is in charge of the Quds force since 16 years and now has more than a year of experience from commanding the battlefield in Syria (and he, and his officers have really changed a lot, and are often making the difference). Except Bashar keeps on insisting on playing a biiiig general and continues countermanding Suleimani's orders through private calls to specific commanders in field Suleimani is generally accepted by Syrians (according to sources within regime forces, they have received the order that he is 'the second most important man in Syria and they should listen to every single of his orders, to the last dot and comma, no discussion, period'). Finally, no matter how important he might be in Tehran, he is simply _the_ power figure for plenty of people in the Middle East (especially so in Iraq, where everybody - including Maliki - is shuddering when Suleimani's name is mentioned).

Finally, it's certain that the insurgents would remove him, if they only could find him. They are meanwhile excelling at sniping, IEDing - even BM-21-ing - regime commanders (mind the BM-21 attack on NDF HQ in Lattakiya City, few days ago, in which two of Bashar's cousins were killed, two injured etc., or the sniping of Brig Gen Ahmed Mansour in Aleppo, yesterday).

I'm rather surprised the Israelis didn't target him yet, then they not only have the reasons and the means to find and track him: he should be their priority No.1 there (except it's in their interest for Suleimani to keep on resupplying Hezbollah and Palestinians in West Gaza with weapons 'made in Syria').

CrowBat
03-28-2014, 09:20 AM
...another indication of the IRGC's pride for its work in Syria:
'Syrian NDF modeled on Basij' - IRGC (http://www.uskowioniran.com/2014/03/irgc-reveals-syrian-ndf-modeled-on-basij.html) (be patient: it's an Iranian website that might take time to download)

...Armed Forces General Staff HQ Deputy IRGC Maj. Gen. Gholam Ali Rashid gave a speech in Dezful this week to war veterans on the commemorative occasion of Operation Undeniable Victory (March 1982), delivering a candid talk on a range of important issues. The first part of this brief post will discuss his comments on Iran's involvement in the Syrian conflict. Farther down, other issues brought up by Rashid will be addressed, including nuclear negotiations and regional foreign affairs.

In his speech, Maj. Gen. Gholam Ali Rashid stated that Syria's National Defense Front (NDF) has been modeled after Iran's Basij militia, confirming American intelligence assessments as far back as 2013. Rashid even went so far as to state NDF inception as an IRGC-QF recommendation that was accepted by Syria's leadership.

The NDF is organized similar to the Basij as a light infantry force, comprised of part-time volunteer reservists. The more secular complexion of NDF might at first glance appear as something of a deviation from Iran's Basij. However, reflected in the inclusive spirit of Iran's Tribal Basij in enlisting diverse Iranian elements. the Syrian NDF is predominantly drawn from Alawites, Christians, Druzes and Armenians. Interestingly enough, like the Iranian Basij during the Iran-Iraq War in relation to their Artesh counterparts, the NDF is considered more motivated and loyal than the attrition-depleted and replacement-filled rank and file of SAA.

The Syrian conflict has provided the IRGC with a lengthy, sustained period of tactical battlefield observation and experience not seen since the days of the Iran-Iraq and First Lebanon wars. In publicity photos from the recent Basij "Towards Jerusalem" exercises, a higher level of training is to be interpreted, particularly for the Tehran formation. Moreover, Iranian military thinkers must be reckoning their biggest land war threat is not an American GF invasion on a scale of or larger than OIF. Rather, the land war threat is more similar to examples found in Syria, Libya and Iraq (occupied and post OIF), where Basij-like rapid reaction formations would for Iran potentially play a critical role (as they are now in Syria).

It has to be said the Syrian conflict has provided a current generation of Iranian military tacticians with adaptive lessons learned, particularly on offense, to be applied toward doctrine and training for their own IRGC and Basij forces. Evidence of such taking form in Syria at a command level is reflected in their application of armor/infantry tactics for the urban battlefield, SF night operations, heliborne operations, UAV missions, force rotation management, logistics and more.

Maj. Gen. Rashid persisted with the official Iran position that there are no IRGC combat formations fighting in Syria, but that there are IRGC-QF advisors assisting Syrian military forces.
...

JMA
03-28-2014, 12:00 PM
You answered the question as you went along... got to kill the snake with a blow to its head.



Hard to say.

On one side, he's not the only highly-experienced IRGC general in Syria. Maj Gen Hamadani (former C-in-C Basiji Corps) is in charge of the NDF, and Brig Gen (possibly advanced to Maj Gen, recently) Jamali (former CO Kerman Security Council with extensive experience in fighting against Afghan and Pakistani drug dealers and asymmetric warfare), is in charge of the entire Syrian intelligence network (including the National Security Bureau, the Air Force Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Directorate/Department of Military Intelligence, General Intelligence Directorate and Political Security Directorate, which in turn are operating their own militias too).

Suleimani is actually under the command of Vahid Haganian, who is a link between Khamenei and the top of the IRGC (and thus the Failaq al-Quds/Quds Force): means, Suleimani has to do what Vahid tells him Khamenei said he should do (in systems of this kind, this is making Vahid more powerful than either, Suleimani or Khamenei).

So, 'technically', I doubt his loss would make that big difference. Nobody, no matter in what function or where, is 'irreplacable'.

But sure, Suleimani is in charge of the Quds force since 16 years and now has more than a year of experience from commanding the battlefield in Syria (and he, and his officers have really changed a lot, and are often making the difference). Except Bashar keeps on insisting on playing a biiiig general and continues countermanding Suleimani's orders through private calls to specific commanders in field Suleimani is generally accepted by Syrians (according to sources within regime forces, they have received the order that he is 'the second most important man in Syria and they should listen to every single of his orders, to the last dot and comma, no discussion, period'). Finally, no matter how important he might be in Tehran, he is simply _the_ power figure for plenty of people in the Middle East (especially so in Iraq, where everybody - including Maliki - is shuddering when Suleimani's name is mentioned).

Finally, it's certain that the insurgents would remove him, if they only could find him. They are meanwhile excelling at sniping, IEDing - even BM-21-ing - regime commanders (mind the BM-21 attack on NDF HQ in Lattakiya City, few days ago, in which two of Bashar's cousins were killed, two injured etc., or the sniping of Brig Gen Ahmed Mansour in Aleppo, yesterday).

I'm rather surprised the Israelis didn't target him yet, then they not only have the reasons and the means to find and track him: he should be their priority No.1 there (except it's in their interest for Suleimani to keep on resupplying Hezbollah and Palestinians in West Gaza with weapons 'made in Syria').

Firn
03-28-2014, 12:17 PM
Interesting and mostly scary stuff, CrowBat. Thanks for the updates.

CrowBat
03-28-2014, 02:26 PM
Ah sorry: I think I understood your question only now.

All involved sides have commanders of the opposite side as priority No.1 on their targeting lists. But, the death of the same is not always changing situation on the battlefield. Or at best, it does, but only temporarily. Overall, it's changing next to nothing.

For example: instructed by the IRGC-QF, the regime launched this campaign very early during protesting, back in 2011, aiming to kill leading activists. It sniped, arrested, detained, tortured and murdered thousands of them - with no effect. They were always rapidly replaced by - usually - more skilled, more cautios too, people.

The insurgents hit back with a similar campaign, which reached its peak in July 2012 with the bombing of that HQ in Damascus, killing several of Bashar's top commanders. But, these were replaced by junior officers, and then by Iranians.

When the ISIS began spreading in Syria, it went after insurgent commanders and did its best to execute dozens of these, in turn throwing much of the insurgency into chaos, and bringing it on the verge of collapse. What happened: new, much more skilled commanders appeared, better supported from abroad (especially by Saudis), and more capable of re-uniting the insurgents.

Except for killing thousands of civilians (whether by targeting apartment buildings or bakeries), the SyAAF is running a campaign of targeting insurgent HQs at latest since summer 2012. At earlier times they were primarily deploying Mi-25s and L-39s for this purpose. For example, they have hit the same insurgent HQ in SE Aleppo four times within two days, killing a number of COs. Without effect, as can be seen.

Since October last year, the SyAAF is deploying MiG-23MFs armed with Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry) and MiG-29s armed with Kh-29s (AS-14 Kedge) to target insurgent HQs in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces. One of MiG-23s has hit the HQ of the Liwa al-Tawhid in N Aleppo, back in December, killing the CO and most of the command cadre (a MiG-29 did something similar in Dayr az-Zawr, practically 'killing' a major onslaught on remaining regime positions in that city, and buying the regime plenty of time to recover, in return). As a consquence, Liwa al-Tawhid lost much of its integrity, and then influence too. But, overall, this didn't disturb the recover of insurgency in this part of Syria: they forced the ISIS out, and are now back in force in that city.

I guess that it shouldn't be too hard for the IASF to track down and kill Suleimani. It has already killed one of his deputies during bombardment of RGD bases in NW Damascus, back in February 2013. But, this changed absolutely nothing (or if, then it reinforced Suleimani's resolve).

Indeed, let's expand this 'Israeli example' even further: the Israelis are liquidating all the possible Arab leaders and military commanders already since something like 50 years (at least since they attempted to assassinate Field Marshal Amer, by downing the Ilyushin Il-14 that was to return him to Cairo from a visit to Damascus, on the evening of 28 October 1958). They were trying to kill Arafat for 30 years (some say they've eventually got him with a dose of Polonium), and they are violating every single cease-fire with Hamas by attacks on its leaders until this very day.

And they were never successful with this 'tactics'. It's rather amazing how insistent are Israelis at reinforcing an obvious failure: indeed, so amazing, that I really wonder why didn't they hit Suleimani long ago.

But overall, all of this is why I say that it's 'hard to gauge'. No matter how many and what commanders in Syria are killed, this war is a stalemate already since one year.

davidbfpo
03-29-2014, 12:27 AM
Cited in part only:
Indeed, let's expand this 'Israeli example' even further: the Israelis are liquidating all the possible Arab leaders and military commanders already since something like 50 years .....And they were never successful with this 'tactics'. It's rather amazing how insistent are Israelis at reinforcing an obvious failure....

I cannot readily see if you commented when the 'The Gatekeepers' documentary was being debated here, but IIRC six Shin Beth Directors argued that the leadership removal approach was not helping Israeli security. The last comments on the Israeli COIN thread refer:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4661

JMA
03-29-2014, 09:00 AM
Cited in part only:

I cannot readily see if you commented when the 'The Gatekeepers' documentary was being debated here, but IIRC six Shin Beth Directors argued that the leadership removal approach was not helping Israeli security. The last comments on the Israeli COIN thread refer:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4661

Didn't see 'The Gatekeepers' but perhaps we are merging targeted assassinations/killings of terrorists in their home environments with the tactical targeting of military commanders in the field.

With the former the problem was always the colateral damage - meaning his family, neighbours and other civilians in the area at the time. The Israelis have improved greatly in reducing the collateral damage - not because the Arabs are concerned (they have no concern about collateral damage when they dish it out) but rather Europeans and North Americans who wring their hands endlessly.

On the other hand taking-out an operational field command post with commander and staff and all communications equipment can achieve more tactically than the killing of hundreds of 'grunts'. There should be no collateral damage in this regard - unless they start to use human shields (which they will if they know a missile has their name on it).

Suleimani is an experienced field commander and should be taken out. Of course he will be replaced... but by junior less experienced commander. If you keep playing this game eventually the command competence level will drop to a level which will give the insurgents a fair chance in combat.

CrowBat
03-29-2014, 09:02 AM
Haven't seen it before. And, well, Shin Beth bosses can complain as much as they like: all the governments since Ben Gurion are ordering such attacks, no matter how ineffective - or directly counterproductive - they turn to be (in total). That said, it's ironic that one of few failures in such attacks - the interception of that Il-14 in October 1956 - proved far more useful for Israelis than a success. The plane was shot down by an Israeli Meteor jet, but Amr was not on board. As should be well-known, Amr subsequently lost nerves, resulting in Egyptian military defeat of 1956. Nasser kept him in his position, but this only resulted in Amr turning the professional Egyptian military into such a quagmire during the early 1960s, that the catastrophic defeat of 1967 was simply unavoidable.

So, I guess, sometimes 'doing less' might be a better idea. Still, my conclusion is that there is no chance that this might be the reason for the Israelis not attempting to hit Suleimani. There must be a reason they do not consider that their problem - or they simply consider his activity in Syria as in their interest.

That said, this morning the insurgents are claiming to have ambushed the convoy carrying one of top regime generals ('Head of Military Security') in Idlib province, Ahmad al-Awad, and assassinated him. He was apparently travelling along the road from Ariha to Lattakiya. Three of his bodyguards were killed too.

This is probably thruth, but there is still no reason to expect the regime positions in Idlib to collapse now.

*************

Meanwhile it seems all the imaginable al-Qaida-linked idiots of the JAN are rushing to Lattakiya province to earn themselves laurels. The Long War Journal (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/03/chechen_al_qaeda_com.php#comments#ixzz2xGsGoOjy) is reporting the presence of Muslim ash-Shishani (Chechen Jihadist that defected with his Jund ash-Sham group from the ISIS to join the JAN), Abu Tarab ash-Shishani, etc., etc., etc., and 'Dr.' Abdullah Muhammad al-Muhysini, Saudi cleric linked to AQ. At least they were to be seen on a video showing them cheering the capture of Hill 45, uploaded on YouTube on 26 March.

(Roggio is wrong though, in regards of declaring Chechens for 'some of the fiercest units in the Syrian Civil War', or explaining they re 'routinely in the forefront of the fighitng': nearly all of their 'operations' took place in the wake of insurgent attacks, and were 'limited' to actions like destroying local churches, slaughtering civilians; even their involvement in several attacks on the ACP always occurred as 'follow-up' attacks of other insurgent groups etc. In this case, they couldn't resist cheering the IF's success on Hill 45 as their own, before demolishing the Armenian church in Kasab, and slaughtering few captured regime troops - than 'fighting'.)

Of course, the internet is buzzing with accusations that Turkey is harbouring and supporting Jihadists - as if it would be impossible for the JAN to reach Lattakiya from Idlib. Erdo's islamisation of Turkey by side, but it really makes me wonder how comes nobody saw or reported all the IF's T-55s passing through the Hatay Province, for example, if Turkey would really be 'supporting al-Qaida'...?

Furthermore, somebody there - it's unclear whether insurgents or the regime (i.e. the IRGC-QF) - should have deployed a unit of about 100 Azeri combatants, two of whom - namaed Ibrahim Sumgayitle and Seyfullah - have been killed so far.

Overall, I don't find this a 'bad' development. Surely, the population of Kasab area - primarily consisting of Armenians - was forced to flee their homes, whether out of fear from Jihadists or fighting as such (no surprise there: there is still plenty of panic in all of Lattakiya). But, I can imagine much worse things than the JAN and the Alawites now slugging it out and killing each other in what is actually a 'high profile side-show'. Tragic is only that the regime is unlikely to hit animals like ash-Shishani or al-Muhysini: they're simply never targeting them.

davidbfpo
03-29-2014, 03:29 PM
Professor Scott Lucas, of Enduring America, an avid watcher of the region, has a short podcast on the latest offensive:http://eaworldview.com/2014/03/syria-video-analysis-game-changing-insurgent-offensive-latakia/

davidbfpo
03-29-2014, 03:34 PM
Crowbat,

I am intrigued by this passage/ question:
but it really makes me wonder how comes nobody saw or reported all the IF's T-55s passing through the Hatay Province...

Did such armour have to move via Hatay Province?

https://www.google.co.uk/maps/vt/data=VLHX1wd2Cgu8wR6jwyh-km8JBWAkEzU4,NiUYdBiyHjRFhfZAthFSRGkh523stuXp1WaEA sWxTepm-9JVOKHMQzFnKa60krkwX0y4ro7xjKsZ28XsAl7RLYVVnVE8tYH VDephxoZPrM2jezxAKRtCJ4XMiNGbIGtnt9ALv-ealjmsG0rssBUBFpenBbPkThvAjJBWBQWTlFGj6zx_ien2lfAy Pstm7ybgrcN_gJMv

CrowBat
03-30-2014, 08:59 AM
That was sarcasm, David (I'm often - and happily - sarcastic).

If you check the map, the answer is obviously negative. The IF is holding places like Bayt Ablak and Dura - in northern Lattakiya and just 7km from Hill 45 - already since 2 years. Even from Salma (which they are also holding since 2 years) they had only to travel for 20km to Hill 45 (and 30 to Kasab).

There is a nice, paved road in between, which was simply not controlled by the regime, and which the insurgents used to by-pass Hill 45 (as if that would be a problem, considering the terrain and forests in that area) to reach Kasab first, and then they attacked Hill 45 from the rear. Some call this 'tactics'.

Of course, for all the possible experts for sports and cooking, this is not making any sense, because 'military was in control' and 'knows everything'. Foremost, 'military is not making any mistakes', while 'Erdo is supporting al-Qaida'. Actually, it's perfectly clear the Alawis and Armenians there fell for the same dumb idea like French generals in 1940 (back then it was 'tanks can't pass the Ardennes', in this case it was, 'they are never going to come that way, and if, we're going to see them on time').

On the contrary, if the attack came from Turkey, as all the pro-regime sources (and plenty of Turks too) cannot emphasise enough, the IF would have to make a huge de-tour, drive its tanks first in direction of Idlib (north) over much more problematic roads, many of which are controlled by the regime - just to reach Turkey. Turkey would then have to let these tanks in, then hide them from all the journos roaming southern Hatay, and then let them attack Kasab from the north - and all the regime stupids on Hill 45 haven't seen or reported anything of this?

That's making absolutely no sense.

Or if: whoever is buying this, I'd have two Ferraries to sell. Price is 'a life-time opportunity', believe me. :p

Firn
03-30-2014, 01:28 PM
I think it is good to have those four maps in one post to have them at one glance. Especially when one discusses complex topics, like the ones raised frequently by CrowBat.



http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/news/special/panels/14/mar/syria_control/img/graphic_1394727729.gif



http://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/main/images/Syria_ethnic-map_3.jpg



http://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/main/images/Syria_Monograph_Pop_Density_v2.jpg



http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0f/Syria_Topography.png

CrowBat
03-30-2014, 09:50 PM
Talking about maps, here another one (see attachment), showing the entire combat zone in northern Lattakiya, including the road I mentioned above - from 'ad-Durra', via 'Nab'al-Murr' to the border crossing and Kasab itself.

See what kind of serpentines going up and down can be found there (typical for most of roads in this part of Syria, and all the way some 200km further south): now imagine the insurgents having to move their T-55s all the way back in direction of Idlib in order to find a way into Turkey... While, bypassing the 'Tower 45' (Hill 45) by night was no big deal.

BTW No.1, as can be seen from that map, the IF (which was already at Qasal Ma'af before the first NDF counterattack) is still fighting for Hill 45, despite tremendous volumes of artillery and air strikes: guess all the heroes of the JAN concluded the place much too hot after all.

Tragically for the locals, Samra is still in JAN hands: all the regime claims about its recovery were premature. And the AQ-linked idiots will be delivering loads of PR-material for the regime if they lose that place.

BTW No.2: the 'Free Syrian Army' is nowhere to be seen in this part of Syria. But (Moslem) Brothers of the 'SMC Light' are 'welcoming' the JAN and IF move towards the coast now... :rolleyes:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mfp8jz1bxyQ

davidbfpo
03-30-2014, 10:44 PM
On Twitter this evening there was a suggestion the latest rebel offensive into Latakia region, an Alawite stronghold, was to prevent any emergence of a new state - hence the Israeli label. Sorry left Twitter and will try to retrieve it tomorrow.

davidbfpo
04-01-2014, 01:52 PM
Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is in Israel and via FP's Situation Report refers to the NYT article, his own words:
an outreach to other partners who may not have been willing to be partners in the past..What I mean is the Gulf states in particular, who heretofore may not have been as open-minded to the potential for cooperation with Israel, in any way.

Then others said, with my emphasis:
While General Dempsey did not go into specifics, other American military officials said that possibilities include intelligence-sharing, joint counterterrorism exercises and perhaps looking for how Israeli and Saudi troops could jointly work on the training of Syrian opposition fighters

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/world/middleeast/converging-interests-may-lead-to-cooperation-between-israel-and-gulf-states.html?ref=world&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report&utm_campaign=SITREP%20APRIL%201%202014&_r=0

Clearly someone has not thought this idea through, particularly how our shared enemies would respond. Let alone IMHO the reaction within both countries.

