We need less Chemo and Surgery and more "Voom."

[Bob's World]

Recently Secretary Panetta applied a cancer treatment analogy to our efforts to defeat terrorism. Apparently the message is that we have applied massive does of chemo therapy and radiation to places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and the Horn of Africa, and our very best surgeons have cut out the portions of the cancer deemed to be most problematic - and yet the cancer continues to spread. Not to worry, however, we are hiring more surgeons.

It seems to me that a "Cat in the Hat Comes Back" analogy is more appropriate. We had a small, but problematic "spot" and despite the best efforts of Cats A, B and C (lets call them "governance," "development" and "security"; or perhaps "regime change," "Pop-Centric COIN" and BPC/CT") the spot has frustrated our best efforts and continued to grow. What we need is a lot less Cat A, Cat B and Cat C, and a little bit of Cat Z and "Voom."

Al-Qaeda 'Cancer' Spreads With U.S. Chasing, Panetta Says Bloomberg.com, By Gopal Ratnam -

“We have slowed the primary cancer -- but we know the cancer has also metastasized to other parts of the global body” despite American military gains against al-Qaeda in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen in the last decade, Panetta said in a speech yesterday in Washington.

... The continuing fight against the terror group “will largely take place outside declared combat zones,” carried out by U.S. Special Operations Forces and through assistance to countries so they “can be effective in combating terrorism on their own,” Panetta said at an event organized by the Center for a New American Security, a policy research group in Washington... Panetta said “we are continuing to ramp up Special Operations Forces” even as the Pentagon’s budget comes under pressure because of budget deficits and debt and the military’s size is being cut back. The forces trained to conduct commando operations, such as the one that killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, already have doubled in size from 37,000 on Sept. 11, 2011, to 64,000 today and “will grow to 72,000 by 2017,” he said...
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-20/al-qaeda-cancer-spreads-with-u-s-chasing-panetta-says.html


The Cat in the Hat Comes Back:

The Cat in the Hat made a return appearance in this 1958 sequel. Once again, the mother has left Sally and her unnamed brother alone for the day, but this time, they are instructed to clear away a huge amount of snow while she is out. While they are working, the cat turns up and snacks on a cake in the bathtub with the water running, and leaves a pink residue. Preliminary attempts to clean it up fail as they only transfer the mess elsewhere, including a dress, the wall, a pair of ten dollar shoes, a rug, the bed, and then eventually outside. The cat reveals that Little Cat A is nested inside his hat. Little Cat A doffs his hat to reveal Little Cat B, who reveals C, and so on. A "spot killing" war then takes place between the mess and Little Cats A through V, who use an arsenal of primitive weapons including pop guns, bats, and a lawnmower. Unfortunately, the initial battle to rid the mess only makes it into an entire yard-covering spot. Little Cats V, W, X, and Y then take off their hats to uncover microscopic Little Cat Z. Z takes his hat off and unleashes a "Voom", which cleans up the back yard and puts all of the other Little Cats back into the big Cat in the Hat's hat. The cat leaves, with the promise he will return some day, and bring all his little cats back.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cat_in_the_Hat

The $64,000 question is: Where is Cat Z, and what is "voom"?

I have my thoughts on that topic, but I would like to hear yours.

[Dayuhan]

I'm not sure the "spreading cancer" analogy is useful from the start.

Cancer is a major threat to life, a potentially fatal disease. Al Qaeda specifically and Islamic extremism generally are not and never have been an existential threat to the US.

"Spreading" is substantially exaggerated IMO. These movements have not been eliminated but they haven't gained in influence or capacity either. In many areas (SE Asia was once melodramatically called the second front in the GWOT) they have declined.

I don't see any impending moment when there can be a "victory" over these movements; it's not that kind of fight. It will be a long fight, but that doesn't mean it has to be a long war. I don't think turning it into a war is advantageous to us.

If I had to outline a very general program, it would look something like this:

1. Defend effectively. Monitoring, tracking, infiltrating, and disrupting plots won't eliminate the antagonists, but it can minimize their impact, deprive them of high profile success, and isolate them from supporters who want to see results.

2. Attack effectively. Find and eliminate the key individuals on the operational and the funding/support side by whatever means work.

3. Starve them. Don't occupy territory, don't feed that "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative. Extended occupations of Muslim territory provide a discrete, specific target for jihadi propaganda and fundraising and should be avoided. We'll never convert the inner circle, they have to be killed, arrested, or driven so far underground that they can't operate. The inner circle can be isolated from their sources of support and recruitment.

4. Don't be stupid. There will always someone who will tell us that the cause of all the mess is bad governance in Muslim countries and we can fix the mess by fixing governance in Muslim countries. Trying to do that is just going to get us deeper in the $#!t. It can be argued (though often exaggerated) that the bad governance problem is to some extent something we helped create, but we can't undo the effect of meddling past by meddling again.

It's certainly a fight, but I don't think it has to be a war. Going big and heavy and indulging in excesses like regime change and nation building does not earn us any advantage and can be a real liability.

All IMO, obviously.

[jmm99]

whether cancer, cats in hats, etc., etc.

We would do better to couch our assertions within the broad conventional frameworks, even if those assertions contain outrageously unconventional strategies and tactics.

The term "fight" has no real meaning in this thread's context. A "War" (armed conflict) Paradigm has meaning. A non-War Paradigm also has meaning; but is more limiting in what strategies and tactics are available.

End rant.

BTW, these (except 4, which is a "don't"):


from Dayuhan

1. Defend effectively. Monitoring, tracking, infiltrating, and disrupting plots won't eliminate the antagonists, but it can minimize their impact, deprive them of high profile success, and isolate them from supporters who want to see results.

2. Attack effectively. Find and eliminate the key individuals on the operational and the funding/support side by whatever means work.

3. Starve them. Don't occupy territory, don't feed that "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative. Extended occupations of Muslim territory provide a discrete, specific target for jihadi propaganda and fundraising and should be avoided. We'll never convert the inner circle, they have to be killed, arrested, or driven so far underground that they can't operate. The inner circle can be isolated from their sources of support and recruitment.

4. Don't be stupid. There will always someone who will tell us that the cause of all the mess is bad governance in Muslim countries and we can fix the mess by fixing governance in Muslim countries. Trying to do that is just going to get us deeper in the $#!t. It can be argued (though often exaggerated) that the bad governance problem is to some extent something we helped create, but we can't undo the effect of meddling past by meddling again.

are within the War Paradigm (the USA position); but questionable under the non-War Paradigm (EU and UN positions).

Note also that the War Paradigm is not limited to the SW quadrant of this matrix (JMM added Tangible = "military struggle" and Abstract = "political struggle"; though various "non-violent", "political" actions can be very "tangible"):

1646

from 1997 Lwin (thesis), Great States, Weak States & Assymetric Strategies.pdf (www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a340989.pdf) (then a CPT, now a COL).

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

I don't like the apparent simplicity of Secretary Panetta using a medical analogy, for several reasons. Such an analogy may suit a domestic and friendly audience, like CNAS. I also fear that what he said is actually policy and indicates how he and others perceive the issues.

The conflict against some terrorism waged by AQ and its affiliates by the USA, allies and friends is above all an ideological, political competition. AQ plus have via their message been able to mobilise and motivate a tiny minority to wage a violent Jihad. Many others, still a minority, have provided non-lethal support and waged the non-violent Jihad.

Several times AQ's message has been rejected and still is by the vast majority who it is aimed at.

Political mobilisation abroad for the USA, allies and friends can be hard to understand, let alone anticipate. Nor does it come from amassing data, viewing the world via a VDU and relying on the "men in black" aka SOF.

Dayuhan is right:
Don't be stupid

Secretary Panetta's speech does not help.

[Dayuhan]

The conflict against some terrorism waged by AQ and its affiliates by the USA, allies and friends is above all an ideological, political competition. AQ plus have via their message been able to mobilise and motivate a tiny minority to wage a violent Jihad. Many others, still a minority, have provided non-lethal support and waged the non-violent Jihad.

Several times AQ's message has been rejected and still is by the vast majority who it is aimed at.

Political mobilisation abroad for the USA, allies and friends can be hard to understand, let alone anticipate. Nor does it come from amassing data, viewing the world via a VDU and relying on the "men in black" aka SOF.

Certainly there's a political and ideological competition going on, but I'm not at all sure it's a competition between us and AQ, or even between us and our allies and AQ. I see it more as an internal competition in the Islamic world, a competition between a more progressive Islam that is willing to coexist with the west (while not subservient to or even totally enamored of Western agendas) and a fundamentalist Islam that sees the West purely as an antagonist. I wouldn't say we have no part in that competition, but we have to accept that we're not one of the competing parties, and we aren't necessarily trying to build our influence. Trying to hard to push our own influence can actually work against us, it feeds the narrative of the fundamentalist and the perception that we are trying to dominate the Islamic world. We're trying to support the competitive position of the groups that are most willing to coexist, even though they are not necessarily friends or allies. That requires subtlety, which has never been our strongest suit. We cannot credibly position ourselves as the champion of the oppressed Muslims, and we will step on our collective putz if we try. We can and should demonstrate that if people attack us we will kill them, but we have to separate that from anything that looks like an attempt to control Muslim countries or impose western ways on Muslims.

The comment that this will be a long fight but it needn't be a long war was perhaps based on an overly civilian view of what war is, but I think that view exists among those who make decisions as well. Call it a war and we immediately conjure up visions of large forces, of campaigns, of overwhelming force. I don't think that's what we need. While this fight - war if you will - will need action, that action will best come from law enforcement in places where there's law, from SF operations where there isn't. Large operations of the sort generally thought of as "war" need to be avoided whenever possible IMO. Even when they succeed they feed that narrative of Westerners conquering Muslims and provide a discrete target for jihadi recruitment and fundraising.

[Fuchs]

Is AQ still about errorism or isn't it long since about loudmouthing, coupled with undermining of Arab regimes in hope for a theocratic caliphate?

Shouldn't it be possible to be a less obvious or at least less enticing target for their PR stunts than said regimes?


AQ in person of UBL declared 'war' and sought its battles, it got those battles in AFG and fled. It got battles in Iraq after they were invited to play there and they lost.
I suppose AQ's interest in PR stunts / battles is not cast in stone; it might be malleable.


The whole AQ / errorism thing changes entirely once you don't assume their tendency towards PR stunts against you and your kind as cast in stone.


AQ transformed from a small terror group and civil war international mercenary group into an ideological movement. Why still treat it as a terror group only?

[Dayuhan]

I'm not sure the attacks can be considered PR stunts.

Undermining Arab regimes has been tried, and has failed. AQ and associated fundamentalist groups have never been able to muster anything close to a credible threat to any significant Arab government. The main target was Saudi Arabia, and they failed miserably there. Many Saudis are perfectly happy to support AQ as long as they are fighting infidels somewhere far away, but when they propose to take over Saudi Arabia the support dies.

The only narrative that's ever really worked for them is the jihad against the foreign invader, and without a foreign invader to fight their status and credibility wane rapidly, as they did after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Seems to me the attacks aren't just PR, they're an effort to bait the US into coming after them. Of course AQ won't win those battles, but keeping the battles going keeps them relevant, and they may think they can wear us down and win the war.

[Bob's World]

Another term for "jihad against the foreign invader" is resistance insurgency.

I think Dayuhan raises several good points in his posts. Consider this. Classic resistance is when a foreign invader physically occupies one's homeland. They have defeated one's formal military forces and forced the formal system of governance to surrender or flee. Only the populace is left in the fight. Often such populaces receive assistance from some outside source. In US doctrine that is called "unconventional warfare" or "UW."

In the Middle East I think in many countries and among many populaces we have a virtual form of foreign "occupation" going on. The West post-WWI, and the US post-WWII have applied a mix of physical and virtual occupation by policy; shaping governance in ways that suited those foreign governments and that left the populaces of the region powerless and irrelevant. When there was a greater threat, in the form of a Soviet desire to replace that Western influence with their own, those populaces generally tolerated that external influence. After all, they had tolerated the Ottomans for several hundred years.

But once that Soviet threat faded, and once the empowering effects of modern information tools connected and empowered these many diverse populaces in unprecedented ways, the people began to move on long suppressed resentments. AQ formed to leverage that latent energy toward their own ends, and employed those same information tools to show that a fairly small non-state group could conduct UW just like, or even better than, large powerful states such as Great Britain, Russia and the US.

Now, if one is that foreign power and wants to exercise complete dominion over some place and people, one must simply wage war and crush the people. It works. But, if on the other hand one simply wants to have influence and ensure flow of critical resources and keeping major sea lanes open, then one would be foolish to wage war. The other way to make a resistance go away is to remove the proverbial thorn from the lion's paw. This is a problem of policy. Not the Ends of policy, but rather the Ways and Means.

We must evolve to the world we live in today. This is the essence of "Voom."

[Entropy]

The $64,000 question is: Where is Cat Z, and what is "voom"?



We must evolve to the world we live in today. This is the essence of "Voom."

Have you read the book? In the book, the Cat shows up uninvited and helps himself to a bath. His bath leaves behind a bathtub ring which the Cat tries to clean. He cleans the tub, but in doing so, he creates another, slightly worse problem. He then tries to "clean" that. After several iterations the dirty "ring" grows and becomes too big for the Cat, so he enlists the cats in his hat. They only make the problem worse and worse. What started as a bathtub ring has grown to cover everything. At last the Cat releases the magic of "voom" which, in an instant, fixes everything.

The "essence" of voom is what everyone who royally F's up fantasizes about - it's the magic cure-all that will make it all better. It's the Dr. Seuss version of the Staples "Easy Button." (Or, rather, the "Easy Button" is the Staples version of "Voom.")

The long and short of it is that there's nothing that will magically come and save us from our mistakes. Sorry for the buzzkill.

"Oh the Places You'll Go" is probably a better Seuss book to use since its central lesson is about overcoming adversity.

[Dayuhan]

Another term for "jihad against the foreign invader" is resistance insurgency.

That would be insurgency against a foreign invader in your own country. Fighting in or funding insurgency in in another country is perhaps something different.


We must evolve to the world we live in today. This is the essence of "Voom."

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "voom", but if anyone expects anything to pop out of a hat and clean up all the mess they are sadly mistaken. I don't see any quick or clean solution to this.

Of course we must evolve. We are evolving. So is everyone else, including our antagonists. Evolution isn't going to provide any absolute answer or any quick fix; it is a slow and messy process that must be continuously refined. The question now is not whether to evolve or not to evolve, but what direction evolution should take and how best to pursue the selected direction.


In the Middle East I think in many countries and among many populaces we have a virtual form of foreign "occupation" going on. The West post-WWI, and the US post-WWII have applied a mix of physical and virtual occupation by policy; shaping governance in ways that suited those foreign governments and that left the populaces of the region powerless and irrelevant. When there was a greater threat, in the form of a Soviet desire to replace that Western influence with their own, those populaces generally tolerated that external influence. After all, they had tolerated the Ottomans for several hundred years.

But once that Soviet threat faded, and once the empowering effects of modern information tools connected and empowered these many diverse populaces in unprecedented ways, the people began to move on long suppressed resentments. AQ formed to leverage that latent energy toward their own ends, and employed those same information tools to show that a fairly small non-state group could conduct UW just like, or even better than, large powerful states such as Great Britain, Russia and the US.

This I think is largely a speculative construct, and I don't see much real evidence to support it. AQ and its predecessor organizations have had considerable success in drawing recruits and funding to fight direct foreign military occupation of Muslim nations, forst by the Soviet Union and then by the US. Without such occupation they rapidly lose relevance and support. I see no evidence at all to suggest that people who travel to fight in faraway insurgencies or send money to support those insurgencies are doing that to change the pattern of governance in their own countries.


Now, if one is that foreign power and wants to exercise complete dominion over some place and people, one must simply wage war and crush the people. It works. But, if on the other hand one simply wants to have influence and ensure flow of critical resources and keeping major sea lanes open, then one would be foolish to wage war. The other way to make a resistance go away is to remove the proverbial thorn from the lion's paw. This is a problem of policy. Not the Ends of policy, but rather the Ways and Means.

Depends on what you mean by the thorn in the lion's paw. If you mean the lasting irritant of large scale US military presence in Muslim countries, I agree. If you think the thorn in the lion's paw is the way Muslim countries are governed... well, that's certainly a thorn but it's not our thorn and trying to mess with it is only going to make matters worse.

[jmm99]

Here's another little matrix, which illustrates the flexibility of the War Paradigm - when it is applied correctly:

1649

from 2009 Hartigan (thesis), Why the Weak Win Wars - A Study of the Factors That Drive Strategy in Assymmetric Conflict.pdf (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a514160.pdf).

See also, 2007 Mauldin (thesis), Analysis of the Inability of U.S. Military Leaders to Provide an Adequate Strategy.pdf (http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/3098/07Dec_Mauldin.pdf?sequence=1), who gets too carried away with the "Indirect Approach". BTW: the "indirect approach" (as used by Hartigan and Mauldin) is not vintage, pure Liddell Hart. It is more Andre Beaufre and others thinking independently.

The bottom line is that a "Strong Power" (e.g., USA) must be prepared to use both Direct and Indirect Strategies in what in actuality will be a mixed War and Peace Paradigm - the pure forms of those paradigms died a long time ago.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

A lot of good fodder for conversation here, that I will nick away at over the weekend. First, though, to be clear, "The Cat in the Hat Comes Back" is a child's book, and there is no magical "voom" that makes our current security challenges go away. "Voom" will be hard work, but more importantly voom will rely upon us first coming to a better understanding of the nature of the challenges we face, and one that takes much more ownership for causation on the parts of governments and governance, both our own and those we interact with abroad.

In many ways the US barreled into the greater Middle East much as the Cat enters into this family's home. In many ways we inadvertently left a "ring" from our actions. I think I would associate the parents coming home and the trouble that promises to bring with that of the local populaces becoming aware of what has happened and being postured to do something about it. The children are the governments of the region. They allowed the Cat in, they feel stuck with the Cat and uneasy with many of his antics, but in many ways they like having him around. But they know the relationship has created a mess and they fear what will happen when they are called to account. I would offer that one big difference is that the kids in the book care about what their parents think. The governments of the greater Middle East fear their populaces, but they by and large do not care about what they think so long as they comply to the lots cast for them.

The many Cats brought in to clean up the mess are like our many approaches to mitigate the effects of our actions and these dysfunctional relationships with these many governments (be they seen as friend or foe). We don't even consider how our very presence contributed so much to the problem, but have a hat full of solutions that we are willing to throw at the symptoms to "cure" or "defeat" the problems.

It's not perfect, but I believe it provides a better insight to what we are dealing with than Mr. Panetta's cancer analogy. How refreshing would it be for Mr. Panetta to look into a camera and say that Western governments, and particularly the US since WWII, are much like the Cat in the Hat, we have barged in to the homes of others in pursuit of our own self interests, we have left a mess, and to be honest, much of our efforts to clean up that mess have by and large served more to make the problem more distributed, more embedded, and more dangerous. We've drawn too much comfort from our perceptions of the good things we bring and too much comfort from the very real tactical successes we have had against aspect of the problem. But we don't understand this well, we don't own our own contributory role, and we don't think very strategically about the effects we need to shape with our engagement. We focus on approaches and first order effects, and those are largely moot in populace-based conflicts.

[Dayuhan]

The children are the governments of the region. They allowed the Cat in, they feel stuck with the Cat and uneasy with many of his antics, but in many ways they like having him around. But they know he's left a mess and they fear what will happen when they are called to account.

Not sure I buy that analogy. These governments are not exactly passive actors who let us in the door and watched helplessly while we made a mess. They are in many cases very much active and have a great deal to do with their own messes and their own successes. They are not children in any way, and our influence over them is in many cases much overrated.

Analogies aside, what specific policy or course of action would you suggest?

[Bob's World]

There needs to be several steps, but the first one is to recognize that our current understanding of ourselves and how we need to act to secure our interests; what those interests actually are; and the nature of the groups we currently label as "threats" and seek to defeat are all deeply flawed. Just admitting that is a huge step.

So step one is a step back.

Step two is to seriously recognize that others act upon their interests as they perceive them. Like us, they are often wrong as well in their perceptions, but right or wrong, what they perceive is what they perceive. What we perceive or wish them to perceive is interesting, but immaterial to reality.

So step two is to seriously seek to understand and appreciate how others (key individuals, non-state actors, significant populace groups, governments, etc) perceive their critical interests; what they see as their reasonable spheres of influence, and what their near and long term goals are. Too often we tend to see everyone in the context of our own interests, values and goals, and it give us a bias of perspective that leads us to not appreciating the friction we cause and also leads us to being operationally surprised.

Those may seem to general for your desire for specific tangible actions in specific places; but how belongs to the executor. We need to begin by first getting to a better understanding. More steps and some examples of specific actions to follow.

[Bob's World]

Step 3 for the US would be to recognize the anomaly of the Cold War era, and the dangers of extending and expanding Cold War institutions and relationships as a framework for best approaching and securing our interests in the modern era. This does not mean to throw the baby out with the bath, but it does mean we need a major overhaul of institutions and relationships to go along with our overhauled perspective described in the steps above.

We need to re-balance our partnerships and figure out how we lend others the security of our strengths without at the same time adopting the vulnerabilities of those we help. The US sits on the global key terrain, and everyone seems to know that except us. We should be as secure as Fort Knox, but instead we are as vulnerable as South Korea, Israel, Taiwan, or a dozen others. WWI came tragically of excessive commitment to outdated alliances. WWIII will probably come from the same thing.

Step 4 is to recognize that less is more. To get a revamped State Department (ideally one that sees itself more as a Foreign Office, with a robust Non-state Department to complement our State Department efforts, and an end to the odd idea of having a counterterrorism division in our diplomacy agency) back in lead for US foreign policy armed with a new agenda based upon this new understanding.

Step 4 also includes a major reframe and resizing of our military. Everything and person who threatens us or who could harm us is a "threat" to us. Cyber is largely a private function for private activities, and a civil function for governmental activities. It is not a military mission as a whole. The military needs to be able to leverage cyber tools to the max, be able to play unplugged with no notice, and have reasonable mechanisms in place to reduce the likelihood or duration of having to play unplugged. Land forces need to be downsized and tailored to be a solid core of warfighting capability to build upon if a need for warfighting should emerge. The Navy and Air Force need to deter major threats and keep our access to resources and markets open. BL, the Army can assume risk on strategic missions, and the AF can assume risk on tactical missions. So less bazillion dollar fighter plane programs and less ground combat units in peace.

[Dayuhan]

This still all seems very general, and it would be interesting to see how you'd propose to apply these principles in a specific case. It's certainly good to appreciate that others act upon their own perceptions of interest, though I think most of those involved already know that, but our assessment of the perception of others is easily distorted by our own preconceived assumptions and models, which can also paint us into various corners. Trying to please everyone is not a viable policy goal: whatever we do, including nothing, will piss somebody off.


Too often we tend to see everyone in the context of our own interests, values and goals, and it give us a bias of perspective that leads us to not appreciating the friction we cause

Would you assume that the friction that affects us is necessarily caused by us?

[flagg]

Interesting discussion......and I have often found myself using an over simplistic medical analogy when discussing western interventions with friends interested in my perspective about big picture foreign policy and geopolitics.

I will now have to pull out my kids Dr Seuss books now to have a look.

I have found a medical patient and medical procedure options analogous to a foreign nation and national foreign policy.

Sick patients/nations come in a number of different varieties.

Same goes for the various forms of medical practitioners/forms of foreign policy assistance and intervention options.

I think what also holds true with the analogy is how most medical treatment/foreign policy assistance and intervention is voluntary on the part of both the patient(host nation) and the medical practitioner team(foreign policy assistance and intervention), but it can at times be performed on a patient involuntarily(patient/nation deemed mentally incompetent) or a medical practitioner team may feel compelled to assist/intervene when they may strongly prefer not to(how some health systems waste money on expensive geriatric care reminds me of failed foreign policy choices with failing states).

I'm admittedly a bit biased in my analogy as I'm a strong believer that most "patients", most of the time, would require substantially less expensive long-term "medical care" if they simply performed basic self-care best practices such as:

*no overeating.......low corruption
*regular exercise......economic opportunity
*no smoking......transparency/accountability
*no boozing......predictability/participation
*no hookers/STIs......fair human rights and equitable justice

Patients/countries that do the basics right, usually don't require external assistance and/or intervention.

But like a lot of poor choices people make with their individual health, a lot of nations make parallel poor choices with their own figurative and literal health.

Which leads to increasing levels of intervention starting with consultations that can quickly become not too indifferent from paparazzi photos of a celebrity patient coming out of both a brothel hopefully followed by a more discrete visit to the VD clinic for some "antibiotics" in the form of greater, but still less invasive, foreign intervention.

And if a patient/nation displays a lack of personal responsibility towards it's own health by failing to implement cheaper, easier, more effective, and more sustainable healthy living choices, then invasive/kinetic options become increasing harder to avoid or argue against.

Sorry for my going through all this.....it's probably pretty over simplistic for this forum...but it's the best I've got at the moment and gives me a chance to put some form and structure to some of my random thoughts over drinks with friends and peers.

After a few trips overseas working in failed/failing/recovering states I'm starting to adjust my medical analogy a bit to include the following:

*addicts

So I'm thinking the world doesn't actually have too many violently schizophrenic mental patients/nations that compel involuntary intervention....fortunately they actually seem quite rare...like in reality.

BUT the world does seem to have a very high percentage of borderline addicts, as well as a fair number of hard core addicts....much like in reality.

There's a lot of patients/countries right now in need of going on strict diets(global financial crisis and it's long term ramifications over the next decade+) which will demand and compel considerable changes to the poor lifestyle choices and consequences of those choices in recent decades.

