What Are You Currently Reading? 2010

[FlyFisher]

U509: If you haven't got it already, I'd really recommend tracking down a copy of David Zabecki's The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War (2006). It's excellent and well worth a read; he's got a great deal of new stuff in there. It's also quite heavily noted so you can follow him to other sources for anything that catches your interest.

I read a couple others recently that were also very good, though only tangentially related: Paul Harris's new biography of Haig (Douglas Haig and the First World War) is, I think, about as balanced a view of the man that I have ever seen -- not shy of criticizing Haig, but doesn't ignore things that were worth praising. Andy Simpson's Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front was also excellent.

Ian

[Tukhachevskii]

A long time since I read on this subject, IIRC Professor Geoffrey Parker wrote about this (I have an emailed a friend more familiar with this subject) and there was a series of books on European warfare, edited by Prof. Geoffrey Best IIRC. Fuchs might know more as his grasp of history is wider than mine and of course the wars centred in what was to become Germany.

Added after reply email:

Geoffrey Parker has written some very readable and yet scholarly books on 16th and 17th century European History which are in print - or at least widely available.

Geoffrey Elton (better know as GR Elton)'s 'Reformation Europe' in the Fontana paperback series of the 1960s/70s is still the best and clearest intro for the non-specialist.
That book takes you roughly just past the 1555 Augsburg treaty.

JH Elliot's 'Europe Divided' is the very clear, well-organised sequel to Elton in the same Fontana series; he's also a lively but reliable author best known for 'Imperial Spain'.
Europe Divided takes you to 1598, death of King Philip II of Spain.

The following volume in the Fontana series - I forget the title ('Europe in Crisis' ?) - is by Parker and takes you up to the Westphalia treaties of 1648. My special subject at college was the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1568 - 1648, about which he has written a lot e.g. 'The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road' (1970s).

.


Parker is required reading especially after he extended/developed the concept of a military revolution first touted by Michael Roberts in the 50s. I would also recommend anything written by Jeremy Black esp.; Rethinking Military History, Warfare in the Eighteenth Century, Europe and the World 1650-1830, and A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society 1550-1800 among others.

As for (G) Elton I have never much liked the "Whig historian" which see Herbert Butterfield and The Whig Interpretation of History

[Tukhachevskii]

Recently read...


David Bellavia (with John Bruning), House to House: An Epic of Urabn Warfare

Mark N. Woodruff, Unheralded Victory: Who won the Vietnam War?

&

Robin Moore, Task Force Dagger: The Hunt for Bin Laden

[Wargames Mark]

Eastern Approaches (https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_ss_0_9?url=search-alias%3Daps&field-keywords=eastern+approaches&sprefix=eastern+a), by Fitzroy MacLean

Complexity: A Guided Tour (http://www.amazon.com/Complexity-Guided-Tour-Melanie-Mitchell/dp/0195124413/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1263271280&sr=8-2), by Melanie Mitchell

[davidbfpo]

Wargames Mark,


Eastern Approaches, by Fitzroy MacLean

Excellent book, the authors tour descriptions through Stalinist USSR are really amazing and the chapter on the conflicts in Yugoslavia i.e. Bosnia is an excellent primer on why the communities fought.

[Spud]

Did a couple over leave (in between struggling through some old Wilber Smith's ... that guy could do with a good editor):

Finally finished The Men Who Persevered (Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam) by Bruce Davies and Gary McKay and The Tiger Man of Vietnam by Frank Walker. Preferred Barry Pettersen's telling of his own story in Tiger Men than the effort by Walker.

Horse Soldiers by Doug Stanton ... good read about the events surrounding the capture of John Walker Lindh in Afghanistan.

Just getting started on Orson Scott Card's Empire ... it was the inspiration for a great XBox Live Arcade game Shadow Complex last year and after finishing off COD Modern Warfare 2 last night there's also a little bit in that. Gotta love a good military conspiracy.

[Spud]

Recently read...


Robin Moore, Task Force Dagger: The Hunt for Bin Laden

Burn it ... Burn it with fire:eek:

[Tukhachevskii]

Burn it ... Burn it with fire:eek:

I, too, have come to the same conclusion. There was much in it that was factual nonsense whilst the rest of it appeaered to be pure fantasy. Don't get me wrong, much of it does reek of virsimilitude but of a strained variety. Still, it was interesting nonetheless.

Just finished reading Sniper One, by Sgt Dan Mills. Scorching stuff!!

