PDA

View Full Version : Kashmir: a simmering, sometimes brutal small war



SWJED
03-04-2006, 06:05 PM
4 March New York Times commentary - Lessons From Another Insurgency (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/04/opinion/04Mukherjee.html) by Anit Mukherjee.


... "I joined the insurgents only because of you," the young Kashmiri man told me, sobbing, "because of the way you humiliated me, they way you tormented me. To regain my honor, I picked up the gun." It was one of my more shocking encounters during my two and a half years of counterinsurgency duties as an Indian Army officer in Kashmir. Shocking, because it was the antithesis of everything I had worked toward. The self-awareness that inevitably dawns on all soldiers in a combat zone came upon me: I was not a part of the solution; I was the problem, or at least part of the problem....

During the first year of my counterinsurgency duties, I believe I created more insurgents than I, for want of a better word, eliminated. This was not only because of inexperience, but also because I lacked fundamental knowledge of the terrain, the people, the culture. I also didn't know how to sift through local intelligence effectively...

As a result, I mostly drew on tips and informants who, with hindsight, were mostly unreliable. The motives for giving me this information were usually property and land disputes, family feuds, tribal and ethnic conflicts and other causes unrelated to the insurgency. Thus, a combination of my own naïveté and enthusiasm, not to mention pressure from senior commanders to deliver results, resulted in actions that alienated the locals and, inadvertently, helped the insurgency.

It was only after a year of combat operations that I was able to build up my own intelligence network and gained the experience to be effective. Although conventional wisdom says that the tours of duty should be short, in my experience militaries fighting insurgencies should instead keep junior officers in the field for as long as they can. Successful counterinsurgency campaigns have usually been small-team operations led by junior officers with intimate knowledge of their areas of responsibility...

As the insurgents in Kashmir lacked the ability to mount conventional attacks, their weapon of choice was the improvised explosive device. Eventually, we largely neutralized this threat by constantly changing our tactics. By being unpredictable and undertaking intensive offensive operations, admittedly a function of abundant manpower, we seized the initiative and became the hunter rather than the hunted.

One of the few, and rarely noticed, successes of Indian security agencies has been their ability to subvert an insurgency. For example, in Kashmir, Indian intelligence services were able to buy out an entire strand of insurgents in the mid-1990's and create local counterinsurgents called Ikhwanis. For a time, they were extremely effective, and were able to wipe out the local insurgency before the foreign-born jihadis poured into the valley. By the time we deployed in the valley in 1999, the Ikhwanis themselves had become corrupted and were being phased out. But that experience taught us how critical it was to co-opt the locals into our counterinsurgency strategy...

davidbfpo
05-31-2012, 08:28 PM
This insurgency has faded from the limelight for a long time, partly as Pakistan has restricted militants crossing the LoC into India-occupied Kashmir for years and Jihadists have focussed on Afghanistan.

Anecdote here (UK) indicates suggests dwindling support for the campaign, reflected in monies raised and Jihadists who seek to fight go elsewhere.

So it is with interest I read this BBC Urdu report, which opens with:
Twenty years after they took up arms to fight Indian rule in the Kashmir valley, hundreds of local insurgents are now returning to their homes after renouncing militancy. The reasons are diminishing support from the Pakistani government, a realisation that the "Kashmir jihad" is going nowhere and a promise of amnesty by the Indian government.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18270058

Astute move by the Indian state to accept the returning militants and families. Be interesting to see how LeT and other, more militant groups change their rhetoric within Pakistan as this struggle was the original catalyst for their emergence.

Ray
06-01-2012, 04:05 AM
600 apply for Jammu and Kashmir’s terrorist amnesty plan

“My government has provided a legal mechanism for those who have crossed over to other side of the LoC during militancy and want to return and live a normal life. Some 600 applications have been received so far which are being scrutinised”, the chief minister said.

Under the policy approved by the cabinet on November 22, the government has decided to facilitate the return of former militants who belong to J&K and had crossed over the PoK or Pakistan for training in insurgency but now have given up arms.

Only those militants who crossed over to PoK and Pakistan between January 1 1989 and December 31 2009 and their dependents will be eligible for this scheme. They or their parents can apply online also. Also, the returnee shall not be entitled to any of the special benefits or privileges available in the existing surrender/rehabilitation policy.

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_600-apply-for-jammu-and-kashmirs-terrorist-amnesty-plan_1514771

omarali50
06-01-2012, 01:28 PM
David, it seems to me (and of course, I am not privy to any inside info in these matters) that the hardcore paknationalist faction within the Pakistani state (and ultimately LET, or at least its leadership, will do what it is told by this faction) is still waiting for the US to leave so that things can "get back to normal". Of course, things will never really get back to where they were, but the dream is not yet dead. Individual Kashmiri origin militants may get tired and wish to go home, but:
1. The Paknationalist-Jihadist complex hopes to fight another day.
2. "Home" is also India, not exactly the most capable state in the world. There is likely to be enough mismanagement, corruption and incompetence in the program to keep the flickering flame of insurgency alive. I am not saying the program won't work at all. Things are slowly getting better in Kashmir and will probably get better even if there is a Paknationalist attempt to turn back the clock...but I am just guessing that the "good news" will likely be tempered by some rather un-German efficiency at the Indian end. (I am personally hoping that I turn out to be wrong..if that makes any sense...I think most Indians, Pakistanis and particularly Kashmiris will be better off if this whole liberation jihad is put to bed)
Something like that.

davidbfpo
08-08-2012, 10:56 AM
A long BBC News report from Kashmir, which is full of gems on a conflict de-escalating, due to state and non-state action or attitudes:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19168219


These displaced Kashmiris - who number more than 36,000 in all, according to officials in Pakistani-administered Kashmir - find themselves increasingly alienated as Pakistan mends fences with India, and the insurgency winds down to a mere shadow of what it once was....

On the Pakistani side, communities along the LoC who had virtually lived in bunkers for 16 years rose up in protest against any hint of militant activity that might endanger the ceasefire. These protests forced local authorities to relocate militants to areas away from the border region.

These [Pakistani] groups cannot keep the insurgency going, because they cannot operate without local support..

davidbfpo
09-07-2012, 10:15 PM
A book review on a country that rarely gets much attention today, the book being 'The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir' by Christopher Snedden. Only Pakistan recognises Azad Kashmir is an independent country IIRC.

Link:http://tahirabbas101.wordpress.com/2012/09/07/review-untold-story-of-the-people-of-azad-kashmir/


The book is likely to be a tremendous value to historians of the region as well as sociologists and political scientists exploring the important developments in Azad Kashmir from the time of partition to the present.

Gurkha
09-08-2012, 01:45 PM
We had their parents begging us, trying to bribe the police and trying every political contact they knew to permit their children back. One of the most important reasons why they are coming back is the collapsing economy in Pakistan and the prosperity in India. Jammu & Kashmir had one of the lowest levels of poverty in India, even at the heights of insurgency. The militants who went to POK, are known as "Muhajirs" ( refugees from India ) and found it difficult to survive on the pittance paid by the ISI which gradually reduced. One of the other important reasons why the insurgency never really succeeded military is the extremely (even I say so myself ) successful light infantry campaign conducted by the Indian Army : no drones, no air support, no artillery( notwithstanding whatever tales you've heard), restrictive Rules of Engagements but the fight was always in the mountains.... the insurgents were relentlessly hunted worn down and eliminated. Own casualties... yes... but in comparison to the Iraq & Afghanistan campaigns.. low. I remember in the 90s the villagers used to tell us that the Afghans & Arabs used to boast to the : " We've driven out the Russians what will these vegetarian, puny, Hindus be able to do , we will massacre them !!" But though they fought the good fight, especially the Afghans, eventually they were eliminated or went back after their "posting". I also think that the very real threat of Human Rights prosecution forced us to conduct a more restricted military campaign which has contributed to this strategic victory. As platoon & company commanders we chafed at it, but in hindsight I think that was one of the best things that happened. When I read about nightime raids and the way the US forces operated in Iraq & Afghanistan I feel that cultural alienation plays a major part in generation of hatred & the accompanying military failure. If one does nightime raids in a culture where women are hidden in Burqas..... what do you expect ? Did I ramble on a bit.... ?!

Bill Moore
09-08-2012, 04:46 PM
Gurkha,

I don't doubt what you're writting, but I can't help but think as I look at the statistics showing reduced violence in Kashmir since 2001 that it has something to do with the conflict in Afghanistan, and that after ISAF withdraws and the issue in Afghanistan is resolved one way or the other that violence will once again increase in Kashmir.

Tell me where I'm wrong.

The conflict in Kashmir is as much a state versus state (Pakistan and India) conflict as an internal conflict, so even if the average Kashmiri isn't excited about fighting for the reasons you listed, it seems probable that Pakistan will continue to send foreign fighters into Kashmir to stir up trouble even if they can't mobilize the population. Currently Pakistan is too busy with Afghanistan and dedicating their resources there to help the insurgents in Afghanistan.