The funny thing is that at both the nation state level and the individual level it has already happened in parallel in the recent past in the form of Cuba. Once the Soviet Union cut the cord with Cuba financially at the nation state level it compelled radical change at both the nation state and individual patient level. From what I recall Cuba saw a considerable drop in obesity, heart disease, and diabetes related health care issues following it...so maybe the use of a medical analogy comparing nation states to individuals isn't just figurative, but literal.

And there are a few nations in need of intervention......but I don't think in the traditional kinetic/military sense......but more along the lines of a family/friends intervention framed in ways as to mitigate the risk of a violent backlash.

What I like about the Dr Seuss reference is the sudden appearance of so many foreign/infidel cats......itself a big part of the problem even when trying hard to help.

Not too unlike a patient/nation finding their hospital room filled with a bunch of relative strangers discussing their fate dispassionately and clinically with one another as if the patient/nation isn't present or more importantly, isn't part of the solution.

To me the answer is the same I heard earlier this year from a bunch of US Army National Guard Docs and PAs who also work in private practice.

90%+ of the problems they face every day is the result of poor basic personal health choices......poor diet, lack of exercise, and too much smoking, boozing, and hookers.

They are running a bit of an innovative medical practice(they all work together both in uniform and on civvie street), their patients don't pay them to make them better once they're sick......their patients pay them to keep them FROM getting sick in the first place.

About the only drug they prescribe is statins....the rest of their prescriptions involve "prescribing concrete pill" to get their patients to harden up and simply nagging them to do the right thing when it comes to the basics.

Maybe the US foreign policy "medical practice" should shift a bit more away from highly invasive oncology/cardiology/orthopedic surgeryand shift a bit more towardsprimary care/wellness practice Albeit maybe a very assertive/aggressive primary care/wellness practice. :)

But possibly the best lesson I've learned about individual human addicts in real life that I suspect also applies when it comes to nation state/patient addicts is that effective treatment requires to patient to not only admitting the addiction/poor behavior, but accept the need to change and adhering to a new code of behavior.

That will probably require version 2.0 that merges a 12 step Alcoholics Anonymous program with Kilcullen's 3 Pillars and 28 Articles. :)


Anywho.....just thinking out loud for a bit,

[jmm99]

Military interventions and occupations underlie this thread - despite the apparent plethora of medical procedures, cats in hats and persistent bathtub rings. So, to go to the former (and not confronting the latter), here's another resource to review.

2009 Vernetti (MAJ USA), Three's Company: The Efficacy of Third-Party Intervention in Support of Counterinsurgency (www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA513314).

Its BLUF is in this graphic:

1651

as explained by the author:


Analysis

Taken together, these results confirm that third-party intervention on behalf of a counterinsurgent decreases the likelihood of a successful outcome. Five of the seven hypotheses are confirmed with Hypothesis #5 and #6 being found not valid (see Table 3).

The results indicate that the occurrence of an early intervention or the occurrence of an early termination of an intervention do not significantly affect the chances for counterinsurgent success.

The results also indicate that third party interventions, military deployments, military occupations, and interventions involving democracies all decrease the likelihood of a successful conflict outcome.

Interventions involving an “indirect” approach to counterinsurgency represent the most promising possibility for third-party intervention with the results indicating that an intervener that participates in this type of counterinsurgent effort has a significantly better chance of bringing a successful outcome.

What is an "indirect" approach, as opposed to a "direct" approach, will be a point of controversy. At least it requires definition in the context of reality - as opposed to "translating" and "interpreting" metaphors and analogies.

Here's his definition of the chart's variables:


INTERVENTION variable: tests for the occurrence of third party intervention in the form of military occupation, military intervention, or other military aid in support of the counterinsurgent forces. The study also includes the suppression of colonial rebellions as interventions if the colonial power deployed additional troops from outside of the colony in orderbto support the counterinsurgent. The variable titled INTERVENTION is coded “1” if an outside country or colonial power provided assistance to the counterinsurgent during the conflict. The dataset includes 59 conflicts that involved third party intervention.

MILITARY variable: refers to the type of military intervention. Specifically, cases are coded “1” if the intervention involved the deployment combat units to assist incumbent government forces. The dataset includes 50 conflicts that involved direct military interventions.

OCCUPY variable: denotes conflicts involving military occupation. Specifically, cases are coded “1” if the intervention involved the deployment combat forces across international boundaries to establish effective control over a territory to which it had previously enjoyed no sovereign title. This includes cases of colonial rebellions or where the intervening power set up a new government after occupation. The dataset includes 30 conflicts that involved military occupations.

STRATEGY variable: used to code counterinsurgent strategy. Specifically, the study uses Nagl’s binary categorization of counterinsurgency strategy [82] [82 Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 27.] with the STRATEGY variable coded “1” for the “indirect” approach, characterized by counterinsurgent strategies that concentrated on winning support among the population. Cases are coded “0” for the “direct” approach to counterinsurgency, characterized by attempts to achieve victory through the destruction of the insurgency’s armed forces. The coding is based off of the RAND “89 Insurgents” dataset’s evaluation of counterinsurgent competency. The RAND study presents a list of capabilities relevant to conducting an effective indirect counterinsurgency campaign [83 & 84] [83 & 84. Gompert and Gordon, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency, xxxiii & 389]; and the variable coding comes from RAND analysts’ evaluation of counterinsurgency competency in 63 insurgency based conflicts. Specifically, the coding represents a subjective analyst evaluation of how well a counterinsurgent or intervening military demonstrated an ability to plan and carry out military operations relevant to a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency.

DEMOCRACY variable: coded to reflect the intervener’s form of government at the time of the intervention. The study codes the intervening state’s regime using Polity2 values from the Polity IV Project dataset. The Polity2 rating is a 21-point scaled composite index of regime type that ranges from highly autocratic (-10) to highly democratic (+10). The DEMOCRACY variable is coded “1” for states with a Polity2 rating 6 or higher. In cases where RAND rated government and intervener with separate competencies, the intervener competency coding was used. Sixty three conflicts are coded for STRATEGY with thirty of these involving third-party interventions for the counterinsurgent.
...
[91] Results for the DEMOCRACY sample are included because the Chi Square probability is very close to the 0.05 Alpha level probability threshold, but they are annotated to show that the results reflect a lower statistical significance (0.076).

The author's conclusion:


Part 5: Conclusion

Does third party military intervention help or hurt an incumbent government during an insurgency?

This study attempted to answer this question by testing prevailing military theories of counterinsurgency in the context of third party intervention using basic tests for statistical significance and bivariate contingency. The results show that intervention on behalf of a counterinsurgent decreases the likelihood of a successful government outcome, and specifically, interventions in general, interventions involving the deployment of combat forces, interventions involving military occupation, and interventions by democratic states decrease the likelihood of counterinsurgent success.

Early intervention, meaning the commitment of third-party support within the first year of conflict, does not appear to have a significant effect on counterinsurgency success. Likewise, the decision to end an intervention early does not appear to significantly alter the chance of counterinsurgent failure.

Interventions in support of an “indirect” approach to counterinsurgencies are the only cases that exhibit a significant improvement for the chances of successful outcome.

In addition, conflicts involving intervention demonstrated longer average duration for losses and shorter durations for successful outcomes. If one accepts conflict duration as a proxy for conflict costliness, then these results indicate that intervention to support a counterinsurgent provides cheaper victories but more costly losses.

The implications for policymakers are twofold. First, the results show that the decision of whether to intervene involves a risky tradeoff. An intervening state may be able to significantly decrease the duration of a successful conflict if it is willing to accept the poorer odds of success. More specifically, intervention provides an opportunity to realize a quicker victory for a besieged government, but the intervening state must be willing to gamble with lower odds of winning and a higher cost for defeat.

All of this should be very "old hat" - e.g., Jack McCuen in the 1960s; but I guess these things have to be periodically "discovered".

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

This still all seems very general, and it would be interesting to see how you'd propose to apply these principles in a specific case. It's certainly good to appreciate that others act upon their own perceptions of interest, though I think most of those involved already know that, but our assessment of the perception of others is easily distorted by our own preconceived assumptions and models, which can also paint us into various corners. Trying to please everyone is not a viable policy goal: whatever we do, including nothing, will piss somebody off.



Would you assume that the friction that affects us is necessarily caused by us?

"Caused" is one of those hard words people like to use. As in "you're saying we caused this." "Abandon" is another one, as it "you can't abandon an ally."

So, did we "cause" the friction that affects us? I'll let Mike clean up the terminology, but I think we have "joint and several liability" in the friction. This is a legal construct that recognizes that there is rarely a single cause for any mishap. Many contributed to the friction, but we are the one standing there with the deep pockets footing the bill.

As we both have noted, AQ did not "cause" this, nor did AQ's Islamist ideology "cause" this, nor did US foreign policy "cause" this, nor did the self-serving governance of the many despotic regimes grown used to acting with tremendous impunity in regards to their own populaces "cause" this. Certainly high food prices and unemployment did not "cause" this either. But all have contributed, and it is our own actions that have created the trail of "blame" that makes it so easy for organizations such as AQ to make the case "but for the role of the US, you would not experiencing the type of governance you currently receive at home." Is it our fault? No, but we have very real causal connections that we need to own up to and that are being exploited by others to focus the actions of the many populaces who are currently acting out to seek a better future. National governments use us as a Bogey man to focus the attention of their own revolutionary populaces away from themselves and onto us. Friends and foes alike do this. AQ uses it to recruit from these revolutionary populaces the foreign fighters and agents of terror and funding and sanctuary they need to pursue their own political agenda of change.

But it is political suicide to admit this in US politics. Those who have essentially stated positions similar to this have been mercilessly attacked by their opponents and abandoned by their allies. We exhibit classic addict behavior, refusing to take responsibility for our own contributions to causation, and rationalizing all causation onto some external "threat" beyond our control. Many factors contribute to this, so this is natural and to be expected. It is human nature. We need to overcome our nature if we are to truly make progress and get better.

I just happened to be watching a bit of the mini-series on Kennedy last night, the episode where he decides to ignore the advice of his cabinet (the same advisor's who convinced him to authorize the Bay of Pigs operations), and not escalate the operation with direct US involvement and to go to the American people and admit his mistake and take full responsibility for what happened. I don't know what actually happened, but we need a bit of how it was portrayed in the movie for our current policies related to the past 11 years of CT.

[Bob's World]

Mike asks and observes:


What is an "indirect" approach, as opposed to a "direct" approach, will be a point of controversy. At least it requires definition in the context of reality - as opposed to "translating" and "interpreting" metaphors and analogies.

I have been working in this space of indirect and direct approaches in the context of the current conflict for nearly a decade, and one of the most amazing things to me is how poorly defined this concept is. I am tempted to say "misunderstood," but if a concept has a dozen definitions, then is it really "misunderstood" if on perscribes more to one definition than to others? Who is to say what is right or wrong? Besides, any way you slice it most take a position as to what the purpose of the indirect approach is that renders their particular definition moot: They think it is about defeating the insurgent and sustaining the current government.

If all roads lead to the same objective, but that objective is what is actually misdiagnosed, then what difference does it make which path you take to get there?

At USSOCOM several years ago some bright action officer sold leadership on a visual of three colorful balls connected by arrows. This was an era when the indirect approach was something done obscurely in the Philippines, and the direct apporach was the only approach in the Middle East. One ball represented friendly forces, with two broad arrows radiating outward, one a supporting effort of indirect approaches aimed through the populace ball to get at the threat ball. The other a main effort of direct approaches aimed directly at the threat ball. It was an evolution and people liked it. Now they had two ways to defeat the enemy. This chart became known by a variety of names, from "the colliding balls" to "the twigs and berries."

After a couple of years, as news "pop-centric" COIN became the rage in major theaters there was a dramatic unveiling of a "major" revolution of the twigs and berries. In a display of powerpoint mastery the old T&B chart rotated before the eyes of the assembled crowd and an new future was revealed: Now the indirect approach arrow as designated as the main effort and the direct approach arrow was designated as the supporting effort. Wise heads nodded in agreement. This was a brilliant advance. All arrows still terminated on the threat ball.

After a quick google, here is what I describe:
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/fighting-global-war-%E2%80%93-indirectly/

[Bob's World]

Indirect approach could be anything from a development project providing water or electricity, to efforts to train and employ host nation security forces directly against the insurgent elements of their populace.

To me, the latter seems more like a nuanced variation of the direct approach. A nuance that is probably lost on the populaces engaged by such enabled and empowered host nation CT forces.

To me, indirect approaches did not go through the populace to engage the threat, instead they were approaches that recognized that both the government and the threat were competing elements of the same populace, and that the insurgent would not exist if there were no market for what they offered. So, any efforts designed to allow the current regime to preserver without having to listen to and address the concerns of its own populace and thereby reduce that market for illegal change seemed to me to be misguided. Efforts to suppress rather than resolve. Direct or indirect approaches largely being moot.

More important would be to ask:

What is winning? History books tell us winning is when we keep the government we are supporting in power and make the current challenger go away. Countries such as Algeria and the Philippines have become so good at this form of COIN that they have "defeated" insurgencies over and over and over again...

To me, this is not "winning." This is merely suppressing the symptoms of popular discontent long enough to continue to secure ones national interests in some place through the government one is comfortable working with. So long as we are honest with ourselves about that fact, then such approaches may well make sense. But when we delude ourselves that such approaches have the interests of the affected populaces at heart and that they have defeated the conditions of insurgency among those people, rather than simply forcing the people to stand down and defeating some specific insurgent groups, we create dangerous precedent. That precedent is then captured as doctrine and becomes a gift that keeps on giving.

One big problem is that we focus on the direct effects of both our direct and indirect approaches. These direct effects become the basis for our metrics to measure our success. How many wells did one drill; how many villages did one clear; how many HVTs did one capture or kill; etc. Do it, count it, assess it, report it. We believe that the sum of such tactical first order effects must naturally ultimately add up to strategic victory. As the research provided by Mike suggests, there is little evidence of this being true.

If we were assessing a campaign like that waged in WWII such thinking applies. Destroy more capacity than the enemy can produce, capture his territory, etc and ultimately he is defeated. This Clauswitzian logic applies to Clauswitzian conflict.

But it does not apply to the populace-based conflicts we contend with today and that we conflate clumsily under the illogical construct of "Irregular warfare." We lump things by how they manifest rather than by how they form. By their appearance rather than by their nature. We confuse Clauswitzian conflicts that happen to include populace-based organizations with internal populace-based conflicts that Clausewitz simply does not apply to much at all. If the primary conflict is internal to that trinity of People-Government-Army rather than between competing separate systems of that trinity, it is totally different dynamic altogether. It is much more civil emergency than war, regardless of how violent in nature or similar in appearance. One must focus on primary purpose for action of the challenger, and the nature of the relationship between the challenger and the challenged. This provides distinctions that matter. What tactics applied or what ideology ascribed to in of themselves offer little in the way of insight as to what type of conflict this is and how to resolve it.

[Dayuhan]

The discussion was of AQ, how did it move to insurgency and populaces? AQ is not an insurgency and has no populace, seems to be wandering a bit off the topic.

[jmm99]

The OP deals with Chemo, Surgery and Voom - which means that almost anything is fair game for discussion. ;)

Bob: I decline, as a retired gentleman, to be drawn into a discussion of "joint and several liability" (a rather primitive legal construct; better replaced by comparative fault and comparative causation). :)

But, seriously, strategic interaction (e.g., direct and indirect strategies; sequential and cumulative strategies) applies across the board to any armed conflict.

More later.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

done in one easy step by rearranging the deck chairs.

Bob: thank you for bringing up the DoD (JCS) 7500 Campaign Plan; as well as your perception of what the term "indirect approach" means - presumably a view prevalent in your community. However, there is another way to look at "direct" and "indirect" approaches.

That way (see below) is not the grandiose, "indirect" approach set out in Robert Gates' Jan 2009 statement (quoted in the three balls graphic) and in the graphic itself:


Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the disacontented, from whom the terrorist recruits. It will take patient accumulations of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies.

The main thrust here is simply "nation (state) building". But, it gets "better" (or "worse").

Following the now primary green lines (just as in the investment commercial), we come to:


Global Environment
Shape
Inhospitable to Violent Extremism
Stabilize

It seems the DoD has reached a program of "world building" (Global Synchronization), which will then (following the big, big green line and arrowhead), isolate the threat - the ENEMY (confined to its red circle and presumably rendered powerless).

Now, turning to a much more modest view of "direct" and "indirect" approaches, generally defining them as follows:

Direct - a plan which adversely affects the enemy's capacity to conduct armed conflict.

Indirect - a plan which adversely affects the enemy's will to conduct armed conflict.

The plan may be offensive, defensive, offensive-defensive or defensive-offensive; and may be executed in a sequential or a cumulative manner. "Direct" and "tangible"; "indirect" and "abstract" seem synonyms to me. BTW: the question of "win, draw, lose" is also handled modestly - with admission that days of reckoning may be postponed.

Even this modest set of "definitions" leaves many questions open for discussion and improvement.

To be continued.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

This seems a useful resource - because of its added thoughts and its multiple questions. 2011 Kotula & Richardson (thesis), Defeating David - Looking Beyond a Matched Strategy (http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA556382).

Its abstract deals with the generalization that, when strategies are matched, the stronger power wins more often than not; but:


Abstract : This thesis builds upon existing contemporary theories that attempt to explain the outcomes of asymmetric conflict. Specifically, this thesis uses Ivan Arreguin-Toft's Strategic Interaction Theory as a baseline to identify theoretical gaps that can not only help further explain asymmetric conflict outcomes, but also provide insight into developing the proper strategy for strong actors.

Arreguin-Toft contends that when the strong actor employs the correct strategy then it will win over 75 percent of conflicts against a materially weaker adversary. This leads to a fundamental question: if the strong actor uses the correct strategy against a weaker opponent, then why do strong actors still lose nearly 25 percent of the time?

In an effort to identify other key variables that help explain non-conventional war outcomes, this thesis evaluates case studies where the strong actor both won and lost an asymmetric conflict after choosing the correct strategy.

This study finds two other factors that are important to achieving victory in an asymmetric conflict.

First, the strong [intervening] actor must have a viable indigenous political authority to work by, with and through. This concept has little to do with political legitimacy. Instead, it focuses on the capacity of the host nation, with strong [intervening] actor assistance, to synchronize its military and political effort to defeat the insurgency.

Second, the strong [intervening] actor must not only use restraint in applying direct military power, but it must also use the correct force: a cadre that is trained in conducting irregular warfare.

As such, this thesis' conclusions are aligned with the belief that it is the host nation's war to win or lose-adhering to this principle provides the strong actor with the best chance of defeating David before losing its political will.

The question comes to the forefront as to what is a "viable indigenous political authority"; as well as whether the intervening strong actor has the "correct force" available.

The authors' analysis summarizes what we have already seen in prior studies:


As previously discussed, no one theory by itself answers the question(s) concerning why strong actors lose to weak actors in asymmetric conflict. However, to date, Ivan Arreguin-Toft’s Strategic Interaction (STRATINT) theory is the most complete. In his 2005 book, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict", Arreguin-Toft successfully demonstrated that if the strong actor employs the correct strategy then it will win over 75 percent of the time against a materially weaker adversary. Whereas, if the strong actor chooses the wrong strategy, then its weaker opponent will win over 60 percent of the conflict engagements.

1654


Arreguin-Toft breaks down the STRATINT possibilities into four scenarios with each actor controlling what strategy it employs. In simple terms, the strong actor can either employ a direct or indirect offensive strategy, and the weak actor can choose either a direct or indirect defensive strategy. He further defines direct versus indirect for each actor based on the following typology. In a direct-direct engagement, strong actors use a conventional attack and the weak actor uses a conventional defense. In an indirect-indirect engagement, the strong actor uses a strategy of barbarism and the weak actor employs a guerrilla warfare strategy.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=1649&d=1353732905

This strategic interaction chart is somewhat similar to a strategic interaction chart based on sequential and cumulative strategies in tangible and abstract areas.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=1646&d=1353538000

The roles of attacker and defender easily flip. E.g., the 2001 Taliban was engaged in a direct-direct engagement in which it was attacking (with some success) the Northern Alliance. Intervention by limited US and UK SOFs - and not so limited US airpower - flipped the attacker-defender roles. When the Taliban later came back, it took on another attacker role - the weak actor employing a guerrilla warfare strategy (as well as a localized political strategy).

The authors then raise some direct questions re: gaps in using the "matching strategies" theory:


On the surface, Arreguin-Toft’s theory is also intuitively logical: the key to victory is choosing the right strategy. However, even as sound as his argument is, several gaps exist in his theory concerning indirect conflicts that merit additional research and consideration.

First, Arreguin-Toft contends that in conflicts where the strong actor chooses the correct strategy, then it will end quickly. While this assumption often holds true in a direct v. direct engagement, it fails to address the inherent protracted nature of indirect conflict.

Second, Arreguin-Toft’s labeling of “Barbarism” and “Guerrilla Warfare” as respective strategies for strong and weak powers in an indirect v. indirect conflict is problematic. These terms over simplify the strategies used by each actor and focuses on the ability (or inability) of the strong actor to defeat its enemy militarily with little regard for the other (social, economic, political) aspects of irregular warfare.

Third, Arreguin-Toft devotes little attention to analyzing the resources employed by the strong actor, and whether or not the strong actor is trained or has experience fighting an irregular war. Clearly, the strong actor is materially superior; however, are there other competing interests that preclude the strong actor from bringing the full weight of its strength to the conflict? More importantly, just because a strong actor chooses the correct strategy as defined by Arreguin-Toft, does not mean its military is adept at implementing the associated tactics.

Finally, Arreguin-Toft fails to distinguish the specific nature of a given conflict particularly when defining the indirect approach used by both actors. For example, what is the nature of the insurgency and its associated grievances? Is it a nationalist movement? Is it motivated by religion? Is there a minority in power? Moreover, there are clearly more tactics available to strong actors than just barbarism. Did the strong actor primarily attempt to kill/capture the insurgents? Did the strong actor attempt to isolate the population from the insurgents with re-location programs? What type of force did the strong actor use? Ignoring these additional considerations fundamentally reduces the STRATINT theory to the military aspect of asymmetric conflict. In short, considering the exact nature of given conflict, as well as clearly defining the political environment, are not only critical to determining the appropriate counter-strategy, but also in determining conflict outcome.

The authors claim no magic bullet - in fact, here is what they see as missing:


The value in summarizing and evaluating the major theories on asymmetric conflict outcomes is that it helps to identify any areas not adequately addressed by the existing literature. Several areas that require additional consideration are missing.

First, in all four theories outlined above, not one considers in detail the exact nature of the weak actor and the type of insurgency it is fighting. This analysis needs to go beyond the type of military strategy (indirect) and tactics (guerrilla warfare/terrorism) used, and instead needs to focus specifically on the nature of insurgency and its grievances with the existing governance structure. How can a strong actor develop a proper counter-strategy if it does not understand the nature of its opponent, and not only what it has to work against, but also what it has to work with? While all four theories appear to address it, not one accounts for popular support of the weak actor as the deciding factor in the conflict outcome. When in fact the ability (or inability) of the strong actor to isolate the weak actor from the population and deliver the essential services such as security, healthcare, education, and infrastructure may be the most important factor in determining the conflict outcome.

Second, what type of force did the strong actor use? Was it a force trained in irregular warfare with experience in conducting counterinsurgency? Did the strong actor use indigenous forces to supplement its effort? This question specifically addresses if the strong actor used the right tool (force) for the job.

Finally, were there any domestic or international constraints levied on the strong actor? Were there domestic economic issues, or another conflict, that precluded the strong actor from using its full capacity? Was there international pressure (or norms) that precluded the strong actor from implementing its military and political agenda? In sum, the only way for the strong actor to develop the appropriate strategy is to not only fully understand the nature of its enemy, but to also understand the operating environment—both at home and abroad. Failure to account for these factors will likely mean a decreased winning percentage for strong actors engaged in an irregular war against a significantly weaker adversary.

All being said, a strong power (considering intervention) has a lot of questions to answer before taking the leap.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

The OP deals with Chemo, Surgery and Voom - which means that almost anything is fair game for discussion.

Actually the OP referred specifically to terrorism, and was built around references to a speech that dealt specifically with AQ. How we got from there to insurgency, populaces, nation-building, and world-building is an interesting question. Conversation creep, perhaps.

[Bob's World]

The discussion was of AQ, how did it move to insurgency and populaces? AQ is not an insurgency and has no populace, seems to be wandering a bit off the topic.

AQ indeed is not an insurgent.

AQ indeed has no populace.

The hard fact is that without the insurgent populaces of others AQ would just be a bunch of radical crackpots of no consequence.

But the other hard fact is that many populace groups in many countries across the greater Middle East have high conditions of insurgency and are either suppressed currently from acting out, or are actively acting out. This is the energy source that gives AQ significance.

AQ conducts what in US Doctrine is called Unconventional Warfare. They leverage the insurgent populaces of others to advance their own agenda for their own purposes. Just as the Soviets did throughout the Cold War. Just as the US did throughout the Cold War.

This is a reality of the new information age. Not only is it harder for governments to keep insurgent populaces suppressed, or to suppress insurgent populaces once they go active; but equally it empowers non-state actors such as AQ to conduct a distributed, networked approach to UW.

It is a bold new world. Age old dynamics, but leveraged as never before through the tools of modern technology. Now more than ever people matter. Now more than ever governments must actually seriously take into account how their actions will affect people. This is not limited to the people living within some system of governance alone, but also people everywhere who are affected by that governance.

US governance affects people all over the world. AQ is leveraging that fact to recruit members of insurgent populaces to join their ranks as foreign fighters and as terrorist operatives. AQ is also leveraging that fact to gain influence among such insurgent populaces and the insurgent groups that emerge from such populaces as part of their UW campaign.

The great irony for the US is that in many cases it is AQ that is in the role of "de Oppresso Liber" while it is the US dedicated to sustaining in power the regimes these populaces rise against. Many don't want a radical Islamist solution for governance. Many don't want complete change of their governance. Most only want a few, small but significant changes to bring governance into synch with the evolving will and expectations of the people it affects.