[reed11b]

Blink by Malcom Gladwell
Not a COIN book per se, but extremely relevant to much of what we discuss here and I recommend the book highly.
Reed

[Bob's World]

FM 31-23 Stability Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine. December 1967

CSM Tommy Smith handed me a copy as I was heading out the door for Afghanistan, and just got around to cracking it open today. An excellent manual all about dealing with insurgency. Term not found in the glossary? "Counterinsurgency."

Thanks Sergeant Major, I approve and share your endorsement of this "lost" bit of doctrine.

[Vahid]

This has been a very contentious book expatiating on the futility of financial aid to the poverty-stricken world for the most part. What also adss to its controversy is the foreword by Niall Ferguson (who is known to have been appallingly unapologetic stance on the British colonisation of the developing world). I haven't read the book, but it has purportedly generated a huge fuss in amongst many NGOs

http://www.dambisamoyo.com/deadaid.html

[Jedburgh]

FM 31-23 Stability Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine. December 1967

CSM Tommy Smith handed me a copy as I was heading out the door for Afghanistan, and just got around to cracking it open today. An excellent manual all about dealing with insurgency. Term not found in the glossary? "Counterinsurgency."

Thanks Sergeant Major, I approve and share your endorsement of this "lost" bit of doctrine.
FYI - there's a thread on the board from '07 that is mostly links to digital copies of vintage COIN and stability doctrine (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2327)

[sandman]

Just finished ARABIAN ASSIGNMENT written by David Smiley commander of the British involvement in the Middle East during the 60’s. Of particular interest was his work in Yemen. I had forgotten that the U.S. favored the Egyptian invasion while the British supported the Saudi backing of the Emir’s guerrillas. Smiley’s constant struggles with the various tribes’ he tried to unite, helps to provide a window into politics in that country today. Also slogged through Tom Chamales’ fictional account of his life as a captain leading the Kachin Rangers while serving with the OSS in Burma, NEVER SO FEW. Very wordy at times (like cutting through elephant grass with a penknife) but loved the ending.

[Steve Blair]

Currently reading One Hell of a Ride (http://www.amazon.com/One-Hell-Ride-Armored-Cavalry/dp/1439244367/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1264176381&sr=8-1) and just finished Theodore Roosevelt and World Order (http://www.amazon.com/Theodore-Roosevelt-World-Order-International/dp/1574888838/ref=tmm_hrd_title_0). The latter is an interesting look at TR's approach to international police power (read overseas interventions), while the former is a pretty good look at 1/4 Cav's operations in 1969.

[PeaceOutE]

I am currently reading Reconciliation in Afghanistan by Michael Semple, The Accidental Guerrilla by David Kilcullen, I am American (And so can you) by Stefphen Colbert. Good times.

Also, I miss Applebee's.

[SMM]

Currently in the queue:

Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice, by Jarret M. Brachman

Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq: Living with Terrorism, Insurgency, and New Forms of Tyranny by Victoria Fontan

Suicide Bombers in Iraq, by Mohammed M. Hafez

Al Anbar Awakening, vol. II: Iraqi Perspectives, ed. by Gary W. Montgomery and Timothy S. McWilliams

[AusPTE]

Leaderless Jihad - Marc Sageman
A Problem from Hell - Samantha Power
The Sling and the Stone - Col Thomas Hammes

[OfTheTroops]

The next 100 years George friedman

[Tukhachevskii]

I have recently read a number of literary gems and I hope two of them at least will be read by the members of the SWC. Firstly, Adrian Greaves’, Lawrence of Arabia: Mirage of a Desert War. Written by a respected scholar whose usual specialisation is the Anglo-Zulu wars it sets out to critically analyse the “myth” of Lawrence so familiar to readers of the Seven Pillars of Wisdom. He does so by analysing the military campaigns in which Lawrence participated in the context within which they occurred as well as placing Lawrence in his place amongst the other principals. It is an important corrective to much of Lawrence’s own “propaganda” as well as the popular myths about the Arab Revolt. Book link: http://www.amazon.com/Lawrence-Arabia-Mirage-Desert-War/dp/0753823667


In Seven Pillars of Wisdom Lawrence wrote movingly of his tragic experience while in the hands of the Turks [the Derra Incident]. Other authors muddled the facts of his arrest and then went on to write in considerable detail, describing his alleged torture and male rape by Turkish guards. Others orientated their books to a consideration of the effects of the ‘incident’ on Lawrence’s psyche. Lawrence claims he eventually escaped the Turks’ custody after a number of hours of torture but no one actually knows what really happened. The answer is simple: no one is ever likely to know, which is exactly what Lawrence intended. The hole alleged affair appears to be little more than a fabrication”. (p. 144-5)

