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davidbfpo
01-16-2013, 11:27 AM
Much of the rhetoric and reporting on Mali has stressed the dangers from the creation of a 'Sahelistan', a safe haven for AQ and allies. As the situation inside Mali develops I thought a second, parallel thread would be necessary.


No-one in Paris - or any other Western capital - wants parts of Mali to become like Afghanistan in the 1990s - a place where acts of terror further afield could be planned and where people would then ask why something was not done earlier.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21018675

The fate of French hostages, from the Sahel to Somalia, is unclear. From the BBC link some details:
Pierre Legrand, 26, Daniel Larribe, 59, Thierry Dole, 29, and Marc Feret, 43, were kidnapped in northern Niger in 2010 by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Philippe Verdon and Serge Lazarevic, were kidnapped in northern Mali in November 2011 by AQIM; Gilberto Rodriguez Leal, 61, was kidnapped in western Mali in November 2012 by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao); and Francis Collomp, 63, was kidnapped in Nigeria by Islamist group Ansaru

davidbfpo
01-16-2013, 11:38 AM
For a very long time attacks on the Algeria oil and natural gas fields in southern Algeria has been an issue, IIRC with very few attacks, even during the recent civil war (not ended, but quieter).

So is this the first 'ripple' from Mali? Note the facts are not clear; an attack on a gas field base, with expat staff kidnapped @ Tiguentourine? Three to six foreigners taken (two Japanese) and two guards killed:http://elwatan.com/actualite/attaque-terroriste-a-in-amenas-trois-ressortissants-etrangers-enleves-a-tiguentourine-16-01-2013-199732_109.php

Two BP staff killed and 'Libyan' accents on a later report.

Link to map, zoom out to see:http://mapcarta.com/17299028

Tiguentourine is 1300 kms south of Algiers and a long way from Bamoko.

As Andrew Lebovich notes:
An attack on an oil facility in southern Algeria is, well, a big deal.

Slightly different report on:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21042659

KingJaja
01-16-2013, 12:42 PM
David,

Have you noticed that Boko Haram has been bit quiet over the past few months? It could be that the jihadis have moved over to Mali, Nigerian security is more effective or a bit of both.

Whatever happens, if Mali proves too hot to handle, they'll hop over to Niger and yes, Nigeria. Nigeria is the major prize - and it keeps me worried.

Will it be possible for the French and ECOWAS to "destroy" all the jihadis - I doubt it. They will have a large expanse of poorly governed space to ply their trade.

Granted, the French could control Bamako, Niamey and the major towns, but what about the rest of this space?

davidbfpo
01-16-2013, 01:16 PM
Kingjaja asked:
Have you noticed that Boko Haram has been bit quiet over the past few months? It could be that the jihadis have moved over to Mali, Nigerian security is more effective or a bit of both.

No I hadn't, but unless it is an outrage Nigeria rarely gets a mention here, nor do i search for updates. There was a Tweet today that the FT had an article making that suggestion - militants had gone to Mali - but I am unable to identify the report.


Whatever happens, if Mali proves too hot to handle, they'll hop over to Niger and yes, Nigeria. Nigeria is the major prize - and it keeps me worried.

I am aware that African borders are to say the least porous, even more so in this region. Defeated, injured and deserting militants may appear, but they may also have "had enough".

Strategically Nigeria is far more important that Mali or 'Sahelistan'; just Pakistan is far more important than Afghanistan. That does not mean those involved in decision-making stand back beforehand. I do find the AU and other African nations welcome for the French action useful, but double-edged as it enables Africa to let others - France plus - do the "heavy lifting".


Will it be possible for the French and ECOWAS to "destroy" all the jihadis - I doubt it. They will have a large expanse of poorly governed space to ply their trade.

Granted, the French could control Bamako, Niamey and the major towns, but what about the rest of this space?

The jihadis can be destroyed as an effective threat if they stay together and do not hide amongst the people - in the settled parts of Mali, i.e. along the river. Once they leave for the "outback" and go silent that is when pursuing them and killing them will get hard - for any force. Incidentally I do not see ECOWAS going into the "outback". There are IMHO options to degrade the jihadi threat in the "outback", notably over access to fuel and water. Jihadis will not walk around, even if feasible in the environment.

In the end the French and other have bought or could buy time for Mali to reform, not just training the military.

KingJaja
01-16-2013, 01:25 PM
David,

Thanks for your response, but it is the "combat experience" those guys get from Mali that worries me.

OTOH, there's an interesting article in the Hindu: http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/french-troops-deployed-as-mali-slips-into-chaos/article4305099.ece


On Thursday, January 10, a public bus operated by the Sonef transport company arrived on the outskirts of Konna, a small town 700 km north of Bamako, the capital of Mali.

It was market day in Konna, and soldiers at the checkpoint on the Konna-Gao road waved the bus through. At the next checkpoint at the entry to the town, soldiers clambered into the bus for a routine security check when the passengers gunned them down. Heavily armed Islamist rebels poured out of the bus, destroying the checkpoint as more fighters arrived in a convoy of jeeps and pickup trucks and fanned out across the town.

davidbfpo
01-16-2013, 07:53 PM
The kidnapping operation in southern Algeria continues to develop; now it appears that a new 'spin off" AQIM group is responsible, they have taken over forty Western hostages and are holding them within a natural gas facility. Yet to read a good summary; partly due to the isolated location and Algeria's ability to disconnect communication links.

The Arabist blog has a good overview of the French action and the likely regional 'ripples'. It ends with:
The main takeaway for the Maghreb – it’s important to remember that the Sahara is very big and population centers in the Maghreb are very far removed from what’s taking place in Mali. To be sure, there are shared sympathies, but each of these will manifest differently in the different Maghreb countries.

Link:http://www.arabist.net/blog/2013/1/16/mali-and-the-maghreb.html

KingJaja
01-16-2013, 09:58 PM
David,

I don't think any serious analyst should be talking about the Maghreb.

The big population centers of the Maghreb may be far removed from Mali, but what about the large population centers of Nigeria?