Those who feel the US is losing control and should double down on seeking to sustain outdated relationships are calling for an approach that is far more likely to make terrorism worse, not better. Neither should the US simply turn our backs or call for government leaders to stand down. Better we act as mediator to bring the parties to the table to work these things out without the avoidable chaos that is Syria today, or Libya last year.

We need a new approach to foreign policy that allows us to build and wield influence without relying so heavily on regime change, nation building or overly broad programs of targeted killing.

We can do this, and it will be far cheaper and far less offensive to those it affects, and much more insynch with US principles than approaches of the past decade.

But if one can't see that suppressed insurgent populaces and a US policy perceived as keeping the status quo in place as a major aspect of the energy source powering this, then one is not likely to get past programs designed to simply "defeat, disrupt, or deny" the symptoms of the problem.

[Fuchs]

(...)energy source(...)leverage(...)new information age(...)empowers non-state actors(...)distributed, networked approach(...)bold new world(...)operatives(...)sustain(...)

Error - error - error. Buzzword overload pre-empts actually reading the text.
Press any key to reboot.

[Bob's World]

People are more informed so governments must listen and govern.

It takes increasing amount of effort (money, force, etc) to keep restless people suppressed.

[Fuchs]

Bold claim, which takes a whole lot of historical analysis and knowledge to support properly.


I have doubts.

Taken from a blog which I happen to know well:



An excerpt from the letters of Pliny (http://www.princeton.edu/%7Echamplin/cla219/219pliny.htm) ( a correspondence between magistrate Pliny the Younger and the Roman emperor Trajan):

To the emperor Trajan

While I was making a progress in a different part of the province, a most destructive fire broke out at Nicomedia, which not only consumed several private houses, but also two public buildings; the town-house and the temple of Isis, though they stood on contrary sides of the street. The occasion of its spreading thus wide, was partly owing to the violence of the wind, and partly to the indolence of the people, who, it appears, stood fixed and idle spectators of this terrible calamity. The truth is, the city was not furnished with either engines, buckets, or any single instrument proper to extinguish fires: which I have now, however, given directions to be provided. You will consider, Sir, whether it may not be advisable to form a company of firemen, consisting only of one hundred and fifty members. I will take care none but firemen shall be admitted into it; and that the privileges granted them shall not be extended to any other purpose. As this corporate body will be restricted to so small a number of members, it will be easy to keep them under proper regulation.

Trajan to Pliny

You are of opinion it would be proper to establish a company of firemen in Nicomedia, agreeably to what has been practiced in several other cities. But it is to be remembered, that societies of this sort have greatly disturbed the peace of the province in general, and of those cities in particular. Whatever name we give them, and for whatever purpose they may be instituted, they will not fail to form themselves soon into political clubs. It will, therefore, be safer, to provide such equipment as is of service in extinguishing fires, enjoining the owners of houses to assist in preventing the mischief from spreading; and if it should be necessary, to call in the aid of the populace.

Many authors in newspapers, blogs and journals have linked the Arab revolts to social media services in the internet. The Egyptian government seems to agree so far as to cut the internet completely in Egypt yesterday. I'm a bit sceptical and see such services as mere and substitutable tools, but it reminded me of the above quoted ancient letter.

Maybe all forms of organisation - even online friends networks and the like - have an inherent potential for political purposes. Maybe modern dictatorships really need to suppress even such forms of organisations / "societies". This might put them at an even greater systemic disadvantage in comparison to open societies than otherwise.

Maybe you underestimate the role of human nature and overemphasize the attention-grabbers of the day a bit.



You're from the U.S..
There was a certain movement from 2008 on, with quite agitated people. Did an unusually high level of "being informed" play a noticeable role in this movement or maybe more mundane, lesser things?
http://www.addictinginfo.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/002.jpg

[Dayuhan]

But the other hard fact is that many populace groups in many countries across the greater Middle East have high conditions of insurgency and are either suppressed currently from acting out, or are actively acting out. This is the energy source that gives AQ significance.

Is that really "the energy source that gives AQ significance"? I'm not at all convinced that it is. A statement like that requires supporting arguments, it can't simply be proclaimed as revealed truth.

I just read this on another thread, it seemed worth re-quoting here:


Al-Shabaab presents its mission in cosmic terms, invoking a civilisational conflict between the forces of Islam and non-Islam. This is coupled with attempts to develop an ‘ummah consciousness’ in potential recruits, encouraging them to identify with Muslim causes worldwide. Typically, the suffering of Muslims around the world is juxtaposed with the ease of life in the West. The central tenet of this messaging is that faith necessitates action, and Muslims need to recalibrate their priorities by placing the liberation of Muslim lands ahead of esoteric matters of faith.

I think the same might well be said of AQ. It might be said as well that AQ established this template.

I see no evidence to suggest that AQ draws its primary impetus from populaces angry at their own governments. AQ and its predecessor organizations have drawn their primary support base from Muslim resentment toward infidel occupation of Muslim lands, first the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and subsequently the American occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. AQ has tried very hard to muster sentiment against Muslim rulers of Muslim countries, but they've generally failed pretty miserably. The only narrative that's ever really worked for them is "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful", which is why they rapidly fade into irrelevance when there's no infidel to expel. Paradoxically that situation makes them more dangerous, as they're likely to try to provoke an incursion that will restore their relevance, but ultimately I think the best way to starve AQ is to stop occupying Muslim countries and deprive them of that core narrative.


US governance affects people all over the world. AQ is leveraging that fact to recruit members of insurgent populaces to join their ranks as foreign fighters and as terrorist operatives. AQ is also leveraging that fact to gain influence among such insurgent populaces and the insurgent groups that emerge from such populaces as part of their UW campaign.

Again, I don't think these people are driven by the "insurgent populace" model at all. They aren't trying to strike a blow against their own government. They see themselves not joining an insurgency (in which they fight their government) but a war pitting the devout against the infidel worldwide, a war in which they travel to the battlefields of the day. The assumption that the core dynamic driving AQ is between governments and their own populaces is very questionable and requires supporting evidence to be accepted.


Better we act as mediator to bring the parties to the table to work these things out without the avoidable chaos that is Syria today, or Libya last year.

That sounds to me like an absolutely disastrous prospect. I don't think we have any credibility at all as mediator among other governments or between governments and their populaces. No mediator can be effective unless all parties to the dispute accept the mediator and desire mediation, and that's not likely to happen with us in the picture. Better to mind our own business than to try to impose ourselves in a role we cannot play and where we are not welcome.


We need a new approach to foreign policy that allows us to build and wield influence without relying so heavily on regime change, nation building or overly broad programs of targeted killing.

Agreed, but I don't see us doing that by messing in the internal affairs of other countries, even if we convince ourselves that we're messing on behalf of "the people".


But if one can't see that suppressed insurgent populaces and a US policy perceived as keeping the status quo in place as a major aspect of the energy source powering this, then one is not likely to get past programs designed to simply "defeat, disrupt, or deny" the symptoms of the problem.

Seems to me that the US policies that have most fed this are polices aimed at altering the status quo, not at sustaining it... supporting the mujahedin against the Soviets in Afghanistan, regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan, etc. Not that I think we should be sustaining the status quo, but in most of the Muslim world the status quo doesn't rely on our sustenance anyway. Trying to change the status quo in ways that we think the populace will like is just going to work us deeper into the scheisse.

[Bob's World]

Fuchs,

Perhaps you read my words and ascribe meanings I do not attempt to convey as you shape them to fit your own bias?

My work is all about human nature. I believe that good tactics in COIN, or dealing with populace-based problems requires a deep understanding of the particular people one is working with. Good tactics demands we appreciate how people are different. But good strategy for dealing with such problems demands we appreciate how people are the same. Over time and and space and across cultures there are strong threads of human nature that bind us all. It is when we fail to recognize these threads, or when we arrogantly think they do not apply to us or our particular situation, that we tend to get into trouble.

Did Caesar struggle with insurgencies? Of course, it is human nature to resist against a system of governance one does not accept. Several other factors contribute to why societies resist or revolt against governance. So Caesar built roads and fleets to move his legions from one problematic spot to the next efficiently so as to retain control of the empire. This is what successful empires do, they build the minimum force necessary to sustain the status quo, and develop infrastructure that facilitates that effort.

But soon it was not just the emperor's legions and his goods moving on those roads and vessels. All manner of commerce, migration and information moved with greater speed as well. This breakthrough in "information technology" designed to ease the control of empire soon drove the cost of sustaining empire to exceed the benefits. When people cannot be controlled in isolation, they will tend to act out en mass.

The same happened to the Holy Roman empire upon the advent of the printing press. When Rome could no longer control information and knowledge, they soon could no longer control those many diverse people who increasingly came to question the legitimacy of that system of rule.

Great Britain's empire began before the age of steam powered industry and transportation and electronic communications. But as their empire was a major facilitator of developing and expanding those technologies in efforts to maximize the income from their far flung possessions, it was those very technologies that soon came to tax the ability of a government in London to exercise control over diverse populaces around the world. As some of the first to rebel noted in America "An island cannot role a continent"! Nor can an island rule the world - not when the populaces of that world are not isolated into virtual islands of ignorance of how their situation compares to that of the situations of others.

The Soviets offered glasnost to the suppressed populaces of the Soviet Union in the hopes that this "openness" and increased transparency of governance would reduce criticisms of governance. Instead it provided a catalyst of information empowerment to many diverse populaces across the empire, and within a decade the empire collapsed. Oh, it could have sustained itself for decades no doubt, through generations of bloody, suppressive state violence and control over the people, but Gorbachev did what few in his position have done before or since: He let the people go, and in so doing sealed the fate of the Soviet empire.

What is going on today in the Middle East is little different. A region of frozen conflicts, autocratic regimes, and powerful external influences. The people there are informed now in ways they have never been before, and with no threat of Soviet dominion to serve as rationale for accepting a much more benign brand of Western manipulation they are drawing courage from each other and acting out to force their own governments to listen and evolve, and to remove what they deem as inappropriate external influence.

As you say, this is human nature. But the speed, scope and scale of events is new. The cost of influence has dropped radically, so that now a small group of networked individuals can conduct UW more effectively than major states such as Russia or the US could in their prime. Equally the cost of control is going up. Governments overly reliant on control to sustain an artificial stability create very brittle systems, and those systems are shattering. Governments that have more flexible systems are also under pressure to evolve, but are better able to flex and bend and continue on.

Governments must evolve in how they govern at home and in how they pursue their polices and interests abroad.

The US is an interesting case. We have tremendous flexibility at home, but in our approaches overseas we cling to rigid systems designed for containing great threats or for bringing some colonial possession back into a "stable enough" status that ensures the costs do not exceed the benefits.

When we learn how to facilitate and accept for others the same freedoms we demand for ourselves, we will break free from the challenges of this period of post -Cold War transition and enter a new age of American influence. But if we cling to the past and the comfort of a status quo designed by and for us, it will break us, just as it has so many before us.

After all, it is human nature.

[Fuchs]

I'm not convinced that costs or ease changed a lot, for much influence works best with much charisma, and that's still working the old-fashioned way.

Look up how many millions of poorly informed, technology-devoid Indians were harnessed by Gandhi for the struggle for independence.

Obama is known for savvy campaign organisation, but it was a simple, old-fashioned convention speech which catapulted him into the race in the first place.

Walesa started the downfall of the Warsaw Pact as a labour leader with a simple worker's strike at a Polish shipyard when the time was ripe.
____________

To me, new technologies and all the other changes that supposedly shook supposedly stable regimes so much are merely old wine in new bottles.

I'm coming from a history-swallowing background here, with much more history knowledge about thousands of years and five continents than one actually needs in life. Thus I see rarely anything really new.


Look, a singer can probably push a regime over the brink with a popular song and music video that's on almost all smartphones in the country and copied like a virus.
Just as well, a hundred years ago the singer would probably have composed a simple song everyone can sing - and almost everyone would sing, teaching others this way.*
The smartphone is a mere superficiality.
______________

One more:
An old boss of mine once explained to me why in his opinion the Dutch and Danes are much better at getting things done with political innovation and experiments than Germans: Whenever there's a challenge, they have one or maybe two university institutes as scientific advisors and thus usually one advising voice.
The German government on the other hand has a whole committee of scientific advisors from dozens of universities. There's almost never just one voice, and the different politicians pick the advice they like and don't get anything experimental of consequence done.

I suppose the overall noise level and diversity of voices heard from new technologies, new institutions et cetera does also have an element that promotes inaction.


__________________
*:
Als Adam grub und Eva spann wo war denn da der Edelmann? / When Adam dug and Eve spun, where was then the aristocrat?
This simple line is still associated with the huge peasant revolts in Germany of around 1525 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Peasants%27_War), when huge peasant armies overwhelmed the ruling class in Southern Germany and were only defeated with help from North Germany and mercenary support.
It didn't take any modern technologies then to set ablaze much of Central Europe within months, almost turning around a thousand years-old dominant order of society.

[ganulv]

Look, a singer can probably push a regime over the brink with a popular song and music video that's on almost all smartphones in the country and copied like a virus.
The thing is that it is typically only in retrospect that we know that the regime was on the brink!

[Fuchs]

People with close-up knowledge of the country in question often sense such developments 'a bit' earlier than the foreign public.

Your foreign politicians won't get such news in their intel dossiers in time if your intelligence agency co-operates industriously with the dictator's domestic intelligence agency, of course.

[Dayuhan]

Did Caesar struggle with insurgencies?

...But soon it was not just the emperor's legions and his goods moving on those roads and vessels. All manner of commerce, migration and information moved with greater speed as well. This breakthrough in "information technology" designed to ease the control of empire soon drove the cost of sustaining empire to exceed the benefits. When people cannot be controlled in isolation, they will tend to act out en mass.

The same happened to the Holy Roman empire upon the advent of the printing press. When Rome could no longer control information and knowledge, they soon could no longer control those many diverse people who increasingly came to question the legitimacy of that system of rule.

Great Britain's empire began before the age of steam powered industry and transportation and electronic communications. But as their empire was a major facilitator of developing and expanding those technologies in efforts to maximize the income from their far flung possessions, it was those very technologies that soon came to tax the ability of a government in London to exercise control over diverse populaces around the world.

...The Soviets offered glasnost to the suppressed populaces of the Soviet Union in the hopes that this "openness" and increased transparency of governance would reduce criticisms of governance. Instead it provided a catalyst of information empowerment to many diverse populaces across the empire, and within a decade the empire collapsed. Oh, it could have sustained itself for decades no doubt, through generations of bloody, suppressive state violence and control over the people, but Gorbachev did what few in his position have done before or since: He let the people go, and in so doing sealed the fate of the Soviet empire.

All of these seem to wedge the history into the theory, and I'd have to question the fit: in each of these cases there were many factors active and the spread of information was not necessarily the dominant factor in any case.

In any event the fall of empires past seems of questionable relevance to the fight against terrorism and AQ. The US is not en empire, and does not hold the Middle East as an Imperial possession, neither does AQ threaten the existence of the US. The Middle Eastern countries now facing actual or potential upheaval are not parts of any empire, each has its own internal issues.


What is going on today in the Middle East is little different. A region of frozen conflicts, autocratic regimes, and powerful external influences. The people there are informed now in ways they have never been before, and with no threat of Soviet dominion to serve as rationale for accepting a much more benign brand of Western manipulation they are drawing courage from each other and acting out to force their own governments to listen and evolve, and to remove what they deem as inappropriate external influence.

I think it's very different indeed from any of the cited examples.

Certainly there's a great deal of tension between governments and various populaces and popular factions all over the Middle East, and in many other places as well. That's not about us, though, and our role in the resolution of those tensions is and should be generally pretty minimal. In some cases there may be scope for action by the US or other outside parties, but only when it's asked for and clearly needed: the last thing we want to do is to try and impose ourselves as a mediator, still less as a spokesperson for "the populace".

The link between AQ and this populace/government internal dynamic is the weakest point in your argument, and you've presented little evidence or reasoning to support it. It seems to me that AQ grows less out of the tension between individual Muslim governments and their own populaces than out of a perceived tension between a long-oppressed but rising Islam and a long-dominant but crumbing West. Again, AQ have tried to extend that perception to generate support against Muslim governments they dislike, but those efforts have seen very limited success. Tho only narrative that's ever really worked for them is opposition to direct foreign occupation.


Equally the cost of control is going up. Governments overly reliant on control to sustain an artificial stability create very brittle systems, and those systems are shattering. Governments that have more flexible systems are also under pressure to evolve, but are better able to flex and bend and continue on.

The cost of controlling what, for whom?


When we learn how to facilitate and accept for others the same freedoms we demand for ourselves, we will break free from the challenges of this period of post -Cold War transition and enter a new age of American influence. But if we cling to the past and the comfort of a status quo designed by and for us, it will break us, just as it has so many before us.

When we learn that the internal affairs of other nations are not our business, and that we've no business trying to define any other government's relationship with its populaces, we may (or may not) begin the process of extracting our collective head from out collective bung. That may take time and effort; it's been there a while and it's in deep.

There's a lot to be thrashed out, all over the world. Most of it isn't about us, though it may have some effect on us.


After all, it is human nature.

It's also human nature to shove reality into our pet theories, whether or not it fits.

[Bob's World]

The theory comes from history, not the other way around.

Too many seek to understand and solve "terrorism" and "insurgency" wholly within the context of a particular place and time and set of facts, and wholly within the context of the mission and ability of their particular institution sent out to deal with the same. This is so incredibly limiting.

Our history books love the war stories, but more often the truly interesting and helpful insights are buried in footnotes, or must be derived from clues authors sprinkle across their text without even being aware they are doing so. Often their main points and conclusions are of questionable value, but buried within the verbiage they use to make those points one finds the nuggets that helps form greater understanding.

Consider this popular example. Comparing British tactics in Malaya to US tactics in Vietnam is great sport; but it offers very little toward the understanding of why either situation occurred to begin with or equally what led to one result in one place, and very different results in the other. No pure military study helps one get to better understanding of what the truly interesting and important lessons from those conflicts are.

Military professionals love to put these conflicts into the context of war, identify a "threat" and wage war against it.

Development professionals love to put these conflicts into the context of basic needs, identify ways to meet those needs, and then poor money and energy into addressing them.

Governance professionals look for external factors for why they might be so rudely, illegally, and quit often violently, challenged in their governance. They then place blame on those external factors and set out to defeat them. This might be some ideology or form of governance different than the one they promote, or it might be some "malign" and "evil" competitor internal or external to the state that is somehow leading the populace to this dangerous state.

This is all human nature as well. People are the common thread. We are assigned roles and we play those roles out. History repeats over and over again as these roles are cast in the universal context of human nature, but flavored with the unique facts of each particular event.

I know I irritate many on this site when I tend to point out the futility of arguing tactics and weapons when one is pursuing such a flawed strategic understanding to begin with. Likewise when I dare to suggest that Clausewitz's very brilliant insights on war and warfare are often not much help (indeed, often quite dangerous) when applied to the internal conflicts and competition for power internal to some particular populace of system of governance.

I also know I don't have all the right answers or are asking all of the right questions. But I pursue answers and ask questions all the same. We have an opportunity to evolve, but opportunities only matter if one is willing to risk departing the well trod path of business as usual to pursue other insights that might actually help us get to where we are seeking to go.

[Dayuhan]

History's a big place, and you can pick something out of it to support practically any point you want to make.

I think the comments in the previous posts about the decline of empires are dangerously oversimplified and of debatable relevance to issues between the US and AQ, and more generally between the US and the Islamist terrorist fringe.

I think you're overrating the extent to which AQ specifically and Islamist terrorism in general derives from an insurgency dynamic, meaning conflict between governments and the citizens of the countries those governments govern. I think the relationship you're claiming needs a great deal more supporting evidence than you're providing.

I think the model you propose has real relevance to questions of insurgency, but I think, again, that you overrate the connection between AQ and insurgency, and exaggerate the extent to which AQ is a reaction to specifically American actions. The issues you cite can help understand populace/government relations in the Middle East, but I think you overrate the extent to which these conflicts are about us or require our involvement.

There is real risk in this construct: if we adopt the idea that AQ exists because we "broke" Muslim governments and put them out of touch with their people, some bright person is likely to conclude that we can disable AQ by "fixing" Muslim governments and making them accountable to their people. I can imagine no worse strategy.

[davidbfpo]

In recent discussions with analysts several have commented on the importance of the local Muslim faith context changing, as the Salaf school gains adherents, so enabling the strand that supports the violent Jihad (Salafism has many strands and may not support the violent Jihad). Islam has changed in many ways recently, notably with external private funding of the more conservative schools of thought - even in places like Kashmir, where a local variant dominated.

I expect someone has written on this private funding, much of it from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia and the possible impact on the violent Jihad. Suggestions or pointers please.

We know that the local context can suddenly and rapidly change when foreign fighters arrive to reinforce an existing insurgency. Of late Mali and Syria have been cited as examples, although the Pakistani reinforcement, if not creation of the Taliban in Afghanistan is the most well known example.

Clint Watts directed attention to a pro-regime, Syrian newspaper report yesterday, so a caveat applies:
published the names of 142 foreign fighters from 18 countries the regime said were killed alongside rebels in Syria's conflict....47 Saudis, 24 Libyans, 10 Tunisians, nine Egyptians, six Qataris and five Lebanese. It also listed 11 Afghans, five Turks, three Chechens, one Chadian and one Azerbaijani.

Link:http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/syrian-newspaper-names-142-dead-foreign-fighters?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=World&utm_campaign=feed

The violent Jihad has a long history before 9/11 and the appearance of AQ. Sometime ago I read a book on them in Imperial India and beyond, they were simply called something else.

[Bob's World]

History's a big place, and you can pick something out of it to support practically any point you want to make.

I think the comments in the previous posts about the decline of empires are dangerously oversimplified and of debatable relevance to issues between the US and AQ, and more generally between the US and the Islamist terrorist fringe.

I think you're overrating the extent to which AQ specifically and Islamist terrorism in general derives from an insurgency dynamic, meaning conflict between governments and the citizens of the countries those governments govern. I think the relationship you're claiming needs a great deal more supporting evidence than you're providing.

I think the model you propose has real relevance to questions of insurgency, but I think, again, that you overrate the connection between AQ and insurgency, and exaggerate the extent to which AQ is a reaction to specifically American actions. The issues you cite can help understand populace/government relations in the Middle East, but I think you overrate the extent to which these conflicts are about us or require our involvement.

There is real risk in this construct: if we adopt the idea that AQ exists because we "broke" Muslim governments and put them out of touch with their people, some bright person is likely to conclude that we can disable AQ by "fixing" Muslim governments and making them accountable to their people. I can imagine no worse strategy.

These are all fair concerns. But I would offer a few thoughts to consider:

1. "Simple" and "Simplistic" share the same root word, but are on opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to understanding some situation. In between the two lay some of our favorite stomping grounds of "complicated," "complex," and "confused." You are very right that "simplistic" solutions do not offer much, unless through pure happenstance they fall upon the right approach. But simple is genius. Simple is so very incredibly difficult to get to yet so very easy to apply. So often we reject simple solutions because we fear they are so, well, "simple," that they could not possibly have merit. So we instead embrace confused, complex and complicated approaches, because if anything is so hard it must be worthwhile, and if I am not producing the results I intended, that is to be expected, after all, this is "complex."

My goal for years has been to get to "simple." The problem is that once once starts to get close to simple one tends to get farther and farther from the comfortably confused, complex, complicated place where most everyone else is happily mucking around. Thus the quote from Einstein I keep at the bottom of my posts. Einstein was the grand master of simple.

2. As to AQ, I don't overrate AQ, but certainly our approach to AQ over the past decade-plus holds them in very high esteem. After all, if everything we have so carefully crafted (from our image of ourselves to our goals for the governance of the Middle East, etc) are all falling about our ankles, it must be some very important, very powerful enemy that is causing that to happen. Right? Wrong.

No, I think AQ is largely a joke, but a very dangerous one who will have the last laugh if we do not stop chasing them in such a complex, complicated, confused manner from pillar to post around the country, with Intel leading our strategy, and military leading our foreign policy, and no nation's sovereignty more important than our own fear of this little band of opportunists.

We need to strike 80% of the organizations currently on the "terrorist" list off, not add more to. We need to analyze why some group loosely associated with AQ is not part of AQ so the we can address them wisely, not why they are AQ so that we can address them simplistically.

It is convenient to our egos, and those of the many out of touch regimes around the Middle East, if in fact AQ is Pied Piper, and that they have indeed brain washed good people to do bad things with their radical, Islamist ideology. But the Pied Piper is a fairly tale, and so is the idea that ideology causes terrorism and insurgency. Governments cause these conditions and they manifest deep withing broad segments of any given populace. Governments are the arctic winds blowing down from the north, and insurgent populaces are like large masses of ice that form and break away from the pack to cause trouble. Our COIN and CT approaches go after that aspect of such masses that floats above the surface, and largely ignores the reality that any effort designed to simply shave ice off of the top or to press the entire mass through brute force beneath the surface, out of sight and mind, is a fool's errand. It can produce temporary effects that look like success, but that are very temporary and symptomatic in nature, and that require constant energy to sustain. So the typically fail, unless the warm waters of good governance work to melt and blend that entire mass into the larger sea.

AQ does not make icebergs, but they work to leverage the destructive energy within and across a sea of such icebergs of popular discontent.

As to Muslim governments being broken, no, we did not "break" them any more than a rich, entitled man "breaks" his children when he allows them to act out with massive unearned wealth with few rules and little consequence for bad behavior. We have manipulated the governance of the region for our own purposes and our actions have indeed allowed many regimes of the region to act with growing impunity toward their own populaces. Those governments did this of their own free will, they need to own their problems and address them. Most seek to simply bribe or suppress such problems back into submission. This is a new era and I don't think such approaches will work. Those Republicans who yearn for the forced, artificial stability of the final years of the Cold War are idiots, or rather "intelligent fools." Likewise those who think we can "fix" this through regime change, nation building, US values and US-brand democratic governance.