Similarly, though with an opposite intention (i.e., that of rehabilitation, if that was needed) is John Bierman and Colin Smith’s, Fire in the Night: Wingate of Burma, Ethiopia and Zion which examines Orde Wingate’s post-war reputation (somewhat tarnished when Slim’s autobiography was published) by examining his role in the three theatres within which he made an impact. It refutes much that has been said about him while portraying him as the complex man that he was rather than in the either/or (genius/upstart) colours that many of his contemporaries painted him in later (post-war) years. It is by no means the last word but, rather, should be read prior to consulting the other works on him. Book link: http://www.amazon.com/Fire-Night-Wingate-Burma-Ethiopia/dp/0375500618

[Wingate on T. E. Lawrence, his distant relation, and the Seven Pillars of Wisdom]
The vanity of the principals plus a great amount of romantic dust has been allowed so far to obscure what really did happen. A ragged horde of at most a few thousand and often only a few hundred Bedouin, paid in gold for approximately two days’ fighting per month ... caused the Turks a certain amount of embarrassment and anxiety...In return for the highly paid assistance of this small rabble of Hedjazi [sic] Bedouin, we have handed over to the “Arabs” the whole of Saudi Arabia, and the Yemen, Iraq, Trans-Jordan and Syria. A more absurd transaction has seldom been seen” (p. 131)

[Wingate to Wavell re. guerrilla ops in Burma]
Guerrillas are born and not made. Essentially, a guerrilla is a man who prefers death on his own terms to life on the enemy’s. (p. 243)

In terms of “popular” history I have also read Patrick Bishop’s 3 Para: Afghanistan, Summer 2006 book link: http://www.amazon.co.uk/3-Para-Patrick-Bishop/dp/0007257783, Cdr Ade Orchard’s Joint Force Harrier weblink: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Joint-Force-Harrier-Adrian-Orchard/dp/0718153995 and James Ashcroft’s, Making a Killing: The Explosive Story of a Hired Gun in Iraq weblink: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Making-Killing-Explosive-Story-Hired/dp/1852273119.

Naturally, these are British works for a British audience but, I believe, provide a much needed perspective on a war in which American cultural capital often decides the manner in which we perceive the (long) war. All three are excellent as personal vignettes of different aspects of the Long War and, as above, the following synopses are each accompanied by a sample quotation.

Bishops’ 3 Para is a snapshot of of small unit cohesion, espirit d'corps and skill at small arms while also enlightening in terms of the experiences of young men in a foreign land, i.e., Helmand Province Afghanistan(in many respects an Afghan counterpart to Dan Mills’ Iraq based, Sniper One). In fact one almost gets the impression that the ghost of Kipling watched over these young men and women.


The engineers’ activities building up the camp inevitably attracted the attention of the Taliban, who would harass them with fire. During August the sappers built the Hesco wall, complete with sangars, around the base. To the south, they cut back the corn and maize fields surrounding the helicopter landing site to a distance of 100 yards, robbing the Taliban of cover. Despite this, the HLS was still vulnerable, and on the 17th August [Major Jamie] Loden ordered a dawn patrol to clear the area. The objective was to deter the Taliban from hiding weapons in advance of any helicopter resupply. One of the attackers’ techniques was to cache rifles and RPGs in buildings and fields along likely patrol routes. This gave them the freedom to move around unarmed, pick up the weapons, carry out the attack, then drop the arms and assume the guise of civilians.


By now the Paras had a reasonable idea of how their enemy were organised. It seemed that they operated in sub-units of about ten men. In the course of the fighting in that summer the Taliban had evolved more sophisticated tactics, firing simultaneously from several angles and using a variety of weapons. Above all, they had developed very fast reaction times. Any patrol was ‘dicked’ immediately. If the Paras stayed for more than ten minutes they could expect to be ambushed – hence the short times allowed for vehicle checks and intelligence-gathering encounters with the locals.(p214-5)

Joint Force Harrier provides an exploration of the experiences of a RN air Sqn employing Harrier GR7s based at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan during a six-month tour. It deftly explains the intricacies of close air support (ROE and such like) in that particular theatre along with the personal and international issues often encountered in coalition Warfighting.

[On supporting an Apache atk helo team]
As we overflew the target area for the first time, our immediate problem was to identify the specific compound where the Taliban gunmen were hiding out. I looked down from the cockpit as I pulled the Harrier into a turn. JTAC Hill was clearly visible, but there were a number of compounds that could have been where the insurgents were hiding out. One of the problems with picking out areas occupied by hostile forces from the air is that we can neither see nor hear firing that is perfectly evident to the troops on the ground. An additional problem in Afghanistan is that there are usually very few ground features clear and distinctive enough to use as markers. Then I had an idea. The Apache had been attacked by an RPG. The pilot was going to remember exactly where the weapon had been fired at him”. (p. 69)

On the other hand Ashcroft’s Hired Gun. Ashcroft was a former British infantryman who was working in Iraq for a PMC and book is written from his unique perspective. It is revealing in terms of the machinations of the PMC business and how it interfaced (with all the attendant problems thereof) with regular forces and civil organisations- Iraqi and Coalition -as well as the “mentality” of a private contractor when compared to regular soldiers (though that is not his intent it does come through nonetheless). It also contains much by way of savvy cultural knowledge the likes of which would have been hard to come by in regular formations tied to Coalition military authorities.


