Diplomatic security after terrorists kill US Ambassador in Benghazi, Libya [Archive]

Peter Dow

09-24-2012, 04:41 PM

CBS News video: WH declares consulate assault "a terrorist attack" (http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7422440n)

CBS News webpage: Military-style tactics seen in US Consulate siege (http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501704_162-57518271/military-style-tactics-seen-in-us-consulate-siege/)

According to this report -

Arutz Sheva, IsraelNationalNews.com 9/16/2012,

Col. Hunt: Libya Embassy Guards had No Bullets (http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/160040#.UFzpxLJlQld)
"The State Department just allowed our guys to get killed," says Fox News military analyst Col. David Hunt.

Colonel Hunt said Thursday that the American mission at Benghazi "was like a cardboard building, there wasn't even bullet proof glass." In addition, Hunt said the security guards inside the mission were private security guards who were not allowed to have bullets n their guns.

"What’s happened in Libya is the final straw of political correctness," he told Breitbart. "We allowed a contractor to hire local nationals as security guards, but said they can't have bullets. This was all part of the point of not having a high profile in Libya."

"The policy of the Obama administration led to this," he said. "It was the policy of the Obama administration to have a low profile in Libya. That's why the rules of engagement were approved by the Secretary of State to have no Marines at Benghazi, and to have an American contractor hire Libyan nationals to provide security there. The rules were they couldn't have ammunition."

"Obama may not have known the details of the State Department Rules of Engagement for Libya, but his Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor would have. The Secretary of State absolutely would have."

"The Department of State Security are the people in charge of diplomatic security. They enforce the rules of engagement, which are set at Clinton’s level at State. The Department of Defense was told we’re not going to have Marines at Benghazi. Whether it goes higher than the Secretary of State to the President, I don't know."

- shockingly, the Benghazi consulate on the night of the attack had -

No Marine Security Guards.

No bullets for the guns carried by the hired Libyan "security"

No fortifications.

This incident confirms my concerns that diplomatic missions in "war-on-terror" countries are not being properly secured by being located in a properly secured and defended military bases.

This reminds me of the storming of a UN base in Mazar-e-Sharif when 7 UN workers were killed in April 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12944851). The guy responsible at the time for UN security - Gregory B. Starr, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, is an American who used to be employed as the person responsible for the security of US diplomatic bases.

My view is that it's not fair on diplomats to leave them vulnerable in peace-time-designed embassies and consulates when there's war on in countries which are host, however unwillingly, to armed enemy forces and it's not fair to expect them to put their lives in the hands of career State Department officials who are incompetent about security or unable and unwilling to take action to remove their juniors who are incompetent.

I have further concerns that the US & NATO countries' military these days lack the military knowledge and competence even to able to secure our military bases. Bases can't be properly secured in or near an urban area. You need a security zone of cleared and controlled ground of at least 6 miles, but 10 miles is better, around a military base to keep enemy fire from rockets and mortars out of range.

If you don't control the ground around a base this happens - 3 were killed at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Attacks: Insurgents Attack Bagram Air Base (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/11/afghanistan-attacks_n_1874017.html)

KABUL, Afghanistan -- Afghan insurgents bombarded a U.S. base and destroyed a NATO helicopter, killing three Afghan intelligence employees, officials said Tuesday. There were also NATO personnel aboard and wounded, the coalition said without providing further details.

We've been at war in Afghanistan for nearly 11 years now and still the US and NATO military are operating out of insecure bases! Our supply routes in Afghanistan have never been secured and recently a decision by NATO-ISAF (commanded by a US general) was taken to close bases along the main highways in Afghanistan making the roads even more insecure.

The military and security leaders we are depending on to keep our personnel safe during this war on terror are incompetent and our diplomats would be well advised to have no faith in them. If I was a diplomat in a country with security problems I would quit and come home until we get proper military and security people in charge.

So there is a pattern here of incompetence at the very highest levels of leadership in the United States, NATO and the United Nations.

The people in charge are incompetent and this is very serious folks. We need urgent action to get competent people in post. We need a shake up at the highest levels of government on the military and security side especially. This can't be allowed to go on.

Obama response inadequate

Obama has ordered "heightened security" and the story so far is that means 50 more marines are on the way to Libya. That's an inadequate response.

It's not enough to "order heightened security" if by that you mean ordering the same incompetent fools currently in charge of security to continue in post but to try to do a proper job this time despite still having no idea what to do.

50 Marine Security Guards would have helped had they been there on the night of the attack to defend Ambassador Stevens but from Colonel Hunt's description of the American consulate building at Benghazi - "was like a cardboard building, there wasn't even bullet proof glass" - it was not an appropriate strong building to choose to stand and fight against a terrorist attack with enemies using infantry weapons such as assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades and mortars.

Had Ambassador Chris Steven's possible Marine Security Guard detail been blessed with leadership from a good military officer of the quality of Colonel Hunt they ought to have been able to assess that Benghazi building as unsuitable for use as a fort against attackers and would have recommended moving to somewhere more secure.

At least with real marines with real bullets in their guns they could have provided a strong armed escort for the diplomatic team on the move.

However, we need to be honest with ourselves folks and admit that really good military officers are a rare breed these days. Just sending in the soldiers to defend against an enemy does no good if the soldiers you send are not well led, properly deployed, able to do the job.

In the worst cases of military incompetence, more soldiers, even more brave US Marines, setting up in a poorly defended building can just mean more targets for the enemy to attack and to kill.

We need to remember the very painful lesson of -

Wikipedia: 1983 Beirut barracks bombing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Beirut_barracks_bombing)

The Beirut Barracks Bombing (October 23, 1983 in Beirut, Lebanon) occurred during the Lebanese Civil War, when two truck bombs struck separate buildings housing United States and French military forces—members of the Multinational Force in Lebanon—killing 299 American and French servicemen. The organization Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bombing.

Suicide bombers detonated each of the truck bombs. In the attack on the American Marines barracks, the death toll was 241 American servicemen: 220 Marines, 18 sailors and three soldiers, along with sixty Americans injured, representing the deadliest single-day death toll for the United States Marine Corps since the Battle of Iwo Jima of World War II, the deadliest single-day death toll for the United States military since the first day of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War, and the deadliest single attack on Americans overseas since World War II.

So I think we ought to be more demanding than just welcoming any US president sending in some marines. We ought to demand a plan that will deploy the marines well so that they can defend themselves and the embassy or consulate and the ambassador very well indeed.

The US and allied western countries ought to

Close all vulnerable diplomatic embassies and consulates in host countries with a war-on-terror connection, with an armed jihadi terrorist groups threat. So that would be not only Libya, but it could be a list of 10 or more dangerous countries, such as Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen - anywhere US embassies have come under fire from jihadi terrorists before.

Establish new secure embassies and consulates within new or existing military bases where the dangerous host country agrees. If the host country does not agree then withdraw our ambassadors from the country altogether.

Peter Dow

09-24-2012, 04:42 PM

My plan for a secure diplomatic military base for Libya

In my following diagram, the US and allied embassies would be situated in the central base, the green zone.

The features of the diagram are similar for any kind of military base whatever you are defending inside.

http://imageshack.us/a/img690/2116/basedefence768.jpg (http://imageshack.us/a/img7/9651/basedefence.jpg)
Click for LARGER image (http://imageshack.us/a/img7/9651/basedefence.jpg)

This diagram shows my suggested layout for the perimeter defences for a military base.

Explanation of the diagram features.

Base - the green area in the diagram represents the central well-defended area of the military base, where various buildings, vehicles and personnel of the base are normally situated.

Machine-gun emplacements - the red and pink dots which encircle the base at a distance of about 6 miles or 10 kilometres from the edge of the central Base, represent static, armoured fortifications or "pillboxes" for one machine gun and its 3-man team of gunners. The spacing between adjacent pillboxes is about 333 metres or 333 yards.

The plan calls for one team of gunners per pillbox serving on base. The gunners are organised into 3 duty shifts of at least 8 hours and so normally only 1 in 3 of the pillboxes will be manned at any one time. The gunners spend their off-duty time in the central Base where their quarters are situated.

If, when and where the perimeter defences are attacked by the enemy, the off-duty gunners can be called back on emergency duty as required by their officers.

Infantry barriers - barbed wire and anti-personnel mines to stop enemy infantry from advancing into the centre of the base.

Vehicle barriers - obstacles and anti-tank mines which prevent enemy vehicles from advancing into the centre of the base.

Reaction Force Zone - Quick reaction forces deploy in armoured vehicles from the central base into the Reaction Force Zone to fire at enemy attacking forces.

Threat Zone - A circumferential military zone around the perimeter defences where the base defenders may assume a hostile intent on the part of uninvited intruders into the Threat Zone and from where locals are forbidden and variously warned off from intruding upon. This land is occupied or leased to the military base and is closely watched using surveillance technology. Warning shots or sub-lethal rounds may be fired upon suspected innocent intruders and identified enemy forces can be fired upon to kill without warning.

The diagram represents a Threat Zone which extends to 10 miles / 16 kilometres from the edge of the central Base. The plan therefore recommends that it is inappropriate to site a well-defended base within 10 miles of an urban area or a public highway which would cause local people and local traffic to enter into the defined Threat Zone routinely making the early detection of real threats difficult to distinguish.

A large Threat Zone is desirable for security purposes because it makes for a safer perimeter defence but does add significantly to the land requirements of the base therefore the availability of a wide area of undeveloped land is ideal when choosing a location for the construction of a new military base.

Some existing military bases are located close to urban areas where a large Threat Zone cannot be defined and this is likely to make such bases much less secure.

Access road Road to access the base from the surrounding road network.

STOP police control barrier Military police stop traffic wishing to enter the base and perform final checks that visitors and loads are authorised to proceed. The control barriers prevent terrorists driving off the road and prevent vehicles proceeding without permission.

The control barrier fortifications need to be very robust so as to survive an enemy truck bomb.

Trust Zone People, vehicles or buildings in the Trust Zone which is everywhere outside of the Threat Zone are assumed to be trustworthy and non-threatening in so far as the base defenders are concerned.

People in the Trust Zone are assumed to be respecting the base's security and the base defenders treat people in the Trust Zone with the same mutual respect for their own security.

Protestors
Protestors who wish to demonstrate for whatever reason their political viewpoints are allowed to approach the base as far as the Warning Line which surrounds the Threat Zone but it is the responsibility of the local authorities to ensure that protestors do not intrude into the Threat Zone without invitation otherwise a hostile intent may be assumed and defensive actions taken.

