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Jedburgh
12-24-2006, 05:29 PM
Steven Metz, SSI, 22 Dec 06: Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB752.pdf)

...Where does Iraq go from here? At this point, the best feasible outcome is, as Ambassador Dennis Ross describes it, "a central government with limited powers; provincial governments with extensive autonomy; sharing of oil revenue; and, at the local level, some rough form of representation and tolerance for minorities". Equally likely is sustained mayhem which eventually leads the government to settle with the insurgents, potentially giving them control of all or part of the Sunni triangle or at least some degree of political influence. It is possible, though, that the insurgents may provoke the government into a draconian response which might, in turn, lead to intervention by other predominantly Sunni Arab states, thus turning Iraq’s civil war into an international one. Either may result in a weak central government, dominated by corruption, with criminal gangs and sectarian militias wielding great influence, or a new authoritarian strong man. Sustaining a multiethnic and multisectarian democracy in the face of mounting sectarian war may be impossible. Outside forces, as Fareed Zakaria notes, can do little to stop a full-blown civil war until its energy is expended. Division of the country into three parts may be inevitable with continued conflict in areas of sectarian overlap, particularly Baghdad and Mosul.

But whether Iraq ultimately turns into a success or failure, it is invaluable as illumination for American strategy. If it is a unique occurrence, then once it is settled, the U.S. military can return to its old, conventionally-focused trajectory of transformation. But if Iraq is a portent of the future, if protracted, ambiguous, irregular conflicts that are cross-cultural, and psychologically complex are to be the primary mission of the future American military (and the other, equally important parts of the U.S. security organization), then serious change must begin.

Rob Thornton
12-26-2006, 02:59 PM
I don't have time to read the whole 153 pg. doc, but this one sticks out right off the bat:
Division of the country into three parts may be inevitable with continued conflict in areas of sectarian overlap, particularly Baghdad and Mosul. I've got plenty of friends and plenty of feed from the folks in Baghdad, and to make a connection between the two would seem to make the author's analysis dated (probably to 2004). I could spend allot of time telling you what the enemy is here, and what he is not- suffice to say, it is not sectarian violence of the scale you see down South. First, there are just not many Shiite here - there are however some sectarian killings - it almost reads like an exported hit. ref. ethnic viloence between Arabs and Kurds, - mostly IO and some attacks on KDP HQs, but not too much - lots of ineffective IO from the Baathists though trying to scare Arabs - however most Kurds here are in fact Sunni.

Most of the violence here is IEDs on the MSRs aimed at CF elements. Some mortars, some SAF, even some PSAF - but no where near the scale down South

Part of the reason - pretty good ISF (with IA being the stronger of the two, but IP coming along OK). Our former CF partner unit 5-20 IN from 3/2 SBCT went down to Taji in NOV. I just got an email from the CDR of B/5-20 today. He says the ISF there are very weak compared to this IA BDE. He says the brief he got when he arrived there was the IA unit there was rated TRA 1 (Training Readiness Assessment - 1 being the strongest number of 1-5). Our BN here is rated a 2 (the criteria to reach 1 requires being able to sustain certain things which requires resources we just don't see all the time - but in all other areas they are doing very well). My buddy says our TRA 2 BN is hands donw better then the TRA 1 unit he's working with in Taji.

I try and get stuff out to the Force on a regular basis about how stuff is working. I maintain a Advisor's LOG on CompanyCommand.mil - but many of you won't be able to access because you must be acitve duty. I just had an article called "An Irregular Shade of Blue" published in Armor, another coming up that Tom Odom really improved on for me about MiTT Relationships called "Avoiding the One Hand Clapping Effect", and another on Mosul COIN (many thanks to Marc for some awesome feedback) that Infantry is picking up for JAN/FEB (attached). None of these are perfect, none is meant to be the answer to all the Advising the ISF woes since everywhere is different, but all are meant to stimulate thought.

Tactically I think we are winning here in Mosul; strategically in Iraq I honestly don't know. Mosul however has a historical notion of going its own way. Through Khanates, Caliphates, Macedonians, etc., Mosul has been what Mosul has always been, a contact point with a cosmopolitan feel, I suspect it will retain that at its heart no matter who claims to be its master.

marct
12-26-2006, 05:05 PM
Hi Rob,

I just finished reading the Mosul COIN piece: nicely done! I think it is a good article with some really good points.

