Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Bill Moore]

The article on Qatar supporting extremists covers much more than Syria and probably should be posted under threads also, but the purpose of putting it here to contrast the two articles and perhaps show some hypocrisy. I know, shocking.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/world/middleeast/qatars-support-of-extremists-alienates-allies-near-and-far.html?ref=world&_r=1

Qatar’s Support of Islamists Alienates Allies Near and Far


In many cases, several analysts said, Qatar has sought to balance a wager on the future of political Islam as a force in the region with a simultaneous desire not to alienate the West. It has turned a blind eye to private fund-raising for Qaeda-linked groups to buy weapons in Syria, for example, but it has not provided direct government funding or weapons. At times, Mr. Stephens and other analysts said, Western pressure has moved Qatar to at least partly suppress some of the overt fund-raising.


“All the gulf intelligence agencies are competing in Syria and everyone is trying to get the lion’s share of the Syrian revolution,” Sheikh Shafi al-Ajmi, also recently identified by the United States as a fund-raiser for Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, said in an interview on the Saudi-owned Rotana television network last summer. So much for claims the rebels aren't getting external support.

http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-harakat-hazm-20140907-story.html#page=1

Syria rebels, once hopeful of U.S. weapons, lament lack of firepower


Congress has yet to approve a $500-million arms and training program proposed by Obama in June, and the rebels — Western-backed as well as other groups — continue to mostly rely on outdated spoils of war seized from the Syrian army in their fight against the government of President Bashar Assad. If they're getting support from several other countries how much of our own treasure should be spend?


One concern on the part of the Obama administration is that the Syrian rebels could lose advanced Western-made weaponry to Islamist extremists.

Those concerns have intensified since July, when a Malaysian airliner was shot down over war-racked eastern Ukraine, most likely by a pro-Russia separatist who had come into possession of a sophisticated antiaircraft missile. Nearly 300 people died.

Another issue is that the reliability of Syrian rebel groups allied with the West is sometimes not clear-cut, particularly when the groups must frequently make compromises with groups blacklisted as terrorists by the U.S. to remain viable.


"They said they want to give us [antiaircraft] Stingers but they need to trust us first," Abu Matar said.

Abu Matar, who like Zeidan was trained in Qatar by Americans, said he had already spent more than two years fighting, and didn't learn anything new.

The great game continues.

[CrowBat]

Nobody said they're not getting support: just that they're not getting support from the USA, and - much more importantly - that the USA are curbing support they're getting from other parties.

...and, of course, that the Jihadists are getting more support than the insurgents.


... If they're getting support from several other countries how much of our own treasure should be spend?Effectivelly: nothing (and if they get anything, then most of that is provided by private groups - sanctioned by official DC).

But, the US should stop curbing support the insurgents are getting from other parties. That would prevent the following from happening:

Another issue is that the reliability of Syrian rebel groups allied with the West is sometimes not clear-cut, particularly when the groups must frequently make compromises with groups blacklisted as terrorists by the U.S. to remain viable.

Namely, these 'unreliable' insurgent groups are forced to do what they do because they're not getting support they've not only been promised, but they need in order to continue their fight too.

On the other hand: curbing support for Jihadists might be not only much more effective, but also in the higher interests of the USA too.

(That is: unless there is interest to let the ISIS spread...?)

[davidbfpo]

This short report, with sourced data and photos by Conflict Arnaments Research popped up yesterday on a US origin emailed daily briefing and in The Guardian today.

Link:http://conflictarm.com/images/dispatch_iraq_syria.pdf

I've never heard of them and their website has no named staff. Anyway this is their explanation:
Conflict Armament Research identifies and tracks conventional weapons in contemporary armed conflicts. Established in 2011, it was created in response to the growing need for informed, on-the-ground reporting on weapons proliferation in modern wars and insurgencies.

I have added this post here in view of the exchange in the last few posts.

[CrowBat]

...and that there was next to no interest to stop the spread of such elements like the ISIS so far, and that for reasons of 'political correctness' is rather 'obvious' (after all, we can't go demanding Saudis to clean up the mess they've created through private sponsoring of such groups since 60 years, can't we, they're our friends, or aren't they...?), can be read here (ignore the title, it's rather sensationalistic, as usually in the media):

Iraq crisis: How Saudi Arabia helped Isis take over the north of the country (http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/iraq-crisis-how-saudi-arabia-helped-isis-take-over-the-north-of-the-country-9602312.html)

...Western governments traditionally play down the connection between Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabist faith, on the one hand, and jihadism, whether of the variety espoused by Osama bin Laden and al-Qa'ida or by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's Isis. There is nothing conspiratorial or secret about these links: 15 out of 19 of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudis, as was Bin Laden and most of the private donors who funded the operation.
...

[CrowBat]

Something else to keep in mind in the future too...

Pit Weinert from ACIG.info has reviewed all the videos he could find on the internet that were taken at recently captured Tabqa AB, in northern Syria. As should be known, this was overrun by the ISIS in August. Pit came out with following numbers of aircraft captured there:

- 1 MiG-21bis
- 11 MiG-21MF
- 1 MiG-21M (probable M; if so, then ex-East German example; if not, then another MF)
- 10 MiG-21UM

Note: it is possible that additional examples are around, then Google Earth photos are showing more MiG-21s around Tabqa than these 23.

Obviously, most of are derelict and there is no chance of them ever being returned to service - at least not without really a complete rebuilt and replacement of most important parts.

But, there is some uncertainty about the exact status of at least the above-mentioned bis. Plus, a photo surfaced of an 'extra' MiG-21U-400, supposedly taken inside one of maintenance hangars at Tabqa, and showing it as captured while still in a very advanced state of overhaul...

So, theoretically - and provided they might ever find enough personnel with the necessary knowledge and experience, plus enough spares and weapons (the latter should be possible) - the ISIS might now be able to make at least 1, perhaps even two MiG-21s airborne.

[CrowBat]

ISIS has killed the top leaders of Ahrar a-Sham in a car bomb in #Idlib, including the movement's leader Abu...

http://fb.me/1mVoFt1IK
The leader of the Ahrar ash-Sham was Hassan Aboud, and yes, it appears he was killed in this bombing.

Though, meanwhile, it's anything but sure this was an attack by the ISIS.

The meeting was held in an underground 'bunker'. AFAIK, it might be hard to kill anybody inside an underground facility with help of a car bomb.

On the contrary, there are reports that the bomb was planted inside that bunker before the meeting.

Rumours (and there are always plenty of these in Syria, no doubt) have it that the leadership of Ahrar ash-Sham met to decide whether to officially side with the revamped FSyA, in exchange for 'US support' (or whatever of this is provided), possibly in reaction to reports that the (official) Saudi support for insurgency is slackening. But, majority of insurgents in that group - and many other of Syrian insurgents - are meanwhile so fed up of Americans, that they opposed this and would have seen this as treachery.

Overall, this version sounds at least 'logic', and if it's true, I wouldn't be surprised to see the Ahrar - or at least large parts of it - defecting from the IF and siding with the ISIS as next...

...and should that happen, it would be a major 'PR victory' for the ISIS.

Now, Ahrar is important as a relatively big, well-organized and -supplied organization of Syrian Salafists, that's sure. But, overall, it's not even 10% of the IF in total (and the IF totals something like 50% of all the insurgency).

Nevertheless, if even a chunk of the Ahrar would defect to it, the ISIS could claim it is including Syrians, and then Syrian Salafists too - which so far was simply not the case (Syrian Salafists and Wahhabists of all sorts, but especially such idiots like the ISIS are at odds with each other).

In total, this might be another tragic consequence of absurd and sadistic US policy towards Syrian insurgency...

(BTW, this is actually all Syria-related, i.e. going off topic in regards of Iraq.)

[davidbfpo]

Eliminating one's enemies in a civil war - in Syria and within the Muslim faith in the region - just keeps on going.

The principal victim was:
Abboud, the head of Ahrar as-Sham, took up a senior political position in the Islamic Front when it was formed in November 2013. He set out a state based on Islamic principles and protecting the rights of women and religious and ethnic minorities, setting it against the vision of the jihadist Islamic State.Now here's no surprise:
Syrian State news agency SANA is celebrating the attack (http://www.sana.sy/en/?p=12675), “28 Members of Ahrar al-Sham Terrorist Organization Killed in Explosion in Idleb Countryside”Link:http://eaworldview.com/2014/09/syria-developing-reports-insurgent-leader-hassan-abboud-dozens-commanders-killed-islamic-state-suicide-bomber/

[CrowBat]

According to this report (http://www.almasdarnews.com/article/confirmed-top-islamic-front-leader-killed/) it was 11 commanders from Ahrar (including not only Aboud, but their military wing leader Abu Abdel Malik too), and up to 35 other leaders and commanders from the Islamic Front.

The source is citing a 'suicide bombing' instead of a car attack.

Meanwhile, and as indicated by plenty of other reports in recent days, the ISIS is going for Dayr az-Zawr as its next target. The regime is already claiming 78 Jihadists as KIA there in the last few days.

[CrowBat]

So, Obama announced the start of US military ops vs ISIS in Syria too; the action should be based on a multi-prong strategy revolving around air power deployed in support of Syrian insurgents reinforced so these can seriously tackle the ISIS....

...there was a meeting in Jeddah during which Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and six GCC states (including Qatar) agreed to join coalition that is going to fight the ISIS...

...Turkey declared it can't join because the ISIS is holding 40+ of its citizens hijacked from the consulate in Mosul as hostages....

...Iran and the Assadist regime haven't been invited to that conference, and are thus effectively left out of this coalition...

...representatives of Syrian insurgents are appearing on the Israeli TV to explain that it's pity there will be no US boots on the ground in Syria, but now it's sure there will be an 'all-out war against the ISIS'...

...Bibi is struggling to explain that Israel is involved too (he wouldn't specify how, and I remain sceptic), that it is going to support US action, but that Iran remains 'ultimate terror'...

...all of this within the last 24 or so hours, on the 13 anniversary of 9/11...

...and everybody on this forum fell silent?

[davidbfpo]

Crowbat,

Silence can sometimes be golden. I expect after the initial USG reaction and internal debate over a new campaign in this long war many of American members just waited to see what President Obama actually decided to do.

I follow some of the public debate in the USA, amidst the shrill voices very few have pointed out 'destroying' ISIS is far from easy. Hence my posts on the analysis of ISIS on this thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=21084

Anyway here is a comment on President Obama's choice by Shashank Joshi, of RUSI (in London). The summary is:
In a shift in policy, President Obama announced on 10 September 2014 cross-border operations to challenge the jihadists of ISIS. The strategy’s success rests on the cooperation of neighbouring countries and the ability to sustain the campaign for the long-term.Link:https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C541178122E2AA/#.VBIDD1e94dX

[CrowBat]

Hm... so, am I free to conclude that after nearly three years of useless monitoring of the civil war in Syria exclusively through the prism of 'al-Qaida's involvement', and declarations of that conflict as 'no matter of higher US interests', this 'Obama's reverse' in terms of deciding to go fighting the ISIS with a combo of US-supported Syrian insurgents and own air power - kind of caused 'shock & awe' within specific circles?

Whether this is the case or not, this attachment might be useful for orientation of many. It might appear oversimplified, but if nothing else, it shows that there might be enough 'boots on the ground' to start what is most likely to develop into a 'major CAS campaign'.

EDIT: there is one thing I'm missing in Obama's declaration, and that might prove crucial in the end. Perhaps I've missed it, but where is 'exit strategy'?

[davidbfpo]

Crowbat's last post ended with:
where is 'exit strategy'?

In Ali Soufan's commentary yesterday in The Guardian there is this phrase, which I think explains why there is no exit strategy:
Thirteen years later, it’s becoming clear that we have not fought a 13-year war so much as a one-year war, 13 times.

So each year we start again. The 'Long War' is here. Needless to say Soufan writes more:http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/11/-sp-9-11-isis-al-qaida-13-years?CMP=twt_gu

[ganulv]

Hm... so, am I free to conclude that after nearly three years of useless monitoring of the civil war in Syria exclusively through the prism of 'al-Qaida's involvement', and declarations of that conflict as 'no matter of higher US interests', this 'Obama's reverse' in terms of deciding to go fighting the ISIS with a combo of US-supported Syrian insurgents and own air power - kind of caused 'shock & awe' within specific circles?

It shouldn’t shock anyone who knows there is a U.S. election coming up and that Democratic (Party) control of the Senate is at stake.

[Dayuhan]

In Ali Soufan's commentary yesterday in The Guardian there is this phrase, which I think explains why there is no exit strategy:

So each year we start again. The 'Long War' is here. Needless to say Soufan writes more:http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/11/-sp-9-11-isis-al-qaida-13-years?CMP=twt_gu

Two things here stand out to me...


But the real work starts where it should have in 2001, with true grassroots opposition – a true comprehensive strategy – that is managed by regional powers and supported by the international community. This will work if regional governments don’t co-opt Obama’s plan to advance their own divisive agendas.

The problem here is that regional governments will co-opt the plan to advance their own divisive agendas. That's inevitable, and there is no realistic way that the US or anyone else can prevent it.


And the underlying issues – of education systems rooted in indoctrination and the suffocation of critical discourse, corruption so pervasive that it has become endemic, oppression of women that has robbed society of their contributions, and an absence of political representation that has served as the fuel of extremism – have been ignored by most governments across the near east, making it inevitable for any spark to cause a conflagration that would prove impossible to extinguish.

This goes back to the argument from governance. It's an appealing argument in some ways: it is certainly true that if these countries were well governed, many of these problems would be much easier to manage. It's also a distinctly frustrating argument, because these countries are not well governed, and the US can neither govern them nor compel them to change the way they govern themselves.

[CrowBat]

So each year we start again. The 'Long War' is here. Needless to say Soufan writes more:[URL]
Indeed, it's tragic we're - de-facto - back to September 2001.

Namely, after formation of this 'anti-ISIS-coalition', I cannot but conclude that the basic idea about how to tackle the threat is still very much the same like back in 2001. 'Arm and fight'.

That said, I do not think the West is fighting the same war all over again since 13 years: too much effort was squandered for absolutely no gain in Iraq in the meantime. Instead, and tragically, it seems that nobody of responsible characters learned anything at all: instead of cleaning the 'backyard' (see: removing all the debilitating regimes in the Middle East, which are core root of the problem), the West is still happily cooperating with any of them pretending to be 'friends'.

And one just can't 'kill' ideas: only provide more attractive alternatives.

[ganulv]

instead of cleaning the 'backyard' (see: removing all the debilitating regimes in the Middle East, which are core root of the problem), the West is still happily cooperating with any of them pretending to be 'friends'.

Gaddafi and Mubarak are gone. Have the lives of ordinary Libyans and Egyptians improved for all that?

[davidbfpo]

Crowbat is right, from his latest post:
And one just can't 'kill' ideas: only provide more attractive alternatives.

For many good reasons the US and by implication all of the Western post-9/11 response has relied on "might is right". Sadly those options fail to recognise and counter that the violence of the jihadists is based on ideas and grievances.

That is unless there is a covert operation based on a strategy which the public know nothing about. If this exists I do wonder if it has any success.

One commentator, John Schindler refers to this in a wide-ranging commentary:http://20committee.com/2014/09/11/defeating-the-islamic-state-a-how-to-guide/

All this is not just about Syria!

[Bill Moore]

Two things here stand out to me...



The problem here is that regional governments will co-opt the plan to advance their own divisive agendas. That's inevitable, and there is no realistic way that the US or anyone else can prevent it.



This goes back to the argument from governance. It's an appealing argument in some ways: it is certainly true that if these countries were well governed, many of these problems would be much easier to manage. It's also a distinctly frustrating argument, because these countries are not well governed, and the US can neither govern them nor compel them to change the way they govern themselves.

Well written, I have debated this with Bob's World on a number of occasions. His general premise seems to ring true, but where it fails in my opinion as a solution is in two key areas. First there seldom a collective entity known as the people or populace. Good governance to one group will be considered poor governance by another. This is a fact of life in most countries. The second area you addressed which is we have limited means to compel any government to actually govern more effectively. At the end of the day it seems that understanding the failures and the consequences of poor governance are important to gain understanding/context, but if is there is something that threatens our interest that resides in that country, improving governance is seldom going to reduce that threat in a timely manner. Shaping governance through engagement certainly isn't without merit, and in some cases it can be more effective than others based on a number of variables, but to assume we can always address root causes seems a bit hubristic to me. We still need to pursue options to manage threats that fall short of fixing governance, but in a way that doesn't make the problem worse. That is where the art comes in, and one can't be a good artist without understanding the subject.

Break

NightWatch had some interesting comments in their daily e-mail that came out last night. Can't find a web link to this report. I have no other sources to validate or refute this, but NightWatch is a respected open source intelligence service. For your consideration.

Comment on car bombs in Baghdad, which supports my hypothesis that ISIL/ISIS may actually be less of a threat when configured as a military force controlling terrain than a traditional terrorist organization. We certainly have the means to make quick work of any ISIL/ISIS conventional capability and probably should, but then what?


Comment: The efforts by the Islamist extremists to terrorize Shiite neighborhoods and probe for weaknesses in Iraqi security continue. They are impervious to the announced US campaign because the bombers mingle among the civilian population. Suicide and other bombings will continue.

Does anyone else have other reports validating this claim?


Reaction to the US President's speech. The so-called moderate Syrian Islamists announced that they are allied to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). That destroys any expectations that moderate Muslims would work with the US effort.

Sounds like 2003 all over again.


Turkey announced that the US cannot use any of its bases or resources in fighting ISIL Turkey also will permit no US soldiers in Turkey for the purpose of fighting ISIL.


CIA announced that the upper limit of ISIL fighting strength is 31,500. This number is significantly higher than the number used earlier in the week. The nature of the fight continues to escalate.

[AmericanPride]

On the subject of governance -

IMO it's not so much 'good' or 'effective' government but pluralistic government that has the greatest impact on stability. Before the proliferation of mass communications and weapons of mass destruction, resistance to repressive government would be more easily curtailed - now, any one man with sufficient amount of explosives or fear can have a significant impact on the course of history. So fundamentally there needs to be a shift towards promoting inclusive government rather than repressing the opposition.

Further - the U.S. with its large size, diversity, and history of populism should be a good case study on effective and pluralistic government. The trend is one towards greater emancipation and participation (notwithstanding recent developments in wealth inequality) as well as generally well-armed and well-funded government controlled by multiple competing interests. Part of this comes from the strength of its institutions, part from well-practiced political norms learned through painful (and usually violent) experiences, and part through active civic agitation. In the Middle East, none of these conditions exist in any amount of sufficiency (except perhaps Israel, Turkey, and Iran), and with the entrenched role of the military in many of these states' political economy, it will take a mass movement to overcome them.

[Bill Moore]

Further - the U.S. with its large size, diversity, and history of populism should be a good case study on effective and pluralistic government.

This is the type of thinking that repeatedly gets us in trouble. We naively assume that the great experiment we have implemented in America can be implemented in any country despite entrenched cultures that are not receptive to pluralistic governance. We're so hubristic in this regard we assumed we could fix bayonets and push an oppressive government out, and then a stable democracy would "naturally" emerge because it is a natural law.

While we may have the American idea for over two centuries it has taken us well over 200 years to even coming close to recognizing it, and yet we insist on imposing our ideology on others. Lets not forget the U.S. has more people in prison than any other nation other than China, and I think that is relevant. We enforce the rule of law with an increasingly militant police force and a less flexible legal system. Perhaps out of necessity, but if that is the case it indicates that our pluralistic form of governance is not working for all, so like any other nation we have our percentage of malcontents. The problems are significantly worse in Iraq and Syria. Pluralistic governance seems like a great idea, but I still question its feasibility as a solution in many countries. Then it begs the question do we care more about the form of government or human rights? Can a more oppressive government effectively suppress ethnic hatred within its society, leading to an uncomfortable peace? Or is it better to remove these governments and push for ballots instead of reason? The results in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya indicate we need to rethink this.

[AmericanPride]

We naively assume that the great experiment we have implemented in America can be implemented in any country despite entrenched cultures that are not receptive to pluralistic governance.

I didn't state anything of the sort - I said it would be a "good case study". Given the challenges to U.S. stability, what are some of the lessons that can be learned from American experiences (both the failures and the accomplishments)? Some may be translatable to other contexts - others not. And it's huge intellectual leap from saying U.S. experiences may be useful for understanding governance to the conclusion that we ought to impose the American form of government on other countries by force of arms.

Also - what makes a culture "not receptive to pluralistic governance"? I'm curious about the historiography of U.S. military thought on governance and where this obession with culture emerged. Why is the relationship between governance and culture the sole or most important determinant of the outcome?


Pluralistic governance seems like a great idea, but I still question its feasibility as a solution in many countries.

That depends on how you define the problem in those countries. If the problem is governance, then I think a strong case could be made for pluralistic reform. If the problem is something else (like the impact on U.S. security) - well, that requires a different answer.


Then it begs the question do we care more about the form of government or human rights?

That's a good question. Officially, yes, the U.S. government does care about the form of government and human rights. That does not always work out well in practice. The underlying question is should we? That's a far more difficult question to answer. From the earliest days of its history, the U.S. has had an ideological (and religous) component to its foreign policy. I think the answer to this question depends upon where you start and where you want to end up.


Can a more oppressive government effectively suppress ethnic hatred within its society, leading to an uncomfortable peace?

Yes - but what does "effectively" mean in practice, for how long, and at what cost? And is it useful to frame the problem as "ethnic hatred"? What if we framed the problem as the distribution of power? The problem with the cultural reading of conflict is that it's essentialist - you have to accept that at some fundamental level different cultures are inherently incompatible. This makes it easier to dimiss practical solutions. But the problem is that no one can ever define exactly where and how ethnicity or culture are inherently conflictual. But how cultures and ethnicities are shaped and relate to one another through systems (i.e. the political process or the state) creates contradictions, and therefore conflict. And those problems can be fixed.

Let's take a look at U.S. race relations, specifically between blacks and whites. Is there anything inherent and blacks and whites in America that make conflict likely between them? Or has been a history of specific political and economic relations (i.e. slavery, disenfranchisement) that have shaped the conflicts between the two groups? If we consider the process of emancipation and political reform in the U.S. (Reconstruction, Civil Rights Movement, etc), there has been a long and mostly deliberate process in dismantling the system of conflict and creating peaceable relations between the two groups in an integrated society. Part of the problem in ethnic conflicts is that the underlying political structure defines the relationship between groups as conflictual but this is often written off as a cultural conflict, not a structural one. When one group occupies resource rich land and the other does not - that's a structural problem, not a cultural one. When one group has education or wealth not accessible by the other group - that's a structural problem. There's a long list. So we need to be careful in how we frame problems of ethnic conflict.


Or is it better to remove these governments and push for ballots instead of reason? The results in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya indicate we need to rethink this.

I don't think it's a question of 'reason' versus non-reason. The people that pushed for the policies in Afghanitsan, Iraq, and Libya had very specific narratives for how the world functions and this colored their perception and decisions. This inherently becomes an onotological problem in figuring out what is the 'ground truth' and how to act on it. It's not only in defining "effective" government - but effective for whom? And how to implement it. And why "we", the U.S., should be the ones doing it. Can those questions ever be answered in a way that satisfies everyone? Probably not - so it's important to build a political process that is capable of managing that kind of diversity and ambiguity.

EDIT: FYI - by pluralistic governance I do not mean "U.S. republicanism". I mean government that makes stakeholders out of the maximum range of participants available and gives each equal access to the mechanisms of power. How that is structured in any specific context depends on the context.

[Dayuhan]

Instead, and tragically, it seems that nobody of responsible characters learned anything at all: instead of cleaning the 'backyard' (see: removing all the debilitating regimes in the Middle East, which are core root of the problem), the West is still happily cooperating with any of them pretending to be 'friends'.

Just out of curiosity... which regimes specifically do you propose to remove, and what do you propose to do in those countries once the regimes are removed?

[CrowBat]

... The second area you addressed which is we have limited means to compel any government to actually govern more effectively. At the end of the day it seems that understanding the failures and the consequences of poor governance are important to gain understanding/context, but if is there is something that threatens our interest that resides in that country, improving governance is seldom going to reduce that threat in a timely manner....My English is not good enough to describe the following in an as eloquent fashion, and my style seems to appear rather 'aggressive' although there's no intention to be such: yet, it is indeed so that I cannot but wonder about some expressions here.

Are you sure that it's 'seldom' that the US can change the way some of its allies are governed? Or isn't it so that this is next to never attempted?

Then when it's attempted, then there is 'no problem' to change things.

Let's consider the latest (known to me) example of an 'intervention' (of sort) in one of countries in question: removal of famous Prince Bandar from his post as Chief of Saudi Intel.

Frustrated by Obama's indecision on Syria, Bandar became a vocal propagator of the idea 'Saudis are going to do all it on their own'. I'm too lazy to search for all the possible links, but '5 minutes of googling' should be enough to find out that as of autumn 2012 and through early 2013, certain papers were full of statements by various Saudi ambassadors essentially stating the same, plus reports about massive Saudi purchases of specific arms for insurgents (usually such that could be obtained only from one source, which was motivated with the idea that should any end in 'wrong hands', these wrong hands couldn't get spares and ammo for them).

Then there was that issue of the FBI's report on 9/11...and bam! Because Sauds are such valuable friends one couldn't ruin relations with them: thus, Obama made it clear to Abdullah that the US are a 'senior partner' in that relationship - and Bandar has to go. In exchange for this, parts of the 9/11 report damning Saudis for their support and involvement were 'weakened' or even deleted.

If it's 'so easy' to kick out an important and highly influential minister, why to hell should there be a problem to force them to do many other things too? Except it is so that there is _no_ interest to force them to change anything, because that would jeopardise own interests?

For example because dictatorships are easier to control than pluralist societies...?

Of course, there are better - or, should I say, 'more humane' - examples from the past too, like imposing a parliament upon the emir of Kuwait in exchange for liberating his sheikdom, back in 1990. Why is it so that nobody recalls that?

But then, that's only 'one more indicator' that it's really anything but 'seldom' that certain 'friends' can be forced into specific decisions.


We certainly have the means to make quick work of any ISIL/ISIS conventional capability and probably should, but then what?
Then you'll have to offer 'them' - all those presently more than happy to join the ISIS - more attractive alternatives than the ISIS could.

Otherwise, you'll have another al-Qaida, another ISIS, another whatever else - at latest in another 10-15 years. Otherwise, this war of which you're tired, is never going to end.

Yet the fact is: you can't offer such alternatives while upholding bigot, corrupt, and oppressive regimes.

[AmericanPride]

Gaddafi and Mubarak are gone. Have the lives of ordinary Libyans and Egyptians improved for all that? .

The problems in Egypt and Libya are structural - they won't be fixed just by removing the old regime; there has to be an active process in constructing a new system of political and economic relations. In Egypt specifically this means bypassing or removing the entrenched military elite that owns something like 20% of the country's economic activity. With that kind of dependency on the military as an institution, there should not be any surprise that changes faces in power doesn't really change who exercises that power. We talk about state-building in the context of rebuilding a state after destroying it in war - why not talk about state-building in the context of reform prior to war?

[CrowBat]

Indeed: 'state-building before it provides growing ground for extremism'.

BTW, it's much more than 20% of the Egyptian economy that is owned by the military elite. The 'problem' in assessing the actual situation is that much of that military elite consists of retired generals. Best example is tourist industry: any 'decent' brigadier or major-general there owns at least a hotel, or construction business or something of that kind.

[CrowBat]

BTW, some more 'food for thoughts' for Bill...


Lets not forget the U.S. has more people in prison than any other nation...This is not the least a 'good example' for the topic on hand. Namely, the US has its own reasons for problems of this kind.

A 'stupid' example, if you like: narcotics...Primarily enjoyed almost exclusively by privileged classes and Chinese immigrants at earlier times, until somebody in (I think it was) California came to 'the idea' of declaring them illegal because he had something against cheap labour offered by Chinese immigrants... and meanwhile, with many of prisons being run by private, commercial persons/companies: well, running a prison in the US is a highly profitable business. Thus, there is 'special' interest in keeping these prisons full...


The problems are significantly worse in Iraq and Syria. Pluralistic governance seems like a great idea, but I still question its feasibility as a solution in many countries.Pluralism functions everywhere, Bill - and that without a single exception.

(There are meanwhile even al-Qaida theologists preaching pluralism and democracy.)

The only difference are 'disturbing factors': in the USA it's the 'lobbying', somewhere else meddling of foreign powers because of 'special commerc...erm, national interests' (oil), quasi-religion etc., etc., etc., etc.

[Dayuhan]

Are you sure that it's 'seldom' that the US can change the way some of its allies are governed? Or isn't it so that this is next to never attempted?

It's seldom attempted because Americans have finally figured out that it doesn't work. Might get a cosmetic shuffling of faces, a few paper "reforms" that are not enforced or taken seriously... but not meaningful change in governance. These countries are governed the way they are for a reason: the people that run them want them run that way and see substantive change as a threat to their own power.


Let's consider the latest (known to me) example of an 'intervention' (of sort) in one of countries in question: removal of famous Prince Bandar from his post as Chief of Saudi Intel.

Let's not pretend that Bandar's removal was solely or even primarily due to US pressure. Bandar had made a pile of enemies in his own tent and a lot of people in Riyadh wanted him out. When Syria didn't go as he wished, and when it became clear that he no longer had the capacity to get the US to do the Saudi dirty work for them, his days were numbered.


Frustrated by Obama's indecision on Syria, Bandar became a vocal propagator of the idea 'Saudis are going to do all it on their own'.

What indecision? Obama made the decision to stay out and stuck to that decision, at least until now, when indecisiveness really is creeping in. He may not have made the decision that you (or Bandar) wanted, but that's not indecision.


If it's 'so easy' to kick out an important and highly influential minister, why to hell should there be a problem to force them to do many other things too? Except it is so that there is _no_ interest to force them to change anything, because that would jeopardise own interests?

It was only "easy" because powerful people in Riyadh also wanted it done. If you think the US can compel any fundamental change in the way the Saudis govern, think again. What leverage does the US have that could force such a change?


For example because dictatorships are easier to control than pluralist societies...?

Possibly so, but the US doesn't have a great track record at controlling either. Certainly the US does not control or even significantly influence the Saudis and the other Gulf monarchies. They do what they want. Look what happened when the US tried to pressure Bahrain to respond to their Arab Spring demonstrations with accommodation and reform. That's a good example of how much influence the US has when serious matters of governance are on the line.


Of course, there are better - or, should I say, 'more humane' - examples from the past too, like imposing a parliament upon the emir of Kuwait in exchange for liberating his sheikdom, back in 1990. Why is it so that nobody recalls that?

Possibly because that kind of leverage doesn't exist without a foreign occupier... and has the pattern of governance in Kuwait really changed that much?


Then you'll have to offer 'them' - all those presently more than happy to join the ISIS - more attractive alternatives than the ISIS could.

Who's "you" in that picture? The US hasn't the right, obligation, or capacity to offer alternative forms of governance to nations in the Middle East. They have to build those for themselves.

[Bill Moore]

Crowbat

While I agree with some of your ideas about pluralism, better alternatives, etc., those ideas are not ideas that "we" can put into practice for others. It is sort of like the super model who looks good on the cover of a magazine after considerable air brushing, but when you see in person she is not much more than a plain Jane. There is a gap between the ideas you're proposing we pursue and the means to do so.

Where I principally disagree with you is that you seem to assume that if we do X then Y will happen. The real world doesn't work that way, there are many factors influencing the outcome of situation beyond what we do. All to often we have to relearn that lesson. Our actions are not necessarily going to be deterministic, they'll just be part of a larger whole. Providing support to various so called moderate insurgent groups could work in our favor, may not have any effect, and could backfire on us. To assume we have perfect control of the outcomes is hubris. We have to make educated assumptions on probable outcomes, and consider if the worst case happens is the risk worth the potential gain?

If we knew how Iraq was going to turn out, do you think Congress would have supported it if we could all go back in time? Some predicted what would happen in Iraq quite accurately, but that doesn't mean they knew. They made an educated assumption. Others assumed we could easily defeat Saddam's military (we did), and then the people would embrace as liberators and they would welcome democracy (they didn't). We learned that there was considerable tension between the ethnic groups, we learned Iran gained considerable sway with the Shia community, we learned that removing all the Ba'athists resulted basically in removing any semblance of governance, opening up control of the state/or sub-regions to a wide range of actors competing for control. Most importantly I hoped we learned the world will do things we don't anticipate, and there are no easy wars where the outcome is certain.


Indeed: 'state-building before it provides growing ground for extremism'.

That is the theory, but it is important to note that others are competing with us to build their version of a state. Unless we completely bring an adversary to their knees, which we haven't done since WWII it is unlikely we'll be able to build a state. We can help the locals build their state, but if there isn't a common vision for what that state should look like between the warring parties then state building will continue to be a distant dream outside the realm of reality.


Let's consider the latest (known to me) example of an 'intervention' (of sort) in one of countries in question: removal of famous Prince Bandar from his post as Chief of Saudi Intel.

