Rifle squad composition

[Norfolk]

Ken White wrote:


Shovels? DIGGING? Yeck...

Yep, for all us Legs out there, you needn't assault a Lawn Dart's position to drive him from it...just toss a digging implement at him.:eek: He'll run faster than a scared jack-rabbit on speed.:D

Rifleman wrote:


Norfolk,

You sure the Green Jackets don't have the same phobia? I don't remember Sharpe and Harper ever digging in.

Actors don't dig (did Cool Hand Luke ever dig a full trench by hisself, even if he was in a labour-camp and on chain-gang, or perhaps there was just a "failure to communicate" this detail?). And TV producers are even more loathe to spend an entire season (or even a month) creating episodes featuring either the construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras, or Moore teaching the Pensinsular Army how to entrench on reverse slopes. Digging is just too unglamorous for all that.:wry:

Besides, the Riflemen at Bunker Hill were dug-in (IIRC), and we know how that one turned out.;)

Edited to Add:

Sorry ODB, didn't see your post until after I'd posted.



Just to add I LOVE THE M60 you can keep the M240 give me back my PIG!!!!!


Funny, I called the M-240 the G-PIG! (However, I would NOT swap it out for an M-60).

ODB, you mentioned the AG directing the gun: you didn't have a separate Gun Commander with binos directing it? You did have a Gun Controller to direct the combined fires of the guns, though, didn't you?

[slapout9]

Now your talking Entrenching tool combat.:D


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QwQu0jqdKc


Grrrrrrrrrrr! let me here growl!

[ODB]

ODB, you mentioned the AG directing the gun: you didn't have a separate Gun Commander with binos directing it? You did have a Gun Controller to direct the combined fires of the guns, though, didn't you?


The AG has/had binos to direct the gunner on target. The weapons squad leader if platoon level SBF would overall direct the guns. The weapons squad leader would initially emplace the guns and give them sectors of fire, shift fire sectors, etc... Then it was on the AG to ensure his gunner adhered to those limits. The weapons squad leader would oversee the whole SBF as many times (if you had smart leaders) the SBF would "beef up" with a SAW.

[Rifleman]

One of the best FMs I use to this day is an old one FM 21-75 Combat Skills of the Soldier, 1984, they don't make em' like this anymore.

I love FM 21-75! I've still got my tattered copy.

[Norfolk]

And one can find the 1984 edition of FM 21-75 here (http://www.operationalmedicine.org/Army/Milmed/fm21_75.pdf).:cool:

[ODB]

I love FM 21-75! I've still got my tattered copy.

Believe it or not I got a new one, found a stack of them and couldn't help not helping myself to a few of them......:D

[ODB]

Thought about making this it's own thread, if others think so as well please move it.

Many of the posts I've been reading lately seem to deal with today's soldiers tactical and technical proficiency within their respective MOS. As some may have read my posts, you know my thoughts, that basic individual skills are the foundation for everything a soldier will do and/or become. I myself have seen the Army shying away from basic individual skills and instead focusing on collective tasks. As a former infantryman turned SF this pains me to no end. Some prime examples are in land nav courses no longer being done with just a compass and map, EIB is done with a GPS and people still fail. Makes me scream WTF!!!! I go down the street where I grew up in the Army to see old buddies, hip pocket training is gone, no longer are NCOs taking advantage of work time to train there soldiers or cross train them. Unfortunately too many times this is due to these NCOs having to spend 80% of their time with those few turds problems than training those who deserve their time or sitting in joe's room playing video games. Amazing what we allow to stay in and attempt to rehabilitate these days of playing the numbers game. When was the last time someone saw troops on a range using iron sights? What happens when your optics batteries die? What would happen if we took away all the computers and had to do it by hand again? Might actually get some people out of their offices and out observing training, assessing their soldiers, and being leaders. Oops did I just say that out loud!!!!!

All the equipment in the world is great, if you can tactically employ it. You could give me a gun that aims itself, shoots around corners, and automatically obtains grazing fire over obstacles, but if I cannot employ it properly what good is it? If I can not get it into the fight? Can I use it at night? Can I use it effectively without optics? Can I hump it uphill both ways barefoot in 3 feet of snow? My point is technology can be a great thing if you know how and when to use it? Do I know why I am humping this 50 pounds of gun and ammo around? What am I going to do with it when I get there? When a soldier knows his individual tasks and why they are important to the task at hand the more effective and willing he will be to do it. Don't just tell him get behind that tree in training, tell him why he is, to provide security for the breech element, to provide cover for himself. Train him in his piece of the pie along with the other pieces and soon you will have a well oiled machine. I love a soldier that asks why?

Task Conditions and Standards = FLUFF FOR HIGHERS!!!!!! At one point in time I actually had to have task, condition, and standards on 3x5 cards for conducting PT Ken White mentioned this above, using enter and clear a room. Very basic task, when every soldier knows his resposibilities. Does not matter what the conditions are, his individual tasks do not change.

My questions I leave you with is this as I am typing this on my computer, using the internet, and watching satellite TV. Is technology the cause for our lack of basic individual soldier skills or is it simply lack of competency in our leaders? When looking at composition we need to look at tactical and technical proficiency vs technology IMO. Who's going to man the squad UAV? The squad recon robot? Then lets see someone shoot iron sights at night in the rain!!!!

[Kiwigrunt]

Fully agree with all your points OBD.

I remember a live fire exercise with M72. I couldn't quite remember (from basic training) how to use the sights so thought I'd ask the DS (a sgt). Did this for 2 reasons. First I realized that I was spending $800 of taxpayer's money. Second I felt it might be handy to know in case next time would be a 2 direction occasion. The sgt told me to just get on with it and fire the bloody thing so, being the good soldier I was, I fired the bloody thing and guess what, I missed.....wonder if the sgt actually knew.....

[Schmedlap]

I did 3.5 years National Guard and 5 years active, in that order. My NCO’s in the NG were all “old-school” guys who enlisted in the late 80s or early 90s. Mostly Panama and Desert Storm vets. They knew fieldcraft, were great at training the individual Soldier skills, and I soon took their expertise for granted. When I went on active duty, I suddenly encountered NCOs who were much younger, much less experienced, and far less competent. After working with my older NG NCO’s, I just assumed that all NCOs knew how to do things like explosive door breaches, how to properly correct a malfunction or do a magazine change, how to terrain associate. I assumed that all NCOs enforced basic standards, like dummy cording (and doing it to a certain standard), putting your trash in your ruck, crapping in a hole, cleaning your weapon instead of playing your Gameboy (seriously, when I first showed up Soldiers were bringing video games to the field – WTF????). Really basic stuff. I was shocked at how much I had to teach my NCOs on active duty, rather than vice versa.

What really blew me away was that they kept on getting promoted. Promotions were based entirely upon their promotion board performance. An NCO could be hopelessly incompetent, but if he could sing the Army Song with gusto, and recite his 3 General Orders, and answer some inane questions about AR 670-1, then he got a “(P)” tagged on to the end of his rank. My input to the process was meaningless because the commander went with what the First Sergeant said and our First Sergeant made himself look good by ensuring his Soldiers did well at the board and did well at the Soldier of the Month/Quarter boards – all three of which were absolutely worthless in sizing up NCOs for their current performance or future potential. I got into some long-winded debates with my commander over senior rater comments; regardless, it did not seem to matter. His position was always, “if your NCOs suck so bad, then you need to train them better.” My position was, “I agree. Let’s keep this guy at E-5 until he further develops. He’s not ready for E-6, but we’ll get there.” That was unacceptable to a CO/1SG combo that used the promotions of their NCOs in a defunct system as performance metrics for their own evaluations and completely disregard the professional responsibilities. The whole chain of command seemed to buy into this crap – maybe even the whole post. That might shed some light on the larger issue.

[Ken White]

operate like that. The bad news is that too many do...

The scary thing is that the system knows it and tacitly encourages it.

BS and time in service too often substitute for just simple competence. AR 600-200 needs a major rework...

[Norfolk]

Kiwigrunt's last post regarding M-72's got me thinking about rockets and AT weapons in the Squad/Section, and it reminded me of an article by Wilf in Asian Military Review a few months ago on the requirement for LAW-type weapons in the Platoon and Section. His chief point seemed to be that LAW-type weapons were best for Infantry Sections not only due to weight issues but especially becuase their distribution throughout the Section reduced or eliminated the requirement for having to site dedicated, heavier (and more readily identifiable to the enemy) AT weapons teams along likely avenues of approach at the Section and Platoon level. And to be honest, the force of his argument is pretty difficult to resist.

Now, I will admit to having been strongly influenced by Lester Grau's piece (http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/weapon.htm) on the RPG-7 (amongst others), and most especially by Eric Hammel's Fire in the Streets: The Battle for Hue, 1968. During the fighting for Hue, the US Army and the USMC found that the M-72 was of marginal use against fortified positions and fighting positions in buildings. The best weapons were found to be the main guns of tanks, 106mm RR, and the old 3.5 inch rocket launcher (our original predecessor site, The MOUT Homepage has a piece on Hue and the use of such weapon (http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/hue1.html)s in it by two of the participants), and the latter was also particularly effective for mouseholeing, while the M-72 was useless for the task. And of course, it was in action against NVA/PAVN T-55s that the M-72 was discovered to be practically useless against MBTs. Not that the RPG-7 is substantially better against tanks; only the odd hit on a weak spot will take an MBT out, but like the (more or less) long-gone 3.5" bazooka, the RPG-7 is fairly decent for taking out field fortifications and fighting positions inside buildings.

It's also a pretty nasty thing to run into during a firefight, and a number of armies issue one or two rocket launchers to each squad/section to enable them to win the firefight as quickly as possible (as well as for use against armour and field fortifications). The PLA, for one, issues a pair of PF 89's to each 8-10 man Squad, but sees fit to issue only a single AR. The NVA/PAVN carried (and still carry) at least one RPG in each 9-man Squad, as does the NKPA, in addition to the Section's single LMG or AR. Grau's article points out that the Iranians liked to issue a pair of RPGs to each Squad, and of course the Russians themselves carry an RPG in each 10-man Section in addition to its pair of ARs.

The observation that I'm trying to point out here is that a rocket launcher or recoilless gun in the 12-15 pound range, that can be carried, loaded, and fired with ease by just one man is a pretty handy and useful piece of kit to have in the Squad/Section, and mainly for non-AT tasks. The M-72 LAW, and roughly comparable weapons, are more or less ineffective in the AT role (just as the RPG and similar weapons are) but are also more or less ineffective dealing with field fortifications, buildings, and of course in the suppressive role during firefights. The RPG and similar weapons, however, are more or less effective in those areas.

Now, weapons like the Carl Gustav, the Mk. 153 SMAW, the RPG-29, and the MBT-LAW are much more effective against armour, and have the advantage of greater range in the AT role than the RPG and similar-type weapons. And of course, they are as good or better than RPG- or 3.5" inch RL-type weapons against field fortifications and, certainly in the Carl G's case, more effective against infantry in the open and for laying smoke. But, these weapons are well over twenty pounds each (they tend to be in the 25-29 pound range), and while they can be carried, loaded, and fired by one man, it is slow and cumbersome to do so in comparison to the RPG-7 or the old 3.5" bazooka. And a good deal more ammunition can be carried for the same weight for an RPG or 3.5" RL than for a Carl G, SMAW, MBT-LAW, etc, which is good for use in the firefight as well as in sustained fighting through field fortifications or urban areas.

Mechanized Infantry Sections have carried the M-3 version of the Carl Gustav, but within the operational context that the Battalions they were a part of were intended for mainly defensive operations against a potential Soviet attack, so losing 2 men out of a (nominally) 8- or 9-man Section was judged tactically appropriate given the prevailing and anticipated METT-T conditions. That may well have had to give if conditions were rather different and sustained offensive operations were expected to be necessary.

I guess my contention/proposition is that if any light AT weapon short of a top-attack (and fairly heavy) weapon like MBT-LAW, BILL, Javelin, and the like, stands no better than a gambler's chance of taking out an MBT (and for some of the same reasons as when a gambler actually wins), then light AT weapons like the RPG and the old 3.5" rocket launcher should be carried by Infantry Platoons with a view to winning the fire fight and busting up field fortifications and fighting positions within buildings. With LMGs/ARs, underslung grenade-launchers, the addition of RPG-type rocket launchers provide a solid "triple jeopardy" tactical capability at Squad, Section, and Platoon levels. I may well be wrong, but I rather suspect that existing LAW-type weapons won't provide this, or like the cancelled Predator, only at a weight that rivals or approaches that of top-attack weapons.

If this contention/proposition is more or less correct, then in what proportion should an RPG- or 3.5" RL-type weapon be present in the Platoon and especially is Squads or Sections? One per Squad/Section, or one per Fire Team? And if so, what will this do to Squad/Section sizes?

[Kiwigrunt]

I suppose it indeed depends on the size of bang we want, the bigger the bang, the bigger the weapon. Check out Bofors new AT4 AST (anti structure tandem) on You tube. Can be set to blast a big hole through a wall (bigger it seems than standard Metador) or for increased behind penetration effect.

Reloadables have their advantages, certainly with regards to lighter and more compact ammo. I still like the idea of diposeables though, increased flexibility without the need for dedicated operators.

[jcustis]

I'd prefer to have my hands on a disposable as well. The SMAW-D was touted as having the high explosive blast capabilities needed to urban jackhammer effects, but I believe only the Army procured any. Does anyone have experience using this round?

[Fuchs]

I'd like to throw two French weapons into the discussion - and a Chinese one.

LRAC F1
It's the French equivalent of the Carl Gustaf M3, but lightweight.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LRAC_F1
Section or platoon support weapon?

SARPAC
Think: Reloadable M72. A weight advantage over M72 kicks in with the 2nd shot. More warheads than just HEAT were available.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarpac
Section or fire team support weapon?

QLB-06
A 35mm grenade rifle.
http://www.sinodefence.com/army/crewserved/qlb06.asp
Platoon support weapon?

[Richard W]

Gentlemen:

I stumbled upon this thread while serving. It may be closed. However I add the following in hopes it will be of interest to some.

German Rifle Platoon Evolution from France 1940 to East Front 1945

In 1940 the German Rifle Platoon was authorized an impressive establishment (Note: I was shocked to discover the many different authorizations. I was equally shocked to find out that local commanders were granted wide latitude to modify their authorized organization. I will focus on the most common organization.)

The Platoon was authorized four 10-man Squads. Each built around a 3-man light machine gun team. In addition it was authorized a Leader, his deputy and 5-riflemen. The Platoon headwaters ("Zug Trup") was authorized a 3-man light mortar team, two messengers, medic, a horse cart leader, a horse wagon leader and of course a Platoon Leader (2/3 of the Platoon Leaders were non-commissioned officers).

The horse drawn vehicles afforded the Platoon considerable lift. It allowed the soldiers to march with minimal equipment (even the machine guns were carried in the wagon). The wagon was road bound. The cart could leave the road. It was used for resupply.

As the war progressed and casualties increased one squad and the mortar team were removed from the authorization. The 4th machine gun was retained in "Zug Trup". Field strength dropped to around 6-men. I do not think that there was any formal attempt to produce a sub-unit maneuver scheme for the small squad. Instead fire and maneuver was carried out within the platoon.

By all accounts this organization worked very well outside of built up areas. However the increasing defensive and urban nature of the war, especially on the Eastern Front led to a final, and very interesting, 1945 authorization.

The 1945 authorization called for two submachine gun squads (of 9-men). The third Squad was designated as a rifle squad (also of 9-men). It was authorized two machine guns. A third machine gun was retained in the "Zug Trup". Apparently because of massive enemy indirect fires, the rifle squad manned the main line of resistance with 2-3 machine gun teams. The two submachine gun squads were placed to the rear, often out of 82mm mortar range. They were tasked with outpost, patrol and counter attack duties. The 1945 authorization replaced the somewhat cumbersome horse cart/wagon lift with soviet style pony carts ("panje wagons", which reportedly were true all terrain and all weather vehicles. The "Zug Trup" was authorized the usual messengers , horse leaders, medic, and leader.

Of interest were the so-called "kiwi" or helpers, usually noncombatant former prisoners, assigned throughout the platoon who were tasked with various re-supply and evacuation tasks. These invaluable helpers compensated in part for the Platoons very low field strength of around 20-men. This small platoon generated an enormous amount of automatic fire power; and with hand held antitank weapons was a formidable opponent. The pony carts enabled the platoon to march vast distances with considerable ammunition in all weather and across most terrain.

Mindful of the manpower shortage in the West the 1945 model may be worth studying.

Finally a note of thanks. I have enjoyed and learned much from this thread.

Regards

Richard

[Ken White]

I'd like to throw two French weapons into the discussion - and a Chinese one.

LRAC F1
It's the French equivalent of the Carl Gustaf M3, but lightweight.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LRAC_F1
Section or platoon support weapon?Not a Carl Gustaf equivalent but rather an M20 rocket launcher equivalent. Like the M20, unwieldy and not too accurate.


SARPAC
Think: Reloadable M72. A weight advantage over M72 kicks in with the 2nd shot. More warheads than just HEAT were available.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarpac
Section or fire team support weapon?The LAW was reloadable also though the intent was to toss it after use. It too had various warheads (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M72_LAW) and there were a couple of variants the article doesn't mention. Biggest difference between the SarPac and the LAW was the latter sold well, the former did not. There's usually a reason for that.

[Norfolk]

Fuchs, Richard W, welcome to the Small Wars Council.:) When you have the time, please formally introduce yourselves here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=47469#post47469).

Fuchs, interesting pieces of kit there, especially the LRAC F1. Could come in handy at either Section or Platoon level, it's light enough, though I will defer to others here and concede that it would probably be best normally held at Company level. The 35mm QLB-06 AGL is an interesting piece of kit, but cannot be employed in the SF role; the PLA uses the earlier Type 87 (http://www.sinodefence.com/army/crewserved/type87grenade_35mm.asp), which can be used in the SF role. There are six of them normally held at Company level, I think; very nasty piece of kit. They replaced the Type 88 5.8mm GPMG at Company level, of which I believe there are a pair now at Platoon level; not such a great piece of kit.

Richard, the German Group (Section) and Train (Platoon) organization was very flexible, and almost always in organization flux. You are quite correct that tactics also normally focused at the Platoon, not the Section, level, the way it should usually be. As a former Bundeswehr man recently told me, the present German Platoon (doctrinally) usually organizes itself into 3 elements for an attack: assault, support, and reinforcement. Similar in some ways, but certainly not identical to the way that many other (especially English-speaking) Armies like to organize into Assault, Support, and Security elements for raids. I strongly suspect that German dismounted infantry tactics have not, in general terms, changed too much since WWII, though the new 10-man Infantry Group with the pair of MG-4 LMGs may change that now. I've got an English translation on the way of the Wehrmacht's 1942 H.D.v 120/2a The Infantry Squad, Platoon, and Company, and this will certainly help to confirm whether this is so or not. (Note to slapout9: this is the translation of the Military Intelligence Service Information Bulletin No. 15, "The German Rifle Company; For Study and Translation" manual that we found at Carlisle, but was in German only - and in the old German script at that. A gentleman in eastern Ohio translates some of the old wartime German manuals.)

The Squad/Section level existed more for command and control purposes during infiltration, and broke itself down into the Machine Gun Truppe (Troop - Squad) that you mentioned, and a Rifle Truppe, with the latter following the former in the Approach and Development phases (Advance/Movement-to-Contact). The Machine Gun Troops were normally used to win the Firefight (as part of the Platoon Firefight), and the Rifle Troops (under the combined command of the Platoon Leader) remained under cover until the Firefight was won by the MGs and it was time to perform the assault.

The organization you describe was, as you note, introduced late in the war. It only occurred on a very limited scale, as the StG-44 assault rifle was not produced in sufficient quantity to replace more than a fraction of the standard Kar 98 carbine. The loss of the MG 34 or 42 in the two Groups armed with StGs was not made up for by the firepower of said assault rifles, even with the pair of MGs retained in the third carbine-armed Group (Section) as well as the "reserve" MG held at Train (Platoon) HQ. In short, it was an interesting case study in the early problems encountered with the integration of assault rifles into the Platoon. It is intersting that the Bundeswehr retained until just the past couple years more or less the same Section and Platoon organization (minus the horses and their handlers, etc.) that the Wehrmacht doctrinally held to.

Edited to Add:

Ken W. wrote:



The LAW was reloadable also though the intent was to toss it after use. It too had various warheads (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M72_LAW) and there were a couple of variants the article doesn't mention. Biggest difference between the SarPac and the LAW was the latter sold well, the former did not. There's usually a reason for that.


Toss it, and then step on it, hard, so nobody could turn around and turn the LAW tube into an improvised mortar tube. The only people, of course, to reload the LAW were the VC. After they started doing this, the manufacturer designed a "fault" into the LAW tube to make it much easier to smash by stepping on it. Maybe it was Ken who was one of those who made this recommendation?

[William F. Owen]

@ The 1945 authorization called for two submachine gun squads (of 9-men). The third Squad was designated as a rifle squad (also of 9-men). It was authorized two machine guns. A third machine gun was retained in the "Zug Trup". Apparently because of massive enemy indirect fires, the rifle squad manned the main line of resistance with 2-3 machine gun teams. The two submachine gun squads were placed to the rear, often out of 82mm mortar range. They were tasked with outpost, patrol and counter attack duties.

@ Mindful of the manpower shortage in the West the 1945 model may be worth studying.



@ - Exactly. This is slightly different to the organisation I am aware of. What's the source? However the format I know of was near identical with each 9 man squad comprising 1-2 MG-42 and then SMGs and AT Weapons. The emphasis on Outposts, patrols and counter-attack, exactly reflects what the Germans knew about operations by that time.

@ Concur. Very useful points Richard W. Many thanks.

[Richard W]

William F. Owen:

Thank you for your kind reply.

In reply to your question regarding my source for the German Rifle Squad organization I offer the following:

German Squad Tactics In WWII by Matthew Gajkowski. A privately Published First Edition 1995. The author appears to have also privately published about a dozen works on various military organizations. The instant work further appears to be a translation in part of a WWII German publication. On pages 103, 104 and 106 the author gives the organization for the November 1944 Grenadier, Jager and Ski Platoons respectively (note: I believe that by 1944 all German, non-specialized infantry platoons wee designated as "grenadier".)

I find these organizations interesting for the following reasons:

1. Modern Western Infantry formations, like the 1944/45 Germans, are relatively few in number, undermanned and heavily equipped with a variety of weapons. The only exception that I know of is the USMC 13-man Squad which maintains a relatively high field strength.

2. Western Infantry formations have become extraordinarily motorized ( I understand that even the American Ranger battalions have mounted their platoons in various light trucks.) This motorization has by necessity tied the infantry platoons all too often to operating near road nets. These road nets can of course be easily interdicted by home made mines and command explosives.

3. Recently, as you no doubt know, the Royal Marines changed their battalion organization from 3-rifle and 1-weapons company to 2-rifle and 2-weapons companies. This may be a trend. The organizational change calls for even more vehicles. This means more road use. It also means more enemy interdiction of road nets by explosives.

4. The 1944/45 German Infantry responded to similar problems by the use of off road, all terrain, all weather support vehicles (pony carts) and non-combatant helpers (freed prisoners) and very small fighting platoons (field strength of around 20- fighting men - See Paul Carrel Hitler Moves East).

The Western pool of potential fighting infantrymen is shrinking yearly. It may be wise to lay the ground work for a radical change in organization, weapons, equipment and tactics.

Regards

Richard.

[William F. Owen]

3. Recently, as you no doubt know, the Royal Marines changed their battalion organization from 3-rifle and 1-weapons company to 2-rifle and 2-weapons companies. This may be a trend. The organizational change calls for even more vehicles. This means more road use. It also means more enemy interdiction of road nets by explosives.
.

I was tangentially involved in arguing against this, and may have had some small success. From what I now here, it will go back to 3 Rifle Coy and 1 FSS Coy, and there is another re-think in the pipeline.

The "trend" was caused by a slightly odd misreading of the operational record, which thinned out Coy Support and put it at the BG level. Why? I could never get a straight answer!

[Richard W]

William F. Owen:

God bless you if you had anything to do with limiting the erosion of Infantry from Western armies.