After we chatted about it, I set part of my mind playing around with the idea of "perception" as a "battlespace" (yeah, I'm still working out the concepts for a theory of symbolic warfare). One of the things that came up as I was reading your article was about the construction of perceptions amongst Coalition Forces by the insurgents.

We (humans) have a tendency to use stereotypes (probably part of our evolutionary heritage). Still and all, the insurgents know Western stereotypes better than we (Westerners) know their stereotypes. Certainly embedding "trainers" in ISF and IP units is useful, but mightn't it also be a good idea to reverse this and embed Iraqi "trainers" in Coalition forces? Just a thought, but I would be very interested to see what you think of it.

Marc

Rob Thornton
12-26-2006, 05:51 PM
Marc,
Great point. We've had great success with embedding Koreans (KATUSAs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KATUSA)) in US Army units. I've heard a few folks mention that we should consider an Iraqi Katusa program, but I'm not sure its gained any traction yet. We're also working hard on getting Iraqi officers to US and allied service schools - the latter is as much about cultural exchanges and strengthening long term security tes as sharing doctrine.
I'm really interested in what ou come up with ref. symbollic warfare - I think we can put it to use. I also sent you an RFI ref. Networks/Linkages via email.
Thanks, Rob

marct
12-26-2006, 06:08 PM
Marc,
Great point. We've had great success with embedding Koreans (KATUSAs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KATUSA)) in US Army units. I've heard a few folks mention that we should consider an Iraqi Katusa program, but I'm not sure its gained any traction yet. We're also working hard on getting Iraqi officers to US and allied service schools - the latter is as much about cultural exchanges and strengthening long term security tes as sharing doctrine.
I'm really interested in what ou come up with ref. symbollic warfare - I think we can put it to use. I also sent you an RFI ref. Networks/Linkages via email.
Thanks, Rob

Hi Rob,

Personally, I think it would probably be a good idea - reinforcing the message that the Iraqis have a lot to offer in the fight and a lot to teach everyone.

The symbolic warfare idea is stil in the think about - talk about stage <sigh>. I haven't got it to the point where I can actually write something coherent yet, but I think I have about 80-90% of the pieces. I'm thinking about trying to write up a case study as a first try at it - I'll send you a copy of the draft if that's okay with you.

On the RFI - it hasn't hit my email box yet, but I'll follow up asap. I hope you had a great (quite) Christmas :).

Marc

Shek
12-31-2006, 12:59 AM
Marc,
Great point. We've had great success with embedding Koreans (KATUSAs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KATUSA)) in US Army units. I've heard a few folks mention that we should consider an Iraqi Katusa program, but I'm not sure its gained any traction yet. We're also working hard on getting Iraqi officers to US and allied service schools - the latter is as much about cultural exchanges and strengthening long term security tes as sharing doctrine.
I'm really interested in what ou come up with ref. symbollic warfare - I think we can put it to use. I also sent you an RFI ref. Networks/Linkages via email.
Thanks, Rob

Rob,

I just finished reading "A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam" by Neil Sheehan, and he specifically brings up how there were suggestions to MACV early on under Westmoreland to adopt a KATUSA like program; however, there was no interest and the concept was never developed or implemented. What kind of benefits do you think would be dervied specifically from this type of program in Iraq?

