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Fuchs
10-24-2012, 07:04 PM
The Best Trained, Most Professional Military...Just Lost Two Wars? (http://www.onviolence.com/?e=642)


(...) President Obama has described our military as “the strongest military the world has ever known.”

There’s just one problem with this...

That military just lost two wars in a row.(...)

If our military is so great, why have the last fifty years been so disastrous? (...)

He's got his opinion about this, and it won't come as a huge surprise to the usual suspects in here.

(I don't agree completely.)

Dayuhan
10-24-2012, 10:50 PM
Winning is achieving your objectives. If the selected objectives are not achievable through armed force, or if mission creep shifts the goalposts to a point not achievable by armed force, no military mission will succeed, no matter what level of training and equipment are employed.

The US military is trained and equipped to defeat an opposing armed force. This it has done in the recent wars. When it was asked to build nations and install self-sustaining governments, success was a lot harder to find. These are not tasks that the US military is trained and equipped to pursue, and they are not tasks appropriate for a military force in the first place. Even the world's best hammer makes a very lousy screwdriver.

Not that the training and equipment are perfect (nothing ever is), but IMO the failure to fully achieve goals (call it "defeat" if you must) in recent wars was less due to military deficiency than to the selection of impractical and unrealistic goals that were not achievable by military force in the first place.

tjmc
10-25-2012, 01:54 AM
If "...the failure to fully achieve goals (call it "defeat" if you must) in recent wars was less due to military deficiency than to the selection of impractical and unrealistic goals that were not achievable by military force in the first place." then why didn't anybody say so in the first place?
Was it foreseeable that goals were unacheivable?

Dayuhan
10-25-2012, 04:22 AM
If "...the failure to fully achieve goals (call it "defeat" if you must) in recent wars was less due to military deficiency than to the selection of impractical and unrealistic goals that were not achievable by military force in the first place." then why didn't anybody say so in the first place?
Was it foreseeable that goals were unacheivable?

I recall believing - and writing - before the Iraq war that while defeating Saddam's military forces would be relatively easy, installing a new government and bringing it to a functional level was likely to be a very formidable task for which the US had little effective capacity. I think a fair number of people pointed out that mission creep in Afghanistan and the emergence of "nation-building" roles was handing the military a role that is not trained or equipped to perform.

Obviously nobody listened, but that doesn't mean we can't learn from those mistakes. To learn from them, though, we have to recognize them, and that means recognizing that the root problem is not lack of capacity in the military but the decision to assign the military a set of tasks that are simply not suited to achievement by a military force. The whole concept of "armed nation building" was fatally flawed from the start. My opinion only, of course.

Bill Moore
10-25-2012, 05:36 AM
Dayuhan correctly framed the issue, but to add when it comes to military capability there isn't any other military that comes close. Population centric COIN is a failed approach that the author of the article thinks would work if the military just adapted to it. The fact is the military did adapt to it and results are telling. When it comes to military activities to include engaging with civilians there is no better, but rightly so our core competency is waging and winning battles. In short we do have the world's best military, there is no other military who could have done better in either war (neither of which were lost) given the same policy objectives.

OfTheTroops
10-25-2012, 11:58 AM
Idiot should check the scoreboard. It's a sure sign of ignorance to place these things in a win loss paradigm. Everyone loses its war. But there is a little less evil in some dark corners due to our efforts. We hear this too much. If you don't know keep your mouth shut.:mad:

Fuchs
10-25-2012, 02:56 PM
Everyone loses its war.

Not sure what you mean because of grammar, but the Swiss will want to disagree if my suspicion about what you mean is correct.

@Bill;
he's easily a top tier military affairs analyst if "highly naive" is the worst that can be said about his articles. There's not much shining competition...


I personally don't agree with his idea to about the direction to go (pop-centric COIN) and would if at all rather treat this as a political fight (=deal with those who have influence, don't try to influence millions of people directly).

I do believe he's more right about the "losing" thing, and consider your and dayuhan's position as rather reflexive partisan - especially in the case of Iraq, where the troubles were started more by occupation mistakes than in Afghanistan.

Furthermore I wouldn't place so much trust in the core competence of winning battles. The American way of warfare works well against near-defenceless opposition (at least superficially) and it works well with overwhelming resources. Competence is yet to be demonstrated in battle, and especially so in crisis. The 101st in Bastogne was probably the only U.S. Army ground forces formation that prevailed in a crisis with inferior resources - ever!
That's not much to show for. Too many Kasserines to contrast this with.

The current doctrine and near-total radio comm dependency of the entire army still needs to be proved to be an effective system in a conflict against a great power. I've got my doubts about the viability of the entire concept in such a scenario.

Ken White
10-25-2012, 04:28 PM
...he's easily a top tier military affairs analyst if "highly naive" is the worst that can be said about his articles. There's not much shining competition...Agree there's little competition but believe that naivete is dangerous. Being intelligent, articulate and passionate does not bestow competence.
I personally don't agree with his idea to about the direction to go (pop-centric COIN) and would if at all rather treat this as a political fight (=deal with those who have influence, don't try to influence millions of people directly).Agreed.
I do believe he's more right about the "losing" thing, and consider your and dayuhan's position as rather reflexive partisan - especially in the case of Iraq, where the troubles were started more by occupation mistakes than in Afghanistan.Also agree. We are victims of our own propaganda and are not nearly as good as we could be or should be.

It should be noted though that we are as competent as most want us to be -- and allow us to be. Fortunately, that's generally been adequate and competitors have all had their own problems -- political and military... :wry:
Furthermore I wouldn't place so much trust in the core competence of winning battles. The American way of warfare works well against near-defenceless opposition (at least superficially) and it works well with overwhelming resources. Competence is yet to be demonstrated in battle, and especially so in crisis. The 101st in Bastogne was probably the only U.S. Army ground forces formation that prevailed in a crisis with inferior resources - ever!That's not totally correct. Just in the past century from WW I's 'Lost Battalion' and Belleau Wood to the failed defense of Bataan and numerous smaller actions in WW II -- the 101st may be the most notable in the Ardennes but there were other units that did well at the time against the odds. Add the 1st Marine Division at the Reservoir in Korea to dozens of smaller battles in both Korea and Viet Nam as well as some more recent examples. That said, while your statement omits a bunch of successes, it is broadly correct -- like all Armies, we've had more failures than successes. Thus OfTheTroops comment; no one wins -- and even the Swiss lost a few, not least Bicocca...
The current doctrine and near-total radio comm dependency of the entire army still needs to be proved to be an effective system in a conflict against a great power. I've got my doubts about the viability of the entire concept in such a scenario.Me too. Doubts that is; we are far too technology, mass and firepower reliant. That's mostly due simply to the fact that we can provide those things (currently, anyway...) and accordingly have been unwilling to properly invest in, train and educate our forces. Dumb way to do business but Congress likes it. :rolleyes:

Firn
10-25-2012, 06:29 PM
That's not totally correct. Just in the past century from WW I's 'Lost Battalion' and Belleau Wood to the failed defense of Bataan and numerous smaller actions in WW II -- the 101st may be the most notable in the Ardennes but there were other units that did well at the time against the odds. Add the 1st Marine Division at the Reservoir in Korea to dozens of smaller battles in both Korea and Viet Nam as well as some more recent examples. That said, while your statement omits a bunch of successes, it is broadly correct -- like all Armies, we've had more failures than successes.

Thus OfTheTroops comment; no one wins -- and even the Swiss lost a few, not least Bicocca...Me too. Doubts that is; we are far too technology, mass and firepower reliant. That's mostly due simply to the fact that we can provide those things (currently, anyway...) and accordingly have been unwilling to properly invest in, train and educate our forces. Dumb way to do business but Congress likes it. :rolleyes:

As most things it is mostly a grey affair but I think is always important to show the links between the society and the ressources it provides and it's military forces. There is nothing deterministic in those links but there is certainly a strong tendency in them.

The great nomadic societies of the vast Eurasian steps tended of course to field highly mobile forces almost all horsed. But the degree of skill and capability as well as the mix between armored and light, lancers and archers or combined differed greatly. To a similar degree it was natural that the famous Swiss had little heavily armored knights and little artillery but were mostly lightly armored infantry. But it was not at all given that they would become often very competent at a tactical and operational level. (There would be a lot of interesting details to add but I will leave it there)

So it is quite logical that the US military enjoys a great endowment of capital (ressources) and technology per capita combined with a specific human capital pool. Obviously this was and is just the starting point and usually the US stepped up in other departments when there was a dire need.

Fuchs
10-25-2012, 06:35 PM
Wait, so when the U.S.military trumps over say, the miniscule Panamanian Forces, it's the greatest military on earth.

Yet when if fails this can be excused with 'others fail as well', completely ignoring that budget-wise it's almost the sum of all 'others'?!?

Firn
10-25-2012, 06:41 PM
Wait, so when the U.S.military trumps over say, the miniscule Panamanian Forces, it's the greatest military on earth.

Yet when if fails this can be excused with 'others fail as well', completely ignoring that budget-wise it's almost the sum of all 'others'?!?

I don't know if this is directed at my post. Anyway is the question about the 'greatest' bit about absolute capability - or efficiency with the relationship between in- and output in mind?

The type of conflict is of course also of great importance because industrial might might be more easily recruited and applied or 'converted' into military effectivness at one end of the scale.

ganulv
10-25-2012, 06:48 PM
we are far too technology, mass and firepower reliant. That's mostly due simply to the fact that we can provide those things (currently, anyway...) and accordingly have been unwilling to properly invest in, train and educate our forces.I don’t know if this question can be addressed in short answer form, and I realize that the answer entails also addressing the question, “What are they expected to be able to do?”, but here it is just in case: what would forces adequately invested in, trained, and educated look like as compared to those currently in existence?

Michael C
10-25-2012, 09:10 PM
One of the more popular posts on the Small War Council asks, "What can we do to keep the SWJ relevant?" Maybe the answer for the SWJ council is, "Quit insulting each other."

I stopped posting on here because people like Bill Moore and "Of the Troops" immediately descend to calling me an idiot or the author of "highly naive articles and this is just another one to add to the compost pile." As a result, I only check the council side when someone links to my article. As usual, most of the "discussion" chooses to personally attack me and avoid the argument.

You gentlemen stay classy.

Dayuhan
10-26-2012, 12:46 AM
As usual, most of the "discussion" chooses to personally attack me and avoid the argument.

I don't think the argument has much substance, and I've never been in the military or involved with it in any way.

To use your own athletic metaphor, sending an army to "do state-building" is like sending an ice hockey team into a basketball game... and then of course blaming them for committing fouls.

This is not just a question of failure to prepare for irregular war or post cold war conflict. The military is perfectly correct to point out that it should not be used for "state building". That's simply not a military function from the start. If you order an engineer to perform surgery, don't blame the engineer if the patient dies.

"Pop-centric COIN" is an abortion of an idea that's based on unsustainable assumptions and programmed to fail from the start. Blaming failure to achieve the goals on inability to execute the strategy is like ordering someone to ride a unicycle up K2 and blaming the rider for the consequent failure.

I wouldn't say the military is completely devoid of responsibility (the world "blame" is really to infantile to be in the discussion at all), and I don't think anyone here would make that claim: certainly there's been an enormous amount of discussion of military shortcomings here. I don't see any point, though, in focusing on that degree of responsibility to an extent that ignores the massive shortcomings on the policy level.

Winning is achieving your objectives. The first step toward winning is selecting a clear, practical, achievable set of objectives and defending them against mission creep. This is not a military function, and if this step gets botched the job of everyone down the line, from the strategic level down to the tactical, gets infinitely more complex.

All the talk we hear of increased complexity stems to me less from any inherent complexity of the situations than from the complexity we impose by adopting vague, ephemeral, impractical goals and pursuing those goals using inappropriate tools and methods.

Ken White
10-26-2012, 01:08 AM
Wait, so when the U.S.military trumps over say, the miniscule Panamanian Forces, it's the greatest military on earth.I've NEVER said or written that the US Military was very good, much less great -- or even far less, the greatest on Earth. I have frequently written that both the German Army and the Commonwealth Armies train to a better standard than do we. I've also harped on our poor state of training for years.

As an aside, the Panama operation won by sheer mass; the number of screw ups there and the flaky actions by too many senior people would have been diastrous had that mass not been present. No trump or triumph there, just heavyweight steamrolling. :rolleyes:
Yet when if fails this can be excused with 'others fail as well', completely ignoring that budget-wise it's almost the sum of all 'others'?!?I did not and am not excusing anything -- I am pointing out that military failure is universal simply because warfare is unpredictable. All forces win some and lose some -- and again, we've lost more than we should have.

I also pointed out indirectly that a big part of our problem is just what you mention in your last sentence here. We have too much money and that encourages waste -- and inefficiency; that leads to poor performance.

I'm not a Tom Ricks fan but he's got it right on mediocre generals -- and they are a reflection of our personnel policies, many of which are dictated by the Congress (particularly with respect to Officers...). That is not an excuse, it is a complaint.

Ken White
10-26-2012, 01:45 AM
I don’t know if this question can be addressed in short answer form, and I realize that the answer entails also addressing the question, “What are they expected to be able to do?”, but here it is just in case: what would forces adequately invested in, trained, and educated look like as compared to those currently in existence?""""They'd have less money. The American solution of throwing money at a problem instead of fixing it has not worked with Education, Medical care -- or the Armed Forces.

For the active forces, there would be fewer people, they'd be a bit older (and thus, hopefully, a bit more mature) and would spend a bout one and half to twice as much time in institutional training staffed by selected Trainers with demonstrated expertise in subject matter and instructing. They would stay in the same units for years and their equipment fit would be a little different -- much of it to allow sea and land basing but rapid reaction to crisis area movement (we pay lip service to that but do not really want to do it -- too much uncertainty and careers might be damaged...). All would have spent some time in Reserve Units before being ALLOWED to enter the active force.

The Reserve Forces OTOH would very much resemble those of today but would be about 50% larger -- they would provide the mass and base for expansion if needed for a major war.

Movement between the two forces, active and reserve would be simplified. Personnel policies that over emphasize 'fairness' and 'objectivity' in selection criteria; 'everyone a generalist * ,' and the very mistaken idea that all persons of like education and experience are equally capable and can perform any job for that rank -- a structure, process and system that needs a MAJOR overhaul so we stop promoting based on 'potential' and being forced to reward decent performance with a promotion until the Peter Principle takes hold -- would disappear...""""

Then the Bwaa-ha-ha-ha-ha-hah from the Capitol and Five Sided Funny Farm in DC woke me up and I fell on my Lance. Sancho laughed and laughed.. :D

* That 'generalist' stuff and excessive rotation of personnel exist not to better train the force but to make assignments and finding square pegs to put in round holes easy for the Personnel bureaucracy. The unnecessary costs of that approach adversely impact the expansion of needed training; that lack of comprehensive training leads to mistrust of subordinates and reluctance to undertake any complex operations. The training process needs to ditch the Tasks, Conditions and Standards approach that limit abilities to aggregate and combine tasks to accomplish a mission; we need Outcome Based Training and Eduction.

Bill Moore
10-26-2012, 03:39 AM
Posted by Fuchs


personally don't agree with his idea to about the direction to go (pop-centric COIN) and would if at all rather treat this as a political fight (=deal with those who have influence, don't try to influence millions of people directly).

Agreed


I do believe he's more right about the "losing" thing, and consider your and dayuhan's position as rather reflexive partisan - especially in the case of Iraq, where the troubles were started more by occupation mistakes than in Afghanistan.

I differ with you here, because the author attempted without providing any supporting evidence to conflate military competence with losing strategies/policies. Sen McCain is absolutely correct when he said we have the world's best military, but that doesn't mean it will achieve national objectives if the objectives and policies are based on fantasy, or conditions exist that are well beyond a military solution. From a strictly military capability stand point we currently have the best the military in the world. There may smaller militaries that are more tactically proficient, but they are too small to overcome our mass and technological advantages in a battle (a war is different if they can survive long enough to counter our strategy). Ken is absolutely right that we could be much better if we revamped our training programs, but despite our numerous shortfalls we are still quite capable. On the other hand, our ability to develop a winning strategy is another matter altogether.

As for losing, the only one we lost is Vietnam and even calling that one a loss is debatable. We debated that enough in other forums, so we may just have to agree to disagree, but more importantly if we listened to our military experts who were familiar with the situation we wouldn't have gotten involved in the first place.

I take issue with the assertion that great armies can't be defeated. Other great armies have been defeated, the British were the best Army in the world when our colonalists defeated them, and after they were defeated they were still the best military in the world. If the British felt it was worth it and if they were willing to employ their full might against our citizens they would have won (opinion obviously), but fortunately they weren't, much like we weren't prepared to do what was necessary to win militarily in Vietnam. The Germans probably had the world's best army when WWII started, but they over extended themselves and made a few other strategic errors, but that doesn't take away from their military competence. I'm not trying to be defensive, but I think it is important to point out there is a difference between having a great military and having a great strategy. Great armies/militaries can be defeated by lesser foes if they have a better strategy, or in some cases if the better military is following such a flawed strategy it ends up defeating itself.


Furthermore I wouldn't place so much trust in the core competence of winning battles. The American way of warfare works well against near-defenceless opposition (at least superficially) and it works well with overwhelming resources.

Actually quite the opposite, we're very good at defeating miliaries that have capable defenses. They provide us targets that we well suited to destroy. I agree with the second part of your sentence, we do rely on overwhelming resources, and that may be one reason we're so bad at strategy? We don't think we need to out think our adversary if we can out muscle him. Unfortunately we do rely on industrial age strategy to mass firepower on alleged centers of gravity with large forces that are enabled with information technology. I agree we have a lot of room to increase our sophistication when it comes to strategy, yet it seems the desire for ever larger forces instead of new ways of fighting still dominates our discussion despite guidance to do otherwise. It is important to note that the Pop Centric approach requires excessively large ground forces to implement.

Fuchs
10-26-2012, 08:25 AM
Why do you think we did so well during Desert Storm and in Panama? Clearly defined and feasible military objectives.

"No competent and motivated opposition" did certainly kind of help.


I've got a standard example which I use to disrupt others' confidence in their nation's military - including my countries':

The Italians wiped the floor with the Abbessinians in 1936.
The British and ANZACs wiped the floor with said Italians in 1940.
The Germans wiped the floor with said British in 1941.


The invasion of Panama says about as much about the U.S. military's competence as the invasion of Denmark, and if you look very much at logistics, of Norway in 1940. The real test of competence for the German army was France, though. The U.S. military had no such test. Its major victories came to being with vastly superior, not about equal, resources.

For this reason I withhold final judgement of the U.S.ground forces' actual (relative) competence even for what's called conventional warfare. Their way of war and especially their love for gold plating and radio comms is dubious.


Bill; show me American ground troops fighting against well-armed opposition and we'll see whether this ability to destroy isn't overcompensated by an inability to survive in face of such an opposition.
I understand American army troops pride themselves in their supposedly unique quality at shattering formations, but this self-image appears to found almost entirely on fighting demoralised and 1970's monkey-model-equipped Iraqis.

Bill Moore
10-27-2012, 04:27 AM
Fuchs wrote,


The real test of competence for the German army was France, though. The U.S. military had no such test. Its major victories came to being with vastly superior, not about equal, resources.

For this reason I withhold final judgement of the U.S.ground forces' actual (relative) competence even for what's called conventional warfare. Their way of war and especially their love for gold plating and radio comms is dubious.

Bill; show me American ground troops fighting against well-armed opposition and we'll see whether this ability to destroy isn't overcompensated by an inability to survive in face of such an opposition.
I understand American army troops pride themselves in their supposedly unique quality at shattering formations, but this self-image appears to found almost entirely on fighting demoralised and 1970's monkey-model-equipped Iraqis.

If you're talking post Korea it is difficult, but I think an argument can be made that the US Army proved its ability to endure against a potentially superior force during the Battle of Ia Drang in 1965. Some may have some valid arguments to counter argue this.

It seems the fact of the matter is we simply haven't had a hard test in the past few decades, but I'm not sure what nation could test us in a conventional battle based on our current technological dominance? Obviously irregular warfare is a different animal altogether.

Dayuhan
10-27-2012, 05:36 AM
"Best in the world" isn't a measure of absolute capability or competence, it's a measure of relative capability and competence. What military would anyone say is better, and on what basis?

Certainly there's room for improvement, as there always is, but I'm not sure we should be pursuing improvement in pop-centric COIN or state-building, tasks that are likely to degrade competence at core military functions. If we really want to run about building states - and I can't see why we should - it's time to develop a specific non-military state building capacity, in which the military's only functions would be providing security and training corresponding military forces.

Entropy
10-27-2012, 06:10 AM
show me American ground troops fighting against well-armed opposition and we'll see whether this ability to destroy isn't overcompensated by an inability to survive in face of such an opposition.
I understand American army troops pride themselves in their supposedly unique quality at shattering formations, but this self-image appears to found almost entirely on fighting demoralised and 1970's monkey-model-equipped Iraqis.

Yes, the American force in Desert Storm outclassed the Iraqi's. Still, I think the American forces did a lot better than most expected. The fact that more American troops were killed in accidents than in combat losses (115 total US combat KIA compared to ~25,000 Iraqis) tells me that one can't simply write off the success of that campaign as merely the product of superior resources and an incompetent enemy.

You're right, though, that the US hasn't fought a peer force for a long time. I, for one, hope that is a"test" we never have to take. Also, I suspect that any "peer force" we'd fight would love their radio comms as much as we do.

JMA
10-27-2012, 07:45 AM
Yes, the American force in Desert Storm outclassed the Iraqi's. Still, I think the American forces did a lot better than most expected. The fact that more American troops were killed in accidents than in combat losses (115 total US combat KIA compared to ~25,000 Iraqis) tells me that one can't simply write off the success of that campaign as merely the product of superior resources and an incompetent enemy.

Been there done that... and yes I agree.

Not sure who expected a lesser result? The smart people knew it was going to be a walk over (especially because of US control if the seas allowing safe and secure LoC).

That is the way the US knows how to fight... by applying overwhelming force to a lesser (in all respects) force. The key here is that at division and maybe brigade level is where the US operates best. Below that all bets are off - as seen by outsiders. US special forces are obviously world class and that offers a ray of hope. But the competence gap between small teams of SF and a convention bde or div is just too great in any form of insurgency war.

JMA
10-27-2012, 09:10 AM
"No competent and motivated opposition" did certainly kind of help.

I've got a standard example which I use to disrupt others' confidence in their nation's military - including my countries':

The Italians wiped the floor with the Abbessinians in 1936.
The British and ANZACs wiped the floor with said Italians in 1940.
The Germans wiped the floor with said British in 1941.

The invasion of Panama says about as much about the U.S. military's competence as the invasion of Denmark, and if you look very much at logistics, of Norway in 1940. The real test of competence for the German army was France, though. The U.S. military had no such test. Its major victories came to being with vastly superior, not about equal, resources.

For this reason I withhold final judgement of the U.S.ground forces' actual (relative) competence even for what's called conventional warfare. Their way of war and especially their love for gold plating and radio comms is dubious.

Bill; show me American ground troops fighting against well-armed opposition and we'll see whether this ability to destroy isn't overcompensated by an inability to survive in face of such an opposition.
I understand American army troops pride themselves in their supposedly unique quality at shattering formations, but this self-image appears to found almost entirely on fighting demoralised and 1970's monkey-model-equipped Iraqis.

