North Korea: 2012-2016

[JMA]

How, short of war, could the north have been prevented from acquiring a nuclear capability?

Try to give it a little thought and see what you come up with.

[JMA]

From the Mail & Guardian (http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-11-25-south-korea-defence-minister-resigns-after-attack):


South Korean President Lee Myung-bak accepted the resignation of his defence minister on Thursday, two days after an attack by North Korea and amid criticism that the South's response was too slow.

[Maeda Toshiie]

You know this or are you speculating?

http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2928852

There are other articles out there.


Try to give it a little thought and see what you come up with.

China? No one else has the leverage to do so.

[Dayuhan]

One of the interesting side effects of the recent incident is that China seems to have backed down on its opposition to a US carrier operating in the Yellow Sea. Previous announcements opposed any operation in the sea, now the reference is to areas within the 200 mile exclusive economic zone, which does not cover all of the Yellow Sea. I wonder if JMA will call this a "humiliating climb down".

Realistically, of course, it's less about China and the US than about China sending a message to North Korea. It would be a huge mistake to believe that China has full control over North Korea and that the North asks permission before taking any action: the North is and has long been quite willing to take their patrons by surprise. They are dependent, but they are well aware of the reasons China keeps them afloat and they are aware that the strategic imperative will still be there even if they throw Beijing a curveball now and then. I don't suppose the Chinese are very happy with the latest performance - hence the back-down on the US exercises that the North finds so offensive - but they still aren't going to allow the North to fold up. If that happened and the North was absorbed by the south, China would have an economically potent, militarily significant US ally on their border. They don't want that and the North Koreans know it, which gives the North leverage despite their dependence.

[Ken White]

and the answer to your question is "of course not..." :D

[Van]

...the US exercises that the North finds so offensive...

Bold assumption that DPRK finds the exercises offensive. The case could be made that the DPRK welcomes these excuses for military action.

The theme lately seems to be "avoid reunification at all costs". Note the failure of the Kaesung Industrial Complex, and how the most recent events derailed a scheduled reunification talk. The appearance is that the North is pursuing status quo, albeit an earlier status quo with more generous food shipments from the South. But it makes a twisted kind of sense.

What advantage is there for regime members in reunification? Who will guarantee their status, quality of life, personal security, and financial incentives? More important, who will guarantee KJI's steady stream of comfort girls?

But who in this game would benefit from reunification?
The U.S. would most likely lose basing (greatly diminished basing as the very least) in the region, and our foothold in the region.

China would lose the buffer between democracy and the middle kingdom, and would run what is likely to be an unacceptable risk of disturbing the harmony of the ethnic Koreans in China.

Japan would see both military and economic threats in the long term from a unified Korea.

South Korea would bear the brunt of rehabilitating an environmentally, socially, and economically devastated region.

Russia is the only player who might be open to reunification, simply to reduce the U.S. presense in the Pacific Rim, but runs risk to their interests in the region from branches and sequels of reunification (various possibilities for war, shifting economic blocks, etc).

So the big question is "What does DPRK really get out of this?"
-Shifting fishing in the region, now that the fishing villages on those islands have been relocated, although this might benefit China more.
-Attention. ("I'm such a big player now! Look how upset I got the U.S.")
-Leverage in the next round of food begging/barginning ("Feed us or we'll do this again!")

-Maybe, and this is the long-shot, Tom Clancy scenario; U.S. attention drawn away from a DPRK ally like Iran or Syria...

[Dayuhan]

Bold assumption that DPRK finds the exercises offensive. The case could be made that the DPRK welcomes these excuses for military action.

Ok granted, should have said "publicly". I've no doubt that the north needs and relies upon responses to provocation. Like so many other governments, they need somebody to hate.

In some ways the most provocative and disconcerting response we could give to provocation would be to completely ignore it, but that's difficult to do... and would leave the temptation to escalate the provocation until response was gained.

I suspect that many regional players would be happy enough to see the status quo of a divided and eternally conflicted Korea continue, but of course the rather eccentric nature of the north makes that status quo a bit shaky.

[JMA]

Ok granted, should have said "publicly". I've no doubt that the north needs and relies upon responses to provocation. Like so many other governments, they need somebody to hate.

In some ways the most provocative and disconcerting response we could give to provocation would be to completely ignore it, but that's difficult to do... and would leave the temptation to escalate the provocation until response was gained.

I suspect that many regional players would be happy enough to see the status quo of a divided and eternally conflicted Korea continue, but of course the rather eccentric nature of the north makes that status quo a bit shaky.

Exactly the reason why this lunatic should never have been allowed to develop nuclear weapons. This applies to Iran as well.

[Dayuhan]

Exactly the reason why this lunatic should never have been allowed to develop nuclear weapons. This applies to Iran as well.

Here we go again with the "allowed to". Who is supposed to declare what other countries are or are not "allowed" to do? Who exactly was supposed to stop them, and how?

[JMA]

Here we go again with the "allowed to". Who is supposed to declare what other countries are or are not "allowed" to do? Who exactly was supposed to stop them, and how?

It happens all the time. Iraq and Afghanistan are just two recent examples.

PS: Spend a little time reading the WikiLeaks nuclear related cables and see what the world was facing in this regard.

[Dayuhan]

It happens all the time. Iraq and Afghanistan are just two recent examples.


Two excellent examples of why invading countries and trying to replace governments we dislike is generally not a good idea. Invading North Korea or Iran would be a fairly complicated and extraordinarily expensive affair with substantial risks... and whom do you propose to do the invading (and the paying)? Not exactly something you're going to build an international coalition around... do you expect the US to do it unilaterally? If not the US, then who?

From an American perspective... I'm afraid you'll have to find someone else. We can't afford the wars we've got, let alone another one. If you're willing to cover the costs, we'll reconsider as soon as your check clears. A trillion or so to start would do.

[JMA]

Two excellent examples of why invading countries and trying to replace governments we dislike is generally not a good idea. Invading North Korea or Iran would be a fairly complicated and extraordinarily expensive affair with substantial risks... and whom do you propose to do the invading (and the paying)? Not exactly something you're going to build an international coalition around... do you expect the US to do it unilaterally? If not the US, then who?

From an American perspective... I'm afraid you'll have to find someone else. We can't afford the wars we've got, let alone another one. If you're willing to cover the costs, we'll reconsider as soon as your check clears. A trillion or so to start would do.

You seem to want to speak on behalf of the US yet are at odds with recent US precedent. So why not from now on just speak for yourself?

[Uboat509]

You seem to want to speak on behalf of the US yet are at odds with recent US precedent.

Unless the president could convince the majority of Americans that Iran or NK poses an immediate direct threat to the US and that no other means to counter that threat exists then it isn't going to happen. Look at the fighting over a relatively small increase in the number of troops in Afghanistan. Recent US precedent concerns the invasion of a country that housed the terrorist organization that had just attacked us and the invasion of a country that we had already beaten once militarily and that many believed was aquiring WMD in order to attack us or to provide to someone else so that they could attack us. Both invasions also happened before the economic crash. Things have changed since those invasions and I don't see a shred of evidence anywhere to suggest that the American people, much less the politicians in DC have the stomache for another invasion or occupation. Nor do I believe that we could afford it in any case.

[Dayuhan]

You seem to want to speak on behalf of the US yet are at odds with recent US precedent. So why not from now on just speak for yourself?

I said an American perspective, not the American perspective. Since I am American, my perspective is an American one... one of many.

Iraq and Afghanistan provide excellent examples of the risks and enormous expense of occupying nations and trying to install governments. Hasn't work out well, and Iran or North Korea would likely have been far worse.

The comment about the check was of course tongue in cheek, but there's a point as well. When people in other countries say "we shouldn't allow..." they generally mean "the American taxpayer shouldn't allow...". The American taxpayer has, I suspect, had just about enough of that.

[AdamG]

Reading music
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bBTIoL5vaOM

Behold, the power of Open Source ... from

http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/12/silent-service-gets-underway.html

So nine subs got under way over the weekend, 2 of those on official deployment. Actually the number is 10 over the period of the last week, because USS Jacksonville (SSN 699) just returned from deployment last week and USS Charlotte (SSN 766) deployed the next day. Worth remembering, ~60% of the submarines in US Navy inventory are in the Pacific.

I'm sure this activity is completely unrelated to recent events on the Korean Peninsula. Or not.

[SWJ Blog]

This Week at War: Could North Korea be the next Afghanistan? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/this-week-at-war-could-north-k/)

Entry Excerpt:

East Asia on the brink of small war.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/17/this_week_at_war_could_north_korea_be_the_next_afg hanistan):

Topics include:

1) A different kind of small war in Korea?

2) Two intelligence reports mean more Afghan headaches for Obama

A different kind of small war in Korea?

This week, South Korea's government took steps to prepare the country for a military confrontation with North Korea. Artillery batteries practiced their gunnery and the country had its first serious civil defense drill in decades. Within the next few days, the South promised another artillery exercise from Yeonpyeong Island, the island the North shelled for an hour on Nov. 23. Should the South carry through with this exercise, Pyongyang made its own promise, a riposte (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/17/AR2010121701936.html) "deadlier than what was made on Nov. 23." The mood in the South has hardened -- another round of six-party talks is out, military preparation and air raid drills are in.

After two unanswered provocations by the North -- the attack on Yeonpyeong and the sinking of the warship Cheonan -- the South's political leaders have concluded that it now pays to be tough and have promised retaliatory airstrikes for future Northern attacks. This change in attitude has consequences for Obama administration officials, who would surely prefer not to be drawn into an armed skirmish. U.S. officials likely agree in principle with a tougher policy toward the North. Much less agreeable to them is letting the South Korean government determine by itself how to retaliate after the next provocation. The United States will want to demonstrate that it is a reliable ally, while also maintaining control over its own fate. How the U.S. government manages this dilemma during a fast-moving crisis remains to be seen.

On Dec. 13, the South Korean army sent its artillery forces into the field for a workout, conducting gunnery exercises (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/13/AR2010121301402.html?sid=ST2010121002741)at 27 sites. Much more important was a nation-wide civil defense drill (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/asia/16korea.html?_r=3&ref=world) on Dec. 15, the first such serious drill in decades. 300,000 police and Civil Defense Corps members mobilized for the 20-minute exercise, herding pedestrians and schoolchildren into bombs shelters and subway stations while South Korean fighter jets buzzed overhead. Eleven million South Koreans participated (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704828104576021071700227348.html?m od=ITP_pageone_2) in the exercise. In addition, the government plans to spend $45 million next year on new bomb shelters. Given Seoul's vulnerability to North Korean artillery fire, a South Korean threat of retaliation previously lacked credibility. Seoul's renewed commitment to civil defense has bolstered the credibility of its new retaliatory policy.

Click through to read more ...



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/this-week-at-war-could-north-k/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[AdamG]

Japan has unveiled a sweeping update of its national defence polices, prescribing a more flexible posture and refocusing its capabilities as it confronts China's military buildup and North Korea's nuclear ambitions.
The National Defence Programme Guideline approved by Prime Minister Naoto Kan's cabinet yesterday stopped short of easing a ban on arms exports - a move opposed by a small pacifist party whose help Kan wants to pass bills in a divided parliament - but left the door open to international joint development of weapons.

http://www.scotsman.com/news/China-and-North-Korea-force.6664823.jp


The traditionally uneasy relationship between Tokyo and Seoul turned chillier last week when Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan said his country's military, known as the Self-Defense Forces, could be dispatched to South Korea to whisk Japanese nationals out of harm's way. The comments were meant to reassure Japanese citizens about potential threats from North Korea or China, but instead they raised concerns about the likelihood of Japan's rearmament.

http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/15/world/la-fg-korea-japan-military-20101215

[SWJ Blog]

‘Small war’ in Korea is postponed (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/small-war-in-korea-is-postpone/)

Entry Excerpt:

Today, South Korean marines proceeded (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/world/asia/21korea.html?ref=world) with an artillery training exercise on Yeonpyeong Island. Instead of delivering “brutal consequences beyond imagination” if the exercise went ahead, the North Korean government instead concluded that it was “not worth reacting” to the 94-minute drill.

South Korea called the North’s bluff and the North folded its hand, at least for now. The South boosted its leverage in several ways. First, it evacuated civilians on the island and in other forward locations. Second, it waited for clear weather and put F-15 fighter-bombers in the air, presumably in preparation for counter-battery strikes against North Korean artillery positions. Finally, about 20 U.S. soldiers participated in the exercise as observes, or more accurately as “trip-wires” for a U.S. retaliatory response against the North. The North’s leaders likely concluded that in this case they did not possess escalation dominance. The North has exposed itself as a bluffer and will have to run much greater risks in the future to reestablish its reputation for ferocity.

This weekend’s drama was a breakthrough for the South Korean government.

Click through to read more ...



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/small-war-in-korea-is-postpone/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Tukhachevskii]

...has an interesting piece on the recent North Korean artillery "attack"...:http://www.kpajournal.com/storage/KPAJ-1-12.pdf

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 23 Dec 10: North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea (http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/198%20North%20Korea%20---%20The%20Risks%20of%20War%20in%20the%20Yellow%20Se a.ashx)

...It is clear that the Yellow Sea is becoming a zone of worsening danger. This analysis of the sea boundary is based on numerous interviews in the ROK and elsewhere on the origins and legal uncertainty surrounding the NLL, the rules of engagement in the South and the history of clashes in the area. This paper is intended as a background resource on a problem that is intertwined with complex historical, political, economic, legal, military and symbolic issues. Resolution will require analysis and compromise across all these dimensions. The NLL is very controversial politically in South Korea; political compromise and the establishment of a de jure inter-Korean maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea (which could well prove territorially less advantageous to the South) would be extremely difficult for any South Korean leader to pull off. An update briefing on South Korean politics within this context will follow this background paper....

[Bill Moore]

http://www.aolnews.com/2010/12/22/north-korea-threatens-war-over-souths-christmas-lights/


North Korea's Grinch-like military reportedly is threatening to shell a floodlit metal tower -- decked with 100,000 light bulbs and topped with an illuminated cross -- that the South has erected on its side of the heavily militarized border, according to the South's Yonhap News Agency. The Christmas tree-shaped beacon was switched on Tuesday night at a ceremony that saw a Santa-hatted choir -- surrounded by gun-toting marines -- sing "Joy to the World" and other carols.

[AdamG]

SEOUL, South Korea – North Korea has faster, more powerful tanks prowling the world's most heavily armed border and 200,000 special forces poised to carry out assassinations and cause havoc in South Korea, a major military review said Thursday.

Seoul's Defense Ministry report, released every two years, signals that the North's military threat has expanded. It comes as President Lee Myung-bak's administration scrambles to respond to criticism that it was unprepared for a Nov. 23 North Korean artillery attack on a front-line island that killed four people.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101230/ap_on_re_as/as_koreas_clash;_ylt=Anc62jNjHYFB1miJNfuQIY9vaA8F; _ylu=X3oDMTJrMjAwMmhzBGFzc2V0A2FwLzIwMTAxMjMwL2FzX 2tvcmVhc19jbGFzaARwb3MDMQRzZWMDeW5fYXJ0aWNsZV9zdW1 tYXJ5X2xpc3QEc2xrA3NvdXRoa29yZWFubw--

[davidbfpo]

An IISS commentary:http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-17-2011/january/north-koreas-uranium-programme-heightens-concern/

[Seabee]

A friend who knows I am interested in the region told me to watch the Korean area as there were signs something was cooking that is not being reported in the press.

Does anyone have a feeling that things are going to hot up in the next couple of weeks?

Best
Chris

[anonamatic]

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MA22Dg01.html
"North Korea set on third nuclear test"

It might be related, but on the other hand I concur with the authors in terms of this being a `when not if' situation. I also expect them to do some things to try to look strong at China's expense. It's very hard to predict what they'll do however because their government is pathologically irrational, and it's not restricted to one area of government, or only a few of their leaders. The crazy runs deep in that country.

To give one example (of which perhaps there are no end...), my first thought was that they might wait some period of time until after Hu's visit to the US had concluded and settled down some before they lit new fires. Then I remembered that they most recently broke the armistice in the middle of China's hosting of the Asian Games. When that happened I was pretty surprised at the level of disdain for China's interests that they demonstrated with that aggression.

[Van]

"The North Korean regime is on alert after signs of public unrest mainly in North Pyongyan Province," Later in the same article, there are references to the influence of the "Jasmine Revolutions" in North Korea.

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/02/24/2011022401282.html

OK, The source is very biased, but...

Hypothetically, (and yes, it is unlikely, but it deserves a degree of consideration) the current North Korean regime falls, and the military district commanders accept South Korean assistance; then what?

What degree of popular resistance is to South Korean/U.S. assistance is likely?

Who is likely to organize the resistance? Or will it be more of a "viral" resistance?

How about a situation where some district commanders accept South Korea's authority and other don't? What if the ones that don't accept the intervention get backing from China or Russia? Which ones are likely to accept the South, which are likely to go with Russia or China? Which might seek autonomy? Why?

Will China tolerate the humanitarian efforts to stabilize the tattered shreds of the North or will they stage their own intervention? Will there be a race for Pyongyang, like the race between the Soviets and the Allies after WW II for control of the remains of Germany? What might make a "natural" demarcation?

How about the likely refuge flow into China? And the refuge flow south?

Will Japan assist in a humanitarian effort? Should they? How tolerant would South Korea be of this assistance? (I've heard it said by Koreans that the only thing that could unify North and South Korea would be the desire to attack Japan.)

How about Russia?

Would Iran attempt to assert itself? (Look at the relationship between North Korea and Iran, there may be reasons for this sequel:Official: Iran, NKorea are in 'one trench' (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/23/AR2011022301967.html).) What other 'non-regional' players might try to intervene?

(Possibly the most important question) What other questions need to be asked?

Yes, it is a wild card scenario; check, I get it. But it is not impossible (just profoundly unlikely, sort of like the idea of a bunch of third world scumbags with bad personal hygiene changing the New York City skyline... So unlikely it would have gotten you thrown out of the Pentagon or CIA, on 10 September, 2001). Let's move past that and really think critically about this scenario.

Van

"Analysis Section:
Two drink minimum"

[anonamatic]

I wouldn't rule a collapse out at this point at all. I'm not sure the whole dynastic transition is going very smoothly. That especially after all the hard case military adventure on their part did not result in the sorts of external activities they could apply the usual twists to lie & attempt to claim victory from. Worse, they crapped on China using the same sort of face losing tactics employed by Russia during the Olympic games during the Asian games. They broke the armistice, everyone there knows they did, it probably carries more weight there and in China than it seems to as well. Since SK hardened up afterwards, it didn't work very well for them in that sense either.

They may try to provoke more serious violence to quell domestic discontent too. The problem with any look at NK is that it's a Disneyland of Crazy. It's impossible, and unreasonable to expect any rational behavior from them, even when everyone in the country is starving.

[Hacksaw]

I wouldn't rule a collapse out at this point at all. I'm not sure the whole dynastic transition is going very smoothly. That especially after all the hard case military adventure on their part did not result in the sorts of external activities they could apply the usual twists to lie & attempt to claim victory from. Worse, they crapped on China using the same sort of face losing tactics employed by Russia during the Olympic games during the Asian games. They broke the armistice, everyone there knows they did, it probably carries more weight there and in China than it seems to as well. Since SK hardened up afterwards, it didn't work very well for them in that sense either.

They may try to provoke more serious violence to quell domestic discontent too. The problem with any look at NK is that it's a Disneyland of Crazy. It's impossible, and unreasonable to expect any rational behavior from them, even when everyone in the country is starving.

this last part in bold... All actors are rational and predictable so long as you are able to understand their frames of reference regarding reasonable and acceptable... now in this case getting that nut cracked is really really hard . I just think we too often ascribe crazy or irrational to behavior/decisions we don't understand... as if they are un-understandable:wry: as opposed to lacking the right decision framework to understand/predict...

I am officially off my soapbox

[AdamG]

North Korea appears to be protesting the joint U.S. and South Korean military maneuvers by jamming Global Positioning Devices in the south, which is a nuisance for cell phone and computers users -- but is a hint of the looming menace for the military.

*
The North is believed to be nearing completion of an electromagnetic pulse bomb that, if exploded 25 miles above ground would cause irreversible damage to electrical and electronic devices such as mobile phones, computers, radio and radar, experts say.

"We assume they are at a considerably substantial level of development," Park Chang-kyu of the Agency for Defense Development said at a briefing to the parliament Monday.

http://abcnews.go.com/International/electronic-warfare-north-korea-nears-completion-electromagnetic-pulse/story?id=13081667

[jcustis]

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-12-18/north-korea-leader-dies/52058036/1


Kim's death was announced Monday by the state television from the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.
Kim is believed to have suffered a stroke in 2008 but he had appeared relatively vigorous in photos and video from recent trips to China and Russia and in numerous trips around the country carefully documented by state media. The communist country's "Dear Leader" — reputed to have had a taste for cigars, cognac and gourmet cuisine — was believed to have had diabetes and heart disease...

Bets on how long the son lasts, if he is in fact the face of leadership who is paraded out tomorrow?

[Bill Moore]

This will either be big news and big change over the next few weeks/months or just another transition in the hermit kingdom. S. Korea's stocks fell 5% already on the news, and their government is holding emergency meetings. Tensions are going to be high for some time, and the potential for a mis-step that leads to a localized or large conflict will be much higher than normal as North Korea conducts its peaceful or not so peaceful power transition.

[SWJ Blog]

North Korea: Kim Jong Il Dead at Age 69 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/north-korea-kim-jong-il-dead-at-age-69)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/north-korea-kim-jong-il-dead-at-age-69) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

one of the few, if not the only UK expert on North Korea (DPRK) Aidan Foster-Carter has written this:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8966048/Kim-Jong-Il-dead-Apocalypse-now-or-a-new-dawn.html

Which opens with:
Anything is now possible. The range of possible scenarios runs from benign to apocalyptic. The world wants North Korea to come in from the cold and embrace peace and reform. That seems unlikely, alas. The Kim regime is heavily invested in an avowed military-first policy, and in continuity – despite marching down a cul-de-sac. The mighty Korean People's Army (KPA), whose clout grew under Kim Jong-il, has much to lose from any outbreak of peace.

And ends with:
Anything could happen in North Korea. For now the rest of the world can do little more than watch, hoping that a bad situation does not become worse. To that end, discreet consultation between Seoul, Washington and Beijing is essential. But don't expect to hear about it.

If conflict returns it is unlikely to be a 'small war'.

[Ray]

I wonder if anything will change.

But who knows?

[davidbfpo]

It has been interesting to read the commentaries on the supposed intelligence failure over the North Korean leadership moves, particularly since one SWJ Blog piece refers to the lack of contact with non-senior staff.


was this a failure as such or rather just a demonstration of the limitations surrounding the gathering of intelligence about this secretive and reclusive country?


There was good 'strategic' intelligence on the fact that Kim was ill, had been for a while, and would likely not survive very long. But there was poor 'tactical' intelligence as to when, exactly, he was going to die...

BBC News:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16287506

[davidbfpo]

I always find the Australian viewpoint useful on regional matters in the Pacific, partly as the UK has drawn in somewhat of late.

So the Australian "think tank" the Lowy Institute has this, with multiple links to those who cannot get enough of matters Korean:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/12/20/Lowy-Institute-writings-on-North-Korea.aspx

Their summary on the last link writing is useful too:
Depending how the crisis evolved, and how key powers responded, a Korean strategic shock could contribute greatly to turning any of this paper's four scenarios – US or Chinese primacy, balance or concert – into a reality. Korea and what happens there could well prove to be the strategic pivot of Asia in the twenty-first century.

Then there's the nuclear issue:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/12/19/KJI-wont-take-his-nukes-to-the-grave.aspx

Given the potential in Korea (both nations) it does rather make the recent US-Australian basing agreement rather dull and peripheral.

Secondly just what role China (PRC) will play is - to me - unclear. Is North Korea best described as a "sick, starving child (or neighbour) with a dangerous military" or "a neighbour who is useful, with a hereditary ruling family"?

[Dayuhan]

Secondly just what role China (PRC) will play is - to me - unclear. Is North Korea best described as a "sick, starving child (or neighbour) with a dangerous military" or "a neighbour who is useful, with a hereditary ruling family"?

A little bit of both... though while North Korea may have its uses to the Chinese, it is also unpredictable and an be a loose cannon.

Certainly there are all manner of possible implications, but there's little the West can do beyond watching, waiting, and reacting to events as they emerge. The Chinese have presumably cultivated contacts in the North Korean military and may have more influence, though it's hard to say how much they actually can do.

[nightowl]

It is a pretty fascinating development to be sure and also a worrying one. The thing that worries me more then anything is that the most likely scenario for renewed hostilities doesn't involve a premeditated North Korean attack but, instead, a South Korean overreaction to a North Korean provocation along the lines of the sinking of the Cheonan or the shelling of YPO Island last Winter. The biggest issue, IMO, with the ROK Armed forces and government was that they have never established a clear "line" on what is an acceptable amount of military provocation from the North. The North only knows that the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of YPO did NOT cause a war... South Korea has said that they will retaliate much more aggressively in the event of another YPO style incident... but do the North Korean's know that for sure? Do even we know that for sure?

Kim Jong Il, as one of those links put it, was a "known unknown." While volatile, it was generally known that he would use the threat of small scale military actions as a counter-weight to try and win North Korea food aid and hard currency. He seemed to get the picture after YPO and did not launch another provocation... but is that because he legitimately heeded South Korean warnings or just because he was waiting for a better opportunity? Does Kim Jong Un have a similar mindset?

Kim Jong Un, on the other hand, is an "unknown unknown." With his European education and background does he harbor a more cooperative view towards the West? His education and experience surely makes him more then aware of the disparity between North Korean economic conditions and those of the rest of the world... Does he want to close that gap? Does the answer to either of those questions even matter if North Korea's military leadership won't allow him to consolidate power? If the military leadership doesn't allow him to consolidate power... then who, really, is in charge in North Korea? What is their agenda?

At the end of the day there's just too many questions and not enough hard answers yet. I have a feeling that the next six months might see some interesting events in North Korea.

[Kevin23]

This has been a topic constantly discussed since Kim-Jong-Il departed this world for that great land of cognac, women, and Hollywood movies in the sky about a week ago. However, with Kim’s passing the question of whether the DPRK that he and the ruling clique has presided over with an iron fist will be able to stand up? Despite what some analysts in the media say about the unlikelihood of the DPRK collapsing, I find that at least on paper the possibility is very likely.

North Korea is a nation that ranks in the bottom 5 or so among states in the world in terms overall quality of life and livability for its citizen’s, alongside
places like Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Congo . As large sections of the North Korean population are starving and a min of upwards of 1 million+ people have died in a famine that has plagued the country since the mid-1990. The famine was brought on by a mixture of the collapse of the North’s patron power the USSR at the beginning of that decade, along with other Warsaw Pact governments that the Kim regime had close relationships with, a strong reluctance to reform on the part of the DPRK’s govt, and just general incompetence & corruption.

Since then the North’s infrastructure, health, education & welfare system has completely ceased to exist. The DPRK also basically has economy or exports to speak of except selling weapons & technology to other rogue states like Iran and Syria (including information & assets used to create WMD). Other illicit exports of the North include the manufacturing and distribution of drugs to overseas markets like meth and heroin, along with other activities like counterfeiting currency. For instance, North Korean diplomats overseas basically function as moneymakers for the regime, and many have been caught dealing drugs, knockoff goods, or in automobile theft rings.

North Korea also ranks at the top as the world’s most oppressive state, with the Kim family regime actually making into the totalitarian rankings in history alongside such governments like Nazi Germany, Stalinist Soviet Union, and Maoist China. The North Korean regime runs a highly complex, massive, and sophisticated secret police network that has reach both inside and outside the country that systematically targets dissidents with a wide variety of methods. In North Korea one can be thrown in prison or even killed for owning something(sometimes the individual’s extended family as well) like a cell phone , or listening to foreign music.

Additionally, the DPRK runs a sizeable system of labor and concentration camps where those imprisoned are held under extremely harsh conditions, denied of adequate food, shelter, and clothing and are virtually worked to death or eventually killed over by camp guards. Not to mention running a cult of personality system in which the Kim family leaders like Kim Jong-Il, his son, and his father are revered as a almighty Gods. All while resisting even economic reforms like those seen in neighboring China.

Like mentioned above the DPRK government spends virtually all resources and money the country has on the armed forces under the “Songun” or strong military policy or luxuries for the Kim Family and related elite, at the expense of the rest of society. The North Korean government by some estimates is reputed to spend something like 50+% of its budget on the military. The DPRK has also pursued a very well-known WMD program over the year that includes a modest nuclear arsenal since 2006 and a large chemical and biological program as well.

With all of this being said, compared to the South of Korea the North obviously doesn’t register on the charts. The ROK has a stable democratic political system, which has existed in full for the past 20 or so years and is relatively uncorrupt overall. Individuals can openly criticize, the government, its leaders, and more without fear of imprisonment. The South’s economy is advanced and state of the art and delivers a wide range of services and opportunities to its citizens, has a very high development rate, along with the fact that numerous South Korean conglomerates like Hyundai, KIA, and other has made the country a major exporting power. South Korean society also provides first world standards of living for its population, with the nation’s education and infrastructure system ranking amongst the best in the world, even surpassing western countries like the US, UK, and France in these areas.

South Korea has also become a major regional military power in recent years possessing a large force that is regarded as one of the most professional and best equipped in the world. It has been estimated by some that if North Korea were to attack the South now and days the DPRK would be handily defeated even without US assistance.