Regards

Richard

[Richard W]

This thread has prompted me to reread Guy Sajer's The Forgotten Soldier. Sajer was a French citizen with a German mother who was drafted into the German Army and volunteered for service in the elite Gross Deutchland Division on the Eastern Front.

Rifle Squad

He describes in great detail the organization (10-men: Squad leader, two 2-man light machine gun teams, two grenadiers and 3-riflemen. No mention of a fire team or squad subunit.) combat and disintegration of a German Rifle Squad in an assault and hasty defense (Pages 169 - 211).

However a 10-man squad was the exception. Usually the Squad strength was about 5-men built around a single light machine gun. (everyone carried linked ammunition for the gun.)

Throughout his account he emphasizes the importance of leadership and comradeship at the Squad level.


Light Machine Gun:

The Germans appeared very comfortable with the 10-man squad. It appeared to give them enough men to carry all of the weapons and ammunition needed for an assault. The light machine guns were without a doubt the key weapons. (interestingly it appears that the Germans took their light machine guns into building during urban combat. The machine gunners fighting if necessary with the their pistols,)

German Light (trench) mortar

Although the light mortar had disappeared from the platoon authorization by November 1943 (See German Squad Tactics in WWII by Gajkowske page 93) Sajer describes it (trench mortar) as in use fairly frequently but in urban combat.

German K 98 Mauser Rifle

This weapon appeared to be used almost as a personal defense weapon by the German Soldier. He was trained to use it at relatively short ranges. The light machine gun was used to engage targets at longer weapons. The German soldiers appeared to be fond of it because of its simplicity and reliability.

Russian "Grenade throwers"

I have no idea what this weapon is. Sajer cites it repeatedly as the most feared Russian weapon for the German infantry. (Did not Wilf or someone write that grenade projectors did most of the killing?)

Regards

Richard W.

[Fuchs]

This thread has prompted me to reread Guy Sajer's German Light (trench) mortar

Although the light mortar had disappeared from the platoon authorization by November 1943 (See German Squad Tactics in WWII by Gajkowske page 93) Sajer describes it (trench mortar) as in use fairly frequently but in urban combat.

German K 98 Mauser Rifle

This weapon appeared to be used almost as a personal defense weapon by the German Soldier. He was trained to use it at relatively short ranges. The light machine gun was used to engage targets at longer weapons. The German soldiers appeared to be fond of it because of its simplicity and reliability.

Russian "Grenade throwers"

I have no idea what this weapon is. Sajer cites it repeatedly as the most feared Russian weapon for the German infantry. (Did not Wilf or someone write that grenade projectors did most of the killing?)

Regards

Richard W.

* The 5cm light mortar (platoon level) production run ended quite early in the war due to insufficient effect, high complexity/price/weight and most likely also due to manpower shortages. Captured mortars, old production 5cm mortars and 8cm weapons were used later on.

* The Germans used the K98 predecessor (almost identical) for rapid assault repelling fire in WW1 and the weapon was certainly as capable as in WW1.
I'd rather call it a squad defensive weapon than a personal defence weapon (my freshly invented term, but more descriptive imho). It was often replaced by captured or regular production SMGs. The offensive tactics changed a lot with the introduction of assault rifles.

* The Russian "Grenade thrower" (Grenade thrower = incorrect / direct translation of Granatwerfer = which is about the same as a "Mörser" = mortar) was most likely the Russian 5cm company mortar. An ubiquitous weapon, but quite forgotten nowadays.

50mm Rotni minomjot obr.1940 g (50-RM 40)
12 kg
0.9 kg projectile (rather heavy for this calibre)
800 m range

The Russians were notorious for their extreme quantity of mortar fire (mostly small calibre), although nowadays it's easier to find info about their high quality (in comparison to Wehrmacht; lower weight, more range, heavier medium calibre gun - not all at once) field artillery pieces and the MRLs.

[Richard W]

Fuchs:

Thank you for the information.

German Rifle Grenade?

I just finished the Forgotten Soldier. Towards the end Sajer describes a fight between his company and partisans wherein the German appear to be armed with both a light mortar and grenade throwers. Could the German "grenade throwers" be rifle grenades? Did the Germans actually use rifle grenades in the field?

Assault Rifle 44?

Sajer at one point writes that he was armed with the "new P.M.". He also writes that the new P.M. has the characteristics of both the old P.M. and F.M. I think Sajer means MG 34/42 when he writes F.M. (I saw a National Geographic show about 6-months ago. They followed a British battlefield archaeologist in East Germany. He was accompanied by former East German EOD soldiers. They found along old defensive lines buried German assault rifles. The old Communist EOD guys claimed that this was common. Based solely on this one TV show I wonder if the German assault rifle was issued more frequently in the East than we thought?)

Translation

Sajer was a native French speaker. He never quite mastered German. He was very young. He served in the German Army between his 16th and 19th years. He wrote about his experiences in long hand French at night during asthma attacks. This was translated into German It was translated back into French. Then into English.

Thank you very much for your time.

Regards

Richard W

[Fuchs]

Fuchs:

Thank you for the information.

German Rifle Grenade?

I just finished the Forgotten Soldier. Towards the end Sajer describes a fight between his company and partisans wherein the German appear to be armed with both a light mortar and grenade throwers. Could the German "grenade throwers" be rifle grenades? Did the Germans actually use rifle grenades in the field?

Assault Rifle 44?

Sajer at one point writes that he was armed with the "new P.M.". He also writes that the new P.M. has the characteristics of both the old P.M. and F.M. I think Sajer means MG 34/42 when he writes F.M. (I saw a National Geographic show about 6-months ago. They followed a British battlefield archaeologist in East Germany. He was accompanied by former East German EOD soldiers. They found along old defensive lines buried German assault rifles. The old Communist EOD guys claimed that this was common. Based solely on this one TV show I wonder if the German assault rifle was issued more frequently in the East than we thought?)

The Germans had a spin-stabilized rifle grenade system ("Schießbecher") similar tot eh U.S. one since 1942, a discharger cup at the muzzle, a propellant-only cartridge and theoretically a sight at the left of the carbine. 30mm calibre, and it had due to spin a poor performance against armour.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Waffen/gewehrgranatgerat.htm

P.M. or MP? MP or MPi is Maschinenpistole, = submachine gun. "New" were indeed only the Maschinenkarabiner/Sturmgewehr (quite the same weapon) if he wasn't in a para unit (as non-national I would have expected Waffen-SS instead of Heer anyway).
The K43 was a Garand equivalent and most likely not what he wrote about.

Why should the StG44 have been issued more in the West/South than the East? I never heard/read any such suggestions before.
It's difficult to deal with Americans about this, but the main effort of the Wehrmacht was in 1941-1945 the Eastern Front. The Heer was grinded to its skeleton there, only part of its remains delayed the Allies in the West, and the Eastern Front always had high priority in the Heer.

[Richard W]

Fuchs:

Thank you for your kind reply.

I must have been unclear in my post. Sajer writes that he was issued a new "P.M." in 1944. At that time he was an 18 year old serving in the Gross Deutchland Division on the Eastern Front. Sajer was French. He may have inverted the initials. I think he meant "MP" 44. The documentary I saw suggested that the MP 44 was issued on the Eastern front in far greater quantities than we previously thought.

Did the German infantry use the rifle grenade in combat. It appears that the American infantry, in the main (with the exception of units like the Canadian - American 1SSF) rarely used the rifle grenade.

Thank you for your help.

Regards

Richard W

[Fuchs]

I've still not seen any credible info about rifle grenade importance for Germans in WW2. All I know is that the hardware existed, was produced, standard equipment and the AT rifle grenades were too weak.

I guess it takes someone who reads more of the nostalgic first-hand accounts (like in the "Der Landser" journal) than me to answer this question.

[Richard W]

Fuchs

I appreciate all of your time.

Regards

Richard W

[Richard W]

I have just finished reading Guy Sajer's The Forgotten Soldier and Max Hastings Overlord. Both books gave in depth descriptions of the 1944 German Infantry Squad. Sajer carries his description into 1945. There is of course a danger of worshiping all things German when it comes to WWII history. But The Germans seemed to have done somethings right with their WWII Rifle Squad composition. So right that if we compare the German 1945 Squad as described by Sajer to the 2008 American Squad we may fairly ask where have 63-years of Infantry research and development funds gone to?

The 1945 Gross Deutchland Division Squad was at full strength 10-men. It consisted of a leader, and two 2-man light machine gun teams armed with the superb MG 42 (7.92 x 57), and five riflemen (one the deputy leader) armed with the new assault rifle (MP43?MP 44/STG 44 in 7.92 x 33). (Note: I cannot figure out what the 1945 squad used for a grenade launcher. Whether the new assault rifle had the capability or they retained one or two K 98's or used the new double barrel flare pistol.)

In comparison an American 2008 Army Squad has 9 men at full strength. It consists of a leader with an M 16, 2-fire team leaders with M 16s, 2 grenadiers with 203's, 2 SAW Gunners with the M 249 and two riflemen with M 16s.

It would appear that in terms of fire power the 2008 American Army Squad is not a great improvement on the 1945 German Squad. (Some might argue that the MG 42 is superior to the M 249.) (OK Panzerfaust v Law/AT4 - I guess the AT4 wins.)

Indeed the only clear advantages that the 2008 squad has is in radios, night vision and body armor. However these advantages add weight (and cost). The weight slows the 2008 squad down compared to the 1945 squad. Maybe there are just some things that cannot, in a major way, be improved on. But I wish we could have spent all that money to make a large number of very good minor changes in our Rifle Squad.

Regards

Richard W.

[Fuchs]

The Wehrmacht got some 2.7cm grenade pistols (overcalibre ammunition) looking like the MZP-1 (equivalent of M79, but skeletonized). It was based on 2.7cm flare gun tech. The effect was too small and it was not considered as successful, but might have been in use with teams who had no carbine. I do not remember photos or texts that mate StG44 and Schießbecher.

One important advance over 40's tech that you missed is the proliferation of optical sights. An ACOG for normal riflemen is a huge improvement (IIRC the USMC introduced these as standard?). Some German sniper of WW2 had only a 1.5 power scope, 3-6 power were not standard. The squad that you described lacked the ability of accurate single shots beyond 200 m entirely.

The German late WW2 squad was a defensive squad, intended much less for attacks than for positional defense and delaying actions/ambushes. Its morale was much reduced, most of the enthusiastic/aggressive soldiers were lost long ago.
WW2 ammunition and weapons were heavy (not good idea for offensive actions), the need for body armor and radios was small due to the long foot marches and the use of field fortifications.
The modern U.S. squad is rather an all-round design.

Squad TO&E are like plans anyway - the troops in the field don't need to care much about that anymore once in contact. Some squads add firepower with heavier weapons/more machine guns, some discard unnecessary equipment, some get mixed with other squads for a new platoon organization, some adopt captured weapons, some ground forces insist even in peacetime on ad hoc platoon team designs for assaults, many squads are down to 80% when operations begin due to plain lack of personnel or simply sick personnel and some squads are down to 4-6 men after their baptism of fire.

It's more important to ensure that the troops in the field adapt quickly than to optimize the peacetime TO&E for 1-10% more efficiency.

I've read few times that squads became or become the smallest maneuver element - but I saw many hints that platoons have been the smallest maneuver element for many decades.
Many analysts look at the platoon and much less at the squad/section.

[Richard W]

Fuchs:

Interesting background information.

Regards

Richard W

[120mm]

Indeed the only clear advantages that the 2008 squad has is in radios, night vision and body armor.

You mean the only improvements between then and now is the ability to see in the dark and communicate?

####, man... What were we thinking???:rolleyes:

P.S. - Have you ever worn PVS-7Bs or better at night??? Or tried to lead a platoon without radios???

Of course, we haven't really "improved" the rifle squad, because the real improvements have come through various and sundry supporting arms and logistic things...

[Fuchs]

I understood that he was disappointed by firepower development and didn't really comment on the whole thing.

[Tom Odom]

In comparison an American 2008 Army Squad has 9 men at full strength. It consists of a leader with an M 16, 2-fire team leaders with M 16s, 2 grenadiers with 203's, 2 SAW Gunners with the M 249 and two riflemen with M 16s.


The modern U.S. squad is rather an all-round design.


The truth is that the US infantry squad has suffered for reasons that have nothing to do with the infantry. We configured the squad according to transport capacity, nine for Bradleys and 11 for light as that is what will fit on a Blackhawk. In the latter case, we downsized the light squad as a bill payer for the advanced attk helo, which we cancelled.

Tom

[Richard W]

120mm:

Thank you for your kind reply wherein you posted in part: "You mean the only improvements between then and now is the ability to see in the dark and communicate?"

I reply: Is it enough? As one commentator put it "we may own the night but we do not own the ground". Enemy insurgent infantry armed in the main with WWII technology (and above all the shovel) appears to have frustrated high tech Western infantry in Afghanistan, Southern Lebanon and Iraq. (see Drudge for links to Israeli papers wherein IDF infantry veterans have bitterly complained about the infantry fighting in Southern Lebanon.)

You also posted in part: "Have you ever worn PVS-7Bs or better at night??? Or tried to lead a platoon without radios???"

I reply: No. Am I missing something here? Are they worn during the day for some reason - zero a weapon? And yes. Was it not the norm in Western infantry until around 1990 to operate without an effective squad radio? The only functional radio was with the Platoon Leader. It was so heavy he needed a dedicated RTO. He also often had to climb to higher ground to talk to the Company Commander. How many Western infantry companies have had effective and complete internal 24/7 radio communications prior to 1990?

You also posted in part: "we haven't really "improved" the rifle squad, because the real improvements have come through various and sundry supporting arms and logistic things".

I reply: Perhaps we should. I have been reading some very well documented accounts of infantry fighting in Afghanistan. The enemy infantry appears to be able to stand and fight against Western rifle squads which backed with massive supporting fires and even small UAV's. (Strategy page reports that American infantry is being supported by 9,000 Raven UAV's.)

The CIA Director recently announced that a massive effort is being made to capture UBL. He has been at large for around 6 1/2 years now. It is not the fault of our rifle squads, However I think our rifle squads must be even more effective in the fight against Islamic insurgents.

Regards

Richard W

[Fuchs]

Strategy page is not to be recommended. It's barely good enough to tell somebody to keep the eyes open for something as perhaps for some reason they didn't get it wrong again.
Strategypage is at least 60% propaganda imho.

The whole 'infantry performance in combat' discussion depends heavily on expectations. Some people's expectations are easily exceeded, others are never content.
Equipment cannot be good enough if someone knows for sure how to improve it at acceptable costs, though.

[jcustis]

For the current Army squad, are the grenadiers true grenadiers, whose sole job is to work the M203? Or are they in practice a morph of something, like the USMC team leader who has a M203 for a T/E weapon?

If it is the former, then I could see how the Army squad may have some good things going for it, as I have never liked the fact that our Tm Ldrs have tried to work C2 and one of the most potent weapons in the squad's arsenal, thus resulting in the 50% effect rule.

[ODB]

The M203 is the most underutilized weapon in an Infantry squad. One of the main reasons is that there is slim to none training ammo (HE variety). Another is many leaders have never used/trained with it and therefore do not know how to properly utilize it. Funny story and prime example. Many years ago as a young squad leader we were conducting a night blank fire before going live. I taught my grenadiers how to properly ground burst illum rounds. I was maneuvering my flanking element and told my grenadier to shoot an illum round (ground burst). Little did we know that the entire chain of command had moved up on to the objective to observe our actions on the object. My grenadier did what he was taught and in the process about took the Company commanders head off. After we finished our actions on the commander started to chew my grenadiers ass. I immediately told him what I trained him to do and that he executed as trained. I was told by the commander that "we" are not proficient enough to utilize the weapon in any other way except for lauching illum into the sky. This is a fine example of leaders not knowing how to utilize the M203 and therefore soldiers for years have suffered. IMO bring back the M79 then maybe it'll actually get utilized.

[Richard W]

jcustis:

Back in the Dark Ages the Army fire team grenadier was the only guy who carried and operated the M79/203. At one point the Army was authorized a five man fire team. This was during the Draft. State side infantry squads were often over strength. So the five man fire team actually had five men.

The fire team was organized into a leader and two buddy teams. The lead or right buddy team was led a by an automatic rifleman supported by a rifleman. The trail or left buddy team was led by the grenadier supported by a rifleman.

The team leader would use tracer from his M16 to designate the target for the automatic rifleman. The grenadier would put rounds down on top where the the automatic rifleman's fires were hitting. The two riflemen carried ammunition for their principals and pulled security. They were not expected to shoot much. It was a good system.

I am told by very impressive young soldiers that the only things that have changed is that they are usually understrength and they carry a lot more gear. The grenadier is still the grenadier.

Regards

Richard W

[Richard W]

Fuchs:

Than you for the tip. Do you recommend another site?

Regards

Richard W

[Ken White]

theoretical as opposed to the actual...


...I reply: Is it enough? As one commentator put it "we may own the night but we do not own the ground".Meaningless comment and applies to a point on the ground and in time. It is not a universal truth by any means. Ground can be owned when necessary and relinquished when not. It is not possible for most forces today to fully occupy all ground in an area of interest -- nor is it necessarily desirable.
Enemy insurgent infantry armed in the main with WWII technology (and above all the shovel) appears to have frustrated high tech Western infantry in Afghanistan, Southern Lebanon and Iraq. (see Drudge for links to Israeli papers wherein IDF infantry veterans have bitterly complained about the infantry fighting in Southern Lebanon.)Drudge? Okay... :rolleyes:

What do you mean by frustrated? All combat forces get 'frustrated' on occasion; nature of the beast. If you mean that "Enemy insurgent infantry" has denied terrain to western infantry when said infantry really wanted the terrain in question, perhaps you could provide examples; I know of no cases where that has occurred in the last six or seven years. Hezbollah, by the way are not insurgents and the Israelis erred in letting their infantry skills atrophy and in the tactical decisions at high levels of command, I don't blame their infantry for being bitter.
I reply: No. Am I missing something here? Are they worn during the day for some reason - zero a weaponPerhaps; we now have the night vision equipment however it is widely available on the market and has already appeared in Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq, it's proliferating world wide and rapidly. Point being that relative advantage will soon disappear and you're back to relative equality of squad versus squad wherein firepower is a minor factor and state of training and attitude are the major factors. The tendency for theorists to count things as opposed to the intangibles always dooms theories to dustbins.
...And yes. Was it not the norm in Western infantry until around 1990 to operate without an effective squad radio? The only functional radio was with the Platoon Leader. It was so heavy he needed a dedicated RTO. He also often had to climb to higher ground to talk to the Company Commander. How many Western infantry companies have had effective and complete internal 24/7 radio communications prior to 1990?True but is it germane to the issue of improved capability today? We used to ride to work on elephants and we no longer do that; things change. The issue is not the item(s), it's their effective use.
...Perhaps we should. I have been reading some very well documented accounts of infantry fighting in Afghanistan. The enemy infantry appears to be able to stand and fight against Western rifle squads which backed with massive supporting fires and even small UAV's. (Strategy page reports that American infantry is being supported by 9,000 Raven UAV's.)These well documented accounts are written by whom? Media people?

The 'enemy' in Afghanistan does not have infantry, they have fighters. They are either really good at what they do (the old guys) or are inexperienced but quite brave (the young ones). Of course they can and will stand and fight. The issue is who prevails at the end of the day.
However I think our rifle squads must be even more effective in the fight against Islamic insurgents.Obviously your prerogative to believe that. However, my sensing is that you have allowed that belief to dictate amendments to a process and structure based on a theoretical construct and that perception without regard to actuality on the ground.

Still, your point may be valid, what precisely would you propose?

Might I again suggest you go to the "Tell us about you" thread and provide us a little background; surely your young contract administrator has had time to ponder that...

[Ken White]

...The fire team was organized into a leader and two buddy teams. The lead or right buddy team was led a by an automatic rifleman supported by a rifleman. The trail or left buddy team was led by the grenadier supported by a rifleman.

The team leader would use tracer from his M16 to designate the target for the automatic rifleman. The grenadier would put rounds down on top where the the automatic rifleman's fires were hitting. The two riflemen carried ammunition for their principals and pulled security. They were not expected to shoot much. It was a good system.Yet again beguiled by theory. What's stated above was the theory written by some young Snowbird in the air conditioning of Building 4. Practically, in combat, that rarely ever worked or happened.

[Richard W]

ODB:

Would not the grenadier feel exposed without an assault rifle attached to his grenade launcher? There was at one time 40mmm "shotgun round" for close defense. But it was a one shot capability and like a 12 gauge shotgun the pellets only opened up about one inch in pattern per yard traveled. Or do you think the M79 should be carried as an additional weapon like the LAW or AT4?

Regards

Richard W

[jcustis]

Perhaps; we now have the night vision equipment however it is widely available on the market and has already appeared in Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq, it's proliferating world wide and rapidly. Point being that relative advantage will soon disappear and you're back to relative equality of squad versus squad wherein firepower is a minor factor and state of training and attitude are the major factors. The tendency for theorists to count things as opposed to the intangibles always dooms theories to dustbins.

Once we hit parity, it will be interesting to see if there is a shift towards personal mini thermal viewers. It'll be a trip to see attacks scheduled to occur during slivers of moonlight, to somehow reduce an oppo's NVG capability.

The ammunition issue for M203s has been terrible for a long time, and there is a dead and buried Marine Gunner probably rolling over in his grave as I type. I also remember practice ranges being oriented towards more distant shots, with decent arcs of fire. The challenge is working a HEDP round at close-in distances, and getting it over and behind intervening cover. Training to that standard is definitely the objective, but we will likely never even be able to hit the threshold.

[Fuchs]

Once we hit parity, it will be interesting to see if there is a shift towards personal mini thermal viewers. It'll be a trip to see attacks scheduled to occur during slivers of moonlight, to somehow reduce an oppo's NVG capability.

A shift to thermal viewers might lead to massive use of smoke (the old IR-transparent varieties) to regain the advantage.
Smoke can be ordered, moonlight is difficult to control.

Next in the tech race would probably be a 3D mm wavelength radar helmet-mounted display. Followed by mm wavelength jammers.

B2topic:
Thermal sights should be limited for some years/decades to sharpshooters, leaders and machine gunners, just like LL sights were in the past. Grenadiers have only a small long-range role in comparison and can be tasked with close-range security without long-range sights.
Infantrymen were supporting their main weapon (machine gun) most of the time in WW2, that's probably a good idea in general.

[Richard W]

I have just started to reread Steel Inferno by Michael Reynolds. It is the story of the 1st SS Panzer Corps in Normandy. One of the things that strikes me in the story is the willingness and ability of the SS Panzer Grenadiers to get out of their vehicles for extended periods of time (weeks) and fight and march effectively. It seems to me that our modern Western infantry, even the light infantry is becoming more and more mechanized. They do not seem to operate away from vehicles for extended periods of time. Vehicles mean roads. Roads mean mines.

Perhaps this cannot be helped. However all three rifle companies in a SS Panzer Grenadier company led by their Battalion Commander would march and fight on foot. Much to the confusion of the Allies in Normandy. Perhaps it is a skill our infantry need to relearn? Perhaps such a skill would demand a reorganization of the rifle squad?

Regards

Richard W

[Fuchs]

I have just started to reread Steel Inferno by Michael Reynolds. It is the story of the 1st SS Panzer Corps in Normandy. One of the things that strikes me in the story is the willingness and ability of the SS Panzer Grenadiers to get out of their vehicles for extended periods of time (weeks) and fight and march effectively.

IIRC they did so because their vehicles (IIRC several hundreds SdKfz 250 and 251) were too thinly armoured (.3" bullet-proof) for Western Front conditions (.50 machine guns, ground attack aircraft) and because the terrain was too closed for classic Panzergrenadier employment anyway. They were also short on gasoline.

[Steve Blair]

IIRC they did so because their vehicles (IIRC several hundreds SdKfz 250 and 251) were too thinly armoured (.3" bullet-proof) for Western Front conditions (.50 machine guns, ground attack aircraft) and because the terrain was too closed for classic Panzergrenadier employment anyway. They were also short on gasoline.

Quite so. A shortage of vehicles also played a role with some (but not all) units.