Unlike Northern Mali, Northern Nigeria is not arid or flat. Unlike Southern Mali, Northern Nigeria has practiced a more austere, rigid form of Islam for a couple of centuries.

I want you to consider this: there are at least 70 million people in Northern Nigeria, 9 million street kids (Almajiri) and extremely porous borders.

What will the fall out from Mali be? The French, ECOWAS and drones cannot prevent militants from sneaking in and out of Nigeria/Niger/Mali and AQIM/Boko Haram will be extremely short sighted if they don't seize the opportunity to expand operations in Nigeria.

There are many factors that would make Islamic militants popular a few are the heavy handedness of security operatives & anger at the corruption of local administrators.

I can see it happening, this could be worse than Pakistan/Afghanistan. Unlike Af/Pak, the Sahel does not have a combination of India, Russia, China and yes, Iran to prevent the contagion from spreading. The only semi-competent military is the Nigerian Army - and the Nigerian Army isn't half as competent as the Pakistani Army.

So I guess we've opened Pandora's box.

KingJaja
01-16-2013, 10:15 PM
The map of West Africa shows the proximity of Northern Mali to Chad & Northern Nigeria.

https://www.google.com.ng/maps/vt/data=Ay5GWBeob_WIPLDYoIWcfVXxvZu9XwJ55OX7Ag,Zx4hob j44v7aNUpGWbG7nc2M84caLDIwORrB-HTXWwY5W18m98q9k3fPFe--SiWvlglqROikNsv9HleuVsupykBW3rgKGX9pk93RNYXfncMwmJ jCmKuOBx-xokqdGVh5ZwSb-vootFGL0dAeLGZ4BaubKBQlh9RLO2YuHf42RlJcxVFtTHVvhau _sF8

Dayuhan
01-17-2013, 10:56 AM
Have you noticed that Boko Haram has been bit quiet over the past few months? It could be that the jihadis have moved over to Mali, Nigerian security is more effective or a bit of both.

Whatever happens, if Mali proves too hot to handle, they'll hop over to Niger and yes, Nigeria. Nigeria is the major prize - and it keeps me worried.

Will it be possible for the French and ECOWAS to "destroy" all the jihadis - I doubt it. They will have a large expanse of poorly governed space to ply their trade.

Granted, the French could control Bamako, Niamey and the major towns, but what about the rest of this space?

To what extent are these conflicts driven by mobile transnational jihadis hopping from place to place, and to what extent are they driven by less mobile indigenous groups? I'd like to know more, for example, about the relationship between Tuareg nationalist groups and AQIM-affiliated Islamist groups in Mali. My understanding (though it's far from my patch and I'll gladly take correction from those who know more) is that the Tuareg have substantial grievances; could the Tuareg be separated from the Islamist movements if those grievances were addressed?

Would like to get M.A.'s thoughts, if he's not too busy in the middle of it all!

davidbfpo
01-17-2013, 04:14 PM
A short analysis from Raffaello Pantucci, newly based at RUSI (London):
The French assault on militant jihadists in Mali reflects a recognition in Paris that the long-brewing Islamist trouble in North Africa is something that has started to spiral out of control, and has potential to have a direct impact within France.

Link:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C50F7C5DB4E4D6/#.UPfVmaF-xEB

davidbfpo
01-18-2013, 01:18 PM
A short analysis of current events in Algeria via the BBC:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21078430

First a reminder about Algeria:
Historically, it is the cradle of armed Islamist struggle in North Africa.

(Closing with) It is as if the old ghosts of the "dirty war" came back from the sands of Mali to haunt Algiers, bringing home the spectre of armed groups which it had taken the Algerian army a decade of great efforts to expel.

M-A Lagrange
01-18-2013, 04:40 PM
Hello,

I'll try to answer Dayuhan question on Tuareg and Islamist. Note, please, that I am no expert on Saharian Afria but on Sub-Saharian Africa (Central Africa to be exact). ;)

As far as I know, Tuaregs do have legitime grieverances and the early hours of the rebellion was mainly aimed to establish a Tuareg State. They kind of took advantage of the chaos generated by the coup.
Tuareg, apparently, received support from AQMI to reach their first and primary objective but AQMI managed to eat the Tuareg rebels and take control of that rebelion.
This appeared very clearly when some Islamist decieded to destroy some of the holliest Muslim monuments of Mali and all Islam in West Africa. The Charia that Islamist apply in North Mali is not the cultural interpretation most of the Muslims living in Mali or in Sahel live by. (Or even the Muslims from Sahel as in Chad or even in Sudan)

Now the operation led by France and Chad troops in Mali officially aims to destroy AQMI capacities in North Mali. Concerning the Tuareg legitimate demands, I really hope the actual trend of the events will not make them disappear and that Mali government will be able to make the part between Tuareg rebels and AQMI.

The situation is complex because the coup initiated in Bamako allowed Tuareg to establish a Tuareg State and because of Bamako domestic disorder and incapacity to address Tuareg problematic, AQMI has been able to develop in North Mali.
I find the analysis that we are now in Lybia civil war act2 a little too easy. It is clear that weapons are coming from Lybia but it is also, the underground root causes, also in a purely Malian domestic problematic that will need to be addressed.
In addition that crisis is a strong challenge for ARICOM that deployed a lot of efforts to train many of the Sahelian states military forces (especially for anti-terrorist operation). AFRICOM will certainly have to re-evaluate its training/follow up procedures in Sahara; especially with failed armed forces of failed states.
That said, Malian army was a lost cause long before the Tuareg deceided to set free from Bamako. :eek:

davidbfpo
01-18-2013, 04:54 PM
Each time we have a crisis there is a surge of comment as everyone seeks to gain knowledge and insight. New experts appear, hitherto unknown experts get publicity and credit after years of study.