Now after my lengthy look at North Korea, does anyone else here think that the DPRK could completely collapse one day in the coming years. I mean given when compared to every other country in Asia, esp it’s geographical and cultural counterpart South Korea and increasingly how many Northerner’s are becoming aware of how well off the former is I think it’s certainly possible at least on paper.

I know people on here who are more familiar then I know in terms of what plans there are to deal with the collapse of the DPRK etc. However, from a foreign & defense policy standpoint I figure that since the war in Iraq has ended, this has to be one of the top priorities and in South Korean circles has been mentioned as something that is not if but when. Spefically, since the North has a huge( if antiquted) military and has WMDS too. And especially, since the North appears to far gone to actually reform at this point.

If there are any thoughts on North Korean state collaspe I would like to hear them.

[davidbfpo]

Kevin23 asked:
.... does anyone else here think that the DPRK could completely collapse one day in the coming years?

Yes, only if China (PRC) was to dramatically change.

I have only considered what happened in Eastern Europe, with the sudden, incremental collapse of the Warsaw Pact - which started in Hungary and a decision on allowing holidaying East Germans to leave for West Germany. Self-doubt certainly existed within parts of the regimes in power, some independent groups notably the church and the USSR's refusal to support coercion. None of these factors apply in North Korea.

We simply know so little about the internal factors at play in North Korea no-one I venture can predict the future.

[ganulv]

Kevin23 asked:

Yes, only if China (PRC) was to dramatically change.

I have only considered what happened in Eastern Europe, with the sudden, incremental collapse of the Warsaw Pact - which started in Hungary and a decision on allowing holidaying East Germans to leave for West Germany. Self-doubt certainly existed within parts of the regimes in power, some independent groups notably the church and the USSR's refusal to support coercion. None of these factors apply in North Korea.
Also, though there was some diversity among the Eastern European and even the Warsaw Pact member nations, their governments were generally imposed by a foreign government to a far greater degree than was the DPRK’s (note that I’m not saying that the Soviets didn’t play rough between 1945 and 1950; the U.S.’s hands aren’t entirely clean there, either, but I’m kind of getting off track) and some of them qualified as satellite states in a way that the DPRK doesn’t (I think a decent comparison for the current situation between China and North Korea is USSR/Cuba and not USSR/Czechoslovakia).


We simply know so little about the internal factors at play in North Korea no-one I venture can predict the future.*accurately :)

[AdamG]

OSAKA, Japan — North Korea doesn't just do a nice line in belligerent rhetoric; it also has the military hardware to make life difficult for its enemy South Korea, according to a new report.

Just as the North risks economic collapse and starvation the regime has diverted funds to its 1.2 million-strong army and its nuclear weapons program, according to the Korea Economic Research Institute in Seoul.

It has also acquired a record number of tanks, warships and air defense artillery, the independent think-tank said in an unsettling report published this week.

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/south-korea/120105/north-korea-military-south-korea-kim-jong-il-un


BEIJING — With its secretive dynastic dictators and its nuclear-armed military, North Korea produces its fair share of intrigue even without the help of Chinese social media. But in recent days, netizens in China added their own plot twist, posting rumors about a military coup that upended young leader Kim Jong Eun.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/north-korea-coup-rumors-fueled-by-chinese-social-media/2012/01/05/gIQA96bdcP_blog.html?tid=sm_twitter_washingtonpost

[AdamG]

The Chinese micro-blogging service Weibo has exploded with rumors that new North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un was assassinated today at the North Korean embassy in Beijing. Twitter death rumors are totally cross-cultural.

http://gawker.com/5884033/chinese-twitter-says-kim-jong+un-was-assassinated-this-morning-in-beijing

[AdamG]

Reconnaissance satellites have identified the huge missile at a government research and development facility in Pyongyang, South Korean government sources told the Chosun Ilbo newspaper.

Analysts estimate the weapon to be around 130 feet long and, equipped with a more powerful booster unit, capable of delivering a warhead more than 6,200 miles.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9182604/North-Korea-preparing-to-unveil-missile-capable-of-striking-continental-US.html

[burkean]

Surprised nobody has raised the special forces in North Korea saga this week.

Found this podcast that goes into the details of how the mouthy general's press office massively goofed the way the story was handled;

http://defencereport.com/defrep-weekly-recap-david-axe-on-korea-the-flame-virus-and-assads-latest-victims/

[davidbfpo]

Burkean,

The story did not feature here in the UK; it did appear on SWJ and attracted only one comment:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/loose-lips-sink-ships-or

Embarrassment I suggest made many here reticent to comment, plus concern that is allegedly SOF activity in a rather fraught context.

[Ken White]

Embarrassment I suggest made many here reticent to comment, plus concern that is allegedly SOF activity in a rather fraught context.Could be that -- or it could be that most here pay little to no attention to most anything David Axe writes...

Could also be that if it were true, this would not be a place to discuss it and if it were not true, there'd be little point in discussing it. ;)

[AdamG]

The South Korean government is investigating unconfirmed intelligence reports that a gun battle, leaving between 20 and 30 soldiers dead, broke out when the North Korean regime removed army chief Ri Yong-ho from office.

The Chosun Ilbo, a South Korean daily newspaper, reported that some intelligence analysts believe Mr Ri, who has not been seen since his abrupt sacking earlier this week, was injured or killed in the confrontation.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-07-20/soldiers-killed-in-north-korean-gunfight-reports-say/4143734/?site=sydney


North Korea's top military official looked healthy in recent appearances, and his departure fed speculation among analysts that Kim purged him in an effort to put his own mark on the nation he inherited seven months ago when his father Kim Jong Il died.

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/ri-yong-ho-key-mentor-young-north-korean-leader-kim-jong-removed-posts-illness-article-1.1115195#ixzz21BtRne3W

[Fuchs]

I'd like to draw some attention to a blog post of mine:

North Korea's military capabilities and deterrence (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.de/2012/08/north-koreas-military-capabilities-and.html)

It's neither centred on machines nor centred on the nature of the regime or the character of its dictator.

Instead, I attempted to make some sense of the headlines of the past two decades and think I had some success.


I can guarantee you that the usual pundits would not publish such conclusions. I suspect they earn better money with more alarmist tendencies.

Moderator's Note: There is a main thread 'North Korea: catch all thread', where this thread may one day be merged into:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=919

[ganulv]

who takes both of them from you and starts beating himself in the head with the stick (http://youtu.be/MNBFv4rYifs). That’s the real deterrent, if you ask me.

I spent February of 1997 in Cuba. I was lodging on the same street as the DPRK embassy which I walked past at least twice a day. It was into my third week there before I saw the gate open. I asked the Cuban cop out front if that meant they were taking visitors. He said he had no idea, it was the first time he had ever seen the gate open but that he would go in to ask for me. He re-emerged and said someone would be out to speak to me in just a moment. Long story short, a kindly-faced tall older man in military uniform who spoke broken Spanish appeared and we had a very pleasant conversation during which I conveyed to him that I was from the U.S. and it was almost impossible to find anything about his country out there and was wondering if his embassy had any educational literature geared towards foreigners as embassies often do. He seemed to be pleased that I was interested in his country (Koreans are rarely lacking in national pride, in my experience! :D) and told me he thought that they did have some of that sort of thing, that if I would wait just a minute he would go ask his jefe. So… I waited longer than just a minute, and eventually an unsmiling short middle-aged man in military uniform who spoke impeccable Spanish emerged. We had a short conversation punctuated by him yelling, “¡Las revistas no llegaron este mes!” and slamming the gate in my face. That left me with the impression that the leadership of the DPRK is dead serious if nothing else.

[Fuchs]

I forgot it's OK to quote texts in full if you're the author yourself...


I'm not concerned about North Korea's military (and don't think anyone should be unless professionally obliged to or obliged to pay taxes in South Korea). It's nevertheless an interesting case study.

North Korea's military was built up with foreign help and WW2 vintage equipment within a few years, and became capable of independent warfare in only half a decade.


By mid-1950 North Korean forces numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 troops, organized into 10 infantry divisions, one tank division, and one air force division, with 210 fighter planes and 280 tanks [...]

(Wikipedia)

That is in itself astonishing. Keep in mind that North Korea was not exactly rich in car mechanics or even aircraft mechanics, despite being the more industrialised half of Korea.

- - - - -

[image]

North Korea overran South Korea's defences in June-July 1950 with superior (light) infantry on the hills/mountains and superior WW2 vintage T-34/85 tanks in the valleys.

The latter were mostly lost and the former was badly decimated when the last South Korean troops and foreign intervention troops defended the area at Pusan.

The details of these battles would make most interesting fodder for this blog post, but I'll abstain because that kind of stuff would only lead to stupid "anti-Americanism" charges and almost nobody would believe me anyway. So whoever is interested; look this stuff up elsewhere, preferably in a non-American and non-Korean source.
The long story short is that North Korea's infantry divisions had already lost most of their combat troops and were defending successfully against numerically and even more so materially superior foreign force with a tactical offence that included heavy use of infiltration tactics. The whole episode was thoroughly amazing and -to some- thoroughly embarrassing.
(Keep in mind that Western-style divisions of the time and even nowadays had up to 1/4th of their troops allocated as drivers of motor vehicles and unavailable for night-time rifle combat!)

Eventually the Inchon landing turned the front-line and the exhausted North Korean military was on the run till the red Chinese intervened and pulled off the whole "superior light infantry on hills/mountains + infiltration attacks" routine anew, with similar results.

The 'hot' war finally ended and the whole deadlock mess became part of the then Cold War.

- - - - - -

Afterwards, North Korea still had a strong claim for being a very proficient opposing force in Korean terrain (not much unlike Italian geography), and this seemed to suffice for a while.

The Cold War finally ended sometime around '86 to '92, and North Korean leadership had to realise that its deterrence was deprived of the PRC's nuclear umbrella, the whole Cold War mutually assured destruction insanity and on top of that North Korea wasn't able to keep up with military technology advances.

The critical weakness was in my opinion about night vision devices (the near infrared passive low light goggles). The Soviet Union had slept over this development and was lagging in military modernisation with the latest night vision gear during the 80's, the Chinese were lagging even more and the North Koreans lagged so hard it's not even clear that they had arrived technologically in the 60's (which featured night vision devices that had to emit near infrared light themselves [...]).


The whole night vision thing was terribly dangerous to North Korea, even if it had the newest toys itself in quantity. The light infantry infiltration techniques depended a lot on the concealment of darkness, and became much less credible due to the improved surveillance at night.

So North Korea changed its deterrence fundamentally. It stopped paying attention to impressing officers in-the-know (who were increasingly rare anyway) and turned towards impressing politicians, pundits and journalists.
This required different things than light infantry skills; something spectacular* was needed.
(1) North Korea turned towards long-range artillery in useless bunkers situated close to Seoul in order to threaten with shelling the city.
(2) North Korea turned towards the ballistic missiles that had scared people with no or superficial knowledge of military affairs so much during the Gulf War in '91.
(3) Finally, it turned towards the ultimate attention-grabbing device: A fission nuke.

They succeeded in impressing enough - and more importantly, the right people. Now they're being left alone, even supported with food deliveries. Deterrence mission accomplished.


Maybe - just maybe - the next time I fail to be impressed by North Korean (or for that matter Iranian) signals of "threat", readers of Defence and Freedom will remember why.

[...]

*: There was a 4th spectacular ingredient of the deterrence strategy: They declared a huge portion of their troops to be "special forces". Saddam attempted the same, but his bluff was called. Most North Korean "special forces" were and are apparently simply the continuation of their trained light infantry of summer '50. In other words: They're probably freed form being sent to rice harvest, or to work in mines and factories. They have definitively no waiver for the huge ballets known as military parades.

(Some formatting and links were lost in this quote.)

[ganulv]

The notion that any country that is not the ROK or Japan (and probably not Japan) has anything to fear from the DPRK seems ridiculous to me. Equally ridiculous to me is the notion that any sane world leader would choose to invade the DPRK. The quality of their equipment and their so-called special forces is irrelevant to that opinion.

[jmm99]

I seek enlightenment re this:


from Fuchs
The details of these battles would make most interesting fodder for this blog post, but I'll abstain because that kind of stuff would only lead to stupid "anti-Americanism" charges and almost nobody would believe me anyway. So whoever is interested; look this stuff up elsewhere, preferably in a non-American and non-Korean source.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Fuchs

This particular post is incoherent, what exactly is your point? The U.S. military is very critical of its performance in the early part of the war and the shortcomings are well documented and there is no intent to hide it. Most soldiers assigned to Korea are encouraged to read "This Kind of War" to ensure that history is not forgotten and hopefully not repeated. You don't have to read non-U.S. or non-Western history books to get that perspective. Hopefully you don't buy the garbage that the communists have published on their glorious victories? :D This reminds me of people inaccurately referring to Giap as a great strategist, when instead he was a leader that failed to learn and repeatedly used the same tactics resulting the slaughter of tens of thousands of his troops.

If your point is that the North Korean military isn't a threat today that would be an inaccurate and superficial analysis. Regardless of the fact that we can defeat their military, they most likely have adapted relatively well based on their asymmetric disadvantages. They can launch a short term devastating offensive on South Korea and then transition into a protracted defensive fight that would present the real threat by forcing all regional actors (China, Russia, Japan, North and South Korea) to make some tough decisions that could result in a larger conflict. There is no doubt we can defeat their attack, what comes next will be the challenge and the threat is multidimensional.

[Bob's World]

I took the point of the blog to be that the current focus and posture of the DPRK military is to deter attacks on NK. I think that is reasonable. That does not mean that they cannot or will not deliver a devastating attack with conventional or nuclear fires on South Korea or Japan, but I would be very surprised if they would ever again attempt to conduct maneuver warfare and invade the South. To do so would expose the military to defeat, and with no military the Regime would likely collapse, and Regime survival is, in most circles, the #1 priority of DPRK.

I think DPRK, South Korea, Japan, Russia and the US all share one common goal: Maintaining the status quo with the DPRK is the preferred option and perceived as the best case for each of those states for their own unique reasons.

But there is a wild card: The populace of the DPRK.

Currently kept in the dark as to their relative situation this populace does not act out. I imagine there is pretty good fear of state response (thus the need to not lose the military in some southern adventure) that helps keep the populace in check as well.

But what happens when this populace inevitably enters the information age? The plans of all these governments to sustain the status quo will become moot. An informed DPRK populace will become a restless one. The DPRK will have to respond to that internal challenge. It will likely make Syria look like a cakewalk in terms of state violence directed at a populace. It will also ratchet up the likelihood of the aforementioned attacks on S. Korea or Japan as an attempt to rally the nationalist fervor of a drifting populace.

Today DPRK is literally a dark hole on a night view of the globe from space. We may all want to consider that in the near term at least, keeping the lights off is a good thing for the stability of NEA.

[Dayuhan]

We may all want to consider that in the near term at least, keeping the lights off is a good thing for the stability of NEA.

Hardly our choice to make.

North Korea is to me another case where our best move is to maintain the status quo until the regime implodes. We have no idea when or how that will happen, of course. It might turn into a consummate bloodbath, it might not: depends largely on what position the bulk of the military decides to take. They may decide to support the regime, they may decide that the regime is no longer viable and that their interests are best served by creating a new one, or by becoming a new one. If I had to place a bet I'd put it on internal coup rather than popular uprising, though an internal could could be brought about by a popular uprising. I wouldn't put much money on it, but that's where the bet would go.

We'll find out, eventually.

[Fuchs]

Jmm99, my sources on this were in German, so I can't tell which anglophone source would suit well. The North Koreans were skilled in infiltration attack (even non-infantry troops and even in numerical inferiority) and amazingly brazen at times. The vehicle-centric opposition opposed them effectively only with its teeth, while their large tail failed in face of such an opposition.


Bill, I've cast the news from North Korea which many people consider highly erratic and irrational into a rational strategy, including explanations for its apparent shift. That was my intent and what the text is about.

I don't care much about the "U.S. military" regarding Korea; it has less than a divisional slice there and most reinforcements that could be sent would be much less optimised for the terrain and opponent than the already in itself large South Korean army.

[max161]

Here is a link to an article I wrote on why the north Korean people do not rebel. Some day they might and I hope they do (but be careful what we ask for because when they do it will have catastrophic regional effects with global impact) but right now the conditions seem to prevent it.

http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201201.maxwell.nkorea.html

[Bob's World]

Hardly our choice to make.

North Korea is to me another case where our best move is to maintain the status quo until the regime implodes. We have no idea when or how that will happen, of course. It might turn into a consummate bloodbath, it might not: depends largely on what position the bulk of the military decides to take. They may decide to support the regime, they may decide that the regime is no longer viable and that their interests are best served by creating a new one, or by becoming a new one. If I had to place a bet I'd put it on internal coup rather than popular uprising, though an internal could could be brought about by a popular uprising. I wouldn't put much money on it, but that's where the bet would go.

We'll find out, eventually.

So we agree.

As to the information part, my point is that some might think it a good idea to force open the door to greater information availability in some way - with the idea that it will promote liberty, democracy, etc, etc. My advice is to let this happen in due time as it inevitably will, but to not think it a good idea to artifically accelerate that process.

[Bob's World]

Here is a link to an article I wrote on why the north Korean people do not rebel. Some day they might and I hope they do (but be careful what we ask for because when they do it will have catastrophic regional effects with global impact) but right now the conditions seem to prevent it.

http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201201.maxwell.nkorea.html

Dave,

This is timely, always appreciate your insights on this topic. Could you elaborate on your four key points at the start of your "Is North Korea Rational" section? Particularly point two, on "Strategic Aim."

I completely agree that they are rational and with your assessment of vital naitonal interest. What I struggle with is how a true strategic aim of reunification squares with a rational assessment of a vital nationl interest of preserving the Kim Family Regime? It seems like actions to unifiy the penninsula under their rule, or efforts to sustain that rule over a defeated Southern populace would both be far too dangerous to that vital interest to risk. Why risk losing all for this aim?

It seem's like Fuch's deterrence theory is more reasonable. Use the military and nuclear weapons to force others to leave them alone and keep the status quo of the Kim Regime intact. If they open the box it seems it would be an impossible task to reestablish the control they have now in the North over this expanded, merged, and much more informed, populace.

Do you think point two is more propaganda than fact (if it comes from DPRK sources), or perhaps overly biased (if coming from South Korean sources)? Just doesn't seem rational to me, and out of place with the broader strategic position and actions they take.

[max161]

Bob,

A few quick thoughts. Of course reunification by the regime does not seem rational to us. But based on many defector interviews including high ranking people such as Hwang Jong Yop (father of Juche ideology), studying north Korean propaganda and assessing the actions of the north the consensus among many Korea hands is that reunification remains a long term aim. This has nothing to do with South Korean bias.

Of course the north has developed nuclear weapons in particular for deterrence. Survival is paramount but the aim of reunification does not have to be at odds with that necessarily. The real irony is that the Regime as well as the ROK, US, Japan, Russia and China all really want the same thing: maintain the status quo (except that the US remains fixated on the nuclear program to the exclusion of most everything else but that truly works to the regime's advantage).

However, attempts at reunification will occur in two scenarios. One is if they assess that the conditions are right and they have the superior capability to reunify (one significant condition is US forces off the Korean Peninsula) and second is if regime survival is threatened and they have no alternative other than to attempt to reunify. Of course that seems irrational to us as the chances of being successful are slim to none. But having it as an aim helps to keep all of us in check as well because no one wants war and we are all too willing to do what it takes to prevent war (again this is kind of a double standard - the north fears that we will attack and thus developed its nuclear program for deterrence and respect as well as the premier tool of blackmail diplomacy that also supports regime survival - yet at the same time it knows we do not want war and that we can be manipulated by our fear of war - I know that sounds irrational but they have been pretty consistent for the last 60 years operating in that manner)

But you are also right in that it is important from a propaganda perspective as well as one of the foundational tenets of the regime. Kim Il-sung was the great liberator (a myth but that is their story and they are sticking to it) and there remains an emotional feeling on both side of the divide to achieve unification. To give up on the quest for unification would undermine the regime so it must remain a key part of their calculus.

But they maintain the balance between deterrence to maintain survival of the regime and the quest for reunification, but reunification only on their terms when they believe conditions are right.

Of course we do not know the inner workings of the regime and the thought process of Kim jong-un and Jong Song-taek and others in the inner circle. I am worried though since they are made up of so many sycophants who make sure they always tell the emperor he is wearing clothes (for their own survival), I fear that advisors may mislead him with reports of military prowess and readiness and when faced with a crisis (regime threatened) he may think that he has the capability to execute a successful attack (again irrational to us but perhaps very "rational" within a system such as theirs). We know our deterrence has worked as they fear our nuclear threat (according to Hwang Jong Yop) but when faced with a crisis and based on misleading information it could lead to very dangerous consequences for the region.

In the end when we talk about rationality we can judge it based on our standards and what makes sense to us. We have to try to understand it from their point of view. And of course we will never know for sure until after reunification occurs when we can hopefully look at the archives and interview survivors of the regime!! :-)

[jmm99]

During the "South to the Naktong" phase of the Korean War (summer 1950), the North Korean positives and US negatives were pointed out by most knowledgeable US writers - at the time, and by those who wrote afterwards. The simple fact is that, during that phase, the North Korean Army was qualitatively superior to the US Occupation Forces (Japan).

A qualitative equilibrium began to develop in Aug 1950 - coinciding with the arrival of the 5th Regimental Combat Team and the Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

All this is ancient history. I still have in mind the photos of exhumed US soldiers, hands bound with comm wire and shot in back of their heads. So, from 1950, I've been of the belief that one does not negotiate with the North Koreans.

Regards

Mike

[ganulv]

All this is ancient history. I still have in mind the photos of exhumed US soldiers, hands bound with comm wire and shot in back of their heads. So, from 1950, I've been of the belief that one does not negotiate with the North Koreans.

There was a lot of that sort of thing (http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2000/06/18/ghosts-of-cheju.html) going around in those days.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by max161


Of course the north has developed nuclear weapons in particular for deterrence. Survival is paramount but the aim of reunification does not have to be at odds with that necessarily. The real irony is that the Regime as well as the ROK, US, Japan, Russia and China all really want the same thing: maintain the status quo (except that the US remains fixated on the nuclear program to the exclusion of most everything else but that truly works to the regime's advantage).

This observation applies to more than DPRK. Our focus on WMD at the exclusion of everything else limits our options for addressing the WMD concerns. We empower that choice instead of creating an environment where maintaining a nuclear weapons program is undesirable.

[Bob's World]

Posted by max161



This observation applies to more than DPRK. Our focus on WMD at the exclusion of everything else limits our options for addressing the WMD concerns. We empower that choice instead of creating an environment where maintaining a nuclear weapons program is undesirable.

Exactly.

How did the saying go? "God created man, but Sam Colt made them equal"?

Same could be said of nuclear weapons and states.

[Entropy]

Posted by max161
This observation applies to more than DPRK. Our focus on WMD at the exclusion of everything else limits our options for addressing the WMD concerns. We empower that choice instead of creating an environment where maintaining a nuclear weapons program is undesirable.

I agree the US is overly-focused on WMD, but I think a lot of that is because North Korea is an active proliferator. I'm not so sure about the rest. How could the US create such an environment? What would that environment look like? It's hard to imagine a scenario where North Korea comes to the conclusion that nuclear weapons are undesirable. Maybe someone can expand my view on this.

We shouldn't forget the South Koreans either. I think it's important to note that US "skin in the game" serves to suppress South Korea's own nuclear ambitions and Japan's as well. North Korea says it wants the US off the peninsula. Well, it better be careful what it asks for because the result could well be a nuclear-armed South Korea and Japan.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Entrophy


I agree the US is overly-focused on WMD, but I think a lot of that is because North Korea is an active proliferator. I'm not so sure about the rest. How could the US create such an environment? What would that environment look like? It's hard to imagine a scenario where North Korea comes to the conclusion that nuclear weapons are undesirable. Maybe someone can expand my view on this.

Frankly I don't know, but I do know that our current approach is rewarding their behavior in ways that may not readily apparent. They're defying the world's sole superpower which gives them more legitimacy with their own people. The sanctions we impose hurt the Korean people more than the Korean government, which in turn also gives the Regime more power. The fact that we focus on their WMD to such an extent makes it a lever for them to influence us more than we influence them.

Potential alternatives, and I want to emphasize the word potential, include encouraging investing in DPRK which in turn will result in more information reaching the populace over time. Lessen the threat rhetoric so DPRK feels their status as a state is secure (obviously the Rep of Korea would have to support). Supposing we could do both of these, the threat to the regime over time would come from their people, and the way the only way the regime would survive is to reform, which most likely over the decades would lead to reunification. I simplified the explaination for purposes of brevity, obviously it would be more complex than this, but we don't enable the North Koreans to change their belligerent narrative, then we'll continue to stay in a state of perpetuate hostility until someone gets out of bed on the wrong side one morning and creates a strategic misstep.

[max161]

Bill,

Over the years we have done many of the things to try to reassure the north. Just look at the agreements made and broken. The 1992 Agreement on Reconciliation and Denuclearization with the ROK - the north never lived up to it. The 1994 Agreed Framework- the north went right on developing an HEU nuclear program. We have removed the north from the US terrorism list. But the north continues to develop nuclear and missile technology and proliferate it. Remember that Iranian and Pakistan missiles are from north Korean technology. Look at the ROK's Sunshine Policy from 1997-2007 which saved the regime from collapse as the ROK provided more aid to the north than China while at the same time the regime conducted nuclear and missile tests as well as naval confrontations.

We have given the north many chances to change their "belligerent narrative" but what I think we have to understand that that narrative is an integral part of the regime, its strategy, and its survival mechanism. To change would undercut regime legitimacy - and when I talk about legitimacy in the north it is legitimacy in the eyes of the elite that supports the regime and manages the political and security apparatus that allows for the continued enslavement of the population and prevents any internal security challenge from arising. Ironically the alliance military forces do two things: on the one hand they do deter attack from the north and at the same time they provide the justification for the regime's key internal political orientation which is the military first policy which is the basic justification for why the people must sacrifice and suffer to protect their nation from aggression. Sure it would be a nice thought to remove US forces or reduce the threat but the irony would be that it would lead to internal regime friction as the justification for the military first policy would be removed. The elite would then likely be challenged and it could end up back to the only option the regime has left when faced with internal threats and that would be to execute its campaign plan to reunify the peninsula. And of course it would be more enticing if the ROK-US alliance was weak and there were no US forces on the peninsula.

I understand all the foreign policy theories of negotiations and how we think we should deal with the north from certain theoretical schools of thought but the most important thing is to understand the real nature of the regime and deal with it as it really is and not as we would wish it to be. We have tried many negotiating tactics from 4 party to 6 party talks - direct ROK - north Korea (which have happened in public and private over decades) and the north reverts to its same pattern of action as it has for 60 years. We have had many diplomats who have thought they could negotiate agreements with the north in good faith but the north continues to break them because it suits them to do so (and we end up giving them concessions again and again over the years).

[Fuchs]

There's little the U.S. can do about North Korea exporting arms and stuff. A few deliveries might be ruined, but not most or even all.

There's no good reason to be much-concerned about North Korea as an offensive threat. The South Koreans know how to handle them and even with the quite defensible terrain of Korea there's not going to be a successful defence of South Korea if the PRC joins North Korea in an attack.
North Korea is not seriously aggressive anyway. It's having sabre rattling and needle attacks, and the South Koreans can bear that

The reunification rhetoric is not a threat in itself. West Germany even claimed the territory of East Germany and denied the latter's sovereignty during the whole Cold War without being the tiniest bit aggressive because of it. If anything, the reunification rhetoric defuses the artillery in range of Seoul in regard to no-war border skirmishes (there could be artillery duels as experienced between Israel and Egypt prior to '67, but what sense would a bombardment of Seoul do if the North claims Seoul to be of the same nation?)


I am kinda annoyed by how the stupid and largely non-performing regime in North Korea which allocates so many of the countries' resources poorly is being talked up as a threat and as a relevant power. They're dysfunctional and the South Koreans can handle them on their own.
The North Korean regime actually wants to get the U.S. involved because that yields bigger blackmail prizes. The "West" should simply stop paying attention. The South Koreans and Japanese can start reconciliation and tone down their nationalism in order to stand more united against threats in their region. The involvement of the U.S. only delays this useful process.

[ganulv]

We have given the north many chances to change their "belligerent narrative" but what I think we have to understand that that narrative is an integral part of the regime, its strategy, and its survival mechanism.

I don’t think it’s stereotyping to say that Koreans can be a bit belligerent in general. It’s a reasonable survival strategy when your little country finds China on one side and Japan on the other.

[max161]

Ganulv,

Korea has been known as both the "Irish of the East" and a "shrimp among whales." And the Korean proverb is "when whales wrestle, shrimp die."

[ganulv]

Korea has been known as both the "Irish of the East" and a "shrimp among whales." And the Korean proverb is "when whales wrestle, shrimp die."

If you plan to make it out the door walking rather than being dragged you should 1) avoid getting into a drinking contest with an Irishman or a Korean and 2) immediately line up behind either when the bar fight starts.

[carl]

the continued enslavement of the population

max161:

That is a great phrase and in just a few words explains why it is unlikely the Kim dynasty will be toppled by popular unrest. There just haven't been many successful slave revolts in history.

I have a question. I understand your point about seemingly irrational actions seeming rational to a very insular regime. My question is how insular and ignorant of the world are the upper echelons of the Kim regime? I've read that Kim jong-un and other members of his family spent a number of years being educated in the West. Do you think that makes a difference? Also is it common for the offspring of other high ups to have spent years in the West and if so will that make a difference?

[Fuchs]

That is a great phrase and in just a few words explains why it is unlikely the Kim dynasty will be toppled by popular unrest. There just haven't been many successful slave revolts in history.