CrowBat
04-02-2014, 10:05 PM
Erm... imagining military cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia is one pair of shoes. Nothing new, then certain people see Israelis doing anything and everywhere 'for the sake of the USA'. :rolleyes:

Blackmailing Abdullah into firing Prince Bandar with help of the 9/11 report is another pair of shoes. But at least a fair one.

But then pushing further and blackmailing Abdullah into military cooperation with Israel too... and then making that public in this fashion...

Sounds like a vabanque game to me.

There are simply limits in how far even - or especially - a person in his position can go. Especially because there are no 'shared' enemies there (or if, then only those shared between the USA and Saudi Arabia).

CrowBat
04-03-2014, 07:00 PM
The SyAAF's head-hunt is going on, and to (my) surprise, it hit the Jihadists most of all - at least in the last 24 hours.

- Muslim ash-Shishani (the 'Red Beard', ex-ISIS, lately Emir of the al-Muhajireen wa' al-Ansar Brigade JAN, top Chechen CO in Syria), should have been injured in northern Lattakiya Province, yesterday, and there are reports he's dead.

- Muhannad ash-Shishani (Deputy Emir of al-Muhajiren wa' al-Ansar Brigade JAN), KIA - supposedly in Aleppo (might be during the fighting for the disused SA-2 site in Ta'ana, SE of Sheikh Najjar IC).

- Ibrahim Ibn Shakaran (Moroccan in command of the Harakat Sham al-Islam Brigade JAN, ex-Guantanamo inmate), KIA in Lattakiya.

One of IF/Ahrar ash-Sham's brigade COs was KIA too: Abu Muhammed al-Maghribi, was KIA in al-Anfal.

Otherwise, it is confirmed that the NDF has captured the Hill 45, yesterday in late afternoon. They're now overlooking all the other peaks in the Kasab area.

SWJ Blog
04-05-2014, 08:32 AM
The Syrian Conflict and its Impact on Hezbollah’s Authority (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-syrian-conflict-and-its-impact-on-hezbollah%E2%80%99s-authority)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-syrian-conflict-and-its-impact-on-hezbollah%E2%80%99s-authority) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

CrowBat
04-05-2014, 03:32 PM
After securing the Hill 45, the NDF was celebrating too much, then the insurgents claimed to have launched a counterattack and recaptured the place (see reports like this one). Furthermore, the insurgents should be on advance in direction of ruins of ancient city of Ugarit. CO of the IF, Zahran Aloush, is kind of 'promising' further advances (as can be read here).

Seems that something serious has happened there, then there are reports about 'delays' in hand-out of regime's CWs. That might mean that Moscow/Tehran/Damascus are using regime's CWs as a sort of 'deterrent' for the case of further insurgent advance into Lattakiya. Certainly, even Assad is stressing that the 'Battle in Lattakiya' is 'existential', and is hinting about possible use of CWs there (as can be read here, in Arabic).

The SyAAF is still targeting insurgent HQs in this area, and there are claims it killed three additional insurgent and/or Jihadist COs, including:

- Abu Muhajer, aka Ana al-Helwa (CO Ahrar ash-Sham)
- Ibrahim Ibn Shakran (CO Harakat Sham al-Islam)
- Abu Safiya al-Masry (XO Harakat Sham al-Islam)
- another, unknown JAN CO

Except for local units, the NDF now has elements of the former 11th AD and the Desert Falcons Special Forces Regiment in this part of Lattakiya Province. These have apparently fired six rockets into Turkey too: the Turkish military hit back with artillery, yesterday.

With other words, this battle in northern Lattakiya has now all the predispositions to turn from a 'flashy side-show' into a 'decisive battle of attrition'.

***********

In other 'news': the SyAAF MiG-25s are now confirmed to have spent several R-40RD/RT MRAAMs. Some reports indicate northern Hama Province, but exact area and reasons are actually unclear. What is known is that during the first 'engagement' (whether of air-to-air or air-to-ground type, that's unclear), about a week ago, one MiG-25 fired four, another then fired two R-40s. IN latest 'engagement', one MiG-25 fired two R-40s, one of which detonated about 5,000m above the ground, while the other hit the ground but failed to detonate (hope, the image attached below is going to function).

http://www.acig.info/forum/download/file.php?id=9229

Surely, it's possible that they're trying to use them in something like 'air-to-ground mode', but I have my doubts about this. Alternative targets are possible L-39s and/or Mi-8s operated by the IF.

CrowBat
04-07-2014, 04:00 PM
Most of news from the last two days are almost exclusively related to regime claims for success in fighting the JAN.

The regime should have encircled the Aleppo Thermal Powerplant east of that city (as-Sufayra). The place is said to be still held by the ISIS, though I suspect the units in question actually defected to the JAN, meanwhile. The local units should be led by two top Jihadists, Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani and Abu Maria al-Ansari, who are said to have been 'trapped' there.

Al-Jawlani, who is from the Golan Heights (Syrians are pronouncing 'Golan' as 'Jawlan') and should have served with the AQ/ISIL in Iraq, is also suspected of being a co-founder of the JAN, and crucial for its subsequent expansion. Some claim him to be de-factor 'leader of the JAN'.

**************

In Kasab area of northern Lattakiya Province, the regime is claiming to have killed the CO of the Liwa al-Khattab Brigade JAN, Abdul Mu'ta ad-Darwish.

**************

In Homs, the NDF 'ambushed' a big group of the Homs Military Council in Joorat ash-Shayyah area, killing the CO of the Katiba Shuhada al-Homs Brigade, Abdul Qadir al-Homsi, 4 battalion commanders and up to 50 others. Apparently, they deployed a car bomb that hit the insurgents while these were preparing to attack the local police station.

**************

Twitter reports indicate a fierce battle for as-Sarka village, on the northern side of Rankous. Supposedly, the regime should have collapsed the first line of insurgent defences there. The insurgents claim to have repelled all attacks and caused losses to the 104th Brigade RGD and Hezbollah units deployed there.

**************

The regime is claiming to have 'liquidated' the JAN emir of Damascus - Abu Hazifa al-Ansari - too. Apparently, this happened in the course of battles for Mleha, where regime claimed to have killed '80 militants, mostly from al-Qaida's al-Nusra Front'.

*************

And the 'why R-40 discussion' is going on, for example here: The SyAAF in decay; R-40s used as AGMs in a desperate attempt to relieve fighter-bombers? (http://spioenkop.blogspot.co.at/2014/04/the-syaaf-in-decay-r-40s-used-as-agms.html)

Frankly, I have my doubts about this really being the case (i.e. that the SyAAF is now trying to shoot ground targets with R-40s fired from MiG-25s).

Theoretically, one might get the R-40RT (IR-homing export variant) to acquire some hot source on the ground, but trying to aim with help of the Smerch 2A radar (as installed on SyAAF MiG-25PD/PDS-exports) would be pointless. That radar has a 'limited depressed' capability when the plane is underway at medium altitudes, and nothing like 'ground mapping mode'. With other words, it wouldn't show anything on the screen.

And the IRST system installed on MiG-25s is said to be such a crap that it couldn't do more but detect an Il-76 underway at 30,000ft in clear weather, from max range of about 15-16km.

But the R-40RTs need support from one of these two systems to be fired.

With other words: the idea of MiG-25s shooting R-40s at ground targets is simply making no sense. It's never going to work and Syrians know that, plus they don't have the fuel (and MiG-25s are extremely thirsty) for such 'games', while my assessment is also the SyAAF is not in such a bad situation as for such measures to become necessary.

AdamG
04-08-2014, 01:32 PM
Terrorists who shuttle back and forth to fight in Syria may pose the next big threat to the West, according to U.S., European and Russian intelligence officials.

Intelligence professionals tell NBC News that Islamic militants act almost like vacationers as they travel back and forth to the world’s most active conflict zone, where they are being trained to conduct attacks both inside and outside the war-torn country.

http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/fears-grow-over-vacationing-terrorists-who-freely-enter-exit-syria-n72371

CrowBat
04-11-2014, 07:18 AM
According to similar sources...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Om3WP_Ncjac

...in Syria, there are:
- 115,000 insurgents organized into 1,500 different groups (why care about 'umbrella' organizations? it's more favourable to present the insurgency as '1,500 different groups'...:rolleyes: )
- 7,500 of these are foreigners, from 74 different countries
- 70 of foreigners are US citizens
- (more than) 1,000 of these 7,500 foreigners are from the West.

Overall, less than 10% of combatants fighting on 'non-regime' side are 'foreign Jihadists'. Hardly any of them are involved in fighting the regime (on the contrary, the ISIS attacked Abu Kamal yesterday morning, causing heavy losses to local insurgents, and then went on to slaughter 7 captured insurgents and 21 civilian activists and supporters of insurgency; man, they ought to be more effective than the Air Force Intelligence...), but well, they're a 'more pressing issue' there, obviously.

Correspondingly, this much of 'US arms and aid' is provided to insurgents:
Syrian Rebels Find Support, and Frustration, in Jordan (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/11/world/middleeast/syria.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0)

...When rebels want to return to Syria to fight, Jordan’s intelligence services give them specific times to cross its border. When the rebels need weapons, they make their request at an “operations room” in Amman staffed by agents from Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United States.

During more than three years of civil war in Syria, this desert nation has come to the world’s attention largely because it has struggled to shelter hundreds of thousands of refugees. But, quietly, Jordan has also provided a staging ground for rebels and their foreign backers on Syria’s southern front. In the joint Arab-American operations room in Amman, the capital, for example, rebels say they have collected salaries as an incentive not to join better-funded extremist groups.

But this covert aid has been so limited, reflecting the Obama administration’s reluctance to get drawn into another Middle Eastern conflict, that rebels say they have come to doubt that the United States still shares their goal of toppling President Bashar al-Assad.

In fact, many rebels say they believe that the Obama administration is giving just enough to keep the rebel cause alive, but not enough to actually help it win, as part of a dark strategy aimed at prolonging the war. They say that in some cases their backers even push them to avoid attacking strategic targets, part of what they see as that effort to keep the conflict burning.

“The aid that comes in now is only enough to keep us alive, and it covers only the lowest level of needs,” said Brig. Gen. Asaad al-Zoabi, a Syrian fighter pilot who defected and now works in the operations room.
...

Considering nobody there gives a damn about finding people like Austin Tice (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/14/austin-tice-missing-syria-one-year_n_3754906.html), while at the same time there are certain retired Generals who are 'loudly thinking' about supplying stored B-52s to Israel too, I most sincerely hope that nobody got his tie dirty...

JMA
04-12-2014, 11:28 AM
Despite the Brits convincing themselves they had no dog in the fight it appears the law of inintended consequences has crept up and bitten them on the ass:

Syria is now the biggest threat to Britain's security (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10758623/Syria-is-now-the-biggest-threat-to-Britains-security.html)

This could be behind a pay wall for regular visitors, so here is an alternative:

British Syria-radicalized jihadists biggest threat to UK national security (http://rt.com/news/returning-british-syria-fighters-804/)

Once again the non-interventionists at all costs have miscalculated. Don't expect a mea culpa though.

Dayuhan
04-12-2014, 12:02 PM
Is there any reason to think that British intervention in Syria would have avoided or reduced that threat?

JMA
04-12-2014, 12:56 PM
Is there any reason to think that British intervention in Syria would have avoided or reduced that threat?

I dunno... what you think?

davidbfpo
04-12-2014, 02:25 PM
Intervention in Syria three years ago was the subject of a debate here, IIRC it was before Bashir Assad's regime launched such a harsh response street protests were replaced by a popular rebellion across a large swathe of Syria. Then again it became an issue after the gas attacks in Damascus.

I assume here that intervention means coercion.

I have not looked back at my post, but external Western overt military action was very unlikely to be enough to crack the Assad regime - such as disabling his air force. Nor have covert military options, notably supplying ATGM & SAM, enabled the opposition to defeat the regime, although as Crowbat repeatedly points out it has reduced the regime's capabilities.

Yes 'red lines' have been drawn, for apparently little effect, except as satisfying the politicians and diplomats need to show "we've done what we can".

Syria is now into its third year of a bitter civil war. A war that has no clear future and could drag on for a very long time - such is the bitterness on all sides.

Back to the UK angle. This week the UK stated refugee aid to Syria would reach US$900m. Hopefully this will have a far greater impact for those refugees than the small number (maybe hundreds) of UK nationals / residents fighting there - although as Crowbat recently pointed out real fighting is not their major role.

If the UK had joined in an early military intervention or after the gas attacks I do wonder if there would have been a domestic consensus supporting such a role. One of the questions for those who support intervention is not only what was the objective and the exit strategy, but when "our boys" are in the middle under fire what do we do then?

Dayuhan
04-12-2014, 02:33 PM
I dunno... what you think?

I think Western involvement in Syria's civil war, directly or by proxy, would be seen as another self-interested attempt by the Western infidel to influence or control Muslim lands. I think that perception would accelerate and increase the recruitment and deployment of foreign fighters and create an increased incentive for direct attacks on Western homelands. In short, I think it would exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the threat of terror attacks against the intervening party or parties.

JMA
04-12-2014, 03:55 PM
Syria Rebels, Government Report Poison Gas Attack (http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/syria-death-toll-rebel-infighting-rises-68-23289105)


Syrian government media and rebel forces said Saturday that poison gas had been used in a central village, injuring scores of people, while blaming each other for the attack.

CrowBat
04-14-2014, 09:56 PM
I think Western involvement in Syria's civil war, directly or by proxy, would be seen as another self-interested attempt by the Western infidel to influence or control Muslim lands. I think that perception would accelerate and increase the recruitment and deployment of foreign fighters and create an increased incentive for direct attacks on Western homelands...Yup, exactly like in Libya, right?

Ah no: 'even more so in Syria', because 'Syria was always a nation of crazy terrorists' - or so we've been taught in the last 60 years...?

Always the same old song... :rolleyes:

***********

Edit: there are actually several reports from different places about deployments of CWs. For example, from Harasta and Kfar Zita (Rif Dimashq) too.

These videos should be showing some of attacks in question:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O6Ucs2nfmb0

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i9x_6tCqQL4´

...and if, then it was surely not 'rebels'.

JMA
04-15-2014, 07:28 AM
Don't read too much into this as the military - a good military - will always prepare contingency plans so as not to be caught off balance by the wild swings in policy of the political class.

Canada prepared for possible military mission in Syria, defence documents show (http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/04/14/canada-prepared-for-possible-military-mission-in-syria-defence-documents-show/)

JMA
04-15-2014, 07:41 AM
Yup, exactly like in Libya, right?

Ah no: 'even more so in Syria', because 'Syria was always a nation of crazy terrorists' - or so we've been taught in the last 60 years...?

Always the same old song... :rolleyes:

Yes, quite delusional.

The CIA - and thereby the US - is up to its elbows in blood in Syria. Sadly the 'involvement' of the US has once again been misguided and misdirected... also once again at a massive human cost to the very people the US is supposed to be protecting.

It doesn't matter how professional your military and intelligence community is when you have a rank amateur in the WH surrounded incompetent cronies this sort of cock-up happens with certainty.

JMA
04-15-2014, 07:43 AM
Syria Rebels, Government Report Poison Gas Attack (http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/syria-death-toll-rebel-infighting-rises-68-23289105)

What happended to this? Did it really happen?

CrowBat
04-15-2014, 08:18 AM
Yes, quite delusional.

The CIA - and thereby the US - is up to its elbows in blood in Syria.Actually not.

I'm trying - quite hard - to find out the extension of that 'involvement'. But, despite all the flashy media reports and no matter how much I tried, there is next to nothing to find. Indeed, I've spent the last few months finalizing the work on manuscript for a small book titled 'Syrian Conflagration, The Syrian Civil War, 2011-2013' (to be published by Helion Publishing Co., in the UK, later this year; see bellow for the cover), and interviewing - back and forth - several dozens of different contacts around the country. But there is nothing to be found about any serious sort of 'US involvement' there. The most one can get to hear is commentary like can be read here: Syrian Rebels Find Support, and Frustration, in Jordan (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/11/world/middleeast/syria.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0)

......When rebels want to return to Syria to fight, Jordan’s intelligence services give them specific times to cross its border. When the rebels need weapons, they make their request at an “operations room” in Amman staffed by agents from Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United States.

During more than three years of civil war in Syria, this desert nation has come to the world’s attention largely because it has struggled to shelter hundreds of thousands of refugees. But, quietly, Jordan has also provided a staging ground for rebels and their foreign backers on Syria’s southern front. In the joint Arab-American operations room in Amman, the capital, for example, rebels say they have collected salaries as an incentive not to join better-funded extremist groups.

But this covert aid has been so limited, reflecting the Obama administration’s reluctance to get drawn into another Middle Eastern conflict, that rebels say they have come to doubt that the United States still shares their goal of toppling President Bashar al-Assad.

In fact, many rebels say they believe that the Obama administration is giving just enough to keep the rebel cause alive, but not enough to actually help it win, as part of a dark strategy aimed at prolonging the war. They say that in some cases their backers even push them to avoid attacking strategic targets, part of what they see as that effort to keep the conflict burning.

“The aid that comes in now is only enough to keep us alive, and it covers only the lowest level of needs,” said Brig. Gen. Asaad al-Zoabi, a Syrian fighter pilot who defected and now works in the operations room.
...

In total: scant shipments of support equipment (cars, comms), some money (less that a friction - really, not even 5% - of what is supplied by other sponsors of insurgency), and food is 'at most' one can track down.

So, if at all, 'the CIA' is involved in operations apparently aiming to keep insurgency 'alive', but not more, while hampering any other 'grand designs' the Saudis, Qataris, and others might have.

That's working in some- (Saudi Arabia) and not working at all in most of cases (Qatar, Turkey, Kuwait).

Total effect of this is that a mass of ex-activists-cum-insurgents turned 'Islamists' over the time and did so because they didn't get anything at all from the West and - or 'but' - then began receiving aid from Islamists instead (exactly as described earlier: given enough time, extremists are going to spread their influence, which is the same that would have happened in Libya too, without a timely US/NATO intervention). Meanwhile, there appears to be effort to 'return some of them' back to 'moderates' (resulting in emergence of SF and SRF), but with idiotically stringent set of 'ROEs' for who might be accepted as 'returnee' and who not...

Especially since even the Hezbollah has issued 'security guarantees' for Israel (it's really ridiculous how everybody is keen to issue that kind of guarantees) many of insurgents (at least those in position to monitor developments abroad) are now convinced that the USA have sold Syria to Iran, in exchange for Iranians curbing their nuclear- and missile-related projects etc. (the new Iranian pres even went as far as to impose a moratorium on all the IRGC's missile testing; in exchange for this, the IRGC is so flush with money for ops in Syria, that the rest of Iranian military is 'on idle' since two years too).

So, if the US is 'up to its elbows in blood' - then because it's doing next to nothing to support people who expected its support. What's worse: because the US are acting that way, the rest of the West either did nothing, or followed in fashion.

From that aspect: yes, the US 'involvement' there is (utterly) misguided and misdirected: it has significantly contributed to destruction of the country as a sovereign nation for decades to come, and to turning genuinely laicist population into some 10-15 different factions based on ethnic- and religious lines, most of which are now at odds with each other.

***********

http://www.acig.info/forum/download/file.php?id=9203

Dayuhan
04-16-2014, 12:20 AM
Yup, exactly like in Libya, right?

Ah no: 'even more so in Syria', because 'Syria was always a nation of crazy terrorists' - or so we've been taught in the last 60 years...?

I haven't seen anyone teach such a thing. Syria is not "a nation of crazy terrorists", but a Syrian civil war with active Western intervention would be an irresistible and accessible magnet for crazy terrorists from anywhere else. It would also provide a convenient and attractive target for the crazy terrorists, distracting them fromn their current obliging practice of killing each other, and would provide an enhanced incentive for attacks on the homeland of whoever's intervening.

Certainly the Syrian Civil War will attract its share of crazies even without Western involvement, and certainly those crazies and their future activities are a problem, but any argument that intervention would have prevented, rather than exacerbated, that problem would be extraordinarily speculative.

I can't see any basis at all for a claim that the Syrian Civil War is a consequence of American or Western actions and therefore an American or Western "responsibility". Herr Fuchs wrote aptly elsewhere:


I noticed again and again that in anglophone political discussions some people make up responsibilities, obligations and rights on the fly, trying to assert authority out of thin air. They invent a duty/obligation/responsibility when they want something particular done yet lack the arguments or evidence to support their opinion. They invent a right when they don't want something particular done.



once again at a massive human cost to the very people the US is supposed to be protecting.

Who exactly is the US "supposed to be protecting" in Syria?