[jcustis]

Perhaps this cannot be helped. However all three rifle companies in a SS Panzer Grenadier company led by their Battalion Commander would march and fight on foot. Much to the confusion of the Allies in Normandy. Perhaps it is a skill our infantry need to relearn? Perhaps such a skill would demand a reorganization of the rifle squad?

If we did re-learn this, we wouldn't be wearing the current levels of body armor with side plates anymore.

[Richard W]

jcustis:

Would it be possible for an American Rifle Squad leader to be granted leave to decide for himself when and when not for his Squad to wear armor?

Thank you

Regards

Richard W.

[Richard W]

Fuchs:

Thank you for your kind reply. I have not got to the part yet where Reynolds explains why the SS Panzer Grenadiers fought almost the entire campaign on foot. But I suspect you are right.

Regards

Richard W

[Richard W]

Back in the Dark Ages the American Army started teaching something called the Dupuy foxhole. (I believe that polite company used the term "fighting position" in lieu of foxhole.) Apparently an American Army General (Dupuy) had studied the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. He came up with an entire system of military thought based upon his study. ("If it can be seen it can be hit")

This translated to a new foxhole for the grunt (and a lot more digging). The Dupuy foxhole essentially was a two man position with a protective berm to it front. The soldiers shot to the oblique from behind the protection of the berm. In order to counter such protective positions, and survive enemy indirect fires, General Dupuy proposed that the then five-man fire team maneuver more aggressively on the battlefield. Almost like a small Squad. In order to do this the fire team had to have its own maneuver elements. It was divided into two "buddy teams" and a leader. One buddy team was built around the M79 and one around the automatic rifle (for a short period of time the echo model of the M14 or M14A1 was reintroduced.)

General Dupuy thought that indirect fire was the big killer on the battlefield. The fire team with its M79 had its own indirect fire weapon. The automatic rifle would pin down the enemy. The grenade launcher would finish him off. The leader woudl mark target with tracer.

With the end of the draft most squads shrank to the size of a fire team. Then the Army switched to the 4-man fire team. It appears that the system never really took root. However indigenous forces, based on a large population, sponsored by the US government used the Depuy fire team tactics. Reportedly with success.

Regards

Richard W

[Ken White]

...This translated to a new foxhole for the grunt (and a lot more digging).and regrettably ill informed as to reality versus theory. Not to be confrontational, I truly do not mean to be but you make these assertions based on your reading as if they were fact. Mostly, they aren't.

Yes, you're correct -- but DePuy (with an 'e' not a 'u[') forgot that Americans hate to dig. We're lousy defenders, we do not do it well. Note that every celebrated British battle is a defence (they do it well) but all ours are attacks -- we don't defend at all well, never have. The DePuy bunker died a natural death.
...General Dupuy proposed that the then five-man fire team maneuver more aggressively on the battlefield. Almost like a small Squad. In order to do this the fire team had to have its own maneuver elements. It was divided into two "buddy teams" and a leader. One buddy team was built around the M79 and one around the automatic rifle (for a short period of time the echo model of the M14 or M14A1 was reintroduced.)That didn't work either. There were three problems; Americans prefer to select their own buddies; the level of training of most fire team leaders couldn't handle the control issue in a dispersed combat setting; and most squads were never full, stateside or overseas (the recruiting problem even with no war was not providing enough people and the draft also failed to fill everyone).
... The grenade launcher would finish him off. The leader woudl mark target with tracer.More great theory. Unfortunately, most Team leaders did not get any tracers; those that did quickly stopped using them. It seems a tracer not only shows where one is shooting, it also shows from where one is shooting...
With the end of the draft most squads shrank to the size of a fire team. Then the Army switched to the 4-man fire team. It appears that the system never really took root.Incorrect on both counts; the former was very much a function of where the unit was located and what its required mission readiness criteria happened to be. The second item is true but was driven by the desire to create two new Divisions without a concomitant increase in end strength. The 'system' you describe never took root because it didn't work. That's not to say teams and squads did not successfully use fire and maneuver, they did -- they just didn't do it in the way you describe.
However indigenous forces, based on a large population, sponsored by the US government used the Depuy fire team tactics. Reportedly with success.Could you share you source for this assertion with us?

[Fuchs]

It seems a tracer not only shows where one is shooting, it also shows from where one is shooting...

For obvious safety reasons I've refrained from trying to see a dark ignition tracer shot from the far business end.
I wonder whether the late ignition (10-50m away from muzzle) helps to keep at least the exact position difficult to spot as it is supposed to do (besides reduction of barrel wear).

Any experiences?

edit: And if it's still too compromising (likely, as most post-WW2 tracer cartridges were of the dark ignition type afaik), how about using incendiary cartridges? Incendiary provides a more visible impact afaik (I never shot with INC - environment and no real training requirement anyway).

[Richard W]

After the American five - man fire team went the way of the dinosaur something interesting happened. The Army authorized every Rifle Squad not one but two belt fed machine guns. One for each fire team.

The German Army had invaded Poland in 1939 with one light machine gun per squad. Later the German Army and Air Force authorized some squads (Panzer Grenadiers and Parachute) two light machine guns per squad.

By June 1944 most second line Infantry formations in Normandy (like the 352 Division) were authorized 4-light machine guns in each rifle platoon (one in each squad and one in the platoon headquarters.) The German Company also had a two gun heavy machine gun squad. Finally there was a gun in the company trains. A total authorization of 15 heavy and light machine guns. (and as Max hastings pointed out in Overlord the Germans also had the ammunition authorization on the ground to match the guns.)

An American Army Rifle Company by contrast had only two machine guns authorized and a much less scale of ammunition. (See Beyond the Beaches, the story of teh American 29th Infantry Division during the Normandy campaign for a very interesting discussion regarding the opposing machine gun tactics.)

This was not good for the good guys.

For reasons I cannot understand the American Rifle Squad continued to soldier on through WWII, Korea and Vietnam without a belt fed machine gun. (I understand that some specialist units had one or more machine guns assigned to each rifle squad.) Apparently it was not until Gulf War I that most American Rifle Squads received their light machine guns.

But when they received the light machine guns the American Squads, for the first time in their history, suddenly had serious fire power at their disposal. However at the same time the perennial Western manning problem raised its ugly head. The American Rifle Squad with an authorized strength of nine men was often reduced to five or six men.

These five or six soldiers had to carry two light machine guns, two grenade launchers, assault rifles, various missiles, rockets and other explosive devices, viewing aids, one or more radios, sundry items, ammunition and armor. And unlike their 1944 German Rifle Squad opponent they did not have a pony cart to assist in movement.

Which brings us back to Rifle Squad composition. Can we have a truly foot mobile Western Rifle Squad in the 21st Century?

Regards

Richard W

[William F. Owen]

Which brings us back to Rifle Squad composition. Can we have a truly foot mobile Western Rifle Squad in the 21st Century?



I can only repeat my enduring observations and opinions, that foucssing on the Squad is a waste of time. It's platoons, multiples and sub-units that actually do the fighting. Squads exist soley to function within a platoon context.

You do not want to be foot mobile. You want to be able to operate dismounted as and when required. The ability to do this is based purely on good training and judgement. EG: When you need to carry lots of water and rations to go long distance through the jungle, you don't wear body armour, or just carry one plate in a plate carrier.

Of course I could be wrong, so anyone things to the contrary, speak up.

[Richard W]

William F. Owen:

Thank you for your kind reply.

I have formed a snapshot in my head of a healthy German Rifle (Grenadier) Squad and Platoon on the Eastern Front in 1944/45. (See Carrol's Hitler Moves East, Sajer's The Forgotten Soldier, Michael Reynolds' works on the Waffen SS. and also Beyond the Beaches).The German Squad consists of five or six soldiers. The Squad, in open terrain, is armed with a MG34/42 light machine gun. The other soldiers carry a variety of German and captured small arms. The soldiers carry little else. Most of their meager gear (along with a antitank weapon or two and mines) is dumped in a Russian all terrain, all weather vehicle called a pony cart. The cart is led by a Soviet

prisoner who is quite happy to exchange the horrors of a German prisoner camp for the dangers of the Eastern Front.

Two of the three Squads in the platoon are led by experienced soldiers. One Squad is led by a noncommissioned officer. Each leader is assisted by a deputy (As far as I know the only deputy position in the German Army in WWII.) Two soldiers are assigned to the light machine gun. The remaining soldier(s) is designated a grenadier.

The Platoon is led by a noncommissioned officer. He is assisted by a headquarters leader, two runners, a medic and a pony cart again led by a Soviet helper.

In urban terrain the light machine guns are removed from the first and second squads and placed in the third squad and platoon headquarters which form "resistance points". The first and second squads perform outpost, patrolling and counter attack duties in a built up area. This is a platoon with a maximum field strength of around 24 combatants. It was incredibly mobile and required very little in terms of resupply.

I think its field strength is remarkably similar to a British Army Infantry Platoon's strength in the Falklands (See Max Hastings and General Frost's works on this subject). (Note: I am privalaged to have copies of the post action reports of several of the British Army Infantry Batallions which faught in the Falklands. Except for the Gurka Battalion all of the Rifle Platoons were very small.) However I do not think, and I say this with the greatest respect for the British soldier, that the Professional British Squad is as moblie as the conscript WWII German Squad.

(as you know one of the great criticism's of the French Army in IndoChina was that it was far too mechanized and had forgot how to walf (with certain outstanding exceptions like Bigerd's 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion. [See Falls' Strret Without Joy and Hell in a Very Small Place.])

It appears that the instant British Rifle Platoon still has a remarkably low field strength. It is is even less foot mobile than its South Atlantic father. In my opinion, and I write this with the greatest respect, a rifle platoon prior to comabt that has a field strength of 20-24 combatants is likely and naturally to break down into four groups one of which is a headquarters. The remaining three groups I think will be hard put to avoid bearing the title "squad".

How that "Squad" is organized, trained and equiped may one day be of the greatest importance to the West. And, at the risk of appearing arrogant, I think our Squads may have to regain extended foot mobility.

Forgive the long post.

Regards

Richard W

[William F. Owen]

I'll try and make this as succinct as possible as I can deal with all the points you make, in detail.

1. Squads/Sections very rarely operate alone. The British Sections of 1918, fought as part of a platoon. There was not intention of making them fight as sections. Platoon Strength was 27-28 men.

2. The German Army of WW2 is a very poor reference point for modern operations. It didn't have the communications and sensors we have today, and by 1944 the infantry was so pushed for man power and training time, it was far less than optimal. How Armies equipped and organised their sections had no effect on the outcome of WW2.

3. A 24-30 man platoon capable of variable groupings, and weapon sets, probably best fulfils the requirements of modern operations. 1 Officer, 1 Sgt, 2 Corporals and 2 L/Cpls is about right.

4. How Platoons are trained, equipped and organised, is of some importance, both in terms of operational capability and also the best use of the budget.

5. What do you mean "Foot mobility?" I am an infantry Apostle, Heretic, Critic and annoyance, but the issue of foot mobility is an utter mystery to me and I never understands it's fascination. Physical fitness, rational operational loads and patrol skills are all essential. Only Infantry can operate across the spectrum of terrain, populations and threats. None of this has anything to do with being "foot mobile", but maybe I am missing the point.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2675&highlight=Patrol+Based This may be useful.

Not to bore the ever tolerant population of SWC, but I now have some pretty firm ideas as to what the modern platoon may look like, and how it should work. Happy to pass it on, if you PM me.

[Fuchs]

Your corporals need to be well-trained if that leadership layout shall suffice in high intensity operations.
I doubt the effectiveness of platoon leadership in both urban and forest combat because of LOS interruptions. Such terrains demand a robust squad leadership imho.
Some patrol scenarios require sub-units of no more than three, sometimes even two men for maximum efficiency. Full platoons leave too many traces, are too easily spotted, don't fit in many hideouts.

The radio equipment in combination with the present lethality of direct and indirect fires plus a good responsiveness of indirect fires influences my opinion on this. Infantry needs to be able of skirmishing / reconnaissance / counter-reconnaissance missions in high intensity warfare. A minimal signature (being a small element helps a lot) helps to survive, and a team of two can as easily call for indirect fires as an entire platoon.
Counter-reconnaissance doesn't require entire platoons as well - sniping and fire&forget ATGMs plus proper ambushing is enough.

Let's consider modern "Jagdkampf" as it exists in German and Austrian theory (I see some inherent problems in the concept, though):
A reinforced platoon operates ahead of friendly forces (possibly unintentionally because neighbouring units were overrun).
Small teams provide area reconnaissance, several squads or smaller teams are used as manoeuvre elements to join for an ambush on detected opponents.
This requires much more squad-level leadership than you described imho.

I've seen some texts on your platoon designs, but I had several times the impression that
- it's either a simple 2-section platoon
or
- you assume that the platoon is the smallest element and teams/sections are not really capable of temporarily pursuing independent missions

[Richard W]

William F. Owen:

Thank you for your kind reply.

I have read the link to your posts regarding patrol based infantry. I am on my second reading. They are brilliant. I am having a difficult time trying to grasp some of the points.

I will certainly take you up on your generous offer to send you a private message wherein I will beg for more information on this subject.

Please allow me to publicly pontificate on the following subjects:

Foot mobility: Some years ago I had the opportunity, privilege really, to do a job with the French Army on the ground. The leadership consisted entirely of veterans of the Colonial Parachute Battalions and Regiments and 2REP. 3BEP and even the dreaded 1REP. Their idea of foot mobility was for an entire Battalion, to include the commander and his staff, "to disappear" in the back country for 3-5 days without backpacks or resupply. Rightly or wrongly I was profoundly impressed with their idea of "foot mobility". (They were nuts on mobilityI am not making this up. They had a unit brothel. It was termed a "mobile" brothel. .) The French had a lot of experience fighting Muslim insurgents. I think their "foot mobility" may be useful in the present fight.

Rifle Squad Man Power: I fear the West may not be able to sustain ground combat against Muslin insurgents because of man power limitations. The Germans had a lot of innovative ideas to get around their man power shortages. We may have to adopt them if we are to survive. (I followed British media reports about an 8-man Rifle Squad from a regular battalion preparing for a six month tour in Afghanistan. In order to bring it to authorized strength the Army had to draft in 4-territorial soldiers, one Army Air Corps soldier and a regular from another infantry battalion. How long can the West keep this up?)

Terminology: I am struck as to how confusing military titles for the same size unit can be. For instance since 1939 English speaking Armies have used the following titles for the same size formation: Regiment, Regimental Combat Team, Regimental Landing Team, Brigade, Brigade Group, Brigade Combat Team, Combat Command, Group and my favorite: "Unit of Action". My head hurts. I hope we can stick to "Squad".

I shall attempt to send a "PM". Thank you for your patience.

Regards

Richard W

[Norfolk]

The key to German Infantry tactics and performance was leadership that emphasized the development and use of judgement, boldness, and risk-taking. As any good infantry leader will do, he takes what men and weapons are available to him, and matches them to the stituation at hand. Formal structures are for apportioning troops and equipment to anticipated tasks, and act as a basis for change, and should not act as a constraint on the leader's ability to anticipate, to plan, and to act. They are useful as a starting point for allocating available resources (I hate phrases like that, but offhand I don't know what other to use) in peacetime and for the start of campaigns or operations. The Germans were fluid in their thinking and their TTPs. They paid no more attention in practice to formal structures than was necessary for planning the allocation of available resources to general concepts of missions and tasks to be performed, and doctrine served principally as a learning aid for developing tactical judgement and for providing common sources of reference.

I just received a copy of the 1942 draft of H.Dv. 130/2a, The Rifle Company (it covers the field from individual soldier right up to Company and is only 200 pages long), and it not only confirms but expands on whatever I've read on the German approach to infantry tactics, and English-speaking Armies would have a hard time adapting to German methods, or rather lack of formal methods. We just won't allow in practice (not for long at least) giving our infantry leaders the sort of freedom of thought and action that the Germans gave theirs, or the sort of very thorough training that they gave their leaders (and of course their soldiers, too). The Germans were minimalist on formal methods, and maximalist on honing the tactical judgement of each leader to respond to each situation. Two words can describe the essence of German infantry tactics: boldness and fluidity. All else flows from that. And few, if any present-day Armies match or even approach the Wehrmacht in these regards.

Richard W.:

Agreed, foot-mobile infantry are necessary, provided that one qualifies the statement by saying that most non-Armoured/Mechanized Infantry Battalions should be able to march and fight entirely on foot if need be, but should at the same time possess a full roster of organic wheeled transport for use when terrain, visibility, or the mission do not preclude their use. In the case of true Light Infantry (Mountain Troops, Paratroops, Commandos, etc.), wheeled transport may also be necessary, but it may often be dispensed with depdending upon conditions. Mountain troops may find themselves very dependent upon hauling their own supplies on their own backs, or by helicopter when possible. Deep-forest or riverine/swamp operations likewise render motor-transport useless, or mostly so, and helicopters again (and small boats) help to fill in when troops aren''t having to carry everything on their own backs. And Paratroops and Commandos may have to do without full motor-transport during raids, seizure of beacheads/airfields, key terrain features, etc. for several hours or even several days. But generally speaking, foot-mobile infantry need access to full motor-transport (preferably organic) when and where possible.

One of the problems in LIC is when motorized/mechanized/armoured infantry are used in lieu of regular foot infantry; the mobility of the former encourages the belief that one can perform the same missions with fewer troops than the latter. Unfortunately, nothing less than having troops physically present most or all of the time suffices in many LIC situations, and being fully dependent upon motor-transport renders one more vulnerable to booby-traps, roadside bombs, ambushes, etc. Not to mention that not being physically on location all the time deprives you of intelligence and leaves the enemy more or less free to act - and you unable to react on the spot as things are justing starting. It's kind of like the difference between having a cop on each street corner and having the streets patrolled by cops in squad-cars.

Edited to Add:

On the subject of ARs vs MGs in the Platoon, Ken handled the matter pretty comprehensively starting at this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=46041&postcount=183), and his next few subsequent posts.

[Fuchs]

We just won't allow in practice (not for long at least) giving our infantry leaders the sort of freedom of thought and action that the Germans gave theirs, or the sort of very thorough training that they gave their leaders (and of course their soldiers, too).

IIRC the Bundeswehr attempted in the 90's to give every squad a Feldwebel (Staff Sergeant) as leader and at least one Stabsunteroffizier (Sergeant) more.
I cannot comment on the past few years because I left and the meaning/requirements of NCO ranks changed (rank inflation).
One rank higher than Staff Sergeant (that would be Oberfeldwebel) was already very appropriate rank for leading a platoon if no officer is available.

Low level initiative helps in difficult situations like when just one or two boats successfully cross a river and 6-30 men need to overwhelm a defense grid of interlocking machine gun positions. That's how the Meuse river crossing at Sedan 1940 worked. No officer survived the initial crossing, but NCO-led teams tore a gap into the French defence.

[Richard W]

Norfolk:

Thank you for the link regarding the automatic rifle v the machine gun. However I remain unconvinced by the arguments found therein. I am on the other hand convinced by the arguments found in the previously cited Beyond The Beaches that the Squad belt fed light machine gun is superior to the Squad magazine fed automatic rifle.

Regards

Richard W

[Kiwigrunt]

...I think its field strength is remarkably similar to a British Army Infantry Platoon's strength in the Falklands (See Max Hastings and General Frost's works on this subject). (Note: I am privalaged to have copies of the post action reports of several of the British Army Infantry Batallions which faught in the Falklands. Except for the Gurka Battalion all of the Rifle Platoons were very small.) ...

Richard W

Reports only on army battalions or also marines?
Do they include some relevant feedback on effect of 2 x GPMG per section as opposed to 1 (2 Para)? And (for marines) the effect of L7 GPMG versus L4 Bren LMG?

[Fuchs]

I am on the other hand convinced by the arguments found in the previously cited Beyond The Beaches that the Squad belt fed light machine gun is superior to the Squad magazine fed automatic rifle.

"It depends"

Belt-feed has generally proved to be more successful, but tactics change.
There's probably no difference between belt and magazine fed machine guns against targets with short exposure like a man running for two seconds from one cover to another. You cannot expend more than a 30rds magazine on this occasion anyway.
Magazine-fed machine support weapons seem to tend to be more accurate and useful as bipod-stabilised long-range single fire weapons (like the LSW), although this is possible with belt feed as well (HK21E). Many belt fed machine guns use open bolt system, though - that's not good for accuracy. Other belt-fed machine guns have their bipod directly attached tot he barrel, which increases dispersion due to troublesome vibrations.

Belt feed is superior in ammo weight (belt pouch + links vs. magazine weight) and in general in volume of fire (this is irrelevant if 100rds magazines compete with 100 or 150 rds belt pouches).

Belt fed weapons tend to be heavier for several reasons, I personally would prefer magazine feed (a lightweight weapon similar in concept to LSW or LMG36) in assault teams and belt feed (open bolt operation, tripod capable, telescope/magnifying scope) for everything else.

Overall it's often a close call which explains why both concepts co-exist at least in the small calibre range (full rifle calibre and AT rifle calibre magazin-fed machine guns are almost extinct).

[Richard W]

Kiwigrunt:

I cannot find a report from one of the Royal marine Commandos. But I recommend a book by their Brigade Commander (Vaux) titled Take that Hill. What I do have:

Scots Guards: The only comment on machine guns regards the ".50 MG were very effective against enemy sangars...they were very good for our morale,,,Their weight and weight of ammunition severely reduced the options for their use when solely manpacked".

2 Para: Under the heading "Minor Tactics": The Battalion was fortunate that it acquired sufficient GPMGs for two per section. Consequently fire and maneuver at section level was between two gun groups, which proved far more satisfactory that between a gun group and a rifle group". (Note this passage was underlined by the writer.) Further: The GPMG, on the other hand, more than proved its worth both in the light and sustained fire role". More under "Recommendations": "A rifle section should be established for two GPMGs". Finally 2 Para reports that its ammunition scale for the GPMG was "800 rds per gun". Ouch!

3 Para: Also "800 rds per gun". Under "Section Organization": "two light machine guns would have been undoubtedly better than one". More: "GPMG. Proved first rate in both light and SF roles. There is a firm need for two light machine guns per section".

1/7 Gurkha Rifle: Each section was divided into "two groups of four: each group had one GPMG". More: "The additional GPMG/LMG per section was most welcome adn provided devastating fire power".

I could not find anything on the Bren.

Regards

Richard W

[Richard W]

Fuchs:

Thank you for your kind reply.

Please see the comments extracted from the British reports above on this subject. In my opinion the 7.62 belt fed machine gun is, in most circumstances, the backbone of Infantry Squad fire power. There is simply no replacement for it. On the other hand it is not too helpful as a personal weapon in room combat. The November 1944 German Squad reorganization (discussed previously) I think addressed this problem. It placed the guns, in an urban setting, with the third squad and platoon headquarters.

Regards

Richard W

[RJ]

Richard W - points of historical order.

When the German Army began the war its primary maneuver elements (Platoons and Squads) were agressivly into assualt mode.

By 1944, most German Army actions for units at that level were definsive in nature. I suspect the increase in MG's per Platoon or Squad were for defense.

The availability of trained and seasoned infantry in the last 18 months of the war in Europe was minimal at best. With the historical mix in that time frame of very young and very old troopers, a need for more fire power in the defense could have evolved because the ability of the German Infantry Squads just didn't measure up to the quality of the troops in 1939 thuough 43.

A lot of good German infantry had been used up in Africa and the Eastern Front by the end of 1943.

Have you adjusted any of your concepts about Rifle Squads
to include this degradation of quality in the German Formations near the end of hte war?

[Richard W]

RJ:

Thank you for your kind reply.

This is a subject way above me. Right now I am reading several books that discuss this matter. (Van Crevald Fighting Power, Reynolds Steel Inferno, Hastings Overlord, Keegan Six Armies) Based on the foregoing this is my uneducated guess on what was going on in the 1944/45 German Infantry Squad.

At its height in 1944 the German Army numbered around 6.5 million (remarkably similar to US Army Ground Forces). However between 1939 and 1945 it suffered around 1.7 million KIA. There had to be a decline in Infantry quality. However all of the foregoing authors cite testimonials from Western Generals that the German Army had a seemingly endless supply of very good combat leaders (Curiously they did not seem to have abnEisenhower or a Marshall or a King).. Indeed the quality of combat leadership may have increased towards the end of the war.