That caveat aside I was amazed to read this FP article, which opens with:
In 1893, in West Africa's upper Niger River basin -- what is now central Mali -- the French army achieved a victory that had eluded it for almost 50 years: the destruction of the jihadist Tukulor Empire, one of the last great challenges to France's rule in the region. The Tukulor Empire's first important conquest had come decades earlier, in the early 1850s, when its fanatical founder, El Hajj Umar Tall, led Koranic students and hardened soldiers to topple the Bambara kingdoms along the banks of the Niger. Umar imposed a strict brand of Islamic law, reportedly enslaving or killing tens of thousands of non-believers over a half century.....Now, the jihadists are back and so are the French -- the two sides slugging it out over the same real estate they fought over 120 years ago.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/15/al_qaeda_country?page=full

The author Peter Chilson has a new e-book ' We Never Knew Exactly Where: Dispatches from the Lost Country of Mali'.

Fuchs
01-18-2013, 06:46 PM
The Eradicateurs
Why Algeria doesn't talk to terrorists -- even if that means killing hostages.
BY GEOFF D. PORTER | JANUARY 18, 2013


http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/18/the_eradicateurs_algeria_terrorists_hostages

Dayuhan
01-19-2013, 03:31 AM
Hello,

I'll try to answer Dayuhan question on Tuareg and Islamist. Note, please, that I am no expert on Saharian Afria but on Sub-Saharian Africa (Central Africa to be exact). ;)

As far as I know, Tuaregs do have legitime grieverances and the early hours of the rebellion was mainly aimed to establish a Tuareg State. They kind of took advantage of the chaos generated by the coup.
Tuareg, apparently, received support from AQMI to reach their first and primary objective but AQMI managed to eat the Tuareg rebels and take control of that rebelion.
This appeared very clearly when some Islamist decieded to destroy some of the holliest Muslim monuments of Mali and all Islam in West Africa. The Charia that Islamist apply in North Mali is not the cultural interpretation most of the Muslims living in Mali or in Sahel live by. (Or even the Muslims from Sahel as in Chad or even in Sudan)

Now the operation led by France and Chad troops in Mali officially aims to destroy AQMI capacities in North Mali. Concerning the Tuareg legitimate demands, I really hope the actual trend of the events will not make them disappear and that Mali government will be able to make the part between Tuareg rebels and AQMI.

The situation is complex because the coup initiated in Bamako allowed Tuareg to establish a Tuareg State and because of Bamako domestic disorder and incapacity to address Tuareg problematic, AQMI has been able to develop in North Mali.
I find the analysis that we are now in Lybia civil war act2 a little too easy. It is clear that weapons are coming from Lybia but it is also, the underground root causes, also in a purely Malian domestic problematic that will need to be addressed.
In addition that crisis is a strong challenge for ARICOM that deployed a lot of efforts to train many of the Sahelian states military forces (especially for anti-terrorist operation). AFRICOM will certainly have to re-evaluate its training/follow up procedures in Sahara; especially with failed armed forces of failed states.
That said, Malian army was a lost cause long before the Tuareg deceided to set free from Bamako. :eek:

Thank you. I understand that the area is not your specialty, but you know more about it than most of us.

Three questions, possibly dumb ones but they seem relevant:

Might it be possible to divide the Tuareg nationalists and the Islamists and turn the former against the latter if the Tuareg's grievances were recognized and addressed?

To what extent would such a strategy be acceptable to whatever passes for a national government?

How would ECOWAS see such a proposal? Is there traditional animosity between the Tuareg and the primarily southern groups that govern the ECOWAS nations? I'm wondering if the ECOWAS governments might resist accommodation to the Tuareg on the grounds that it might encourage Tuareg or similar out-of-power ethnic groups in their own countries to seek similar accommodation?

Apologies for my ignorance, just trying to sort matters out to some extent!

Bill Moore
01-19-2013, 06:03 AM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/algerian-reticence-spoils-us-strategy-for-region/2013/01/18/7af23fbe-617c-11e2-89a2-2eabfad24542_story.html

Algerian stance spoils U.S. strategy for region


The hostage crisis in Algeria has upended the Obama administration’s strategy for coordinating an international military campaign against al-Qaeda fighters in North Africa, leaving U.S., European and African leaders even more at odds over how to tackle the problem.

One person's opinion


The region was destabilized by a flood of weaponry and armed Tuareg nomads who had fought for Gaddafi but escaped across Libya’s borders. Many of those mercenaries have since teamed with AQIM to take control of the northern half of Mali.

“This has just been an utter disaster. It was eminently foreseeable,” the senior U.S. diplomat said of the ripple effects from Libya. “It was the infusion of that additional manpower and weapons . . . that enabled this to happen.”

M-A Lagrange
01-19-2013, 06:17 AM
Hey Dahuyan,

The questions you ask have their importance because it implies that Malian State is able to make a difference between Tuareg’s legitimate grievances and AQMI efforts to impose a terrorist state in Sahara.
The question is: will Malian State blame (and punish) the Tuareg for having allowed AQMI to take control over North Mali.

About racism against Tuareg: it is clear that Tuaregs are perceived, as many nomadic people, as “bandits and un-educated” by many of the southerners in Mali and in the countries southern from Mali. The Tuareg grievances are the result of both a self-exclusion because of their nomadic way of life and exclusion from sedentary populations. A very classical "pre-insurgency" pattern which fuels both hatery and fear on all sides.

In addition you add a complex and ramping but existing tension between Christians and Muslims which has been exacerbated in the last decade.
I spent some time at the border between North Mali and Burkina more than 15 years ago; there was no problem between Christians and Muslims. Last year when the coup took place, first reaction in West Africa capitals were extremely harsh against Tuaregs who were already assimilated to AQ terrorists I the popular imagination. That said, Tuaregs are Muslims but a minority are Islamist.

For a better understanding of the challenges of the approach you propose, I encourage you to read the following article (In French but Google translate can do miracles)

"Le risque est grand de voir Bamako mener de larges représailles contre les Touareg" http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/01/15/mali-le-risque-est-grand-de-represailles-contre-les-touareg_1817055_3212.html

The risks of large scale reprisals against the Tuaregs by Bamako are high
From news paper Le Monde.

This article explains quite clearly the difference between the Tuaregs from MNLA and the Islamist.

davidbfpo
01-19-2013, 11:58 AM
Bill,

You cite a WaPo article:
The region was destabilized by a flood of weaponry and armed Tuareg nomads who had fought for Gaddafi but escaped across Libya’s borders. Many of those mercenaries have since teamed with AQIM to take control of the northern half of Mali.