SWJ Blog
04-16-2014, 12:20 AM
Why Russia Supports Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-russia-supports-syria)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-russia-supports-syria) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

CrowBat
04-16-2014, 10:16 PM
I haven't seen anyone teach such a thing.No surprise: you only missed half the things that have happened in the Middle East since nearly 70 years...


Syria is not "a nation of crazy terrorists"...Next time I'm there and happen to run over any kind of US tourists (is unlikely to happen any time soon, of course, but you ought to be patient when things are about Syria), I'll ask them for their telephone numbers or e-mail addresses. Then I'll forward these to you so you can ask them - and hear with your own ears - what they've been told by their family, friends etc. when informing them they're about to do a trip to Syria.


...but a Syrian civil war with active Western intervention would be an irresistible and accessible magnet for crazy terrorists from anywhere else. It would also provide a convenient and attractive target for the crazy terrorists...Ah, I see: you're back to tell me a few jokes again.

Tell me: Syria didn't become 'an irresistible and accessible magnet for crazy terrorists'? And this didn't happen precisely because of....what idiotic reason is now going to come to your mind...? :rolleyes:


Certainly the Syrian Civil War will attract its share of crazies even without Western involvement...Ah, you - the very person that is so much in love with complaining about anybody trying to 'guess the future' - is now predicting the future, and say 'it will'?

Because you don't think it didn't do so - already?


...and certainly those crazies and their future activities are a problem, but any argument that intervention would have prevented, rather than exacerbated, that problem would be extraordinarily speculative.While your argumentation is based on legs as solid as a card tower, eh?


I can't see any basis at all for a claim that the Syrian Civil War is a consequence of American or Western actions and therefore an American or Western "responsibility".Oh, anybody trying to say 'this is what caused the war' is simply stupid. That's sure. But, sigh... well somebody like you, somebody who is trying to discuss the developments in Syria, and especially somebody doing that and being from the USA, sigh.... gosh, this is so boring to explain for XYth time, especially to people so insistent on proving completely unable to think and learn... might want to recall all the BS caused by Bush Sr.'s calls for Iraqis to raise against Saddam, back in March-April 1991, and then what has his failure to support the Iraqis that rose caused over the time.

(And no, I'm not worried: you're now certainly going to come back with some sort of hyper-eloquent explanation for why there is no need for you - or anybody else in all of the USA - to learn anything from that, and so many other, similar examples.)


Who exactly is the US "supposed to be protecting" in Syria?Ah, yes: there are no 'civilians' in Syria. 'Terrorists parking only' there... :rolleyes:

Well, no problem. Let the Iranians, Hezbollah and a regime that has a history of supporting about 40 different terrorist organizations around the world finish their business. They might take quite some time, few years at least, but if you let them: then there will be - indeed - nobody left to protect.

Dayuhan
04-17-2014, 12:14 AM
Next time I'm there and happen to run over any kind of US tourists (is unlikely to happen any time soon, of course, but you ought to be patient when things are about Syria), I'll ask them for their telephone numbers or e-mail addresses. Then I'll forward these to you so you can ask them - and hear with your own ears - what they've been told by their family, friends etc. when informing them they're about to do a trip to Syria.

So now you're jumping from "so we've been taught in the last 60 years" to a few comments heard by the miniscule handful of people that have contemplated traveling to Syria? People say all kinds of things about all kinds of places... I've heard people say the country I live in is full of crazy terrorists. That hardly equates to "so we've been taught in the last 60 years". Scuttlebutt from the ignorant doesn't constitute "teaching". Neither does random internet ranting from self-proclaimed authorities, something you might want to remember before embarking on lectures.


Tell me: Syria didn't become 'an irresistible and accessible magnet for crazy terrorists'?

Of course it has... but the terrorists that flock there are shooting at each other, not at us or our proxies. Because we don't have a proxy, we don't face that question of whether to abandon the proxy or provide direct support when our proxy predictably fails to accomplish what we hoped for. The assorted "crazy terrorists" don't have that "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" mantra to fall back on, and they don't have a clear reason to urge attacks on the West... of course they'll still try, but we aren't handing them the narrative on a silver platter.

There's nothing that empowers the radical Islamic fringe quite so effectively as Western boots on the ground in Islamic countries, especially in countries in conflict. Western proxies aren't as good, but they'll do. Why supply your enemies with something they thrive on?


And this didn't happen precisely because of....what idiotic reason is now going to come to your mind...? :rolleyes:

It happened because some of the Syrians tried to overthrow their dictator, the dictator declined to be overthrown, and a civil war ensued that emerged as a proxy showdown between Sunni and Shi'a. That showdown has drawn militants from both sides from around the region. I don't see any credible argument suggesting that the influx of militants would have been reduced by inserting Western intervention, directly or by proxy, into that picture.


Ah, you - the very person that is so much in love with complaining about anybody trying to 'guess the future' - is now predicting the future, and say 'it will'?

I was asked what I thought the impact of Western intervention on militant inflow would have been. I answered. That's an opinion, not a prediction. What do you think would have been the impact of Western intervention on militant inflow?


Oh, anybody trying to say 'this is what caused the war' is simply stupid. That's sure. But, sigh... well somebody like you, somebody who is trying to discuss the developments in Syria, and especially somebody doing that and being from the USA, sigh.... gosh, this is so boring to explain for XYth time, especially to people so insistent on proving completely unable to think and learn... might want to recall all the BS caused by Bush Sr.'s calls for Iraqis to raise against Saddam, back in March-April 1991, and then what has his failure to support the Iraqis that rose caused over the time.

Yes, that was dumb. Do you suggest that Bush Sr's irresponsible comments to Iraqis in 1991 are a reason for the US to intervene in Syria?


Ah, yes: there are no 'civilians' in Syria. 'Terrorists parking only' there... :rolleyes:

When did the protection of Syrian civilians become an American responsibility?

davidbfpo
04-17-2014, 12:37 PM
Slightly different viewpoint:
Edward Dark offers a perspective on the conflict — that of Syrian troopsLink:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/syria-aleppo-offensive-rebels-jabhat-nusra-regime.html

JMA
04-17-2014, 12:47 PM
No surprise: you only missed half the things that have happened in the Middle East since nearly 70 years...

Crowbat, I see you have met my 'friend' from the boonies.

Replies just encourage him.

Dayuhan
04-18-2014, 12:15 AM
Replies just encourage him.

Your disinclination to reply is of course understandable. If I'd made a comment like this...


a massive human cost to the very people the US is supposed to be protecting.

...and somebody asked me who exactly the US is "supposed to be protecting" (somebody would ask; it's too obvious a question not to ask) I wouldn't want to reply either.

JMA
04-18-2014, 06:48 AM
LOL ... nice try... now go read what Samatha Power has said (for starters)



Your disinclination to reply is of course understandable. If I'd made a comment like this...



...and somebody asked me who exactly the US is "supposed to be protecting" (somebody would ask; it's too obvious a question not to ask) I wouldn't want to reply either.

JMA
04-18-2014, 10:30 AM
Back in 2012 I said the Syrian rebels should not be armed. Here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=141002&postcount=56)

The result of arming the rebels is plain for all to see. The genie is out of the bottle. Idiots.

Edward Luttwak wrote the following article in the NYT: In Syria, America Loses if Either Side Wins (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/opinion/sunday/in-syria-america-loses-if-either-side-wins.html) in August 2013

A well argued article spoilt by the paragraph near the end.


This strategy actually approximates the Obama administration’s policy so far. Those who condemn the president’s prudent restraint as cynical passivity must come clean with the only possible alternative: a full-scale American invasion to defeat both Mr. Assad and the extremists fighting against his regime.

I suggest rather that the 'Obama policy' is as a result of dithering and indecisiveness rather than by design.

Luttwak is obviously wrong in suggesting that the only military response is 'a full-scale American invasion'.

How is it possible that otherwise intelligent people can't appreciate that a poke in the eye with a sharp stick can be more effective than numerous kicks to the shins?

JMA
04-18-2014, 12:04 PM
Actually not.

I'm trying - quite hard - to find out the extension of that 'involvement'. But, despite all the flashy media reports and no matter how much I tried, there is next to nothing to find. Indeed, I've spent the last few months finalizing the work on manuscript for a small book titled 'Syrian Conflagration, The Syrian Civil War, 2011-2013' (to be published by Helion Publishing Co., in the UK, later this year; see bellow for the cover), ...

Good luck with the book... be sure to announce when its available.


So, if at all, 'the CIA' is involved in operations apparently aiming to keep insurgency 'alive', but not more, while hampering any other 'grand designs' the Saudis, Qataris, and others might have.

That is why they are only up to their elbows in blood and not up to their armpits.


So, if the US is 'up to its elbows in blood' - then because it's doing next to nothing to support people who expected its support. What's worse: because the US are acting that way, the rest of the West either did nothing, or followed in fashion.

Agreed, the US approach is one of fear in the WH and indifference of the people:

"Indifference is not so much a gesture of looking away--of choosing to be passive--as it is an active disinclination to feel. Indifference shuts down the humane, and does it deliberately, with all the strength deliberateness demands. Indifference is as determined--and as forcefully muscular--as any blow." - Cynthia Ozick


From that aspect: yes, the US 'involvement' there is (utterly) misguided and misdirected: it has significantly contributed to destruction of the country as a sovereign nation for decades to come, and to turning genuinely laicist population into some 10-15 different factions based on ethnic- and religious lines, most of which are now at odds with each other.

Agreed

Tukhachevskii
04-18-2014, 12:30 PM
So, if at all, 'the CIA' is involved in operations apparently aiming to keep insurgency 'alive', but not more, while hampering any other 'grand designs' the Saudis, Qataris, and others might have.

Of course there might be othdr reasons. After the fiasco of Afghanistan where thd CIAIA left things largely under the ISIs remit during the Soviet occupation if you were going to keep tabs and gather HUMINT on he groups fightijg in Syria, as well as what their supporters are up to then what better place to be than Jordan. Right in the thick of things.


gods below i hatd my new tablet. I miss my desktop, cant even write properly with thismdakned thijg.

JMA
04-18-2014, 07:00 PM
Raising specter of genocide, US Ambassador Power slams ‘industrial-style slaughter’ in Syria (http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/04/17/raising-specter-genocide-us-ambassador-power-slams-industrial-style-slaughter/)

The problem:


America’s ambassador to the United Nations raised the specter of genocide in Syria, after officials this week sounded the alarm about spiraling violence in that country’s civil war.

While Power obviously cares the WH does not. Listen to this clown:


White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, though, reiterated that the administration’s view is “there’s not a military solution” – he said Assad “will never again rule all of Syria,” but the situation must be resolved “through a negotiated political settlement.”

I guess Niall Ferguson has it right:

China Should Intervene in Syria, Not America (http://www.niallferguson.com/journalism/politics/china-should-intervene-in-syria-not-america)

Why?


Under President Obama, U.S. grand strategy has been at best incoherent, at worst nonexistent. I can think of no better complement to the president’s recent “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region than to invite China to play a greater role in the Middle East—one that is commensurate with its newfound wealth and growing military capability.

CrowBat
04-19-2014, 08:30 AM
...Neither does random internet ranting from self-proclaimed authorities, something you might want to remember before embarking on lectures.Don't worry: I have realized already months ago there is no point in 'lecturing' you about anything at all. It's not only that you can't learn: you refuse learning even from your own mistakes - or mistakes of your own government, to be more precise - so what would be the point?


Of course it has... but the terrorists that flock there are shooting at each other, not at us or our proxies & other blahblah...You see, this is a typical example of you working hard on finding excuse No. 745.396 for all the nonsense Washington is doing in Syria.

You're asking since when is the USA responsible for protection of civilians...

Whether this is the official US policy or whatever else, it doesn't matter: it's not me who is declaring the USA for 'craddle of democracy', 'supporting anybody struggling for freedom and democracy' and all other BS of that sort. That's simply the image emitted by the USA since decades. That image has created specific expectations from specific people outside the USA: you can now ignore this and explain it for irrelevant, and no part of your policy, and whatever other nonsense, but this is the soup the USA have created. Therefore, don't get surprised when there are plenty of people disapointed to realize the USA do not act that way in reality - and then turning against the USA as as result.

In 1989, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan which they have sysematically ruined in 10 years of war. They've left behind a week 'central' government, opposed by US/Saudi sponsored insurgency, run by Pakistan. Instead of doing something to rebuild the country, the USA have left Afghanistan at mercy of Pakistani (and other) Saudi-sponsored Islamists - with well known results. What a surprise then, that 20+ years later Afghanistan is still the same quagmire....

In 1991, the USA kicked Iraq out of Kuwait, and then called Iraqis to raise against Saddam. The Iraqis did so, but did not receive any kind of support: Saddam was left free to gas Shi'a in southern Iraq and Kurds in the north. When, 10 years later, the USA finally came to the idea to remove Saddam, Americans were ah so greatly surprised the Iraqis were not the least pleased about their late appearance....

The uprising in Libya received Western/NATO+friends support within 2 months of breaking out. It was over within 8 months, with dictatorship removed. Correspondingly, there was no time for Wahhabists (or similars) to gain a foothold, not to talk about 'taking over' the insurgency. Instead, Libya now has a pro-Western government. Surely, it's going to need another 10-15 years to get all of its troubles sorted out, but its biggest problem is out of the way.

The uprising in Syria is now more than 3 years old. It never received any kind of serious Western support (or if, then only in the last few weeks), with the result of the Wahhabists (and/or similars) being given all the time not only to gain a foothold, but indeed nearly collapse the insurgency 'from within'. Result: none of problems from 2011 has been removed, the country is in tatters for decades, unlikely to regain any semblance of sovereignity, full of extremists of all sorts, harbouring heavy IRGC-QF presence etc., and therefore likely to remain a main source of troubles for the time of our lifes.

I'm begging you, Dayuhan: PLEASE, do not 'learn' anything at all from all of these. Come back with your silly babbling about the lack of proxies in Syria, about the lack of cohesion within Syrian insurgency, and then go on listing the remaining 745.394 of your cheap excuses.

But, and whether you accept them or not, and no matter how much you refuse to accept them, these are bottom line facts. That's where the core of the issue - namely utter stupidity of decision-makers in Washington - lies; and that's all I have to say to you any more.

Feel free to come back with excuse 745.397 too, no problem: until you offer a sign of realization of what I'm telling you all the time, I'll just click on 'ignore'.

CrowBat
04-19-2014, 08:43 AM
Back in 2012 I said the Syrian rebels should not be armed. Here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=141002&postcount=56)

The result of arming the rebels is plain for all to see. The genie is out of the bottle. Idiots.I have no problems with the DC deciding 'do not arm the insurgents'.

But then at least the same DC could come to its senses and stay completely out of the situation. After all - just ask Dayuhan, he'll be happy to explain it to lenght - there are 745.396 (probably 745.397 meanwhile) reasons to stay out of there.

Instead, they are following the WORST POSSIBLE SOLUTION, which is, 'well, we're going to arm them, a little bit', and doing so while doing even more to hinder others from 'arming the insurgents'. Coupled with bi-products of such behaviour (see 'let the Iranians kill insurgents' and see 'let Russians re-arm the regime, Iranians are bledding themselves to death by paying the bill'), that's just resulting in ever more suffering and destruction.

As such, effectivelly, that cannot but result with 'creating your own enemy of tomorrow' - which is insane, to put it mildly.

JMA
04-19-2014, 08:48 AM
Don't worry: I have realized already months ago there is no point in 'lecturing' you about anything at all. It's not only that you can't learn: you refuse learning even from your own mistakes - or mistakes of your own government, to be more precise - so what would be the point?

Exactly, so don't feed the ....

JMA
04-19-2014, 09:45 AM
I have no problems with the DC deciding 'do not arm the insurgents'.

Well who knows what the WH is thinking? Does anyone? Do they themselves?

See this:

Advanced U.S. Weapons Flow to Syrian Rebels (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304626304579509401865454762?mg=ren o64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB1000 1424052702304626304579509401865454762.html)


But then at least the same DC could come to its senses and stay completely out of the situation.

Too late... up to their elbows in blood and getting deeper. Clearly the situation is now so serious and complex that its beyond the WH... and probably the 'analysts' at the CIA too.


After all - just ask Dayuhan, he'll be happy to explain it to lenght - there are 745.396 (probably 745.397 meanwhile) reasons to stay out of there.

I call that the 'condom solution' ... instead of one size fits all, rather one policy (in this case hiding under your bed) fits all situations regardless of the situation on the ground.


Instead, they are following the WORST POSSIBLE SOLUTION, which is, 'well, we're going to arm them, a little bit', and doing so while doing even more to hinder others from 'arming the insurgents'. Coupled with bi-products of such behaviour (see 'let the Iranians kill insurgents' and see 'let Russians re-arm the regime, Iranians are bledding themselves to death by paying the bill'), that's just resulting in ever more suffering and destruction.

As such, effectivelly, that cannot but result with 'creating your own enemy of tomorrow' - which is insane, to put it mildly.

This, I suggest, is as a result of having no policy to start with. The situation has spun out of control and we now see a misguided and misdirected patch-job in a desperate attempt to control the damage.

The situation should never have got to this... it now demands action which will be resisted by Russia... which means the US won't do it.

CrowBat
04-19-2014, 12:05 PM
Yup. And to paraphrase certain ex Secretary of State, and in relation to your earlier post about ideas on 'China should do it': 'You can't force your bank to...' - launch (or finance) an armed intervention in Syria.

Really, I haven't been to the USA and the DC for some eight years or so. But if this - and other ideas of similar 'brilliance' aired from there in recent years can be taken as anything as indication of way people there are thinking...

...oh boy, we're up to eyebrows deep in... erm...trouble.

JMA
04-19-2014, 07:32 PM
Canadian-funded study explores how foreign fighters in Syria use social media (http://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/canadian-funded-study-explores-how-foreign-fighters-in-syria-use-social-media-1.1782481)


Based on the data, the report found that a large number of foreign fighters receive their information about the Syrian conflict through so-called disseminators – “unaffiliated but broadly sympathetic individuals who can sometimes appear to offer moral and intellectual support to jihadist opposition groups.”

wm
04-19-2014, 09:45 PM
Canadian-funded study explores how foreign fighters in Syria use social media (http://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/canadian-funded-study-explores-how-foreign-fighters-in-syria-use-social-media-1.1782481)
Quote:
Based on the data, the report found that a large number of foreign fighters receive their information about the Syrian conflict through so-called disseminators – “unaffiliated but broadly sympathetic individuals who can sometimes appear to offer moral and intellectual support to jihadist opposition groups.”


What I find most interesting is this quotation from the article:
ICSR has previously reported that up to 2,800 of foreign fighters in Syria are of European or western nationality.

The report gives a breakdown of the foreign fighters’ country of origin based on their sample: Australians, Canadians and Americans together accounted for 5.3 per cent, while fighters from the United Kingdom made up the highest number of foreign fighters.
United Kingdom: 17.9 per cent
France: 11.6 per cent
Germany: 11.1 per cent
Sweden: 10 per cent
Belgium: 8.9 per cent


This set of statistics seems to support the following claim made recently in this thread--that Syria's conflict is drawing the loons there rather than their staying and acting out at home. I've paraphrased, but the gist is the same I think. The original wording is found at post 590 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=155130&postcount=590)of this thread

JMA
04-19-2014, 09:51 PM
Besieged and terrified … and the food is about to run out for Damascus refugees (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/19/syria-besieged-refugees-yarmouk-starvation)


Syrian blockade of Yarmouk refugee camp raises fears for 18,000 people left starving inside, with some already resorting to eating leaves and animal feed

Who gives a rats ass about the starving kids I hear from the so-called great and civilised nations of the world.

How do they sleep at night?

CrowBat
04-22-2014, 03:23 PM
Nobody. That's why it's so sillent here: presently, everybody and his/her next kin is busy thinking about reason 745.398 - related to ignoring repeated use of chemical weapons by regime in Idlib area (should have something to do with supposed 'red lines'), the last few days...

wm
04-22-2014, 03:54 PM
Nobody. That's why it's so sillent here: presently, everybody and his/her next kin is busy thinking about reason 745.398 - related to ignoring repeated use of chemical weapons by regime in Idlib area (should have something to do with supposed 'red lines'), the last few days...

Lots of people care. They just happen to prioritize their national blood and treasure differently than others might like. Who helped Biafra or Bangladesh?

Wyatt
04-23-2014, 12:42 AM
Nobody. That's why it's so sillent here: presently, everybody and his/her next kin is busy thinking about reason 745.398 - related to ignoring repeated use of chemical weapons by regime in Idlib area (should have something to do with supposed 'red lines'), the last few days...