Frustrated by Obama's indecision on Syria, Bandar became a vocal propagator of the idea 'Saudis are going to do all it on their own'. I'm too lazy to search for all the possible links, but '5 minutes of googling' should be enough to find out that as of autumn 2012 and through early 2013, certain papers were full of statements by various Saudi ambassadors essentially stating the same, plus reports about massive Saudi purchases of specific arms for insurgents (usually such that could be obtained only from one source, which was motivated with the idea that should any end in 'wrong hands', these wrong hands couldn't get spares and ammo for them).

First off I have no idea if we facilitated the removal of Bandar, but even if we did that doesn't mean we can facilitate good governance. We probably just paid someone off to get rid of someone we didn't like. That doesn't change the culture of a government.

It is certainly worth surfacing all ideas for consideration, but we should also be critical and realistic about each idea. If we decide to pursue it, fine but we have to watch for signs it isn't working and have back up plans and adjust as needed. Although we preach this, I have seldom seen it done.

[AmericanPride]

but if there isn't a common vision for what that state should look like between the warring parties then state building will continue to be a distant dream outside the realm of reality.

How much effort is actually placed in building a "common vision" between different internal actors? This kind of facilitation/mediation does work when applied appropriately but it's the kind of work that is often difficult and long-term; not exactly the kind of thing that succeeds in when passions are high and elections are near. I think the U.S. can do a much better job in this part of it's soft-power / smart-power tool kit.

[CrowBat]

...Where I principally disagree with you is that you seem to assume that if we do X then Y will happen. The real world doesn't work that way...Perhaps it does, perhaps not.

If we follow what's said by that gent who said he was ordered to go to the elected pres of Ecuador, and tell him he either has to follow US instructions and - between others - indebt the country forever by taking development loans from the World Bank, or he's going to get assassinated (and this happened just a few months later)... then sorry, but yes, we have to assume that if 'we' do X then Y will happen.

(And 'we' can only be the USA, then here in the EU we don't have strong, united foreign policy that would matter on international plan and be supported with the use of force as necessary, but 27 sets of entirely different commercial interests supported by lame and slowly applied economic sanctions.)

Translated to the ME, characters like Abdullah know all too well how dependable on Western support for their survival they all are, and that's why they shut up when said to shut up. All provided somebody comes to the idea to tell them to shut up - instead 'bowing - to tie shoelaces, of course'...

And regarding 'many factors': fact is that sanctions like travel bans (i.e. a la 'you'll not go to Geneva to drown yourself in cognac, buy yourself 1001st Rolex and enjoy Ukrainian whores until you order your police and intel to finally stop all the private donations for AQ and similar idiots') are really easy to impose. They would hit the selected few, 1000% sure and send a strong signal that proverbial sh!t has hit the fan and enough is now enough.

Anything is better but hushing up such facts like FBI's findings that the wife of the Saudi ambassador financed the 9/11 idiots (and I don't want to know what kind of possible connections can be found behind bombings in London or in Madrid; not only that local intels imposed extremely strict bans on any kind of relevant reporting but it's a 'historic fact' that such affairs are even easier to hush up here in the EU).


If we knew how Iraq was going to turn out, do you think Congress would have supported it if we could all go back in time?Iraq is, IMHO, an extremely rare, very special case - where the entire nation went after an idiotic president like a flock of sheep follows its shepherd into a slaughter.

Frankly Bill, I was monitoring what was going on back then 'front row, legs free' as we say it here, and simply couldn't believe what's going on. Until then, I could never imagine Americans going that 'retard'. There was no sane discussion of pros and cons, no argumentation, no critique, nothing. Even within the IC it was like in a church with worshipers repeating dogmas and reciting in trance, 'The president said, the SecState said, the MOD said, the president said, and amen...'

The entire affair stood in absolutely no relation to 9/11, yet everybody was happy to forget what was all the uproar about - and plunge into that catastrophe too. Perhaps it's really so that in such cases your nation functions like broken software, and whenever in doubt wants back to mama. It's definitely so that when facing a hard-to-determine sort of threat, it selected a kind of enemy that was much easier to determine...

Now, whether everybody there was bribed, or so shocked by 9/11 that nobody could see further than the tip of one's nose... no clue. But, like I mentioned in my post above, it's tragic that even 13 years later nobody learned anything about Islamic extremism at all. The only difference is that nowadays every conflict with potential involvement of the USA is seen through the prism of that 'Iraq mistake'.


Some predicted what would happen in Iraq quite accurately, but that doesn't mean they knew. They made an educated assumption.Sorry, nah. The people I happen to know have clearly said things like, 'well, beg your pardon, but all that's missing are 100kg of Sarin, that's a clear matter of fact - and Curveball is bull-####ting'. The only thing such people couldn't believe was how short their careers became, and how fast they found themselves on receiving end of utterly destroying defamation campaigns.

So, no 'educated guessing' there: that was a 'system error', the decision taken was completely wrong and against any better advice - and all of that was clear right from the start.


First off I have no idea if we facilitated the removal of Bandar...Admittedly, what I mentioned above is my theory, an 'educated guess' if you like - also based on 'uproar' it caused within specific circles of the Saudi military: but, sigh, the timing was EXTREMELY strange, simply too much to be an 'accident'.

Overall Bill: such 'things' are doable, and not only 'seldom'. It's just about what 'things' the US decides to do, and what not.

[Bill Moore]

How much effort is actually placed in building a "common vision" between different internal actors? This kind of facilitation/mediation does work when applied appropriately but it's the kind of work that is often difficult and long-term; not exactly the kind of thing that succeeds in when passions are high and elections are near. I think the U.S. can do a much better job in this part of it's soft-power / smart-power tool kit.

AP,

Another approach that briefs well because it sounds logical, but in practice it rarely works. I think we go to great lengths to assist opposing groups identify common interests and a common vision, but we can't force them to do so. How many years has the U.S. been trying this with Israel and the Palestinians? We have assisted the UN throughout much of the world seeking peace agreements, sometimes it works (at least temporarily) other times it doesn't based on the number of obstacles/issues to reaching an agreement. I know we tried to negotiate such agreements between the various ethnic groups in Iraq, and sat in some of those discussions. Gen Zinni was probably right when he wrote that sometimes we need to sit back and wait until the fighting is over either due to one side winning, or both sides reaching a state of exhaustion and a desire for the fighting to end.

I don't think attempting to arrange peace between warring parties is what is meant by soft power, but I get your point. I have spent a lot of time reading theories on war, theories that are grounded in history and still prove to be generally true today. I haven't seen any peace theories that are grounded in reality as of yet, but would love to study them if you are aware of any. I'm not talking about visions of unicorns and rainbows, but theories that have been proven to work over time.

[AmericanPride]

I haven't seen any peace theories that are grounded in reality as of yet, but would love to study them if you are aware of any. I'm not talking about visions of unicorns and rainbows, but theories that have been proven to work over time.

'Peace theory' is actually a relatively new development in academic study - the theories of war go back into ancient history as you know, but this '[grounding] in history' in and of itself does not necessarily make them relevant for modern problems. That we as a species are still quick and prone to violence says more about our lack of development than advanced weapons says about our progress. Now 'peace theory' or 'conflict resolution' or whatever else you want to call it - just because the theory is young does not mean the practice is also young. I'd start with Contemporary Conflict Resolution by Ramsbotham, et al since they provide a good once-over-the-world view of the emerging field.

I wouldn't call 'peace theory' new insofar its inventing something novel, but instead a reframing of the same problems that theories of war investigated. How do wars end? How are wars prevented? These are things that have been well practiced in history but not studied in the same depth as actually fighting wars. Why should war be the anchor in conflict studies and not peace since peace is in one way or another the desired outcome. If we accept Clausewitz's premise that war is fundamentally 'politics by other means', then what are the political means other than war? And there are 'means' - negotiation, mediation, facilitation, peacebuilding, etc. Not all are applicable in every situation just like not every military tactic is relevant in every war. And just like war is not guaranteed to succeed every time, neither is 'peace theory' - so we shouldn't hold it to impossible standards.

We also shouldn't assume that means other war also aren't confrontational, dangerous, or even sometimes fatal in themselves - labor actions, political agitation, etc all fall within the range of activities short of war but also aim to compel an adversary to change their behavior and to gain leverage at any subsequent negotiation. This isn't about 'raindows' and 'unicorns' - not sure why any discussion of 'peace' by military professionals should be seen with skepticism since doesn't the 'soldier above all pray for peace'? - but about limiting the costs of violent conflict and resolving political problems in a way that it is sustainable and hopefully just. And of course, there's a significant difference in process between emerging and on-going conflicts - there's alot of complexities to be untangled before people can even 'reason' together.

Implementing these practices in a deliberate, targeted, and sustained way is fairly new and it's mostly the work of international organizations and NGOs, with some but not all governments participating. Much of it is done through a social process although sometimes with official political sanction or oversight. Although states do practice these things in their own unique ways - the Congress of Vienna, the United Nations, the European Union, etc; these were/are all mechanisms in resolving disputes short of war. So there's alot of momentum in that direction and of course as evidenced by events this year, there's also many challenges and setbacks. That's not surprising but it's also no an indicator that it's impossible or undesirable for states, particularly the U.S., to pursue activist policies through means other than war.

EDIT: I also tend to sympathize with Crowbat's line of argument that it's not so much what the U.S. can and cannot do but what it wants to and does not want to do. If the State budget was at all comparable to the DoD budget, there would probably be a significant change of direction in U.S. policies and strategies vis-a-vis conflict. What are U.S. priorities and who makes (and how do they make) those determinations? So the U.S. can definitely do more to influence and/or facilitate pluralistic reform and I would also argue that in the long-term, pluralist governance is good both for the U.S. and for international security.

[Bill Moore]

AP,

I'll take a look at the recommended reading, thanks.

What I meant by historically grounded, is that there is some evidence this theory will work, versus just being another good idea that isn't feasible. Obviously new ideas have to be tested, and I'm not opposed to that, but it isn't a theory by my definition until it has been tested and proven to be effective. It is an idea or concept, and while being open to new ideas we should probably go in with the assumption that is only an idea, so we should be prepared for it to fail and have contingencies in our hip pocket.


If the State budget was at all comparable to the DoD budget, there would probably be a significant change of direction in U.S. policies and strategies vis-a-vis conflict. What are U.S. priorities and who makes (and how do they make) those determinations?

It is unrealistic to think that DOS's budget should be comparable to DODs based simply on the amount of money it costs us to purchase and maintain our various systems, conduct major exercises, daily training, etc., but your point is taken. By interaction with the State Department has been mixed. There are some true heroes who have strategies for promoting peace and economic development over time in their particular countries, and there are a fair amount of bubble heads who have no clue how the world works, as demonstrated by the State Department rep who foolishly posted a twitter photo stating the U.S. stands behind the opposition with the Syrian Resistance. Giving bubble heads more money to promote bad policy approaches will probably result in more conflicts. The problem from the outside looking in is it doesn't appear leaders in the State Department are held accountable, unlike a General or Admiral who does something stupid or has demonstrated incompetence is likely to be relieved.

Finally, when DOS took over the security assistance mission from DOD and used it more as a form of diplomacy than building real capacity the U.S. has wasted billions of dollar pursuing inept efforts to build partner nation capacity because it is led by State reps who have limited expertise in the field. I understand why it went under State, but they need to be augmented with sufficient DOD and law enforcement expertise to put together effective capacity building efforts that will more likely ensure that Americans will see a return on their investment of tax dollars. These are areas State out of necessity, or by choice, under resources, so if more money could help address some of these shortfalls.

[AmericanPride]

What I meant by historically grounded, is that there is some evidence this theory will work, versus just being another good idea that isn't feasible.

I agree - my point is that whereas military study has many decades (and centuries) behind it, the field of 'peace studies' has existed for only the last several decades. That we are just now coming around to investigating the nuances of conflict resolution and peace-building, however, does not mean that there are not numerous historical examples of this in practice. As far as developing working theory, you're right, that takes time and there's been a significant amount of work done in that regard. But how many years was it between Sun Tzu and Thucydides, and Thucydides and Machiavelli, and Machiavelli and Clausewitz? And how many more years before someone brought all of their thoughts together in a cohesive 'theory' (and there are still numerous competing theories)? And at the end of the day, I'm sure you'll agree, whether the theory is about war or peace, it's just an idea and events have a way of overtaking them at the ground level.


By interaction with the State Department has been mixed. There are some true heroes who have strategies for promoting peace and economic development over time in their particular countries, and there are a fair amount of bubble heads who have no clue how the world works, as demonstrated by the State Department rep who foolishly posted a twitter photo stating the U.S. stands behind the opposition with the Syrian Resistance. Giving bubble heads more money to promote bad policy approaches will probably result in more conflicts. The problem from the outside looking in is it doesn't appear leaders in the State Department are held accountable, unlike a General or Admiral who does something stupid or has demonstrated incompetence is likely to be relieved.

My experiences have been mixed too - and I would say there are 'true heroes' and 'bubble heads who have no clue' in the military as well. And I would dispute your last statement if we are to use the outcomes of Iraq and Afghanistan as measurements of competence. Anyway, I think a significant problem for the U.S. is the the process of inter-agency cooperation. Each department is fairly effective at their own tasks, but not so much at understanding the tasks of others. In some fields - like joint military operations and interagency cooperation on counter-terrorism - there have been significant improvements but this isn't true across the whole of the government or the full range of its responsibilities. Maybe there needs to be some bureaucratic reform as well as emphasis on 'jointness' at the department level. But I think the U.S. sub-par performance is less an indicator that 'peacebuilding' doesn't work and more that the U.S. is just a bad practitioner of politics other than war.

[Dayuhan]

By interaction with the State Department has been mixed. There are some true heroes who have strategies for promoting peace and economic development over time in their particular countries, and there are a fair amount of bubble heads who have no clue how the world works, as demonstrated by the State Department rep who foolishly posted a twitter photo stating the U.S. stands behind the opposition with the Syrian Resistance. Giving bubble heads more money to promote bad policy approaches will probably result in more conflicts.

Very few DoS people spend enough time in one country (let alone enough time outside the embassy/bubble) to offer realistic "strategies for promoting peace and economic development over time in their particular countries".

DoS is set up to manage relationships between and among states, not to deal with the internal problems of other countries: even AID is less about promoting development than about using aid as a lever to advance perceived US interests. It's tempting to say that the US should have more capacity to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, but I have doubts: not really our business, we don't do it well, and the potential for adverse unintended consequences is high.

I understand that some people find pleasure in imagining that the US has the capacity to dictate policy to other countries and then castigating the US for failing to use that imaginary capacity, but it doesn't seem a particularly productive pastime to me.

[Bill Moore]

Dayuhan,

I agree with your overall assessment, so where does that leave us when we state our means to project national power include diplomacy, information, military and economic power? What other credible tools do we have in the toolbox beyond the military?

A lot of folks tend to believe if we just threw more money at State and AID a lot of our issues would magically disappear. I see little evidence of that being true. On the other hand, I think we're over militarizing a number of issues, so we're between the proverbial rock and a hard place.

[Dayuhan]

I agree with your overall assessment, so where does that leave us when we state our means to project national power include diplomacy, information, military and economic power? What other credible tools do we have in the toolbox beyond the military?

The tools are pretty much what they've always been, we just have to be more realistic about what we can expect to accomplish with them, particularly when it comes to meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. The illusion that we can settle another countrys internal disputes or persuade people to accept a government they detest just by spreading aid money around may be attractive, but it's illusory. The idea that we can persuade or compel bitter enemies to sit down and accept "inclusive government" because we want them to is attractive, but illusory. The idea that we can compel governments of other countries to govern as we think they should is attractive, but illusory, as is the idea that we know best how other countries should be governed.

There's a tendency among disengaged observers to overrate American influence and assume that the US has more ability to control others than it actually does. The world is a much more multipolar place than it once was, and whatever another country needs, be it arms, technology, or credit, the US is not the only place to get it. That limits the carrots, just as domestic politics limits the sticks: using threats to force others to do our will is always an appealing prospect to those fond of bluster, but there's no assurance at all that it will work, especially when the electorate is in no mood to back the threats up.

It's easy to claim that, for example, the Saudis depend on the US for their survival, but saying it doesn't make it so. They don't depend on us for their survival, and they have as much leverage over us as we have over them, as they rather pointedly made clear recently by pushing a $3 billion arms deal with France, a deal that the US defense industry would have much rather seen on US shores. File that under mild reprimands, but the point is that we don't just dictate any more, if we ever did.


I think we're over militarizing a number of issues, so we're between the proverbial rock and a hard place.

That's true, and I think it often comes down to taking on goals that we have no realistic or practical means to accomplish ("nation building", among others), then dumping them on the military for want of other options. Hopefully we've learned a thing or two about that.

[CrowBat]

...Giving bubble heads more money to promote bad policy approaches will probably result in more conflicts....Come on, Bill: as if it is the DOS that's determining US foreign policy...

The DOS neither has the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 55th, 99th, nor the last word in this regards - and there is rarely such a brilliant example for this fact, but Syria.

Especially when it comes to the Middle East, if you demand - and expect - specific type of actions from the DOS, the US should better follow my advice (see one of posts some 4-5 pages back), and save plenty of tax-payer's money by disbanding it.

[Bill Moore]

Come on, Bill: as if it is the DOS that's determining US foreign policy...

The DOS neither has the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 55th, 99th, nor the last word in this regards - and there is rarely such a brilliant example for this fact, but Syria.

Especially when it comes to the Middle East, if you demand - and expect - specific type of actions from the DOS, the US should better follow my advice (see one of posts some 4-5 pages back), and save plenty of tax-payer's money by disbanding it.

The Department of State is the principal producer of most foreign policies, many of which are rubber stamped. Not all foreign policies are rubber stamped and there will be a number of actors involved.

http://www.state.gov/s/p/


The Policy Planning Staff''s mission is to take a longer term, strategic view of global trends and frame recommendations for the Secretary of State to advance U.S. interests and American values.

http://careers.state.gov/learn/what-we-do


The Secretary of State, the ranking member of the Cabinet and fourth in line of presidential succession, is the President's principal advisor on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for representing the United States abroad.

Recommended reading

http://americasotherarmy.com/

[CrowBat]

The Department of State is the principal producer of most foreign policies, many of which are rubber stamped. Not all foreign policies are rubber stamped and there will be a number of actors involved....but crucial ones - like Syria - are, and that's what eventually matters.

If, for example, Obama convinces himself 'Syrian insurgents are a bunch of doctors, farmers etc., with whom one can't cooperate', then that's it and the DOS could turn upside down and walk on its hair - but it's not going to change his opinion.

[Dayuhan]

...but crucial ones - like Syria - are, and that's what eventually matters.

If, for example, Obama convinces himself 'Syrian insurgents are a bunch of doctors, farmers etc., with whom one can't cooperate', then that's it and the DOS could turn upside down and walk on its hair - but it's not going to change his opinion.

More likley CIA, DoD, DoS and a few others did a detailed breakdown on the opposition groups, what might be done to help them, and what the probable and possible consequences would be, and the conclusion at the end of the process was that there were no suitable candidates for proxy war and that the risk/reward balance on a proxy war was not attractive.

Believe it or not, they aren't stupid... and your disagreement with their decision doesn't make it wrong.

[AmericanPride]

Bill,

This article (https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/maged-mandour/tripoli-airstrikes) discusses in some more detail the problem that Crowbat and I raised.


What does this mean for the progressive forces in the Arab World? It seems to me that the current dynamic will only serve to sideline those demanding genuine change. The security narrative of the conservative regimes is overpowering the demand for greater freedoms as the call for democracy is becoming smothered under the need to “combat terrorism”. There is also deliberate mixing of moderate and radical forms of Islamism. In other words, in the minds of many Arabs the Muslim Brotherhood has become synonymous with ISIS, and the opposition to the current regimes has become equivalent to the support of terrorism. This naturally feeds into the hands of Islamists, who are becoming radicalised due to severe repression.

But as living conditions deteriorate and the level of suppression increases, radicalism is becoming more attractive to the millions of disenfranchised Arab youth, leading to a cycle of suppression and radicalism that seems to have no end in sight. It seems that this cycle can only come to an end in the long term, when the failures of both parties leave space for a well-organised, ideologically motivated revolutionary movement capable of exploiting both forces, namely Islamism and conservatism.


The illusion that we can settle another countrys internal disputes or persuade people to accept a government they detest just by spreading aid money around may be attractive, but it's illusory. The idea that we can persuade or compel bitter enemies to sit down and accept "inclusive government" because we want them to is attractive, but illusory.

It's not an either/or proposition. Depending on the context (the country, the U.S. relationship with said country, the principal actors involved on both sides, the issue, etc) the U.S. exercises a range of influence over other countries. The American ability to influence regime decisions in North Korea, in Mexico, and in Saudi Arabia are unique to the conditions around those relationships. The U.S. has and will influence countries on behalf of priviate commercial interests, strategic political aims, and other reasons - some substantial, some trivial. The U.S. simply does not prioritize developing and exercising this kind of influence for the purposes of facilitating pluralist government.


That's true, and I think it often comes down to taking on goals that we have no realistic or practical means to accomplish ("nation building", among others), then dumping them on the military for want of other options. Hopefully we've learned a thing or two about that.

Pluralist reform and "nation-building" are two distinct activities. The U.S. had no problems in 'facilitating' changes in 'communist' regimes for 50 years - why is the U.S. suddenly powerless in influencing positive reform in authoritarian regimes? I don't think it's a question of what's possible; it's one of preference and willingness.


The world is a much more multipolar place than it once was, and whatever another country needs, be it arms, technology, or credit, the US is not the only place to get it. That limits the carrots, just as domestic politics limits the sticks: using threats to force others to do our will is always an appealing prospect to those fond of bluster, but there's no assurance at all that it will work, especially when the electorate is in no mood to back the threats up.

This is true, but only to an extent - and we witnessed that during the Cold War when the national liberation movements flocked to the 'communist' banner after the U.S. refused to support their bids for independence and in many cases, democracy. When the U.S. does not strengthen democratic governance, what and who remains in power? It's not helped by the total absence of any long-term strategy for U.S. foreign policy. An interesting case study is Yemen's Saleh's exploitation of U.S. desperation for Arab counter-terrorism allies to fund and arm his government - which ended with predictable results when his regime imploded, leaving the Yemen terrorism problem unresolved. Ditto Somalia since 2001.

[Dayuhan]

This going well off topic and probably should be moved elsewhere, but I'll leave that to David...


It's not an either/or proposition. Depending on the context (the country, the U.S. relationship with said country, the principal actors involved on both sides, the issue, etc) the U.S. exercises a range of influence over other countries. The American ability to influence regime decisions in North Korea, in Mexico, and in Saudi Arabia are unique to the conditions around those relationships. The U.S. has and will influence countries on behalf of priviate commercial interests, strategic political aims, and other reasons - some substantial, some trivial.

Influence in any given case depends on the extent and credibility of the incentives and penalties that the influencing power can deploy, and extent of resistance in the target of the influence. The second factor is key. Commercial concessions are generally not difficult, especially if there's something in it for those who rule. When we start talking about applying influence to force reforms that many ruling elites will see as immediate threats to their own positions, prerogatives, and even survival, resistance is very high. The response may be an outright refusal or an attempt to feign compliance with a charade of pseudo-reforms, but ruling elites in other countries are not going to simply surrender their power and perks because we want them to.


The U.S. simply does not prioritize developing and exercising this kind of influence for the purposes of facilitating pluralist government.

What's the basis for that statement? I think the US has placed a fairly high priority on efforts like "democracy promotion", reducing corruption, etc. The efforts just haven't been very productive, largely because nobody has any clear or convincing idea of how to do it.


The U.S. had no problems in 'facilitating' changes in 'communist' regimes for 50 years - why is the U.S. suddenly powerless in influencing positive reform in authoritarian regimes? I don't think it's a question of what's possible; it's one of preference and willingness.

When did the US ever effectively facilitate reform in Communist countries, up until the point where Communism collapsed from the inside? To put it simply, the US is generally powerless to force reform in authoritarian regimes because the penalties and incentives we are effectively able to deploy are not sufficient to overcome the very high level of resistance to reform in the target countries.


This is true, but only to an extent - and we witnessed that during the Cold War when the national liberation movements flocked to the 'communist' banner after the U.S. refused to support their bids for independence and in many cases, democracy.

I agree that this was a huge mistake and one that greatly strengthened our opponents in the Cold War. The extent to which that's analogous to current circumstances is very debatable.


When the U.S. does not strengthen democratic governance, what and who remains in power?

You can't strengthen something that isn't there, and outside attempts to create democratic governance have generally not been very successful.


It's not helped by the total absence of any long-term strategy for U.S. foreign policy. An interesting case study is Yemen's Saleh's exploitation of U.S. desperation for Arab counter-terrorism allies to fund and arm his government - which ended with predictable results when his regime imploded, leaving the Yemen terrorism problem unresolved. Ditto Somalia since 2001.

What were the alternatives in Yemen or Somalia? Certainly strengthening democratic governance wasn't an option, as there wasn't any to strengthen.

A better example might be the US effort to get Bahrain to respond to its Arab Spring with accommodation and reform, which clearly demonstrates the limits of US influence.

This debate tends to come back to the debate between realism and idealism: do you deal with what exists and try to make the most of it, or do you try to replace it, with a huge variety of potential unintended consequences, many of them very unattractive?

Since the unspoken focus of these generic discussions is so often Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, it might be useful to look specifically at the elephant in the drawing room. What specific policy reforms would we want to promote, what means could we adopt to promote them, and what would the probable outcomes be?

[AmericanPride]

Since the unspoken focus of these generic discussions is so often Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, it might be useful to look specifically at the elephant in the drawing room. What specific policy reforms would we want to promote, what means could we adopt to promote them, and what would the probable outcomes be?

First let it be said without reservation that Saudi Arabia is a police state. There are some exemptions depending on one's proximity to the royal family, but at the end of the day, everything is subordinated to the security of the House of Saud. Saudi Arabia actually has a fairly rich and active underground democratic movement that enjoys both popular support and a measure of patronage from some leading families of the country that are not content with the country's policies. The kingdom has on and off implemented incremental and sometimes only symbolic reforms but there is a recognition from the royal family that there is a strong democratic opposition (at least in sentiment if not in organization). The problem in Saudi Arabia (and Egypt, and other security-obessed states) is that in the havoc of the War on Terrorism, these movements are marginalized to the extent that the only alternative to the clearly repressive status quo is Islamic fundamentalism.

The U.S. plays a significant role in this because it's the U.S. that often reinforces the status quo. The U.S. has a special deference towards the political stability of the House of Saud that it does not show elsewhere - i.e. Yanukovych's Ukraine. Unfortunately, our policies have placed us in a position to choose between economic security and national security. Islamic fundamentalism is a response to the repressive conditions in these states, the perception that the U.S. is a major patron of these states, and the marginalization and violence inflicted upon the general populations by these regimes (and at times by the U.S.). Fifty years ago when it took an army to do any serious damage that was not a major problem. But now that one man can become a walking weapon of mass destruction, that changes the calculus.

The first step in reform is loosening the controls of the police state. For Saudi Arabia, that means disbanding the vice police, marginalizing the National Guard, and constraining domestic intelligence. It also means challenging who controls the mechanisms of power, namely the management and distribution of the country's oil wealth. Gradual political agitation and reform is preferable - the dilemma is that when authoritarian regime's recognize they're not as popular as they believed, they cease the reforms out of fear of losing power. The consequence is an escalation in the opposition's radicalism. At this point, the spigot that produces Islamic fundamentalism won't be turned off any time soon so that will be a problem for many years.

The issue for the U.S. is that it's going 'mainstream' and becoming better organized as a consequence of war and the lack of alternatives. Where the tipping point is, and what will trigger it, remains to be seen at least in Saudi Arabia. I think in Iraq and in some extent Syria that tipping point has been crossed with ISIS, which will make such movements far more difficult to uproot. This is no longer a simple counter-terrorism program where the aim is to dismantle an organization. We can destroy the organizations but now more will appear to replace them. The U.S. needs to start attacking the root of the problem - and that's the repressive and elitist political economies of Arab states (where are the Turkish, Indonesian, and other terrorist groups in Muslim-majority democratic states?).

And just a thought - it might be worthwhile to consider a transition period that includes a reform-minded strong-man to be followed by the implementation of democratic governance. The strong-man could provide the stability necessary to actually implement reforms and challenge the old guard while also preventing the mob from essentially wrecking the whole project. There are a couple of post-Cold War examples of something similar occurring.

[davidbfpo]

Dayuhan posted:
This (thread is) going well off topic and probably should be moved elsewhere, but I'll leave that to David...

Agreed. I shall see if there is a suitable thread or create one.

The dilemma for the USA (and others) has always been akin to "draining the swamp by reform" or "suppression is best for stability".

[CrowBat]

Further to following post by AP:


...
This article (https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/maged-mandour/tripoli-airstrikes) discusses in some more detail the problem that Crowbat and I raised.
...

...In other words, in the minds of many Arabs the Muslim Brotherhood has become synonymous with ISIS, and the opposition to the current regimes has become equivalent to the support of terrorism. This naturally feeds into the hands of Islamists, who are becoming radicalised due to severe repression.
...The same can be said for a mass of observers in the West, who are liberally bunching all Syrian insurgents, no matter what group, under 'extremist Islamists' and 'ISIS' - which they are not. ISIS is not 'Syrian', and except in Dayr az-Zawr area where it forced all of insurgents into submission through cutting off their supply links and connections to the outside world and sandwiching them between itself and regime-held areas, it contains actually very few Syrians (and most of these were forced into submission too).

Another extremist group, the JAN - and which is predominantly Salafist, not Wahabist - ended at the list of terrorist organizations because it declared itself allied with AQ, and some of its bosses are maintaining corresponding ties (no doubt about this), but despite clearly stating it does not intend to launch a 'Jihad' against anybody outside Syria (i.e. against anybody except the regime).

...and the entire conflict is seen completely through the prism of 'that's an uprising of Islamist extremists', and 'if it's interesting then only because of the ISIS' - which is why that topic is discussed most of the time on this forum, and why this thread is going off topic.

Anyway, against better advice from its IRGC-QF advisers, and against increasing resistance from within its own military, instead of rushing it to support its counteroffensive against the IF and FSyA north of Hama, or into counterattacks on insurgents advancing in southern Syria, the regime is dispatching the SyAAF (it's air force) into more show attacks on Raqqa, Tabqa and Dayr az-Zawr. It's claiming scores of ISIS as KIA and hundreds of its vehicles as destroyed. Even one of 'Scuds' paraded by the ISIS through Raqqa recently should have been destroyed.

Nothing of this can be independently verified, except the following:

- even MiG-21s are deployed for this purpose, although they are hopelessly useless for this purpose and operating at the very edge of their endurance when flying missions against targets in Raqqa area, as can be seen from this video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iHWMDrJkcpQ

- and they get shot down by the ISIS, then this has better air defences than most of insurgents, as can be seen from this video and the still attached below (the MiG in question was hit earlier today and crashed into a house, killing eight civilians in Raqqa, fate of pilot remains unknown):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWcon4di26s

So, it seems the regime is very eager to catch as much attention as possible in performing the role of 'good' one in the anti-ISIS campaign...

The photo below is showing the upper side of the left stabilizer of the MiG-21 shot down by the ISIS over Raqqa today.

[Dayuhan]

The same can be said for a mass of observers in the West, who are liberally bunching all Syrian insurgents, no matter what group, under 'extremist Islamists' and 'ISIS'

Who exactly is saying this, and where?

[Dayuhan]

First let it be said without reservation that Saudi Arabia is a police state.

I don't think anyone seriously disputes that.


Saudi Arabia actually has a fairly rich and active underground democratic movement that enjoys both popular support and a measure of patronage from some leading families of the country that are not content with the country's policies.

There's also a great deal of skepticism and concern that a move toward democracy could result in chaos and collapse. A lot of the support for the regime is driven not by affection for the regime, but fear that a transition would become violent and that a weak successor would be unable to hold the country together. Saudis are acutely aware that they sit on top of something lots of people want, and concerned that political distuption could expose the country to dismemberment.

Iraq hasn't helped: American neocons hoped to hold up Iraq as an example of what democracy can bring to the Middle East, and they have unfortunately succeeded, though not in the way they hoped to.


The U.S. plays a significant role in this because it's the U.S. that often reinforces the status quo. The U.S. has a special deference towards the political stability of the House of Saud that it does not show elsewhere - i.e. Yanukovych's Ukraine.

I think you overrate the importance of the US in maintaining Saudi internal security. They are quite capable of doing that on their ownm, and American suggestions are generally ignored. They do not need our support to stay in power and they do not take instructions from us.


Islamic fundamentalism is a response to the repressive conditions in these states, the perception that the U.S. is a major patron of these states, and the marginalization and violence inflicted upon the general populations by these regimes (and at times by the U.S.).

That seems considerably oversimplified


The first step in reform is loosening the controls of the police state. For Saudi Arabia, that means disbanding the vice police, marginalizing the National Guard, and constraining domestic intelligence. It also means challenging who controls the mechanisms of power, namely the management and distribution of the country's oil wealth.

Possibly true, but do you expect Americans to be the ones to do this? If so, how, and how exactly is it our business?


The U.S. needs to start attacking the root of the problem - and that's the repressive and elitist political economies of Arab states (where are the Turkish, Indonesian, and other terrorist groups in Muslim-majority democratic states?).

Again, how do you propose that the US do this? Do you really think we know best how other countries should be governed, and that we can simply wade into other countries trying to change governance without blowback and a heinous range of unintended consequences?