Have you ever read Tipping Point (http://www.amazon.com/The-Tipping-Point-Little-Difference/dp/0316346624/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1346460066&sr=8-1&keywords=tipping+point) and The Black Swan (http://www.amazon.com/The-Black-Swan-Improbable-Robustness/dp/081297381X/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1346460077&sr=8-2&keywords=black+swan)?

We cannot really know in advance why and when they will collapse, but they may, and it my happen suddenly and soon. Or very late. We don't know.
It's a classic "Ask me afterwards!" problem.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by max161


Ironically the alliance military forces do two things: on the one hand they do deter attack from the north and at the same time they provide the justification for the regime's key internal political orientation which is the military first policy which is the basic justification for why the people must sacrifice and suffer to protect their nation from aggression. Sure it would be a nice thought to remove US forces or reduce the threat but the irony would be that it would lead to internal regime friction as the justification for the military first policy would be removed. The elite would then likely be challenged and it could end up back to the only option the regime has left when faced with internal threats and that would be to execute its campaign plan to reunify the peninsula. And of course it would be more enticing if the ROK-US alliance was weak and there were no US forces on the peninsula.

I understand all the foreign policy theories of negotiations and how we think we should deal with the north from certain theoretical schools of thought but the most important thing is to understand the real nature of the regime and deal with it as it really is and not as we would wish it to be. We have tried many negotiating tactics from 4 party to 6 party talks - direct ROK - north Korea (which have happened in public and private over decades) and the north reverts to its same pattern of action as it has for 60 years. We have had many diplomats who have thought they could negotiate agreements with the north in good faith but the north continues to break them because it suits them to do so (and we end up giving them concessions again and again over the years).

Agreed, yet...

I realize we have to deal with the world we have, yet it seems ironic that we have policy shapers in the Capital region calling for U.S. intervention in Syria which more than likely would empower extremists who would further destabilize another important region of the world, while we completely ignore the humanitarian disaster in North Korea and instead focus almost solely on their WMD program. I tend to agree that the status quo is probably the best solution for the states in the region for now, but it is a crying shame the best solution condemns a few million people abject poverty and no hope for a better tomorrow. On the other hand the Syrian economy was expanding (and of course so was the gap between the haves and have nots), and while the people weren't free to practice religious extremism their life wasn't all that bad. Assayd is was not Qadaffi, but obviously his response to the revolt has put in a positon with few options to reduce the tensions using anything resembling a political solution.

One more thought, while we preach soft power, in reality we leverage our coercive power more often than not. It seems that if we implement sanctions that result in punishing the affected population we can still call it soft power if it is intended to result in freedom, nuke free countries, etc. In reality when you say we have given North Korea several chances, that is true but it has been always been a carrot and stick approach, and the threat of the stick was always there. No where near the extent you have, I have also been watching the regimes behavior for a long time, and I agree we with to deal with the reality of the situation, but also think there will be opportunites to reframe our approach if we remain open to them.

[carl]

Fuchs:

You're right. We can't know for sure until after the event. And there have been some successful slave revolts in history. Haiti is the one I can think of. I just think it very unlikely but not impossible.

[Fuchs]

The slave analogy isn't a really good one.
The people in power and the masses are neither in the quantity ratio typical for slave societies nor are they separated by ethnicity as has been typical for most slave-keeping societies.

There are probably greater similarities to Pol Pot's regime, Stalin's regime, Ceaucescu's Romania or to (pseudo-)Communist Albania.

[ganulv]

There are probably greater similarities to Pol Pot's regime, Stalin's regime, Ceaucescu's Romania or to (pseudo-)Communist Albania.

I’ve always thought Romania was a decent comparison, though off the top of my head no other modern state has incorporated into their political system the sort of ancestor worship seen in the DPRK. (I know there are still monarchies out there, but that really doesn’t seem to me to be what is going on in North Korea.)

[carl]

Fuchs:

I think slavery by ethnicity is mostly a modern phenomenon. The Romans and Greeks and all manners of ancient and not so ancient peoples were quite willing to enslave people who looked like them and had the same culture. I read a book once about slavery amongst the American Indians and ethnicity, if I remember correctly, didn't have much to do with it (Ganulv can correct me on this).

But whether the poor North Koreans can be accurately described as slaves was not really the main point when I complemented max161 on the phrase. The main point is that they have about as much chance of throwing off their shackles as the slaves have had in slave societies. Not much. Whether they fit the precise definition of slaves doesn't change that chance much in my opinion.

As far as the Soviet Union goes I read a book about the Soviet Union's WWII war effort, Richard Overy's I think, and it occurred to me as I was reading it that the country seemed to me to be a slave state. Stalin was at the height of his power and nobody but nobody had a chance or a right. I thought they were essentially, slaves.

[Fuchs]

The iron grip of North Korea's regime likely depends on three conditions
(1) oppression and control by a domestic intelligence service
(2) an elite which would lose almost everything in a revolution
(3) a population that's too lethargic by oppression and malnutrition to revolt

(1) and (2) were very often not enough to maintain a dictatorship in modern times. (3) may change eventually.

Most importantly, the PRC political leadership may some day decide to end the BS in North Korea and could do so as did the Vietnamese end the Pol Pot regime.

The West has probably enough possibilities to make North Korea China's foreign problem #1. It could also assure Beijing that a reformed North Korea would remain an ally of Beijing, in fact it might even be able to promise a neutralised South Korea in the event (at least no foreign forces or bases in South Korea).

[Dayuhan]

The West has probably enough possibilities to make North Korea China's foreign problem #1. It could also assure Beijing that a reformed North Korea would remain an ally of Beijing, in fact it might even be able to promise a neutralised South Korea in the event (at least no foreign forces or bases in South Korea).

How exactly would "The West" be in a position to make assurances about the outcome of Korean reform, or to promise South Korea's neutrality? Would "The West" be making these decisions for either Korea?

I rather doubt that "The West" has the capacity to transform Korea into a problem for China. "The West" is not in control of the Korean Peninsula or of what happens there.

[Fuchs]

How exactly would "The West" be in a position to make assurances about the outcome of Korean reform, or to promise South Korea's neutrality? Would "The West" be making these decisions for either Korea?

I rather doubt that "The West" has the capacity to transform Korea into a problem for China. "The West" is not in control of the Korean Peninsula or of what happens there.

Oh, we can turn it into a problem. Carrots and sticks.
Whenever we deny China something, we can say "You would have got it if you had fixed North Korea into something bearable." Whenever we do something embarrassing to china we could say "We would respect your feelings and sensitivities more if you had fixed North Korea into something bearable." Whenever North Korea does something stupid such as firing a torpedo, we can support South Korea in its reaction and publicly blame the PRC as North Korea's big brother and expose that China is either too weak to exert influence on a small neighbour or implicated itself.

We can furthermore create the foreign policy environment for PRC to "fix" NK without accusations of war of aggression et cetera (it could even get a UN permit for an invasion, considering that NK is in theory still at war with South Korea and keeps violating the cease fire!) and the PRC can then exercise enough control to avoid reunification talks for the time being.


Remember, there was a time when Germany and Austria were considered to be one nation (with high tides around 1860 and 1940). A nation can separate permanently.

[Dayuhan]

Oh, we can turn it into a problem. Carrots and sticks.
Whenever we deny China something, we can say "You would have got it if you had fixed North Korea into something bearable." Whenever we do something embarrassing to china we could say "We would respect your feelings and sensitivities more if you had fixed North Korea into something bearable." Whenever North Korea does something stupid such as firing a torpedo, we can support South Korea in its reaction and publicly blame the PRC as North Korea's big brother and expose that China is either too weak to exert influence on a small neighbour or implicated itself.

How does that turn anything into a problem for China? Do you really think they care what we say or what we blame them for? What are we supposed to "deny China" anyway? Not like they're coming to us for favors. Are we going to threaten not to borrow any more money from them if they don't "fix" North Korea?

The Chinese don't control North Korea, can't "fix" them and can't force them to do anything they don't want to do.


We can furthermore create the foreign policy environment for PRC to "fix" NK without accusations of war of aggression et cetera (it could even get a UN permit for an invasion, considering that NK is in theory still at war with South Korea and keeps violating the cease fire!) and the PRC can then exercise enough control to avoid reunification talks for the time being.

Why would the Chinese want to invade North Korea? They don't need to exercise control to avoid reunification talks, there's virtually zero prospect of any such talks under the current dispensation. The Chinese have no particular interest in changing the status quo anyway, and it's not likely that anything the US or "The West" says is going to change that.

[davidbfpo]

Dayuhan posted this just:
The Chinese have no particular interest in changing the status quo anyway

I am not so sure about that. I have a recollection that PRC was not very impressed with the flow, however small or not, of starving refugees across the border into Manchuria, where there was a Korean minority who felt kith & kin affinity required them to offer hospitality.

Secondly, if North Korea continues to starve and has little to offer for foodstuffs, will fraternal relations change?

[Bob's World]

There are several major factors that cloud/shape our thinking on North Korea. We really need to not discuss North Korea in terms of problem/solution until we have isolated and taken on each of those factors.

Some of those factors, IMO, are:

1. The obsolete basis for our state to state perspectives and relationships in North East Asia. Born of WWII, designed for the ideological phase of the Cold War in the dark days of Nationalist China falling to Mao, the war in Korea, etc in the tail end of the Truman administration, these things are out of date. We need to get out a clean slate in some back room and reframe the problems, interests, etc for the world we live in today. When one only makes iterative changes to old perspectives and plans one tends to carry over outdated concepts that corrupt the products that come from that approach.

2. Having a 4-star US Command in South Korea. Four Star Generals don't succeed by doing less or by reducing the assessment of the threats they face. We are probably 1-2 ranks over-grade in every single position in the military, so this is not just a Korea problem, but the senior US commander there should probably be a Major General. Yes, the rest of the commands in PACOM would need to adjust in similar fashion. (20 years ago TSOC commanders were Colonels, and we've had to grow those billets up to 2-stars just to have some degree of parity at the table. We'd be better served if we reduced all of the others by two grades instead.)

3. Our poor understanding of the nature of and the distinction between revolution and resistance. Our doctrine is a hot mess that is still far too weighted in the colonial experience of Western nations, with good doses of logic-corruption stirred in from our own containment and war on terrorism experiences. We don't have a good idea of how close the DPRK populace is to revolution because we don't have a good understanding of what factors contribute most to creating the coiled spring with in a populace for some event to unleash, nor do we have a good appreciation for how the populaces of DPRK actually feel about their situation or who they blame. (I suspect they blame other governments more than they blame their own). This brings us to Resistance. One can almost guarantee that any military effort to "liberate" or "stabilize" or "nation build" North Korea will be met with a determined resistance insurgency. One that will probably find sanctuary and support in the PRC. Any ideas about conducting those types of operations really need a reality check. But there is no such reality in our current doctrine.

4. Our fixation on WMD. This is a tough issue, but while I have no silver bullet answer, I do believe that our current fixation on and weighting of this issue is unhealthy to our overall national security. We need to rethink this. The only nation that the DPRK could destroy or defeat through the employment of nuclear weapons is their own. They know that. Same is true for Iran. Tough issue, but we need a smarter, more balanced perspective.

There are other issues as well, of course, but the beauty of each of these for the US is that these are all problems of our own creation, and therefore fully within our duty and authority to fix. We need to fix ourselves first, then go out and see what we can do to shape the actions of others. We tend to cling to outrageous positions, and then make equally outrageous demands of others to comply to us. That approach is wearing thin.

[Bob's World]

#1 and #2 reasons there is no revolution in the DPRK:

[Fuchs]

Dayuhan, the Chinese see themselves as a thousands of year old superior civilization that's again on the rise and bound to become the centre of the world again that makes all other nations look bleak.

You underappreciate the weight of embarrassment in such a context.


Besides, of course they can "fix" North Korea. All it takes is will.

[Bob's World]

easier and better that China attempt to "fix" North Korea than the US.

Our most recent Defense Strategic Guidance says in effect, "no more massive, expensive COIN/nation building efforts like we just stumbled through in Iraq and Afghanistan" (paraphrase).

Any effort to go into a post-conflict DPRK and "fix" them would would likely trigger a far worse resistance insurgencies than we created and then attempted to resolve in those two afore mentioned locations. Far better we let China own that mission. I think we can live with China having greater influence in the DPRK than we can with what it would cost for us to attempt to force an American solution.

[Dayuhan]

I am not so sure about that. I have a recollection that PRC was not very impressed with the flow, however small or not, of starving refugees across the border into Manchuria, where there was a Korean minority who felt kith & kin affinity required them to offer hospitality.

Secondly, if North Korea continues to starve and has little to offer for foodstuffs, will fraternal relations change?

That is one reason why the Chinese don't want to disrupt the status quo. Any such disruption would probably create violence and disorder, and generate a similar flow of refugees. I think the Chinese are smart and observant enough to know that while a decision to disrupt the status quo is easy, controlling the consequences of that disruption is often not so easy.

China's Korea policy has for decades been based on keeping the DPRK afloat and existing. That derives from the assumption that any likely scenario for a DPRK collapse would be chaotic and likely violent, would provoke a flood of refugees, and could lead to a unified Korea under the auspices of the ROK, an outcome China sees as unacceptable. Of course nobody can be sure that a DPRK collapse would lead to that outcome, but neither can anyone assure that it would not.

Paradoxically, the policy of keeping the DPRK afloat no matter what has given the DPRK leverage over China. In theory, China could force the DPRK to do what China wants by threatening to stop giving aid. In practice, the DPRK knows that the aid will keep coming, because the Chinese don't want the DPRK to collapse... so they can essentially go ahead and do what they please, knowing that China will carry on supporting them.


Dayuhan, the Chinese see themselves as a thousands of year old superior civilization that's again on the rise and bound to become the centre of the world again that makes all other nations look bleak.

You underappreciate the weight of embarrassment in such a context.

What makes you think that accusations or blame from the US embarrass the Chinese?


Besides, of course they can "fix" North Korea. All it takes is will.

That's optimistic, to say the least. I'm not personally convinced that any nation can reliably expect to "fix" any other in any circumstances, and the degree of control that China has over North Korea is often wildly overrated.


easier and better that China attempt to "fix" North Korea than the US.

Why would the Chinese want to do that? Why assume that anyone must, should, or will try to "fix" North Korea?


Any effort to go into a post-conflict DPRK and "fix" them would would likely trigger a far worse resistance insurgencies than we created and then attempted to resolve in those two afore mentioned locations. Far better we let China own that mission. I think we can live with China having greater influence in the DPRK than we can with what it would cost for us to attempt to force an American solution.

How did we get to the assumption of a "post-conflict DPRK"? What conflict are we talking about? Are we assuming a revolution? A war?

When things do fall apart, nobody knows how they will shake out, and nobody will be in any position to offer assurances about the post-conflict disposition. There are things not amenable to control.

[Fuchs]

What makes you think that accusations or blame from the US embarrass the Chinese?

What makes you think "we" is "US"?


Oh, we can turn it into a problem. Carrots and sticks.
Whenever we deny China something, we can say "You would have got it if you had fixed North Korea into something bearable." Whenever we do something embarrassing to china we could say "We would respect your feelings and sensitivities more if you had fixed North Korea into something bearable." Whenever North Korea does something stupid such as firing a torpedo, we can support South Korea in its reaction and publicly blame the PRC as North Korea's big brother and expose that China is either too weak to exert influence on a small neighbour or implicated itself.

We can furthermore create the foreign policy environment for PRC to "fix" NK without accusations of war of aggression et cetera (it could even get a UN permit for an invasion, considering that NK is in theory still at war with South Korea and keeps violating the cease fire!) and the PRC can then exercise enough control to avoid reunification talks for the time being.

[Dayuhan]

What makes you think "we" is "US"?

Does it matter? Do you think accusations or blame from anywhere are going to embarrass the Chinese at all, let alone enough to get them to change a policy they find congenial? Does anyone but the US care enough to bother?

[Fuchs]

That's exactly my point. They have high ambitions and high expectations.
It would be possible to create the feeling that North Korea's behaviour and existence is a shame to them, since it's their backyard and they don't keep it calm.

This isn't about trade war mechanics or bargaining chips, but about the psychological needs and desires.
So far they can be amused by how easily the North Koreans fool the shallow-brained foreigners. Turn that perception into one of North Korea actually damaging the standing of China and being a chain that keeps China from being an example to the world and they might act very, very differently.

Turn North Korea into China's problem, period.
And I mean China, not just the Chinese government. Everything from caricatures and jokes up to political speeches in front of cameras and ruining days they intended to shine on.
Make them *want* to clean up the North Korean mess.

[Dayuhan]

It would be possible to create the feeling that North Korea's behaviour and existence is a shame to them, since it's their backyard and they don't keep it calm.

Possible for who exactly to create this feeling? How do you propose to create this feeling, and why do you think the Chinese give a hot round one about any feeling that anyone tries to create?


Turn that perception into one of North Korea actually damaging the standing of China

Among whom do you propose to create this perception, and how?


Turn North Korea into China's problem, period. And I mean China, not just the Chinese government. Everything from caricatures and jokes up to political speeches in front of cameras and ruining days they intended to shine on.
Make them *want* to clean up the North Korean mess.

Neither you nor I nor anyone else can make the Chinese want to do anything. They really don't care.

PS: That's aside from the reality that even if the Chinese wanted to try and "fix" North Korea it's not likely that they could, and the effort would almost certainly create more problems for them than it would solve, as efforts to "fix" other countries usually do. Why would they want to step into that kind of mess just because some unspecified person, nation, or group of people or nations is making a transparently manipulative attempt to embarrass them? The Chinese are in no way omniscient, but they aren't that stupid. Nobody's that stupid, except perhaps the Americans.

[Fuchs]

Look, from my point of view you simply lack creativity and imagination if you cannot believe that their perception of North Korea could be warped into seeing it as an intolerant embarrassment.


I suppose back in 1990 would have agreed that some Kosovars would certainly not be able to turn NATO against the government in Belgrade, to make Yugoslavian policy unbearable to most EU powers.
Yet, it happened. All they needed was a decent opportunity, some imagination and an understanding of which trigger they need to use.

[Dayuhan]

Look, from my point of view you simply lack creativity and imagination if you cannot believe that their perception of North Korea could be warped into seeing it as an intolerant embarrassment.

Ok, so display your creativity and imagination and tell us who you think could do this, how they could do it, and why you think the Chinese would care enough to undertake a risky venture that would probably end up in a world of scheisse just because someone (who?) undertakes a transparent attempt to manipulate them.

If you can't do that, all you've got is a fantasy. A marvelously creative and imaginative fantasy, but a fantasy nonetheless.

[Fuchs]

Step (1) for avoiding said transparency is certainly not to publish the plan in the internet, right?

I could easily devise an IO and diplomatic campaign, and add more proposals for action as history develops and more opportunities become available. I've got plenty ideas on this, and this should be quite obvious by what I wrote so far.
There's a limit to how much I do for free, though.


Your apparent idea of a Chinese black box that's immune to foreign influence is ridiculous.
They're humans just like you and me, their bureaucracies are bureaucracies not much unlike ours and their businesses are businesses like ours (=relevant in regard to media).
They have high expectations for the future and their standing in the world, and it's a piece of cake (for the Western great powers) to turn North Korea into their responsibility and their problem.
The bigger challenge is to get the Americans off their autopilot and out of the way. THAT is a tough nut (in the short to medium term).


P.S.: You're apparently equally lacking imagination in regard to what the PRC could do about North Korea.

[Dayuhan]

it's a piece of cake (for the Western great powers) to turn North Korea into their responsibility and their problem.

I officially call BS on that. You can't even tell us who's supposed to be undertaking these actions, let alone what they're supposed to do and why you think it would work... you just say you could do it. I don't think you could.


You're apparently equally lacking imagination in regard to what the PRC could do about North Korea.

I can do all kinds of amazing things in my imagination, but I'm not going to pretend that imagination will translate seamlessly to reality.

[Tukhachevskii]

A. It would be possible to create the feeling that North Korea's behaviour and existence is a shame to them, since it's their backyard and they don't keep it calm.

B. 1. Turn that perception into one of North Korea actually damaging the standing of China and
2. being a chain that keeps China from being an example to the world and they might act very, very differently.

C. Turn North Korea into China's problem, period. [...] Make them *want* to clean up the North Korean mess.


As my 12 year old niece would say (in her best American accent) "really?....really?

A. What is shame? Here's one definition (http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/172864/1/31.pdf):

...shame is the feeling of loss of standing in the eyes of oneself or significant others and can occur as the result of a failure to live up to expectations for a person of one’s role or status. It entails not merely the feeling of having lost status, but the conviction that one is really not who one thought one was—the failure to achieve a wished-for self-image, the failure to live up to an ego ideal, or perhaps even the revelation that one embodies a negative ideal. p. 128
And here (http://www.gse.harvard.edu/~ddl/articlesCopy/ShameRevisnFinalFigs.pdf) are some more.

Why should the DPRKs existence be "shameful" to China? The DPRKs existence provides China which a buffer zone against what it perceives to be an ally of the US (not there’s a perception we could work on). The DPRK is an ally, sabre rattling aside, China and the DPRK have relations that are qualitatively stronger than those of China and Russia or even China and the US. A sabre-rattling DPRK, in what you euphemistically describe as their backyard, serves to increase China’s worth in the six-party process and in the international arena precisely because they are “in their backyard”. Furthermore, do you really think China shares the universal sense of shame (or the standard of civlisation0 you seem to think exists as some kind of platonic ideal-type?

B. for a response to 1 see above. As for 2. What do you mean by “being an example to the world”? is there an objective criteria for this? If so please do tell.

C. The DPRK is/isn’t China’s problem in the same way that Mexico is for the US, or Iraq is for Iran (&c). The DPRK is an existential fact that China has to deal with anyway on a day to day basis. Calling the DPRK a “problem” implies that there is a solution. What is the problem though? As I see it, as a political relist, the DPRK is a state pursuing its own interests in an international system. No different from the US, Chile or Bangladesh. Each has to formulate policy based on its environment, its competitors/threats and its domestic structure. If the DPRK is a problem then it must be “abnormal” (there’s a functionalist bias in there somewhere)…what is a “normal” state? As for the DPRK being a “mess” you’ll have to objectively define what exactly a mess is.

[Entropy]

Look, from my point of view you simply lack creativity and imagination if you cannot believe that their perception of North Korea could be warped into seeing it as an intolerant embarrassment.


I suppose back in 1990 would have agreed that some Kosovars would certainly not be able to turn NATO against the government in Belgrade, to make Yugoslavian policy unbearable to most EU powers.
Yet, it happened. All they needed was a decent opportunity, some imagination and an understanding of which trigger they need to use.

I don't think your Kosovo example supports your assertion. First, the prospect for civil war there was well known - indeed long before 1990. You can google up a prescient CIA analysis on Yugoslavian reforms in 1970.

Secondly, the "trigger" in your example was rebellion and civil war. I think if that were to occur in North Korea then the Chinese will be forced act. At that point there might be an opportunity to persuade/shame/whatever the Chinese. Then again there might not be. Personally, I'm suspicious of any claims of certainty regarding what is "obvious" when the future is involved.

Regardless, there is no such "trigger" in North Korea at present and the Chinese and others are working hard to prevent one from happening. No one really wants to deal with the consequences and so pretty much everyone is trying to push the inevitable off into the future as much as possible. Absent a trigger, AKA, a fundamental change in the status quo, I don't see your IO doing squat. Or maybe you advocate creating a trigger to force China's hand in order to provide an opening for your grand IO plan? Sounds like something Doug Feith would come up with.


There's a limit to how much I do for free, though.


Well, if your ideas, whatever they are, live up to your hype, then the US State Department will want to hire you as a consultant. Let us know how that goes.

[Fuchs]

You guys are serious and really cannot imagine how to pull it off, right? Amazing.


OK, I'll give you a tiny bit of taste "how to", with two points only of probably more like 20 overall. Overall time horizon; about a decade. Budget; very low nine digits per annum for all points, maybe less.

(1) Create and maintain the impression that NK is an unworthy ally - not only in government, but also amongst the political population as a whole.
(This is simple, as long as you don't overdo it and keep your plan secret enough.)

Disinformation aimed at Chinese spies could involve documents pointing at NK officials spying / lying / joking / cheating at the PRC.

Create diplomatic situations in which PRC and NK disagree, NK doesn't support the PRC and most importantly, openly votes against the PRC.

Play into cultural differences, introduce and reinforce prejudices about North Korea's leadership in public forums with fake accounts from within the PRC (if necessary via proxy; employ a few people from Taiwan as well as Hong Kong exiles in the UK for the texting, but make them believe their main effort is something else). Identify opinion multipliers and exploit them in order to leave some impression on an almost 2 billion nation. Employ viral means such as caricatures, jokes, rumours etc..

Stop deliveries of foodstuff to NK in order to let them ask the PRC for support instead. Again, make sure that Chinese get the impression that NK is a burden, not an asset - unworthy and incompetent. Talk loudly about how NK is China's problem, not ours, and China ought to subsidise NK since NK it's China's zone of influence and responsibility.

Employ civilian lobbyists just as corporations do. Use corporations (not from your country, but run by a national of your country) as strawmen and pay them back through profitable orders or preferred treatment in some cases.
The lobbyists would be more effective for other strategic points, but they can also be effective in point (1) by complaining to Chinese officials about anything from criminal NK refugees in the border area to transmitting aforementioned jokes, rumours and prejudices.

Openly compare PRC and NK in speeches about Chinese successes and mentioning what a drag NK is to China with its backwardness and how it (supposedly) affects Western respect for East Asians in general.

Once you get a NK defector official such as an embassy employee etc, use him to bribe a Chinese official against Chinese interests as if he did it for NK. Then allow him to flee to your political asylum as if he did it only because of the consequences at home. Don't pass the opportunity by allowing him to defect right away. Make sure people learn about the bribing, preferably by having bribed someone who was about to fall from grace anyway (=one of the publicized corruption cases).

(+ more actions I did not think of within a mere few minutes.)


- - - - -

(2) Create and maintain high expectations concerning order and 'loveliness' of China's zone of influence. The state of affairs in NK shall be unsatisfactory and a stench on China measured at the high expectations.

Speeches covering this topic without being too direct.

Speeches about how the EU did (or failed to) keep order in its periphery.

Direct, public requests to china calling them to restore order in their zone of influence (which, admittedly, would first need to be recognised.)

Influence media (possibly even through movie scripts) to reinforce the view that great powers and especially super powers need to keep their backyard orderly. Translate a couple of existing books that suit the theme and make sure they're very much available.

Visiting dignitaries/pols could make suitable points in interviews.

Let South Korea publicly propose politically impossible pipelines and other traffic lines through Beijing, pointing out that NK is an obstacle to development. In case that NK plays along at first, make sure to blame NK for eventual failure of the project. Exaggerate the relevance for China.

Point out at (almost) every opportunity how NK is a troublemaker even to the PRC's interests. Anything from Chinese fishermen getting in trouble with NK gunboats to troubles caused by NK's air policing.
For example, fly with Chinese dignitaries from Beijing to Seoul, let the pilot switch off one engine, let him tell over the cabin loudspeakers that they're going to make an emergency landing for safety, later let him complain over cabin loudspeakers that NK airfields are the closest, but don't permit the landing - then let him fly painstakingly slow and with some shaking and noises to a South Korean airport. Make sure those dignitaries really, really believe that NK was implicated in their troubles (instead of the pilot). Make sure the incident gets publicised, exploit whatever statements the dignitaries give after the landing.

Reply with dismissive remarks about China's inability to keep order on the Korean peninsula whenever China issues remarks bout our failures of similar nature.

Analyse the rumours and nationalism within China, and their potential for making your point about China being obliged to fix NK. Contemplate how to exploit them in their specific cases.


(+ more actions I did not think of within a mere few minutes.)

(3) to maybe (20) not going to be written in here.




I could go on page after page. Many in themselves small efforts that form a whole with some synergies and stand a good chance of ultimately turning the opinion against NK.
Once that's done, all "you" need to do is allow the PR to fix the problem.
The methods involved in the latter action might be covered up on paper by the fact that NK is in theory still at war and the aggressor, but in practice it would amount to threatening or assaulting a sovereign state and I won't lay out any 'how to' proposals for such an action.

[Ulenspiegel]

Another strategic approach is to more or less openly define North Korea's government as creature of the PRC, in the same time decleare South Korea as a very valuable member of the "western" economic system. Do not longer interact with the NK government in for them important matters only talk to the PRC.

Make clear that ecomnomic damage NK will do to the south is the responsibility of the PRC and will handled as damage directly done by the PRC, i.e. if your dog bites the neighbour you are responsible. This would turn the current hostage approach used by NK against China.

[max161]

My comment is that some (but not all) of the comments being made in this thread all sound well and good from a western perspective. I would ask anyone who is interested in thinking about the problems on the Korean Peninsula to use their imaginations (and perhaps do some studying) to try to imagine how the the Korean people (north and South) and the Chinese view these situations. Many of the things we are imagining on this thread might seem ludicrous to the various actors who have a direct role in the affairs on the Peninsula. I think we could make (and I think a number of you have made) many of the same criticisms about how we were (and perhaps still are) ignorant of Afghanistan, it's people, culture, traditions, and history and we can see where that has gotten us. The discussion on this thread would likely lead down the same path for the Peninsula as was taken in Afghanistan. Only the path on the Peninsula is perhaps at least slightly more dangerous, complex and will have more far reaching implications than Afghanistan will ever have.