I don't see Austrians or South Africans clamoring to send their fighting men into the fray, so why shout so loudly? Would you volunteer your sons (figurative or literal) for this war?

Wyatt
04-23-2014, 02:03 AM
I don't see Austrians or South Africans clamoring to send their fighting men into the fray, so why shout so loudly? Would you volunteer your sons (figurative or literal) for this war?

Edited to add.

This question was to far too harsh and upset the very constitution of our most esteemed commonwealth friend. For that I shall humbly submit the required text and nix my crude comeuppance in the bud.

"that having reviewed earlier posts by JMA I note that nowhere did he advocate boots on the ground so my comment on his sons was out of line. My apologies."
<--- I even included your quotation marks!:D

As far as this.... "I'll put money on it that you don't have the balls or the integrity to do it"

Nous Defions!

PM again for my PayPal info.

Dayuhan
04-23-2014, 02:23 AM
In case you're curious about what JMA actually did advocate, it's here:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=12821&page=12


Two cruise missiles is all it will take...

With this as clarification:


Don't think you were there when I first raised this in the 'Ivory Coast' thread, so here we go:

Quote:
It is time to stop pussy-footing around and apply JMA's 3-Cruise-Missile-Option.

With some sections of the army wavering (it appears) the first missile targets the barracks of the most loyal unit to Gbagbo - do it now, tomorrow.

The second with 12 hours warning targets the current location of Gbagbo himself - he won't be there but will get the message strength 5.

Thereafter the word is put out that there's a $1m for the person who provides Gbagbo's location as a target for the third missile.

JMA never explained what he expected the outcome of this proposed action to be, so on that score your guess is as good as mine.

My own guess is that the outcome would have been Assad going to ground, his army moving out of their barracks and dispersing their assets, and a combined message telling us to stick our demands where the sun don't shine. That of course would leave us with a choice between backing down and escalating, neither appealing.

Obviously nobody knows what would have happened if... but somehow that proposal seemed to me unlikely to achieve much.

I mention it only on the principle that people who accuse others of "getting it wrong" really ought to be able to offer a convincing suggestion of what "getting it right" would have been.

CrowBat
04-23-2014, 08:01 AM
Lots of people care. They just happen to prioritize their national blood and treasure differently than others might like. Who helped Biafra or Bangladesh?Did I start talking about 'red lines'?

And re. Biafra: nobody (that is, at least no nation officially sided with separatists), and in Bangladesh it was India.


I don't see Austrians or South Africans clamoring to send their fighting men into the fray, so why shout so loudly? Would you volunteer your sons (figurative or literal) for this war?Let me see...

Did Austria or South Africa say, 'Bashar, if you use chemical weapons, that's a red line'? Does either of the two have bases in about 150 countries and territories around the globe, and is either claiming to be the 'cradle of democracy' or is eager to 'support anybody fighting against terrorism'?

I moved out of Vienna a few years ago, so might not be entirely current with latest developments: perhaps I've missed or have forgotten something, so please feel free to correct me.

That said, sure: the last I recall, our nifty FM and MOD have withdrawn our 'peacekeepers' from the UN-contingent on the (Syrian side) of armistice lines on the Golan because they saw them under a threat. They did so at the first sign of trouble there, so yes: I agree that they're sissies (our troops less so, see their deployment in Chad).

Prior to that, they (the 2nd Bn) were there since something like 40 years, spending most of the time drinking themselves into unconsciousness - because of boredom. For what purpose, nobody really knows. Supposedly, they were 'protecting peace'; actually, they were establishing de-facto Israeli occupation and annexation of the Golan Heights. The latter is not recognized even by the DC, but who cares? De-facto is certainly perfectly enough for everybody with corresponding interests.

So, obviously, I'm very supportive of such 'meaningful' deployments. So much so, I'm probably the next to get suspended for posting sarcastic commentary. :rolleyes:

And the South Africans... oh my, indeed, they are the last to send their troops into the fray. For example, they didn't do so in the DRC, and even less so in the CAR. And they didn't do so in the DRC for example, because the DC is supporting a genocidal regime in Kigali, and thus - indirectly - the M23 'insurgents/rebels', while at the same time the SOCOM and AFRICOM are burning billions of US-taxpayer's money for sending planes and troops there, for which nobody can say what to hell are they doing there (then, ho-hum, they aren't doing anything at all, except landing, inspecting, walking around, disappearing in the jungle etc.).

But sure, I should not come to the idea to connect that 'military operation' with taking over the illegal extraction of Congolese koltan, gold and diamonds from Rwandans, and/or Israeli diamond-handlers.

Well, whatever they're doing there, it's certainly 'far more important' and 'of crucial national interest' for the USA - than Syria is ever going to be. Damn, here's the idea: why not send South African troops to Syria? That way they could be as curbed as much as anybody else trying to help the insurgency there...

Hope, I've got everything right and to your full satisfaction here.

CrowBat
04-23-2014, 08:05 AM
Edited to add.

This question was to far too harsh...Why 'far too harsh'? Because you missed South African deployments to the CAR and the DRC, or because you're supposing that I'm proud of Austrian government?

Hey, yesterday the Austrian government decided to accept 40 refugees from Syria. Wow. For a fierce patriot like me, that's almost as much as somebody else declaring 'red lines' - and then swiftly forgetting about them. I now have every imaginable reason to be proud... to be _extremely_ proud... of 'my' government, isn't that so?

Dayuhan
04-23-2014, 11:49 PM
Don't worry: I have realized already months ago there is no point in 'lecturing' you about anything at all.

There's no point in lecturing anyone here. This is not a classroom, where someone appoints you master and your lessons are received without question. It's a discussion forum, where people engage as equals and no opinion or position is any better than the evidence and reasoning presented to support it.


It's not only that you can't learn: you refuse learning even from your own mistakes - or mistakes of your own government, to be more precise - so what would be the point?

There seems to be some confusion here between fact and opinion. You seem to feel that the US government's failure to become directly involved in Syria was and is a mistake. That's your opinion. Others have other opinions. While there's no doubt that Syria is a mess, it is at least not our mess, and if we have to choose between a mess with us in the middle of it and a mess without us in the middle of it, I for one will take the latter any day.


You're asking since when is the USA responsible for protection of civilians...

Whether this is the official US policy or whatever else, it doesn't matter: it's not me who is declaring the USA for 'craddle of democracy', 'supporting anybody struggling for freedom and democracy' and all other BS of that sort. That's simply the image emitted by the USA since decades. That image has created specific expectations from specific people outside the USA: you can now ignore this and explain it for irrelevant, and no part of your policy, and whatever other nonsense, but this is the soup the USA have created. Therefore, don't get surprised when there are plenty of people disapointed to realize the USA do not act that way in reality - and then turning against the USA as as result.

Hence the overwhelming global clamor for US involvement in Syria... oh, wait, that doesn't exist, does it. You may perhaps have noticed that US involvement in the domestic conflicts of other nations is typically not greeted with joy or perceived as support for democracy. More often it's perceived, with good reason, as self-interested meddling. I've no doubt that there are factions in Syria that would be delighted to take our guns and (especially) our money, but I see no reason to suppose that the absence of US interference is perceived as failure to support democracy. Fear that people will doubt our commitment to democracy if we don't dive into every conflict on the planet is a very weak argument for intervention.


In 1989, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan which they have sysematically ruined in 10 years of war. They've left behind a week 'central' government, opposed by US/Saudi sponsored insurgency, run by Pakistan. Instead of doing something to rebuild the country, the USA have left Afghanistan at mercy of Pakistani (and other) Saudi-sponsored Islamists - with well known results. What a surprise then, that 20+ years later Afghanistan is still the same quagmire....

Of course it is. That's not because of any lack of the US "doing something to rebuild the country", it's because building a nation and installing democracy were never realistic goals from the start. The US can't build an Afghan nation: only Afghans can do that, and they will have to do it in their own time and in their own way, not at the behest of or on a template provided by Americans. Sending an Army to build a nation makes about as much sense as asking an engineer to do neurosurgery in any event. The lesson to take away from Afghanistan is that "armed nation building" is a fool's game and any intervention that has a chance of forcing the US into a nation building role should be avoided like the plague.


In 1991, the USA kicked Iraq out of Kuwait, and then called Iraqis to raise against Saddam. The Iraqis did so, but did not receive any kind of support: Saddam was left free to gas Shi'a in southern Iraq and Kurds in the north. When, 10 years later, the USA finally came to the idea to remove Saddam, Americans were ah so greatly surprised the Iraqis were not the least pleased about their late appearance....

I agree that urging Iraqis to rebel when there was no will to support them was stupid and wrong... but are you seriously arguing that this mistake was a cause of the later resistance to American occupation? That seems quite insupportable. Somehow I don't think those Sunni insurgents in Fallujah and Ramadi were fighting because the US failed to support them against Saddam, and the Kurds, who had more reason than anyone to feel betrayed, showed no great enthusiasm for the insurgency. If we take a lesson from this, it will be that the reactions of various parties in Iraq to the eventual American occupation were driven by their perceived interests, threats, and opportunities at the time, not by memories of transgressions past.


The uprising in Libya received Western/NATO+friends support within 2 months of breaking out. It was over within 8 months, with dictatorship removed. Correspondingly, there was no time for Wahhabists (or similars) to gain a foothold, not to talk about 'taking over' the insurgency. Instead, Libya now has a pro-Western government. Surely, it's going to need another 10-15 years to get all of its troubles sorted out, but its biggest problem is out of the way.

I would call Libya a qualified success, in that the two primary goals of the intervention were achieved: the dictator fell and the US was not dragged into taking responsibility for the aftermath. Whether that could have been repeated in Syria is another question altogether: Syria is not Libya and would have been a far more complicated target for intervention. You know the reasons why, I'm not going to bother listing them.


The uprising in Syria is now more than 3 years old. It never received any kind of serious Western support (or if, then only in the last few weeks), with the result of the Wahhabists (and/or similars) being given all the time not only to gain a foothold, but indeed nearly collapse the insurgency 'from within'. Result: none of problems from 2011 has been removed, the country is in tatters for decades, unlikely to regain any semblance of sovereignity, full of extremists of all sorts, harbouring heavy IRGC-QF presence etc., and therefore likely to remain a main source of troubles for the time of our lifes.

If you want to argue that the US should intervene or should have intervened in Syria, you'll need to demonstrate what vital or at least pressing US interests are/were at stake (last effort in this regard went in the fail bin), and show that there is/was an opportunity for intervention that offered reasonable prospects for success without threatening to draw the US into full-scale involvement. It would also help to demonstrate that there was sufficient home front support for intervention to sustain he effort, because it's never a good idea to start something if you know the commitment to finish it isn't there.


I'm begging you, Dayuhan: PLEASE, do not 'learn' anything at all from all of these. Come back with your silly babbling about the lack of proxies in Syria, about the lack of cohesion within Syrian insurgency, and then go on listing the remaining 745.394 of your cheap excuses.

Non-intervention doesn't need an excuse, all you need is the absence of compelling reason to intervene and a lack method that offers a good chance of success and limits the risk of escalation. Intervention is a costly, risky, and messy business that goes wrong more often than right, and the burden of proof is on those proposing it, not those opposing it.

Saying that intervention goes wrong because it's done wrong means nothing unless there's a credible explanation of what doing it right might be.


But, and whether you accept them or not, and no matter how much you refuse to accept them, these are bottom line facts. That's where the core of the issue - namely utter stupidity of decision-makers in Washington - lies; and that's all I have to say to you any more.

No, those aren't facts. Those are your opinions. There's a difference.

CrowBat
04-24-2014, 09:17 AM
...There seems to be some confusion here between fact and opinion....Cut the ****, really. There's no 'confusion'. You're putting words into my mouth and turning and twisting my argumentation as it suits you.

Namely, it's something like one year ago that I told you: NO, there is NO point in USA launching an intervention in Syria. It's MUCH TOO LATE.

Can you compute and get that into your mind?

Or are you just unable to understand what you read, i.e. prefer to ignore what I wrote?

Namely, all I'm telling you (and all the ones thinking like you) all the time is: STOP MEDDLING THERE. Hands off Syria. Do not mix into that affair.

Though keep in mind: that includes 'stop preventing others from aiding insurgency' - too.

Like so many other people with similar standpoints, you have no trace of an idea what's going on there, and - worst of all - you don't know how to care about consequences of what you're doing (so much so, one should forbide such characters to get involved into foreign politics).

From your standpoint (and with 'your' I mean you and everybody else thinking the way you do), the only thing 'interesting' about Syria is whether there's AQ there or not. I say, yes, there is AQ there, and it is there because nothing was done against it when there was time to do something (and there was plenty of time, and even more opportunity). Whichever way, it doesn't matter any more. You decided not to do anything about it when there was time and opportunity, you decided that this is so because there was no 'pressing/vital national interest' to do so - and now INDEED, it's not your business any more.


...You may perhaps have noticed that US involvement in the domestic conflicts of other nations is typically not greeted with joy or perceived as support for democracy....And? Why are the USA then curbing support from other parties for the insurgency? If it's 'a bad idea' to mix there, then why mix at all?

Why insist on 'we're not going to get involved', but then get involved in a fashion that is only protracting the war, which is only providing Iran with more opportunity to bolster the regime, and therefore results in increasing the suffering and destruction of the population?


Of course it is. That's not because of any lack of the US "doing something to rebuild the country", it's because building a nation and installing democracy were never realistic goals from the start.... The lesson to take away from Afghanistan is that "armed nation building" is a fool's game and any intervention that has a chance of forcing the US into a nation building role should be avoided like the plague.Hehe: thanks! Yes, they were no goals (neither 'realistic goals' nor any other kind).

Why did the USA got involved then? For what 'goal'? A pay-back for Vietnam - at the cost of bolstering Islamist regime in Pakistan, enabling it to make a nuclear bomb, and impose a Wahhabist regime in Afghanistan...? Because you can't think about consequences of what you're doing...?

And furthermore: along that line, what is then the goal of ongoing US involvement in Syria? Enabling the regime to survive, enabling Iranians to take over the country, or enabling the Wahhabists to impose their regime? Doing the same like Assad did through creating an 'extremist Islamist oppostion/cum Jihad', by turning Syria into what the USA are preaching all the time that Syria is, namely a 'terrorist empire' and ally of that supposed 'axis of evil'...?

And what's the lesson? Let me guess: you'll never come to the idea to conclude that the lesson is that if you mix without sober thinking about consequences, and especially while having no clue about what's going on, all the BS you caused is going to get back to you like a 'boomerang' - though one consisting of a truck-load of bricks (or hijacked airliners flown into your skyscrapers)....?


I would call Libya a qualified success, in that the two primary goals of the intervention were achieved: the dictator fell and the US was not dragged into taking responsibility for the aftermath. Whether that could have been repeated in Syria is another question altogether: Syria is not Libya and would have been a far more complicated target for intervention....And now you're back to telling jokes... :D

Just a page or so back, you explained that such an intervention in Syria would be contraproductive because presence of US troops in Syria (something nobody sane has ever demanded) would make Syria a sort of magnet for all possible Jihadists.

When asked if Syria didn't became a magnet for Jihadists already without US military presence (or precisely because there was no intervention on time so to prevent such a development, like there was in Libya), you decided to ignore that question - because you realized that was a wrong idea. And after realizing that was a wrong idea now you come back to explain for 27th time that 'Syria is not Libya' - while having proven yourself as having no clue about Syria, first and foremost (so, if you have no clue: how can you draw any comparisons?) - and then rush to get back to your off-topic dogma, namely 'Tom wants a US intervention in Syria', no matter how much is that based on little else but your imagination.

What are you going to insinuate as next - and why?


...you'll need to demonstrate what vital or at least pressing US interests are/were at stake..Sigh... here we go again: NONE. There are neither vital nor pressing interests for the USA in Syria.

Thanks. Then do us all a favour and GET TO HELL OUT OF THERE, PRONTO.

For the sake of Syrians - and anybody with at least two sane brain cells left around: forget about that country, act like you've never heard about it (shouldn't be a problem, should it?), PLEASE.

Wyatt
04-25-2014, 12:22 AM
Why 'far too harsh'? Because you missed South African deployments to the CAR and the DRC, or because you're supposing that I'm proud of Austrian government?

Hey, yesterday the Austrian government decided to accept 40 refugees from Syria. Wow. For a fierce patriot like me, that's almost as much as somebody else declaring 'red lines' - and then swiftly forgetting about them. I now have every imaginable reason to be proud... to be _extremely_ proud... of 'my' government, isn't that so?

Who says I'm proud of my governments response? Its pretty easy to make the case that this administration is indecisive, I won't argue against that. The policy makers are not people I hold much faith in. I do have faith in those who inevitably get told to implement policy on the ground.

Maybe behind the administrations hand wringing is a cold reality that for at least awhile, Quds force, hizb allah and متشدد everywhere get to spend some time killing each other. Perhaps they are content, indifferent or too cowardly to do anything more than fan the flames with some small arms and tow missiles. This administrations risk calculus is obviously way different than your own.


The question wasn't "far too harsh" for me. It was considered ill founded by JMA.

davidbfpo
04-25-2014, 07:29 PM
Once again VICE's reporter reports from Idlib Province, as a guest of the Saudi-backed SRF, 25 mins long:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Cb3OURdl3g

The text ends with:
What we witnessed was a brief window into a complex and morally ambiguous conflict with no end in sight.

Fuchs
04-25-2014, 07:38 PM
In 1991, the USA kicked Iraq out of Kuwait, and then called Iraqis to raise against Saddam. The Iraqis did so, but did not receive any kind of support: Saddam was left free to gas Shi'a in southern Iraq and Kurds in the north.

Actually, the Halabja gas attack happened in 1988, years before the Kuwait thing. I'm not aware of any evidence about Hussein having used poison gas in 1991.

davidbfpo
04-25-2014, 08:56 PM
Actually, the Halabja gas attack happened in 1988, years before the Kuwait thing. I'm not aware of any evidence about Hussein having used poison gas in 1991.

IIRC the 1991 use only recently became public information, I think a former USG official made the reference and it was reported by the US media, alas a Google search failed to find a source.

Earlier reports appear to have slipped out of sight. I have just found this:https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-IraqSarin

JMA
04-28-2014, 08:07 AM
John McCain with Charlie Rose (http://www.charlierose.com/watch/60379260)

At about 19:00 they move on to Syria.

JMA
04-29-2014, 12:27 PM
Syrian rebels who received first U.S. missiles of war see shipment as ‘an important first step’ (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syrian-rebels-who-received-first-us-missiles-of-war-see-shipment-as-an-important-first-step/2014/04/27/61ec84d8-0f53-4c9f-bf0a-c3395819c540_story.html)


the arrival at the base last month of U.S.-made TOW antitank missiles, the first advanced American weaponry to be dispatched to Syria since the conflict began, has reignited long-abandoned hopes among the rebels that the Obama administration is preparing to soften its resistance to the provision of significant military aid and, perhaps, help move the battlefield equation back in their favor.

AdamG
04-29-2014, 02:29 PM
Surely the US Administration will address this... :rolleyes:



Al-Nusra uses chemical weapons against Syrian Army soldiers (SAA)


In this video, we see Al-Nusra rebels walking through a Syrian Army position. The dead Syrian soldiers do not appear to have been shot or blown up. There is no blood on any of the dead soldiers in the video. It looks as though their faces have been burned and some are holding gas masks in their hands.

This is proof the Al-Nusra has chemical weapons and most probably Sarin.

Read more at http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=493_1398720597#biPAZPsJVyS5wx07.99

If it was a gas attack, maybe the outpost was hit at night. Something about the bodies looks like they were half-dressed, particularly the cluster away from the farmhouse at the 8.00 or so mark. Survivors trying to regroup got a dose from the vapors?

Note that the SAA have been stripped of weapons and magazines.

Bodies have black burns on their faces - that's indicative of a Sarin gas attack, right?

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/sarin/basics/facts.asp

JMA
04-30-2014, 11:05 AM
Syria chemical weapons: the proof that Assad regime launching chlorine attacks on children (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10796175/Syria-chemical-weapons-the-proof-that-Assad-regime-launching-chlorine-attacks-on-children.html)

Lucky for Assad and any others there is no red-line on the use of chemicals.

then:

Syria Missed Another Chemical Weapons Deadline. Now What? (http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/04/syria-missed-another-chemical-weapons-deadline-now-what/)


“I never have a reason to believe that Bashar al-Assad tells the truth about anything, but we are not in a position to give a judgment as to whether the declaration is complete or deliberately incomplete, or incomplete but not deliberately so. That’s a technical task,” the (administration) official said.