Defence force For the smallest bases, this plan calls for a defence force of three serving companies of gunners - one company for each of the 3 shifts.

One company needs at least 200 gunners and their officers so 3 companies total at least 600 gunners and their officers. In addition, military and support personnel are needed for other duties such as policing visitors, cooking, vehicle and plant maintenance engineers, medical, supplies storage & management, camp tidying up, latrine digging, reserves etc.

The defence force required would be of an infantry battalion size of perhaps of about 800 soldiers / marines and support personnel in total and so the base defence force commander would likely be ranked at Lieutenant Colonel or higher.

For larger bases with central Base areas that could be miles wide, such as military air bases that require aircraft runways, the lines of perimeter defences would need to be longer and so more gunners etc would be required.

Low profile

A military base like the one I describe can still be reasonably low profile if it is situated somewhere out of sight and out of mind, such as in the Libyan desert somewhere south of the coastal road between Tripoli and Benghazi.

Fuchs

09-24-2012, 05:46 PM

Such a base for diplomats would not be 'low profile', but a gross affront to local people and challenges the very need for diplomats to be in country. US diplomats in risky places already are known to have minimal interaction outside embassies - this would end it.

Oh yes, who provides the guard force (battalion equivalent), the host nation or the foreign nations?

I second that.

U.S. embassies re already rather unpopular because of their often outrageous security demand affecting local traffic and their fortress-like appearance.

I suggest to

(1) Stick with the existing, already quite fortified embassies and consulates in calm countries.

(2) Have embassies in troublesome countries only in places very close to police stations, army bases or buildings that can be expected to be well-secured (such as ruling party's headquarter, presidential palace etc); piggyback on existing security arrangements in order to boost the own security.

(3) Build consulates in troublesome countries only high in high-rise buildings (8+ floors). This does largely neutralise car bombs and makes it rather easy to stop even an armed mob (assuming elevators can be stopped). Preferably have a roof that's suitable for an evacuation by helicopter. Use a separated and CCTV-secured part of the garage.

(4) Demand public safety guarantees from host governments, local police chiefs/governors whenever the risk of riots or assaults is high.

(5) Live with the fact that there is no 100% security anywhere or for anyone.

Peter Dow

09-24-2012, 06:17 PM

Such a base for diplomats would not be 'low profile',
Sure it would be. The Libyan desert has a very low population density. This would not be like the Green Zone in Baghdad situated in the middle of the capital city but rather out in the middle of nowhere.

but a gross affront to local people
What? Like the "gross affront" of the US military bases in UK, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greenland, Kosovo, Israel, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Qatar, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Guam, Brazil and Cuba? ;)

and challenges the very need for diplomats to be in country.
No it doesn't. It is needed to challenge the anti-American terrorists who want to challenge our diplomats' welcome in the country.

US diplomats in risky places already are known to have minimal interaction outside embassies - this would end it.
Actually it would provide more possibilities for interaction because the diplomats would be able to leave the secluded embassy by helicopter at times unknown to the terrorists. Thus diplomats could arrive at events anywhere in country for surprise visits leaving the terrorists flat-footed.

Oh yes, who provides the guard force (battalion equivalent), the host nation or the foreign nations?
The foreign nations.

Most of the battalion equivalent would comprise of 3 companies operating in 3 shifts.

I would suggest -

If it was a US-only embassy military base, all 3 companies would be American.
If it was a diplomatic base for the US embassy and embassies of only a few close allies of the US, such as the UK, Canada, perhaps one or two others, 2 companies would be American, the other would be from one of the other countries and would rotate deployments.
If many or all of the US's NATO allies were joining in to locate their embassies there then 1 company would always be American, the 2 others would rotate around the NATO countries.

Fuchs

09-24-2012, 06:36 PM

What? Like the "gross affront" of the US military bases in UK, Germany, (...

Actually, the embassy fortress in Berlin (http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/amerikanische-botschaft-in-berlin-ein-anflug-von-alcatraz-1671311.html) was an affront to the German people and got bad press for years.

It fell much short of a battalion battlegroup fort right next to our capital, it is an embassy of an ally and it was/is still quite an insult.

Btw, you seem to have lost all sense for the cost/benefit ratio. Three companies of guards for an embassy is insane.

Besides, laying AP and AT mines in a foreign country is insane as well, and will be outright illegal in all those countries which ratified the ban on AP mines.

Peter Dow

09-24-2012, 07:05 PM

I second that.

U.S. embassies re already rather unpopular because of their often outrageous security demand affecting local traffic and their fortress-like appearance.
You are describing embassies in capital cities. That's not what I am proposing. There's no traffic in the middle of the Libyan desert. Appearance doesn't matter when no-one is there to see it.

I suggest to

(1) Stick with the existing, already quite fortified embassies and consulates in calm countries.
Agreed. My proposal is only for countries with a history of jihadi terrorist attacks against embassies and diplomats. So that might be only something like 10 countries.

(2) Have embassies in troublesome countries only in places very close to police stations, army bases or buildings that can be expected to be well-secured (such as ruling party's headquarter, presidential palace etc); piggyback on existing security arrangements in order to boost the own security.
Next to a military base etc would be no safer from a suicide bomber driving a truck bomb. Only placing an embassy within a military base, taking advantage of the perimeter defences of the military base would be much safer.

(3) Build consulates in troublesome countries only high in high-rise buildings (8+ floors). This does largely neutralise car bombs and makes it rather easy to stop even an armed mob (assuming elevators can be stopped). Preferably have a roof that's suitable for an evacuation by helicopter. Use a separated and CCTV-secured part of the garage.
No it doesn't. :mad:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/40/Beirutembassy.jpg

Wikipedia: 1983 United States embassy bombing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_United_States_embassy_bombing)

The 1983 U.S. embassy bombing was a suicide bombing against the United States embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, on April 18, 1983, that killed 63 people, mostly embassy and CIA staff members, several soldiers and one Marine. 17 of the dead were Americans.

The car bomb was detonated by a suicide bomber driving a delivery van packed with about 2,000 pounds (910 kg) of explosives

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/7/77/Alfred_P._Murrah_Federal_Building_before_destructi on.jpg

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cb/Oklahomacitybombing-DF-ST-98-01356.jpg/408px-Oklahomacitybombing-DF-ST-98-01356.jpg

Wikipedia: Oklahoma City bombing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oklahoma_City_bombing)

The Oklahoma City bombing was a terrorist bomb attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Downtown Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. It would remain the most destructive act of terrorism on American soil until the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Oklahoma blast claimed 168 lives, including 19 children under the age of 6[1] and injured more than 680 people.

(4) Demand public safety guarantees from host governments, local police chiefs/governors whenever the risk of riots or assaults is high.
Such safety guarantees are easier given than delivered. What if the embassy gets bombed despite the guarantees? No doubt such safety guarantees have been sought and given in every case where an embassy has been bombed.

(5) Live with the fact that there is no 100% security anywhere or for anyone.
Live with the fact that during a war on terror, diplomats do require competent military defences for embassies and consulates. Don't live with incompetent diplomatic security measures. Let's put 100% effort into making our diplomats as secure as they can be. We can only do our best but we should do at least that.

KenWats

09-24-2012, 07:28 PM

Peter,

I'm sure your arrangement would be very secure, you put a lot of thought into it from a security perspective. However, if you move the embassy out into the middle of the desert (or other unpopulated area, away from the seat of host nation government), you limit his engagement with the foreign government. Also, your military attaches and regular diplomatic dealings will either necessitate A) a lot of traffic into your secure area, if we make the host nation folks come to us (perfect for pre-operational surveillance for a local terror cell, or even an infiltration route) or B) a lot of convoys of diplomats driving around (ready target for an ambush?).

Seems to me that the mission of the embassy is not to be impregnable. The mission of the embassy is to allow face to face interaction with the host government (among other things). Everything else (to include security) should support that. Not to say that stupid things weren't done in Libya or elsewhere and that we shouldn't try to correct said stupidity. Hard to have face to face interaction if your embassy is a smoking hole in the ground, but you can't have it very effectively if you have a 10 mile security perimeter out in the middle of nowhere with AT mines, blast walls, and a battalion sized security element.

Just my two cents.

The Other KenW :)

Peter Dow

09-24-2012, 09:22 PM

Actually, the embassy fortress in Berlin (http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/amerikanische-botschaft-in-berlin-ein-anflug-von-alcatraz-1671311.html) was an affront to the German people and got bad press for years.

It fell much short of a battalion battlegroup fort right next to our capital, it is an embassy of an ally and it was/is still quite an insult.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/84/Embassy_usa_berlin_westside.JPG/800px-Embassy_usa_berlin_westside.JPG

The US Embassy in Berlin looks impressive to me. I'd be very pleased if Scotland had an impressive US embassy building like that.

We've just got a wee US Consulate in Edinburgh. :(

http://photos.state.gov/libraries/unitedkingdom/164203/images/Edinburgh_Consulate300x234.jpg

Btw, you seem to have lost all sense for the cost/benefit ratio. Three companies of guards for an embassy is insane.
Well bear in mind the plan is easily adapted to station many allied countries' embassies in the one secure diplomatic base. That would enable the costs to be shared among many countries as well.

Three companies gives you enough guards to man the perimeter defences at 6 miles radius from the central base. If you use less guards then you need to space the pillboxes out too much or shrink the perimeter diameter which starts to bring enemy mortars into range of the central base from outside the barrier defences.

There are rational military reasons for using that many guards to defend against typical infantry-style attacks of the sort that we saw against the Benghazi consulate.

The thing which would be, so to speak, "insane" would be terrorists attacking and failing to make any impression on a secure embassy designed according to my plan. The martyrdom video of that failed attack is not one the terrorists would want to show on YouTube. :D

Besides, laying AP and AT mines in a foreign country is insane as well, and will be outright illegal in all those countries which ratified the ban on AP mines.
Land-mines are an efficient way to defend a perimeter. Granted there are huge problems with conventional mines left over from old wars but the way to go with land-mines is smart, self-deactivating or self-destructing mines which can be designed to be set to become inert and safe when the lease for the land on which the base was sited was up. Those are the land-mines that the US is using now.