It may not be an insurgency, but it will likely continue to be a fight against foreign militias until the issue is resolved between India and Pakistan.

Thoughts from an outsider.

Gurkha
09-08-2012, 05:53 PM
True but it will not rise the way it did after the last Afghan war because, firstly the Kashmiris are no longer swayed (the vast majority of them) by calls for jihad, the Pakis now fully realize the extent of the demon they have created and finally because of the comprehensive anti-infiltration measures on the Line of Control & the CI grid in the Valley. The troop concentration In Kashmir is probably the highest ever achieved in the world.Attempts to infiltrate will increase and some will get through but unless the political establishment muffs it up yet again, the hearts & minds of the Kashmiri people are no longer with the fight. However, India is watching AfPak with trepidation and is preparing for the worst.......

JMA
09-08-2012, 06:16 PM
One of the other important reasons why the insurgency never really succeeded military is the extremely (even I say so myself ) successful light infantry campaign conducted by the Indian Army : no drones, no air support, no artillery( notwithstanding whatever tales you've heard), restrictive Rules of Engagements but the fight was always in the mountains.... the insurgents were relentlessly hunted worn down and eliminated. Own casualties... yes... but in comparison to the Iraq & Afghanistan campaigns.. low.

I would like to hear/learn more about this aspect you speak of... if you have the time.

.

carl
09-09-2012, 02:54 AM
Gurkha:

I second JMA's request.

I also request, if you can, that you expand on your following comment because it is very interesting. It shows some mature wisdom.


I also think that the very real threat of Human Rights prosecution forced us to conduct a more restricted military campaign which has contributed to this strategic victory. As platoon & company commanders we chafed at it, but in hindsight I think that was one of the best things that happened. When I read about nightime raids and the way the US forces operated in Iraq & Afghanistan I feel that cultural alienation plays a major part in generation of hatred & the accompanying military failure. If one does nightime raids in a culture where women are hidden in Burqas..... what do you expect ? Did I ramble on a bit.... ?!

And welcome to SWJ. We, or at least me, are thrilled to have guys who aren't American.

One last request, what are good Indian sources that may cover some of the things you commented upon?

Gurkha
09-09-2012, 05:15 AM
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/indian-armys-counter-insurgency-operations-in-jk-i/

http://www.ipcs.org/publications/


THE INDIAN APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Colonel Behram A Sahukar, The Parachute Regiment, Indian Army retired

Gurkha
09-09-2012, 05:41 AM
In my experience, ultimately every army reflects the ethos, culture & beliefs of a nation in a very strong manner. Its members who join up are generally very patriotic, believe in their version of history & superiority of their culture.As one moves away from the officer cadre and the special forces components, who in general are more "intelligent" & aware ( I know, I know its a large generalisation !!), the vast majority, consisting of PBI, soon develop a hostile attitude towards the population. They do not and perhaps cannot, given their cultural orientation & poor education, empathise with
the locals. Since they form the face of the military instrument, the population begins to hate them leading to a failure in the CI campaign. People from this part of the world are culturally & religiously extra sensitive else, but many aspects of their culture are in vehement contrast to that of the average american.... hence the difficulties in WHAM (Winning Hearts & Minds). In our case while the cultural, religious & ethnic divide does exist, it is not as much, and in any case India is highly multi cultural & religious country and more importantly the Army is a real reflection of that diversity. With experience of the insurgencies of Nagaland, Punjab & Sri Lanka, we adjusted to the Kashmir scenario, though the extensive support by the Pakis did complicate things initially.

Gurkha
09-09-2012, 06:17 AM
I would like to hear/learn more about this aspect you speak of... if you have the time.

.

Essentially the doctrine called for

1. The use of min force & collateral damage.

2. Area domination.

3. Intelligence based operations.

4. WHAM.

As Kashmir was mountainous, the standard operating units was a rifle company averaging a strength of 50 - 60 men ( the balance 60 being away on leave, training courses, administrative details, base security etc.). This company would on average have about 100 sq km ( 10km by 10 km) or a small valley to cover. Based on informer intel, surveillance patrols, or police intel, the company would split into 7 - 8 teams and lay a combination of ambushes & cordon around villages at night. A search would be carried by day ( DAY ONLY). The police, including policewomen, would assist in controlling the civil population except in really remote villages where we would do it ourselves. Normally 3 -4 militants would be caught / killed in such operations. The area was also extensively dominated by patrols & ambushes to restrict freedom of movement. A very, very important reason for our success is that we were just not road or track bound. The hardiness of the average Indian soldier & the immense strength of the regimental system were critical factors in achieving tactical success. Also all that we would carry would be ammunition, no bullet-proof jackets, no helmets, little food & water. It helped very much to move light. In those days we didnt even have NVDs. A comparison with road bound , conscript & primarily mechanised armies like the Russians in Afghanistan will always see light infantry do better. In this light, please read the Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. I was quite taken aback when I read it : road bound operations, basic drills flouted & huge unwieldy columns detected from miles away. Apart from the SPETZNAZ, Airborne troops & to an extent their Naval Infantry, they appeared to have abysmal infantry skills & a very poor man management system of conscripts all of which lead to their military defeat. I wonder how you guys are doing it in Afghanistan.

Interesting reads :

http://www.amazon.com/Bear-Went-over-Mountain-Afghanistan/dp/0788146653

http://www.specialoperations.com/mout/soviet16.html

Bill Moore
09-09-2012, 06:42 AM
Posted by Gurkha


The area was also extensively dominated by patrols & ambushes to restrict freedom of movement. A very, very important reason for our success is that we were just not road or track bound. The hardiness of the average Indian soldier & the immense strength of the regimental system were critical factors in achieving tactical success. Also all that we would carry would be ammunition, no bullet-proof jackets, no helmets, little food & water. It helped very much to move light. In those days we didnt even have NVDs. A comparison with road bound , conscript & primarily mechanised armies like the Russians in Afghanistan will always see light infantry do better. In this light, please read the Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. I was quite taken aback when I read it : road bound operations, basic drills flouted & huge unwieldy columns detected from miles away. Apart from the SPETZNAZ, Airborne troops & to an extent their Naval Infantry, they appeared to have abysmal infantry skills & a very poor man management system of conscripts all of which lead to their military defeat. I wonder how you guys are doing it in Afghanistan.

Thank you, this is the best post I have on SWJ in weeks! Highlights, font changes, etc. are all mine to emphasize what used to be common sense in our infantry and special ops ranks. I wonder if we can ever get back to the basics?

Of course we would need blue force trackers for every individual so staff and commanders in the rear could manage tactical operations based on their keen insights, and the rear echelon would also have to have the means to monitor water and caloric intake for each troop because the troops/conscripts couldn't be trusted to do it on their own, body armor would remain mandatory, otherwise someone could get hurt, and we wouldn't be allowed to move without ISR support. Other than that I think we could get back to the basics and actually take the initiative.

davidbfpo
09-09-2012, 12:15 PM
Gurkha,

I also recall a BBC documentary a few years ago, perhaps by Mark Tully, which found that locally recruited light infantry battalions had also contributed to Indian success. Given the numbers involved - from the main Indian Army - I assume these local units were only a small proportion of the total.

As Bill Moore commented your comparison with the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is noteworthy. Given the once strong Indo-Soviet/Russian relationship, including with the military, did that assist in observing and learning? For example by attendance at staff colleges.

Ken White
09-09-2012, 02:22 PM
Of course we would need blue force trackers for every individual ...body armor would remain mandatory, otherwise someone could get hurt, and we wouldn't be allowed to move without ISR support. Other than that I think we could get back to the basics and actually take the initiative.Got to have Mobile Cocoons to protect the roadbound and inculcate reticence... :mad:

What Gurkha describes is what we were doing 46 years or so ago. It really worked -- until about 45 years ago we quit doing it and got road and hide bound. That mostly due to the pernicious influence of the one year tour (practically for too many/Officers and more than a few NCOs, two six month tours doing two different things in different places) and excessive politicization.

It is noteworthy that politically driven efforts to reduce own casualties almost certainly produced far more casualties all sorts including our own and resulted in a failure to achieve the objectives...

Now, we're worse. We've lost our minds...

Ray
09-09-2012, 07:23 PM
Gurkha has raised valid operational issues that has contributed to why the IA has been successful.

The IA does not take it that they are operating in a foreign land. Yes, there are cultural differences (as in every part of the country), but that fact does not niggle since we are all Indians.

Body armour is important, but the Indian body armour is so heavy that very few wear it and hence quite some casualties occur.

The IA infantry has never been road bound or supplies bound. It is capable of being self contained for more than a week. Been there, done that!

And what is most important that make it a win win is that we do not fire first and ask questions later. We draw fire and then we take action and this is seen by all who are there on the spot to include civilians.

There is no gung ho attitude and instead as if it is in the routine of a day's work, even though unpleasant.