Fuchs, historically the German military machine was indeed quite outstanding. Better you leave it there than to cherry pick examples to try to make your point. The end result of arrogant national politics and military strategy led to a crushing military defeat in the field of an increasingly outnumbered and logistically deprived army. German humiliation did not stop at the destruction of their once fine military but extended to the national humiliation of the rape of their women on an industrial scale (reminiscent of the middle ages).

This constant harping on about the lack or peer level opponents - meaning Germans - no longer has any meaning. The German military record is merely historical and will never be repeated. There are many valuable lessons that can be (and should be) learned from the German military history but this continuing innuendo about German military prowess - which is now long gone - serves no purpose today especially with the reported poor performance of German troops in Afghanistan.

The US remains vulnerable in terms of 'mass' coming from potentially China and to a lesser extent Russia. Other than that who could threaten a US force in conventional terms?

The US and all western armies remain vulnerable to insurgencies where the self imposed restrictions provide a level playing field for semi-trained insurgents armed with AK-47s and a few RPGs.

How to win against an insurgency? Read Edward Luttwak.

Fuchs
10-27-2012, 11:10 AM
There's always the possibility that one country comes close to a perfect storm and gets very much right in the art of war for some time.

Look at the early 18th century and the French will impress, 2nd half of the same century and the Prussians will impress, early 19th century French, late 19th century Prussians, early 20 century Germans, late 20th century supposedly Americans.
Now the question is about who's going to be next and why should we pay attention to who got it right in a paradigm long gone?


It's a professional obligation of military leaders to strive for being "the next". I doubt that the NATO powers got what it takes to excel beyond what you'd expect of them due to their budgets.
People are way too content, and disappointments in small wars merely push them to the edge where they reaffirm their belief that they'd get it right if it was only about a great war.

Too bad, history tells me that many people have been wrong in such a belief already. Take Prussia after Valmy, for example.

ganulv
10-27-2012, 12:45 PM
The fact that more American troops were killed in accidents than in combat losses (115 total US combat KIA compared to ~25,000 Iraqis) tells me that one can't simply write off the success of that campaign as merely the product of superior resources and an incompetent enemy.
How might things have looked had the U.S. been allowed five weeks rather than five months for the buildup?

Entropy
10-27-2012, 01:22 PM
Not sure who expected a lesser result? The smart people knew it was going to be a walk over (especially because of US control if the seas allowing safe and secure LoC).


Yes, I agree the smart people knew we would soundly defeat the Iraqis (I was in college at the time and ignorant on military topics, so I certainly wasn't one of the smart ones). My point is one of degree - I don't think many of those smart people thought the defeat would be as decisive as it turned out to be. I think this is reflected in the casualty numbers. The degree to which we bested the Iraqis says something about our competence at that time (I think a lot of that competence is gone thanks to ten years of fighting insurgents).


How might things have looked had the U.S. been allowed five weeks rather than five months for the buildup?

I'm sure we could come up with a multitude of "what-ifs" and counter-factuals, but in this case I wonder where a five-week limitation would come from?

There certainly was a danger that Iraqi forces could have pressed into Saudi when there were only the Saudis and (if I remember correctly), the 82nd and some aircraft there to stop them.

Ken White
10-27-2012, 02:59 PM
That is the way the US knows how to fight... by applying overwhelming force to a lesser (in all respects) force. The key here is that at division and maybe brigade level is where the US operates best. Below that all bets are off - as seen by outsiders. US special forces are obviously world class and that offers a ray of hope. But the competence gap between small teams of SF and a convention bde or div is just too great in any form of insurgency war.While you are absolutely correct in the main, that isn't totally true; there are varied and changing units (due to the vagaries of personnel rotations) that operate competently. There are just far too few of them and the pattern of change and competence is essentially unpredictable.

While that variance has always been true to an extent -- and will always be -- the percentage of less competent units is now several orders of magnitude larger than it has historically been. That is due almost totally to the terribly flawed BTMS -- Task, condition and Standard -- individual training model. The troops learn to do some tasks quite well but other important tasks are not well taught (many due to having a low initial pass rate, thus making the trainers look bad) and the troops do not learn how to integrate and combine those tasks for combat. A flawed and excessive rotation of individuals dependent personnel system does not help -- though it does provide jobs for a lot of personnel folks...:rolleyes:

There are Officer and NCO competence problems as well but they mostly result from the same training process flaw with an added unintended consequence of a personnel system that for them significantly over emphasizes 'fairness' and 'objectivity' in selection criteria and that seems to believe all people of like rank are equally competent. That is not true, never has been and never will be. :mad:

It should also be noted that until the early 1980s, movement of Officers and and NCOs between conventional and SOF units was quite common. As the 'new' training system took hold, the SOF guys very quickly insulated (isolated ? ) themselves in order to achieve and maintain a little 'purity.' Equally noteworthy is that they are not forced to use that flawed training model and that attempts to export elements of their training process to the broader Army in the past few years have been stoutly resisted -- by both communities... :eek:

We have major systemic flaws; little will change until the entire 'system' is revamped. Tom Ricks is right for a change, the Generals are a big part of the problem, no question -- but they are far from solely responsible; who, after all, approves their selection...

Surferbeetle
10-27-2012, 03:10 PM
The Rolling Stones -- Doom And Gloom (Lyric Video), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rPFGWVKXxm0


...the mechanics of the global kill chain continues to evolve and although Mars may take a breather or change weapons from time to time, he isn't going anywhere...

SAC (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Air_Command), ICBM (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICBM), Trident (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fleet_Ballistic_Missile), and...

http://itmakessenseblog.com/files/2012/07/Drones.jpg

Ken White
10-27-2012, 03:16 PM
Contrary to some assertions here, we have a history of doing just that -- the Pols and the Generals screw it up and the Kids pull their fat out of the fire. That was true in times past, that was true in WWI and WW II, in Korea, in Viet Nam, in DS/DS and in Afghanistan and Iraq. We ain't great; we are adequate.
The degree to which we bested the Iraqis says something about our competence at that time (I think a lot of that competence is gone thanks to ten years of fighting insurgents).True dat...
I'm sure we could come up with a multitude of "what-ifs" and counter-factuals, but in this case I wonder where a five-week limitation would come from?

There certainly was a danger that Iraqi forces could have pressed into Saudi when there were only the Saudis and (if I remember correctly), the 82nd and some aircraft there to stop them.As one thoroughly involved at the time, admittedly personally all stateside, DS/DS would've been a bit more difficult, we would've had a few more casualties and it would have taken a bit longer but the result would've been pretty much the same.

As is and has often been the case, we're far from perfect -- but our opponents historically and over 200 plus years -- have always been either militarily or politically even less competent. It is no particular accident that our own Civil War was one of our longer wars and produced more casualties and losses than any others. ;)

Bob's World
10-28-2012, 12:15 PM
America is a nation with many competitors. In fact, arguably everything not American, be it state or non-state, is in competition with the US. That is as it should be. Competing with powerful states possessed with a sense of "right" and "righteousness" to rule or dominate wide areas beyond their borders is how America herself rose to power. When our competitors stubbornly clung to obsolete positions and expended their waning strength in the process it served to accelerate our rise.

Today it is America clinging to obsolete positions, and it is America that expends its waning (relative) strength in the process. We have grown so used to the idea that competitors can be "contained" or simply directed (backed by the force of our wealth and military power) to act in the manner we deem appropriate that we appear to find it beneath us to simply roll up our sleeves once again and compete.

To blame the military for "losing" wars that are not truly wars (we easily won the war parts, it was the subsequent policy aspects of clinging to old policies and refusal to recognize change, while employing the military to somehow enforce such inappropriate positions to work that challenged our forces. The largest failing of the military was their dog-like loyalty to continue to play, to continue to chase that ball, until they collapsed in exhaustion. Good dogs don't tell their masters to stop throwing the ball, and good masters don't need to be told.

What are the existential threats to the US today and into the foreseeable future?? By and large, these are not military problems. We need to reframe how we see ourselves and how we see the world. We need to stop resisting the resistance, and decide once again to compete.

But first we must tone down the ideological mantra that shapes our current policies and that hinders the ability of US citizens, companies, as well as our official policies, to compete effectively in the current environment. This not all that hard, after all, it is primarily a return to what got us where we are, and an abandonment of what we have adopted to stay there. The ideas and motivations that fueled our rise are far superior to those that we have applied to stifle the competition of others to stay on top.

The principle of the right of self-determination of governance for all is far superior to the belief that all should embrace some form of US-like democracy.

Appreciate that values are rooted in history and culture, and that while the US history an culture is not evil, to push the values born of it too aggressively onto others certainly is.

Look hard at corruption laws that drive US business to either stay home or simply abandon the US altogether to avoid harsh rules and penalties that no other nation emposes upon their citizens that dare to go out and seek international opportunities. (Watch an episode of "Jungle Gold" about the raw world of gold mining in Ghana for a glimpse at just one aspect of this as armed Chinese operations dominate the scene)

We are in a confused place as a nation. Just listening to the rhetoric of the current Presidential contest gives clear evidence of that. One candidate calling for a doubling down on the perceived successful approaches of a past that no longer exists, while the other recognizes change must happen, but has yet to map out for anyone what our approach to that might actually look like. In the mean time we rely heavily on CT, sanctions and excessive military postures to attempt to slow the change until we figure things out.

To frame this as our military "losing two wars" is far too narrow and symptomatic of a viewpoint to help us truly fix what ails us.

Surferbeetle
10-28-2012, 03:18 PM
...hang on....:wry:

Creative destruction, From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creative_destruction


Creative destruction, sometimes known as Schumpeter's gale, is a term in economics which has since the 1950s become most readily identified with the Austrian American economist Joseph Schumpeter,[1] who adapted it from the work of Karl Marx and popularized it as a theory of economic innovation and the business cycle. The term is derived from Marxist economic theory, where it refers to the linked processes of the accumulation and annihilation of wealth under capitalism. These processes were first described in The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels, 1848)[2] and were expanded in Marx's Grundrisse (1857)[3] and "Volume IV" (1863) of Das Kapital.[4]

At its most basic, "creative destruction" (German: schpferische Zerstrung) describes the way in which capitalist economic development arises out of the destruction of some prior economic order, and this is largely the sense implied by the German Marxist sociologist Werner Sombart who has been credited[1] with the first use of these terms in his work Krieg und Kapitalismus ("War and Capitalism", 1913).[5] In the earlier work of Marx, however, the idea of creative destruction or annihilation (German: Vernichtung) implies not only that capitalism destroys and reconfigures previous economic orders, but also that it must ceaselessly devalue existing wealth (whether through war, dereliction, or regular and periodic economic crises) in order to clear the ground for the creation of new wealth.[2][3][4]


In philosophical terms, the concept of "creative destruction" is close to Hegels concept of sublation. In German economic discourse it was taken up from Marx's writings by Werner Sombart, particularly in his 1913 text Krieg und Kapitalismus:[14]

Again, however, from destruction a new spirit of creation arises; the scarcity of wood and the needs of everyday life... forced the discovery or invention of substitutes for wood, forced the use of coal for heating, forced the invention of coke for the production of iron.

It has been argued that Sombart's formulation of the concept was influenced by Eastern mysticism, specifically the image of the Hindu god Shiva, who is presented in the paradoxical aspect of simultaneous destroyer and creator.[1] Conceivably this influence passed from Johann Gottfried Herder, who brought Hindu thought to German philosophy in his Philosophy of Human History (Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit) (Herder 179092), specifically volume III, pp. 4164.[1] via Arthur Schopenhauer and the Orientalist Friedrich Maier through Friedrich Nietzsches writings. Nietzsche represented the creative destruction of modernity through the mythical figure of Dionysus, a figure whom he saw as at one and the same time "destructively creative" and "creatively destructive".[15]

Fuchs
10-28-2012, 04:28 PM
America is a nation with many competitors. In fact, arguably everything not American, be it state or non-state, is in competition with the US.

I'll tell him once I meet the next farmer from Malawi.


Seriously, you added a lot to the more usual US-centric view here.
Your statement would be trivial if true, for it could then just as well be said that everything not Turkish is in competition with Turkey.

Bob's World
10-28-2012, 05:26 PM
I'll tell him once I meet the next farmer from Malawi.


Seriously, you added a lot to the more usual US-centric view here.
Your statement would be trivial if true, for it could then just as well be said that everything not Turkish is in competition with Turkey.

Fuchs,

Somehow I doubt you spend much time chatting with farmers anywhere, yet alone in Malawi. But you miss my point. It is not that everyone is out the get the US, it is that everyone everywhere is in competition with each other. We are part of that competition.

The US didn't shed any tears for the UK when we nudged past them during WWII, nor would the UK shed any tears for the US if the situation were reversed. This is not about "allies" and "enemies," or "friends" and "threats." It is about competition. Those in power tend to set up systems to suppress the competition of others and to provide advantages to themselves. Spain did this, France did this, the UK did this, and the US has done this in its own way as well. Just as an example. Same applies to all nations. Increasingly their are major players who are not nations at all, and who have a flexibility of loyalty that is particularly frustrating to an American approach to foreign policy that is so emotional rather than pragmatic.

My point is that we need to stop whining and lashing out at those seeking their own best futures in ways that circumvent, by-pass or ignore our carefully crafted systems of obstacles that have been rendered as obsolete and irrelevant as the Maginot line by the emerging global geo-economic / political reality. Instead we need to put on our big boy pants and come up with a new understanding and new approaches for competing more effectively in the world as it is, not as we wish it was.

Bill Moore
10-28-2012, 05:52 PM
Posted by Bob's World


Today it is America clinging to obsolete positions, and it is America that expends its waning (relative) strength in the process.

Some are, but it seems most of our national policy statements address the significant strategic level geopolitical changes taking place beneath our feet, but perhaps they fail in describing how we should adapt to them? The author of the article that starting this thread pushed for a U.S. military capability to conduct "population-centric" COIN, which in my view equates to your comment:


Appreciate that values are rooted in history and culture, and that while the US history an culture is not evil, to push the values born of it too aggressively onto others certainly is.

Of course we can't see past ourselves so we don't understand why there are so many strong antibodies against us pushing our values. Yet when the communists, many of them sincere in their belief they had the best system, pushed and often imposed their system upon others we clearly saw that as an evil that needed to be fought.


What are the existential threats to the US today and into the foreseeable future?? By and large, these are not military problems. We need to reframe how we see ourselves and how we see the world. We need to stop resisting the resistance, and decide once again to compete.

There is some truth to this, and I think that is the way we're drifting towards. OEF-A and OIF were aberrations that took off this path (at least the way we conducted them), which is why I'm strongly opposed to transforming the military to fight these types of wars. The return on investment is negative to the extreme.


But first we must tone down the ideological mantra that shapes our current policies and that hinders the ability of US citizens, companies, as well as our official policies, to compete effectively in the current environment.

What ideological policies prevent us from competing at the business level? The only one I can think of is our outdated policy concerning Cuba. The ban on doing business with Iran is not ideological, but defensive in nature. There are a number of ideological policies that prevent us from competing effectively for influence at the government level.


We are in a confused place as a nation. Just listening to the rhetoric of the current Presidential contest gives clear evidence of that. One candidate calling for a doubling down on the perceived successful approaches of a past that no longer exists, while the other recognizes change must happen, but has yet to map out for anyone what our approach to that might actually look like. In the mean time we rely heavily on CT, sanctions and excessive military postures to attempt to slow the change until we figure things out.

Generally agree, but this also ties into Surferbeetle's comment on creative destruction. We are a strong and resilient nation, and in some ways that can be negative because most realize we need to change, but because we're so strong we don't have to change. It may come down to either a soft landing (if we effectively get in front of the needed change and direct it), or a hard landing if wait until the current system fails.

Bob's World
10-28-2012, 06:54 PM
The example of a value-based law that absolutely cripples the ability of US business to compete overseas is the anti-corruption laws. The rules are incredibly vague and impossible to ensure compliance with, and the penalties are so severe as to risk a death penalty on a business found out of compliance.

State Department has a zero tolerance position on "corruption." Very well intended, but as a successful business owner pointed out in a discussion with State officials I attended last year "that in many places corruption is how many places do taxation where formal taxation does not exist." He also pointed out that "I don't see US business people when I go overseas. I see them from every other country, but by and large US capital is too fearful of being nailed for corruption to even participate at all." Unsaid, of course, was that to strike a deal in many places, what is seen as corruption under US law is simply seen as a standard business practice by many others.

When US entrepreneurs outmaneuvered the UK for rights to develop Saudi oil there were no such constraints in place. Today more pragmatic countries are cutting deals and moving forward, while US capital is either fleeing or to too scared to be employed.

We need to get off of our moral high-horse and stop expecting everyone else to play by rules designed by us, for us. They are playing by their own rules now, and the only ones being truly hurt by our rules now are ourselves.

JMA
10-28-2012, 07:04 PM
To blame the military for "losing" wars that are not truly wars (we easily won the war parts, it was the subsequent policy aspects of clinging to old policies and refusal to recognize change, while employing the military to somehow enforce such inappropriate positions to work that challenged our forces. The largest failing of the military was their dog-like loyalty to continue to play, to continue to chase that ball, until they collapsed in exhaustion. Good dogs don't tell their masters to stop throwing the ball, and good masters don't need to be told.

Yes, these losing wars claims are quite provocative hence my comment to the author that he should not run to mommy if he gets an aggressive response when he posts this sort of nonsense.

So where in your opinion does moral courage or the lack thereof play a part in all this?

JMA
10-28-2012, 07:10 PM
We need to get off of our moral high-horse and stop expecting everyone else to play by rules designed by us, for us. They are playing by their own rules now, and the only ones being truly hurt by our rules now are ourselves.

Come on Bob this is silly.

The US had its chance force moral conditions on the world when the Soviet Union collapsed but failed.

The rapacious greed of US corporations needed to be tamed and to the credit of the US it has done well in that regard. But leaving the back door open for the scum of the earth to enter was not smart. You had your chance and you blew it.

Bob's World
10-28-2012, 10:07 PM
Moral Courage is a hard thing to define, but we all know it when we see it.

Have many senior leaders opted to "go along to get along"? Absolutely. Actually that is prevalent across the ranks. But one has to temper that with the realization that as an institution our military really just does not understand the nature of this type of conflict. We are far too blinded by the inertia of what the force was actually trained, organized and equipped to do; an inability to adapt the lessons learned from historic conflicts that were similar in nature to the realities of our own current mission, interests and the world we live in today; and the complete subjugation of military leadership to civil authorities (there are a great number of brilliant civilians working in the Pentagon, but few have a foundation as trained, experienced military professionals).

When I listen to smart, successful military leaders justify the "success" of heavy CT approaches, or "Clear-Hold-Build," or Nation Building, etc: I don't think they are being dishonest, I think they are in large part truly baffled by why these programs are not producing the promised results. They can look at their tactical metrics and see success piled upon success, but they can look out their window and see that reality is anything but success. We focus on the wrong things. As a wise man once said, "things that count most cannot be counted, and the things one can count do not count." We love things we can count. The same wise man said "people love chopping wood, as the results are immediately evident." The military in particular loves chopping wood, and our promotion system loves wood choppers.

Bottom line is that many factors contribute to why powerful nations stumble in this way. If it is any consolation, history books are full of very similar tales.

Surferbeetle
10-28-2012, 11:07 PM
When I listen to smart, successful military leaders justify the "success" of heavy CT approaches, or "Clear-Hold-Build," or Nation Building, etc: I don't think they are being dishonest, I think they are in large part truly baffled by why these programs are not producing the promised results. They can look at their tactical metrics and see success piled upon success, but they can look out their window and see that reality is anything but success. We focus on the wrong things. As a wise man once said, "things that count most cannot be counted, and the things one can count do not count." We love things we can count. The same wise man said "people love chopping wood, as the results are immediately evident." The military in particular loves chopping wood, and our promotion system loves wood choppers.

Let's return to first principles and seek some clarity?

When we truly observe, it is done by focusing on deeds, not rhetoric. Einstein was not swayed by empty rhetoric, nor Charles Darwin, etc. These folks and other observers understand that nature is ruthless, efficient, and red in tooth and claw...

Afghanistan - I can read a map, but you should be able to do a better job on this one than I can...

Iraq - Saddam, his sons, and many of his gang no longer walk the earth....blood has been spilled to atone for what was taken from us. Oil production is back up to what it was before Saddam took power ~ 3 million bbl/day. Internet penetration has gone from something close to zero to what appeared to be more than 50% in urban areas by my observation.

Iran - The economy is in shambles. The Syrian connection/pass thru supply route is fractured. Velayat-e faqih has a viable competitor in Najaf. Saudi Arabia & GCC, Turkey and Israel circle, scheme, and smell weakness...

Arab Spring - The world's largest youth bulge has a better chance to find employment and apply it's energy to productive efforts than previously.

US Army - Many of the weak remaining from the '92 purge have been run off. The SOF model is validated and has earned resourcing...GPF will be cut; unless the 2 trillion mentioned in the campaign is needed to bring a proud and headstrong country to heel (the 12th Iman will not get his chance to come home for a while yet)...and if so GPF will gain a reprieve for a time.

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act - Continues to gain in strength, governments need money to pay bills. Banking will be brought to heel. Shadow banking will be brought to heel. Commodities trading will be brought to heel. Rule of Law will continue to spread...

As to the lost wars, lost way narrative...BS

Dayuhan
10-28-2012, 11:10 PM
The US had its chance force moral conditions on the world when the Soviet Union collapsed but failed.

I'm not sure the US has ever had an opportunity to "force moral conditions on the world", and that sounds like the kind of Quixotic quest that ends with inevitable exhaustion and failure. The world is a large place with a very low standard of morality and no particular inclination to follow American instructions. The fastest route to the collapse of American power would be to waste it in a futile effort to police the world.


The rapacious greed of US corporations needed to be tamed and to the credit of the US it has done well in that regard. But leaving the back door open for the scum of the earth to enter was not smart. You had your chance and you blew it.

Some would say the rapacious greed of American corporations was simply redirected to domestic financial dealings. Of course American corporations are as greedy and as profitable as they ever were. They've just found ways to make money under changing conditions.

The reluctance of American companies to make long-term deals in politically unstable areas has as much to do with risk tolerance as with corruption regulations. In objective terms the Chinese (for example) are doing the oil-consuming world a favor by pumping oil in places where other companies won't go. If they didn't pump it that oil would probably not come to market at all.

It will be interesting to see what happens when a government that has made long-term deals with the Chinese is faced by an insurgency that wants to change those deals. Will they write it off, or will they jump in and try to "do COIN"?

But back to the original question...


(...) President Obama has described our military as “the strongest military the world has ever known.”

There’s just one problem with this...

That military just lost two wars in a row.(...)

If our military is so great, why have the last fifty years been so disastrous? (...)

I don't see any inconsistency there. The US by any objective standard does have "the strongest military" in the world and in the history of the world. That doesn't mean it will always succeed, especially if it's used in pursuit of objectives that cannot be achieved through the use of military strength. Driving a screw with a hammer is likely to fail, but that doesn't mean you have a lousy hammer.

Fuchs' point that the US military hasn't been proven in equal contest against a peer opponent is true, but irrelevant, since "strongest in the world" is a relative measure, not an absolute measure, and the potential peer competitors have even less experience of peer conflict and far less evidence of capacity.

In theory Russia or China could threaten the US with mass, but does either have the capacity (or, really, the incentive) to deploy and support that kind of mass outside their borders in a situation where the US would be forced into a full military confrontation?

carl
10-29-2012, 01:39 AM
If you're talking post Korea it is difficult, but I think an argument can be made that the US Army proved its ability to endure against a potentially superior force during the Battle of Ia Drang in 1965. Some may have some valid arguments to counter argue this.