U.S. Landmine Policy (http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c11735.htm)

On Friday, February 27, 2004, the new United States policy on landmines was announced. This policy is a significant departure from past approaches to landmines. It ensures protection for both military forces and civilians alike, and continues U.S. leadership in humanitarian mine action -- those activities that contribute most directly toward eliminating the landmine problem and mitigating its effects on landmine survivors. Under the new policy, the United States will:

eliminate all persistent landmines from its arsenal;

continue to develop non-persistent (self-destructing/self-deactivating) landmines that will not pose a humanitarian threat after use in battle;

continue to research and develop enhancements to the current self-destructing/self-deactivating landmine technology in order to develop and preserve military capabilities that address the United States transformational goals;

seek a worldwide ban on the sale or export of all persistent landmines;

get rid of its non-detectable mines within one year;

only employ persistent anti-vehicle mines outside of Korea between now and 2010, if needed, when authorized by the President;

not use any persistent landmines -- neither anti-personnel nor anti-vehicle -- anywhere after 2010;

begin the destruction within two years of those persistent landmines not needed for the protection of Korea;

seek a 50 percent increase in the U.S. Department of State's portion of the U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program over Fiscal Year 2003 baseline levels to $70 million a year.

One thing which is, so to speak, "insane", with regard to land-mines is the reckless way NATO-ISAF forces are driving about on Afghanistan's roads not cleared of enemy mines or road-side bombs and getting our soldiers killed.

For a better way to secure supply routes in Afghanistan see my post "4. Secure supply routes for Afghanistan. Land routes." (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=139820&postcount=4) in my thread "How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror)" (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16388) in the "OEF - Afghanistan" forum of SWC forums.

Peter Dow

09-24-2012, 10:49 PM

Peter,

I'm sure your arrangement would be very secure, you put a lot of thought into it from a security perspective.
Thanks Ken. My plan is a good starting point for sure.

However, if you move the embassy out into the middle of the desert (or other unpopulated area, away from the seat of host nation government), you limit his engagement with the foreign government.
The base could provide an office and quarters for a representative of the host government - if the base was in Libya, that would be a representative of the Libyan government, a diplomat from the Libyan foreign ministry could be stationed alongside the embassies sited there. So there could be face to face contacts at any time.

Add to that telephone, internet and video conferencing and instant engagement could be easily sufficient.

Also, your military attaches and regular diplomatic dealings will either necessitate A) a lot of traffic into your secure area, if we make the host nation folks come to us (perfect for pre-operational surveillance for a local terror cell, or even an infiltration route) or B) a lot of convoys of diplomats driving around (ready target for an ambush?).
Helicopters Ken. All diplomats and VIP visitors can arrive and leave by helicopter completely unobserved from 10 miles away which is as close as spies would be allowed to get. Therefore compared to a capital city embassy my plan is superior if not perfect for avoiding surveillance and ambushes.

Seems to me that the mission of the embassy is not to be impregnable. The mission of the embassy is to allow face to face interaction with the host government (among other things). Everything else (to include security) should support that.
Well how does the country retreat of the US President - Camp David (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David) - seem to you? Camp David too is a small military base officially called "Naval Support Facility Thurmont" which is staffed by the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marines. Did you know that?

When one thinks of Camp David, one never thinks of the security there - one just thinks of Camp David as a place in the country for the President to have face to face meetings at. It will be something similar with the embassies base I propose in my plan.

Not to say that stupid things weren't done in Libya or elsewhere and that we shouldn't try to correct said stupidity. Hard to have face to face interaction if your embassy is a smoking hole in the ground, but you can't have it very effectively if you have a 10 mile security perimeter out in the middle of nowhere with AT mines, blast walls, and a battalion sized security element.
It's not hard. It'll work as conveniently for the diplomats and visitors as a Libyan version of Camp David.

Visitors arriving by helicopter will be 6 miles away from Anti Tank mines when they land and there could be an area in the central base as large as Camp David (0.5 km2) with no base guards in that small camp within the central base.

All the base security details described here can be ignored and be forgotten by diplomats. Those details matter only for those who must design, build, staff and run the base. The diplomats will be too busy thinking about diplomacy to think about the security infrastructure of the base. Sure they will see the layout of the base as they come in to land and take off but then never give it a second thought.

Just my two cents.

The Other KenW :)
Thanks Ken! :)

Peter Dow

09-26-2012, 06:06 PM

Machine-gun emplacements - the red and pink dots which encircle the base at a distance of about 6 miles or 10 kilometres from the edge of the central Base, represent static, armoured fortifications or "pillboxes" for one machine gun and its 3-man team of gunners. The spacing between adjacent pillboxes is about 333 metres or 333 yards.

The plan calls for one team of gunners per pillbox serving on base. The gunners are organised into 3 duty shifts of at least 8 hours and so normally only 1 in 3 of the pillboxes will be manned at any one time. The gunners spend their off-duty time in the central Base where their quarters are situated.

If, when and where the perimeter defences are attacked by the enemy, the off-duty gunners can be called back on emergency duty as required by their officers.

More on what I have in mind for the machine gun emplacements.

The plan calls for something much better than WW2 style pillboxes. We can do much better in this day and age.

There would be a minimum of 180 machine gun emplacements required by my plan.

I would hope that the budget for such an important high-value facility would stretch to maybe, for each,

a 25mm canon, which typically have a range out to 2.5 km / 1.5 miles with
a 12.7mm (0.5") or 7.62mm machine gun back-up.

Also I'd want the guns mounted into some kind of swivelling gun turret, with working parts like the gun turret on top of an infantry fighting vehicle maybe. In fact the cheapest option might be to buy off-the-shelf turrets which are already in mass production for vehicles like the Bradley IFV with some additional armour capped on top of it because it doesn't need to be light, just very strong against incoming mortar or artillery fire.

http://pdxtac.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/army-bradley-turret-1024x527.jpg

http://www.armyrecognition.com/images/stories/europe/italy/weapons/hitfist/Hitfist_light_turret_25mm_30mm_gun_for_armoured_in fantry_fighting_vehicle_Oto_melara_Italian_defence _industry_military_technology_640.jpg

The one issue there might be with IVF turrets is that it really needs lower gun elevation than is standard for an IFV turret. IFV guns often don't dip below -10 degrees below the horizontal. That's not ideal because the gun turrets are going to be much higher off the ground than they would be in an IVF and ideally the gunners ought to be able to target the ground beneath them as well as the ground hundreds of metres away.

Naval ship mounted cannons tend to dip lower, down to -20 degrees and that would be better, but naval cannons are not usually well armoured for the gunner's protection.

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_25mm_mk38_pic.jpg

They do come in remotely operated versions which is an interesting option to consider.

http://www.seaforces.org/wpnsys/SURFACE/Mk-38-machine-gun-system-Dateien/image037.jpg

Peter Dow

09-26-2012, 06:07 PM

The gun turrets would be mounted in I am thinking probably some kind of massive high-security armoured & reinforced concrete sloping at a pyramid-type-of-angle type bunkers / towers.

Maybe something like this, only not with a sharp top but a gun turret on top.

http://www.artonfile.com/images/OLDROME-12-2.jpg

The idea of gun towers is to give the gunner a good view of the desert terrain which is unlikely to be completely flat and dips in the ground could otherwise provide cover for attacking mortar teams. Gun towers also enable the gunners easily to see over and beyond any obstacles in the vehicle barrier into the Threat Zone. The gun towers should be robust enough so that they could take a number of artillery shells without collapsing.

Peter Dow

09-26-2012, 08:35 PM

In fact the cheapest option might be to buy off-the-shelf turrets which are already in mass production for vehicles like the Bradley IFV with some additional armour capped on top of it because it doesn't need to be light, just very strong against incoming mortar or artillery fire.

http://imageshack.us/a/img823/8395/bradleyturret.jpg
Bradley turret

bourbon

09-26-2012, 11:33 PM

Peter, has it occurred to you that such a siege mentality and withdrawal into fortress embassies is exactly the response the terrorists want to provoke?

bourbon

09-26-2012, 11:37 PM

Why the Benghazi Consulate Attack Will Blind the U.S. - The instinct to protect U.S. spies and diplomats will mean limiting their access to human intelligence throughout the restive Middle East (http://world.time.com/2012/09/25/why-the-benghazi-consulate-attack-will-blind-the-u-s/), by Robert Baer. TimeWorld, September 25, 2012.

People unfamiliar with espionage may wonder, given the risk, what the downside is of making locals go to Americans. The problem is a basic one: any local with dangerous information worth having won’t risk passing through a security cordon. Even if the would-be informant were willing to risk being seen by hostile lookouts while approaching a U.S. facility, that person simply could not be sure that the American guards aren’t working for the enemy.

The damage caused by Benghazi isn’t limited to making it harder for the local mole or informant to hand over a packet of documents or a nugget of information to his American handler. Any good spy has to immerse himself in the local milieu — just as a great diplomat like Ambassador Stevens was doing. Night and day, the capable spy is out meeting with locals, having schooled himself in their language and customs. As soon as he gets off the plane at his new destination, he’ll start learning his way around the streets. It means endless driving, getting lost and finding your way back. And it’s always done alone, with no safe way to reach out to a local for help.

Peter Dow

09-27-2012, 01:56 AM

Peter, has it occurred to you that such a siege mentality and withdrawal into fortress embassies is exactly the response the terrorists want to provoke?
The terrorists want to kill the US Ambassador or other embassy staff whenever they like so they prefer weak embassy security or perhaps no embassy at all.

The terrorists also want to prevent the establishment of new foreign military bases and to close any existing bases and drive out all foreign military forces.

So a new super-secure military fortress embassy is exactly the response the terrorists don't want to provoke. They want us to surrender and withdraw from the countries concerned altogether, not to secure our defences so our diplomats can stand up and speak out for the friendship and alliance we offer to the people of those countries.

I also wish to take issue with your suggestion that the establishment of a new fortress embassy represents some kind of mentality of "siege" or "withdrawal" or disengagement from diplomacy with the local people of the host country.

To explain that the converse is the case, that such a fortress embassy base could be ideal for a renewed and more intensive engagement with the local people of the host country, (which on the face of it, I admit, may seem to be a strange statement to make) I do need to reveal much about the nature of the war on terror which may be obscure. It's a long explanation so please bear with me. If any of this requires further clarification or explanation please do ask.

People almost everywhere, and Libya is no exception, view their country, the world, via the media - TV, radio and the internet. The person-to-person diplomatic meetings that matter for local people are the meetings which are reported in the media.