Yet they went ahead and signed a deal with Assad??????

... and the bodies pile up.

http://worldobserveronline.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/im-gonna-tell-God-everything.jpg
The last thing a 3-year-old Syrian said before he died: “I’m gonna tell God everything”

davidbfpo
05-17-2014, 04:24 PM
A week ago a IISS Strategic Comment had the title 'Syria's war: Assad gains upper hand' and partly ended:
...While its survival is no longer in question in the medium term, its ability to rebuild the pretence of a state remains in doubt, given its limited resources, internal contradictions and the reality of soft partition. Syria is, in effect, transforming into small statelets, none of which is viable on its own.

Link to a very short free passage:http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2014-a6f5/syria--39-s-war--assad-gains-upper-hand-6a54

davidbfpo
06-03-2014, 06:57 PM
The full title of this Canadian article is: A Throne of Bones: The Assad Regime’s Military Strategy Leading to the June 3rd Election (http://www.iaffairscanada.com/2014/a-throne-of-bones-the-assad-regimes-military-strategy-leading-to-the-june-3rd-election)


While wide swathes of the country remain outside government control, regime forces and their allies have reversed the steady downward trend they were experiencing through 2012 and have since gone on the offensive in key areas. Damascus and its allies established a clear set of strategic priorities to focus on in the months leading up to the June election, and they have eagerly pursued them in order to establish their preferred environment for the event. The Syrian military is far from strong enough to retake all the territory it has lost, but it is capable of making significant progress in areas where it chooses to concentrate its forces and firepower, as recent months have shown.

Some maps too, although after the first minus a key.

davidbfpo
06-06-2014, 05:27 PM
A very different story:http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/06/islamic-state-iraq-and-greater-syria

davidbfpo
06-15-2014, 05:32 PM
This post appeared first in the current Iraq thread and is cross=posted here. There have been allegations here that the Assad regime has a "Nelson's eye" to ISIS.

So from Twitter (so maybe a "pinch of salt";)) just:
Seems Assad's army of terror finally started striking ISIL bases after largely ignoring, rather, aiding them, for more than a year. Assad is certainly not working on his free will. Either Iran ordered the strikes, or he realized if he doesn't strike, someone else/US will.

JMA
06-23-2014, 01:27 AM
Sadly it is apparent that the US and the West (may as well tar everyone with the same brush) have once again proved to be hopelessly incompetent when it comes to foreign policy.

In the case of the US it is beyond doubt that the CIA is a Keystone Cops outfit of laughable proportions but surely even they would have presented the White House with the intel on what was likely to develop, then what was developing as the civil war progressed. There is clearly a lethal combination in the WH / CIA mix under this US Administration.

The Brits can't get off scott-free as in their system a similar cock-up has occurred.

Syria civil war: Hundreds of radicalised fighters are already back in the UK, warns former MI6 chief (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/syria-civil-war-mi6-fears-the-jihadist-enemy-within-9554429.html)


Mr Barrett is co-author of a new report, released this month, which states that the Syrian war “is likely to be an incubator for a new generation of terrorists” and reveals that more than 12,000 foreign fighters have gone to Syria since the war began. That is more than the 10,000 who went to Afghanistan during the decade-long jihad against Russian occupation. One in four foreign fighters in Syria is from the West – part of a global phenomenon, with fighters from more than 80 countries represented on the battlefield.

(Added by Moderator) The cited report, from the Soufan Group, was posted four days ago on the main thread on foreign fighters and is:http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf

Just in case some smart guy throws out the Monday morning quarterback line this is what I posted on 09-24-2012 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=141002&postcount=56):


Same holds with Syria as it did with Libya... arm the opposition at your peril.And as referred to in the Libya thread on 04-11-2011 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=119085&postcount=693):


I suggest that the strategy should have been to bring the end to the Gaddafi regime without the population getting militarised and gaining war experience in the process. This apart from the future best interests of Libya itself but also in case a western coalition has to return one day it would be better to face the current stumble-bum Keystone Cops than some switched-on and experienced militia or army.

Don't arm or train the rebels... just concentrate on taking Gaddafi out (within the constraints of the UNSC resolutions of course) ;) How does one explain the recurring incompetent decision making at the highest level in two of the world's major nations?

Bill Moore
06-23-2014, 08:56 AM
JMA,

I don't recall seeing these posts, but they are great insights. I think we put blind faith and too much emphasis on surrogates or using the buzz phrase "through, by and with" approach. This approach certainly has application in some cases, but it is not want we should depend upon for our national security. As you correctly point, militarizing a populace to pursue our goals can have long term negative blow back against our national interests. Perhaps removing Qaddafi unilaterally with U.S. or NATO forces without supporting a rebellion would have been a much better option. This is one reason I argued against providing support to rebels in Syria, we would never provide enough to be decisive, and our aid would simply prolong the conflict resulting a war like society that ultimately makes stabilizing the region much, much harder.

JMA
06-24-2014, 05:03 PM
Bill, IMHO there is also a place for the use of surrogates but with the caveat that the potential for a spill over of unintended consequences have been carefully considered.

I have mentioned - in a simplistic manner - the potential for accurately targeted interventions against the individual causing of problems. JMA's 3-Cruise-Missile-Option.

I continue to be amazed how the Gaddafi, Assad etc etc can get away with unspeakable crimes and not be held personally responsible while thousands of their countrymen are killed by them and again later in the process of trying to dislodge them.

So while I have stated way back that the rebels in Syria should not have been armed I did advocate that a personalized strike on Assad himself would be quite acceptable.

It is not that I am so smart but rather that so many in decision making positions are so damn stupid.



JMA,

I don't recall seeing these posts, but they are great insights. I think we put blind faith and too much emphasis on surrogates or using the buzz phrase "through, by and with" approach. This approach certainly has application in some cases, but it is not want we should depend upon for our national security. As you correctly point, militarizing a populace to pursue our goals can have long term negative blow back against our national interests. Perhaps removing Qaddafi unilaterally with U.S. or NATO forces without supporting a rebellion would have been a much better option. This is one reason I argued against providing support to rebels in Syria, we would never provide enough to be decisive, and our aid would simply prolong the conflict resulting a war like society that ultimately makes stabilizing the region much, much harder.

TheCurmudgeon
06-24-2014, 07:55 PM
JMA,

I don't recall seeing these posts, but they are great insights. I think we put blind faith and too much emphasis on surrogates or using the buzz phrase "through, by and with" approach. This approach certainly has application in some cases, but it is not want we should depend upon for our national security. As you correctly point, militarizing a populace to pursue our goals can have long term negative blow back against our national interests. Perhaps removing Qaddafi unilaterally with U.S. or NATO forces without supporting a rebellion would have been a much better option. This is one reason I argued against providing support to rebels in Syria, we would never provide enough to be decisive, and our aid would simply prolong the conflict resulting a war like society that ultimately makes stabilizing the region much, much harder.

Bill, by “removing Qaddafi unilaterally with U.S. or NATO Forces..." you mean declare war on a sovereign nation? As impractical as it may be arming the local population and becoming involved only once there is an alternative government body that you can deal with, it is more appropriate response than unilateral invasion. It also does not create a group of foreign fighters – a situation different from Syria.

Syria is drawing in foreign fighters for ideological reasons, but that does not guarantee that any of these fighters will return to their homelands to wreak havoc. A large number of Americans went off to Spain to fight fascism against the wishes of the U.S. government and they did not return en mass to start killing people. There is no guarantee that they will continue the fight once back home.

I understand JMA’s admonitions, but I think that each situation needs to be considered separately. You also need to know who are in the lines of succession - who is the next Devil you will have to deal with? Also, dictatorial leaders dominate a population. Once that leviathan is removed, all the other sectarian conflicts will rise to the surface. With it unlikely that the population has ever dealt with parliamentary politics each group will seek the greatest advantage for themselves while simultaneously trying to seek vengeance for real or perceived injustice. It is rarely as simple as killing Qaddafi.

JMA
06-25-2014, 02:54 AM
Bill, by “removing Qaddafi unilaterally with U.S. or NATO Forces..." you mean declare war on a sovereign nation?

Why the surprise?

You don't remember Operation Just Cause - the US invasion of Panama in 1989 where Noriega was 'lifted'. A 80% public approval in the US for the action.

The US now certainly has the wherewithal to target the leadership of such countries - in other words the cause of the problem - without getting tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians killed through some unimaginative conventional method of removing such criminal leadership.

We can discuss what level of sovereignity a criminal or illegal - non-democratically elected - government can hide behind if you wish.

JMA
06-25-2014, 03:06 AM
I understand JMA’s admonitions, but I think that each situation needs to be considered separately. You also need to know who are in the lines of succession - who is the next Devil you will have to deal with? Also, dictatorial leaders dominate a population. Once that leviathan is removed, all the other sectarian conflicts will rise to the surface. With it unlikely that the population has ever dealt with parliamentary politics each group will seek the greatest advantage for themselves while simultaneously trying to seek vengeance for real or perceived injustice. It is rarely as simple as killing Qaddafi.

Well are these various situations being 'considered separately' by the recent US administrations? I don't think so. It is clearly apparent that the 'smart guys' in these Administrations are not as smart as they think they are.

Part of any intelligent planning process factors in the Law of Unintended Consequences based on the intel and background of the situation provided by (in the case of the US) I suppose State and the CIA (yea I know those Keystone Cops guys again).

Then we get onto the subject of the wisdom of forcing these diverse groups to remain trapped within the arbitary boundaries - called countries - if you wish.

TheCurmudgeon
06-25-2014, 02:05 PM
Why the surprise?

You don't remember Operation Just Cause - the US invasion of Panama in 1989 where Noriega was 'lifted'. A 80% public approval in the US for the action.

The US now certainly has the wherewithal to target the leadership of such countries - in other words the cause of the problem - without getting tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians killed through some unimaginative conventional method of removing such criminal leadership.

We can discuss what level of sovereignity a criminal or illegal - non-democratically elected - government can hide behind if you wish.

JMA, I am not surprised. I was a little surprised to see Bill interested in the idea.

I have no allusions about these things. There is no such thing as International Law; there is only what various actors can get away with. The larger the power, the more you can get away with. We complain about the Crimea but we had much less justification to invade Grenada, although the justification was similar – we needed to go in and protect American students at a university - they needed to protect Russians in the Crimea.

TheCurmudgeon
06-25-2014, 02:14 PM
Well are these various situations being 'considered separately' by the recent US administrations? I don't think so. It is clearly apparent that the 'smart guys' in these Administrations are not as smart as they think they are.

Part of any intelligent planning process factors in the Law of Unintended Consequences based on the intel and background of the situation provided by (in the case of the US) I suppose State and the CIA (yea I know those Keystone Cops guys again).

Then we get onto the subject of the wisdom of forcing these diverse groups to remain trapped within the arbitary boundaries - called countries - if you wish.

I agree with you up to the point of using the Law of Unintended Consequences. That law speaks more to the Rumsfeldian “unknown unknowns.” Bush the Wise knew not to overthrow Saddam because of the chaos it would unleash. Bush the Foolish intentionally disregarded what should have been common knowledge with the foolhardy belief that we could all live together – “Peace in our time.”

The grunts at CIA and maybe even State probably understand these things, but Presidential policy inevitably skews what information actually gets through the layers of appointees to the top.

Maeda Toshiie
06-25-2014, 04:15 PM
Bill, IMHO there is also a place for the use of surrogates but with the caveat that the potential for a spill over of unintended consequences have been carefully considered.

I have mentioned - in a simplistic manner - the potential for accurately targeted interventions against the individual causing of problems. JMA's 3-Cruise-Missile-Option.

I continue to be amazed how the Gaddafi, Assad etc etc can get away with unspeakable crimes and not be held personally responsible while thousands of their countrymen are killed by them and again later in the process of trying to dislodge them.

So while I have stated way back that the rebels in Syria should not have been armed I did advocate that a personalized strike on Assad himself would be quite acceptable.

It is not that I am so smart but rather that so many in decision making positions are so damn stupid.

Is that even possible? I highly doubt the necessary intel for real time targeting is available.

JMA
06-26-2014, 01:02 PM
Is that even possible? I highly doubt the necessary intel for real time targeting is available.

The theory (my theory) is that you may not actually kill him (the targeted leader) but you will drive him underground and make life as intolerable for him as he has made it for his subjects.

Let me give you a very broad summary of events...

The 3-cruise missile theory.

The first missile is aimed at a strategic military target. Something like the most loyal troops like a Presidential Guard or the like. This makes the point that troops loyal to the 'target' can and will be targeted.

The second missile is aimed that the official residence of the 'target' at 24 hours notice. He won't be there when it arrives but the message will be clear.

The third missle will be reserved for a strike on the target. A reward of $1m (or more) will be promised for information on the location of the 'target' leading to a successful strike on him but probably won't be used.

As with Gadaffi and Saddam who moved a few times a day to avoid being in one place long enough to offer a target the strain becomes unbearable (as these people are used to the world revolving around them in their time and not having to keep moving out of fear for their lives). The result is that even their supporters avoid them as they do not wish to be collateral damage in the event of a strike and they themselves begin to trust no one and eventually offer a nice isolated target for a strike or a visit from a special forces team.

The result... let the target fell the fear and don't end up having many thousands of civilians killed to get at the 'target' when the message will be clearly transmitted to the one who is the cause of all the problems that there is a cruise missile with his name on it.

If the use of quid pro quo cruise missile strikes had been used (in the manner I suggested) in Syria the regime could have/ would have been put under sever pressure without having to arm the rebels (and we know hat a stupid policy that has been).

Dayuhan
06-26-2014, 11:52 PM
The theory (my theory) is that you may not actually kill him (the targeted leader) but you will drive him underground and make life as intolerable for him as he has made it for his subjects.

Let me give you a very broad summary of events...

The 3-cruise missile theory.

The first missile is aimed at a strategic military target. Something like the most loyal troops like a Presidential Guard or the like. This makes the point that troops loyal to the 'target' can and will be targeted.

The second missile is aimed that the official residence of the 'target' at 24 hours notice. He won't be there when it arrives but the message will be clear.

The third missle will be reserved for a strike on the target. A reward of $1m (or more) will be promised for information on the location of the 'target' leading to a successful strike on him but probably won't be used.

As with Gadaffi and Saddam who moved a few times a day to avoid being in one place long enough to offer a target the strain becomes unbearable (as these people are used to the world revolving around them in their time and not having to keep moving out of fear for their lives). The result is that even their supporters avoid them as they do not wish to be collateral damage in the event of a strike and they themselves begin to trust no one and eventually offer a nice isolated target for a strike or a visit from a special forces team.

The result... let the target fell the fear and don't end up having many thousands of civilians killed to get at the 'target' when the message will be clearly transmitted to the one who is the cause of all the problems that there is a cruise missile with his name on it.

If the use of quid pro quo cruise missile strikes had been used (in the manner I suggested) in Syria the regime could have/ would have been put under sever pressure without having to arm the rebels (and we know hat a stupid policy that has been).

Ok, so you've fired off your three missiles. The dictator goes underground, his army disperses. They issue a statement telling you to stick your missiles where the sun don't shine, and proceed to do more of whatever it was you objected to in the first place. Your bluff has been called. Now what do you do? Do you escalate, and (assuming you're in the awkward position of leading a democracy) face the wrath of your populace and rest of the political edifice? Do you back down? Or do you just stand there buck naked with your putz shriveling in a cold breeze?

I can't see how it's a good idea to start firing off missiles based on assumptions about how somebody else is going to react, because you don't know how they're going to react. I can't see how it's a good idea to start something you aren't willing to finish: if you don't have a viable and politically feasible plan to escalate if plan A fails, better keep your missile in your pants, because once you're in, you're in.

I agree on not arming the rebels, unless of course there is some faction that you really want to see win and that you really think can win, both contentions requiring very realistic assessment and full awareness that you might be wrong. However, just because you don't arm the rebels doesn't mean they won't get arms. They will. People make ways. If they don't get them from you, they'll get them from someone else: no shortage of actors and agendas out there. If they want to fight, they will. If the dictator falls, different factions will fight it out to fill the vacuum. These things are not ours to control, and will happen whether we like it or not.

TheCurmudgeon
06-27-2014, 02:06 AM
The theory (my theory) is that you may not actually kill him (the targeted leader) but you will drive him underground and make life as intolerable for him as he has made it for his subjects.

Let me give you a very broad summary of events...

The 3-cruise missile theory.

The first missile is aimed at a strategic military target. Something like the most loyal troops like a Presidential Guard or the like. This makes the point that troops loyal to the 'target' can and will be targeted.

The second missile is aimed that the official residence of the 'target' at 24 hours notice. He won't be there when it arrives but the message will be clear.

The third missle will be reserved for a strike on the target. A reward of $1m (or more) will be promised for information on the location of the 'target' leading to a successful strike on him but probably won't be used.

As with Gadaffi and Saddam who moved a few times a day to avoid being in one place long enough to offer a target the strain becomes unbearable (as these people are used to the world revolving around them in their time and not having to keep moving out of fear for their lives). The result is that even their supporters avoid them as they do not wish to be collateral damage in the event of a strike and they themselves begin to trust no one and eventually offer a nice isolated target for a strike or a visit from a special forces team.

The result... let the target fell the fear and don't end up having many thousands of civilians killed to get at the 'target' when the message will be clearly transmitted to the one who is the cause of all the problems that there is a cruise missile with his name on it.

If the use of quid pro quo cruise missile strikes had been used (in the manner I suggested) in Syria the regime could have/ would have been put under sever pressure without having to arm the rebels (and we know hat a stupid policy that has been).

Again, killing the target, in this case Assad, is no guarantee that the next person in line is better, or that there will even be a orderly transition of power. The result could be total anarchy. At least with Assad in power you have someone to negotiate with.

Seems to me you want to know what you are going to get next before you pull that trigger.:confused:

JMA
06-27-2014, 02:55 AM
Again, killing the target, in this case Assad, is no guarantee that the next person in line is better, or that there will even be a orderly transition of power.

Yes that is always a consideration when one considers an assassination.


The result could be total anarchy. At least with Assad in power you have someone to negotiate with.

Yea, over the bodies of 160,000 civilians.

I guess you don't understand the concept I propose. No matter.


Seems to me you want to know what you are going to get next before you pull that trigger.:confused:

Obviously.

You want to anticipate the consequences, intended and unintended, of all actions before proceeding.

JMA
06-27-2014, 10:32 AM
Oh, you are back.

Enjoy the little rant?

Seriously Steve - as I have told you before - I have little interest in discussing anything of this nature with someone with zero military background.



Ok, so you've fired off your three missiles. The dictator goes underground, his army disperses. They issue a statement telling you to stick your missiles where the sun don't shine, and proceed to do more of whatever it was you objected to in the first place. Your bluff has been called. Now what do you do? Do you escalate, and (assuming you're in the awkward position of leading a democracy) face the wrath of your populace and rest of the political edifice? Do you back down? Or do you just stand there buck naked with your putz shriveling in a cold breeze?

I can't see how it's a good idea to start firing off missiles based on assumptions about how somebody else is going to react, because you don't know how they're going to react. I can't see how it's a good idea to start something you aren't willing to finish: if you don't have a viable and politically feasible plan to escalate if plan A fails, better keep your missile in your pants, because once you're in, you're in.

I agree on not arming the rebels, unless of course there is some faction that you really want to see win and that you really think can win, both contentions requiring very realistic assessment and full awareness that you might be wrong. However, just because you don't arm the rebels doesn't mean they won't get arms. They will. People make ways. If they don't get them from you, they'll get them from someone else: no shortage of actors and agendas out there. If they want to fight, they will. If the dictator falls, different factions will fight it out to fill the vacuum. These things are not ours to control, and will happen whether we like it or not.

JMA
06-27-2014, 10:38 AM
Obama seeks $500M to train, equip Syrian rebels (http://news.yahoo.com/obama-seeks-500m-train-equip-syrian-rebels-185903098--politics.html)


With the conflicts in Syria and Iraq becoming increasingly intertwined against the same Sunni extremist group, President Barack Obama moved on Thursday to ratchet up U.S. efforts to strengthen more moderate Syrian rebels.

First he does nothing (or very little) then he does the wrong thing.

Reminds me of the Churchill quote (which is certainly applicable to this administration):

"You can always count on Americans to do the right thing - after they've tried everything else."