[Ken White]

Well spake...;)

[Ulenspiegel]

My comment is that some (but not all) of the comments being made in this thread all sound well and good from a western perspective. I would ask anyone who is interested in thinking about the problems on the Korean Peninsula to use their imaginations (and perhaps do some studying) to try to imagine how the the Korean people (north and South) and the Chinese view these situations. Many of the things we are imagining on this thread might seem ludicrous to the various actors who have a direct role in the affairs on the Peninsula. I think we could make (and I think a number of you have made) many of the same criticisms about how we were (and perhaps still are) ignorant of Afghanistan, it's people, culture, traditions, and history and we can see where that has gotten us. The discussion on this thread would likely lead down the same path for the Peninsula as was taken in Afghanistan. Only the path on the Peninsula is perhaps at least slightly more dangerous, complex and will have more far reaching implications than Afghanistan will ever have.

Very good assessment.

My friends from South Korea (first and second generation immigrants to Germany) with family member still in the Seoul region were in favour of a very strict policy against the north. My colleague from mainland China becomes quite uncomfortable when asked about the potential role of Peking in this mess. And I as citizen of the former FRG but with large parts of my family living in the GDR at that time I assume that there is no simply solution. :-)

[Dayuhan]

You guys are serious and really cannot imagine how to pull it off, right? Amazing.

I don't think any of this stands a snowball's chance in hell of changing Chinese policy. Information operations have a place, but they aren't magic; there is no Jedi mind trick that will change a nation's mind and induce it to do your will, especially when doing your will is likely to create all kinds of trouble for the nation in question.

Don't kid yourself, they will know exactly what you're trying to do, almost from the start. So will most of the observing (and publishing) pundits.

Like certain other strategies occasionally proposed on SWJ, your suggestion relies on the assumption that the people on the other side of the picture will react as you say they will. Of course in the imaginary world that works very well. In the real world it does not: the other guy rarely cooperates.


Once that's done, all "you" need to do is allow the PR to fix the problem.

The PRC can't "fix" the DPRK, and the effort would probably make an enormous mess for them. They of course know this: it doesn't take a genius to notice what happens when nations try to "fix" other nations. They aren't going to try, because they don't want to, and you can't make them want to... except of course in your imagination, where all things are possible and the other fellow always predictably responds to your initiatives in accordance with your desires.

You still haven't told us who "you" are supposed to be. Who do you expect to undertake this effort?

[max161]

I would be happy to have a discussion on north Korea and strategy for the Peninsula. I will offer up some of the work I have done on this should anyone care to read it and discuss it. I have posted the following papers and a briefing in a public drop box so it you are interested in downloading and reading them I would be happy to discuss them:

"Beyond the Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula" http://db.tt/zWLh99pM

A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula Beyond the Nuclear Crisis (A Military Review article that summarizes te thesis above) http://db.tt/gpCh0r76

“It Takes A Strategy” To Deal with north Korea and its Provocations - http://db.tt/K5RVOnyV

CATASTROPHIC COLLAPSE OF NORTH KOREA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES MILITARY http://db.tt/vpUkyeXH

North Korea Strategic Culture and Potential Futures (briefing) http://db.tt/rXArE4XX

Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula - Thoughts on Irregular Threats for north Korea Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse: Understanding Them to Counter Them http://db.tt/yItb3zmd

Why North Korea will continue to “Muddle Through” - Regime Survival on the Backs of its People and in the Hands of its Military http://db.tt/HxGsZLXU

My testimony before the HASC Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on the future of Irregular Warfare and in part I discuss the irregular threats posed by the north in a post-war/post regime collapse north Korea. http://db.tt/LVFzYtuT

I have a number of other papers and briefings but these give an idea of some of my thinking on this topic over the years.

[Tukhachevskii]

...seems to be a real problem for our Fuchs (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/cultural-differences.html)(forget Chinese cultural concepts let's talk Sweden!)

[Fuchs]

Like certain other strategies occasionally proposed on SWJ, your suggestion relies on the assumption that the people on the other side of the picture will react as you say they will. Of course in the imaginary world that works very well. In the real world it does not: the other guy rarely cooperates.

You think of China as a nation, I think of it as a huge group of people. People follow certain psychological defects and limitations. It is possible to exert influence on them, and it's being done all the time.

Right now, you and I are certainly under influence of political manipulation. Because we're humans, and not impervious to manipulation AND because people exist who understand how to manipulate people.

The ground rules for doing it are actually rather simple, albeit manifold.


You still haven't told us who "you" are supposed to be. Who do you expect to undertake this effort?

Actually, I did. You could read more carefully.
Oh, wait. You even quoted the part where I wrote it!

Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
it's a piece of cake (for the Western great powers) to turn North Korea into their (edit: China's) responsibility and their problem.
So I guess you just don't want to understand.

[davidbfpo]

Can all contributors please enjoy the discussion here on a topic that is quite new and has taken an unexpected direction of late. I have now acted twice to keep posts within our rules and still facilitate a debate.

Thank you for your understanding.

[Dayuhan]

You think of China as a nation, I think of it as a huge group of people. People follow certain psychological defects and limitations. It is possible to exert influence on them, and it's being done all the time.

Of course it's possible to exert influence, within limits. You're proposing that "influence" can persuade a nation to perform a 180 degree pivot in a long-standing policy and undertake actions that it has consistently considered diametrically opposed to its own interests. That's outside any realistic assessment of the limits of available influence.

The assumption that the PRC could "fix" the DPRK even in the extremely unlikely event that you could make the PRC want to "fix" the DPRK is in itself highly questionable. I'm sure you could contrive a perfectly lovely fantasy process to accomplish the goal, but when reality sets in any attempt by one nation to "fix" another is liable to become extremely sloppy and generate all manner of unintended consequences.


Actually, I did. You could read more carefully.
Oh, wait. You even quoted the part where I wrote it!

So I guess you just don't want to understand.

Surely you didn't seriously and literally mean "the Great Western Powers", acting secretly and in concert... that alone would be somewhere on the border between fantasy and delusion.

[Fuchs]

Of course it's possible to exert influence, within limits. You're proposing that "influence" can persuade a nation to perform a 180 degree pivot in a long-standing policy and undertake actions that it has consistently considered diametrically opposed to its own interests. That's outside any realistic assessment of the limits of available influence.


Outcomes much more unlikely than that are realistic because they are real.

* U.S. support for Israel after '67

* EU turning on Yugoslavia, ripping a piece of it away and giving it to a group of bands who were previously advised by EU officials how to garner the needed support

* various U-turns in regard to being allied / rivals in the Second World

* Molotov-Ribbentropp pact

* U.S. turning away from preventing/destroying left-leaning governments in Latin America

* half of the U.S. turning towards domestic economic and fiscal policies that hurt their own self-interest

* Germany and others giving up stable national currencies and lender of last resort

* collapse of Apartheid in South Africa

* conservative German government U-turning against nuclear energy

* U.S. so-called "conservatives" u-turning towards nation building '02

* Britain allowing its colonies to go

* U.S. becoming involved in East Asia post-'38 on behalf of China (post-Nanking) despite this actually harming its trade interests

* U.S. participating in WWI without serving any of its interests, after a three-year propaganda campaign by Britain

* sudden U.S. tolerance of North Korea as a nuclear power

* Turkey turning away from EU towards its own neighbourhood policy

* France dropping Arab dictators in favour of good relations with Arab populaces

* Saudi Arabia's sudden tolerance for foreign troops '91 and later


Such U-turns happen all the time, just look at history.
China has even turned on former allies before, and that didn't take any outside influence.

[Dayuhan]

Of course things happen and things change. That doesn't mean they change on command, or that the application of "influence" can reliably dictate the course of political evolution.

[Entropy]

Such U-turns happen all the time, just look at history.
China has even turned on former allies before, and that didn't take any outside influence.

Of course, but one should also realize that much of the time U-turns don't happen. The fact that U-turns occurred, can occur and will occur in the future does not mean that China will, in this particular instance, do a U-turn on North Korea. Nor does it demonstrate your assertion that influence can bring such a U-turn about.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World


Any effort to go into a post-conflict DPRK and "fix" them would would likely trigger a far worse resistance insurgencies than we created and then attempted to resolve in those two afore mentioned locations. Far better we let China own that mission.

I think this assumption can be challenged. I agree the potential for a serious resistance movement exists since the entire society is militarized and to varying degrees influenced by Juche, but unless China and Russia provide external support it is unlikely the resistance will garner the same level of international attention and subsequent external support such as fund raising to sustain their efforts. Of course we have no idea how this will ultimately unfold, so it could very much turn into an enduring insurgency. Our approach to COIN will most likely fail, so much rather see the South Koreans, Chinese, etc. take the necessary measures to establish security.

Regardless of who wades into the mess it will be expensive and require a large number of troops.

[Dayuhan]

Regardless of who wades into the mess it will be expensive and require a large number of troops.

Probably true, but it's also true that there's no terribly pressing reason for anyone to wade into the mess. I don't see how anyone needs to try and "fix" North Korea. Contain, manage, and wait for it to rot out from the inside seems to me a much more viable strategy.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan,


Contain, manage, and wait for it to rot out from the inside seems to me a much more viable strategy.

It seems the South Korean government is quite content to let their fellow Koreans in the north starve as long as it doesn't disrupt their economic miracle. With the exception a few Christian activist groups no one seems to care for the average North Korean.

The world will probably keep pumping just enough money into the DPRK to keep it on life support, of course that dooms millions of North Koreans to a terrible life under a corrupt regime. Definitely not advocating for U.S. intervention, at least directly, but hopefully their is a moral aspect to our policy objectives.

There is also the question about what happens if the DPRK does collapse. Does a failed state with weapons of mass destruction present a threat to regional security or is it over played? Can the problems simply be contained with a little extra border security until they work it out on their own? Would China and S. Korea make a power grab? I just hope we come up with something more intelligent than clear, hold and build.

[Dayuhan]

It seems the South Korean government is quite content to let their fellow Koreans in the north starve as long as it doesn't disrupt their economic miracle. With the exception a few Christian activist groups no one seems to care for the average North Korean.

I'm not sure lack of concern is the operative constraint. What would you want the South Korean government, or anyone else, to do to liberate the north?


The world will probably keep pumping just enough money into the DPRK to keep it on life support, of course that dooms millions of North Koreans to a terrible life under a corrupt regime. Definitely not advocating for U.S. intervention, at least directly, but hopefully their is a moral aspect to our policy objectives.

There's nothing wrong with a moral aspect to policy objectives, but all policy objectives, moral and otherwise, are constraint by a limited range of realistic policy options. Liberating the north and raising the population's standard of living to that of the south is a lovely and moral objective, but without a realistic strategy for achieving the objective, what's it worth


There is also the question about what happens if the DPRK does collapse. Does a failed state with weapons of mass destruction present a threat to regional security or is it over played?

Certainly it's a threat, but trying to force or impose an unwelcome change on a failed state with weapons of mass destruction also poses risks.

If anyone has a realistic proposal for a way to "fix" North Korea without a war (thought to be undesirable), I'm all ears...

[JMA]

There is also the question about what happens if the DPRK does collapse.

Its a good question too.

[JMA]

If anyone has a realistic proposal for a way to "fix" North Korea without a war (thought to be undesirable), I'm all ears...

There has to be a war?

I'm all ears waiting for an explanation of the risks relating to doing effectively nothing.

[davidbfpo]

A comment that dropped in overnight:
SWJ has one of the best reputations for civil discussions.

[Dayuhan]

There has to be a war?

To change the status quo? As I said, if anyone has a realistic suggestion for a way to significantly change the status quo without a war, I'm all ears. Haven't seen one yet. The North Korean regime is not going to change because we want it to change, and an effort to compel change could have all kinds of potential consequences, up to and including war.


I'm all ears waiting for an explanation of the risks relating to doing effectively nothing.

The status quo has risks, certainly, and as Bill points out it certainly sucks for the North Koreans. Whether or not that would make it worth an effort to alter the status quo would depend on what realistic means for altering it are available and on what the associated risks are. The status quo may not be wonderful, but it's manageable. Hardly worth rocking the boat unless you've very good reason to believe doing so would improve matters.

In the absence of any realistic strategy for improving the status quo, what's wrong with staying with it? It's not ideal, but neither is it intolerable.

[JMA]

To change the status quo? As I said, if anyone has a realistic suggestion for a way to significantly change the status quo without a war, I'm all ears. Haven't seen one yet. The North Korean regime is not going to change because we want it to change, and an effort to compel change could have all kinds of potential consequences, up to and including war.

Fuchs has done a better job explaining how he believes "influence" should be approached and could work than you have - continuing your stock position in near every instance - of suggesting doing nothing.

North Korea will change when they have no alternative but to submit to influence/pressure/whatever. In this case the key lies with China, as with Syria the key lies with Russia/Iran.

[carl]

I think this assumption can be challenged. I agree the potential for a serious resistance movement exists since the entire society is militarized and to varying degrees influenced by Juche, but unless China and Russia provide external support it is unlikely the resistance will garner the same level of international attention and subsequent external support such as fund raising to sustain their efforts. Of course we have no idea how this will ultimately unfold, so it could very much turn into an enduring insurgency. Our approach to COIN will most likely fail, so much rather see the South Koreans, Chinese, etc. take the necessary measures to establish security.

Bill: If a serious resistance movement did arise and neither South Korea, Red China nor Russia supported it, it would have no chance. It would have no sanctuary and no external support. Northern Korea would be essentially an island and what resistance there was would wither and die.

I hesitate to say this since I haven't read any of max161's papers yet, but I agree with you in questioning how much of a resistance could develop especially if the South Koreans showed up and contrived to provide everybody with 3000 calories a day. Juche might be have some appeal but enough or more than enough food to eat is a pretty powerful motivator.

[Bob's World]

Carl,

Just curious, by your own reporting, these are an incredibly hardy people used to living on very little in best of times. Just how much "external support" do you think they will need to wage a resistance?

Now, perhaps, DPRK government takes full responsibility for the hardships of living in North Korea, so that the populace will welcome as liberators any invading foreign military forces. But I suspect that is not the case. I suspect this is a populace that will see foreign military presence as just that, a foreign invasion of their homeland, and they will logically resist.

We have a bad habit of thinking that what we offer is so good, and that those who we oppose are so bad, that of course their populaces will be immediately grateful for our efforts to remove their government and then occupy their country while we give them new, better government, coupled with development and all manner of modern goodies.

Yet we caused a resistance insurgency in Iraq that bled us hard for several years. President Obama's plan for curing Afghanistan, as promoted by General Petreaus, has been making the resistance insurgency stronger in Afghanistan with yearly growth numbers he wishes he could replicate in his programs designed for improving our economy at home. Seems it is easier to grow an insurgency than it is to grow an economy. Bottom line is that it is human nature to resist, and North Koreans being human will likely resist as well.

As to "sanctuary" that will come from within the very populace that is resisting us. Will we be willing to employ the hard measures such as used by the Germans in WWII to reduce such internal sanctuary? No. I hope not. Instead we will attempt to bribe the support of the populace, and through our very largess will become the primary supporter of the very insurgency we are attempting to quell.

Likely we will blame China or some ideology for the insurgency, and not be able to realize that it is our very presence that is driving it, or that the very people who smile and accept our aid by day are passing it on to the fighters by night.

If we have learned anything about insurgency over the past 10 years it should have been that we don't know anything about insurgency. Like most governments faced with some form of insurgency we do not accept our own causal role and instead see the insurgents as somehow distinct from the larger populace they emerge from and blame the fighting elements on malign actors, foreign agitators and radical ideologies. Historically, the best governments at COIN have been those that recognized their causal role and that focused on fixing the broken aspects of governance rather than the "broken" aspects of the populace. The US is not among "the best governments at COIN," at least not in our foreign efforts.

Any assumption other than the expectation that any regime change forced upon the DPRK will be met with revolution; and that any foreign occupation of the DPRK will be met with resistance is dangerous. There is no earthly reason to ever place an American boot on DPRK soil. This is a mission best left to the ROKs, and even they will find a violent welcome, I suspect. Best we let this sleeping dog lie. Conditions will evolve in time of their own accord, and there is far more risk than gain from any thoughts of rushing that inevitable day along.

[carl]

Bob:

I figured I would draw you out with that one.:D

No time now but will reply shortly.

[Bill Moore]

I'm not sure lack of concern is the operative constraint. What would you want the South Korean government, or anyone else, to do to liberate the north?

First off, I never implied anyone should invade to liberate the north, that is a reach on your part. My point goes back to my original point, the U.S. and other nations openly oppose DPRK's WMD program, but are relatively quiet about the human rights abuses in North Korea. Expanding the focus of pressure to include human rights does put China and other supporters of North Korea is tougher position diplomatically to continue to support an oppressive government. Failure to gain support through their normal cycles of provocation because the world is tiring of their treatment of their people puts them in a position where they'll be more likely to adapt changes over time. This would potentially increase the stability of North Korea and the region. A lot of countries are tired of the U.S. determining who can and can't have nuclear weapons, so that is hardly a high moral ground issue that resonates.


There's nothing wrong with a moral aspect to policy objectives, but all policy objectives, moral and otherwise, are constraint by a limited range of realistic policy options. Liberating the north and raising the population's standard of living to that of the south is a lovely and moral objective, but without a realistic strategy for achieving the objective, what's it worth

What world are you writing about? I seem to recall some rather lofty and unrealistic policy objectives for both Iraq and Afghanistan. Again you're the one saying liberate the North, I'm looking for strategies for changing the behavior of the regime in the North, not replacing it. Change is already happening in North Korea, so I'm leary of the experts who continue to believe the legacy system will continue forever without a military intervention. It is evolving now and the world should explore ways to shape that evolution.

In simple terms I'm recommending widening our aperture and getting in front of the problem instead of our continuing ### for tat. ### for tat may be the appropriate short term response to hold things in place, but it is inadequate for longer term shaping actions and activities.

[reed11b]

Anyone ever consider that ENDING sactions against NK would provide the current leadership far more challenge and adversity then maintaining the current sanctions?
Reed

[Dayuhan]

Fuchs has done a better job explaining how he believes "influence" should be approached and could work than you have - continuing your stock position in near every instance - of suggesting doing nothing.
What Fuchs suggests is simply not realistic. First, it relies on the assumption that the "Great Western Powers" (who he means by that I've no idea, you'd have to ask him) can act secretly and cooperatively toward a common goal without that being patently obvious to anyone who's half paying attention. Second, it assumes that these "Great Western Powers" have sufficient influence to make the Chinese want to do something that they most emphatically don't want to do, have no real reason to want to do and have very real reasons to avoid.

These assumptions seem pulled out of thin air and no basis for them is presented.

I've no objection to trying it: unlike some plans we've seen that are based on fixed assumptions about what can be done and how others will react to proposed actions, the consequences of its failure would not be terribly inconvenient. It won't work, of course, but at least it probably wouldn't blow up in anyone's face. Even when the whole "secret" plot inevitably ends up all over the Internet it would only seem mildly silly.


North Korea will change when they have no alternative but to submit to influence/pressure/whatever.

Do you assume that change in North Korea can only be the consequence of external "influence/pressure/whatever"? If so, why?


In this case the key lies with China, as with Syria the key lies with Russia/Iran.

I don't think that assessment is accurate. The key in Syria is not Russia or Iran, but the Syrian Armed Forces. If enough of his military defects, Assad will fall, no matter what Russia or Iran say or do. If enough of his military stays loyal and fights it out, he will sustain the civil war and possibly win.

Of course even if we assume that Russia or Iran is "the key", that gets us nowhere, because Russia and Iran will act according to their own perception of their own interests, and no combination of Western powers is going to change that perception.

Similarly, "the key" in North Korea is likely to be the DPRK armed forces: I doubt that there will be really meaningful change unless the generals either decide to take over themselves or refuse to suppress a popular uprising. Neither of these seems likely any time soon, though a coup would naturally be unexpected until it occurs.

Similarly, even if China was "the key", that would get us nowhere, because the Chinese have no interest whatsoever in trying to "fix" the DPRK, and that's not something any outside influence is going to change.


The U.S. and other nations openly oppose DPRK's WMD program, but are relatively quiet about the human rights abuses in North Korea. Expanding the focus of pressure to include human rights does put China and other supporters of North Korea is tougher position diplomatically to continue to support an oppressive government.

I have no problem with expanding the focus of pressure to include human rights, but I also have no illusions about that accomplishing anything. It's certainly not going to put China in a tougher position: the Chinese consistently and vigorously oppose any effort to enforce an externally dictated human rights standard on anyone, anywhere. Making human rights an issue might well induce the Chinese to give more support, just to show how little they care and how seriously they oppose the idea of anyone pressuring anyone else to conform to such standards.


Failure to gain support through their normal cycles of provocation because the world is tiring of their treatment of their people puts them in a position where they'll be more likely to adapt changes over time. This would potentially increase the stability of North Korea and the region. A lot of countries are tired of the U.S. determining who can and can't have nuclear weapons, so that is hardly a high moral ground issue that resonates.

I can see the point about overreliance on the WMD issue, and mostly agree. I doubt, though, that changing the focus of complaint to anything else is going to produce much meaningful change. China will support the DPRK just enough to keep the regime afloat, because they do not want the regime to fall. That's not something any external influence is going to change. As long as the DPRK is assured of that support, they've little incentive to change, and of course they are institutionally very deeply against change.

There are cases in which "we" - the US, the West, whatever - are simply not in control, and where attempting to take control is likely to create a bigger mess than what we've already got. Sure, we can try to exert influence, but don't expect much tangible result, because the influence "we" can bring to bear is quite limited.


I seem to recall some rather lofty and unrealistic policy objectives for both Iraq and Afghanistan.

And that got us... where?


Again you're the one saying liberate the North, I'm looking for strategies for changing the behavior of the regime in the North, not replacing it. Change is already happening in North Korea, so I'm leary of the experts who continue to believe the legacy system will continue forever without a military intervention. It is evolving now and the world should explore ways to shape that evolution.

I'm not convinced that "the world" has common objectives in this, or most, cases, and I think the capacity to shape and change the regime is very limited. No objection to trying various carrots and sticks, but they haven't worked well in the past and aren't likely to work well in the future.

Realistically, I think we're stuck with the status quo or some minor variant thereof, and are likely to be in that position for some time. We can talk less about WMD and more about human rights, but is anything likely to change? I doubt it. The catalyst for change is probably going to be internal, it will probably take us by surprise, and it will not be dictated or controlled by any outside power.


Bill: If a serious resistance movement did arise and neither South Korea, Red China nor Russia supported it, it would have no chance. It would have no sanctuary and no external support. Northern Korea would be essentially an island and what resistance there was would wither and die.

I hesitate to say this since I haven't read any of max161's papers yet, but I agree with you in questioning how much of a resistance could develop especially if the South Koreans showed up and contrived to provide everybody with 3000 calories a day. Juche might be have some appeal but enough or more than enough food to eat is a pretty powerful motivator.

Insurgency in the Philippines has been going on for 40+ years with no sanctuary and no meaningful external support. Different situations of course, but sanctuary and external support are not absolutely necessary for insurgency to endure.

Invasion and foreign occupation can be a powerful motivator... though it seems a very moot point, since I don't think anyone is likely to invade the DPRK any time soon.

[Fuchs]

What Fuchs suggests is simply not realistic. First, it relies on the assumption that the "Great Western Powers" (who he means by that I've no idea, you'd have to ask him) can act secretly and cooperatively toward a common goal without that being patently obvious to anyone who's half paying attention.

Look, if you quote with "", quote correctly.

A correct quote would be "Western great powers".

Next, if unsure what a "Western great power" is, accept the help of an encyclopaedia, preferably one quite up-to-date.
This one (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_power) might help, but other encyclopaedia exist as well, of course.


It's late and I'm not in the mood of creating another long list (about great powers acting secretly, cooperatively and not totally obviously in history).

[Dayuhan]

Look, if you quote with "", quote correctly.

A correct quote would be "Western great powers".

Next, if unsure what a "Western great power" is, accept the help of an encyclopaedia, preferably one quite up-to-date.
This one (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_power) might help, but other encyclopaedia exist as well, of course.

From the link provided:


There are no set or defined characteristics of a great power.

So we still have no idea whatsoever who you meant when you used the expression.


It's late and I'm not in the mood of creating another long list (about great powers acting secretly, cooperatively and not totally obviously in history).

No need to bother, because such a list would be completely irrelevant in any case. It's like suggesting that because nations have historically reversed policy in some cases, it is therefore possible to reverse another nation's policy as desired, on cue. Just because something has happened in the past doesn't mean you or anyone else can make the same thing happen again at any time of your choosing.

The idea that any combination of Western powers can make the Chinese reverse a long-standing perception of self-interest and inspire them with a sudden desire to "fix" the DPRK makes an amusing hypothesis, but it seems too dependent on the assumption of predictable and controllable reaction to have much place in the real world.

[Fuchs]

Does it make sense to debate with someone who first asserts something strongly, then in face of historical evidence to the contrary plays the same down and finally proceeds to preventively declare all non-consenting evidence irrelevant for his other assertion?


It's kinda like debating with a priest about science.*


__________________
*: I'm curious if comparing a SWC member with a priest is (also) an offence in the eyes of the mods.

[Dayuhan]

Why not propose that we summon up earthquakes and volcanoes to dispose of our rivals? If anyone points out that you don't have the power to do that, you can easily refute the claim by posting a list of historical earthquakes and eruptions...

__________________
*: I'm curious if comparing a SWC member with a priest is (also) an offence in the eyes of the mods.[/QUOTE]

[carl]

Insurgency in the Philippines has been going on for 40+ years with no sanctuary and no meaningful external support. Different situations of course, but sanctuary and external support are not absolutely necessary for insurgency to endure.

Invasion and foreign occupation can be a powerful motivator... though it seems a very moot point, since I don't think anyone is likely to invade the DPRK any time soon.

Well Dayuhan, I have to admit, you got me. You are right. Sanctuary and external support aren't absolutely needed to keep and insurgency going at such a low level for 40 years that is might well be mistaken for the kind of disorder and banditry that has been going on in and around the various islands of the Philippines for the last (you pick a number) hundred years.

I agree that nobody is likely to invade the Kim Kingdom. Though (don't get mad at me max161, this is an uneducated guess) if the place does collapse, or when, I don't see the restoration of the said Kim Kingdom being a very powerful motivator.

[Dayuhan]

Sanctuary and external support aren't absolutely needed to keep and insurgency going at such a low level for 40 years that is might well be mistaken for the kind of disorder and banditry that has been going on in and around the various islands of the Philippines for the last (you pick a number) hundred years.

From the early 80s through the mid 90s the insurgency was a clear and direct threat to government, with up to 40k men under arms and a presence in virtually every part of the country... without sanctuary or external support. That's a wee bit beyond disorder and banditry.


I agree that nobody is likely to invade the Kim Kingdom. Though (don't get mad at me max161, this is an uneducated guess) if the place does collapse, or when, I don't see the restoration of the said Kim Kingdom being a very powerful motivator.

I also do not think anyone would be trying to restore the dynastic monarchy, but there might be some serious issues over who gets to succeed that monarchy. Whether or not any outside power will want to get involved in those issues is of course impossible to say, but it would not be something to be undertaken lightly.

[carl]

Carl,

Just curious, by your own reporting, these are an incredibly hardy people used to living on very little in best of times. Just how much "external support" do you think they will need to wage a resistance?

Now, perhaps, DPRK government takes full responsibility for the hardships of living in North Korea, so that the populace will welcome as liberators any invading foreign military forces. But I suspect that is not the case. I suspect this is a populace that will see foreign military presence as just that, a foreign invasion of their homeland, and they will logically resist.

We have a bad habit of thinking that what we offer is so good, and that those who we oppose are so bad, that of course their populaces will be immediately grateful for our efforts to remove their government and then occupy their country while we give them new, better government, coupled with development and all manner of modern goodies.

Yet we caused a resistance insurgency in Iraq that bled us hard for several years. President Obama's plan for curing Afghanistan, as promoted by General Petreaus, has been making the resistance insurgency stronger in Afghanistan with yearly growth numbers he wishes he could replicate in his programs designed for improving our economy at home. Seems it is easier to grow an insurgency than it is to grow an economy. Bottom line is that it is human nature to resist, and North Koreans being human will likely resist as well.

As to "sanctuary" that will come from within the very populace that is resisting us. Will we be willing to employ the hard measures such as used by the Germans in WWII to reduce such internal sanctuary? No. I hope not. Instead we will attempt to bribe the support of the populace, and through our very largess will become the primary supporter of the very insurgency we are attempting to quell.

Likely we will blame China or some ideology for the insurgency, and not be able to realize that it is our very presence that is driving it, or that the very people who smile and accept our aid by day are passing it on to the fighters by night.

If we have learned anything about insurgency over the past 10 years it should have been that we don't know anything about insurgency. Like most governments faced with some form of insurgency we do not accept our own causal role and instead see the insurgents as somehow distinct from the larger populace they emerge from and blame the fighting elements on malign actors, foreign agitators and radical ideologies. Historically, the best governments at COIN have been those that recognized their causal role and that focused on fixing the broken aspects of governance rather than the "broken" aspects of the populace. The US is not among "the best governments at COIN," at least not in our foreign efforts.

Any assumption other than the expectation that any regime change forced upon the DPRK will be met with revolution; and that any foreign occupation of the DPRK will be met with resistance is dangerous. There is no earthly reason to ever place an American boot on DPRK soil. This is a mission best left to the ROKs, and even they will find a violent welcome, I suspect. Best we let this sleeping dog lie. Conditions will evolve in time of their own accord, and there is far more risk than gain from any thoughts of rushing that inevitable day along.

You are right there is no good reason to put any American troops in the northern part of Korea. Who suggested that? That would be a silly thing being as there are so many South Koreans available for that. Besides, they speak the language and some of them are related.