I am looking forward to more posts of Gurkha.

Madhu
09-09-2012, 08:43 PM
There is no gung ho attitude and instead as if it is in the routine of a day's work, even though unpleasant.

A touch of reflexive antipathy, or perhaps I am mistaken?

:wry:

@ Gurkha: At any rate, interesting about day versus night. I thought the opposite was true during the Punjab insurgency, that night time meetings were important and used for a time to suggest more troops and police? But it seems that different approaches were tried at different times and in different ways in different places, because of multiple insurgencies in different parts of the country. Makes sense, I guess.

Interesting comments. To quote carl, this forever civilian looks forward to hearing more :)

Did WHAM didn't have as much of a place in that insurgency, or was it approached differently? I admit, it's difficult stateside to get good information, because there are so many parties to various conflicts that prepare a kind of mental space within American media and academia. I'm not saying that a particular claim is true or false, just that it's hard to know who is downplaying human rights violations and who is exaggerating said incidents. Also, Western human rights groups and academics have a tendency to inadvertently side with one group versus another, often due to the concerns of a particular diaspora. Some members of a diaspora are more concerned with overseas events and are persistent and interested in getting a message across. Just tough to know, to get an honest assessment from a distance. It really is quite a difficult environment, in terms of truth-getting. At least, that's what it feels like.

Ray
09-10-2012, 08:49 AM
When I read about nightime raids and the way the US forces operated in Iraq & Afghanistan I feel that cultural alienation plays a major part in generation of hatred & the accompanying military failure.

An important issue that must not be lost sight of.

But then, it is not easy for those who have a totally different psychology and lifestyle to understand.

When I stated that we do not have that 'gung ho' attitude, what I meant was that we do not have that 'win at all cost without a loss to own lives'. In fact, it is a good philosophy that whatever be the task not a single own lives should be lost.

However, the mindset is not that in the Indian Army. Win, and of that there is no doubt, but in a more 'peaceable' way, with minimal damage to those not involved in the battle and being ready to explain each action as to why it had to be taken and could not be avoided.

There are many reasons for it, cultural, religious, and the dread of harassment through inquiries if an operation is botched up. The command style is Befehlstaktik, based on a 'no error' syndrome. And worse, is that any trumped up complaint is nightmare to the Army personnel, with all organisations including the State and Central Govt and the pinkos of the Human Rights, to include the bleeding heart one sided international conscience keepers, swooping down like vultures!

India is not the US to shrug off complaints and tell all to take a walk.

Therefore, the scope to be 'gung ho' is highly limited and even non existent!

On the issue of Search. One has to search by day so that no innocent is killed. If a person attempts to escape the search, it is obvious that that person is not clean. At night, even innocents may feel that the cover of darkness is good enough to leave the scene and avoid the questioning. And that can lead to innocents being killed. None would appreciate that.

Civic action what the Indian Army has launched under Op Sadbhavna where the IA on its own and with its own funds are opening up schools in all areas including remote areas. electrifying villages, improving sanitation, building bridges, taking children to mainland India to see for themselves what is India, is helping the effort in reducing insurgency.

What people want is a better life.

Religion alone cannot give one a better life and all understand that.

And as Gurkha has said, Pakistan is in a shamble economically and there is total chaos even religion wise, where sects are ruthlessly killing each other.

They realise that such things are not happening in Kashmir, where the economy is way higher and there is no ruthless killing of Shias by Sunnis and vice versa.

And the Hurriyat is slowly becoming redundant!

Gurkha
09-11-2012, 12:02 PM
Gurkha,

I also recall a BBC documentary a few years ago, perhaps by Mark Tully, which found that locally recruited light infantry battalions had also contributed to Indian success. Given the numbers involved - from the main Indian Army - I assume these local units were only a small proportion of the total.

As Bill Moore commented your comparison with the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is noteworthy. Given the once strong Indo-Soviet/Russian relationship, including with the military, did that assist in observing and learning? For example by attendance at staff colleges.

1. Locally recruited light infantry, the JAMMU & KASHMIR LIGHT INFANTRY, recruiting Hindus & Muslims from J & K , is a standard regiment of the line. It tends to do well as the Kashmiri (Muslim) soldiers are able to generate excellent intelligence.

2. There is very limited Army inetrafce with the Russians notwithstanding the IA equipment profile, so no exchange of tactics or docrtine. In fact the joke is that given our finances we are constantly trying to implement operations as per western doctrine with Russian equipment on Indian scales !!http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/images/icons/icon12.gif

carl
09-11-2012, 04:30 PM
THE INDIAN APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Colonel Behram A Sahukar, The Parachute Regiment, Indian Army retired

This was a good piece. It was easy to read and gave good review of all the small wars ops the Indian Army has been involved in, and there have been a lot. It had almost no acronyms! Imagine that, plain English that anybody can follow. Its free on the net.

Gurkha: Do you have a link for "Doctrine for sub-Conventional Operations"?

Ray
09-11-2012, 06:24 PM
Gurkha,

I also recall a BBC documentary a few years ago, perhaps by Mark Tully, which found that locally recruited light infantry battalions had also contributed to Indian success. Given the numbers involved - from the main Indian Army - I assume these local units were only a small proportion of the total.

As Bill Moore commented your comparison with the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is noteworthy. Given the once strong Indo-Soviet/Russian relationship, including with the military, did that assist in observing and learning? For example by attendance at staff colleges.

The Scouts were the first who were raised from locals and they were to operate in their own native area. However, they got amalgamated. Only the Ladakh Scouts remain in such a role.

JAK Light Infantry were initially the JAK Militia funded by the J&K Govt, but under op control of the Indian Army, staffed by IA officers and they operated in J&K.

As far as I remember, one unit was of J&K Sikhs and Hindus and the remainder of the Regiment was composed of Jammu and Kashmir Muslims. I am not aware of the composition now. They have been amalgamated in the Indian Army and are posted all over India as any regular unit.

Ray
09-11-2012, 06:41 PM
Do you have a link for "Doctrine for sub-Conventional Operations"?

Try this:

Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations, Ist issue Dec 2006, 45 Pg, 16.5 MB
http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm

carl
09-12-2012, 09:53 PM
As Kashmir was mountainous, the standard operating units was a rifle company averaging a strength of 50 - 60 men ( the balance 60 being away on leave, training courses, administrative details, base security etc.). This company would on average have about 100 sq km ( 10km by 10 km) or a small valley to cover. Based on informer intel, surveillance patrols, or police intel, the company would split into 7 - 8 teams and lay a combination of ambushes & cordon around villages at night. A search would be carried by day ( DAY ONLY). The police, including policewomen, would assist in controlling the civil population except in really remote villages where we would do it ourselves. Normally 3 -4 militants would be caught / killed in such operations. The area was also extensively dominated by patrols & ambushes to restrict freedom of movement. A very, very important reason for our success is that we were just not road or track bound. The hardiness of the average Indian soldier & the immense strength of the regimental system were critical factors in achieving tactical success. Also all that we would carry would be ammunition, no bullet-proof jackets, no helmets, little food & water. It helped very much to move light. In those days we didnt even have NVDs.

Gurkha:

I have some questions that are probably obvious to others but not to me.

How long would the 60 man unit stay in its small valley or 10x10 km area?

Where would they stay? Would they stay in houses, police stations, purpose built facilities etc.?

Would the 60 man unit put out 7-8 cordons or ambushes every night or only on some nights? How many guys did you normally have on each ambush?

How far would each little ambush group normally walk to get to their set-up site? What was the max distance they could set something from where they slept and ate?

In the little area or valley, who was the king so to speak, the Indian Army commander, the local police commander or did the the two work together?

Where did the intel used by the 60 man unit mostly come from, the unit itself, the police or a source outside the small area or valley?

Could outside units swoop in to do things without the approval or knowledge of the king of the little area or valley?

If you have time, I'd be obliged to you if you could answer some of these questions. They are probably blindingly obvious to most but not to me.

Gurkha
09-13-2012, 01:45 PM
This was a good piece. It was easy to read and gave good review of all the small wars ops the Indian Army has been involved in, and there have been a lot. It had almost no acronyms! Imagine that, plain English that anybody can follow. Its free on the net.

Gurkha: Do you have a link for "Doctrine for sub-Conventional Operations"?

Try
http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm

JMA
09-13-2012, 04:54 PM
Try
http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm

I'm getting a corrupt file message

Ray
09-13-2012, 05:32 PM
Gurkha:

I have some questions that are probably obvious to others but not to me.

How long would the 60 man unit stay in its small valley or 10x10 km area?

Where would they stay? Would they stay in houses, police stations, purpose built facilities etc.?

Would the 60 man unit put out 7-8 cordons or ambushes every night or only on some nights? How many guys did you normally have on each ambush?

How far would each little ambush group normally walk to get to their set-up site? What was the max distance they could set something from where they slept and ate?