As I have posted elsewhere a recent article points out that Tuareg elements of Mali's army, trained by the USA, deserted to the "other side". One wonders what is the truth?

Post 230 on the parallel Mali thread (cited in part)

A strange NYT article on the US role before the coup in Mali in mid-2012, one wonders why this had been in the public domain and challenges the value of the US DoD programme across West Africa:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/world/africa/french-jets-strike-deep-inside-islamist-held-mali.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&seid=auto&pagewanted=all&_r=2&


According to one senior officer, the Tuareg commanders of three of the four Malian units fighting in the north at the time defected to the insurrection “at the crucial moment,” taking fighters, weapons and scarce equipment with them. He said they were joined by about 1,600 other defectors from within the Malian Army, crippling the government’s hope of resisting the onslaught.

I have a suspicion that much of the writing before the French action, especially in the USA, followed a legend that is was this 'flood' from Libya that split Mali. A convenient, acceptable legend when in fact Mali was a weak state and even weaker when part of the army being Tuareg deserted.

KingJaja
01-19-2013, 01:37 PM
Interesting piece by Howard French:


For sheer sexiness, few news monikers can compete with the al Qaeda label.

This, in a word, is how one of the world's most remote and traditionally obscure regions, Africa's arid and largely empty Sahel, has suddenly come to be treated as a zone of great strategic importance in the wake of the recent offensive by a hodgepodge of armed groups, including one called al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, that has threatened the survival of the Malian state and sent violent ripples throughout the neighboring area.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/18/al_Qaeda_Mali_Francafrique_France_Howard_French?pa ge=0,0

davidbfpo
01-19-2013, 04:27 PM
Under the microscope a hitherto unknown analyst & blogger has provided a snapshot of Jihadist activity in the border region of Illizi Province, Algeria in 2011 and 2012 will follow shortly:http://www.makingsenseofjihad.com/2013/01/a-closer-look-at-microinstability-in-algeria.html

Bill Moore
01-19-2013, 05:40 PM
Bill,

You cite a WaPo article:

As I have posted elsewhere a recent article points out that Tuareg elements of Mali's army, trained by the USA, deserted to the "other side". One wonders what is the truth?

Post 230 on the parallel Mali thread (cited in part)

A strange NYT article on the US role before the coup in Mali in mid-2012, one wonders why this had been in the public domain and challenges the value of the US DoD programme across West Africa:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/world/africa/french-jets-strike-deep-inside-islamist-held-mali.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&seid=auto&pagewanted=all&_r=2&

I have a suspicion that much of the writing before the French action, especially in the USA, followed a legend that is was this 'flood' from Libya that split Mali. A convenient, acceptable legend when in fact Mali was a weak state and even weaker when part of the army being Tuareg deserted.

Also in the article:


Some Defense Department officials, notably officers at the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command, have pushed for a lethal campaign to kill senior operatives of two of the extremists groups holding northern Mali, Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Killing the leadership, they argued, could lead to an internal collapse.

I don't follow this region as closely as I used to, but the assumption about killing senior operatives to create network collapse is more often a false assumption than a correct one. It is another one of those so called lessons from the last decade of war that we need to reconsider the validity of. There are cases where some leaders are so charismatic that they create a personality cult and their death would be very disruptive, at least for awhile. This doesn't mean we shouldn't endeavor to act early versus waiting for a crisis, but we need to act based on understanding. The issues driving this conflict have been going on for years, and while charismatic leaders are required to mobilize, organize, and direct movements (terrorist, insurgency, or otherwise), once started they can have a life of their own.

I think the U.S. places too much emphasis on its through, by and with mantra because it is based on a generally false assumption that the rest of the world shares our interests and most are willing to act in partnership or better yet as our surrogates to pursue our goals. What the article didn't state is why the U.S. trained officers defected? What were their interests? Why didn't we understand them to begin with? What "expert" told us this was the right course of action? Based on what?

On the other hand I'm not convinced that these incidents call our DOD program in the region into question. If you look at our foreign engagement over the years you'll find we win some and we lose some, but the objectives for the most part appears sound (even if they are pursued incorrectly), and their little doubt that security forces need additional assistance in most cases. What we must do better is gain a deeper and more accurate understanding of what is really happening, what are the real issues in the eyes of the locals, and only then can we hope to realistically reach point where we identify "common interests," that then allows us to develop a collaborative strategy that will be based on understanding instead of wishful thinking. Second we have to stop rushing to the most convenient surrogate as we have done throughout history (most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan), which more often than proves to be counterproductive overtime.

KingJaja
01-19-2013, 06:18 PM
I don't know how authentic this is.


There were indications yesterday in Abuja, that the leader of the Boko Haram Islamic sect, Imam Abubakar Shekau was wounded during a gun battle with security men recently.
Sources said in Abuja that security agencies traced the whereabouts of Shekau, who succeeded late Mohammed Yusuf as leader of the sect to Mali, where he escaped to after sustaining injuries during a gun duel with soldiers of the Joint Task Force, JTF, a.k.a Operation Restore Order.
Sources told Saturday Vanguard that the Federal Government approved the deployment of 1,200 soldiers apparently because of the need to arrest the wounded Boko Haram leader.
The Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Azubuike Ihejirika who addressed officers and soldiers of the Nigerian army shortly before they were airlifted to Mali Thursday in Kaduna, asked them to be extra vigilant as there are indications that some terrorists had sneaked into the country with the aim of causing havoc.
Ihejirika however, pointed out that the Nigerian Army was not resting on its oars as the war against terror was being won.

http://www.informationng.com/2013/01/boko-haram-leader-shekau-shot-flees-to-mali.html

KingJaja
01-19-2013, 10:34 PM
This is EXTREMELY WORRYING, Nigerian troops en route to Mali are attacked with IEDs WITHIN NIGERIA.