As far as external support needed to wage a resistance, I'd say a lot was needed. Critical even it be. If Kim Kingdon collapsed and the plucky (and uniformly slim) residents of the northern part of Korea decided to fight for a return of those halcyon days they would need some money from somewhere since they ain't got any. I have noticed that insurgencies, no matter how noble the participants, need money to insurge. If Red China, Russia and South Korea isolated the place nothing much from the outside could get in hence no money. (Though what external player in their right mind would want to bankroll a restoration of the Kim Kingdom?)

And again if Red China, Russia and South Korea isolated the place there would be no physical sanctuary available for those who would restore the Kim Kingdom or an approximation thereof. I have read that sanctuary is of critical importance to insurgents. They need someplace to go where the enemy can't physically follow. This is important because closets with false walls will only get you so far. Now maybe the thin but plucky residents of the northern area of Korea could pull that off but it would be hard and a bit of a historical anomaly.

If the Kim Kingdom does eventually fall apart, I suspect there will be a lot, or not a lot, of South Koreans headed north. Whether those thin people will resist them, I don't know. But maybe if they contrived to give the former Kim subjects enough to eat so they won't be so skinny, maybe the chances of a noble resistance will be lessened.

[carl]

From the early 80s through the mid 90s the insurgency was a clear and direct threat to government, with up to 40k men under arms and a presence in virtually every part of the country... without sanctuary or external support. That's a wee bit beyond disorder and banditry.

By my reckoning, the early 80s through the mid 90s is about 15 years, not 40. And since it is not now what it was, I figure that one of the reasons it isn't is because it didn't have sanctuary and external support. Lack of those two things allowed the gov to suppress/defeat it to the point where it went back to the disorder/banditry stage. Which happened a couple of times before in the last 113 years.


I also do not think anyone would be trying to restore the dynastic monarchy, but there might be some serious issues over who gets to succeed that monarchy. Whether or not any outside power will want to get involved in those issues is of course impossible to say, but it would not be something to be undertaken lightly.

That sounds reasonable.

[Dayuhan]

As far as external support needed to wage a resistance, I'd say a lot was needed. Critical even it be. If Kim Kingdon collapsed and the plucky (and uniformly slim) residents of the northern part of Korea decided to fight for a return of those halcyon days they would need some money from somewhere since they ain't got any.

Who ever said anything about fighting to restore the Kim regime? How do you know they wouldn't fight to be able to define the successor to the Kim regime themselves, rather than having it defined by an outside power? Or that various factions who want to take over wouldn't fight with each other and anyone else willing to be on the spot?

I wouldn't be prepared to bet that the north would simply submit to foreign intervention, or that lack of money or sanctuary would render them unable to insurge. It might happen, but it might not... and if it didn't, the occupying power could find themselves in a quite unpleasant situation.


By my reckoning, the early 80s through the mid 90s is about 15 years, not 40. And since it is not now what it was, I figure that one of the reasons it isn't is because it didn't have sanctuary and external support.

The insurgency has gone on for over 40 years. If you include the Huk rebellion (which is reasonable), it's gone on for well over 60 years... without sanctuary or significant foreign assistance. Of course it's had ups and downs within that time, but even now it's by no means over.


Lack of those two things allowed the gov to suppress/defeat it to the point where it went back to the disorder/banditry stage. Which happened a couple of times before in the last 113 years.

Not so. The government didn't suppress/defeat the insurgency. The insurgency collapsed to the extent that it has because of the sudden and unexpected loss of the Marcos regime and because of its own inability to adapt to the post-Marcos political landscape, not because of anything government did.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Reed11b
Anyone ever consider that ENDING sactions against NK would provide the current leadership far more challenge and adversity then maintaining the current sanctions?

Exactly, and we need more outspoken critics of our excessive and cowardly use of economic sanctions to pursue foreign objectives. This is policy that our State Department embraces because it creates the illusion of effective action while in fact accomplishing little other than strengthening the Regime targeted by the sanctions and undermining their people, the same people that could pressure their regime to change.

We're stuck in the past because old school self proclaimed experts continue to push ineffective policies and approaches to ahieve those policies. I find it comical to the extreme to see the constant stream of attacks against Department of Defense for not being adaptive, when other calcified government agencies such as State, Justice, etc. get a free ride in the media.

Human rights is another issue that creates a dilemna for any nation that is part of the globalized economy. Most governments, to include China, can't hide from the various forms of global media (North Korea is currently an exception, but that too appears to be changing), and exposure of human rights violations will in many cases weaken their legitimacy with their
populace. If the populace is empowered, and empowerment comes through economic engagement and development, not sanctions, over time that government is compelled to modify its behavior.

There a few lonely nations out there that continue to support authoritarian regimes, China, Iran and Russia, but they do so at considerable risk to their long term interests.

Posted by Bob's World


Just how much "external support" do you think they will need to wage a resistance?

Some level of logistical support is an inescapable fact for sustaining any resistance. They can and most likely will wage a tough resistance if invaded, but it is unlikely it will be able to sustain that effort for years. How much support can the local populace provide the resistance forces? This is one case where I hope the S. Koreans (I have little hope for our capability) could wage an effective PSYOP campaign if we keep the gringo presence out of North Korea (or at least minimize it). China and Russia may find it in their interests to provide support for the resistance, if they do then the argument is mute to begin with.

[JMA]

What Fuchs suggests is simply not realistic.

That of course is merely in your opinion.


First, it relies on the assumption that the "Great Western Powers" (who he means by that I've no idea, you'd have to ask him) can act secretly and cooperatively toward a common goal without that being patently obvious to anyone who's half paying attention. Second, it assumes that these "Great Western Powers" have sufficient influence to make the Chinese want to do something that they most emphatically don't want to do, have no real reason to want to do and have very real reasons to avoid.

You can argue persuasively that the Chinese "emphatically don't want to" force any change to the status quo in North Korea? I would be interested to hear such an argument ... if you can make it.

"Secrecy" in some matters can never be guaranteed. To claim it to be a critical success factor is a poor attempt to bolster a weak argument.


These assumptions seem pulled out of thin air and no basis for them is presented.

The same can be said for your increasingly desperate need for just doing nothing.


I've no objection to trying it:

You? Where do you come into the equation? You don't really think the "Great Western Powers" give a hoot what you think, do you.


... unlike some plans we've seen that are based on fixed assumptions about what can be done and how others will react to proposed actions, the consequences of its failure would not be terribly inconvenient. It won't work, of course, but at least it probably wouldn't blow up in anyone's face. Even when the whole "secret" plot inevitably ends up all over the Internet it would only seem mildly silly.

So that means everyone should just sit back and do nothing? LOL

[Dayuhan]

Exactly, and we need more outspoken critics of our excessive and cowardly use of economic sanctions to pursue foreign objectives. This is policy that our State Department embraces because it creates the illusion of effective action while in fact accomplishing little other than strengthening the Regime targeted by the sanctions and undermining their people, the same people that could pressure their regime to change.

This is largely true, but I can also understand that the people at State have a limited menu to choose from when the politicians ring up asking for something they can do that will make them look like they are doing something without actually having to do anything. In many cases I suspect that sanctions are adopted less for their impact on the country being sanctioned than to give politicians an opportunity to look as if they're engaged and taking a stand without having to run risks. I can understand the desire to avoid risk, especially when there's little gain to be had, but the resulting pile of sanctions, which often drag on long after any marginal utility they might have had is gone, is not helping anything.

Sanctions targeting specific individuals and entities do IMO have a place in the repertoire, but have to be used carefully. The nation-wide variant are an overused and largely ineffective device.


Human rights is another issue that creates a dilemna for any nation that is part of the globalized economy. Most governments, to include China, can't hide from the various forms of global media (North Korea is currently an exception, but that too appears to be changing), and exposure of human rights violations will in many cases weaken their legitimacy with their populace. If the populace is empowered, and empowerment comes through economic engagement and development, not sanctions, over time that government is compelled to modify its behavior.

I'm not sure I follow this. China's disregard for human rights and open sponsorship of others who disregard human rights is blatant, open, and widely discussed in media... has that created any dilemma for the Chinese?

It's true that China's economic development has significantly empowered much of the populace, and that the empowerment may at some point in the future compel China to modify its behaviour toward its own citizenry, but that hardly seems imminent. China's support for North Korea doesn't seem to be imposing any negative economic or other consequences.


Some level of logistical support is an inescapable fact for sustaining any resistance. They can and most likely will wage a tough resistance if invaded, but it is unlikely it will be able to sustain that effort for years. How much support can the local populace provide the resistance forces? This is one case where I hope the S. Koreans (I have little hope for our capability) could wage an effective PSYOP campaign if we keep the gringo presence out of North Korea (or at least minimize it). China and Russia may find it in their interests to provide support for the resistance, if they do then the argument is mute to begin with.

Maybe I'm not following something, but all this talk of resistance insurgency seems very hypothetical. Who would want to invade the DPRK in the first place? If the place collapsed into complete disarray there might be calls for somebody to go in and stabilize the place, but I'd guess that would be one of those things that everybody thinks somebody else ought to do but nobody wants to do.


That of course is merely in your opinion.

Of course. Everything anyone says here is their opinion, unless otherwise stated and appropriately referenced. I don't think it's an unreasonable opinion: the idea that any combination of Western powers can induce a 180 degree policy shift by the Chinese simply by manipulating media does seem... improbable at best, does it not?


You can argue persuasively that the Chinese "emphatically don't want to" force any change to the status quo in North Korea? I would be interested to hear such an argument ... if you can make it.

Looking at the way China has managed relations with the DPRK over the last few decades, what other conclusion is possible?


"Secrecy" in some matters can never be guaranteed. To claim it to be a critical success factor is a poor attempt to bolster a weak argument.

Agreed. It was Fuchs who pointed out that transparency would have to be avoided. I simply pointed out that avoiding transparency is easier said than done. Of course it's difficult to manipulate people when they know you're trying to manipulate them, and of course the Chinese would know. So would everybody else.

Of course it's easy to declare that you know exactly how to reverse the Chinese perception of self-interest and give a generic list of devices that you say will "pull it off". Actually doing it would be another thing altogether.


You? Where do you come into the equation? You don't really think the "Great Western Powers" give a hoot what you think, do you.

Of course not. Neither do they give a hoot what Fuchs thinks, or anyone else here. All of these discussions are purely hypothetical. Surely you don't think that anyone's paying attention. Even if we all agreed that Fuchs' Jedi mind trick hypothesis could actually make the Chinese want to "fix" the DPRK, it still wouldn't happen and it still wouldn't work. We're just a few guys yakking on the internet.


So that means everyone should just sit back and do nothing? LOL

In the absence of a clear, concrete, limited and achievable objective and a realistic, practical strategy for achieving that objective, what would you want anyone to do? Contain, manage, and wait for an internal shift isn't "doing nothing", it's acceptance of the reality that the situation is not amenable to control, influence is limited, and any attempt to significantly alter the status quo is likely to make things worse for everyone concerned. Should someone simply "do something" for the sake of doing something, even without a clear goal or a realistic strategy? Why? What do you think should be done, and by whom?

[Bob's World]

A few points to consider:

1. A resistance insurgency is not an effort by the people to restore the government that was defeated, a resistance is an effort by the people to remove a foreign influence/presence that they believe has no right to be there. This is a critical point we for some reason refuse to understand, and that refusal led us to believe that neither the Iraqi nor the Afghan people would resist our efforts to "free them from oppression." We look to what happened in Germany and Japan post WWII and draw the wrong conclusions. Both those populaces were subjected to long, sustained warfare prior to the defeat of their respective militarize and governments. In Japan we wisely sustained the Emperor, viewed as the core of "legitimacy" or we would have likely faced a major insurgency there. Also, with with China (under natioanalist or communist rule) so near and full of reasonable motivation to exact revenge on a war weakened Japan, we were the lesser of two evils. In Germany all Germans well appreciated that it was far better to subject themselves to the Allies than to be subjected to the Soviets. We were not accepted because we were better than Hitler, but because we were better than Stalin.

If the DPRK attacks and is then pushed back forcing a regime change, or if the current regime collapses and foreigners move in to "build a nation" and "bring democracy" etc it will not be going into a populace that has been subjected to years of warfare, nor will it be going into a populace that perceives this help as the lesser of two evils. By any logical assessment and reasonable understanding of resistance insurgency, the people would resist. Hard.

2. Given the Western programs of "COIN" and our refusal to appreciate that the fighting force of the insurgency is just the tip of a much larger populace iceberg of discontent, we, the Western or even Chinese society going in to mold things in their image, would become the primary supplier of the insurgency through our aid to the populace writ large. China would probably be more effective at this than we would, and US interests would not suffer if the PRC had the lead on dealing with any kind of governmental collapse in the DPRK.

3. We still have a hard time balancing what we WANT with what we NEED. Interests are (should) be based on needs. We have a lot of "wants" in our current national policy. We "wanted" to make Iraq and Afghanistan democracies shaped and valued in our image. We needed those countries not to grant formal sanctuary to terrorist NSAs or to attack our interests and allies. There is a massive gap between those wants and those needs. Attempting to bridge that gap is indeed, a bridge too far.

We should ask sincerely, what do we "need" in terms of the DPRK and our interests, and do our policies and plans reflect those needs, or some much fluffier concept of "wants."

[max161]

I am mystified that no one is talking about the elephant in the room which is of course Korean Reunification. We all talk about various aspects of the Korean problem (or the Korea Question as stated in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement) without regard to what is established Alliance Policy as per the June 2009 Joint Vision Statement. Whether north Korea attacks or the regime collapse the ultimate end state that everyone should be discussing is Korean Reunification and how to help South Korea achieve it.

The other point is we continue to talk about the Korean Problem with little regard for Korea. Again, many of the comments in this string are seemingly made in the spirit of big brother knowing how to solve all and again with little understanding of Korean culture, politics, tradition, history (and emotions)of the Korean people. I cannot emphasize enough how many of these comments sound just like discussions of Afghanistan by those who knew nothing of the culture, politics, tradition history (and emotions) of the Afghan people. And we see how things have turned out for us in Afghanistan.

We need to understand the process of Korean Reunification and how the Koreans are going to achieve it. And as counter-intuitive as it will seem to many of you, although the Chinese desperately want to maintain the status quo (their policy is the three "no's": no war, no collapse, and no nukes) they are prepared to allow South Korea to shoulder the burden of Korean Reunification following war or collapse. They do not want the burden of a collapsed north Korea and they believe that by allowing South Korea to reunify the Peninsula they can achieve their major Northeast Asian regional aim and that is to get US troops off the Peninsula. You can see the Chinese hedging strategy playing out with its 50 and 100 year leases of vast tracts of mineral deposits which provides currency to the regime (helping to keep it afloat and thus prevent collapse and possibly war) and ensures their long term access even after reunification (they will exploit the provisions in the South Korean Constitution that says that all Koreans are citizens of the Republic of Korea and they will claim they made deals with Koreans that should be honored by Koreans) Furthermore, they will intervene with troops not to fight South Koreans or even Americans but to prevent north Koreans from coming across the border (and also likely to try to police up all evidence of their complicity in the north's nuclear programs). But they will use the fact that China and South Korea have good relations (and that China is South Korea's number one trading partner) and that China has no interest in preventing reunification and in fact is willing to withdraw its troops from the Korean Peninsula and to press South Korea as it reunifies to have no foreign troops on the Korean Peninsula. With post-collapse or post-conflict and the path to reunification many (including some in the US) can argue there is no reason for US troops on the Peninsula. Ironically though, China could not only live with but would tacitly support US troops remaining in Japan as this is believed to reduce the chances of Japan remilitarizing which is the fear of Chinese and Koreans alike.

But I would urge everyone wanting to make policy and strategy recommendations to please do so from an understanding of the Korean situation and all its history, culture, customs, and politics.

[Fuchs]

Again, many of the comments in this string are seemingly made in the spirit of big brother knowing how to solve all and again with little understanding of Korean culture, politics, tradition, history (and emotions)of the Korean people.

That's because we were discussing how big brother could pursue his interests. The discussion hasn't been about North Korean people's interests.



they are prepared to allow South Korea to shoulder the burden of Korean Reunification following war or collapse. They do not want the burden of a collapsed north Korea

...and South Koreans visiting reunified Germany haven't exactly expressed their enthusiasm for Korean unification.

[max161]

Mr. Fuchs,

I would respectfully submit that the considerations of the Korean people (north and South) are pretty important in the equation for analyzing how to achieve one's interests.

I think the Ministry of Reunification in the ROK might have a different view than your sample size of Koreans visiting Germany. Sure the South Korean people are conflicted and even more so because President Lee has been very vocal in discussing the reality of potential costs and even put forth a proposal for a reunification tax to save money for the enormous costs. But I would submit that there will be no long term solution to the Korea problem until reunification can be achieved. And I think German and Korean reunification will be nearly an apples and oranges comparison - there are a lot of lessons to be applied but the conditions that exist on the Peninsula are vastly different between Korea and Germany.

[davidbfpo]

David and others,

Your comment:
I am mystified that no one is talking about the elephant in the room which is of course Korean Reunification.

this would fit many other topical threads where the exchange goes in completely unpredictable directions and prefers to take an understandably remote view, invariably from within the USA. Some threads raise issues that are uncomfortable, even if some "top brass" read SWC & SWJ that does not mean posting is protected. Even more so as national elections loom.

There is one SWC thread for example that has had a significant local "boots on the ground" input, where the USA has little knowledge. I refer to Kingjaja on the Nigeria thread.

Perhaps you can help by getting a Korean aboard to add their views?

[Dayuhan]

Whether north Korea attacks or the regime collapse the ultimate end state that everyone should be discussing is Korean Reunification and how to help South Korea achieve it....

...We need to understand the process of Korean Reunification and how the Koreans are going to achieve it.

Completely agree that reunification on southern terms is a desirable long term goal, and that it's probably inevitable. At this point, though, I'm not sure that even Koreans have a clear idea of how or when this will happen. I agree that as this process begins it would be a good thing to help it along, but I'd be concerned that a decision to "help" that process could too easily creep into an effort to initiate, accelerate, or control that process, which I suspect would be a very dangerous thing.

When Koreans are ready to move into a reunification process, they should have any help they need. If anyone who's not Korean wants to try to initiate or control that process, I'd be very wary. Just an opinion, of course.

[max161]

When Koreans are ready to move into a reunification process, they should have any help they need. If anyone who's not Korean wants to try to initiate or control that process, I'd be very wary. Just an opinion, of course.

Dayuhan - exactly. I could not agree more with your opinion.

[Fuchs]

I think the Ministry of Reunification in the ROK might have a different view than your sample size of Koreans visiting Germany.

I would be surprised if not, bureaucratic self-interest is quite universally strong.

They might build a Ministry of Non-Reunification next to it and the people there would be fierce about their bureaucratic self-interest (and survival) as well.

[max161]

Mr. Fuchs,

I will ask the Minister of Unification when I attend a meeting with him in two weeks when he is here visiting the states.

[max161]

I received this important comment (and very succinct analysis) in response to the article below from a Korea Hand which should be studied by anyone who wants to understand north Korea. He is one of the most well qualified to make this statement particularly because he is fluent in Korean and has extensive experience communicating face to face with north Koreans as well as reading north Korean primary source documents so when he gives us the north Korean translation and differentiates between policy and politics we should pay attention. I am personally guilty of using military-first policy when it should be military first politics. I will pay more attention to my "kiyosunim" (most learned professor).


This treatment of outsiders trying to invest is nothing new...it is consistent with past practices for the last 30 years under Kim Jong-il influence. Hatred of foreigners and encouragement and reward for xenophobia has been a very successful tool for Kim Jong-il's rule. Chinese reforms always started with decentralization, giving local administrators a chance to develop as they could as long as they were loyal to the party. Nothing of the kind is possible in the NK political system where centralization is absolute and reward for rejecting all outside influence is one of the keys to leadership. Songun chongchi does not mean "military-first policy." It means "military-first politics" and the Kim Regime has never, ever, used the term military-first policy – songun chongchaek. That is an international media misrepresentation that our government has adopted. However, there has been a defacto military first policy since 1964 with the introduction of the four military lines. And military-first means everything outside NK is the enemy...everything. .. because the regime’s strategy is to project everything is the enemy except the regime. Half of its own people are projected as the enemy.

September 5, 2012

North Korea Launches Barbed Attack on Chinese Investor
By REUTERS
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2012/09/05/world/asia/05reuters-korea-north-xiyang.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print

[max161]

I would also offer this for those who want to understand more about north Korea. Andrei Lankov (truth in lending I have known him for many years) was a Soviet Citizen who studied in Pyongyang, is fluent in Korea and then later defected to Australia and is now a professor in South Korea. He is one of the biggest advocates for getting information into north Korea.

This excerpt is why I am skeptical of north Korean reforms. But if they really do attempt reforms we (the Alliance South Korea in the lead with US in support) absolutely need to be preparing for regime collapse. We need to be aware of the potential fallout from reforms because as much as we want them to reform, open up, and change, those reforms might not lead to the change we want to believe in:


This is a recipe for discontent and even a revolution, somewhat similar to the recent events in Tunisia or the events of 1989 in Romania and East Germany.

And the real question is whether Kim Jong-un can find a balance among the north Korean "trinity" (fear, economic reforms and propaganda):


Alas, a North Korea in the throes of reform would not become immediately more stable but would become less stable than the ossified state of the Kim Jong Il era. It is possible, though unlikely, that the regime would find a balance of fear, economic incentives and propaganda that would allow it to keep the populace under control.

I am not optimistic that they can find balance other than one weighted most heavily on fear, secondarily on propaganda to reinforce that fear (and control), and only cosmetic economic reforms.

The risk in reforming North Korea

By Andrei Lankov, Published: September 4

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/envy-could-destabilize-north-korea/2012/09/04/f898fdaa-ef9d-11e1-adc6-87dfa8eff430_print.html

[Bill Moore]

Posted by max161


The other point is we continue to talk about the Korean Problem with little regard for Korea. Again, many of the comments in this string are seemingly made in the spirit of big brother knowing how to solve all and again with little understanding of Korean culture, politics, tradition, history (and emotions)of the Korean people. I cannot emphasize enough how many of these comments sound just like discussions of Afghanistan by those who knew nothing of the culture, politics, tradition history (and emotions) of the Afghan people. And we see how things have turned out for us in Afghanistan.

Each thread tends to start with a slice of a larger problem and then expands from there. Fuchs opened this thread focusing on the North Korean military and questioned its ability to be a viable threat. Accordingly the the discussion initially focused on how to deal with the potential threat. Reunification is an interesting topic, but first I want to touch upon your cherry picking of experts.

Admittedly there is little discussion on the ROK view since like ours it is inconsistent and divided among party lines. Like many you seem to assume reunification is going to happen, but there are others who also claim some expertise in the region that disagree with that assessment. They see no sign whatsoever that the DPRK is going to collapse (as we have been hearing for over the past 20 years) and believe two separate Koreas is in the best interests of most concerned. Maybe it will, maybe it won't, but the larger point is relying on those we label as experts can actually impede gaining understanding of the situation, because those we label experts tend to have strong views on a topic that are hard to sway even when emergent facts call their views into question.

This reliance on cherry picked experts has resulted in bad policies in the past when we later learn that the experts were wrong. I recall one school of experts on Iraq telling us the Iraqi people would embrace democracy and that there was no ethnic tensions in the country, while another school of experts called the shots accurately. Everyone is qualified to evaluate the available evidence and question the experts. Expert views should be sought out, but not blindly accepted. All experts have one key shortcoming which is they're human and have biases that skew their best efforts to be completely intellectually honest.

Obviously many, if not most, Koreans in the North and South want to reunite the Koreas, but of course have different views on what a united Korea should look like. Putting that to the side for a minute, I wonder what nations (I hope the U.S. is) are thinking a reunified Korea will mean to the region and the world? Would two the world's largest militaries united into one under one the world's strongest economies lead to greater regional stability or instability? How would Japan feel about it? Would China or the U.S. have more or equal influence with a united Korea? If the U.S. pulled it troops out of Korea after reunification how would that our ability to deter hostilities in the region? If the Koreas united, would there be a justification for a large ground force in East Asia? Of course most of these questions can't be answered factually until after events unfold, but we can only offer opinions on what we think will happen and what will be in our interests. East Asia with a unified Korea would require a new security paradigm for all concerned.

[max161]

Bill,
If you read my work you might see that I cite experts from across the spectrum (even Bruce Cumings who claimed for many years that the US started the Korean War) to include north Koreans. I am expressing my opinions based on my years of analysis and I have linked a cross section of the body of work I have produced over the years. I stand by my research and scholarship and I offer it to the forum for discussion. I will be happy to discuss anything but if you think I am cherry picking experts I would recommend you read my work. I thought the forum would benefit from two current open source articles that seem relevant to the discussion with some commentary and analysis but if you think that is cherry picking then my sincere apologies.
V/R

Dave

[Dayuhan]

That's because we were discussing how big brother could pursue his interests. The discussion hasn't been about North Korean people's interests.

I remain unconvinced that a proactive effort to "fix" the DPRK or induce someone else to do so is in big brother's interest, whoever big brother happens to be. Rocking that boat could go all kinds of unpredictable places, many of them not in anyone's interest.

[JMA]

I remain unconvinced ...

That's fine too.

.

[Dayuhan]

That's fine too.

Your permission is noted and appreciated.

Have you read any of the material David Maxwell linked to? It provides an excellent starting point for informed discussion. Having watched the peninsula for many years without having actually studied it I found them an excellent way to fill in gaps in my own observations.

As a starting point I'd suggest this one for being quite recent:

http://dl.dropbox.com/u/6891151/FINAL%20CUSKOS%202012%20PAPER%402P%20David%20Maxwe ll.pdf

and this one for being more comprehensive:

http://dl.dropbox.com/u/6891151/FINAL%20Korea%20Strategy%20Paper.pdf

[Bill Moore]

Posted by max161


If you read my work you might see that I cite experts from across the spectrum (even Bruce Cumings who claimed for many years that the US started the Korean War) to include north Koreans. I am expressing my opinions based on my years of analysis and I have linked a cross section of the body of work I have produced over the years. I stand by my research and scholarship and I offer it to the forum for discussion. I will be happy to discuss anything but if you think I am cherry picking experts I would recommend you read my work. I thought the forum would benefit from two current open source articles that seem relevant to the discussion with some commentary and analysis but if you think that is cherry picking then my sincere apologies.

Dave,

I will read each paper over the next couple of days, and I suspect I have read a couple already, but will double check each link. I'm not faulting your work, my point addresses the larger issue of labeling someone an expert and then blindly following them instead of engaging in critical thinking. We have done that for the past 10 years with the current fight we're in.

In this thread I do think you and Dayuhan are to quick to dismiss ideas that don't fit your paradigm. Dismissing them is one thing, saying it isn't possible is another. A lot of potentialties are possible over time and I don't think anyone on this thread is talking about potential changes within the next year or so.

I like Dayuhan's term of "informed opinion" versus expert. To be clear I agree with most of your points, but I'll still challenge them (to drive exposure of the underlying logic). I do it to myself, so no one else gets a buy either :D. One opinion I'm sitting on the fence is that reunification is destiny. I'm also not convinced it would be a thing for regional security over time. I like the Koreans also, but they're not exactly a peace loving people.

[JMA]

Have you read any of the material David Maxwell linked to? It provides an excellent starting point for informed discussion. Having watched the peninsula for many years without having actually studied it I found them an excellent way to fill in gaps in my own observations.

As a starting point I'd suggest this one for being quite recent:


No I haven't and not about to now... maybe over the weekend.

It would be interesting to hear from you a little more on this previous statement of yours:


... even if China was "the key", that would get us nowhere, because the Chinese have no interest whatsoever in trying to "fix" the DPRK, and that's not something any outside influence is going to change.

You can - and probably will - play with the definition of "fix" but the fact remains that without the support of China NK would fold in a matter of weeks/months.

I would be interested to hear why a stable North Korea closely allied to China would not be in the Chinese interest? Want to take a shot at that?

As to your rather interesting comment that it all hinges on the NK armed forces I would ask you how long do you think they would last - as an effective force - if they were to be deprived of pay, food, winter clothing, fuel, weapons, ammunition?

I've been on the receiving end of this sort of "influence" and know that no matter how strong the spirit is - which actually strengthens in the face of such adversity - such deprivation will reduce the armed forces to a mere shell... they will probably stick together only for self preservation but will have no ability for any significant military action other than perhaps a spirited last stand (a la Gen Custer).

Please try to answer this yourself and not refer me to what Maxwell has written.

[max161]

Posted by max161
my point addresses the larger issue of labeling someone an expert and then blindly following them instead of engaging in critical thinking. We have done that for the past 10 years with the current fight we're in.


Bill,

I do not think I have suggested blindly following any so-called expert. I think I have suggested throughout my comments that we need to study the situation on the Peninsula and that many of the comments seem to suggest similar thinking that we have done over the last decade in regards to Afghanistan and Iraq in which we have not sought to understand the nature of the problem and the history and culture of the people and countries involved. Most of the discussion as been US and western centric and I have tried to try to provide some views from the Korean and Chinese perspectives.

I think you and I are in violent agreement that critical thinking is required and I have tried to provide some of my critical thinking that I have done over the years. And I have never considered myself an expert on Korea but a student of the Korean problem trying to learn about and understand the nature of the problem and suggest some alternative strategies for dealing with those problems.

Dave

[Bill Moore]

Dave,

I read all your articles except for “Beyond the Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula, April 2004” which I intend to get to. You were correct to be defensive towards my previous comments because you did a great job of including contrarian expert opinions in your informative articles. However, unless you’re misreading my comments, or I’m misreading yours, it seems we agree on more than we disagree on in regards to the Korea problem.