The German Army, unlike the Western Allies, deliberately organized their Army into a, qualitatively speaking, hierarchal and uneven fashion. Something as follows:

1. Elite units capable of leading the assault.
2. Units capable of offensive operations.
3. Units capable of front line defensive operations.
4. Units capable of rear area security.
5. Units capable of manning static fortifications.

Right up until 1945 the German Army fielded elite, well armed and equipped assault units boasting 10-man rifle squads. I think that the November 1944 infantry reorganization enabled, on paper, the German infantry to better conduct delays and defensive operations while retaining the ability to conduct local counter attacks. My hunch is that the German personnel system made very good use of a declining man power pool (organizing static "Stomach" heavy machine gun units wherein all of the personnel had the same medical aliment.). Above all the German leadership at all levels except the very top were infinitely flexible.

It is a real shame that Hitler got his hands on the German Army.

Regards

Richard

[Kiwigrunt]

Kiwigrunt:

I cannot find a report from one of the Royal marine Commandos. But I recommend a book by their Brigade Commander (Vaux) titled Take that Hill. What I do have:

Scots Guards: The only comment on machine guns regards the ".50 MG were very effective against enemy sangars...they were very good for our morale,,,Their weight and weight of ammunition severely reduced the options for their use when solely manpacked".

2 Para: Under the heading "Minor Tactics": The Battalion was fortunate that it acquired sufficient GPMGs for two per section. Consequently fire and maneuver at section level was between two gun groups, which proved far more satisfactory that between a gun group and a rifle group". (Note this passage was underlined by the writer.) Further: The GPMG, on the other hand, more than proved its worth both in the light and sustained fire role". More under "Recommendations": "A rifle section should be established for two GPMGs". Finally 2 Para reports that its ammunition scale for the GPMG was "800 rds per gun". Ouch!

3 Para: Also "800 rds per gun". Under "Section Organization": "two light machine guns would have been undoubtedly better than one". More: "GPMG. Proved first rate in both light and SF roles. There is a firm need for two light machine guns per section".

1/7 Gurkha Rifle: Each section was divided into "two groups of four: each group had one GPMG". More: "The additional GPMG/LMG per section was most welcome adn provided devastating fire power".

I could not find anything on the Bren.

Regards

Richard W


Thanks for that Richard.

It is interesting to note that there appears to be a consensus through a number of battalions in favour of fireteams with a gimpy each. Not quite in line with Karcher's (or Melody? I get confused) suggestion of one gun per squad.

[Richard W]

Kiwigrunt:

Thank you for your kind reply.

If memory serves the British put eight battalion size formations into the Falklands (1 Welch Guards, 1 Scots Guards, 1/7 Gurkha, 2, Para, 3 Para, and 40, 42 and 45 RM Commando). I would describe the Welch and Scots Guards as dismounted mechanized infantry. I would also describe the remaining six formations as light infantry. Every Rifle Section in each battalion was authorized one GPMG.

It is interesting that to the best of my knowledge the two dismounted battalions neither tried to increase their number of GPMGs nor did they recommend post action that the number be increased.

The three Army light battalions both tried to double the number of GPMG's and recommended that the number be permanently doubled post action.

The three Royal Marine light battalions both tried to bring a GPMG and a Bren Gun for each section and recommended two guns per section post action.

In other words the guys who knew all about carrying heavy things were the most enthusiastic for the additional weight of another GPMG and 800 rounds of 7.62 x 51 link (about 56 pounds without the packaging).

The SAS were engaged in an action early on to cover the beach landing site. The target was a group of Argentine soldiers overlooking the landing beaches. They were called the "Fanning Hill Mob" by the SAS. If memory serves the SAS alloted 24 men to attack the Fanning Hill Mob. Twelve of the 24 carried a GPMG for the task.

See the books by Hastings, Frost and Vaux for more on this subject.

Regards

Richard W

[120mm]

120mm:

You also posted in part: "Have you ever worn PVS-7Bs or better at night??? Or tried to lead a platoon without radios???"

I reply: No. Am I missing something here? Are they worn during the day for some reason - zero a weapon?

I think I've failed to communicate, here. When I said PVS-7Bs or better, I meant PVS-7B or "a better version of NODs." (Didn't mean to apply that wearing them at night was "better", so sorry about that.)

You do have a point about squad composition, but as others have said before me, how important a point is it? Back when I was much younger, we had large squads that didn't work, and small squads that did.

On belt-feds at the squad level: The main problem I see, as a former M60 gunner, is the feeding method, itself is problemmatic when you want someone to be mobile. The bag/box and links were constantly getting fouled, or torn off, or you just couldn't move quick enough to keep up with the rest of the squad.

I've seen some home-brewed versions of the RPK that looked promising, (cut down barrel and different stock) with the hard ammo case; and there are versions of the SAW ammo box that are better than others.

But at the squad level, you have a definite trade-off, when it comes to the automatic rifle/squad machinegun.

On the M203: I've never been a fan of this design. The method of loading is anti-intuitive and cumbersome. The new H&K underbarrel launcher appears to be lightyears ahead of it, esp. in it's ability to be detached and used as a pistol. (as well as the pivot to load)

I once had the opportunity to burn up 300 HE and 800 paint rounds that were going "out of date" and am impressed with the round's basic capabilities once you get some practice, and "think out of the box" with it....

[William F. Owen]

Kiwigrunt:

Scots Guards: The only comment on machine guns regards the ".50 MG were very effective against enemy sangars...they were very good for our morale,,,Their weight and weight of ammunition severely reduced the options for their use when solely manpacked".

2 Para: Under the heading "Minor Tactics": The Battalion was fortunate that it acquired sufficient GPMGs for two per section. Consequently fire and maneuver at section level was between two gun groups, which proved far more satisfactory that between a gun group and a rifle group". (Note this passage was underlined by the writer.) Further: The GPMG, on the other hand, more than proved its worth both in the light and sustained fire role". More under "Recommendations": "A rifle section should be established for two GPMGs". Finally 2 Para reports that its ammunition scale for the GPMG was "800 rds per gun". Ouch!


The .50 is man packable but at great cost. 1 can of 105 rounds weights >30lbs. The gun and tripod need 3-5 men to man pack it, and once assembled it's not really an act of war to manoeuvre. A Barrett light .50 will produce the same round for round terminal effect for far less weight.

I know, talk to, and correspond with some of the Company Commanders and officers from 2 Para that fought at Goose Green, so I can add something to this.

a.) There is some debate as to where the idea for 2 x GPMG came from. One source suggests Sydney Jary talked to Lt Col Jones.

b.) The organisation of UK fireteams comes from the 1980 PAM45 laying out the 2 x 4 man teams in the mechanised section operating from the FV-432. One team carried the GPMG and one carried the 84mm MAW.

c.) The after action report may be dishonest to the degree that there is not way anyone can say 2 fireteam of GPMG worked better than one, because there is simply no comparative data. The UKs employment of the Rifle Group and Gun Group was taught and done wrong from the word go (1942/43) so I remain to be convinced. -

d. ) Te 2 x GPMG statement was also used to support the creation of 2 x Fireteams each with a 5.56mm L-86 LSW. This was put into place with no testing. Experiments conducted in 1995 showed that Platoon and section organisation was not well understood, and the Platoon was far more effective in the attack if organised and trained differently.

[William F. Owen]

In other words the guys who knew all about carrying heavy things were the most enthusiastic for the additional weight of another GPMG and 800 rounds of 7.62 x 51 link (about 56 pounds without the packaging).


Major Dale Colette MC, (OC A Coy - 3 Para) made the categoric statement that it was the GPMG than won firefights and that the SLR was just for self defence. I put it to members of 2 Para, (and hypothesised in my RUSI Article) that they might have focussed on having no SLRs and just SMGs, to carry to more ammo and to have a lighter hand held automatic weapon for exploitation. The reply came back - "not sure about that."

...but! The number of GPMGs in the platoon or section is missing the point. These days you have far better communications and sensors. That makes a massive difference. The problem area for modern dismounted operations is not weapons

...and why is having 2 GPMG so good when only 22 men out of an available >80 took part in the final "assault" on Darwin Hill?

It was MILAN missiles that forced the surrender of the Boca House position and M72 LAW than was actually used by the CSM and Corporal Abols to break into the Darwin Hill position.

[William F. Owen]

I've seen some texts on your platoon designs, but I had several times the impression that
- it's either a simple 2-section platoon
or
- you assume that the platoon is the smallest element and teams/sections are not really capable of temporarily pursuing independent missions

Fuchs mate,

Yes it could be 2 x 15 man sections (section of 3 x 5 fireteams), or 3 x 10 man sections,(section of 2 x 5 man fireteams) or 6 x 5 man fire-teams, or 5 x 6 man fireteams.

I do not make this assumption. It depends on the mission / task, the number of men available. If you send out a 4 man OP party, then you have to have at least another 4 men to protect them and at least a 10-15 man QRF. Experience from Basra suggests that QRFs may even have to be Sub-unit size, unless you want to see your the bodies of the 4 man OP team hung from a bridge.

I am not really worried about Anti-armour operations. We're pretty good at that. It's the complex environment that posses the challenge.

[William F. Owen]

Foot mobility: Some years ago I had the opportunity, privilege really, to do a job with the French Army on the ground. The leadership consisted entirely of veterans of the Colonial Parachute Battalions and Regiments and 2REP. 3BEP and even the dreaded 1REP. Their idea of foot mobility was for an entire Battalion, to include the commander and his staff, "to disappear" in the back country for 3-5 days without backpacks or resupply.

I've no doubt they could walk around for 3-5 days in the Bundu, but so what? If they bumped into some serious opposition, with access to caches, how would they have re-supplied ammo, and evacuated casualties?

If the answer is helicopters then they fail the test for un-supported dismounted operations, which seems to be the "not needed" holy grail of infantry operations. The Chindits were pretty good and needed an entire air force to support them. A OPS-35 SOG Recon Team, needed as many as 10-14 Helicopters and aircraft, to get an 8-12 man team in and out of the AO.

3 Days of supply, including water, rations and batteries is about +/- 25lbs under most conditions. I guess you could halve that if you can effectively forage water, and these days, that has become very easy compared to the past.

[Norfolk]

It is interesting to note that there appears to be a consensus through a number of battalions in favour of fireteams with a gimpy each. Not quite in line with Karcher's (or Melody? I get confused) suggestion of one gun per squad.

No, it certainly isn't quite in line with what Melody found, but Karcher would seem to agree. I suppose that we can all lay blame for this debate on some now-forgotten German panzergrenadier who first decided to take the MG from his Gruppe's SPW as he dismounted, figuring that if one MG per Gruppe was good, then two must be better. And while we're at it, we can lay further blame on individuals in the US Army who latched on to this and perpetuated it. So, whether two MGs per Squad/Section is a reflection of a genuine tactical requirement, or more a case of the Infantryman's predilection for "acquiring" as many MGs and other pieces of shiny kit as come into hand's grasp, the formal studies would suggest the latter. Commando Forces and Special Forces may require GPMGs in 4-man Fire Teams/Patrols, given their isolation and relative lack of external support, but regular Infantry usually not.

But...,back to the Infantry's poaching of every automatic that they can lay their hands on. The Infantry naturally reorganize themselves around whatever automatics they have, with a rough handful or half-dozen men grouping themselves around each automatic, and typically they carry an UGL in their midst as well. An AT weapon of some sort usually finds its way into their midst, typically for use against targets of the fixed, immobile persuasion. The Falklands War is the classic example of infantry dispensing with doctrine that said each enemy MG should be the object of a Platoon attack; the lads quickly chucked this rubbish and proceeded to take out MGs with every AT weapon they could lay their hands on. Pretty soon many of them were on to clearing ordinary trenches with Carl G's and LAWs instead of rifles and grenades.

The reality is that from war to war, Infantry more or less consistently organize themselves into basic fighting groups of about a half-dozen men (in turn breaking themselves down into teams of 2s or 3s), each group with an automatic weapon, a grenade launcher, and an AT weapon of some sort. And whether you're starting with a German Platoon of four 10-man Sections each with a GPMG, a US Army or Commonwealth Army Platoon of three 8-9 man Squads/Sections each with a pair of LMGs, or a USMC Platoon of three 13-man Squads each with 3 LMGs, or whatever, you still usually end up with these roughly half-dozen man groups.

The main difference between these different Platoons is how many of these groups do you tend to end up with. The Germans usually had 3 or 4, the US Army and the Commonwealth usually 3, and the USMC usually 3. As to Wilf's Platoon, it would probably find itself whittled down from five or six 5-6 man teams (2 of them GPMG teams) to three or four 4-6 man groups, two of them with a GPMG; it's probably more efficient than the other Platoons, and simpler to fight, but isn't much more resistant to battle losses given its modest size to begin with. The other English-speaking Squads/Section would find themselves like the late WWII-German Groups, overarmed and undermanned; good for defence, but lousy for offence. Wilf's Platoon might avoid or at least mitigate that, provided that it dispensed with LMGs in the non-GPMG teams. This would fit with Melody's point that not more than a third of infantry strength should be absorbed by automatic weapons; implicitly, grenade launchers would likewise have to be factored into this 1/3rd fire support:2/3rds assault force ratio, as, like ARs/MGs, they don't handle nearly as well as rifles/carbines in CQB.

[Ken White]

For obvious safety reasons I've refrained from trying to see a dark ignition tracer shot from the far business end.
I wonder whether the late ignition (10-50m away from muzzle) helps to keep at least the exact position difficult to spot as it is supposed to do (besides reduction of barrel wear).It helps a great deal but is not perfect in that sense, a bright green or red line is still fairly easy to spot and work a back bearing as long as one is not too far off axis.
And if it's still too compromising (likely, as most post-WW2 tracer cartridges were of the dark ignition type afaik), how about using incendiary cartridges? Incendiary provides a more visible impact afaik (I never shot with INC - environment and no real training requirement anyway).That works well with the .50cal/12.7mm, using either incendiary or API. It worked less well with the old .30-06 (7.62x63mm; the incendiary charge in the blue tip M1 cartridge was too small) and, to my knowledge, there is no incendiary for the 7.62x51mm or the 5.56x45mm.

Larger problem in any event is getting tracers to the troops to use, some people strip them out of MG belts but tracers are frequently hard to come by.

[Rifleman]

How nice! I go away for a couple of weeks and return to find all these new posts to read! :)

A couple of thoughts:


After the American five - man fire team went the way of the dinosaur something interesting happened. The Army authorized every Rifle Squad not one but two belt fed machine guns. One for each fire team.

I was there for that one. We thought we were pretty hot at the time, too!


For reasons I cannot understand the American Rifle Squad continued to soldier on through WWII, Korea and Vietnam without a belt fed machine gun. (I understand that some specialist units had one or more machine guns assigned to each rifle squad.) Apparently it was not until Gulf War I that most American Rifle Squads received their light machine guns.

But when they received the light machine guns the American Squads, for the first time in their history, suddenly had serious fire power at their disposal.

Yes, officially you're correct but let's make a distinction between what was official doctrine and what often happened in the field in Vietnam.

I've mentioned this a couple of times before (sorry to sound like a broken record): the rifle squad of that era didn't include the M60 at squad level but many Vietnam Vets remember employing the M60 at squad level as standard operating procedure anyway.

The usual Army squad in Vietnam wasn't 11 men in two fire teams (even if that was what the book called for). It seems to have been about six to eight soldiers with one M60, one M79, and a handful of riflemen with M16s.

So the "squad" itself was often, defacto, a large fire team and not a squad as we think of one: very similar to the German WWII squad, Paul Melody's proposed squad, and the fire teams in Wilf's proposed platoon.

[William F. Owen]

@ And whether you're starting with a German Platoon of four 10-man Sections each with a GPMG, a US Army or Commonwealth Army Platoon of three 8-9 man Squads/Sections each with a pair of LMGs, or a USMC Platoon of three 13-man Squads each with 3 LMGs, or whatever, you still usually end up with these roughly half-dozen man groups.

@ As to Wilf's Platoon, it would probably find itself whittled down from five or six 5-6 man teams (2 of them GPMG teams) to three or four 4-6 man groups, two of them with a GPMG; it's probably more efficient than the other Platoons, and simpler to fight, but isn't much more resistant to battle losses given its modest size to begin with.

@ Wilf's Platoon might avoid or at least mitigate that, provided that it dispensed with LMGs in the non-GPMG teams.

Platoons are not games of absolute numbers. Numbers is not that important compared to Leader ratios, cost, training and primary equipment's. For example, a Company of 4 x 24 man platoons is far more expensive than 3 x 32 man platoons.

A Fully manned 1918 Commonwealth Platoon was 27-28, dependant on whether it was commanded by an Officer or NCO. (1 extra was the Officers Batman!- Soldier Servant).

I picked 30 men, as being able to be transported across current scales of commonly used vehicles, and to offer the greatest range of flexible groupings for smallest number of leaders (1 less corporal and L/Cpl per platoon) within generally accepted spans of command. I am looking at principles of organisation, not TOEs. The 30-man platoon is just an example of that thinking.

40-Man platoons have all problems associated with being 25% larger, and probably 50% more expensive. This would reduce the number of platoons and companies held in a battle group for a given number of men. Cost may be mitigated by needing less officers, NCO's and primary equipment, but I suggest a 40 man platoon needs at least 2 more NCOs to maintain effective spans of command.

The discussion on Platoon Organisation never starts from the real world perspective that the Manning level of a Battle Group is X or Y. - (that being said someone has just asked me to start looking at just that!)

Yes, a 30-man platoon may drop to 24 or even 4, but that can't govern principles of organisation. Principles are what commanders are trained in. The T of E (like that shown) is just a budget pot.

"You x men, and NCOs, plus Y equipment. Now get the job done."

The where my thinking currently stands there are no 5.56mm LMGs!


30 Man Platoon Outline

Manning
1 Officer, 1 Sergeant, 2 Corporals, 2 Lance Corporals, 24 other ranks

Weapons.
30 x Individual Weapons/Carbines (5.56mm)
6 x 40mm UGL kits, or 40mm launchers
2 x GPMG (7.62mm)
2 x Long Range Rifles (8.6mm)
1 x 60mm Mortar Hand Held
2 x MAW, - Alcotan / Panzerfaust / 84mm
M72 type LAW and M200 type Rifle grenade issued as required.

3 x ATGM Posts held for Anti-armour mission

Communications
30 x PRR
6 x PRC-148 or 710 type multi-band hand held.
1 x HF Manpack
6 x Commanders GPS sets (PLGR) and PDAs

Night Vision
30 x NVG and IR Weapons pointer
4 x Weapons mounted Long Range Night Sight
4 x Thermal Weapons sight
6 x Light Weight Laser Range Finder

Organisations – organised by mission, transport and operational requirement.
2 x Multiples
Each multiple is 3 x 5 man teams. Each multiple Commanded by the Platoon
Commander, and the Platoon Sergeant.
3 x Sections
3 Sections of 2 x 5 man teams, or each section as 3,3,4 groups.
5 x Sections of 6 men
6 Sections of 5 men.

Transport (as dismounts)
5 x 6 man APC
4 x 8 man APC (2 spare seats)
3 x 10 man APC
10 x M/WMIK crews (2 Sections of 5 vehicles)

[Fuchs]

That's simply not enough machine guns.
1 machine gun in 15 men - that's nto enough at all.
It might function in deliberate attack due to reinforcements, but it's not enough to hold terrain against infantry. It's also not enough to set up a machine gun on every truck if they're being moved in 2 ton trucks.
I'd at least declare six rifles to automatic rifles with bipod, increased magazine capacity and heavier barrel for short-time suppressive fire.

The snipers are apparently permanently attached instead of being attached according to circumstances. Their training won't be optimal with so little contact with other/senior snipers. If one sniper becomes a casualty, a replacement sniper may arrive, but it takes days or weeks to become a good team - a time during which the platoon either has no sniper team or the snipers are at unnecessary risk.
The use of sniper teams being detached from a battalion sniper platoon would allow a more flexible sniper strength (0-3 teams à 2), time to recover, time to build teams in the platoon, ability to concentrate snipers at hot spots, ability to replace a lost or reduced sniper team immediately with an intact team, plenty contact with other snipers for training and still all the time one intact sniper team at the platoon to help train sharpshooters and infantry in general in fieldcraft and marksmanship.

I do also wonder about the choice of a 60mm mortar. 51mm FLY-K has a unique low signature (Georgia offers a 60mm copy, though) and enough range for infantry platoon applications. I prefer this tool.

Well, and again; doesn't look like enough well-trained NCOs to me. Maybe I simply don't know enough about UK corporals, though.

[William F. Owen]

@ That's simply not enough machine guns.

@ The snipers are apparently permanently attached instead of being attached according to circumstances. Their training won't be optimal with so little contact with other/senior snipers.

@ I do also wonder about the choice of a 60mm mortar. 51mm FLY-K has a unique low signature (Georgia offers a 60mm copy, though) and enough range for infantry platoon applications. I prefer this tool.

@ Well, and again; doesn't look like enough well-trained NCOs to me. Maybe I simply don't know enough about UK corporals, though.

@ US Platoons only have 2 x M240B. You can give every 5 man team a GPMG if you want. Carried loads will climb by some 35% or more and there will be no measurable increase in capability, for mobility, communications or observation. - so why do it? You can add SAWs and also reduce all you other capabilities at the expense of merely adding automatic fire. The focus is on projected HE and enhanced suppression - which works better than just MG suppression.

@ It doesn't matter where the sniper training comes from. You can detach 5 men to the Regimental Sniper Wing. - and they are not Snipers. They are long range riflemen. I did not say Sniper Rifles.

@ A RO 51mm would be the optimal but it's not made anymore. 60mm offers commonality with other 60mm ammo natures, and costs very little. FLY-K is very expensive, and not proven, plus it adds a unique ammo nature to platoon.

@ You have one NCO or officer for every 5 men. 20% of the manpower is leaders.

I am not saying this is perfect or the last word. Its a starting point to provoke discussion on the issue, so if you want to change the number of men from 30, to 40 and add another 6 Machine Guns, then OK. If you can do that for less load and lower overall costs, then let me know.

[Fuchs]

U.S. platoons have several SAWs as well, I'm missing an equivalent in your description. The firepower is too small without anything in between GPMG and AR.

Long-range rifleman are a waste. Make them snipers, sniper training is cheap as they're on active duty anyways.

A 20+ % leader ratio is very useful for force growth/mobilization. It enables the force to quickly double or even triple its size.
Small unit leader survivability is often lower than common infantryman survivability. The percentage of leaders would drop quickly in a high intensity conflict anyway.
Plus: You'll find out about a lot of unsuitable leaders once a conflict goes hot.

[William F. Owen]

@ U.S. platoons have several SAWs as well, I'm missing an equivalent in your description. The firepower is too small without anything in between GPMG and AR.

@ Long-range rifleman are a waste. Make them snipers, sniper training is cheap as they're on active duty anyways.


@ What do you mean firepower? It's a meaningless term. Every man has an automatic weapon, so you cannot physically increase the number of automatic weapons.

@ Says who? A Long range rifleman is the trained operator of the long range rifle. About 2 days of instruction and range time.

Fuchs, if you know better and have the data, then show me.

[Fuchs]

@ What do you mean firepower? It's a meaningless term. Every man has an automatic weapon, so you cannot physically increase the number of automatic weapons.

@ Says who? A Long range rifleman is the trained operator of the long range rifle. About 2 days of instruction and range time.

Fuchs, if you know better and have the data, then show me.

Wilf,
so why don't you delete the last two GPMGs? 2 GPMG are no more automatic weapons than 2 assault rifles are. You used a meaningless argument.

Firepower is the weapons effect that intimidates, destroys, wounds, kills and occasionally even ignites.
I have probably for the very first time found someone who argues that an assault rifle has as much firepower as a GPMG.
The usual point of view is that controllability, ammunition capacity before reload and ability to fire more shots in a fire fight (without a glowing barrel, molten handguard or cook-offs) constitute superior firepower against all but the smallest (and at the same time slow) targets. This point of view has strong and obvious merits.