American air and artillery support available may militate against that being a good example.

carl
10-29-2012, 02:20 AM
The main point of the article is that military boosterism (We're number 1! We're number 1!) blinds one to the obvious military deficiencies exhibited by the American military establishment. And if those flaws are not seen they cannot be corrected. This statement of Sen. McCain "We have the highest trained, most professional, best military in history.” is a fine example of unthinking boosterism. It is the kind of thing that gets in the way of fixing the things, many things, that are broke. The C brothers expand upon this general theme in this post

http://www.onviolence.com/?e=641

about how generals aren't held responsible. And in this post

http://www.onviolence.com/?e=634

about politically correct views of the military.

There is nothing at all objectionable or controversial about the main point of the article. It is simple common sense that if you continually hear that you are the best of best ever that you won't be very inclined to change.

The second big point in the article is that the military establishment (the author uses the word culture) can't adapt. This also seems obvious given the events of recent history. The guys lower down can and have, quite a lot in some cases. But the establishment, all of it, political and military can't. They just go blindly along doing what hasn't worked for the past 10 or 20 years whether it be knowing the F-35 is going to make it or knowing with even more certainty that this is the year the Pak Aarmy/ISI is going to come around.

We have been getting away with this but the lower ranks may not have time to make up for the incompetence of the suits and multi-stars the next time. Which it why it is important that we remove the stars from our eyes. (Get it? Stars in our eyes, a dual reference to removing the baleful influence of the generals and the blindness that We're number 1! afflicts us with. I just now thought of it.)

Bill Moore
10-29-2012, 02:35 AM
Posted by Surferbeetle,

Some of your comments had no context, so I didn't understand what you were implying, but comments on a couple.


Iraq - Saddam, his sons, and many of his gang no longer walk the earth....blood has been spilled to atone for what was taken from us. Oil production is back up to what it was before Saddam took power ~ 3 million bbl/day. Internet penetration has gone from something close to zero to what appeared to be more than 50% in urban areas by my observation.

Saddam and his sons are dead, and good on us, but killing them did not require a major occupation, an excessive de-bathification program, and a largely failed nation building effort. Once Saddam was dead and the sanctions lifted I believe the Iraqis would have gotten their oil production back up to pre-Saddam years on their own (Western corporations would be allowed to provide technical expertise). The 50% internet penetration in itself is not a positive if 50% of them are using it to inform their views from disinformation on radical websites promoting ethnic hatred. That probably isn't happening, but still referring to internet penetration as a positive without understanding its impact seems a bit of reach. However, despite our win and we did win, we pushed Iraq into, or much closer to, Iran's sphere of influence, and ethnic violence is still very active, and the risk of civil war has not been erased. We won, but what the results of that win is too early to assess.


Iran - The economy is in shambles. The Syrian connection/pass thru supply route is fractured. Velayat-e faqih has a viable competitor in Najaf. Saudi Arabia & GCC, Turkey and Israel circle, scheme, and smell weakness...

Is an Iranian economy in shambles really in our long term interest? We did the same to Iraq, and when we removed Saddam we had to deal with that economic shamble in addition to an insurgency, a civil war, and transnational terrorism. It was assessed by some experts that weaker economy actually made Saddam more powerful. It seems feasible that a country with a strong and diversified economy would be more difficult for the government to control, because government handouts would be less valuable as a tool to control the masses.


Arab Spring - The world's largest youth bulge has a better chance to find employment and apply it's energy to productive efforts than previously.

This will be true only if they liberalize and allow their human capital to increase. If the result of Arab Spring is Sharia law and more oppression then I think we and they will all be greatly disappointed.


US Army - Many of the weak remaining from the '92 purge have been run off. The SOF model is validated and has earned resourcing...GPF will be cut; unless the 2 trillion mentioned in the campaign is needed to bring a proud and headstrong country to heel (the 12th Iman will not get his chance to come home for a while yet)...and if so GPF will gain a reprieve for a time.

In your opinion what is the SOF model? I think the GPF still has many weak senior leaders who are failing to adapt, and can't think beyond the bounds of outdated doctrine (to include our COIN doctrine). As for the SOF model, we have "a" CT model, but is it the best model possible? We also have a Cold War UW/FID model that we try to apply to every security problem. My point is I hope we don't have a SOF model, but rather an adaptive SOF that constantly evolves and unlike GPF isn't constrained by doctrine.

Bill Moore
10-29-2012, 02:59 AM
Posted by Carl


There is nothing at all objectionable or controversial about the main point of the article. It is simple common sense that if you continually hear that you are the best of best ever that you won't be very inclined to change.

I hate the excessive self-promotion and the everyone in uniform is a hero crap also. It puts the lowest performer on par with the highest performer. Heroes are exceptional individuals, most of us are not heroes and claiming that everyone is weakens the value of the term to mean almost nothing. Most in uniform make sacrifices (deployments, injuries, varying levels of extended discomfort, and of course the ultimate sacrifice), and that deserves some level of respect in my view, but not on the same level as true heroes. Maybe our vocabulary is too limited and we don't have another term that equates to a person to deserves respect, but falls short of a hero.

Claiming that we're the best on the other hand does not prevent us from adapting, and actually it may force us to work harder to retain our position as the best. This seems to apply to corporations who want to retain the reputation of their brand, to athletes, and to special operations. Even Bruce Lee said a little bragging was useful because it forced you to train harder to back up your boasts. There are factors that limit our ability to adapt, but it isn't because we recognize ourselves as the world's best military.


The second big point in the article is that the military establishment (the author uses the word culture) can't adapt. This also seems obvious given the events of recent history. The guys lower down can and have, quite a lot in some cases. But the establishment, all of it, political and military can't. They just go blindly along doing what hasn't worked for the past 10 or 20 years whether it be knowing the F-35 is going to make it or knowing with even more certainty that this is the year the Pak Aarmy/ISI is going to come around.

The author comes from the conventional military, and their ability to adapt is slower than the Special Operations community, but to state we continue to go on blindly doing what hasn't worked for 10 years is a gross exaggeration. The system that holds us back more than any other is Congress and the money associated with military spending. The military is frequently stopped from adapting by our civilian leadership, and in our country we accept that because we believe the military should be subordinate to our civilian leaders, but that comes with a cost also. Additionally, investing in high tech weapons is wise for a number of reasons the author doesn't have the experience to understand yet. We will have enemies in the future that don't look like the enemies we're fighting today, and it takes time to develop and field higher end capabilities. We also have to retain this industrial base as unpleasant as that may sound.


We have been getting away with this but the lower ranks may not have time to make up for the incompetence of the suits and multi-stars the next time. Which it why it is important that we remove the stars from our eyes. (Get it? Stars in our eyes, a dual reference to removing the baleful influence of the generals and the blindness that We're number 1! afflicts us with. I just now thought of it.)

Many, if not most, of our Generals and Admirals are very competent. The fact that three in the Army are recently called out for character failures (not necessarily competence failures) is news only because it is NOT the norm. As for your shot at humor, it is best if you keep your day job :D

carl
10-29-2012, 03:38 AM
Bruce Lee bragging in order to spur himself to greater efforts to back up the brag was a great stratagem, for Bruce Lee. Anything will work for an individual who is driven from within as he was; elite athletes and spec ops types too for that matter. I am not so sure that works for large organizations. Given the frailties of human nature, I think it much more likely that continually crowing about being the best makes such organizations complacent and keeps them in the same old groove. Why change what has made them the "best"? There is more than one factor that keeps us from adapting, but I think that firmly believing we are the "best" is one of the factors.

Blaming the politicians is something the military establishment has done for years. I'll bet it is something they teach at the secret multi-star school that exists in the basement of the MGM Grand in Las Vegas. It is true to an extent, but only to an extent. To give two examples of things the military does to itself, flip ones but they do go to the point, the politicians haven't created and inflicted the cult of powerpoint nor that of the reflective belt upon the military. The politicians don't much care if the military is FOBed up or not. They have proved that. The politicians are only partially responsible for constructing the temple of the night raid. The military doesn't adapt at military things they way we would hope. That is partially the fault of the military.

We have gone on doing the same thing for ten years, or one year at a time 10 ten times. That is the sense I get from bits of reading. Are we still road bound? I get the sense that we mostly are. Have we lightened the soldiers load in the 10 years we've been walking those sere hills and mountains? Have we cut down on the night raids? Do very high ranking military officers still go along with the fantasy that the Pak Army/ISI is useful? Is the date when the F-35 will be combat ready still unknown? Do we have a new tanker in the sky yet? Does the LCS have anything but a 57mm gun to fight with yet?

Reading On Violence I believe the authors well understand the value of high tech weapons. What they mostly object to is high tech that isn't worth the cost and weapons that don't seem to work. The F-35 example is mine, the little light bomber that can't-be all things to all men at least not until the year 2035. I can't speak for them on the need to maintain an industrial base but I understand the need for it. And I also see that we are very close to having only one, count it, one fighter mfg.

Competent is as competent does. It doesn't matter if most of the multi-stars know what they are doing if the corps of general officers produces inferior results, which it can be argued, they do.

You don't mean I have to give up selling material to Leno do you?

omarali50
10-29-2012, 03:52 AM
clearly the US military (not just the political leadership, the military) did not have a clear notion of what an occupation/liberation of Afghanistan would mean and how best to do it if it was needed. I have no doubt that when it comes to an actual tactical maneuver (capturing position X, securing position Y or patrolling down track Z) the US army is one of the best in the world. And without a doubt when it comes to big firepower high tech stuff, its simply in a class of its own; but generals have to be able to think beyond that and the US army does not do a great job of that. It wasnt just the job of some hack in the state department to plan for "the day after" in Iraq, it was General Frank's job and he didnt do it. Same thing in Afghanistan.
And in both cases a reasonably successful outcome (by current standards, a very satisfactory outcome, but of course, not by "ideal" standards, i.e. the standards that are the norm in the liberal imagination) was possible with less treasure and blood then was spent on sub-optimal outcomes.

ganulv
10-29-2012, 04:17 AM
clearly the US military (not just the political leadership, the military) did not have a clear notion of what an occupation/liberation of Afghanistan would mean and how best to do it if it was needed.
Of course Cofer Black’s narrative is that the unseating of the Taliban (not to argue that they’re the good guys, but getting rid of them was not exactly a liberation now, was it?) was the CIA’s baby.

Surferbeetle
10-29-2012, 04:55 AM
Some of your comments had no context, so I didn't understand what you were implying, but comments on a couple.

My comments and list are what I see as GWOT* deeds/deliverables and secondary & tertiary effects resulting from our involvement in the region. I mean to contrast this with the lost war/lost way narrative which I disagree with.


Saddam and his sons are dead, and good on us, but killing them did not require a major occupation, an excessive de-bathification program, and a largely failed nation building effort.

I agree that we as a coalition overpaid for the results we see at this time.


Once Saddam was dead and the sanctions lifted I believe the Iraqis would have gotten their oil production back up to pre-Saddam years on their own (Western corporations would be allowed to provide technical expertise).

Can't say regarding the counterfactual you lay out here, however I followed the bidding for various oil and gas fields....western corporations seemed to predominate in Kurdistan while a very interesting variety of corporations won blocks in the rest of the country. Think I posted some newslinks on SWJ regarding this...will look and get back to you.


The 50% internet penetration in itself is not a positive if 50% of them are using it to inform their views from disinformation on radical websites promoting ethnic hatred. That probably isn't happening, but still referring to internet penetration as a positive without understanding its impact seems a bit of reach.

My first year (03-04) was spent out and about most everyday working with my Iraqi counterparts in utilities and infrastructure. My observations were primarily of engineers, accountants, admin staff, technicians, and blue collar workers...a subset of the population to be sure but I viewed them as a representative slice of the middle class. During my time there I witnessed an 'info wave' as goods and ideas flooded into a 'lacking' northern Iraq. It was a mostly positive experience, and I noted that the engineers in Kurdistan (who had access to these things prior to '03) were well ahead of those where I was at.

Admittedly these are limited and empirical observations, however bottom line, I see internet penetration as a force for good. I fully understand the other side/security concerns and am not attempting to discount the harm resulting from 'misuse' (as I see it) of this technology.


However, despite our win and we did win, we pushed Iraq into, or much closer to, Iran's sphere of influence, and ethnic violence is still very active, and the risk of civil war has not been erased. We won, but what the results of that win is too early to assess.

Broadly true, and I agree that it is too early to fully assess things.

This article would be an example of the current dynamic at work.

Iraq suffers from its chaotic foreign policy, Ranj Alaaldin, guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 16 October 2012 04.46 EDT, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/16/iraq-foreign-policy-conflict-national-interest


Is an Iranian economy in shambles really in our long term interest? We did the same to Iraq, and when we removed Saddam we had to deal with that economic shamble in addition to an insurgency, a civil war, and transnational terrorism. It was assessed by some experts that weaker economy actually made Saddam more powerful. It seems feasible that a country with a strong and diversified economy would be more difficult for the government to control, because government handouts would be less valuable as a tool to control the masses.

You raise some solid points regarding a strong and diversified economy's ability to empower its citizens. I wonder however about the ability of trouble makers, for lack of a more detailed breakout, to siphon off of a vibrant economy and thus pursue problematic/regionally destabilizing courses of action. I also wonder about the opportunity costs of a war with Iran, the obvious point being a stronger economy would allow things to drag on resulting in greater opportunity costs


This will be true only if they liberalize and allow their human capital to increase. If the result of Arab Spring is Sharia law and more oppression then I think we and they will all be greatly disappointed.

I would argue that another war, or a bungled western economic recovery would result in the opportunity cost of failing to appropriately steady those who would welcome western efforts to do so.


In your opinion what is the SOF model?

The SOF business model, as I see it, is a product of GWOT.

Broadly it provides our nation with an expanded and consistent/industrial security spectrum/adjustable yield...massive retaliation to individual retaliation...24/7, anywhere. Nukes, GPF/USAF/USN, USMC, and SOF are that spectrum.

The SOF model appears to use drones to coordinate and enable a number of efforts that were not linked previously or linked in time previously.

It appears to be very heavy on direct action and very light on 'SF' as I was taught/observed it as a youngster.


I think the GPF still has many weak senior leaders who are failing to adapt, and can't think beyond the bounds of outdated doctrine (to include our COIN doctrine).

Yes...but the why is interesting to consider.

I believe that the COIN model is a militarized, autocratic, frankenstein version of what happens in everyday western democratic and chaotic/mostly rank-less civilian life which is closer to a 'policing and development' model.

With respect, many active military have lost touch with civilian life and this is part of the difficulty in translating 'COIN' to the military so that they are able to implement it. JRTC, NTC, and Hohenfels are some of the places where I was taught and attempted to teach this military model before being sent out to implement it...so I also admit that I am part of this problem.

The US military is amazing...but...not everybody is a banker, mayor, city manager, city attorney, city accountant, city engineer, etc...


As for the SOF model, we have "a" CT model, but is it the best model possible? We also have a Cold War UW/FID model that we try to apply to every security problem. My point is I hope we don't have a SOF model, but rather an adaptive SOF that constantly evolves and unlike GPF isn't constrained by doctrine.

Again, I would suggest that MAD is our coldwar business model (conceived and born during that time) and that a new post-coldwar business model is the GWOT SOF model that I have attempted to describe.

This is not to say that there was not a SOF model prior to GWOT, but what I see today appears to be different from yesterday and institutionally blessed as opposed to the arguably red-headed stepchild of yesterday...(again, not deliberately attempting to be needlessly provocative)

*GWOT is no longer 'official' but it's my shorthand for our efforts post 9/11

Ken White
10-29-2012, 04:57 AM
...the politicians haven't created and inflicted the cult of powerpoint nor that of the reflective belt upon the military. The politicians don't much care if the military is FOBed up or not. They have proved that. The politicians are only partially responsible for constructing the temple of the night raid. The military doesn't adapt at military things they way we would hope. That is partially the fault of the military.Congress dictates how those who like Powerpoint and Reflective Belts, those who order night raids will be selected, 'educated' and promoted. It approves those who get to Flag rank. Note the words dictate and approve...
We have gone on doing the same thing for ten years, or one year at a time 10 ten times. That is the sense I get from bits of reading. Are we still road bound? I get the sense that we mostly are... Again, speak to your Congress. The Armed forces are risk averse; all those things you cite would entail risk of more casualties and lost careers. It's not a 'risk averse' calling, so why are they so risk averse?
Have we lightened the soldiers load in the 10 years we've been walking those sere hills and mountains?Yes. Almost everything but the Armor; the heaviest item. That enforced risk aversion again.
Do very high ranking military officers still go along with the fantasy that the Pak Army/ISI is useful?I'm not sure any ever did believe that though they were told by their civilian masters to be nice for several reasons. They do what they're told...

carl
10-29-2012, 04:00 PM
Nope Ken, don't buy it to the extent you imply it is. There are just too many things done that Congress can't affect. It may approve those who attain flag rank but it doesn't have much to do with selections from O-1 to O-2 to O-3 and on and on. That is the military establishment. Congress didn't promote the "kill team" platoon leader after the crime was known about. And Congress didn't put the female O-6 at the door of the PX to make sure that everybody had or bought a reflective belt. Congress doesn't write the field manuals or supervise and approve the curriculum at the various schools. They may grandstand from time to time about something but they don't maintain the hive. Nope, don't buy it. To easy to blame somebody else instead of looking at the military establishment, which is what the original article said must be done.

Nor do I buy that Congress and by extension the Americans are especially risk averse. We stay at the war for over a decade now despite the casualties. Congress went for the various surges knowing full well that increased casualties would result. What Congress doesn't like is foolish casualties and they look into that. But, again aside from occasional grandstanding, they, and we, are willing to accept losses if they seem to make sense.

You are right that the military is not a risk averse calling. But it seems quite evident that the star wearing is a risk averse calling. It being my opinion that that is not to be laid at the feet of Congress, that leaves something else. My forever a civilian uniformed opinion is that military culture changes radically at the very high levels. Maybe their risk aversion at that level has something to do with it being easier to count and make judgments than actually think hard. At those levels Congress can only approve what they are presented with. And I remember that officer McMaster was not originally going to be selected for promotion beyond COL.

With the Pak Army/ISI they do what they are told to an extent. But nobody told GEN Barno to share info with the ISI despite advice from his intel people (as related in Operation Dark Heart). He did that on his own. And ADM Mullen gushed entirely too much about how he and Kayani were good buddies for that to be an ordered act. And Omar is entirely too convincing when he speaks about how easy the Pak Army can charm the brains out of high ranking heads.

The point of the article is that we have to start looking at the military failures of the military. We do.

Steve Blair
10-29-2012, 04:25 PM
There are a number of reasons for the evolution of the risk-adverse culture. Some come from within the military, others originate outside it. Hanging it all on Congress is the easy answer, and ignores the problems that exist within the services. Doesn't mean that Congress doesn't have a share in the blame...but just that they aren't the only ones.

Constant rotation, a stunning cultural inability to look at its own history (but at least they've been consistent in that inability), accelerated deification of the military by outsiders with their own agendas, and a host of other things contribute to the military's inability to look at itself honestly and find answers. Congress...they're a mixed bag as well. If they pay attention at all, they remember the Cold War and its associated misconceptions and flawed assumptions about the US's historical military norms. They like spending programs, because those translate to jobs they can brag about and a certain level of myth creation.

Ken White
10-29-2012, 10:20 PM
Nope Ken, don't buy it to the extent you imply it is.Don't try to determine what I'm 'implying.' Read what I write and don't add the gospel according to Carl to it. :wry:
There are just too many things done that Congress can't affect.No question and I've never denied that. As I said above, Steve's right. He's more right than you happen to be because he understands it's a mixed bag. What I wrote was this:

""Congress dictates how those who like Powerpoint and Reflective Belts, those who order night raids will be selected, 'educated' and promoted. It approves those who get to Flag rank. Note the words dictate and approve...""

As you acknowledge:
It may approve those who attain flag rank but it doesn't have much to do with selections from O-1 to O-2 to O-3 and on and on. That is the military establishment.True -- but those FlagOs do make those selections and decisions...

Not only that but Congress acceded to other Politicians to place Troops in a position where 'night raids' were one of the few answers to the tactical problem presented in a combat situation that is artificially constrained by political and not military considerations.

Don't fix the belts and raids, they're only symptoms of a far broader problem. That's the point.
To easy to blame somebody else instead of looking at the military establishment, which is what the original article said must be done.In reverse order, I was more than likely strongly criticizing the military establishment before you and the author of that article were born. What has happened since then is that I've learned that while much of that criticism was and is well deserved, the Flags aren't the only problem. It is cultural (and much of that is American societally induced) and it is pervasive -- I'm merely pointing out that as is true of much wrong in American society today, a series of well intentioned but poorly thought out laws affect the military in strange and unforeseen ways.

I'm not blaming anyone -- there's enough of that for a whole slew of folks. What I am doing is writing that if you want to fix it, fix all of it or the problems will just reappear. We've done partial fixes before, after Korea and after Viet Nam -- but those fixes attacked the outward manifestations (or some of them...) and did not address the long standing political, systemic and societal problems at the root of the dysfunction.
Nor do I buy that Congress and by extension the Americans are especially risk averse.Again, read what I wrote. I did not write that, you assumed it as you do many things. I specifically wrote that the Armed Forces were risk averse. They live in fear of Congress -- they don't understand the Congress and it doesn't understand them...

They aren't afraid of the bad guys; they're afraid of Congressional disapproval and 'harmful' media attention. The Talibs don't keep the Troops roadbound or overloaded. The FlagOs know as well as you that those things are wrong but they continue to do them because they're averse to the political consequences of not doing it.
But, again aside from occasional grandstanding, they, and we, are willing to accept losses if they seem to make sense.Broadly agree -- but that grandstanding has adverse impacts. See MRAP...

We are roadbound party due to those creatures, MRAPs, of the media and Congress -- none of the service really wanted to buy them (sometimes not for the right reasons...) but buy them we did -- at the SecDefs's insistence to placate Congress and hush the uninformed media howling. He did that over the objections of the services.
But it seems quite evident that the star wearing is a risk averse calling.It always has been to a great extent; fear of strange political maneuvering has always permeated the US Army even back to the Revolution. Many FlagOs avoided it in years gone by but now we communicate too well -- and with visuals... :rolleyes:
It being my opinion that that is not to be laid at the feet of Congress, that leaves something else.My forever a civilian uniformed opinionCivilian or uniformed... ;)
is that military culture changes radically at the very high levels.that's correct. :D

Two Stars are the crossover point; almost none escape that.
Maybe their risk aversion at that level has something to do with it being easier to count and make judgments than actually think hard.Not nearly that simple.
At those levels Congress can only approve what they are presented with.Not so -- at those levels, the whims and wishes of various Congress creature are made known by discrete letters and phone calls. Those whims are ignored at one's peril and the Two and more Stars know that while few lesser beings get to see it -- and rarely suffer from it.
And I remember that officer McMaster was not originally going to be selected for promotion beyond COL.Yep, he was a threat to the institution, not because he could and did think and would say things the General's didn't want to hear -- but because he had attracted Congressional attention.
The point of the article is that we have to start looking at the military failures of the military. We do.What the heck do you think I've been writing here for over five years? Look. No question it's definitely needed -- but an improperly focused look can give you the wrong result.

For examples of that, see DoD, Goldwater-Nichols / Combatant Commands and USSOCOM -- all creatures of the politicians in Congress. All well meaning but all directly contributing to the malaise you see, the bureaucracy you can't and all demanding risk averse thought less Congress meddle some more. A malaise and meddling that some of us had or have to live with and that Michael C illustrates...