We did not break this and we cannot fix this. We are, however, the major player in the mix. It is easy for these governments, and for organizations such as AQ to blame the US. This is human nature, just like the US blames AQ and ideology. We can, however, form a more helpful perspective and be willing to accept that change is happening and that many of these systems will find solutions that work for them that do not necessarily make us happy. It is not about us. We must learn when to simply let people sort things out for themselves, and how to better set red-lines for all parties that work to minimize the violence of change, and how to better mediate from neutral positions, rather than mandate from biased positions we take so often.

So, yes, simple is hard. But it is my goal. But what I offer may not be quite to simple yet, I assure you, it is not simplistic.

[wm]

Bob's World started this thread with a reference to a Panetta speech, a medical metaphor, and the The Cat in the Hat Comes Back. He proceeded to ask "Where is Cat Z and what is 'voom'?"

I think that the starting point and frame of reference are somewhat mistaken. Try reading "Yertle the Turtle" instead:

The eponymous story revolves around a Yertle the Turtle, the king of the pond. Unsatisfied with the stone that serves as his throne, he commands the other turtles to stack themselves beneath him so that he can see further and expand his kingdom. However, the stacked turtles are in pain and Mack, the turtle at the very bottom of the pile, is suffering the most. Mack asks Yertle for a respite, but Yertle just tells him to shut up. Then Yertle decides to expand his kingdom and commands more and more turtles to add to his throne. Mack makes a second request for a respite because the increased weight is now causing extreme pain to the turtles at the bottom of the pile. Again Yertle yells at Mack to shut up. Then Yertle notices the moon rising above him as the night approaches. Furious that something "dares to be higher than Yertle the King", he decides to call for even more turtles in an attempt to rise above it. However, before he can give the command, Mack decides he has had enough. He burps, shaking the stack of turtles and tossing Yertle off into the mud, leaving him "King of the Mud" and freeing the others.
As I'm sure you can see, at least two levels of metaphoric interpretation are available for King Yertle and the pond/mud puddle. Please note that the turtles solved their problem without recourse to outside intervention. The turtles apparently saw no need to ask an eagle (Little Cat Z?) to swoop down from the sky and carry King Yertle away (voom?).

The polar positions taken in the rest of this thread remind me of another Theodor Geisel (AKA Dr. Seuss and Theo. LeSieg) story--"The Zax"--while the need to define terms precisely in order to identify the problem and its sources)/solutions is reminiscent of "Too Many Daves" (both in The Sneetches and Other Stories). For those who want to get past the children's literature, I'd suggest a review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations discussion of family resemblances as a way of trying to solve the problems of applying definitions to achieve identification.

BTW, my simple answer to Bob's initial question is to suggest that maybe the Cat in the Hat with his matroysha (nested Russian Dolls) solutions ought to stop calling in places where he isn't invited.
Or, more tersely, "Cat in the Hat, MYOB!*"

*MYOB =mind your own business

[Bob's World]

There is some truth to the idea that everything we need to know about dealing with these situations "we learned in kindergarden."

But that would be "too simplistic," so we seek the long, complex, expensive, intrusive, violent, controlling solution instead. (and the special equipment, gangs of contracted SMEs, massive defense budgets to go with).

[jmm99]

"the two levels of metaphoric interpretation" are what ?

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

"Cat in the Hat, MYOB!*"

Amen.


"Simple" and "Simplistic" share the same root word, but are on opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to understanding some situation.

I applied the term "simplistic" purely to your conclusions about the fall of the Roman, Holy Roman, British, and Soviet empires, and the extent to which those falls were caused by expanded access of populaces to information. I would stand by the observation that both those conclusions and their application to the interface among the US, Muslim Governments, insurgents, and terrorists are simplistic.


Simple is so very incredibly difficult to get to yet so very easy to apply. So often we reject simple solutions because we fear they are so, well, "simple," that they could not possibly have merit. So we instead embrace confused, complex and complicated approaches, because if anything is so hard it must be worthwhile, and if I am not producing the results I intended, that is to be expected, after all, this is "complex."

I've nothing against simple solutions, but they have to presented in clear and specific terms to be implemented. I note that your pescriptions are often cast in extremely general terms.


As to AQ, I don't overrate AQ, but certainly our approach to AQ over the past decade-plus holds them in very high esteem. After all, if everything we have so carefully crafted (from our image of ourselves to our goals for the governance of the Middle East, etc) are all falling about our ankles, it must be some very important, very powerful enemy that is causing that to happen. Right? Wrong.

No, I think AQ is largely a joke, but a very dangerous one who will have the last laugh if we do not stop chasing them in such a complex, complicated, confused manner from pillar to post around the country, with Intel leading our strategy, and military leading our foreign policy, and no nation's sovereignty more important than our own fear of this little band of opportunists.

I don't think AQ is a joke at all: people attacking us and killing our people are never a joke. I don't see any evidence that anything is "falling around our ankles" in the Middle East, and to the extent that anything is, that's not a consequence of anything AQ has done.


We need to strike 80% of the organizations currently on the "terrorist" list off, not add more to. We need to analyze why some group loosely associated with AQ is not part of AQ so the we can address them wisely, not why they are AQ so that we can address them simplistically.

I agree that affiliation to AQ is vastly overestimated and that many organizations described as "AQ linked" probably have little or no impact on us. A better question would be whether any given organization is attacking us or killing our people, or trying to. If they are, that requires a response, whether or not AQ is involved.


But the Pied Piper is a fairly tale, and so is the idea that ideology causes terrorism and insurgency. Governments cause these conditions and they manifest deep withing broad segments of any given populace.

I'm disturbed by the way "terrorism" and "insurgency" are lumped together here, suggesting that they are the same thing, or inextricably linked, or are products of the same causes. Any such contention would require supporting evidence that is not given here. I'd certainly agree that governments are a leading cause of insurgency, but I think the link that you draw between insurgency and the type of terrorism exemplified by AQ is extremely tenuous and requires far more support than you've provided. It's not enough to say that it is so.


Governments are the arctic winds blowing down from the north, and insurgent populaces are like large masses of ice that form and break away from the pack to cause trouble. Our COIN and CT approaches go after that aspect of such masses that floats above the surface, and largely ignores the reality that any effort designed to simply shave ice off of the top or to press the entire mass through brute force beneath the surface, out of sight and mind, is a fool's errand. It can produce temporary effects that look like success, but that are very temporary and symptomatic in nature, and that require constant energy to sustain. So the typically fail, unless the warm waters of good governance work to melt and blend that entire mass into the larger sea.

I can see how this analogy applies to insurgency, but I don't see how that needs to concern us: other than the ones we created with our ham-handed regime changes, there's not an insurgency on the planet that requires a major commitment from us. In fact, I think we need to ditch the "COIN"-driven assumption that insurgency is someting that by definition should be countered, and start looking at it as an opportunity.

How this all relates to "terrorism" in the AQ mold is another question entirely, and again the proposed link between insurgency and AQ-style terrorism is in no way clear.


AQ does not make icebergs, but they work to leverage the destructive energy within and across a sea of such icebergs of popular discontent.

AQ has not successfully leveraged popular discontent with Muslim governments. They've tried, but they've failed. The discontent that they have leveraged stems from broader relations between "the West" and the Islamic world, and the perception that "the West" oppresses Islam. I see no evidence to suggest that the terrorists who struck at the west or the fighters who flocked to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan or the Americans in Iraq were driven by anger at their own governments. Any claim that this was indeed the case needs to be supported with specific evidence and compelling logic. It is not self-evident truth.


As to Muslim governments being broken, no, we did not "break" them any more than a rich, entitled man "breaks" his children when he allows them to act out with massive unearned wealth with few rules and little consequence for bad behavior. We have manipulated the governance of the region for our own purposes and our actions have indeed allowed many regimes of the region to act with growing impunity toward their own populaces.

This contention seems to me paternalistic to the point of being patronizing. These governments are not our children. Certainly we tried to manipulate them; they also tried to manipulate us. Arguably they were the more successful manipulators. These governments did not require our permission or help to oppress their populaces; they did it on their own and of their own free will. We can't make them stop and we never could. I don't see any evidence that we "enabled" them to oppress or that they would have been any less oppressive if we hadn't been there.


We did not break this and we cannot fix this. We are, however, the major player in the mix.

I don't think we are or need to be "the major player in the mix".


We can, however, form a more helpful perspective and be willing to accept that change is happening and that many of these systems will find solutions that work for them that do not necessarily make us happy. It is not about us. We must learn when to simply let people sort things out for themselves, and how to better set red-lines for all parties that work to minimize the violence of change, and how to better mediate from neutral positions, rather than mandate from biased positions we take so often.

I agree for the most part, though I don't think this requires much change: again, these governments do not depend on us for sustenance, we are not keeping them afloat, and we have little or no control over their actions. Setting red lines for all or any parties is something I'm less comfortable with: we have no business setting red lines in the internal affairs of other countries and there's no point at all in setting red lines you're not able or willing to enforce.

It is not for us to mandate, nor do we do so. Neither is mediation any of our business, unless it is requested by all parties to a given conflict. Trying to impose ourselves as a mediator or as self-appointed spokesperson for any group is an excellent and dramatic way to self-destruct.


So, yes, simple is hard. But it is my goal. But what I offer may not be quite to simple yet, I assure you, it is not simplistic.

Mind our own business to the greatest possible extent. Do not unilaterally interfere in the internal affairs of others. Kill those who attack us.

What could be simpler?

[Bob's World]

So, what, pray tell, is a "terrorist" organization?

Terrorism is, after all, merely a tactic. Many insurgents use terrorist tactics. Many governments (to include our own) use terrorist tactics. Many non-state actors with broad political agendas, such as AQ, use terrorist tactics.

Frankly it is a label that bundles all manner of actors based upon a particular tactical approach. I don't find that very helpful, as it does not create a category that frames or suggests a particular family of solution to apply.

Which leads to "counter-terrorism," which equally is a little more than a commitment to seek to disrupt, defeat, deny, etc those individuals and organizations that employ terrorist tactics. It is very symptomatic in nature, and as such does not much consider WHY some organization or individual is acting out, or why they have come to a position where they believe terrorist tactics are their best hope for achieving their goals.

AQ is actually more accurately a non-state political action group that operates outside the rule of law to conduct unconventional warfare to leverage the insurgent populaces of a wide range of primarily Muslim states, employing both guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics, to force change upon the governments of those states and their foreign allies.

This cannot be well addressed by "counter-terrorism." Nor can this be well addressed by the slightly broader concept of "combating-terrorism." What I have long argued is that we we really need is a much broader, more holistic construct of "counter-unconventional warfare." This gets us past an excessive focus on the tactics employed, and instead forces us to think in the context of the actual operations being waged. Much of our jousting in the "3rd world" with the Soviets during the Cold War was essentially counter UW. We did not fly drones to Moscow and attempt to kill soviet leaders with missiles. But we fly drones in the sovereign airspace of many countries where AQ and nationalist insurgents operate and attempt to kill them. I find this odd at best.

But the energy source of any successful UW campaign is an insurgent populace. One cannot go to a stable, satisfied populace and create an insurgency. One can, however, go to place where such conditions are strong, but suppressed, and employ ideology, motivation, arms, leadership, funding, etc to move such a populace to action.

Che Guevara did not understand this fundamental truth of UW. He wanted to ignite a flame of insurgency that would spread and envelope all of South America. He looked at his map and picked a country in the middle of the continent and decided to light his fire there. So he went to Bolivia. But Bolivia had already had a revolution and much of the latent insurgent energy of the populace there was already released. He found few recruits and no sanctuary among the people. He was in short order hunted down and killed. He failed because he did not understand UW and the necessity for conditions of insurgency to fuel any such movement. AQ does not make that mistake, or perhaps they do not understand either, but the fact is there are so many populaces across so many countries in the Middle East with high conditions of insurgency that they cannot hardly help but finding fertile ground for their operations.

If not AQ, it would be someone else. They exploit the opportunity, they do not create the opportunity. I suspect this is why AQ has never resonated nearly as well among the Muslim populaces of the Asia-Pacific Region as they have in those areas that have not had the political revolutions yet such as have occurred there. As you well know, things are not perfect in Malaysia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Cambodia, or the Philippines - but these people and these nations have already thrown off the major aspects of external, illegitimate manipulation and are working toward their own destiny. Small groups and small numbers of individuals are open to help from groups such as AQ, but nearly so much as in the greater Middle East.

This is political. There are simple, fundamental aspects of human nature that provide a framework for understanding these problems. Each is unique in its details, but all are similar in their fundamentals.

[wm]

"the two levels of metaphoric interpretation" are what ?

Regards

Mike

Level 1: King Yertle is the US (post Truman Doctrine), the Pond is the Earth and the other turtles are the various countries in the world.
Level 2: Yertle is the tyrannical leader of any country/organization with grandiose ambitions, the pond is just that country/organization while the other turtles are various segments of the dominated populace/workforce/organizational membership.

[wm]

Terrorism is, after all, merely a tactic.
I'm not so sure that terrorism is always a tactic. Saying so is equivalent to saying that terror activities are being used as a means to some end. I suspect that some terrorist acts are conducted as ends in themselves. I am thinking primarily of some of the things done by so-called anarchists in the later 19th Century, but Timothy McVeigh's exploit in OKC might also fit in that category.

Which leads to "counter-terrorism," which equally is a little more than a commitment to seek to disrupt, defeat, deny, etc those individuals and organizations that employ terrorist tactics. It is very symptomatic in nature, and as such does not much consider WHY some organization or individual is acting out, or why they have come to a position where they believe terrorist tactics are their best hope for achieving their goals.
The above categorization of counter terrrorism seems rather shallow. I see two aspects to counter terrorism. The first includes those actions one might take to prevent terrorist activity. These are what, for example, the Counter IED community calls actions to the left of the boom. Seeking to answer Bob's "why" question above, rightly belongs in this part of counterterrorism. I submit demotivating someone from the commission of terrorist acts is rather hard without knowing what is motivating him or her to engage in them in the first place.
The second aspect of counter terrorism is remediation--restoring order/cleaning up the mess after the terrorist action has occurred. How one does this may well fuel further terrorism. Knocking down the hovel next to the big hole left by the IED in the process of filling the hole, enforcing a curfew to "keep people safe" until we find the terrorists, or just leaving the restoration to the locals' own devices are probably not conducive to achieving the sort of results that the first aspect of counter terrorism is attempting to achieve.

[Steve Blair]

I remain unconvinced that terrorism is "merely" a tactic. As WM points out, there are far too many cases where terrorism is clearly an end and not a mean. Also, there are too many examples of groups that have over time spun into a cycle of violence where the attack is the end in and of itself and the why of the attack no longer has any real meaning.

[davidbfpo]

An article based on 2iC SOCOM's presentation to an open conference, amidst the "we need more" approach there is some balance by a CFR expert:
Successful employment of the indirect approach requires both proactive involvement and patience for the effort to produce results. It requires placing SOF teams out in troubled regions for extended periods so they can gain familiarity, knowledge and relationships and then begin to execute solutions with the resident partners...This runs counter to a common tendency to wait until crises are full blown and action is imperative.

Link:http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=983

[Dayuhan]

Which leads to "counter-terrorism," which equally is a little more than a commitment to seek to disrupt, defeat, deny, etc those individuals and organizations that employ terrorist tactics. It is very symptomatic in nature, and as such does not much consider WHY some organization or individual is acting out, or why they have come to a position where they believe terrorist tactics are their best hope for achieving their goals.

Disrupt, defeat, and deny is essential. It may not be the only the only thing that's essential, but it's certainly essential. That doesn't mean you don't have to look at and address the "why", it just means that when someone is actively trying to kill you or your people you stop them first and then worry about why.

One of the problems with efforts to identify and address causes is that they are very much open to erroneous interpretations of causes. One trend we often notice in the US is the tendency to assume that everything happens because of us, and that everyone else simply reacts... thus if AQ wants to kill us that must be a "backlash" against something we did to them, and we can make them stop by not doing whatever that was. I think we underestimate the extent to which AQ is proactive, acting not in response to situations but in an attempt to initiate conditions they believe will be conducive to their growth.


AQ is actually more accurately a non-state political action group that operates outside the rule of law to conduct unconventional warfare to leverage the insurgent populaces of a wide range of primarily Muslim states, employing both guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics, to force change upon the governments of those states and their foreign allies.

Again we have the contention that AQ primarily exploits an "insurgency" dynamic (built around relationships between Muslim governments and the populaces they govern) rather than a wider perception of direct occupation of Muslim land and direct oppression of Muslims by the West. This contention could use less repetition and more supporting evidence, as it is anything but self-evident.



We did not fly drones to Moscow and attempt to kill soviet leaders with missiles. But we fly drones in the sovereign airspace of many countries where AQ and nationalist insurgents operate and attempt to kill them. I find this odd at best.

Not odd at all. By the time we had effective drones the Soviet Union no longer existed... and there was always that MAD thing going on.


But the energy source of any successful UW campaign is an insurgent populace. One cannot go to a stable, satisfied populace and create an insurgency. One can, however, go to place where such conditions are strong, but suppressed, and employ ideology, motivation, arms, leadership, funding, etc to move such a populace to action.

I don't see the relevance of this, since AQ is not creating an insurgency or moving a populace to action.


I suspect this is why AQ has never resonated nearly as well among the Muslim populaces of the Asia-Pacific Region as they have in those areas that have not had the political revolutions yet such as have occurred there. As you well know, things are not perfect in Malaysia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Cambodia, or the Philippines - but these people and these nations have already thrown off the major aspects of external, illegitimate manipulation and are working toward their own destiny. Small groups and small numbers of individuals are open to help from groups such as AQ, but nearly so much as in the greater Middle East.

That's certainly not true in, say, The Philippines or Thailand, where "external, illegitimate manipulation" by national governments that Muslim minorities do not accept is alive and well. The limited appeal of AQ in these ideological markets stems more from AQ's preoccupation with pan-Islamic issues and foreign occupations that seem very remote in these parts: Southeast Asian Muslims are for the most part more concerned with their own domestic issues than with what's going in the Middle East or South Asia.

The assumption that those who support AQ do so because they want to change their own governments is inherently suspect and needs to be supported by evidence and reasoning. It's not credible simply because it's said to be so.

[jmm99]

I've said elsewhere that I have a "tortoise mind". ;)

Here is where I got in considering your turtle story (before asking the question you answered).

OK, Yertle ends up in the mud; so, that's OK with Mack who got all the turtles off his back. But, what about all them other turtles - who also ended up in the mud ? Some of them undoubtedly would blame Mack for their now wet and muddy existence - he (that is, his burp) being the proximate physical cause of their condition. Some others of them, looking at the moral aspect, would blame Yertle, the prime mover of the turtle pile for his benefit. My conclusion: both Mack and Yertle ended up as turtle soup after the respective groups of muddy turtles got done with them. Sort of the Louis XVI and Louis St.-Just of their little turtle world.

You know from our other conversations that I don't have a philosophical mind. Now, you know that I don't have a metaphorical mind, either. :)

Regards

Mike

PS: Not being a complete Luddite, I did order Philosophical Investigations (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1405159286) (this is the 2009 Hacker-Schulte German-English version of 592 pp.) - and, to fill out my collection of Works by Whackos, The Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Collected Works 1955-1980 with Commentary (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691145075) ("Many Worlds" etc.).

[Bob's World]

I think the discussion on getting to a more sensible perspective on terrorism and counterterroism is an important one.

Just as it is important to understand what is insurgency, role of the energy source of the nature of the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed, as well as the role of those external to those dynamics (such as AQ today) who seek to leverage that energy to their own ends.

Dayuhan mentions that there are many Muslim populaces who still have high levels of this "energy," or what I call conditions of insurgency across the Pacific. That is very true and I am very encouraged by recent actions by the government of the Philippines to change their approach in their Bangsamoro program to better address those conditions. But AQ's agents have not had much success with their UW campaign in the Pacific. Indonesia and Malaysia are primarily Muslim, and both of those countries have, since addressing the colonial problem, been largely stable. Are these works in progress? Absolutely, revolution brings change, but typically also brings ineffective and chaotic government. These things take time. I don't think they are very vulnerable to AQ exploitation, nor do I think they need much US help in dealing with the few agents of AQ that do show up, or those small internal movements who still act out within their current systems. Less is more. We need to focus, as we have in the Philippines, on respecting host nation sovereignty and helping to build partner professionalism, rather than capacity.

And while I appreciate that there are some few individuals over the course of history who have created terror for terror's sake, that certainly does not apply to what governments called the "Anarchist" movement of the last century. That was not much different than what is going on now. A movement intended to force government and society to evolve to change with the tremendous changes that were occurring with the rise of the industrial age and electronic communications. Old systems of entitlement were being challenged to make room for rising classes. Did a few wingnuts join the cause? Certainly. I am sure there are a few wingnuts sitting around AQ campfires as well.

But by and large, in the middle of the bell curve, terror is a tactic. Which leads us to CT. We keep trying to expand CT to make it encompass every aspect of the current terrorist problem. In some ways its just a name, so why worry if so many activities that have very little to do with the tactic being countered are bundled together.

For me this is one of those important nuance issues. CT is threat centric. So inevitably when one bundles activities under a CT banner they all have an ultimate purpose of making some particular threat go away. I think that is far too symptomatic, and results in an endless series of short-sighted tactical approaches, driven by intel and led by the threat. I believe we are better served by keeping CT narrowly defined, and then coming up with a better name for a more holistic approach that CT would be a mere sub-set of.

Not only is CT far too symptomatic and threat focused, it also leads us too easily down the slippery slope of getting into actions of questionable legitimacy that are very abusive of the sovereignty of the nations where these CT activities take place. When one appreciates that in most of these places what we are calling "terrorists" is typically 8 parts nationalist insurgent movements and perhaps 2 parts external non-state UW actor one gets to why a different framework is so important. CT approaches tend to conflate those all as one "terrorist" problem, as that facilitates easier targeting. Far better if we take approaches that force is to break these organizations down by the nature of their relationships and by their primary purposes for action, rather than conflate them by their shared tactics, associations and ideology. Once we do that we can begin to out compete AQ for influence with the populace groups these insurgents emerge from, and also get to approaches with the governments involved that support, rather than degrade, perceptions of sovereignty and legitimacy. The lead should be policy and diplomatic approaches designed to help convince key partners they are better served by engaging their populaces more professionally, and by creating vehicles to give the people more effective ways to legally address their grievances within the context of their own cultures. This may mean that some in power will be legally replaced with new leaders, and it will certainly mean that many in power will need to evolve to stay in power.

Or we can just do CT to keep those pesky people in check and sustain governments we think will best support our interests. I don't recommend this. Conditions of insurgency grow for a reason. Insurgent organizations form and act out for a reason. Organizations with regional agendas form and wage UW for a reason. We need to focus more on understanding what those reasons are and how to best encourage or assist as necessary those governments in addressing those reasons. Currently we apply CT, and we attack the symptoms.

[Dayuhan]

I think the discussion on getting to a more sensible perspective on terrorism and counterterroism is an important one.

I think the discussion is going around in a rather unproductive circle.


Just as it is important to understand what is insurgency, role of the energy source of the nature of the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed, as well as the role of those external to those dynamics (such as AQ today) who seek to leverage that energy to their own ends.

The problem with this formulation is that AQ is not leveraging "insurgency" at all, if we define insurgency as conflict between governments and the populaces they govern. They've tried, but they've failed. What AQ does leverage effectively is a widespread (but not universal) perception of Western oppression among Muslims, particularly resentment toward direct "infidel" occupation of Muslim countries. When deprived of this stimulus - such as after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan - AQ's relevance and support decline rapidly. Paradoxically, this is when they are most dangerous: because they need foreign intervention to survive, they will lash out and attack in hopes of provoking that intervention and restoring their relevance. That's no reason to give them what they want.


Dayuhan mentions that there are many Muslim populaces who still have high levels of this "energy," or what I call conditions of insurgency across the Pacific. That is very true and I am very encouraged by recent actions by the government of the Philippines to change their approach in their Bangsamoro program to better address those conditions. But AQ's agents have not had much success with their UW campaign in the Pacific. Indonesia and Malaysia are primarily Muslim, and both of those countries have, since addressing the colonial problem, been largely stable. Are these works in progress? Absolutely, revolution brings change, but typically also brings ineffective and chaotic government. These things take time. I don't think they are very vulnerable to AQ exploitation, nor do I think they need much US help in dealing with the few agents of AQ that do show up, or those small internal movements who still act out within their current systems. Less is more. We need to focus, as we have in the Philippines, on respecting host nation sovereignty and helping to build partner professionalism, rather than capacity.

SE Asian Islamic insurgent/separatist movements are generally not that susceptible to AQ manipulation mainly because they and their popular support base are focused on local issues and not really concerned with the pan-Islamic narrative or the perception of general oppression of the ummah that AQ has to sell. There are of course a few exceptions to that rule, and local organizations will cooperate with jihadi groups to the extent they deem convenient, but in any broad scale sense SE Asian Muslims are concerned with local issues and don't particularly care about foreign occupations in Iraq or Afghanistan, about Palestine, etc.


For me this is one of those important nuance issues. CT is threat centric. So inevitably when one bundles activities under a CT banner they all have an ultimate purpose of making some particular threat go away. I think that is far too symptomatic, and results in an endless series of short-sighted tactical approaches, driven by intel and led by the threat. I believe we are better served by keeping CT narrowly defined, and then coming up with a better name for a more holistic approach that CT would be a mere sub-set of.

I agree that "CT" as we know it now should only be one part of any effort to address terrorism and its underlying issues. It remains an important part, and it's natural that it's the part that will dominate military discourse because it's the part of the program that the military, along with the intel and LE communities, is responsible for implementing. Whatever we think of causes and whatever we can do to alleviate causes, it has to be clear beyond doubt that people who attack us or our allies, plot to attack us, or shelter those who attack us will be subject to direct action, wherever they are. No nation can condone or accept attacks on its territory or citizens, whatever the cause.