I was in a foul mood when I was summoned to the CPA to help Colonel [John] Hind [US Army] in one of his latest presentations before leaving the country. He had asked me for my input for a briefing for a two-star general about insurgent threats and we had ended up having a vigorous discussion in the Embassy chow hall. I refused to call it an argument because that implied to opposing but informed views, and as far as I could work out Colonel Hind was woefully ignorant. The problem was he insisted on lumping together all enemy forces under the politically correct title of AIF or ‘Anti-Iraqi Forces’. I tried to explain that the situation was more complex that that. Much of the rural ‘AIF sabotage’ against infrastructure targets was carried out by the very same tribes hired as guars in order to extort more money. When the sheiks demanded more money to ‘hire more guards’, the biggest mistake was to pay them. The situation would quieten down again until either the sheik wanted even more money, or the neighbouring sheiks were furious that they were being paid less. Then, all the tribes would be out blowing pipelines and claiming that they needed to hire more guard. We knew who was blowing up the pipelines because (a) insurgents would not wander into tribal areas because the tribes would kill them and (b) the inexperienced tribesmen often blew themselves up setting the devices (IEDs)”. (p. 239)

I hope one of the technically savvy moderators is kind enough to add the appropriate links to the above. (Done and an invoice is en route).

[Intel Geek]

Accidental Guerilla - David Kilcullen
Starting With the Contras by Christopher Dickey today.

I'm mostly just thumbing through With the Contras. I'm doing a paper on the 1978 war in Nicaragua and I'm hoping there's some good background info on the Sandinistas. I'm waiting for At the Fall of Somoza by Lawrence Pezzullo to arrive from Amazon.

On Deck:

The Gamble - Thomas Ricks
The Peace to End all Peace - David Fromkin

[davidbfpo]

This review has also appeared on SWJ Blog:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/02/review-the-insurgent-archipela/ so if you have any comments add them there please.

The Insurgent Archipelago, by John Mackinlay, a an ex-UK soldier and now an academic, in paperback was published in late '09 and is subject of an extensive review in British Army Review (BAR) and the entire review is on the Kings of War site:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/02/review-the-insurgent-archipelago/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+KingsOfWar+(Kings+of+War)

Last paragraph:
But this is also why the book is to be treasured for what Mackinlay does, unusually for this literature, is say something new. With The Insurgent Archipelago he has planted a flag on new territory which others may explore too, to contest or to confirm. His theory is complete and clearly articulated and sorely needed. It deserves to be apprehended by all those whose task it is to defeat the challenges posed to the post-industrial West by global insurgency. Looking for the cutting edge of theory on insurgency and counterinsurgency? Here it is.

Amazon:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Insurgent-Archipelago-John-Mackinlay/dp/1849040133

I have no interest in plugging the book, just feel that it may contribute to a debate on conflict that appears to be more alive in the USA than here.

[Mike in Hilo]

Mark Moyar's latest, A Question of Command--Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq.

Cheers,
Mike.

[Mike in Hilo]

Because it has just been reissued, I decided to reread, after decades, my 1972 edition of Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An. Reaction:

Deserves to be read, but I'd recommend doing so in tandem with William Andrews, The Village War; and Eric Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, which happen to treat two adjacent provinces. The book describes how mass organization over more than a decade culminating in 1965, moved the countryside of Long An beyond the reach of meaningful GVN influence. Race's point is that this was possible because only the Party's "the last will be first and the first will be last" agenda of literally capsizing the feudal social hierarchy could generate the requisite popular loyalty. As Race relies heavily on accounts of individuals who attained some standing in the Revolution after sacrificing the better part of their lives to the cause, this may be a somewhat idealized version. Andrews's The Village War, also an interview-based village study, may offer a useful counterpoint, focusing more sharply on such practicalities as the efficacy of "the medium is the message" armed propaganda.