You've got to fix the problems, not the symptoms.

carl
10-30-2012, 02:48 AM
Ken:

Steve is able to say the thing well and more clearly than I in many fewer words. Well and ably said.

I do read what you write and what you imply too. There was a plainly implicated suggestion that I responded to..

I hope Flag Os don't make decisions about promoting from O-1 to O-2. They should leave those decisions to people lower down. I don't see how a Flag O could possibly know enough about an individual not on his immediate staff to know if that person should go from O-2 to O-3.

Nope Ken, don't buy it when you say "Not only that but Congress acceded to other Politicians to place Troops in a position where 'night raids' were one of the few answers to the tactical problem presented in a combat situation that is artificially constrained by political and not military considerations." Night raids are the solution chosen. And it is the solution stuck with even when it doesn't work well and hasn't for years. That is a failure of military imagination, a failure of the military. The civilians may put the military in difficult situations, sometimes even impossible. But those Flag Os get paid to use their noodles and adapt in imaginative ways. They don't seem to do that very well. And no sympathy for the Flag Os if they want to complain about political constraints. That is the way it has always been.

The mortal enemy of good enough is perfect. An ally of perfect is "fix the whole thing and not just part of it." Mostly. Often you gotta do what you can do when you can do it. If you don't because you are waiting for the opportunity to do the whole thing, nothing gets done because that opportunity may not come in time or ever. It would be much better to fix "the long standing political, systemic and societal problems at the root of the dysfunction.", but that is a pretty tall order and not likely to happen. If all that isn't done, problem will likely return, but not for a while and during that while things may be a bit better.

This is what you wrote about Congressional risk aversion "Again, speak to your Congress. The Armed forces are risk averse; all those things you cite would entail risk of more casualties and lost careers. It's not a 'risk averse' calling, so why are they so risk averse?" It seems quite reasonable to view that as a powerful statement about how risk averse Congress is. But I was wrong. Good. We are in agreement that Congress isn't all that risk averse.

If the Flag Os won't do what they know is the right thing because "they're afraid of Congressional disapproval and 'harmful' media attention", that is moral cowardice. No sympathy nor absolution for what is plainly a lack of strong moral character.

In the end it doesn't matter why we are so tightly bound to the road. We are. That is a bad thing. The Flag Os of an army that is road bound probably can't be judged in a favorable light.

I disagree about the MRAPs. They were developed and fielded because the Humvees couldn't take the hits. It was pretty apparent that the choice wasn't between getting off the road or going MRAP. The military establishment wasn't going to get off the road. So that left the MRAP as the only out. That was a perfectly rational response to the situation. And it was caused by a military failure.

What I said was "My forever a civilian uniformed opinion". What I meant to say was 'My forever a civilian uniNformed opinion'. Oh what a difference an n makes. I mostly lose my hat while wearing it on my head too.

Granted that Congress creatures make their wishes known. But that is late in the process. Most of the winnowing out has been done by then I would guess, done by the military establishment.

I don't understand why McMaster having attracted Congressional attention would matter unless he was espousing things that the establishment didn't want to hear. It would seem to me that if merely having attracted attention was the sin, then the sin is actually jealousy by the establishment. And besides, you said at those levels the whims and wishes of Congress are made known so the people become known to Congress anyway.

You are right about a Congress trying to fix things and getting it wrong. But the Congress tries fix things because nothing will get done otherwise. The military establishment won't do it, refuses to do it so Congress tries, poorly but at least they try. I agree too that in order to fix it you have to see it in focus but the people who can see it most clearly, won't do anything. But they are more likely to do something, a little tiny bit anyway, if they don't have dopey statements about being the best in world history ringing in their ears.

Ken White
10-30-2012, 05:18 AM
I do read what you write and what you imply too. There was a plainly implicated suggestion that I responded to...Not so but I'd never expect you to acknowledge that.
I hope Flag Os don't make decisions about promoting from O-1 to O-2. They should leave those decisions to people lower down. I don't see how a Flag O could possibly know enough about an individual not on his immediate staff to know if that person should go from O-2 to O-3.Yet another case of perceiving an implication that wasn't there. You're focusing on the wrong things, those symptoms. Of course they don't make those decisions -- and your lack of knowledge is showing. There decisions are made in accordance with the Congressionally dictated Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) as amended into OPMs 21. Those acts are nominally produced by the Armed forces and Congress merely writes them into law and the Prez signs them. In fact, congressional staffers virtually dictate what goes into them and the FlagOs sign off because they have little choice.
But those Flag Os get paid to use their noodles and adapt in imaginative ways. They don't seem to do that very well. And no sympathy for the Flag Os if they want to complain about political constraints. That is the way it has always been.I'm not disputing that, I'm merely trying to show you that the system isn't as simplistic as you seem to think.
It would be much better to fix "the long standing political, systemic and societal problems at the root of the dysfunction.", but that is a pretty tall order and not likely to happen. If all that isn't done, problem will likely return, but not for a while and during that while things may be a bit better.As it did when Max Taylor turned the Army around in the late 50s (that worked until McNamara got in an screwed up everything...) and Shy Meyer and others did in the 70s. It'll happen again -- but not until last years LTCs hit four stars -- in about 6 to 10 years.
"This is what you wrote about Congressional risk aversion "Again, speak to your Congress. The Armed forces are risk averse; all those things you cite would entail risk of more casualties and lost careers. It's not a 'risk averse' calling, so why are they so risk averse?" It seems quite reasonable to view that as a powerful statement about how risk averse Congress is. But I was wrong. Good. We are in agreement that Congress isn't all that risk averse." (emphasis added / kw)We obviously define 'quite reasonable' differently. I specifically wrote the Armed Forces were risk averse.

Congress isn't risk averse, not a bit, they are not in danger and basically don't care much about anything military -- they just want happy voters and do not want the Armed Forces to upset anyone...
If the Flag Os won't do what they know is the right thing because "they're afraid of Congressional disapproval and 'harmful' media attention", that is moral cowardice. No sympathy nor absolution for what is plainly a lack of strong moral character.I'm not sure they want your sympathy and I certainly wasn't seeking it. It is quite easy to stand outside any system or process and kibitz rifghteously. Neither you nor I know what you would do in their situation. What I do know is that I've seen a number stand up for what they thought was right and get creamed for it and that trend has worsened in the last 30 years or so. As one of the better three stars I've known once told me "I'm mediocre -- all Generals are mediocre; if you're too good the system will kill you as threat to its well being." Another said "I can walk down the hall and stick my elbows out but if I stick them out too far, they'll get cut off -- I can't do any one or any thing a bit of good with no elbows..." Should it be that way? No, absolutely not but unlike you, they have to deal with what is, not what's ideal or should be.

You and I agree that it should not be that way, we disagree on what can be done. I served through two major reform periods when things were dramatically improved but the underlying problems were not addressed and so I watched all those reforms dissipate -- and in each case, the system worsened after the reform period to a lower state than it was before the reforms started. That's why I'm adamant that fixing the symptoms is not wise. It's been done and each time, things not only reverted, they worsened. I contend no major fix is going to happen absent an existential problem. Not necessarily a big or bad war -- real and significant national economic problems could do it.
I disagree about the MRAPs. They were developed and fielded because the Humvees couldn't take the hits. It was pretty apparent that the choice wasn't between getting off the road or going MRAP. The military establishment wasn't going to get off the road. So that left the MRAP as the only out. That was a perfectly rational response to the situation. And it was caused by a military failure.Yes and no. There was a failure to procure and adequate vehicle when there were plenty of indicators of probable need as far back as the late 70s. That's lick on the Generals. However, the MRAP was a terrible answer to that failure, not really rational or tactically sound but it certainly was expedient (and expensive...). That's a lick on the politicians.

What it also did was provide mobile cocoons, armored shelter -- troops that use them quickly become conditioned to the relative safety and don't want to leave them. The Generals know that and would force the Troops out but they know if they get a whopping number of casualties that the news media and a fickle congress can be unpredictable so best to avoid casualties. The Good guys don't worry about it but due to a personnel system that rewards mediocrity to achieve 'fairness,' every Commander isn't a good guy...

Also, be careful what you assume. A lot of folks in the Army and Marines did and do today in fact get off the road -- too many do not but a lot do and much depends on the quality of the unit and its commander. That all commanders are not good or strong enough to do that is an indictment of that Officer Personnel Management system that says selection must be 'fair' and 'objective.' What that essentially means is that he or she whose turn it is gets to command, competent or not. Back to those O1 and O2 folks -- virtually everyone on of them will be a Captain. Some should not be. Many will make Major and so on...

On that score and on risk aversion aside from the BLT sitting off the coast of North Africa there were some elements at Sigonella who could've been in Benghazi very quickly. They were ready and willing and I hear some FlagOs wanted to go -- I'll bet big bucks they were told to forget it by ecehlons above reality. We'll see...
... then the sin is actually jealousy by the establishment.A bit, there's more to it. The two Stars and above see themselves as Stewards of the Institution -- no question in my mind they overplay that role.
And besides, you said at those levels the whims and wishes of Congress are made known so the people become known to Congress anyway.Yes but the key to their survival is in how well they 'protect' the institution and that means not offending Congress OR slamming the institution. McMaster was not viewed as adequately protective... :wry:
But they are more likely to do something, a little tiny bit anyway, if they don't have dopey statements about being the best in world history ringing in their ears.For every person in a position to achieve some change, positive or negative, who believes that stupid trope, there are five to ten who do not. Things are neither as broken or as easy to fix as you seem to think.

Bill Moore
10-30-2012, 06:18 AM
There are a number of reasons for the evolution of the risk-adverse culture. Some come from within the military, others originate outside it. Hanging it all on Congress is the easy answer, and ignores the problems that exist within the services. Doesn't mean that Congress doesn't have a share in the blame...but just that they aren't the only ones.

Constant rotation, a stunning cultural inability to look at its own history (but at least they've been consistent in that inability), accelerated deification of the military by outsiders with their own agendas, and a host of other things contribute to the military's inability to look at itself honestly and find answers. Congress...they're a mixed bag as well. If they pay attention at all, they remember the Cold War and its associated misconceptions and flawed assumptions about the US's historical military norms. They like spending programs, because those translate to jobs they can brag about and a certain level of myth creation.

Steve, while I may sound like an apologist for the military I'm far from it, but it gets a little old when everyone, especially those uninformed on how things actually work only throw stones at our senior military leaders.

I don't think we have a cultural inability to look at our history, but rather like most we cherry pick our history to conform with our preconceptions. I agree strongly with Ken that our problems are largely cultural in orign. The only saving grace is that most others, perhaps all others, have even worse cultural problems which is why most militaries around the world are somewhat of a joke. That is no excuse for us not to adapt, but it does put it in perspective.

The last two weeks at my location have been exceptionally frustrating. Dealing with officers who can't see past doctrine and they continuously struggle to make problems conform to their preconceived doctrinal solutions. I have seen nothing positive come from our officers indoctrinated in JMPE. I think it is a stretch to call it education, at best it is training. This is how you will work in my factory.

We have many, many constraints on our people ranging from cultural, educational, Congress, media, and of course good ole ineptness. We should actually be pleasantly surprised we're as good as we are.

Carl,

You have a media fed bias against night raids, so it is your opinion they should cease, and just because the military doesn't share your opinion they're inept? The fact of the matter is those targeted by them fear them, but yes it also disrupts normal life, but it should be needless to say that war disrupts normal life, and even if we were naive enough to quit conducting them their life would still be disrupted by those you are indirectly arguing that we support. Until we're allowed to address the threats that reside relatively safely across the border, night raids are a viable tactic (not a strategy) to disrupt attacks on our troops. It is not a strategy for winning, but then we never a strategy for winning.

Bob's World
10-30-2012, 10:23 AM
Night Raids are a tactical masterpiece. No question about it. Equally, they are a strategic disaster. That is the counter-intuitive reality of operations such as being conducted in Afghanistan today. Caveat: This was not nearly as true in Iraq, but that is because in Iraq they were conducted primarily against another foreign party to the fight (AQ proper, there conducting UW and Guerrilla Warfare, and the foreign fighters they brought with them).

This is one of many examples where we simply transplanted a reasonably successful tactic from one fight to the next with no strategic understanding of why it worked in one place but had little chance of doing much more than temporary suppression of the insurgent at the cost of growth of the insurgency in the other. The Marine's transplant of Clear-Hold-Build from Anbar to Helmand is another example of this.

Why is this true? Largely because those measures implemented to increase tactical efficiency and effectiveness against the insurgent by a foreign force come at the direct expense of reinforcing the very perceptions of the host nation government among the affected populaces that are critical to success. Night Raids and C-H-B operations as we have been conducting them absolutely destroy any perceptions of host nation Sovereignty, Legitimacy; They also destroy any perception that the affected populace is being treated with respect or justice.

We say with one voice that we "support the sovereign and legitimate government of Afghanistan," Then when the President of that "Sovereign" country demands that we make changes to our tactics that will come at the cost of the efficiency and effectiveness we need to maximize our scores on our tactical metrics, he is told to essentially stand down and shut up by a foreign general. That is what US-delivered "sovereignty" equates to? Really?

We are a slave to our tactics and our tactical metrics. We delude ourselves into believing that tactical successes in this kind of conflict can somehow add up to a strategic victory. This is why everyone scratches their heads over the persistent reports of "progress" and "success" in Afghanistan, while at the same time violence is increasing, green on blues are increasing, and the government is showing no signs of interest in becoming what we want them to be. Huh.

The fix is pretty damn easy, but it will cause all of our tactical metrics to plummet. Just ask these questions in the design of every campaign, and tailor the operation until one has a COA that maximizes these perceptions:

1. How will the conduct of this operation shape the perceptions of the populaces both directly and indirectly affected by it to think that their government is going about its business in a manner they deem appropriate?

2. How will the conduct of this operation shape the perceptions of the populaces both directly and indirectly affected by it to think that their government actually has the right to govern them?

3. How will the conduct of this operation shape the perceptions of the populaces both directly and indirectly affected by it to think that their government treats their small segment of the overall populace with equal respect to other similarly situated populaces?

4. How will the conduct of this operation shape the perceptions of the populaces both directly and indirectly affected by it to think that their government implements the rule of law in a manner perceived as "just" by that populace?

5. If the populace affected by this action does feel that it is improper in any way, what effective, legal, vehicles do they perceive they have to raise their concerns and have them addressed?

It is that simple. Putting a couple of Afghan Commandos on a raiding team and gaining a warrant from some judge in Kabul may sound like a good fix to an American commander who wants to appease a whining President of Afghanistan who does not understand how these raids are winning the war; but such fixes in no way address the damage these operations do to those critical perceptions. For every tactical step forward when a true "high value" guy is taken off the battlefield in such a manner is matched with a much larger strategic failure in the effects that same operation had on these critical perceptions among the populaces directly and indirectly affected by the same action.

We are tactical geniuses, and strategic idiots. It is really that simple. And we prioritize tactics and the immediate gratification of tactics executed well. We are woodchoppers.

Oh, back to Iraq: Why the difference? Because when one illegitimate outsider beats up on another illegitimate outsider, the populace doesn't much care. But when an illegitimate outsider is beating up on your friends and family in order to impose upon you a government and system of governance that has little to no legitimacy in your eyes? Then they care very much indeed.

(For any interested I will be briefing an expanded version of this at an assessments workshop next week).

Steve Blair
10-30-2012, 02:08 PM
Steve, while I may sound like an apologist for the military I'm far from it, but it gets a little old when everyone, especially those uninformed on how things actually work only throw stones at our senior military leaders.

I don't think we have a cultural inability to look at our history, but rather like most we cherry pick our history to conform with our preconceptions. I agree strongly with Ken that our problems are largely cultural in orign. The only saving grace is that most others, perhaps all others, have even worse cultural problems which is why most militaries around the world are somewhat of a joke. That is no excuse for us not to adapt, but it does put it in perspective.


Bill,

I think you misunderstand my point. I don't think that issues lie only at the feet of senior military leadership. There's enough to go around...and at all levels.

jmm99
10-30-2012, 04:19 PM
I have to add the obligatory - the problem is political and not to be solved by the US. So, forget nation building in Astan.

Reasoning: The Kabul government is a lousy bunch; just as the Saigon government was a lousy bunch. In both cases, their opponents are and were even lousier. The major difference between the two situations politically are the multitude of regional power centers in Astan vice only two material power centers in Vietnam.

Regards

Mike

carl
10-30-2012, 04:57 PM
Bob Jones:

I second Mike's opinion. Very well written and argued. Asking the questions is a good approach and the questions are good.

I am very interested in an expanded version. Is there any way you can get it to those of us who here in the hinterland (mainly me)?

carl
10-30-2012, 05:37 PM
On that score and on risk aversion aside from the BLT sitting off the coast of North Africa there were some elements at Sigonella who could've been in Benghazi very quickly. They were ready and willing and I hear some FlagOs wanted to go -- I'll bet big bucks they were told to forget it by ecehlons above reality. We'll see...A bit, there's more to it.

Over at the The Captain's Journal

http://www.captainsjournal.com/

information is posted that Gen. Ham wanted to go and was going to send forces despite the word from above and was relieved just seconds after telling people to act.

You have no idea how much I hope that is true. Speaking for myself, it would be a huge morale booster if an actual made member of the multi-star club was determined to do the right thing regardless of career consequences. That kind of demonstration is important beyond immediate effects I think. It is good example and shows the people low down on the totem pole that maybe all isn't lost. Of course, the story, if true includes that Gen Ham's second in command was so willing to relieve him put a bit of a damper on the thing but I'll take what I can get.

Ken White
10-30-2012, 05:48 PM
...information is posted that Gen. Ham wanted to go and was going to send forces despite the word from above and was relieved just seconds after telling people to act.May or may not be true, we'll see. Too early to tell

Regardless and as I wrote things aren't nearly as bad as you seem to think -- nor are they going to be as easy to fix as we both wish...
...That kind of demonstration is important beyond immediate effects I think. It is good example and shows the people low down on the totem pole that maybe all isn't lost.True but it is far too often incredibly difficult to do that -- unless the circumstances lend themselves to it... :wry:

carl
10-30-2012, 05:54 PM
True but it is far too often incredibly difficult to do that -- unless the circumstances lend themselves to it... :wry:

That is why it is so admirable when it is done.

I didn't know there was a BLT sailing about. Where off the coast was it?

Fuchs
10-30-2012, 07:01 PM
(...)
information is posted that Gen. Ham wanted to go and was going to send forces despite the word from above and was relieved just seconds after telling people to act.

You have no idea how much I hope that is true.(...)

You do seem to vastly under-appreciate the benefits of civilian control over the military.
It's human and thus not perfect, but orders of magnitude better than a military not under strict civilian control.

reed11b
10-30-2012, 07:38 PM
""""They'd have less money. The American solution of throwing money at a problem instead of fixing it has not worked with Education, Medical care -- or the Armed Forces.

For the active forces, there would be fewer people, they'd be a bit older (and thus, hopefully, a bit more mature) and would spend a bout one and half to twice as much time in institutional training staffed by selected Trainers with demonstrated expertise in subject matter and instructing. They would stay in the same units for years and their equipment fit would be a little different -- much of it to allow sea and land basing but rapid reaction to crisis area movement (we pay lip service to that but do not really want to do it -- too much uncertainty and careers might be damaged...). All would have spent some time in Reserve Units before being ALLOWED to enter the active force.

The Reserve Forces OTOH would very much resemble those of today but would be about 50% larger -- they would provide the mass and base for expansion if needed for a major war.

Movement between the two forces, active and reserve would be simplified. Personnel policies that over emphasize 'fairness' and 'objectivity' in selection criteria; 'everyone a generalist * ,' and the very mistaken idea that all persons of like education and experience are equally capable and can perform any job for that rank -- a structure, process and system that needs a MAJOR overhaul so we stop promoting based on 'potential' and being forced to reward decent performance with a promotion until the Peter Principle takes hold -- would disappear...""""

Then the Bwaa-ha-ha-ha-ha-hah from the Capitol and Five Sided Funny Farm in DC woke me up and I fell on my Lance. Sancho laughed and laughed.. :D

* That 'generalist' stuff and excessive rotation of personnel exist not to better train the force but to make assignments and finding square pegs to put in round holes easy for the Personnel bureaucracy. The unnecessary costs of that approach adversely impact the expansion of needed training; that lack of comprehensive training leads to mistrust of subordinates and reluctance to undertake any complex operations. The training process needs to ditch the Tasks, Conditions and Standards approach that limit abilities to aggregate and combine tasks to accomplish a mission; we need Outcome Based Training and Eduction.

Our vision is near identical. I disagree with Reserves first, but I think recruiting college kids for enlisted jobs and flatning the pay scale between O's and E's would help reach the same end goal (a more mature force) as would eleminating up-or-out policies and needless PCS moves.
Reed

carl
10-30-2012, 08:02 PM
You do seem to vastly under-appreciate the benefits of civilian control over the military.
It's human and thus not perfect, but orders of magnitude better than a military not under strict civilian control.

No not at all. That is not what would have (or will) buoyed me up. The hopeful thing is that somebody may have proved himself willing to do the right thing in spite of the personal cost. It was the actions of the man, not the legality of the relief. I would be happier if they had to relieve all the multi-stars in the room to get the job done and then find one in the building down the road (Guess what Chief of European Dental Command, you have a new job.), but like I said, I'll take what I can get.

It is the evidence of some strong moral character existing among the multi-stars that would be the good thing.

But then maybe none of this is true. If it is true, what a black mark upon the Americans, a general relieved in this circumstance.

davidbfpo
10-30-2012, 08:36 PM
There are many interesting posts on this thread, some of them refer to domestic American political factors and others are familiar themes or critical points.

I am curious at the timing, as the US presidential election looms near and from this vantage point national security issues do not appear uppermost. Whatever happened in Benghazi remains obscure and the cited source is rather partisan to make a judgement on.

What does strike me is whether the USA is about to enter a period of introspection after the war in Iraq, a failing war in Afghanistan and occasional "fire-fighting" elsewhere versus domestic factors and priorities. Apportioning blame will happen, so who better to blame than the military institution which cannot readily defend itself?

I can discern a pattern of thought, from US military veterans - similar to "Yes we are the best trained, most professional army; you, the politicians gave us the orders after being full briefed and now you say we failed?"

Sadly neither is right or wrong IMHO. Were all those involved "speaking truth to power"? IIRC a post-Vietnam comment by whoever.

davidbfpo
10-30-2012, 08:49 PM
The account given on Captain's Journal and the comments made about US forces being in a position to take action in Benghazi appear to lack credibility.

I don't dispute that small SOF / USMC detachments were in Sicily, or that the 6th Fleet's BLT was available - although IIRC it was not at sea at the time. Given the distance from Sicily to Benghazi I do wonder if recce drones could have been overhead quickly, assuming availability. Secondly once mobilised whether any detachment could have flown there in time.

If the AFRICOM commander decided that military force was a valid option - without sufficient intelligence and risk assessment from those on the ground in Benghazi he was a brave man, braver than many I expect.

It is interesting to contrast the decisions made by the then Brigadier David Richards, who was the UK commander in Sierra Leone and decided to go way beyond his orders. His career did not apparently suffer, indeed he rose to be the Army Commander and is now CDS. Perhaps the difference are legion, including not telling London what he had done!

carl
10-30-2012, 09:20 PM
David:

There are a lot of unkowns with the Captain's Journal piece. I brought attention to it with that in mind.

From what I've read in other places, the drones got there after the thing started but were there for the majority of it.