CT approaches tend to conflate those all as one "terrorist" problem, as that facilitates easier targeting. Far better if we take approaches that force is to break these organizations down by the nature of their relationships and by their primary purposes for action, rather than conflate them by their shared tactics, associations and ideology.

To a large extent I agree, but I think your assessment of the "primary purposes for action" is flawed in a way that leads to some very dangerous conclusions. If we assume that AQ draws its sustenance from the relationships between Muslim governments and the populaces they govern, there's a tendency to try to affect causation by trying to influence those relationships. That's both wrong and dangerous: AQ draws its sustenance not from relationships between Muslim Governments and those they govern but from the perceived relationships between the Muslim ummah and the non-Muslim world around it. Trying to interfere in relations between Muslim governments and those they govern will be ineffective and probably disastrous: we have little influence in most of these relationships and we have no credibility as a mediator. Neither populaces nor governments want us involved and trying to push our way into the picture uninvited just reinforces AQ's narrative of Western interference. That doesn't mean engagement is never a good idea, but it should be multilateral whenever possible and it should be as requested by local groups with a credible claim to speak for the people, not initiated by us.

We can effectively deprive AQ of much of their impetus simply by not invading or occupying Muslim territory, and my minimizing our overt interference and military footprint. We have to understand that if we do this we will be attacked: AQ will try to provoke a response that they can manipulate. That doesn't make it any less important. Trying to change the patterns of governance in the Muslim world is both futile and dangerous. We shouldn't obstruct change, and we should work with it as it occurs (as we've been doing) but trying to compete for influence over Muslim populaces or trying to appoint ourselves as a mediator or champion of the populace is going to snap back in our faces in a major way.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan

We disagree about the nature of AQ, so we will disagree with how to best deal with AQ and the the problems of governance and instability in the places they operate.

Worth considering is that you subscribe to a position that fits fairly closely with the thinking that has driven US reactions since 9/11. How is that working for us?

I am reminded of a favorite question that Ranger Instructors would pose to Ranger Students who were in the midst of hopelessly mucking up some particular task or mission: "Ranger, are you as F'd up as you want to be"?

Its kind of like "when did you stop beating your wife." There is no good answer. "Yes, Sergeant, I want to be this F'd up"? or "No, sergeant, I want to be even more F'd up"?

I think our current position buys too heavily into the sizzle. I try to focus on the steak. Governments are much more comfortable when they can lay responsibility for these types of problems at the feet of some malign actor, some ideology, or some set of environmental or economic conditions beyond their control - and then simply apply the energy of the state to defeat, deny or disrupt those who act out illegally to operationalize such popular discontent.

But without insurgent populaces who are both very dissatisfied with their own systems of governance, and who equally perceive that external Western influence, money and manipulation is a major factor in why their governance is so out of step - there would be no AQ. Getting rid of AQ without addressing that base of energy will only open the way for the emergence of "AQ 2.0." With this much demand, there will be someone to step up and provide supply. We attack supply, and ignore demand; much as we do with the largely illegal drug-related criminal problems that are also growing beyond our capacity to suppress. Our current approaches are simplistic and will break us.

We need simple approaches that are much more honest about what really fuels these powerful illegal challengers. You don't have to agree with me, but that does not make me wrong. All I know for certain is that the current assessment/approach does not work.

You tend to share the assessment/understanding that has brought us to this place, but argue for different tactics. I don't think new tactics will get us there. We need a new assessment. We need a new understanding. Once we have that, new approaches will present themselves, and they will be far less costly and far less intrusive than the ones of the past decade. I suspect they will be far more productive and much more in line norms of what most humans see as acceptable government action as well.

[Fuchs]

But without insurgent populaces who are both very dissatisfied with their own systems of governance,

...or maybe rather just with the other guys' leaders being in power and handing the spoils down to their followers.

[Bob's World]

...or maybe rather just with the other guys' leaders being in power and handing the spoils down to their followers.

Fuchs, revolutionary insurgency does not of necessity bring better governance, more often is simply brings different goverance that is usually far less effective than what existed before.

And, as you note, often the rising power simply falls in on the old system and the only real change is who benefits and who suffers.

All true, yet that in no way undermines my proposition that conditions of insurgency grow when some distinct segment of the overall governed populace comes to perceive the current system as intolerable. Their are many reasons why men fight (most tied to youth and testosterone), but when societies grow restless in this way the most common drivers appear to be those more closely tied to the top of Maslow's hierarchy.

They do not perceive the governance to be acting in a manner they deem as appropriate
They do not recognize the right of some system of governance to rule or affect them at all
They do not feel that they are treated equally as other similarly siuated sub-populaces are
They do not feel that they receive justice under the rule of law as it is applied to them
And perhaps most importantly, they do not perceive themselves to have trusted, certain, and legal means consistent with their culture to affect governance driving the perceptions listed above.


I bundle all of this up as "poor governance" (not to be confused with similar terms often used in COIN theory to describe what is more accurately ineffective governance). Effectiveness is nice and can be measured by anyone, but goodness is what fosters natural stability and can only be measured by those subject to said governance.

But as you point out, often when such peceptions drive a populace to act, when they prevail they too often simply flip the table and become equally oppressive (and the cycle begins anew). King George is on record for his amazement that George Washington would not accept the role of "King." Noting that if he turned that down that he was "truly the greatest man of all."

[Fuchs]

All true, yet that in no way undermines my proposition that conditions of insurgency grow when some distinct segment of the overall governed populace comes to perceive the current system as intolerable.

"Government", not "system".

There's no reason to see a cure in democracy if the point of the insurgents is that they want some of their own ideologues in power who wouldn't win democratically.

[Bob's World]

"Government", not "system".

There's no reason to see a cure in democracy if the point of the insurgents is that they want some of their own ideologues in power who wouldn't win democratically.

"Democracy" is only a cure if democracy is what the populace in question sees as appropriate in the context of their culture.

But democracy has many shades and is a term that gets tossed around pretty loosely. We certainly don't have anything close to pure democracy in the US.

The final bullet that I mention is perhaps the essence of "democracy." How a particular society secures and nurtures this line of legal feedback from those who are governed to those who govern is up to them. When some external power comes in and thinks they have the one perfect way to do this and then seeks to impose that system on others, one can almost guarantee they are wrong. Such systems would be de facto illegitimate and a violation of sovereignty. That is a deep hole to crawl out of, regardless of how bad the old system was, or how good you think your new system is.

That is the hole we dug in Iraq and Afghanistan. Easy to dig, hard to crawl out of.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob


All true, yet that in no way undermines my proposition that conditions of insurgency grow when some distinct segment of the overall governed populace comes to perceive the current system as intolerable. Their are many reasons why men fight (most tied to youth and testosterone), but when societies grow restless in this way the most common drivers appear to be those more closely tied to the top of Maslow's hierarchy.
They do not perceive the governance to be acting in a manner they deem as appropriate


And perhaps most importantly, they do not perceive themselves to have trusted, certain, and legal means consistent with their culture to affect governance driving the perceptions listed above.

I bundle all of this up as "poor governance"

Bob,

Your argument is borderline irrational, but most importantly it is completely irrelevant to the issue at hand. First, many in our government have been pushing the same view for years and our current strategy is based on reforming governments (it isn't working). Second, you tend to identify every insurgent as legitimate and automatically default to finding the State government illegitimate which is a serious bias on your part. Poor governance really? When a minority of Islamists want to impose Shari'a law upon all and the government fights to defeat their attempt to subject the people to their extreme views this is poor governance? Really? A government fights against a communist insurgency which only has 15% of populace supporting it, and their goal is suppress the people much more than the current government, yet any effort by the government to defeat them is illegitimate, because only the insurgents are legitimate? Really?

Government's have every right and obligation to defend the status quo. In some situations we support them, in others we support the insurgents (based on our interests), and in most cases we remain neutral (or should). As Dayuhan correctly points out we're not going to fix other people's government's and even if we did AQ would still survive, so as a core of our strategy to defend the U.S. fixing governments to defeat AQ won't work and it is too expensive to sustain, so it isn't feasible to begin with.

While I don't concur with Dayuhan's assessment of AQ, it is still very much alive and it is growing in many parts of the world, his overall approach to dealing with it is one of the most level headed I have seen (it is not the approach we're following now, we're following Bob's approach of trying to fix foreign governments and it isn't work well for us)

Posted by Dayuhan


1. Defend effectively. Monitoring, tracking, infiltrating, and disrupting plots won't eliminate the antagonists, but it can minimize their impact, deprive them of high profile success, and isolate them from supporters who want to see results.

2. Attack effectively. Find and eliminate the key individuals on the operational and the funding/support side by whatever means work.


3. Starve them. Don't occupy territory, don't feed that "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative. Extended occupations of Muslim territory provide a discrete, specific target for jihadi propaganda and fundraising and should be avoided. We'll never convert the inner circle, they have to be killed, arrested, or driven so far underground that they can't operate. The inner circle can be isolated from their sources of support and recruitment.

Solid points have been ignored since 9/11, but there are at least to categories of starving them. The psychological you address above, and then the financial. They won't conduct effective transnational terrorist attacks without adequate resources.


4. Don't be stupid. There will always someone who will tell us that the cause of all the mess is bad governance in Muslim countries and we can fix the mess by fixing governance in Muslim countries. Trying to do that is just going to get us deeper in the $#!t. It can be argued (though often exaggerated) that the bad governance problem is to some extent something we helped create, but we can't undo the effect of meddling past by meddling again.

The fact that we're pushing to the point of imposing our values on other States and their societies is what is creating the backlash against us in many cases. It provides propaganda for AQ, and for the emergent AQ 2.0 and 3.0 and all their step children. If our goal is to reform the world, that won't be done peacefully or within a budget we can afford.

[Bob's World]

Bill, pray tell, when have I EVER said the US needs to "fix" the governance of others?

I merely point out the broken part we should be concerned about. Governments and their populaces must make these repairs for themselves. But most government have no interest in making such repairs when they can simply play the "might makes right" card and suppress the illegal actors. As you say, governments have the right to do this. Such is sovereignty. But equally, when the people under such a sovereign system find it to be intolerable they too have both the right and the duty to rise up and challenge it.

You may think the principles contained in our Declaration of Independence to be uniquely American, or concepts that have become somehow quaint or irrelevant with time. America and all we think we stand for is sadly doomed when that becomes the case. If a man or a nation is not what they proclaim to be, then they are little or nothing of value at all.

And your example of Communism is "borderline irrational" as well.

Do you think the people Russia looked to Communism because they wanted to be communists or because they wanted to get rid of the Tsar?

Do you think the people of China looked to Communist because they wanted to be communists or because they wanted to be free of external Colonial powers and their puppet regime?

Do you think the people of Vietnam, Malaya, etc, etc turned to communism because they wanted to be communist or because they wanted to be free of Western Colonial powers and their puppet regimes??

Again, I cannot emphasize enough, revolution does not happen to bring something new, it happens because their is tremendous energy within a significant segment of the populace to remove something that exists and is deemed intolerable.

Do governments have the right to simply ignore the reasonable concerns of their evolving populaces and enforce the rule of law in a war-like way to sustain the status quo? Certainly. But the US and our interests are not well served by dedicating our reputation, our treasure and the blood of our young men and women to such efforts.

Does Dayuhan suggest effective ways to kill the current crop of complainants? Sure. No rocket science there. That may well reduce a particular threat in a particular place for a short period of time. Congratulations. Mark all your tactical metrics Green, give yourself a top block ORE and go home. But such tactical successes are growing the deep roots of strategic failure. Such "successes" validate the anti-American message of organizations such as AQ, and serve to extend the reign of governments no longer wanted by their own people in their current form. It allows such governments to treat their people with impunity and to rely for their sovereignty upon the protection of the US rather than upon the consent of those they govern.

That is not who we are Bill. And those who rationalize such poor behavior in the name of national security are, IMO, dangerously wrong. Wrong about who we are, wrong about how we best secure our interests, wrong about why such conflicts occur and how to resolve them, and wrong about what the long-term results of this reactionary abuse of the sovereignty of so many others in the name of preserving the sovereignty of ourself will bring.

We cannot fix others. We cannot resolve their insurgencies or repair their relationships with their own people. This they must do on their own. But we can work across the DIME spectrum in a neutral way in those few places that are actually critical to our interests to force governments to listen and to help keep violence (state or insurgent) within the bounds of clear red lines.

What you suggest is little different than practices of the last century to take out Union organizers, and to send pipe-swinging goons into a mass of striking workers. To me, that is irrational. And not in a borderline sort of way.

[Dayuhan]

Worth considering is that you subscribe to a position that fits fairly closely with the thinking that has driven US reactions since 9/11. How is that working for us?

One of the core elements of my position is that the US should not occupy Muslim territory or try to determine the form of governance in any Muslim country. That doesn't sound like what we've been doing.


But without insurgent populaces who are both very dissatisfied with their own systems of governance, and who equally perceive that external Western influence, money and manipulation is a major factor in why their governance is so out of step - there would be no AQ.

You keep saying this, but you provide no evidence or reasoning to support the contention. It's simply laid out as revealed truth. The problem with this is that it's not consistent with what we see on the ground. We know that populaces aren't turning to AQ for help in getting rid of their own governments because every attempt by AQ to raise an insurgency against a Muslim government has failed to draw anything close to a critical mass of popular support. What we actually see is that while Muslim populaces are happy to fund and support AQ as long as they're fighting infidels far away, that support stops as soon as AQ tries to bring the jihad to their neighborhood. Interview-based studies on foreign fighter motivations have not revealed any hint that people are traveling to fight in order to affect governance in their home countries: the motivation is consistently to end the oppression of Muslims and expel the infidel in the place where the fight is going on.

The contention that AQ s driven by populaces who oppose their own governments and believe that support for AQ will change those governments has to be supported by convincing evidence and reasoning to be accepted. It can't simply be decreed.


Getting rid of AQ without addressing that base of energy will only open the way for the emergence of "AQ 2.0."

It's good that we don't need to address the "base of energy" that comes from tension between Muslim governments and their populaces, because we can't. That's not about us and it would be self-defeating to try to impose ourselves on those situations. The governments in question do not for the most part depend on us, are not accountable to us, and will not do what we want.


Again, I cannot emphasize enough, revolution does not happen to bring something new, it happens because their is tremendous energy within a significant segment of the populace to remove something that exists and is deemed intolerable.

Possibly true, but since AQ is not a revolution and you've shown no evidence to suggest that AQ is driven by revolutionary sentiment, I don't see the relevance to AQ.


Such "successes" validate the anti-American message of organizations such as AQ, and serve to extend the reign of governments no longer wanted by their own people in their current form. It allows such governments to treat their people with impunity and to rely for their sovereignty upon the protection of the US rather than upon the consent of those they govern.

This is arguably happening Iraq and Afghanistan, where our (IMO) misguided attempts to install governments left those governments under our protection and dependent on us. That (again IMO) was a bad idea, it shouldn't have been tried and it shouldn't be done again. Other than those cases, which of course occurred after AQ was already established, I can't think of any Muslim government who relies on the US to protect it from its people, or whose oppression of its people is empowered by US support. That contention, again, needs to be supported by specific evidence and examples.


But we can work across the DIME spectrum in a neutral way in those few places that are actually critical to our interests to force governments to listen and to help keep violence (state or insurgent) within the bounds of clear red lines.

How do you propose to "force governments to listen"? Even if you could, how do you force them to hear what you think you hear, or react as you think they should?

I seem to recall that not long ago the US told the government of Bahrain to listen to its people and implement reforms. I also recall that all we accomplished was to look impotent: they ignored us. I think you overrate the influence we can bring to bear.

[Bill Moore]

Bob,

Some of your points are spot on, but your logic in my opinion jumps all over the place. I'll highlight a couple of your comments below, but ultimately what I would like you to explain is what do you propose we do differently? I hear your arguments about governance and they apply in some, maybe even most cases, but since you're not proposing trying to fix their governments, and assumingly you recognize the requirement for the U.S. to protect itself from terrorist attacks, what is the so what of your argument? I think most U.S. policy makers and senior military leaders have recognized that insurgencies are due to a "segment" of the population being disconnent with their government or the global order. That certainly doesn't mean in all cases that the government should change! We have Islamists in the U.S., a very small minority, who want to impose shari'a law. Should the government allow that? We have Aryan Nation types that want to purge our state and society of all except Christian whites. Should we allow that? Why are you always so aghast when a government decides to protect the state and their citizens from similiar groups? You keep saying the people, but in fact you are only referencing particular group that more often than not is a minority group that is opposing the government, so the people argument really doesn't carry a lot of water. It is especially weak when we're talking strictly terrorist organizations that are not capable of fomenting a mass movement. You have readily admited that if the insurgents win they may in fact install a worse government. Does anyone think the Vietnamese are better off under an oppressive communist government than they would have been under another system? There are times we have to make choices, tough choices where the best answer is often the lesser of two evils. In my 30 plus years working in East Asia (with an occassionalworking holiday in the Middle East and Africa) I trained the militaries of three dictators (South Korea, Philippines, and Thailand, and there was also Indonesia but I didn't get a chance to work with them). Now they're democracies, so I think an argument can be made that our efforts to "help" them from falling to communism created some political space that allowed them to evolve politically and socially, which unlikely wouldn't have happened under communism (Vietnam, Laos).


Bill, pray tell, when have I EVER said the US needs to "fix" the governance of others?

When your argument is our strategy is wrong because "we're" not addressing poor governance then I think it is fair to claim you are proposing we help fix the governance of others. We already recognize the challenge poor governance presents, so again what are you proposing?

I
merely point out the broken part we should be concerned about.

Why do you think this is new? I remember discussing this topic at length in my early years in SF (it was in our doctrine). Recognition and concern is one thing, but is it the military mission to fix it? Our link is professionalizing military forces, the State Department plays a much larger role. Unfortunately since the Cold War ended we seem to think we have a mandate to tell every country in the world how they should behave, so I think we may have taken it a bit too far. In response nations are forming new coalitions to oppose perceived or real U.S. bullying.


But most government have no interest in making such repairs when they can simply play the "might makes right" card and suppress the illegal actors. As you say, governments have the right to do this. Such is sovereignty.

True in some cases, in others there is nothing a government can or should do to appease Islamists and hard core communists who have a vision for a state that does not serve the people. For one, I am glad governments do fight these extremists, I hope they are generally fair to most people, and would make every effort to encourage that versus forcing it upon them. The U.S. you refer to is still aspirational, the reality is we have more people in prison than any other nation, hell we even privatized over 10% of our prisons and these fast growing businesses have lobbies that influence Congressional law making so they can maintain a high prision population. We are casting stones from a glass house.


You may think the principles contained in our Declaration of Independence to be uniquely American, or concepts that have become somehow quaint or irrelevant with time. America and all we think we stand for is sadly doomed when that becomes the case. If a man or a nation is not what they proclaim to be, then they are little or nothing of value at all.

Are you claiming we should conduct a global crusade to impose the principles contained in our Declaration of Independence? Using your logic I guess the Muslim Brotherhood is obligated to push jihad globally, if they don't they are not who they proclaim to be. In that case we'll see a clash of political ideologies and only might will make right, so we're back where we are now. Again we're casting stones from a glass house.



And your example of Communism is "borderline irrational" as well.
This gets interesting


Do you think the people Russia looked to Communism because they wanted to be communists or because they wanted to get rid of the Tsar?

Do you think the people of China looked to Communist because they wanted to be communists or because they wanted to be free of external Colonial powers and their puppet regime?

Do you think the people of Vietnam, Malaya, etc, etc turned to communism because they wanted to be communist or because they wanted to be free of Western Colonial powers and their puppet regimes??

Very few turned to communism, Ho imposed it and brutally executed any political opponents, especially ones who were more popular. Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Ho killed millions of their own people, so glory to the people, or maybe it was actually better to support the state?


Do governments have the right to simply ignore the reasonable concerns of their evolving populaces and enforce the rule of law in a war-like way to sustain the status quo? Certainly. But the US and our interests are not well served by dedicating our reputation, our treasure and the blood of our young men and women to such efforts.

In the vast majority of cases we don't. In my opinion the Bush administration led us astray to pursue an unreachable dream; however, there are some cases that when they're in our national interest we do make sacrifices to defend those interests. If we do it smart and focus on FID instead of taking over the mission (which fails in the vast majority of times). We can do this with little sacrifice relative to what we did in Afghanistan and Vietnam. It also allows us an honorable exit if the State fails to reform. We tried to help you, but you failed to help yourself so we're out of here.


Does Dayuhan suggest effective ways to kill the current crop of complainants? Sure. No rocket science there.

Often there is no rocket science required. What seems to harm us more than anything else is all the talking heads in national security competing to come up with the new "clever" idea.


That may well reduce a particular threat in a particular place for a short period of time.

Often that is all we need to do and should do. We fool ourselves if we think we come up with permanent solutions. History doesn't stop, yet our national policy tends to embrace the idealist book titled, "The End of History."


Congratulations. Mark all your tactical metrics Green, give yourself a top block ORE and go home.

I don't use metrics, I leave that to those who think they're applying science to something they really don't understand.

[Bill Moore]

It allows such governments to treat their people with impunity and to rely for their sovereignty upon the protection of the US rather than upon the consent of those they govern.

Where does the U.S. allow or encourage this? No other nation in the world puts more pressure on governments to treat their people better than the U.S., but at the same time we have to work within the confines of reality. I think you are wearing blinders when you write stuff like this. Go to the State Department website and look at the daily press briefings, they always address poor governance and put pressures on those governments. What other nation in the world is doing this in a meaningful way?


That is not who we are Bill. And those who rationalize such poor behavior in the name of national security are, IMO, dangerously wrong.

You're beginning to sound like Oliver Stone with these conspiracy theories. Where are we turning a blind eye to governments that treat their people badly? Do we work with them? Yes, but at the same time we encourage reforms. If we didn't work with them, the reality is someone else would and they would enable that government to treat their people a lot worse. Note China's assistance to Sri Lanka because we disengaged because we couldn't stand the the smell of the human rights abuses. Did our disengagement make thinks better for the Sri Lankan people?


We cannot fix others. We cannot resolve their insurgencies or repair their relationships with their own people. This they must do on their own. But we can work across the DIME spectrum in a neutral way in those few places that are actually critical to our interests to force governments to listen and to help keep violence (state or insurgent) within the bounds of clear red lines.

We generally do this already, but if we have critical interests then it isn't always effective to work in a neutral manner. Fortunately these cases are the exception rather than the rule.


What you suggest is little different than practices of the last century to take out Union organizers, and to send pipe-swinging goons into a mass of striking workers. To me, that is irrational. And not in a borderline sort of way.

I never said that, but it reads well, so bravo on your use of propaganda to attack my argument by putting me in the goon camp. On second thought when your grand kids can't enjoy hostness twinkees in their school lunch you may think twice about the value of unions. :D

[Fuchs]

Where does the U.S. allow or encourage this?
Afghanistan. Was also done in Pakistan, Egypt, ..... long list, especially if you go back a bit.
Yes, old stories are relevant if there hasn't been a fundamental break with old practices.



No other nation in the world puts more pressure on governments to treat their people better than the U.S., (...)

I consider sending this to a German website for joke quotes.
Did you ever take notice of other countries' foreign policies? Or your own countries'?

It's especially ironic as when the U.S. applies pressure, it very often hurts those foreign people first and foremost. Those alleged hundred of thousands of less births or children died of poor care in Iraq prior to 2001; they were -if true at all- the product of Saddam's AND U.S. policies.
Almost all other countries wanted the sanctions lifted, only the U.S. and UK consistently kept all embargoes up. The lesson; never empower the US or UK to pull it off a second time, no open-ended UN embargoes any more!

[Bob's World]

Originally Posted by Bob's World
But without insurgent populaces who are both very dissatisfied with their own systems of governance, and who equally perceive that external Western influence, money and manipulation is a major factor in why their governance is so out of step - there would be no AQ.

Dayuhan counters:
You keep saying this, but you provide no evidence or reasoning to support the contention. It's simply laid out as revealed truth. The problem with this is that it's not consistent with what we see on the ground. We know that populaces aren't turning to AQ for help in getting rid of their own governments because every attempt by AQ to raise an insurgency against a Muslim government has failed to draw anything close to a critical mass of popular support. What we actually see is that while Muslim populaces are happy to fund and support AQ as long as they're fighting infidels far away, that support stops as soon as AQ tries to bring the jihad to their neighborhood. Interview-based studies on foreign fighter motivations have not revealed any hint that people are traveling to fight in order to affect governance in their home countries: the motivation is consistently to end the oppression of Muslims and expel the infidel in the place where the fight is going on.

The contention that AQ s driven by populaces who oppose their own governments and believe that support for AQ will change those governments has to be supported by convincing evidence and reasoning to be accepted. It can't simply be decreed.

We are looking at the exact same evidence, just as a city person, an occasional hunter and an experienced woodsman all look at the same sign in a forest. Just because the first two "see no evidence" of the many things the woodsman sees does not mean the woodsman is just making stuff up. He sees nuances that the others miss. This is true in all walks of life. We are talking about the nuance here, and I realize nuance is hard to describe, and equally hard to appreciate. One has to rely on a bit of faith.

AQ's message has always relied heavily on the pillar that Muslim populaces dissatisfied with their own situations of governance (under "apostate" regimes -i.e., regimes that have sold out to the West), must first break the sources of that corrupting external influence and support before they can find success at home. This is a bit part of their UW campaign message. They use this to recruit individual fighters and to solicit economic support and to find "sanctuary" for the nodes of their networked operations.