And just a thought - it might be worthwhile to consider a transition period that includes a reform-minded strong-man to be followed by the implementation of democratic governance. The strong-man could provide the stability necessary to actually implement reforms and challenge the old guard while also preventing the mob from essentially wrecking the whole project.

I can't find the "bang head against wall" emoticon, so the :confused: will have to do. Or maybe just a big WTF?

[AmericanPride]

There's also a great deal of skepticism and concern that a move toward democracy could result in chaos and collapse.

That's also the common refrain from the autocrats in power.


A lot of the support for the regime is driven not by affection for the regime, but fear that a transition would become violent and that a weak successor would be unable to hold the country together.

This was true to an extent in Syria but is not as accurate in Saudi Arabia. It's probably more accurate in Wahhabist strongholds like the Nejd but regions like the Hijaz are probably more concerned with the confiscation of their wealth by the royal government. The peoples of the Hijaz have a history of autonomy and there is been long-standing tension betweem their leading families and the al-Saud family. There's also the question of the assumption that every element desires to "hold the country together" or that it's beneficial or necessary for democratic reformation. Saudi Arabia was formed by conquest less than one hundred years; it's borders are literally drawn in sand. It's formation as a state is dependent not on political institutions but the House of Saud. The same arguments made in favor of Iraq's partition (which I disagree with actually) could be made about Saudi Arabia. I don't necessarily think partitioning Saudi Arabia is ideal but it's territorial integrity is less important than its political reformation so perhaps it's something that should be considered.


Saudis are acutely aware that they sit on top of something lots of people want, and concerned that political distuption could expose the country to dismemberment.

Which Saudis are you referring to specifically?


Iraq hasn't helped: American neocons hoped to hold up Iraq as an example of what democracy can bring to the Middle East, and they have unfortunately succeeded, though not in the way they hoped to.

I agree. The Iraq was a disaster on many levels for the U.S. - not least of which is the credibility of the U.S. as a champion of democratic government and human rights.


That seems considerably oversimplified

What's your view?


Possibly true, but do you expect Americans to be the ones to do this? If so, how, and how exactly is it our business?

The U.S. cannot and should not attempt to do it directly. It can however prompt reforms through diplomatic and social pressure either at the government or grass-roots level. It is "our business" because (1) the U.S. has a moral obligation as the patron of the international system and the self-proclaimed defender of democratic governance and human rights; (2) pluralist governance will go a long ways in marginalizing extremism and terrorism, and the U.S. has a primary security interest in this regard; and (3) the U.S. has the political and economic means to compel change in other states.

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has transitioned from a challenger of the Old World status quo (imperialism, colonialism, autocracy, etc) to a defender of the current status quo, which is a half-completed project of an international order founded on the recognition of universal human rights. Unfortunately, from the point of view of hegemonic stability theory, this makes the U.S. reactionary and conservative since it aims to preserve its gains rather than risk making new ones (i.e. "unintended consequences"), which in the long term actually undermines its capabilities and credibility as other challengers emerge who are willing to take risks for their own gains (China, Russia, Islamists, et al). It is in the long-term interests of the U.S. to actively promote and agitate for pluralist governance around the world.


Do you really think we know best how other countries should be governed, and that we can simply wade into other countries trying to change governance without blowback and a heinous range of unintended consequences?

We don't know best how other countries 'should' be governed, but we do know that pluralist governance is the most stable and effective government in the long term. Pluralism does not define how a state should be ordered (i.e. is it a republic or a democracy? what kind of institutions will it have?) since there are a wide range of options and cultural characteristics that make governance different in every part of the world. However, we do know that government is made more effective the larger the number of stakeholders involved in its political processes and institutions, however organized. And we also know that pluralist states are not as aggressive towards one another as well as more effective in reducing radicalism.

You make the inference that I am arguing the U.S. should put the Iraq War on repeat in a global campaign for democracy. That is not true. War is essentially a destructive and anti-humanist endeavor, even if necessary. We should be building political institutions, not tearing them down. You also make the inference that there is a inverse relationship between pluralist governance and stability. This is not true at all. There is certainly instability during transition between one form of government and another, but any kind of government with strong institutions is inherently stable. And that's where the U.S. should start: strengthening political institutions. War is not effective in that regard.

This is why I also floated the idea of a transitional 'strong-man' government. A number of states have more or less peacefully transitioned from an autocratic government to a pluralist one: Spain, South Korea, Taiwan, etc. Yes - there are risks, such as a right-wing counter-revolution (i.e. fascist Italy, Japan, Nazi Germany) or foreign invasion prematurely ending the experiment of democratization. But in the majority of cases, a braod-based civic movement is capable of pushing through democratization. A reform-minded autocratic government is really a 'useful idiot' who can maintain sufficient stability and legitimacy to reform institutions until they are removed from power (preferably through an electoral process). So, that's the other action the U.S. can take: promoting the development of civic society.

Pluralist sentiment exists in Saudi Arabia. There are reform-minded members of the royal family, though not many and none in key positions of power (yet). The challenges to democratization in Saudi Arabia is not some mythological Arab aversion to pluralism, but the autocratic nature of the state, as well as a political economy financed exclusively by oil wealth to expand royal patronage to the National Guard (security) and the clerical establishment (legitimacy). Democratizing the country's oil wealth would democratize the country - and that, in turn, would go a long way towards reducing the threat of terrorism. And of course, a caveat must be mentioned that reducing the long-term threat of insecurity does not affect the current threat (i.e. AQAP, etc) and security forces must remain available to combat them. The U.S. can't reform Saudi Arabia's political economy from the outside, but we can help shape the conditions to make this possible through a variety of political, social, and economic levers.

[CrowBat]

This is remaining off topic, but about people with whom one could 'start':

Interview with a Saudi atheist (http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/columns/article/interview-with-a-saudi-atheist_11146)

...“I was shocked to meet older people in their forties and fifties who been hiding their atheism for decades. They said that only recently with the young generation in their twenties had they found other people who think like them and were able to find social group that they can talk and debate about their ideas in.” Jabir politely demurs when asked about the backgrounds of these people; confidentiality and secrecy run deep in the Saudi Arabian atheism milieu.
...
When asked how this makes him feel to be Saudi, Jabir says: “The fact that Saudi is not a secular country, make one pessimistic for the future. But the fact that this country is a theist state, promoting one of the most extreme forms of Islam, horrifies me. I don’t see change from society, I don’t see change from the royal family, and as for the outside world, they don’t care how many people are killed for simply refusing to believe in the religion they were born into, as long as the oil keeps pumping.”

Although Jabir’s vision is deeply depressing, it is undeniable that Saudi Arabia is changing. With a booming population, rising unemployment, falling revenue from oil sales, and the ever-growing Internet and social media expansion, the country faces times of change and possible instability. It could yield a society that is freer and more tolerant of differing views and ideas from within its communities.

Yet, it may also, as the political system reacts to these new conditions, be a time of tightening and ever greater social and religious restrictions. The nightmare situation for Jabir is that when the relatively reform-minded King Abdullah dies it will bring about a new monarch who will let the religious police and certain segments of the Saudi community start an aggressive witch-hunt for ‘non-believers’.
...

[CrowBat]

Back to topic: the following is in relation to regime's claims about the SyAAF bombing all possible ISIS targets in NE Syria, recently...

Assad Strikes Hard Against Moderate Rebels, Doesn’t Touch ISIL (http://freebeacon.com/national-security/assad-strikes-hard-against-moderate-rebels-doesnt-touch-isil/)

... Insurgents of all stripes, except for the Islamic State group, say the Syrian government appears to be stepping up its attacks on them ahead of the threatened American air campaign. Pro-government and antigovernment analysts say Mr. Assad has an interest in eliminating the more moderate rebels, to make sure his forces are the only ones left to benefit on the ground from any weakening of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS.

Mr. Assad has maintained from the start of the conflict that he and his allies are the only force in Syria capable of battling the extremists effectively. But Islamic State activists in Homs said on Wednesday that there had been no recent government airstrikes against the group, adding to opposition suspicions that Mr. Assad prefers to focus on attacking his other opponents while letting the Islamic State’s unchecked brutality argue the case to Syria and the world that his rule is the best alternative.

The Faith in God Brigade in Talbiseh is probably one of the most moderate forces left on the battlefield. Many others have been radicalized by years of inconclusive violence and the influence of foreign fighters and deep-pocketed Islamist donors. For several months recently, parts of the brigade operated under Harakat al-Hazm, an insurgent umbrella group that has received American-made TOW missiles and other aid that the United States has tried to keep out of the hands of more extreme groups.
...

If connected to reports about the IRGC training up to 150,000 Shi'a combatants in Iraq... well, that might prove enough for everything: fighting the ISIS, present a force inside Iraq that cannot be removed by the US and allies - and then going to Syria to finish the insurgency (weakened by continued regime attacks) too...

Thus, can't avoid but asking again: what's Obama's exit strategy for the war on Daesh?

(For those who wonder what's 'Daesh', see here (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/09/17/france-is-ditching-the-islamic-state-name-and-replacing-it-with-a-label-the-group-hates/).)

[Dayuhan]

That's also the common refrain from the autocrats in power.

That doesn't mean concern doesn't exist in other places as well. You don't have to be an autocrat to notice that transitions out of autocracy, especially those initiated by external meddling, are a very difficult and very dangerous time for many countries, and are often followed by violent competition for power and/or a slide back into even worse autocracy.


There's also the question of the assumption that every element desires to "hold the country together" or that it's beneficial or necessary for democratic reformation... The same arguments made in favor of Iraq's partition (which I disagree with actually) could be made about Saudi Arabia. I don't necessarily think partitioning Saudi Arabia is ideal but it's territorial integrity is less important than its political reformation so perhaps it's something that should be considered.

Considered by who? Nobody who isn't a Saudi has a right to an opinion on the value of Saudi territorial integrity, any more than anyone who isn't Iraqi has a right to an opinion on whether or not Iraq should remain as a single state. These are matters for the people of the countries involved to resolve.


Which Saudis are you referring to specifically?

The ones I know are typically in business, not on the top tier and with no connection to the royals, but reasonably well off. They've traveled and in many cases studied abroad. Many are open to Western ways and admire democracy, but are very worried about how a transition would be managed and about the rather grim possibilities of a transition that's mismanaged.

I spent some time in the Kingdom in the 90s, and things actually seem more stable to me now... the oil glut was not a happy time there. As long as money is flowing, there's a lot of hesitation about rocking the boat. A fair number of people have a stake in the system and are reasonably comfortable, but are also not secure enough in their comforts to take them for granted and want to risk them. There's certainly discontent, but whether that discontent is anywhere near the level needed to initiate change remains to be seen.


What's your view?

Islamic fundamentalism and its violent offshoots are less a reaction to autocracy in the Muslim world than to a widespread perception that Muslims in general and Arabs in particular have been repressed, abused, manipulated, and maltreated by the West... the syndrome Bernard Lewis calls "aggressive self-pity". Emasculating and humiliating military defeats at the hands of Israelis, Americans, and practically anybody else have left a lot of people itching for payback. Have you ever wondered why Osama's calls for fighters to rise up against infidel invaders from the Soviet Union and the US got such a response, but his efforts to rouse jihad against the Saudi royals fell so flat? The "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative has a lot more traction than the "rise up against your effete rulers" narrative.


The U.S. cannot and should not attempt to do it directly. It can however prompt reforms through diplomatic and social pressure either at the government or grass-roots level.

"Diplomatic and social pressure" accomplish nothing beyond getting people annoyed at foreign meddling.

One thing we need to recognize, but often don't, is that in many autocratic countries even people who hate their governments do not want the US meddling in their internal affairs... US criticism of a government is often the fastest way to get people rallying behind the government. In much of the world, particularly the oil producing world and most especially the Arab world, accepting money or support from the US instantly discredits a political group: they are seen as sellouts to manipulative Western imperialists. Somehow people have got it into their heads that we typically act to advance our own interests, not theirs. Can't imagine how.


It is "our business" because (1) the U.S. has a moral obligation as the patron of the international system and the self-proclaimed defender of democratic governance and human rights;

Ok, we declare ourselves patron of the system and defender of the faith, and that gives us a moral obligation... to whom? Whether or not we think it's "our business" is not the question: do the people of the country involved think it's or business?


(2) pluralist governance will go a long ways in marginalizing extremism and terrorism, and the U.S. has a primary security interest in this regard; and (3) the U.S. has the political and economic means to compel change in other states.

I have yet to hear any credible suggestion of how American political and economic means can effectively be used to compel change in other countries.

An internally initiated transition to pluralism has a real chance to achieve stability and marginalize extremism, though this is by no means assured, as we see in Libya. When a transition is internally initiated, the people behind it typically have at least a chance of mustering the support and the means to actually govern. They are typically at least to some extent organized and capable before they get to take power, because if they weren't organized and capable they won't have the chance to take power (sometimes less the case in the "color revolution" model).

When a transition is externally initiated, that is not the case, one reason why externally initiated transitions typically fail so miserably. You cannot lump internally and externally initiated initiatives together. Pluralistic government has to evolve, and its evolution is a process that we cannot dictate or control. If we try to skip or accelerate that process to suit our own objectives, we end up with a government that can't endure and a mess that can and does endure.

There may be times and places where the US can assist internally initiated transitions, but it requires subtlety, restraint, and deep awareness of local conditions, none of which are American strong points.


It is in the long-term interests of the U.S. to actively promote and agitate for pluralist governance around the world.

It is in the interests of America's many creditors around the world to actively promote and agitate for fiscal prudence and stability in the US. Do we let them dictate policy to us? Do you really think anyone in the world really wants Americans meddling in their internal politics?


You make the inference that I am arguing the U.S. should put the Iraq War on repeat in a global campaign for democracy.

No, I make the inference that you're suggesting that the US meddle in the internal affairs of other countries. I think that's something we should avoid to the greatest possible extent... not because of any moral principle, but because we generally make such a mess of it.


And that's where the U.S. should start: strengthening political institutions. War is not effective in that regard.

Strengthening political institutions in other countries? You redefine the term "hubris".


And that's where the U.S. should start: This is why I also floated the idea of a transitional 'strong-man' government... A reform-minded autocratic government is really a 'useful idiot' who can maintain sufficient stability and legitimacy to reform institutions until they are removed from power (preferably through an electoral process).

And if your "useful idiot" decides there will be no electoral process, or that he will manipulate the electoral process? During the Cold War we thought we were using "useful idiot" strongmen to fight Communism, only to find that in reality we were their useful idiots, supporting and sustaining them while they ravaged their countries and in many cases lent legitimacy to the Communists. Do you really think we can control a strongman once he's in the chair?

This is not something the US should even be considering, IMO. Whether another country needs or does not need a strongman ruler is not for us to decide.


Pluralist sentiment exists in Saudi Arabia. There are reform-minded members of the royal family, though not many and none in key positions of power (yet). The challenges to democratization in Saudi Arabia is not some mythological Arab aversion to pluralism, but the autocratic nature of the state... a we can help shape the conditions to make this possible through a variety of political, social, and economic levers.

What specific levers do you propose to use, and how?

Of course pluralist sentiment exists. So do lots of other sentiments. There are some who would fight to separate, and others who would fight to keep them from separating. There are any number of foreign powers just waiting for a chance to jump in and advance their own interests. There's Islamist sentiment in there too, in a number of varieties. There's an army and a security apparatus with the capacity to use force and interests of their own to protect.

If we can't predict or control what's going to happen when we start rocking the boat - and we certainly can't - it might be better not to start. It's not our damned boat to begin with.

[empress]

Citing Dayuhan:
If we can't predict or control what's going to happen when we start rocking the boat - and we certainly can't - it might be better not to start. It's not our damned boat to begin with.

Yes exactly. This is a multipolar world. At least consulting with Russian and Syrian authorities would be deft in this situation for Obama adm. prior to broadening scope of US involvement over there.

Someone in another post (JWING?) calculated 5K plus ISF already killed in the last 8.5 months. And today's debate in Congress with defense leaders was similar to the one prior to the surge in Afg., with a tilt towards going allin this conflict-including argument for boots on the ground.

Every time they have been pushed out a certain area looks like ISIL just leaves and regroups elsewhere. I dont know if they can be seriously decapitated strictly by airpower without our SOF guys.... hmmm.

This madness has to stop!

[CrowBat]

... At least consulting with Russian and Syrian authorities would be deft in this situation for Obama adm. prior to broadening scope of US involvement over there.
What was first, egg or hen?

Did Russia consult the West when it provoked a 'civil war' (i.e. de-facto invaded) Ukraine, or when it began supporting the regime in Damascus and thus de-facto supported the provocation of the civil war in Syria? And what shall one discuss with Assadist regime, which not only provoked this war in Syria or made itself responsible of ...atrocities outstrip Islamic State in Syria (http://www.timesofisrael.com/assad-atrocities-outstrip-islamic-state-in-syria-un-panel-says/), but is not in control of the airspace over all of northern and north-eastern Syria (i.e. areas held by the Daesh) either, and remains insistent on destroying 'moderates' and not attacking the Daesh as much as dependable on monetary support from Tehran...?


Someone in another post (JWING?) calculated 5K plus ISF already killed in the last 8.5 months. And today's debate in Congress with defense leaders was similar to the one prior to the surge in Afg., with a tilt towards going allin this conflict-including argument for boots on the ground.The ISF proved corrupt, inept, inert, running away whenever facing strong opposition and thus unable to fight effectively. Whichever way one turns it, considering who's in charge in Baghdad and what Iranians are doing in the country (i.e. the parts of it still under Baghdad's control), it's next to certain the ISF will be largely replaced by IRGC-created 'Basiji-style' force currently undergoing training, armed with Russian and Iranian weapons bought by Baghdad with help of money provided by China.

Frankly, none of parties listed here cares what the USA and the West want. I.e. they do, but are already neck-deep in developing their own countermeasures, most of which are clearly designed to prevent any sort of Western influence for decades to come. With other words: the force in the process of being created by the IRGC is likely to become capable of tackling the Daesh on its own, and then moving against insurgents in Syria too, thus leaving a clique in Tehran in de-facto control over something like one third of remaining oil reserves, and most of Iraq and Syria.

No doubt, it's probably going to take a few years until this plan is realized: indeed, this is most likely going to last beyond the term of current US administration. Should this mean this issue should not be of our concern?

And, once Tehran secures its hegemony over Iraq and Syria, what do you think is going to happen next? Tehran is going to disarm this 'Iraqi Shi'a' military, it's going to let Kurds have their own state in northern Iraq, it's not going to move against Israel, against Saudi Arabia and GCC states etc. - or, better yet: it's going to take care to uphold Western interests in the Middle East...?


Every time they have been pushed out a certain area looks like ISIL just leaves and regroups elsewhere. I dont know if they can be seriously decapitated strictly by airpower without our SOF guys.... hmmm.

This madness has to stop!...I'm actually in agreement with you here. But, with this 'demand' we're back at the start of the 'off topic' part of discussion here: that's not going to happen as long as the US (and the West) continues insisting on upholding reactionary police states that are its 'allies' there.

[CrowBat]

Despite the usual bunching of insurgents with extremists and insistence that 'moderates' are not fighting, that whatever one sends to insurgents is reinforcing extremists, that one cannot trust them etc., etc., etc. (like in the video below)...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DveDwEk122Y

(BTW, typical in this style of argumentation is Rand Paul's explanation about 'JAN, ISIS, al-Qaida' being 'stronger' - in sense of more numerous - than the FSyA. This is nothing but nonsense. Firstly, and as usually, he completely ignored the IF, which is the most numerous insurgent group. Secondly, even if all combined, these groups do not count even 50% of either, the 'FSyA block' or the IF. Thirdly, while about 50% of the JAN is Syrian, the rest of extremists are simply not, and thus it's dishonest to mark them as such and explain 'we don't know who they are'.)

U.S. Congress approves arming Syrian rebels, funding government (http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/18/us-iraq-crisis-congress-vote-idUSKBN0HD2P820140918)

...The U.S. Senate approved President Barack Obama's plan for training and arming moderate Syrian rebels to battle Islamic State militants on Thursday, a major part of his military campaign to "degrade and destroy" the radical group.The Senate voted 78-22, in a rare bipartisan show of support for one of Obama's high-profile initiatives.
...

[Dayuhan]

Despite the usual bunching of insurgents with extremists and insistence that 'moderates' are not fighting, that whatever one sends to insurgents is reinforcing extremists, that one cannot trust them etc., etc., etc. (like in the video below)...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DveDwEk122Y

]

Paul is well out on the fringe on any subject and well beyond the fringe on foreign policy; his views would hardly be thought "usual". A more mainstream view, a better illustration of the arguments for non-intervention that actually carry some weight in DC, would be those of Mark Lynch, for example:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/08/11/would-arming-syrias-rebels-have-stopped-the-islamic-state/


But, with this 'demand' we're back at the start of the 'off topic' part of discussion here: that's not going to happen as long as the US (and the West) continues insisting on upholding reactionary police states that are its 'allies' there.

Are the US and "the West" really "upholding these regimes? Are they really that dependent on either, and is there really as much influence there as you think? I suspect not: the mantra of "dependent on the west" has simply been repeated until it's accepted without question or thought.

[CrowBat]

Sigh...what you've posted is the same line - including all the same, lame excuses and speculation. Indeed, the kind of speculation you're complaining about?!?

You've got this all explained, long ago: you prefer to ignore all I wrote in reply and thus it makes absolutely no sense in discussing anything with you (even if, I would be repeating myself for '1.977th time' :rolleyes:).

*************

Meanwhile, in the real world, French making it official they're flying combat sorties in Iraq: Irak Premieres Frappes Francaises (http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/irak-premieres-frappes-francaises) (in French),

...and Saudis 'making it official' they've got DF-21s:

Saudi Arabia has Acquired the DF-21 Missiles says Saudi General (http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/Issues/20140918/Con20140918723944.htm) (in Arabic).

Now let's see if intermediate range (1.700km) ballistic missiles might ever help them at least move their small finger to fight the Daesh.... :rolleyes:

[AmericanPride]

That doesn't mean concern doesn't exist in other places as well. You don't have to be an autocrat to notice that transitions out of autocracy, especially those initiated by external meddling, are a very difficult and very dangerous time for many countries, and are often followed by violent competition for power and/or a slide back into even worse autocracy.

I'm not sure about your qualifier of "often". Violent transitions do in fact occur - American Revolution, for example. However, there are also many peaceful transitions. A Freedom House report analzyed 67 democratic transitions and found that 32 of them were won by non-violent means. You could also say that non-violent transitions occur almost as often as violent ones. So let's try to be careful in defining the problem here.


Considered by who? Nobody who isn't a Saudi has a right to an opinion on the value of Saudi territorial integrity, any more than anyone who isn't Iraqi has a right to an opinion on whether or not Iraq should remain as a single state. These are matters for the people of the countries involved to resolve.

That's increasingly becoming an 'old world' view. The emerging structure of international law is producing a new paradigm where human rights (among which include participation in a pluralist governmental process) are more important than states' rights. This is the ethical and legal basis of the responsibility to protect which while now focused on the most egregious violent crimes, it also sets the conditions for encompassing all recognized human rights. This is the ideological reason why Republicans in the U.S. Congress not too recently rejected the U.N. treaty on disability rights.


The ones I know are typically in business, not on the top tier and with no connection to the royals, but reasonably well off. They've traveled and in many cases studied abroad. Many are open to Western ways and admire democracy, but are very worried about how a transition would be managed and about the rather grim possibilities of a transition that's mismanaged.

Those are legitimate concerns but are they sufficient justifications to persist in injustice?


As long as money is flowing, there's a lot of hesitation about rocking the boat. A fair number of people have a stake in the system and are reasonably comfortable, but are also not secure enough in their comforts to take them for granted and want to risk them. There's certainly discontent, but whether that discontent is anywhere near the level needed to initiate change remains to be seen.

And that's the fundamental problem in a centralized, autocratic, patronage state like Saudi Arabia. Compliance with the political system is not an endorsement or acceptance of it, and the royal family is acutely aware of the simmering discontent beneath the surface of political niceties. Where is the tipping point in KSA? I don't know - short of some kind of internal upheaval or catastrophic external conflict, the next major event will be succession of the next monarch.


Islamic fundamentalism and its violent offshoots are less a reaction to autocracy in the Muslim world than to a widespread perception that Muslims in general and Arabs in particular have been repressed, abused, manipulated, and maltreated by the West... the syndrome Bernard Lewis calls "aggressive self-pity". Emasculating and humiliating military defeats at the hands of Israelis, Americans, and practically anybody else have left a lot of people itching for payback..Have you ever wondered why Osama's calls for fighters to rise up against infidel invaders from the Soviet Union and the US got such a response, but his efforts to rouse jihad against the Saudi royals fell so flat? The "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative has a lot more traction than the "rise up against your effete rulers" narrative.

This is not entirely true. Many people answered the call to arms against the KSA - but the Saudis also have a fairly effective internal security service. And many of the sponsors of Islamic fundamentalism are the Saudis in power in the first place. Who writes the school text books, organizes training camps, and so on? So when 9/11 occurred and the chickens came home to roost, the KSA had already distanced itself from bin Laden - and the rest of the patronage state followed the al-Saud lead for the reasons you described in your previous comments (you don't sh*t where you eat).


"Diplomatic and social pressure" accomplish nothing beyond getting people annoyed at foreign meddling.

That's an oversimplication.


One thing we need to recognize, but often don't, is that in many autocratic countries even people who hate their governments do not want the US meddling in their internal affairs... US criticism of a government is often the fastest way to get people rallying behind the government.

That's also an oversimplication.



In much of the world, particularly the oil producing world and most especially the Arab world, accepting money or support from the US instantly discredits a political group: they are seen as sellouts to manipulative Western imperialists. Somehow people have got it into their heads that we typically act to advance our own interests, not theirs.

True. And we've consisently made the mistake that backing 'stable' autocratic regimes is in our own interests - but I don't think history bears that out. It could be on a case-by-case or limited basis but not as a matter of policy, and certainly not with the aim of preserving that status quo for any significant amount of time. Why did Eastern Europe welcome the U.S. and E.U. with open arms after the fall of communism but the Arab Spring did not offer the same warm welcome? It's a consequence of U.S. policies in those regions, not any cultural or social disposition towards autocracy.


Ok, we declare ourselves patron of the system and defender of the faith, and that gives us a moral obligation... to whom? Whether or not we think it's "our business" is not the question: do the people of the country involved think it's or business?

These questions operate on multiple levels. First, on a principled basis, those with the power to act of an obligation to do so. Whether or not the exemption carved out for political decisions is legitimate is open for debate. Second, from a political theory point of view, the U.S. has an obligation to itself to fulfill the obligations it claims to have in order to maintain its own credibility.


I have yet to hear any credible suggestion of how American political and economic means can effectively be used to compel change in other countries.

That this discourse is not mainstream does not mean no 'credible suggestion' exists. And 'compel' is the wrong word. The discourse has moved to a paradigm of 'multi-track' diplomacy that includes upwards of nine lines of effort (depending on the model used). The U.S. has frequently but selectively shaped conditions through political and economic means (i.e. Ukraine) to promote democratization.



When a transition is externally initiated, that is not the case, one reason why externally initiated transitions typically fail so miserably. You cannot lump internally and externally initiated initiatives together.

You can't?


Pluralistic government has to evolve, and its evolution is a process that we cannot dictate or control. If we try to skip or accelerate that process to suit our own objectives, we end up with a government that can't endure and a mess that can and does endure.

Yes - those are problems, evidenced by Iraq most recently. But those problems are not inherent in the process of pluralist reform, even if externally sponsored. Political conditions in the U.S. may prompt these mistakes but that's a consequence of governmental politics and not the actual process of pluralist reform.


There may be times and places where the US can assist internally initiated transitions, but it requires subtlety, restraint, and deep awareness of local conditions, none of which are American strong points.

I agree - but that's not a reason for the U.S. to ignore the problem of autocratic regimes entirely.


No, I make the inference that you're suggesting that the US meddle in the internal affairs of other countries. I think that's something we should avoid to the greatest possible extent... not because of any moral principle, but because we generally make such a mess of it.

The U.S. does this on a regular basis. That's the job of diplomats. It's only a question of degree.


Strengthening political institutions in other countries? You redefine the term "hubris".

That's often a stated goal for many international organizations so how is that 'hubris' for the U.S. to recognize it can play a major part in that process?


If we can't predict or control what's going to happen when we start rocking the boat - and we certainly can't - it might be better not to start.

And it's that risk-aversion that often leads to loss in long-term relative security. Attempting to preserve the status quo out of fear of 'rocking the boat' is a losing strategy.


It's not our damned boat to begin with.

That depends on how you define 'the boat'.

[SWJ Blog]

Iraq, Syria, and the Islamic State: The “Boots on the Ground” (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/iraq-syria-and-the-islamic-state-the-%E2%80%9Cboots-on-the-ground%E2%80%9D)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/iraq-syria-and-the-islamic-state-the-%E2%80%9Cboots-on-the-ground%E2%80%9D) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Patrick Cockburn, of The Independent, is known to have a different viewpoint on what is happening and his article starts with:
If the United States and its allies want to combat the Islamic State jihadists (IS, formerly known as Isis) successfully, they should arrange a ceasefire between the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the non-IS Syrian opposition. Neither the Syrian army nor the “moderate” Syrian rebels are strong enough to stop IS if they are fighting on two fronts at the same time, going by the outcome of recent battles.



A truce between the two main enemies of IS in Syria would be just that, and would not be part of a broader political solution to the Syrian crisis which is not feasible at this stage because mutual hatred is too great.


Link:http://i100.independent.co.uk/article/the-one-thing-that-could-stop-isis--l19FZ6G1Hg

[SWJ Blog]

Obama Taps Star General To Build Syrian Rebel Army to Fight ISIS (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/obama-taps-star-general-to-build-syrian-rebel-army-to-fight-isis)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/obama-taps-star-general-to-build-syrian-rebel-army-to-fight-isis) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[CrowBat]

Yeah, it's 'obvious' that the idea of making friends with a regime that's responsible for provoking a multi-enthnic and inter-religious civil war, wholesale slaughter of 400.000 Syrians, deployment of chemical weapons against civilians and destruction of most of major Syrian cities, making 10 million of - supposedly - its own population into refugees...

...but especially for importing Daesh and helping it grow so it can present itself as 'fighting extremist Islamists and thus a preferred friend of the West'...

...is simply 'brilliant'.

The next on that menu would be making friends with Khamenei's clique in Tehran: then provide air support for their- and Assadist hordes so these can clean up the entire mess in Iraq, Jordan, Israel, then Saudi Arabia and whatever else might find itself in the way... Ah, ups: Israel is 'friends', sorry.

Whatever: call it a 'speculation' if you like, but it's obvious that such an enterprise would be much easier to organize but finding out what insurgents are 'good ones' in Syria, then training and arming them, and guiding them through a war and politics. Not to talk about finding out what party in Iraq might be acceptable to cooperate with.... Doh, that's all too complex. Instead, make friends with two regimes that are excelling at squashing peaceful protesters that demand such nonsense like human rights, dignity and pluralism: who to hell cares about the latter factors? Nobody. On the contrary, organizing such an alliance would remove all the problems caused by corrupt and bigot regimes in the GCC, and foremost it could be completed within as little as one year (which in turn would remove the need for something as absurd as demands for GCC regimes to stop being as oppressive as those in Damascus and Tehran, but also finally cut off the financing they're providing for extremists all around the world). Simply fantastic.

And then the Middle East will be pacified - 'once and forever'. :rolleyes:

[CrowBat]

While the fans of the Assadist regime can't stop bragging about all possible air strikes on the Daesh, there is simply no evidence of these.

Instead, all one gets to hear are reports about strikes on civilians - and, if at all, then moderate insurgents in the Talbiseh-Rastan pocket.

Here one of related reports:
Nearly 50 dead in Syrian airstrikes on Homs province (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Sep-17/270957-nearly-50-dead-in-syrian-airstrikes-on-homs-province.ashx?utm_source=Magnet&utm_medium=Recommended%20Articles%20widget&utm_campaign=Magnet%20tools#axzz3E4bOTfqz).

Anybody curious to make friends with such characters? Perhaps some want to check who is actually fighting the Daesh in Syria, before coming to such ideas:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwSnyQYy5SE

[CrowBat]

Here is something like a summary of US air strikes on targets in Syria, flown the last night - as reported from the locals, and sorted out per province:

* Raqqa
- 7 strikes in total on targets inside the city were recorded during the night
- three locations in Tel Abyad area, north of this city, were hit
- the governor palace in Raqqa was completely destroyed during the night; this area was hit again early this morning, causing a huge fire
- Tabqa AB was hit five times
- Base 93 was hit three times - by Tomahawks

* Idlib
- JAN HQ in Idlib (no specific place mentioned)
- JAN HQ at Khirbet Ghazala (where the CO Mohammed Brigade, Abdu Ismail Mohammed was KIA)
- Activists are reporting that the strikes in this Province have hit the Ahrar ash-Sham HQ too, but 'only killed civilians'.

* Dayr az-Zawr
- no specific targets mentioned yet, but given 'several air strikes' were reportedly flown there, and all by night, it's clear these were undertaken by the US: SyAAF is not known to have flown a single nocturnal air strike in three years of war.