In the little area or valley, who was the king so to speak, the Indian Army commander, the local police commander or did the the two work together?

Where did the intel used by the 60 man unit mostly come from, the unit itself, the police or a source outside the small area or valley?

Could outside units swoop in to do things without the approval or knowledge of the king of the little area or valley?

If you have time, I'd be obliged to you if you could answer some of these questions. They are probably blindingly obvious to most but not to me.

There are no hard and fast rules of deployment.

It depends on the degree of threat in that area of responsibility of a Battalion.

In some areas, they operate from Battalion bases, and in some areas, the Battalion is dispersed in Company Posts. These posts are located on dominating features and on the estimated likely approaches of the terrorists, as also to have observation over villages that are known to be havens for terrorists.

Based on the intelligence, ambushes are sent out, the strength being such that the post or base has adequate numbers for administration as also capable of defending itself from any terrorist attack.

These ambushes are coordinated on a Battalion grid.

There is no King as such. It is a tacit understanding that since the Army has to do the actual operation, the command and control is that of the Army echelon. The Police are basically to act for Liaison and oversee that no law as such is violated.

Ambushes are laid within a few hours of turnaround from the post. However, when intelligence is there of mass infiltration, the strength goes up and so does the distance and turnaround time.

Intelligence is bottom up and top down. It is constantly collated and disseminated. Electronic surveillance gives immense amount of information of terrorists plan.

davidbfpo
09-13-2012, 05:55 PM
Gurkha posted a link to Indian doctrine in these matters:http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm


I'm getting a corrupt file message

It loaded here and then announced 'Failed to load PDF document'

davidbfpo
11-08-2012, 09:31 PM
An excellent article in a hitherto unknown Indian magazine 'The Caravan' in September; hat tip to two "lurkers":http://www.caravanmagazine.in/reportage/departed

The article is based on interviewing several returnees, alongside a general commentary.

carl
11-09-2012, 06:22 AM
David:

You were right. That is an excellent article.

One of its themes in stated in this sentence.

"Many others grew disillusioned with the harsh realities of a freedom struggle run by Pakistani intelligence, which showed little concern for the independence or freedom of Kashmiris."

That seems to be a fairly common sentiment among those forced to work with the Pak Army/ISI. Nobody likes those guys. I wonder why we haven't tried hard to take more advantage of that over the years. Just another in a list of things that seem obvious but we never seemed to do.

Dayuhan
11-09-2012, 06:33 AM
Just another in a list of things that seem obvious but we never seemed to do.

When things that seem obvious aren't done, two immediate possibilities spring to mind:

1. Those in charge are complete idiots and incapable of seeing or doing the obvious.

2. Maybe things aren't so obvious as they seem. There may be factors in the picture that you aren't seeing.

Always worth considering the possibility that #2 is in play. Any time things seem simple and obvious it's worth taking a much closer look.

carl
11-09-2012, 03:27 PM
Dayuhan:

Give the suits and the multi-stars inside the beltway the benefit of the doubt?

Nah, I don't think so.

Ray
11-10-2012, 06:20 AM
An excellent article in a hitherto unknown Indian magazine 'The Caravan' in September; hat tip to two "lurkers":http://www.caravanmagazine.in/reportage/departed

The article is based on interviewing several returnees, alongside a general commentary.

The Govt has a scheme to rehabilitate the ex militants.

Apart from that there are many 'reluctant' militants, in that they were 'shanghaied' while young and taken across, many against their will. Many such columns of young school children being taken across have been apprehended in the past. One such column was apprehended during my time.

I have interacted with militants who have returned to India and they were quite disillusioned with Pakistan and in what is called by Pakistan as Azad Kashmir, where because they observed that instead of Kashmiris ruling the so called Azad Kashmir, they AK Govt was being run by Pakistan and it administrators with a figurehead Kashmiri.

They also felt that Pakistan was not interested in an independent Kashmir and were merely using them, the Kashmiris, so that they could annex Kashmir and make it a part of Pakistan.

Also, they felt that modernity was there in India but not in the so called Azad Kashmir.

And their biggest worry was that as a part of Pakistan, the Kashmiris would lose their identity, which they have in India since the Valley is predominantly Muslim and hence their singular character was up front and recognised and would not be diluted owing to the provisions of the Indian Constitution wherein in non Kashmiris cannot buy land or settle down in Kashmir and that way the Kashmiri character would be in perpetuity, but would not be so in the so called Azad Kashmir, where all are Muslims in Pakistan and hence the bargaining power would not be there.

Ray
11-10-2012, 06:25 AM
You may like to read Dr Shabir Choudhry's blogs:http://drshabirchoudhry.blogspot.co.uk/

Dr Shabir Choudhry was born in Nakker Shamali (near Panjeri) in District Bhimber, Azad Kashmir. He went to UK in 1966, and holds a dual nationality. He left secondary school in 1970 with no qualifications. In 1975 he started part time studies and passed Matriculation from Panjeri, passed ‘O’ and ‘A’ levels from UK, and resumed full time degree course and passed BA (Hons) in 1984. He was awarded Mphil and PGCE in 1990 and PhD in 2002. At present he is self - employed, provides private tuition, translation/ interpretation and consultancy. Dr Shabir Choudhry has done extensive research on the issue of Kashmir and Indo Pakistan relations. He is founder member of JKLF and became its Secretary General in 1985, and got elected President of JKLF and Europe in 1999. At present, he is: • He is author of more than 25 books and booklets in English on various aspects of the Kashmiri struggle. • Through out his adult life he has actively worked for Kashmir cause, and for peace and Rights Movement in Kashmir and South Asia. • Also he regularly takes part in proceedings of UN Human Rights Council and has attended various International conferences on Kashmir.

JKLF is a militant organisation and he is a member of the same.

davidbfpo
11-10-2012, 01:54 PM
Hat tip to a "lurker" on Twitter:
An infiltration bid was foiled by the troops on the Line of Control by killing the four militants.....Friday’s killing followed an attack late last month by gunmen on a Srinagar hotel, after they aborted an attempt to ambush an Indian army convoy

Link:http://dawn.com/2012/11/10/four-militants-killed-in-kashmir/

delhidjinn
11-19-2012, 07:24 AM
A little of tangent but the Kashmir's militancy decline has revved up the tourism and movie making industry. The endangered deer Hangul has been spotted outside its protected zone. http://uniqueindiatour.com/blog/78-kashmir/21242-something-to-cheer-about-kashmir-wildlife-tourism-gets-a-boost.html

Bill Moore
01-06-2013, 06:22 AM
Moderator Adds

This new thread was entitled 'Indian troops kill Pakistani soldier in Kashmir' and was today changed to reflect a broader theme 'Kashmir: a simmering, sometimes brutal small war'.

There is a second Kashmir thread, mainly with posts from 2012 on, 'Kashmir militants give up fight and head home', which provides some of the context and recently details of the Indian Army role:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15691

A third thread covers one particular "hot spot" in 1999, in this small war, 'The Kargil War (new title, all aspects)' and this continues to be updated:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16595 (ends)


http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1246295/1/.html


ISLAMABAD: A Pakistani soldier was killed and another wounded Sunday when Indian troops stormed a military post on the two countries' de facto border in Kashmir, the military said.

It said an exchange of fire was continuing after the Indian incursion across the Line of Control marking the frontier in the Haji Pir sector, 80 kilometres (49 miles) north of Islamabad.

Will be interesting to see what triggered this and how it will play out. It has been quiet for a while. Can't help but wonder if things will heat back up again after we downsize in Afghanistan, if not before.

Ray
01-06-2013, 08:07 AM
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1246295/1/.html



Will be interesting to see what triggered this and how it will play out. It has been quiet for a while. Can't help but wonder if things will heat back up again after we downsize in Afghanistan, if not before.


I presume it was because the Pakistanis recently killed an Indian soldier in the KG sector and have repeatedly violated the cease fire.

I don't think this will lead to anything serious.

Ray
01-07-2013, 07:34 AM
As of today, the Pakistanis have resorted to shelling and exchange of Small Arms fire.

But then that is business as usual and more so, when infiltration is being assisted.

davidbfpo
01-07-2013, 09:52 AM
Ray,

From afar I am puzzled that infiltration is a current problem. As another thread attests to Azad Kashmir based militants are not crossing the Line of Control; there was a report in late 2012 four had. I had read awhile ago that Pakistan had heavily restricted activity.

What is the level of activity?

The other thread is:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15691&page=2

Ray
01-07-2013, 08:25 PM
Ray,

From afar I am puzzled that infiltration is a current problem. As another thread attests to Azad Kashmir based militants are not crossing the Line of Control; there was a report in late 2012 four had. I had read awhile ago that Pakistan had heavily restricted activity.

What is the level of activity?

The other thread is:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15691&page=2

Infiltration is on all the time.

It waxes and wanes, but it continues all the time.

Of late the Pakistanis have been repeatedly violating the ceasefire and so, maybe India retaliated.