About 190 Nigerian troops were ambushed a few kilometers from Okene in Kogi state today. The attack took place around 6: 05 AM Nigerian time as militants cut through the convoy of Mali-bound Nigerian army peacekeepers traveling in three luxurious buses via Kaduna too Bamako, Mali. The militants decimated the convoy with the aid of IEDs planted on the highway and began firing on the troops afterwards.
The soldiers were under escort at the time and the military escorts alter returned fire, but the assailants who were parked on both sides of the highway escaped the scene after two soldiers had been killed and several others injured.
Nigerian Army spokesperson, Brigadier General Bola Koleosho confirmed to Saharareporters by phone that two soldiers were killed while the bomb explosion injured four others. The wounded soldiers are receiving treatment at the Federal Medical Center in Okene.

http://www.osundefender.org/?p=87980

Dayuhan
01-20-2013, 12:04 AM
The risks of large scale reprisals against the Tuaregs by Bamako are high

I'd think that would be counterproductive, but of course that doesn't mean it won't happen. The question is whether the Western powers or ECOWAS want to help it to happen or enable it to happen.

Would it be feasible to make aid to the Mali government conditional on them reaching a fair settlement on the issues that are pushing the Tuareg to rebel? Would that be a non-starter for the Mali government or for the ECOWAS participants?

"Mali" in my first second language means "mistake". Coincidence of course, but still...

davidbfpo
01-20-2013, 05:18 PM
A long analysis on Algeria's stance, interesting as clearly outside the government there is no consensus. Algeria IMHO is one of the key players, yes partly due to its military capability, but more due to its diplomatic role with factions and nations:http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/2013/01/19/some-early-algeria-perspectives-on-the-sahel-situation/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+TheMoorNextDoor+(The+Moor+Next+ Door)

Surferbeetle
01-20-2013, 05:53 PM
David,

Found this article to be of interest:

Jihadists’ Surge in North Africa Reveals Grim Side of Arab Spring, By ROBERT F. WORTH, Published: January 19, 2013, NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/20/world/africa/in-chaos-in-north-africa-a-grim-side-of-arab-spring.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&hp


Algeria’s authoritarian government is now seen as a crucial intermediary by France and other Western countries in dealing with Islamist militants in North Africa. But the Algerians have shown reluctance to become too involved in a broad military campaign that could be very risky for them. International action against the Islamist takeover in northern Mali could push the militants back into southern Algeria, where they started. That would undo years of bloody struggle by Algeria’s military forces, which largely succeeded in pushing the jihadists outside their borders.

The Algerians also have little patience with what they see as Western naïveté about the Arab spring, analysts say.

“Their attitude was, ‘Please don’t intervene in Libya or you will create another Iraq on our border,’ ” said Geoff D. Porter, an Algeria expert and founder of North Africa Risk Consulting, which advises investors in the region. “And then, ‘Please don’t intervene in Mali or you will create a mess on our other border.’ But they were dismissed as nervous Nellies, and now Algeria says to the West: ‘G*dd@&n it, we told you so.’ ”

davidbfpo
01-21-2013, 12:00 AM
Jason Burke is a British journalist and author who has become a well-known commentator on terrorism, for The Guardian and The Observer in the UK; currently he is faraway from the UK and 'Sahelistan' in India.

His column looks at two aspects, the British setting and the global counter-Jihadi approach and ends with (with my emphasis):
There is another problem with framing the threat as "global". From General David Petraeus reformulating counter-insurgency tactics for the US army to MI5 putting spooks in police stations, the grand realisation of the middle of the last decade for those combating extremism was "think local, not global". This meant dumping identification of militants through profiling in favour of painstaking tracking of networks; questioning the vision of al-Qaida as global terrorist masterminds and unpicking the granular details of every extremist group from Morocco to Malaysia; it meant tailoring tactics to ground conditions and the customs of local communities; it meant degrading the credibility of the enemy by minimising the danger they posed.

The new challenge this decade may be an unforeseen one: the hard-learned lessons of last decade being neglected, if not deliberately unlearned.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/20/algerian-hostage-crisis-dark-days

KingJaja
01-22-2013, 04:02 PM
Seems like another front is being opened.


(Reuters) - An armored column of Chadian troops in Niger moved towards the Malian border on Tuesday, part of an African military force that is gradually deploying to support French operations against Islamist rebels in northern Mali.

A Reuters reporter witnessed the Chadian forces, who are experienced in desert operations, advancing north from the capital Niamey on the road to Ouallam, some 100 km (60 miles) from the border, where a company of Niger's troops are already stationed.

France, which launched air strikes in Mali 11 days ago to halt a surprise Islamist offensive toward the capital Bamako, has urged a swift deployment of the U.N.-mandated African force to back up its 2,150-strong ground forces already there.

Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou, who visited the troops at Ouallam military base, condemned the al Qaeda-linked Islamist alliance controlling Mali's vast desert north. An Imam, or Muslim cleric, said prayers for the troops.

"We are going to war. A war imposed on us by traffickers of all kinds, an unjust war, from which the peaceful citizens of northern Mali are suffering terribly," Issoufou told the forces.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/22/us-mali-idUSBRE90L0GK20130122

davidbfpo
01-26-2013, 12:06 AM
A wide ranging article from The Economist, which has some odd references, such as the bulldozers and tunnelling in insurgent Mali and a very useful map of religious observance across northern Africa:http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21570720-terrorism-algeria-and-war-mali-demonstrate-increasing-reach-islamist-extremism?frsc=dg%7Ca

It ends, IMO not very helpfully with:
Should radicalised and militant forms of Islam spread farther, current grounds for confidence will be undermined. Intelligence agencies already have a heavy presence in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, to sniff out terror links with the east African diaspora in the West. The real threat, though, is to African countries themselves. In many, including resource-rich ones like Nigeria, religious cleavages are widening. Both action by jihadists and action against jihadists could exacerbate the dangers.

davidbfpo
01-26-2013, 12:58 AM
Dr. Omar Ashour, from Exeter University, weighs in on 'The Algerian Tragedy', a country that has drifted out of Western attention until the recent incident. He starts with:
Let’s start by stating the obvious: AQIM is not a product of the Arab Spring. AQIM exists because of the military coup that ended the “Algerian Spring” two decades ago. And it has not been strengthened by the Libyan revolution, but rather by the failure of state-building in North Mali, the absence of post-conflict reconciliation and reintegration in Algeria, and a lack of accountability for a shadowy Algerian security establishment whose brutal methods have proved woefully inadequate to the challenge.