I purposedly write 'US air strikes' here, because it seems the US are alone in striking targets inside Syria: UK has promised to join, but didn't do so yet. Except for fighter-bombers, Rear Adm John Kirby has mentioned involvement of 'bombers and Tomahawk missiles'. Jordan is the only Arab nation to officially acknowledge involvement of its air force so far, but what the official website of the General Command of the Armed Forces of Jordan (http://jaf.mil.jo/) (in Arabic) says, seems to indicate RJAF flying strikes against targets inside Iraq.

Furthermore, locals are reporting rather weak presence of the Daesh in most of targeted areas: seems that majority of extremists went slaughtering Kurds in the Kobane pocket...

[CrowBat]

More news on US strikes on the Daesh in Syria: majority of these seem to have targeted a large convoy of extremists moving in direction of Kobane and Tel Abyad. Supposedly, most of this was obliterated. The YPG then launched a counterattack and mopped up.

Another Kurdish force - which seems to have entered Syria from Iraq - is moving from Ras al-Ayn on Mabroukah, and should have captured the latter town. YPG is claiming that this offensive is to go westwards, in direction of Tel Abyad.

With other words: except for targeting the Daesh and Ahrar ash-Sham, the US is presently supporting a pincer-attack by the YPG which should help ease the pressure upon Kobane pocket.

*************

Separately from this, the Israelis have shot down a SyAAF Su-24MK2 this morning.

According to the IDF, the Sukhoi penetrated the airspace over Israeli-occupied Golan Heights at around 08.57hrs local time, and crossed into the Israeli-controlled airspace by about 800 metres at an altitude 'between 10,000 and 14,000ft'. 'From the moment that the decision was made until impact, 1 minute and 20 seconds passed'.

The photo below should be showing the crew that ejected. Video below was taken at Khan Shih, which is half-way between Damascus and Qunaitra: while insurgents claim they've shot down the plane in question, I would say this is the Su-24MK2 shot down by the Israelis:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z7YM8hwwwco

The IDF confirmed that the crew ejected successfully.

This is a loss that will be felt by the SyAAF: although originally in posession of only 21 aircraft, No. 819 Squadron (their only Su-24-unit) flew up to 30% of all strikes recorded over Syria since July 2012.

[Dayuhan]

It seems inevitable that intractable problems will generate utterly unrealistic "solutions" from onlookers, but this conflict seems to be doing more than its share. This has to be right up there near the top:


If the United States and its allies want to combat the Islamic State jihadists (IS, formerly known as Isis) successfully, they should arrange a ceasefire between the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the non-IS Syrian opposition.

If we're going to presume omnipotence, why not just "arrange for" the ISIS guys to shoot themselves and/or each other, and have done with it?

Obviously Assad has no interest in a truce with "the non-ISIS opposition". His interest lies in annihilating the non-ISIS opposition, so he can pitch himself as the only alternative to ISIS. Why would Assad go ahead with a truce and focus on ISIS when he knows perfectly well that as soon as ISIS is out of the picture he'll be the next target? Makes no sense. Assad seems perfectly happy to have ISIS in the picture, as well he might be: as long as they're around, he's no longer the least attractive alternative.

The proposal is every bit as unrealistic on the other side. "The non-ISIS opposition” is anything but cohesive and unitary: you're talking about hundreds of divergent and deeply conflicted factions, from relative moderates to full blown Islamist loonies like al-Nusra, which is among the most obvious demonstrations that "non-ISIS" does not necessarily mean "moderate". Even the thought of trying to get all or even most of them to agree to or observe a truce is far beyond the bounds of absurdity.

So we propose to “arrange a truce” between those who haven’t the capacity to agree on a truce (or anything else) and those who have no reason whatsoever to want a truce, and we expect this to happen… why? Because we decided that it should be? Again, if we were omnipotent we’d have easier ways of solving the problem.

Another prevailing utterly unrealistic proposal goes back to the old “find the good guys and make them win” mantra, also known as “arm and fund the moderates, and guide them through war and politics”. The obvious questions about whether a proxy war is really an advisable strategy, whether a suitable proxy exists, and (most of all) what we propose to do when our proxy doesn’t win are generally not answered, or even acknowledged: it’s just assumed that there have to be good guys, that they will surely win if we support them, that they will of course willingly submit to our “guidance”, and that of course they would never ever dream of applying our money and resources to any purpose not approved by us.

Given the number of times we’ve been burned in that particular fire you’d think we’d know better than to stick our faces back into it… but I guess we’re slow learners.

And then of course there’s the old reliable proposal that America should “demand” that the GCC regimes stop being oppressive and do as we say, as if they give a rat’s ass about our demands, and as if they need to.

All of these “proposals” have one thing in common: they assume capacities that do not in fact exist. That makes them quite useless for any practical purpose, though they do provide us with a way to make an unrealistic suggestion and then accuse others of incompetence for not following it. Why anyone would want to do that is something I’ve not quite figured out. Different strokes, I guess…

[CrowBat]

Sigh, more of usual speculation and guessing...

In all of your regurgitation, there is only thing that's making me curious, Dayuhan: you're all the time emphasising how disunited the insurgents are.

Provided you are able to at least once answer a question: who has ever told you that 'Assadists' are 'unified'?

Assad is meanwhile an Iranian puppet, upheld for the purpose of representing Iranian interests in Damascus and holding together a bunch consisting of different militias.

On the battlefield - and that's all that matters in Syria presently - his regime is supposedly represented through the 'Syrian Arab Army'. Where is this Syrian Arab Army, please? Can you mention me but a single brigade, not to talk about any division of the former Syrian Arab Army that is still existing?

Yes, there is a Ministry of Defence and the usual chain of command, but officers of these have representative roles only: their main duty is to listen to IRGC-QF officers and follow their orders. Technically, the 'Syrian military' (including intelligence services) is under the control of IRGC-QF officers: much of it is actually run by various families that are siding with Assad in interest of their own survival. Result is a mafia-like organization, not a 'military': even somebody with Soleimani's authority has experienced all sorts of problems in attempting to exercise battlefield control of all the diverse forces. His staff has launched seven different offensives through 2013 and in early 2014, and couldn't complete even one of these because of 'disruption' by various of cliques - which often withdrew their forces from the battlefield in disagreement with him. And since Soleimani was sent back to Iraq, the cooperation between different cliques only worsened - which is why we haven't seen any of glorious large-scale offensives being undertaken since months.

The air force is receiving orders from the Ba'ath Party HQ, not from the MOD or down the usual chain of command: the Ba'ath Party is primarily consisting of Sunnis and maintaining its own militia which, at least according to Iranians, has proven more combat effective than any other elements of regime's military. Should it then be surprising the SyAAF proved most-effective in providing CAS when doing so in support of BPM units - which include several former Special Forces regiments? None of BPM-members I managed to contact so far would say he's fighting 'for Assad': 'for Syria', 'defence of my family' etc., but not for Assad. And, they dislike Iranian presence and influence too. So, they're one 'clique' there.

Air Defence Force was disbanded already before the war, and integrated into the SyAAF: majority of its former units were disbanded and their personnel integrated into the NDF.

Theoretically, the core of what is left of the Army would be the Republican Guards Division. This is meanwhile down to only two 'special' brigades, plus air defence assets (most of those operating 'high-tech' systems, like SA-17s and SA-21s) and few artillery regiments equipped with MLRS' and SSMs. One of 'special' brigades has a sole duty of keeping Alawites under control: during the fall of Tabqa, the regime flew out all of its favourites, but left behind hundreds of soldiers to get slaughtered by the Daesh. This caused renewed unrest and some public protest even within supposed 'core support base', which were squashed only through mass-arresting of anybody who expressed critique. And that's the next point of conflict here: loyal Alawites vs. disloyal Alawites (and where one should keep in mind that Alawites are traditionally disunited, and held 'together' only by sheer violence and brutality of the Assadist regime).

Out of RGD's former three mechanized brigades only one remains existent: the 104th (that is: its remnants after three years of war) was sent to save Dayr az-Zawr. The equipment of the other two is now manned by Hezbollah and Iraqis, under command of IRGC-QF officers, of course.

The 4th AD was broken down into detachments that were put in command of countless detachments from various Army units already back in 2011 (in order to prevent defection). All of these were - together with all that's left of the Army - reorganized by the IRGC-QF into the NDF. The NDF is operated in form of about 100+ battalions, sometimes bunched together into makeshift brigades and even divisions for specific tasks, but majority of these are 'territorial' by nature: capable only of limited defensive operations within the area where their members are living. There are ex-intelligence, ex-Army, ex-Shabiha, ex-air defence, and then 'other' battalions, each of them run by their own clique and with its own level/degree of loyalty to the regime. Nobody knows to what side would which of them turn should Assad fall.

Except for the BPM, the other two most effective 'military forces loyal to the regime' are the militia of the Syrian Nationalist Party's (SSNP, which has Nazi-like ideology) and the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA was established already back in the late 1960s, and is meanwhile largely recruited from the West Bank). In essence, the regime's military can barely survive without them (and the BPM): they're involved in every single 'successful' offensive operation of the regime since this spring. The SSNP and the PLA are fighting 'on regime's side', but not for Assad either.

Now try to arrange a 'truce' between these forces and the insurgents: even when Iranians were arranging truces with specific of insurgent held pockets around Damascus and Homs earlier this year, they first had to remove specific regime units from the given area in order to negotiate. Whenever they didn't there were renewed atrocities, looting, raping and all of that sort. Just like on the insurgent side, there are 'commanders' that are disobeying any corresponding orders - if for no other reasons then because they know they have too much blood on their hands and are afraid of retaliation (whether by their own or the 'other' side). And that's 'just for the start'...

And for those shedding crocodile tears over non-cooperation with the Assadist regime... Bashar and Iranians can only thank to Obama, but not complain about him. It's not only that this intervention comes much too late, that Obama has left them three years to save the regime from the collapse, and grow the Daesh for their own purposes. The Daesh's advance on Mosul came just about when the IRGC was about to go bankrupt because of US sanctions - by pure accident, I guess? Thanks to Daesh's advance, they're now free to finance themselves through Iraqi purchases of Iranian arms and ammo, Russian arms and ammo and wholesale raise of Shi'a militias in Iraq.

But 'no', I guess you'll say: that's taking things into context. We're discussing Syria, so who cares about Iraq here.

OK, then let's go back to Syria: this intervention in Syria is coming just about when the Daesh was preparing a major assault on Dayr az-Zawr. Thanks to this intervention, the extremists are never going to launch that attack - and thus Bashar is never going to find himself facing such fierce critique from within 'own' ranks, like after the fall of Tabqa.

On the contrary: withdrawal of major FSyA, SF and SRF contingents for 're-training and re-equipment' in Jordan and KSA is opening major gaps in insurgent frontlines. US attacks on the JAN are likely to open additional gaps in these frontlines, which other insurgent groups can't close on their own: for this, they lack troops, armament and supplies - and they are already lacking troops, armament and supplies to fight both, the Daesh and the regime at the same time. And the US is doing nothing from curbing ever fiercer air strikes by the SyAAF against FSyA, SF, SRF and the IF.

What do you think: attacks on the JAN and the Ahrar are improving position of the FSyA and the IF? On the contrary: given how disillusioned by the USA (and the West) majority of insurgents became after three years of waiting for them, it's no surprise they're all very sceptic about results of this intervention. Indeed, should it turn out the US air power is continuously killing civilians while missing various of Ahrar's and JAN's HQ, it is going to be not the least surprising if insurgents turn against the USA too: such actions are therefore an ill-advised va banque game.

So, where is actually the problem? USA are already 'cooperating' with the regime in Damascus, though indirectly. Run the way it is, the US-led action in Syria is saving that regime. I have said it already, and I'll repeat it: sooner or later, Bashar is going to decorate Obama for his achievements in saving his regime. Khamenei, Vahid & Co are then going to stand in line right behind Bashar...

[Bill Moore]

I think further disunifying Assads security forces should be a primary effort by the resistance and their supporters, and this can be done if the resistance is willing to compromise. As for a temporary alliance with Assad Sec Kerry said Assad was not fighting ISIL, so much for that realist approach.

No doubt we can defeat Assad, but should we until there is some hope there won't be a worse blood bath when he falls and everyone is vying for power and seeking revenge? We will end up taking the blame and our foreign friends who insisted we help remove Assad will imply we the morning after problem also.

We can't defeat ISIL unless the masses in the region turn on them and we turn a blind eye why they slaughter them. We can certainly weaken them, but just as much effort should be directed at psychological operations to facilitate decisive operations.

[CrowBat]

Bill,
all this theory, guessing and speculation is not going to help anybody. One can't go demanding from some insurgents to do this or that like if they are a state: they are insurgents, not a state, otherwise they wouldn't be insurgents but the state. So, clean the table first (and the backyard too, then obviously the table is never going to get clean without the backyard getting cleaned), help the insurgents become a state and then demand things from them.

Though the idea with destabilizing the 'Assadist coalition' is a sound one (definitely a much better solution that launching a military intervention at least two years late and then in entirely wrong fashion... sigh... why is that Churchill's statement 'you can always count on Americans to do the right thing, after they've tried everything else' - not leaving my mind today...). In three years of war, absolutely nothing has been done in this regards: opponents of the regime within Assad's 'very own' ranks are simply left on their own device... On the contrary, internet is full of BSPR thrown up by Assad fans, and they threw up so much... 'dirt', that even serious politicians have lost direction.... :rolleyes:

************

Whatever, now comes a wonderful illustration for how misguided this operation is. The US is bombing the Daesh now the third night in succession. Apparently, USAF B-1s, F-22s, F-15Es and F-16Cs, and USN's BGM-109s have manwhile been joined by RSAF F-15S' and UAEAF's F-16s. Surprise, surprise, the GCC decided to move their small finger, after all...

Saudi prince flew jet in Syria ISIL attacks (http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/saudi-prince-flew-jet-in-syria-isil-attacks?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter)

...The son of Saudi Arabia’s crown prince was among the pilots who carried out attacks against ISIL militants in northern Syria this week.

Photographs released by the official Saudi Press Agency yesterday showed eight Saudi air force pilots at an undisclosed location after returning from the mission.

The pilots included Prince Khaled bin Salman, son of Crown Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.

Dressed in flight suits, the beaming pilots posed for a group photo in front of a fighter jet parked in an airplane hanger. Two of the pilots were also seen sitting in a two-man fighter jet, and there were additional shots of the pilots examining helmets and other equipment in a dressing room.

The fighter jet was marked with the crossed swords ensign of the Royal Saudi Air Force.

“My sons, the pilots, fulfilled their obligation toward their religion, their homeland and their king,” SPA quoted Crown Prince Salman as saying.
...


UAE’s first female fighter pilot likely dropping bombs on ISIS militants in Syria (http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/uae-female-fighter-pilot-dropping-bombs-isis-article-1.1951052)

...Maj. Mariam Al Mansouri, 35, joined the United Arab Emirates' air force once the military branch accepted women. She graduated the academy in 2008 and now pilots an F-16 Block 60 fighter jet, likely among those taking part in the air strikes against Islamic State terrorists in Syria.

She’s raining bombs on terrorist thugs.

The first female pilot in the United Arab Emirates' air force is reportedly taking part in the coalition air strikes against ISIS militants hiding in Syria.
...

By all theoretical commonality of the deployed hardweare, it would be interesting to find out how did they sort out the control and the IFF: then this is anything but sorted out even between friendlies (i.e. USAF and the USN), and if somebody gets a nervous finger, or some SyAAF idiot runs in between all of them...

And now comes the bitter part: except for one of two B-1B-strikes during the first night (these have hit one of Daesh columns converging on the Kobane pocket), all that all these planes are hitting - are empty buildings. All the videos released by the CENTCOM so far are showing no outside movement, few vehicles around, and some show that no sentries were posted nearby. Reports indicate that majority of objectives were vacant:

Syria Rebels Say They Were Told of Airstrikes Against Islamic State (http://online.wsj.com/articles/syria-opposition-says-it-was-informed-strikes-would-begin-1411459825)

...Syrian opposition figures said the U.S. military informed them over the weekend that American airstrikes against Islamic State would begin this week, advising the Free Syrian Army to prepare its forces while a covert arming program run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency provided fresh weapons.

The U.S. bombarded Islamic State-held towns and cities overnight Monday to provide support to the FSA and pave the way for the allied opposition to attempt to clear and hold territory held by the Islamist militants. So far, more than a dozen airstrikes have hit Islamic State military targets and administrative buildings in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces in the north as well as al Qaeda's official arm in the country, al Nusra Front in the northwestern city of Idlib, the opposition said.

A statement from the U.S. Central Command, which is spearheading the operation, confirmed the airstrikes in Raqqa and Aleppo and added that it also targeted Deir Ezzour province in eastern Syria, where Islamic State has been siphoning off oil and selling it on the black market to finance its operations. The statement made no mention of airstrikes targeting Nusra in Idlib,

But Islamic State had also been preparing for the airstrikes, moving its top leadership and most sophisticated weapons from Raqqa, residents said, after the U.S. announced earlier this month that it would target the extremist group in Syria.

Residents of Raqqa said they didn't know where the weapons and leadership were relocated to, but Monday's night's airstrikes hit at least four Islamic State military bases and an administrative building in the province. Raqqa is the only province that is fully controlled by Islamic State and serves as operational headquarters for the group.
...

So, more or less, this is all 'shock and awe' - all over again. Useless blasting of empty structures...

(to be continued...)

[CrowBat]

Throughout this time, the Daesh is attacking the Kobane pocket and has - according to Kurdish sources - reached a point only 5km outside this town, during the afternoon. And this after overrunning the local YPG HQ, as shown on this video (warning: GRAFFIC in some places!):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qRLPs1L22cE

Coalition raids prompt ISIS advance on Syria Kurdish town (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Sep-24/271793-us-led-airstrikes-prompt-isis-advance-on-syrian-kurdish-town-of-kobani.ashx#ixzz3EEQbLnoG)

...ISIS has reinforced fighters who are battling Kurdish forces for control of a Syrian town at the border with Turkey, a redeployment triggered by U.S.-led air strikes on the group elsewhere, a Kurdish military official said.

Ocalan Iso, deputy leader of the Kurdish forces defending the town of Kobani at the Turkish border, said more ISIS fighters and tanks had arrived since the U.S.-led coalition began air strikes on the group on Tuesday.

"The number of their fighters has increased, the number of their tanks has increased since the bombardment of Raqqa," Iso told Reuters by telephone. He repeated calls for the U.S.-led coalition to expand its air strikes to ISIS positions near Kobani, which is also known as Ayn al-Arab.

"Kobani is in danger," he said.
...

So, the Kurds are crying for help, but all they've got so far is from the nearby pocket held by the FSyA (yes, there are two FSyA-held pockets north of Raqqa, no matter how much is this ignored by almost everybody), and from those Kurds that brought their families to the safety in Turkey, and then returned to fight the Daesh. Contrary to the extremists, though, neither the FSyA nor the YPG forces there have tanks and artillery: only RPGs and machine-guns.

Meanwhile, Twitter reports from this evening are indicating new waves of air strikes - but not in support of YPG/FSyA forces at Kobane: instead, those that 'know better' are blasting empty 'HQs' and 'storage sites' around Abu Kamal, Mayadin, and Markdah near Dayr az-Zawr... :rolleyes:

This is making damn lots of sense. Especialy because the Daesh has withdrawn so many of its forces from this area, that its lines there are held by Arab tribes that used to fight for the FSyA already since 2011 (they nearly liberated all of Dayr az-Zawr in summer 2012), until they found themselves sandwiched between the regime and the Daesh (by the ISIS advance into their backs), then had all of their leaders killed by extremist suicide bombers - and were left without a choice but to submit themselves to the extremist command...

Congratulations to whoever is writing that frikkin' targeting list: this is reminding me of similar air strikes on Bagram AB back in October 2001, when somebody was so eager to spend several dozens of GBUs (the cheapest went at something like US$500.000) to blast rusty hulks of long-since abandoned MiG-15UTIs, MiG-17s and Il-28s at the local junkyard... while a look into one of old issues of the World Air Power Journal could've provided clear and undisputable evidence that such target selection is simply stupid.

[Bill Moore]

Crowbat


all this theory, guessing and speculation is not going to help anybody. One can't go demanding from some insurgents to do this or that like if they are a state: they are insurgents, not a state, otherwise they wouldn't be insurgents but the state. So, clean the table first (and the backyard too, then obviously the table is never going to get clean without the backyard getting cleaned), help the insurgents become a state and then demand things from them.

This approach will lead to a huge humanitarian disaster, if insurgents are just insurgents, then they're just thugs, and I don't think they're just thugs. They have a political agenda, unfortunately too many competing ones to be successful. We can help them establish a shadow government now and begin training/educating those who will need to fill critical positions to avoid a vacuum. I understand your point about cleaning the backyard, but they can and should begin the critical preparation work for the next phase. If they don't those with the plan like MB will take over.

[Dayuhan]

Sigh, more of usual speculation and guessing...

That's... entertaining, given your own habit of simply declaring that early American intervention was "the right thing", while presenting no supporting evidence or logic beyond variants on the "because I said so" theme.


Provided you are able to at least once answer a question: who has ever told you that 'Assadists' are 'unified'?

Nobody told me that, neither have I said that. You have a way of putting words into other people's mouths, and assuming opinions that aren't there.


Now try to arrange a 'truce' between these forces and the insurgents: even when Iranians were arranging truces with specific of insurgent held pockets around Damascus and Homs earlier this year, they first had to remove specific regime units from the given area in order to negotiate. Whenever they didn't there were renewed atrocities, looting, raping and all of that sort. Just like on the insurgent side, there are 'commanders' that are disobeying any corresponding orders - if for no other reasons then because they know they have too much blood on their hands and are afraid of retaliation (whether by their own or the 'other' side). And that's 'just for the start'...

Yes, that's why "arranging" a large scale truce to serve our strategic purpose seems so far outside the realm of credibility.


The Daesh's advance on Mosul came just about when the IRGC was about to go bankrupt because of US sanctions - by pure accident, I guess? Thanks to Daesh's advance, they're now free to finance themselves through Iraqi purchases of Iranian arms and ammo, Russian arms and ammo and wholesale raise of Shi'a militias in Iraq.

Certainly the rise of ISIS has been very convenient for Iran and for Assad, and certainly they've taken full advantage of the opportunity. That doesn't necessarily mean they created ISIS to serve their own purposes: it could just as easily mean that they simply took advantage of events as they emerged.


But 'no', I guess you'll say: that's taking things into context. We're discussing Syria, so who cares about Iraq here.

You'd guess wrong.


So, where is actually the problem?

IMO the problem is that there's no viable end state goal and thus no real strategy, just an attempt to show some visible action against ISIS without excessive commitment. I think the actions being taken are aimed more at the domestic audience than at achieving any particular impact on the ground.


I think further disunifying Assads security forces should be a primary effort by the resistance and their supporters, and this can be done if the resistance is willing to compromise.

Is there any evidence that the resistance is willing to compromise, and do we have any viable and realistic way to disunify Assad's forces?


No doubt we can defeat Assad, but should we until there is some hope there won't be a worse blood bath when he falls and everyone is vying for power and seeking revenge? We will end up taking the blame and our foreign friends who insisted we help remove Assad will imply we the morning after problem also.

That's been the problem from the start, no? If Assad falls, that leaves a vacuum with an infinitude of factions fighting to fill it. That's not a reason to actively support Assad, of course, but it is a reason not to wade neck-deep into the scheisse.


Throughout this time, the Daesh is attacking the Kobane pocket and has - according to Kurdish sources - reached a point only 5km outside this town, during the afternoon.

Is it realistically possible to provide effective CAS to ground forces in Kobane or elsewhere without properly trained and equipped forces on the ground communicating with the air forces?


Congratulations to whoever is writing that frikkin' targeting list: this is reminding me of similar air strikes on Bagram AB back in October 2001, when somebody was so eager to spend several dozens of GBUs (the cheapest went at something like US$500.000) to blast rusty hulks of long-since abandoned MiG-15UTIs, MiG-17s and Il-28s at the local junkyard... while a look into one of old issues of the World Air Power Journal could've provided clear and undisputable evidence that such target selection is simply stupid.

If you assume that the purpose of the exercise is to degrade and destroy ISIS, it makes no sense. If the purpose of the exercise is to put on a show of "doing something about ISIS" for domestic consumption, while allowing the Saudis to get some princes into combat with minimal risk and the Emiraltis to showcase women's participation and earn some warm-and-fuzzy points in the west... maybe in that context it makes a bit more sense.

If an action seems supremely irrational it's often because the purpose we assume is not the actual purpose of the action.

[CrowBat]

That's... entertaining, given your own habit of simply declaring that early American intervention was "the right thing"...Since you obviously have never carefully read even one posts of mine: mind pointing at the place where I have said anything of this kind?


Nobody told me that, neither have I said that. You have a way of putting words into other people's mouths, and assuming opinions that aren't there.That's a very precise explanation for what you're doing with my posts, and that all the time, thanks.

Seems you don't like the same being done to you?


Yes, that's why "arranging" a large scale truce to serve our strategic purpose seems so far outside the realm of credibility.Oh, really?


Certainly the rise of ISIS has been very convenient for Iran and for Assad, and certainly they've taken full advantage of the opportunity. That doesn't necessarily mean they created ISIS to serve their own purposes: it could just as easily mean that they simply took advantage of events as they emerged....which is a well-formulated excuse for 'at best the regime was negligent, and at worst they facilitated the rise of the Daesh'...


Is there any evidence that the resistance is willing to compromise...Do I really need to find you all of their corresponding statements?


...and do we have any viable and realistic way to disunify Assad's forces?Nope: the US is completely powerless in this regards - as it is in all other similar regards... Makes one wonder who to hell came to the idea to call the US a 'superpower'... :rolleyes:


That's been the problem from the start, no? If Assad falls, that leaves a vacuum with an infinitude of factions fighting to fill it.What kind of evidence can you provide in support of this speculation?


Is it realistically possible to provide effective CAS to ground forces in Kobane or elsewhere without properly trained and equipped forces on the ground communicating with the air forces?Ever heard of something named 'INTERDICTION'?

Rumour has it that this should've been a part of some 'air-land-battle' concept of the US military...

Half the Daesh is presently converging on the Kobane, and nobody is attacking all of their columns moving in territory where there is nobody else but the Daesh to find.

Meanwhile, they're assaulting YPG/FSyA positions 1 kilometre outside the town...


If you assume that the purpose of the exercise is to degrade and destroy ISIS, it makes no sense. If the purpose of the exercise is to put on a show of "doing something about ISIS" for domestic consumption...

If an action seems supremely irrational it's often because the purpose we assume is not the actual purpose of the action.Who said the action is 'supremely irrational' (except you)?

If one doesn't destroy these refineries, one is not going to get contract to rebuild them. That's 'perfectly rational'.

The problem is that if the declared purpose of this operation is 'destroying the ISIS', then why destroying the Syrian infra-structure? If some princes there want 'show', they can keep on flying air shows - or crashing F-15s against sand dunes while flying supersonic at minimal altitudes for fun...

[CrowBat]

Crowbat

This approach will lead to a huge humanitarian disaster, if insurgents are just insurgents, then they're just thugs, and I don't think they're just thugs.Bill,
If 10 million of Syrian refugees (inside and outside the country), 400,000 dead (arguably, 'only' 200,000 of these 'confirmed'), and deployment of chemical weapons is no 'huge humanitarian disaster' already, I don't know what else might ever become one.

The insurgents haven't had any other political agenda except removal of the regime. It was Turkey, followed by the USA and the West (France, UK, Germany, etc., etc.) that began requesting from them to declare political agendas - even imposing ultimatums on then to do so. Even as of mid-2012, when they were assaulting Aleppo for the first time, insurgents continued attempting to avoid any such declarations. And thus they received no aid when there was time to provide it - and thus prevent the spread of extremism.

Instead, they were left to their own device - and exposed to extremists that arrived with pockets full of cash.

Then, in autumn 2012, there was something like a 'last ditch attempt' - a series of efforts by different parties to 'sort insurgents out'. The only result of this was friction between insurgents along all imaginable lines, precisely because of insistence upon their declarations of political agendas.

Syria is not functioning that way. Syrians do not think 'well in advance': grossly oversimplified, it can be said that 'they do and then think'. That might not sound 'logical' or even 'reasonable' to us, but that's the way they function.

Correspondingly, one can't demand (or, better said: one shouldn't have) from them to state political agendas before they remove the regime: that's begging for precisely the kind of trouble we've seen emerging there ever since.

Next point that should be kept in mind is this: Syria is never going to be something like 'unified political entity'. Syrians are traditionally diverse, not only in regards of their ethnic groups or religion, but especially in regards of their political interests. They are insistently (yet respectfully) 'pluralist' by their nature, history and tradition: 'insistently' because they insist on their own standpoints, 'respectfully' because - with few exceptions (see Jadid, Assad Sr. etc.) - they know to respect differing standpoints. This means: they'll always quarrel about politics. Always. Now, tomorrow, in 10 and in 100 years.

Therefore, there is absolutely no need to now go 'teaching' them about establishing shadow governments, filling critical positions etc. After three years of all sorts of failures in doing exactly this, I would say it is about the time to realize: this is NEVER going to work.

Again: they do not function that way.

This does not mean there would be some sort of 'political vacuum' and 'anarchy' if the insurgents would topple Assad 'tomorrow in the morning'. Syrians are very good at self-organizing themselves, even with bare minimum of resources (or none at all). Despite all they went through, they're reasonable too, and know to reconciliate. In that sense, some recommended 'viewing':

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=al2fXeAvg38

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwSnyQYy5SE (Probably the best part is one guy's definition of 'moderate Islam' in this report)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FavaA3w6eXw

[CrowBat]

Kobane is about to fall: reports from late afternoon indicate the Daesh entering the town and the local CO of YPG forces announcing they'll fight to the last man.

Daesh is already posting videos like this one, showing them on the south-eastern entry into the town:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EfJWgjj96-4

...while the US air is still blasting empty houses around Hassaka and the Tabqa AB...

[davidbfpo]

It is all very strange Crowbat and I've yet to spot an official explanation from the allies (the UK bombers are only for Iraqi targets).

We can all speculate. Notably is Turkey responsible, as it fears the Kurds as much as ISIS? Or a brutal calculation that pushing tens of thousands of Kurds from the Kobane pocket into Turkey, will bring Turkey in - to create a "safe zone". Incompetence is not a factor, although it appears there are no spotters on the ground to direct attacks.

[CrowBat]

It's extremely strange, indeed.

Firstly: 'allied air strikes'. Except for those official reports about four RSAF F-15S' flying a sortie against Syria, and a female UAEAF F-16E-pilot taking part too, from 23 September, all I've found so far was a brief 'news ticker' on the website of the Jordanian Ministry of Defence about involvement of the RJAF. Nothing has been said about number of sorties flown, though, and one of my contacts helping me with Arabic (my skills in that language are rather rudimentary) told me his understanding is that the RJAF's missions in question were actually 'flying recce over southern Iraq'...

Yesterday I caught a glimpse at some report on the AJE, about the 'allies' - that is five air forces including the QEAF (Qatari Mirage 2000s), RBAF (Bahraini F-16Cs), RJAF, RSAF, and the UAEAF (F-16Es) - flying a total of 23 sorties in all of the time between 23 and 30 September.

In words: twenty-three sorties in six days.

Haven't found any kind of written confirmation for this online yet, but must admit: I gave up trying after the first few days.

Overall, to me it appears as if Dempsey and Co were hard at trying to up-claim their participation, but the Gulf Arabs (and Jordanians) didn't actually do anything at all - except to provide bases.

And regarding Turkey: wherever I check this evening, conclusion is the same. Obama is purposedly scarifying Kobane for Turkey to get involved in a war, move in and establish a 'buffer zone' inside Syria, in turn providing an 'instant ground force' to fight the Daesh with support of US air power - stationed at Incirlik, for example (and, this evening the Turkish parliament voted for a law granting permission for military to act in Syria as necessary). Turkey would profit from such a situation too - because the fall of Kobane, followed by Turkish troops moving in to establish the buffer zone demanded so much by Istanbul in recent days, would prevent creation of a large Kurdish-held area inside NE Syria. I.e. should it come into being (something I doubt Obama is going to left happen that easily), the Kurdish statehood would be limited to what the Kurds hold in Iraq, and a small part of Hassaka Province in Syria.

Re. does Turkey fear Kurds as much as the Daesh: despite the fact that of candidates for Turkish presidency (and then the one with third highest number of voters) is a Kurd, Turkey is actually fearing Kurds more than the Daesh. Whether due to negligence or by design, it has left all possible Jihadists use it for entering Syria in the last two years. It has left the Daesh use local facilities (like hospitals) too. But, it has never left the YPG - which is de-facto Syrian off-shot of the PKK - to cross the border (into Turkey), get reinforcements or supplies: any YPG member trying to do that is immediately arrested.

Finally, regarding 'spotters on the ground': according to all reports, and with exception of arranging Allen's meeting with various leaders in Jordan the next week, the US admin didn't contact any of Syrian insurgent groups ever since announcing incoming air strikes, on 22 September. Washington is not communicating with insurgents, and that's it.

So, it might be no 'military incompetence', after all, rather political, but... well, they say that the way to hell is plastered with good intentions.