People contribute to this for many reasons, but if it is hard evidence you seek, if you much touch the holes in Jesus's hands, look simply at products such as the report on foreign fighters in Iraq prepared by Dr Joe Felter several years ago, and then compare where those "foreign fighters" came from with where the "Arab Spring" later burst into action. AQ drew upon the the very high conditions of insurgency in those states and drew upon the sub-populaces who were most dissatisfied with their own governments. They traveled to Iraq not to help make Iraq part of some "Caliphate," but rather to help defeat this source of foreign influence so that they could finally find some success at home.

Now, when those insurgencies did finally go active at home (with AQ support and influence), did the people all rally under an AQ flag and attempt to elevate AQ into the governance of their country or to join some "Caliphate"? Of course not. Again, revolution is not to bring some specific form of governance seen as good, revolution gains popular support to remove some system of governance widely deemed as bad. With success finally at hand after so many generations, why would anyone want to submit themselves to the extremist view of the world offered by AQ? Revolution, perhaps more than any other condition, makes for strange bedfellows. We need to stop judging people by who they associate with in times of great crisis and need, and instead appreciate the nature of all the relationships in play, and the primary purpose for action by the various parties.

Bill says
"governments have a right to defend themselves"

This is very true, but in life as in law, for every right there are reciprocal duties.

We are too quick to jump in and help certain governments exercise their "rights" to defend themselves from their own insurgent populaces when we are in hot pursuit of the handful of AQ operatives working among those populaces conducting UW. We are so consumed by our own pursuit of our "right" to exact our revenge on AQ and to render them unable to conduct future attacks on the US and our interests that we forget our own reciprocal duties as well.

It is time for governments under attack by non-state actors, be they insurgents at home, or regional UW/terrorist actors from abroad to stop using the "right to defend themselves" as rationale for acting in ways counter to their own principles and in ways that are so abusive of the sovereignty of others. It is time for governments to equally hold themselves to task for the "duty" part of that equation.

The governments where the insurgent populaces live must (IE "have a duty") to listen to and seek to govern their entire populaces fairly and in a manner consistent with fundamental aspects of human nature (which manifest uniquely in every populace). Instead they cling to the status quo (not to be coerced by terrorism), and seek simply to "enforce the rule of law."

When any nation seeks to vigorously enforce rule of law that is perceived as unjust by those that law is enforced against, it is tyranny. Doubly so when the government seeking to enforce those laws is perceived as having no legitimate right to do so by those they affect.

We do not need to fix the national governance of others, but neither should we enable others to ignore their duties to their own people. What the US needs to focus on is updating our foreign policies so that we operate under the same principles abroad that we operate under at home. Our problem is not a domestic one (though that is growing as well), but rather a foreign one. Governance does not stop at borders, and US governance affects people around the globe. We have a duty to ensure to the degree possible that our governance does not provoke others to bring illegal violence back against us. Excessive pursuit of our right to defend ourselves does far more damage to make those perceptions worse, than the killing of a few particular actors serves to make things better. We celebrate our tactical victories, while we ignore our growing strategic failure.

But boy do we love tactics. No nuance to interpret there. Dead is dead. Success, next target.

We still have those rights, but we must tailor how we pursue those rights into the larger context of how we pursue our duties. You can't hand some one a gift with one hand, and then punch him in the face with the other and expect a positive result. We must subjugate all of our tactical actions of every nature to the larger strategic effects we seek to achieve. Currently we just measure tactical successes of tactical actions and then assume they will add up to strategic success. That does not work in this type of conflict.

[Fuchs]

When any nation seeks to vigorously enforce rule of law that is perceived as unjust by those that law is enforced against, it is tyranny. Doubly so when the government seeking to enforce those laws is perceived as having no legitimate right to do so by those they affect.

That's a horrible kind of definition.
The political opposition (minority) in a country often perceives rules given by the majority (and enforced through rule of law) as unjust, and very much ideology-driven minority partisans question the legitimacy of such acts at times (there's a prominent example these days).

This doesn't mean there's tyranny at work. It requires very different criteria to be met.

[Dayuhan]

People contribute to this for many reasons, but if it is hard evidence you seek, if you much touch the holes in Jesus's hands, look simply at products such as the report on foreign fighters in Iraq prepared by Dr Joe Felter several years ago, and then compare where those "foreign fighters" came from with where the "Arab Spring" later burst into action.

That's not evidence. It's not even a very compelling correlation.


AQ drew upon the the very high conditions of insurgency in those states and drew upon the sub-populaces who were most dissatisfied with their own governments. They traveled to Iraq not to help make Iraq part of some "Caliphate," but rather to help defeat this source of foreign influence so that they could finally find some success at home.

And you expect us to take this statement, unsupported, on faith? As revealed truth? Sorry, but that's stretching faith beyond the breaking point. Just a few of the problems with that formulation:

1. The "foreign fighter" phenomenon is not limited to Iraq, or to places where the fighters are fighting the US. Foreign fighters have appeared in numerous conflicts, most of which have no plausible connection to conditions in their home countries. Are you suggesting that foreign fighters who traveled to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan or the Russians in Chechnya did so to defeat foreign influence in their home country? That Arabs who fought in Bosnia or the Tajik civil war were trying to affect governance at home? Or that foreign fighters in conflicts where the US is involved have a completely different set of motivations than foreign fighters in other conflicts?

2. Many foreign fighters who fought came form countries where foreign influence in general and US influence specifically have no meaningful place in sustaining the regime that ruled their home country. There's no imaginable reason why a Libyan or a Syrian would fight Americans in Iraq to remove a source of support for a government he disliked at home. These governments were not in any way supported or sustained by the US, but they still provided foreign fighters.

3. Studies based on interviews with captured foreign fighters do not reveal any hint of the motive that you suggest. In fact this idea is notably absent from every study of foreign fighters that I've seen. Now maybe it's true that everybody else looking at the problem is just a dumb city slicker wandering around in the bush missing all the signs that are clear to you alone... but is there not at least a chance that some of them aren't so ignorant? It would be useful if you could describe these signs nobody else sees in specific detail, not in generalities.


Now, when those insurgencies did finally go active at home (with AQ support and influence), did the people all rally under an AQ flag and attempt to elevate AQ into the governance of their country or to join some "Caliphate"? Of course not.

I see little evidence to suggest that AQ support and influence had anything to do with the Arab Spring. Looked more to me like AQ was taken by surprise and failed to capitalize to any significant degree, largely because their message was simply inconsistent with the desires that drove the Arab Spring.

AQ's most notable failure to inspire revolution, of course, had nothing to do with the Arab Spring. Throughout the early to mid 1990s AQ tried desperately to provoke revolution in Saudi Arabia. Circumstances should have been ideal for this effort: he was coming off what was perceived as a great victory over the Soviets in Afghanistan, he had drawn extensive support within Saudi Arabia during that fight and had a deep network of contacts. Conditions in Saudi Arabia looked ripe: the oil glut had caused massive dislocation and the presence of American forces was a major irritant. Still the effort fell flat on its face. Osama was unable to generate anything even remotely approaching the critical mass needed to challenge the government. His message just didn't resonate: Saudis were more than willing to support his jihad against the Soviets, but when he took it home they weren't interested. It's not plausible that his failure was caused by exile and repression: the Ayatollah Khomeini, for one, had inspired a revolution from exile in an equally repressive environment bys mailing cassette tapes. His message resonated with Iranians, and repression failed. Osama just didn't have the support. That doesn't mean Saudis loved the royal family, it meant that they don't see AQ as a viable alternative.

Again, AQ has certainly tried to push the narrative built around opposition to apostate regimes. That narrative hasn't really worked for them, though: they've only been able to draw widespread support when they've opposed foreign invaders in Muslim lands.


We are too quick to jump in and help certain governments exercise their "rights" to defend themselves from their own insurgent populaces

Again, other than in Iraq and Afghanistan, where are we helping a Muslim government to fight an insurgent populace, or enabling a Muslim government to oppress its populace? They don't generally need our help or ask our permission, and they aren't going to stop because we want them to.

Your argument would be more effective if it referred to specific policies and specific countries, and gave examples of policies that you think are counterproductive and the policies you believe should replace them.

[Entropy]

Bob,


AQ drew upon the the very high conditions of insurgency in those states and drew upon the sub-populaces who were most dissatisfied with their own governments. They traveled to Iraq not to help make Iraq part of some "Caliphate," but rather to help defeat this source of foreign influence so that they could finally find some success at home.

I think you need to revisit what AQ did in those countries. Yes, they wanted to kill the foreign infidel and drive them out of "Muslim lands." But more than that they wanted to purge the apostates. Look at the actual operations conducted by AQ-in-Iraq - they killed so many Muslim Iraqis that even UBL got pissed off at the carnage they caused. I'm not sure how bombing a market full of Shiites helps to defeat the "foreign influence," but maybe someone can explain it to me.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Fuches


Afghanistan. Was also done in Pakistan, Egypt, ..... long list, especially if you go back a bit.
Yes, old stories are relevant if there hasn't been a fundamental break with old practices.

What time period are you speaking of in regards to Afghanistan? As for Egypt and I would add Iran prior to the 79 revolution we chose what we believed to the lesser of two evils that was designed to achieve the most good for the most people. In hindsight we can question every decision and made, but to evaluate them fairly you have to look at them in the context in which they were made. I think you miss a very important point regarding Egypt. Our many years of engaging their military helped professionalize their force and taught respect for human rights, at least my Middle Eastern standards. If we didn't have that relationship I fear that much worse would have happened at Tahir Square.


I consider sending this to a German website for joke quotes.
Did you ever take notice of other countries' foreign policies? Or your own countries'?

Have all the fun you like, but when doing so please a hard look at your country's foreign policy and share with us what nations you liberated from oppression? What groups of people you protected from genocide? Few people in the U.S. to include myself claim our country is perfect and that serious mistakes haven't been made throughout our history, but I find it hard to argue with the claim that no nation in history has done for the betterment of mankind.

Has for noticing other nation's foreign policy, yes I do take notice. I watched first hand as the French still try to implement an oppressive policy in parts of Africa, on the other hand I have been impressed with the efforts of Norway to promote peace in many war torn areas through diplomacy. I have seen numerous countries push economic development programs, and of course trade deals, etc. If you have a particular point you like to make about German foreign policy please make it.


It's especially ironic as when the U.S. applies pressure, it very often hurts those foreign people first and foremost. Those alleged hundred of thousands of less births or children died of poor care in Iraq prior to 2001; they were -if true at all- the product of Saddam's AND U.S. policies.

I agree with you on this issue and have written as much several times on SWJ. It was a cowardly policy that achieved little except wrecking Iraqi socieyt and further empowering Saddam.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4PgpbQfxgo&feature=player_detailpage


Almost all other countries wanted the sanctions lifted, only the U.S. and UK consistently kept all embargoes up. The lesson; never empower the US or UK to pull it off a second time, no open-ended UN embargoes any more!

True, this wasn't a shinning moment in our history, but it doesn't erase all the good we have done over the years either.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World


Currently we just measure tactical successes of tactical actions and then assume they will add up to strategic success. That does not work in this type of conflict.

First off this isn't true anywhere and it has never has been in our history.

Second, you have habit of conflating tactical operations and our national strategy. A Bde commander may very appropriately measure his success on tactical successes as they related to targets, securing an area, etc., but he is there to support a larger strategy that involves much more than what the military is doing.

Name your JSOTF or JTF, they have tactical and operational level missions that have a strong military flavor that are supporting a larger strategy where all the elements of DIME are at play, and not just the U.S.. In some cases numerous nations are playing a strategic role openly or behind the scenes.

SOF and GPF should be focused tactical successes, some of those tactical successes are enabled through indirect ways, but they're their to achieve the M in DIME. All elements of national power blend with one another to some degree, so it isn't as stove piped as it sounds.

[Fuchs]

Have all the fun you like, but when doing so please a hard look at your country's foreign policy and share with us what nations you liberated from oppression?

Irrelevant, as I was disputing
"No other nation in the world puts more pressure on governments to treat their people better than the U.S., (...) "

The U.S. rarely does or did so at all. It's at times the cover for what it really presses for, though. The hypocrisy of opposing evil only when it's not useful is overwhelming.

The mere words don't mean much. That's why the U.S.'s track record in this regard has such a weak pro side.


Few people in the U.S. to include myself claim our country is perfect and that serious mistakes haven't been made throughout our history, but I find it hard to argue with the claim that no nation in history has done for the betterment of mankind.

It's very easy to answer: Greeks, Frenchmen, Englishmen, probably even Germans.
The power of philosophical and conceptual advances originating from these countries is much greater than whatever feeble attempts of good-willed and at the same time not utterly inept foreign policy the U.S. can bring up to compete.



If you have a particular point you like to make about German foreign policy please make it.

You made a general claim, so there's no reason to limit the answer to a specific part.



True, this wasn't a shinning moment in our history, but it doesn't erase all the good we have done over the years either.

It doesn't. The problem is that all the bad stuff outweights the good stuff in my opinion.
Opinions may vary, but I suppose it's only possible to see more positives than negatives by assuming more horrible things would have happened without this or that meddling.
Then again, keep in mind that your country almost blew up the world in a conflict/rivalry which it hyped up itself and in which it fearmongered superbly, vastly exaggerating the problem.

[ganulv]

It's very easy to answer: Greeks, Frenchmen, Englishmen, probably even Germans.

The power of philosophical and conceptual advances originating from these countries is much greater than whatever feeble attempts of good-willed and at the same time not utterly inept foreign policy the U.S. can bring up to compete.
As a U.S. citizen who lived in Central America in the mid-90s I am not apt to defend the foreign policy of my nation, but on the topic of philosophical advances in particular, my country did have something to do with the birth of representative government in France. It is an understatement to say that the French Revolution was a mixed bag, but it (and the philosophical advances leading to and emanating from it) did have some power.

[Bob's World]

Bob,



I think you need to revisit what AQ did in those countries. Yes, they wanted to kill the foreign infidel and drive them out of "Muslim lands." But more than that they wanted to purge the apostates. Look at the actual operations conducted by AQ-in-Iraq - they killed so many Muslim Iraqis that even UBL got pissed off at the carnage they caused. I'm not sure how bombing a market full of Shiites helps to defeat the "foreign influence," but maybe someone can explain it to me.

AQ did not go to Iraq until we did, and they went there because we were there. It was, for AQ, primarily a battle field against foreign influence in the region. Their battlefields for taking on "apostates" were in all those other Muslim countrie around the region where they were recruiting fighters to come help them against us in Iraq, while at the same time conducting UW to support those insurgent movements at home.

The fact that they killed many Muslim Iraqis is immaterial to their goals there, just as the fact that we killed many Muslim Iraqis was immaterial to ours.

But for our operations to remove Saddam, there would not likely be any AQ in Iraq today, and very little Iranian influence as well. We need to own that.

[Fuchs]

As a U.S. citizen who lived in Central America in the mid-90s I am not apt to defend the foreign policy of my nation, but on the topic of philosophical advances in particular, my country did have something to do with the birth of representative government in France. It is an understatement to say that the French Revolution was a mixed bag, but it (and the philosophical advances leading to and emanating from it) did have some power.

ganulv, what we know as "French Revolution" was about the gazillionth French popular revolt - the one that eventually succeeded. There was no need for the improvement of the odds of a revolt as evidenced by the earlier ones, it was the food price crisis that determined Paris would be involved and not mere peasants far away as usual, the U.S. had no influence on the success chance of the revolt, Voltaire etc provided the enlightenment philosophical underpinnings which made some of the wealthy people join the revolt and there was really little political happening in France until long after 1815 that one could be proud of.
The single best thing of the revolt was probably the code civil (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleonic_Code) - do you want to claim this was due to U.S. influence?
According to Wikipedia, it was the work of four French scholars and Napoleon.

The chronological proximity and order of the American and French revolutions has been used to build up one more U.S. myth, but I don't subscribe to it.

[Surferbeetle]

Fuchs, Bill, all,

As we think about contributions towards 'the betterment of world' one place to look would be:

List of Nobel laureates by country, From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Nobel_laureates_by_country

:wry:

[ganulv]

ganulv, what we know as "French Revolution" was about the gazillionth French popular revolt - the one that eventually succeeded. There was no need for the improvement of the odds of a revolt as evidenced by the earlier ones, it was the food price crisis that determined Paris would be involved and not mere peasants far away as usual, the U.S. had no influence on the success chance of the revolt, Voltaire etc provided the enlightenment philosophical underpinnings which made some of the wealthy people join the revolt and there was really little political happening in France until long after 1815 that one could be proud of.

You're apples-and-oranging and not sticking to a fixed definition of "success." There was the overthrowing of the aristocracy and there was the creation of a new governing framework (which ended up being the ascendency of the bourgeoisie). I don't think anyone would argue that the U.S. had much to do directly with the former (plently indirectly through the debt the French Crown ran up in aiding the Revolutionaries), but no influence on the latter? I'll of course give you that the flows from Voltaire, Rousseau, to Jefferson and back across the Atlantic were reciprocal, but come on, the American experiment was looked to (http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/291/reunited-and-it-feels-so-good?act=3).


The chronological proximity and order of the American and French revolutions has been used to build up one more U.S. myth, but I don't subscribe to it.

So you are arguing that things either just happened to occur more quickly in France or just happened to take longer in Germany and Italy?

[Fuchs]

the American experiment was looked to (http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/291/reunited-and-it-feels-so-good?act=3)

I can read French.
Can you point me at a francophone source, not suspicious of being partial to your view by birth, telling us that the colonists were an important and positive influence on the French Revolution? Or maybe a German one. Dutch? Spanish?

I suppose there are some, but I doubt they would provide substantial food for a list of the U.S.' good deeds.


To me, U.S. claims of being a big force for good always weep a lot of an U.S.-centric worldview.
U.S. claims of being a bigger force for good than ugly add an unhealthy dose of disrespect or ignorance concerning the damage done to this.


I don't think any country can really claim to be a huge force for good in the world. Especially not in the balance.
The ones which do almost no harm and some good tend to be small, such as Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway - and the Dutch need to cope with their imperialism history just as the great powers have some graveyards of imperialism victims somewhere (including the U.S.).

Foreign policy is -save for diplomatic efforts of some envoys such as some odd Scandinavians or Luxembourg's pols in some places- generally a poor direction for looking at in search for good deeds.
Foreign policy is usually about gaming, being gamed or simply pursuing actual national interest (surprisingly rare).
Almost all good deeds in this area have a smell of hypocrisy because of their selectivity or are by-products of or cover for something else.


The stuff where one can really claim to have helped mankind advance is usually about ideas; philosophy and science mostly. That's overwhelmingly the product of individuals (hardly practical any more in many sciences) who either worked for profit or were employed to first and foremost bring forward their own country.


U.S. myths and illusions about being a force for good are really as childish as equivalent German myths and illusions a hundred years ago were.
(I'm often astonished how Americans still stick to conceptions and problems which European countries did shed between 120 and 20 year ago.)

[ganulv]

I can read French.
Can you point me at a francophone source, not suspicious of being partial to your view by birth, telling us that the colonists were an important and positive influence on the French Revolution? Or maybe a German one. Dutch? Spanish?

I suppose there are some, but I doubt they would provide substantial food for a list of the U.S.' good deeds.
I think you have decided already, so why go to the trouble?


The stuff where one can really claim to have helped mankind advance is usually about ideas; philosophy and science mostly. That's overwhelmingly the product of individuals (hardly practical any more in many sciences) who either worked for profit or were employed to first and foremost bring forward their own country.
Did I or did I not specifically point out that I was speaking of philosophy in my post above?

[Fuchs]

I think you have decided already, so why go to the trouble?

There's no real reason to. Sometimes people discuss because they like to express their opinion, without an actual chance to convince the other participant(s) consciously.

It's actually a quite common style of discussion.

[Bob's World]

As they say, "there are no clean hands" in this business of being a powerful state that seeks to exercise interests abroad.

Some go in with the intent to get their hands dirty, or not caring, others do so inadvertently, but all get dirty.

These countries also tend to logically prioritize their own interests in determining what outcomes they seek to promote. The US is no different in that regard.

Where we differ is that we define as interests (particularly in the post Cold War era) broad concepts of promoting US leadership, US values and US democracy. I understand the attractive logic and good intentions behind why those "interests" made their way into our national security strategy, but I disagree with them very much and believe they actually lead us more often to do things that put our historic interests at risk, rather than make them more secure.

Having good intentions is better than having bad intentions, but the nuance of one's intentions are typically lost on a popualce that finds themself on the reciving end of the actual engagement. There is, after all, no such thing as "friendly fire."

(Oh, and the French very much bought into a form of the ideals of democracy developed during the American experience. The French also took those ideals on the road to "share" with "liberated" populaces in places such as Egypt and Spain and, like the US today, were always surprised when their well intended efforts were met with powerful resistance insurgencies from those recently liberated oppressed people.)

[ganulv]

It's actually a quite common style of discussion.
Discussion (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2y8Sx4B2Sk)?

[Dayuhan]

Having good intentions is better than having bad intentions, but the nuance of one's intentions are typically lost on a popualce that finds themself on the reciving end of the actual engagement. There is, after all, no such thing as "friendly fire."

Also worth remembering that anything we do, including nothing, is going to piss somebody off, sometimes to the point of violence. It's worth asking, in any given case, whether we've pissed off "a populace" or a small fraction of a populace that has a powerful vested interest in pursuing a certain agenda.

If we're looking for a policy that will please everybody and assure that everybody loves us and nobody hates us, we might as well give up from the start, because no such thing can exist.

[Bill Moore]

Fuchs, Bill, all,

As we think about contributions towards 'the betterment of world' one place to look would be:

List of Nobel laureates by country, From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Nobel_laureates_by_country

:wry:

Good catch, this is one measure of what nation has made the most (and continues to do) contributions to the betterment of mankind, but it still doesn't capture the essence of our national character to do well for others (this character is separate from our government).

[Backwards Observer]

Good catch, this is one measure of what nation has made the most (and continues to do) contributions to the betterment of mankind, but it still doesn't capture the essence of our national character to do well for others (this character is separate from our government).

Agree.

[Dayuhan]

List of Nobel laureates by country, From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Nobel_laureates_by_country

:wry:

This might be a better reference:

List of countries by Nobel laureates per capita:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Nobel_laureates_per_capita

Availability of research funding in different countries would also need to be factored in to get a relevant comparison.

[Backwards Observer]

This might be a better reference:

List of countries by Nobel laureates per capita:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Nobel_laureates_per_capita

Availability of research funding in different countries would also need to be factored in to get a relevant comparison.

No doubt your added perspective is useful. My agreement with Bill Moore and Surferbeetle on this score is based in part on the following anecdote.

A relative of mine went from Singapore to Caltech in the eighties studying interplanetary geophysics; moved on to JPL and ended up working on the Mars Observer, which the Martians unfortunately shot down in '93.

This same kid once sat for hours in front of her family's first washing machine (front loader) in the late seventies watching it like it was left behind by ancient astronauts.

The semi-autistic nerds she studied with at Caltech are some of the most supportive and helpful oddballs one could imagine and for the most part remain a close-knit group to this day. She now teaches high school. What does any of this mean? I don't know, but it impresses me for some reason.

(In fairness to Fuchs, the washing machine may have been a Grundig, if memory serves)

[Surferbeetle]

Posted by Bill Moore
Good catch, this is one measure of what nation has made the most (and continues to do) contributions to the betterment of mankind, but it still doesn't capture the essence of our national character to do well for others (this character is separate from our government).

Bill,

Like you, I have traveled and seen enough to know that America is in many instances a force for good.

Perhaps part of the underlying concept we are wrestling with (the elephant and the blind men describing it's various parts) is appreciation/trust/reliability? Sunrises (across Nicaraguan jungles, Iraqi rivers, Euro mountain ranges, US seacoasts, etc) and and nighttime cityscapes (San Salvador, Baghdad, Barcelona, Munich, Ciudad Juarez, or wherever) often provide me with daily hope and inspiration. Like me, you know that a basic meal, clean water, shelter, electricity, and security are pretty big deals in many parts of the world. Systems - technical, economic, and governance have to successfully mesh every day/night to make these basics available, and that meshing requires appreciation/trust/reliability.

Are fuel deliveries dependable? Is the fuel sufficiently pure to spin the turbine? Is the turbine sufficiently engineered and maintained to generate power? Are the transmission and distribution systems capable and sufficiently placed? Are generators the answer instead? Will the 'schools' persist for long enough to educate the number of minds needed to carry the new generation along while caring for old one and the future one to come?

What organizations/countries/clusters are known/trusted for turbines (Hitachi, Siemens, GE, etc), fuel (coal (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_coal_production), oil (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_oil_production), natural gas (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_natural_gas_production), etc), food (wheat (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_wheat_production_statistics), soybeans (http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/agr_pro_soy-agriculture-production-soybean), etc), education (universities (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lists_of_universities_and_colleges_by_country)), information (newspapers (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Newspapers_by_country), internet (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Internet_service_providers_by_country), telecommunications (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Telecommunications_by_country), etc)?

War and death, however, literally make many gun-shy. That's double edged of course, good for our enemies (few of them) and bad for our friends, admirers, and business/economics partners (many of those). Shorthand wise, we are out of balance and we need to get back to focusing on the many versus the few. Akin to - waaayyyy too much time & resources spent on the screw-ups to the detriment of the unit as a whole...:wry:


This might be a better reference:

List of countries by Nobel laureates per capita:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Nobel_laureates_per_capita

Ratio's are very helpful for gaining additional insights and context that numbers in isolation do not always provide.

Growing and building things for a better tomorrow versus arbitrarily imposing them. ;)

Free markets (in many instances the theoretical ideal, bounded by messy reality of course) and coalition building? Globalization? :D

Backwards,

Perhaps a sitcom for you...http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Big_Bang_Theory

[Backwards Observer]

Backwards,

Perhaps a sitcom for you...http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Big_Bang_Theory

Call me Nigel.:rolleyes:

[Dayuhan]

The semi-autistic nerds she studied with at Caltech are some of the most supportive and helpful oddballs one could imagine and for the most part remain a close-knit group to this day. She now teaches high school. What does any of this mean? I don't know, but it impresses me for some reason.