It is all a part of life on the LC.

The actual numbers are not released and in fact played down because the Govt is on a policy to defuse the animosity and build bridges.

It has succeeded to some extent, though some doubt it and think it is a sell out to Pakistan.

davidbfpo
01-08-2013, 04:46 PM
First the BBC reports a second clash, this time with Pakistani troops crossing the LoC, with two dead Indian soldiers:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20945842

Twitter has unconfirmed reports that: a) one soldier's head removed and is missing, other body also mutilated; b) the Pakistani soldiers were from the SSG (SOF) and c) from Jason Burke (from The Observer):
Three possible reasons for clash. 1 hot headed commanders in sector, 2. tactical aim to infiltrate militants where no snow. 3 Pak Army wants to stir up eastern frontier to bolster domestic credentials and give Washington a fright.

Just great, one can only hope for a blizzard to descend upon the LoC and freeze both sides.

omarali50
01-09-2013, 05:01 AM
IF even 50% of various accounts (like this one, most detailed yet: http://www.telegraphindia.com/1130109/jsp/frontpage/story_16418934.jsp#.UOziJ47R1SU ) are true we most likely had usual ### for tat shenanigans until yesterday, but beheading is a definite extreme provocation. If that is what happened (that persons in Pak army uniforms crossed the border and beheaded one or maybe two Indian soldiers) then possibilities would include:
1. Hot-headed local commander
2. Hot-headed (and extremely provocative) move by the high command
3. Cold blooded high command move to escalate tensions in the cause of some domestic priorities (set stage for new caretaker regime? derail excessive Indo-Pak bonhomie from the civilian regime?). All of these options sound insane, but you never know.
4. Jihadi false-flag operation? After all, they carry out operations wearing Pak army uniforms all the time within Pakistan. Why not

Are there other possibilities?

3 would seem to be the real danger here. The rest can all blow over eventually.

What do people think?

Btw, from a military professional point of view, this will probably lead to a serious inquiry on the Indian side. If a pakistani soldier was killed 2 days ago, one would expect the opposing army to be extra alert. To get 2 soldiers killed can happen to any unit on military duty in hazardous zones, but to have the attackers behead them and take the heads away? that doesnt look good.

omarali50
01-09-2013, 05:58 AM
That comment grew into this blog post about escalation on the LOC

http://www.brownpundits.com/2013/01/09/escalation-on-the-line-of-control/

Ray
01-09-2013, 07:42 AM
First the BBC reports a second clash, this time with Pakistani troops crossing the LoC, with two dead Indian soldiers:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20945842

Twitter has unconfirmed reports that: a) one soldier's head removed and is missing, other body also mutilated; b) the Pakistani soldiers were from the SSG (SOF) and c) from Jason Burke (from The Observer):

Just great, one can only hope for a blizzard to descend upon the LoC and freeze both sides.


The niggling issue is the beheading of the head and carrying back by the Pakistanis.

This is what may cause an issue because the Pakistanis had mutilated an officer they captured and killed during the Kargil War and which has been hotly debated in India and the Govt is being pressurised to take up the case since mutilation and torture apart from contravening the Geneva Convention is also an insane and inhuman act.

davidbfpo
01-10-2013, 12:28 AM
The Indian military spokesman, with my emphasis:
The body of one of the soldiers was found mutilated in a forested area on the side controlled by India...(he) denied Indian media reports that one body had been decapitated and another had its throat slit..

The Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman:
Two Indian soldiers were killed in the attack and their bodies subjected to barbaric and inhuman mutilation.

Well I suppose that counts for clarity Indian style!

Back to my question and Ray's answer on activity along the LoC:
Firing and small skirmishes are common along the 740-km (460-mile) LoC despite a ceasefire that was agreed in 2003.

However, incursions by troops from either side are rare. Retired Indian army Brigadier...said Tuesday's incident - about 600 metres from the de facto border - marked the most serious infiltration since the ceasefire was put in place.

Link:http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/01/09/india-pakistan-kashmir-firing-reaction-idINDEE90802T20130109

Ray
01-10-2013, 06:02 AM
The Indian military spokesman, with my emphasis:

The Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman:

Well I suppose that counts for clarity Indian style!

Back to my question and Ray's answer on activity along the LoC:

Link:http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/01/09/india-pakistan-kashmir-firing-reaction-idINDEE90802T20130109

Project Pakistan is Prime Minister's pet desire of his lifetime wherein there is peace and amity at all costs.

That is why even after 26/11 (Mumbai), the peace initiative continued inspite of national anger.

The military has to ensure that they do not contradict the Govt plans by stating anything that appears out of sync.

The Deputy GOC of the Div on Indian TV was categorical.

blueblood
01-10-2013, 08:29 AM
IF even 50% of various accounts (like this one, most detailed yet: http://www.telegraphindia.com/1130109/jsp/frontpage/story_16418934.jsp#.UOziJ47R1SU ) are true we most likely had usual ### for tat shenanigans until yesterday, but beheading is a definite extreme provocation. If that is what happened (that persons in Pak army uniforms crossed the border and beheaded one or maybe two Indian soldiers) then possibilities would include:
1. Hot-headed local commander
2. Hot-headed (and extremely provocative) move by the high command
3. Cold blooded high command move to escalate tensions in the cause of some domestic priorities (set stage for new caretaker regime? derail excessive Indo-Pak bonhomie from the civilian regime?). All of these options sound insane, but you never know.
4. Jihadi false-flag operation? After all, they carry out operations wearing Pak army uniforms all the time within Pakistan. Why not

Are there other possibilities?

3 would seem to be the real danger here. The rest can all blow over eventually.

What do people think?

Btw, from a military professional point of view, this will probably lead to a serious inquiry on the Indian side. If a pakistani soldier was killed 2 days ago, one would expect the opposing army to be extra alert. To get 2 soldiers killed can happen to any unit on military duty in hazardous zones, but to have the attackers behead them and take the heads away? that doesnt look good.

Omar, it is somewhat disappointing to see that even educated Pakistanis like yourself believe that it was a ### for tat retaliation by PA. IA has nothing to gain from ceasefire violation unlike PA. If there is, please enlighten me.

PA on the other hand is well known for such barbarism.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ajay_Ahuja

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saurabh_Kalia

Two of the many examples out there.

Despite these incidences IA buried Pak soldiers with due respect when PA refused to accept the bodies.

I was just watching Salman Khurshid's (Minster External affairs) interview. For half an hour he kept repeating the rhetoric. Fuc**** moron.

davidbfpo
01-10-2013, 01:04 PM
We all know a spark can cause a conflagration, if this report is true "It was grannie that done it".


Indian bunker construction on the northern reaches of the Line of Control — initiated after a grandmother crossed into Pakistan-administered Kashmir to be with her sons — sparked off a spiral of violence.....Early in September, 70-year old Reshma Bi, left the village of Charonda, near Uri, to live with her sons and grandchildren across the Line of Control....appeared to have left in the hope of living out her last years with her family.

Link:http://m.thehindu.com/news/national/runaway-grandmother-sparked-savage-skirmish-on-loc/article4291426.ece/?maneref=http%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FNnMvH7SX

davidbfpo
01-13-2013, 01:56 PM
An Indian commentary on the potential crisis in Kashmir, on the wider context and concludes:
Pakistan has suffered far more deaths in sectarian violence and terrorist incidents than India. In 2012, they lost more than 6,000 lives compared to India, which saw about 800 deaths. This alone should have compelled them to clamp down on the non-state actors working as death merchants.

Link:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/indo-pak-ties-are-as-kaleidoscopic-as-ever

davidbfpo
01-30-2013, 01:02 PM
Thanks to a "tweet" from a lurker:
In classified protests to a United Nations watchdog that have never been disclosed till now, Pakistan has accused Indian soldiers of involvement in the torture and decapitation of at least 12 Pakistani soldiers in cross-Line of Control raids since 1998, as well as the massacre of 29 civilians......Ever since 9/11,” a senior Pakistan army officer told The Hindu, “we have sought to downplay these incidents, aware that a public backlash [could] push us into a situation we cannot afford on the LoC.

Link:http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/locked-in-un-files-15-years-of-bloodletting-at-loc/article4358199.ece

Some fascinating comments on communication within each country, best of all some statistics:
Pakistan argues that India’s own figures show a sharp decline in operations by jihadists in Jammu and Kashmir. Last year, according to the Indian government, 72 terrorists, 24 civilians and 15 security personnel, including police, were killed in terrorist violence in the State — lower, in total, than the 521 murders recorded in Delhi alone. In 2011, the figures were, respectively, 100, 40 and 33; in 2010, 232, 164 and 69.

Ray
01-31-2013, 05:25 AM
Pakistan has suffered far more deaths in sectarian violence and terrorist incidents than India. In 2012, they lost more than 6,000 lives compared to India, which saw about 800 deaths. This alone should have compelled them to clamp down on the non-state actors working as death merchants.