One assumption I question is that North Korea will execute the final option if faced with regime threatening internal instability. Granted I have no idea what North Korean leaders are actually thinking, but it seems to be a bit of a reach that they believe their military would be successful in uniting the peninsula. There is always a danger in applying western logic to an eastern problem, but it seems more probable that they would focus internally and ask China for a bailout package, which I believe would be in their interest to do so (cheaper than containing a failed state on their border.

It seems unlikely that there will be a citizen revolt if the KFR can retain control of its military, and the military is willing to use force against its citizens. The military would have to lead the rebellion, and do so they would need assurances of external support or believe that other military leaders would join in. That is hard to conceive how they would organize such a revolt in a hyper paranoid society where everyone is a state spy.

I found your proposed strategy to convince the KFR that it will survive as a means of deterring attack brilliant. That would provide needed time for longer term strategies involving information operations and economic engagement to erode KFR’s control to work. You pointed out that North Koreans are interfering with South Korean elections (seems to be a norm for other nations to interfere in elections, we have a long history of doing so in the past), and they want the party that supports the Sunshine policy to win. Obviously nK supports it, and while it may help nK achieve their objectives in the short term I suspect it would be more effective at undermining the regime over time than a harder stance.

In addition to these soft power approaches I agree with your suggestion that we should also take active measures such as sinking a couple of their submarines and then not taking credit for it in response to their sinking of the ROK frigate. It would send a clear message and if the attack wasn’t claimed it would give nK the option of not responding to maintain their legitimacy.

I still think we (the global community) should put more pressure on the KFR for their massive human rights violations. Currently outside of a relatively few nK watchers these atrocities get little fanfare compared to say Sudan, so the North Koreans are given a lot of freedom from world opinion to continue these abuses unabated. Instead of us coming across as a power for the betterment of the human race, we instead focus on telling nK they can’t have nukes, which paints us as a hegemonic power telling other states what they can and can’t do. World opinion may or may not mitigate their behavior, but we won’t find out unless we try. World opinion won’t change KFR’s ethics, but I suspect it will cause them to question the value of continuing to conduct such activities if they feel other nations are being pressured by their populations to take some sort of action against North Korea. Of course the situation in Syria and elsewhere calls that assumption into question.

While not making the WMD issue, we should do everything possible using all element of DIME to curtail their WMD programs, but focusing solely on WMD is like declaring war on terror, war on drugs, and war on IEDs. Many greats successes have been made in all these efforts at the tactical level, yet drug trade remains very profitable, IED attacks are proliferating at an ever greater rate, and of course terrorism will persist. We need a strategy that addresses the problem not a symptom of the problem, and that is what you’re advocating.

[Dayuhan]

Everything below is my opinion. Just imagine the IMOs in every paragraph.


You can - and probably will - play with the definition of "fix" but the fact remains that without the support of China NK would fold in a matter of weeks/months.

Fuchs introduced the term "fix" (post #34), and I cannot say with certainty what he meant by it. I would guess that anyone proposing to "fix" the DPRK believes that the the Kim dynasty should either be removed or persuaded/compelled to adopt policies deemed suitable by whoever is doing the fixing. Not saying there can't be another interpretation, but I can't think of one at the moment.

Loss of Chinese support would certainly be a major blow to the Kim dynasty. Whether or not they would fold, and when, is of course uncertain. I suspect they'd hang in longer than you think. That's largely an academic concern, though, because the Chinese policy of not allowing the regime to fall has been a constant for decades. It does not look likely to change any time soon, and it's very doubtful that any outside influence will change it.

It's often supposed by those who haven't been watching the peninsula for long that because China is the DPRK's sole ally and supporter, the DPRK is therefore totally subservient to China and must do whatever the Chinese tell it to do. This has not actually been the case: the Kims have not always followed instructions, and cannot be relied on to do what the Chinese want. They can do this because they know that preserving the dynasty has a central place in Chinese policy and they believe that the policy will continue even if they do not always follow the Chinese playbook.

That could of course change: the Chinese could reassess their policy of keeping the Kim dynasty in power, or the dynasty could push Chinese patience to the point where the policy is abandoned, or some combination of the two could occur. While these things could happen, it's not likely that any outside power can make them happen. So far the Chinese have shown no indication that this policy is likely to change, and the Kims have been fairly astute in their assessment of what they can get away with.

While the Chinese could probably sink or totally cripple the Kim dynasty, they have a clear and long-standing policy of preventing that. They don't want the dynasty to fall. While the Chinese could in theory use the threat of sinking or crippling the regime to compel whatever policy changes the Chinese might think desirable, that threat is largely blunted by that same policy: the DPRK regime does not believe the threat will be carried out. I do not believe the Kims will adopt any policy they see as a serious threat to their absolute dominance even if the Chinese tell them to.


I would be interested to hear why a stable North Korea closely allied to China would not be in the Chinese interest? Want to take a shot at that?

The question is not whether that outcome is desirable, but whether it can be achieved. If the DPRK goes out of control, nobody anywhere will be able to predict the outcome with any certainty, and there's a very good chance that a stable North Korea closely allied to China would not be the outcome. The existing order is not exactly stable, but neither is it completely out of hand. It is not controlled, but neither is it completely beyond influence or allied to China's actual or potential antagonists. If that order is disrupted anything could happen, the outcome would be beyond prediction or control and could easily be much worse for the Chinese.

So far the Chinese seem to feel that sustaining the existing order, whatever its deficiencies and irritants, is preferable to the risk involved in trying to disrupt that order. That may of course change, if the Chinese decide that it should. I do not think any outside power has the capacity to significantly affect that decision.


As to your rather interesting comment that it all hinges on the NK armed forces I would ask you how long do you think they would last - as an effective force - if they were to be deprived of pay, food, winter clothing, fuel, weapons, ammunition?

They're not at war in any active sense, so they could probably last until they could no longer squeeze their needs out of the populace. if pressed too far, they might dispose of the regime and take over themselves... again, the Chinese are unlikely to push to that point, because of the consistent policy previously referred to.


I've been on the receiving end of this sort of "influence" and know that no matter how strong the spirit is - which actually strengthens in the face of such adversity - such deprivation will reduce the armed forces to a mere shell... they will probably stick together only for self preservation but will have no ability for any significant military action other than perhaps a spirited last stand (a la Gen Custer).

Any nation or armed force that allows itself to depend on an outside power for its sustenance is asking for that kind of pressure, but it's not likely that the DPRK armed forces will face it any time soon. Since they are not actively engaged in combat, what need do they have for significant military action? Even if the Chinese were putting the squeeze on to try to compel some policy change, the squeeze would come off if the DPRK were under attack... unless of course you're hypothesizing an attack by the Chinese, a very farfetched scenario.

In short: Chinese policy to date has been based on preventing either war or regime collapse. That policy could change, but it cannot be changed at the instigation of any imaginable "us" and there's no sign that it's likely to change any time soon. While other powers should watch out for and be prepared for potential Chinese policy changes, the most likely eventuality, and the scenario on which primary plans are based, should be that Chinese policy is likely to remain pretty much as is for the near to medium term.

[Entropy]

Yes, the whole idea of "fixing" North Korea is very vague. I would like to understand what this actually means in terms of an end state. Only then can we really examine whether China possesses the capability to bring about that end state and, if so, whether the US and Western Powers possess the capability to compel China to act.

[carl]

Who ever said anything about fighting to restore the Kim regime? How do you know they wouldn't fight to be able to define the successor to the Kim regime themselves, rather than having it defined by an outside power? Or that various factions who want to take over wouldn't fight with each other and anyone else willing to be on the spot?.

I read a few articles that max161 posted. From these and from doing a little cogitating it seems that the existence of northern Korea is currently and has been for the past 1/2 century about one thing, the preservation of the Kim dynasty. So then I figured if the place collapsed it would be logical to assume that if those poor enslaved people chose to engage in a noble insurgency against the South Koreans who would likely show up, they would be inclined to fight for the restoration of the thing they have been taught is the center of the universe, the Kim dynasty.

You use the phrase "define the successor to the Kim regime themselves". Now given that those tragic enslaved people have had their political horizons and imaginations constrained at knife point for generations, I wonder if the concept of defining anything themselves would register.


I wouldn't be prepared to bet that the north would simply submit to foreign intervention, or that lack of money or sanctuary would render them unable to insurge. It might happen, but it might not... and if it didn't, the occupying power could find themselves in a quite unpleasant situation..

Anybody can insurge. But the lack of sanctuary makes if very much harder to successfully insurge.


The insurgency has gone on for over 40 years. If you include the Huk rebellion (which is reasonable), it's gone on for well over 60 years... without sanctuary or significant foreign assistance. Of course it's had ups and downs within that time, but even now it's by no means over.

Let's grant that for arguments sake. So what we have is an insurgency or 'gies that just can't seem to win. And they don't have any sanctuary in another country that they can use, so if the gov forces get up the moxie or power there is no place they can't be got to. This seems a good argument to the effect that if you want you guerrilla war to work out well for the guerrillas, you would do well to pick a country that shares a border with another country that your guerrillas can use as a sanctuary. That is not 100% true all the time, but it seems a very strong trend.


Not so. The government didn't suppress/defeat the insurgency. The insurgency collapsed to the extent that it has because of the sudden and unexpected loss of the Marcos regime and because of its own inability to adapt to the post-Marcos political landscape, not because of anything government did.

I think you gave a good explication as to why the gov had everything to do with the insurgency collapsing. The gov changed itself in a way that foiled the insurgency. That is exactly the thing govs are supposed to try and pull off.

[carl]

If the DPRK attacks and is then pushed back forcing a regime change, or if the current regime collapses and foreigners move in to "build a nation" and "bring democracy" etc it will not be going into a populace that has been subjected to years of warfare, nor will it be going into a populace that perceives this help as the lesser of two evils. By any logical assessment and reasonable understanding of resistance insurgency, the people would resist. Hard.

How hard can you resist when starving? I don't think you give those people much credit for seeing and remembering. They see that they are all pretty skinny. They remember times of starvation. They remember the people and families who disappeared. They know what happens if they forget their Kim pin. I don't think the South Koreans would have to go far to be the lesser of two evils.


China would probably be more effective at this than we would, and US interests would not suffer if the PRC had the lead on dealing with any kind of governmental collapse in the DPRK.

I wonder if the Red Chinese would send any large numbers of people into northern Korea if the Kim dynasty fell apart. All those Chinamen walking about might provoke some resentment from the Koreans north or south.

[carl]

I have a general question. Let's say the Kim dynasty fell apart. Russia, Red China and South Korea decided to let the South Koreans handle the problem inside the country and all three decided that nobody else would be permitted to interfere. Effectively this would make northern Korea an island.

Now let us stipulate that since there isn't much food to eat in northern Korea in the best of times, and this wouldn't be the best of times, the people there would be dependent upon food coming in from outside northern Korea. Let us stipulate further that some kind of insurgency does break out (I am not so sure this is likely). Since the South Koreans would entirely control the import and distribution of food, could they not use that to throttle the insurgency pretty quick? I do not mean starving people, I mean controlling the distribution in such a way that everybody who wants to eat has to show up in a particular area and be scrutinized. This would be sort of what the British did in parts of Malaya and what we did in parts of the Philippines long ago.

What are people's opinion of this?

[carl]

max161:

I have two questions.

First, since some of the high up Kim dynasty people appear to have spent much time abroad being educated including the king himself, what effect does this have on their ability to judge their kingdom's power relative to the other countries?

Second, if the place does collapse, how would the status of the king, his family and entourage affect things? If Kim and crew found refuge in somewhere what might that mean? If he was killed or ended up in the Hague what would that mean? If the South Koreans caught him what would they do with him and how would that affect things? What do you think?

[ganulv]

offer as good a look-see at the contemporary DPRK as I have seen. [LINK (http://www.vice.com/the-vice-guide-to-travel/vice-guide-to-north-korea-1-of-3)]

[davidbfpo]

Carl asked:
controlling the (food) in such a way that everybody who wants to eat has to show up in a particular area and be scrutinized

I assume the party effectively controls food distribution and production, so giving up that responsibility and power simply would not happen. Now a few years ago the Ethiopian regime, under Mengistu, resisted NGOs taking over food distribution as a famine developed and millions IIRC died.

I expect the regime says the food is given to us in homage, as we are so strong, well-led etc.

[carl]

David:

My question had to do with what might happen after the current order disintegrated, if it came to that.

[Dayuhan]

I read a few articles that max161 posted. From these and from doing a little cogitating it seems that the existence of northern Korea is currently and has been for the past 1/2 century about one thing, the preservation of the Kim dynasty. So then I figured if the place collapsed it would be logical to assume that if those poor enslaved people chose to engage in a noble insurgency against the South Koreans who would likely show up, they would be inclined to fight for the restoration of the thing they have been taught is the center of the universe, the Kim dynasty.

You use the phrase "define the successor to the Kim regime themselves". Now given that those tragic enslaved people have had their political horizons and imaginations constrained at knife point for generations, I wonder if the concept of defining anything themselves would register.

Do you assume that an insurgency must start with "the people"? North Korea has a rather large army, which would remain armed even in the event of state collapse. Is it not likely that some of the leaders of that army might decide that they are the rightful heirs, and that a good number of their followers might think the same way? It's easy to assume that "the people" would follow whoever promised food, or that they would embrace the liberators as bringers of prosperity, but "us and them" is a powerful motivator and assumptions do not always play out. I remember being assured that Iraqis would dance in the streets and welcome us as liberators. Of course it's possible that North Koreans armed and otherwise would welcome an intervening force with relief and delight, but I'm not sure I'd want to base any plans on the assumption that such would be the case.

In any event all of this talk of insurgency derives from chains of assumptions long enough to be of limited utility. Suffice it to say that I think any decision to intervene in or occupy North Korea in the event of a hypothetical state collapse would have to be approached with great caution. Nobody anywhere knows what such a collapse will look like or how it would play out, and there might possibly be some circumstance in which such action might be necessary... but I'd hope whoever proposes to take it thinks well and hard before committing, and I'd doubly hope that Americans are not involved.


Anybody can insurge. But the lack of sanctuary makes if very much harder to successfully insurge.

Granrted, but I'd hesitate to assume that lack of sanctuary would make effective insurgency impossible.


Let's grant that for arguments sake. So what we have is an insurgency or 'gies that just can't seem to win. And they don't have any sanctuary in another country that they can use, so if the gov forces get up the moxie or power there is no place they can't be got to. This seems a good argument to the effect that if you want you guerrilla war to work out well for the guerrillas, you would do well to pick a country that shares a border with another country that your guerrillas can use as a sanctuary. That is not 100% true all the time, but it seems a very strong trend.

In the particular case of the Philippines, though, the limiting factor on the insurgency has not been lack of sanctuary, but the ineptitude of the insurgent leadership. I'm not sure sanctuary or outside assistance would have made much difference.


I think you gave a good explication as to why the gov had everything to do with the insurgency collapsing. The gov changed itself in a way that foiled the insurgency. That is exactly the thing govs are supposed to try and pull off.

The government did not change itself. The change was imposed on it by the populace, through a chain of events that was not anticipated by anyone. If the government (and the US) had gotten their way, Marcos would have remained in power and the insurgents might have won.

All that is a digression, but the bottom line for me is that it would be unwise to assume that an occupied nation cannot or will not insurge because they lack some factor we think necessary for insurgency.

[Bob's World]

I suspect much of the modern American perspective on "sanctuary" for insurgency is shaped by our experiences in places like Vietnam and Afghanistan where the existence of formal legal sanctuaries in neighboring states were available and so problematic. Those were legal sanctuaries. Legal status is an important form of sanctuary and it can indeed come from a border. It can also come from a status, be it simply declaring some individual or organization to be "outside the law" or more modernly, to place them on a "terrorist list." Such status facilitates the ability to capture or kill or attack; but it severely limits the ability to pursue virtually any other form of engagement. It also provides a sanctuary as that once one is outside the law, the law no longer applies to them. Such a status makes one a target of law enforcement, but it gives one complete sanctuary from the rule of law. We give such sanctuary to so many organizations today.

But the most important form of sanctuary comes from the support of a poorly governed populace. Charlie owns the night because he walks among you during the day. You don't know who he is, but the people do, because he and they are one and he operates from the sanctuary of their support, and cannot exist without that same sanctuary.

The archetypal hybrid of Robin Hood is instructive. Robin and his men had many forms of sanctuary. Most famously they had Sherwood Forest. But more importantly they were deemed outlaws and possessed broad support among the people. If the Sheriff somehow denied or destroyed the forest, does he also deny or destroy the sanctuary and thereby defeat this organization? Of course not. He would merely force them to adopt new tactics as they continued to rely on the two primary sources of their sanctuary. They would live and hide among the people and operate in more distibuted, networked ways. Much as the French Underground did in WWII, for an example most are aware of.

The same is true in Afghanistan in regards to Pakistan today. Deny or destroy the FATA? Best case one forces AQ and others to simply migrate and adopt modified tactics, as AQ has already done.

Same would be true in North Korea. Same would be true in the US. Same would be true virtually anywhere.

Those action officers who dared to suggest that the Iraqi people might not greet the American army as liberators were banned from the planning process. Higher said that is what would happen, so shut up and plan. Stay in your lane.

Napoleon liberated the Egyptians from the Ottomans and brought them all of the goodness of the French enlightenment, and could not understand why they resisted his presence so fiercely. Same in Spain.

Unless one is the lesser of two evils, if you are a "liberator" you better be prepared for a strong resistance insurgency if one does more than simply defeat, pillage and leave. The US in both post WWII Germany and Japan was the lesser of two evils. The war weakened and defeated German and Japanese people were both fully aware of what the alternative to American occupation was. We deluded ourselves to think that it was "a good war" and that the people loved us because we were Americans and brought them the goodness of American enlightenment and the Marshall Plan. No, they tolerated us because we were the only thing between them and Soviet/Sino oppression.

Americans have a biased historical view on insurgency of every form. Both why it occurs and why it does not occur. We fixate on things like the physical legal sanctuaries that we create for our opponents to use and blame them, rather than owning how the very nature of our operations are creating the problems we face.

If we delude ourselves as to how the North Korean populace is apt to reasonably react to foreign "liberation" we will once again find ourselves in a mess of our own design. Many experts will blame China for providing "sanctuary" and call for an expansion of the conflict or for hard action against China (as they do now for Pakistan). Einstein called such experts "intelligent fools." It is an apt title. We all wear it at times, but some wear it often. Our policy and doctrine on insurgency is a product of intelligent fools, and we write intelligent, but foolish war plans as well.

[max161]

max161:

I have two questions.

First, since some of the high up Kim dynasty people appear to have spent much time abroad being educated including the king himself, what effect does this have on their ability to judge their kingdom's power relative to the other countries?

Second, if the place does collapse, how would the status of the king, his family and entourage affect things? If Kim and crew found refuge in somewhere what might that mean? If he was killed or ended up in the Hague what would that mean? If the South Koreans caught him what would they do with him and how would that affect things? What do you think?

Carl,

Some very good questions. To the first, I would say the regime elite absolutely knows the reality of the north's relative power which is why they feel they absolutely have to have nuclear weapons. I do not think they are under any illusions that they cannot complete head to head with any country. But I also think that they can execute a strategy of perceived strength from a position of weakness. We usually interpret Juche as self reliance and we laugh at that because the north has never been and never will be self- reliant under their current economic and political system. But as a Korean scholar pointed out just the other day at a conference, Juche is really about being in control and controlling your destiny and that is how the regime leadership feels. They believe they can play all sides against the other and manipulate the situation to their benefit. I am sure one of the things that Kim Jong-un has studied in detail is how his grandfather manipulated Stalin and Mao and support for north Korea in the Korean War (and then in the late 1950's purged all the north Koreans who had made the Long March with Mao - and that is the last time China ever really attempted to intervene significantly in the north internal affairs) and how Kim Jong-il has manipulated the 5 parties in the 6 party talks.

The second question is one that requires further analysis and assessment based on Kim Jong-un taking over. One of the lines of thinking was if Kim Jong-il (if it was even possible but assume it was) sought some kind of political asylum it would cause two things - it might be able to be exploited as a way to illustrate the illegitimacy of the regime by showing the Kim Family is no longer infallible and that it has abandoned the country. But some speculate it could have the alternate effect - either it would not be believed, or it would be believed that he was removed under duress but regardless of which, it could on the one hand harden the resolve of some segments of the population while on the other, it would be extremely psychologically and emotionally damaging to many in the population who once were "true believers." Although it is an extreme example we should remember that the Kim Family Regime has been deified and raised to a religious stature (remember that everyone has to pledge personal loyalty to the leadership and not to the nation or a constitution or even the party - we should also recall that north Korea is the only country of the world that is a necrotocracy - it is ruled by dead people - Kim Il sung is still the supreme leader even in mortal death - Kim Jong-il did not assume any of his father's titles and in his death his son has not assumed any of his father's titles - each creates new titles while preserving the previous father's titles, but I digress). So if the regime was to bolt the country it is difficult to say how the people will react. I think it would end up causing a lot of problems and different ones among many different people in many segments of society. With Kim Jong-un in power now, things have changed again. One of the things that some scholars speculate and it seems to be born out in the press is that Kim Jong-un has embarked on what they are beginning to call "Image Politics" which is a combination of tying him to his very charismatic grandfather who is still revered as the Great Leader and introducing the people to western images which makes Kim Jong-un seem to be cosmopolitan and a man of the world who knows how to operate in the modern world (a fiction of course but it might play to the internal audience). But if he becomes as revered as his grandfather we might wish for Kim Jong-il to still be alive because he was not and never will be loved as Kim Il-sung was. Which brings us to an important question, what happens at the end of the regime? To borrow from Linda Robinson's book "Tell me how this ends," how does the end of the regime come about. If Kim Jong-un was to go away, the various scenarios under which that might happen could have very different effects on the population and military. If he was killed as a result of military action (even if the north initiated hostilities) he could be idolized as a martyr. Of course if he was killed in some kind of internal coup - the ROK could or would likely be blamed and he could also be made a martyr. Regardless the end of the regime is going to cause tremendous internal problems within north Korea and the effects cannot be predicted with any certainty. That said, the ROK should be preparing for that eventuality now. There are many things that should be done from a policy perspective (and the majority of them are non-military) to try to inform and influence the population so that the effects of the end of the regime can be mitigated to the extent they can be. But that is the subject of a lot of ongoing research now. So I will stop here and look forward to continuing the exchange of ideas.

[max161]

Please see the article linked here:

09/06/2012 16:42
NORTH KOREA - CHINA
After Chinese voice criticism, Pyongyang reacts harshly
http://www.asianews.it/news-en/After-Chinese-voice-criticism,-Pyongyang-reacts-harshly-25743.html


My comments: Although China's three no policy is oft-stated (no war, no instability or collapse, no nukes) I have heard some postulate that China is as strongly focused on convincing the north to institute Chinese-style economic reforms (with less emphasis on no nukes) as the US is so strongly focused on getting the north to end its nuclear program and rid the Peninsula of nuclear weapons. The irony is that both global powers seem to have little sway over regime thinking and actions. It seems to simple to us as outsiders – give up nuclear weapons and get tremendous economic benefits and support – Open up and reform and you will get support from the international community. But I think this illustrates the true nature of the regime –not only is it completely recalcitrant, it is thoroughly paranoid, trusts no one, and believes that regime survival requires developing and maintaining nuclear weapons and not changing its political and economic system in anyway.

[carl]

max161:

I agree that the Kim dynasty cannot let up even a little bit. All they have to do is look at what happened when the Reds loosened up a little in Russia and what happened to the Shah. Police states expose themselves to great danger when they open up or loosen up.

I have some further questions.

Do you think the people of northern Korea can be likened to "institutional men"? Those are the guys who have been in prison for most of their lives and really have no idea how to function on their own; the kind of guy depicted in a Joseph Wambaugh novel who gets out and almost immediately does something to get back in. If or when the Kim dynasty goes away, will those poor enslaved people be something like that? The comment about the paralysis of the people brought this question to mind.

This would apply to the oppressors in the security organizations also. Could they be likened to people like the big wigs in the prison gangs, people who only know the most base kind of brutality and can thrive in prison but are totally out of their element on the outside? If they are like that (I don't know) what would you do with them? Will these guys be worse than the official killers of other fallen police states?

This question has to do with something Bill Moore said and has to do with targeting second tier leadership for coercion and co-option. It seems to me that would be more effective the earlier you could do it. Is it possible to do that to any extent now given the nature of the system in northern Korea? How able are the South Koreans to talk even in an informal way with those second tier leaders? Has that ability or lack thereof been increasing or decreasing over the years?

I understand the logic of an aggressive information campaign. If those poor people can be thought of as "institutional men" then an info campaign might serve the function (a little bit) of a halfway house. How would the info campaign be conducted? How would you get the info in to the enslaved?

I keep saying the South Koreans because it seems to me that they are the ones who are by far most important in dealing with this problem.

[carl]

Do you assume that an insurgency must start with "the people"? North Korea has a rather large army, which would remain armed even in the event of state collapse. Is it not likely that some of the leaders of that army might decide that they are the rightful heirs, and that a good number of their followers might think the same way? It's easy to assume that "the people" would follow whoever promised food, or that they would embrace the liberators as bringers of prosperity, but "us and them" is a powerful motivator and assumptions do not always play out. I remember being assured that Iraqis would dance in the streets and welcome us as liberators. Of course it's possible that North Koreans armed and otherwise would welcome an intervening force with relief and delight, but I'm not sure I'd want to base any plans on the assumption that such would be the case.

The question I answered was why I thought if there was any insurgency it would aim at a restoration of the Kim dynasty or a facsimile thereof. Your response above did not address my answer. But that is ok. The discussion meanders here and there.

I don't assume that if the there was any insurgency it would start with anything or body. For it to succeed it would depend on the support of those poor enslaved people. They are pretty hungry and therefore pretty tired and enough to eat might to do a lot to take the wind out of the sail of any call to fight "them." In any event, if the South Koreans can control food distribution, they can throttle any incipient insurgency. That is why I mentioned Malaya.

I don't know what will happen when or if the Kims fall. I have some ill informed opinions (as ever, feel free to use that as a straight line) and some hazy ideas (ditto for that) about what may be done in this or that event.


In any event all of this talk of insurgency derives from chains of assumptions long enough to be of limited utility. Suffice it to say that I think any decision to intervene in or occupy North Korea in the event of a hypothetical state collapse would have to be approached with great caution. Nobody anywhere knows what such a collapse will look like or how it would play out, and there might possibly be some circumstance in which such action might be necessary... but I'd hope whoever proposes to take it thinks well and hard before committing, and I'd doubly hope that Americans are not involved.

All fair enough. Please notice that I do not speak about us doing much of anything in the north. It is the ROK that will do or not do.


Granrted, but I'd hesitate to assume that lack of sanctuary would make effective insurgency impossible.

In the particular case of the Philippines, though, the limiting factor on the insurgency has not been lack of sanctuary, but the ineptitude of the insurgent leadership. I'm not sure sanctuary or outside assistance would have made much difference.

Lack of sanctuary doesn't make the insurgents task impossible, it just makes it a lot, a lot, harder. In the Philippines lack of sanctuary may very well have made no difference. We can't know. It is easily observed though that the various insurgencies there haven't been able to bring it home. My opinion is that lack of sanctuary is a big part of that. Inept leaders can learn to be ept if they have a place to hide out and think about what they did wrong and what they might do right. That is one advantage of having a sanctuary.


The government did not change itself. The change was imposed on it by the populace, through a chain of events that was not anticipated by anyone. If the government (and the US) had gotten their way, Marcos would have remained in power and the insurgents might have won.

But the gov did change, however it happened, and that change knocked the pins out from under the insurgency.


All that is a digression, but the bottom line for me is that it would be unwise to assume that an occupied nation cannot or will not insurge because they lack some factor we think necessary for insurgency.

Nothing is impossible. But those factors can make things more or less likely and more or less likely to succeed.

(Have you noticed the spell check doesn't like the word "insurge"? It doesn't seem to like "ept" either.)

[Dayuhan]

The question I answered was why I thought if there was any insurgency it would aim at a restoration of the Kim dynasty or a facsimile thereof. Your response above did not address my answer.

I don't think that would be the aim, but that's looking so far down the line that any comment would be extremely speculative. We have no idea what a hypothetical DPRK collapse would look like or how it would play out. We have no idea how China and the ROK would react: presumably that would be defined by how a collapse happened and how it played out. If a collapse occurred and if it occurred in such a way that somebody was considering sending forces to occupy, repair, stabilize, whatever, I wouldn't want to assume that the foreign force would not face a difficult insurgency problem.

I agree with David M that concerned nations have to be prepared for the possibility of change, possibly sudden and disruptive change, but there are so many unknowns and they are so thoroughly unknown that any such preparation is going to be challenging. The timing and content of whatever happens is likely to be thoroughly unexpected.


I don't assume that if the there was any insurgency it would start with anything or body. For it to succeed it would depend on the support of those poor enslaved people. They are pretty hungry and therefore pretty tired and enough to eat might to do a lot to take the wind out of the sail of any call to fight "them." In any event, if the South Koreans can control food distribution, they can throttle any incipient insurgency. That is why I mentioned Malaya.

Possibly so... but again, I suspect that it would be unwise for an occupying power anywhere to assume that any insurgency they face will be easily throttled.


I don't know what will happen when or if the Kims fall.

Neither does anyone else; welcome to the club. Anyone who claims to know is full of it.