Rob Thornton
12-31-2006, 09:52 AM
Shek,
I think its a long term benefit. Its one where embedded soldiers from the host nation would really see how we interact with each other. Example - trying to explain the role of our NCOs at different levels is difficult if your culture (or military cultrure) does not provide for it. Its our NCOs who uphold the standards, its our NCOs who perpetuate success, its our NCOs that allow us to decentralize and continue mission based off of intent. The same is true with the officers.
Here is a story about base defense of our little chunk of terrrain 5 or 6 months ago. The perimeter security positions were adequate, fields of fire not perfect, but my efforts to get new towers and ENG here work have mostly gone unanswered (side note/rant - talk about being on the outside looking in - MAREZ looks like the place was dipped in concrete and I can't even get a few towers out here and some T-Walls in 10 months? I've gotten a little of what I asked for, but I've had to wait on the AIF to fire a 2 stage RPG through a wall into one of my guy's room - OK enough rant :D )
Anyway in the back was a position that covered the 6, the position was well located, but could have been improved. Overwatching that position were several others that could have provided interlocking fields of fire. One day a RPG team supported by a PKC pulls up maybe a 100 meters short of the position; the PKC Gunner gets out quickly, fires a burst at the position, and the the 2 man RPG team gets out and and fires 3 rockets into our patch.
Well we decided to walk the ground with the BN CoC and AAR why it happened. I started by pulling up on a piece of high ground where we could look at the position from the reverse through binos without being seen by the two soldiers manning it. Both were lounging out there, helmet off, cell phone on, not paying any attention to pulling security. The BN CoC was furious; but I said hold onto your anger, because we need to walk down there and incidentally, this is less of a soldier failure and more of a leadership failure - you may find you need to look in the mirror after we finish.
So off we go to the position. As we get near, the helmets go on, the soldiers go into the bunker and they wait. We climb up and say hello. I'd asked the BN CoC to let me ask a few questions first. So, I says "when was the last time a leader came to check on you?" "Never" was the reply. "When was the last time somebody asked you what you were supposed to be doing here?" I asked. "Never." was the reply. I had to explaing to the CoC that being a leader implies taking on certain responsibilities - somewhere there should be a NCO who posted these guys, checked on them, ensured they were supplied, corrected them, etc. Somewhere there should be an officer who occassionally spot checked these positions, ensured they were tied in, understood how it tied into the defense, etc. It would be even better if a SNCO accompanied that officer, so the SNCO could mentor the officer. Somewhere there should have been some BN C2 that held the CO CDR tasked with the Defense of our patch accountable.
While it resonated with a few, most did not get it at the time. There just was not any relatvity, nothing for them to even remotely associate it with. The things I'd learned in my time coming up did not fit. FOrtunately we worked through it, and through a combination of static postions, and patrols AIF rarely screws with us here anymore (i'm still pissed about the lack of Force Pro here vs. the concrete ice cream cone at MAREZ:mad: , but Que Sera Sera)
While embedding MiTTs to BNs, BDEs and DIVs is good and works the big things, I think a KATUSA style approach would compliment it very well. It would also benefit our units out there with a SME on changes in "atmospherics" :eek: - "SGT Ibrahim, does this feel right to you?" "No LT, this feels like an ambush." While combied patrolling is useful also and provides modeling for ISF, it has its limitations. Somthings just take time and constant exposure to understand tacitly. Other lessons often get overlooked because they require reptition to resonate. It should not be looked at as the end all answer, but as another facet or tool in building an organization. They wil probably teach us as much as we teach them (this is true in my case), and they may reject some of what we do because it does not or cannot work for them.

Steve Blair
12-31-2006, 04:32 PM
Such a program wasn't considered in Vietnam for political reasons. Sheehan misses the boat here to a degree, as it was kicked around before Vann even came in-country. The main bone of contention, if memory serves, was Vietnamese sensibilities and not wanting it to look like a repeat of the French colonial army to their eyes (French officers and SVN enlisted personnel). That may not be a valid concern in hindsight, but it was considered a very real possibility at the time.

There were other reasons as well, some of which centered around a lack of respect for SVN forces in general. But it was the political consideration that was trotted out as the main reason NOT to follow this sort of program.

Shek
01-01-2007, 08:47 PM
Such a program wasn't considered in Vietnam for political reasons. Sheehan misses the boat here to a degree, as it was kicked around before Vann even came in-country. The main bone of contention, if memory serves, was Vietnamese sensibilities and not wanting it to look like a repeat of the French colonial army to their eyes (French officers and SVN enlisted personnel). That may not be a valid concern in hindsight, but it was considered a very real possibility at the time.

There were other reasons as well, some of which centered around a lack of respect for SVN forces in general. But it was the political consideration that was trotted out as the main reason NOT to follow this sort of program.

Steve,
Thanks. I just at the beginning of my journey of reading into Vietnam and starting to kick around all the different theses out there on where things went wrong. It's interesting to think that the idea was rejected for political (neo-colonial) reasons, when it appears that the politicians we supported were those who existed in prominence as a result of French colonialism.

jcustis
01-02-2007, 04:05 AM
Certainly embedding "trainers" in ISF and IP units is useful, but mightn't it also be a good idea to reverse this and embed Iraqi "trainers" in Coalition forces? Just a thought, but I would be very interested to see what you think of it.

I concur whole-heartedly. However, one of the pitfalls of having a ####-hot contract linguist is that the small unit commander has to beware his personal agenda and the baggage that he brings in with each translation. I presume we would have similar problems with an embedded IA/IP member. It goes back to the nagging problem of vetting. We simply do not have the cultural familiarity or corporate knowledge to do it effectively for every unit.