1965 Long An was much different from the post-1970 one of my acquaintance. By then one of the more secure provinces, enemy influence was relatively localized in the minimally populated NW, where, in a reflection of the extant paradigm, it radiated out of a PAVN infiltration route cum base area. This was the Plain of Reeds swamp complex, which extended from Svay Rieng (Cambodia) to within a few miles of Saigon-Cholon. Long An Province Chief Col. Nam (1973) was not reluctant to send his RFs even into this redoubt, on battalion size ops.

Race tries to explain, with less certitude, reasons for the virtual drying up of the enemy's local manpower pool by the pivotal year 1970, a question which, IMO, holds greater relevance to the current conflicts. Having offered land hunger as a problem, he credits the promise of the GVN Land To The Tiller Program...But LTTT wasn't widely implemented until 1972. There is further attribution--to local recruitment of PFs and their assignment to their native villages; and to arming of the PSDF village militia. But none of this would have been possible without elimination of the enemy main force units. Race decries the intensely violent level of warfare of the 1967-'69 phase, and the accompanying, wrenching dislocations, including mass forced relocations and urbanization. But it may be that (as Begerud finds in his work), attrition and coercion proved, after all, to be the sine qua non....Looking ahead from a 1970 vantage point, Race believes the apparent security is ephemeral and will rapidly deteriorate pari passu with US troop withdrawal. True for sure in a number of other places, but Long An is not a good example. The problem was a steady, but manageable, drain--until the province was overrun by PAVN in 1975.

Cheers,
Mike.

[tcdrennen]

I have to get a new copy of The Peace to End All Peace; my TPB fell apart after the second reading. Excellent hidtory focused on the details and sequences of the blunders that created the modern Middle East.

[Brett Patron]

Articles on AQIM, the Sahel, Trans-Sahara, and that area of Africa west and north of Nigeria....

oh yeah..and "The Count of Monte Cristo" on my new e-book reader. :D

[MikeF]

My apologies to all--must have pushed the button inadvertantly--Post should not, of course, appear twice--The first version happens to be the edited version..

Cheers,
Mike.

Mike, thank you for that overview. I've read Andrews, and now I want to check out the other two. If you have a chance, I'd recommend that you add these two to your collection. I've found that individual case studies focused on specific villages meld well with the regional studies.

David Donovan, "Once a Warrior King."

Kregg PJ Johnson, "LRRP Company Command, The Cav's LRP/Rangers in Vietnam 1968-1969."

v/r

Mike Few

[Mike in Hilo]

Mike, thanks again. I say "again" because I acquired The Village War solely on the basis of your recommendation in that piece you contributed to the SWJ maybe some 18 months ago... I have read Once a Warrior King--and will look for your other suggestion. Re: Race and Bergerud--if you are pressed for time, I'd say Bergerud is the must read--keeping in mind that it deals with an atypically intractable area where "..many people had forgotten why they were fighting."

Cheers,
Mike.

[MikeF]

Mike, thanks again. I say "again" because I acquired The Village War solely on the basis of your recommendation in that piece you contributed to the SWJ maybe some 18 months ago... I have read Once a Warrior King--and will look for your other suggestion. Re: Race and Bergerud--if you are pressed for time, I'd say Bergerud is the must read--keeping in mind that it deals with an atypically intractable area where "..many people had forgotten why they were fighting."

Cheers,
Mike.

Cool, Thanks for the tips and thanks for reading.

I've got a question for the group. What translation of Sun Tzu would y'all recommend. I've got a buddy studying in Shanghai right now, and he's attempting to read Sun Tzu in the original text. Two issues- First, it is written in old chinese so some of the characters are no longer used. Second, archeologist are finding more manuscripts that they think are part of the original author(s) work.

v/r

Mike

[Van]

What translation of Sun Tzu would y'all recommend.

Samuel Griffith's was the academic standard for a long time, but Thomas Cleary's is more current and pretty well respected, and has been released in several different forms. Several things enter into translation of Sun Tzu; the actual text of Sun Tzu, the commentaries of latter writers, and how it is presented in English. Cleary is good on all counts.

[William F. Owen]

I've got a question for the group. What translation of Sun Tzu would y'all recommend. I've got a buddy studying in Shanghai right now, and he's attempting to read Sun Tzu in the original text. Two issues- First, it is written in old chinese so some of the characters are no longer used. Second, archeologist are finding more manuscripts that they think are part of the original author(s) work.


The R.L. Wing (http://www.amazon.com/Art-Strategy-Translation-Tzus-Classic/dp/0385237847) translation was the one recommended to me and it makes way more sense that the Griffith translation. - E.G. It's not "Art of War."

[Van]

Oh who am I kidding? My favorite interpretation of Sun Tzu (alt. spg. "Sun Zi") is the one by Tsai Chih Chung (http://www.amazon.com/Sunzi-Speaks-Art-War-English-Chinese/dp/7801885090/). My review of it is here (http://www.amazon.com/review/R1SZA4EXYM5NSX/ref=cm_cr_rdp_perm).