One does not understand the logic for this oft repeated equation of Pakistan having suffered more deaths in sectarian violence and terrorist incidents than India,

The Shia Sunni internecine battles are their own creation as is the Taliban of all hues. It is a known fact that the terrorists are taken to be 'strategic assets' of Pakistan.

Pakistan would do well to realise the deep seated meaning behind the words from the Bible - As you sow so shall you reap!

omarali50
01-31-2013, 05:25 PM
As the state's fractures become more public in pakistan, things are popping out all over the place. For those who can understand Urdu, this discussion will be most interesting: http://www.zemtv.com/2013/01/31/capital-talk-on-geo-news-col-r-ashfaq-hussain-air-marshall-r-shahid-latif-lt-gen-r-talat-masood-31st-january-2013/

This article is in English: http://gen-shahidaziz.blogspot.com/2013/01/putting-our-children-in-line-of-fire.html

btw, lest this article give anyone the impression that General Shahid Aziz is very sane, please read some more of his pieces, starting with: http://gen-shahidaziz.blogspot.com/2012/12/on-whose-side-is-allah.html

My somewhat intemprate comment on this General: http://www.brownpundits.com/2013/01/26/my-heart-broke-when-i-saw-it-it-was-just-a-boy/#comment-49301

Ray
01-31-2013, 07:53 PM
The Indian PM who was born in Gah Pakistan has put his political life on the line trying to make peace with Pakistan.

At each step, he seems to be at sea with the Pakistani response. Still he bats on!

There is nothing wrong with Indians or Pakistanis.

it is just that there is a trust deficit.

In the first war, it was said by Pakistan it was tribal and Pak army men on leave who were inflamed and so they attacked! Imagine that!

Who provided the logistics and it is surprising that Army men 'on leave' can take their country to war!

In 1965, it was said by Pakistan that it were Indian Kashmiris who were 'rebelling' against India. It turned out the so called rebels were Pakistani troops operating under Op Gibraltar.

In Kargil, the Pakistan Army and Musharraf claimed that it were the Mujhaeedins who infiltrated. Now Pakistan Generals and a Colonel all from ISI has gone on record that it was always the Pakistani Army which was in action and not mujhadins.

Musharraf continues to deny it and he did so on Indian TV.

It is time to own up, clear the air, get trust back and move ahead.

There has been too much of bloodshed.

davidbfpo
07-09-2013, 09:51 PM
Stephen Tankel, a regional analyst and LeT expert, provides insight into a possible pivot to Kashmir by extremists after Afghanistan:http://warontherocks.com/2013/07/pakistani-militants-plan-own-pivot-east/

parvati
07-10-2013, 08:27 AM
LeT’s collaboration with local groups in Kashmir is not surprising given the denial plausibility and the ability to avoid crossing the LOC. LeT’s collaboration with groups within Kashmir is a an old strategy and more and more the Indian press is reporting that they are in collaboration with India based groups including as SIMI, Jaish Mohamed, IM and their expansion even extends as far out to recruiting cadres and collaboration with groups in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh etc. Even the recent attacks in Srinagar mentioned in the article davidbpfo provided were attributed to HM with LeT backing. Something is cooking in Kashmir.

On a second note, one constantly hears of Kashmir being the most militarized zone in the whole and the oft-repeated figure is 700,000 Indian troops stationed in the area. Given that the both the Pak/Chinese border is in the area, I am sure the figures are high, but 700,000 sounds too much. I have come across Indian mainstream media reporting around 70K paramilitary and 150-200k infantry troops, Indian govt. has never made the numbers public and the 300K versus 700k is still a huge difference.

davidbfpo
08-06-2013, 01:41 PM
An interesting backgrounder and rightly observes can the new Pakistani government and an Indian government heading to the ballot box exercise restraint:http://www.firstpost.com/india/exclusive-dirty-war-on-loc-preceded-deadly-poonch-ambush-1014081.html

davidbfpo
09-07-2013, 05:38 PM
Another report on returning militants, this one in the NYT and has some extra details, plus how one returnee appears to have been compromised and freed by the courts:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/07/world/asia/homesick-militants-are-offered-a-way-back-to-kashmir.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_ee_20130907&_r=0&pagewanted=all

The compromised militant's words:
You’re not a terrorist for life...It’s very possible that you will change your mind

Ray
09-09-2013, 11:23 AM
Kashmiris are not serious terrorists.

Most join not on ideological or religious grounds, but the monthly pay is good.

That they are not serious is indicated by the fact that the JKLF is no longer taken as a serious outfit by the Pakistanis and ISI and so they have given the task to the Let, Huji and others foreign elements, while using the Kashmiris as guides and porters.

davidbfpo
01-22-2014, 10:55 PM
Within an article on scaling down the military presence in Kashmir and placing the emphasis on the police are several facts, here are some:
The principal reason to consider scaling back the Army’s counter-insurgency presence in Kashmir is simple: there isn’t an insurgency to be fought. Ever since the 2001-2002 near-war between India and Pakistan, levels of violence in the State have fallen steadily. In 2001, as many as 1,067 civilians, 590 security forces personnel, and 2,850 terrorists were killed in fighting. The numbers fell in 2003 to 658 civilians, 338 security forces and 1,546 terrorists. Last year’s numbers, the authoritative South Asia Terrorism Portal records, were 20 civilians, 61 security forces and 100 terrorists.

In population-adjusted terms, the insurgency in J&K cost 1.51 lives per 100,000 persons of its population, lower than the homicide rate in Delhi or Haryana. The State’s total firearms fatalities were well below those in Uttar Pradesh (1,575 in 2012) or Bihar (681) or even West Bengal (269).

Link:http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article5597916.ece?

MoorthyM
01-23-2014, 03:03 PM
The author of this article, Praveen Swami, has overlooked the strategic aims of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia backed Islamists in South Asia.

These Islamists, such as Pakistani intelligence backed Lashkar-e-Taiba want to “recapture” India for Islam. Under this vision, a radicalized Kashmir is to be used as a base for escalating radicalization of India’s Muslim minorities and formation of jihadist groups in the Indian heartland. The Islamists have made great strides in this direction. It has just been noted that a group modeled after (Pakistan-based) Tahreek-e-Taliban has now taken root in the central Indian city of Aurangabad.

Strategically, from an Islamist view, there is little to be gained by intensifying jihad in Kashmir at this time as it would invite retaliation by the Indian army, bring hardships to the local (Muslim) population, and make them reluctant to help the Islamist cause. Fundamentally, India (like every other nation) has failed to understand why the locals have been drawn to radical ideologies and how to extricate them. That’s the bottom line.

In my 2009 book, Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War, an entire section titled, “Siege of India (pp: 81-133)” is devoted to a discussion of the ongoing multi-front jihadist assault on India.

This may be one of those situations where a storm is waiting in the wings of the calm.

jmm99
01-23-2014, 06:22 PM
There are a number of threads here at SWC to which you could contribute.

For the benefit of other members/viewers, I don't know Moorthy (his first name, BTW); but I've just looked up his book, Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War (http://www.amazon.com/Defeating-Political-Islam-The-Cold/dp/1591027047) (2009). Here's the Amazon pitch:


Al Qaeda and its sympathizers are often viewed as isolated fanatics outside of the mainstream Muslim population—outlaws not only in the West but also in respectable Muslim nations. This book argues just the opposite: that in fact terrorism is the logical outgrowth of an international Islamic political agenda that is endorsed and funded by Islam’s major players—Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. Author Moorthy S. Muthuswamy labels these nations the "Axis of Jihad". For decades, he says, they have been devoted to extending their spheres of influence in the name of religion.

Utilizing a recent groundbreaking statistical analysis of Islamic doctrines and an analysis based upon the outlook of Muslims, he discusses the possibility that Islam is less a religion and more an ideology of conquest.

Muthuswamy urges US policymakers to rethink the War on Terror along the lines of the successfully waged Cold War against communism. The nuclear physicist-author makes the following main point:

Like the Cold War, this war is more a contest of ideas than armed conflict. Rather than placing the emphasis on military might and costly wars abroad, the West should invest the bulk of its effort in a science-based ideological war, one that is directed at discrediting the simplistic, conquest-oriented theological roots of Islamist indoctrination and jihadist politics.

Muthuswamy also emphasizes the importance of a largely non-Muslim India in the War on Terror, in view of its location and size. The India-born author gives a fascinating description of modern Islamic conquest in South Asia. His insights into the Islamist siege and subversion of Indian democracy should be revealing for the citizens of western democracies.

The author asserts that the West needs India in dealing with the conundrum that is Pakistan, as they both share language, culture, and more with each other.

This fresh perspective on the ongoing threat from Islamist terrorism offers much to ponder about the future course of US foreign policy initiatives.