I remember your argument about accuracy replacing volume of fire for suppression. That works fine - unless you don't know where exactly (really exactly - like accurate to one metre) the enemy is. In that case you need to spray a bit - that requires volume of fire. You'll also need volume of fire to tear through some cover like sand bags or walls and to drive enemies away from behind such imperfect cover - you won't be able to do that with LSW or 5.56 assault rifle shots.


About the "Long range rifleman"; who is this? Is this someone who has joined the Army three months ago?
Even conscript armies have enough time for a six-week sniper course to add fieldcraft, sniper tactics, counter-sniper tactics and FO skills to the repertoire for marginal costs. They just need to want it.
I don't think that you can have any data that rejects this because this isn't about data at all.
A two-day course won't even suffice to learn to read the wind. It's enough to have two cold days during this instruction = they won't be able to learn much about mirage. Two very windy days = they won't learn much about reading slight bushes movement. Two days is enough to learn how to use their weapon, their scope and a LRF tool, that's nothing in comparison to what these two could learn in just a couple more weeks (it would help a lot even if they were no talented snipers) and certainly not enough to exploit the potential of a .338LapMag rifle simply because it's about more than holding the weapon steady and read the distance from an electronic tool.

A single rifle type like 8.6mm (.338LapMag) is just a compromise. Such a weapon won't be able to shoot a powerful subsonic bullet to fool acoustic-based sniper detection systems (which all seem to depend on the sonic boom of the bullet) and to achieve minimum signature overall like VSSK does.
A .338 will also not be able to match the armour penetration effect of a .50 or to achieve its range. Both could be even better with 9x90, but as long as that's just in prototype stage I'd recommend a .50 for really long-range shooting and for the ability to penetrate BMD/BTR and recce vehicles with SLAP.
That's why I prefer to offer the platoon snipers the choice between three different weapons. Conventional sniper rifle, AT rifle and suppressed subsonic heavy bullet rifle.

I don't want to piss you off; but these are components of your layout that don't seem to be anywhere near-optimal to me. And that's what you claimed; to have an idea how a platoon could be optimised.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,
so why don't you delete the last two GPMGs? 2 GPMG are no more automatic weapons than 2 assault rifles are. You used a meaningless argument.

Sven, the GPMGs are 7.62mm x 51. The Carbines are 5.56mm. As you know 7.62mm is greatly more capable, in terms of target perforation and comparative terminal effect at a given range. 5.56mm for a SAW with the same barrel length as a Carbine, has no increase in performance, and even with a longer barrel on the SAW the performance increase is negligible.


remember your argument about accuracy replacing volume of fire for suppression. That works fine - unless you don't know where exactly (really exactly - like accurate to one metre) the enemy is. In that case you need to spray a bit - that requires volume of fire.

...but you can spray with a carbine just as well as you can spray with a SAW.


You'll also need volume of fire to tear through some cover like sand bags or walls and to drive enemies away from behind such imperfect cover - you won't be able to do that with LSW or 5.56 assault rifle shots.

Which is why I suggest 2 x 7.62mm GPMG and 2 x 8.6mm LRR


Even conscript armies have enough time for a six-week sniper course to add fieldcraft, sniper tactics, counter-sniper tactics and FO skills to the repertoire for marginal costs. They just need to want it.

If you were training unit snipers, I'd agree, and BTW, I don't think it needs to take six-weeks.


Two days is enough to learn how to use their weapon, their scope and a LRF tool,

Correct! and as LRR operators that's all I want from their training. If they can hit a 1 x 0.5m target out to 1,000m, 60-70% of the time, I'm happy.
They also need to be able to use the Thermal Image site, but that can only engage out to 600m, so not a great training challenge as 8.6mm has a pretty flat trajectory out to 600m.


it's about more than holding the weapon steady and read the distance from an electronic tool.

It is, but not much. These guys as good shots, not snipers. They can use Mil-dot reticle or a Hold over type reticle to judge distance and engage. Or use an LRF, or BOMARS type system. Wind, light, shooting up and down, all comes with practice and that's built into the Platoon training program.


A .338 will also not be able to match the armour penetration effect of a .50 or to achieve its range.

8.6mm is, lighter, cheaper and more accurate out to 1,000m (RMCS testing 1996) and requires less training.


That's why I prefer to offer the platoon snipers the choice between three different weapons. Conventional sniper rifle, AT rifle and suppressed subsonic heavy bullet rifle.

So, you increase expense/cost, training and complexity across three weapons systems? You also loose a lot of internal stowage space inside your APCs or supporting vehicles


I don't want to piss you off; but these are components of your layout that don't seem to be anywhere near-optimal to me. And that's what you claimed; to have an idea how a platoon could be optimised.

I don't want to be pissed off, but I do want to be challenged. I present these and other ideas to rooms full of British Infantry Officers and NCOs, so I understand the arguments.

This is why I posted my suggestions here. The folks on this board are mostly smart and experienced so it's a privilege to get the feedback.

[William F. Owen]

If memory serves the SAS alloted 24 men to attack the Fanning Hill Mob. Twelve of the 24 carried a GPMG for the task.


Sorry, missed this.

A friend of mine was on the Fanning Head raid, and planned it. Couple of things.

1. There were 16 GPMG, a 51mm Mortar, A Naval Gunfire FO party (NGFO 1?) and a hand held thermal imager.

2. The Raid was planned to "bluff" an Argentine Heavy Weapons Company into surrendering by making them believe they were under attack by at least two companies. If they did no surrender the plan was to use Naval Gunfire to do the damage.

3. The troops concerned were so overloaded that one of the helicopters used, could not actually lift off at the first attempt.

So all in all, I submit that this is not a particularly useful example for the matter under discussion.

[Fuchs]

Wilf, I bet you know a universal trend in infantry during war since early 20th century.
They drop some of the non-weapons and non-ammo equipment to lighten up and pick up additional heavy weapons to increase their firepower.

The peacetime design of small units should attempt to give the best basis for tailoring to specific circumstances in wartime. A platoon TO that is weak on machine guns will in my opinion be changed very much once the conflict goes hot.
I'm pretty sure that the infantrymen who use your organization won't accept your argument that additional machine guns are no improvement.
They might end up with four to six GPMGs.

Think about it; the opposing force might have three machine guns and easily pin down your two machine guns. Your platoon would be effectively reduced to about 20-24 assault rifles and some GLs (which are very difficult to use with accuracy when the user is already pinned down).

Possible reasons (just one necessary) why your GPMG firepower might be temporarily reduced to a single GPMG for the entire platoon: the machine gunner
is KIA,
is WIA,
panicked,
is being pinned down,
is clearing a stoppage,
changing position,
lost LOS due to smoke/dust,
is in wrong position,
misunderstood the situation and shoots to wrong direction,
is reloading/changing barrel,
his machine gun was damaged by a hit,
has expended his munition too quickly and is separated from ammo bearers.

Or think about a L-ambush at a road. You'd only have a single machine gun for the flank and one for the front. Remember the difficulty to turn the machine gun beyond its about 60° cone without losing several seconds due to repositioning.


5.56mm for a SAW with the same barrel length as a Carbine, has no increase in performance

The external and terminal ballistics performance is not very different, but the internal ballistics allow for a much higher sustained RoF.
The psychological effect is almost the same effect as of a GPMG, it's much better able to suppress (more than just one or two opponents as possibly with accurate single shots) and to hit moving targets than a assault rifle/carbine.
I believe that this is too obvious to discuss it much.

[William F. Owen]

I bet you know a universal trend in infantry during war since early 20th century.
They drop some of the non-weapons and non-ammo equipment to lighten up and pick up additional heavy weapons to increase their firepower.

I am unaware of this trend. AARs I know of from Vietnam talk about the need for more night vision and radios. None I have seen mention the need for more weapons. Same was true from the Falklands, with the exception of wanting a light mortar and an M-203.


I'm pretty sure that the infantrymen who use your organization won't accept your argument that additional machine guns are no improvement.
They might end up with four to six GPMGs.

I don't understand the focus on Machine Guns. MG suppression is less effective than Projected HE, which is what kills and what works. 2 Para doubled the number of GPMGs in a platoon to 6! Yet it was the use of projected HE that reduced the enemy positions.

Again, you can give every man a GPMG if you want. You will loose something in return.

If you want 6 GPMG then fine. You can only scale each gun with 600 rounds. (You can't allocate more if you only want to hold only 1 x 7.62mm 4-BIT pallet at BG HQ) Now it is possible to have another pallet, held at BG HQ but each man in the Platoon is now carrying 2.7-3kg of ammo more, so they have to give something up. Your 100% re-supply weight is now more than 3 times greater than it was, and can't be carried by two men, (97kg versus 27kg).

Cost has now gone up to a huge degree, with the need for more TI sighting units, weapons kits, and training ammunition. A large amount of internal stowage space, both in guns, ammo, kits and TI sights, is also gone, so some other capabilities have probably been lost.

As you can see, like the number of 30 men, I didn't pull the figure of 2 GPMGs out of thin air.


Think about it; the opposing force might have three machine guns and easily pin down your two machine guns. Your platoon would be effectively reduced to about 20-24 assault rifles and some GLs (which are very difficult to use with accuracy when the user is already pinned down).

I don't see how this is a valid argument. It assumes fire fights are based on linear equations. What if the snipers killed the enemy MGs? What about my mortars, LAWs and MAWs, or even ATGMs??


Possible reasons (just one necessary) why your GPMG firepower might be temporarily reduced to a single GPMG for the entire platoon: the machine gunner etc etc

That's why each gun is crewed by a 5-6 man team.


Or think about a L-ambush at a road. You'd only have a single machine gun for the flank and one for the front. Remember the difficulty to turn the machine gun beyond its about 60° cone without losing several seconds due to repositioning.

I'll have the same problem in a triangular harbour. Why would I let one possible "ambush" pattern, or harbour design define my scale of weapons?


The external and terminal ballistics performance is not very different, but the internal ballistics allow for a much higher sustained RoF.
The psychological effect is almost the same effect as of a GPMG, it's much better able to suppress (more than just one or two opponents as possibly with accurate single shots) and to hit moving targets than a assault rifle/carbine.


Suppression has nothing to do with a high ROF. 30 rpm cyclic suppresses jus as well as 800 rpm cyclic. However I don't see a great variation in cyclic rate between most 5.56mm carbine and SAWs. (750-850 rpm approx)

I bet that at 200m, you would not be able to tell the difference between a 3-5 or even 10 round bursts fired from a 5.56mm Carbine and a 5.56mm LMG and if someone was suppressing the window you were using, you wouldn't care.

You are right about moving targets. The best cyclic rate for hitting a running man is about 1,200 rpm (20 rounds a second) and is why the MG-42 had such a high rate of fire.

[Fuchs]

I know about Vietnam LRRP teams and GI squads which added GPMGs (GPMGs not being part of the official TO&E of squads) and I remember lots of examples from WW2 and Korea that clearly showed an increase in heavy weapons in the infantry. There should be no doubt that WW1 infantry added lots of machine guns between 1914 and 1918.
The quantity of machine guns and the calibre of mortars tend to rise in wartime.


I don't understand the focus on Machine Guns. MG suppression is less effective than Projected HE, which is what kills and what works. 2 Para doubled the number of GPMGs in a platoon to 6! Yet it was the use of projected HE that reduced the enemy positions.
Meanwhile, the enemy was suppressed and didn't kill much due to the intense machine gun fire?
Would projected HE work as well against enemies who fight smarter and change positions after spending half a magazine? Would HE projection have helped as much against rear slope defenses? I bet that ATGMs and light tanks are not useful against rear slope defensive positions.


I don't see how this is a valid argument. It assumes fire fights are based on linear equations. What if the snipers killed the enemy MGs? What about my mortars, LAWs and MAWs, or even ATGMs??
I won't write pages to cover every aspect in detail when I want to raise a single point.
All the mentioned support weapons can be used by both sides, if you claim that these kill a superior number of enemy machine guns then I claim that the opponent's support weapons have killed your two machine gun positions plus some others. Seriously, this is not helpful.
Less machine guns = less volume of fire = less effect (both psychological and physical).


That's why each gun is crewed by a 5-6 man team.
Which is only a partial and unreliable fix for the mentioned problems.


I'll have the same problem in a triangular harbour. Why would I let one possible "ambush" pattern, or harbour design define my scale of weapons?
You don't need to. But lots of standard positions don't work fine with only 2 machine guns. And every such example casts doubts about whether 2 GPMGs only is "optimal".


Suppression has nothing to do with a high ROF. 30 rpm cyclic suppresses jus as well as 800 rpm cyclic. However I don't see a great variation in cyclic rate between most 5.56mm carbine and SAWs. (750-850 rpm approx)

I bet that at 200m, you would not be able to tell the difference between a 3-5 or even 10 round bursts fired from a 5.56mm Carbine and a 5.56mm LMG and if someone was suppressing the window you were using, you wouldn't care.
I didn't write about cyclic, but about sustained RoF. Btw, There's no such thing like "30 rpm cyclic" and troops should avoid to use windows if possible.

You have an underlying assumption that the enemy's positions are well-known.
That coins your suppression argument of few+aimed = volume+sprayed.
I think this is optimistic. I never really saw well-camouflaged conscript riflemen at 100m distance.

Modern weapons have easily 300-400m effective range, machine guns even much more on tripod. HE projection out to 300m is too inaccurate, aiming is difficult and requires significant exposure. Quit the same goes for accurate single shots to long range - the hit chance isn't high unless the rifleman exposes himself for a while. He might even be unable to hit the machine gunner if the latter uses a good tripod and telescope combination to fire from behind cover.

Your platoon would be limited to two GPMGs as only weapons with reliable firepower in a forest. 5.56mm is easily deflected and stopped, explosive munitions detonate directly after safety distance and the lack of clear vision requires some spraying. A WW2 platoon would be clearly superior in a dense forest.

It's important to gain fire superiority (relieve the own troops from being pinned down and pin the others down) even if you're not the one who initiated the firefight.
This highlights whether the weapons are the right ones to turn the tide. A UBGL and a long range rifle are only effective with careful aiming, and that's not really possible while you're being pinned down.
Assault rifles can do something (but unless properly coordinated) they won't turn the tide against an opponent who already has fire superiority. Even if they did, their firepower would dwindle quickly afterwards due to reload activity.
The impressive, intimidating firepower of machineguns is what turns the tide most easily. Their belt length or magazine capacity also suffices to keep fire superiority for more than few seconds.
But you need some redundancy, or you won't have enough machine guns for the job.
5.56 machine guns can turn the tide just like GPMGs because the ability to penetrate cover isn't required to pin the enemy down. It can even be counter-productive as you want them to take cover.
The disadvantage of 5.56 machine guns to 7.62 machine guns is not in suppression, but in killing through cover and at long ranges.

I doubt that your 2 GPMGs can turn a firefight, I doubt that the UGLs and heavy rifles would help much to turn a firefight and the assault rifles - well, assault rifles are standard. The enemy will have lots as well.

I understand your ammunition and weapons weight concerns. I never liked to carry a GPMG myself. But to take away firepower in all missions is not the solution, especially no solution that deserves to be associated with being "optimal".
That's why I advocate a flexible platoon that partially reorganizes and re-equips to suit a mission.
Deliberate defense = 6 GPMG.
Patrol = much less GPMGs.
Offense = some machine guns, but most important external support.
Recce = no machine guns, sub squad size.

I believe that such a flexible TO&E is a much better answer than to have an all-round TO&E that is still quite heavy for some tasks and much too weak on machine guns for other tasks.

The ultimate test would need to be actual combat against even-sized opponents, as lots of psychological and Murphy's law components play into this. Exercises won't help to test the effect in a firefight.

[William F. Owen]

I understand your ammunition and weapons weight concerns. I never liked to carry a GPMG myself. But to take away firepower in all missions is not the solution, especially no solution that deserves to be associated with being "optimal".
That's why I advocate a flexible platoon that partially reorganizes and re-equips to suit a mission.
Deliberate defense = 6 GPMG.
Patrol = much less GPMGs.
Offense = some machine guns, but most important external support.
Recce = no machine guns, sub squad size.

I believe that such a flexible TO&E is a much better answer than to have an all-round TO&E that is still quite heavy for some tasks and much too weak on machine guns for other tasks.

The ultimate test would need to be actual combat against even-sized opponents, as lots of psychological and Murphy's law components play into this. Exercises won't help to test the effect in a firefight.

I'll start here as this is the useful bit. :D

Sven, you can add 4 more GPMG. I don't say you shouldn't. As long as you add 2 more TI sights, and loose other weapons systems to keep the cost and weight the same, then OK. I can't tell you you're wrong. Just tell me what you are prepared to loose to have the extra 4 guns and 2 TI sights.

...but I see no difference in the weapons needed for what you call deliberate defence, patrol, offence and Recce. This is a WW2 form of infantry operations which I believe we have moved beyond. - and this also assumes that each phase is distinct, which it is not.

We don't need actual combat to gather good data. Suppression can now be very accurately modelled, but fear less so.

..and why are we so focussed on the Weapons? The communications and sensors deliver the greatest increase in capability.

[Fuchs]

Sensors and communications gear seemed to be OK. It would be nice to incorporate the personal radio into the more powerful radios so nobody would have to carry two radios, but that's it.

What I would sacrifice for more GPMG in certain missions? Mobility. Some missions don't require much foot mobility.

My view on classic infantry is very much WW2-like because I split infantry into two groups in my mind; classic infantry for very closed terrain (forest, settlements, mountains) for WW2-like missions.
Completely different skirmisher infantry for screening & delaying actions with emphasis on stealth and indirect fires. The latter would be used to screen efficiently terrains that provide some concealment and cover, but also long lines of sight in some directions.

I took this as a conversation about classic infantry. The platoon didn't look at all like a platoon for my concept of skirmishing (which is still maturing). That's why my demands look old-fashioned at times.

I doubt that suppression can be modeled. I've seen such modelling in papers, and it looked like nonsense.
Consider the OCSW suppression claims, for example. They claimed a huge suppressive effect for a munition that cannot be evaded.
To stop shooting and to lie down to eliminate exposure to direct fire bullets doesn't help against OCSW, so why should it suppress? It would either not suppress anymore as soon as the opponents understood the weapon or it would make them run - both isn't suppression.
In the worst case all enemies would have a ghillie-suit with 20 layers kevlar base and would become almost immune to OCSW.
Some other modelling was not as much nonsense, but still not convincing because too many training and morale factors contribute that cannot be modelled ex ante.

[Distiller]

Just 2 GPMG for ~30 men is not enough. Somebody talked about the "natural grouping" in combat, which is like 6 or 8 men. Every one of these groups need a high-volume direct fire weapon = GPMG.

But do I get it right from that you assume just one man per GPMG? Is that realistic? I don't think so. No sustainability here without the second guy *only* there for carrying extra ammo and help with the MG.

@ Fuchs: You don't like the marksman rifle (long barrel full caliber)? Well, you wouldn't need it if you wouldn't give those 4 riflemen (or so) in the "natural" group a carbine optimised for close to mid-range work only. Because of that you need a long-range precision rifle to supplement the GPMG. But it's not a sniper, neither from his ops characteristics, nor from his equipment.

To complete the "natural group", a 1-man grenade launcher, and a 1-man SRAAW shooter would round it out. (Here of course too the question of sustainability with just 1 guy per hungry weapon arises, but ...).

The idea of LMGs in my mind is (besides the caliber thing) a high-volume direct fire weapon with only a 1-man crew. But does it work? If you got too much money, for certain missions you could equip the 2-men GPMG crew with two LMGs, but basically I wouldn't want to trouble them with an unfamiliar weapon.

[jcustis]

The idea of LMGs in my mind is (besides the caliber thing) a high-volume direct fire weapon with only a 1-man crew. But does it work?

This is an excellent point that I don't think has been mentioned yet in all 18 pages of this thread, :D or the weapons thread.

If we are considering the sphere of influence of one tm leader, and then the squad leader, followed by the platoon commander, and roll that up into a metric whereby X leader can control X number of men, does this issue of a 1-man LMG vs. a 3-man GPMG tm come into play?

With the right personal weapon, a 3-man team can do much more than simply employ the machine gun, assuming that the gun is not actually emloyed for whatever reason. But has this been a concern for any of the planners of weapons/squad size and whatnot?

[William F. Owen]

Just 2 GPMG for ~30 men is not enough. Somebody talked about the "natural grouping" in combat, which is like 6 or 8 men. Every one of these groups need a high-volume direct fire weapon = GPMG.


Again, why is 2 not enough? The Current US platoon has 2 GPMG/M240. Does it not have enough GPMG? I have seen no AAR mentioning this, nor any opinions from the now 60+ combat veterans I have interview notes on.

What the platoon model under discussion lacks is LMG/SAW in 5.56mm. - yet the platoon still has 26-28 fully automatic 5.56mm carbines. Thus I submit that this is where the discussion lies. Can 4 men with 5.56mm carbine match the all round capability of 4 men with 3 x carbines and 1 x LMG/SAW



If we are considering the sphere of influence of one tm leader, and then the squad leader, followed by the platoon commander, and roll that up into a metric whereby X leader can control X number of men, does this issue of a 1-man LMG vs. a 3-man GPMG tm come into play?


Sorry. I assumed this was a given. If the 30 man platoon is operating as 6 x 5 man teams, 2 of the teams have 1 GPMG each. Just like the UKs 1918 Platoon,(also only had 2 x Lewis Guns) each team is dedicated to supporting the action of the GPMG. If required they can use other weapons, but that is their primary function, should the weapon be deployed on the mission.

[William F. Owen]

It would be nice to incorporate the personal radio into the more powerful radios so nobody would have to carry two radios, but that's it.

The more powerful radios may cause unsafe dispersion. PRR capabilities seem fine. As you see, all the Officers and NCOs have PRC-148s/710s.


What I would sacrifice for more GPMG in certain missions? Mobility. Some missions don't require much foot mobility.

I can't think of any mission or role where the reduction of mobility would be acceptable.


My view on classic infantry is very much WW2-like

Well this would explain our difference of opinion. I consider a lot (not all) of WW2 infantry doctrine about as relevant as Napoleons infantry.


I doubt that suppression can be modeled. I've seen such modelling in papers, and it looked like nonsense.

There are pretty good suppression models for comparing weapons effects. Obviously they are models, and there purpose is not to replicate human behaviour but to compare data. We can now measure a vast range of human factors and apply them in useful ways. This is far better than relying on very poor sources, such as opinions and memories.

[jcustis]

Can 4 men with 5.56mm carbine match the all round capability of 4 men with 3 x carbines and 1 x LMG/SAW

All-round? Perhaps. In the defense, I would argue that they cannot, especially across extended operations. I'd argue that it is easier to bring fires to bear quickly with a LMG/SAW when a team is on 25% alert, than with a single carbine.

Put another way, I would have an easier time planning a 25% alert status for rest purposes with several SAWs being manned, than 25% alert with just riflemen.

[Ken White]

...
I can't think of any mission or role where the reduction of mobility would be acceptable...

...I consider a lot (not all) of WW2 infantry doctrine about as relevant as Napoleons infantry...

...This is far better than relying on very poor sources, such as opinions and memories.All very, very true and the first two are hypercritical and too often ignored. You do good work; take the rest of the day off... ;)

[Norfolk]

Given that despite having a pair of 5.56mm LMGs and UGLs in each Squad (in order to reduce or eliminate the old need to attach the Platoons' GPMGs to them), the US Army Platoon still often finds itself attaching its two 7.62mm GPMGs out to them in order to gain fire superiority in the firefight, perhaps each Fire Team requires its own AR/LMG of a calibre appreciably greater than 5.56mm, or also that GPMG teams are eliminated in favour of every Fire Team possessing such an AR or LMG of 6.5-7.62mm calibre. AR's or magazine-fed LMGs, used by well-trained troops, would be capable of solid suppression without compromising mobility by having to haul great amounts of ammo for belt-feeds.