What's most important for diplomacy with the people is getting our ambassadors and other diplomats on TV watched by the people, seen in a favourable light, having friendly meetings with popular local people etc. That's how you connect with local people these days.

Now let's take a look at what is going wrong with our diplomatic "connecting with local people" attempts.

The terrorists who killed the US ambassador in Benghazi were able to do so because they had the distraction, cover and support of an angry mob.

It was the fuss and incitement to violence which was broadcast on Egyptian satellite TV which is watched in Libya (and across North Africa and the Middle East) which stirred up the Benghazi mob.

The incitement to violence was on the pretext of a supposedly "offensive" video which had been uploaded on YouTube for a while and could have sat there for years and never come to public attention. It was the Egyptian satellite TV coverage that suddenly blew the whole issue up.

The Egyptian satellite TV channel chose to bring that particular video to the attention of their TV viewers. They had no intention of ever bringing to the attention of their viewers any of the very friendly and diplomatic videos made by US Embassy staff in the region attempting to connect with the local people.

That TV channel was not trying to be diplomatic or make friends with Americans or westerners but trying (and succeeding) in prosecuting their jihadi terrorist war against us "infidels". That was an enemy propaganda broadcast.

Egypt's NileSat was used to incite the mob which besieged the US Consulate in Benghazi and gave cover for the jihadi terrorist group which killed US Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens and three other Americans.

It seems on this occasion the mob was incited to violence by a Saudi-funded Egyptian satellite TV channel called "Al Nas" -

Radical religious Al-Nas TV gains influence in Egypt (http://www.arabmediasociety.com/index.php?article=273&p=0)
Analysis by Muhammad Shukri of BBC Monitoring on 26 June

Al-Nas (The People) TV, an Arabic-language religious satellite TV channel which broadcasts 24 hours a day from the Media Production City in 6 October City in Egypt, has mesmerized Egyptian and Arab viewers generally.

A few months after its launch in January 2006 as a station focusing on social and entertainment content, the channel's administration decided to turn it into a Sunni religious TV, a move that has attracted millions of viewers to the channel in Egypt and across the Arab world.

The channel is owned by Saudi businessman Mansur Bin Kadasah and is managed by Atif Abd-al-Rashid.

- by someone called "Sheikh Khalad Abdalla".

Atlantic Wire: The Egyptian Outrage Peddler Who Sent an Anti-Islam YouTube Clip Viral (http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2012/09/egyptian-outrage-peddler-who-sent-anti-islam-youtube-clip-viral/56826/)

http://cdn.theatlanticwire.com/img/upload/2012/09/13/Abdalla_1/large.jpg

But it did gain the attention of a Glenn Beck-style TV pundit in Egypt: Sheikh Khalad Abdalla, a host on the Islamist satellite-TV station al-Nas. On Sept. 8, Abdullah lit the match that set this entire international incident in motion and broadcast an offensive clip of the trailer

Peter Dow

09-27-2012, 01:57 AM

This same NileSat's satellite was used to incite terrorism in Iraq against US and coalition forces. Al Zawraa TV was a pro-terrorist TV channel broadcast on Egypt's NileSat into Iraq and the whole Middle East to drum up support and recruits for terrorism against our forces there. NileSat was used by the enemy to help to kill 4,400 US soldiers and wound 32,000 in Iraq.

YouTube video - Al Zawraa Iraqi-terrorist satellite TV broadcast on NileSat (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SxLSVF3T1nI)

NileSat Know your enemy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nilesat)

Satellite TV "footprint" maps showing where on the ground TV signals from the NileSat satellites can be viewed.

http://nilesat.com.eg/Portals/0/Content_Images/NileSat-101.jpg

http://nilesat.com.eg/Portals/0/Content_Images/104.jpg

We need to be thinking about stopping the anti-American, anti-Western propaganda being broadcast by our enemies and replacing it with friendly TV.

It should be possible for the European companies who set up the NileSat satellites (there are about 4 satellites, 2 companies) to change the ground control station from which the NileSat satellites take their uplink TV signal feeds. Of course they will need pressure from the European governments before they will do that.

So there is a diplomacy job for the US State Department to speak to European governments to get them to apply governing, legal, financial (and if all else fails military) pressure to require the satellite companies such as Astrium and Eutelsat to take control of those satellites out of the hands of the Egyptians and into maybe NATO hands.

So I would recommend that the Americans appoint a good US diplomat to take on that task to get Europe fighting terror instead of broadcasting it. However, if Europe fails to take action to confiscate control of the NileSat satellites then by all means the US President should hand the matter over to the US military Space Command to take those satellites out by all means necessary.

I have taken some time to draw up this map showing the main players in the NileSat terror broadcasting situation. I hope this explains what is going on.

http://imageshack.us/a/img829/9420/mapofusavsegypt860.jpg (http://imageshack.us/a/img824/7196/mapofusavsegypt1222.jpg)

The map of Egypt's NileSat satellite TV terror TV - LARGE 1222 x 812 pixels (http://imageshack.us/a/img824/7196/mapofusavsegypt1222.jpg)

So if the uplink satellite link for NileSat is removed and replaced, where should the new satellite uplink be stationed? Well it could be Cyprus, Crete, Malta, Turkey or Israel maybe but to receive North African TV signals for uplink it would be useful to have a satellite uplink site in North Africa. But it would have to be well defended because our satellite TV uplink will be a target for the jihadi terrorists. It's not ideal having such a critical facility somewhere in a city where it will attract mortar fire.

http://farm7.staticflickr.com/6192/6061544605_bb27719b2b_z.jpg
Where better than a North African military base, in Libya perhaps, the site for the fortress embassy, to put a satellite uplink to broadcast friendly satellite TV to connect to local people throughout North Africa and even into the rest of the Arab Middle East?

A quote from U.S. Embassy in Baghdad Not Yet Finished But Ready to Grow | Fox News (http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,277953,00.html) shows the problem that even the strongest fortress base sited in an urban environment like the green zone of Baghdad is vulnerable to indirect fire such as from mortars.

Living in a high security situation, personnel have been asked recently to wear helmets and flak jackets when walking around outside the buildings. The request followed an increased level of mortar attacks against the area in May and a homicide bombing inside a Green Zone cafeteria in April that killed eight people.
On May 19, all congregation outdoors was prohibited "due to the threat of indirect fire (IDF) against the embassy compound," according to a memo from the U.S. Mission in Iraq, reprinted in The Washington Post.

Setting up in an unpopulated area makes defending from indirect fire a practical possibility. Ideally, you'd want to broadcast via your uplink to satellite TV, live meetings between the ambassadors and other diplomats and local VIPs, or have them interviewed live by the world media journalists, sitting in the open air, wearing T-shirts, sipping their lemonades or colas or whatever, calm, confident, in control. It's impossible to do that if you have incoming mortar fire, right?

If you want to connect with local people that's how to do it in style. That's how we win the war on terror - by outsmarting the terrorists, by not being in the least terrorised and looking the part.

Wyatt

09-27-2012, 02:37 AM

I cant help but think that an american news channel ran by the govt for the purpose of propaganda in the arab world would do anything other than confirm the hegemony/imperialism narrative that our opponents propagate on their own channels.

This plan along with the afghanistan plan seems to take a list of reasonable tasks like "improve consulate security" and "increase exposure to moderate/pro american news media" and crank the amp up to 11.

Peter Dow

09-27-2012, 10:32 PM

I cant help but think that an american news channel ran by the govt for the purpose of propaganda in the arab world
That wasn't what I was proposing, though it sounds like a good idea worth considering.

would do anything other than confirm the hegemony/imperialism narrative that our opponents propagate on their own channels.
What I am proposing is pulling the plug on our opponents' channels by seizing control of the satellites which are now used to broadcast them.

If you are having difficulty understanding my proposal then imagine turning on your TV and trying to tune in to an enemy channel but not being able to because the satellite is no longer sending that channel's TV signals to your TV. That. :rolleyes:

Making an example of a number of obvious enemy channels will give a lesson for the remaining channels to be a lot fairer about the great good which American influence has brought and offers to the world, or else.

This plan
Mmm ...

along with the afghanistan plan
You mean the thread I started in SWC OEF Afghanistan forum - How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16388)

Please do post your comments, replies, about that thread in that thread where I am much more likely to address specifics about it.

seems to take a list of reasonable tasks like "improve consulate security" and "increase exposure to moderate/pro american news media" and crank the amp up to 11.

If you've got a green zone in the middle of nowhere you need the amp turned way up to get noticed! :D

Shutting down enemy satellite TV channels is more like confiscating the enemy's amps. :cool:

Dayuhan

09-27-2012, 11:49 PM

Making an example of a number of obvious enemy channels will give a lesson for the remaining channels to be a lot fairer about the great good which American influence has brought and offers to the world, or else.

The lesson might just be to make your deals with, say, ChinaSatCom.

Wyatt

09-28-2012, 12:04 AM

So we are to seize by military force/electronic warfare any satellite television station that broadcasts un-American/anti coalition material? Even if this is possible how would you respond to people pointing out that the 'murica violated the sovereignty of states and seized the private property of numerous countries around the globe. what if the tv station was german? or british?

I dont mean to derail the thread towards the satellite plan.

Dayuhan

09-28-2012, 12:44 AM

jcustis

09-28-2012, 06:43 AM

Peter, as Steve Metz has already said in another thread of yours:

A wise strategy is one where the expected benefits--increased security--justify the expected strategic costs (blood, money, lost opportunities). This does not meet that standard.

I would offer that you have gone to great lengths to ignore the reality that one does not focus on the MOST DANGEROUS course of action that any enemy may employ, but the MOST LIKELY. It is a time-proven measure that allows one to apply the resources at hand; whether it be at 10 diplomatic mission or 100 does not matter.

I could button an ambassador up in a 70-ton main battle tank to reduce the risk from a wide range of threats as he moves about a host country, but there are a host of other reasons why that approach would be neither practical or prudent. As the saying goes, "just because you can does not mean you should."

I will give it to you that you've applied a great degree of thought to your position. Are you related to anyone with the last name of Sparks?

Dayuhan

09-29-2012, 01:44 AM

Are you related to anyone with the last name of Sparks?

You must admit that a few of these, mounted on strategically located pyramids, would be a huge deterrent to attack on any embassy...

http://i22.photobucket.com/albums/b329/dayuhan/MerkaGavin.jpg

Fuchs

09-29-2012, 04:09 AM

Come on, his idea is so 'weak'* that we really don't need any ad hominem or guilt by imaginary association tricks to fend it off.