I've often noted that even people who truly dislike the United States routinely comment that individual Americans seem to be very nice people. They sometimes seem to find this a bit disconcerting, as if the world would be a more consistent place for them if we were all A-holes.


Like me, you know that a basic meal, clean water, shelter, electricity, and security are pretty big deals in many parts of the world. Systems - technical, economic, and governance have to successfully mesh every day/night to make these basics available, and that meshing requires appreciation/trust/reliability.

I agree... but too often Americans think such systems can simply be installed, and this misimpression often leads to all manner of well intentioned mess.

[Backwards Observer]

I've often noted that even people who truly dislike the United States routinely comment that individual Americans seem to be very nice people. They sometimes seem to find this a bit disconcerting, as if the world would be a more consistent place for them if we were all A-holes.

People who are able to muster up the energy to 'truly dislike' entire countries probably find a-hole lot of things disconcerting.

[Dayuhan]

People who are able to muster up the energy to 'truly dislike' entire countries probably find a-hole lot of things disconcerting.

A surprising number of people seem to feel bereft without someone to loathe, and generic loathing seems every bit as satisfying as specific loathing, maybe more so. Grace Slick didn't quite sing "don't you want somebody to hate", but she might have...

[Backwards Observer]

A surprising number of people seem to feel bereft without someone to loathe, and generic loathing seems every bit as satisfying as specific loathing, maybe more so. Grace Slick didn't quite sing "don't you want somebody to hate", but she might have...

I'm straining the memory banks here, but I seem to recall being instructed that Marlowe uses the Mephistopheles character in Doctor Faustus to suggest that there is at root a form of self-loathing proportional to our distance from the Divine. YMMV.



Why this is hell, nor am I out of it. Think'st thou that I, who saw the face of God and tasted the eternal joy of heaven, am not tormented with ten thousand hells in being deprived of everlasting bliss?
Christopher Marlowe, Dr. Faustus

[Bob's World]

I've often noted that even people who truly dislike the United States routinely comment that individual Americans seem to be very nice people. They sometimes seem to find this a bit disconcerting, as if the world would be a more consistent place for them if we were all A-holes.



In many ways, this is the crux of the problem for the US. What we often chalk up broadly as "anti-Americanism" is in fact much more "anti-American Foreign Policy and how we seek to pursue the same."

As noted here, we create an environment at home where individuals can excel, as noted by the many Nobel prizes awarded to Americans; yet when our government seeks to determine what our national interests are abroad, and how to best secure those interests, we make decisions, implement policies, and pursue actions that far too often deny for others who live in those places the very things we demand for ourselves at home.

The US must come to grips with this dichotomy. If a handful of AQ operatives were working across the US Midwest conducting UW, just as they are currently across the Magreb in Africa, would we pursue the same policies and rules of engagement in Kansas, Oklahoma and Nebraska that we are in countries such as Mali, Algeria and Libya?

If a governor in North Dakota, a new oil-rich state, suddenly grabbed vast powers from the other branches of government and the people he is supposed to serve and vested those powers in his self, would we rationalize that the oil from that state is too important to risk a disruption of losing that particular leader and our relationship with him? Would we then act to help him expand the capacity of the state police and national guard so that they could more effectively protect the government from the illegal violent acts coming from that populace? After all, as Bill reminds us, a government as the right to defend itself. Equally the US has a right to pursue its interests.

The US is not an evil country or even very oppressive as major global powers in history go. In fact, history will likely find us to be this oddly conflicted giant, who sought great control, power and influence on one hand, but was so torn by guilt that it paid full retail prices for what it could have taken by force, and ultimately went broke as it enriched and protected those it had imposed itself upon abroad. I'm not sure history will know what to do with that, as it is indeed "American exceptionalism" at work. I suspect the Chinese already scratch their heads in wonder as they shape their own long-range plans, always keen to avoid the mistakes of others.

[wm]

The US must come to grips with this dichotomy. If a handful of AQ operatives were working across the US Midwest conducting UW, just as they are currently across the Magreb in Africa, would we pursue the same policies and rules of engagement in Kansas, Oklahoma and Nebraska that we are in countries such as Mali, Algeria and Libya?

If a governor in North Dakota, a new oil-rich state, suddenly grabbed vast powers from the other branches of government and the people he is supposed to serve and vested those powers in his self, would we rationalize that the oil from that state is too important to risk a disruption of losing that particular leader and our relationship with him? Would we then act to help him expand the capacity of the state police and national guard so that they could more effectively protect the government from the illegal violent acts coming from that populace? After all, as Bill reminds us, a government as the right to defend itself. Equally the US has a right to pursue its interests.

The dichotomy identified is based on analogies that have far too many relevant dissimilarities to make them a useful tool for drawing conclusions. What a government does/may do legitimately within its own borders is very different from what it does/may do legitimately elsewhere, if for no other reason than the differences in sovereign power in the two arenas.

In an earlier post, Bob's World identified a correlation between rights and duties, noting that the having of a right spawns a correlative duty. One of the things that I think he got wrong was that the correlation does not exist within a single holder. That is, my rights to, e.g., life, liberty, and property (from Locke) do not produce duties for me to protect my life, not to enslave myself, and to seek to acquire property. Instead, my right to life (if I have one) engenders a correspondiong duty in others not to deprive me of my life without good reason.

I add the " without good reason" because I doubt rights are absolute. As Justice Holmes noted in Schnenk v. US (249 U.S. 47, 1919)

The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic.

I also submit that Bob's World has the primacy of rights over duties just backwards, Rather than saying that my possession of a right spawns a correlative duty in others, I would suggest that a more correct view of the relation between rights and duties looks like the following: because each of us has duties, others may make rights claims against us in light of those duties.

Finally, I am unclear from whence Bill and Bob derive this "right" of self defence for governments. The right of self defence for a nation is derived, in an a argument found in St Augustine's writings, from the right of individual self defense. But that is an argument from analogy, not a deduction, and the analogy may be as suspect as Bob's two analogies quoted above. Additionally, a nation is much more than just its government.

[Surferbeetle]

Finally, I am unclear from whence Bill and Bob derive this "right" of self defence for governments. The right of self defence for a nation is derived, in an a argument found in St Augustine's writings, from the right of individual self defense. But that is an argument from analogy, not a deduction, and the analogy may be as suspect as Bob's two analogies quoted above. Additionally, a nation is much more than just its government.

Wm,

One for the reading list

Scottexalonia Rising, By ROGER COHEN, Published: November 26, 2012, IHT, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/opinion/catalonia-texas-and-scotland-move-toward-independence.html?ref=europe


Of course, immigration, lust and love have mixed the blood of the Scottish, Texan and Catalonian tribes (Call them “Scottexalonia” in their shared separation itch.) “I’m a mutt,” Barack Obama once said. So, increasingly, is a wired, remittance-linked world where many live with, say, one foot in Birmingham and another in Lahore.


In 1996, I began a piece called “Global forces batter politics” with these words: “Throughout much of the world today, politics lags behind economics, like a horse and buggy haplessly trailing a sports car. While politicians go through the motions of national elections — offering chimerical programs and slogans — world markets, the Internet and the furious pace of trade involve people in a global game in which elected representatives figure as little more than bit players.”

Extrapolate out 16 years from that. National politics, as President François Hollande of France is only the latest to discover, is often no more than tweaking at the margins in the exiguous political space left by markets and other global forces. And that is in France!

[jmm99]

Thanks for quoting Holmes correctly and in full:


The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic.

He is often "quoted" (paraphrased) with "falsely" omitted.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

So, then I am to believe that a country can act more aggressively and in a war-like manner in some other country where it has no sovereign rights than it can within its own borders??

Certainly for the US we can get away with doing so, but just because an action is "legal" does not mean that it is also "right"; Much of what we do legally overseas is done in such a manner as to build causation and motivation for others to conduct acts of terrorism against us, or to provide support to those who intend to do so.

We take far too much comfort in the "legality" of our actions and do not place nearly enough importance on the propriety of our actions. We believe if a government has legal legitimacy in accordance with our laws that that is more important than having political legitimacy in accordance with the culture of the people and places they hope to govern.

Populace-based conflicts are by their very nature illegal; and in operating outside the law do not much care about the law or our legal holdings and positions. For purposes of stability political legitimacy trumps legal legitimacy virtually every time.

No, my examples of operations we do not conduct within our own borders was simply to make the point that we all know that such operations would be both illegal and improper. They are no less improper when we conduct them abroad, only more legal. Such operations create sanctuary, support and recruits for ogainzations such as AQ, even as they take out some small number of current operators. HOW we operate is far more important than how efficiently we operate and how big of a score we put up on our chart of tactical metrics.

Tactical success of this nature is far more apt to lead to strategic failure than to the ends we actually seek. That does not mean to end tactical operations, but rather to refrom the nature and scope of them so as to make them more proper. This will be far less effective tactically, but we need to put an eye on the bigger picture.

[wm]

So, then I am to believe that a country can act more aggressively and in a war-like manner in some other country where it has no sovereign rights than it can within its own borders??
Certainly, because one cannot wage war within/against one's own country. How odd does this sound? "Today the President of the United States requested that the Senate ratify his declaration of war against his own country."

[J]ust because an action is "legal" does not mean that it is also "right"
In similar fashion, moral rectitude ("right") does not also confer legality. And please don't forget that "right/wrong"," moral/immoral", and "legal/illegal" are contraries not contradictories. Some things are amoral or non-moral, non-legal or extra-legal.


Populace-based conflicts are by their very nature illegal
Proof please

No, my examples of operations we do not conduct within our own borders was simply to make the point that we all know that such operations would be both illegal and improper. They are no less improper when we conduct them abroad, only more legal. Such operations create sanctuary, support and recruits for ogainzations such as AQ, even as they take out some small number of current operators. HOW we operate is far more important than how efficiently we operate and how big of a score we put up on our chart of tactical metrics.
I am reminded of a scene from the movie The Battle of Algiers. I do not have the exact quotation at hand, but in the scene, Col Mathieru is briefing other French paras on the mission. He tells them that as much as they might not like to hear it, what they are doing is police work, not war.
Here are some other quotations from the movie that are worth considering.
In the first, a journalist is interviewing a captured FALN leader :

Journalist: M. Ben M'Hidi, don't you think it's a bit cowardly to use women's baskets and handbags to carry explosive devices that kill so many innocent people?
Ben M'Hidi: And doesn't it seem to you even more cowardly to drop napalm bombs on defenseless villages, so that there are a thousand times more innocent victims? Of course, if we had your airplanes it would be a lot easier for us. Give us your bombers, and you can have our baskets.

In the following, Col Mathieu is refering to the previous quotation
And those who explode bombs in public places, do they respect the law perhaps? When you put that question to Ben M'Hidi, remember what he said?
Finally, we have a discussion between two FALN leaders

Ben M'Hidi: Jaffar says you weren't in favor of the strike.
Ali La Pointe: No, I wasn't.
Ben M'Hidi: Why not?
Ali La Pointe: Because we were ordered not to use arms.
Ben M'Hidi: Acts of violence don't win wars. Neither wars nor revolutions. Terrorism is useful as a start. But then, the people themselves must act. That's the rationale behind this strike: to mobilize all Algerians, to assess our strength.

[Bob's World]

Legal populace based conflict is "politics." I don't think we are discussing politics. Illegal politics is "insurgency' (and yes, I realize there are many definitions of insurgency and most like to include "violence" as a required characteristic)

As to waging war against one's own populace, I absolutely agree that governments should not do so, and that therefore revolutionary insurgency is much more a civil emergency than a form of war, and that COIN against a revolutionary insurgency is not warfare.

Yet we label it so.

The government of Afghanistan wages war against its populace, and we assist them in that endeavor.

The government of Syria wages war against its populace and we condem them for that endeavor.

The government of Yemen wages war against its populace and we assist them in that endeavor.

etc, etc, etc. Far too often when a government simply sets out to "enforce the rule of law" they end up waging war against their populace as their approach to COIN. More enlighted governments willl wage war with one hand and hand out goodies with the other hand.

Some may think it a fine nuance to worry about what one calls their activities.

I think COIN is only a domestic operation, and that it is not war. Others (and doctrine) differ.

I think when we help another with their COIN it is FID (and actually doctrine agrees, but we ignore that as "SOF-stuff that doesn't apply to conventional forces). It is important to recognize that our mission is unique from the host nation so that we don't inadvertently start violating the very sovereignty and legitimacy we are attempting to help repair. To often our solution is a major aspect of the problem due to this very effect. It is only just now, after over 11 years that the ISAF Commander is starting to subjugate itself to Afghan sovereignty. That is amazing. We rationalize our actions in the name of tactical efficiency, but it is rationalization all the same.

[Dayuhan]

So, then I am to believe that a country can act more aggressively and in a war-like manner in some other country where it has no sovereign rights than it can within its own borders??

We have the sovereign right to pursue people who attack us or who we know are plotting to attack us. In countries with functioning legal and law enforcement systems that doesn't have to be done in a "war like manner": that's not just in our country, it's in most countries. In the few exceptions where there is no local law, other means are needed. I quite agree that we shouldn't be targeting "nationalist insurgents" in these attacks, but neither am I convinced that we are. I don't think it's an entirely bad thing for nationalist insurgents (or anyone else) to know that if they harbor our enemies they may suffer for that decision.

I have a few issues with your proposition:

First, the connection you propose between AQ and nationalist insurgency is quite tenuous and not supported by hard evidence or detailed reasoning. If you propose a major policy shift based on that proposition, you have to support the proposition a lot more effectively.

Second, there's no clear need to compete with AQ for influence among nationalist insurgents because there's no clear evidence that AQ has much influence with nationalist insurgents. AQ's attempts to generate nationalist insurgency have generally failed: AQ has only gained real support when they fight against a foreign invader. Where nationalist insurgencies in Muslim countries have flourished, as in the Arab Spring, those insurgencies have shown few signs of AQ influence: even where AQ-connected groups have participated, they aren't in control. The Arab Spring rebellions had no special AQ flavor and even where Islamist groups like the Muslim Brothers have played major roles they have tried to steer toward a moderate stance. I see no concrete reason to assume that AQ is an effective or dominant element in any nationalist insurgency anywhere, and I think attempts to push the AQ issue to an insurgency perspective are very questionable.

Third, your policy recommendations are too general to be reasonably discussed. If you would select a few specific regions or nations where you think current policy is wrong, describe what you think is wrong, and offer specific recommendations illustrating your contentions, the argument would be more effective.

I certainly agree that invasion, occupation, regime change and "nation-building" in Iraq and Afghanistan were counterproductive and effectively gave AQ more of what it needs to survive, but I have no clear idea of what you actually and specifically propose to do outside those countries, especially in the core Arab countries. These nations are not our children or our dependencies, we have minimal influence over them, and we certainly aren't enabling them to oppress anyone. It's hard to see how your general propositions apply in any specific sense.

In some ways I think you're a bit stuck in a Cold War paradigm. Possibly the greatest mistake the US made in the Cold War was to allow Communists to seize the moral high ground of opposition to decaying colonial regimes and troglodyte post-colonial dictators. That decision did leave us in the awkward position of supporting and empowering (generally the empowerment was more economic than military) regimes that relied on us against insurgents that were primarily nationalist in character. The times they have a'changed, and I don't think that paradigm is particularly applicable now, at least not in any case I can think of offhand.

[jmm99]

This one is simply not correct - cuz of inclusion of "within":


Certainly, because one cannot wage war within/against one's own country. How odd does this sound? "Today the President of the United States requested that the Senate ratify his declaration of war against his own country."

assigning a notional meaning of "engage in an armed conflict" to "wage war" - since some here apparently see "war" as a much more violent conflict than a "fight".

E.g., the US Civil War (part of much larger sequence of military struggles and political struggles from before the Revoution to the present - a much too huge topic to discuss here).

Regards

Mike

PS: After reviewing the above as posted, a problem still exists if we delete "within" - as amended to basic proposition:


... one cannot wage war against one's own country ...

I'd include MAJ Nadal (whom The Bear and I are discussing) and al-Awlaki as eamples of "ones" who have waged war against their country.

I think this even more limited proposition works:


... a state cannot wage war against itself ...

Yup, I've been lightly skimming the bloody Austrian (he-he).

[Bob's World]

We have the sovereign right to pursue people who attack us or who we know are plotting to attack us. In countries with functioning legal and law enforcement systems that doesn't have to be done in a "war like manner": that's not just in our country, it's in most countries. In the few exceptions where there is no local law, other means are needed. I quite agree that we shouldn't be targeting "nationalist insurgents" in these attacks, but neither am I convinced that we are. I don't think it's an entirely bad thing for nationalist insurgents (or anyone else) to know that if they harbor our enemies they may suffer for that decision.

I have a few issues with your proposition:

First, the connection you propose between AQ and nationalist insurgency is quite tenuous and not supported by hard evidence or detailed reasoning. If you propose a major policy shift based on that proposition, you have to support the proposition a lot more effectively.

Second, there's no clear need to compete with AQ for influence among nationalist insurgents because there's no clear evidence that AQ has much influence with nationalist insurgents. AQ's attempts to generate nationalist insurgency have generally failed: AQ has only gained real support when they fight against a foreign invader. Where nationalist insurgencies in Muslim countries have flourished, as in the Arab Spring, those insurgencies have shown few signs of AQ influence: even where AQ-connected groups have participated, they aren't in control. The Arab Spring rebellions had no special AQ flavor and even where Islamist groups like the Muslim Brothers have played major roles they have tried to steer toward a moderate stance. I see no concrete reason to assume that AQ is an effective or dominant element in any nationalist insurgency anywhere, and I think attempts to push the AQ issue to an insurgency perspective are very questionable.

Third, your policy recommendations are too general to be reasonably discussed. If you would select a few specific regions or nations where you think current policy is wrong, describe what you think is wrong, and offer specific recommendations illustrating your contentions, the argument would be more effective.

I certainly agree that invasion, occupation, regime change and "nation-building" in Iraq and Afghanistan were counterproductive and effectively gave AQ more of what it needs to survive, but I have no clear idea of what you actually and specifically propose to do outside those countries, especially in the core Arab countries. These nations are not our children or our dependencies, we have minimal influence over them, and we certainly aren't enabling them to oppress anyone. It's hard to see how your general propositions apply in any specific sense.

In some ways I think you're a bit stuck in a Cold War paradigm. Possibly the greatest mistake the US made in the Cold War was to allow Communists to seize the moral high ground of opposition to decaying colonial regimes and troglodyte post-colonial dictators. That decision did leave us in the awkward position of supporting and empowering (generally the empowerment was more economic than military) regimes that relied on us against insurgents that were primarily nationalist in character. The times they have a'changed, and I don't think that paradigm is particularly applicable now, at least not in any case I can think of offhand.

Equally, my friend, it is I who believe you are stuck. We look at the same evidence, but from different perspectives, so we see different things.

As to the communists having the moral high ground during the cold war, the hard fact is that all of the larger, more powerful coutries were competing for influence/control over those weaker countries deemed as important to the larger competition between the Soviet-Sino block and the West. No clean hands.

The communists did, however have an advantage in those places where the West was working to sustain systems born of the the very colonialism that nationalist movements were seeking to be free of. These people did not of necessity want to be communists, just like Americans didn't want to be French, and just like most Muslim populaces today don't want to be part of some Islamist Caliphate. But one takes what help one can find, and then worry about the consequences later.

The greater Middle East has been heavily manipulated by the Ottomans, the Europeans and the US for centuries. Now those populaces are largely free of those external systems and at the same time more connected and empowered by modern information technologies than ever before. Those are indisputable facts.

AQ seeks to exploit this situation for their own interests and goals. They do not cause insurgency, but they do seek to leverage the conditions of insurgency that are so prevalent among the people of that region.

The governments cling to how they want to govern, while populaces seek evolution. When denied evolution these things often turn to revolution. It is human nature.

The communists did not cause the insurgencies of the 50s and 60s, but they did seed to exploit that energy to extend their reach and influence. Similar today with AQ. That does not make me stuck in the Cold War. But from what you write, I don't think you understand the Cold War or the current disruptions very well.

These are disruptions rooted in people wanting change, not wars caused by outside forces pushing some controlling ideology. Governments that create and nurture legal means for their people to shape such evolution may well lose the control they have held with in some particular family or segment of the society, but they gain a natural stability that immunizes the people they serve from these external sources of influence and exploitation.

You don't have to agree with that assessment. Your mind is made up. I post it here for other members of the small wars community who are more open minded and appreciate that much of what is captured in Western COIN studies, doctrine, etc is heavily biased. So is what is said by the other sides of these contests. The truth lies somewhere in the middle, and not much is written about that. One must find it for themselves

[davidbfpo]

Like many SWC discussions this thread has meandered and taken some odd diversions, e.g. a character from the Simpsons appears.

Having read Bob's last post and the reading elsewhere about Algeria's 50th anniversary of independence this passage stood out:
much of what is captured in Western COIN studies, doctrine, etc is heavily biased. So is what is said by the other sides of these contests. The truth lies somewhere in the middle, and not much is written about that. One must find it for themselves.

Western COIN studies have until relatively recently been in the context of struggles for national independence, i.e. ending colonial rule and the demise of 'settler' regimes, notably in Southern Africa and in Algeria a mix of the two. I am not sure where the truth lies, somehow I doubt it is in the middle - itself a very Western sentiment, that compromise is all.

The article on Algeria had this:
What these populations aspire to and how they perceive the west is the major issue in international politics because this anger, emblematic of an arc of insecurity from Morocco to Indonesia, will not go away.

Link to a 6.5k word article:http://www.opendemocracy.net/martin-evans/history-of-algeria-in-six-objects

Elsewhere on SWC is a thread on films for COIN, in which 'The Battle of Algiers' features, so maybe readers will want to follow this:
This December ‘Algeria and the Arab Revolutions: Pasts, Presents and Futures’ will contain a series of articles exploring Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1966 film The Battle of Algiers; a film that inspired ant-imperialist struggles across Africa, Asia and Latin America and which, through its honest depiction of terrorism and counter-terrorism, continues to speak to the contemporary world.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/freeform-tags/algeria-and-arab-revolutions-pasts-presents-and-futures

[wm]

This one is simply not correct - cuz of inclusion of "within":

Quote:
Certainly, because one cannot wage war within/against one's own country. How odd does this sound? "Today the President of the United States requested that the Senate ratify his declaration of war against his own country."

[much material removed]

Yup, I've been lightly skimming the bloody Austrian (he-he).

Hoisted by my own petard. :o
Would it help if I specified that the member of the family (of resemblences) that those involved in certain language games map to when they use the word "war" to which I was referring when I used the word "war" is war as "defined" by the requirements for engaging in it found in the US Constitution?
(And that's a mouthful) :wry:

[davidbfpo]

With recent developments in West and East Africa, there are reasons to suspect that the al-Qaida vision, so widely believed to be in retreat, may actually be undergoing a transition to a different entity as part of a larger-scale renaissance. If this is the case, the implications could be considerable....as a potent idea it may be undergoing a transition to a different entity.

Link:http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/middle_east/al_qaida_%E2%80%93_potency_idea

The author is Professor Paul Rogers.

[Dayuhan]

As to the communists having the moral high ground during the cold war, the hard fact is that all of the larger, more powerful coutries were competing for influence/control over those weaker countries deemed as important to the larger competition between the Soviet-Sino block and the West. No clean hands.

Of course everybody was competing for influence, and of course nobody had clean hands. The communists simply read the direction of events earlier and more pragmatically, and were openly building bridges with nationalist and anti-colonial movements well before WW2. That left the Eurocentric US responding to their move and occupying the ground of defending colonial regimes and post-colonial dictators, a morally indefensible position for the self-styled land of the free. I didn't say the Communists were more moral, I said they recognized the more morally and historically defensible position earlier and moved to fill it, and the US played into their hands by trying to stand against the obvious tide of history. From this they gained a meaningful propaganda advantage in the developing world, and the US gained a long succession of liabilities that still hang over us.


The communists did, however have an advantage in those places where the West was working to sustain systems born of the the very colonialism that nationalist movements were seeking to be free of. These people did not of necessity want to be communists, just like Americans didn't want to be French, and just like most Muslim populaces today don't want to be part of some Islamist Caliphate. But one takes what help one can find, and then worry about the consequences later.

The difference, of course, is that while the populaces in the countries involved may not have considered themselves "communist", many of the insurgent movements the Communists supported actually did identify themselves as Communist and were actually led by declared Communists. Those that won often did set up recognizably Communist governments. I can't think of a single indigenous insurgency (one not primarily directed at an occupying foreign power) in the Muslim world that openly declares itself a part of AQ or is led by AQ members. The victorious insurgencies of the Arab Spring show no signs of significant AQ influence. I see no evidence at all to suggest that indigenous insurgencies in the Muslim world have been successfully leveraged by AQ.


The greater Middle East has been heavily manipulated by the Ottomans, the Europeans and the US for centuries. Now those populaces are largely free of those external systems and at the same time more connected and empowered by modern information technologies than ever before. Those are indisputable facts.

AQ seeks to exploit this situation for their own interests and goals. They do not cause insurgency, but they do seek to leverage the conditions of insurgency that are so prevalent among the people of that region.

You keep repeating this, like a mantra, as if repetition were a supporting argument. It's not.

Yes, AQ seeks to leverage conditions of insurgency. My point is that this effort has generally failed. What AQ has successfully leveraged is a broad resentment in the Muslim world toward perceived aggression and injustice on the part of the West generically, and specific anger at specific occupations of Muslim territory. That narrative has worked for them. Their efforts to generate or hijack indigenous insurgencies have been resounding failures.


The governments cling to how they want to govern, while populaces seek evolution. When denied evolution these things often turn to revolution. It is human nature.

Yes, but you're not demonstrating any connection between this phenomenon and AQ. Again, it's not enough to say it is so. You have to support that claim with evidence and reasoning.