SWJ Blog
06-27-2014, 08:00 PM
Obama Wants $500 Million to Train Syrian Rebels. Now What? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/obama-wants-500-million-to-train-syrian-rebels-now-what)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
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davidbfpo
07-02-2014, 02:15 PM
A long article by a SME via Open Democracy; with a short opening summary:
Why is the Syrian Army, against all predictions, winning the war in Syria? One has to delve into the history of the Syrian state since independence to understand how the military shaped the state and learned to divide its opponents.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/kamal-alam/pax-syriana-neither-vanquished-nor-allconquering

Some history given refers to fighting the IDF, which was a "hot" topic on another thread on the 1982 war.

TheCurmudgeon
07-02-2014, 11:11 PM
Yea, over the bodies of 160,000 civilians.

I guess you don't understand the concept I propose. No matter.


I think I understand it, I just think it is simplistic.This is from research (http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/017/7167.pdf) on killing the head of terrorist organizations as a tactic, but the principal is the same.


In general, the study found that the decapitation strategy
appears to have little effect on the reduction of terrorist activity. The most notable trend from the statistical analysis was that decapitation strikes on religious terrorist groups tended to be followed by sharp increases in fatalities. This could be an important indication that decapitation strikes should be carefully considered on the basis of the type of group targeted. As this strategy is currently viewed to be effective by policy makers and is supported by public opinion, more data should be gathered in order to thoroughly study the efficacy of the tactic.

The British finally gave us these types of targeted killing of IRA members in part because there was never anyone in power long enough to negotiate a final peace. Killings don't change the nature of the grievances, the reason people fight, or the dynamics of the game, it only alters the players.

I doubt that killing Assad, even if accomplished in the early days of the conflict, would have resulted in a lower death toll. It is not a solution that can bring a conflict to an end. There will have to be trials for war crime, reintegration of fighters, and a peace and reconciliation commission to bring closure to the war.

Without a massive commitment of forces from outside Syria, it will end in one of two ways. Assad, or someone like Assad (probably more brutal) wins; or the country is divided with Assad remaining in power in "South Syria" and a food fight over the north. That food fight will be just as bloody.

Bill Moore
07-03-2014, 05:15 AM
A long article by a SME via Open Democracy; with a short opening summary:

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/kamal-alam/pax-syriana-neither-vanquished-nor-allconquering

Some history given refers to fighting the IDF, which was a "hot" topic on another thread on the 1982 war.

Not all of predicted the Syrian army would lose. I never saw any indication they would. They maintained external support, they're moderately well trained for an Arab army, they're willing to fight, and their opposition is divided.

Those that predicted his fall were the hardcore population centric crowd who think popular will is the determining factor. Hopefully this serves as a wake up call to challenge some of our naive views on warfare. I also don't think we should have provided support to the rebels. The only faction organized enough to establish control were the extremists. Live and learn or not.

JMA
07-03-2014, 10:59 AM
I think I understand it, I just think it is simplistic.This is from research (http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/017/7167.pdf) on killing the head of terrorist organizations as a tactic, but the principal is the same.

Your reference relates to: "Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?"

Did I ever say that it did?

Would that be the only possible reason to target insurgent leadership?

You clearly neither understand what I stated nor the wider view towards he targeting of insurgent/terrorist leadership.

Then again we see from the following study: Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark (http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00157) where it concludes:


Ultimately, however, leadership targeting alone is not enough to effectively fight a strong and emboldened terrorist organization.

Again, I would ask the author - with tears in my eyes - why she assumes that leadership targeting is the sole strategy employed to fight the organisation.


The British finally gave us these types of targeted killing of IRA members in part because there was never anyone in power long enough to negotiate a final peace. Killings don't change the nature of the grievances, the reason people fight, or the dynamics of the game, it only alters the players.

I am not aware of the British policy in this regard but would assume that the legality of 'murdering' citizens of their country was a significant factor.


I doubt that killing Assad, even if accomplished in the early days of the conflict, would have resulted in a lower death toll. It is not a solution that can bring a conflict to an end. There will have to be trials for war crime, reintegration of fighters, and a peace and reconciliation commission to bring closure to the war.

No, no, no. Where do you get this stuff from? Syria is not the US and they have never been concerned with what the US thought - certainly since 1971 when daddy took charge. Let us assume that the CIA was in fact a competent outfit and they had an accurate assesment of the Syrian hierarchy and the importance and value of each of the component role players. They would be in a position to identify the demise of which persons would lead/contribute to the strategic result sought by the US in Syria (taking into account any possible negative or unintended consequences).


Without a massive commitment of forces from outside Syria, it will end in one of two ways. Assad, or someone like Assad (probably more brutal) wins; or the country is divided with Assad remaining in power in "South Syria" and a food fight over the north. That food fight will be just as bloody.

No...

Once again you miss the point.

The world is now faced with the outcome - 160,000 dead and massive infrastructure damage - as a result of the actions (or inaction if you prefer) over the last few years. In any such situation it is always a matter of who dies/gets killed. In this case we have seen (the majority of the) 160,000 killed being as civilians and citizens rising up against an illegitimate and brutal dictatorship. I certainly would not be outraged if the dead comprised the military and supporters of the Assad regime. Because of the carnage there must be no doubt that the need for revenge (a beast alive and well in the heart of the Arab) will have its day and this is not only as a result of the years under the brutal Assad dictatorship but in addition the 160,000 deaths in the last few years. Yes the blood will flow... and probably with some justification. Why would you want to protect the perpetrators?

Now please read this:

Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns (http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00076#.U7UL1hZRf1o)


Is killing or capturing insurgent leaders an effective tactic? Previous research on interstate war and counterterrorism has suggested that targeting enemy leaders does not work. Most studies of the efficacy of leadership decapitation, however, have relied on unsystematic evidence and poor research design. An analysis based on fresh evidence and a new research design indicates the opposite relationship and yields four key findings. First, campaigns are more likely to end quickly when counterinsurgents successfully target enemy leaders. Second, counterinsurgents who capture or kill insurgent leaders are significantly more likely to defeat insurgencies than those who fail to capture or kill such leaders. Third, the intensity of a conflict is likelier to decrease following the successful removal of an enemy leader than it is after a failed attempt. Fourth, insurgent attacks are more likely to decrease after successful leadership decapitations than after failed attempts. Additional analysis suggests that these findings are attributable to successful leadership decapitation, and that the relationship between decapitation and campaign success holds across different types of insurgencies.

Thanks for the references, Mike

TheCurmudgeon
07-03-2014, 01:26 PM
Once again you miss the point.

The world is now faced with the outcome - 160,000 dead and massive infrastructure damage - as a result of the actions (or inaction if you prefer) over the last few years. In any such situation it is always a matter of who dies/gets killed. In this case we have seen (the majority of the) 160,000 killed being as civilians and citizens rising up against an illegitimate and brutal dictatorship. I certainly would not be outraged if the dead comprised the military and supporters of the Assad regime. Because of the carnage there must be no doubt that the need for revenge (a beast alive and well in the heart of the Arab) will have its day and this is not only as a result of the years under the brutal Assad dictatorship but in addition the 160,000 deaths in the last few years. Yes the blood will flow... and probably with some justification. Why would you want to protect the perpetrators?


I am afraid that I am missing your point. I will go back over the conversation and see where I missed the mark. If there is a post you made that has your central thesis please point me to it.




Now please read this:

Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns (http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00076#.U7UL1hZRf1o)


I am familiar with this paper. I don't like it for two reasons. The first is that, while Mr. Johnson complains about other research using poor data sets, he cherry picks his data to include only instances where there was an attempt on the life of key leaders. He then breaks it into two groups; successful and unsuccessful attempts. There is no comparison to any other situation where an insurgency or civil war ended.

He also considers success in a very short term temporal way. For example of the 44 successful decapitations Chad appears 3 times, Indonesia – 3, Philippines – 2, Pakistan – 2, Sri Lanka – 2, Algeria - 6 times, and India a whopping 11 times. So India successfully decapitated the insurgent leaders eleven times but did not find peace. In Algeria the government killed the leader of the same group, the GIA, 5 times. This is what the author sees as success. Of the 44 instances of successful decapitation only 8 nations appear only once on the list. One of those is the US and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi which allegedly ended the insurgency in Iraq. So no, I find this work less than convincing.

He is using a well recognized effect, the short term disorganization that occurs after a key leader is killed, to extrapolate that killing key leaders is an effective tactic for ending insurgencies. There is little in this paper that changes my opinion that you cannot truely end an insurgency or civil war without addressing the key issues and bringing closure through the appropriate trials and tribunals.



Thanks for the references, Mike

No problem, I just wish I could link to articles on JSTOR, but most people don't have access.

JMA
07-03-2014, 07:06 PM
I am afraid that I am missing your point.

Yes you are in assuming that advocates of targetting insurgent leadership believe it is a 'sliver bullet' for ending the conflict.

It is not... if correctly implemented it can and does dislocate the insurgent's command and control and thereby its operations as a component of the overall strategy.

US and Brit special forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan have 'taken out' (probably) hundreds of 'leaders' over the years. They are replaced by more junior and less experienced fighters and the war continues... but each time a little less effectively.

I would accept any criticism that the McChristal/Lamb team placed way too much emphasis on such killing. They may have had their reasons for doing so.

davidbfpo
07-04-2014, 06:50 PM
A short BBC story, by Newsnight, which in summary was a British military designed option:
The plan was called Extract, Equip, Train... a shock and awe attack that would allow the Syrians themselves to defeat Assad....Once the Syrian force was ready, it would march on Damascus, with the cover of fighter jets from the West and Gulf allies.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28148943 and http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10945457/Britain-planned-to-train-and-equip-100000-Syrian-rebels.html

Bill Moore
07-04-2014, 08:06 PM
David,

Assad is a tyrant and a leader who made a relatively small crisis a regional crisis due to his poor response to it. On the other hand, what I fail to understand is why the West and others are so adamant that getting rid of Assad at this time is in our interests. I believe the greatest threat to the West is AQism linked extremists. Assad is fighting the same adversary we are for very different reasons. Removing Assad could expand the safe haven for AQ, not shrink it. We assume that if Assad is removed a moderate government will form, and go after the al-Nusra and ISIS. Maybe, but that seems to be a very optimistic assumption. Thoughts?

davidbfpo
07-04-2014, 10:13 PM
David,

Assad is a tyrant and a leader who made a relatively small crisis a regional crisis due to his poor response to it. On the other hand, what I fail to understand is why the West and others are so adamant that getting rid of Assad at this time is in our interests. I believe the greatest threat to the West is AQism linked extremists. Assad is fighting the same adversary we are for very different reasons. Removing Assad could expand the safe haven for AQ, not shrink it. We assume that if Assad is removed a moderate government will form, and go after the al-Nusra and ISIS. Maybe, but that seems to be a very optimistic assumption. Thoughts?

Bill,

Part of the problem, certainly from my UK viewpoint,, is that very few understood Syria, including the almost fascist regime apparatus and rather stupidly thought the initial peaceful protests should be supported - if only with rhetoric or political statements.

To be fair the UK, along with some Western states, has got intself into a situation where few understand let alone argue about 'interests' that may overwhelm domestic / universal principles of human rights. An argument hard to make when the regime's response was so harsh, children being tortured @ Der'ea and shooting protestors.

Into the Syrian civil war came the AQ-linked groups, which had virtually no independent presence in Syria beforehand. Funded by the "usual suspects" and neighbours having their own interests.

I was struck by the almost complete absence of any reporting on the still considerable Palestinian community being caught in the middle, until June this year:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27969293 The 'radical' or rejectionist factions of the PLO for years were hosted in Syria, not that a record of success e.g.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/As-Sa%27iqa

Elsewhere SWC have debated IIRC what is the greatest threat to the West, which is wider than the UK & USA. It is not AQ IMHO; our greatest threat is ourselves - preferring comfort at home and please stop showing footage of 'orrible people doing dastardly things to each other.

Bill Moore
07-05-2014, 03:03 AM
Posted by David


Into the Syrian civil war came the AQ-linked groups, which had virtually no independent presence in Syria beforehand. Funded by the "usual suspects" and neighbours having their own interests.

Once more information is made available by analysts instead of the media spin masters I believe the above statement will be proven to be false. al-Qaeda wasn't the cause of the rebellion, but as a networked organization they had nodes in Syria that were established during the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and those logistics networks which can support movement both ways still exist.

This enabled AQ linked groups to respond quickly to the opportunity the rebellion created. It is unfortunate that AQ is present in both Iraq and Syria, because it does distort the West's perception that every Sunni fighter is affiliated with AQ. They're not, but AQ is active, and they have the most the effective groups, and those groups pose a threat to us. To pretend otherwise is as foolish is pretending AQ is the only faction opposing the governments in Iraq and Syria.

There also seems to be some truth that groups that are successful create their own gravitational pull and members from less effective groups join the winning team.

More important than AQ centeral is the concept of al-Qaedaism which is various groups and individuals embracing the idea of violent jihad to establish a caliphate, so the idea behinds UBL's AQ will always remain relevant despite our attempts to wish it away. I'll shock some readers, but it relevant much like Jesus remains relevant to the over 200 plus sects of Christianity. A lot of nuances between the sects, but they all believe in Jesus being the son of God.

In Syria, and Iraq, we have both the idea and a network that was able to exploit the situations there to become a central actor in the rebellions. It really doesn't matter if they're directed by AQ leadership in Pakistan does it? Networked groups don't have to have central leadership. Networks have a lot of characteristics we still haven't come to grips with yet, but one of them is the ability to surge, or swarm, to exploit opportunity, which is what happened in Syria, and now Iraq. We have asymmetrical views of the conflict, as state actors we attempt to view the revolts in Syria and Iraq as two separate fights, the non-state actors don't recognize the borders, so they view it differently and until we understand that I doubt our ability to come up with an effective strategy to more effectively manage this threat. It is easy to see this when we hear our political leaders talking about the governments in Syria and Iraq as the primary determinants in our response, when in reality the government in Iraq is becoming less relevant. This is where a case for adapting and exploring the human domain concept can be made to develop alternative options to supporting or opposing a particular government, but I digress.

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=27&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CFYQFjAGOBQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.strategicstudiesinstitute.arm y.mil%2Fpubs%2Fdownload.cfm%3Fq%3D1210&ei=fD-3U4mgJM_joASu9YCgCQ&usg=AFQjCNEnlsH2uAJGoEzaJz9Hfhqg5d-A2Q&sig2=QgCJ7Ge2YPedFTtBCs6nWQ&bvm=bv.70138588,d.cGU



In his July 18, 2013, testimony to the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade, Thomas Joscelyn
defined al-Qaeda as:
a global international terrorist network, with a general
command in Afghanistan and Pakistan and affiliates
in several countries. Together, they form a robust
network that, despite setbacks, contests for territory
abroad and still poses a threat to U.S. interests both
overseas and at home.6

Not familiar with the next journal, but the information seems to jive with what I know and suspect.

http://www.vox.com/2014/6/13/5803712/11-things-iraq-crisis-isis

11 facts that explain the escalating crisis in Iraq


3. ISIS thrives on tension between Iraq's two largest religious groups

Perhaps the single most important factor in ISIS' recent resurgence is the conflict between Iraqi Shias and Iraqi Sunnis. ISIS fighters themselves are Sunnis, and the tension between the two groups is a powerful recruiting tool for ISIS.


When ISIS reestablished itself, it put Sunni sectarianism at the heart of its identity and propaganda. The government persecution, according to the Washington Institute for Near East Studies' Michael Knights, "played right into their hands." Maliki "made all the ISIS propaganda real, accurate." That made it much, much easier for ISIS to replenish its fighting stock.

That wasn't the only way the Iraqi government helped ISIS grow, according to Knights. The US and Iraqi governments released a huge number of al-Qaeda prisoners from jail, which he thinks called "an unprecedented infusion of skilled, networked terrorist manpower - an infusion at a scale the world has never seen."


7. The Syria conflict has made ISIS much stronger

When fighting Syrian troops, ISIS can safely retreat to Iraq; when fighting Iraqis it can go to Syria. Statistical evidence says these safe "rear areas" help insurgents win: "one of the best predictors of insurgent success that we have to date is the presence of a rear area," Jason Lyall, a political scientist at Yale University who studies insurgencies, said.

At the end of the day Bob is right, poor governance (greatly understated in this case) created the opportunity, but I think once the fighting escalates to the point it is now that good governance won't stop it. It has its own momentum, and the issues become broader, the people become militarized, compromise is a dream at this point, so if there is a desire to end the fighting a side must be defeated militarily. Then good governance may be able to consolidate the peace gained.

SWJ Blog
07-05-2014, 10:40 PM
Have The Islamist Militants Overreached In Iraq And Syria? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/have-the-islamist-militants-overreached-in-iraq-and-syria)

Entry Excerpt:



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SWJ Blog
07-07-2014, 05:31 PM
6 Strategies for Syria and Iraq (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/6-strategies-for-syria-and-iraq)

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SWJ Blog
07-19-2014, 02:30 AM
LANDPOWER: Russia, Syria, China, and Drones (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/landpower-russia-syria-china-and-drones)

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SWJ Blog
07-19-2014, 11:51 AM
Raqqa: From Regime Overthrow to Inter-Rebel Fighting (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/raqqa-from-regime-overthrow-to-inter-rebel-fighting)

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davidbfpo
07-23-2014, 11:36 PM
A short article by a Syrian diplomat who has defected. Maybe nothing new for SWC readers, but IIRC not written by a Syrian who was an insider.

Here is one passage:
ISIS’s role in Syria fits into a plan that has worked for Assad on several occasions. When a crisis emerges, Assad pushes his opponents to spend as much time as possible in developing a response. While implementing such diplomatic stalls, he floods the crisis with distractions designed to divert attention away from Syrian government misdeeds. His favorite diversion is terrorism, because it establishes him as a necessary force to contain it. In the meantime, world events wash away international focus on the initial crisis.

Link:http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/inside-assad-s-playbook-time-and-terror#.U9AVhi5hN19.facebook

SWJ Blog
08-14-2014, 01:10 AM
US Airstrikes Helped, But Kurds From Syria Turned Tide Against Islamic State (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-airstrikes-helped-but-kurds-from-syria-turned-tide-against-islamic-state)

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SWJ Blog
08-16-2014, 05:08 AM
State Piracy in Syria (And Iraq) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/state-piracy-in-syria-and-iraq)

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davidbfpo
08-16-2014, 11:44 PM
A detailed WaPo article, with many links, that looks back to the early days of the Syrian Civil War 'Would arming Syria’s rebels have stopped the Islamic State?':http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/08/11/would-arming-syrias-rebels-have-stopped-the-islamic-state/

It starts with:
Former secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton made news this weekend (http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/hillary-clinton-failure-to-help-syrian-rebels-led-to-the-rise-of-isis/375832/) by suggesting that the rise of the Islamic State might have been prevented had the Obama administration moved to more aggressively arm Syrian rebels in 2012. Variants of this narrative have been repeated so often by so many different (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/former-ambassador-to-syria-urges-increasing-arms-supply-to-moderate-rebels.html?_r=1) people in so many venues that it’s easy to forget how implausible this policy option really was.

(And ends with) Had the plan to arm Syria’s rebels been adopted back in 2012, the most likely scenario is that the war would still be raging and look much as it does today, except that the United States would be far more intimately and deeply involved. That’s a prospect that Clinton frankly acknowledged during her interview (http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/hillary-clinton-failure-to-help-syrian-rebels-led-to-the-rise-of-isis/375832/?single_page=true), but that somehow didn’t make it into the headline. As catastrophic as Syria’s war has been, and as alarming as the Islamic State has become, there has never been a plausible case to be made that more U.S. arms for Syrian rebels would have meaningfully altered their path.

CrowBat
08-20-2014, 06:33 AM
As catastrophic as Syria’s war has been, and as alarming as the Islamic State has become, there has never been a plausible case to be made that more U.S. arms for Syrian rebels would have meaningfully altered their path.Yeah, because all the plausible cases were declared for non-plausible....

But never mind: keep on trying everything else - before you do the right thing.

CrowBat
08-24-2014, 11:35 AM
Here some more food for thoughts of all those considering 'Assad the lesser evil' in Syria (in comparison to the ISIS):

Assad Policies Aided Rise of Islamic State Militant Group (http://online.wsj.com/articles/assad-policies-aided-rise-of-islamic-state-militant-group-1408739733)

The Islamic State... gained momentum early on from a calculated decision by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to go easy on it, according to people close to the regime.

Earlier in the three-year-old Syrian uprising, Mr. Assad decided to mostly avoid fighting the Islamic State to enable it to cannibalize the more secular rebel group...


...which is precisely what I'm 'implying' since longer.