[pjmunson]

Looking for an academic, at least well researched and hopefully noted, book on the dynamics of gangs like MS13 and 18th Street and how they have spread across borders from LA to Mexico and Central America.

On another note, recently read "No Angel" by Jay Dobyns. I found it very interesting and an easy read, not sure how much Small Wars use you'd get out of it, but it does give some idea of group dynamics of an outlaw group. Another highly recommended academic gang read is "Islands in the Street" by Martin Sanchez-Jankowski.

[davidbfpo]

PJMunson,


Looking for an academic, at least well researched and hopefully noted, book on the dynamics of gangs like MS13 and 18th Street and how they have spread across borders from LA to Mexico and Central America.

Methinks the answer lies on this RFI thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9802

I've copied your request to the RFI thread.

[Tukhachevskii]

Saul David’s Victoria’s Wars: The Rise of Empire (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Victorias-Wars-Empire-Saul-David/dp/0670911380) is an impressive political and military history. I was struck by the particularly forceful notion, an appropriate asymmetry given our current pre-occupation with “asymmetric wars” in general, that a large proportion of Britain’s wars were small for us but considered major for our enemies particularly when one realises that, for the day (and even now), a major war was considered one fought only between comparable (Great) powers (or peer competitors in today’s parlance). Obviously, the Crimean War (Chapter 8) would thus count as a “large” War yet, oddly perhaps, one fought very much like a small one if only because of logistical, command and coalition gremlins. From the influence of those great PMCs (after a fashion) the East and West India Companies to changes in domestic electoral geometry (i.e., the fall of Disraeli to his erstwhile nemesis Sir Robert Peel) to the effects, often deleterious, of international rivalry between Powers that were Allies one day and Enemies the next to the financial burdens for the extension, consolidation and then subsequent “policing” of “empire” much of that past era really is prologue to our current one (in which the “empire” being extended is now that of “the rule of law”). Yet what is also striking is the manner in which, given Britain’s almost otherworldly technological superiority (in comparison with its non-European opponents), financial power and social organisation she still managed to lose wars (i.e., Afghanistan) which, by the standards of the day, should have been a walk-over due to issues which still have contemporary resonance;


[Mountstuart Elphinstone, former governor of Bombay on the proposed British invasion of Afghanistan c. 1835] [q-e]I used to dispute with you against having an agent in Caubul [sic], and now we have assumed the protection of the state as if it were one of the subsidiary allies in India. If you send 27,000 men up the Bolan Pass to Candahar [sic] (as we hear intended), and can feed them, I have no doubt you will take Candahar and Caubul and set up Soojah [Shuja, then claimant to the Afghan throne]; but for maintaining him in a poor, cold, strong and remote country, among turbulent people like the Afghans, I own it seems to me to be hopeless.[/q-e] (p. 21)

Of greater contemporary significance is the excellent book by Ali Ahmad Jalali and L. W. Grau, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/TAUDOC/Other%20Side%20of%20Mountain.pdf). A companion to their earlier The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan this book focuses specifically on Mujahideen TTPs during the Soviet-Afghan war using vignettes of the commanders involved from almost all of the various Mujahedeen groups that participated. Perhaps rather unsurprisingly it is remarkable to see how consistent Afghan TTPs have been with regards to the manner in which ambushes (Ch.1) , raids (Ch.2), Shelling/Mortar strikes (Ch.3), mine warfare (Ch.5) and urban warfare (Ch.14) is conducted when we compare the vignettes in this book to after action reports from current operations. Other chapters reveal Afghan TTPs in the conduct of: attacking a strong point (Ch. 4); Blocking Enemy Lines of Communication (Ch.6); Siege Warfare (Ch.7); Defence against (Soviet Spetznaz) Raids (Ch.8); Countering (Soviet) Heliborne Insertions (Ch. 9); Defending against a Cordon and Search (C.10); Defending Base Camps (Ch. 11); Counter-ambushes (Ch.12); and, Fighting an Encirclement (Ch.13). There are also numerous and revealing tidbits of information that are usually glossed over or omitted in scholarly or historical commentaries one of which, for instance, was the use of video cameras by Mujahedeen commanders which were used not for BDA, propaganda or for later training use (as I would have supposed) but rather to prove to other factions and groups that ordnance had been expended in order to justify the allotting of further weapons and supplies for future operations (p. 108fn2). The Arabs who joined in the Jihad, however, were (apparently) more interested in taking videos, in the earlier stages at least, and were considered prima donnas by many Mujahedeen groups (p129fn4). Another little know operation involved mujahedeen using sympathisers/moles in DRA (the Soviet satellite Afghan army) formations to drug DRA officers prior to an attack; fittingly, one of the Mujahedeen commanders was an M.D! (p.119). I was also surprised to learn that the DRA was not entirely ineffectual as a fighting formation at least if the Battle of Panjawee in 1982 is to go by (pp.123-5).