But that would entail a substantial expansion in the size of the Platoon (which was handily sidestepped in Wilf's Platoon by concentrating the guns in two dedicated teams), as each Fire Team would have to be capable of both fire support (AR/LMG and UGL) and assault (double the number of riflemen/carbineers as AR/LMG/Grenadiers). Melody went to pains to explain how war experience demonstrated the need for 2 men dedicated to assault/CQB for each man dedicated to fire support/suppression. One problem leads to a solution, which in turns leads to another problem.:wry:

[William F. Owen]

Given that despite having a pair of 5.56mm LMGs and UGLs in each Squad (in order to reduce or eliminate the old need to attach the Platoons' GPMGs to them), the US Army Platoon still often finds itself attaching its two 7.62mm GPMGs out to them in order to gain fire superiority in the firefight, perhaps each Fire Team requires its own AR/LMG of a calibre appreciably greater than 5.56mm

Which is why I can't see the reason for a 5.56mm LMG/SAW apart from psychological support for the team. Not a trivial issue, but it needs to be recognised.


Melody went to pains to explain how war experience demonstrated the need for 2 men dedicated to assault/CQB for each man dedicated to fire support/suppression. One problem leads to a solution, which in turns leads to another problem.:wry

I just don't get the Assault/CQB stuff. I was taught this back in 1980, and straight after the Falklands, it was junked. Once you have struck and suppressed, someone (very few) needs to go forward and confirm the position as suppressed and find the next fire position to exploit your advantage. This is the same inside buildings as it is outside or on some wooded hillside. I just don't buy this FUP/Assault/ fight through stuff. No one ever seems to do it, and have it work well. This is why my platoon functions are concentrated around fire support and reconnaissance. The Reconnaissance teams can exploit once the suppression/destruction has gained them the opportunity.

[Norfolk]

I just don't get the Assault/CQB stuff. I was taught this back in 1980, and straight after the Falklands, it was junked. Once you have struck and suppressed, someone (very few) needs to go forward and confirm the position as suppressed and find the next fire position to exploit your advantage. This is the same inside buildings as it is outside or on some wooded hillside. I just don't buy this FUP/Assault/ fight through stuff. No one ever seems to do it, and have it work well. This is why my platoon functions are concentrated around fire support and reconnaissance. The Reconnaissance teams can exploit once the suppression/destruction has gained them the opportunity.

I think it's not so much having such-and-such numbers of bodies dedicated to Assault/CQB itself per se, as simply having enough bodies to perform both the aforementioned roles and to serve as a sort of ready replacement pool for battle losses, both those suffered by the assault elements as well as the support elements. After all, who takes a machine gunner off his gun so that he can replace a rifleman who's become a casualty? But few hesitate to take riflemen as replacements for machine gunners who become casualties. I wonder how much of this is more or less a reflection of an immutable reality of the battlefield, or how much of this is simply a reflection of certain pragmatic views on the actual fighting abilities of most less-than-thoroughly-trained infantry? Personally, I'm a big believer in GEN DePuy's proposition that Infantry Platoons that use two elements to suppress and only one element to assault afford the best chances for a successful Platoon attack (reinforced of course by Kilcullen's reflections on his time at Warminster that using only a c. dozen men in the assault during a Company Attack while the rest of the company suppressed worked best). It's just that how much redundancy do you really need in a Platoon, Section, etc. in order to deal efficiently with battle losses?

[Ken White]

I can't even bloviate and make that better...

[Norfolk]

I can't even bloviate and make that better...

Blovete, bloviet, blovaite...whatever that word was, Ken? Take pity on the functionally illiterate peons of this world, wise old Master.;)

[William F. Owen]

Personally, I'm a big believer in GEN DePuy's proposition that Infantry Platoons that use two elements to suppress and only one element to assault afford the best chances for a successful Platoon attack (reinforced of course by Kilcullen's reflections on his time at Warminster that using only a c. dozen men in the assault during a Company Attack while the rest of the company suppressed worked best). It's just that how much redundancy do you really need in a Platoon, Section, etc. in order to deal efficiently with battle losses?

I'd be a bigger believer if it was not DuPuy that made that observation!

...but yes. I concur. UK Platoon Attack doctrine has the whole platoon suppressing while as few as one fire team actually tries to get forward and exploit. - This is what Kilcullen was observing, and what the Australians are now doing. The problem for the UK is that no one has ever written down or explained why this is done! - or as of the last time I was invited to observe a Platoon Attack at the infantry school.

And then we might want to ask if the Platoon/Company should create a "reserve" or have an element specifically held to exploit, in addition to that already given the task.

[Ken White]

I'd be a bigger believer if it was not DuPuy that made that observation!and so too did Ken White -- proving even a General can be correct occasionally... :D

[Norfolk]

Well, since that proposition has been verified in both testing and war by a Digger, a Four-Star General, a Field Marshal, and a Living Fossil;), I suppose all must now bend to the imperious will of this Council on the matter of the ratio of suppression to assault elements (GETM/METT-T dependent of course:rolleyes:).

Obstinate deniers of this verified truth will be cattle-prodded, hog-tied, flogged until flayed alive, and roasted on a spit...and then subjected to a continuous loopback recording of reviews and interviews re: all recent autobiographies/articles/books/memoires and the like by past and/or present civilian officials of the current Administration.:eek:

Wilf: Dupuy (http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tndupuy.htm) or DePuy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_E._DePuy) you meant to refer to?

Probably a Platoon should have one of its elements designated as its Exploitation element/Reserve, but perhaps only Company itself should possess a more "formal" Reserve per se. Kilcullen noted that the heavy weapons element of the Company was the most useful element from which to form a Reserve; personally, I would qualify that strongly by stating its dependence on GETM/METT-T.

[Ken White]

Sections 1.12 and 1.13, Canadian Human Rights Act ( R.S., 1985, c. H-6 ). :p :D

[Norfolk]

Geriatric Abuse! My Attorney will contact you.

Sections 1.12 and 1.13, Canadian Human Rights Act ( R.S., 1985, c. H-6 ). :p :D

My apologies Ken, I did not mean to offend your sensibilities.

It is interesting, however, that you did not invoke the Human Rights Act against this little passage:



Obstinate deniers of this verified truth will be cattle-prodded, hog-tied, flogged until flayed alive, and roasted on a spit...and then subjected to a continuous loopback recording of reviews and interviews re: all recent autobiographies/articles/books/memoires and the like by past and/or present civilian officials of the current Administration.


I suppose though that it's all about where you stand depends upon where you sit.

Now let me help you with your wheelchair, Ken...;):D

[Ken White]

My apologies Ken, I did not mean to offend your sensibilities.Grumpily accepted.
It is interesting, however, that you did not invoke the Human Rights Act against this little passage:Why would I do that; you merely suggest some possibly excessively light penance for error -- that's to be encouraged. Good job.
I suppose though that it's all about where you stand depends upon where you sit.Is that a Socratic quote...
Now let me help you with your wheelchair, Ken...;):DJust hand me that oxygen bottle and get yer grubby paws off my chair... :D

[gute]

What a topic! All that I have read is very interesting and informative. I am an avid reader of military history and current military affairs. I spent time in the Marine Corps, but never saw combat. I am familiar with weapons because of the time I spent in the Corps and the last 16 years in Law Enforcement.

I read an article a couple of years ago about research conducted at the end of WWII relative to squad size and the squad leaders ability to have effective control. If I remember correctly the research concluded that the ideal size of a rifle squad was 7-9 men. I have served as a fire team leader, squad leader and acting platoon sgt, but never in combat. During training exercises I found it challenging to lead three other Marines, but not hard. Squad leader was more difficult and acting platoon sgt was tough. I do believe age and more so experience are the deciding factors. To most of you this is duh statement.

I find the Distributed Operations concept of the Marine Corps very interesting. Where I diifer is with the squad command structure. With this I believe a 12 man squad lead by a E-6 with one of the fire team leaders acting as an assistant squad leader with the rank of Sgt to be reasonable. The squad would look like this:

SL - E-6
DM - E-3/E-4
GR - E-2/E-3
SAW - E-2

ASL/FTL - E-5
RM - E-4
RM - E-2/E-3
AR - E-2

FTL - E-4
RM - E-3
RM - E-2/E-3
AR - E-2

With the interest in rifle grenades making a comeback and the Marine Corps looking to replace the SAW with an Automatic Rifle, the composition of the three fire teams changes. The SL commands the support unit and directs the squad. I would assume with his rank of E-6 he has been in the infantry for 6-10 years and would have a wealth of experience (that's probably changed with Iraq and Afghanistan). The support squad has a designated marksman or DM, the grenadier humps a M32 multi-barrel grenade launcher, and the SAW man has a 7.62 AR.

The other fire teams have a Sgt to lead all eight Marines as well as provide leadership from a breaching position into the assault.

I have no idea which AR the Marine Corps will choose, but I like the Land Warfare M6A2 - which may also be fired from the open bolt.

I have read a great deal about bullets and which one the military should change to. 5.56, 6.5, 6.8 and 7.62. Also which rifles - HK416, M16A4, XM8, SCAR, LW, etc. It gives me a headache. I feel like the guy in Hamburger Hill talking about which eye to close when a flare goes up and which pill to use to clean his water. I fould a website that provide a lot of great info about the 5.56 and what the round is capable of doing when it is modified. When I write modified I mean 55 grain, 62 grain, 77 grain, etc.

With the military being the military I will venture that there is no change and the 5.56 stays so with that I go with a M16A6 (made up), which is a 5.56 caliber, 16.1 inch barrel with the LR 300 upper receiver. This will allow the stock to telescope and fold, which would be beneficial in vehicles and CQB. The buffer spring is moved to the front of the receiver from the stock. The automatic rifleman will hump basically the same weapon, but capable of firing from the open bolt (maybe a little longer barrel). The AR in the support fire team will have a 7.62 version of the 5.56 AR (def longer barrel). More range, bigger punch. The DM rifle will also be 7.62 (18-20 inch barrel) and the one made by LW rifles seems like it will work.

The CAP concept the Marine Corps utilized in Vietnam could also be used. Increasing the size of the squad to 15 men by adding a corpsman, RO, and a TAC-P type (good time to make TAC-P operations a warrant officers MOS in the Marine Corps - speciality if I have ever seen one).

Maybe I am taking too much current firepower away from the squad. I will not even get into drum mags for the AR's - hit and miss.

I am probably way out of my element, but what the heck. Feedback would be nice.

[William F. Owen]

I find the Distributed Operations concept of the Marine Corps very interesting.

You may want to consult the DO thread http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5636


The support squad has a designated marksman or DM, the grenadier humps a M32 multi-barrel grenade launcher, and the SAW man has a 7.62 AR.

Dedicated support squads make sense. I am a fan of M32, but I can't see a good reason for a 7.62mm AR. Makes no sense on the weight versus effect case unless it's actually a semi-auto sniper rifle.


I have read a great deal about bullets and which one the military should change to. 5.56, 6.5, 6.8 and 7.62. Also which rifles - HK416, M16A4, XM8, SCAR, LW, etc. It gives me a headache. I feel like the guy in Hamburger Hill talking about which eye to close when a flare goes up and which pill to use to clean his water.

Concur. As an area of discussion it serves no purpose, as concerns IWs unless you are on the extreme end of the spectrums. - and IMO, the area of real discussion is not really about the bullet but other issues.


I am probably way out of my element, but what the heck. Feedback would be nice

No you are not. To my mind, the merit of SWJ is that it's all about what you say, and the strength of reasoned argument. Credentials count for little if you are prone to talk rubbish, or cite your credentials in support of your argument.

[reed11b]

Main advantage of GPMGs is RANGE RANGE RANGE. Otherwise a SAW is just as capable. Any support weapon that can reach the range of a GPMG can supplant them in support. I like the 25mm payload rifle myself, but other options abound. Mortars are a possibility if they could be equiped with PGMs.
As far as big or small sections, that concept is based upon sections being the smallest unit that can act INDEPENDENTLY. Truth is, they can not, not for the most part. So big sections are still to small to effectivly use fire and movement techniques, becouse they can not sustain casulties or meet the variety of threats on the modern battlefield. A platoon is really the smallest unit you want patroling on it's own. See Mr. Owens article on Patrol-based Infantry for an example.

[Ken White]

"A platoon is really the smallest unit you want patroling on it's own. "Having led or participated in well over a hundred recon and combat patrols in less than Platoon (some less than even Squad) strength, I'm having difficulty seeing a rationale for that.

I would, in fact suggest that a Platoon patrol is a bad idea, too big to hide and too small to fight much...

[reed11b]

I have been on many squad sized patrols as well, but I feel we were lucky to have never been hit with any level of sustain contact. As soon as a squad starts taking casualties, it becomes practically imobilized. Become imbolized and you need rescue. A small platoon may be too large to patrol as a massed unit but it can be dispersed into sections that remain within support range of each other. Particularly for urban combat, lone squad patrols risk the entire squad.
Reed
P.S. Yes I know NCO's LOVE squads becouse that is the tactical echelon they get to lead. Doesn't make them well sized or structured for independent ops however.

[selil]

I guess the Marine fire team patrol to contact concept is gone? LRRPs were five or seven?

[Steve Blair]

LRRPs were 5-7, as was the standard SOG Spike Team or RT. I think Force Recon also ran with a 5-7 man structure. Of course, it also came down to mission. SOG ended up having reaction companies on standby in several areas, and would use those for missions as needed. Basically, if they were sneakin' the small element went in.

[Ken White]

I have been on many squad sized patrols as well, but I feel we were lucky to have never been hit with any level of sustain contact....but I would hope you were never hit because you were doing it right, not due to luck -- which IMO, is finding a parking place at the Mall during the Christmas Season.
... As soon as a squad starts taking casualties, it becomes practically imobilized. Become imbolized and you need rescue....I'd say "not necessarily" to either but the more important point is to avoid taking casualties by just doing it right.
...A small platoon may be too large to patrol as a massed unit but it can be dispersed into sections that remain within support range of each other. Particularly for urban combat, lone squad patrols risk the entire squad.Small or large is immaterial, a Platoon is still too large to hide and to small to fight much of anything even slightly larger.
P.S. Yes I know NCO's LOVE squads because that is the tactical echelon they get to lead. Doesn't make them well sized or structured for independent ops however.Not the issue at all; that's just silly. I've led more Platoons than I did Squads and in more places; the issue is getting the job done and for Infantry in most cases that means patrolling -- lots and lots of patrolling and then more patrolling. Doing that by Platoon limits the area you can cover and the times you can cover a given area. The advantage to Squad and smaller size patrols is quantity, coverage area and a certain amount of stealth.

A patrol is almost never an independent op, it is an integral part of a planned information gathering or combat action plan of generally a Co or rarely a Bn (or even more rarely, hopefully, of a Bde). It is usually short range and fairly short in duration and it should be planned, if a reconnaissance or presence effort, to avoid contact. Squad size combat patrols are more rare but are ideal for prisoner snatches, OP/LP destruction and a few other things.

We can disagree on the utility of platoon sized patrols.

[reed11b]

I guess the Marine fire team patrol to contact concept is gone? LRRPs were five or seven?

The whole point of LRRPs was NOT to make contact. If they did, they beat feet away. Marine fire team move to contact I am not familier with, but I do not hold Marine tactics in very high regard anyway.

In rural or jungle environments, especially at night, a limited squad patrol (With some sort of ready force backup) makes sense, however, in an urban environment it does not. You can expect contact. You can expect to have no safe exit route. you can EXPECT to take casualties. Combat is becoming increasingly urban and any discusion of unit compisition needs to take this in consideration.
Reed

[Norfolk]

Quite agreed with Ken. The only time you'd use a Platoon in a patrol (as opposed to a hasty or deliberate attack) is on a Fighting Patrol where you're very definitely going out of your way to deal real damage to someone, and in a way that's really going to hurt. As for Squad/Section-level Fighting Patrols, Ken's covered that. But Reconnaissance Patrols on the other hand thrive on the smallest possible number of men; the smallest I've been in was 3 men (it was the Regimental standard at the time), and the largest was 6 (and that was for a longer-range patrol that was tasked with recceing and securing an LZ for a Battalion-level air assault. Personally I had issues with the 3-man Recce Patrol, and these have since been resolved, but a recce patrol can't do its job properly if it can't see without being seen, ever. And that means the fewest possible number of men with the tightest control, creating the least noise, and leaving the least sign.

I remember watching a Recce demonstration put on by a reserve infantry regiment from Toronto years ago. The battalion intelligence officer gave the presentation while eight infantrymen formed up for presentation purposes, and said intelligence officer proceeded to describe how an 8-man Recce Patrol would go about its business. Those of us from The RCR just had our jaws drop; we'd been using 3-man patrols (a figure since slightly adjusted, and to my satisfaction:D) for years to do what these guys were proposing to do with no less than 8, an entire Section. I remember thinking that this might have worked in Korea, but that wasn't how things were done now.

As for sending a Squad/Section out on an Advance/Movement-to-Contact, as Selil said, this is really done best with the Fire Teams moving autonomously, so they each can see while minimizing their chances of being seen, and presenting no massed target for the enemy. Not the same task obviously as a Recce Patrol of approximately the same size, but the basic principles until contact remain much the same.

[Ken White]

...however, in an urban environment it does not. You can expect contact. You can expect to have no safe exit route. you can EXPECT to take casualties. Combat is becoming increasingly urban and any discusion of unit compisition needs to take this in consideration.
ReedSeems to me METT-TC, as always, applies. Do the guys in Afghanistan and the Philippines know about this urban stuff?

One should always expect contact and to take casualties. One should never expect to have no safe exit route but acknowledging that can happen, there should be an extraction plan...
...but I do not hold Marine tactics in very high regard anyway.I suspect some of them feel the same way about Army TTP. Both types have advantages and disadvantages -- like everything else in the world.

[selil]

The whole point of LRRPs was NOT to make contact. If they did, they beat feet away. Marine fire team move to contact I am not familier with, but I do not hold Marine tactics in very high regard anyway.

In rural or jungle environments, especially at night, a limited squad patrol (With some sort of ready force backup) makes sense, however, in an urban environment it does not. You can expect contact. You can expect to have no safe exit route. you can EXPECT to take casualties. Combat is becoming increasingly urban and any discusion of unit compisition needs to take this in consideration.
Reed

Actually LRRPs were used for a variety of missions and capabilities. Perhaps through a myopic lens of artificial constraints on size, capability, and environment what you say makes sense. If you take what was one discussion and impose your own set of rules and ideology to bend the requirements to some expected outcome I am sure you can be quite right. In one very specific if rare occasion in the spectrum of conventional warfare and COIN I am sure there is at least one mission where your proposed size and scope holds sway.

I will take a pass on your rather nasty if childish comment about Marines.

[reed11b]

Not the issue at all; that's just silly.
I can be silly...

I've led more Platoons than I did Squads and in more places; the issue is getting the job done and for Infantry in most cases that means patrolling -- lots and lots of patrolling and then more patrolling. Doing that by Platoon limits the area you can cover and the times you can cover a given area. The advantage to Squad and smaller size patrols is quantity, coverage area and a certain amount of stealth.
But did they operate w/o the other squads also patroling or being in range to provide support? If they made contact, did they "fire and manuever" on there own or did they create a base of fire and call in the other squads? Squads are differnt then fire teams in that they are supposed to "Fire and Manuever" on there own, but in real life they very rarely do, so why create an unessasry layer of command and a faulty doctrine based on it? Can a 5-6 man fire team patrol as effectivly as an 8-man squad?

A patrol is almost never an independent op, it is an integral part of a planned information gathering or combat action plan of generally a Co or rarely a Bn (or even more rarely, hopefully, of a Bde). It is usually short range and fairly short in duration and it should be planned, if a reconnaissance or presence effort, to avoid contact.
On this we agree 100% No argument there. My squad size patrols tended to be of the "lets go kick rocks and see what we stir up" variety, hence my feeling of being lucky we rarely did.

Squad size combat patrols are more rare but are ideal for prisoner snatches, OP/LP destruction and a few other things
Again, can a 5-6 man fire team or a stick of 2-3 5 man fire teams perform the same mission as effectivly as a squad?


We can disagree on the utility of platoon sized patrols.

We probably don't disagree that much, Platoon patrol or movement is for urban conflict since it can take casualties and maintain movement. Again usually as part of a larger unit. I think most of our argument was due to me poorly explaining what I was trying to say. I'll try to take more time to explain clearly in the future.

[Ken White]

I can be silly...


But did they operate w/o the other squads also patroling or being in range to provide support?Rarely, depended on the location and situation. More so in cities but not universally, almost never away from them. Very rarely in Korea, sometimes in Viet Nam. Varied in other places.
If they made contact, did they "fire and manuever" on there own or did they create a base of fire and call in the other squads?Since most of the time there were no other elements around, we either fought or scooted.
Squads are differnt then fire teams in that they are supposed to "Fire and Manuever" on there own, but in real life they very rarely do, so why create an unessasry layer of command and a faulty doctrine based on it?I don't think the doctrine is faulty -- the application is. We don't trust each other as much as we used to and many Commanders are afraid to relinquish too much control for fear of failure. Force protection is IMO overdone also. Risk aversion seems to have become a way of life in much -- not all -- of the Army.
Can a 5-6 man fire team patrol as effectivly as an 8-man squad?Better -- 8 is too many, five's about the limit for a less than squad patrol, four is good, three will work. Eight isn't useful for much; the old 11 man squad was pretty useful and the Marines 13 man squad is even better. A Squad augmented with an M240 team is not a good idea, the 240's too heavy, hurts agility. In small units, skill and agility trump firepower.
On this we agree 100% No argument there. My squad size patrols tended to be of the "lets go kick rocks and see what we stir up" variety, hence my feeling of being lucky we rarely did.My perception is that "let's go see what we stir up" has become the norm in US patrolling and recon -- not too smart, IMO. Comes a big war, we can relearn the hard way.
Again, can a 5-6 man fire team or a stick of 2-3 5 man fire teams perform the same mission as effectivly as a squad?METT-TC rules, always. What do you want to do? What's the best element to accomplish that? What is the least number of people you can expose and still get the mission accomplished?
Platoon patrol or movement is for urban conflict since it can take casualties and maintain movement. Again usually as part of a larger unit.METT-TC or situation dependent???:wry:

[Uboat509]

I have spent a lot of time in units where squad-sized or smaller patrols were commonplace, including a few where the maximum sized patrol possible was twelve men (excluding add-ons like terps or officers). I have found that I am generally more comfortable in a smaller patrol. It's sort of similar to the reason I have avoided mech or armor like the plague my whole career, being the biggest baddest thing on the battlefield may provide you with a certain amount of protection but it also makes you the biggest target on the battlefield. In the context of COIN, it also makes a bigger signature which tends to make the bad guys go find something else to do, not especially useful when the mission is to kill or capture the bad guys. I saw a lot of huge operations come up with squat and a lot of smaller ones come up with success. Broad sweeping statements like, x number of men on a patrol is too small and can't work are not useful and are, in my opinion, generally unsupportable. Even in Iraq, small sniper patrols are having quite a bit of success, largely due to the stealth and agility afforded them by their size. As Ken points out, there is no magic number that is guaranteed to work or guaranteed to fail. METT-TC will determine that number for you and there are no reliable shortcuts around that fact.

SFC W

[Darksaga]

It will be interesting to see if they do bring back the M60 as a commonly used crew served weapon.

Two years ago I heard the testing of the new barrel for the M60 while in the field. As many of you know the M60 has a very distinct sound to it that is unmistakable.

Whoever was testing it was going cyclic on the weapon for several minutes. It was very impressive.

I guess the real question will be is if that type of weapon is still applicable in a COIN environment?

[William F. Owen]

Main advantage of GPMGs is RANGE RANGE RANGE. Otherwise a SAW is just as capable. Any support weapon that can reach the range of a GPMG can supplant them in support. I like the 25mm payload rifle myself, but other options abound. Mortars are a possibility if they could be equiped with PGMs.

In terms of weapons and ammunition weight, as well as cost, the SAW is very roughly half what a GPMG is. A SAW weights 7.5kg and 500 rnds 5.56mm link is 6.07kg. An M240 weighs 12.5kg and 500 rounds weighs 13.5kg.

However the SAW is proposed and generally employed as a one man weapon. The GPMG is at the very least a two to three man weapon in terms of effective employment. Individual loads can be far better balance across a dedicated GPMG team, than a lone SAW gunner, especially once TI sights and range finders are scaled. 7.62mm rounds will also destroy and perforate cover, that a 5.56mm weapon cannot.