I also found two reviews. One (by Diana West in the WT), BOOK REVIEW: Reversing U.S. policy in AfPak (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/27/reversing-us-policy-in-afpak/?page=all), is favorable. The other (by GB Singh in NER), Dangerous Policy (http://www.newenglishreview.org/custpage.cfm/frm/42165/sec_id/42165), is unfavorable. The latter attacks Moorthy's message, but also attacks the messenger (IMO). I did take Mr Singh's advice on one point: I will read the book ! :)

Moorthy, the concept here at SWC is to attack the message (ruthlessly), but not to attack the messenger. In short, an officer and a gentlemen standard works best in preventing flaming and in keeping learnable conversations going. In that context and in my opinion, Mr Singh should have left out the last half of his last paragraph.

I encourage you to post here, not only in this thread but elsewhere.

Regards

Mike

carl
01-23-2014, 09:26 PM
MoorthyM:

If the 'Preventing AQ expansion' thread gets going you gotta get into the discussion. The US needs some ideas beyond Preds shooting Hellfires.

Moderator adds: new thread created, so please post there and so next two posts have been moved (ends)

blueblood
02-20-2014, 04:39 PM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJHn7GqH1mk

Nice video tried to cover a lot of subjects like stone pelting, Op Sadbhavna, officer-soldier scuffle etc.

davidbfpo
07-03-2014, 12:38 PM
I am not sure what the intention of the new Indian central government is here; no doubt it is a mixture of factors:
The new government's only planned initiative in the northern region so far is a mass movement of population. Hundreds of thousands of Kashmiri Pandits – Hindus who had fled the Kashmir valley in the 1990s ....

The author is not impartial and this appears not in the 'news', but in the 'comment' section:http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/03/kashmiri-nightmare-narendra-modi-pandits-jammu-human-rights

JMA
07-03-2014, 05:49 PM
I am not sure what the intention of the new Indian central government is here; no doubt it is a mixture of factors:

The author is not impartial and this appears not in the 'news', but in the 'comment' section:http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/03/kashmiri-nightmare-narendra-modi-pandits-jammu-human-rights

Can't think of why India wants to hold onto Kashmir which has hisgtorically had 80-90% muslim population.

Ray
07-04-2014, 06:36 PM
Can't think of why India wants to hold onto Kashmir which has hisgtorically had 80-90% muslim population.

Kashmir is NOT one entity.

It has the Valley - predominantly Sunni Muslim.

Leh - Buddhists, who want a separate State.

Kargil - Shias who hate the Sunnis of the Valley.

Jammu - Hindu.

It is a misconception that J&K is a Muslim State.

Historically, the Muslims of Kashmir were the highest caste of Hindus - Brahmins!

They were coerced and tortured by the Afghans and the Chak of Central Asia to become Muslim.

The Sufi Muslim saints quoted Hindu Gods in their scriptures and poems.

Read the book, if you can lay your hands on - The valley of Kashmir (1895), by Lawrence, who was a British administrator in J&K.

https://ia600409.us.archive.org/BookReader/BookReaderImages.php?zip=/9/items/valleyofkashmir00lawruoft/valleyofkashmir00lawruoft_jp2.zip&file=valleyofkashmir00lawruoft_jp2/valleyofkashmir00lawruoft_0007.jp2&scale=4&rotate=0

https://archive.org/details/valleyofkashmir00lawruoft

The Kashmiri Muslims don't eat beef which is a Hindu religious taboo!

It is just this pan Islamic wave and Saudi money through Pakistan that has incited the people.

Money speaks it appears.

Ray
07-04-2014, 06:46 PM
I am not sure what the intention of the new Indian central government is here; no doubt it is a mixture of factors:

The author is not impartial and this appears not in the 'news', but in the 'comment' section:http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/03/kashmiri-nightmare-narendra-modi-pandits-jammu-human-rights

India is a secular country.

If Kashmir goes, thanks to vested interests and not solely Moslem, then there will be a bloodbath in India since none will stomach a Second Partition on religious grounds.

And will Pakistan, which is already tottering with internal confusion and a dead and dying economy, be able to absorb the exodus?

The imbalance will be catastrophic not only to India, but to the world.

All are worried about the same.

davidbfpo
07-05-2015, 06:36 PM
One of the BBC's reporters has been to Azad Kashmir Pakistan-administered) and reports:
Pakistani army chief Raheel Sharif's recent statement that "Pakistan and Kashmir are inseparable" has added to tensions between India and Pakistan. The two nuclear-armed neighbours each claim Kashmir in its entirety, and occupy different parts of it. But as the BBC's M Ilyas Khan discovered on a recent visit to Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistani-administered Kashmir and the base camp for the insurgency, all is unusually quiet.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-33359800

davidbfpo
08-05-2015, 08:56 PM
A detailed article by Shashank Joshi (RUSI) via the Australian Lowy Institute's email briefing:
On 27 July, three (Kashmiri) militants crossed from Pakistan into the Indian state of Punjab, according (http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/gurdaspur-terror-attack-gps-shows-terror-team-from-pakistan-got-drug-cartel-help-too/)to GPS sets they were carrying. They planted five IEDs on a railway track, targeted bus passengers and holed up in a police station in Gurdaspur 20km from the border, eventually killing seven Indians. The attackers were themselves killed by local police after a day's siege.
Link:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/08/03/Indias-Gurdaspur-terrorist-attack-Location-timing-and-method.aspx?

omarali50
08-26-2015, 03:40 AM
a longish article, but covers a lot (I think, obviously)

http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/2015/08/pakistan-and-indiathe-long-view.html

davidbfpo
04-26-2016, 08:59 PM
A grim update on a long suspected "dirty war":
Imroz and his team redoubled their efforts, spreading their net across 55 villages in three districts, Bandipora, Baramulla and Kupwara. An ad-hoc inquiry run by volunteers and funded by donations saw the number of unmarked and mass graves mapped rise to 2,700. Inside them were 2,943 bodies; 80% of them unidentified.....And a new deposition submitted by Imroz's field workers covering two more districts, Rajoori and Poonch, mapped 3,844 more unmarked and mass graves, taking the total number to more than 6,000. There are still another 16 districts yet to be surveyed, leaving Imroz to wonder how many violent deaths and surreptitious burials have been concealed across Kashmir.Link:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/09/mass-graves-of-kashmir?

davidbfpo
07-09-2016, 10:27 PM
A success for India and not popular locally:
Indian authorities have imposed an indefinite curfew in most parts of Kashmir (https://www.theguardian.com/world/kashmir), a day after government forces killed the top rebel commander in the disputed Himalayan region, officials said, describing it as a major success against fighters opposed to Indian rule.Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/09/india-imposes-kashmir-curfew-after-death-of-rebel-leader? (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/09/india-imposes-kashmir-curfew-after-death-of-rebel-leader?CMP=share_btn_tw)

davidbfpo
08-01-2016, 08:00 AM
Insight into one aspect of the disorder in Kashmir via Katoh's comment on a SWJ article, not on Kashmir:
Lately in the militancy affected Kashmir Valley in India there was a wave of unrest post the killing of a 22 year old militant commander who had risen to fame on account of his good looks, ISIS style of videographed threat messages (given without masking his face) and his adroit use of social media.
The police forces in Kashmir used Pellet guns to quell the unrest since protests in Kashmir very quickly and often assume a hue of deadly violence. Use of these guns had been introduced in 2010 to reduce the fatalities among rioting supporters of militants.
However, this non lethal weapon resulted in a number of eye injuries on account of the large crowds on the streets including bystanders. Human nature being what it is, a dead rioter goes out of public gaze in a short time. If the number of fatalities is large then the media does not even publicise names. However young people sans their previous malevolent disposition and lying on a hospital bed with bandages over one/both eyes/bloodshot eyes lead to an outpouring of pity.
Consequently the Pellet Gun which was introduced in Kashmir with good intentions got demonized by local politicians, NGOs and the media.
Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/influencing-behavior-in-mid-21st-century-asymmetric-and-irregular-warfare

davidbfpo
08-06-2016, 09:21 PM
An unusual critic a former Indian Army officer asks questions what is happening in Kashmir, where 500k security personnel are deployed, a 1 to 25 ratio and with extra-ordinary powers, let alone weaponry:http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/et-commentary/would-pellet-guns-be-used-in-gujarat/

A sample:
Wani, a Hizbul Mujahideen commander, was gunned down by security forces, and Kashmir erupted, leaving 50 protesters dead, thousands injured, many blinded for life, with curfew in the Valley for more than 25 days. The CRPF continues to use pellet guns. Our most disciplined force, the Indian Army, was even accused of firing at elderly women. On Wednesday, an ATM security guard Reyaz Shah was shot at point blank range by security forces. He had 360 pellets in his body. I still hear many cases of the ‘midnight knock’. This has to stop. There has to be some accountability. No one can touch the security forces, thanks to the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), a “dirty word” to quote former R&AW chief A S Dulat.
Not familiar with the issues this very short polemic helps; it is from Aljazeera:http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/upfront/2016/08/reality-check-cares-kashmiris-160805094424509.html

Post 193 on the Indian insurgency thread explains AFSPA:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2248&page=10

davidbfpo
09-14-2016, 04:07 PM
Hat tip to WoTR for this review piece by an American South Asian SME:http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-case-for-revising-indias-counterinsurgency-strategy-in-kashmir/

I had not seen the public statements by the Indian military that they could do no more. Curious to see the emphasis on better policing too.

davidbfpo
09-18-2016, 06:45 PM
The unrest in Kashmir this summer has been far greater than usual, notably the response to the death of a young, popular Kashmiri militant in July and often builds up before the annual UN General Assembly meeting.