Having rooted around looking for work on Afghan guerrilla TTPs I was glad to have “hit the mother lode”. Accompanied by detailed maps and candid reminiscences by those involved it is thoroughly recommended. In the quote below it appears that, for one guerrilla commander at least, one up-two back really is best in a company sized attack (with what appear to be large platoon groups composed of 20man sections/squads);


[Commander Wazir Gul on a raid against a security outpost] [q-e]My group's base was in Zandeh Kalay which is some 25 kilometers south of the [Lataband] pass [on the Kandahar-Sairobi highway]. I planned the attack at the base. We left the base at 1500 and moved to the Tezin Valley where we spent the night. We carried our supplies and ammunition on mules. Once we got to the Tezin Valley, I met with the commanders of other groups and we coordinated our attack. The total strength of the combined Mujahideen force was about 150 fighters. We left what we did not need for immediate combat at Tezin and moved out toward our targets. We brought the mules with us. There were three chief components in our combined force—two fire support groups and an assault group. Each fire support group had heavy weapons (three BM-1, four DShK, three 82mm mortars). Their mission was to attack and pin down the Soviet base at Mulla Omar and the Sarandoy base at Lataband. The assault group had twelve RPG-7s and four 82mm recoilless rifles. The assault group was composed of three 20-man teams. Each 20-man team had a designated enemy outpost to attack.[/q-e] (p.93)

In another “after-action-report” concerning an ambush in the Kandahar area Commander Mulla Kalang reveals the general disregard for civilian casualties/reprisals against civilian families of rival Mujahedeen (i.e., his own countrymen) who refused to participate in the action but who would, nonetheless, be blamed for it while also revealing the Mujahedeen’s understanding of the relationship between terrain & time, their ability to co-ordinate attacks with groups from other locales and Soviet SOPs (i.e., the absence, at this time, of Soviet reconnaissance efforts contrary to extant Soviet doctrine):


[q-e]We decided to divide the 250 available Mujahideen into several groups. The groups were armed with RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers and four-to-five 82mm recoilless rifles. All ambushes were sited in the green zone to the south of the road. Each ambush group had an assigned sector of the kill zone. All groups were instructed to open fire simultaneously as the head of the column reaches the Ashoqa villages. It was expected that at that time the tail of the column would have just cleared the Pashmol villages. At that time, most of the local population still lived in their homes along the road. Few had migrated to Pakistan since no major Soviet military actions had taken place there. The Mujahideen groups coming from Malajat (the southern and south-western suburbs of Kandahar) and other neighbouring bases moved during the night to their designated ambush sites. The ambush plan was kept secret from the local population and local Mujahideen units since resistance groups based in the ambush area were reluctant to participate, fearing retaliation directed at their homes and families still living there.[/q-e] (p.44)

Also one wonders what the outcome would have been had Soviet COIN efforts been more effective at engaging the locals and sowing dissent amongst the Mujahedeen (perhaps by buying them off/co-opting them as the Romans had done with the Goths and the Byzantines had done with the Avars, Bulgars et al and turned them against one another) especially when the Mujahedeen cared even less about civilian casualties than the Soviet’s did as is evinced in a local saying amongst civilians;


[q-e] the government oppress us during the day and the Mujahedeen oppress us at night[/q-e] (p.115)

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Warrior's Rage Douglas Macgregor Ph.D.

$26.00USD in the mini mall at Ft. Knox. Only paid full price because I really want to read before its out in paperback.

Has anyone read it? I really like it so far.

:)

[Tukhachevskii]

My reading of late has centred on a re-appreciation for, and, to some extent, a re-discovery of, the art of war in antiquity (or thereabouts). I suspect that recent discussions on the SWC regarding Roman COIN operations ( http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=93992) and Luttwak’s rekindling of interest in Byzantine strategic thought ( http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9655) may have had something to do with it. Nonetheless, the works consulted over the past weeks comprise;

The Interlinear Translation of the Anabasis of Xenophon ( http://ia340909.us.archive.org/1/items/anabasisofxenoph00xenoiala/anabasisofxenoph00xenoiala.pdf). There has been renewed interest in Byzantine strategy, especially in the recent article by Edward Luttwak ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Luttwak) in Foreign Affairs and reading the original really is enlightening if only for comparing what Xenophon ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xenophon) actually says with Luttwak’s, and other commentators, interpretations.