If you want to leverage that capability in a 7.62mm LAR, then an HK-417 weighs 4.23 kg and 500 rounds is 14.6kg (I think - check my figures)

- So two men with 7.62mm LARs, and 240 rounds carry less weight than carried by one man with an M-249, and 500 rounds. Even if the SAW carries 250 round he is is just carrying 1 kg more. It's not just range. Weight versus capability versus numbers are also critical.


As far as big or small sections, that concept is based upon sections being the smallest unit that can act INDEPENDENTLY. Truth is, they can not, not for the most part. So big sections are still to small to effectivly use fire and movement techniques, becouse they can not sustain casulties or meet the variety of threats on the modern battlefield. A platoon is really the smallest unit you want patroling on it's own. See Mr. Owens article on Patrol-based Infantry for an example.

As the author (very glad you read my work. Thank you) I am not sure this is what I wish to imply. My personal advocacy on this matter is that of the multiple, with is 3-5 x 3-5 man teams. So smallest is 3 x 3 and biggest is 5 x 5. Personally I believe that patrol size is dictated far more by the level of support the patrol can expect than anything else. If you are in rural terrain and have everything I want on the end of a radio, 15 mins out, you can probably live with 6 men. 6 men on a summer afternoon in Gaza, Dundalk or even Fallujah may not be optimal.

...and as far as I can tell the average SOG OP-35 RT Patrol was usually 8 men, 3 x USSF and 5 Indig. My notes are in a suitcase somewhere but I know of only one RT that ran as 3 (and only once), but I am sure several teams ran heavy with 12 or more. Both Plaster's and Greco's books contain detailed numbers.

...and DAMN! Reed is that you Buddy?? Good to know you're out there! Welcome aboard. Dismiss all the condescending mathematics at the start of this post - you know where I'm coming from! :D

[VMI_Marine]

It will be interesting to see if they do bring back the M60 as a commonly used crew served weapon.

I don't see why they would. The M240B is a good weapon. The Marine Corps is actually converting all of our 240Gs to 240Bs. I just wanted the front rail system and the heat shield, but once they converted my team's gun I saw what a difference the hydraulic buffer makes. It slowed the rate of fire down a good bit, and greatly increased the reliability.

[Fuchs]

I've got a question.
This "patrol" thing as mentioned all the time by U.S. and Commonwealth people doesn't fit into well to what Germany armies did. Patrols of such sizes (squad to platoon) were usually mounted or patrolling along the lines the gaps between Eastern Front strongpoints (usually along otherwise empty trenches or channels).

"We" apply some different patrols for base security around Kunduz, but I don't know the size. Maybe they use squads now. There are certainly not enough men in the base for proper patrolling in more than squad strength. Kundus is unique because the terrain offers no opportunity for stealth unless you move at night and hide at day on high ground. But afaik stealth is not desired in Kunduz anyway because the patrols shall and do deter the Taleban from using 107mm rockets.

The most common battlefield scouting mission in German armies was a stealth-oriented 2-3 men team that infiltrates a short distance (2 km for example) and reports back (or, if it just scouts without infiltration it was often a lieutenant with one or two soldiers).

Platoon-sized dismounted ops were either "Stoßtrupp" actions; strictly offensive, to take out a single position or to take prisoners or they were movement to contact.


I'm a bit confused about this focus on patrolling in U.S. and UK. Maybe it's a consequence of the many LIC in the past two generations?

------

About the M240; it may suffice, but it's much heavier than necessary.
Even the Russian PKM and its decendant Pecheneg is better in some regards.
I would recommend the SS-77 from South Africa for the U.S.Army: http://world.guns.ru/machine/mg13-e.htm
2+ kg saved without a loss of capability and the tactical employment would be the same (unlike with the MG3 which is different because of its high ROF, but also lighter than M240).

[reed11b]

Hey WilF, good to see you are still putting out new thought provoking work, keep it up.
Fuchs, the patrol focus in this discusion is probably my fault since I used it incorrectly to define offensive movements outside the wire (Iraq).
My concept on "squad" size is based on there not being a need for squads and that a fire-team based platoon is more aplicable to modern ops. Arrainging squads for the assault or defense or even patrol like you see in many "perfect squad size/compisition" discusions makes very little sense since the enemy and the conditions you fight in have a say in what is ideal anyway. My ideas differ from WilF's only in minor details, so reading his article is the best way to figure what I am trying to say since I am doing a poor job of it myself.
Reed
Anychance of getting an imbedded spellchecker? that would be grate..errrr great.

[Ken White]

I've got a question.
This "patrol" thing as mentioned all the time by U.S. and Commonwealth people doesn't fit into well to what Germany armies did. Patrols of such sizes (squad to platoon) were usually mounted or patrolling along the lines the gaps between Eastern Front strongpoints (usually along otherwise empty trenches or channels).Commonwealth and US patrols are used for for that. Commonly called Contact Patrols (sometimes by some Communications Patrols). No sense sending a Platoon or even a Squad if a Team sized patrol is adequate, the size is very much situation dependent...
...afaik stealth is not desired in Kunduz anyway because the patrols shall and do deter the Taleban from using 107mm rockets.That too. "Presence" patrols. A squad sized patrol is ideal for that, big enough to deter the casual shooter (if said Squad acts like it knows what it's doing) and small enough to be reasonably agile while allowing more time and space coverage than a Platoon sized patrol...
The most common battlefield scouting mission in German armies was a stealth-oriented 2-3 men team that infiltrates a short distance (2 km for example) and reports back (or, if it just scouts without infiltration it was often a lieutenant with one or two soldiers).A whole lot of that, the bulk of patrols in fact (outside COIN / LIC where the presence patrol does both show the flag and recon work). Reconnaissance (US 'Recon,' Commonwealth 'Recce') patrols -- except it's generally 4 or 5 people and only very rarely is an Officer sent. Four is pretty common for the simple reasons that's the size of a US fire Team (a half squad) and allows two buddy pairs.
Platoon-sized dismounted ops were either "Stoßtrupp" actions; strictly offensive, to take out a single position or to take prisoners or they were movement to contact.Generically called Combat Patrols in the US. The same except that the minimum number required for the mission is usually sent to reduce exposure; no sense sending a Platoon of 40 plus if ten or twelve people are adequate for the mission.
I'm a bit confused about this focus on patrolling in U.S. and UK. Maybe it's a consequence of the many LIC in the past two generations?Not really, most of our 'doctrine' was developed in WW I, refined in WW II (both Theaters of Operations) and has really received only minor tweaks since then; aggressive and extensive patrolling was found to avid surprises and to develop a lot of intel. That proved true also in Korea, in Viet Nam and today. It is still with us since, generally, it works. It could be improved in some instances but Armies change slowly... :wry:
About the M240; it may suffice, but it's much heavier than necessary. Even the Russian PKM and its decendant Pecheneg is better in some regards. I would recommend the SS-77 from South Africa for the U.S.Army: 2+ kg saved without a loss of capability and the tactical employment would be the same (unlike with the MG3 which is different because of its high ROF, but also lighter than M240).All true but we have a bad problem with the "it wasn't invented here syndrome." I recall a Bundeswehr LTC pointing out that the US would buy the Karcher Decon device, engineer it for seven years until it no longer worked and then adopt it. He was about right... :(

[William F. Owen]

Not really, most of our 'doctrine' was developed in WW I, refined in WW II (both Theaters of Operations)

Yep, the epistemology of US/UK thoughts on patrols and patrolling is one that essentially says the Patrols are some type of optional or specialist activity. Most manuals still have a separate section or chapter on "Patrols" or "Patrols and Ambushes" as though they are somehow distinct from Attack and Defence. Most armies are still stuck in a WW1 mindset.

[Kiwigrunt]

Anychance of getting an imbedded spellchecker? that would be grate..errrr great.



Dew knot trussed yore spell chequer two fined awl yore mistakes!;)

[Black Brunswicker]

First of all, hello to all, it's my first post. The reason that I joined this forum is that I found that many people here were discussing some of the same questions and ideas then I. I am thinking since some years about Infantry organization, tactics and weapons.

For the infantry platoon this is where my thinking currently stands:


Rifle Platoon of 32 Men: 1 Officier, 1 Sergeant, 4 Corporals, 26 other ranks (I choose 32 Men because they can ride in 4 common APC)

Basic Organisation:
- Platoon HQ and Support Section: 1 Officier, 1 Sergeant, 1 Radio Op, 1 Medic, 1 Forward Observer, 2 Mortar Operators with 1 x 60mm Mortar, 1 Sniper
- 3 x Rifle Sections with 1 x Section Leader, 1 x Assistent Section Leader, 2 x Machinegunners and 4 x Riflemen; with 2 x LMG, 2 x 40mm Grenade Launchers and antitank weapons

There various variation how the platoon can also be organised, like 4 Rifle Sections of 7 + HQ or 2 x Rifle Sections of 2 Sections of 12 + Support Section + HQ

There are also some variation the sections can be organised
- 2 x Fire Team of 4
- 1 x Assault Team of 5 and 1 x Support Team of 3 with 2 LMG and 1 40mm GL)
- 1 x Assault Team of 4 with 1 x LMG, 1 x 40mm GL and one Support Team with the anittank grenade launcher and 1 x LMG


Basic Equipment:
- 26 x Short Assault Rifles 5.56mm like HK416 or SIG SG551 (about 8 of them with a telescopic sight like ACOG)
- 6 x light machineguns like FN Minimi, Negev or Ultima 100
- 6 x 40mm Grenade Launchers like AG36 (I like the ones which you can convert into a stand-alone weapon) or HK69A1
- 1 x Long Range Rifles (8.6mm) like Sako TRG-42
- 1 x 60mm Mortar
- 3 x Antitank Grenade Launchers like Carlgustav M3
maybe some AT4CS if required
riflegrenades and handgrenades
- 9 x Radios VHF, Portable
- 2 x Radios VHF, Manpack

which weapons exactly is for me not so important. Important is a powerfull mix in the platoon and in the sections. I want some antitank , antipersonel (mortar and 40mm grenade launchers) and suppressiv fire (MG) capabilities.


It is diffcult to chose the right mix of weapons, I considered a lot of different weapons for the platoon like

7,62mm Machineguns like FN MAG or the Mk 48
7,62mm Semi-Automatic Sniper Rifles like the M110 SASS
different 40mm grenade launchers (like the M32) and light mortars
antitankweapons like NLAW, Panzerfaust 3, Carlgustav and AT4

but I couldn't integrate all into one platoon.

There is no right answer for the weapons, I also just looked for a well out-balanced platoon and for flexible weapons. One of the main problems are the antitank (support) weapons, which are heavy and have some other disadvantages.

I first started with a 8-man section with 2 x FN Minimi, 2 x M203 and 1 x Panzerfaust 3. Then I thought about a 8-man section with 1 x Carlgustav, 1 x FN MAG and 1 x HK69A1 40mm grenade launcher, which is already a good mix - I think - but not so flexible. I also thought about a squad with a 5-men AT/assault group with 1 x UGL 40mm and 1 x MBT LAW and a 3-men Support Group with a 7,62mm Mk 48 and a 40mm MGL.

I didn't want to create a very big platoon and I also believe that small sections of 8 or 9 men are easier to command and to lead. I tried to keep the organization and the weapons simple, but sometimes it contradicts with other objectivs.

Any feedbacks?

[William F. Owen]

I didn't want to create a very big platoon and I also believe that small sections of 8 or 9 men are easier to command and to lead. I tried to keep the organization and the weapons simple, but sometimes it contradicts with other objectivs.

Any feedbacks?

Welcome.

I could say great minds think alike or fools seldom differ. Good to see you put the radios in.

Why do you make these assumptions?

Dunno how much of these forums you've read (my guess is most - :) ) but almost every aspect of your suggested TOE is discussed in depth in about 5-6 threads other than this one.

[RJ]

I want to thank all who have contributed to these 20 pages. Great insight and every possible angle and configeration a rifle squad can be stretched of shrunk too.

When I got the feeling (de ja vu) the second time in the last 8 pages, I recycled myself and went back to the first 4 pages. If anyone joined this discussion in the middle and hasn't read pages 1 - 4 ----I recommend you take the time to do so.

The results of a 12 man Marine DO Squad in combat will be most interesting to this old 13 man Rifle Squad and 9 man Recon Squad leader after about two cycles thru the effort in Afganistan.

Thanks again. I am amazed of the things that have changed and those that have remained.

[jcustis]

When I got the feeling (de ja vu) the second time in the last 8 pages, I recycled myself and went back to the first 4 pages. If anyone joined this discussion in the middle and hasn't read pages 1 - 4 ----I recommend you take the time to do so.

You are absolutely right. Those first four pages are gems, and reminded me that I needed to print off some of the text and linked material and offer to a motivated Aussie cavalry exchange officer.

[RJ]

Is it too soon for the Marine Corps to comment on the effectiveness of the 12 man squads in those two battalions deployed to Afganistan within the last 18 months?

Or the basic squad set up in fireteam members and weapons.

This might be premature, but it is on my mind and thought I'd ask.

[RJ]

I came across an article on the CH-53E Super Stallion
and in checking the personnel load line found out that it can haul and deliver 37 personnel in it normal seating config., and 51 Marines with the addition of center asile seats.

The CH-53E will be upgraded to a K version that will have bigger engines and a heavier lift capability by 2015.

The"E" versions are are being refurbished with three bigger engines that will increase their capability to function better in hot conditions and fly higher for mountian work.

The rear ramps are receiving FB M3M 50. cal supression sistem that provides 180 degree rear protection for the aircraft.

A fleet of these can and have delived 3 squads at a time. Could this aircraft (or the future variants for it) solve the personell fit limitations for intact squad delivery to the battlefield for many nations and the U.S. ARMY?

The following is an excerpt on the CH-53E's recent roles in the Marine Corps picked off Goggle.

Since their arrival in Djibouti in early April 2003, HMH 461 was instrumental in accomplishing the Combined Joint Task Force Horn-of-Africa's mission of detecting, disrupting and defending against trans-national terrorists by supplying organic operational reach and providing flexibility to a wide variety of counter-terrorism activities across the region.

The Ramp Mounted Weapon System (RMWS) has been added to Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron's CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters, giving them 180 degrees of defensive fire from the rear of the aircraft. The RMWS was being evaluated as a possible defensive weapon system for several assault support aircraft in the Marine Corps, but HMH 461 is the first Fleet Marine Force squadron to actually implement the system in real-word operations.

The RMWS is a Fabrique Nationale (FN) M3M .50-caliber machine gun modified into a weapon system specific for Marine Corps applications.

The CH-53 has tremendous capabilities and there have been several instances where this capability could have directly benefited Marines.

The missions the CH-53 has been called upon to do have been long-range, over the horizon, sometimes without escort missions. Durning the O'Grady rescue in September 1995, they were able to take Cobras with them, but it was a relatively long-range, over the horizon mission. The inability to have a rear-mounted suppressive fire capability could have cost them significantly. Fortunately, the missiles that were shot at them didn't impact the aircraft.

During missions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Marines were cargo strapping personnel on the ramp of the aircraft with M16's (Marine standard issue assault rifle) and M60's (medium machine gun) to provide a rear suppressive-fire capability.

In mid-2005 three H-53 Sea Stallion helicopters were brought out of retirement and transported between Aug. 9-11 to Naval Air (NAVAIR) Depot (NADEP) Cherry Point, NC, where they were upgraded before being put back into active service.

This marked this first time H-53s have been recalled from the nation's war reserve, also known as the aircraft "bone yard," at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AZ. The Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center located there maintains more than 5,000 excess DoD and Coast Guard aircraft for the nation's war needs.

The H-53 is critical to the fleet and is the only heavy-lift helicopter in the Marine Corps. These helicopters can carry internal and external cargo and transport up to 55 troops. Essential for bringing necessary supplies to Marines on the front lines, the aircraft are also used for long-range insertion and search and rescue missions, and they are capable of in-flight refueling.

It's very much the workhorse of the Marine Corps and is the most heavily utilized aircraft in the fleet. Unfortunately, there are just not enough of them. The Marine Corps has lost many H-53s in the last few years because of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and needs to increase the amount available.

The Marines activated these war reserve CH-53E helicopters to sustain high, hot and long duration heavy lift for US and coalition forces engaged in the global war on terrorism. The Marines hadn't lost any aircraft to enemy action, but the harsh and unforgiving natural environment where these aircraft are relied upon for day-to-day logistics and assault support has taken its toll. In order to meet present mission requirements, deployed Marines have to transfer aircraft between squadrons.

[Ken White]

The Army will not want to buy the 53K because they didn't invent it. American parochialism is alive and well, budget problems or not...

They'll point out that the Chinook can do almost the same on troop lift (I've seen more the 60 people on a C Model in hot and high...). Most Chinooks carry three MG, two side and a ramp, calibers vary...

I've always contended that the Armed Forces should compete and buy the best design for a requirement; then compete the design and get at least two competing production sources. Everybody laughs at that idea on two counts. Congress won't support it because the manufacturers would not like that approach and the parochialism... :(

[ODB]

The most I experienced is 72 troops on a CH-47. The best part was the pilots trying to figure out how to make it over the mountain passes in Afghanistan, but they finally did it, 11 warning lights later.

[Cavguy]

The most I experienced is 72 troops on a CH-47. The best part was the pilots trying to figure out how to make it over the mountain passes in Afghanistan, but they finally did it, 11 warning lights later.

Sounds like a great story - classified?

[William F. Owen]

The CH-53E will be upgraded to a K version that will have bigger engines and a heavier lift capability by 2015.


I'd check that. I have a briefing .ppt on CH-53K and it states that it is a new build AC. As CH-53K has a new wider fuselage (to take JLTV) I can't see how you'd upgrade an E to a K, but I might be wrong.

[RJ]

You are correct. That upgrade was a slip on my part.

The new AC will have a larger cabin and even bigger engines than the the current engine upgrade on in system
aircraft.

[Distiller]

I would NEVER stuff so many people into a single vehicle!

[RJ]

I'll bet there is a hellofastory that goes along with that 72 folks in the flying banana. :eek:

[Ken White]

I would NEVER stuff so many people into a single vehicle!reasonable options. Sometimes you don't have those...

[SGTMILLS]

Isn't it amazing how the conversation in "Rifle Squad Composition" can switch to you rotary geeks? :D have a great Thanksgiving!

[William F. Owen]

Isn't it amazing how the conversation in "Rifle Squad Composition" can switch to you rotary geeks? :D have a great Thanksgiving!

I prefer the term "Student of Airmobile Capability" and "Boring Organisational Pendant", to better describe my area of interest, rather than Geek. ;)

[SGTMILLS]

I prefer the term "Student of Airmobile Capability" and "Boring Organisational Pendant", to better describe my area of interest, rather than Geek. ;)

ha! yeah, i guess geek sounds worse than it's intent. Besides, I LOVED hearing things like "trailblazer element, this is airwolf 2, we will be in your area all evening" or EVEN BETTER was "trailblazer element, this is spectre 6, we will be in your AO this evening." two minutes pass, "roger, this is spectre 7, we will ALSO be in your AO" :D

[ODB]

The 72 man CH-47 flight isn't classified, it was during my 101st days during OEF I, seems so long ago now. Notoriously aviation always showed up with one less A/C for exfil. We went in with 3 x CH-47s for 3 glorious days of "mountain climbing". On exfil we got word only 2 A/C were inbound, so plan was changed to pick up a platoon plus and take them to Khwost, then get the rest of us and take us to Bagram. Refuel and go back and get the other platoon. 2-3 minutes out the pilots make contact and tell us to load everybody, they're going to check the torque and see if the A/C could handle the load. We did what any good infantry guy does and thermited any extra unneeded weight. We loaded and the pilots felt the A/C could handle the load so off we went. Well unfortunately not so much, as we came upon the mountains the pilots were pulling up and we were going down. The last thing you want to hear is hold on as your altitude is decreasing. We race tracked for some time while the pilots tried to find a lower crossing point, they found one but it was too far out of the way for current fuel levels. The pilots then decided to circle back, fly NAP of the earth and use the propellor blast to keep us off the ground. Basically we did a slingshot down one mountain up over the other. By this time the floor is slick as can be from puke. We ended you refueling in Kabul, where the crew chief broke out the video camera to record the new record of 72, the previous record was 60 as set by us 2 weeks earlier. When we got the pilots got the asses chewed by their command and our command put them in for an award. Neither bird flew in country again as they needed to be sent back for extensive refit.

[Distiller]

Both the ground troop head honcho and the pilot should have their asses kicked for such a stunt. I'm not against stunts, but they have to have some merit. Can't see one here, only the risk of 75 troops lying burnt and crippled on an Afghan mountainside.

[RJ]

and the ensuing hijack down the path of vertical envelopment , I feel the need to redirect to the original track. Rifle Squad composition.

In the past pages a mention of the Marine Corps testing of a 12 man squad under combat conditions surfaced. The Marines were going to test the one man shorter squad in Afganistan in 2007-2008.

Did it happen? And has there been any comments on this "new" size aquad and its effectiveness?

Did the Marine Corps make the first fireteam leader the squad leader with responsibilities to lead his fireteama nd the other two in his squad?

Any comment or statement about how this concept was received bythe troops and what kind of problems stuck their ugly heads up during the testing period, would be appreciated.

[B.Smitty]

30 Man Platoon Outline

Manning
1 Officer, 1 Sergeant, 2 Corporals, 2 Lance Corporals, 24 other ranks

Weapons.
30 x Individual Weapons/Carbines (5.56mm)
6 x 40mm UGL kits, or 40mm launchers
2 x GPMG (7.62mm)
2 x Long Range Rifles (8.6mm)
1 x 60mm Mortar Hand Held
2 x MAW, - Alcotan / Panzerfaust / 84mm
M72 type LAW and M200 type Rifle grenade issued as required.

3 x ATGM Posts held for Anti-armour mission

Communications
30 x PRR
6 x PRC-148 or 710 type multi-band hand held.
1 x HF Manpack
6 x Commanders GPS sets (PLGR) and PDAs

Night Vision
30 x NVG and IR Weapons pointer
4 x Weapons mounted Long Range Night Sight
4 x Thermal Weapons sight
6 x Light Weight Laser Range Finder

Organisations – organised by mission, transport and operational requirement.
2 x Multiples
Each multiple is 3 x 5 man teams. Each multiple Commanded by the Platoon
Commander, and the Platoon Sergeant.
3 x Sections
3 Sections of 2 x 5 man teams, or each section as 3,3,4 groups.
5 x Sections of 6 men
6 Sections of 5 men.

Transport (as dismounts)
5 x 6 man APC
4 x 8 man APC (2 spare seats)
3 x 10 man APC
10 x M/WMIK crews (2 Sections of 5 vehicles)

I just came upon this thread, so forgive me for posting so late.

Mr. Owen, I had a couple questions about your 30-man platoon TOE from way back.

I recognize the desire to pack more HE tossers into the platoon, but does this really leave enough basic infantry for CQB, room clearing, and so on in a 30 man platoon?

If you have 5 CSWs (2xGPMG, 2xMAW, 1x60mm mortar, not including ATGMs), you'll tie up at least 10 men carrying and supporting them. Take away two more for the LRRs, for a total of at least 12 soldiers tied up supporting CSWs or wedded to a big weapon. You may even tie up more as ammo bearers for the CSWs.

Add in 3 ATGM posts plus missiles and that's at least another 6 soldiers. Given that, and taking away the PL and PS, two thirds of your platoon will be non-door kickers.

I see you also include a carbine for each man in the platoon, allowing some men to drop their CSW and become riflemen, as needed. However can a foot-borne CSW gunner reasonably carry a carbine plus ammo in addition to his CSW+ammo? They are probably overloaded as it is (especially factoring in body armor).

[reed11b]

Smitty, if you have 3 ATGMs in use, you are probably not in a serious door kicking (i.e. COIN/CT) environment. If you are facing tanks, you probably are focused on that level of threat.
Reed

[B.Smitty]

Smitty, if you have 3 ATGMs in use, you are probably not in a serious door kicking (i.e. COIN/CT) environment. If you are facing tanks, you probably are focused on that level of threat.
Reed

Understandable, but then does the Company keep the ATGM posts when not in use? If that's the case, why not just have the ATGMs at the Company level and attach as needed to Platoons?