It is easily observed though that the various insurgencies there haven't been able to bring it home. My opinion is that lack of sanctuary is a big part of that. Inept leaders can learn to be ept if they have a place to hide out and think about what they did wrong and what they might do right. That is one advantage of having a sanctuary.

My opinion is that you're assuming a military cause to a primarily political phenomenon. Lack of physical sanctuary has not been a huge constraint for NPA leaders; very few have been killed or captured by the Government. The NPA is largely receding everywhere but Eastern Mindanao, but it's not being defeated by Government, it's essentially dying of natural causes, and I can't see how a physical sanctuary would change that.

[JMA]

I agree with David M that concerned nations have to be prepared for the possibility of change, possibly sudden and disruptive change, but there are so many unknowns and they are so thoroughly unknown that any such preparation is going to be challenging. The timing and content of whatever happens is likely to be thoroughly unexpected.

Well... this is the tragedy of it.

The US and the Western powers have probably spent billions of monitoring North Korea and they have diddly to show for it. They haven't got a clue.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan was correct... disband the CIA.

Where he was wrong ... IMHO ... was that he suggested they be absorbed into the State Department. Taking Laurel and Hardy and combining them into one would not solve any problem... probably make it worse.

[carl]

Bob Jones:

I have some problems with what you wrote and will go over what I think you have wrong.

Yes, it is true that if people won't give up the insurgents, that is a form of sanctuary. But if Sherwood Forest is gone, Robin and the boys won't necessarily get picked up that day, but they lose training areas, they lose supply caches or dumps, they lose some peace of mind because the Sheriff's men can get at them much more quickly. They lose a lot. The Sheriff's men gain propinquity and they gain time. They can get at Robin much more quickly once they know where he is than if he were deep in the forest. All they have to do is get somebody to talk to them. If they be good cops, they know how to do that. Physical sanctuary gives advantages to insurgents. Lack of it gives advantages to the security forces. I don't see how you can get around that. Yes the organization can survive if it disperses and lays low, but they aren't advancing in effectiveness. The French underground that you mention is a good example. It was there to a certain extent, but it was ineffective and had next to no effect on the Germans. (And of course, the French underground was dependent upon external support.)

It is true that if FATA were denied to AQ they might simply go elsewhere. But what if your objective was to secure FATA from the baleful effects of AQ? Then you objective is achieved. And if your objective is to kill AQ and force them to move, you are getting closer to your objective. Every time you force somebody to move or disperse, you force them to use resources, thought and energy on just surviving that they would have otherwise used to hurt you. That is what they are doing to the LRA now. Keep them moving. Never give them any rest nor anyplace to rest and eventually that tires them into exhaustion and they die or give up. That works. That is how we subdued the Apaches in the end. We just kept after them and they go tired of running. If you deprive insurgents of physical sanctuary, you can keep them on the move and it is easier to tire them out.

There are a couple of things wrong with your Germany and Japan illustration. The first is, there was no choice between us and the Reds for the people on our side of the line. We weren't going to give them or as importantly, the territory upon which they resided to the Soviets. That wasn't going to happen and they knew that.

Your point though that both Germany and Japan being fought to exhaustion and therefore not inclined to resist anybody is a good one.

Which brings us to your point of our being the lesser of two evils. Not really true as I pointed out above, but what about the Soviets? They surely weren't the lesser of two evils and the governance they provided was terrible. But there wasn't much resistance to their rule and no successful resistance until the Reds let up in the late 80s. So why was that? One reason probably was the people of the Soviet occupied countries knew we weren't going to fight the Soviets to get that territory. The more important was the an effective apparatus of suppression precluded any resistance. Simply put, no matter how bad the governance provided by the Soviet supported communist states, there wasn't a damn thing the people could do about it because the secret police would kill them if they tried.

This is a great weakness on your insistence that poor governance will result in an insurgency, you overlook the power that properly done suppressive measures have. By the same token you always seem to overlook the power that terrorism perpetrated by insurgent has to provide the sanctuary of closed mouths. Yes the villagers may not tell you Charlie is setting over there under the awning, but many of them aren't telling you because they don't want their or their children's throats cut that night if they tell you. That in a sense is a suppressive measure done to prevent insurgency against the insurgency so to speak.

Please go back and read what I have written about northern Korea. I have always prefaced my musings by saying if Red China, Russia and South Korea decide to isolate the place. If Red China wasn't in on the deal and decided to back any insurgency in northern Korea directed against the South Koreans in the event the Kim dynasty collapsed, the game couldn't be won because there would be sanctuary and support provided by a very powerful country.

I don't know of course what would happen in the event of the Kims coming down and the South Koreans moving in. But I don't think that 20 million slaves would be inclined to fight too hard to be restored to slavery. But maybe...no, I still doubt it.

[Fuchs]

May I pull out my model of war being a lot about reducing the opponent's repertoire again? :D

Consider the ability to use a hideout "A" (say, FATA) as being part of the repertoire of the reds. You may now negate this and scratch it from his active repertoire - possibly only temporarily - and the reds will simply stick to whatever active repertoire have left. Their activity will become more focused on it (i.e. they will be more elsewhere), but this doesn't necessarily mean much progress for your overall campaign.

The de-activation of elements of the hostiles' active repertoire is very helpful when this is about their offensive repertoire. It does not make much sense to reduce their defensive repertoire to the point where they only employ techniques and behaviours that make it extremely difficult to continue your offensive efforts.


So far, a young Muslim from London travelling to Pakistan without having relatives there rings some alarm bells. Imagine the reds would lose the convenient bases in FATA (and assuming they were shut out of certain troublemaker Madrasses as well). Said young Muslim will probably travel to Tunisia instead, possibly with a two-week tourist travel to a beach hotel as do so many other people.

Always keep in mind the #### did hit the fan long AFTER OBL was forced to evacuate from Sudan.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World


But the most important form of sanctuary comes from the support of a poorly governed populace. Charlie owns the night because he walks among you during the day. You don't know who he is, but the people do, because he and they are one and he operates from the sanctuary of their support, and cannot exist without that same sanctuary.

Of course there is a political aspect and you have an interesting political theory. Your political theory is another among tens of existing theories that should be considered, but none of these theories have universal application. Setting political theories aside for minute, the military aspect of the conflict is also important, something we have seemed to forgotten since 9/11 as we all rushed to embrace nation building and forgot about a potential role for the military to actually combat the resistance in addition to everything we do.

First off the VC weren't successful and they would not have been as successful as they were without external support from North Vietnam and ultimately China and the USSR. The NVA conventional forces were, and no it wasn't a transition to war of movement, these were two different force entirely, not an evolution of the insurgents into a real army. Point taken about sanctuary provided by the people, but sanctuary is only one type of support. In the real world of fighting other forms of support are needed.

The importance of external support for a resistance movement depends upon a lot of factors, so there are no universal laws or principles that blindly apply, and I know that is a disappoint to our doctrine writers, so they'll continue to dismiss this fact. In short the resistance needs the "means" to resist relative to those are they resisting, and of course it must be tied to their ways and ends (and the ways and ends must be tied to the means). If the resistance doesn't have the means to sustain a level of effort and the occupying power is competent and capable the resistance will be relatively rapidly reduced to a manageable level. Underlying factors may still be present, so may the resistance, but it won't be a significant threat.

North Korea is an interesting case, and none of us know how it will unfold, but we can all speculate. If the North Koreans are isolated from the rest of the world (which is a hopeful assumption) then the question is how long can they sustain the resistance? If the North Korean army transitions from a conventional to guerrilla warfare approach and it has been preparing to do so for years, then I suspect from a military aspect it is likely they can sustain for years (much like the Iraqi resistance which no doubt they studied closely). Of course the ability to sustain themselves with food may be another matter.

If the Army capitulates or if major nK units are persuaded to side with the ROKs will the people have the will and means to sustain a resistance? Militarizing and brain washing a society is one thing, but it doesn't seem to be too much of a reach that the paradigm they have had engrained for persist indefinitely. That assumption is hopeful also, because nK agents that were captured were extremely loyal to the North even after working in the South and seeing the contrast, so the assumption that we're going to turn them around with economic incentives alone is rather naive (yet we embrace this type of naivity in Afghanistan). In many cases it took a concerted efforts to de-radicalize them (using the buzz term of the day).

In short there a lot of unknowns and a lot of possibilities. I say this cautiously, but this seems like one case where an intelligent PYSOP effort could actually work if the ROKs did it. Putting U.S. forces in the north for anything other than combat operations against North Korean regular forces could produce some tough antibodies. The ROKs need engage the nK people, and if need be bring us in later to assist after they established a trusted relationship.

I don't think the conflict is going to happen based on reasons I put in previous posts, and noted our Korean expert doesn't want to address the potential disadvantages of unification :D

However, if events unfolded and a conflict materialized I suspect our egos would drive a course of action that has U.S. forces all over North Korea for CNN photo ops. This way we lead our poor ROK brothers who don't understand COIN the way we do to victory based on our lessons observed from OIF and OEF-A. The biggest lesson we fail to grasp to gain understanding and then act instead of imposing a solution on a problem we really don't have a clue about.

[Bob's World]

All politics is not insurgency, but all insurgency is political. If not political, such as the drug business related conflict in Mexico, it isn't insurgency.

Just like all war is politics, but not all politics is war.

But not all political conflict is war either, certainly revolutionary political conflict internal to a state is very different in nature (cause and cure) than political conflict between states, such as occurs in conventional warfare or resistance insurgency.

But the VC were to the NVA just as the Militia were to Washington's Continental Army. Our history likes to separate the two, so that we can claim a COIN victory against the VC and then blame a conventional loss against the NVA as something that happened to ARVN after we lost. That is an artificial construct. Just as the creation of two states, North and South, in mid-insurgency, was an artificial construct. Convenient labels that box in our thinking.

But one must understand the political causal essence of conflict if one is going to then shape a military effort that is likely to facilitate a political victory. Too often we refuse to recognize the inconvenient truth of the political essence, as it runs counter to our approved narrative or objectives or both. When we allow that to happen, as we did in Vietnam and as we do today in Afghanistan, it leads us to misapply the military. We fight the conflict as we have defined it conveniently in our minds, rather than the conflict as it actually exists before us. That is why we lose those conflicts.

Now to DPRK. We run the risk of creating a convenient construct for the populace of DPRK to act IAW as well, and our belief in that construct could lead us to make tragic miscalculations regarding our peacetime approaches now, or our approach to any potential conflict that could arise some day.

To wish away the likelihood of a popular resistance to any form or occupation due to our misguided belief that what we bring is so good that the affected populace will embrace it, or that some misguided concept of "sanctuary" not being available will prevent a resistance, or that because their might not be a foreign sponsor for the resistance that the people will not employ what they have at hand, are all forms of the type of wishful thinking that we apply far too often.

We refuse to learn the strategic lessons of populace-based conflicts because to do so forces us to accept hard truths about ourselves. This in turn leads us to write the same flaws of past plans that led to the creation of the insurgencies that stymied us into our plans for future conflicts. The cycle continues to repeat itself. Human nature at work. It is human nature to resist on one hand, and it is equally human nature for government to not see the flaws of its ways.

[ganulv]

North Korean functionaries are claiming that their country now possesses missiles capable of reaching the U.S. mainland (http://www.salon.com/2012/10/09/north_korea_says_us_within_its_missile_range/). This reminds me of an anecdote from a fellow who was brought to my undergraduate institution to interview for an at–the–time recently created position for a forensic anthropologist. He had previously been affiliated with a program which sought to identify and exchange human remains with the DPRK. He said his interactions with North Korean colleagues had been very good and that those guys were invariably professional and even amiable. But he also had a story of being taken to a North Korean museum which housed an exhibit to the nation’s space program which included a photo of the Space Shuttle with a North Korean flag crudely Photoshopped onto its side. I think it safe to assume that the DPRK’s ballistic missile capabilities are in the same general neighborhood.

[AdamG]

SEOUL, South Korea — A senior South Korean policy maker on North Korea said on Friday that it must be assumed that the North has the capacity to mount a nuclear device on a ballistic missile, adding that such a capability would pose “an existential threat” to South Korea.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/world/asia/south-korean-official-warns-of-existential-threat-from-north.html?_r=0

[AdamG]

The Japanese government has ordered its military to shoot down the missile that is expected to be launched by North Korea as early as Monday.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9728806/Japan-poised-to-shoot-down-North-Korean-missile.html

[AdamG]

SEOUL -- North Korea launched a long-range rocket Wednesday morning in defiance of international warnings that the second test-firing of a missile this year would violate international sanctions.

The Japanese government said Wednesday that debris from North Korea's long-range rocket fell into waters off the Philippines at 10:05 a.m. after passing over Okinawa.

Pyongyang fired the Unha-3 rocket at 9:51 a.m., Seoul's defense ministry said earlier in the day.

Japan didn't order its military to intercept the North Korean rocket, according to officials.

Shortly after the North's defiant launch, the Japanese government convened an emergency meeting of security-related ministers.

http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-north-korea-launches-rocket-20121211,0,4357504.story

[AdamG]

WASHINGTON — American and South Korean officials reported seismic activity in North Korea on Tuesday that appeared to be evidence of the country’s third, and long-threatened nuclear test and a new challenge for the Obama administration in its effort to keep the country from becoming a full-fledged nuclear power.

“We believe that North Korea has conducted a nuclear test,” said Kim Min-seok, spokesman of the South Korean Defense Ministry.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-test.html?_r=0

[AdamG]

North Korea vowed Tuesday to cancel the 1953 cease-fire that ended the Korean War, citing a U.S.-led push for punishing United Nations sanctions over its recent nuclear test and ongoing U.S.-South Korean joint military drills.

Without elaborating, the Korean People's Army Supreme Command warned of "surgical strikes" meant to unify the divided Korean Peninsula and of an indigenous, "precision nuclear striking tool." The statement came amid reports that Washington and North Korean ally Beijing have approved a draft of a UN Security Council resolution calling for sanctions in response to North Korea's Feb. 12 nuclear test. The draft is expected to be circulated at the UN this week.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2013/03/05/north-korea-ceasefire.html

[AdamG]

(Reuters) - North Korea said on Tuesday its strategic rocket and long-range artillery units have been ordered to be combat ready, targeting U.S. military bases on Guam, Hawaii and mainland America after U.S. bombers flew sorties threatening the North.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/26/us-korea-north-combat-idUSBRE92P06520130326

..and a WaPo "Nothing to see here, move along" analysis
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/25/a-photo-that-makes-north-korea-look-a-lot-less-scary/

[davidbfpo]

The thread 'North Korea's military capabilities and deterrence' appeared in late 2012 and it is appropriate to merge it into the longer, main thread on North Korea.

A new thread will be created for the current crisis or "sabre rattling" by North Korea, March 2013 and this thread closed.

[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note

This new thread replaces a long running thread on North Korea, which started in February 2006, with 400 posts and 56k views. That thread is now closed, but can be viewed:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=919

There are a few relevant posts on the current sabre rattling by North Korea (DPRK) and this have been moved over - so this note appears after them.

[davidbfpo]

Two interesting and different commentaries on current events. One by a RUSI analyst 'Viewpoint: What is driving North Korea's threats?':http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21950069

The author notes:
....there is little reason to suspect that it will deliver on some of its other promises, at least anytime soon.

One reason for this is that a major audience for Kim Jong-un's tough talk is domestic. The young leader was promoted quickly through the ranks of the Korean People's Army by his late father, despite having done little to earn those qualifications. Standing up to North Korea's enemies will help Kim Jong-un consolidate his military and political power.

The second is by a long-time British academic expert on North Korea asks 'Could a Korean Armageddon really happen?:http://m.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/mar/29/could-north-korean-armageddon-happen


Namely: are they serious? Do they mean it? Could a Korean Armageddon really happen? My one-word answer would be no. A wag at South Korea's defence ministry quipped earlier this month that "barking dogs don't bite".

I'd forgotten the joint venture in North Korea by a South Korean company and the author notes:
And each day dozens of South Koreans still commute from Seoul across the DMZ to supervise Northern workers at a joint venture industrial park. That is the reality on the ground. With any luck it will remain so.

In a previous article @ Kaesong this activity has never been stopped:http://m.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/mar/08/north-korea-nuclear-threat-unknown-quantity

One wonders what China and Russia think?

[davidbfpo]

A sketchy report on what some refer to as a key barometer of relations:
The two countries have historically been reluctant to meddle with Kaesong, even during periods of fraught tension elsewhere. The complex has never been shut down, in its eight years of operation, and remains an important symbol for both sides. For the North, it is a sign of economic liberalisation and achievement. For the South, it is a blueprint of how the two countries might one day cooperate more fully. More than 120 South Korean companies employ over 53,000 North Koreans at Kaesong for their cheap and skilled labour.

DPRK is restricting entry and exit to Kaesong:
A total of 858 South Korean workers, and seven other foreigners remain on the Kaesong site and could potentially be held hostage if the situation worsens.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9968191/North-Korea-blocks-entry-to-Kaesong-industrial-zone.html

[ganulv]

A sketchy report on what some refer to as a key barometer of relations:

DPRK is restricting entry and exit to Kaesong:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9968191/North-Korea-blocks-entry-to-Kaesong-industrial-zone.html

It was heavily covered on NPR this morning in the States. I don't want to make light of the very real danger that exists every day along the DMZ, but I remember in the spring of 1994 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/dprk_nuke.htm) when the US media was full of stories about how the peninsula was on the brink of war that I wrote to a friend in Seoul and asked if everything there was OK. I received a letter back a couple of weeks later that the whole situation had been a blip there.

The young and new leader is of course a variable which was not present two decades ago.

[Stan]

Here's a scan from my bedroom window in 1980 along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) with the DMZ two clicks south of our quarters.

The intensity of the music and BS from the loudspeakers lulled me into sleep for over a year.

The other part of this madness was working with the UN (seconded) all the while the USG barked from far away and the music and propaganda increased with each passing day.

It's one thing to realize that the North Korean leader is little more than an adolescent, and yet another thing for an educated American politician to play the same game while our troops are on this fragile line of defense.

[AdamG]

The US is moving an advanced missile system to the Pacific island of Guam as a precaution following threats by North Korea, the Pentagon has said.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22021832

[ganulv]

Here's a scan from my bedroom window in 1980 along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) with the DMZ two clicks south of our quarters.

The intensity of the music and BS from the loudspeakers lulled me into sleep for over a year.
Stan,

Here it is (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xw46Ll-Zy4s&list=PL10943F1A08C72A17) looking from the other direction, where it (or at least this segment) is apparently the closest thing the DPRK has to a tourist attraction. Weird, but hardly the weirdest thing going on there, I guess.

[max161]

at this link:
http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2013/04/how-does-north-korea-off-ramp-this.html

[Bill Moore]

max161,

You are one of the few people I listen to on Korea. Too many others have a year or two there and assume they're an expert and nothing new is going on. At the end of the day, we don't know what is going through the mind of Un, and all the factors driving his behavior. Nor do we know how the ROKs will respond to a potential incident. We can all speculate, some can even make educated guesses, but at the end day we're in a period of uncertainty.

In response to this comment


I remember in the spring of 1994 when the US media was full of stories about how the peninsula was on the brink of war that I wrote to a friend in Seoul and asked if everything there was OK. I received a letter back a couple of weeks later that the whole situation had been a blip there.

Unless your friend was a General Officer or senior Korean politician then it was simply an observation based on the fact he or she didn't see anything pending. I suspect you could have asked that question throughout history to millions of people globally and got a similiar answer just before their nation went to war. I think that may have a couple of times to us? 7 December, 9/11...

Of course that is one reason I think this will die down because the element of surprise appears to have slipped by, but once again I (we) don't know.

[max161]

Bill:
The comment you are referring to about 1994 was not mine but is from "ganulv" above (I was there in 1994 and I remember it sure seemed like more than a blip). In my blog at the link I offer some thoughts on how the regime might off ramp this situation and achieve objectives that support the regime's strategy and policies and what its propaganda narrative might be. I fully agree that no one can know for sure what is going on inside the regime and what they are really thinking but their patterns of actions are revealing and provide at least some clues.
V/R
Dave

[ganulv]

Unless your friend was a General Officer or senior Korean politician then it was simply an observation based on the fact he or she didn't see anything pending. I suspect you could have asked that question throughout history to millions of people globally and got a similiar answer just before their nation went to war. I think that may have a couple of times to us? 7 December, 9/11...
He was just a life-long resident of Seoul. I've never been to Korea but the half dozen or so Korean friends I have seem to share the attitude that the War is probably never going to resume but that it might at any moment, and without warning.

[Stan]

Stan,

Here it is (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xw46Ll-Zy4s&list=PL10943F1A08C72A17) looking from the other direction, where it (or at least this segment) is apparently the closest thing the DPRK has to a tourist attraction. Weird, but hardly the weirdest thing going on there, I guess.

Great video, Matt !
The DMZ has attracted tourists for years, even the Dallas Cowboys cheerleaders on the southern side.

While I was there a north Korean kindergarden class came for a visit with 3-year olds spitting at us. Can't imagine what they were being taught and now can only imagine what those same kids are like as adults.

The building filled with explosives is real. In fact, the entire MSR1 from Freedom Bridge to Seoul has huge overpasses (without roads leading anywhere) also filled with explosives. Once blown, no way of getting to the capital via armored vehicle unless you want to take a stab at driving a tank through a rice patty :D

[J Wolfsberger]

It's one thing to realize that the North Korean leader is little more than an adolescent, and yet another thing for an educated American politician to play the same game while our troops are on this fragile line of defense.

True.

But what really scares me is that there don't seem to be many "educated American politician(s)." What we have instead is a surplus of highly indoctrinated, over aged, self serving adolescents.

I'll be very surprised if this latest chest thumping by NK doesn't lead to a very bad outcome.

[jmm99]

that international relations have followed the path of internet relations ?

"Suppose you have two groups (http://www.smbc-comics.com/)"

Shocking - utterly shocking.

Regards

Mike

[carl]

It seems to me that King Kim III's ongoing bluff, if it is a bluff, will have to be called eventually. If it is not, tribute will have to be paid to this king for years and years to come. If and when the bluff is called, there is a chance very serious fighting will ensue. I don't see any way around this ultimately, either pay or risk a fight.

A separate question. Let's say a decision is made to call. It doesn't matter what the provocation will be, there is always another one coming. Do you think it would help if sort of an open proscription list of DPRK high officials was published? It would name names and say, politely, the guys on this list are dead if a war starts. The idea would be to personalize consequences and thereby discourage aggressive behavior. The King doesn't rule unassisted after all.

[slapout9]

After Pershing Missiles I got tp play with this one as a kid to:D
Zero to Mach 10 in 5 seconds!!!! with a Neutron Warhead. Little Kim needs to learn a lesson. Link to live footage of Sprint ABM test.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=msXtgTVMcuA


Here is another one good one with more detail. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5vq4mWyYl2Y

[Bill Moore]

that international relations have followed the path of internet relations ?

"Suppose you have two groups (http://www.smbc-comics.com/)"

Shocking - utterly shocking.

Regards

Mike

This is a classic, thanks for posting.

[slapout9]

Link to article on US delays Missile test amid so called tensions with North Korea. This is a prime example of how America is in decline and no longer respected in the world. We yield to mass murders and leave our allies and friends in suspense about our true intentions as far as it regards our political will to actually honor our defense treaties. We are facing the greatest crisis of leadership I have ever seen in my lifetime for this country. Think Nixon would have put up with this worst haircut ever kinda guy.....I Don't think so.

http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/06/17634341-us-delays-missile-test-amid-tensions-with-north-korea?lite

[Wyatt]

Ive got some local context given to me and some general thoughts.

A very good friend of mine is part of a wealthy and well connected korean family living in seoul. They have been moving money out of the country this time which is something they have never done before. they have also prepared plans to leave, which is also new.

As far as general thoughts. If we are attacked I believe we will be caught flat footed. Its classic boy who cried wolf and if they act now, it will be after the public has determined thats its only another show.


How many times has the US and ROKs taken a hit and done nothing? mini subs, arty fire, sunken ships, DPRK agents and sympathizers in the south. They have been allowed to take such action with impunity because have had no meaningful response. They may perceive this as batting 100%, and they may be right.

Didn't Saddam believe we would not intervene in kuwait because 1. we told him kuwait wasn't an american concern 2. The 16 some-odd UN resolutions that did nothing militarily and had no teeth and 3. He believed the US military risk avers and afraid of casualties

Its entirely possible in my eyes that kim jong un sees the US and the ROKs in a similar light.

[davidbfpo]

An interview with a SME, mainly on the nuclear proliferation aspects:http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/interview-siegfried-hecker-north-korea-complicates-the-long-term-picture

[slapout9]

CNN does an analysis of how a real war could play out according to Retired US Army Brigadier General James "Spyder" Marks.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qPiT_x9NG4

[davidbfpo]

Dr Schindler's blog offers a commentary and includes this key passage:
The bottom line, as Myers make clear, is that the juche stuff is all mumbo-jumbo for external consumption while the regime’s actual beliefs, which the population is bombarded with non-stop, are based in crude nationalism that works well at motivating the people though terrible times. Basically, Pyongyang is not a bunch of Commies, rather a bunch of Nazis, of a rarified Asian variety. Myers, who spent years studying the regime’s ideology, demonstrates that the DPRK’s esoteric worldview owes more to Japanese mystical ultranationalism, learned during Tokyo’s occupation of the country from 1905 to 1945, including – time to possibly get worried here – an emphasis on sacrifice and death in kamikaze fashion, than anything to do with Marx, Lenin, or Mao.

Shortly after:
Myers also shows that Pyongyang has no fear of the United States and perhaps wants a confrontation, even a military one, to gain dominance over the Korean peninsula. The DPRK’s assessment of strategy, grounded in very different ethnic and political assumptions, is radically different from our own.

Link:http://20committee.com/2013/04/05/do-experts-know-what-they-are-talking-about/

[carl]

David:

Here is a link to an interview with Prof. B.R. Myers, the man whose work prompted the XX Committee comment.

http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2010/04/immersion-in-propaganda-racebased-nationalism-and-the-unfigureoutable-vortex-of-juche-thought-colin-.html

Prof. Myers work and view are unlike anything I've read about North Korea. It seems perfectly sensible and extremely scary. The interview and Prof. Myers book are from 2010 and the interview contains this quote:
I think a time may well come when North Korea really is so desperate, and has no other way in which to rally its people around it, that it will actually look for a military confrontation with South Korea.

I strongly urge people to read the interview. Those guys, all of them, ain't like us and the rules of behavior we (including me) are used to don't apply.

As an aside, Prof Myers mentions more people having seen Korean movies lately. The first one I ever watched was 3 years ago called Tae Guk Gi. I never saw a war movie with such ferocious antipathy toward the enemy (the DPRK) as that movie. Maybe I just don't know much about Koreans but if the attitude of the producers of that movie at that time is anything to go by, if the North and the South go at it, it will be something.

[slapout9]

I strongly urge people to read the interview. Those guys, all of them, ain't like us and the rules of behavior we (including me) are used to don't apply.



Not to disappoint anybody but the only way out of this mess is to analyze Little Kim as a System and then Attack him as a System. If we continue to analyze him in terms of Clausewitz,Sun Zu,Who Flung Dung we will just keep running around in a maze. Or more precisely we should analyze the larger system that controls him. To do that we should ask the First Strategic Question(1) which is Where should we be and that is China! We should strive hard to come up with a Strategic Plan that makes little Kim irrelevant to our long term interest. We need to stop using obsolete guessing based some dead foreign people and use some hard core current real world facts. Face it Colonel Warden is right.:)

[carl]

Slap:

I don't see how North Korea can ever be irrelevant. It is important to South Korea and Korea is important to Japan and therefore it is important to us. The same with Red China. The only way I can see to make the DPRK irrelevant is to give up any interest in what occurs in the western Pacific. I don't see that happening.

What is SBW?

[slapout9]

carl,
I used to say SBW stood for Slapout Based Warfare but it is really Systems Based Warfare. The more comolex and confusing an entity is the easier it is to understand it by viewing it as a System connected to other larger Systems. You understand it without realizing it. By making this an Air Power Mission and making South Korea and China more important to us and letting them control Bad Korea's(Little Kim) 5 Rings we could make Little Kim(Bad Korea) irrelevant. Link to Colonel Warden's latest article!

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/2011/2011-1/2011_1_04_warden.pdf

[carl]

Slap:

If you mean we should try to bump off Kim III, I'm all for it. But I don't think we could if the only option was an air strike. We would have to have information about not only where he was when the weapon is launched but where he would be when it landed. That is close to impossible to know.

I read Warden's article quickly and was not impressed. Everything he says has been said by airpower advocates since after WWI. He does dress it up with new words though. The problem with airpower doing it all is for that to work you have to have perfect information at all times about all the worthwhile targets and you have to have weapons that can kill the target. As long as people can think, dig and hide, airpower can't do it all. Warden in fact advocates airpower advocates start from the premise that '"airpower has no limits"'. He says also that "With precision of effect combined with precision of impact, bloodless war becomes a reality." First I don't trust anybody who can seriously say war can be bloodless and the two precisions he mentions depend upon perfect knowledge and execution. That can't happen.

I still don't get it. If South Korea is important to us and they get into a fight with the North, then the North is important to us.

[slapout9]

carl,
The short answer is any ground force(s) should be supplied by South Korea, which by the way has really been an Air Force idea since the 50's.

I am not recommending a UBL style style bug hunt for Little Kim which is an entirely different situation Bad Korea is a (System)not a terrorist organization and it should be attacked as a country (System) if that becomes necessary.

If you read the article in detail you will find that an Airpower solution can be a complete annihilation of a country just like Rome and Carthage if we determine that is what we want.