What constituted "in time" could not have been known beforehand.

From what has been reported elsewhere there was continuous reporting from the people on the spot almost from the moment the thing began, plus the feed from the drones. We had a lot of people there for a lot of weeks beforehand looking, seeing and reporting. Benghazi is part of Africom's area so I would hope Gen Ham had more than a hazy idea of what was going on from that looking, seeing and reporting. With that in mind, it is not such a leap to make the decision (if made). Tripoli sent a planeload of people to Benghazi the second they heard.

As far as the timing goes, that was in the hands of the people who made the attack.

Madhu
10-30-2012, 10:36 PM
This is an Afghanistan specific comment - I think:

How exactly does the day to day decision making work within the larger NATO and ISAF structure? Who is in charge on a day to day, month to month, year to year basis and how does this affect the basic Afghan campaign in terms of operational strategy, resources, training, etc?

I am not an apologist for the military either, but militaries are only one part of the entire strategic picture. Militaries are a result of their societies and represent the intellectual fashions of the day, including the idea that the Taliban insurgency is a Maoist type insurgency, that poverty when treated by aid and development will "heal" the insurgency, and so on.

I'm not excusing anyone and this is a military site so it focuses on the military and its ideas....population centric COIN seems to be the hammer that is used for this particular nail. A close study of the history of this region, in my opinion, will show that foreign aid and development and outside involvement in building militaries (first Pakistan from the fifties onward) to Afghanistan today is destabilizing rather than stabilizing, in many ways....

Madhu
10-30-2012, 10:46 PM
Ken,

I respectfully disagree on your point about the American Army and Pakistan.

Historically, the American Army and NATO are huge boosters of the Pakistani Army for a variety of reasons, some good, some bad:

1. As a bulwark against communism during the Cold War.
2. As a potentially useful partner in joint military operations (Mid East and within UN operations).
3. As a potential strategic prize to be kept out of the reach of China and Russia.
4. As a potentially useful ally against Russia and/or Iran.
5. As a potentially useful ally against India or as a conduit for policy toward the 'stans and Central Asia.
6. Large British Pakistani population as a lobby within NATO and the Anglo-American alliance.
7. Perhaps even a Saudi lobby within the web of American alliances, etc.


Traditionally, the Pentagon has been a huge booster and hungered for mil-mil ties and believes in American training of foreign military officers in an almost religious manner. This is likely changed currently, and State is probably the biggest booster. CIA and State and other DC agencies receive huge budgets for administering Pakistan aid programs, military and civilian. This is a DC lobby. There is no other phrase for it.

Retired American military, contractors, and intelligence personnel represent an important lobby for contacts and business with various members of the elite.

In short, "water carriers" in the worst instances....

Ken, I'm sorry, but you must know better. Behind the scenes there are factions that insist we must work with parts of the Pakistani Army and Intelligence services while others suggested this wouldn't work. Those that argued the first had egg on their faces after Abbottabad and there is a lot of CYA going on.


1. I will add some "references" when I have time, but for now, you all can search for Tommy Franks and Musharraf, among other American Generals who are reported to have close working ties from the past.
2. Colin Powell had a meeting which is detailed at GWU site (oh, the name escapes me, the one that posts declassified material) with a Pakistani Minister in Aug 2011 and there was much talk about reviving MeTT training, etc.
3. We tried to work with Nawaz Shariff and then Musharraf prior to 9-11 in order to nab bin Laden. ISI agents were found when Clinton lobbed missiles at training camps in Afghanistan. We've known, always known, but tried to have our cake and eat it too. We would have the old working relationships back and use our contacts to go after Al Q internally. And then mission creep....but this is on everyone involved, everyone. Simply everyone.

carl
10-31-2012, 12:47 AM
This is a DC lobby. There is no other phrase for it.

Retired American military, contractors, and intelligence personnel represent an important lobby for contacts and business with various members of the elite.

In short, "water carriers" in the worst instances....

I never thought of it like that before. That is very insightful. Damn clever of the Pak Army/ISI, or very lucky.

Bill Moore
10-31-2012, 04:22 AM
Posted by Bob's World after too many sips from the pop centric COIN pitcher :D

Actually I agree with the jist of your comments, we preach one thing and do another, but note I never referred to night raids as strategy, simply a tactic that is effective against the enemy and reduces US casualties (can be argued). In lieu of a strategy which we don't have it is a viable tactic.


The fix is pretty damn easy, but it will cause all of our tactical metrics to plummet. Just ask these questions in the design of every campaign, and tailor the operation until one has a COA that maximizes these perceptions:

1. How will the conduct of this operation shape the perceptions of the populaces both directly and indirectly affected by it to think that their government is going about its business in a manner they deem appropriate?2
. How will the conduct of this operation shape the perceptions of the populaces both directly and indirectly affected by it to think that their government actually has the right to govern them?3.
How will the conduct of this operation shape the perceptions of the populaces both directly and indirectly affected by it to think that their government treats their small segment of the overall populace with equal respect to other similarly situated populaces?
4. How will the conduct of this operation shape the perceptions of the populaces both directly and indirectly affected by it to think that their government implements the rule of law in a manner perceived as "just" by that populace?
5. If the populace affected by this action does feel that it is improper in any way, what effective, legal, vehicles do they perceive they have to raise their concerns and have them addressed?

Of course what you don't address is how will abandoning this tactic enable the opposition? Will it increase their freedom of movement? Will they be able to conduct more operations against coalition forces if they're not disrupted (especially if the population doesn't reject the insurgents)? There are two sides to this coin, and they're both important.

Ken White
10-31-2012, 04:37 AM
Historically, the American Army and NATO are huge boosters of the Pakistani Army for a variety of reasons, some good, some bad:All true -- but that was then, this is now and Pakistan has done much to help us and is also doing some things that are far from helpful and we all know that. As Bob's World is fond of illustrating, the Cold War with the USSR is over and Nations are pursuing, properly, their own interests. There are areas where our interests and those of Pakistan diverge and Pakistan rightly pursues its interests.
This is a DC lobby. There is no other phrase for it.True. However it is equally true for several other nations and areas. Regrettably, our political system today seems to require minor crises and oversea involvement here and there. Part of that is true interest, part to keep the US economy pumped up and part is pure selfishness and / or job security on the part of those who are assigned or fall into such work. Rightly or wrongly Pakistan is no more important to us than are the Philippines or Paraguay. We have interests and relationships a lot of places, Pakistan is more important at the moment than some but not as importan as others. Times change, things shift.
Ken, I'm sorry, but you must know better.For what and why are you sorry? I see nothing for you to be sorry about...
Behind the scenes there are factions that insist we must work with parts of the Pakistani Army and Intelligence services while others suggested this wouldn't work. Those that argued the first had egg on their faces after Abbottabad and there is a lot of CYA going on.All true and I do indeed know all that. None of this changes the fact that Carl wrote: ""Do very high ranking military officers still go along with the fantasy that the Pak Army/ISI is useful?"" *

To which I responded ""I'm not sure any ever did believe that though they were told by their civilian masters to be nice for several reasons. They do what they're told..."" I responded in that vein because that is how I see the situation today and part of that is based on a fairly close relationship with some former USArCent commanders and staff folks. Both nations pursued their interests and differences were plated over by both -- that is less true today. Carl specifically addressed "high ranking military officers" and not the US polity in general. The attitudes of and within the Armed forces and those of an within the rest of government often vary but the military guys do what they're told. It's that simple.
We've known, always known, but tried to have our cake and eat it too.True that. So too is Pakistan practicing the same game.
We would have the old working relationships back and use our contacts to go after Al Q internally. And then mission creep....but this is on everyone involved, everyone. Simply everyone.IMO that reversion is unlikely, water under bridges and all that.

* I have no particular bone to pick with Paksitan, they are merely pursuing their own interests and are leery of us -- with good cause -- as we are pursuing our interests and are leery of them -- also with good cause. Carl's the guy who keeps excoriating them here. Mayhap you should educate him. ;)

carl
10-31-2012, 05:07 AM
Ken:

I know things will not be easy to fix and I hope that they are not as broke as I fear, though in the aircraft acquisition part I know they are that broke and probably worse.


We obviously define 'quite reasonable' differently. I specifically wrote the Armed Forces were risk averse.

In my own feeble defense, you wrote "are" risk averse. I know because I cut and pasted that part. But that is a quibble.


I'm not sure they want your sympathy and I certainly wasn't seeking it. It is quite easy to stand outside any system or process and kibitz rifghteously. Neither you nor I know what you would do in their situation. What I do know is that I've seen a number stand up for what they thought was right and get creamed for it and that trend has worsened in the last 30 years or so. As one of the better three stars I've known once told me "I'm mediocre -- all Generals are mediocre; if you're too good the system will kill you as threat to its well being." Another said "I can walk down the hall and stick my elbows out but if I stick them out too far, they'll get cut off -- I can't do any one or any thing a bit of good with no elbows..." Should it be that way? No, absolutely not but unlike you, they have to deal with what is, not what's ideal or should be.

You and I agree that it should not be that way, we disagree on what can be done. I served through two major reform periods when things were dramatically improved but the underlying problems were not addressed and so I watched all those reforms dissipate -- and in each case, the system worsened after the reform period to a lower state than it was before the reforms started. That's why I'm adamant that fixing the symptoms is not wise. It's been done and each time, things not only reverted, they worsened. I contend no major fix is going to happen absent an existential problem. Not necessarily a big or bad war -- real and significant national economic problems could do it.

These two paragraphs are intensely interesting and say some big things. First though a critical editorial comment about the first paragraph. I know you don't mean it to come across as a plea for understanding the plight of the multi-stars but, to me, that is what it comes across as. Now to the actual content, the important things.

The quotes from the generals are kind of chilling. It is like they are slaves of a police state that is able to exert an almost absolute rigid mind control. I didn't know it was that bad, scary bad. Kinda like the Borg.

I also didn't know that when that veritable police state was able to rescind previous reforms, things were worse than they had been before. I can understand your attitude now. I still think that it may be worth trying, mainly because I fear that the existential problem may not be recognized as such and quickly turn into an irrevocable defeat before the Borg can be overthrown and changes made. Yours is pretty powerful testimony though.

This leads me to a question. From what you say, I gather the Borg is getting more powerful. Do you think it will continue to grow in power such that it will be able to snuff out light of reform burning within last years LTCs before they hit the 4 star rank in 6-10 years? Will it kick reformers out altogether?


Also, be careful what you assume. A lot of folks in the Army and Marines did and do today in fact get off the road -- too many do not but a lot do and much depends on the quality of the unit and its commander.

Yes. Good comment. Comments like this and Bill's are sort of like the opposite side of the coin of Eric and Michael's. You guys are not blind boosters and so see and say what is wrong.

I am still shaking my head at the mind control structure multi-stardom has managed to establish. Those guys are geniuses, not military geniuses but geniuses. It's like Ellsworth Toohey is the beau ideal of the 4 star general.

carl
10-31-2012, 05:20 AM
* I have no particular bone to pick with Paksitan, they are merely pursuing their own interests and are leery of us -- with good cause -- as we are pursuing our interests and are leery of them -- also with good cause. Carl's the guy who keeps excoriating them here. Mayhap you should educate him. ;)

Who me? I don't need no edjucation.

I do have a bone to pick with the Pak Army/ISI. Those Americans they've killed. Don't really care if they were simply and innocently pursuing their interests as they perceived them, our guys are still dead. I have a bigger bone to pick with the suits and multi-stars on our side who won't see the sun in the sky. I figure we shouldn't buy the bullets for guys whose simple pursuit of their interests results in our guys being dead.


The attitudes of and within the Armed forces and those of an within the rest of government often vary but the military guys do what they're told. It's that simple.

Military guys do do what they are told. Multi-stars live in a whole 'nother world and sometimes they do, sometimes they don't, sometimes they will and sometimes they won't. It is a different game up there, as you well know.

Dayuhan
10-31-2012, 06:37 AM
Multi-stars live in a whole 'nother world and sometimes they do, sometimes they don't, sometimes they will and sometimes they won't. It is a different game up there, as you well know.

Possibly so, to some extent, but I don't think they get to dictate policy re Pakistan, or on most other issues.

Bill Moore
10-31-2012, 06:59 AM
Originally Posted by carl
Multi-stars live in a whole 'nother world and sometimes they do, sometimes they don't, sometimes they will and sometimes they won't. It is a different game up there, as you well know.

Certainly a lot of multi-stars getting relieved of command for not following guidance from the beltway.

carl
10-31-2012, 08:18 AM
Possibly so, to some extent, but I don't think they get to dictate policy re Pakistan, or on most other issues.

Dictate? No. They do have more than a small bit of influence though.

carl
10-31-2012, 08:20 AM
Certainly a lot of multi-stars getting relieved of command for not following guidance from the beltway.

Who? I lose track.

Bob's World
10-31-2012, 10:17 AM
Bill,

Actually this is not "pop-centric" at all. If it were we'd be doing this and not be in the hole we are in. No, pop-centric is little different than threat-centric, in that both tend to hold the government harmless, both the host nation and our own. Both are also two paths to the same end: Defeat the insurgent.

Pop-centric thinks one can bribe the populace to success, and that manufacturing better effectiveness of host nation services is the long-tern answer. There is no evidence of that ever working for long, if at all.

Threat-centric thinks one can simply defeat the various aspects of the threat: his fighters, his sanctuary, his ideology, his funding, etc, and that that is the long-tern answer. Equally, while this has indeed suppressed the fighting in many places over time, and has eradicated more than a few specific insurgent groups, I am not aware if it ever producing an enduring peace, and it typically drives the conditions of insurgency deeper into the fabric of the society.

No, sometimes I feel a little lonely on these thoughts, so perhaps they are "Bob-centric"; but in simplest terms they recognize that the roots of these conflicts reside in the nature of the relationship between various aspects of some populace and the systems of governance that affect their lives. Actual sins of governance and grievances of populaces vary widely, but the core human emotions that seem to pop up again and again in the many histories of these types of conflict around the globe and over time are the ones I try to focus on here.

Those chasing threats or populaces either one with a package of tactical programs that do not keep an eye to the the larger strategic criteria I attempt to discover, define and describe, tend to fail. They may put up great numbers, get a great report card and big promotion for their efforts on their tour, but they fail at their mission. Truth.

As to this:


Of course what you don't address is how will abandoning this tactic enable the opposition? Will it increase their freedom of movement? Will they be able to conduct more operations against coalition forces if they're not disrupted (especially if the population doesn't reject the insurgents)? There are two sides to this coin, and they're both important.

I have never advocated abandoning any tactic, what I have said is one must frame their COAs and CONOPS for implementing any tactic or program, be it one to defeat, develop or shape governance, with these simple strategic questions as their framework. One must then also employ these same considerations for their measures of success. If one does this and the government one is supporting still falls to the insurgency?

Well, sometimes you just can't fix something no matter how bad you want to and it will go sooner than you want it to. You don't know what will replace what goes, and most likely things will be chaotic and messy for quite some time while the people who this directly affects sort it out on their own terms. Sometimes the insurgent is right and needs to win, more often the government is just too wrong and needs to go; better however, if one can convince said government to cure itself and avoid that uncertainty and chaos all together.

But we have put GIRoA in a sanctuary. We don't honor their sovereignty, but we allow them to act in all manner of self-destructive ways and protect them with our blood and treasure. History will judge us poorly for this. Public opinion already has.

Cheers.

Madhu
10-31-2012, 01:48 PM
Ken -

In my opinion, you veer toward the latter.

And no one has a problem with Pakistan, we are talking about the leadership of the Army and the intelligence agencies, certain of which are able to help us because it just so happens that they trained huge numbers of so-called non-state actors (some of whom just happen to live in training camps and safe houses inside the country), some of which killed Americans on American soil and abroad. Also, they get paid a lot. Add that to the drug money and misdirected aid money and it adds up. Over the years, how much does the missing money add up to (I'm talking total world aid from the 1950s onward). A nuke or two?

Call it a different kind of Marshall Plan.

It's only natural that civilians such as Carl and I are leery of militaries that have a history of coups, interfere internally in governance and buy journalists and air time, and threaten their own populations physically. When American military--retired or otherwise--express admiration or a kind of benign understanding indulgence toward such a military, then, well, you can bet civilians start to become a bit testy.

'Cause it makes us worry about some of you (kidding but you know what I mean).

I understand that there are brave individuals who don't like the situation and may be trying to help us, but we are talking the realm of dissidents here and not "rogue actors". I sometimes think the term rogue actor was developed to distance ourselves from the fact that we are to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia what Russia and China are to Iran. It's a way to misdirect and lie.

PS: Training scores of state/non-state actors is a bad strategy, so, no, I don't see how these agencies are acting in their nation's interest. It has hurt them badly and hurt their people badly. It's one thing to say, "this is the situation and we are not going to change it," it's another to say, "gee, they are just following their interests," in a mirroring fashion as if their Army is just like the American Army. Providing intellectual cover probably isn't a good idea because it means that you can't think about a situation properly. Poor rhetoric sometimes leads to poor decision making.


I didn't think you lot represented the same sort of institution, but if you do think that, can you point me to the American coups that I've missed?

PPS: Getting this right matters because we are about to embark as a society on a discussion about how we are to work with the currently changing Mid East. I have a sinking feeling we will do the same thing we've done over the years with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Pakistan and now Afghanistan. It matters to understand how our aid, military or otherwise, how our building up of armies, Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan or otherwise, may have long term negative implications for our nation. We inadvertently hurt people, including our own.

Ken White
10-31-2012, 02:08 PM
I know things will not be easy to fix and I hope that they are not as broke as I fear, though in the aircraft acquisition part I know they are that broke and probably worse.No more broken than it's always been. We just don't have the money now to throw away on dozens of X- models that never make it into production.
In my own feeble defense, you wrote "are" risk averse. I know because I cut and pasted that part. But that is a quibble.'Are' is present tense, I wrote that at the time I wrote the paragraph. 'Were' is past tense, I wrote that to show what I'd previously written. I cite all that superfluousity to illustrate how you often seem to tend to concentrate on non essentials to the exclusion of the point of the item.
I know you don't mean it to come across as a plea for understanding the plight of the multi-stars but, to me, that is what it comes across as.Not a plea but a statement of the facts of life they have to live with.
It is like they are slaves of a police state that is able to exert an almost absolute rigid mind control. I didn't know it was that bad, scary bad.It isn't scary -- it is pervasive and it does stifle initiative and It isn't a police state -- it's a bureaucracy.
I also didn't know that when that veritable police state was able to rescind previous reforms...Borg can be overthrown and changes made.The reforms were not rescinded, most are still with us. what happened was that some reforms were implemented but many were simply stalled by the bureaucracy and were never fully implemented however, the bureaucracy learned and developed defenses to preclude similar later attempts at reform. An example is the power of the Training and Doctrine Command and the entrenched civilian bureaucracy there. They're going to make sure that no future reformer pulls a Meyer and tries to eliminate their jobs and power by changing the way they do business. Throughout DoD, senior civilians are a problem -- I can talk about 'em because I used to be one -- they stay and provide bureaucratic continuity, the Generals rotate through at two and three year intervals. So who's running the show? A GO who stays a year or two and is nominally in Command -- or his senior civilians who've been there for years, were there when he got there and will be there when he's gone?

They know the GO is in charge so they just wait out a potential reformer in hopes the next guy will be more pliable. They are masters of the stall and all the arcane and tedious rules and regulations that can be used to stifle change of which they disapprove.

Getting rid of the bureaucracy is likely impossible; reducing it's power and effect is possible. That's the good news. The bad news is that Congressional reform will be needed to do more than superficial change. Almost everyone knows there's a ceiling on Federal Employee numbers. Few know there's also a Floor, a level that agencies cannot go below lest too many workers lose their jobs and become disgruntled voters or the employment figures in an area start to look bad due to Federal layoffs...
This leads me to a question. From what you say, I gather the Borg is getting more powerful. Do you think it will continue to grow in power such that it will be able to snuff out light of reform burning within last years LTCs before they hit the 4 star rank in 6-10 years? Will it kick reformers out altogether?The bureaucracy always tries and will impact some. Many like Michael C will leave in disgust, a few will try to stay to effect change but will get tossed. Still fewer will stay, survive and may achieve some improvements.

Bureaucracies are always self protective. Ours is that and also is not stupid. Last time we had a big personnel cut, in the early '90s, they offered Majors up to a hundred plus thousand in hard cash to depart early and forego their retirement. A lot of smart up-and-comers took that.
I am still shaking my head at the mind control structure multi-stardom has managed to establish. Those guys are geniuses, not military geniuses but geniuses. It's like Ellsworth Toohey is the beau ideal of the 4 star general.You're focusing on the wrong thing, that's a symptom. The multi stars are slaves to the bureaucracy, a bureaucracy that affects the entire US government which is far too large, far too expensive, has far too much money and tries to do far too many things it should not be doing. The bureaucracy must cater to Congress in all things to get funds; it's self protective so it forces all its minions, regardless of rank, to cater to the whims of 535 people who have 535 different ideas on what should be bought and how the system should operate. Take your aircraft purchase problem; how much of the excessive costs and delays are caused by ECP that some Congroid insists upon because the required part will be produced by a business in his or her district...

It's really amazing that we, the US -- and the Armed Forces in particular -- do as well as we do in spite of the bureaucracy that is in constant conflict with a governmental system that is designed to be dysfunctional. The bureaucracy wants to grow, the system tries to limit that. We all suffer from the results.

You and Michael C are correct, the system needs change. I know that also -- as does almost everyone wearing a uniform but Borg or Bureaucracy, the systems, plural, fight to protect themselves and to grow. Just fixing the symptoms will not achieve lasting results.
I figure we shouldn't buy the bullets for guys whose simple pursuit of their interests results in our guys being dead.I agree with you but unfortunately, that's not the way the world works.
Military guys do do what they are told. Multi-stars live in a whole 'nother world and sometimes they do, sometimes they don't, sometimes they will and sometimes they won't. It is a different game up there, as you well know.Not all that different. You'd be surprised about how those guys get jerked around -- and treat each other (lot of jealousies and vengeance up there...). They get a lot of perks to make up for that so there's a veneer of difference but in the end, they do what they're told by civilians who generally do not understand what the forces should do or are able to do -- and in that, I include many senior DoD civilians who have far more rapport with Congroids than do any of the Star wearers. Those folks have a different agenda and military reform is not one of their issues.

Madhu
10-31-2012, 02:16 PM
....in my first post on this thread. I was referring to the following:


Document 2 – State 109130
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "The Secretary’s Lunch With Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar," June 22, 2001, Confidential, 8 pp. [Excised]

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has lunch on June 19, 2001 with Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar to discuss Afghanistan, U.S. sanctions and Pakistan-China relations. Secretary Powell encourages the Foreign Minister to explain Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan as “the United States and Pakistan have different perspectives about the Taliban.” Minister Sattar describes the Pakistan-Taliban "relationship as ‘reasonable, but not problem free,’ and listed points of contention such as: smuggling of goods through Afghanistan to Pakistan, Afghan refugee/migrant flows into Pakistan, and Pakistani fugitives in Afghanistan.”

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/doc02.pdf

I've got more (you all know by now I like to use references for my comments. Plain ole' opinion kinda bores me right now....you guys got good reads for me, I'll read them).

We strung things out during the Afghan campaign a lot longer than we needed to because we believed our own fairy tales about that region and our ability to outsmart locals when they did the outsmarting. Given the location of prominent Al Q leaders within that country, they did a lot of outsmarting of us (even if the leadership didn't know about OBL, it means they weren't looking very hard and so that is kind of outstmarting us too). I can understand why people want to sweep this stuff under the rug. I sometimes think there is a touch of the "soft bigotry of low expectations" about our dealings in that part of the world.