(Says the guy who collects infractions for supposed ad hominem attacks, more often than not thinking skins are too damn thin in this place.)

*: I came up with this kind of ideas when I was 14.

Peter Dow

09-29-2012, 12:43 PM

The lesson might just be to make your deals with, say, ChinaSatCom.
Well if European satellite companies confiscated NileSat satellites because of pressure from European governments then presumably Chinese government pressure could prevent Chinese companies replacing NileSat with Chinese satellites?

Whatever the countries of origin for the satellites, the same "or else" should apply if diplomacy and international agreement fails to confiscate improperly regulated satellites.

So we are to seize by military force/electronic warfare any satellite television station that broadcasts un-American/anti coalition material?
The issue is inciting, organising, sponsoring terrorism, acts of war against us which are killing our people.

Broadcasting peaceful, non-threatening material is not the issue.

Even if this is possible
It's physically possible OK.

Satellites can be

jammed by overloading the satellite receiver with a high intensity signal (possible, been done)
zapped with a laser (possible, not sure if been done)
robot wars in space - a killer satellite that hunts down prey satellites (possible, not sure if been done)
blasting with anti-satellites missiles (possible, been done but litters orbit with debris)

how would you respond to people pointing out that the 'murica violated the sovereignty of states and seized the private property of numerous countries around the globe.

Well the general approach to defensive actions in the war on terror was outlined in the Bush Doctrine (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bush_Doctrine).

A state or a commercial company should not expect to have its wishes to use its state or private property to kill people respected. It should expect to be stopped, one way or another.

We should respond to those killers thus.

If you kill people using satellites and provide the lame excuse "Oh, it's state sovereignty", or "Oh, it's private property". It won't wash. It's not OK. It's never OK.

If you kill our people then it's our responsibility, it's our business to stop you by any means necessary.

what if the tv station was german? or british?
Well the NileSat satellites are provided for Egypt by European companies with German and British components, shareholders, facilities etc. but the French components are the biggest contributor country to those European satellite companies I believe.

European national and European Union governments should impose tighter regulation of our own satellite TV industry to stop incitement to terrorism on satellites they make, sell or hire out.

Europe, the USA and all responsible members of the international community ought to be looking to institute a global regulatory framework.

It raises the same kinds of issues as regulating the arms industry. There are big profits to be made so companies would rather not be regulated and to hell with the consequences for peace and security.

The big profits mean the companies can buy corrupt political influence to prevent responsible regulation.

From a British republican perspective I would say that it is unrealistic to expect the United Kingdom with a very incompetent head of state, Queen Elizabeth, to be the state which leads the way to a solution of these issues.

British republicans like myself with the internet can try to offer leadership in terms of education to the select few such as the members of this forum but the UK state in many ways is a viciously anti-British state so don't expect too much help from the kingdom.

The people of Britain are being brainwashed to accept the harmful monarchy by state control of broadcasting the same way the Arab people are being incited to support terrorism by state control of broadcasting.

I dont mean to derail the thread towards the satellite plan.

I don't think it is "derailing" the thread. Satellite TV is central to the issue of diplomatic security and the security of us all.

Humanity will simply be unable to deliver security for the people while irresponsible states are prosecuting their wars globally using satellite TV.

We need a blacklist of irresponsible states who simply are not allowed by the United Nations, by the international community, by the free world, to be states calling the shots with satellite TV.

Yes those countries with blacklisted states can still have some channels broadcast on satellite TV - but only channels which are supervised by other states, by multinational organisations to ensure responsible broadcasting.

Wyatt

09-29-2012, 02:58 PM

Well if European satellite companies confiscated

The people of Britain are being brainwashed to accept the harmful monarchy by state control of broadcasting the same way the Arab people are being incited to support terrorism by state control of broadcasting.

state control really sounds great. :D

Id rather our strategy allow a market place of ideas to work rather than try to create some nebulous america borg that seeks to control everything. partially because if we did that our enemy would be proven right.

Peter Dow

09-29-2012, 04:33 PM

SratFor comments on the subject:

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/diplomatic-security-light-benghazi?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120927&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=601b5c9db5af46cb8c608fcc7da4867d

Obviously not the last word on the subject (nothing ever is), but a real-world look at the situation and potentially some fodder for discussion.

I would use blunter words to highlight the basic problem of diplomatic security. For example,

tensions with the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and its desire to keep the U.S. Embassy insecure.)

I might say "its desire to terrorise the U.S. Embassy".

In the war on terror we are dealing with states who do not wish our diplomats to be secure. They wish our diplomats and our people to be insecure so that they can terrorise or kill them for their political aims, such as to extort protection racket payments from us.

The author omits to mention that basic building security in U.S. Embassies is provided by U.S. Marine Security Guards (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_Security_Guard).

A Marine Security Guard or Marine Embassy Guard is a member of the the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group,[3] (formerly Marine Security Guard Battalion), a battalion-sized organization of U.S. Marines whose detachments provide security at American Embassies, American Consulates and other official United States Government offices such as the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Cuba, or the United States Mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium.

While the author mentions that the U.S. State Department lacks enough Diplomatic Security Service special agents and doesn't have funds allocated to build a new secure embassy in Libya -

the 100 new special agents the Diplomatic Security Service is slated to hire this year will not be enough to replace those leaving the service.
..
the construction of a new office building is nonetheless an expensive undertaking and something that the department cannot do under its current operating budget without the U.S. Congress allocating funds to pay for the construction project.

- he fails to mention that in the real world the U.S. gives away billions in military aid (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_military_aid). The top recipients in 2010 were -

Country_______$U.S. millions
Afghanistan ____6,800
Israel__________2,800
Egypt _________1,302
Iraq___________1,006
Pakistan_________914

The only reliable ally in that list is Israel. The other countries are not reliable allies. If you have to pay for loyalty, it's not true loyalty. It's a protection racket.

So if the U.S. quits giving military aid to those unreliable regimes that would save around $10 billion dollars a year and that's plenty to construct and run new fortress embassies wherever a threat of terrorism arises.

By reallocating those funds, the U.S. could increase by multiple factors the size of the U.S. Marine Corps Embassy Security Group from its current tiny battalion size (800 people) to say division size (20,000) which it could use to defend newly built fortress U.S. Embassies where terrorism is a threat and where the war on terror is yet to be won.

My plan calls for a battalion size of guard force to defend a new U.S. and allies embassy base for Libya.

Nor does the author mention that in the real world the State Department oversees billions of dollars of U.S. tax-payer development aid (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Agency_for_International_Development ) to countries where embassies and diplomats are terrorised.

Nation Billions of Dollars
Afghanistan 2.75
Pakistan___ 1.35
Haiti______ 0.70
Israel_____ 0.59
Kenya_____0.50
Sudan_____0.46
West Bank/Gaza0.38
Jordan_____0.36
Ethiopia____0.35
South Africa0.34
Georgia____0.33
Egypt _____0.32
Tanzania___0.31
Nigeria_____0.29
Uganda____0.26
Indonesia__0.26
Mozambique0.23
Liberia_____0.22
Colombia___0.22
Iraq_______0.22

Only yesterday it was reported that the U.S. State Department is trying to pay another $450 million in aid to Egypt. (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/world/middleeast/white-house-move-to-give-egypt-450-million-in-aid-meets-resistance.html?_r=0)

So that is the generous American people that the world loves but isn't it a bit stupid to try to pay for the country's development while embassies and diplomats in that country are under threat? You can't help people if you get yourself killed, right?

Instead, spend the military aid for war-on-terror, terrorism-effected countries on building, maintaining and guarding very secure fortress embassies and leave those states and political parties which are misled by incompetent leaders to go bankrupt, financially and politically, which would require those countries to under-go some process of regime-change either internally or externally led.

The military aid should be enough if re-allocated to diplomatic security to build new fortress embassies and secure diplomats but if for some reason the President and the Congress allowed the Pentagon to dig its heels in and refuse to pay for diplomatic security then it's better to take some money from the development aid budget for the country with a terrorist problem to provide security for the diplomats and embassies based there.

Better to stop propping up weak governments and use very secure embassies as a place for robust diplomacy to tell local politicians to stop wrecking their own economies as they tend to do by foolishly suppressing and oppressing their most enterprising individuals, tell them to stand aside if they are not up to the job of leadership.

It's worth noting that even if the decision had been made to construct a fortress in the desert it would still be under construction, and there would still be a need to have diplomatic boots (well, ok, diplomatic Gucci shoes) on the ground...
Well the construction of a fortress embassy base would need military engineers' boots on the ground accompanied with marines' boots as security for the engineers totalling more military boots and equipment on the ground than the battalion of embassy security guards needed after completion.

If and when there is a construction site then presumably the U.S. embassy can set up temporary facilities somewhere within the security cordon established there?

But long before a construction site is in being there is the preliminary approval of the concept of a fortress embassy base to be given by both the U.S. and Libyan authorities.

Then comes the search for a possible site and then surveying of possible sites to be done before selecting a candidate site then allocation of the land and final approval to build is given the go ahead.

So yes there is a lot of diplomacy needed even now but most of that diplomacy can be done over the internet and telephone, or in the USA or Europe, Libyans visiting us, until such time as they are ready to send the marines in I would have thought.

Wyatt

09-29-2012, 04:52 PM

if the US wanted to do this, which it doesn't, what does the us do when libya says "no" to the plan?

Peter Dow

09-29-2012, 06:50 PM

Peter, as Steve Metz has already said in another thread of yours:
If you have something to say about another thread of mine then I suggest you say it there in that other thread where it is appropriate for me to reply and I may do but only if your comment is worthy of my reply.

Certainly there is no value in quoting from another thread a comment which consists of a platitude and a non-specific, unjustified criticism.

If you parrot a meaningless comment it doesn't make the comment any more worthy for repetition.

I would offer that you have gone to great lengths to ignore the reality that one does not focus on the MOST DANGEROUS course of action that any enemy may employ, but the MOST LIKELY.
So was the reckless fool who thought Ambassador Stevens should gamble his life in a Benghazi death trap focusing on the "most likely" action of the enemy?

So was the thinking that it was most likely that the enemy would not kill Stevens in Benghazi? So just chance it?

Well before you go advising anyone about security I suggest that you spend your spare time playing a solo game of Russian roulette (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_roulette).