Regardless, even without the ATGMs, there are still at least 12 soldiers tied up with CSWs or LRRs. Is this a reasonable ratio of riflemen to CSW/LRRs?

On a separate note, I worry that rounds for the current crop of crew-served MAWs are just too heavy to carry in significant numbers. The average CG round weighs 3+kg. Most other MAW rounds are significantly heavier (IIRC, Panzerfaust 3 rounds are >10kg each). How many rounds does an average 2-man CG team carry? 4?

This is where the RPG-7 is nice. It has a range of rounds from 2kg to 4.5kg.

[William F. Owen]

If you have 5 CSWs (2xGPMG, 2xMAW, 1x60mm mortar, not including ATGMs), you'll tie up at least 10 men carrying and supporting them. Take away two more for the LRRs, for a total of at least 12 soldiers tied up supporting CSWs or wedded to a big weapon. You may even tie up more as ammo bearers for the CSWs.


Add in 3 ATGM posts plus missiles and that's at least another 6 soldiers. Given that, and taking away the PL and PS, two thirds of your platoon will be non-door kickers.

Who carries what weapon and when would be decided by the mission. This is what the platoon has available, NOT what the platoon carries. Items not in use would be back-loaded.

Nor are the scales absolute. I would expect the scales to vary with mission and the type of formation. Facing a lot of armour (could happen), you would need double the ATGM posts.

....and this is not the last word in TOE. It's merely an example to extrapolate things from. I'm speaking about scaling the platoon at a conference in Brussels in December, so I'll be working on this some more. Thanks for the interest.

[Firn]

What about the addition of a spotting scope (http://www.birding.in/birding_optics_spotting_scopes.htm) per GPMG team? This way the biggest source of direct firepower would have excellent observation capabilities at hand. It should greatly enhance the capability to detect and identify the targets and to observe the effect of the force (suppressive fire by the GPMG, the effectivness of the IDF and so on)

Firn

P.S: One in Owen's DMR team would of course be nice too. In decent conditions you can easily see moving men from 15km or more with a good one. I recently came across the very interesting book 'Sniping in France, with notes on the scientific training of scouts, observers, and snipers' (http://www.archive.org/details/snipinginfrancew00pricrich). It of course a bit biased, having been written in 1920 by Hesketh Hesketh-Prichard (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hesketh_Hesketh-Prichard), but is very informative and not only concerning the quintessential importance of telescopes (spotting scopes) for observation in both static and open warfare.

[jcustis]

What about the addition of a spotting scope per GPMG team?

I'd say no. The are bulky and not so easy to put into use. A good quality pair of binos or a well-glassed monocular is satisfactory.

[Firn]

I'd say no. The are bulky and not so easy to put into use. I good quality pair of binos or a well-glassed monocular is satisfactory.

That is what I thought too before I spend some time with a good spotting scope. On can get one suited for most situations for 0,7 kg with a light tripod. With 1,3 kg you can have a brilliant one. There is a huge world of difference between a quality spotting scope with a 30x W (or 20-60x) eye piece or and 7x or 12x binos. You must try and see to believe. One can easily get handheld a rather steady picture with some aiming technique and a steady one when using a tree or wall. A tripod is of course the best way to use it.

Overall I do think that pound for pound it can be a very valuable addition, especially in places like Afghanistan. To exchange some firepower for far more observation power can be the sine qua non.

Firn

P.S: The Part III of the Appendix (p. 239) has some of the many observations in the book. Interesting aspects are the close link between observes with telescopes and aerial photography or the close cooperation between machine guns, snipers and artillery with the observer with the so priced telescopes.

[William F. Owen]

P.S: The Part III of the Appendix (p. 239) has some of the many observations in the book. Interesting aspects are the close link between observes with telescopes and aerial photography or the close cooperation between machine guns, snipers and artillery with the observer with the so priced telescopes.
Yep, that's the part of the book most "Snipers" don't bother reading. (It's Part IV, Appendix C, page 192 in the Leo Cooper 1994 Edition.) I strongly recommend all of the Appendix. It shows how far many modern sniper doctrines have strayed from the original intent, and yet cling to the least relevant parts.

Hopefully UK operations in Afghanistan are forcing some long over-due changes.

[Fuchs]

It's OK for a picket team, but I wouldn't include a spotter scope into a squad in general. It's enough if two are available at the platoon sergeant's vehicle.

[William F. Owen]

It's OK for a picket team, but I wouldn't include a spotter scope into a squad in general. It's enough if two are available at the platoon sergeant's vehicle.

Not sure I agree. If you want every fire-team in the platoon to be able to perform an OP task, then a good tripod mounted spotting scope per team is a good idea. Having said that, something like this (http://www.el-op.com/files/PDF/ThermalImaging/UN_CORAL_CR.pdf)maybe a much better choice lb for lb.

....and yes, it's Israeli, but I've actually played with it, so I'm more confident in it's recommendation. :D

[Fuchs]

That's strange. I thought I knew that you like the equipment pool concept.

It's called "Mutterschiff " (concept) concept in Germany. An infantry squad has a mothership (Boxer APC) where it leaves all unnecessary equipment. This allows for much more equipment for choice than the squad could reasonably carry at once. A squad .50BMG rifle and Pzf3 munitions, for example.

I applied this to the platoon for even less often needed equipment; a spotting scope, for example.
So there would be a squad mothership and a platoon mothership (platoon Sgt vehicle).

I would assign spotting scopes to the latter because it's unlikely that the platoon needs to equip more than two observation posts with such a device.

The utility of such a scope is after all
- to detect/identify something far away (beyond the normal area of interest/weapon range of infantry)
- to identify suspicious objects within weapon range (but at the upper end of it) that could not be identified with binoculars (snipers).
Both preferably from a fixed position.

The long range aspect reduces the quantitative requirement; a platoon could make do with two easily in almost all situations.


We should also keep in mind that monocular optics are quite exhausting to the eye and have a very small field of view due to their strong magnification; they're therefore not very good for general observation tasks (detecting movements).

- - - - -

Thermal sensors are great for the detection of otherwise adequately camouflaged targets/objects and for looking/aiming through simple smoke - and not for much else afaik.

[Firn]

I like the concept of a sensible pool of ressources strapped to an AFV or stored in a combat outpost. I think there is a natural tendency by the boots on the ground to do just that. If they do so always with sensible stuff is another question.

Thinking of the example in this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=87579&postcount=86) I can see how 4-6 spotting scopes for a platoon in an Combat outpost on an Afghan hilltop could make quite a difference. Perhaps a mixture between larger (http://www.optics4birding.com/nikon-fieldscope-82ed-scope-review.aspx) and smaller (http://www.birdwatch.co.uk/website/content/view/236/43/) ones would be wise.

Let us take the mission of this platoon. Basically you would want to have at least a spotting scope in an overwatch position, best if teamed with an GPMG, a DM, HE-projector and someone capable to control and direct indirect fire. With binos and something like CORAL-CR (target acquisition capabilities and thermal sensor) you have a complete sensor package to support your other elements around and in the village quickly. This means something from 6-9 people.

On of the other elements might also want to have one spotting scope if the establish an OP outside or inside the village. In this specific instance it could also have been helpful. So you have a need for something between two and four spotting scopes, with the others remaining at the outpos. Others may need less, while under some (very) rare circumstance not even one might be useful.



The utility of such a scope is after all
- to detect/identify something far away (beyond the normal area of interest/weapon range of infantry)
- to identify suspicious objects within weapon range (but at the upper end of it) that could not be identified with binoculars (snipers).
Both preferably from a fixed position.

Agreed, although many underestimate the ability to get a quick stable position with a spotting scope, especially in the 15-30x range.


We should also keep in mind that monocular optics are quite exhausting to the eye and have a very small field of view due to their strong magnification; they're therefore not very good for general observation tasks (detecting movements).

I do not agree with the notion that they are that exhausting. If you cover your passive eye up and look with both eyes open through a good optic you don't tire too easily. Still I would swap eyes after 10-15 minutes, perhaps even before. For general movement detection binos are usually far better, however for small movements in distant places spotting scopes are great. With a 30x fixed eyepiece you have roughly a field of view of 35-40m at 1000m.


Firn

[Fuchs]

I meant "fixed position" tactically, not mechanically; a unit not moving. Spotting scopes aren't what a patrol leader would use on a 30 sec stop.

I have a dominant eye (which happens to have less sight clarity nevertheless). Viewing through a monocular with the other one is very tiring - and the idea of binoculars is very much based on the notion that binoculars are less straining to use.

[kaur]

News from UK.


The British Army is already providing an immediate
response by redeploying 7.62 mm L96 sniper
rifles (made surplus by the arrival of the L115
.338 rifles) and 7.62 mm L7 General Purpose
Machine Guns (GPMGs) down to section level,
carried by foot patrols. This is good, but not
ideal; the manually-loaded L96 is slow-firing,
the GPMG very heavy.

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/btbjdw.pdf

It seems that 1 unit has HK 417 in squad.

http://a.imagehost.org/t/0774/UK_SFSG_417.jpg (http://a.imagehost.org/download/0774/UK_SFSG_417)

[William F. Owen]

The British Army is already providing an immediate
response by redeploying 7.62 mm L96 sniper
rifles (made surplus by the arrival of the L115
.338 rifles) and 7.62 mm L7 General Purpose
Machine Guns (GPMGs) down to section level,
carried by foot patrols. This is good, but not
ideal; the manually-loaded L96 is slow-firing,
the GPMG very heavy.


GPMG very heavy? Really? Compared to what? A Javelin Round? Sorry but the article referenced is trying to say that something that is not actually a problem, is problem.

GPMGs into the platoon, some sniper weapons, and light mortars solves 90% of the problems. Giving every man an HK-417 just makes the old problem worse and the platoon less effective per kg of carried weight. The UK could solve the problem. It chooses not to.

[Kiwigrunt]

Also interesting to see that (on the photo that Kaur posted) the UK SF are using L85's instead of their much lighter Colt Canada sfw (M4 with 16" barrel). Wonder if that is for increased long range accuracy or maybe to do with reliability. The latter would be a reverse from early L85 days.

[William F. Owen]

Also interesting to see that (on the photo that Kaur posted) the UK SF are using L85's instead of their much lighter Colt Canada sfw (M4 with 16" barrel). Wonder if that is for increased long range accuracy or maybe to do with reliability. The latter would be a reverse from early L85 days.

These guys are actually SFSG, so not actually SF. They are using the L85 because they are not scaled as SF except for UORs. SF are still using C8's (L-119) ... last I heard.

[Kiwigrunt]

These guys are actually SFSG, so not actually SF. They are using the L85 because they are not scaled as SF except for UORs. SF are still using C8's (L-119) ... last I heard.

Ah, I see, all maka da sense now. That's partly the 'old' 1-Para, isn't it?

[William F. Owen]

Ah, I see, all maka da sense now. That's partly the 'old' 1-Para, isn't it?

Well yes, that's the idea. Last plan I heard it was 2 Coy's of Para, 1 Coy of Royal Marines and 1 Coy of RAF Regiment (the old "2 Squadron!"), but I think that may have all gone by the way in recent times - as there simply aren't enough bodies in RM or RAF Regt.

[Firn]

Some further thoughts.

Let us look at a similar mission in difficult terrain to the one in the video. I think we all know that the GPMG is heavy and looses some of its effectivness (grazing fire) in the mountains. The fire support by mortars becomes more important because they can touch almost all places of the terrain. This goes also for the to a lesser extent for the 40mm.

Would it make sense if the element on overwatch swaps the second GPMG for the observation and target acquistation/fire direction gadgets mentioned above, some additional MG ammunition and a DMR rifle? I could also imagine to have a dedicated HE-projector instead of the second GMPG, perhaps something like that new Korean Rifle, the XM25 or simply a simple 40mm GL with more ammunition carried by the team.

Perhaps the key idea of the above post to emphasize and strenghten the ability of a "normal" element of the infantry to observe, recon and surveil the battlespace. This way it can better hunt for precious and much needed information and enemy elements. The same unit should also have the capability to effectively and efficiently direct the supporting indirect fire across two organic levels, the grenade launcher of the unit and the platoon's mortar and those of other layers. In certain missions under a certain METT-TC it may be worth to do so at the expense of the second GPMG.

Overall this is part of the larger debate about the mobility, protection and firepower of the infantry.

Firn

[jcustis]

The fire support by mortars becomes more important because they can touch almost all places of the terrain.

They can also be very cranky when it comes to getting effects on target, in that sort of terrain.

[Ken White]

They can also be very cranky when it comes to getting effects on target, in that sort of terrain.My experience is dated and thus refers to different weapons and ammunition (but in the same calibers other than the 120mm for 4.2" [107mm] switch) but Mortars rarely got cranky with good crews. Mountains were no problem and they generally were far more accurate there than Artillery...

Possibly interesting aside, the Chinese in Korea could put a Mortar round in your hip pocket but were lousy rifle shots; the Viet Namese were not nearly as good with their mortars but were good rifle shots...

[jcustis]

Was that success due to registered targets and shift from known point missions?

What I was basing my comment off of is the difficulty on the FOs end, especially if he is not a FO with those primary duties and commensurate degree of training.

How about rifle grenades Ken? Any familiarity with them?

[Ken White]

Was that success due to registered targets and shift from known point missions?

What I was basing my comment off of is the difficulty on the FOs end, especially if he is not a FO with those primary duties and commensurate degree of training.Lot of calls for fire by unit NCOs not FOs. While their knowing what they were doing was definitely an asset, in my observation a good FDC could talk a poor FO or even Joe Tentpeg into getting stuff on target -- that's with manual calculation on an M16 Plotting Board, of course. A good FDC can fix all sorts of FO and weapon / ammo shortfalls. The best Computers were / are former FO /FIST guys.

Part of the 'good' FDC problem is automation which adversely impacts innovative ability and part is that, unless watched, the FDC Chief will use his best plotter for everything and the others don't get to develop the skills.
How about rifle grenades Ken? Any familiarity with them?Yep, they had some advantages but did require a hefty amount of training for 'accurate' use (accurate in quotes because they weren't consistent), the 40mm eased the training burden and works almost as well for most things and is at least as accurate. We're better off with the 40mm and the M79 /M203 / M 32 / M320. Not a fan of the Mk 19 though.

[Firn]

Besides the points answered by Ken I justed wanted to point out that the mortar has traditionally been the mountain infantry's best friend. Not only does it allow you to suppress and target almost everything within range with considerable effect, but it can also do this job deployed behind ridges, on steep slopes and possibly close a good supply route. The FOs/platoon should have the tools and training to make the best use of it.

Sending the vehicle supplied HE from afar is way easier on the backs of the humping soldiers.

[Tukhachevskii]

the mortar has traditionally been the mountain infantry's best friend. Not only does it allow you to suppress and target almost everything within range with considerable effect, but it can also do this job deployed behind ridges, on steep slopes and possibly close a good supply route.

The Soviet experience in Afghanistan underlines this experience. They quickly found that their 82mm Vasilek "semi-automatic" mortar provided stirling, timely and in most cases devastating fire support (especially in burst fire mode) in contrast to their SP and towed arty. I wonder how far along the Dragon system is progressing for the USMC? Hope it hasn't been cancelled (...would like to hear that the Royal Marines will subsequently aqcuire them in future. Ahhhhhh, BAe, god love yah :D).

[kaur]

One comment to Tukhachevskii's Afganistan comment. During IIWW Soviet troops used this kind of launcher in Caucasus. Fuchs can say now that this is copy of Nebelwerfer :)

http://h.imagehost.org/t/0448/M-8-8.jpg (http://h.imagehost.org/view/0448/M-8-8)

[Firn]

While reading in another thread where I wanted to post I came across this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=74494&postcount=13) which puts some of my thoughts better in words than I did.


but I'll lay it out here. Many dicussions throughout the SWJ revolve around weapons. Everyone talks about the ideal round, ideal lethality, ideal caliber, firing rates, etc..... Finally someone brought up one of my biggest pet peeves (Thanks Coldstreamer). POSITIVE ID. At what distance with the naked eye can a soldier positively ID (PID) his threat in any environment? Yes, the environment makes a difference and I know all the associated factors. For arguements sake let's say open desert:

1. In local attire carrying an AK or RPG?

2. In local attire hiding an AK or RPG under his clothes?

3. In military uniform carrying an AK or RPG?

4. In military uniform with no weapon visable?

Aditionally lets use the same constraints with common current optics found within our force.

1. ACOG 4x power

2. M68 or EOTECH 0x power

3. Binos (showing my age by allowing the old M22) 7x50

4. Thermals (lightweight)

5. ELCAN M145 3.4x power

Staying in the daylight only realm, night becomes a completely different story.

I'm not talking capabilities with sniper teams and other specialties. Most discussions center around the "force" in general.

Additionally this changes based on the fight your in. Yes one can PID someone shooting from a much further distance or can they?


Also trying to get the ability and equipment to ID something or somebody was perhaps the key issue of that old book written in 1920. What the "drag net" of observers logged down could then be dealt in a myriad of ways. Heavy MGs, a whole rifle platoon, snipers, raids or various doses of artillery fire were used to achieve the objective.


Firn

[Fuchs]

One comment to Tukhachevskii's Afganistan comment. During IIWW Soviet troops used this kind of launcher in Caucasus. Fuchs can say now that this is copy of Nebelwerfer :)

http://h.imagehost.org/t/0448/M-8-8.jpg (http://h.imagehost.org/view/0448/M-8-8)

Fin stabilized, rail instead of tube-launched - very different and much smaller than a Nebelwerfer - also much less complicated (the ammunition).


Mortars are not good against forward slope positions on a steep mountain, but that kind of position is rather rare anyway.

[Ken White]

Mortars are not good against forward slope positions on a steep mountain, but that kind of position is rather rare anyway.if they're on or near the military crest provided one is present; the blowdown can do an amazing amount of damage. If there is no military crest then you are indeed stuck with direct fire. Reverse slope defenses are a more difficult target for everything, hence their popularity...

[Fuchs]

The fuze and frag pattern are also something that should be kept in mind. Most mortar bombs have a quite horizontal frag pattern (if they explode while descending straight down).
This pattern is extremely inefficient against targets on near-vertical surfaces in comparison to their performance against target in flat terrain.
Even proximity fuzes don't help much.

A low trajectory (even direct fire) munition and some of the very rare forward frag mortar bombs (or air burst WP-Inc) can be much more efficient in that case.

[Firn]

A low trajectory (even direct fire) munition and some of the very rare forward frag mortar bombs (or air burst WP-Inc) can be much more efficient in that case.

Perhaps a part of the solution.


Corps to field more grenade launchers (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/02/marine_launcher_021510w/)



“The typical [Marine] company will … receive three MSGLs,” she said. “The MSGL is a commander’s discretionary weapon. Unit commanders will decide the means of employment.”


...


“When there’s an exchange of fire going back and forth, one of our goals is to immediately gain fire superiority, and when you fire six rounds and you hear six explosions on the back end, sometimes that quiets the guy who’s shooting back at you,” Maj. Jody White, team leader for the weapon’s acquisition, said last June. “It allows us to maneuver at that point, and seek him out and destroy him.”


This sounds like they are giving one of those big .40 revolvers to each rifle platoon of the company, doesn't it?

This firepower comes at a price called weight. A dedicated grenadier with a lighter, stand alone single-shot launcher can carry a lot more rounds. This is important if it is used by light or mountain infantry. Still the M32 can make of sense, especially when you have to put quickly a lot of HE downrange. I rambled about this topic before (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=87900&postcount=29). :D



Firn


P.S: It should be the L variant, capable to shoot higher velocity 40x46 mm grenades.


The second variant is the Mk 1L, which features a new sliding buttstock and a 140 mm (5.5 in) long cylinder. Certain special-purpose grenades such as tear gas canisters and less-lethal impact rounds are too long to fit in older models of the MGL, but they will fit in the Mk 1L's extended chambers. As a result, the weapon can fire a wider range of ordnance, and is more suitable for use in peacekeeping and riot control operations. The Mk 1L also incorporates all the improvements found in the Mk 1S.

[VMI_Marine]

Was that success due to registered targets and shift from known point missions?

What I was basing my comment off of is the difficulty on the FOs end, especially if he is not a FO with those primary duties and commensurate degree of training.

I'll use this to segue into a point I'd like to discuss - training specialists within the squad. Looking at the USMC squad composition and likely future missions, I'm considering task organizing my squads to create a squad headquarters with some specialist training, using one of the three organic fire teams. Keep in mind that these "specialists" will be cross-trained 0311s. I envision it looking something like this:

Squad Leader
Assistant Squad Leader
Radio Operator
Forward Observer
Intel Specialist

The other two fireteams would stay organized traditionally. Obviously I'm assuming some risk by concentrating these skill sets, but I don't intend to keep everyone else ignorant of radio operation, call for fire, or SSE. I do intend to have designated personnel focused on those skills, however. These specialists should ideally be mature and experienced, with a deployment under their belt, so they have a solid grounding in basic 0311 individual tasks. Most of the limiting factors that I've identified come from the practical constraints of training a company, namely a limited number of experienced infantrymen who can master these skills.

I believe the biggest benefit would be freeing the squad leader to lead his squad without worrying about the details of transmitting routine reports, conducting CFF and all of the mental calculations that go with it, or keeping track of all of the information requirements from higher. This way, he can focus on the commander's intent. Unfortunately, the fire support initiatives I have seen geared towards increasing squad capabilities have focused on training the squad leader, which I think is a bad idea. Communications, fire support, and intelligence are all becoming increasingly technical, requiring more time to achieve mastery.

I've been out of an infantry company for five years now, so I'm a little unsure of how practical this will be once my vision collides with reality. Any thoughts so far?

[jcustis]

I believe the biggest benefit would be freeing the squad leader to lead his squad without worrying about the details of transmitting routine reports, conducting CFF and all of the mental calculations that go with it, or keeping track of all of the information requirements from higher. This way, he can focus on the commander's intent.

From a strictly time management perspective, there isn't a whole lot of separation, or flash to bang, between incidents and reporting, especially at the squad level, so I don't see "routine reporting" as a combat chore. I don't believe then that there are routine reports to be submitted, nor should someone else be relied on to maintain situational awareness of information requirements from higher. Those are elements of the squad leader's lot in life, and if delegated down to allow him to focus on commander's intent, what's left?

If we are talking about static OP or fixed site security operations (for a patrol base), then there may be an advantage to some arrangement where the SL should not be the primary guy for such tasks, but squads are not the base unit usually for those type missions - platoons are.

For some skillsets like CFF, sure, they could be pushed down further to a solid lance corporal who has a knack for it and can do it, and I'd argue that the Marine with the most time available would be a great candidate, since you are addressing the mounting training requirements. The guy with the most time is almost never the most mature or well-rounded Marine in the squad, so how do we resolve that fact?

The core problem I see is the issue of radio assets. I myself do not know if each infantry squad has a PRC-117 assigned to them, but I'm pretty certain that PRC-148 and -152 radios are prevalent down to the squad and team. They serve as the conduit to the platoon, and under the rifle company experiment design, there are enablers that will be carved out from a platoon strength to do these tasks and can be farmed out down to squad levels.

I hate to say it, but right now I'd just be happy getting a basic 0311 to show me he knows how to follow a TM and zero his RCO.

[jcustis]

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA509378

Where Are the Infantry Sergeants: An examination of the Marine Corps' policies and processes that adversely affected the availability of infantry sergeants to serve as squad leaders in the operating forces - Major Thomas M. Tennant

This is another thesis paper submitted for a military studies masters degree requirement at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. The historical section that details the history of the squad leader has a lot of researched detail about the employment of squad leaders as far back as the AEF in WWI.

[Tukhachevskii]

Organizing Modern Infantry: An Analysis of Section Fighting Power (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_13/iss_3/caj_vol13.3_06_e.pdf)

Link appears troublesome. Artilce is at Canadian Army Journal Vol. 13, No. 3.

[Tukhachevskii]

The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries (http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/combat-soldier-infantry-tactics-and-cohesion-twentieth-and-twenty-first-centuries-audio)