Link:http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-origins-of-algeria-s-hostage-crisis-by-omar-ashour#q5MiG8P2uGYiICZP.99

A short backgrounder and a salutary reminder that most of Algeria was pacified at a huge cost, the war continues albeit mainly in the far south, with virtually no people to "swim amongst".

davidbfpo
01-26-2013, 02:55 PM
Phil Mudd, a former analyst at the FBI & CIA, offers his perspective on what has happened and ends with:
We did not know how these types of al Qaedist fringes would play out 10 years ago, when I remember sitting at the nightly threat briefings at CIA, wondering, after yet another attack in yet another locale, whether we might be losing. Today, though, history has taught us the lessons of how these groups fail: trailing brightly from the fading al Qaeda comet, they win their 15 minutes of fame. Or maybe 15 months. Tomorrow, though, their real challenge begins. They have been, and will be, the architects of their own demise.

Link:http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/24/algeria-attack-represents-al-qaeda-s-dying-gasp.html

davidbfpo
01-27-2013, 09:11 PM
A rather long, but worthwhile review by Andrew Hussey, a UK-based academic whose specialism is France and North Africa. It's title is:
'Algiers: a city where France is the promised land – and still the enemy' and the sub-title: believes the only way to makes sense of the problems Algeria faces today is to look back into its colonial history. He takes a journey through 21st-century Algiers – into a dark past

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/27/algeria-france-colonial-past-islam

He is writing a book:
The French Intifada, which is a parallel attempt to make sense of French colonial history in north Africa. This book is a tour around some of the most important and dangerous frontlines of what many historians now call the fourth world war. This war is not a conflict between Islam and the west or the rich north and the globalised south, but a conflict between two very different experiences of the world – the colonisers and the colonised.

SWC has many threads that include Algeria; the main one is 'France's war in Algeria: telling the story':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15864 , but until Mali little on what happened in Algeria after independence fifty years ago.

I stand corrected there is a small thread 'Algeria Again? Contemporary affairs':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2079


As Omar Ashour reminds us Algeria had a 'Spring' twenty years ago that led to a bitter civil war.

Bill Moore
01-27-2013, 09:53 PM
Phil Mudd, a former analyst at the FBI & CIA, offers his perspective on what has happened and ends with:

Link:http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/24/algeria-attack-represents-al-qaeda-s-dying-gasp.html

This is a very poor piece of analysis in my opinion. I don't think anyone claimed the Algerian attack represented a spike, but rather it was part of a much larger spike of activity that has been enduring throughout the region from Nigeria, to Mali, to Libya, and Algeria.

As for AQ being on the short and final, Al Shabab gained in strength, AQ in Yemen gained in strength, Baku Harim (sp?) in Nigeria gained strength over a period of years and months. No one can evaluate a trend on a particular event, regardless of its media coverage, but on the other hand you can't dismis the trend either. Happy thoughts are a substitute for real analysis.

davidbfpo
01-29-2013, 01:41 PM
Jason Burke, of The Observer adds a review article and poses the question:
But does this all add up to al-Qaida 3.0, more dangerous than ever before? There's a simple test. Think back to those dark days of 2004 or 2005 and how much closer the violence seemed. Were you more frightened then, or now? The aim of terrorism is to inspire irrational fear, to terrorise. Few are as fearful today as they were back then. So that means there are two possibilities: we are wrong, ignorant or misinformed, and should be much more worried than we are; or our instincts are right, and those responsible for the violence are as far from posing an existential threat as they have ever been.

Link:http://m.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/29/al-qaida-terrorism-threat-west

davidbfpo
02-01-2013, 11:40 PM
A very short USIP commentary 'Regional Security Lessons from the Attack on Algeria's In Amenas Gas Plant', which draws attention to:
average annual attacks on energy infrastructure have risen from slightly more than 200 worldwide during 1980-99 to 380 over the last decade, 2000-11.

Not only do attacks tend to cluster in certain regions, they also occur in waves. The crests of these waves tend to correspond with flashpoints of instability that are characterized by localized ‘bursts’ of violence aimed at energy infrastructure. Algeria and the Maghreb are not peculiar in this regard. Other recent waves and clusters could be identified in Colombia, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Russia.

Four lessons:
Four important lessons can be gleaned from USIP's project on the vulnerability of energy infrastructure. First, attacks on energy facilities historically occur in 'waves,' and we might be at the start of one such wave in the Maghreb and the Sahel. Second, attacks are likely to cluster around natural gas and oil installations because they are often far removed from major administrative centers and because they provide a wide variety of high-value targets.

Third, the interconnected nature of causes demands an examination of the people, equipment and virtual networks that support energy operations. This will help tailor solutions to fit the local context. Fourth, violent non-state actors are less likely to be homogenous groups with a singular focus.

Link:http://www.usip.org/publications/regional-security-lessons-the-attack-algerias-in-amenas-gas-plant

USIP are IMHO a long way behind the "oil majors" in thinking about the issues, the "majors" have long had facilities in vulnerable areas, which has included Algeria for at least twenty years. Somehow I doubt the "majors" or insurers will comment preferring discretion and commercial confidentiality.

davidbfpo
02-11-2013, 10:47 PM
Three succinct comments by Brian Jenkins from RAND

Part 1: The Motivations Behind the Amenas Terrorist Attack

This opens with a sharp caveat:
If the assault on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi held any lessons for government officials who must make immediate assessments, eager-to-be-interviewed experts, or critics ready to point fingers, it was this: What is initially known about a terrorist attack beyond the what, when, and where often turns out to be wrong. Many of the critical details may not be known for days, weeks, months—or ever. There will always be omissions and distortions. That lesson undoubtedly applies to the bloody terrorist attack on the Amenas natural gas facility in Algeria

Link:http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/01/the-motivations-behind-the-amenas-terrorist-attack.html

Part 2: The Dynamics of the Hostage Situation at Amenas

A thorough review, including historical aspects like:
In the 1970s, hostage situations accounted for about 20 percent of all terrorist incidents. (On the risk to hostages)... 79 percent of the hostages who died in hostage incidents were killed during a rescue operation, either by their captors or by their rescuers (Based on a 1977 RAND Study).