PS: I mean, read that document. We keep doing the same things over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over again and expect different results. At this point, though, I am waiting for the history books and more interviews and declassified material. I need more intellectually. And to go all school marm on you, young people lurking, you demand more too.

Ken White
10-31-2012, 02:44 PM
It's only natural that civilians such as Carl and I are leery of militaries that have a history of coups, interfere internally in governance and buy journalists and air time, and threaten their own populations physically. When American military--retired or otherwise--express admiration or a kind of benign understanding indulgence toward such a military, then, well, you can bet civilians start to become a bit testy.Testy is okay, misperceptions less so. You and Carl have misperceptions about the US Armed Forces and you tend to accord the hundreds (thousands when you include those retired) of US Flag Officers far more power than they actually possess. As I told Carl and as you objected to, they do what they're told. In many ways, they're more constrained than are Majors and Lieutenant Colonels.

Not just militaries buy journalists and air time -- in fact, when it comes to that, the militaries, here, there or elsewhere are generally way down the power curve...

American military people, retired or otherwise do not set the policy of the US toward any given nation. None. You may judge people on what they say if you wish, but I'd suggest that being aware of what they're directed to say and appear to do is not the same as watching what they actually do and to whom they respond.
I sometimes think the term rogue actor was developed to distance ourselves from the fact that we are to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia what Russia and China are to Iran. It's a way to misdirect and lie.Yep. Agreed but who directs that? What level of government?
PS: Training scores of state/non-state actors is a bad strategy, so, no, I don't see how these agencies are acting in their nation's interest. It has hurt them badly and hurt their people badly.I agree, so does Bob's World. Shame that many don't agree with us, isn't it?
It's one thing to say, "this is the situation and we are not going to change it," it's another to say, "gee, they are just following their interests," in a mirroring fashion as if their Army is just like the American Army. Providing intellectual cover probably isn't a good idea because it means that you can't think about a situation properly. Poor rhetoric sometimes leads to poor decision making.Usually does lead to poor decision making -- doesn't change the reality that both we and Pakistan are pursuing our interest as seen by some in each Nation.

I can assure you that I do not see their interests and ours in the same light nor do I see their -- or any other Army -- as a mirror image of the US Army. We're kind of unique -- not special, not great (usually just barely adequate, in fact) but we are different. I've worked with enough others to know that, to appreciate the good points of that difference (and there are some) and dislike the bad issues (and there are some of those as well).
I didn't think you lot represented the same sort of institution, but if you do think that, can you point me to the American coups that I've missed?Nope, I can't. That's due to a strongly entrenched civilian control ethic. As I said, the Generals do what they're told... :D

You have assumed, as Carl often does, that I have attitudes that I do not possess and did not state. Y'all tend to make standing broad jumps at wrong conclusions and infer things that tickle your sensibilities, things that were not written or meant. :wry:
PPS: Getting this right matters because we are about to embark as a society on a discussion about how we are to work with the currently changing Mid East. I have a sinking feeling we will do the same thing we've done over the years with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Pakistan and now Afghanistan. It matters to understand how our aid, military or otherwise, how our building up of armies, Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan or otherwise, may have long term negative implications for our nation. We inadvertently hurt people, including our own.I could not agree more. However, you're talking to the wrong guy. I'm with you on all this -- you need to address this to the Council on Foreign Relations and the rest of the US governing and foreign policy elite. They're the idiots that sway our government of the day in certain directions with their misguided vision of what's needed.

ADDED: I agree with the thrust of your later post. Many in the US Armed Forces who had experience in the area (and many more like me who had that but were retired) let the powers that be know we were getting taken for a ride and that we were not going to outsmart people playing a game they've played for centuries -- especially not on their own turf. You see how much good that did,

ganulv
10-31-2012, 03:59 PM
It's only natural that civilians such as Carl and I are leery of militaries that have a history of coups, interfere internally in governance and buy journalists and air time, and threaten their own populations physically. When American military--retired or otherwise--express admiration or a kind of benign understanding indulgence toward such a military, then, well, you can bet civilians start to become a bit testy.Having spent time in Central America in the mid-90s as a very impressionable 20-year-old I came to pretty much the same conclusion about the State Department (http://www.markdanner.com/articles/show/the_truth_of_el_mozote). My view of the world is much more nuanced now but I think my knee is going to jerk for the rest of my life when I see a blue blazer. The DOD does not have the job of spreading truth, justice, and the American way. State, on the other hand, says its mission statement is to “[a]dvance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.”

Steve Blair
10-31-2012, 04:17 PM
PS: I mean, read that document. We keep doing the same things over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over again and expect different results. At this point, though, I am waiting for the history books and more interviews and declassified material. I need more intellectually. And to go all school marm on you, young people lurking, you demand more too.

You don't need to wait that long. Many of the patterns you're talking about in US policy go back to our own Indian Wars (the constant struggle between the Army and the Department of the Interior). There's plenty out there about the US in the Philippines (anything by Brian Linn is well worth the read), and the interaction between State and the Marine Corps in Central America is also pretty well covered.

This, incidentally, is why I contend that the US military is often reluctant to learn from its own past...or in some ways may actually be incapable of learning.

Fuchs
10-31-2012, 04:30 PM
Sometimes I sense that the usual suspects at SWC (not that many are active here...) think of the U.S. heavily armed bureaucracies as something more special than they are.

I suppose you don't need to look at individuals, individual laws or events to explain the state of affairs at all. The global socio-economic and psychological theories apply to U.S. humans just as to almost all if not all others.


This fits well to he persistence of certain problems.
You might close with the solution an inch or two more if you look at the problems as fundamental, human ones - and strive to search for some policy lever that could trick the bureaucracies into being better (illusionary) agents of the people.


Or you simply destroy the beast and replace it with a newborn version, one without all the accumulated scars, poisoning and decrepitude. The newborn will need some time until it can acquire all those bad old habits.

JMA
10-31-2012, 05:18 PM
You do seem to vastly under-appreciate the benefits of civilian control over the military.
It's human and thus not perfect, but orders of magnitude better than a military not under strict civilian control.

Not sure I agree fully... but can see where you, as a German, are coming from .

Ken White
10-31-2012, 05:39 PM
Sometimes I sense that the usual suspects at SWC (not that many are active here...) think of the U.S. heavily armed bureaucracies as something more special than they are.Not special but breeders of ineffectiveness in the name of efficiency...:rolleyes:
Or you simply destroy the beast and replace it with a newborn version, one without all the accumulated scars, poisoning and decrepitude. The newborn will need some time until it can acquire all those bad old habits.Exactly -- which is why I'm a fan of our ad-hocery. And why the bureaucracies hate and stomp on ad-hocery; thery like all those old habits. Job security, y'know... ;)

Ideally we'd have a big training base from which we select individuals, form and deploy units for specific conflicts and durations and then disestablish them to be replaced by another newly formed bunch when needed. That's not about to happen, costs would be too great and even if we did that, the training base would still become an old bureaucracy... :eek:

Dayuhan
11-01-2012, 04:15 AM
This conversation has wandered a bit, nothing unusual.

Certainly most here can find something to complain about in US foreign policy, though different people will have different complaints. I don't see how that can be laid at the door of the military: foreign policy is an executive function. The military may have some debatable degree of influence, but responsibility lies with the executive branch. I can't see any instance in which one could state with any certainty that policy would be different if the military had taken a more aggressive role, nor do I think the military taking an aggressive role in the formulation of foreign policy would necessarily be a good thing. Like Fuchs, I believe the only thing worse than a military under civilian control is a military not under civilian control, and thus under no control at all.

The citation in the original post seemed to complain that the claim that the US military is the strongest that has ever existed is inconsistent with that military's performance in recent COIN campaigns. I don't see any inconsistency there. The US military is by any objective standard the most powerful military force that has ever existed. Not all goals are achievable through the application of military force, though, and recent campaigns are evidence of that.

Certainly the US military has its share of weaknesses, defects, and inefficiencies. Some of these are common to almost any large bureaucratic organization. It is perhaps some saving grace that the potential peer competitors have similar problems: the overt corruption in the Chinese and Russian military is as severe an obstacle to performance as anything afflicting the US.

I still think the equivocal results in COIN campaigns are attributable less to military deficiencies (though they certainly exist) than to policy errors. I see no reason why American forces should be taking a primary role in any fight against another country's insurgents. If we need to assist a government in a fight against insurgents, fine: that's why we have Special Forces. It's not something to be undertaken lightly, but it something we've some capacity to do. Sending our own forces to fight another country's insurgencies is something to be avoided in almost any case. Fighting insurgents is a fundamental governance function, and it is not our place to be taking on fundamental governance functions in other countries. That's a recipe for a mess, for reasons RC Jones has explained many times.

Our government has a hammer. It's not a perfect hammer in any way, but it's better than anyone else's hammer. If the government chooses to employ the hammer as a screwdriver, we shouldn't blame the resulting mess entirely on the hammer.

Bill Moore
11-01-2012, 06:58 AM
Posted by Bob's World


Pop-centric thinks one can bribe the populace to success, and that manufacturing better effectiveness of host nation services is the long-tern answer. There is no evidence of that ever working for long, if at all.

Of course there is, 3-24 say it works, so it must be law :D. I agree, and that is what happens when you have a bunch of GPF folks who have been focused on fighting tank battles get tasked to write a COIN manual. They turn to a couple of guys who had no experience at all, but did a thesis on COIN in college and subsequently were crowned the COIN home coming queen.


Threat-centric thinks one can simply defeat the various aspects of the threat: his fighters, his sanctuary, his ideology, his funding, etc, and that that is the long-tern answer. Equally, while this has indeed suppressed the fighting in many places over time, and has eradicated more than a few specific insurgent groups, I am not aware if it ever producing an enduring peace, and it typically drives the conditions of insurgency deeper into the fabric of the society.

I guess it depends by what you mean by enduring, but it does achieve effects if you're willing to go to the extremes needed to make this approach work. Fortunately our national values don't permit this, but based on that we should realize it isn't an option. It is like the paper Davidbpo posted on the USSR's experience in Afghanistan. In it the Soviets pointed out we finally realized we were waging war on the peasantry, and it was a no win situation.


No, sometimes I feel a little lonely on these thoughts, so perhaps they are "Bob-centric"; but in simplest terms they recognize that the roots of these conflicts reside in the nature of the relationship between various aspects of some populace and the systems of governance that affect their lives. Actual sins of governance and grievances of populaces vary widely, but the core human emotions that seem to pop up again and again in the many histories of these types of conflict around the globe and over time are the ones I try to focus on here.

I think you're close, but the Afghan people aren't ready to accept a national government yet, or so it seems. Karzai is strongly criticized, but he knows what he needs to do to retain the loyality of the tribe/ethnic group that will be with him after we leave. The Soviets realized Afghanistan was ungovernable and their task was easier than ours, because you can impose a communist system upon the people by the very dictatorial nature of communism.


Those chasing threats or populaces either one with a package of tactical programs that do not keep an eye to the the larger strategic criteria I attempt to discover, define and describe, tend to fail. They may put up great numbers, get a great report card and big promotion for their efforts on their tour, but they fail at their mission. Truth.

Only partially true, those executing the missions at the tactical more often than not accomplish their mission. If the mission doesn't support the strategy, or strategies, then shame on us for letting them happen. In my view I think it does support the strategy and we're over reacting to enemy propaganda in many cases.


As to this:


Quote:
Of course what you don't address is how will abandoning this tactic enable the opposition? Will it increase their freedom of movement? Will they be able to conduct more operations against coalition forces if they're not disrupted (especially if the population doesn't reject the insurgents)? There are two sides to this coin, and they're both important.

I have never advocated abandoning any tactic, what I have said is one must frame their COAs and CONOPS for implementing any tactic or program, be it one to defeat, develop or shape governance, with these simple strategic questions as their framework. One must then also employ these same considerations for their measures of success. If one does this and the government one is supporting still falls to the insurgency?

At best these missions disrupt. You can't win with coercive/lethal operations if we're not prepared to conduct them in their safe havens.


Well, sometimes you just can't fix something no matter how bad you want to and it will go sooner than you want it to. You don't know what will replace what goes, and most likely things will be chaotic and messy for quite some time while the people who this directly affects sort it out on their own terms. Sometimes the insurgent is right and needs to win, more often the government is just too wrong and needs to go; better however, if one can convince said government to cure itself and avoid that uncertainty and chaos all together.

Strongly agree, and this ties into a comment I made on blog response earlier:


It is the host nation's fight (political and military) to win or lose, if they fail to take the needed actions, or lack the political legitimacy to do so, then they can't win. When they can't win is when we tend to make what in hindsight appear to be very dumb decisions about surging our forces and in fact taking the lead, that is when we own the problem and it is our fight to win or lose. That in itself seems to be form of mental illness, we realize the HN can't win for a variety of reasons, so we decide to prompt them up with our military forces and then wonder why the people we think we're trying to help are turning against us.


But we have put GIRoA in a sanctuary. We don't honor their sovereignty, but we allow them to act in all manner of self-destructive ways and protect them with our blood and treasure. History will judge us poorly for this. Public opinion already has.

Agree, time to move on. The scariest part of this is all the articles I see on the lessons the Army learnt in the past decade. Unfortunately most of them need to be unlearned.

Bob's World
11-01-2012, 10:47 AM
Bill,

Only point I think I need to clarify is that what I propose in no way prevents going into safe havens after the enemy. It simply drives a shaping of HOW we best do that.

For example, we could have aggressively gone into the Pakistan tribal regions in intel-driven raids back in 2001-2002, kicking in doors, dragging out true AQ members, lined them up on their knees in the village main street and announced "These men came to our homes and murdered our friends, families, women and children. We are here to avenge those murders." Shot them in the back of the head and got back on our aircraft and moved to the next target. The local Pashtuns granting those AQ sanctuary under Pashtunwali would most likely have simply nodded in acknowledgment, understanding and respect, and gone back about their business with a very positive view of the US.

Instead we coaxed (threatened, bribed) the government of Pakistan to go up into the tribal regions to "enforce the rule of law and secure their borders", etc. Thereby violating a long standing agreement of non-interference between that government and those populaces, and accelerated Pakistan to its current instability in the process. Equally the drone strikes we do now that are so loved for their clean, easy, safe application bring death within the terms of the rules of law we have written for ourselves, but absolutely violate fundamental rules of humanity and bring the same kind of violent, unjustified death to innocent Pakistanis, Yemenis, etc as the attacks of 9/11 brought to innocent Americans. Just because a true AQ terrorist is having dinner at the home of some family who knows he is a terrorist, it does not give us the right to kill that family with a missile through their front door. We have a strategy that conflates the problem to better hammer it, when we need to segregate the problem to better get at the true evil that needs to be cut out. Our CT strategy and terrorist organization lists enable this poor behavior and shape our poor performance. Yet we cheer every tactical success as we ignore the accompanying strategic set-back. We are better than this. Morally, professionally, culturally. We are better than this.

We make logical decisions that are strategic disasters because we simply do not understand the nature of the problem and do not design, implement and assess our actions within a proper, strategic context.

Madhu
11-01-2012, 12:50 PM
Ken - you wrote (and I've searched the thread a couple times and don't see it right now but it was there, it's there I tell you! :) ) that Pakistan looks after their interest just as the US does.

The words you used and the way you put them together created an equivalency it seemed to me but I'm not entirely fair on this subject around here. (Doesn't help when I scan a thread and can't find the quotes now does it? Maybe I'm just nuts....)

Anyway, I apologize for assuming an intent that wasn't there.

I read the use of words like "merely" and "rightfully so" (Pakistan looks after its own interests, rightfully so) as approval or at least a "benign understanding".

At any rate, there is no point engaging me on this topic because I've got knee jerk qualities, major knee jerk, on the subject. The emotional well is poisoned on this subject, I'm not fair on it, it's better to ignore me.

During the Cold War, and as a younger person, it was painful, personally painful, to watch many people forget the US' anti-colonial and revolutionary history and to lose all feeling for a people struggling toward something other than colonialism simply because it was outside a Western context and because their choices with regard to the Soviet Union were, IMO, often foolish.

The well is emotionally poisoned and it won't be unpoisoned. It's not your fault, it's not anyone's fault, it's just what happened.

And I loathed the Soviet Union. My book shelves have plenty of Soviet dissident books on them. To read about those camps or the security states and what it did to the people!

But other people mattered, too. I agree with everything Bob says about self-representation.

Anyway, I apologize. You are experienced enough and savvy enough people to know what is happening. You've worked with various diaspora and other nationals. You know sometimes it's all uphill because of trust issues.

I am sorry.

Madhu
11-01-2012, 12:58 PM
The US military is an awesome, almost too amazing to contemplate, instrument when used appropriately.

It's also a wasteful overly bureaucratic and weirdly managed (within and without) machine.

Both are true at the same time. It's possible for both to be true and that complicates discussion.

I was studying for my medical specialty boards when 9-11 occurred. I never gave a thought to the military in any way in my entire life up to that point. I had cut off my cable television in order to study and never saw any images contemporaneously. Never, until years and years later. Just never wanted to watch or look. I heard everything on radio.

Prior to toppling the Taliban, there was a huge argument, that the US would get bogged down. But what people meant is that we would never initially topple the Taliban. I remember those articles and pundits talking on the radio like yesterday because I happened also to be intensely studying and it all stuck, the genodermatoses and quotes of various officials and military, all in my magpie brain.

The initial removal of the Taliban did shock and amaze, it happened so quickly. To say otherwise is to rewrite history. To completely rewrite it.

But what happened afterwards? That's a group effort, Iraq, complacency, NATO and ISAF and the US military and governance and public opinion, American and otherwise, and the whole messy lot of it.

All that the "international system" had built up intellectually after world war II came out in the desire to re-wire an entire society, it came out from the UN and aid agencies and Brussels and DC and various international capitals....

Like I said, a different kind of Marshall Plan.

So, used appropriately, you are beyond gifted as a military. The trick is to do it properly.

Fuchs makes a good point about "tricking" bureaucracies and this is where the whole disruptive thinkers debate comes in and my comments about lobbies are not entirely inappropriate.

But how?

Madhu
11-01-2012, 01:01 PM
@ Ganulv, Steve Blair and others. I'll try and check them out. That is exactly what I wanted.

Carl - A Col. Tunnell's article is making its way across the web, on Michael Yon's website and on zenpundit's. There are people who spoke up behind scenes, it appears. That letter won't make you entirely happy though, because he appears skeptical of the way we did things with our ISAF Karzai Pakistan NATO everyone else alliance pop-COIN-iess (er, not comments on policy, but on the way this affects day to day tactics. I think. My lack of military knowledge hurts me in interpreting things).

No one is really in charge, it seems from my outsider viewpoint.

From my vantage point, I can't know what happened behind closed doors, who stood up for what, who protested, and how it went down.

The better part of valor for me may be to do just what I said: wait for declassified materials and proper study at a distance.

Not much help for today's issues but I won't be a help. "Stay out of it mostly" is not a message that resonates much outside places like this.

Ken White
11-01-2012, 05:19 PM
Ken - you wrote (and I've searched the thread a couple times and don't see it right now but it was there, it's there I tell you! :) ) that Pakistan looks after their interest just as the US does.I meant that all nations look after their own interests; the US and Paksitan do not differ on that predilection even if their interests are vastly different and their methods are equally so.
I read the use of words like "merely" and "rightfully so" (Pakistan looks after its own interests, rightfully so) as approval or at least a "benign understanding".No approval nor a benign understanding, simply acceptance that is reality. Accepting the fact that all Nations have a right, even a responsibility, to look after their own interests does not equate to nor imply approval of their interests or methods. I disagree with some of our interests and methods; I disagree with some of those of Paksitan. My disagreement does not change the fact that the governing powers in all nations are going to take care of themselves in the manner(s) they choose... :(
At any rate, there is no point engaging me on this topic because I've got knee jerk qualities, major knee jerk, on the subject. The emotional well is poisoned on this subject, I'm not fair on it, it's better to ignore me.We all have our soft spots and you are far to sensible to be ignored.
During the Cold War, and as a younger person, it was painful, personally painful, to watch many people forget the US' anti-colonial and revolutionary history and to lose all feeling for a people struggling toward something other than colonialism simply because it was outside a Western context and because their choices with regard to the Soviet Union were, IMO, often foolish.At that time and as an older person, I shared those emotions. That shortsighted approach was foolish and has done the US more harm than would adhering to our principles have done. That is one of my disagreements with our approach to protecting our national interests. The Puritans have a lot to answer for. City on a hill indeed... :mad:
...You know sometimes it's all uphill because of trust issues.Is that ever the truth... :wry:

No apology was necessary, really -- sorry for my poor choice of words.

Dayuhan
11-02-2012, 12:02 AM
I meant that all nations look after their own interests; the US and Paksitan do not differ on that predilection even if their interests are vastly different and their methods are equally so.

If nations had and looked after clearly defined interests, the world would be a simpler place than it is. Within any given nation at any given time there are multiple competing perceptions of national interest. Policy may oscillate among those perceptions depending on who's in power at any given moment, or there may be an effort to balance those perceptions, or the multiple parties involved may independently and simultaneously pursue their own perceptions of interest.

It all gets very sloppy, and very unpredictable.

Bob's World
11-02-2012, 09:37 AM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NQUmkdKIjhs&feature=related

'nuff said.

davidbfpo
11-02-2012, 12:53 PM
Imagery Bob may be effective, I still think words win and slightly edited:
it is entirely possible that a lot of our current generals stink for whatever reason.. but surely the key reason for our failings in recent military campaigning is that the policy being served is misconceived.

Hat tip to David Betz on KoW, which refers to this topic via a review of Tom Ricks latest book:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/11/oh-history-you-bitch/

Fuchs
11-02-2012, 01:25 PM
Ken, you blame a lot of problems on politicians and top brass, or the system.

I'd like to throw some more into the ring; I suppose the U.S. military personnel is poor at learning, adapting and improving.

My strongest supporting evidence is that the vast majority of those I got in contact with are amazingly thin-skinned and react allergic to criticism, direct approaches against inadequate state of affairs and the like.
I have yet to find a professional group that's as defensive.


I cannot imagine heavily armed or other bureaucracy that runs very well without its individuals being able to bear criticism unless it comes from a superior.

Ken White
11-02-2012, 01:52 PM
Ken, you blame a lot of problems on politicians and top brass, or the system.

I'd like to throw some more into the ring; I suppose the U.S. military personnel is poor at learning, adapting and improving.I agree with that -- but is that not a function of the political factors that shape the institution (and they are pervasive...) and select the top brass? Serving individuals bear some responsibility, of course but the "system" shapes all the factors you cite, it selects the Brass based on very political criteria and they shape the system...

The US forces are comprised of individuals who can learn adapt and improve -- or improvise -- as well as any grouping of people anywhere in the world. However, they are constrained by a system, a set of institutions, that deliberately constrain those attributes in a flawed effort to obtain uniformity, consistency and nowadays, to not embarrass anyone. That's a systemic flaw, not a human failing. That "system" is designed by those politicians and that brass.
My strongest supporting evidence is that the vast majority of those I got in contact with are amazingly thin-skinned and react allergic to criticism, direct approaches against inadequate state of affairs and the like. I have yet to find a professional group that's as defensive.In addition to that defensiveness, there are few professional groups that are as distrustful of subordinates as the US Army. Is it possible both those shortcomings are introduced by the fact that the members of the institution really know that their training and education are not totally adequate? That they know they're not as good as the common wisdom (or lack of it...) states; they're not really as good as they would like to be?
I cannot imagine heavily armed or other bureaucracy that runs very well without its individuals being able to bear criticism unless it comes from a superior.Heh. They don't take that well, either...