Rob Thornton
01-02-2007, 04:23 AM
We could mitigate quite a bit though by using the TTs as the first line of QA/QC. Lets say an IA BDE gets X number of slots (I think we better think of them like school slots vs. taskings) - the BDE passes those slots down to the BN with the requirments. The BN submit the list through the BN MiTT and the MiTT does the weeding out. The TTs are positioned to ask the right questions of not only the soldier - but also his leadership, and to hold the leadership responsible for sending a suitable NCO or officer. The unit then does its own interview, and gives the guy a trial basis. If it doesn't work the guy returns to his unit.

I think its important a unit is not forced to take on a guy as a tasker. It has to work both ways in order for it to accomplish the intent. If the members of the unit and IA don't see mutual advantages, then it won't achieve the purpose. An important point.

marct
01-02-2007, 11:45 AM
Hi Folks,


I concur whole-heartedly. However, one of the pitfalls of having a ####-hot contract linguist is that the small unit commander has to beware his personal agenda and the baggage that he brings in with each translation. I presume we would have similar problems with an embedded IA/IP member. It goes back to the nagging problem of vetting. We simply do not have the cultural familiarity or corporate knowledge to do it effectively for every unit.


We could mitigate quite a bit though by using the TTs as the first line of QA/QC.....
I think its important a unit is not forced to take on a guy as a tasker. It has to work both ways in order for it to accomplish the intent. If the members of the unit and IA don't see mutual advantages, then it won't achieve the purpose. An important point.

I have a feeling that the personal agenda issue is going to happen regardless of any vetting <wry grin>. Rob's scenario sounds workable to me, although I couldn't claim to be an expert in the specific area.

But let me return for a second to the question I had originally posed: what about embedding Iraqi trainers? The reason in most organizations for putting in a trainer is to transfer specific skills from a person to a group. What sort of skills might be transfered from an IA/IP trainer to a CF unit? I was originally thinking that it might be basic cultural perception skills - the "atmospherics" Rob mentioned in a previous post, but also some other basic cultural knowledge.

It strikes me that it would be both interesting and useful to sit down and see what "they" can teach "us".

Marc

Steve Blair
01-02-2007, 03:00 PM
Marc,

This goes back in many aspects to the way scouts were (or were not) used by the Frontier Army. The better commanders used their scouts (both Anglo and Native) as embedded trainers of a sort; drawing on their knowledge of the area and local populations to succeed in their missions. The bad ones did not. We have seen repeats of this sort of disconnect ever since then (and most likely did before this time frame as well...it just happens to be one that I am most familiar with).

Perhaps it's cultural (and not limited to the US), but there has always been a very high level of tension when this kind of concept comes forward. To bring Vietnam back into the picture, some of the more successful irregular units (read Special Forces, SOG, and some of the other high-speed, low sunlight projects) made use of native troops in a similar role, although it wasn't expressly spelled out as such. But at the same time you saw units (and not just line units) that ignored advice and input from their local attachments and did not do well.

marct
01-02-2007, 03:07 PM
Hi Steve,

We did the same thing here - again with mixed results <sigh>. It may be cultural, but I suspect a large part of it is human nature - "we" have noything to learn from "them", although we can teach them a thing or two <wry grin>.

Part of the reason I raised the entire question goes back to the entire coalition idea. In many ways, any "government" set up by a western coalition will be, de facto, part of that coalition. And, if they are, then they should have an investment in training coalition troops, at least in the specifics of their operational area. Maybe we should count it as part of officer training <evil grin>.

Marc

jcustis
01-02-2007, 04:38 PM
...if they are, then they should have an investment in training coalition troops, at least in the specifics of their operational area.

One of the significant past issues was the fact that the IA were rarely deployed close to their homes. Outside of the language, and being able to sniff out foreigners, the ISF I've dealt with couldn't bring much to bear in the way of "training" a coalition unit.

One realm they were good in was reminiscing about what training was like under the old ways, and I've always argued that some of these old hands need to be in the U.S., helping us get our MiTTs squared away in the business of training an Iraqi force, not trying to create copies the coalition units (at least no yet).

Steve Blair
01-02-2007, 05:58 PM
One of the significant past issues was the fact that the IA were rarely deployed close to their homes. Outside of the language, and being able to sniff out foreigners, the ISF I've dealt with couldn't bring much to bear in the way of "training" a coalition unit.

One realm they were good in was reminiscing about what training was like under the old ways, and I've always argued that some of these old hands need to be in the U.S., helping us get our MiTTs squared away in the business of training an Iraqi force, not trying to create copies the coalition units (at least no yet).