Link:http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/01/the-dynamics-of-the-hostage-situation-at-amenas.html

Part 3: What Does the Amenas Attack Mean for U.S. Policy in Africa?

This is very short, almost a "holding" action as France acts in Mali and the USA decides what to do next:http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/01/what-does-the-amenas-attack-mean-for-us-policy-in.html

There is an very different point of view in a SWJ Blog piece today 'The Amenas Siege and the Growing Hostage Problem in Africa':http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-amenas-siege-and-the-growing-hostage-problem-in-africa

KingJaja
02-12-2013, 08:59 AM
davidbfpo,

The best thing the US should do is to look beyond the Al Qaeda bogeyman.

There's a lot going in Africa that would have occurred irrespective of Libya etc.

M-A Lagrange
02-22-2013, 09:01 AM
After the quick progression, comes the time for search and destroy...


Mali: the battle continues Iforas, 30 Islamists killed in the operation

Operation "Panther IV", "continues" and "progress." This was said Thursday the staff of the French army. Monday started, this operation is to dislodge the Islamists in the region of the Adrar des Iforas in north-eastern Mali. "This is not just a progression, it is also quite favorable search this area is that people can hide. Should therefore avoid exceeding the terrorist positions and have people in the back, it is therefore a thorough enough search, "said the spokesman of the General Staff, Colonel Thierry Burkhard, at the weekly press briefing of defense.

"It is estimated that twenty terrorists were neutralized in the first place attachment" on Tuesday, in which Harold died Legionnaire Vormezeele. Wednesday, a little further east, "a little less than a dozen terrorists" have in turn been announced Thierry Burkhard, bringing the death toll on the side of jihadist thirty dead.

The previous count, announced Wednesday by Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian was 25 Islamists killed. Several ammunition depots were also destroyed, according to the staff. A wide Mali entire Staff announcement "about 200 sorties" from Thursday, February 14, with "sixty" carried about by hunters, although they are not necessarily made of keystrokes, at we said.

A "ten goals" have been destroyed by air strikes, mainly carried out by fighters but also some by helicopter, according to Colonel Burkhard. These "targets" were mainly in the region of the Adrar des Ifoghas but also in the region Bourem. These are "half" of logistics sites that have been destroyed, but also "an armored reconnaissance and four pick-up," he said. Weapons caches were discovered and several rocket-propelled vehicles were recovered.

En savoir plus sur http://www.atlantico.fr/pepites/mali-bataille-iforas-se-poursuit-30-islamistes-tues-dans-operation-647122.html#63bDuYMbxZpOL1EF.99

davidbfpo
02-22-2013, 12:19 PM
Marc,

I look forward to the elucidation of:
....several rocket-propelled vehicles were recovered.

Yes I know it probably means somthing else.:) Certain interests will welcome the 'rocket propelled vehicles gap'.:wry:

M-A Lagrange
02-22-2013, 02:37 PM
Marc,

I look forward to the elucidation of:

Yes I know it probably means somthing else.:) Certain interests will welcome the 'rocket propelled vehicles gap'.:wry:

OK, the original was: several vehicles equiped with rocket launchers.
The beauty of google...:D

jmm99
02-22-2013, 06:25 PM
The Ontos (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M50_Ontos) ...

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/34/Ontos.jpg

Alas, there has been an Ontos Gap since 1969. ;)

Regards

Mike

davidbfpo
02-26-2013, 10:25 PM
Michael Wills gives some context in a short blog:http://www.hurstpublishers.com/islamism-in-the-saharan-sahel/


The surge in international interest in the Saharan Sahel region of Africa following the French-led intervention in Mali and especially the attack on the In Amenas gas facility in southern Algeria by armed Islamists has drawn attention to the links between these incidents and the conflict in Algeria in the 1990s.


As for AQIM, before Al Amenas:
nothing could disguise the fact that AQIM was a shadow of its Algerian forebears.

KingJaja
02-27-2013, 11:47 AM
Interesting read from the WSJ.

As a Nigerian, I can tell you upfront that the Nigerian Army bristles at "being told what to do" by the US Army (or any Western Army). This article validates that.

Secondly, nobody in the Nigerian government wants wide swathes of the Nigerian Military to be trained by a foreign power - especially when US trained officers have a reputation for going back home and executing successful coups.


KUMBOTSO, Nigeria—The shooting clattered on for 30 minutes, residents of this dusty town say, and when it ended, four militants holding a German engineer hostage were dead.

So were the engineer, and four innocent bystanders.

In vast West Africa, a new front-line region in the battle against al Qaeda, Nigeria is America's strategic linchpin, its military one the U.S. counts on to help contain the spread of Islamic militancy. Yet Nigeria has rebuffed American attempts to train that military, whose history of shooting freely has U.S. officials concerned that soldiers here fuel the very militancy they are supposed to counter.

It is just one example of the limits to what is now American policy for policing troubled parts of the world: to rely as much as possible on local partners.

The U.S. and Nigerian authorities don't fully trust each other, limiting cooperation against the threat. And U.S. officials say they are wary of sharing highly sensitive intelligence with the Nigerian government and security services for fear it can't be safeguarded. Nigerian officials concede militants have informants within the government and security forces.

For the U.S., though, cooperation with Nigeria is unavoidable. The country is America's largest African trading partner and fifth-largest oil supplier. Some 30,000 Americans work here. Nigeria has by far the biggest army in a region where al Qaeda has kidnapped scores of Westerners, trained local militants to rig car bombs and waged war across an expanse of Mali the size of Texas. Last month, al Qaeda-linked extremists' attack on a natural-gas plant in faraway Algeria left at least 37 foreigners dead

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443294904578044932155502840.html

M-A Lagrange
03-03-2013, 11:23 PM
First of all, I would like to draw your attention to the 2 videos the French army released about the Malian conflict. This is interesting because it is the first images of the conflict from the French Army which has ordered a full black out on that conflict.
http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2013/03/03/l-armee-francaise-diffuse-ses-videos-de-combats_885922

Now some news. Part from the death of a 3rd French soldier, French government is very cautious about the death of 2 high targets from AQMI.