[Bill Moore]

It is all very strange Crowbat and I've yet to spot an official explanation from the allies (the UK bombers are only for Iraqi targets).

We can all speculate. Notably is Turkey responsible, as it fears the Kurds as much as ISIS? Or a brutal calculation that pushing tens of thousands of Kurds from the Kobane pocket into Turkey, will bring Turkey in - to create a "safe zone". Incompetence is not a factor, although it appears there are no spotters on the ground to direct attacks.

Not really an explanation, but a couple of days on the news (NPR) the Pentagon spokesman was getting grilled my the press on this issue and his explanation was stunning. He said they didn't have an agreement to defend Koran as though that was a satisfactory answer. I suspect Crowbar is right about Turkey having something to do with it.

We need remember there is a Kurdish nation even they don't have a state, so I see this explanation helping us Iraq since we're relying heavily on the Kurdish there. Those poor folks can't get a break.

[Bill Moore]

Also of interest today in the news is that moderate sunnis in Aleppo said that ISIL made some mistakes, but that they were still brothers. I'm sticking with my belief we shouldn't be involved. We will get played like a violin by the Arabs, while we'll be convinced we're in charge. Seems we may be intentionally helping them eliminate the Kurdish in that area. If true are we supporting ethnic cleansing.?

Provocative comment, but as a nation we need to do a better job of balancing realism and adhering to our values. Values we seem to be drifting away from.

[CrowBat]

AFAIK, in most of the EU, and in many of federal states in the US, 'holding the ladder' for a thief trying to enter a home through the window, is equal crime to actually climbing that ladder and emptying the house. In some it's punishable to even turn the other way without alerting security services. Or isn't it?

So, if one declares a war on the Daesh, and then looks the other way and bombs the JAN or some empty houses while the Daesh is slaughtering Kurds in Kobane and forcing 160,000 others to flee to become homeless refugees in Turkey.... what shall one think about this?

Should somebody happen not to care about Kurds: well, imagine the outcry if the Daesh would force 160,000 Israelis to flee their homes....?

Now, I have no doubt that some might say, 'hey, that's a part of the strategy, called 'let them rot' and designed to let the extremists ruin their reputation between the locals on their own which in turn should prompt the locals to act on their own. Theoretically, this sounds great, especially when supported by articles like the following one: The U.S. Can’t Destroy ISIS, Only ISIS Can Destroy ISIS (http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2014/09/us-cant-destroy-isis-only-isis-can-destroy-isis-unfortunate-merits-let-them-rot-strategy#).

However, sad fact is that this article contains a number of illusions, i.e. theories that - to put it mildly - are simply not supported by facts one gets when taking a closer look at the situation there (in Algeria). Specifically:


...During the early 1990s the Algerian government fought one of the nastiest civil wars in recent history against a broad-based Islamist insurgency. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) conducted a brutal insurgent campaign employing vicious terrorist tactics on par with today’s modern menace the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (known by the acronyms ISIS, ISIL or IS for Islamic State – you pick the one you like). GIA attacks were often indiscriminate and violent; involving large civilian massacres – quite ISIS like. While I always reserve extreme caution in endorsing any counterinsurgency or counterterrorism tactic utilized by the Algerian government, there may be one instructive lesson from Algeria’s strategy that we in the West and particularly the U.S. might examine for designing a plan to counter ISIS.

The Algerian government, having already tried extreme brutality and overwhelming force, recognized the need to employ smarter tactics. Rather than tracking every GIA member to ground and in so doing causing harm to locals and further bolstering GIA’s popular support, the Algerians selectively employed what Luis Martinez, author of The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998, describes as the “Let Them Rot” strategy. The Algerian government, Martinez explains,“sought to avoid human losses for non-strategic zones, but also to lessen the demoralizing effects of the ‘dirty job’ on the troops.” (See pg. 150.) Algerian security services isolated districts with Islamist sympathies leaving the GIA emirs to govern via Islamist law and principles. Contained by the Algerian security services, GIA emirs employed their extreme practices and quickly alienated the local populace as the district, walled off from the rest of society, crumbled economically. Over time, the districts and the GIA emirs that ruled them, slowly "rotted" creating conditions favorable for the development of local militias to combat the GIA. Local businessmen and disillusioned Islamists were re-engaged over time by the Algerian government who offered employment through security positions and opportunities through economic development plans. In the end, the Algerian government didn’t destroy the GIA in these selected districts, they instead let the GIA defeat itself.
...


Call it 'hair splitting' if you like, but:

1.) Use of 'extreme brutality and overwhelming force': this was something that in nearly 95% of cases happened spontaneously, i.e. not on order from above, and not as a part of strategy, but because units involved were seeking revenge for massacres committed by Islamists.

Even so, and although much-reported, such cases remained few in total numbers: under immense pressure from various European powers the authorities were doing whatever is possible to show that they are respecting human rights. Or how else would author like to explain a high number of Islamists that were arrested - and then released too, after a few months (all provided the author happens to know about this fact) - or the fact that Islamists found themselves 'embedded' with the population and convinced the security forces are afraid of them, in quite a few places and for quite a long time?

2.) Algerian authorities, 'sought to avoid human losses in non-strategic zones, but also to lessen the demoralizing effects of the 'dirty job' on the troops.'

It's now anything between 10 and 33 years since this war, and Algerian military and security services are in the process of retiring dozens of thousands of troops that were involved. And thousands of these are suffering immense psychological problems: this is not so because they were involved in 'dirty jobs', i.e. massacres, but because they have seen with their own eyes what the terrorists were doing to the population while in their teenage.

Perhaps author would like to check his data on this issue before jumping to conclusions?

3.) Perhaps the most important part: 'Algerian security services isolated districts with Islamist sympathies leaving the GIA emirs to govern via Islamist law and principles'.

Frankly, in nearly 15 years of research about this conflict, I have never heard about such strategy/tactics. If anything of this kind has happened, then not as a part of strategy. Surely, Algerians would isolate specific districts and sometimes do so for several months. However, this happened because they lacked troop strength to go in, mop up and secure the area.

Before anybody comes to the idea to complain that I'm making this up because it simply cannot be that the Algerians were lacking numbers: one of issues with the Algerian military is that - for obvious reasons (corruption, favourising etc.) - troops are not permitted to serve in their region of origin unless they have eight years of service in their books; i.e. all the active troops (including officers, of course) have to serve 'far away from home' for eight years, before they are permitted to re-deploy close to their area of origin. Except one does not know about this fact, it should be obvious that this practice/regulation has caused quite a number of problems with deploying specific units around the country during that war.

Because of this problem, the authorities began organizing a sort of armed militia that was responsible for protection of their homes/villages/towns, that knew the local people and terrain etc.

Thus, quite on the contrary: it can be said that the Algerian military did precisely the same mistake like the French in Algeria before, i.e. was deploying inexperienced conscript troops on a terrain unknown to them for most of the war.

Therefore, any impression about 'isolated districts and letting the GIS to rot' is based on theories of somebody who has studied this conflict from very, very far away - to put it mildly.

Now, before somebody comes to the idea to ask me, 'then how to hell did the Algerians then win, actually?' Well, they began deploying professional troops (primarily special forces) in ops supported by helicopters and advanced ELINT/SIGINT assets for actions against specific, carefully selected terrorist leaders. With these out, and with the population well informed about what the terrorists were doing to it, the rest was 'easy' (well: kind of), or at least a 'matter of time'.

Furthermore, the 'letting the Daesh rot' idea is simply bad, and this for several reasons. Firstly, Daesh is already in deep problems with large parts of local population. It's not only that various Sunni tribes in Iraq are turning against it, but there was already an armed uprising against it in Dayr az-Zawr (and this only few months after it occupied this area), as can be read here (http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/08/11/isis-brutally-subdues-rebellion-in-syria-beheading-tribesmen-who-resisted-their-rule/), here (http://leilashrooms.wordpress.com/2014/08/04/the-deir-al-zour-intifada-against-daesh/), here (http://ww4report.com/node/13524) (just for example).

Reaction of the Daesh is always the same: mass slaughter.

Thus, I would say that there is simply no time to 'let them rot': if one gives these idiots enough time, there will be nobody - especially no 'local population' - left to save.

[CrowBat]

And now comes the next trouble (in addition to US ignorance of situation in Kobane).

Following withdrawal of the JAN and Ahrar from positions in northern Aleppo - in the wake of US attacks on their local bases - the IRGC-QF and NDF have launched an offensive around the northern rim of this city in western direction and attacked the Hindarat Village, which is on the only road connecting Turkey with the liberated (insurgent-held-) areas of Aleppo. They have not yet captured Hindarat, but are already inside of it.

Worse yet: additional regime forces should be on the way around Hindarat to Nubol and az-Zahra (Shia' villages near Menngh AB, 35km NW from Aleppo), i.e. are already assaulting Sayfat and Mt Antar, near Haritan and Anadan.

Means: while we're about to see many more of 'TOW-videos' from Harakat Hazm, like the one below in the coming days, should the regime punch through to Nubol and az-zahra, the insurgents inside Aleppo will be besieged.

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=981_1412281376

[CrowBat]

As could've been expected...

Following an assault of NDF armour, supported by the Brigade of al-Quds al-Filistini (IRGC-QF), the Ba'ath Party Militia and one of Hezbollah Battalions, the regime brought parts of Hindrat under its control, and established a major checkpoint on its northern entrance, and the hills overlooking the area.

With this, it is overviewing the Kastillo road and al-Jundul roundabout: although these are still held by the FSyA and IF, all insurgent forces inside Aleppo are now de-facto under a siege.

And: ISIS Fighters Enter Kobani (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Oct-03/272872-isis-fighters-enter-kobani-reports.ashx#axzz3EEZ8EkQz)

ISIS fighters entered the Syrian town of Kobani near the Turkish border, a CNN editor said Friday.

CNN editor Ram Ramgopal tweeted that Alan Minbic, a Kurdish fighter, told the network that jihadists had entered the southwestern edges of the besieged town, known as Ain al-Arab in Arabic.

Heavy clashes erupted earlier Friday between Kurdish militiamen and ISIS jihadists who have besieged a key Syrian town near the Turkish border, an AFP correspondent reported.

ISIS militants in Syria have advanced on Kobani, known as Ain al-Arab in Arabic, despite U.S. airstrikes in support of Kurdish fighters.

Heavy mortar fire around the town was heard across the border and plumes of white smoke were rising up, the correspondent reported from the Turkish side of the border.

"We are desperately watching what the murderer ISIS is doing," said 48-year-old Turkish Kurd Cafer Seven, who came to Mursitpinar border crossing 10 days ago from the Turkish city of Van.

"We are in deep sorrow. Our brethren are under difficult conditions. This is brutality!" he said as he gazed at the heavy smoke rising over Kobane.

Kurds have expressed anger and disappointment over Ankara's policy against ISIS, accusing the government of turning a blind eye to the group and refusing to allow Turkish Kurds to cross the border and fight in Syria.

"There is a massacre being committed before the eyes of the world. The world remains silent when Kurds are being massacred," said Burhan Atmaca, 54, who also came to Mursitpinar to show solidarity with Kurdish fighters in Kobane.
...

Congratulations Obama: call Assad and demand your medals there... :rolleyes:

[Tukhachevskii]

... the political realist in me heartily agrees; I couldn't have said it better.

Embracing Assad Is a Better Strategy for the U.S. Than Supporting the Least Bad Jihadis (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham-e-fuller/us-assad-isis-strategy_b_5898142.html)

Assad is not going to be overthrown in the foreseeable future. He is hardly an ideal ruler, but he is rational, has run a longtime functioning state and is supported by many in Syria who rightly fear what new leader or domestic anarchy might come after his fall. He has not represented a genuinely key threat to the U.S. in the Middle East -- despite neocon rhetoric. The time has now come to bite the bullet, admit failure, and to permit -- if not assist -- Assad in quickly winding down the civil war in Syria and expelling the jihadis. We cannot both hate Assad and hate those jihadis (like ISIS) who also hate Assad. We fight, crudely put, with al-Qaeda in Syria and against al-Qaeda in Iraq. But restoration of order in Syria is essential to the restoration of order in the Iraqi, Lebanese, Israeli and Jordanian borderlands. Permitting Assad to remain in power will also restore a Syria that historically never has acted as a truly "sectarian" or religious state in its behavior in the Middle East -- until attacked by Saudi Arabia for its supposed Shi'ism.

[CrowBat]

A glorious idea, no doubt.

Now, would you, or the author of that article, explain how is anybody supposed to 'make peace' with Assad - if he's neither in control of even 50% of all the gangs supposed to be fighting on his behalf, nor in control of what's going on outside Damascus?

Alone the title of that feature is a shame and points at the author simply being clueless: what kind of 'least bad Jihadis' are the SF, SRF, Harakat Hazm, 13th Division-, 93rd Brigade-, 97th Brigade-, 19th Artillery Brigade FSyA etc.?

And then think about following examples:

1.) This 'regime' offensive that has cut off insurgents in Aleppo is run by the al-Quds al-Filastini Brigade, a Battalion each of Ba'ath Party Militia and Hezbollah, and only supported by (IRGC-commanded) NDF tanks and artillery. None of these formations is 'fighting for Assad', and only the BPM is 'Syrian'.

2.) The very moment Assad attempts making anything more but 'temporary truce' with another of besieged-and-starved-to-death insurgent pockets (actually, most of such truces were negotiated by IRGC-QF officers, not by Assadists), he's likely to get assassinated by one of 'his own' gangs, simply because all them either have an ideology that's exclusive and totalitarian, or so much blood on their hands that they can't make peace without concern for their own security, or are little else but criminals.

And overall: who has said that a Syria without insurgents and without the Daesh/Jihadists etc. is going to be 'stabile again'? Anybody here ready to bet the Alawites are then not going to start fighting each other, or at least not going to start fighting the SSNP, the BPM, the PLA, perhaps even the IRGC and Hezbollah - in order to re-establish their claim at exclusive right to rule?

[Tukhachevskii]

A glorious idea, no doubt.

Now, would you, or the author of that article, explain how is anybody supposed to 'make peace' with Assad - if he's neither in control of even 50% of all the gangs supposed to be fighting on his behalf, nor in control of what's going on outside Damascus?



I believe the point of the article is that Assad should be supported in regaining control of Syrian territory. As for the various forces fighting with the SAA they are only doing that because the US/UK/France/Turkey have been supporting the other guys. You can't push someone into a corner and then expect them not to use any and all measures to protect themselves. As the de facto government of Syria working with Assad means we assist conditionally; he leashes his dogs (and sends them back to where they come from) and in return we help him regain control of his country by shaping his actions, and restraining him where possible, through conditionality (stop doing X and we'll give you Y). No one said it was easy. The point is you can't help restore the Iraqi state and leave out the Syrians when they are both fighting the same enemy (which also happens to be our enemy). As for the Iranians they are merely doing what they have to to keep those maniacs as far away from their borders as they can (they are fighting in Iraq too don't you know). The best way to get the Iranians out of Syria and Iraq is to ... take their place. IMO. How is another question. I don't think large scale "BOG" is the answer. SoF (which can also collect valuable intelligence on the ground), artillery and air power might well be though.

[CrowBat]

I believe the point of the article is that Assad should be supported in regaining control of Syrian territory.By side the fact that you're proposing cooperation with a character responsible for deployment of chemical weapons against civilians (not only insurgents); detention and murder of at least 15,000, more likely 60,000 peaceful protesters; for wholesale destruction of nearly all major cities in Syria; for death of up to 400,000 Syrians in total (of which about 210,000 are 'confirmed'); for provoking a civil war with inter-religious and inter-ethnic 'flavour'; who is not only cooperating with such terrorist organizations like the IRGC, Hezbollah, PFLP etc., but depends on them for his naked survival...

...but: how?


As for the various forces fighting with the SAA they are only doing that because the US/UK/France/Turkey have been supporting the other guys.First of all, you should define 'SAA' here. What is 'Syrian Arab Army' today? Where is it? For example: can you mention at least one battalion or brigade of the 'Syrian Arab Army' that is still existent?

(PLEASE: just one battalion or brigade, I'm not asking for anything more.)


... As the de facto government of Syria working with Assad means we assist conditionally; he leashes his dogs (and sends them back to where they come from)...Assad is neither in control of the IRGC-QF, nor in control of IRGC's 'regulars' deployed in Syria, or in control of Iraqi Hezbollahis recruited by the IRGC and deployed in Syria to fight against insurgents: only Khamenei is (via Vahid). Assad is not in control of the Hezbollah. Assad is not in control of such 'native' militias like the NDF (this is commanded by IRGC-QF officers), not in control of the Ba'ath Party Militia, not in control of the SSNP's militia, not in control of the PLA, not in control of the PFLP. He's not even in control of various Alawite- or IC-run militias that could be considered 'closest' to the regime (indeed, some of them are run by members of the 'inner circle').

He's only in control of quasi MOD and the chain of command inherited from the former Syrian Arab Army - the primary purpose of which is to represent that 'SAA' in the public, the air force (which is including the former air defence force), 2-3 brigades and few artillery regiments (all that is left) of the former Republican Guards Division and little else.

So, how should he 'leash his dogs'? And what do you think would the IRGC-QF do if he comes to the idea to tell them, 'thanks a lot, you can now go home'?


The point is you can't help restore the Iraqi state and leave out the Syrians when they are both fighting the same enemy (which also happens to be our enemy).Since when is the 'regime' in Syria fighting the Daesh?

Except for Daesh's attack on Tabqa AB and nearby Army bases, can you cite one major clash between any of militias fighting for the regime and the Daesh?

And if the regime in Syria is not fighting the Daesh (which is the case), then how can you say that this regime and the government of Iraq are 'fighting the same enemy'?


As for the Iranians they are merely doing what they have to to keep those maniacs as far away from their borders as they can (they are fighting in Iraq too don't you know).I can even cite from the Iranian doctrine of national defence developed several years ago. That's why I do understand they're fighting this battle in Syria and Iraq, no problem with this.

But, what's going to happen once they - supposedly - 'win' that war?

Or, alternatively: what's going to happen if they lose?


The best way to get the Iranians out of Syria and Iraq is to ... take their place. IMO. How is another question. I don't think large scale "BOG" is the answer. SoF (which can also collect valuable intelligence on the ground), artillery and air power might well be though.So, you want to replace the IRGC-QF's presence and influence between the Shi'a of Iraq with help of few SF teams?

Good luck...

[Tukhachevskii]

Good luck...

Holy Moly Batman! Did I step into the Pentagon War room by accident? I do not recall, at any point, saying that I have the answers (unlike you apparently). What I did was proffer an opinion. If I were an ops planner I am sure I would have come up with an actual OPLAN that took all those factors into account. The world is not black and white; it is shades of grey;) The view of the world as being divided between good and evil is a peculiarly American one and which, moreover, seems to fail you at every turn. The world is, has been and will continue to be messy; there is no universal morality to which you can measure the standards of others (read Morgethau's Politics among Nations). You have to work with what you've got not with what you'd like. Furthermore, getting on a moral high horse and spitting on everyone is an activity fraught with danger (sort of like people who live in glass houses throwing stones). US actions of the past decade or more could easily be narrated or em-plotted into a similar story arc of evil and oppression against the little man.

What exactly is your angle here? What's your beef bub?


Hey! wait a minute... JMA is that you!?!?!?:eek:

[CrowBat]

I don't have a problem with you, per se, but with nearly all of ideas you mentioned.

I don't know whether it's morale, or if I'm nave or something, but there are few things I'm insistent upon. First is that I insist calling a spade a spade, no matter what it takes. Second is I say what I think: I'm not acting one way while thinking the other, I'm not trying to be diplomatic for the sake of anything, and - for example - I can't 'make friends' with people that have plagiarised my publications even if they apologise. Kill me, I'm that way, and can't say why, but for similar reasons I couldn't make deals with mass murders.

Back to the topic: in this very case, I do not see how can anybody expect to make deals with a mass murderer that is then actually a puppet? I find it silly alone to call him a 'president of Syria', whereas he's little else but a representative for a conglomerate of yet more mass murderers, criminals, and terrorists.

Talking that way signals to me: 'Hey Tom, I've got no clue what I'm talking about, but this sounds like a damn good idea.'

That's why I started asking for both, your knowledge and logic.

For example: when you're talking about 'SAA', then tell me what kind of 'SAA' is there any more?

Correct me if I'm wrong, but after studying the Syrian military for years, and following this war on day-by-day base ever since it erupted, I cannot but conclude that, to the best of my knowledge, there is none, nitchevo, nix, absolutely nothing left of the 'SAA' - and that since quite long. Theoretically, one could consider the 'NDF' for its 'successor/replacement', but this is not even that: the NDF does consist of a number of companies and whatever other sorts of 'detachments', 'task forces' etc., of the former SAA. But, these have been reformed and retrained into newly-established battalions, with their - entirely new - designations too.

Without Iranians - i.e. without IRGC-QF's battlefield management staff - there would be even no unitary command of 'regime' forces.

And what's this NDF? Better guards. Even all the possible detachments from former 'elite' SAA units (like the 1st, 3rd, or 4th ADs) - now only have a bare minimum of 'offensive support' capability (in terms of, 'they can provide company-sized tank detachments for support of specific, short-duration operations'), while the majority of militias grouped underneath the aegis of the NDF only have a bare minimum of defensive capability.

Unsurprisingly, and to keep it short, the main military force of the 'Syrian regime' is not the NDF; it's a conglomerate of foreign - Iranian-controlled - militias (some of them, like certain Hezbollah units, with something like 'special forces' style of training). They're running the show: they're centrepieces of all offensives and all major defensive operations.

That's why I'm asking: it's not only 'morale', and politics. It's practiality too. How do you - or anybody else - expect the regime to 'lash its dogs', say Iranians to go, and then 'regain control of Syria' if this is de-facto the only military-like force in its hands?

Such expectations simply make no sense to me.

[Tukhachevskii]

I don't have a problem with you, per se, but with nearly all of ideas you mentioned.


Such expectations simply make no sense to me.

Fair enough pal. I've long since given up on the SWC. The toxicity levels are too high for my liking. Its obvious this thread is your little fiefdom and I wish you all the best with your interesting endeavour (there are so many undiscovered SMEs out there just aching for their big break;)).

I for one can't be asked anymore. There was a time when I would have passionately argued with the best of them but this "parrot is dead". I found my way here on the heels of my betters. I shall leave behind them too.

I wash may hands of this silliness.

T, Out

[CrowBat]

Why is it so that whoever is talking about 'SAA', whenever asked to explain what is 'SAA' today, to cite at least one of 'SAA' units that is still existent - and this does not matter what person or in what position, nor from what place on this planet - is offended?

[davidbfpo]

Some may doubt Crowbat's postings on the situation with the Assad regime in Syria, just refound this BBC News report 'Syria: Assad loyalists concerned by rise of paramilitaries', now four days old:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29429941

It ends with an optimistic passage:
Most Syrians, whether they support the opposition or government, want to see an end to the war. But only a just deal that prevented reprisals and brought to justice those responsible for war crimes would allow the dust to settle.

[CrowBat]

The insurgents have launched a counterattack on Hindarat, yesterday, and seem to have recovered at least a part of the place.

This didn't improve their situation a lot, then the regime is still overlooking all the roads in the area, but what's interesting is that the insurgents are claiming to have captured quite a lots of 'Afghans and Iranians' too.

Below two photos of the captured 'IRGC'... cough... 'Syrian Arab Army' troops in question.

**********

And in Kobane...The Daesh has breached defences on the eastern side of the town, and Kurds are now down to desperate measures, including:
Kurdish Female Suicide Bomber Strikes ISIS (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/kurdish-suicide-bomber-attacks-isil-syria-201410518318542637.html)

...A female Kurdish fighter has carried out a suicide attack in the besieged Syrian town of Kobane, killing an unknown number of fighters from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a monitoring group has said.The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said a woman blew herself up at an ISIL position east of Kobane on Sunday, detonating a grenade that was in her possession, killing ISIL fighters in the process.
...

...while the Daesh is not only said to be entering Kobane from south too, but its idiots are already proudly distributing photos of beheaded female YPG combatants around the internet.

BTW, it's ironic to read CNN's and similar reports about the 'ISIL advancing in spite of air strikes', or 'changing tactics and scattering'. Perhaps this is the case in Iraq, but a review of all CENTCOM releases about air strikes flown over Syria in period 22/23 September - 4 October 2014, has shown that the USAF, USN, and five allied air forces have flown precisely six (6) air strikes against targets in Kobane area. None of them against any target closer than 15km from that town.

Sigh...

[OUTLAW 09]

Appears the Syria SFA captured a Russian SIGINT facility that was monitoring all insurgent ops for Assad. Probably one of their most important sites outside of Russia these days.

Embarrassing to say the least for Russian SIGINT types.

Many had not know it was even in Syria.

BIG - #Syria rebels captured Russian SIGINT facility in Tel al-Hara, #Deraa
http://spioenkop.blogspot.com/2014/10/captured-russian-spy-facility-reveals.html … (v @oryxspioenkop)
pic.twitter.com/dbYQ3y7g4f

On the 5th of October 2014, the Free Syrian Army captured the Центр С or المركز س 'Center C or Center S' SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) facility (logo on top) jointly operated by the Russian Osnaz GRU radio electronic intelligence agency (logo on the right) and one of the Syrian Intelligence Agencies (logo on the left). Situated near Al Hara, the facility was of vital importance for the Assad regime as it was responsible for recording and decrypting radio communications from every rebel group operating inside Syria, making it likely the Russian-gathered information at this facility was at least partially responsible for the series of killings of rebel leaders by airstrikes.

Translation from 3:08; ''A directive issued by the surveillance office on May 31 to eavesdrop and record all radio communications of the terrorist groups, directive signed by brigadier-general Nazir Fuddah, commander of the first center''

The facility was recently upgraded and expanded by Russia to provide Syria and Iran with situational awareness of the Middle East. After the upgrade, which took from January to mid-February, it reportedly covered the whole of Israel and Jordan and a large part of Saudi Arabia.[1] According to the report, the upgrade was a reaction to Iranian concern of the facility being too much focused on the Syrian Civil War, neglecting espionage on Israel. New equipment and additional personnel was thus added to the base.

It is unknown if the facility is named Center C or Center S ('S' for Syria or special), it is known there's at least one other Russian-Syrian SIGINT facility around, which likely has a similar name.

The Russian operator of this facility was the Osnaz GRU, responsible for radio electronic intelligence within Russia's Armed Forces.

[OUTLAW 09]

More photos from inside of the Russian SIGINT site captured in Syria---run by GRU--no wonder Russia did not want US bombers cruising Syrian airspace.

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2014/10/06/captured-russian-spy-facility-reveals-the-extent-of-russian-aid-to-the-assad-regime-2/

[CrowBat]

...The facility was recently upgraded and expanded by Russia to provide Syria and Iran with situational awareness of the Middle East. After the upgrade, which took from January to mid-February, it reportedly covered the whole of Israel and Jordan and a large part of Saudi Arabia.[1] According to the report, the upgrade was a reaction to Iranian concern of the facility being too much focused on the Syrian Civil War, neglecting espionage on Israel. New equipment and additional personnel was thus added to the base...
And that's making it obvious that the sole reason of Iranian presence in Syria is that of 'fighting against Islamist extremism' spread by 'Jihadists pretending to be Syrian insurgents'...?

Ah well...

Back to Kobane:
YPG combatants inside Kobane run out of RPG rounds, two days ago, and that's the major reason why the Daesh managed to penetrate the southern and eastern parts of the town.

While the Daesh is claiming to have captured half of the town, the fighting is now primarily concentrated to the area around Mursitpinar border crossing.

Turkish Army units are now well positioned just a few hundreds of metres away from Kobane, on the Turkish side of the border, but not moving: Turkish government demands security guarantees from the YPG (which it considers a terrorist organization, because it's the Syrian-off-shot of the PKK), and its subjection to Turkish control, US/NATO decision to move against the Syrian regime too (not only against the Daesh), and few others. The YPG on the other side, said it would consider any Turkish incursion into Syria for hostile invasion, and fight against it. There are (unconfirmed) reports that most of Kobane wants the YPG/PYD to accept Turkish conditions, but the PKK representatives there refused to do so. With other words: Turkey is not going to do anything at all, despite its declarations it's not going to let Kobane fell (reminds me of Srebrenica and UN blue helmets in eastern Bosnia of 1994).

Although precise figures remain unknown, it's quite obvious the Daesh in Kobane has suffered extensive losses, and meanwhile had to reinforce its gangs there: Chechen unit from Islamic State reportedly fighting at Kobane (http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/10/chechen_unit_from_islamic_stat.php#ixzz3FOTgZ2gV).

Another Deash gang involved there should be the 'Sabri', also composed of Chechens and other Caucasians. Supposedly, this 'special forces' style of asset should have been responsible for breaching the defences of Tabqa and Base 93 too.

This morning, AJE (http://m.aljazeera.com/story/201410671849840817) is reporting that the YPG managed to push the Daesh away from Mishtenur Hill - supposedly thanks to a series of 'massive Allied air strikes'. Air strikes should have happened (few were flown on 5 October too, already), and they should have hit four Daesh positions south and east of the town, but their actual results remain speculative at best.

Here the CENTCOM releases for the previous two days:
CENTCOM, 5 October (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-5-u.s.-military-conducts-airstrikes-against-isil-in-syria-and-iraq)

In Syria, one strike northwest of Al Mayadin destroyed an ISIL bulldozer, two ISIL tanks and destroyed another ISIL vehicle. Two strikes northwest of Ar Raqqah struck a large ISIL unit and destroyed six ISIL firing positions. To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed fighter aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations. All aircraft departed the strike areas safely.

CENTCOM, 6 October (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-6-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil-in-syr)

In Syria, one strike destroyed an ISIL tank near Taqba Airfield west of Ar Raqqah. One strike destroyed two ISIL fighting positions south of Kobani. One strike southeast of Dayr az Zawr destroyed an ISIL tank. To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed fighter and remotely piloted aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations. All aircraft departed the strike areas safely.

Although plenty of UAVs - some of them armed - have been seen (and photographed) in the Syrian skies over the last few days, this is the first official citation of their use against the Daesh in Syria.

Furthermore, Kurdpres (http://www.kurdpress.com/En/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=8462#Title=%0A%09%09%09%09%09%09%09%09Hundreds ) reports that Turkey has finally left several hundreds of Kurds (and Turks?!?) to enter Kobane and go fighting the Daesh.

[CrowBat]

Here some more arguments to make friends with Assad. :rolleyes:

Some thus might consider the following 'shocking', I know, but well, when one runs such a comprehensive CW-project, it's easy to forget some unimportant details....

UN: Syria Declares Another 4 Chemical Facilities (http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/syria-declares-chemical-facilities-26021611)

Syria has declared four chemical weapons facilities it hadn't mentioned before, a special representative of the U.N. secretary-general told the Security Council on Tuesday. The news heightened concerns that the Syrian government hasn't been fully open about its chemical weapons program.

Diplomats said Sigrid Kaag told them during closed consultations that three of the facilities are for research and development and one is for production, and that no new chemical agents have been associated with the four sites.
...
The OPCW has said the dismantling of Syria's chemical weapons facilities is expected to begin this month, and the first of the 12 facilities should be destroyed by the end of November. The global chemical weapons watchdog also has said it is still working with the government to resolve discrepancies in its chemical weapons declaration.

Kaag also told diplomats Tuesday that an OPCW fact-finding mission found chlorine had been used "systematically and repeatedly" in attacks as recently as August, Power tweeted.

Lithuania's mission to the U.N. tweeted: "Connect the dots: @OPCW sure chlorine used in #Syria, witnesses saw it dropped by helicopters, which only Assad has. Who's responsible?"
...


Oh, and for fans of the 'Syrian Arab Army', here an Afghan colonel seen while being picked out of rubble of his HQ in Hindarat, and then interrogated by IF insurgents (don't worry, it's not graffic, just a little blood at his head):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QaHFoA_tf0Y

Funny to see a member of what so many still consider the 'Syrian Arab Army' (actually one of involved IRGC gangs) needs an interpreter to talk with Syrian insurgents.

Except, of course, one has no clue about Arabic and considers the later for 'foreign Jihadists'...

[CrowBat]

And now it's 'official':
U.S. officials: ISIS will capture Kobani, but it's not a big concern to us (http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/08/world/meast/isis-threat/index.html?hpt=hp_t1)

...The key Syrian border city of Kobani will fall to ISIS, but that's not a major U.S. concern, several senior U.S. administration officials said.

If Kobani falls, ISIS would control a complete swath of land between its self-declared capital of Raqqa, Syria, and Turkey -- a stretch of more than 100 kilometers (62 miles).

The officials said the goals in Syria are not to save cities and towns, but to go after ISIS' senior leadership, oil refineries and other infrastructure that would curb the terror group's ability to operate -- particularly in Iraq.

The officials said saving Iraq is a more strategic goal for several reasons, including the fact that the United States has a relationship with the Iraqi government.
...

Yeah. Guess it's also in 'higher US interest' to grant the Daesh another flashy victory - and especially an opportunity to upload more videos and photos of spiked heads on the internet, to bolster its recruiting around the world.