Two points:

Americans are admittedly thin skinned in the non-acceptance of criticism -- it's not just the Armed forces and it's partly a result of a lot of boosterism and rather foolish promotion of self esteem (at a cost to self respect and self confidence). IOW, it's true and it is as much or more a societal thing is it is a military peculiarity. The Military peculiarity added to that -- fighters tend to see everything as a challenge of some sort -- just compounds it.

US military people, like all groups can be defensive and band together if attacked, verbally or otherwise. Also like all groups, while they may reject the slams of outsiders, internally they can be quite self critical and discerning. I've met those in the services that are unthinking boosters and who are hyper defensive. My rough guess is that they're about 20% of all. Another 20% are self critical and truly concerned with getting it right. Then there's the 60% in the middle who tend toward both ends and meet in the center with a cluster of 20% or so that hew to neither side. I suspect that is pretty much the human norm in most organizations or groups.

What all that effectively gives you is a bunch of overly sensitive and combative Americans wherein about a third are blind to the flaws and prone to boosterism, another third who are well aware of shortcomings and work, usually not publicly, to improve things as much as they can within a system that is excessively heirarchial and which is often politically manipulated for non-military purposes. Then there's yet another third that are really just sort of there, they don't do much either way. It's noteworthy that the "system" is a creature of the Politicians and the Brass so they tend to be over-represented in the Booster category, publicly anyway -- hard for the folks in charge to admit they've screwed things up... :wry:

Sounds like any other grouping of persons from most anywhere in the world to me -- except many if not most are thin-skinned, defensive Americans. ;)

Bob's World
11-02-2012, 02:15 PM
Imagery Bob may be effective, I still think words win and slightly edited:

Hat tip to David Betz on KoW, which refers to this topic via a review of Tom Ricks latest book:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/11/oh-history-you-bitch/

Dave,

Clearly we have policy issues. But this does not let Generals off the hook for matching those polices with equally flawed campaigns.

We all need to own this, because we all worked together to build it.

BushrangerCZ
11-02-2012, 05:39 PM
this is why:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1X6HnOA88vw

carl
11-03-2012, 12:23 AM
[B]No one is really in charge, it seems from my outsider viewpoint.

From my vantage point, I can't know what happened behind closed doors, who stood up for what, who protested, and how it went down.

The better part of valor for me may be to do just what I said: wait for declassified materials and proper study at a distance.

Not much help for today's issues but I won't be a help. "Stay out of it mostly" is not a message that resonates much outside places like this.

Sometimes what you write sounds like you are apologizing for what you write. Knock that off! You call 'em like you see them and you KEEP calling them like you see them. Your good sense, honesty and the work that is behind what you write is apparent to all. Don't shy away any more. If you do I might get peeved.

I haven't read Tunnell's article yet but I will.

carl
11-03-2012, 01:04 AM
No more broken than it's always been. We just don't have the money now to throw away on dozens of X- models that never make it into production.

Oh yes, way more broken than it has ever been. The F-35 design won in 2001 and it may get into actual operational service, nobody exactly knows when. When that when comes all those F-15s and F-16s are going to be rather old, as in two decades or more old. The tanker replacement saga seems to be never ending and we still don't have any new ones. The first contract was let and rescinded going on 10 years ago. The Army has tried and tried to get a new scout helo into service and they can't get it done. No, it is beyond busted when we can't even manage to replace the helos used to squire the President around from Andrews to the White House and back.

An awful lot of those X-planes were research aircraft that were never intended go into production. Those were solely tools to learn. Some of the other X-planes were so designated because they were prototypes for aircraft that did go into production. Some didn't. Whether those X-planes were a waste of money is a matter of opinion. Way back when they didn't cost much in any event. You just bent some metal, installed an engine and went. Things really got expensive when the 'trons started to trump aerodynamics. It seems like after the teen fighters it became extremely hard to get things into the air and after the F-22, it is almost impossible. We may or may not have wasted money on X-planes back then but we got things into the air.

The rest of your post was wonderful. It was like a briefing by an insider on the whys and wherefores of the defense machine.

davidbfpo
11-03-2012, 09:37 AM
A couple of posts have referred to a letter by Colonel Tunnell, it is on this link:http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/secarmy_redacted-redux.pdf

There was a SWJ Blog, with comments:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/army-colonels-memo-foreshadowed-doomed-soldiers-email

JMA
11-03-2012, 03:36 PM
We all need to own this, because we all worked together to build it.

OK, so what should the individual consequences be?

Thereafter what and how long would it take to replace with those who built it with those without guilt or blood on their hands?

carl
11-03-2012, 04:04 PM
There was a SWJ Blog, with comments:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/army-colonels-memo-foreshadowed-doomed-soldiers-email

The comments over there are fascinating.

Tunnell's missive I read finally. It was very interesting. Some things seem spot on and other things seem to be sour grapes. I think Ike may be frowning at some of the comments. That is merely my opinion of course.

Bob's World
11-03-2012, 05:14 PM
OK, so what should the individual consequences be?

Thereafter what and how long would it take to replace with those who built it with those without guilt or blood on their hands?

I don't think we need to go on a witch hunt to see who to punish.

It's just time to recognize that we don't need to control, directly or indirectly through the Northern Alliance, Afghanistan to prevent it from being an AQ sanctuary. To recognize that the Northern Alliance has absolutely no interest or desire to be the government we want them to be. To recognize that we are better off simply packing up and going home than we are executing any kind of phased out exit plan.

JMA
11-03-2012, 05:56 PM
I don't think we need to go on a witch hunt to see who to punish.

As an onlooker I have been able to observe part of the problem being that incompetents don't get fired they get reassigned.

The least that should be accepted is that those who were in the system at the time, all of them, acknowledge what went wrong and how it went wrong - all the while showing some contrition.

Bill Moore
11-03-2012, 06:06 PM
Posted by Bob


I don't think we need to go on a witch hunt to see who to punish.

I hope it never evolves into this, war and conflict are inherently messy and mistakes will be constantly be made. In theory those who make mistakes become wiser for it, which is why senior officers and senior NCOs should have accumulated a lot of wisdom over the years (because they have 20 plus years of mistakes under their belt they learned from).

We'll never become a learning organization if we in fact become a zero defect military. For those that are entrenched in a particular way of thought and can't learn they should be removed (politely), but there is no need for a witch hunt. Witch hunts should only apply when an officer wittingly participates in something like facilitating a faulty contract because it benefits him personally, not because of tactical errors (unless they are gross mistakes that most people in the same circumstance wouldn't have made).

Fuchs
11-03-2012, 06:42 PM
As an onlooker I have been able to observe part of the problem being that incompetents don't get fired they get reassigned.

The least that should be accepted is that those who were in the system at the time, all of them, acknowledge what went wrong and how it went wrong - all the while showing some contrition.

A system knows no incompetents, but people officially judged to be incompetent. That may be correct or not - it's why a second chance (with care) makes sense.

Ricks revived the old tale of how Marshall fired 500 flag officers in WW2 (which was known to many, but it needed a book promo tour to push it into a larger discussion). This well-respected approach allowed for second chances as well - and many of those who were relieved did well at a later time, when they were ready for the new command.


The only ones which need to be fired immediately are really dangerous people (those who disrespect democracy, laws or the lives of subordinates a lot), people who are too old for a second chance and those who are incompetent in a indisputable way.

davidbfpo
11-03-2012, 07:08 PM
Fuchs noted that:
Ricks revived the old tale of how Marshall fired 500 flag officers in WW2

Peter Caddick-Adams, a British military historian, has talked about the impact of Dunkirk on the defeated British Army's officers; they collapsed from the physical and mental impact of the blitzkrieg, were taken prisoner, were sacked as operational commanders and were retained for service. Note this was in the British Empire's darkest days in May 1940.

Jim Storr, author of 'The Human Face of War', has a chapter on the career of general officers in WW2, which IIRC notes the demise of the majority, a few were taken prisoner and one Army Commander, 1st Army, General Anderson, after the surrender in Tunisia, never had a field command again:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth_Arthur_Noel_Anderson

I am sure the British Army has other examples, such as in WW1 and maybe the RN & RAF, for removal from command in wartime.

Fuchs
11-03-2012, 07:41 PM
I just realised that I cannot remember noteworthy removals of German flag rank officers from command during wartime for reason of incompetence or similar. (Hitler did it a lot, but rarely so for reasons that stood the test of time, of course.)

It certainly happened a lot, but it doesn't appear to be well-documented or much-discussed.

Goering removed fighter wing (about a hundred pilots) and group (3 groups + a flight of 4 = 1 wing usually) leaders from command in 1940 and replaced them with younger officers, many of them aces. This happened during the Battle of Britain IIRC, and it led to an increase of aggressiveness.

On the other hand, army performance failures in Poland '39 led to a huge aggressiveness, doctrine and lessons learned training program for leaders from bottom up to division level.

_______________

There is a most noteworthy example of a leader failing and totally turning around towards a "great" military career:
Frederick the Great pulled a 'Darius III' in his first battle and ran when his cavalry lost the fight (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mollwitz). His 2nd in command ordered the superior infantry forward and the battle was still won.
Nowadays Frederick is being considered to have been among the top ten generals of his century.

carl
11-03-2012, 08:37 PM
To recognize that we are better off simply packing up and going home than we are executing any kind of phased out exit plan.

Should we continue to pay for the fuel and ammunition for the ANSF after we leave? And should we make special provisions to take along the many thousands who have worked for and with us, and their families, when we go?

Bob's World
11-03-2012, 09:06 PM
Carl,

We were manipulated (willingly) by the Northern Alliance. We did not trick them into supporting us, rather it was quite the opposite. Most are now mulit-millionaires and already have their exit strategies well funded and well planned out. I shed no tears for them.

Those in the villages, those who embraced the Villlage Stability program, for example, that is another matter. There will be no offers of sanctuary for these people I am sure, and they have no millions to show for their buying into what we were selling. These are the ones who are most vulnerable to what will happen as the US and GIRoA both light out for other places.

As we prioritize our loyalties, I think we might want to think about our own troops, their families, and the people of the US. I think this has gone on long enough.

carl
11-03-2012, 10:03 PM
Bob:

Those who aren't rich will look at us and say "You promised." If we don't at least try to make some extraordinary provisions for them that makes us a pretty shameful lot. Those who aren't rich to whom we made promises will probably not look kindly upon us if we were to bug out precipitously leaving them. We might have to steal out like thieves in the night.

Do you think we should continue to supplies fuel and bullets once we leave? The Soviets did that at least until their system collapsed.

JMA
11-04-2012, 06:26 AM
Bob:

Those who aren't rich will look at us and say "You promised." If we don't at least try to make some extraordinary provisions for them that makes us a pretty shameful lot. Those who aren't rich to whom we made promises will probably not look kindly upon us if we were to bug out precipitously leaving them. We might have to steal out like thieves in the night.

Do you think we should continue to supplies fuel and bullets once we leave? The Soviets did that at least until their system collapsed.

Carl, the problem stems from the concept of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend". You can of course exploit this situation without throwing billions at these temporary 'fair weather' allies but that is not the way the US works.

The US politicians - remember Nixon with his "Peace with Honor" BS - seem to be able to sell anything to the voters but after the US troops are safely back at home and the country concerned drops off the radar thats when the real problems begin. More were killed after the war in Vietnam. What are the stats from Iraq using "Mission Accomplished" as the end of the war (they thought).

What will happen in Afghanistan is anyones guess but what is for certain is that the leaders of the current regime are well set up with US money to move at short notice while for the villages the cycle of violence will continue.

Bob's World
11-04-2012, 01:31 PM
Bob:

Those who aren't rich will look at us and say "You promised." If we don't at least try to make some extraordinary provisions for them that makes us a pretty shameful lot. Those who aren't rich to whom we made promises will probably not look kindly upon us if we were to bug out precipitously leaving them. We might have to steal out like thieves in the night.

Do you think we should continue to supplies fuel and bullets once we leave? The Soviets did that at least until their system collapsed.

Carl, you act like we somehow lured the Northern Alliance into doing something they were not already completely dedicated toward the accomplishment of. Or, as if the Afghan populace somehow has any more say now in who rules them than they did before. This is still a land where the only sure vote is cast in 7.62mm lead.

Think about it, if the election process was truly fair and functional, the Taliban government in exile would have simply rallied a "get out the vote" campaign rather than a long, bloody insurgency.

Government to government relations are contracts, not blood oaths. You worry about what happens if the US "abandons" GIRoA; but answer this, how long ago do you think that Northern Alliance-based government abandoned us?? 5 years ago? 10 years ago? Never really caring about what we wanted from the first place? We were "abandoned" long ago, but were too self-absorbed to notice or even much care.

Again, they abandoned us long ago, and have been manipulating us to protect and fund one of the most self-serving governments on the planet. Will many good Afghan people suffer when we leave? Yes. But many good Afghan people suffer because we stay as well.

Time to stop make arguments based on false logic and poor facts. It is only just in the past few months that our senior leaders in Afghanistan are waking up to the fact that the interests and efforts promoted so heavily by ISAF are not anything that GIRoA is interested in at all. If we would have truly honored Afghan sovereignty from the start we would have realized this long ago. Allowing our General's opinions to trump the host nation's President is a bad policy that leads inevitably to places like the one we are in now.

As soon as we stop driving the train as to what "must" be done, there will be a HUGE compression and reduction of security effort by GIRoA. As soon as we stop funding development and security forces there will be an immediate halt to 90% of that as well. We have been self-serving in our approaches just as much as GIRoA has. Time to let this situation find a more natural balance. That is a balance that may well end up with significant Taliban influence over it. We need to prepare for that reality and be willing to swallow our pride and reach out to embrace it.

The only way our true enemies gain undue influence or sanctuary in Afghanistan is if we once again turn our backs on the place or are too proud to reach out to the new management that is sure to rise. Judging by our spiteful positions on Cuba, Vietnam and Iran, however, I am not optimistic that we will this time decide to be the bigger man and extend our hand first. Most likely we will allow ourselves to be manipulated by a vocal diaspora that has fled in our wake to enjoy their il-gotten gains in the safety of our borders

davidbfpo
11-04-2012, 02:00 PM
Moderator's Note

The last set of posts have significantly left the thread's subject behind. I fully accept matters Afghan impact the American context for the subject 'The Best Trained, Most Professional Military...Just Lost Two Wars?'

Matters Afghan have their space, although a thread on leaving doesn't exist yet. Yes time to have a new thread, after I check and then copy / move the off subject posts.

carl
11-04-2012, 05:06 PM
David:

Your judgment in these matters is good. You decide.

But let us amend the original question the C's asked. We'll go from 'How come such a great military just lost two wars?' to 'How come this country of ours that professes to be a cut above, the city on the hill, is probably going to abandon millions of people to lethal killers again?' Just like we did before.

I remember the aftermath of our abandoning South Vietnam. I hoped we would never do it again though I knew in my heart that we probably would. That won't make it any less sad and shameful though.

carl
11-04-2012, 05:11 PM
The US politicians - remember Nixon with his "Peace with Honor" BS - seem to be able to sell anything to the voters but after the US troops are safely back at home and the country concerned drops off the radar thats when the real problems begin. More were killed after the war in Vietnam. What are the stats from Iraq using "Mission Accomplished" as the end of the war (they thought).

JMA, what do the people you talk to in the RSA and other places think of this continuing pattern of behavior of the US, people who aren't Americans?

jmm99
11-04-2012, 09:38 PM
with the OP's question:


from Carl
How come this country of ours that professes to be a cut above, the city on the hill, is probably going to abandon millions of people to lethal killers again?

In answer, it will continue to do so until (1) it ceases to preach that it is "the city on the hill"; and (2) it ceases to preach that it will safeguard "millions of people" from "lethal killers".

It will continue to do so so long as its strategy continues to be based on what was so clearly stated to be US strategy in Afghanistan from the gitgo:


Future of Afghanistan (http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/6757.htm)
Richard N. Haass (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_N._Haass), Director, Office of the Policy Planning Staff, and U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan,
Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC
December 6, 2001

Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before the Committee on Foreign Relations in my capacity as U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan.

Our aims in Afghanistan are well known to the American people and this Committee. We seek to bring about an Afghanistan that is free of terrorists, that no longer is a source of poppy, and that allows its citizens -- including an estimated five million refugees and an unknown number of internally displaced persons -- to return to their homes and live normal lives in which opportunity comes to replace misery. ... (JMM: much more of the same in the rest of the statement).

Not to blame Mr Haass too much, who was simply following in the footsteps of a flock of US Presidents (from Wilson to GWB, at the time) and stating what his boss Colin Powell wanted stated.

If one believes that the US is "the city on the hill" and has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers", then one is obliged, I suppose, to preach what Mr Haass said. The problem is that, if in the course of these neo-colonial wars, one must pull the plug, charges of hypocrisy are well founded indeed.

I do not believe that the US is "the city on the hill"; or that it has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers" - other than its own citizens. I am therefore a "bad, evil person".

Regards

Mike

Ken White
11-04-2012, 09:56 PM
I do not believe that the US is "the city on the hill"; or that it has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers" - other than its own citizens. I am therefore a "bad, evil person".I strongly agree that we are not such and further, even if we were, we do not have the physical capability of properly doing that 'safeguard' foolishness. All we do we when we try an fail is instill a false hope.

That is the biggest single reason we are unpopular with and in most of the world.

Sensible is not evil nor is it bad; behavior that is emotion based but essentially not sensible is, OTOH, bad. It may not be evil due to good intentions but in its disregard for capability it does more harm than good and is therefor bad...

Dayuhan
11-04-2012, 11:47 PM
But let us amend the original question the C's asked. We'll go from 'How come such a great military just lost two wars?' to 'How come this country of ours that professes to be a cut above, the city on the hill, is probably going to abandon millions of people to lethal killers again?' Just like we did before.

I remember the aftermath of our abandoning South Vietnam. I hoped we would never do it again though I knew in my heart that we probably would. That won't make it any less sad and shameful though.

The word "abandon" is emotionally loaded and I don't see any place for it in a discussion like this. Do you suggest that protecting the populace of the world is an American responsibility? Or that once the US associates with a dysfunctional government they are then committed to defend the governed populace forever?

If Afghans want to keep the Taliban out, they can do that. They sent the Russians back to Russia, they're sending the Americans back to America, they can send the Taliban back to Pakistan... if they want to. If they don't want to, that's ultimately up to them. I don't see how protecting Afghans from themselves, or from each other, is an American responsibility.

jcustis
11-05-2012, 02:13 AM
The word "abandon" is emotionally loaded and I don't see any place for it in a discussion like this. Do you suggest that protecting the populace of the world is an American responsibility? Or that once the US associates with a dysfunctional government they are then committed to defend the governed populace forever?

If Afghans want to keep the Taliban out, they can do that. They sent the Russians back to Russia, they're sending the Americans back to America, they can send the Taliban back to Pakistan... if they want to. If they don't want to, that's ultimately up to them. I don't see how protecting Afghans from themselves, or from each other, is an American responsibility.

Quoted for truth, as they say. Absolute truth.

Bill Moore
11-05-2012, 03:13 AM
Posted by JM999


If one believes that the US is "the city on the hill" and has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers", then one is obliged, I suppose, to preach what Mr Haass said. The problem is that, if in the course of these neo-colonial wars, one must pull the plug, charges of hypocrisy are well founded indeed.

I do not believe that the US is "the city on the hill"; or that it has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers" - other than its own citizens. I am therefore a "bad, evil person".

Posted by Dayuhan


The word "abandon" is emotionally loaded and I don't see any place for it in a discussion like this. Do you suggest that protecting the populace of the world is an American responsibility? Or that once the US associates with a dysfunctional government they are then committed to defend the governed populace forever?

Lot's of wisdom in the above quotes, and while I emphasize with Carl's lamenting, I have come to a place where I believe the American people have a strong sense of right and wrong, which is a large part of what makes me proud to be an American. The downside to this (and I have definitely been guilty of this) is they feel compelled to act when they see an injustice in the world, but they have no idea where that act will take them or the millions of people impacted by it. We collectively have naive beliefs about how the world works, and then when we find out that can't save all the children or send all the girls to school despite our best efforts, and we get tired of our people coming home in coffins or terribly maimed with no end in sight we abandon altrustic goals for more reasonable ones. The question we need to ask in the beginning before we commit is will we ultimately do more good, or create a worse situation like we did in Iraq where more people died after Saddam was soundly defeated?

A case in point that is not Afghanistan centric. We generally find it apalling that kids would work in a so-called sweat shop for 10-12 hours a day in a developing nation, although kids did it in the US during the industrial revolution. We find it more disgusting if they're working in a company making goods for a US Company. We're so disgusted that we jump on our white horse and ride to the rescue. In this case Senator Harkin in 1993 proposed legislation banning imports from countries that hire underage workers. Bangladesh saw the writing on the wall, and directed its factories quit hiring children. Bravo! America came to the rescue, we can all sleep better.

The rest of the story is those kids didn't go to school or stay home and watch Sesame Street, in many cases they ended up in worse jobs, living on the street, and in many cases they ended up as child prostitutes. They worked in those sweat shops because they were the best available alternative and we took that away from them with the best of intentions, because we used mirror imaging, and assuming if the kids weren't in sweat shops they would be going to school.

We're naive as a people because most of our people view the world through 30 second sound bytes and make a judgment on whether something is good or bad, and may even push to have the government deploy the military to "fix" the problem. The military isn't broke because it can't fix these problems, but our national level decision making process is.

Dayuhan
11-05-2012, 08:29 AM
I believe the American people have a strong sense of right and wrong, which is a large part of what makes me proud to be an American. The downside to this (and I have definitely been guilty of this) is they feel compelled to act when they see an injustice in the world, but they have no idea where that act will take them or the millions of people impacted by it. We collectively have naive beliefs about how the world works, and then when we find out that can't save all the children or send all the girls to school despite our best efforts, and we get tired of our people coming home in coffins or terribly maimed with no end in sight we abandon altrustic goals for more reasonable ones. The question we need to ask in the beginning before we commit is will we ultimately do more good, or create a worse situation like we did in Iraq where more people died after Saddam was soundly defeated?

I think the sense of right and wrong is only part of the problem. All too often our foreign policy goals are built more around what politicians think will be salable to the home front audience than around what is realistic and pragmatic in the environments where we operate. It's easier to sell armed intervention to the populace with a promise that we're there to "install" democracy, defend human rights, and serve all those other lovely lofty goals that Americans love to hear in a sound bite. The problem is that when the sound bite is history, the domestic audience that bought the sound bite has to confront the reality that any attempt to actually do these things is almost certain to bog down in an interminable morass of lost lives and gargantuan expenditures.

At some point we need to accept reality: we can't "fix" other nations. That's not about military power: even were our military twice as powerful as it is now, we still couldn't use it to "fix" other nations. Trying to use military force to "fix" someone else's nation - meaning to impose our own ideas of how that nation ought to be managed - is a one-way road to failure that shouldn't be embarked upon in the first place.

slapout9
11-05-2012, 09:17 PM
Have been following this most interesting discussion. So here is my take. The situation in the current two wars is different than what happened in Vietnam but there is one constant that relates to both the current wars and our past experience in Vietnam and that is we have had a total failure of our Foreign Policy.......so we blame the military! Until we address the fact that we have had a Total Political failure in dealing with the rest of the world our problems will just continue.