Which may be the right thing to do in this case because we no street credibility with Korea they kill our people, steal out ships and property and those of our Legal Treat Allies and we do nothing but give them booty, we may be backed into going all out because we have cried wolf to many times, we have drawn to many lines, to many times with no real consequences.

On second thought he would be easy to find as he really wants to be Dennis Rodman's Prison Bitch. Gee if Gay marriage becomes legal and they hook up he would be an American citizen, it which case it would OK to use Drones on him:eek:

[carl]

Slap:

I am always skeptical of airpower enthusiasts claims. They have been making the same claim for going on a century now. Airpower is decisive but it can't do it all every time, everywhere as they claim.

In the case of the DPRK, airpower wouldn't be needed at all, except in a tactical sense, if Red China played along and shut the border. If that happened North Korea becomes an island with no navy, an island that has no fuel and no food. If you are hard enough and hold the north and south borders, they fall. No sorties needed.

In any event, Kim III has the initiative. We are going to react to what he does, not the other way around. We, including Red China, aren't going to do anything unless in reaction. The key is Red China of course. If the North and South were to go at it the result, or at least the immediacy of the result depends on if they keep the border open and if they logistically support the North. If they isolate the North, airpower isn't needed. If they don't, airpower won't be able to do the job alone.

You're right though. I don't see any need at all for for US troops to go north of the border.

In any event, the reason I so strongly recommend reading that interview is that the thing that is really important is the world as it exists inside the DPRK. That world is way different in ours, so different I don't see how we can affect it at all in the long run...short of a kill it dead war. That is as sobering a thought as there can be.

[carl]

Slap:

I've been thinking on this and I wonder if there is something else, another type of ring, that can be attacked ala Warden and attacking Kim III as a system...sort of.

According to the interview with Prof Byers the slaves in the DPRK know only what the king and the king's men want them to know. The Kim dynasty's power depends entirely upon that. What if you put big drones continuously off both coasts. The drones would be broadcast stations for TV, radio and any other thing you could think of. They would show and talk about the world, especially South Korea, compare and contrast, how the South Koreans aren't downtrodden and aren't living for the day the peninsula is reunited. Also highlight how all the suffering those poor people undergo is really for the Kims and nobody else.

The effectiveness of this could be gauged by how much the Kim regime howled. What do you think?

[slapout9]

carl,
Hold on I am coming but we have really, really bad weather coming in LA (Lower Alabama) so I will be off the air for a while. But like MacArthur or a good dog I shall return:)

[slapout9]

I am always skeptical of airpower enthusiasts claims. They have been making the same claim for going on a century now. Airpower is decisive but it can't do it all every time, everywhere as they claim. I don't disagree that.


In the case of the DPRK, airpower wouldn't be needed at all, except in a tactical sense, if Red China played along and shut the border. If that happened North Korea becomes an island with no navy, an island that has no fuel and no food. If you are hard enough and hold the north and south borders, they fall. No sorties needed. That is why I brought up the fact that China is the Larger System that must be properly influenced in order to have a successful long term solution.


In any event, Kim III has the initiative. We are going to react to what he does, not the other way around. We, including Red China, aren't going to do anything unless in reaction. The key is Red China of course. If the North and South were to go at it the result, or at least the immediacy of the result depends on if they keep the border open and if they logistically support the North. If they isolate the North, airpower isn't needed. If they don't, airpower won't be able to do the job alone. Sorta agree except US Airpower would most definitely be our US decider along with the South Korean Ground force.


You're right though. I don't see any need at all for for US troops to go north of the border. Agree it would be a really bad idea.


In any event, the reason I so strongly recommend reading that interview is that the thing that is really important is the world as it exists inside the DPRK. That world is way different in ours, so different I don't see how we can affect it at all in the long run...short of a kill it dead war. That is as sobering a thought as there can be. I did read the article and I liked it alot, but I am not surprised at all. Little Kim is a gang leader, almost a cult leader(both of which I have dealt with, gangs in particular) so his somewhat strange antics don't surprise me at all. And he is NOT crazy he knows exactly what he is doing! And he is a very dangerous guy. The OLDEST gangs in the world come from the Asian area, they have been at this a long time. I suspect we will see more of this type activity as we do the Asian Pivot or what ever they are calling it now.

The new trinity of War analysis should be should be Race, Religion and Language not the Army, Government and the People.Just my opinion as usual.

[slapout9]

I've been thinking on this and I wonder if there is something else, another type of ring, that can be attacked ala Warden and attacking Kim III as a system...sort of.

According to the interview with Prof Byers the slaves in the DPRK know only what the king and the king's men want them to know. The Kim dynasty's power depends entirely upon that. What if you put big drones continuously off both coasts. The drones would be broadcast stations for TV, radio and any other thing you could think of. They would show and talk about the world, especially South Korea, compare and contrast, how the South Koreans aren't downtrodden and aren't living for the day the peninsula is reunited. Also highlight how all the suffering those poor people undergo is really for the Kims and nobody else.

The effectiveness of this could be gauged by how much the Kim regime howled. What do you think?

It's is not another ring per say... it is a Process (PsyOp Communications) and belongs in Ring #2(Processes sometimes called System Essentials). Not really that important IMO for the simple reason it would take to long for any beneficial Effect to happen. South Korea may want to do it as part of some type of a Political Propaganda Campaign but the USA should stay back from something like that.

[Maeda Toshiie]

Slap:

I've been thinking on this and I wonder if there is something else, another type of ring, that can be attacked ala Warden and attacking Kim III as a system...sort of.

According to the interview with Prof Byers the slaves in the DPRK know only what the king and the king's men want them to know. The Kim dynasty's power depends entirely upon that. What if you put big drones continuously off both coasts. The drones would be broadcast stations for TV, radio and any other thing you could think of. They would show and talk about the world, especially South Korea, compare and contrast, how the South Koreans aren't downtrodden and aren't living for the day the peninsula is reunited. Also highlight how all the suffering those poor people undergo is really for the Kims and nobody else.

The effectiveness of this could be gauged by how much the Kim regime howled. What do you think?

Based on what I have read in this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nothing_to_Envy

No. Not likely to work.

1. For those with state sanctioned TVs and radios, they can't be tuned to any other channels. If someone else parks transmitters to transmitted and/or jam the official North Korean channels, this might just provoke a real war.

2. Via the border, there is quite a bit of a black market trade ongoing. This means that those (other than the Pyongyang elite) with connections, especially those locals near the border, do have access to illicit material including SK soaps.

3. My personal theory: many in the country knows just how screwed up their country in comparison with the rest of the world. For those old enough, they certainly know that things had gone much worse since the early 90s. This includes people in the power structure, especially those from the mid tier down. Meanwhile their survival instincts kick in and they simply want to carve out whatever they can out of this crumbling rubbish heap. If they can climb higher up this trash heap, the better. If they can profit from the illegal black market trade, the better.

As for the generation were born in the 90s? It is hard to say. They might just be convinced that their current circumstances are the best that have ever been (in NK at least) and it is all thanks to the evil imperialists and their running dogs.

Because of how pervasive the controls are in place, no one knows who or what to trust, not even close family members of blood. They parrot the necessary words and actions when in front of any other human being (or worse, any living thing). Only those who are brave enough or desperate enough, would attempt to get out of that mental assylum. Somehow, I do feel that the control system that was set in place is so strong that it even locks the top leadership into this rattling train that is slowly falling apart on its way to hell.


Off topic: God, I wish SK manufactured music and TV soaps would stop afflicting the region...

[carl]

I did read the article and I liked it alot, but I am not surprised at all. Little Kim is a gang leader, almost a cult leader(both of which I have dealt with, gangs in particular) so his somewhat strange antics don't surprise me at all. And he is NOT crazy he knows exactly what he is doing! And he is a very dangerous guy. The OLDEST gangs in the world come from the Asian area, they have been at this a long time. I suspect we will see more of this type activity as we do the Asian Pivot or what ever they are calling it now.

That is a very interesting observation. In your experience, how have gang leaders lost their positions?

[carl]

It's is not another ring per say... it is a Process (PsyOp Communications) and belongs in Ring #2(Processes sometimes called System Essentials). Not really that important IMO for the simple reason it would take to long for any beneficial Effect to happen. South Korea may want to do it as part of some type of a Political Propaganda Campaign but the USA should stay back from something like that.

I don't think an extended period of time for something to work with the Kim dynasty is a drawback. This has been going on for decades and decades so if something would have an effect in say 5 years, that's actually pretty quick.

You're right though, the whole thing would have to be a South Korean play.

[carl]

Maeda Toshiie:

Prof. Byers makes the same point in the interview that Kim's slaves don't actually have much envy of the outside world. The propaganda world they live in has taken care of that. But a critical point he makes is that the sacrifices they know they are making have a point, the 'liberation' of the south and reunification of the peninsula. He says that since the South has elected a gov that is actually kind of hostile that whole line of argument is breaking down. Sort of "We go through all this to save them and they don't want to be saved. WTF? Why are we doing this?" He says enough info is getting through so that is becoming a concern, hence the provocations.

The other point he makes is if the idea gets out that all the suffering isn't for Korea, but for the Kims, then there might be trouble.

So the idea would be to build upon those two things.

As far as the technical aspects, I don't know. I have confidence in people's ingenuity with radios, TVs, cell phones and all that. But their ingenuity won't come into play unless they have something to shoot for and broadcasts or texts or whatever are something to shoot for.

You are very right that a well organized police state with an ideology of some kind to back it up is extremely difficult to bring down from the inside, perhaps impossible. So the kind of outside push I am suggesting may help a bit. Or it may not do anything at all. I figure though something new (maybe it was tried before, I don't know) should be tried. Otherwise the choice ultimately is giving Kim III a blank check, or a big war. If they get really upset we would know it was working.

The thing in the interview that mildly shocked me was that the average North Korean man is shorter than the average South Korean woman. That is something.

[Maeda Toshiie]

From the reports by the defecting civilians, the famine in the 90s took a severe toll, in deaths and the health of those who survived. This is especially true in areas outside of Pyongyang. I am sure those who grew up at that period of time (and survived), would have suffer from stunted growth.

:wry: I suppose the good outcome of that is that their army has a larger number of people to select tankers from, given the size of Soviet tanks. :wry:

I think there are sporadic reports of mutinies over the years. Not all may be true, but I can't believe that all are untrue. The guess of some is that these mutinies are due to ration shortage. Given the draconian discipline, they must be really hungry to mutiny.

There are reports that PRC stopped shipment of fuel to NK. Might actually be untrue with shipments continuing quietly, but surely a sign of PRC's anger towards NK's recent action.

-----------------------------

The possible scenarios that I can see (but not necessarily likely):

1. North Korea attempts to maintain status quo, while trying to squeeze whatever concessions they can out of the rest of the world and PRC. NK will slowly waste away while the rest of the world moves on.

2. North Korea attempts to follow PRC's example of liberalizing the economy. This is highly unlikely, since Kim III is no Deng Xiaoping, nor there seems to be a Deng Xiaoping in NK. Even if there is, he/she can't do anything with the cult of Kim being firmly entrenched in the political ideology. The chance of this happening is very very slim.

3. North Korea finally implodes with Kim losing control or dead. Would the PLA drive in and attempt to secure Pyongyang and plant a puppet? Would there be a sufficiently big incident that the South Korean government can use as justification to intervene?

4. (Unintended?) escalation to full-scale war, due to the hardline factions on both sides who keep raising the stakes?

-----------------------------

The cost of the war and the even bigger cost of reunification is what stopping South Korea from marching north and putting an end to it all. I am sure everyone is aware that the cost will make the German reunification look like a walk in the park. Plus, I believe South Korean government still wants sufficient justification for a massive intervention. At the very least, they probably want to look like they are forced into action, so as to make themselves look like the victim of NK bullying and then as a saviour for the North Korean civilians on world political stage. However bellicose the current rhetoric seems, it is still words and no blood has been spilled these few months.


It's late over here at GMT +8. My post may seem a little incoherent...

[slapout9]

That is a very interesting observation. In your experience, how have gang leaders lost their positions?

That is probably one of the biggest myths out there! They don't loose their position they transition to somebody else often just like a country does. That is why we still have so many gangs around and they are still getting stronger. Again that is a generalization and there are a lot more moving parts but that has generally what I have seen. PS sendindg them to prison doesn't stop the gang from functioning either. Another general myth that floats around a lot.

[slapout9]

It's late over here at GMT +8. My post may seem a little incoherent...

Seems pretty coherent to me. Add some more if you have time.

[carl]

That is probably one of the biggest myths out there! They don't loose their position they transition to somebody else often just like a country does. That is why we still have so many gangs around and they are still getting stronger. Again that is a generalization and there are a lot more moving parts but that has generally what I have seen. PS sendindg them to prison doesn't stop the gang from functioning either. Another general myth that floats around a lot.

If you wanted depose a gang leader somehow though, how would you go about it? What might work? What I am getting at is what in gang dynamics might be useful against Kim III?

Maeda: no incoherence that I could see.

[slapout9]

If you wanted depose a gang leader somehow though, how would you go about it? What might work? What I am getting at is what in gang dynamics might be useful against Kim III?



If enough of Kim's inner circle were mad at him because the country could be lost then they might think it was worth the risk to do something like that. But you are dealing with 3 generations of the Kim ruling elite(all kinds of cousins and aunts and uncles floating around and on the Kim gravy train) which as I said is what makes Asian Gangs and Family Dynasties so difficult and different to the American way of dealing with things. Kim has a cult leadership quality about him that makes the situation very different and unstable. All in all a very, very low probability of success operation IMO.

[carl]

So, the way I read it, this is going to eventually end with a big fight. It could go on forever if we just kept issuing the checks forever. But human nature precludes that. Somebody will inevitably get ticked off and say no more and then the fight comes.

So, if the fight is inevitable, would it not be better to have it sooner, while their nukes are still of uncertain utility, than later after they have had time to perfect them?

My opinion of course makes no difference at all. Does anybody know if the South Koreans are leaning that way?

[Maeda Toshiie]

The North has rejected South's call for talks. This indicates to me that the South is more willing to talk than to start a war. The government still balks at the cost of reunification, especially on by force. The economic and human cost is unacceptable.

The South Korean people seem to be keen on downplaying concerns on the North's threats. I think it is recognized that the North cannot carry out afford carry out its threats, at least not in the near future.

[jmm99]

Good path, to ask the South Koreans what they want - esp. where nukes might (at some point) be involved.

In the Cold War Era, the South Koreans and Germans were both faced with difficult questions - basically, would the village be destroyed in order to save it ? Edward Luttwak outlined the paradoxes in his Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (http://www.amazon.com/Strategy-The-Logic-War-Peace/dp/0674839951) (1987).

The complex issues (when the Thermonuclear Era was younger than I) are covered by Andre Beaufre in his An introduction to strategy: With particular reference to problems of defense, politics, economics, and diplomacy in the nuclear age (http://www.amazon.com/introduction-strategy-particular-reference-economics/dp/B0007DOEDE) (1965), and Deterrence and Strategy (http://www.amazon.com/Deterrence-Strategy-A-Beaufre/dp/B007ZKNJI8) (1965).

Herman Kahn presented one view in his On Thermonuclear War (http://www.amazon.com/On-Thermonuclear-War-Herman-Kahn/dp/0313200602) (1960). Hugh Everett (Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hugh_Everett_III)) had a less optimistic view in his 1959 "The Distribution and Effects of Fallout in Large Nuclear-Weapon Campaigns" (see notes 11 & 12 of Wiki).

The bottom line is that nukes change the equation drastically, where different folks will apply different strokes to avoid the "The Day After (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2B7sdLPMfc)" (1983).

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

So, the way I read it, this is going to eventually end with a big fight. It could go on forever if we just kept issuing the checks forever. But human nature precludes that. Somebody will inevitably get ticked off and say no more and then the fight comes.

So, if the fight is inevitable, would it not be better to have it sooner, while their nukes are still of uncertain utility, than later after they have had time to perfect them?

My opinion of course makes no difference at all. Does anybody know if the South Koreans are leaning that way?

This is why I think criminal Behavior Theory is often better than Military Theory. If little Kim wanted War he would have already started one, no need to alert the Enemy with threats. He wants us to pay up.....straight up extortion scam IMO.

With that in mind here is a Link to Chapter 9 From Warden's original work "The Air Campaign." This chapter is called "The Orchestration Of War" where you see Vietnam just substitute North Korea there is some good advice there.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp09.htm

[davidbfpo]

Someone to follow on Twitter, @BruceWBennett:
Senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, specializing in Northeast Asian military issues. Opinions do not represent RAND. RTs are not endorsements.

He's just Tweeted:
Kim Jong-Un appears to be particularly concerned about regime security.....He's tightened the border with China, put uniformed security guards around himself, & tried to cut info flow from the outside - esp. China....More signs that there may be more insecurity in North Korea than many analysts believe

[Firn]

Bruce might have been on something, or not but the news coming out from NK is quite chilling and comes right out of Stalins playbook (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/13/north-korea-statement-jang-song-thaek-kim-jongun-uncle)...


The accused Jang brought together undesirable forces and formed a faction as the boss of a modern day factional group for a long time and thus committed such hideous crime as attempting to overthrow the state by all sorts of intrigues and despicable methods with a wild ambition to grab the supreme power of our party and state.

The accusation is a classic since the days of the revolutions. If your biggest goal is the revolution your biggest goal afterwards is to avoid to lose power by suffering a successful counter-revolution. Branding someone as an enemy of the people will not go out of fashion.


Jang was appointed to responsible posts of the party and state thanks to the deep political trust of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il and received benevolence from them more than any others from long ago.

He held higher posts than before and received deeper trust from supreme leader Kim Jong Un, in particular.

The political trust and benevolence shown by the peerlessly great men of Mt. Paektu were something he hardly deserved.

Showered with trust and benevolence by all the peerlessly great Kims, obviously among them the current great man he committed high treason against them and the state.


When his cunning move proved futile and the decision that Kim Jong Un was elected vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea at the Third Conference of the WPK in reflection of the unanimous will of all party members, service personnel and people was proclaimed, making all participants break into enthusiastic cheers that shook the conference hall, he behaved so arrogantly and insolently as unwillingly standing up from his seat and half-heartedly clapping, touching off towering resentment of our service personnel and people

:wry:


He was so imprudent as to prevent the Taedonggang Tile Factory from erecting a mosaic depicting Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and a monument to field guidance given by them. Jang turned down the unanimous request of the service personnel of a unit of the Korean People's Internal Security Forces to have the autograph letter sent by Kim Jong Un to the unit carved on a natural granite and erected with good care in front of the building of its command. He was so reckless as to instruct the unit to erect it in a shaded corner.

You really could not make that stuff up. It is actually quite sad to read it, as you know that the guys writing it are trying hard to save their bottom. Certainly they don't want to be accused of leaving out important details.


He instructed his stooges to sell coal and other precious underground resources at random. Consequently, his confidants were saddled with huge debts, deceived by brokers. Jang made no scruple of committing such act of treachery in May last as selling off the land of the Rason economic and trade zone to a foreign country for a period of five decades under the pretext of paying those debts.

Interesting to see the Rason economic zone getting mentioned, possibly only to make the accusation of personal enrichment/sellout more plausible.


He let the decadent capitalist lifestyle find its way to our society by distributing all sorts of pornographic pictures among his confidants since 2009. He led a dissolute, depraved life, squandering money wherever he went.

He took at least 4.6 million Euro from his secret coffers and squandered it in 2009 alone and enjoyed himself in casino in a foreign country [China?]. These facts alone clearly show how corrupt and degenerate he was.

It really feels like a long checklist in which every box has to be ticked off.



As regards the means and methods for staging the coup, Jang said: "I was going to stage the coup by using army officers who had close ties with me or by mobilizing armed forces under the control of my confidants. I don't know well about recently appointed army officers but have some acquaintances with those appointed in the past period. I thought the army might join in the coup if the living of the people and service personnel further deteriorate in the future. And I calculated that my confidants in my department including Ri Ryong Ha and Jang Su Gil would surely follow me and had a plan to use the one in charge of the people's security organ as my confidant. It was my calculation that I might use several others besides them."

There can be no doubt that after hearing so much about 'flatteres' and supporters that a considerable amount of true or imagined political allies and acquaintances of Jang, beside those already mentioned, have been arrested and maybe already executed.

And finally:


The era and history will eternally record and never forget the shuddering crimes committed by Jang Song Thaek, the enemy of the party, revolution and people and heinous traitor to the nation.

No matter how much water flows under the bridge and no matter how frequently a generation is replaced by new one, the lineage of Paektu will remain unchanged and irreplaceable.

Our party, state, army and people do not know anyone except Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un.

Kim Jong Un has clearly tightened his grip on power but it also shows a certain amount of weakness an insecurity as his father was able to handle the elite and family with less brutal means. On the other hand he was able to get the state work according to his will, no doubt aided by the recent shuffles within which were also mentioned in the statement.

So what does it mean for that corner of the world?


PS: As it is a statement of the NK party I quoted more then usual.

[ganulv]

Kim Jong Un has clearly tightened his grip on power but it also shows a certain amount of weakness an insecurity as his father was able to handle the elite and family with less brutal means.

Just spitballing, perhaps irresponsibly so, but I wonder if the age difference between Kim Jong Un and his uncle has something to do with the execution? Age normally carries so much weight in Korean society. By having Jang Song Thaek executed, Kim Jon Un may hope to make it plainly clear that his position trumps his youth.

Even if that is part of it, I would assume there are plenty of other things at play. I’m not claiming to be an expert on the situation or anything.

[davidbfpo]

A short commentary by Mark Fitzpatrick, from IISS (London), which is worth reading and ends with:
North Korea is also a more dangerous state to its citizens. The danger is most palpable to Jang’s associates, who numbered in the thousands. Facing a similar purge, many will seek escape, by self-exile if possible, or self-defence if necessary. Given Kim Jong-un’s control over the military and party, a coup d’état is unlikely. On the other hand, Jang’s execution, which up until a few days ago was entirely unexpected, shows how unpredictable North Korea is.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2013-98d0/december-5b5c/north-korea-f530

These three sentences though say it all:
The power struggle under way in North Korea is often portrayed as balancing the relative strength of the military and the Party. In practical terms, it is a struggle over resources. Over the past year, the military was stripped of control over foreign currency-earning enterprises.

Even for such a workers paradise foreign exchange earnings exert a powerful influence. Earnings that do not come from traditional exports

[Firn]

Indeed, as I wrote before, the many 'flatters' must fear for their health and life if they did not already lost it.


In other words, Jang was letting his country be taken advantage of by China. As Beijing’s principle partner in Pyongyang, Jang advocated certain economic reforms encouraged by China, including free-enterprise zones. With his execution, China may have lost its best means of exerting positive influence over North Korean policy.

The economic part is quite interesting. Economy is to a good degree about scarce ressources like capital, labour & land and so forth while political power is to various degrees about it's control. Within a liberal Western democracy the overall control over the economy and it's ressources is obviously far less stringent then in a country like NK.

The almost complete dominance of the political power over the (economic) ressources and the overall extreme scarcity make the stakes a lot higher, sometimes a question of life and death. An example for the common man might have been the hunger years in which every bit of food counted.

For the elite a key goal seems to be the consumption of luxury goods, which are mostly not producable within the borders. So as a mean to obtain those one needs hard currency which is difficult to get and a specific kind of scarce good. The most important streams of foreign currency must be the FEZ and the export of natural ressources and both get mentioned in the statement, but more importantly were indeed likely strongly connected with Jang. In any case I wouldn't be surprised if the FEZ would stay intact and even get pushed by Kim, as the fight over them has been won and they still key to get many pleasures of the outside world.

To sum it up the struggle for political power in NK can indeed be a 'winner takes it all, loser loses everything' game which makes the stakes so high. Not much time ago Jang had almost all which a Noth Korean can dream of, now he has nothing.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/01/03/north-korean-leader-feeds-uncle-to-starving-dogs-reports-say/?cmpid=edpick&google_editors_picks=true

North Korean leader fed uncle to starving dogs, report says


The Singaporean Straits Times cited a report from Wen Wei Po, a Beijing-control newspaper, that said Jang Song Thaek and five close associates were stripped and fed to 120 dogs that had not eaten for three days. The entire process, witnessed by 300 senior officials, lasted for about an hour, the report said. Fox News could not immediately verify the report

Unfortunately, true or not, this story could be true in the crazy fiefdom of North Korea, but

http://www.smh.com.au/world/why-kim-jongun-probably-didnt-feed-his-naked-uncle-to-120-dogs-20140104-30a85.html

Why Kim Jong-un probably didn't feed his naked uncle to 120 dogs


But there are five big reasons that this story just does not seem particularly plausible. The fact that the Western media have so widely accepted a story they would reject if it came out of any other country tells us a lot about how North Korea is covered - and how it's misunderstood.


Third, South Korea's media have also not touched the story. "This story has hardly been picked up on by Korean media which is one reason to be suspicious," Chad O'Carroll, who edits the news site NKNews.org, told me via email. "The other reason to be suspicious is because the rumour surfaced ages ago - but no one paid attention to it," he said.

South Korean media are quite plugged in to North Korean defector communities, to sources still in the country and most especially to South Korea's intelligence agency. Some of those outlets can be eager to pick up stories or rumors that portray North Korea in a negative light. And, as O'Carroll pointed out, they're not shy about running single-source stories. But South Korea's many news outlets, big and small, seem to be treating this story as so implausible it's not even worth mentioning. And they would know.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/secret-state-of-north-korea/?utm_campaign=secret-state-of-north-korea&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=prebroadcast&elq=a668b41f2f4e413eaaa9bfe44305dba1&elqCampaignId=795

Secret State of North Korea

Interesting video, about 60 minutes with some insightful secret filming of North Korea society. There is definitely potential for a North Korea Spring despite the naysayers who are focused on historical North that had more control over the information their people received.

Comment towards the end of the video is along my line of thinking, and that is of course the Arab Spring made sense in hindsight, but no one saw it coming.

The upcoming video should provide additional insights.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/secret-state-of-north-korea/is-there-hope-for-resistance-in-north-korea-live-chat-1pm-et-wed-115/

Is There Hope for Resistance in North Korea?


“What surprised me the most wasn’t the poverty and poor conditions people live in—which are, undoubtedly, shocking,” says FRONTLINE director James Jones. “It was the ordinary North Koreans who were standing up to authority.”

What forms is the resistance taking? Is it organized? Do dissidents have a chance to challenge Kim Jong-Un’s authority? Are we on the brink of a “North Korean Spring” — or a major crackdown?

[ganulv]

Thanks for the heads-up on this one, Bill. Definitely looks worth a watch.

[AdamG]

Washington (AFP) - North Korea poses a mounting threat to the United States due to its pursuit of long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, the Pentagon said Tuesday in its latest strategy document.


The release of the Pentagon's strategic review came as North Korea flexed its military might three times over the past week, firing short-range Scud missiles and rockets into the sea. The test launches were timed to coincide with joint US-South Korean drills that Pyongyang opposes.

The strategy document said the United States will seek to stay ahead of the threat of ballistic missile arsenals in Iran and North Korea, noting plans to bolster the number of ground-based interceptors on US soil from 30 to 44 while investing in better sensors.

http://news.yahoo.com/n-korea-poses-growing-threat-us-pentagon-004803319.html

[AdamG]

South Korean military gains authority to launch pre-emptive strike against North when necessary

http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=158760&category=2

[AdamG]

BEIJING (Reuters) - China declared a "red line" on North Korea on Saturday, saying that China will not permit chaos or war on the Korean peninsula, and that peace can only come through denuclearization.
China is North Korea's most important diplomatic and economic supporter, though Beijing's patience with Pyongyang has been severely tested following three nuclear tests and numerous bouts of saber rattling, including missile launches.

http://news.yahoo.com/china-says-not-permit-chaos-war-korean-peninsula-032259434.html

[AdamG]

Separate for maximum visibility and insight into what makes Dear Leader tick. Some of this is just too Orwellian to let languish in a larger thread.

North Korean intelligence official tells of aborted coups and assassination attempts

One of only a handful of North Korean intelligence officials ever to have escaped the country paints a dark portrait of plotting and factions in Pyongyang



In one plot, a group of officers hoping to provoke a Russian intervention against the regime planned to stage a bomb attack on the Russian consulate in the North Korean city of Chongjin. In another, a north eastern army unit planned a missile strike on key targets in Pyongyang. Both plots, said Mr K, were discovered before they took place.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10740104/North-Korean-intelligence-official-tells-of-aborted-coups-and-assassination-attempts.html

[AdamG]

UNITED NATIONS (AP) — North Korea on Friday accused the United States of being "hell-bent on regime change" and warned that any maneuvers with that intention will be viewed as a "red line" that will result in countermeasures.

Pyongyang's deputy U.N. ambassador Ri Tong Il also repeated that his government "made it very clear we will carry out a new form of nuclear test" but refused to elaborate, saying only that "I recommend you to wait and see what it is."

His comments came at North Korea's second press conference at the United Nations in two weeks, a surprising rate for the reclusive Communist regime.

http://news.yahoo.com/north-korea-says-us-hell-bent-regime-change-164854158.html

[AdamG]

North Korea will execute 200 supporters of Jang Song Thaek, executed uncle of Kim Jong Un: report

The government made a list of about 200 high-ranking supporters and their family members, who have been declared followers of Jang Song Thaek, who was executed in Dec. 2013. The families will likely be sent to concentration camps, according to reports.

Read more: http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/north-korea-execute-200-supporters-jang-song-thaek-article-1.1744668#ixzz2xyDuA0J4

[carl]

200 executions at a shooting range with an audience! And here I thought the only open gate to hell was in the Great Lakes region of Africa.