These are some of the same mistakes we made in Vietnam. We tried to make the ARVN a "little U.S. Army," which wasn't necessary for the situation, and the misuse of CIDG units as light infantry reaction forces is almost criminal in retrospect.

But that language and "foreigner detection" skill could be VERY useful. Again, we're looking almost a KCS program sort of thing. Those ralliers were more or less made organic to the US units they operated with, and for the most part they were successful (some more than others, but that's the nature of the beast). Using Iraqi personnel in this role could also create a certain level of internal unit continuity. By that I mean the "scout" could be passed on to a unit's replacement, bringing area knowledge that might not make it into the PowerPoint turnover slides. It could also be expanded from a single scout to a squad or platoon, perhaps. Just casting out ideas here, but there's clearly something of value in the idea. It's just a shame that the organization seems hell-bent on repeating earlier errors "just to make sure" before moving on.

I also don't consider such a scout program unique to Iraq in any way. This is a capability we will need in the future, at least in the basics.

jcustis
01-02-2007, 06:48 PM
Except in rare cases, mass is required to field any worthwhile numbers (after the guys on leave, sick, lame , and lazy cull the on hand strength.)

I don't think a scout program would work because they would never be around, at least not until we get a Western Union system up and running.

JKM4767
01-04-2007, 09:54 PM
I don't have time to read the whole 153 pg. doc, but this one sticks out right off the bat: I've got plenty of friends and plenty of feed from the folks in Baghdad, and to make a connection between the two would seem to make the author's analysis dated (probably to 2004). I could spend allot of time telling you what the enemy is here, and what he is not- suffice to say, it is not sectarian violence of the scale you see down South. First, there are just not many Shiite here - there are however some sectarian killings - it almost reads like an exported hit. ref. ethnic viloence between Arabs and Kurds, - mostly IO and some attacks on KDP HQs, but not too much - lots of ineffective IO from the Baathists though trying to scare Arabs - however most Kurds here are in fact Sunni.

Most of the violence here is IEDs on the MSRs aimed at CF elements. Some mortars, some SAF, even some PSAF - but no where near the scale down South

Part of the reason - pretty good ISF (with IA being the stronger of the two, but IP coming along OK). Our former CF partner unit 5-20 IN from 3/2 SBCT went down to Taji in NOV. I just got an email from the CDR of B/5-20 today. He says the ISF there are very weak compared to this IA BDE. He says the brief he got when he arrived there was the IA unit there was rated TRA 1 (Training Readiness Assessment - 1 being the strongest number of 1-5). Our BN here is rated a 2 (the criteria to reach 1 requires being able to sustain certain things which requires resources we just don't see all the time - but in all other areas they are doing very well). My buddy says our TRA 2 BN is hands donw better then the TRA 1 unit he's working with in Taji.

I try and get stuff out to the Force on a regular basis about how stuff is working. I maintain a Advisor's LOG on CompanyCommand.mil - but many of you won't be able to access because you must be acitve duty. I just had an article called "An Irregular Shade of Blue" published in Armor, another coming up that Tom Odom really improved on for me about MiTT Relationships called "Avoiding the One Hand Clapping Effect", and another on Mosul COIN (many thanks to Marc for some awesome feedback) that Infantry is picking up for JAN/FEB (attached). None of these are perfect, none is meant to be the answer to all the Advising the ISF woes since everywhere is different, but all are meant to stimulate thought.

Tactically I think we are winning here in Mosul; strategically in Iraq I honestly don't know. Mosul however has a historical notion of going its own way. Through Khanates, Caliphates, Macedonians, etc., Mosul has been what Mosul has always been, a contact point with a cosmopolitan feel, I suspect it will retain that at its heart no matter who claims to be its master.
I certainly agree that Mosul doesn't always follow the trends of the rest of the country. I left Mosul in Jan '04, during the infancy of the insurgency that would soon devastate the area. I attribute a lot of the problems to tactical failures on the part of the TF that replaced the 101st. Mosul in the spring and summer of '04 is a perfect example of what large FOBs do to a battlespace. I have also recently learned of the successes of ISF in the city and compared to what Mosul used to look like, I think CF have done a commendable job in the last year. After a year on a MiTT, I can understand the labors of getting Iraqis to 1. get along and 2. take ownership of their mission and AO.

JKM4767
01-04-2007, 10:03 PM
One of the significant past issues was the fact that the IA were rarely deployed close to their homes. Outside of the language, and being able to sniff out foreigners, the ISF I've dealt with couldn't bring much to bear in the way of "training" a coalition unit.