Fuchs
11-06-2012, 01:15 AM
It might help to not elect leaders near-universally despised even in allied countries.

The crew that pushed for the Iraq war was actively insulting Germany in multiple ways - and it takes a lot for the average Central European adult to become offended in comparison to some other groups of people.

carl
11-06-2012, 01:37 AM
If one believes that the US is "the city on the hill" and has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers", then one is obliged, I suppose, to preach what Mr Haass said. The problem is that, if in the course of these neo-colonial wars, one must pull the plug, charges of hypocrisy are well founded indeed.

I do not believe that the US is "the city on the hill"; or that it has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers" - other than its own citizens. I am therefore a "bad, evil person".

Regards

Mike

You don't have to believe the US is "the city on the hill" but I want it to be the shining city on the hill and when we turn our back on our promises we are that much further from what I hope we would aspire to be.

We have no obligation to safeguard the billions except to the extent that we should do what we say we are going to do. What Lincoln said meant something then and can mean something now, and that is important to those billions.

We are choosing to pull the plug on the people we made promises too. There isn't any "must" about it. The Finns through their history have been confronted with musts, we aren't. What we are doing is getting frustrated, mostly because our refusal to see the world as it is, and leaving those we said we would not leave. That lessens us.

You judge for yourself what kind of person you are. I will judge for myself what I wish we would be and judge for myself too when we fall short.

carl
11-06-2012, 02:18 AM
Carl, you act like we somehow lured the Northern Alliance into doing something they were not already completely dedicated toward the accomplishment of. Or, as if the Afghan populace somehow has any more say now in who rules them than they did before. This is still a land where the only sure vote is cast in 7.62mm lead.

I don't give a darn about the warlords. I give a darn about all the people we made promises to and who will be subject to that 7.62 mm vote when we bug out, cut off the money and don't bother to try and make extraordinary efforts to take people who trusted us with us.


Think about it, if the election process was truly fair and functional, the Taliban government in exile would have simply rallied a "get out the vote" campaign rather than a long, bloody insurgency.

I have thought about it. I thought to myself that Taliban & Co have never much cared for elections. The results are too unpredictable for them. MO wrapped himself in the cloak of the Prophet, he doesn't do elections.


Government to government relations are contracts, not blood oaths. You worry about what happens if the US "abandons" GIRoA; but answer this, how long ago do you think that Northern Alliance-based government abandoned us?? 5 years ago? 10 years ago? Never really caring about what we wanted from the first place? We were "abandoned" long ago, but were too self-absorbed to notice or even much care.

Tell me, are there gradations in how seriously we should view promises? Does a promise or a commitment leave more wiggle room than a blood oath?

That is a nice bit of sophistry, us being abandoned. It cleverly shifts the blame. "Your honor I woulda kept the deal but they broke it first." And you always use "Northern Alliance" so we don't have to think about the little people we are going to bug out on. "Northern Alliance" sort of blocks them from view.


Will many good Afghan people suffer when we leave? Yes. But many good Afghan people suffer because we stay as well.

So one equals the other then? No I think not. That knife is sharp and it will cut deep when we bug out. We can lessen the pain for some if we try to take a bunch of them out with us when we go, or arrange for them to come later if things fall apart. I think we should do that. Do you think we should do that?


Time to stop make arguments based on false logic and poor facts. It is only just in the past few months that our senior leaders in Afghanistan are waking up to the fact that the interests and efforts promoted so heavily by ISAF are not anything that GIRoA is interested in at all. If we would have truly honored Afghan sovereignty from the start we would have realized this long ago. Allowing our General's opinions to trump the host nation's President is a bad policy that leads inevitably to places like the one we are in now.

I agree wholeheartedly with you last sentence. That speaks directly to the point the C's were making in their original post. As you said previously, our generals allowed scores to trump wisdom. That is poor soldiering. Of course since they have made it into the multi-star club, they will benefit now and forever from the impunity that comes from being in the club.

I agree with you first sentence also, though probably in a different way. I would apply it to our relations with our enemy, the Pak Army/ISI. But it is probably too late now.


As soon as we stop driving the train as to what "must" be done, there will be a HUGE compression and reduction of security effort by GIRoA. As soon as we stop funding development and security forces there will be an immediate halt to 90% of that as well. We have been self-serving in our approaches just as much as GIRoA has. Time to let this situation find a more natural balance. That is a balance that may well end up with significant Taliban influence over it. We need to prepare for that reality and be willing to swallow our pride and reach out to embrace it.

I think India, Iran, the Stans, Russia and Turkey are all going to have something to say about that. As for us, if we are going to bug out, which it seems we are fated to do, why on earth would we entreat with Taliban & Co? All those countries know a lot more about it and are a lot closer. After bugging out we wouldn't have any pull with anybody anyway.

I asked way above if you thought we should stop funding the ANSF after we bug out. I take it that you think we should. We didn't take a blood oath so that is OK I guess.


The only way our true enemies gain undue influence or sanctuary in Afghanistan is if we once again turn our backs on the place or are too proud to reach out to the new management that is sure to rise. Judging by our spiteful positions on Cuba, Vietnam and Iran, however, I am not optimistic that we will this time decide to be the bigger man and extend our hand first. Most likely we will allow ourselves to be manipulated by a vocal diaspora that has fled in our wake to enjoy their il-gotten gains in the safety of our borders

Yeah, that diaspora will have a voice. Their throats won't be sliced. The ones we made promises too whom we won't take with us, they won't be heard, for they will be dead.

A lot of your arguments, they abandoned us, things will reach their natural level when we leave, the enemy isn't really that bad (Mullah Omar, the getter outer of the vote) remind me of the things that were said from 1973-1975. It was all said then too so our self esteem wouldn't be lessened when we pulled the plug.

carl
11-06-2012, 02:38 AM
The word "abandon" is emotionally loaded and I don't see any place for it in a discussion like this. Do you suggest that protecting the populace of the world is an American responsibility? Or that once the US associates with a dysfunctional government they are then committed to defend the governed populace forever?

If Afghans want to keep the Taliban out, they can do that. They sent the Russians back to Russia, they're sending the Americans back to America, they can send the Taliban back to Pakistan... if they want to. If they don't want to, that's ultimately up to them. I don't see how protecting Afghans from themselves, or from each other, is an American responsibility.

The word abandon is a simple description of an act. You promise to stand by something and you don't, you have abandoned it. If that is emotionally loaded that is a measure of the 'don't you dare hurt my feelings' culture we live in now, a culture that in my view blinds us to consequences of our actions.

Your first question is a simple device to distract. We'll move on.

When we say we are going to stick with somebody we should, at least to the point where we make a good faith effort to try. We never did because we never recognized and dealt with realistically the Pak Army/ISI. So now we are going to bug out. Since that is a done deal seemingly we should keep the money going to the ANSF and we should make arrangements to take those who worked with us, with us, when and if they need to go. We won't of course. To damn difficult to assimilate people like that (the word that is to be uttered disdainfully with slightly curled lips). We have incurred, I think, certain moral obligations. (I know what's coming so please don't present me with the argument that nations only have interests, not moral obligations. I don't agree.)

Your last paragraph I heard before, almost 40 years ago. Only then instead of Afghans, it was South Vietnamese. The argument facilely ignored outside actors then, just as it does now.

jcustis
11-06-2012, 04:09 AM
I don't give a darn about the warlords. I give a darn about all the people we made promises to and who will be subject to that 7.62 mm vote when we bug out, cut off the money and don't bother to try and make extraordinary efforts to take people who trusted us with us.

Carl, who are you referring to when you say we made promises to people?

JMA
11-06-2012, 07:22 AM
Originally Posted by Dayuhan
The word "abandon" is emotionally loaded and I don't see any place for it in a discussion like this.


The word abandon is a simple description of an act. You promise to stand by something and you don't, you have abandoned it. If that is emotionally loaded that is a measure of the 'don't you dare hurt my feelings' culture we live in now, a culture that in my view blinds us to consequences of our actions.

Your first question is a simple device to distract. We'll move on.

Agree. Glad to see someone else has picked up on that.

You are correct. We have now entered the era of the 'spin'.

Surely there is some smart young guy with time on his hands who can plot the path of spin from the beginning when the intervention was being justified up to now when the spin is being applied to justify cutting and running.

I am constantly amazed how some people (many around here) just jump onto and defend to the death the current spin band wagon being applied by the current Administration. Worthy of study.

JMA
11-06-2012, 07:40 AM
JMA, what do the people you talk to in the RSA and other places think of this continuing pattern of behavior of the US, people who aren't Americans?

As Ken has told me many times he and presumably many/most/all USians don't care what outsides think.

Nobody I know trusts or believes what an American President, diplomat or spokesman says.

There is a little more sympathy for the military because it is appreciated that they are vulnerable to political whim and fancy and as such don't have much real authority.

To an outsider the US system of electoral collages and micro-management of the military by unqualified members of congress is about as ridiculous as what passes for a government system in China.

USians will of course not see it this way as they see their history justifying their current system... much like the Brits preaching democracy to the 3rd world while they themselves had/still have an unelected upper house. There are none blind as...

davidbfpo
11-06-2012, 10:37 AM
Moderator's Updated Note

Today I have created a new thread 'Afghan Exit: why, how and more in country and beyond': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16907

Fifteen posts from here to there were copied over.

Why? These posts have significantly left the thread's subject behind 'The Best Trained, Most Professional Military...Just Lost Two Wars?'

Please add posts on the wide ranging issues of an Afghan Exit there.:)

Dayuhan
11-06-2012, 11:57 PM
The only "spin" is see in all this is the hair-tearing garment-rending hysteria implicit is terms like "abandon", "bug out", "cut and run".

Try dropping that and looking at it calmly.

Obviously every strategy and every campaign requires periodic assessment. If there's no visible progress and returns on investment are totally out of proportion to cost, those campaigns either need a completely new strategy or they need to be terminated. There are no blank checks and no nation can afford to eternally throw resources into a black hole that shows no sign of progress, especially when no remotely vital strategic need is served.

Is the campaign in Afghanistan working? I don't think so.

Has anyone proposed a clear, coherent, realistic strategy to make it work... not just another strategy for suppressing the Taliban, but a strategy for putting together a self-sustaining Afghan state that fits American preferences? If they have, it's a well-kept secret.

So realistically and without emotional hysteria, given the enormous cost, the economic and political constraints, the absence of any evidence of progress and the lack of viable alternative strategies, what's the argument for staying in?

There are no blank checks or eternal commitments; never have been, never will be. It seems pretty clear to me at least that at this point our presence is an actual obstacle to progress: as long as the Americans are there to do the spending and the fighting, there is no incentive for the Afghan Government to even try to sustain or defend itself.

The US cannot transform Afghanistan or guarantee Afghan security, any more than we can for any country other than our own. The most we can do is give them a half chance and a window to put things together on their own. At some point they have to stand up and take responsibility for themselves, and it looks like that point is getting closer. I don't see any abandonment or betrayal in recognizing that.

carl
11-07-2012, 01:31 AM
The only "spin" is see in all this is the hair-tearing garment-rending hysteria implicit is terms like "abandon", "bug out", "cut and run".

You are fond of that rhetorical technique, I think its called labeling. Inigo's comment was best, "You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means."

See you at the other thread.

JMA
11-07-2012, 06:30 PM
Has anyone proposed a clear, coherent, realistic strategy to make it work... not just another strategy for suppressing the Taliban, but a strategy for putting together a self-sustaining Afghan state that fits American preferences? If they have, it's a well-kept secret.

Who selected that aim? .... ("putting together a self-sustaining Afghan state")

You?

The military - in this case the US military - have have to attempt to operate in an ever changing strategic environment (like shifting pack ice) due to political, whim, fancy and vacillation.

Why do you keep asking outsiders to do the thinking you elected politicians to do? After four years in office the buck stops with the Obama Administration. Go ask them what the strategy is.

USians elected Bush for a second term, now you put this guy back in the Whitehouse for "four more years". In a democracy you get the government you deserve.

Dayuhan
11-08-2012, 12:43 AM
Who selected that aim? .... ("putting together a self-sustaining Afghan state")

You?


That would have been the Bush administration. I don't and didn't agree with that policy. I thought it was stupid, as I've said many times. I don't make policy, for better or worse.


After four years in office the buck stops with the Obama Administration. Go ask them what the strategy is.

The strategy now appears to be to get out with all deliberate speed. It won't be an entirely gracious or graceful exit, but that was a given once the deranged policy of install-a-democracy "nation building" was adopted. Jump in a sewer, you ain't gonna come out smelling like roses. That's not a consequence of how you climbed out of the sewer, it's a consequence of jumping in.

TheCurmudgeon
11-25-2012, 11:03 PM
Thought I would throw out a thought and argue that the problem is in the gap between what the Army is expected to do (the ultimate political solution, i.e. a democratic Afghanistan) and what it is capable of doing (destroy enemy military capabilities). The U.S. Army does not have the capability, nor the will, to accomplish this political objective. It does not matter if the objective is the right one. Not for us to argue. It is the objective. If we do not have the capability and we are not interested in creating that capability (we currently pay lip service to it with things like Advise and Assist Brigades), who should fill the gap between capability and requirement ... what is commonly referred to as "mission creep". It is not mission creep, it is the mission, the Army just can't do it as configured.:confused:

Not for the Navy to do, they sink Ships. The Air Force drops bombs. Maybe the Marine can help, since they are the only other ground force, but they are spread pretty thin. They certainly have more experience. None the less, it is the Army who is stuck with occupation duty in large scale conflicts. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Rethinking-the-American-Way-of-War-and-the-Role-of-Landpower/2012/09

Bill Moore
11-26-2012, 01:46 AM
Thought I would throw out a thought and argue that the problem is in the gap between what the Army is expected to do (the ultimate political solution, i.e. a democratic Afghanistan) and what it is capable of doing (destroy enemy military capabilities). The U.S. Army does not have the capability, nor the will, to accomplish this political objective. It does not matter if the objective is the right one. Not for us to argue. It is the objective. If we do not have the capability and we are not interested in creating that capability (we currently pay lip service to it with things like Advise and Assist Brigades), who should fill the gap between capability and requirement ... what is commonly referred to as "mission creep". It is not mission creep, it is the mission, the Army just can't do it as configured.:confused:

Not for the Navy to do, they sink Ships. The Air Force drops bombs. Maybe the Marine can help, since they are the only other ground force, but they are spread pretty thin. They certainly have more experience. None the less, it is the Army who is stuck with occupation duty in large scale conflicts. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Rethinking-the-American-Way-of-War-and-the-Role-of-Landpower/2012/09

I take issue with the will part of your argument. First off the Bush administration argued we were not an occupation force (we were) in either Afghanistan or Iraq, so the responsibilities of an occupying power were not accepted at the political level. I suspect that will continue to be the case.

Second there was, and to some extent continues to be a debate on the roles of the military and the roles of the State Department (State has a lot of big ideas, a lot of hope, but very little capacity to do anything on this scale), but they still oppose the Army doing this, and they carry some weight on Capital Hill.

Assuming we were given the mission there would be the will to get done, and the solution wouldn't be advise and assist BDEs. It would be much more complicated and robust. We would have to have a civilian corp of experts that would probably come from our reserves and national guard to facilitate the construction of a political system that never existed in the first place. Many would have to be civilians that are temporarly deputized (for lack of a better term) because their skill sets wouldn't be resident in the ranks.

I still think Iraq and Afghanistan are aberrations instead of the new norm. I suspect for the next decade or so we'll be less ambitious and more reasonable when we design our objectives. We're capable of assisting governments who desire to change (Eastern European governments, Burma, etc.), but forcing undesired political system change is probably not something we want to invest in.

Dayuhan
11-26-2012, 10:54 AM
Thought I would throw out a thought and argue that the problem is in the gap between what the Army is expected to do (the ultimate political solution, i.e. a democratic Afghanistan) and what it is capable of doing (destroy enemy military capabilities). The U.S. Army does not have the capability, nor the will, to accomplish this political objective. It does not matter if the objective is the right one. Not for us to argue. It is the objective. If we do not have the capability and we are not interested in creating that capability (we currently pay lip service to it with things like Advise and Assist Brigades), who should fill the gap between capability and requirement ... what is commonly referred to as "mission creep". It is not mission creep, it is the mission, the Army just can't do it as configured.:confused:

Not only does the US Army not have the capability to transform Afghanistan into a democracy, the US Government overall doesn't have that capacity. Neither does anyone else, which raises some questions about the wisdom of selecting goals we haven't the capacity to achieve.

If any smart people are considering the possibility of trying to reconfigure the Army to make it capable of achieving such goals, I hope they're also considering the possibility that we might at some future time need an Army that functions as an Army. It would suck to reconfigure the Army to turn them into agents of democratic transformation and suddenly run into a situation where we need them to destroy an opposing armed force.

I would personally rather let the Army be an Army... if we really desperately need some organization to turn nations into democracies we should build a new organization, let the Army handle Army functions (fighting armed antagonists and training the host country military) and have a civilian organization tasked with the rest of it. Whether we really need to be going around trying to impose democracy in other countries is another question altogether, to which I suspect "no" is a really good answer.

TheCurmudgeon
11-26-2012, 12:41 PM
I take issue with the will part of your argument. First off the Bush administration argued we were not an occupation force (we were) in either Afghanistan or Iraq, so the responsibilities of an occupying power were not accepted at the political level. I suspect that will continue to be the case.

While I would argue that some in the military knew exactly what was to come in both Iraq and Afghanistan and chose to ignore it during the planning, execution and what came after, that is not the point of what I am getting at.


Second there was, and to some extent continues to be a debate on the roles of the military and the roles of the State Department (State has a lot of big ideas, a lot of hope, but very little capacity to do anything on this scale), but they still oppose the Army doing this, and they carry some weight on Capital Hill.

Assuming we were given the mission there would be the will to get done, and the solution wouldn't be advise and assist BDEs. It would be much more complicated and robust. We would have to have a civilian corp of experts that would probably come from our reserves and national guard to facilitate the construction of a political system that never existed in the first place. Many would have to be civilians that are temporarly deputized (for lack of a better term) because their skill sets wouldn't be resident in the ranks.

OK, this is what I was thinking. A constabulary "force" for lack of a better term under the auspices of the State Department. It could be made up of current reserve forces (designated for dual use) including Civil Affairs, MPs, Medical units, Engineers, and the like. It would need some very specialized capabilities that it would pull from State. It would not be the Peace Corps with weapons. Its mission would be limited to stability and humanitarian assistance (not nation building or social restructuring). It would be built around a preferred political solution but would have the flexibility (given that they have the go ahead from Washington) to allow traditional governments to remain in power as long as they were not the problem in the first place. It would be capable of defending itself against lightly armed company size elements.

Based on the above parameters, what would such a force require (other than funding)?



I still think Iraq and Afghanistan are aberrations instead of the new norm. I suspect for the next decade or so we'll be less ambitious and more reasonable when we design our objectives. We're capable of assisting governments who desire to change (Eastern European governments, Burma, etc.), but forcing undesired political system change is probably not something we want to invest in.

I disagree with and agree with this assessment. Baring a major collapse of the current world systems small wars, humanitarian interventions, and stabilization will be more prevalent in the future than near peer wars. We will, by necessity, be less inclined to get involved in the next few cases, but it is man's curse that he forgets. I would prefer not to forget what we have learned in the last ten years.

TheCurmudgeon
11-26-2012, 12:51 PM
I would personally rather let the Army be an Army... if we really desperately need some organization to turn nations into democracies we should build a new organization, let the Army handle Army functions (fighting armed antagonists and training the host country military) and have a civilian organization tasked with the rest of it.

I agree completely.


Whether we really need to be going around trying to impose democracy in other countries is another question altogether, to which I suspect "no" is a really good answer.

I don't think it is that simple, although I agree that we cannot "impose democracy". The world is changing as those parts of the world who are not democratic experiment with the idea or fight against it altogether. It took the French nearly a hundred years from the revolution to a stable democracy and included two emperors and at least two republics. The original round of revolutions of 1848 would not see a stable Europe for over another hundred years and two world wars. I suspect that we will see the same types of gestation from the Arab Spring. Political transitions of this type are messy. They involve an internal restructuring of the society's value system. We may not be able to force countries into becoming a democracy but we certainly can limit the damage that they will inevitably do, that may end up on our doorstep, as they make the transition themselves.

Ken White
11-26-2012, 03:26 PM
...Baring a major collapse of the current world systems small wars, humanitarian interventions, and stabilization will be more prevalent in the future than near peer wars.Arguable on several levels. A major collapse might not be required, we -- the world -- could get simply get smarter. Unlikely, to be sure but a series of minor and more probable "collapses" could trigger change for better OR for worse. Note also that our ability to predict near peer wars is suspect at best.

However, the issue isn't really what might occur but our response...
We will, by necessity, be less inclined to get involved in the next few cases, but it is man's curse that he forgets. I would prefer not to forget what we have learned in the last ten years.What we have learned in the last few years we also learned in the Indian Wars, in the Philippines, in the Caribbean and Central America and in Viet Nam:

- Small wars should be kept small. Commitment of major forces, the GPF, is inherently and by definition enlarging.

- Humanitarian interventions should be of the shortest possible duration to preclude any semblance of occupation or of overwhelming local mores and practices.

- "Stabilization" is a myth. We have never stabilized anything. We have imposed or, more often, tried and failed to impose our will on others. That's not stabilizing, that's simply interfering for our nominal and theoretical advantage -- and it universally fails.

What we have learned in the last ten years we really already knew and that knowledge was not forgotten, it was deliberately ignored as much for US domestic political reasons as for any others; we didn't keep the war small; we didn't intervene for humanitarian but rather for political reasons and we did not 'stabilize' but instead added significantly to the normal flow of destabilization that is endemic to humankind.

Oh -- we also learned that our 'doctrine' has lost its way and our overall state of training and military education is marginal.

I'm with you. I hope we don't forget those things.

TheCurmudgeon
11-26-2012, 04:15 PM
However, the issue isn't really what might occur but our response...What we have learned in the last few years we also learned in the Indian Wars, in the Philippines, in the Caribbean and Central America and in Viet Nam:

- Small wars should be kept small. Commitment of major forces, the GPF, is inherently and by definition enlarging.

- Humanitarian interventions should be of the shortest possible duration to preclude any semblance of occupation or of overwhelming local mores and practices.

Agree with all of the above.


- "Stabilization" is a myth. We have never stabilized anything. We have imposed or, more often, tried and failed to impose our will on others. That's not stabilizing, that's simply interfering for our nominal and theoretical advantage -- and it universally fails.

Disagree to a point. I think there are examples of successful "Stabilization"; for example, Bosnia. In that case we (along with others) imposed our will on the local population in order to reduce the threat to the neighboring countries. But I agree successful cases are limited. I would add that the odds of them failing increase the farther afield we go from simply keeping the peace. The more we try to "change the world" the more likely we are to fail. Stabilization can also take the form of Containment which does not necessarily require direct military action but may require military and civilian presence. The current situation in around Syria is an example of this type of situation. We cannot fix them but we can keep their problems from spilling over to other countries ... or at least try to stop that.


Oh -- we also learned that our 'doctrine' has lost its way and our overall state of training and military education is marginal.

Perhaps part of our problem is that we are trying to do too much in realms that we have limited capabilities. As a result, we have to throw out doctrine and dilute training and education. Just a thought.

My intent would be to, for the most part, remove this burden from the U.S. Army and move it over to State where it belongs. Yes, there would still be a contribution of forces as well as logistical support but I believe it is a better solution than continuing to expect the Army to do things that are beyond their capabilities.