Dead Abu Zeid and Elmokhtar: Chad maintains the Drian urges cautionBelmokhtar death, which had claimed the attack site in January Algerian gas Amenas, followed by a hostage repressed by the army in Algeria, where 37 foreign and Algerian died, like Abu Zeid, was not confirmed by the French authorities, who are very discreet, or in Bamako and Algiers. "No comment" , it was said laconically Saturday at the French presidency. "We want it can be verified, it is a matter of time. were not able to confirm " , a source explained Sunday at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs .
Jean-Yves Le Drian, French Minister of Defence himself Sunday called the"prudence" in an interview with the Depeche du Midi made public by his ministry, Mr. Le Drian, questioned these proclamations Chadian replies "A rumor repeated the environment is no information, and the Minister of Defence should not speak in the conditional. I call for caution and a sense of responsibility with respect to information that we are not able to confirm material at this stage " .

I also call for caution with the google translation... :D

Stan
03-04-2013, 08:31 PM
Not that these translations are much better :D

French news black out (http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/01/21/284689/france-slams-media-blackout-on-mali-war/)

Islamist commander Abou Zeid's death in Mali 'probable' (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21654190)

Chadian officials claim their troops have killed Mokhtar Belmokhtar (http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00023209.html)



I also call for caution with the google translation... :D

davidbfpo
04-08-2013, 01:16 PM
A title that may jar with many here, by Patrick Smith in The Africa Report, a Paris-based monthly journal:http://www.theafricareport.com/North-Africa/african-armies-are-better-than-you-think.html

Citing an AU official:
What are we doing 50 years after independence calling on former colonial powers to resolve our security disputes?

Earlier articles include 'Who are the exemplary armies in Africa?' and 'Why are African armies so bad?'.The later ends with:
..what most of these armed forces lack are motivation and allegiance to the mission they are entrusted with.#
.....Fighting without knowing why... 

These armies are wary of the State and the State is suspicious of them... lest they turn against them.



davidbfpo
05-27-2013, 07:41 PM
I do know where Niger is, but had forgotten there is a French-owned and run uranium mine. The attacks had little reporting here, as Woolwich happened.


Islamist militants staged brazen twin car bomb attacks on an army base and a French-run uranium mine in Niger, killing at least 20 people and taking several trainee army officers hostage...The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)....claimed the near simultaneous bombings

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/niger/10076437/Islamist-bombers-kill-20-in-Niger-attacks-seize-hostages.html

Two French reports need to be read; one suggests the location at the mine was very carefully chosen and production will be hindered for two months:http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130526-niger-enquete-continue-comprendre-comment-terroristes-sont-introduits-le-site-areva

The second strike on a military base appears to have targeted the army officers training academy:http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130527-issoufou-niger-arlit-hommage-soldats-somair-terroriste-mujao-mokhtar-belmokhtar-

davidbfpo
05-29-2013, 01:18 PM
Analysis of recent events by Andrew Lebovich on al-Wasat:
While news is still emerging, this post is an attempt to provide context and a preliminary assessment of what we know so far about these attacks. I will also look at what the attacks signify regarding the evolution and current state of jihadist militancy in the Sahel, before briefly looking at the overall security environment in Niger.

He ends:
Many questions remain about the attacks last Thursday and their effect on the region. We will get answers to some of those questions, but not all. But the attacks in northern Niger have once more shown the determination of militants to stage significant attacks, cast a light on the changing nature of militancy in the Maghreb and Sahel, and shown the persistent security challenges facing the region’s fragile states.

Link:http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/05/28/niger-attacks-and-the-sahels-shifting-jihad/

davidbfpo
08-20-2013, 09:50 PM
A short report 'Challenging the Myth of the Drug-Terror Nexus in the Sahel' from the West Africa Commission on the Impact of Drug Trafficking on Security, Governance and Development in West Africa (WACD) by a German author.

In summary:
This paper reviews the evidence for the links between drug smuggling and extremist activity in the Sahel-Sahara region. While it demonstrates that such links clearly exist, the paper argues that the widespread talk of a drug-terror nexus in the Sahel is misleading, for several reasons. First, much of the evidence presented as basis for such claims can either be easily debunked, or is impossible to verify. Second, rather than the two extremist groups as such, involvement in drug trafficking appears to concern individuals and groups close to, or within, MUJAO and AQIM: within both groups, members are driven by multiple and, at times, conflicting motivations. Third, numerous other actors are playing an equally or more important role in drug smuggling, including members of the political and business establishment in northern Mali, Niger and the region’s capitals, as well as leaders of supposedly ‘secular’ armed groups. Fourth, the emphasis on links between drug trafficking and terrorism in the Sahel serves to obscure the role of state actors and corruption in allowing organized crime to grow. Fifth, the profits derived from kidnap-for-ransom played a much more significant role
in the rise of AQIM and MUJAO.

Link:http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-the-Drug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf

davidbfpo
08-31-2013, 09:25 PM
jane Corbin, one of the better BBC reporters, returns to the Amenas incident in a hour long documentary 'This World: Terror in the Desert', which I am watching now. So far nothing new, but she has several hostages talking, both expats and Algerian hostages.

Hopefully you too can watch:http://www.bbc.co.uk/tv/bbctwo/live

Or there is a written article:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-23878183

AdamG
10-02-2013, 03:19 PM
Death, Darkness and the Deserters
From the archives, a harrowing tale of African desert warfare from June 2008
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/f107d318173f

davidbfpo
12-04-2013, 09:01 PM
Thanks to a lurker a new report on this theme:http://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/GDPO%20West%20Africa%20digital.pdf%20FINAL.pdf

From the conclusion:
The din of the chest-beating around narco-trafficking and state failure in West Africa is rendering very difficult a useful debate about affordable and effective measures that might avert the well documented worst consequences of the ‘war on drugs’.