One realm they were good in was reminiscing about what training was like under the old ways, and I've always argued that some of these old hands need to be in the U.S., helping us get our MiTTs squared away in the business of training an Iraqi force, not trying to create copies the coalition units (at least no yet).
On the contrary, the IA BN I advised had about 90&#37; of its' soldiers from that area, which was phenomenally helpful to us during joint ops and clearing up the intel picture. I do agree that there are indeed Iraqi Officers and NCOs who could greatly help US MiTTs prepare for deployment. I also believe those same individuals exist that could actually "advise" CF elements in theatre. Although finding enough these individuals would be a challenge; not to mention pulling all the good leaders from their IA units would be disasterous; as in many cases, it's literally one or two leaders keeping the unit together.

jcustis
01-04-2007, 10:20 PM
On the contrary, the IA BN I advised had about 90% of its' soldiers from that area, which was phenomenally helpful to us during joint ops and clearing up the intel picture.

Was it in the Shi'a south, or north of Tikrit?

RTK
01-04-2007, 11:39 PM
IA proximity to their places of dwelling is a crapshoot. The BDE I had in Ninevah Province had most of the leaders from the Kurdish North and most of the jundis from the Shia south. Hardly any of them were from Ninevah, which worked both ways, good and bad.

Rob Thornton
01-05-2007, 06:18 AM
Although finding enough these individuals would be a challenge; not to mention pulling all the good leaders from their IA units would be disasterous; as in many cases, it's literally one or two leaders keeping the unit together.

When we first got here, we did not find many leaders in the BN. The BN CDR's understanding of running a BN was taking his rather large PSD out and kicking in doors. He was was an interesting sort of fellow - old regime IP type and a Zebari Kurd (not everyone understands that there were quite a few Kurds on the Saddam payroll). About 4 months into our tour the powers that be changed him out and put him in a position more suited to his talents - LNO with the IP - believe it or not - a good match. They brought in a new guy and he brought in several FGs with him.

The focus changed in the BN. This new CDR started developing his companies, and the staff. He and his FGs actively sought advice, and he has made some stand up decisions that could have significantly lined hs pockets, but instead improved the security situation and showed CF what is possible with an IA unit.

There are now quite a few leaders in the BN, so much so that its no longer a "Jenga" sort of eqaution. I talk to other TT types and they see similiar progress up here in Ninewa, but I don't think it goes below the 35th parallel - it starts to get muddy down there. I think a person's expectations about progress are an important part of the equation. If a person thinks they are going to going to radically improve a unit in 12 months, they may be setting themselves up for disappointment. It can happen, but you'll be more effective aiming for small dents in the problem that add up collectively vs. looking for the grail. BCTs and such tend to measure their success in what they accomplish in 12 months - that is just what we are geared to. I'd recommend a longer outlook, one that begins with understanding where the start points and end points are.

It may be similiar though (or it may be very different) in the very far South (say below the 32nd) -I just don't know anybody down there, nor do I hear much about it - this is also a big problem in that sharing what works and hearing about what doesn't is lethargic at best.

I would not expect too many things to be the same if I rotate back in a year -there seems to be too much politically (both in Baghdad & Washington) that could dramatically alter the equation.

I tell friends and family what I see here. Its my little patch. Everybody's frame of ref. is a little different either in time or geography.

JKM4767
01-05-2007, 02:07 PM
Actually, directly east of Tikrit, sitting just west of the notional "green line". The BN was a unique mix of Sunni Arab, Shia Turkoman and Kurds.

Shek
01-07-2007, 02:10 AM
I certainly agree that Mosul doesn't always follow the trends of the rest of the country. I left Mosul in Jan '04, during the infancy of the insurgency that would soon devastate the area. I attribute a lot of the problems to tactical failures on the part of the TF that replaced the 101st. Mosul in the spring and summer of '04 is a perfect example of what large FOBs do to a battlespace. I have also recently learned of the successes of ISF in the city and compared to what Mosul used to look like, I think CF have done a commendable job in the last year. After a year on a MiTT, I can understand the labors of getting Iraqis to 1. get along and 2. take ownership of their mission and AO.

JKM,
FYI - we were forced to consolidate into large FOBs. We fought to maintain many of the company FOBs that were used by you guys open only to be told no at the GO level. I was asked by a few of the Iraqis that "hosted" platoon FOBs if we could keep them open, but the same as above applied. Baghdad was pushing towards reducing the footprint.
Shek