'Sound Strategy', there's simply no other description... :rolleyes:

But of course, one can't say the CENTCOM didn't try to help. Now they're sending B-1Bs to hit something in general Kobane area, as can be seen on this video showing one high above that town, yesterday:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acyIYOMBQ-8

I only wonder why is this reminding me of the Op Rolling Thunder: perhaps because a strategic bomber is used to hit tactical targets...?

[AmericanPride]

Crowbat,

I share your sentiment. Appears that the goal isn't really to defeat or destroy ISIS. '[Curbing] the group's ability to operate' by targeting senior leadership and infrastructure worked so well... in what previous wars?

[davidbfpo]

I have been pondering the likely fall of the Kobane pocket, just what is going on?

We know the Turkish stance on joining the coalition is very conditional. Turkey appears to list it's enemies as in the order of: Syria, Turkish Kurds (PKK) and ISIS. On the basis that the use of bases in Turkey for strikes on ISIS / Syria / Iraq has been precluded, would it be correct to think overflying is OK if Iraq is the destination (for the Cyprus-based RAF Tornados) and any SOF or JTAC on the ground in Turkey or via it?

The press has reported that air attacks in the Kobane pocket have been difficult in the absence of JTAC (forward air observers) and speculation that links with the embattled Kurds are difficult due to more than politics.

Here is Ben Barry from IISS:
....the problems around Kobane illustrate "not so much the lack of a land component but the lack of any real ability to synchronise the air effort with what is taking place on the ground. There is a powerful argument for having Western special forces on the ground in the forward air control role to help spot and guide aircraft to their targets.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29524140

Yes this is very speculative from my armchair.

Are we seeing a "Benghazi moment"? Repeating the imminent civilian massacre that led to a UN Resolution and a Western coalition's use of airpower to thwart Gadafy's forces advancing on Benghazi.

This does ignore that sanctuary for 160k (Syrian Kurdish) civilians has been given by Turkey to date, though for not the fighters.

As one Tweet today asked is Kobane a distraction from the adavance on Baghdad, now within artillery range? I suspect Iraq is not as safe for the media watching the likely fall of Kobane town from within Turkey. the media are not always facilitated by Turkey, as the BBC attested to:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29498188

[CrowBat]

Let me start with a sort of 'summary' of what's going on, especially so in regards of Turkey - where I was critical initially, but meanwhile think to understand what's going on.

Note: this is likely to become quite a 'wall of text', so better get yourself something drinkable, and a pack of Camels too...

In simpliest words:
- Kobane is attacked by the Daesh, who are extremists and terrorists; I guess there is no need for any further descriptions of it.

- Kobane is defended by the YPG: YPG came into being as an 'independent, Kurdish militia' in north Syria, and was originally under the control of the KRC (a government-like body including representatives of various Kurdish and even Assiriyan political parties). Since its establishment it was taken over by the PYD, which is the Syrian offshoot of the PKK (and largely consists of ex-PKK terrorists that withdrew from Turkey after the latest cease-fire there). The PKK was a near-Maoist group, that used to enjoy support of the USSR and Assadists at earlier times, and fought a 30-years long war with Turkey.

Because of this, the YPG is considered 'terrorists' too.

In the process of taking over the YPG, the PYD has assassinated, forced into submission or into exile nearly all of the KRC, to a degree where the latter is no player in the game any more. The emerging PYD/YPG conglomerate is including Assiyian/Assiriyac (or whatever the name) groups for the purpose of presenting itself as 'inclusive' and 'democratic', which it is not: the units in question are the poorest trained and equipped around, capable of guard duties only, and all are under Kurdish command.

The PYD/YPG has completely ignored Syrian insurgents for three years and refused to cooperate with them. It was only in Aleppo that a relatively small group of the YPG sided with insurgents (they had no other choice). Elsewhere, PYD/YPG - i.e. 'Syrian Kurds' - acted either as if the war is not their business, or outright cooperated with the Assad regime. Indeed, part of their problem with the Daesh comes from the fact that these two groups are competing for Syrian oil and who's going to sell more of it to Damascus.

And the sexy female combatants with which the YPG is scoring one PR-victory in the West after the other: most have fled their families because their parents have sold them (literaly) to somebody to marry (a quite widespread and increasing problem in that part of the World since nearly 25 years).

Thus, these are not some 'non-religious', 'sane' and 'democratic' people there, longing for Western support. They only care about their own business. And they have - repeatedly - turned down Turkish offers for help on condition of siding with insurgents even after the Free Syrian Army has deployed one of their better brigades (the Knights of the Dawn) into Kobane to help fight the Daesh (the unit in question is still there and was quite successful in knocking out a number of ex-Iraqi Army MBTs the last few days).

- For anybody with at least a trace of insight: this is therefore a 'terrorists vs terrorists' battle, with the (predominantly Kurdish) civilians in Kobane area paying the price for PYD/YPG's ignorance.

- The PYD/YPG hates Turkey and has threatened with attacks should Turkey 'invade' Syria, i.e. if Turkish military moves into Syria to fight the Daesh.

At the same time, they demand help and - especially - heavy weapons from Turkey... erm, sorry: what? Turkey should arm terrorists threatening it?

- To make matters better: Assad said the same, Daesh too, and both are threatening with attacks on Turkish proper should Turkey invade. Plus, Turkey was not attacked yet (otherwise the NATO could've activated Chapter 5 of its Charta): hell, even the USA wouldn't mind Kobane falling to the Daesh either - and that's official - yet Turks 'must'?

- I'm really sorry if I'm going to add any more 'offense against the USA' here, but I would like to stress: this is exclusively a critique of the US gov's and it's and its military's conduct of this campaign, nothing against the 'USA' as such.

Sad fact is: this (US) government, its IC and its military are acting like a bunch of confused idiots. And that's the 'best case'. In worst case like a broken computer that needs a reset. Alone the idea of 'we're going to bomb the extremists around Syria, a lil' bit, now and then, for the next 12-36 months or so', and meanwhile 'bomb and destroy the Deash in Iraq' - is absurd. Absurd, nothing else. It's as absurd as any military strategy based on this idea. Not more needs be said about this, period.

- Perhaps more importantly: who to hell should trust a government, an IC and a military that are waging a war on such ideas?

Please mind, this is now 14th year of this 'war on terror', and the third or fourth major campaign of this kind, and it's all over the same again, a true de-ja-vu: nobody there in Washington, in the CENTCOM etc. nobody learned anything at all. While 'bombing' as such is no bad idea, it is simply no replacement for solutions for core issues. But instead of searching for such, the USA are back to 'bomb them'... Does that appear sane and/or trustworthy to anybody here?

And so, the US would like to bomb the Daesh and other extremists, but don't even know where. That's why they're 'concentrating on Iraq, because there's a friendly gov there'....?

Erm, sorry: a friendly gov controlled from Tehran and renowned for slaughtering Sunni Arabs whenever there's an opportunity?

- Nevermind. Position of the US gov is, 'let the Deash have its fun with Kobane'.

Yeah, great: let the Daesh win a tactical and PR-victory that are both turning it into a 'strategical victory' too - because it's so highly visible in the media?

Is there nobody in the DC left capable of understanding repercussions alone for Daesh's recruiting if they win another 'victory'? Can't nobody connect the dots and what it would mean if the Daesh can say, 'Americans bombed us, but we won, nevertheless, nobody can stop us'?

And so, we're coming down to the Turkish government...

- Erdogan and Davatoglu are Islamists; that's not only their ideology, but what they and their followers are living. It's not only that one can find Daesh flags in many of Turkish stores these days, or there are thousands of Turks sending their kids to the Daesh too: earlier (already back in 2011), Turkish gov has not only forced much of the FSyA to subject itself to the Moslem Brotherhood (thus creating the rift that eventually ripped the insurgency apart), but has supported at least the JAN (if not the Daesh too). Thus, it's easy to put the blame on them and say, 'see these Turkish Islamists, they're pro-Dash and don't want to support the Kurds'.

But, one should keep few additional things in mind: one way or the other, Turkish government was elected by majority of Turkish voters. Means, it might be 'Islamist' by orientation, but it's 'democratic' too.

- Primary duty of the Turkish government are Turkish interests. Whatever the origins, reasons and logic for these interests might be, one of these is the removal of the Assadist regime in Syria, another is keeping the country safe from extremist Kurds with whom Turkey just ended fighting a 30-years long war. It's not as if the Daesh wouldn't matter for them, or if they do not see it as a threat (on the contrary, Erdogan & Co know very well they would not last long should the Daesh manage to spread within their country), but they can't act in any other fashion because the Daesh did not attack Turkey (at least not yet).

Furthermore, for them (and for me too) it makes no sense at all to follow the short-sighted US strategy and do as if the Daesh in Syria is a stand-alone enterprise, unrelated to existence of the Assad regime (and few other, de-facto same regimes in the area). That's a perfectly logical, and very much 'sane' standpoint. That's why its no contradiction for them to have said, they'll do whatever is possible to prevent the fall of Kobane: they are doing so, but through diplomatic means (for example through exercising pressure upon the USA to start bombing the Daesh there; Americans wouldn't come to the idea to do so on their own).

Plus, let me remind you: Turkey has already left 160.000 Syrian civilians pass the border at Kobane, and has about 800,000 (at least, if not 2 million as some say) Syrian refugees. With few exceptions, the Turks are taking good care of these people: they're really helping them. They're even providing medical care to YPG terrorists. But if some refugees - and some of Turkish Kurds now too - do not think this is enough and start torching public buses they're getting their dose of tear gas so they can cool down.

Overall: how can anybody say, 'Turks are letting people die?'

- As next, Erdogan and Davatoglu are not as stupid as to publicly declare Daesh's activity in Syria for a 'sideshow' to what's going on in Iraq - like that bunch of amateurs and wannabes in the DC has done (and this 'for the records'!).

- And, finally: if they are to cooperate with the YPG, they need to make sure that Kurdish leaders are coming to their senses and are seriously interested in cooperation (with Syrian insurgents and with Turkey). As mentioned above: so far, Kurds acted as if the war against the Assadist regime is not their business, and this at the cost of nobody being ready to help them. Therefore, keep in mind: Daesh's attack on Kobane is a direct result of that standpoint, and a clash of two terrorist organizations.

Bottom line: what kind of help should Erdogan/Davatoglu provide there?

Hand at heart: Obama can consider himself happy if he doesn't get to hear 'fu.k off' from Ankara these days.

[davidbfpo]

Today John Kerry had a meeting with the British Foreign Secretary in London and said the following:
...the US was "deeply concerned for the people of Kobani" and had conducted more strikes in the region as a result, it had to focus on the bigger strategic objectives. "As horrific as it is to watch in real time what is happening in Kobani ... you have to step back and understand the strategic objective....Notwithstanding the crisis in Kobani, the original targets of our efforts have been the command and control centers, the infrastructure....We are trying to deprive the (Islamic State) of the overall ability to wage this, not just in Kobani but throughout Syria and into Iraq.
Link:http://www.itv.com/news/update/2014-10-08/john-kerry-hints-protecting-kobani-is-not-priority/

[davidbfpo]

AP has an article on the coalition air strikes in both Iraq and Syria:http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ap-analysis-us-led-airstrikes-produce-gains-26025294?singlePage=true

[CrowBat]

Sorry David, but that AP article is a precise repeat of the same nonsensical mistake all the Western media is doing: namely, that of pouring more water to the Daesh's mills.

See this:

In neighboring Syria, days of airstrikes have been unable to stop militants on the verge of capturing a strategic town on the Turkish border.

This is making the Daesh appear in the public as if it cannot be even hit by air strikes. Actually, the situation is such that air strikes are 'too little, too late', and run in disjoined fashion.

To explain what I mean, have a look at the summary of CENTCOM's (and few DOD's) releases for activity over Syria since 23 September:

CENTCOM, 23 September: (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/sept.-23-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil-in-s)

U.S. military forces and partner nations, including the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, undertook military action against ISIL terrorists in Syria overnight, using a mix of fighter, bomber, remotely piloted aircraft and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles to conduct 14 strikes against ISIL targets.

The strikes destroyed or damaged multiple ISIL targets in the vicinity of Ar Raqqah, Dayr az Zawr, Al Hasakah, and Abu Kamal and included ISIL fighters, training compounds, headquarters and command and control facilities, storage facilities, a finance center, supply trucks and armed vehicles.
...

CENTCOM, 23 September: (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/sept.-23-u.s.-military-conducts-airstrikes-against-isil-in-iraq-and-syria)

U.S. military forces continued to attack ISIL terrorists in Iraq and Syria, using a mix of bomber and remotely piloted aircraft to conduct three airstrikes last night and today.

Two of the airstrikes were conducted last night as part of the operation over Syria and resulted in one damaged ISIL armed vehicle and one destroyed ISIL armed vehicle southwest of Dayr Az Zawr.
...
To date, U.S. Central Command has conducted 194 airstrikes across Iraq against ISIL. Along with partner nations, U.S. Central Command has also conducted 16 airstrikes across Syria against ISIL.

CENTCOM, 24 September: (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/sept.-24-u.s.-military-conducts-airstrikes-against-isil-in-iraq-and-syria)

A fifth airstrike damaged eight ISIL vehicles in Syria northwest of Al Qa'im. All aircraft exited the strike areas safely.
...
To date, U.S. Central Command has conducted 198 airstrikes across Iraq against ISIL. Along with partner nations, U.S. Central Command has also conducted 20 airstrikes across Syria against ISIL.

CENTCOM, 24 September: (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil-in-syria)

U.S. military forces and partner nations, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, attacked ISIL terrorists in Syria today, using a mix of fighter and remotely piloted aircraft to conduct 13 airstrikes against 12 ISIL-controlled modular oil refineries located in remote areas of eastern Syria in the vicinity of Al Mayadin, Al Hasakah, and Abu Kamal and one ISIL vehicle near Dayr az Zawr, also in eastern Syria.
...
To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations. In addition, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also participated in these airstrikes. All aircraft safely exited the strikes areas.

For 25 September 2014, there are no CENTCOM-reports related to air strikes against targets in Syria.

CENTCOM, 26 September: (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/sept.-26-u.s.-military-conducts-airstrikes-against-isil-in-iraq-and-syria)

In Syria, three airstrikes south and southeast of Dayr Az Zawr destroyed four ISIL tanks and damaged another.

CENTCOM, 27 September: (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/sept.-27-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil)

In Syria, an ISIL vehicle was destroyed south of Al-Hasakah. Also near Al-Hasakah several buildings that were part of an ISIL garrison were destroyed. An ISIL command and control facility near Manbij was damaged. An ISIL building and two armed vehicles at the Kobani border crossing were destroyed. An ISIL held airfield, an ISIL garrison and an ISIL training camp near Ar Raqqah were damaged.

To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy attack and fighter aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations. In addition, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates also participated in these strikes. All aircraft exited the strike areas safely.

CENTCOM, 28 September: (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/sept.-28-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil-in-s)

In Syria, two airstrikes near Dayr ar Zawr destroyed one ISIL tank and damaged another. One airstrike in northeast Syria destroyed three ISIL armed vehicles and an ISIL Humvee. U.S. and partner nations conducted airstrikes on four ISIL-held modular refineries and an ISIL command and control node north of Ar Raqqah; although we continue to assess the outcome of these attacks, initial indications are that they were successful.

To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy fighter aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. In addition, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also participated in these strikes. All aircraft departed the strike areas safely.

CENTCOM, 29 September: (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/sept.-29-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil-in-s)

In Syria, one airstrike near Dayr ar Zawr destroyed one ISIL armed vehicle while another destroyed an ISIL anti-aircraft artillery transport vehicle. U.S. and partner nations conducted two airstrikes on an ISIL compound and an ISIL-held airfield in northwest Syria near Aleppo. Two airstrikes were conducted on ISIL compounds near Ar Raqqah, while two other airstrikes struck an ISIL training camp and ISIL vehicles within a vehicle staging area adjacent to an ISIL-held grain storage facility near Manbij. The storage facility was being used by ISIL as a logistics hub and vehicle staging facility. Although we continue to assess the outcome of these attacks, initial indications are that they were successful.

To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed U.S. Air Force aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. In addition, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Jordan also participated in these strikes. All aircraft departed the strike areas safely.

(to be continued...)

[CrowBat]

CENTCOM, 30 September: (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/sept.-30-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil)

In Syria, two airstrikes near Dayr ar Zawr destroyed an ISIL armored vehicle and an ISIL armed vehicle. Five strikes in northeast Syria near Sinjar destroyed one ISIL artillery piece, one ISIL tank, three ISIL armed vehicles, two ISIL facilities, an ISIL observation post and struck four ISIL fighting positions. Three strikes near Mazra al Duwud near the Syrian/Turkish border, destroyed one ISIL artillery piece, damaged another, and destroyed two ISIL rocket launchers. One strike northeast of Aleppo destroyed four ISIL-occupied buildings. All aircraft departed the strike areas safely.

CENTCOM, 1 October: (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-1-u.s.-military-partner-nation-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil)

In Syria, three strikes near Kobani destroyed an ISIL armed vehicle, an ISIL artillery piece, and an ISIL tank. All aircraft departed the strike areas safely.
...
To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy fighter aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations. In addition, the United Kingdom also participated in the Iraq airstrikes. All aircraft departed the strike areas safely.

DOD release, 1 October (see bottom): (http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0814_iraq/Airstrikes2.html)

As of 1 October, U.S. and partner nation attack aircraft have flown over 1,700 strike sorties in support of operations against ISIL targets in Iraq and Syria using over 800 munitions against 322 targets.

CENTCOM, 2 October: (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-2-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil)

In Syria, one strike near Kobani destroyed an ISIL checkpoint. Another strike in Syria, north of Sinjar Mountain, damaged an ISIL tank. One airstrike west of Raqqah destroyed an ISIL tank, while one strike east of Aleppo struck multiple ISIL facilities. To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations. In addition, the United Arab Emirates also participated in these strikes. All aircraft exited the strike areas safely.

CENTCOM, 3 October: (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-3-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil-in-syr)

In Syria, one strike south of Al Hasakah destroyed an ISIL garrison, while one strike southeast of Dayr Az Zawr destroyed two ISIL tanks. Two strikes north of Ar Raqqah struck two modular oil refineries and an ISIL training camp, while another strike northeast of Aleppo struck an ISIL occupied building. One strike against an ISIL artillery piece west of Ar Raqqah was not successful. To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations. In addition, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also participated in the Syria strikes. All aircraft departed the strike areas safely.

DOD, 3 October: (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123337)

...Operations against the so-called Islamic State continue apace with 334 airstrikes against the terror group, Pentagon Press Secretary Navy Rear Adm. John Kirby told reporters at the Pentagon today.

Those airstrikes, the admiral added, are causing the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant to change its tactics.

Kirby briefed on the situation in Iraq and Syria and the coalition that is building against ISIL. He said there have been, to date, 248 airstrikes in Iraq and 86 in Syria.
...

DOD, 4 October: (http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0814_iraq/Airstrikes2.html)

In Syria, two strikes, south of Ayn al Arab destroyed an ISIL armored personnel carrier, an ISIL vehicle and struck a small ISIL unit. Two strikes east of Ayn al Arab destroyed an ISIL vehicle, an ISIL building, three artillery positions and struck a large ISIL unit. Two strikes southeast of Dayr Az Zawr destroyed one ISIL tank and one ISIL vehicle. One strike southwest of Ar Raqqah damaged Taqba Airfield. One strike west of Ar Raqqah destroyed an ISIL artillery piece. One strike south of Al Hasakah destroyed an ISIL depot and logistics complex. To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed fighter and remotely piloted aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations. In addition, the Kingdom of Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also participated in these strikes. All aircraft departed the strike areas safely.

CENTCOM, 5 October (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-5-u.s.-military-conducts-airstrikes-against-isil-in-syria-and-iraq)

In Syria, one strike northwest of Al Mayadin destroyed an ISIL bulldozer, two ISIL tanks and destroyed another ISIL vehicle. Two strikes northwest of Ar Raqqah struck a large ISIL unit and destroyed six ISIL firing positions. To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed fighter aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations. All aircraft departed the strike areas safely.

CENTCOM, 6 October (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-6-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil-in-syr)

In Syria, one strike destroyed an ISIL tank near Taqba Airfield west of Ar Raqqah. One strike destroyed two ISIL fighting positions south of Kobani. One strike southeast of Dayr az Zawr destroyed an ISIL tank. To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed fighter and remotely piloted aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations. All aircraft departed the strike areas safely.

CENTCOM, 7 October

In Syria, two airstrikes west of Al-Hasakah successfully struck multiple ISIL buildings, including an air observation building and staging areas. Another airstrike northeast of Dayr az Zawr successfully struck an ISIL staging area and an IED production facility. One airstrike south of Kobani destroyed three ISIL armed vehicles and damaged another; another strike southeast of Kobani destroyed an ISIL armed vehicle carrying anti-aircraft artillery. Two airstrikes southwest of Kobani damaged an ISIL tank; another airstrike south of Kobani destroyed an ISIL unit. One airstrike southwest of Rabiyah struck a small group of ISIL fighters. To conduct these strikes, the U.S. employed U.S. Air Force attack, fighter and bomber aircraft deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations. In addition, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also participated in these airstrikes. All aircraft safely exited the strike areas.

***********
***********

My count (and please feel free to correct me):

- that's 113 'strikes' flown between 22/23 September and 7 October against targets in Syria.

Arguably, most of fighter-bombers carry more than two PGMs nowadays, so they can hit more than one target per 'strike'; B-1Bs many more. But, in total, this still means: _only_ 113 strikes were flown against targets in Syria in three weeks, only 14 of which (I hope I don't have any 'doubles' here) have hit any kind of targets in Kobane area. That's less than 1 air strike a day against the Daesh in Kobane area.

And with this, the point of this post: no, it's not so that 'days of airstrikes have been unable to stop militants on the verge of capturing a strategic town on the Turkish border' - but serious effort in Kobane area began only two days ago and thus could not have had any kind of effects upon the Daesh so far.

Thus, instead of babbling nonsense and spreading de-facto pro-Daesh PR, the author should realize that that until two nights ago, the US and allies barely touched the Daesh in Kobane area.

Well: if one is not attacking the target, nobody can expect the target to start showing any reaction.

[Mark Pyruz]

Funny to see a member of what so many still consider the 'Syrian Arab Army' (actually one of involved IRGC gangs) needs an interpreter to talk with Syrian insurgents.

Except, of course, one has no clue about Arabic and considers the later for 'foreign Jihadists'...

Actually the interpreter speaks more correct Persian than the POW.

Regarding the two pics of "Iranian POWs," the one on the left's phenotypic characteristics appear to be Hazara.

[davidbfpo]

With our pol-military outlook sometimes the civilian dimension, so here is a long piece by Joshua Hersh 'The Lessons of Atmeh', a refugee camp in Syria just over the Turkish border:http://www.vqronline.org/reporting-articles/2014/10/lessons-atmeh

It is sub-titled:
In one of the harshest camps for refugees of the Syrian conflict, even the best intentions can backfire.

Long term such camps, inside and outside Syria, pose a huge problem for everyone. Logistics aside, when peace does come - will the people return home?

No-one, especially the host states, will want the camps to become pernament, like those for the Palestinians.

I am aware that some NGOs have thought about this and supported basic planning and training.

[ganulv]

A recent interview with University of Oklahoma professor Joshua Landis re: his comparison of the contemporary Levant to interwar Europe: http://youtu.be/_-roW5Y7vbw If you take nothing else away from the video, you'll at least learn that Jerry Seinfeld has a family tie to Aleppo.

Landis's take is that the Syrian conflict is not one in which political boundaries will be redrawn, but rather one in which demographics will be violently resorted (i.e., ethnic cleansing).

[CrowBat]

Kobane, Kobane, Kobane.... (and 'bad ally' Turkey, of course)...

Everybody is talking about Kobane as if it's the only place in Syria where there is combat. Actually, it seems the YPG and FSyA in Kobane have stopped the Daesh onslaught on this town. That is: the Daesh is now in control of two thirds of Kobane, but unable to advance any further.

On the contrary, the Kurds and FSyA are meanwhile launching counterattacks and recapturing some points. That is at least according to the SOHR (http://syriahr.com/en/2014/10/ypg-advances-and-kills-now-less-than-13-isis-in-ein-al-arab-kobane/), the YPG killed 13 Daesh yesterday while retaking two checkpoints in Kobane, and overall (http://syriahr.com/index.php?option=com_news&nid=24925&Itemid=2&task=displaynews#.VDvNq_ldXYg), the Daesh should have lost 42 idiots during the fighting there.

Ironic about the situation is that there are thousands of Kurds fighting for the Daesh too (i.e. there might be more of them fighting for the Daesh but for the YPG). Here a - warning: GRAFFIC - video of YPG and Deash-Kurds massacring each other:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FJDjtKUQHRo

More importantly...

Syrian regime continues its offensive north of Aleppo, attempting to clear insurgents from the area around the Infantry School, north of this city, and complete the encirclement of insurgents by reaching Nubol and az-Zahra - two regime-controlled Shi'a enclaves NW of Aleppo, presently supplied only through a - what else - Kurdish-held parts of NW Aleppo Province.

This offensive began the last week, and is almost completely run by the IRGC and Hezbollah: the NDF is only providing tank- and artillery support. After exploiting withdrawal of the JAN from some of local positions, this operation had quite some success early on. Meanwhile it was stalled after reaching Hindarat: the IF counterattacked there and temporarily captured the place, but then lost it and is now holding out on the outskirts, as can be seen on this video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E7cBXy0TarE

Another example of IRGC-combatants captured by insurgents at Hindarat appeared meanwhile in form of this video: this bloke says he served a sentence for drug-smuggling in an Iranian jail, until the IRGC offered him to go fighting in Syria for a pay of US$600 a month (almost as good as that of IRIAF pilots!):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHzKvwXLY7E

Elsewhere in Syria: the regime - that is: several IRGC-run brigades - have managed to overpower the last defenders of Jobar. This place was under a siege and continuous intensive attacks by elements of the Republican Guards (meanwhile largely suplanted by the IRGC) for more than two years. With this, the insurgent-held parts of Eastern Ghouta are now completely encircled and under a siege too.

Except for plenty of Iraqi Shi'a, the IRGC has lost one of its officers there: Maj Jabar Drissavi was KIA a few days ago. He was the second-highest IRGC officer KIA in Syria so far (after Maj Gen Abdollah Eskandari).

Further to this, at least according to the article here (http://eldorar.com/node/61412), the Hezbollah should have suffered a loss of no less but 840 KIA and 2,400 WIA in the war so far - and this not only during the fighting against Syrian insurgents and the JAN in Syria and Lebanon, but in Iraq too.

[CrowBat]

Some interesting developments there in Syria of the last 24-48 hours...

It's ironic to say that recent US attacks on makeshift refineries run by different Arab tribes in Daesh-controlled parts of Syria seem to have quite a fascinating effect - but upon the fuel reserves of the Syrian regime, not those of the Daesh.

Namely, they do see to have near-interrupted the flow of oil to regime (via the pipeline from Dayr az-Zawr to Homs). That means: the near-permanent fuel crisis of the regime (obvious in quite a few cases since mid-2012) has been significantly increased - indeed to a level where this is felt in the public there is now a major fuel shortage in Syri: Cold Winter Coming: Syria’s Fuel Crisis (http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=56917)

As next... while everybody is blaming and damning Turkey for not providing any kind of help for the YPG (and FSyA) fighting the Daesh in Kobane, slowly, very slowly, indications are trickling in about Turkey actually very much doing what it can. It's not only that Turks report (http://webtv.radikal.com.tr/Turkiye/10474/kobanide-sokak-savasi-suruyor.aspx) their local hospitals have treated at least 605 (another source said 620) YPG combatants WIA since the start of Daesh's attack on Kobane (including a number of PKK-terrorists sought for by the Turkish authorities, between them two 'commanders'). Or that the Turks don't mind a new YPG HQ that is on border crossing to Turkey. Lately, they have left in a US liaison team to meet Kurds and thus there is now a direct link between the CENTCOM and the YPG, resulting in YPG providing HUMINT and the CENTCOM not only significantly increasing the number of strikes, but these becoming effective too.

According to CENTCOM releases for 12 October (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-12-u.s.-military-conducts-airstrikes-against-isil-in-syria-and-iraq), 13 October (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-13-u.s.-military-conducts-airstrikes-against-isil-in-syria), 14 October (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-14-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil), and 15 October (http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-15-u.s.-military-conducts-airstrikes-against-isil-in-iraq-and-syria), US, RSAF and UAEAF planes flew 51 air strikes against targets in Syria, primarily against the Daesh in Kobane area.

Correspondingly, today we're going to read plenty of news like this one: Islamic State militants are retreating in parts of the strategic Syrian town of Kobane, a Kurdish official has said (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29629357).

Indeed, this combination of air strikes and cautious advance by the YPG and FSyA seem to have pushed the Daesh into the eastern outskirts of Kobane, perhaps even forced them out of the southern part of the town. This morning there are rumours (this report by WP (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/kurds-claim-to-have-turned-tide-against-islamic-state-in-kobane/2014/10/15/af9b5726-547f-11e4-809b-8cc0a295c773_story.html) is one example) that the Kurds and FSyA are actually in control of 80% of the place and have even recovered Mt Mishtenur, on the eastern side of the town.

With this, chances of the Daesh capturing Kobane are de-facto nil.

[davidbfpo]

Crowbat a question about the Kurds. Two days ago you posted this:
Ironic about the situation is that there are thousands of Kurds fighting for the Daesh too (i.e. there might be more of them fighting for the Daesh but for the YPG)..

IIRC this theme has appeared elsewhere, which came as a surprise to me.

I appreciate the Kurds across the regional borders are not a unified mass and recall a small number have supported the violent jihad before, IIRC when in Iraq years ago.

Why would thousands today support the Daesh?

[CrowBat]

Frankly: I've got no clue, David.

What I can tell you is (short version): it's more than a year that I've heard first time about recruiting of hundreds of Kurds in Iran (and local authorities doing nothing against this, in some cases even being afraid of recruiters).

While trying to find more info about this topic, I somewhere stumbled over a report about Treasury imposing sanctions against specific figures in Tehran for 'supporting the ISIL'. Back then I was wondering about 'actual reasons' for such reports. But, in last few weeks multiple reports appeared about thousands of Kurds that have joined the Daesh. Many of these are supported by videos uploaded on YouTube by quasi-Turkish or quasi-Arabic members of the Daesh, with a distinct accent several people told me is 'Kurdish'.

In total, when I connect the dots and calculate all the numbers I've heard from sources anywhere between Diyarbakir in Turkey and Baku in Azerbaijan... I can't but conclude that about 10,000 of them have already joined.

(And that's my 'most conservative' estimate.)

[AdamG]

Make a fresh batch of popcorn, the hilarity level is about to go to 11. With the MiG-21's crash record, ISIS looks like they're building a Kamikaze Squadron.


Beirut (AFP) - Islamic State group jihadists are being trained by Saddam Hussein's former pilots to fly three fighter jets captured from the Syrian military, a monitoring group said Friday.

The planes, which are believed to be MiG-21 and MiG-23 jets, are capable of flying although it is unclear if they are equipped with missiles, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

The jets were seized from Syrian military airports now under IS control in the northern provinces of Aleppo and Raqa, according to the Britain-based group, which has a wide network of sources inside the war-torn country.

http://news.yahoo.com/jihadists-training-fly-syria-warplanes-monitor-115733078.html

[CrowBat]

Aside of the nonsense about 'MiG-23s', this is actually an issue that should be taken seriously, Adam.

The Daesh has captured at least 25 MiG-21s (of different variants) at Tabqa, plus 2 at Ksheesh ('Jirah').

Additionally, it has captured perhaps as many as 13 L-39s at Ksheesh.

Of course, most of planes in question are long since derelict and of no use: indeed, the two MiG-21FLs at Ksheesh were posted as gate-guards already about 10 years ago. But, several others were in 'near operational' condition when seen for the last time.

Except for planes, photos and videos released by various Jihadist idiots there have shown stocks of air-to-air missiles, UB-16-57 and similar pods for unguided rockets, and light bombs of Soviet design. There is little doubt that they've captured stocks of spares - plus an intact radar station nearby.

Summary of what they've got:
- planes
- spares
- weapons
- radars necessary to guide pilots of these aircraft.

Now, the usual Western prejudice would be that 'barbaric Jihadists' have no clue how to operate such complex pieces of machinery like 'MiGs'. Actually, not only that especially L-39s are easy to operate (just ask all the private pilots in the USA: they own more L-39s than all the air forces around the world), but MiG-21s are relatively easy to maintain and operate too (exception is landing at speeds higher than those of Space Shuttle).

More serious is fact that when one monitors various Jihadist internet appearances carefully enough, it's obvious they're looking for and recruiting people with technical and electro-technical skills, i.e. technical personnel with military background. Several cases are known of them forcing captured Syrian military personnel to work with them, or even hijacking Syrians, Turks, Kurds and others with required skills to work for them.

Furthermore, Daesh is claiming to be operating several helicopters supposedly captured in Iraq already since June. While this is not true, it points at the fact that they are eager to obtain a sort of 'air force' capability.

Combined with the fact that the Daesh includes a large number (over 1,000) of ex-Iraqi Army and Iraqi Air Force officers, with enough related experience, that it has captured enough military bases in Iraq and Syria to find the necessary documentation, means that the Daesh is 100% sure in possession of necessary technical documentation too.