An Indian think tank's research suggests deaths have dropped:https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CspBVQ1WAAAxfVc.jpg:large
See:http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm

Even before today's attack some suspected the Pakistani military have renewed the "militant" option:http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/pakistan-the-rebirth-of-jihad/

Last night un-named "militants" upped the temperature, as the BBC reports in this backgrounder:
Militants have attacked an army base in Indian-administered Kashmir, killing at least 17 soldiers, the army says.All four of the attackers were killed. Carrying guns and grenades they stormed a base in Uri, close to the Line of Control with Pakistan in a pre-dawn ambush.Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-37399969
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-37399969)

davidbfpo
09-20-2016, 11:16 AM
It appears that India has learnt little:
An imminent cross border terrorist attack should have been anticipated by our counter-terrorist agencies if the September 17 statement of Vikash Chandra – inspector general of the Border Security Force, Kashmir frontier – to PTI was correct. He said that around200 militants from across the border were trying to infiltrate (http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/150-200-terrorists-waiting-to-infiltrate-into-valley-border-security-force-1459989). He added that some had already sneaked in. No doubt he had made this statement – which came before the Uri attack on September 18 – to support the Modi government’s allegation that Pakistan was influencing the Valley unrest. But anybody who knows Pakistan’s activities would have realised that there was no need for it to physically send terrorists across the border merely to throw stones; if 200 men were coming, then this was for something much more sinister.
Another news report on September 19is more disconcerting (http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/jump-in-infiltration-attempts-since-kashmir-unrest-3038292/). This would indicate that the entire intelligence process had broken down in the valley. TheIndian Express quoted a “senior police officer” saying that the multi-agency centre (MAC) in Srinagar which is meant to “fuse” counter-terror intelligence from different agencies has not met since protests began in the Valley, i.e. from the second week of July. It cited another “top police officer” that no reliable figures on successful infiltration attempts could be collated since “the protests have caused a breakdown in our information network”.Link:http://thewire.in/67174/uri-attack-aftermath-india-must-pause-leaps/

davidbfpo
09-28-2016, 11:54 AM
An excellent explanation of the current crisis by Shashank Joshi, via the Australian blog Lowy Interpreter:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/09/27/Indias-strategic-restraint-on-Kashmir.aspx

Point to note:
The Uri attack killed 18 soldiers, but this has to be understood in the context of the death of 135 members of Indian security forces this year alone, including 64 in Kashmir.

AdamG
09-29-2016, 03:51 PM
India conducted surgical strikes last night along#the LoC to safeguard our nation, the Defence Ministry said on Thursday. “Significant casualties have been caused to terrorists and those trying to shield them. We don’t have a plan to further conduct such strikes. India has spoken to Pakistan,” DGMO Lt Gen Ranbir Singh said.
“Based on receiving specific and credible inputs that some terrorist teams had positioned themselves at launch pads along Line of Control to carryout infiltration and conduct terrorist strikes inside Jammu and Kashmir and in various metros in other states, the Indian Army conducted surgical strikes at several of these launch pads to pre-empt infiltration by terrorists. The operations were focussed on ensuring that these terrorists do not succeed in their design to cause destruction and endanger the lives of our citizens.

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/india-conducted-surgical-strikes-last-night-in-pok-to-safeguard-our-nation-defence-ministry-3055715/

davidbfpo
04-18-2017, 08:20 PM
Kashmir has been "bubbling along" for awhile, with occasional reports in the media I use, so thanks to Twitter for the pointer to this commentary by a former Indian Home Minister; which is sub-titled:
The writing on the wall is clear. The alienation of the people of the Kashmir Valley is nearly complete. We are on the brink of losing Kashmir.

He writes:
he writing on the wall is clear. The alienation of the people of the Kashmir Valley is nearly complete. We are on the brink of losing Kashmir. We cannot retrieve the situation through a ‘muscular’ policy — tough talk by ministers, dire warnings from the Army Chief, deploying more troops or killing more protesters.
Link:http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/kashmir-is-sliding-into-disaster-4614675/

A "lurker" added:
The assessment is correct. The Hindu Central government's only aim is to suppress Muslims and they feel that strong arm tactics will solve the Valley problem. But the situation is explosive. Pakistan is very happy that we are creating our own problems.

davidbfpo
05-03-2017, 11:54 AM
An Indian SME commentary on the situation in Kashmir and the apparent decision by the Indian national government to:
...adapt the “strong arm strategy” of the Israeli government of ignoring the Palestinians since 2001.

(Later) All these would indicate that blindly following the Israeli strategy as our counter-terrorist tactics would be totally inadvisable.Link:http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/NewsDetail/index/1/10571/Should-We-Talk-to-the-Stone-Throwers-in-the-Valley

Bill Moore
05-04-2017, 01:50 AM
I suspect India will learn (or just observe) the same lesson Israel should have learnt, which is the strategy of escalate to de-escalate is usually ineffective. Not only will generate more resistance, it also risks pushing divided anti-government actors together under common cause. There are no simple answers to complex problems.

AdamG
12-25-2017, 01:06 AM
At least four Indian soldiers were killed Saturday in Pakistani firing along the highly militarized de facto border that divides the disputed region of Kashmir between the nuclear-armed rivals, Indian officials said.
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/india-pakistani-fire-kills-indian-soldiers-kashmir-51967358

davidbfpo
12-26-2017, 10:02 AM
Via a Twitter account @Minalami (https://twitter.com/Minalami) for a Jihadism specialist and Editorial Lead/team manager @ BBC Monitoring:
Online accounts affiliated with so-called Islamic State (IS) have shared a video showing a pledge of allegiance to the group made by “mujahidin in Kashmir”, possibly paving the way for an IS declaration of a new branch there.There are a dozen tweets giving more details.

Also covered in this Israeli online publication:http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-global-jihad-december-21-27-2017/

davidbfpo
02-10-2018, 09:27 PM
Almost a Part Two to the above post; this time from CTC @ West Point and part of the conclusion:
It currently remains to be seen if the ISJK morphs into something larger than an idea or whether it simply remains an online propaganda channel. The likelihood that ISJK inspires a sufficiently large number of young Kashmiris to stimulate an entire new wave of jihad in Jammu and Kashmir seems unlikely, at least in the short term. The real threat lies in ISJK effectively radicalizing Kashmiri youth via its social media campaign and coordinating activity through digital networks, which can give way to heightened terrorism, extreme tactics, and sectarian attacks.
Link:https://ctc.usma.edu/idea-threat-islamic-state-jammu-kashmir/

One must wonder how Pakistan will respond to such a development, given that ISJK is reportedly anti-Pakistani. Would Pakistan encourage, if not direct, the existing Kashmiri groups to violently respond to the new group?

Watch and wait for the likes of us.

davidbfpo
02-13-2018, 09:58 AM
Meantime the insurgency continues, not stone-throwing, an armed assault on an army camp last Saturday, with three soldiers killed and families threatened.
Link:https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jaish-e-mohammad-targets-sleeping-families-at-sunjuwan-army-camp-kills-two-officers/articleshow/62868028.cms

davidbfpo
04-27-2018, 10:45 AM
An Indian SME commentary that ends with:
The Modi government should listen to professional advice in formulating its Kashmir policy. The results of wrong policies are borne by the security forces, not to mention the Valley public. In August 2016, Northern Army Commander, Lt. General D S Hooda, recommended that “all” including separatists and student protestors should “sit down and see if we can find an end”. Even DGP (J&K), S P Vaid, told a prominent weekly on April 12, 2018 that “talks, including with neighbour Pakistan, was the only solution to Kashmir issue.
Missed from the article due to space was this and provided by the author:
It is the global experience that security forces get demoralized if they are asked to face prolonged insurgency during which they are forced at act against their own citizens.
Link:http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/jammu-and-kashmir-terrorism-militancy-encounter-mehbooba-mufti-bjp-blind-to-the-valley-5153288/

davidbfpo
08-02-2018, 10:42 AM
A NYT article reflecting time on the ground, even if clearly much of it with Indian security forces. One small passage, the context being the funeral of a dead militant - the focus of the article:
One woman who identified herself as a separatist leader looked out at the sea of mourners and gravely smiled.“We are winning,” she said. “These bodies are our assets.”
Link:https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/world/asia/kashmir-war-india-pakistan.html?