Perhaps some there in the DC might think twice before coming to the idea to 'cooperate' with Assadists now.

carl
08-24-2014, 01:15 PM
Here some more food for thoughts of all those considering 'Assad the lesser evil' in Syria (in comparison to the ISIS):

Assad Policies Aided Rise of Islamic State Militant Group (http://online.wsj.com/articles/assad-policies-aided-rise-of-islamic-state-militant-group-1408739733)


...which is precisely what I'm 'implying' since longer.

Perhaps some there in the DC might think twice before coming to the idea to 'cooperate' with Assadists now.

One of the unpleasant things to consider is the DC genii may be more comfortable and therefore more willing to deal with an 'established' government, no matter how bad, than a bunch of ragamuffin rebels. The inside the beltway types wouldn't know exactly what to make of people who were grocers and doctors and demonstrably brave but without the proper credentials and discernible hierarchy. I think quite within the realm of probability they would rather stay within their bureaucratic comfort zone with the devil's representatives than venture out of that zone in the company of flawed angels.

Bill Moore
08-25-2014, 11:51 AM
One of the unpleasant things to consider is the DC genii may be more comfortable and therefore more willing to deal with an 'established' government, no matter how bad, than a bunch of ragamuffin rebels. The inside the beltway types wouldn't know exactly what to make of people who were grocers and doctors and demonstrably brave but without the proper credentials and discernible hierarchy. I think quite within the realm of probability they would rather stay within their bureaucratic comfort zone with the devil's representatives than venture out of that zone in the company of flawed angels.

Obviously true, but it may also be true that since there are several hundred different groups fighting Assad in Syria, that the most rational decision is to deal with the government?

carl
08-25-2014, 11:06 PM
Obviously true, but it may also be true that since there are several hundred different groups fighting Assad in Syria, that the most rational decision is to deal with the government?

No, the easiest thing to do is deal with the government. If there are lots of groups there are lots more chances you can find some pretty good people to work with. But it would take work, imagination, insight, Arabic language skills and it would be dangerous and uncertain.

It would be the most rational choice if your unstated objective was to make your life and career progression easier. But if your actual objective was the good of the USA and you took the easy route, you would have to admit to yourself that you weren't worth much.

Bill Moore
08-26-2014, 01:14 AM
Think there is more going on than you're giving our policy wonks credit for.

http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/223971.htm


However, based on our experience on the ground over the past year, we have been refocusing our activity. Over the past few months the State Department and USAID have stepped up efforts to channel resources directly to local and provincial governments and civil society groups, as well as the SOC.

Our focus is increasingly on ways to help communities maintain basic security, keep the lights on, provide water, food and basic medical care – staving off the advances of extremist groups who seek to exploit peoples’ desperation. It allows these localities to maintain the basic public institutions that will be so critical in rebuilding a post-Asad Syria.

In towns and cities under opposition control, we are beginning to provide cash grants to pay local law enforcement and teachers. We continue to train local councils and civil society organizations in administration and local governance. And we are providing equipment and supplies to help them, including heavy equipment such as generators, cranes, trucks, and ambulances. In one major city, for example, we have helped reopen 17 schools serving 9,300 students. In another major city, we funded the refurbishment of 60 police stations and are providing non-lethal equipment and basic stipends to 1,300 policemen, who are struggling to maintain order. Paying stipends not only helps keep these people on the job, but it also helps deprive the extremist groups of the chance to fill the vacuum themselves.

Make no mistake: this is extremely difficult work and nobody is saying that this assistance will turn the tide against what remains an extremely serious and deteriorating situation. As we learned in Iraq – even with 160,000 American troops, ten years of effort, tens of thousands of schools refurbished, and hundreds of millions of dollars spent – it takes generations to restore stability in societies wrecked by decades of dictatorship and civil wars.

There are several talks going with numerous groups, but I suspect if we're interested in crushing ISIL we may share a limited and common objective with Assad. The world isn't black and white, and I know you know that. I'm actually surprised by how much we are doing, and then if you consider what other countries from the region and Europe are doing there are plenty of helping and non-helping hands all working quietly to pursue their objectives.

What exactly do you think we need to do at this point?

Dayuhan
08-26-2014, 02:09 AM
No, the easiest thing to do is deal with the government. If there are lots of groups there are lots more chances you can find some pretty good people to work with. But it would take work, imagination, insight, Arabic language skills and it would be dangerous and uncertain.

Is it certain that we need to "work with" someone in Syria? Getting involved in a proxy war is a complicated and risky business... we need to have clear and specific goals and we'd need a plan B if our chosen proxy is unable to do the job. Do we have either?

CrowBat
08-26-2014, 07:31 AM
One of the unpleasant things to consider is the DC genii may be more comfortable and therefore more willing to deal with an 'established' government, no matter how bad, than a bunch of ragamuffin rebels.Theoretically, you're right.

In practice, the actual problem is that there is an immense (and growing) gap between what the intel is recommending and what the politics (i.e. political decision-makers) is doing.


...I think quite within the realm of probability they would rather stay within their bureaucratic comfort zone with the devil's representatives than venture out of that zone in the company of flawed angels.And I 'think' Obama (and all sorts of his supporters) is badly in need of an excuse for doing nothing at all - simply because he 'knows better'.

And what comes out of doing nothing... well, should a better example appear in the time of my life than this ISIS affair, I'll eat my hat.

Dayuhan
08-26-2014, 12:57 PM
In practice, the actual problem is that there is an immense (and growing) gap between what the intel is recommending and what the politics (i.e. political decision-makers) is doing.

Intel does not in itself recommend anything. It's information. It's one input into recommendations and decisions. I don't think any of us have access to the intel or the decision making process, and if we did we wouldn't be talking about it.


And I 'think' Obama (and all sorts of his supporters) is badly in need of an excuse for doing nothing at all - simply because he 'knows better'.

And what comes out of doing nothing... well, should a better example appear in the time of my life than this ISIS affair, I'll eat my hat.

As the Mark Lynch piece that David linked to points out:

Had the plan to arm Syria’s rebels been adopted back in 2012, the most likely scenario is that the war would still be raging and look much as it does today, except that the United States would be far more intimately and deeply involved... As catastrophic as Syria’s war has been, and as alarming as the Islamic State has become, there has never been a plausible case to be made that more U.S. arms for Syrian rebels would have meaningfully altered their path.

Did you actually read it? It's worth a look, even (especially) if you don't agree.

Bill Moore
08-26-2014, 07:43 PM
No, the easiest thing to do is deal with the government. If there are lots of groups there are lots more chances you can find some pretty good people to work with. But it would take work, imagination, insight, Arabic language skills and it would be dangerous and uncertain.

It would be the most rational choice if your unstated objective was to make your life and career progression easier. But if your actual objective was the good of the USA and you took the easy route, you would have to admit to yourself that you weren't worth much.

There are two assumptions in your argument, one is flat out wrong. First you're logic implies the U.S. not doing anything (wrong, we did things, so you obviously meant not enough) is why Syria ended up the way it is. Syria ended the way it is due to a host of local and regional factors that had nothing to do with the U.S.. When you embrace American Hubris views, then of course you view the world as though we're the center of all, and we are the cause and effect of all, but that has little to do with reality.

The other assumption is if we intervened to a greater extent there would be a different outcome. That may or may not be true. If we killed Assad and greatly neutered his military it is probable his regime would have fallen, but we have no clue what would have happened after that, but we sure as heck would own the problem at that point, and to what end?


But if your actual objective was the good of the USA and you took the easy route, you would have to admit to yourself that you weren't worth much.

This argument assumes that getting the U.S. involved in a regional quagmire would somehow be in our interest? Why isn't it in our interest to see both of our adversaries (Sunni extremists and Iran and their proxies) fight one another, and for once strain their economies instead of ours? Why can't we wait until there is an opportunity to actually achieve something that is in our interests? Removing Malaki would be one example, the situation was managed to great effect in that aspect, but who knows what the new government will do.

Since I'm not sure of the extent of support we're providing and to whom, I can't make an argument on whether we need to increase it our not, but I haven't see a good argument yet on why we should intervene, or should have, intervened, militarily in Syria. Everyone is making a lot of wild guesses made on sensational news reporting instead of facts, because the facts are not available the public.

We had our so called expert on Syria, and his/her expertise was due to tweeting back and forth to "one" person he/she knew in Syria. The first casualty of any conflict is the truth, but I would hope most people who visit SWJ have enough experience to realize that and try to look beyond the headlines.

In the end those clamoring for U.S. military involvement should provide a theory of change and identify a condition that we can feasibly obtain. None provided to date other than criticism for the U.S. policy wonks, and trust me I like to criticize them as much as any body else, but at the end of the day if we can't provide a sound strategy that is our interest, not one that merely satisfies our emotional craving to do something, then recognize the complaints for they really are, just background noise from frustrated people.

CrowBat
08-27-2014, 08:03 AM
There are two assumptions in your argument, one is flat out wrong. First you're logic implies the U.S. not doing anything (wrong, we did things, so you obviously meant not enough) is why Syria ended up the way it is...
Bill,
I'm the first to say that, a) 'no, the USA is no centre of the World'; b) 'no, the USA would not go killing Assad' even if WH decided to 'do something' about Syria; and c) there is no certainty about the outcome of a possible US intervention in that country.

BUT...

- A matter of fact is that this 'war on terror' against specific extremists is de-facto one of priorities in the foreign policy of the USA. It doesn't matter whether you like this fact or not, or whether you want to fight that war or not: you're 'Target No.1' on targeting lists of extremists in question.

- This results in conclusion that

a) whenever the USA fails to act, and especially when the USA fails to act preventively, extremists are going to exploit the situation to their advantage;

b) whenever the USA fails to act, majority (if not all) of the West is failing to act too;

c) whenever the USA fails to act and drags the West with it, most of pro-West actors around the World fail to act too, and

d) this is precisely what happened in Syria.

So, perhaps doing nothing in Syria was in 'best interest of the USA' - supposedly because 'getting USA involved in a regional quagmire is not in interest of the USA'. Fine. But, it resulted in nobody else - except extremists and their supporters, of course - doing anything at all. And that has made space for extremists. Worse yet: doing nothing in Syria resulted in massive frustrations for various of US friends in the Middle East, because it resulted in a direct threat for their security and simultaneous 'success' of their enemies.

Therefore: in this case, lack of US action resulted in an outright catastrophe - in Syria, and in Iraq.

If you think that's 'bolstering US interests in the Middle East'... well, perhaps you should go back to checking that with 2+2=4, too.

Furthermore:

This argument assumes that getting the U.S. involved in a regional quagmire would somehow be in our interest?You - the USA - are eyebrows-deep in that quagmire since at least 1942 (start of cooperation with Sauds and thus Wahhabists), indirectly since 1919 (King-Crane Comission), and very directly ever since, so where is the problem?

On the contrary, if you argument/think in this fashion, then the question is rather: why everywhere else (in the Middle East) but only not in Syria? Where's the logic in that?


Why isn't it in our interest to see both of our adversaries (Sunni extremists and Iran and their proxies) fight one another, and for once strain their economies instead of ours?Because whichever of them 'wins' (all provided that conflict is 'winnable' for one of involved belligerents) they remain your (US) enemies.

Means: whichever party wins there, it's only going to be reinforced by success.

Is this in US interest?


Why can't we wait until there is an opportunity to actually achieve something that is in our interests?Oh, no problem. You can repeat the exercise from the 1990s, and wait until another airplane crashes into some skyscraper - or something else of that kind happens.

It's your choice, really. You can ignore the fact that, in military terms, the ISIS is far more sophisticated than the AQ ever was. You can further prefer to offer them more time so they can get even better, too. No problem: just wait and see.


Removing Malaki would be one example, the situation was managed to great effect in that aspect, but who knows what the new government will do.That was near-pointless, and came much too late.

But, don't let yourself get disturbed by such observations....


Since I'm not sure of the extent of support we're providing and to whom, I can't make an argument on whether we need to increase it our not, but I haven't see a good argument yet on why we should intervene, or should have, intervened, militarily in Syria.In essence, official USA are not providing any kind of serious help to anybody (in Syria). There is simply no trace of evidence for that.

The WH is meddling (in particularly idiotic fashion) through attempting to condition provision of aid by third parties (Saudi Arabia, Turkey etc.) to specific groups of genuine Syrian insurgents, and/but - foremost - through attempting to steer specific groups of (genuine) Syrian insurgents (not Jihadists) from 'operational rooms' in Jordan and Turkey. This meddling is usually to be seen in stoppage of all flow of aid provided by other players whenever this is needed the most (like when the regime is on offensive). Which in turn is usually resulting in Syrian insurgents getting only more frustrated by the lack of US support, then in defections of the same to the side of Islamists etc., etc., etc.

Except for this, the WH has only permitted specific private, US-based organizations to provide non-lethal aid (cars, food, clothes etc.) to hand-picked groups of Syrian insurgents.

Is that of any help?


Everyone is making a lot of wild guesses made on sensational news reporting instead of facts, because the facts are not available the public.That depends on what facts do you want to get, and especially: what do you prefer to hear (or ignore), I would say.

From my POV, 'sensational news' were all those declaring the uprising and insurgency in Syria for 'al-Qaida' right from the start, which was a mountain of nonsense and BS. Tragically enough, that had the 'desired' effect - between others of keeping the USA (and West) out of this affair - and now a group worse than AQ advancing there too.


In the end those clamoring for U.S. military involvement should provide a theory of change and identify a condition that we can feasibly obtain.While I'm not 'pro-US intervention', I offered plenty of 'theories' that have proven to 'work' over the time. For example, an 'investment' of little more than 50, perhaps 100 million into right groups, back in summer 2012, could have prevented Syria from going down the sink. Various people high above circles you or me are frequenting have suggested very much the same.

So, perhaps some (re-)reading (?) of older posts might be of help here.

While yes, it's terribly frustrating to see what became of the country and people (who were quite effectively frustrated away from the West by the lack of support), it's really not my fault if you (and quite a few of others) prefer to look the other way and consider this for, 'just background noise from frustrated people'.

Dayuhan
08-27-2014, 09:40 AM
It's your choice, really. You can ignore the fact that, in military terms, the ISIS is far more sophisticated than the AQ ever was. You can further prefer to offer them more time so they can get even better, too. No problem: just wait and see.

That's probably true, but since the threat from AQ was never military action, it's also of limited relevance.


While I'm not 'pro-US intervention', I offered plenty of 'theories' that have proven to 'work' over the time. For example, an 'investment' of little more than 50, perhaps 100 million into right groups, back in summer 2012, could have prevented Syria from going down the sink. Various people high above circles you or me are frequenting have suggested very much the same.

Yes, I recall these theories. They were quite extraordinarily theoretical, and based on sweeping assumptions with little evidence presented to substantiate them. They dealt with possibilities that were extensively evaluated, and for excellent reasons rejected, back in the day.

Bill Moore
08-27-2014, 12:20 PM
Crowbat


A matter of fact is that this 'war on terror' against specific extremists is de-facto one of priorities in the foreign policy of the USA. It doesn't matter whether you like this fact or not, or whether you want to fight that war or not: you're 'Target No.1' on targeting lists of extremists in question.

While I don't agree with many of our leaders' decisions, it is dead wrong to assume we don't recognize the threat from terrorists and we're not acting upon those threats. Just because you didn't see it in the media doesn't mean we're not disrupting this threat. Approaches can be argued, and I don't think it is the U.S. approved approach, but I see an advantage when our adversaries are killing each other. They're expending limited resources and exposing to the world what they represent, and I think the world needed a reminder to stiffen their resolve.

As for spending a few million dollars, we have certainly done that. Furthermore, several Arab nations have provided millions in support to different groups. While money is important, it is of relative importance since others are providing it. If we want a specific group or groups to win I think we would have to provide direct military assistance like we did in Libya, but I don't think those groups would be able to stabilize the country after Assad fell if we did that. Do you? If you do, how do you see that happening?

carl
08-27-2014, 02:01 PM
Think there is more going on than you're giving our policy wonks credit for.

http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/223971.htm



There are several talks going with numerous groups, but I suspect if we're interested in crushing ISIL we may share a limited and common objective with Assad. The world isn't black and white, and I know you know that. I'm actually surprised by how much we are doing, and then if you consider what other countries from the region and Europe are doing there are plenty of helping and non-helping hands all working quietly to pursue their objectives.

What exactly do you think we need to do at this point?

The program you described is a worthy one, but it will do nothing at all to help those communities when and if an IS battle group shows up. Perhaps something added to the program described that would be viable against that IS battle group would be a good thing. A vital thing actually for when that IS battle group shows up if it can't be defeated all that other stuff means nothing at all and anybody who participated in them may be killed for doing so.

Big boys rules on a grand scale now and that has to acknowledged by the powers that be. Part of big boys rules may be this: tell Assad we are going to work with him, use him, then when IS is gone, whack him. That way we got the two birds that are messing up the garden.

carl
08-27-2014, 03:26 PM
Since I'm not sure of the extent of support we're providing and to whom, I can't make an argument on whether we need to increase it our not, but I haven't see a good argument yet on why we should intervene, or should have, intervened, militarily in Syria. Everyone is making a lot of wild guesses made on sensational news reporting instead of facts, because the facts are not available the public.

Crowbat argued the case better than I can but I want to address this particular point.

To me your argument in the paragraph above boils down to "Trust us we know what we are doing and you don't need to know...and by the way if you did you would see how good we were but we won't let you know so trust us."

After L. Paul Bremer, Rumsfeld, the spectacle of us paying the Pak Army/ISI to kill us and all the other things that have happened over these many years, I don't trust those with the facts not available to the public not to be anything but hammer headed stupid.

Bill Moore
08-27-2014, 04:48 PM
Crowbat argued the case better than I can but I want to address this particular point.

To me your argument in the paragraph above boils down to "Trust us we know what we are doing and you don't need to know...and by the way if you did you would see how good we were but we won't let you know so trust us."

After L. Paul Bremer, Rumsfeld, the spectacle of us paying the Pak Army/ISI to kill us and all the other things that have happened over these many years, I don't trust those with the facts not available to the public not to be anything but hammer headed stupid.

Carl,

A of lot truth in that argument and there is the rub. A lot of our covert and clandestine efforts are conducted by idiots who don't have a clue and their work is concealed from critics, so they have a degree of free play that won't be exposed until it is a tragic failure. On the other hand, covert and clandestine operations don't work if they're exposed, so obviously there is a tension here that can't be resolved unless we take covert and clan ops off the options list. I don't think we want to do that. There has been talk for years on pushing these paramilitary ops from the CIA to the military. I think there are pros and cons for doing that and I'm not prepared to present an informed opinion on keeping the same or switching DOD to the lead. Like you said, we have already seen what the likes of Rumfield and Wolfowitz did as DOD leaders, imagine giving them the lead for the nation's covert and clan capabilities for paramilitary operations. It really comes down to picking the right people to lead these I think more than picking the right organization.

We work best when we're not trusted and are forced to demonstrate we don't have our head up our butts. My point to Crowbat is I suspect, I certainly don't know in my current position, we're doing more than meets the public eye. A large of part I suspect is due to partners in the region not wanting their roles publicized. Is it enough? Is it the right thing? Are our objective right? I don't know.

CrowBat
08-27-2014, 08:31 PM
..As for spending a few million dollars, we have certainly done that.I'm sorry, but I haven't seen a single dollar of any kind of official US aid (except relief supplies for refugees) reaching insurgents.

All I've seen is plenty of babbling in the media, sure, but there are no bucks, and thus no 'Buck Rogers'.

Yes, the WH is telling Saudis, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Qataris, Turks and whoever else, 'do it yourself' - but then meddling through 'interventions from highest points' (WH) whenever things develop the way 'USA' (WH, again) don't like them.


Furthermore, several Arab nations have provided millions in support to different groups. While money is important, it is of relative importance since others are providing it.In the case of Saudi Arabia, it's rather something like few billions - most of it meanwhile squandered because of Qatari 'interventions' (usually either ignored, or wholeheartedly supported by the WH).


If we want a specific group or groups to win I think we would have to provide direct military assistance like we did in Libya, but I don't think those groups would be able to stabilize the country after Assad fell if we did that. Do you? If you do, how do you see that happening?
Sigh... again: Syria is so piss-poor, that any money is making difference. Saudis had it easy to build up the IF: sure, from the US standpoint, that organization has 'wrong' religion, and seems not the least curious to make any promises about 'peace with Israel'; but hell, one can't really expect the Syrian Sunnis to convert to Christianity as 'thanks', can one? And expecting anybody in Syria to make promises about some sort of future peace with Israel... come on... that's fantasy.

Anyway, even few Syrian private businessmen found it relatively easy to build up the SF and SRF, which are presently major recipients of Saudi aid.