Overall: they have the wish, and now they have equipment, and are likely to have the skill necessary to overhaul and maintain, and then to fly these MiGs. And they've been left two months to do something about them (time-frame between the capture of Tabqa and the start of US attacks on NE Syria).

And finally: the Daesh is lot less keen to run suicide ops than AQ, for example. That's one of factors making it much more attractive for all 'potential recruits' in comparison. So, I doubt we're going to see the emergence of some sort of a 'Kamikaze Air Force'.

On the contrary, while they are unlikely to grow an 'USAF-equivalent/counterpart' in a matter weeks, months or even years, gauging by the fact that the Taliban have managed to establish and run a small, yet operational and combat-effective air force under precisely the same circumstances back in the 1990s - and that while having a lot less money, and far lesser global reach than the Daesh - I would say that one should take Daesh's efforts in this regards damn seriously.

[CrowBat]

Here the first video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Ux0Mb7pryM

[ganulv]

Courtesy of Spiegel Online (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/bild-997874-765061.html).


http://cdn1.spiegel.de/images/image-765054-galleryV9-iqvg.jpg

[Bill Moore]

To clarify my position, I am an advocate of UW when it is part of an effective strategy; however, too many, especially UW fans outside of the military, over estimate the efficacy of UW to achieve strategic ends regardless of the context. This is little different than the advocates for strategic bombing prior to WWII who thought they could win the war by themselves with their deeply flawed theories on air power. It is refreshing to see that most airmen no longer accept that myth, but of course there remains some who hang on to flawed theories like Warden. The CIA and SOF also need to relook their theories regarding the efficacy of UW through an honest study of history to determine what works, what doesn't, what conditions determined success or failure, etc.

The following Congressional Research Study points to the fact that a Free Syrian Army does not actually exist. If our civilian leaders (I'm confident our military planners understand this) are proposing strategies based on supporting a mythical army, we're off to bad start. We need to be leery about the high volume of misinformation on blogs, twitter, etc. (that often intended to be little more than propaganda to garner support for a particular group or individual in Syria) that attempt to paint another picture. At a minimum trust but verify, but better yet marginalize the talking heads in our media who insist on accepting myths as facts. Plans based on myths will fail when they confront reality.

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf


As of September 2014, the term “Free Syrian Army” does not correspond to an organized command and control structure with national reach and unified procurement, intelligence, logistics, or sustainment capabilities. Since 2011 uprising, there has been and continues to be no single military leader of the movement. At first, a number of Syrian military defectors identifying themselves as leaders of the “Free Syrian Army” attempted to provide unified leadership and build these types of capabilities for emergent opposition forces across Syria but were unable to exert control over the actions of individual brigades. Regional and personal rivalries, the ascendance of Islamist armed groups, and competing foreign patrons continue to undermine these efforts. A Supreme Military Council (see below) formed in an attempt to overcome these challenges has proven incapable of overcoming them to date.

This doesn't mean that an external power can't eventually integrate and more effectively organize these resistance forces. This must be one of the first steps, and until that is accomplished little will be accomplished by providing arms without U.S. or other foreign advisors on the ground to direct operations based on a coherent plan. This casts doubt on the logic of those who advocated support for the "FSA" when the conflict first emerged. It explains why Sen McCain posed with al-Nusra fighters, based on a lack of understanding (a continuing thorn in our side when it comes to developing strategy). Even if one of the many resistance groups, or one of the fleeting coalition of groups, got lucky (chance is a key element in war) and removed Assad, the different groups would quickly turn on one another, which is hardly the better peace and regional stability I suspect we desire.

The next report is an article on a classified CIA report that states "their" efforts to arm rebels in the past has failed in most instances. Hopefully the actual report provides more than statistics and analyzes why many efforts failed and some succeeded. They did identify in the article, that the presence of U.S. (or other foreign) advisors were helpful.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/us/politics/cia-study-says-arming-rebels-seldom-works.html?_r=0

C.I.A. Study of Covert Aid Fueled Skepticism About Helping Syrian Rebels


The C.I.A. review, according to several former American officials familiar with its conclusions, found that the agency’s aid to insurgencies had generally failed in instances when no Americans worked on the ground with the foreign forces in the conflict zones, as is the administration’s plan for training Syrian rebels.

Noted exception in Afghanistan when we supported the Muj against the USSR,


That covert war was successful without C.I.A. officers in Afghanistan, the report found, largely because there were Pakistani intelligence officers working with the rebels in Afghanistan.


“It’s a very mixed history,” said Loch K. Johnson, a professor of public and international affairs at the University of Georgia and an intelligence expert. “You need some really good, loyal people on the ground ready to fight.”

In my opinion, the CIA has proven over the years to be astrategic when it comes to supporting resistance movements, insurgencies, etc., they tend to throw money and arms at a problem without thinking it through. While the military has a reduced capability in developing strategists and good operational planners compared to WWII, it still retains the majority of those trained to develop strategy, and it has an education system that be adapted to support developing strategists for this type of conflict. Perhaps there is a need to develop a "joint" command for special warfare that develops this expertise at the strategic and operational levels. SF already has the doctrine for the tactical level, of course that must continuously evolve based on changes in political and social systems, technology advances, etc.

Bottom line we need to do this better.

[CrowBat]

Bill...


The following Congressional Research Study points to the fact that a Free Syrian Army does not actually exist.What's new about that?

The 'Free Syrian Army' was always an idea of a non-religious, non-sectarian insurgency against Assadists. For Syrian insurgents, it's a trademark, like meanwhile there is a trademark of the Free Syrian Police (actually a neutral service organized by former police officers that are controlling civilian life and security in most of insurgent-held areas). In the West, the term was foremost used by the media that was in trouble with explaining all the various groups fighting under that title - even more so once all the possible foreign powers began conditioning provision of aid on insurgents declaring their political and religious intentions (which was precisely what caused the rift within insurgency and disunited the original FSyA into about 6,400 different militias organized into some seven umbrella groups).

Ever since, it's foremost used by everybody with similar levels of cluelessness like the media.


If our civilian leaders (I'm confident our military planners understand this) are proposing strategies based on supporting a mythical army, we're off to bad start.If US civilian leaders can't see the FSyA, then for following reasons:

- regime gased it again (using CWs it promised to destroy) and there is still too much smoke but to see,

- they're intentionally looking the other way, or

- insist on a standpoint that every Moslem (including all those looking like a Moslem) = al-Qaida.

But you know, frankly: I can perfectly understand this position. Really. Imagine Obama, all his advisers and all the others insisting on this POV having to explain three separate uprisings of supposed 'extremist Islamists' (see Dayr az-Zawr area) against the Daesh in August this year, emergence of such groups like White Shroud (anti-Daesh insurgency in same area, ambushing and assassinating idiots), even the Salafist Ahrar ash-Sham fighting the Daesh - just not the regime they insist not to bomb etc.?

Let just start with a guess about who between them might happen to know about this all?

And then try to find out how many American citizens in total know about such facts?

Hand at heart: explaining this is pure horror. Nobody in the DC can do that. So, better say, 'FSyA is a myth' and voila: everybody is happy!


We need to be leery about the high volume of misinformation on blogs, twitter, etc. (that often intended to be little more than propaganda to garner support for a particular group or individual in Syria) that attempt to paint another picture. At a minimum trust but verify, but better yet marginalize the talking heads in our media who insist on accepting myths as facts. Plans based on myths will fail when they confront reality.Let me see if I understand this clearly: the 200 or so TOW-kills scored by Harakat Hazm only and this in the area between Hama and Moarek since January this year alone (i.e. this is not to talk about dozens of others), all nicely documented on videos - are a 'myth'?

Ah yes: Harakat are about 5,000 former Syrian military officers, no 'farmers, students and doctors', and thus not fitting in Obama's (& CO's) argumentation.

Never mind: forget me mentioning them.


This doesn't mean that an external power can't eventually integrate and more effectively organize these resistance forces. This must be one of the first steps, and until that is accomplished little will be accomplished by providing arms without U.S. or other foreign advisors on the ground to direct operations based on a coherent plan....which is the reason why the USA are now making air-drops to Kurds that are listening to command of PKK-leadership, which is considered 'terrorists' not only by Turkey, but half the EU/NATO too and is fighting for something that is against US interests, namely an independent state?

Makes sense...


This casts doubt on the logic of those who advocated support for the "FSA" when the conflict first emerged. It explains why Sen McCain posed with al-Nusra fighters, based on a lack of understanding (a continuing thorn in our side when it comes to developing strategy). Even if one of the many resistance groups, or one of the fleeting coalition of groups, got lucky (chance is a key element in war) and removed Assad, the different groups would quickly turn on one another....How do you want to know? Right now, these 'different groups' are working together very well. Otherwise, the insurgent frontlines would've collapsed long ago.


The next report is an article on a classified CIA report that states "their" efforts to arm rebels in the past has failed in most instances.Is this serious?

So, Hazm, SRF and others haven't got the US-made TOWs (most are from lots manufactured just 3-4 years ago) that can be seen on so many videos...?

Fantastic. I'm therefore extremely proud to - for the first time in history ever - present video-evidence of a 'myth'. See here:

Non-existing Free Syrian Army using TOWs:
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=ede_1412871065

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=8d8_1412954857

Harakat using TOWs:
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=f3a_1413312384

Southern Front using TOWs:
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=a74_1413328282

13th Division (ex-FSyA now Army of Mujahideen) using TOWs:
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=a97_1413403410

...and Islamic Front using TOWs:
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=e08_1413208929

Yes, ladies and gentlemen: all you can see here has never happened - at least not according to US Congress and the CIA.


In my opinion, the CIA has proven over the years to be astrategic when it comes to supporting resistance movements, insurgencies, etc., they tend to throw money and arms at a problem without thinking it through.And in my opinion CIA can't do anything if there is a pres that's micro-managing this cluster-f..k although entirely clueless about what and why is he doing - and who insists on interrupting the flow of supplies every time the IRGC-led regime gangs are on offensive.


Bottom line we need to do this better.Finally something I can agree with.

[CrowBat]

Contrary to CIA's own reports to the Congress, the agency appears to be doing quite well with its 'vetting' of Syrian insurgents.

Here an excellently-prepared, really 'authoritative' Complete and Growing List of Vetted Groups (http://notgeorgesabra.wordpress.com/2014/10/21/the-moderate-rebels-a-complete-and-growing-list-of-vetted-groups/) of Syrian insurgents that either already have, or are about to get US military aid.

Summary of 'mythical' groups in question:

- V Corps FSyA (including 13th Division; Knights of Truth, 101st Division; Falcons of Mt Zawiya; 1st Infantry Brigade; Harakat Hazm; Nouradin az-Zanki; Ahmad al-Abdo Martyrs Brigades; Falcons of al-Ghab Brigade and Brigade of the Chargers)

- Qunaitra Military Council FSyA & SRF (Grandons Brigade, Youth of Sunnah Brigade; al-Anfal Brigade; 1st Brigade; and Damascus Martyrs Brigade)

- Jaysh al-Mujahideen (Syrian Martyrs' Brigades; Omari Brigades; Yarmouk Brigade; Partisans of Islam Front; Hamza Division; Sword of ash-Sham; Martyrs of Islam Brigade; Dawn of Islam Brigade; Helpers of Sunnah Brigade; Helpers Brigade, Amoud Horan Brigade; Emigrants and Helpers Brigade; One-ness Battalion of Horan; and 1st Artillery Battalion)

Of course, all of these are presently fiercely attacked by the SyAAF: Syrian Air Force Carries Out 200 Strikes in 36 Hours (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/21/syria-strikes_n_6022042.html?ncid=txtlnkusaolp00000592)

...The Syrian air force carried out more than 200 air strikes around the country in the past 36 hours, a group monitoring the war said on Tuesday, a rapid increase in government raids as U.S.-led forces bomb Islamist insurgents elsewhere.

The intensified strikes by President Bashar al-Assad's forces will add to the fear among his opponents that the government is taking advantage of the U.S. raids on Islamic State to attack other foes, including opposition groups that Washington backs.

Analysts say the increase could be because the Syrian military wants to weaken rebel groups before they get training and equipment promised by the United States.

Since midnight on Sunday, the Syrian military carried out at least 210 raids, including barrel bombings, on provinces in the east, north and west of the country, the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said. It said there were many casualties but did not give an exact figure.

The military concentrated the strikes in the "western corridor" that stretches from the southwest up through Damascus towards the Mediterranean, according to the information from the the Observatory, which says it gathers details from all sides of the conflict.

The air raids struck areas in the Hama, Daraa, Idlib, Aleppo and Quneitra provinces as well as the Damascus countryside, it said. It also hit the eastern Deir al-Zor province where U.S.-led forces have also been bombing Islamic State, the Observatory added.
...

At least there are no new reports about deployment of chemical weapons, sigh... at least not by the regime.

Namely, the Daesh is back to attacking Ayn al-Arab/Kobane in force. According to a YPG-release from yesterday, it has brought reinforcements from Raqqah, Jarabulus, Manbij and Tel Abyad and launched an all-out attack from several directions. They should have attempted to attack with two suicide car bombs, but both vehicles were destroyed before reaching Kurdish positions. The YPG claimed 11 idiots KIA in the east, 13 in the south, 19 in the south-west and 14 in the west, in exchange for 11 own KIA.

As should be known, two days ago the YPG was 'reinforced' by a typical US 'shot from the hip' style of nonsensical action: i.e. through air-drop of bundles with AK-47s, ammo and hand grenades. It doesn't matter if one JDAP parachute failed and a box ended in Daesh hands - which is now widely becried by the media.

But, what should matter is: why offending what should be a crucial ally in the area (Turkey) and who to hell is 'vetting' the YPG?

Plus: this morning there is a flood of reports about the Daesh launching some sort of chemical weapons attack in Kobane area, and about a number of injured YPG combatants.

[Bill Moore]

Crowbat


Here an excellently-prepared, really 'authoritative' Complete and Growing List of Vetted Groups of Syrian insurgents that either already have, or are about to get US military aid.

Why do you believe this Marxist propaganda site is authoritative? This looks like little more than propaganda directed against English speaking nations to gain support for different resistance movements, that by the way embrace a Marxist ideology. All photos of the Syrians throughout the articles show them holding up signs in English (target audience), and holding up drawings of President Obama.

There is nothing authoritative about this site. That doesn't mean everything in it is inaccurate, or that any of it is inaccurate, but it is clearly intended as propaganda. It also tells a story that agrees with your view, so obviously you embrace it. That is a human tendency we all embrace, and have to consciously fight to get closer to objective and further from subjective.

Your authoritative site is in George Sabra's name, a noted Syrian communist who is now the head of the Syrian National Council (SNC). Clearly an a non bias source that wouldn't twist the facts to achieve a political objective.

Who are the real puppet masters in Syria? Here is one view

http://news.az/articles/region/92937


Turkey and Qatar have been vocal supporters of the Syrian opposition and have been heavily engaged in efforts to coordinate the fragmented Sunni-majority Syrian rebels. The two states contributed jointly to the formation of the Syrian opposition’s civilian wing, the Syrian National Council, and its military wing, the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Both countries have also been criticized for supporting the al-Nusra Front, the majority of whose militants later joined the ranks of ISIL.

The Qatar-Turkey line has occasionally deviated from the U.S.-Saudi approach in restructuring the opposition like the Syrian National Coalition and FSA into the Higher Military Council.

Nonetheless, the propaganda is well done. Give every organization a Facebook page, a flag, and a few photos to create the illusion of a real army in being.

War has always been propagandized with half-truths and lies, the only difference now is that it has exponentially increased with the web and social media.

[CrowBat]

Crowbat
Why do you believe this Marxist propaganda site is authoritative?Because ideology of the owner of that website does not matter in the case of the work by two guys that sat down and really did their homework.

Besides, what kind of problem have you got with Syrian Marxists?

If nothing else, from your standpoint the only thing that should matter here would be that Marxists certainly can't be 'Islamist extremists'...


All photos of the Syrians throughout the articles show them holding up signs in English (target audience), and holding up drawings of President Obama.Yes, that's perfectly right. Guess, you've never seen all the similar photos from Kfarnabel at earlier times?


There is nothing authoritative about this site.I'm not talking about the site, but the list of vetted insurgent groups posted on it. No matter whether one likes the site and its owner, or not, the list is correct (at worst, affiliations of specific groups would be better re-grouped the way I've posted them here).


That doesn't mean everything in it is inaccurate, or that any of it is inaccurate, but it is clearly intended as propaganda.Oh, excuse me.

Then please help me understand you correctly:

- posting lists of Syrian insurgent groups the sheer existence of which is declared a 'myth', but which actually have been vetted by the CIA and either already have got TOWs or are about to get them, is 'propaganda';

- while, realizing the correct nature of the 'FSyA' title as a trademark three years too late is... exactly what?

Alternatively, you can explain me your view of what's going on here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hmx48qsBQz4


It also tells a story that agrees with your view, so obviously you embrace it.Sure: it confirms my information, which is good for me - and very bad for everybody explaining something else.


That is a human tendency we all embrace, and have to consciously fight to get closer to objective and further from subjective.Exactly that has brought me at this standpoint.

Difference is: contrary to 12 years ago, this time I'm not going to shut up.


Your authoritative site is in George Sabra's name, a noted Syrian communist who is now the head of the Syrian National Council (SNC). Clearly an a non bias source that wouldn't twist the facts to achieve a political objective.And the funny thing here is: more than half the groups in question can't care less about the SNC - and this precisely because they do not want to subject themselves to the control of Turkey/Qatar-supported Moslem Brotherhood.

Of course, in order to know about this one should 'consciously fight to get closer to objective and further from subjective'.

So, as you can see, we're even in agreement here.


Who are the real puppet masters in Syria? Here is one view...I'm not surprised you're posting a source offering just the usual set of generalizations. But what never stops making me wondering about people like you is the following:

1.) Why are you throwing together groups like those listed above, which are clearly US-Saudi supported, and refusing to accept the SNC and Turkish-Qatari line - between others because the later was so far primarily providing aid to Islamist and extremist groups, like the JAN, Ahrar etc.?

2.) Why are you blaming me for 'spreading Marxist propaganda' while failing to realize that your problem is the same like all those that share your ignorance about 'details' of the Syrian insurgency?

3.) Why are you limiting yourself to reading such 'mainstream' stuff and generalizations? Why don't you check reports by the US Treasury citing specific Iranian nationals (http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_EvolutionofISILRelationships_FactSheet_June2 014.pdf) (here too (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Feb-07/246688-us-targets-key-iran-based-al-qaeda-facilitator.ashx#axzz2t4guL6bI)) right next to Kuwaiti nationals (http://www.worldtribune.com/2014/08/07/u-s-treasury-kuwaiti-nationals-funneling-funds-raised-via-social-media-isil/) (alternatively here (http://en.alalam.ir/news/1621234), and more precisely here (http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2605.aspx)), and Qatari nationals (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/qatar/11124714/Senior-Isil-commander-raised-1.25-million-from-Qatari-nationals-says-US-Treasury.html) instead?

These are not only clearly identifying specific persons that are providing funding and recruitment for the al-Qaida and Daesh in Syria, but also making it clear: the above-listed Syrian insurgent groups have never received any kind of funding from sources listed by the US Treasury.

And overall: why is it so hard for people like you nowadays to activate their brains, start collecting information, start thinking and connecting dots?


Nonetheless, the propaganda is well done. Give every organization a Facebook page, a flag, and a few photos to create the illusion of a real army in being....and still - and obviously - that's nothing in comparison to the Daesh and the Assadist regime.

Then, without the USA (and entire West) misunderstanding Daesh's videos of beheading its US and British hostages, the USA and allies wouldn't get involved against it.

And, without skilful manoeuvring and propaganda of the regime, everybody would know what's actually going on in Syria.


War has always been propagandized with half-truths and lies, the only difference now is that it has exponentially increased with the web and social media.Very nice. Then I'll offer you the following promise: in order to distinguish propaganda from reality, henceforth I'll post every single video of TOW-use by above-listed groups I can put my hands upon.

Let's start with non-existing Harakat Hazm, which never destroyed this 2S1 Gvozdika:
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=6d5_1413895155

...nor has it ever hit this T-55 in northern Hama province:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U8yTG0VcRC0

[Bill Moore]

Crowbat

Only the blind would argue that resistance elements are not fighting bravely against Assad, whigh is all the videos demonstrate. They don't prove who is doing the fighting. As for using main stream news as sources I readily admit that is a shortfall, but it is no worse than citing resistance websites. Clearly you understand we can't post classified information on a blog? Unless you are a former member of the Obama administration. You are certainly knowledgeable on the situation. You are also a biased source of information. Nonetheless I enjoy reading your posts. You should keep in mind that America's interests will not always align with yours.

[CrowBat]

Bill,
after posting my last post above and while preparing few artworks ('colour profiles') of SyAAF MiG-21s captured by the Daesh at Tabqa AB for one of my future publications.... it dawned upon me that I failed to express my appreciation for you about one (or even 'a few') fact(s).

Namely, you are now in exclusive club of about 0,0001% of total US population that knows there is something like 'Syrian Marxists'.

It might sound silly at the first look, and it's certainly going to sound 'patronizing', although what I'm going to write as next is not meant that way: but, I think this is an important step forward.

If you wonder why: because this means you're one of very, very, very, very, VERY few Americans not considering all the Syrians either for 'crazy Islamist terrorists' or for 'fans of that lesser-evil, named Bashar'.

IMHO, this is important for the next reason you mentioned in your reply too: yup, only the blind would argue there is no resistance against Assad. This stands precisely in opposition to what the US government, most of US political establishment, large parts of the IC and especially most of the military are arguing.

That said, and because you 'still insist' that this 'doesn't prove who is doing the fighting', I guess I'll have to keep on posting videos of TOW-kills. Reason is rather simple: just to show you how many of them are used in combat, and how many Assadists are blown up by them.

Regarding sources: nope, my primary sources are no mainstream media, internet etc. And nope: at least from my standpoint I can say I'm not posting plenty of 'sensitive' stuff I do happen to know. I do not demand anybody to do something of that kind either.

But, I do happen to have contacts to people serving with (what is left of) the Syrian military, to people that joined the insurgents etc. and I also do happen to be in a position to...let's say 'monitor'... let's say 'discussions' within certain, 'quite influential' circles in the DC. Of course, all of this is completely unofficial by nature and some of stuff they say sometimes proves wrong. Therefore, nobody is obliged to 'believe' anything I say. Yet, the point is this: primary reason why I'm - sometimes - posting links to specific media/blogs or other sorts of internet websites is solely to point at sources confirming what I've heard from somewhere else.

Am I biased?

I'm staunchly against any regime that's terrorising its population. But especially against one that has caused the death of 400,000 people and forced 10 million of others to become homeless refugees, that's purposedly destroying most of Syrian cities, regularly using chemical weapons, and then depending on two major (and several minor) terrorist organizations for own survival.

If that's making me 'biased', oh my dear Sir: yes, I am.

On the contrary, the end of your post is leaving me not a little bit bamboozled: precisely what kind of 'US interests' here are then 'not align' with mine?

Would you like to say the US is now curious to ignore regimes doing all of what I listed?

***********

That all said, here one example of what you're not going to find in any kind of media: the top ranks of the Assadist military (that is: the few old farths left over from the former SyAA) are presently (and seriously) considering official re-designation of military services from 'Syrian Arab Army' to something like the 'Syrian National Army'. I.e. the droppin 'Arab' from the official designation.

Local IRGC-QF commanders were a lil' bit stunned about this (then the IRGC is eagerly Arabizing even the official Iranian history since years), but they've meanwhile joined related discussions with suggestion of something like: 'Syrian Peoples' Army'.

Should you wonder where have I got this: sorry, I can't say more than I have already said.

Whatever, I am a great fan of sarcasm, and thus cannot fail observing few things:

- That with 'Syrian People's Army' would be the gem - even more so because half the 'people' in question either do not speak Arabic with Syrian accent, or do not speak any Arabic at all. :D

- I'm eagerly waiting for reaction of such regime's combatants like those from the Ba'ath Party Militia, Arab National Guard (the latter are primarily Egyptians, but few Lebanese and other Arabs too), and then the Syrian Socialist Party Militia (the standpoint of which is that Arabs are better than even Nazi's Arians) - once they realize the regime for which they are fighting has decided to drop not only 'Arab', but even pan-Arabism from its agenda. :rolleyes:

[Bill Moore]

Am I biased?

I'm staunchly against any regime that's terrorising its population. But especially against one that has caused the death of 400,000 people and forced 10 million of others to become homeless refugees, that's purposedly destroying most of Syrian cities, regularly using chemical weapons, and then depending on two major (and several minor) terrorist organizations for own survival.

If that's making me 'biased', oh my dear Sir: yes, I am.

I hear you, and this is understandable. You need to understand that America rode in on their white horse with their white hats on with the best intentions for Iraq and Afghanistan, and have little to show for our effort. In some ways we're a wounded country and hesitant to throw our hat in the ring again unless we can anticipate a better outcome for our sacrifice, and we did sacrifice.


On the contrary, the end of your post is leaving me not a little bit bamboozled: precisely what kind of 'US interests' here are then 'not align' with mine?

Crowbat, I attempt to project a possibly hidden logic in Obama's strategy. That doesn't mean that logic actually exists, but I simply offer it as an alternative view. Maybe he thinking this or that. Frankly, I have no longer have any idea what our national goals are now in Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan. I hear one thing, yet the visible strategy doesn't support the what I hear, so I hope as a citizen that there is an invisible part that I don't see that makes sense. That is a real possibility, but my confidence level is much lower than it has been in the recent past.


Would you like to say the US is now curious to ignore regimes doing all of what I listed?

Based on comments above, I think the U.S. is temporarily out of the regime change game. However, if the people rise up against their oppressive government, a U.S. State Department rep will get on twitter and tell them that America supports them. Hope they don't take that too seriously and actually start a war in hopes we will actually help.


- That with 'Syrian People's Army' would be the gem - even more so because half the 'people' in question either do not speak Arabic with Syrian accent, or do not speak any Arabic at all. :D

No surprise, the Syrian Army now only protects the regime and the Alawite minority. I would hate to be an Alawite in Syria now, especially if I had a family, knowing the curtain will eventually close. Just like Kaddafi, Assad must rely on foreign soldiers or mercenaries. That generally indicates the end game is in sight.

Cheers

[CrowBat]

I hear you, and this is understandable. You need to understand that America rode in on their white horse with their white hats on with the best intentions for Iraq and Afghanistan, and have little to show for our effort. In some ways we're a wounded country and hesitant to throw our hat in the ring again unless we can anticipate a better outcome for our sacrifice, and we did sacrifice.We're turning in circles now: it has already been said that Afghanistan was justified, but only 'curing the effects of disease', while Iraq was simply stupid.

Doesn't mean that 'Syria' would be 'wrong'.


Crowbat, I attempt to project a possibly hidden logic in Obama's strategy. That doesn't mean that logic actually exists, but I simply offer it as an alternative view. Maybe he thinking this or that. Frankly, I have no longer have any idea what our national goals are now in Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan. I hear one thing, yet the visible strategy doesn't support the what I hear, so I hope as a citizen that there is an invisible part that I don't see that makes sense. That is a real possibility, but my confidence level is much lower than it has been in the recent past.One of latest statements regarding 'goals' in Syria was something like 'need to respect Iranian interests in upholding the Assad regime'.

Nobody in the DC, and especially not in the DOS cared about respecting Iranian interests - and that since 35 years. On the contrary. But now, when the regime in Syria is de-facto run by an Iranian terrorist organization (or two, if we add Hezbollah to the IRGC), there is a need to respect these?

So, if you're searching for an 'invisible' part, here one idea: either the Iranians have operational nukes - or this is simply making no sense, i.e. it's so absurd, that it's mindlessly idiotic.


Based on comments above, I think the U.S. is temporarily out of the regime change game. However, if the people rise up against their oppressive government, a U.S. State Department rep will get on twitter and tell them that America supports them. Hope they don't take that too seriously and actually start a war in hopes we will actually help.Well, the problem is that they do (take that seriously), and thus any such action is stupid too.


No surprise, the Syrian Army now only protects the regime and the Alawite minority.......and is looting Moarek as we're talking: the BPM's 'Tiger Force' (a 'reinforced-regiment'-sized special forces outfit led by Col Sohail Hassan) has captured this 'southern Gate to Idlib Province' yesterday.

Interestingly: Moarek resisted four months of NDF's and Hezbollah's armoured onslaughts, earlier this year (that's where Hazm has knocked out most of those 200+ MBTs and IFVs using TOWs), while this success was achieved with help of a nocturnal heliborne operation - precisely the way taught by the IRGC-QF.

[Bill Moore]

One of latest statements regarding 'goals' in Syria was something like 'need to respect Iranian interests in upholding the Assad regime'.

Who said this? When? Makes no sense whatsoever? Did Israel and Turkey respond to whoever made that comment?

[CrowBat]

That was Obama, about two weeks ago (sorry, I'm too lazy to search for relevant links, right now).

And no: neither Israel nor Turkey responded to this.

Guess, they were as bamboozled as most of Obama's advisers were... :rolleyes:

[CrowBat]

Must congratulate Obama again.... and withdraw my promise to Bill to continue posting videos of TOW-kills too...

Namely, the last few days, and in the wake of its failed assault on Idlib City, the JAN - reinforced by parts of Jund al-Aqsa, Ahrar ash-Sham and, supposedly, even few Daesh units - has launched an all-out attack on positions of the Syrian Revolutionary Front, Harakat Hazm, and FSyA's 5th Corps (Fursan Haq) in Idlib Province.

The SRF is - or, better said: used to be - one of biggest groups of the FSyA, but Washington was always in clinch with its boss, Ja'amal Ma'arouf. Nevertheless, and together with Hazm and Fursan, it was one of recipients (and most prolific users) of TOW ATGMs.

Why 'used to be'?

Because a combination of withdrawal of units for 're-training and re-armament', severe air strikes by the SyAAF, bribery of specific commanders, and Jihadist assaults on those that refused to defect... have overpowered the SRF and caused its near total collapse in Idlib Province. Reports are still sketchy but it seems that at least two of its battalions have defected to other insurgent- or even Jihadist groups (at least one of SRF's unit should've changed sides to the JAN), a group from Hazm too, and then the SRF HQ in Dayr Sinbol - plus most of other villages that used to be under its control (mostly W and SW from Ma'arat an-Nouman) - was/were overrun by the Jihadists too. The SRF in Idlib thus lost nearly all of its heavy weaponry, including all of MBTs and TOWs in the process. Hazm lost much of equipment too (including additional stocks of TOWs).

... to make matters worse: this happened only days after regime captured Moarek (only to loot whatever was left of that town), put Kfar Zita under a siege, and launched an assault on Kfar Nabudah and Huways, only few kilometres south of Khan Sheykhoun (third largest city/town in Syria held by insurgents).

Considering Obama's practice of ignoring his own mistakes, US president is surely going to be happy to hear that Kfar Nabl - origin of some high-profile yet quite bitter critique of his idiotically short-sighted policy in recent times - is likely to fall under the JAN control now too.

...and Bill is going to be relieved because this means there will be much less internet presence from Syrian Marxists...

...while everybody else can now say, 'I told you so, I told you so, delivering US weapons to Syrian insurgents is equal to handing these out to Jihadists'...

That way everybody can feel happy and nobody must care about core reasons for this catastrophe.

[Bill Moore]

Two points. One, we can work with Marxists. Two, my point isn't to tell anyone I told you so, my point was to avoid unnecessary bloodshed due to our ineptness in doing these things. We give enough support to prolong the conflict, but not to win it. It results in more deaths and suffering, and nothing is accomplished. It will only get worse if Clinton becomes President.

It isn't over until it over, so there is room for hope that things can change. Keep in mind that the US is only one factor in this conflict, and it clearly isn't the decisive one.

[CrowBat]

I was kidding you, Bill; the rest was not meant specifically for you.

And regarding the rest: the fight between the SRF and the JAN was provoked by money, i.e. distribution of money earned from smuggling oil from fields under insurgent and JAN control. The SRF - significant parts of which were withdrawn out of Syria for re-training and re-arming to fight the Daesh - found itself without solution but to start arresting JAN commanders that felt emboldened by minimalized SRF presence.

The JAN - apparently reinforced by parts of Ahrahr ash-Sham and definitely reinforced by all of Jund al-Aqsa - then started bribing some of SRF commanders to defect. This worked in perhaps 2-3 cases, but it didn't in others. Even so, the SRF's position was weak because so many fighters are away, and the JAN finally assaulted.

This simply shouldn't have happened:

a) The idea of withdrawing insurgents for re-training abroad is stupid, stupid, and stupid, and if nobody in the DC ever realized that this would - at least 'temporarily' - weaken insurgent position, and then cause jealousy between other groups, he/she belongs being locked somewhere and the keys thrown away...

b) I simply do not understand how nobody in the USA can understand this: the ####in' MONEY is the core issue in this war. Only well-funded groups can function and fight. Without money, no insurgency can recruit and arm - nor win, especially not against opponents like the regime (funded by Iran), Daesh (funded by whoever only van fund them), and such groups like the JAN (funded the way al-Qaida is funded, obviously in quite effective fashion then otherwise it wouldn't exist for 20+ years). And versa-vice: all sorts of extremists are flourishing there PRECISELY BECAUSE they are all WELL FUNDED. Exactly this is leaving moderates without a choice but to leave, and that's why idiots like Obama then 'can say', 'there're no moderates to find in Syria'.