The communists did not cause the insurgencies of the 50s and 60s, but they did seed to exploit that energy to extend their reach and influence. Similar today with AQ. That does not make me stuck in the Cold War. But from what you write, I don't think you understand the Cold War or the current disruptions very well.

I don't think you're reading what I'm writing. I never said communists or communism caused those insurgencies, I said they recognized those insurgent situations early and moved effectively to exploit them. They were in many cases quite successful. AQ has not had similar success. Anyone here can name a long list of Cold War insurgencies that openly identified themselves as Communist. Can you name even one indigenous insurgency (again, one directed at a local government, not a foreign occupier) that openly identifies with AQ or where AQ has significant influence?


These are disruptions rooted in people wanting change, not wars caused by outside forces pushing some controlling ideology. Governments that create and nurture legal means for their people to shape such evolution may well lose the control they have held with in some particular family or segment of the society, but they gain a natural stability that immunizes the people they serve from these external sources of influence and exploitation.

The claim that AQ and its supporters seek primarily to alter relationships between Muslim governments and those they govern, rather than relationships between the Muslim ummah and the world around it, is another mantra. Again, this can't just be stated, it has to be supported with evidence and reasoning.


You don't have to agree with that assessment. Your mind is made up. I post it here for other members of the small wars community who are more open minded and appreciate that much of what is captured in Western COIN studies, doctrine, etc is heavily biased.

I think your mind is also made up, and I post for the same reason.

I agree that much of what is enshrined in COIN doctrine is heavily biased and based on invalid assumptions, but I don't see any reason why COIN doctrine has to be part of the fight against AQ. Other than the ones we've created by occupation and "nation-building", there's not an insurgency on the planet that requires more than a small FID presence from us. We don't need to "do COIN", if we stop creating insurgencies we won't have to fight them on any significant scale. If we stop giving our enemy what they thrive on - occupations of Muslim lands - they'll be forced to fall back on trying to exploit indigenous insurgencies, a position that has not succeeded for them and is not likely to.

Again, your position would be more credible and comprehensible if you would identify specific policies toward specific countries (ideally other than Iraq and Afghanistan, where we all know we %$#@ed uo) that you think have failed, and suggest specific policies that you think would improve matters. That's particularly relevant in the Arad heartland: what specifically would you have us do with regard to, say, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States?

[Bob's World]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
The greater Middle East has been heavily manipulated by the Ottomans, the Europeans and the US for centuries. Now those populaces are largely free of those external systems and at the same time more connected and empowered by modern information technologies than ever before. Those are indisputable facts.

AQ seeks to exploit this situation for their own interests and goals. They do not cause insurgency, but they do seek to leverage the conditions of insurgency that are so prevalent among the people of that region.


Dayuhan's response:
You keep repeating this, like a mantra, as if repetition were a supporting argument. It's not.

Actually it is true. If I come across as a mantra it is only because I bother to respond to your mantra claiiming my position to be false.

I've never claimed AQ was successful in taking charge of or leading an insurgency anywhere. Most don't want what they are selling. But that does not mean they are not selling it, nor that their primary source of "energy" (funding, sanctuary, recruits, etc) does not come form these many latent and active insurgent populaces. They are, and it does.

If your point is yes, but they are failing in taking over these insurgencies and that the whole "Caliphate" paranoia in the West is much more an over reaction to AQ propaganda than anything we really need to worry about, then with that I can totally agree.


You keep arguing against a point I have never tried to make.

[Bob's World]

That's particularly relevant in the Arab heartland: what specifically would you have us do with regard to, say, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States?

Dare I address this yet again, only to be accused of reciting a mantra? :-)

Look, the "tactics" of what precisely needs to be done in any particular place is always going to be unique, and must be shaped to the specifics of the problems, cultures, types of governance, nature of grievances, types of active revolutionary and pre-revolutionary organizations, any outside state or non-state UW or FID actors, etc. Oh, and then of course shaped by what, if any, national interests we might have in that place or the issues taking place there.

Good tactics must be based in the details of how things/people are different. Good strategy, however, must be based in a good understanding of how things are the same. My focus is on strategy, as that is, IMO, where our problems lie.

To apply an indirect fire or navigation comparison: An error is tactics is like a location error, a 10M mistake at the start equates to equal 10M errors regardless of range; but an azimuth error of a single degree is a 17.7 Meter error at a 1,000 meters and continues to grow by that same amount every 1000M farther out one goes.

We have made tactical errors throughout our response to 9/11, that happens and they are easily addressed and recovered from. But we have made azimuth errors in our strategic framing that send us farther and farther from where we want to be every day we continue to pursue them. But with these three countries you name, a similar strategic understanding and framework applies:

1. All have high conditions of insurgency (that are unique in how they manifest and how active they are etc).

2. All are primarily Muslim.

3. All have systems of governance that are, or have been until recently, highly reliant upon their relationships with powerful external partners

4. All have been "targeted" by AQ as sources of funding, sanctuary, recruits, etc

5. All are tied to long-stated US national interests as either a producer of, or controlling a crucial LOC for movement of vital energy resources.

6. All were under Ottoman and European control prior to the Cold War, and all were locations the US/West worked diligently to maintain or gain the role of primary security ally (rather than the Soviets) throughout the Cold War; and then worked to sustain those relationships through the comfortable certainty of sustaining particular people, families.systems of governance in place post-Cold War.

7. US will continue to have interests in these places for the foreseeable future.

8. The populaces of these places are, I suspect, much more comfortable with their own values and concepts of what proper governance is than they are with the US brand version of those things our NSS directs that we should promote.

9. The status quo is increasingly unsustainable at acceptable costs (though the Saudis and the Gulf States are pouring in increasing amounts of bribes, security, etc as their fear of revolution grows).

10. As Morsi is finding out, the people do not want to trade one dictator for another. These populaces have evolving expectations of governance that are more liberal than what they have had, but not nearly so liberal as what we promote. Grabs of excessive powers by new governments will be resisted (regardless of the ideology of the new government) just as clinging to excessive powers is resisted now.

11. Everyone is better served by evolution of governance far more than they are by revolution of governance or simple suppression of the problem, either one. The tendency in governance, however, is to resist change until change is forced.

So:

The US has an opportunity to be a agent for peaceful, evolutionary change on the terms of the people, cultures and governments actually involved. But so far we have demanded to cast this on our terms in our context. Step one is to abandon our context and embrace theirs. This is there problem, it must be their solution.

1. We need to mediate or facilitate mediation in as neutral a way as possible.

2. We need to set redlines for both governments and populace groups in terms of violence, and other activities counter-productive to the process.

3. We need to encourage populaces to embrace non-violent tactics for their insurgent movements, and then deter governments from applying excessive violence against such activities.

4. We need to use our full DIME(but light on the M) to get these governments to hold true, substantive talks with their many diverse populace groups.

5. We need to stop conducting CT operations against elements of these revolutionary populace groups simply because they are talking to AQ. We need to incentivise them to work in the context of our concept for supporting evolution, rather than in the AQ context of supporting revolution. So long as we support status quo or Western values AQ will win this competition for influence.

There are, I believe 5 broad, fundamental perception of governance that we should use as our guideposts. All of these are as perceived by the actual populaces we are working with in the context of their unique cultures and situations. What we perceive is moot.
1. They need to feel that governance is acting in a manner consistent with evolving perceptions. As example, there is significant voice in Saudi Arabia that they would like a judicial system not totally under the King's control. That is the type of issue that needs to be on the table. We don't need the al Saud family run out of town, but we do need them to listen (they need to listen even more than we need them to. We can always work with whomever runs them off, but if we allow that we will need to compete with the Chinese, Russia, various European, etc for what we have there now, and we should avoid that if possible).

2. The people need to recognize the right of their government to govern them. If current regimes have tarnished legitimacy, they need to work to repair that. This will most likely mean they will need to relinquish some of their near total power. But better to be forced at the negotiation table (yes, I realize Kings don't negotiate, they prefer to be beheaded) to transition to a parliamentary monarchy than to lose the whole thing attempting to cling to what is no longer sustainable. They need to sort this out for themselves. The UN cannot 'grant' or bestow legitimacy, it must be earned.

3. They must fine-tune law enforcement approaches and policies to be perceived as more just. A lot of work for all of these countries on this one. Just stepping back for attempting to force the status quo of governance will help. if the government is not dedicated to the suppression of popular opposition, they do not have to be nearly as heavy handed in their law enforcement.

4. Respect and dignity. The Shia in the gulf, Christians in Egypt, etc all must perceive that they have equal treatment and opportunity under the law as other similarly situated segments of the populace (this all applies in Israel-Palestine as well, by the way).

5. And lastly is some system of official empowerment. These governments must find what works for them (as assessed by their people) to ensure that within the context of their culture they have systems in place for the shaping of governance that are perceived by the people as being trusted, certain and legal.

If we can convince these governments to do this; if we can accept the risk associated with the uncertainty of change; if we can step back from pushing our own ideology or fearing the ideology of others; if we can come to the realization that we have our over characterization and response to "terrorism" must be toned way back, then we can do this.

There are a lot of "ifs" that good tactical approaches tailored for each place will need to address. But all of those tactics must be in synch an over-arching strategy similar to what I lay out here. To date we set tactical metrics, and then get so focused on putting up big tactical numbers that we lose sight of what we are actually trying to do. Time to put good strategy in the lead, and let intel and tactics follow. My opinion.

[Dayuhan]

I've never claimed AQ was successful in taking charge of or leading an insurgency anywhere. Most don't want what they are selling. But that does not mean they are not selling it, nor that their primary source of "energy" (funding, sanctuary, recruits, etc) does not come form these many latent and active insurgent populaces. They are, and it does.

The claim that AQ's "primary source of energy" is "these many latent and active insurgent populaces" remains unsupported by evidence or reasoning. It's just a claim. It's also a questionable claim, because we an easily observe that AQ is most effective when they exploit the wides[read anger at western influence in general and "infidel" occupation of Muslim lands specifically. If the primary source of energy was an insurgency dynamic, you would expect AQ to be most effective when hey are trying to rally support against Muslim governments. This is not what we actually see, and that needs to be explained. The explanation has to be specific and not dependent on broad correlations. Observing that bad governance (by our standards) is common in countries where AQ draws support is not sufficient cause to deduce that bad governance causes support for AQ, because many other factors are also present in those environments.

You earlier claimed that foreign fighters travel to fight in order to change conditions in their home countries. I pointed tout that this claim is incompatible with 3 consistent observations about the foreign fighter phenomenon. I've seen no reply. Ignoring inconvenient inconsistencies does not advance your argument.


If your point is yes, but they are failing in taking over these insurgencies and that the whole "Caliphate" paranoia in the West is much more an over reaction to AQ propaganda than anything we really need to worry about, then with that I can totally agree.

I don't think there is any "Caliphate paranoia" in the West, except among professional paranoiacs who are afraid of everything. It's pretty obvious that the Caliphate is a fantasy. There is some not unreasonable concern that those who pursue that fantasy want to kill us in the process: not concern that they'll succeed in creating a caliphate, but concern over their habit of trying to kill us.

Of course many of the responses have been poorly calculated, ineffective, and counterproductive. Not all of these have been "threat-centric". The idea that we can "drain the swamp in the Middle East" or that we can disable AQ by restructuring patterns of governance in Arab Countries is not threat-centric, but it is beyond our capacity and it is the kind of hubris that leads us to places like the one we're in now.

[ganulv]

I don't think there is any "Caliphate paranoia" in the West, except among professional paranoiacs who are afraid of everything.

Well… (http://www.npr.org/2011/03/11/134458058/States-Move-To-Ban-Islamic-Sharia-Law)


http://www.motherjones.com/files/images/banned_sharia_map_web.jpg (http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/02/has-your-state-banned-sharia-map)

[Dayuhan]

Dare I address this yet again, only to be accused of reciting a mantra? :-)

No, this is not a mantra... mantras are the short ones, like "insurgency is the source of AQ's energy" and "foreign fighters travel to fight in order to change governance in their home countries". Finally we get a bit specific, a good thing.


Look, the "tactics" of what precisely needs to be done in any particular place is always going to be unique, and must be shaped to the specifics of the problems, cultures, types of governance, nature of grievances, types of active revolutionary and pre-revolutionary organizations, any outside state or non-state UW or FID actors, etc. Oh, and then of course shaped by what, if any, national interests we might have in that place or the issues taking place there.

I was looking more for policies than tactics but this will suffice.


But with these three countries you name, a similar strategic understanding and framework applies:

With much of this I agree; no response to those is necessary. There are some sticking points.


1. All have high conditions of insurgency (that are unique in how they manifest and how active they are etc).

As I've said before, I think you're using a non-standard definition of "insurgency" here, which makes discussion confusing. I'd agree that there's widespread discontent with governance in these areas; whether or not that has reached a point where it can be called "insurgency", as the term is generally understood, is debatable. If you're going to use non-standard definitions of terms it's good to explain your definition before using it. Discussion gets complicated when people ascribe different meanings to the same words.


3. All have systems of governance that are, or have been until recently, highly reliant upon their relationships with powerful external partners

Major red flag on this one. Looking at Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States, I don't see one case in which you could realistically claim systems of governance that "are, or have been until recently, highly reliant upon their relationships with powerful external partners". Reliant for external defense, possibly, but not for control of the populace and certainly not for economic sustenance. One of the consistent weaknesses of your argument is that you consistently and drastically overrate the reliance of other governments on us, and therefore the degree of influence that we can bring to bear on their behaviour. Assuming influence that you haven't actually got is dangerous.


6. All were under Ottoman and European control prior to the Cold War, and all were locations the US/West worked diligently to maintain or gain the role of primary security ally (rather than the Soviets) throughout the Cold War; and then worked to sustain those relationships through the comfortable certainty of sustaining particular people, families.systems of governance in place post-Cold War.

Again, you overrate the degree to which these governments were "sustained" by outside influence.


9. The status quo is increasingly unsustainable at acceptable costs (though the Saudis and the Gulf States are pouring in increasing amounts of bribes, security, etc as their fear of revolution grows).

I think "increasingly unsustainable" is simplistic and inaccurate. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are arguably more stable today than they were in the 90s. Not that they've solved the problems, but domestic investment, decreased unemployment, etc have bought a substantial reprieve.


So:

Now we get to the sticky bits...


The US has an opportunity to be a agent for peaceful, evolutionary change on the terms of the people, cultures and governments actually involved. But so far we have demanded to cast this on our terms in our context. Step one is to abandon our context and embrace theirs. This is there problem, it must be their solution.

You assume that "they" have a consistent context, that we know what it is, and that we have a part to play in the changes. I'm not sure any of these assumptions are sustainable.



1. We need to mediate or facilitate mediation in as neutral a way as possible.

2. We need to set redlines for both governments and populace groups in terms of violence, and other activities counter-productive to the process.

3. We need to encourage populaces to embrace non-violent tactics for their insurgent movements, and then deter governments from applying excessive violence against such activities.

4. We need to use our full DIME(but light on the M) to get these governments to hold true, substantive talks with their many diverse populace groups.


This, frankly, fills me with horror, and I can imagine no worse course of action. What right or standing have we to mediate in these disagreements? re we being asked to mediate, or to impose red lines, or to "use our full DIME" by any of the actors in these environments? Very simply put: no, we are not. The governments don't want us involved, the populaces don't want us involved, our own populace doesn't want us involved. Any attempt by us to impose ourselves as "mediator" is going to offend everyone involved and be perceived by all concerned (including most Americans) as a Trojan horse ruse aimed at building our own influence and taking control. This directly supports AQs narrative of western interference and subversion.

We are not trusted or wanted in these places, and any attempt to impose ourselves in these internal consequences is likely to blow up in our faces. Even where we've played a part in creating problems through meddlings past, bad meddling can't be corrected by more meddling. It has to be corrected by less meddling: unless there's a specific request from groups with a realistic claim to represent the populace or a significant portion thereof, we need to stay out of the internal affairs of these countries. Even where such a request exists, it's best managed mutilaterally.

Look at what happened in Bahrain. We came in advising accommodation, negotiation, and reform. We were promptly ignored, and achieved nothing beyond underscoring our own impotence.

Effectively what you're proposing here is that these governments need to be "fixed" and that we have a central role to play in making the fixing happen. That's scary.


5. We need to stop conducting CT operations against elements of these revolutionary populace groups simply because they are talking to AQ. We need to incentivise them to work in the context of our concept for supporting evolution, rather than in the AQ context of supporting revolution.

Are we "conducting CT operations against elements of these revolutionary populace groups" in any of the countries under discussion?


There are a lot of "ifs" that good tactical approaches tailored for each place will need to address. But all of those tactics must be in synch an over-arching strategy similar to what I lay out here. To date we set tactical metrics, and then get so focused on putting up big tactical numbers that we lose sight of what we are actually trying to do. Time to put good strategy in the lead, and let intel and tactics follow. My opinion.

The overarching strategy you describe seems based on the assumption that the governments in question are reliant on us and must do what we want them to do, and that the populaces concerned want us to step in and interfere in the domestic affairs of their nations. These seem to me like unsupported, exaggerated, and very dangerous assumptions, and I don't see how you can build "good strategy" on faulty assumptions.

[Bob's World]

Look, I stand by both my assessment and my recommendation.

Would love to hear yours.

We can ignore these conditions; we can attack the symptoms; or we can address the causes.

I believe we need to largely ignore where our interests are small; we need to attack symptoms only to the degree necessary to mitigate the dangers, and always subjugated to: our efforts to work with governments to address causes in those places where our interests are high.

Not nation building. That is an even bigger, more flawed concept than excessive CT. You cannot develop a country to stability, nor is effective government as measured by Western standards in any way a cure for instability.

As to using a non-standard definition for insurgency, what choice do I have? The doctrinal definition that demands that there be active, organized violence in order to be an insurgency is so narrowly symptomatic. It is no wonder we always attack symptoms and call it success when those overt symptoms die down. After all, at that point is no longer "insurgency" under the accepted definition. I merely recognize that the narrow case in the doctrinal definition is an apex condition of a much broader dynamic. We get to better understanding and smarter approaches when we open our aperture and our minds to better consider where these things come from and how to best prevent or cure the same.

My definition requires governments to own their role in causation. Governments prefer to blame anything else. Be it some ideology, some malign actor, some foreign government waging COIN poorly in your country, the economy, drought, unemployment, etc. Anything but owning their own key role. This is why we "counterinsurgency" rather than "counterpoorgovernance." We counter the symptom rather than the problem. Most often we actually make it a major goal to actively protect and preserve the problem as is. I find that odd, but I realize most don't think much about that at all. They just apply the doctrinal definition and approaches and merrily attack the symptoms.

[Dayuhan]

Look, I stand by both my assessment and my recommendation.

Seems to me that if you're going to put a proposal on the table you should be willing to defend it against reasonable criticism. Repetition is not defense.


Would love to hear yours.

I gave them a while back, I will try to resuscitate them. Not sure if it was on this thread, there are many on the same or similar subjects. Wasn't that long ago.

(edit: general outline here: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=142520&postcount=2)


We can ignore these conditions; we can attack the symptoms; or we can address the causes.

It's difficult to address causes that are rooted in history; we haven't got a time machine. There's always the temptation to look at the legacy of past meddling, decide that meddling was a mistake, and try to correct it with more meddling. That won't work: the cure for bad meddling isn't good meddling, it's less meddling. We cannot address causes by forcing our way unwanted and uninvited into the government/populace dynamic in other countries: all that's going to do is get all sides pissed off at us. Sometimes there's a place for multilateral mediation, if it's requested by all parties to the dispute being mediated, or intervention, in rare and extreme cases where it's requested by someone with a credible claim to speak for the populace or a substantial part thereof. Trying to push into these matters unilaterally and on our own initiation seems to me a very dangerous idea.


I believe we need to largely ignore where our interests are small; we need to attack symptoms only to the degree necessary to mitigate the dangers, and always subjugated to: our efforts to work with governments to address causes in those places where our interests are high.

We can only work with governments where they choose to work with us, and we generally can't force them to do that.


Not nation building. That is an even bigger, more flawed concept than excessive CT. You cannot develop a country to stability, nor is effective government as measured by Western standards in any way a cure for instability.

Agreed. Not can you simply command reform or force a change in the relationship between government and populace, especially in nations where your influence is very limited.


As to using a non-standard definition for insurgency, what choice do I have? The doctrinal definition that demands that there be active, organized violence in order to be an insurgency is so narrowly symptomatic. It is no wonder we always attack symptoms and call it success when those overt symptoms die down. After all, at that point is no longer "insurgency" under the accepted definition. I merely recognize that the narrow case in the doctrinal definition is an apex condition of a much broader dynamic. We get to better understanding and smarter approaches when we open our aperture and our minds to better consider where these things come from and how to best prevent or cure the same.

You can refer to high levels of domestic dissent, or tension between government and populace or portions thereof, or a pre-insurgency condition, or conditions conducive to insurgency. Tension between nations precedes war and can cause war, but it isn't war. The conditions that precede and cause insurgency are closely linked to insurgency, but they are not insurgency. Better to come up with a new word for it than to use a standard word with a non-standard definition that just creates confusion.


My definition requires governments to own their role in causation.

Unfortunately your prescription requires us to compel or persuade other governments to own their own role in causation. That means interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and foreign interference in Muslim countries is what AQ thrives on.



Governments prefer to blame anything else. Be it some ideology, some malign actor, some foreign government waging COIN poorly in your country, the economy, drought, unemployment, etc. Anything but owning their own key role. This is why we "counterinsurgency" rather than "counterpoorgovernance."

If we try to counter what we consider to be "poor governance" in another country, we will inevitably end up using our own metrics to determine what "poor governance" and "good governance" are, which you yourself say is a bad idea. What other metrics do we have, though? Easy to say "those of the people", but we often don't know what those are, and different segments of the people often have very different metrics, often thoroughly incompatible ones. Messing in some other nation's governance is a business we don't need to be in and generally shouldn't be in, IMO.


Most often we actually make it a major goal to actively protect and preserve the problem as is. I find that odd, but I realize most don't think much about that at all. They just apply the doctrinal definition and approaches and merrily attack the symptoms.

Where exactly do we "make it a major goal to actively protect and preserve the problem as is"? Did we "protect and preserve" the status quo in any of the Arab Spring rebellions? If not there, then where? An allegation like that needs to be specific.

[Bob's World]

Where exactly do we "make it a major goal to actively protect and preserve the problem as is"? Did we "protect and preserve" the status quo in any of the Arab Spring rebellions? If not there, then where? An allegation like that needs to be specific.

Why limit ourselves to the Arab Spring countries?

We did this in Vietnam.
We do this in Yemen, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines and Isarel in varying degrees currently.

We agree to disagree on our understanding of this dynamic. I personally am fine with that. I find your interpretations of a very subjective field of human endeavor to be cripplingly literal. One need not agree with another's position to understand that positon. At times I feel that the only positions you can understand are the ones you agree with. I'm not sure what to do with that.

[Dayuhan]

Why limit ourselves to the Arab Spring countries?

Trying to stay reasonably current, and within geographic context.


We did this in Vietnam.

Yes we did, and in many other places during the Cold War. That's past, and cannot be changed.


We do this in Yemen, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines and Isarel in varying degrees currently.

Yemen, perhaps to some extent. We didn't make any particular effort to preserve Saleh, in fact I think there was a fair bit of machination aimed at getting him out. I'm not sure in any event that it's reasonable to talk about "insurgency" in Yemen, it's more a chaos of clan, ethnic and sectarian conflict. Certainly there's no coherent insurgent movement representing a coherent set of popular demands. Any party, external or internal, trying to mediate in Yemen is in for one massive headache.

In Afghanistan I tend to agree, but that's an inevitable consequence of regime change and nation-building, a strategy I've disagreed with from the start. We were always going to be to some extent invested in whatever we installed there, and we were never going to install a structurally viable government. That meant we painted ourselves into a corner where no matter what we did we'd be supporting and sustaining a dysfunctional government, because we were bound to be invested in a government we produced and the political culture has not re-evolved (since the devolution of the civil war) to a point where it can sustain functional governance.

I don't think we've been trying all hat hard to "preserve and protect the status quo" in the Southern Philippines. Our entry was largely intended to disrupt the status quo of a bandit-cum-terror group operating more or less freely under a government that could have suppressed it, but didn't because too much money was being made from it. There's been quite continuous pressure to alter the status quo... that pressure has often been based on what I feel is a mistaken assessment of the status quo, and I'm not sure where it will lead, but it has been there.

In Saudi Arabia our position on the status quo is of course quite irrelevant. We couldn't change it if we wanted to, and the government doesn't need our help to sustain it. There's nothing we can say or do that's going to change the way the Saudi government relates to its populace, and trying to push our way into that equation (where nobody, including the populace, wants us involved) is going to be counterproductive at best.


We agree to disagree on our understanding of this dynamic. I personally am fine with that. I find your interpretations of a very subjective field of human endeavor to be cripplingly literal. One need not agree with another's position to understand that positon. At times I feel that the only positions you can understand are the ones you agree with. I'm not sure what to do with that.

How can anyone understand your position if you won't explain it? You declare that it is so, if challenged you repeat that it is so, and if challenged again you say those doing the challenging just don't get it and are some how blind or deluded. I don't think the questions I've asked are all that unreasonable or that undeserving of answers.

If we come over the horizon telling the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or the Gulf States that we're going to work with them to resolve their differences with their populaces, how can we reasonably expect any answer other than "piss off"? hat do we do when we get that very predictable answer?

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan


It's difficult to address causes that are rooted in history; we haven't got a time machine. There's always the temptation to look at the legacy of past meddling, decide that meddling was a mistake, and try to correct it with more meddling.

This is perhaps the most insightful comment I have seen in weeks in the SWJ Council. We too often fool ourselves into thinking "we" can address underlying issues, and in the process of doing so waste billions of dollars and spill way too much blood. In the end the underlying causes remain. We need to return a strategy based on common sense, not one based on false hope.