The problem in all these cases is always the same: lack of management skills, which results in plenty of money (and other 'stuff') ending in wrong hands and being squandered for no profit in return. And even more so: Qatari interventions through 'direct donations' to specific commanders (usually those that eventually sided with the JAN or the ISIS), which in turn caused quarrels and then loss of influence of major politico-military alliances, like the FSyA and then the SNC.

A strict control and relatively simple disciplinary measures - plus a 'muzzle' over Qatari noses, of course - could've been imposed. One could've followed the Pakistani example from dealing with 'seven parties' of Mujaheddin in Afghanistan of the 1980s and say, 'bring me a video showing you've used what I've provided; no video, no beans, bullets and gas'.

Not only ironically, but 'idiotically', the US-run 'control rooms' never acted in that fashion. If they moved at all, then to stop the flow of supplies to insurgent groups during specific of regime's offensives. Obviously, this did little to 'bolster' Saudi or Emirati influence.

So, investing into 2-3 groups (the Farouq Brigade and various of its franchises that began emerging in 2012 and 2013 would be one of good examples; ever since, the once powerful and influential Farouq was largely destroyed by a combination of regime's and ISIS' attacks), and thus provoking a 'snowball' effect in sense of 'others' seeing that these 2-3 groups are 'flourishing' and 'well-supplied', was one of very promising ideas.

For those who are now going to say, 'But Tom, you can't possibly predict the future or know what would have happened', all I can say is 'shut up, that's precisely how the Islamists and then the ISIS did it too'.

Namely, when one asks them, major reason why various insurgent groups began joining Islamists, and then even Jihadists, was a) disappointment over lack of support from the West, and especially b) they saw that these (Islamists and Jihadists) are better supplied and thus better organized too.

They had the money, beans and bullets; moderates not. And so, gradually, after 'winning' enough people to their side - or killing anybody opposing them (or letting the regime kill the people in question) - the ISIS was left to spread in Syria.

Guess, that's 'evidence' that my ideas in this case wouldn't work, right?

Bill Moore
08-27-2014, 10:36 PM
Guess, that's 'evidence' that my ideas in this case wouldn't work, right?

My evidence to support my assumptions is that there are over 100 different groups (probably way more than that) in Syria. No leader is able to consolidate power through his ideology and vision.

While no group has the winning narrative, the Islamists have narrative that resonates more with young men because the Islamists demonstrate both military capability and a vision that appeals to young men who don't have the capacity yet to use history to inform their thinking to anticipate what the repercussions will be if the Islamists actually win.

If we removed Assad, and we probably should have after he used chemical weapons, it would be a free for all for king of the hill that would result in continued bloodshed, perhaps worse than it is now, with no foreseeable end. The most likely winner in the long run would be the Islamists unless external powers intervene, but the Islamists wouldn't be able to control the entire country, so the war would continue and it would destabilize the region as a whole.

I'll now argue against myself, the region is becoming destabilized anyway, neither Assad, al-Nusra, ISIS, or the minority moderates can win at this point, so to bring this to a head the region needs to intervene militarily to either:

A. Greatly reduce the strength of ISIS, which in turn empowers al-Nusra (AQ) and Assad.

B. Remove Assad, which may free up al-Nusra and other groups to direct their power towards ISIS.

C. Put LH and Iran in checkmate, but I don't know how we would.

D. Support Assad and return the status quo which is morally reprehensible after he gassed his people.

Of course morality changes with time. We certainly had no qualms deliberately attacking civilians in WWII in both Germany and Japan with fire bombs to compel the nation to stop fighting and surrender non-conditionally. Assad is doing the same, but in 2014 we don't find that acceptable. I agree it isn't acceptable, but it isn't entirely irrational either.

Dayuhan
08-28-2014, 01:46 AM
A strict control and relatively simple disciplinary measures - plus a 'muzzle' over Qatari noses, of course - could've been imposed.

How exactly would you have proposed to "muzzle" the Qataris? They do not take instructions from the US.


So, investing into 2-3 groups (the Farouq Brigade and various of its franchises that began emerging in 2012 and 2013 would be one of good examples; ever since, the once powerful and influential Farouq was largely destroyed by a combination of regime's and ISIS' attacks), and thus provoking a 'snowball' effect in sense of 'others' seeing that these 2-3 groups are 'flourishing' and 'well-supplied', was one of very promising ideas.

Promising if you assume that money is the only variable, but we all know that money is not the only variable.

What you're not acknowledging is that choosing a proxy, especially in a fight with no clear and realistic desired end state and no compelling US interest at stake, is a blind two-footed jump onto the mother of all slippery slopes. What do you do when your proxy doesn't win? Do you write it off, or double down, or triple down, a course that inexorably points toward direct involvement?

Of course it's easy to say that the proxy would win if only the US did whatever you suggest, but in all of these fights there's always a pack of people claiming that it'll all be right if only a few tens of millions get thrown at whoever they like. What they say and what happens are two very different things.

CrowBat
08-28-2014, 07:10 AM
My evidence to support my assumptions is that there are over 100 different groups (probably way more than that) in Syria. No leader is able to consolidate power through his ideology and vision.So what? Why is it 'always' necessary to have 'one' leader and unity?

There are no 100, but about 1000 different Syrian insurgent groups. Yes, some work together excellently in the north of the country, and fight each other in the south etc. But, generally, most of them are working together rather well. Foremost: main reason for quarrels between them - and the main reason for all of their 'lost battles' are supplies. So, if one provides supplies, there's no reason to fight.

On the contrary, and as you can read in these two very detailed articles by another chap from ACIG, describing some of recent insurgent ops (note: made by two French authors, so English is a lil' bit 'jumpy'), whenever there are supplies, they come together and fight joint battles against the regime:

- Rebels attack the military base of Hamadiyah (Idlib province), July 2014 (http://historicoblog3.blogspot.co.at/2014/08/example-of-operation-of-syrian-uprising.html)

- Lift the blockade of Mleha (August 3, 2014) (http://historicoblog3.blogspot.co.at/2014/08/example-of-operaton-of-syrian-uprising.html)


While no group has the winning narrative, the Islamists have narrative that resonates more with young men...What Islamists there have such a narrative?

None. Get yourself some contacts in Syria, ask whoever you like. It's not about narratives but about food, ammo and organization.


... because the Islamists...You ought to define 'Islamists' here too: do you mean the IF, which is friendly to the JAN, but at odds with the ISIS? Or the JAN, which is friendly to the IF and often cooperating with moderates in one part of the country, while fighting both of these in other part of the country, and is generally at odds with the ISIS?

Or do you mean the ISIS - which is neither Syrian, nor 'rebels/insurgents', nor can be can be considered 'Islamic', but only 'mental illness'?

Or any other of so many 'Islamist' groups there?

And generally: only the IF and the ISIS are demonstrating any kind of military skills. The JAN was so much weakened by the ISIS, that is meanwhile primarily used to provide suicide bombers for delivering coup de main at the start of specific attacks.


If we removed Assad, and we probably should have after he used chemical weapons, it would be a free for all for king of the hill that would result in continued bloodshed, perhaps worse than it is now, with no foreseeable end....but there was none of that so far and an end to this conflict is foreseeable now?

On the contrary, removal of Assad would've:
- removed the credence of 'legal' regime in Damascus;
- thrown ranks of Alawites into disarray (traditionally, Alawites were seldom a solid block, and there are all the time minor uprisings and unrests against the regime between already since October 2012)
- removed the credence of Iranian involvement, which weakened native insurgency to a degree where this became unable to fight the ISIS and lost all of NE Syria to it.

With other words: such an action could've at least limited the spread of the ISIS inside Syria (if not prevented it), in turn denying it a base from which it launched the offensive into Iraq.

While, as the situation is right now, the regime is not only responsible for helping the ISIS establish itself in Syria, but reporting about its 'fight' against the ISIS and flying air strikes against their bases for PR purposes, while actually buying nearly 50% of its fuel from them (i.e. de-facto financing the ISIS); and Iranians - who were near bankrupt just two months ago - are now yielding immense political and monetary profits from the ISIS, because they're now 'good' and 'useful' - for their support for that failed government in Baghdad, and for their support for Kurds too. And that's not to talk about the Hezbollah and other, similar 'factors'...

Sorry, but if the policy of even considering cooperation with all of these jerks is not failed to doom.... then I don't know what else is.


The most likely winner in the long run would be the Islamists unless external powers intervene, but the Islamists wouldn't be able to control the entire country, so the war would continue and it would destabilize the region as a whole.'Islamists' are going to win this war, sooner or later. We all have to cope and live with that. That's so because dominant majority of the Syrian population are Sunni Moslems. Question is just: what 'Islamists'.

Here is a point where I can only conclude: as usually, the longer the war goes on, the more extremist sort of Islamists.

Therefore: the policy of protracting the war - which is what the WH is pursuing since 2012 - is an idiotic one.

davidbfpo
08-28-2014, 06:48 PM
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerners-go-fight-syria-and-iraq-it-aint-half-hot-here-mum

Within this long article - with many points made - is this table:https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BwJBunkCMAMR1Xw.jpg

carl
08-28-2014, 07:33 PM
It really comes down to picking the right people to lead these I think more than picking the right organization.

I ask your personal opinion. Is the US military capable of selecting and putting the right people in charge, or is the personnel system so strong that that is impossible?

Same question for the spook community, are they capable of that? Can either group overcome their bureaucracies in order to accomplish the mission?

Bill Moore
08-29-2014, 01:57 AM
I ask your personal opinion. Is the US military capable of selecting and putting the right people in charge, or is the personnel system so strong that that is impossible?

Same question for the spook community, are they capable of that? Can either group overcome their bureaucracies in order to accomplish the mission?

I can' answer for the spook community. For the military if it was considered important they would carefully select commanders, at least initially much like they do for certain elite SOF units. If it wasn't considered important, then you get what you get from the bureaucracy.

ganulv
08-29-2014, 03:20 AM
A of lot truth in that argument and there is the rub. A lot of our covert and clandestine efforts are conducted by idiots who don't have a clue and their work is concealed from critics, so they have a degree of free play that won't be exposed until it is a tragic failure. On the other hand, covert and clandestine operations don't work if they're exposed, so obviously there is a tension here that can't be resolved unless we take covert and clan ops off the options list. I don't think we want to do that. There has been talk for years on pushing these paramilitary ops from the CIA to the military. I think there are pros and cons for doing that and I'm not prepared to present an informed opinion on keeping the same or switching DOD to the lead. Like you said, we have already seen what the likes of Rumfield and Wolfowitz did as DOD leaders, imagine giving them the lead for the nation's covert and clan capabilities for paramilitary operations. It really comes down to picking the right people to lead these I think more than picking the right organization.

The military is already involved in Title 50 operations, though, isn’t it?

davidbfpo
09-04-2014, 10:53 PM
A long, multi-sourced and linked article - the full title being 'Provocation and the Islamic State: Why Assad Strengthened the Jihadists' and from an author who is an observer or student of the Syrian Civil War: http://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2014/09/03/provocation-and-the-islamic-state-why-assad-strengthened-the-jihadists/

His argument is that Assad has consistently followed a strategy of provocation, which is cited as:
simply means taking control of your enemies in secret and encouraging them to do things that discredit them and help you

Bill Moore
09-05-2014, 12:21 PM
A long, multi-sourced and linked article - the full title being 'Provocation and the Islamic State: Why Assad Strengthened the Jihadists' and from an author who is an observer or student of the Syrian Civil War: http://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2014/09/03/provocation-and-the-islamic-state-why-assad-strengthened-the-jihadists/

His argument is that Assad has consistently followed a strategy of provocation, which is cited as:

I suspect some of these claims are true, but it is also true that the first casualty of war is the truth. We're to the point now, especially in the social media era, where everyone simply quotes their so called experts creating a cesspool of opinion and propaganda attempting to shape the views of various audiences. We won't have access to what our intelligence community knows, but we're to the point that we have to rely on the professionals (not the retired loud mouths from the military and CIA who are making money has talking heads), because the truth has been too distorted in the public realm.

The strategy of provocation sounds logical in hindsight, and may in fact have been Assad's strategy, but it is also a strategy that the state would have had little control over once implemented. Other reasons could explain what is happening, such as the government may be forced to buy oil from ISIS based on economic realities. As for protecting ISIS to prevent the other groups from gaining strength, maybe, but it could also be that ISIS is located in the areas that Assad's forces are not capable of defending (to far away from Damascus). Seems like government has never had good control of eastern Syria.

The counterfactual argument that "if" support was provided to the moderates earlier the extremists wouldn't be as strong is simply pure speculation. First off quite a bit of support was provided to the moderates from a lot of different countries, but we like to ignore that. The moderates simply don't appear to be that strong, which goes back to the former article you posted that they're not that united.

We want to believe so badly that this rebellion is all about moderates seeking to overthrow an illegitimate government that we tend to grasp at straws when they are presented if we think they support our world view. No doubt there are many moderates in Syria who have a vision for the country that is more aligned with what the U.S. considers universal values, but is also true many do not. While most potential outcomes are possible in a conflict, it is hard to envision how various groups of moderates who are not united could effectively control the stronger extremist groups if the moderates actually ousted Assad. First they would have to consolidate power among themselves, and this period of chaos would create a window of opportunity for ISIS and al-Nusra and others who seem to be better organized. We all know this isn't a simple conflict between extremists and moderates and Assad. There are many actors within and external to the country that are interacting in ways that results in an unpredictable situation. In the end, those of us on the outside, and even most in the inside, are stuck viewing this conflict through opinion of others, not expert opinion, just opinion. Those that argue that someday the stock market will crash are probably right, but if they can't tell you when it isn't overly helpful. Those that tell us this conflict is all about poor governance may be right, but again it is trite and not helpful. Those that argue it would be better if the moderates win seem to be right also, but they don't provide realistic strategies on they could.

All the background noise is important, but ultimately we have to determine what, if anything, actually threatens our interests and deal with it. Ideally in a way that doesn't strengthen Iran, Assad, AQ, or other groups that our contrary to our interests. However, we don't live in an ideal world, and waiting to develop the perfect strategy could put us in a position in disadvantage. We may have to choose from the least bad of several bad options.

CrowBat
09-05-2014, 06:39 PM
....perhaps David posted that precisely because there're so mufh insisting on 'the first casualty of war is the truth'...while the idea of sticking heads into sand and searching for excuses is usually proving the worst one...?

Furthermore:

- It doesn't matter - not the least - what the US IC knows. What matters is what the WH decides (and what Israel tells the WH and State Department they should think) and that are Problems No.1 thru 99 in the case of US policy for Syria.

- And from the standpoint of the WH (and everybody gathering around it or searching for excuses 'to do nothing there'), every excuse is good just NOT to cooperate with what is left of the insurgency: either (or earlier) it is (or was) 'better' because insurgents are not united and nobody knows what would happen if they win; then it was 'better' because everybody was explaining that the insurgency = Islamist extremists, and 'Assadists = fighting against Islamist extremists', although neither of this was (or is) truth; and lately it's 'better'.... well, because anything is better but to cooperate with or support anti-Assadist insurgents... :rolleyes:

...and all of this, of course, because it's so 'impossible to predict' what would've happened in Syria if one would have provided support to insurgency.

(Where's that bamboozled smiley....?)

Makes me wonder: if that's so impossible to predict, but it's so easy to predict what is going to happen if Assadists are left in power... then how to hell comes that nobody predicted the emergence of the ISIS, first and foremost?

- Yeah, it's so pity the insurgency was so very much weakened by a simultaneous attacks from Iran- and Russia-supported regime and the ISIS from the other side. But, what can one do now? 'Nothing'. Back then when the insurgency was near-destroyed through cooperation of the regime and the ISIS, one didn't find that at least worth reporting, not to talk 'understanding'. So, why doing anything else now, when 'moderates simply don't appear to be that strong' any more...?

- Has the gov had good control of eastern Syria? Well, think whatever you like, but the fact is that the original cadre of idiots that established the ISIL in Syria has entered Syria and passed government-controlled territory with help of a bribe of local regime's functionaries. Barely three months later, they were already in control of specific oilfields and 'exporting' oil to the regime in Damascus (via the pipeline in Homs).

So, if the gov was 'not in control', then how comes these idiots had to pay a bribe for a safe passage through gov-controlled territory?


We want to believe so badly that this rebellion is all about moderates seeking to overthrow an illegitimate government that we tend to grasp at straws when they are presented if we think they support our world view. No doubt there are many moderates in Syria who have a vision for the country that is more aligned with what the U.S. considers universal values, but is also true many do not.This is so right, you wouldn't believe. After nearly four years of insistent ignorance - or at least downplaying - of moderates in Syria, there are hardly any moderates left. And even the few that are left are certainly not going to start cheering any kind of US/Western help any more. That train is away, long, long ago - just like the Iraqi 'pro-US-train' was away in 1991, and in 2003 there was hardly anybody left greeting the US invasion.

But, why learn from such historical lessons? It's so much more easier to explain that there are too few moderates left and nobody can be sure about what would they do if...well, if... erm... if what happens?


... Those that tell us this conflict is all about poor governance may be right, but again it is trite and not helpful. Those that argue it would be better if the moderates win seem to be right also, but they don't provide realistic strategies on they could.....yeah, and that's a reason more to keep on protracting this war through letting others to provide only enough help for the insurgency to survive, but not to win...


...However, we don't live in an ideal world, and waiting to develop the perfect strategy could put us in a position in disadvantage. We may have to choose from the least bad of several bad options.Yeah, that's why it's better to go on with Assadists, because the longer the war lasts the more extremist is everybody getting - and because the USA are 'not meddling' since that is not in 'higher US interests'...?

Sigh...

Bill, frankly, while the sarcast in me has big fun reading and commenting it, this logic is this short >><< of confusing even me.

carl
09-05-2014, 07:00 PM
We won't have access to what our intelligence community knows, but we're to the point that we have to rely on the professionals (not the retired loud mouths from the military and CIA who are making money has talking heads), because the truth has been too distorted in the public realm.

Given the history of the last 25 or so years relying upon "the professionals" for almost anything is a sure fire recipe for disaster.

CrowBat
09-05-2014, 10:08 PM
...and here's what's the probable reason for this 'new' problem, i.e. 'shall we or shall we not cooperate with Assad' and this intensive search for all possible excuses not to support Syrian insurgency....

Just few days ago, Col Pesach Malovany (IDF, ret.), has published his newest book, titled (as far as the Google Translate says) 'North Shall Evil (http://www.israeldefense.co.il/?CategoryID=516&ArticleID=6915). Malovany, who served as expert for Arab militaries with the IDF, became famous for his book 'The Wars of Modern Babylon' (like his new title, this is available in Hebrew only), which is a massive volume about the history of Iraqi armed forces. Correspondingly, his new book is covering the history of Syrian armed forces.

...and, between others, on the back-cover of that book, one can read the following:


Upon Israel, the Syrian army filled two dominant while conflicting roles; up until the Yom - Kippur War, the Syrian Army was a key participant and supporter of the hostilities toward Israel, while after the Yom - Kippur War, the Syrian Army was responsible of making the Israeli-Syrian border and Golan Hights one of the most peaceful areas in Israel and the Middle-East.

And that's the essence of the newest 'thinking' we can hear from the DC in regards of Syria: 'if we support Assad, then his army is going to take care for Syria to remain peaceful.'

...as peaceful as graveyard.

Bill Moore
09-05-2014, 10:59 PM
Given the history of the last 25 or so years relying upon "the professionals" for almost anything is a sure fire recipe for disaster.

Can't argue the facts you presented, but what is the alternative? To have passionate bloggers with personal agendas influence the voters and then have the voters influence the politicians to take action which may be rash and unwise, or rely on all-source intelligence analysts to provide the closest proximity to truth we can obtain, and then see what we should do based on "our national interests," if we need to do anything?

Everyone with a Smartphone can now be a propagandist and push a narrative out, and even support it with tidbits of truth to support it. The truth in the Middle East is exceedingly complex and shifting, so to assume simple answers like provide support to rebel group X will work is overly deterministic. It may or may not achieve whatever our objective(s) are, and there are certainly risks of it going bad based on our history of grossly mismanaging most UW efforts we have been involved in at the strategic level.

http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/au7hpz/billions-and-billions

The video at this link is sadly hilarious, it was Jon Stewart supporting Obama during his election run in 2007, obviously Obama didn't do any better. It is roughly 4 minutes long after the 30 second commercial, and it is focuses on foreign policy in the Middle East. Sort of sums up why I'm hesitant for any grand schemes the home team may be dreaming up.