No US/Saudi supported body in Syria (like the SRF is one) should lack money or have to fight for it. Until this changes, nothing is going to change there. And nothing is going to change, because insurgents will still have to fight the Jihadists and the Daesh, or between each other, instead against the regime.

Lookie here:
- The next FSyA affiliate, Dawn of Freedom Brigades, has given the JAN 72 hours to return captured areas, or it will attack.

- But the JAN can't care less. Instead, there are now reports (http://news.yahoo.com/syrian-al-qaida-forces-amass-near-turkey-crossing-114139384.html) that the JAN is massing in Sarmada, in northern Idlib, near Bab al-Hawa border crossing to Turkey. If they capture that place, they'll cut off all insurgents in northern Syria from links to Turkey.

Such reports in turn might have prompted somebody in the DC to activate his/her second, perhaps even the third brain cell, then somebody there suddenly started thinking logically - at least a little bit:
US Officials Consider Striking Another Militant Group in Syria (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-officials-consider-striking-another-militant-group-in-syria-jabhat-al-nusra/2014/11/03/86a19bac-6382-11e4-9fdc-d43b053ecb4d_story.html):

...U.S. officials are weighing whether to broaden the air campaign in Syria to strike a militant group that is a rival to the Islamic State and that is poised to take over a strategically vital corridor from Turkey.

Extremists from the al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra group were said Monday to be within a few miles of the Bab *al-Hawa crossing in northwestern Syria on the Turkish border, one of only two openings through which the moderate Free Syrian Army receives military and humanitarian supplies provided by the United States and other backers.

Over the weekend, rebels said Jabhat al-Nusra forces swept through towns and villages controlled by the Free Syrian Army in Idlib province, west of Aleppo. Rebel groups associated with the Free Syrian Army were routed from their main strongholds, with scores of fighters fleeing toward Turkey or defecting to join the militants, according to opposition activists.

Apart from one attack by Tomahawk missiles against an *al-Qaeda cell within Jabhat al-Nusra in late September,when the Syrian airstrikes began, U.S. and Arab warplanes have been targeting the Islamic State, a separate group that the administration has made clear is its primary target in Iraq and Syria.
...

Overall, all of this remains too little, too late - and too stupid.

[CrowBat]

Oh, and to add salt to the injury: half the FSyA insurgents that were sent via Turkey to join the YPG and FSyA units already fighting in Kobane - have returned to Turkey.

Reason: the YPG wouldn't let them have anything of ammo dropped by the USAF.

Is stupidity a major condition for everybody in the DC - whether civilian or military - advancing in rank and being appointed to decision-making positions, nowadays?

[CrowBat]

It seems I'll have to answer my question on my own. Namely, it's certainly so that stupidity is one of major prerequisites for becoming a pres: why listen to advisers when one knows everything better...?

Spies Warned White House: Don’t Hit Al Qaeda in Syria (http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/06/spies-warned-white-house-don-t-hit-al-qaeda-in-syria.html)

...“If the U.S. attacks Nusra without attacking Assad, all the average Syrian sees is that the U.S. is enabling, emboldening, and strengthening the Assad regime,” said Christopher Harmer, a former Navy officer and an analyst with the Institute for the Study of War, which monitors developments in Syria. “It’s not that the Syrian people love Nusra; it’s that Nusra has been in the fight against Assad, and the U.S. has looked for every excuse to stay out of the fight against Assad.”
...

This is imposing the question: why paying advisers? How about firing all of them and saving tax-payers plenty of money...?

[davidbfpo]

A short review by the BBC's Jeremy Bowen; note film portions of the report were on BBC News Channel yesterday, behind the lines with the Syrian regime, which is partly cited here:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-30011154?

He ends with:
The war is changing, morphing into an even more grotesque shape, but it shows no signs of ending.

[davidbfpo]

A German authored article for Carnegie, with numerous links and ends with:
Considerations for cooperation with Assad overlook his weakness, to say nothing of the destruction it would bring to the anti-IS alliance. It could easily lead to the collapse of this coalition and would require policy choices that the U.S. in particular is not ready to take. For once, realpolitik appears to be the most solid deterrent against a deal with Assad.
Link:http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/12/02/case-against-alliance-with-assad/hvru

[SWJ Blog]

New US Military Command Established for Iraq and Syria Operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/new-us-military-command-established-for-iraq-and-syria-operations)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/new-us-military-command-established-for-iraq-and-syria-operations) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Two quite different reports. First hat tip to WoTR, a detailed view of a possible Turkish buffer zone in Syria:http://warontherocks.com/2014/12/the-origins-of-turkeys-buffer-zone-in-syria/

Personally I cannot see this happening, as neither the Turks or USA can agree.
http://warontherocks.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/AKP-Buffer-Zone-Map.jpg

[davidbfpo]

With my emphasis:
The US State Department has put out a firm message to the Syrian opposition: you will never defeat the Assad regime. Brett McGurk, a senior official in the effort in Syria and Iraq against the Islamic State, told a Congressional committee (http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/10/state-dept-rebels-are-never-going-to-defeat-assad-militarily/) on Wednesday, “We do not see a situation in which the rebels are able to remove [Assad]. It will have to be a diplomatic process.”
Link:http://eaworldview.com/2014/12/syria-special-us-tells-opposition-will-never-defeat-assad-heres/

The author, Professor Scott Lucas, suspects an unlikely diplomatic dance is underway possibly.

Well I expect the non-ISIS rebels will not be having a happy Xmas if they read this.

[davidbfpo]

On the Oryx blog context and detail for this not so quiet war:http://spioenkop.blogspot.co.uk/2014/12/why-israel-is-bombing-syria-and-is.html

It starts with:
Israeli airstrikes on targets in Syria remain shrouded in secrecy, and are often subject to speculation about what has been hit this time. For instance, the recent raids on Syrian territory, during which just one Popeye air-to-surface missile was intercepted by a Syrian Pantsir-S1 SAM system, saw depots near Damascus being hit by Israeli jets, although the content of these is unknown. The actual locations and targets reported to have been hit do often not correspond with the truth. This post will try to make clear why Israel is bombing Syria and why it is getting away with it.

(Concludes) Essentially, both parties are waging a covert war spanning a large period of time. Syria (as well as Iran for that matter) use Hizbullah and other anti-Israel groups in the Middle East as a proxy to fight the war on their own terms, whereas Israel manages to strike at its enemies without any retaliation.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/inside-syrian-civil-war/

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/syrian-civil-war-60-minutes-bob-simon/

Inside Syria's Civil War was a 60 minutes special that aired last night. Much like the Frontline special on the Syrian conflict, it is quite moving. There are many heroes in this film, but two will stand out. Ordinary people standing up in times of extraordinary challenges. It also explains why more and more rebels are turning to the Islamists. Assad's brutality seems to know no limits, so it is becoming harder to imagine a negotiated settlement with the level of hatred that has emerged. His behavior will likely result in a terrible response against the Alawites and other minorities in Syria.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2874474/Al-Qaeda-linked-jihadists-seize-two-strategic-bases-Syrian-army-two-year-siege-mainstream-rebel-fighters.html

Al Qaeda-linked jihadists seize two strategic bases from Syrian army after two-year siege by mainstream rebel fighters

Symbolic and perhaps significant strategically, time will tell.

[CrowBat]

...ah well, 'strategic' is really relative here.

Ma'arat an-Nauman is 'strategic': it's a historic place at the cross-road of seven different strategic routes, connecting (clockwise) Idlib, Aleppo, Hama (and thus Homs and Damascus) with ports like Lattakia and Banias...

Wadi ad-Dayf and Hamadania bases nearby have lost their relevance at latest in June-July this year, when the last regime offensive to relieve them run out of steam when the glorious 'SAA' thugs captured Moarek - and then got busy looting it.

The 700 or so surviving regime troops that have fled these two bases and are presently trying to punch through jihadists lines to reach Moarek, about 15km south, were mere victims of regime's insistence on 'holding out to the last bullet': Iranians... excuse me: IRGC-QF that is in charge of the 'Syrian military', have long since recommended a withdrawal.

Somebody sane could now go and try to tell the JAN idiots to stop slaughtering dozens of regime troops captured when they were left behind: this is only making the rest more eager to really resist to the last bullet....

*************

What is really 'strategic' here: three years of fighting by disunited insurgents, poorly and rather haphazardly supported by various powers from outside (lately the USA) have not managed what a better-supported JAN has managed now in only three weeks.

Yup gentlemen: just three weeks since the JAN has overrun the US/Saudi-supported SRF and took over all of its bases in the Idlib Province, forcing about 10,000 survivors (including their families) to flee to Turkey, the Jihadists are now on advance in this small pocket of Syria...

For orientation, see the map attached below - and keep in mind that the terrain in direction in which the surviving regime troops are fleeing is largely flat... Only 'cover' is that provided by the Ba'ath Party's... erm.... 'Syrian' and 'Arab' air force...

***********

Talking about 'poorly' or 'better' supported factors here: while insurgents of the IF are getting between 60 and 100 bucks a month, those of US-supported groups used to get 150 bucks a month - until November, when, following the collapse of the SRF, Obama cancelled all the aid provided to them....

In comparison, JAN Jihadists are cashing up to 500 bucks, those of the Daesh often much more...

Makes me wonder about several things: how comes the jihadists can get better paid than state-supported insurgents? Shouldn't somebody there within responsible circles simply get ashamed (especially considering the fact that persons in positions in question are usually very good at pocketing quite a lot of supposed 'aid')? And I have to question logic of certain people too, i.e. ask once again if being dumb in silliest fashion is meanwhile the ultimate qualification for people getting certain jobs in the DC and surrounding areas?

Namely, as explained so often before, simple maths is dictating the way of life in such poor countries like Syria: the side that pays more is more attractive too.

**********

But you know what's really 'strategic'?

A topic you all seem to have completely missed during my absence.

Namely, back in October certain Maj Gen Hossein Hamadani (ex C-in-C Basiji Corps IRGC) was appointed the new C-in-C IRGC-QF, and thus of the entire Syrian military.

And then he launched that offensive of his new military - the Basiji-like 'NDF', spear-headed by the Hezbollah and IRGC-troops - all the way around eastern Aleppo and to the north of the city.

The offensive in question went something like this: Hamedani first spent the Afghan Hazaris of the IRGC's Liwa al-Fatimum to capture Hindarat (town about 15km NE of Aleppo). These were nearly overrun and mauled in a counterattack by the IF and the Hazzm, but meanwhile Hamedani moved two brigades of Hezbollah around their flanks and punched further west. Meanwhile, his fourth brigade, the IRGC's Liwa al-Quds (primarily Palestinians) has turned south and is now approaching the Kurdish-held Sheikh Masqood district of northern Aleppo.

Few 'strategic BTWs' here...

- What's left of FSyA and IF insurgents in eastern Aleppo are about 500 metres short of getting encircled and put under a siege since yesterday. And that just at the start of the winter...

- Curiously, the eastern flank of Hamadani's offensive went all the way along the areas held by the Daesh. Do you think the supposed 'arch-/sworn enemy' of the regime moved a small finger and tried to spoil that offensive but at least some nuance attacks into its flank?

- ...as mentioned above, the JAN has meanwhile liquidated the most powerful moderate (and US-supported) insurgent group in that part of Syria (the SRF), and badly damaged the second most important such group (Harakat Hazzm)... causing up to 1,000 of combatants from these two, plus some other of allied groups to defect to the Daesh...

- ...and then the JAN withdrew its forces out of eastern Aleppo, and began ramming its head against well-entrenched and -supplied Shi'a enclaves of Nubol and az-Zahra (about 35km NW of Aleppo), apparently in hope of achieving some kind of major victory against 'infidels'...

Bottom line: thanks so much Obama, the moderate insurgency in northern Syria is next to destroyed.

The US logic seems to be to drive Syrians into the hands of Jihadists and/or beast of the Daesh - and then bomb them. Fantastic idea, really: I'm sure that all those convinced that 'all Syrians are terrorists, anyway', are feeling more than confirmed now...

...this is so absurd, I cannot imagine that either Assad, or Khamenei could ever dream about Obama doing them such a big favour!

Though, one should keep in mind one thing too: this is not only the end of moderate insurgents in northern Syria, but is really the start of turning that country into a better breading ground for extremists of all sorts than even Afghanistan ever was. And if anybody thinks doing things this way is going to solve the situation in a matter of even 2-3 years, the person in question needs to consult the nearest psychiatrist. At best right now.

[CrowBat]

Silly me, almost forgot the two other 'strategic' affairs in Syria of the last few weeks....

Somebody at WINEP raped a ton of electrons at a futile exercise of 'studying' recent SyAAF ops against the Daesh: Syrian Air Force Operations: Strategic, Effective, and Unrestrained (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syrian-air-force-operations-strategic-effective-and-unrestrained).

By side the fact that this piece is unusually poorly researched (then, SyAAF losses are usually well-documented and rather easy to track - all provided one is doing so; and the number of SyAAF losses is nowhere near '200 combat aircraft' even if one adds the nearly 50% loss of SyAAF helicopters in three years of war...)...

But, who said they are 'unrestrained'? After letting the SyAAF to bomb all of Syria back into stone-age for three years, the mighty EU came to the idea to impose an embargo on export of kerosene to Syria: EU tries to ground Bashar al-Assad's warplanes by banning fuel supplies (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11290437/EU-tries-to-ground-Bashar-al-Assads-warplanes-by-banning-fuel-supplies.html).

Ha! I bet Assad's knees are shaking now! This is going to deliver the message! It's going to kill him... :rolleyes:

**********

Nah, seriously now (at least I'll try, please enjoy the following with a big dose of sarcasm and some Southern Comfort too)...

To say that the Daesh is not attacking the regime, or the regime is not attacking the Daesh, would be unfair. They're so much at odds with each other, I can't say. They have a big dispute there, really.

It's about oil and gas supplies.

Namely, everybody knows, even sparrows on my roof (not to talk about all the crows there) - although there is 'no evidence', of course - that the Daesh is selling Syrian oil to the Syrian regime. But those stinking US-led airplanes bombed Daesh's makeshift refineries into oblivion, back in September and October. So, Daesh was now in trouble: it needed a new source of oil and gas it could sell to the regime.

Solution? Attack the biggest gas field in Syria - the Sha'er - which, by pure accident, of course, was held by the regime. Nobody said the Daesh-beasts know no logic.

So, in late October, they by-passed Dayr az-Zawr and drove all the way 'down' to attack Sha'er and T.4 AB. Almost took the regime by surprise, mauled the famous 'Tiger Force' of Col Sohail (Ba'ath Party Militia's 'special force'), and then became bogged down.

Of course, neither Assad nor Hamadani were happy about this treachery. Soi, they hit the Daesh very hard. The SyAAF was bombing ar-Raqqa and other places wide and far - prompting that poor gent from the WINEP to write his article, although he never got the grasp of the context.

Anyway, the SyAAF air strikes (up to 30 a day), eventually made the Daesh mad, so it launched an offensive on Dayr az-Zawr. A very interesting operation there, with two prongs: one from NE, other from SE. Led by plenty of VBIEDs, this almost overrun the local air base, few days ago. At least the regime wouldn't have a reason to claim it has regained control of Dayr az-Zawr airport (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/12/recent-developments-on-ground-syria-december-2014.html) - if it didn't lose it, first and foremost.

Now, the regime had its SAM-site and much of the 64th Artillery Regiment overrun when the Daesh took that hill NW of the air base, but it still found enough tubes and gunmen around to fire back a better part of that garrison's supply on chemical weapons. These were supported by about 20 Iranian- and Russian-made SSMs (attached bellow is a photo showing wreckage of a 9K79 Tochka (aka SS-21 Scarab)... apparently a variant equipped with 9N123K cluster-bombs warhead...

Result: the Daesh was beaten back with about five dozens of truckloads of dead at that posit alone, plus several hundreds of KIA elsewhere around the place and Dayr az-Zawr AB is now 'safely' in regime hands... 'thanks to heroism' of (Druze) Brig Gen Essam Zahreddine and his '104th Airborne Brigade', of course.

Who said the regime can't have its heroes in this war - even when using CWs...

[CrowBat]

...and the promised photo of the winner of this year's '9K79 Tochka/SS-21 Scarab in Syria' contest...

[CrowBat]

...but wait: the story is still not over. On the contrary: it's getting better and better!

Ever heard of something called 'ash-Shaietat'?

Yup, that's that silly Sunni tribe living all over Syria and Iraq - so often declared for 'Islamist extremists' all over the last 10 or so years, that they are fiercely at odds with al-Qaida and now the Daesh too.

Well, few years ago, somebody within the CENTCOM finally came to his senses and used to cooperate with ash-Shaietat, provide them with arms and help them in their fight against the AQI. (Don't worry: the 'US-friendly' gov in Baghdad would never do anything of that kind nowadays.)

But, since they have been overrun by the Daesh in Dayr az-Zawr area, and had about 700 of their members massacred for launching several uprisings against the beasts, back in August... well, who in the DC would ever come to the idea to provide some help to them? After all, they are 'extremist Islamists' and thus cannot pass the vetting...

And then think about all the uproar and discussions if somebody wold try to get the Congress to grant some US$2-3 billion that would be required for such an operation, and then take the CIA - or whoever else - some 2-3 years to organize and run... :rolleyes:

And thus, instead of leaving them get massacred by the Daesh, the IRGC came to the idea to recruit about 200 of them, re-train them in Palmyra, and send them back to the frontlines in Dayr az-Zawr. As 'NDF Battalion'. Bellow the photo of the first group that arrived at the local air base, courtesy transport aircraft of the 'Syrian Arab Air Force'...

[CrowBat]

Ok... the withdrawal from Wadi ad-Dayf turned into a rout. Sort of....

As can be seen here (https://twitter.com/Conflict_Report/status/544810379583684608), majority of remaining T-55s, T-62s, and BMP-1s run out of fuel and were given up (not even sabotaged; simply abandoned). The JAN, Ahrar & CO captured about 20 of them.

There are plenty of videos of troops ambushed and killed during their attempt to withdraw towards Hama.

Regime-fans report about 1,000 troops that got away (and that's all that was left of the former 11th Armoured Division), with around 100 KIA, plus some 80 rebels KIA... But, it turns out that at least 200 regime troops were captured, and fate of 'few hundred others' remains unknown....

Overall, 'total loss' in terms of equipment, and at least '30% loss' in troops...

The M5 highway between Hama and Aleppo is now definitely blocked. Means, the regime must waste plenty of fuel to haul all the supplies from Homs, via Palmyra, to Aleppo.

[CrowBat]

...ah, and according to official releases, following officers of the 11th Armoured Division are already 'confirmed as KIA':

1. Brig Gen Mou'az Waakad Abu Assaaf (Deputy CO, came from Suweida)
2. Col Wasseem Al (from Maysaf in Hama)
3. Capt Arwa Haatim Taraaf (from Baniyas in Tartous)
4. 1st Lt Mohammad Khalil (from Aleppo)

So far the only 'higher' ranking officer known to have managed it back to Moarek is Col Ahmad Afouf (from Aleppo): he and Lt Rami Issa are WIA.

[SWJ Blog]

Rethinking Our Strategy in Iraq and Syria (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/rethinking-our-strategy-in-iraq-and-syria)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/rethinking-our-strategy-in-iraq-and-syria) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[CrowBat]

...to 'complete' (well, almost) the story about flight of regime troops from Wadi ad-Dayf, here the IDs of some that didn't manage it:
https://twitter.com/archicivilians/status/545609845831766016

**********

...further to my critique of that WINEP-article about Syrian Arab Air Force's supposed 'offensive' against the Daesh, here (http://syriahr.com/en/2014/12/about-3000-air-strikes-by-al-assad-air-forces-in-60-days/) a list of actual targets of most of air strikes:

About 3000 air strikes by al-Assad air forces in 60 days

SOHR documented 2973 air strikes by regime warplanes and helicopters around Syria since 20th of October/2014 until yesterday’s midnight in the 10th of December/2014.

...warplanes went in 1611 air strikes targeted areas in Damascus, Dar’aa Aleppo, Idlib, Reef Dimashq, al-Quneitra, Homs, Hama, Der-Ezzor, Lattakia, al-Hasakah....

...helicopters dropped no less than 1362 explosive barrels on areas in Damascus, Dar’aa Aleppo, Idlib, Reef Dimashq, Homs, Hama, al-Hasakah, Lattakia...


***********

...another issue that rose quite a few eyebrows the last few days was article An influential, unpublished report looks to radically revise notions of how to achieve peace in this war-torn country (http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/18/syria-assad-ceasefires-surrender-nir-rosen-hd-centre-report/)
Written by somebody who is unlikely to have at least even went through the customs at Damascus IAP, this is full of entirely misguided conclusions, like:


Rosen... attempts to partially rehabilitate the image of the Syrian regime. “While the Syrian state was not the most attractive one even before the 2011 uprising, it also was not the worst regime in the region,” he writes. “It has strong systems of education, health care and social welfare and compared to most Arab governments it was socially progressive and secular…. It had a solid infrastructure and a relatively effective civil service.”
Such are making me wonder about what Syria is he talking? The one on Earth or perhaps some on Jupiter....?

'Not the worst' = has detained and/or murdered most of political prisoners in the entire Middle East
'Strong system of education' = that's why everybody who only could was sending kids abroad for education
'Health care' = yup, if one could pay for it
'Social welfare' = in what form? Employing thousands in useless jobs to keep them loyal?
'Socially progressive' = sure, if one is either Alawite or Ba'athist
'Secular' = while even Bashar 'converted' (pro-forma) to Sunni Islam, his followers - and they are those making the 'regime' - consider him a 'God'...
'Solid infrastructure' = guess, Rosen never travelled any of the highways in Syria, or saw all the construction sites that remain unfinished for decades...
'Effective civil service' = if this means 'all the intelligence/security services' responsible for maintaining regime in control of population... then yes, he's finally right.

**********

...Russia continues providing new armament to Syria. Between others such like BM-27 Uragan MLRS, some of which can be seen in action against insurgents in Jobar:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHQiKGGCNwQ

...while the future of Iranian ability to continue providing aid for Assad is anything but certain:
Iran's support for Syria tested by oil price drop (http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/19/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iran-idUSKBN0JX21420141219)

If it had not been for Iranian support we could not have survived the crisis," a senior Syrian trade official said from Damascus, requesting anonymity.

"It was Iranian support that has been the most important. In return, we are promising them more and more, and opening more and more doors for them to invest in Syria," he said.
...

“The 50 percent steep fall in oil prices will break Iran’s back, not just the level of support for Assad,” a prominent member of the Damascus Chamber of Industry said, also requesting anonymity.

Iranians have delivered turbines for power plants and have been promised contracts to rebuild housing, roads and other infrastructure destroyed by the war on the understanding that Tehran would finance them in return for equity shares.
...
Growing power cuts have hit government-controlled areas as more gas fields go out of action, forcing the authorities to rely even more on imports of fuel for its power plants.

Islamic State militant control of some of the border crossings with Iraq has disrupted the flow of tens of thousands of barrels of crude from Iraq that were delivered overland by oil tankers, an oil trader based in the region said.

Four Iranian tankers have discharged cargoes of gasoline products in the last two months in Syria's ports, traders said. But they did not end shortages accentuated by higher demand in the winter season, prompting small protests in Alawite villages near the port of Latakia, the heartland of Assad support.


There are already rumours about some sort of rift between Rouhani and Khamenei, with the former insisting on stopping deliveries of crude and cash to Assadist regime.

**********

On the other hand, a Daesh-operated UAV was shot down by regime forces over Dayr az-Zawr, and an Israeli UAV over Qunaitra:
Unmanned reconnaissance aircraft crashes near Syrian town of Quneitra, Syrian state-run news agency reports (http://www.timesofisrael.com/syria-israeli-drone-downed-near-border/#ixzz3MZUu7Njr)

...
An Israeli drone was 'brought down' near the Golan Heights town of Quneitra, Syrian state TV reported Sunday night.
...
The report described the drone as a Skylark.
...



**********

Not everything is milk and honey for the Daesh any more:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f1705f00-85e6-11e4-a105-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3MOAiWEPe

Morale isn’t falling — it’s hit the ground,” said an opposition activist from Isis-controlled areas of Syria’s eastern Deir Ezzor province. “Local fighters are frustrated — they feel they’re doing most of the work and the dying . . . foreign fighters who thought they were on an adventure are now exhausted.”
...
Analyst Torbjorn Soltvedt, of Verisk Maplecroft, a UK-based risk analysis group, said morale may be taking a hit as militants grapple with the shift from mobile army to governing force.

They feel they are the ones going to die in big numbers on the battlefield but they don’t enjoy any of the foreigners’ benefits- Activist in Deir Ezzor

“Before they were seizing territory, forcing armies in Iraq and Syria to retreat,” he said. “Now they’re basically an occupying force trying to govern.”

After flocking to Syria and Iraq during Isis’s heady days of quick victories, some foreigners may also be questioning the long, gruelling fight ahead.

Mr Solvedt said his organisation has had many reports of foreign fighters, including Britons, contacting family members and state authorities seeking ways to return home.

Isis members in Raqqa said the organisation has created a military police to crack down on fighters who fail to report for duty. According to activists, dozens of fighters’ homes have been raided and many have been arrested. Militants told a local journalist that they must now carry a document identifying them as a fighter and showing whether they are assigned to a mission.

An opposition activist in close contact with Isis fighters in Raqqa showed the Financial Times a document listing new regulations restricting jihadis’ behaviour. The paper, which could not be verified and which did not appear to have been issued in other Isis-held areas, warned that those who did not report to their offices within 48 hours of receiving the regulations would be punished.

“In Raqqa, they have arrested 400 members so far and printed IDs for the others,” the activist said.

The identification document for one fighter from the Gulf consisted of a printed form stating “name, location, section and mission assignment”, with his details filled in by hand.
...
Activists in Isis-held parts of Syria said many fighters in Raqqa were angry about being sent to Kobani, a small Kurdish town near the Syrian border with Turkey that has become a focal point for coalition strikes. The fighters argued that the town was not strategically important enough to justify the losses they were incurring. According to a December 7 report by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based monitoring group with a network of activists across Syria, Isis lost about 1,400 fighters in 80 days of fighting. The US official said many Isis fighters have been killed in the town.

Foreign militants have often been the most active in major battles but opposition activists said as fighting intensifies, more demands are being made on local fighters who do not have deep-rooted loyalties to Isis.

IN that sense: IS said to execute 100 foreign fighters who wanted to quit (http://www.timesofisrael.com/is-executes-100-foreigners-trying-to-quit-report/)

Rumours have it that the CENTCOM is claiming up to 1,000 killed Daesh in Ayn al-Arab/Kobane alone; YPG/PYD is claiming another 1,000, plus the FSyA about 500. That would make this the costliest Daesh battle so far. No wonder there isunrest.

Anyway, the YPG/PYD and FSyA are meanwhile in control of about 75% of that town.

[CrowBat]

More about Assadist struggle to ascertain its own survival with help from Tehran and Moscow:

- From here (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/orig...#ixzz3MUvdAyjK):

The Syrian delegation included mostly government officials in charge of financial and economic issues in Syria. It seemed that the purpose of the visit was mainly to get additional aid from Moscow. However, Syrian officials issued surprising statements afterward denying that Damascus had asked Moscow for any financial loans or a "line of credit."

The same diplomatic source said that this formal speech in Damascus aims to cover up that the demands of the Syrian economic delegation to Moscow included Russian loans, or a so-called line of credit of about $3 billion. However, the Russian side failed to meet this demand. This Syrian denial then arose merely to cover up the Russian rejection. Such a rejection can be justified because Moscow is dealing with other pressing priorities at the moment, including the Ukraine crisis and the global decline in the prices of energy resources; more important, Moscow must clarify some points with Damascus, not only on the level of economic aid and military logistical support, but also on the political level, in terms of the general behavior of the two allies regarding the ongoing events in Syria.
...

- Nevertheless, from here (http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4606252,00.html):


...The report also claimed that Russia and Iran had opened a new credit line to Syria worth 6.4 billion dollars. Tehran has opened a credit line of 4.5 billion dollars and Russia opened a credit line of a billion dollars, in addition to 500 million intended for food and 400 million intended for flour.

With other words: as long as Iran can pay, Russians are happy to continue providing...

[ganulv]

Via https://twitter.com/green_lemonnn/status/547358544115531776.


November 2010

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B5ibsTtCIAA4u0J.png


-------

October 2014

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B5ibscdCMAAnoFK.png

[Bill Moore]

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/12/24/isis-reportedly-shoots-down-jordanian-plane-over-syria-pilot-captured/

ISIS reportedly shoots down Jordanian plane over Syria, pilot captured


Islamic State group fighters shot down a Jordanian warplane on Wednesday over Syria and captured its pilot, activists and the country’s military said.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said the aircraft was shot down near the northern city of Raqqa, the Islamic State group's de facto capital.



Jordan’s state news agency, Petra, confirmed that the pilot was from Jordan and he has been captured, the BBC reports.

[CrowBat]

The CENTCOM and the Jordanian MoD have meanwhile denied a 'shot-down'. Without revealing any kind of details, they're talking about some sort of 'clear evidence' that the plane came down for other reasons.

Whatever was the case, the F-16AM (ex-Dutch, apparently) came down in a lake 11km east of ar-Raqqa. Lieutenant Muaaz Yusuf el-Kasasbah, its pilot, ejected safely and is now.... a 'hostage' (or 'POW'?) of the Daesh.

Few things are notable here:
- Generally, Coalition aircraft are flying high enough to avoid most of Daesh air defences; but sometimes they do get low to strafe. Whichever is the case, and despite some reports about the Daesh getting MANPADs from stocks captured from the Syrian military, or even from sources in Eastern Europe (see here (http://www.cbc.ca/news/isis-s-armaments-in-question-after-jordanian-plane-shot-down-1.2883537) for details), presently there is no evidence that any of these have been used.

- The RJAF is 'just another' of so many local air forces that de-facto represent USAF-clones: they were trained and are flying the same way, have the same procedures, tactics etc. The only difference between them and the USAF is that they are clocking more hours (they're not grounded for months because of political struggle over budgets though, contrary to the USAF).

- That said, it is notable that the plane in question is probably the oldest type in action against the Daesh: these F-16AMs were manufactured (primarily by Fokker) in the early 1980s. It is also notable that the F-16 has a history of engine-related crashes too...

One thing is interesting, though: the unit that captured the pilot seems better organized than most of the other Daesh units shown so far.

Overall, I'm sorry for the pilot, but somehow....can't put this into proper words (and certainly not into anything like 'politically correct expressions')... I'm not as concerned for his fate as if he would've been from some other state. Jordan is run by experts in turn-coating: the gov there is officially 'strongly against' the Daesh and the RJAF flying strikes against them, but at the same time they are tolerating 'Sunni revolutionaries', although these are openly collaborating with the Daesh. With other hands: the gov is likely to have its links to the beasts, and the pilot to get bought out in one way or the other.

************

Harrowing Journeys With Free Syrian Army’s Farmers and Fathers (http://www.vocativ.com/world/syria-world/meet-accidental-warriors-free-syrian-army/)

Abandoned mansions and Al Qaeda amusement parks were among the things Lindsey Snell saw in the fall of 2014, as she and her team spent time with factions of the Free Syrian Army and civilians in and around Aleppo. They chronicle life in rebel-held territories three years into the brutal civil war. The mansions left behind by the rich who fled Syria are now military bases. Abandoned amusement parks are war trophies. Some schools are open, but they’re frequently hit in bombing attacks by the Assad regime, often when students are inside. “The regime is clearly targeting schools. It’s in [Assad’s] benefit to keep the future generation illiterate,” a teacher tells us. Some displaced civilians have spent years in camps that routinely flood. In spite of the hardships, the Syrian people push on.
...

[davidbfpo]

The title comes from an article in The Guardian. We have steadily grown used to the role of foreign jihadis in the Syrian civil war; this time it is the reaction of Syrians - outside state controlled areas - who get quoted:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/25/foreign-jihadis-syrian-civil-war-assad?CMP=share_btn_tw

[davidbfpo]

A WaPo article on a vexed issue here, Syrian regime manpower and the title does suggest the content:
Desperate for soldiers, Assad’s government imposes harsh recruitment measures
Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/desperate-for-soldiers-assads-government-imposes-harsh-recruitment-measures/2014/12/28/62f99194-6d1d-4bd6-a862-b3ab46c6b33b_story.html

[davidbfpo]

Not by me, rather Professor Joshua Landis, a US academic and IIRC sometimes criticised here:http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/year-end-predictions-analysis-joshua-landis-28-december-2014/?

He opens with:
Syria will become increasingly fragmented in 2015. The Somalia-ization of the country is inevitable so long as the international community degrades all centers of power in Syria and the opposition fails to unite.

I found it coherent and sadly realistic.

[davidbfpo]

This thread has run since August 2012, with 81.8k views and 834 posts. It is appropriate now as 2015 looms (in the UK) that it be closed and a new thread started.

The new thread, refelcting my previous post, is called 'Syria: the next Somalia?'.