After all, there is only one bullet in the six chambers of the revolver so really it is "most likely" that each time that you pull the trigger that you won't shoot yourself in the head. :rolleyes:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4d/SW-629.jpg
Russian roulette anyone?

It is a time-proven measure that allows one to apply the resources at hand; whether it be at 10 diplomatic mission or 100 does not matter.
Peace is a very forgiving environment for utterly incompetent security and military personnel who can get away with foolish recklessness because no enemy is trying to kill them or the VIPs they are tasked to protect.

So fools may well think themselves as applying peace-time-proven measures and so long as there is peace they may live and their VIPs may live too.

War provides a different standard of proof for security. Foolish recklessness which has stood the test of peace-time in war-time suddenly gets proven as the foolish recklessness it always was and the VIP gets killed.

Do you keep your house front door unlocked at each night because it is "most likely" you won't be robbed? I don't.

Do you drink and drive because it is "most likely" you won't get in an road accident and won't be stopped by the police and breathalysed? I don't.

I could button an ambassador up in a 70-ton main battle tank to reduce the risk from a wide range of threats as he moves about a host country, but there are a host of other reasons why that approach would be neither practical or prudent. As the saying goes, "just because you can does not mean you should."
It doesn't mean you should assume an Ambassador will be OK in a Benghazi death-trap either.

Just because you can take reckless risks with your and someone else's personal security, it doesn't mean you should.

I will give it to you that you've applied a great degree of thought to your position.
Thanks. :)

Are you related to anyone with the last name of Sparks?
No.

Surferbeetle

09-29-2012, 07:54 PM

Hmm...wonder about your embassy hypothesis...especially in a information based world where perception is often reality.

For the sake of argument let's presume you are correct and that the fortress embassy business model is the way to go. You advocate to coordinate with the Chinese, Russian, Iranian, etc embassies in order to help set them up fortress embassies in our country as we work on setting up fortress embassies in their countries. Fields of fire will need to be cleared and minefields emplaced within our country and theirs. Helipads will need to be setup or clearance gained throughout our country and theirs so that diplomats can fly to and from events and meetings. The job description of diplomat as someone who engages with civil society, in a diplomatic manner, to advocate and persuade through dialog will need to relooked. In summary your proposed business model will change the perception of diplomats as civilian members of civil society.

Let's review your model against the job description of Diplomat and the historical record of Diplomats who have served in wartime outside of fortress embassies:

Foreign Service Officer, http://careers.state.gov/officer

The mission of a U.S. diplomat in the Foreign Service is to promote peace, support prosperity, and protect American citizens while advancing the interests of the U.S. abroad.

Who We Look For, http://careers.state.gov/officer/who-we-look-for

There are several areas that all career tracks have in common:

Each engages with host government officials, private sector leaders and international organization officials. In every career track, you will work closely with people from other countries.

Each fosters dialogue between the United States and the host country. In every career track, you will advocate U.S. policies, promote U.S. interests, and strengthen understanding between our country and other nations.

Foreign Service Officer Qualifications - 13 DIMENSIONS, http://careers.state.gov/uploads/1e/be/1ebeb6be82c173e5cfb6e132b6fbd9b0/3.0.0_FSO_13_dimensions.pdf

• Composure. To stay calm, poised, and effective in stressful or difficult situations; to think on one's feet, adjusting quickly to changing situations; to maintain self-control.

• Cultural Adaptability. To work and communicate effectively and harmoniously with persons of other cultures, value systems, political beliefs, and economic circumstances; to recognize and respect differences in new and different cultural environments.

• Experience and Motivation. To demonstrate knowledge, skills or other attributes gained from previous experience of relevance to the Foreign Service; to articulate appropriate motivation for joining the Foreign Service.

• Information Integration and Analysis. To absorb and retain complex information drawn from a variety of sources; to draw reasoned conclusions from analysis and synthesis of available information; to evaluate the importance, reliability, and usefulness of information; to remember details of a meeting or event without the benefit of notes.

• Initiative and Leadership. To recognize and assume responsibility for work that needs to be done; to persist in the completion of a task; to influence significantly a group’s activity, direction, or opinion; to motivate others to participate in the activity one is leading.

• Judgment. To discern what is appropriate, practical, and realistic in a given situation; to weigh relative merits of competing demands.

• Objectivity and Integrity. To be fair and honest; to avoid deceit, favoritism, and discrimination; to present issues frankly and fully, without injecting subjective bias; to work without letting personal bias prejudice actions.

• Oral Communication. To speak fluently in a concise, grammatically correct, organized, precise, and persuasive manner; to convey nuances of meaning accurately; to use appropriate styles of communication to fit the audience and purpose.

• Planning and Organizing. To prioritize and order tasks effectively, to employ a systematic approach to achieving objectives, to make appropriate use of limited resources.

• Quantitative Analysis. To identify, compile, analyze, and draw correct conclusions from pertinent data; to recognize patterns or trends in numerical data; to perform simple mathematical operations.

• Resourcefulness. To formulate creative alternatives or solutions to resolve problems, to show flexibility in response to unanticipated circumstances.

• Working With Others. To interact in a constructive, cooperative, and harmonious manner; to work effectively as a team player; to establish positive relationships and gain the confidence of others; to use humor as appropriate.

• Written Communication. To write concise, well organized, grammatically correct, effective and persuasive English in a limited amount of time.

Benjamin Franklin, http://www.usdiplomacy.org/history/overview/history_benjaminfranking.php

John Adams, http://www.usdiplomacy.org/history/overview/history_johnadams.php
_______________

My perception of your hypothetical fortress embassy business model is that we would be hunkered down in a fortress embassy with a greatly reduced ability to communicate that we desire "promote peace, support prosperity, and protect American citizens while advancing the interests of the U.S. abroad." Can you quantify the impact to our nation's bottom line of your hypothetical business model vs that that of our current model, which is ~236 years old and, which supports our 14 trillion USD GDP economy?

jcustis

09-29-2012, 08:17 PM

Peter, I've taken a peek at your internet presence in a number of other places. good lord man...

I'll be dropping out of this discussion post haste.

Nothing to see here folks. Keep Calm and Carry On.

Peter Dow

09-29-2012, 09:21 PM

You must admit that a few of these, mounted on strategically located pyramids, would be a huge deterrent to attack on any embassy...
No but a couple of hundred of these in a giant circle surrounded by a minefields would be.

http://imageshack.us/a/img839/8237/guntowerc.jpg
The Pyramid of Cestius, Rome, photoshopped into a gun tower

Peter Dow

09-29-2012, 09:38 PM

Id rather our strategy allow a market place of ideas to work rather than try to create some nebulous america borg that seeks to control everything. partially because if we did that our enemy would be proven right.
In war, you don't seek to control everything, just the enemy.

If we the people of the world don't want to leave America or NATO to end satellite terror TV using unilateral military power then I suggest we set up a United Nations Security Council regulatory authority along the lines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Atomic_Energy_Agency).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. The IAEA was established as an autonomous organization on 29 July 1957. Though established independently of the United Nations through its own international treaty, the IAEA Statute,[1] the IAEA reports to both the UN General Assembly and Security Council.

So I propose the International Satellite TV Broadcasting Agency (ISTBA) to be an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of satellite TV broadcasting, and to inhibit its use for any terrorist purpose, including the killing of diplomats.

But if we the people of the world can't be bothered doing something like that then don't complain when America gets tired of having its diplomats killed and starts taking out TV satellites.

Peter Dow

09-29-2012, 10:14 PM

if the US wanted to do this, which it doesn't, what does the us do when libya says "no" to the plan?
Diplomacy can be done over the internet and telephone, or in the USA or Europe, Libyans visiting us, until such time as they are ready to say "yes" to the fortress embassies base plan.

Meanwhile the US should halt all military aid to Egypt, Pakistan, Iraq etc. and save some of that billions of dollars a year which the US could spend on reconstruction projects back home.

While our forces remain in Afghanistan some of the $6.8 billion per year military aid to Karzai should instead be spent on NATO setting up an NATO-Afghan auxiliary force, to help to defend NATO-ISAF supply lines. Karzai's army should get nothing.

While "no" to the plan is the prevailing answer, we should not be terrorised into giving war-on-terror countries any military aid whatsoever or disproportionate development aid in response to acts of terrorism.

The US has been bled white by vampire state-sponsors of terrorism for years and giving US blood and treasure so freely simply encourages those countries to think that they need terrorists as proxies to squeeze more cash and influence out of Washington.

It is time to stop paying for this protection racket. It is time to stop exposing diplomats to such risks. Bring them home.

If and when one war-on-terror country says "yes" to the plan and then that country would be the only one to benefit from an intensive and rewarding engagement with the West. In time the rest would follow not wishing to miss out and be left behind.

Dayuhan

09-29-2012, 11:54 PM

Couldn't you accomplish the same goal with a lot less hassle and expense by parking a suitably sized naval vessel offshore and designating it an "embassy"? Of course that would be completely inconsistent with the purpose and function of an embassy, but so would a fortress in the desert.

One of the great advantages of proposing things that you know will never be tried is that you will never be proven wrong, and can carry on for all time claiming that your way would have been better. This is not an uncommon device on these forums, though this is perhaps an unusually extravagant example. Those who would prefer to consider the real world would be well advised to follow Jon's excellent example and become elsewhere, which I think I will do.

Peter Dow

09-30-2012, 12:14 AM

Hmm...wonder about your embassy hypothesis...especially in a information based world where perception is often reality.

For the sake of argument let's presume you are correct and that the fortress embassy business model is the way to go.
Mmm.

You advocate to coordinate with the Chinese, Russian, Iranian, etc embassies in order to help set them up fortress embassies in our country as we work on setting up fortress embassies in their countries.
No, I don't advocate any such thing in our countries, nor any such thing in China or Russia.

As I explained in my original post, these fortress embassies bases are only intended for a short list of dangerous war-on-terror countries.

The US and allied western countries ought to

Close all vulnerable diplomatic embassies and consulates in host countries with a war-on-terror connection, with an armed jihadi terrorist groups threat. So that would be not only Libya, but it could be a list of 10 or more dangerous countries, such as Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen - anywhere US embassies have come under fire from jihadi terrorists before.

Establish new secure embassies and consulates within new or existing military bases where the dangerous host country agrees. If the host country does not agree then withdraw our ambassadors from the country altogether.

I never suggested that any country would need to or be allowed to set up a fortress embassy in our countries.

The reciprocal diplomatic arrangement to apply is the requirement for diplomatic security.

Fortress embassies bases are only required in those countries where there are armed terrorist groups at large.

We provide all diplomats security with no need nor justification for a fortress embassies base in our countries. We don't have home-grown terrorist groups in our countries at large in our cities trying to kill diplomats from other countries.

As for Iran, well that's a war-on-terror country if ever there was one. Yes Iran is a country where it would be appropriate to build a fortress embassies base for sure; that's if the US wants to restore diplomatic relations with Iran at all of course.

Fields of fire will need to be cleared and minefields emplaced within our country and theirs.
No, only theirs, and it's only a limited list of countries.

Helipads will need to be setup or clearance gained throughout our country and theirs so that diplomats can fly to and from events and meetings.
In theirs, not ours. Well you don't really need a brand new helipad everywhere to land a helicopter. Helicopters can land on any reasonably flat and big enough area of ground in the country-side or similar-sized surface in the urban environment.

Yes helipads are useful to guide the helicopter pilot to an exact spot; that's why they are handy to have on small tight landing spaces such as roof-top buildings or ships or oil-drilling platforms etc.

The job description of diplomat as someone who engages with civil society, in a diplomatic manner, to advocate and persuade through dialog will need to relooked. In summary your proposed business model will change the perception of diplomats as civilian members of civil society.
It would be longer to travel to meetings so diplomats would be more picky about the meetings they would travel to though travelling by helicopter it is still possible.

The much bigger difference having a remote fortress embassies base would make would be fewer numbers visiting the embassy to conduct routine business.

Visitors to the embassy unless they were VIPs who came by helicopter themselves would have a much longer, time-consuming and expensive road journey and so alternative methods of achieving routine embassy and consulate tasks such as issuing visas or whatever may be done more by internet, telephone, subcontracted services in the cities and so on.

There may be an enhanced emphasis on diplomatic media work, appearances on TV, especially if our reasonable demand for a fair hearing on all appropriate news and comment TV channels was being enforced by strong regulation of satellite TV broadcasting.

Other than that I don't see the role of diplomat changing all that much because of where he or she is based.

Let's review your model against the job description of Diplomat and the historical record of Diplomats who have served in wartime outside of fortress embassies:

Foreign Service Officer, http://careers.state.gov/officer

Who We Look For, http://careers.state.gov/officer/who-we-look-for

Foreign Service Officer Qualifications - 13 DIMENSIONS, http://careers.state.gov/uploads/1e/be/1ebeb6be82c173e5cfb6e132b6fbd9b0/3.0.0_FSO_13_dimensions.pdf

Benjamin Franklin, http://www.usdiplomacy.org/history/overview/history_benjaminfranking.php

John Adams, http://www.usdiplomacy.org/history/overview/history_johnadams.php
_______________

My perception of your hypothetical fortress embassy business model is that we would be hunkered down in a fortress embassy with a greatly reduced ability to communicate
No actually, in combination with enhanced satellite TV appearances, the ability to communicate could be one thousand times better.

that we desire "promote peace, support prosperity, and protect American citizens while advancing the interests of the U.S. abroad." Can you quantify the impact to our nation's bottom line of your hypothetical business model vs that that of our current model, which is ~236 years old and, which supports our 14 trillion USD GDP economy?
Well a lot of the war-on-terror countries are massive drains on the US treasury taking billions of US tax-payer dollars in military and development aid. So stopping paying those would save money. If they all turned around and wanted a fortress embassy in the first year then that year would cost a lot but subsequent years would cost less than the $10 billion plus they take every year.

Some like Saudi Arabia buy weapons and other high value goods from the USA and from Europe. Perhaps if the US insisted on a fortress embassy base for Saudi Arabia or withdrew the ambassador then those business contracts might be at risk? Perhaps other less threatened countries would step in to try to sell their weapons to the Saudis instead?

My answer to the oil-rich Arab kingdoms and Iran who fund terrorism more than anyone in the world is regime-changing them to proper democracies so that we have no diplomatic security problems eventually, though regime-changing a country can be difficult, seizing their satellites and allowing democratic and republican opponents of the regimes to broadcast into those countries would help to inspire internal revolution which may not require our forces to invade to oust the old regimes.

In short, no I don't know the exact plus or minus to the USA's bottom line year by year but I do have a lot of confidence that the USA will do very well. :)

Peter Dow

09-30-2012, 01:30 AM

Couldn't you accomplish the same goal with a lot less hassle and expense by parking a suitably sized naval vessel offshore and designating it an "embassy"?
Yes in the case of countries like Libya with a nearby coast line it could be a good solution which could be up and running very quickly.

For Libya it would be possible to have two ships - a larger "embassy ship" anchoring 12 plus miles offshore off of Tripoli and a second smaller "consulate ship" anchored 12 miles plus offshore off of Benghazi.

So a fuller range of options if the Libyans say "no" to a land-based fortress embassy would be -

Diplomacy can be done over the internet and telephone, at sea in anchored ships acting as floating embassies / consulates, in a neighbouring country, or in the USA or Europe, Libyans visiting us, until such time as they are ready to say "yes" to the fortress embassies base plan.

For Libya, I had in mind using an anchored ship off the coast as a staging point for supplies to be offloaded from other ships then loaded onto helicopters for onward transport to the fortress embassies base.

I think for Libya the ship embassies solution is a good idea to try out and get some experience of how practical and useful operating a remote embassy would be. This experience could be invaluable to inform the design requirements of a remote fortress embassies base on land.

Ship embassies are also an option for Egypt and Pakistan though not for Afghanistan being landlocked. (The alternatives for Egypt and Pakistan of using a remote embassy based in Israel and India respectively could be considered - although friendly countries Israel and India are not without their own security problems.)

The large U.S. Embassy in Baghdad having invested so much in to enhance security is probably worth keeping for now.

Of course that would be completely inconsistent with the purpose and function of an embassy, but so would a fortress in the desert.
Well I can think of 4 Americans who'd be better off alive and well today in a ship embassy anchored off Benghazi or Tripoli.

So long as the ship embassy wasn't anchored too close to land within missile, mortar or artillery range of the shore I would think it would be fairly safe. I assume it would be a US Navy ship with guns, missiles and marines of course.

Better still is over the horizon 12 miles plus offshore so that helicopters flying from ship to shore can initially fly parallel to the shore but unseen from the shore for an unpredictable distance before turning and heading inland.

If as I have read there are indeed a large number of ground to air missiles in the hands of terrorists then we need to bear in mind that travelling by helicopter can be vulnerable to those missiles or even machine gun fire so it is best security procedure to do things like change the route so that terrorists never know where to lie in wait, have an attack helicopter escort, equip the helicopters used with anti-missile devices etc.

Also even if a diplomat achieves surprise by arriving unexpectedly at a public event in Tripoli or Benghazi, remember that very quickly the word will get out and terrorists with ground-to-air missiles will be on their way to follow the diplomat leaving and to try to shoot down the helicopter when it departs. So don't wait around visiting for too long and lose the advantage of surprise. A quick landing, speech, wave, photo for the cameras, drive away, take off, back to ship - all before the terrorists know anything is happening.

But yes the more I think about it, the ship embassy concept looks good to go! :cool:

One of the great advantages of proposing things that you know will never be tried is that you will never be proven wrong, and can carry on for all time claiming that your way would have been better. This is not an uncommon device on these forums, though this is perhaps an unusually extravagant example.
Well as far as the ship embassy concept is concerned, I wouldn't be so sure that it won't be tried.

I believe that a couple of US ships are indeed off shore Libya somewhere but that is maybe more to do with hunting down the terrorists who killed Ambassador Stevens and his colleagues.

So if there are two US ships off Libya now then there might be more one day soon and one ship with the new ambassador to Libya aboard maybe. :)

Those who would prefer to consider the real world would be well advised to follow Jon's excellent example and become elsewhere, which I think I will do.
Well remember that in real world the US government paying state-sponsors of terrorism billions of dollars in military aid, which is more money than their corrupt leaders have ever seen in their lives before is exactly the incentive to make sure they keep the terrorist fires burning.

If before 9/11 someone had told the Afghan and Pashtun elite that they'd have their hands on $6 or $7 billion per year in military aid to spend if only they'd provide a base to train up some jihadi terrorists to attack America I suspect that they would have readily agreed to do their best to bring it on.

Sometimes the real world needs improving upon and that's the case in the war on terror.

Peter Dow

09-30-2012, 11:16 AM

Well before you go advising anyone about security I suggest that you spend your spare time playing a solo game of Russian roulette (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_roulette).

I must apologise to jcustis and to forum readers because it seems that I have been misunderstood.

I could have and would be happy to rephrase my point as a question asking - "Would you think it wise to pay Russian Roulette?"

I don't actually really want jcustis to play the Russian Roulette game. I wish him well and good health!

I was asking readers to think of a hypothetical thought experiment to illustrate a fault in jcustis's logic and I regret that I have been misunderstood.

The point I was trying to make is that I do want jcustis, and other readers, to think about the foolishness of assuming that "the most likely" outcome will happen and betting your, or someone else's life on an assumption that "the most likely" outcome will always happen.

So my post wasn't an ad hominem attack against jcustis. It was meant to be a vivid explanation of the dangers of anyone gambling with personal security.

Once again my apology if I have been misunderstood.

Dayuhan

10-01-2012, 11:18 PM

But yes the more I think about it, the ship embassy concept looks good to go! :cool:

It was actually meant to be a facetious proposal.

Don't you think a ship, or a desert fortress, would be a wee bit awkward for visa applicants, or for Americans who need a notary stamp or a passport renewal? Are they meant to swim out to the ship, or hire their own helicopters?

What I think you overlook here is that most of what an embassy does involves routine pedestrian functions that require an accessible public interface.

What you suggest would make sense if the primary function of diplomatic service was to assure the safety of diplomats. As with the military, force protection is important, but taking it to a point that compromises the mission is hardly rational.

Peter Dow

10-03-2012, 01:11 AM

It was actually meant to be a facetious proposal.
Well I am serious about advancing the ship embassy proposal but if you don't wish to get the credit for your idea, I won't name you as the author of the proposal.

One joke I did think of would be to call the ship embassy idea "Gunboat Diplomacy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gunboat_diplomacy)". ;)

Don't you think a ship, or a desert fortress, would be a wee bit awkward for visa applicants, or for Americans who need a notary stamp or a passport renewal?
Yes but not as awkward as you imagine.

Are they meant to swim out to the ship, or hire their own helicopters?
Now I know you are being facetious.

What I think you overlook here is that most of what an embassy does involves routine pedestrian functions that require an accessible public interface.

What you suggest would make sense if the primary function of diplomatic service was to assure the safety of diplomats. As with the military, force protection is important, but taking it to a point that compromises the mission is hardly rational.

There are a number of alternative methods of doing business these days which don't involve customer and business ever being in the same building or location. Information can be exchanged by telephone or by internet allowing the embassy officials on ship to provide some services as a mail order company would.

In the case of valuable original customer documents, such as passports, which embassy officials required to have hands-on access to, embassy customers or their couriers could drop those off somewhere secure, at the site of the former embassy perhaps, which could then be sent by secure courier to the embassy ship or fortress, by armoured truck, boat or helicopter, in a diplomatic bag.

Documents could be returned from the embassy ship to the customer by similar methods.

AdamG

10-11-2012, 09:02 PM

They described the second facility as a significant and largely secret complex, housing diplomatic and intelligence personnel. Among their assignments was a high-priority inter-agency program to locate shoulder-fired missiles and other weapons loosed by Libya's 2011 revolution. That program is coordinated by the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/11/usa-libya-annex-idUSL1E8L9E1220121011?type=marketsNews

ganulv

10-16-2012, 07:38 PM

Stan

10-17-2012, 07:03 PM

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/11/usa-libya-annex-idUSL1E8L9E1220121011?type=marketsNews

Hmmm, what to say here without putting my butt into the frying pan :D

Just about every embassy in Africa and in Europe has several of these so-called top secret locations. Actually, they are little more than logistics and admin areas separated from the main building for several obvious reasons. This does not mean to say the security in any of the buildings is intentionally better than the others, and, I suspect, the attackers would never have gone for the admin buildings as they probably had no idea where and what those buildings were. No profile, minions and local staff working there, etc.

On to the SAMs. It was nearly 6 years ago we were offered a cool million for a SAM. Sadly, we don’t have any. Let’s not take this out of context; it’s not cash, it is assistance money and you don’t get to choose what and where. Anyone with 5 minutes on his hands and Google can go to the State dot Gov site and figure out what all that Sierra means (or doesn't).

Be careful who you go to bed with tonite :eek:

Stan

10-17-2012, 07:08 PM

The amazing story of what happened in Libya (http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/the-amazing-story-of-what-happened-in-libya/263597/) | theAtlantic.com (http://www.theatlantic.com/)

“There are real and important diplomatic-security strategy questions to answer going forward (such as why there’s been no mention so far of emergency filter or other masks in the consulate’s safe haven of the sort homeland-security officials once recommended for all Americans at home). But that doesn’t negate that what Secretary Clinton said is right: the ambassador and the others on the ground in Benghazi signed up for a dangerous job, and we should all be so lucky as to have the courage they showed on September 11 and 12.”

Hi Matt !
There are gas masks everywhere and there are many that wouldn’t give you (the instructor) the time of day to even pay attention while teaching them how to employ the mask. Some have bad hair days and others simply will not comply. The locations of the masks, much like the fire extinguishers, are made known to the intended users. As to Secretary Clinton’s statement, I have to agree. Libya has no garden spots left (other than hiding out in the logistics buildings :rolleyes:), and most of those fine (first time) diplomats get to serve in a Sierra hole before they get Paris.

Been out for a long while and will be leaving again shortly. Keep all the others in check and be a PITA (it worked for me for a short while !)

ganulv

10-19-2012, 02:53 PM

Keep all the others in check and be a PITA
Good to hear from you and I can manage the latter, at least!

Been out for a long while and will be leaving again shortly.
Any scuttlebutt for the Mali thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9254&page=4&highlight=mali) before you head back out?

Bill Moore

01-19-2014, 09:20 AM

http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf

Published January 15, 2014

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Review of the Attacks on U.S. Facilities.

Hopefully this report will both raise some concerns with Department of State security practices and quell the endless conspiracy theories. Mistakes were clearly made, but some mistakes have been mis-contributed to intentional action versus the fog of war.

It clearly states there were numerous and substantiated reports of Al-Qaeda linked groups operating in Libya, and the increasing threat they posed to the U.S. facilities. The CIA acted on these threats and beefed up the security at their facilities, while the Ambassodor's request for increased security were not acted upon.

The military was preparing to sending troops, but by the time they were prepared to deploy the folks at Benghazi were long evacuated (that is reality that most people in the military get when you're deploying from a cold start).

It is important to acknowledge at the outset that diplomacy and intelligence collection are inherently risky, and that all risk cannot be eliminated. Diplomatic and intelligence personnel work in high-risk locations all over the world to collect information necessary to prevent future attacks against the United States and our allies. Between 1998 (the year of the terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania) and 2012, 273 significant attacks were carried out against U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel. 1 The need to place personnel in high-risk locations carries significant vulnerabilities for the United States. The committee intends for this report to help increase security and reduce the risks to our personnel serving overseas and to better explain what happened before, during, and after the attacks.

The Committee explored claims that there was a "stand down" order given to the security team at the Annex. Although some members of the security team expressed frustration that they were unable to respond more quickly to the Mission compound, the Committee found no evidence of intentional delay or obstruction by the Chief of Base or any other party. The Annex was the CIA facility, their security personnel did respond as quickly as possible.

The mortar fire was particularly accurate, demonstrating a lethal capability and sophistication that changed the dynamic on the ground that night. According to testimony by the Chief of Base, it was only after this third wave of attacks, when the mortars hit, that he decided it was necessary to evacuate the personnel from the Annex. At least some the attackers were well trained, this clearly wasn't poorly trained militia member casually hip firing a mortar.

FINDING #1: In the months before the attacks on September 11, 2012, the IC provided ample strategic warning that the security situation in eastern Libya was deteriorating and that U.S. facilities and personnel were at risk in Benghazi.

FINDING #2: The State Department should have increased its security posture more significantly in Benghazi based on the deteriorating security situation on the ground and IC threat reporting on the prior attacks against Westerners in Benghazi including two incidents at the Temporary Mission Facility on April 6 and June 6, 2012.

On July 9, 2012, Stevens sent a cable to State Department headquarters
requesting a minimum of 13 "Temporary Duty" (TDY) U.S. security
personnel for Libya, which he said could be made up of DS agents, DoD
Site Security Team (SST) personnel, or some combination of the two.

The State Department never fulfilled this request and, according to Eric Nordstrom, State Department headquarters never responded to the request with a cable.

In an August 16, 2012, cable to State headquarters, Stevens raised
additional concerns about the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi
following an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting held on
August 15, 2012, in Benghazi.

( 1) The Principal Officer "remarked that the security situation in
Benghazi was 'trending negatively"' and "that this daily pattern of
violence would be the 'new normal' for the foreseeable future
(2) A CIA officer "briefed the EAC on the location of approximately ten
Islamist militias and AQ training camps within Benghazi."
(3) The Principal Officer and a CIA officer "expressed concerns with the
lack of host nation security to support the U.S. Mission [facility]."

I'm quite familiar with chaos and confusion in the heat of the moment, but this wasn't that. The red flag was sent up prior to the event more than once and it was ignored. I have a hard time accepting that department leadership ignored their people in harm's way when they requested a modest increase in security. The report later went on to say there was considerable confusion on who had the authority within State to make the decision.

In contrast, the CIA, in response to the same deteriorating security situation and IC threat reporting, consistently upgraded its security posture over the same time period. Specifically, the attack on the British Ambassador's convoy by a rocket-propelled grenade on June 11, 2012, led to a CIA security audit of the Annex. As a result, CIA quickly implemented additional security measures due to the threat of continued attacks against Western personnel in Benghazi.

The Committee has reviewed the allegations that U.S. personnel, including in the IC or DoD, prevented the mounting of any military relief effort during the attacks, but the Committee has not found any of these allegations to be substantiated. The following assets were deployed or in the process of deploying in response to the Benghazi attacks (based on a review of DoD documents and testimony before the Committee):

- one unarmed Predator was diverted to provide surveillance coverage of the Temporary Mission Facility as it was being attacked. This Predator was subsequently replaced by another Predator to enable the first Predator to return to base for refueling
- A seven-person security team (consisting of two DoD personnel, four
CIA personnel, and a linguist) flew from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli to
Benghazi and successfully helped evacuate the Americans from the
Annex to the airport.
- Two FAST teams were ordered to deploy, one for Benghazi, but by the time they were ready, and then add the flight time it would have been too late (post evacuation)
- Special Operations units were ordered to deploy, but they couldn't get there until after the U.S. personnel in Benghazi were evacuated.

JMA

01-19-2014, 12:29 PM

Bill, after the Camp Bastion attack two Marine generals get (effectively) fired.

After this debacle it all gets swept under the carpet.

I keep telling Africans who tell me they are confused by the actions of the US not to worry as they are not nearly as confused as the Americans themselves are.

http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf

Published January 15, 2014

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Review of the Attacks on U.S. Facilities.

Hopefully this report will both raise some concerns with Department of State security practices and quell the endless conspiracy theories. Mistakes were clearly made, but some mistakes have been mis-contributed to intentional action versus the fog of war.

It clearly states there were numerous and substantiated reports of Al-Qaeda linked groups operating in Libya, and the increasing threat they posed to the U.S. facilities. The CIA acted on these threats and beefed up the security at their facilities, while the Ambassodor's request for increased security were not acted upon.

The military was preparing to sending troops, but by the time they were prepared to deploy the folks at Benghazi were long evacuated (that is reality that most people in the military get when you're deploying from a cold start).

The Annex was the CIA facility, their security personnel did respond as quickly as possible.

At least some the attackers were well trained, this clearly wasn't poorly trained militia member casually hip firing a mortar.

I'm quite familiar with chaos and confusion in the heat of the moment, but this wasn't that. The red flag was sent up prior to the event more than once and it was ignored. I have a hard time accepting that department leadership ignored their people in harm's way when they requested a modest increase in security. The report later went on to say there was considerable confusion on who had the authority within State to make the decision.

- Two FAST teams were ordered to deploy, one for Benghazi, but by the time they were ready, and then add the flight time it would have been too late (post evacuation)
- Special Operations units were ordered to deploy, but they couldn't get there until after the U.S. personnel in Benghazi were evacuated.