The works by Theodore Ayrault Dodge ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodore_Ayrault_Dodge) (c. late 19th Century) though having been largely superseded, by the work of (for instance) Adrian Goldsworthy ( http://www.adriangoldsworthy.com/) with respect to Roman Warfare, still repay reading if only for the wealth of information and depth of analysis Dodge provides. Which see;
Alexander and the Macedonian Art of War ( http://ia331430.us.archive.org/0/items/alexanderhistory00dodg/alexanderhistory00dodg.pdf),
Caesar and the Roman Art of War ( http://ia350640.us.archive.org/1/items/caesarhistoryofa00dodguoft/caesarhistoryofa00dodguoft.pdf) and
Hannibal and the Carthaginian Art of War ( http://ia341326.us.archive.org/3/items/cu31924030986438/cu31924030986438.pdf).

Indeed, Dodge’s observations regarding Caesar’s Gallic campaign are no less true of today’s small wars;

(From Dodge’s, Caesar and the Roman Art of War); Statecraft counts for much in a great captain's work. Caesar's policy in Gaul was on the whole so harsh as scarcely to rate as policy at all. This is the civil aspect of the matter. From another point of view it was as masterly as the problem was difficult. Caesar had to conciliate some tribes while attacking other neighbouring and friendly tribes. He had to supply himself while destroying victual for the enemy. He had to elevate part of the people in order to suppress another part. He had to play one half of the population against the other half. He had a population of eight million Gauls to oppose his dozen legions.(p.341)


Richard D. Hunt, Queen Boudicca’s Battle of Britain ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Queen-Boudiccas-Battle-Britain-Richard/dp/1862271941). Using primary sources (Caesar, Cassius Dio, Suetonius and Tacitus) Hunt reconstructs the events that led to the “Iceni uprising” (covered in Chapter VIII). Hunt gives a masterful account of the political background, tribal composition of Britain, Roman polices and Boudicca’s ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boudica) CoA and resultant aftermath in a book numbering only 137 pages all told (as a writer of crime fiction, rather than a historian, he also writes a cracking narrative). I often thought of the tribal uprisings in Iraq when I read this book and of the travails of an occupying power attempting to reorganise a foreign land (though the Romans came to annex not liberate). The parallels are striking right down to the complex interplay of carrot and stick and patron-client relations employed by the Romans towards Britain’s tribes and their “notables”. Caesar and Tacitus knew the importance of understanding the “Human Terrain” something which has recently come into vogue (but which is nothing if not common sense- “know your enemy” and all that);

(says Caesar) By far the most civilised inhabitants are those living in Kent[sic!], a purely maritime district, whose way of life differs little from that of the Gauls. Most of the tribes in the interior do not grow corn but live on milk and meat, and wear skins. All the Britons dye their bodies with woad, which produces a blue colour, and this gives them a more terrifying appearance in battle. Their wear their hair long, and shave the whole of their bodies except the head and the upper lip. Wives are shared between groups of ten or twelve men, especially between brothers and between fathers and sons; but the offspring of these unions are counted as the children of the man with whom a particular woman cohabited first[!](p.11)

Nor were they lax in IPB...

(Says Tacitus) Their strength is in their infantry. Some tribes also fight from chariots. The nobleman drives, his dependants fight in his defence. Once they owed obedience to kings; now they are distracted between the jarring factions of rival chiefs. Indeed, nothing has helped us more in war with their strongest nations that their inability to co-operate. It is but seldom that two or three states unite to repel a common danger; fighting in detail they are defeated wholesale.(p.16)

And like Petraeus in Iraq the Roman governor Publius Ostorius Scapula, sent to bring order and replace his ineffectual predecessor, inherited a situation in Britain, writes Tacitus in his Annals, that was nothing short of...

...chaotic. Convinced that a new commander, with an unfamiliar army and with winter begun, would not fight them, hostile tribes had broken violently into the Roman province. But Ostorius knew that initial results are what produce alarm or confidence. So he marched his light auxiliary battalions rapidly ahead, and stamped out resistance. The enemy dispersed and were hard pressed.p.47

And what of Roman motivation to invade? Perhaps those of a cynical bent will find parallels here too...

(...says Tacitus) Britain yields gold, silver and other metals, to make it worth conquering.(p.11)

In fact, seen in the perspective of antiquity Boudicca’s uprising is little different to those experienced by the Allies in Iraq (sans AQI and WMD of course; although the idea of equating Boudicca with people like Moqtada As-Sadr makes my stomach churn). Obviously, the Allies in Iraq were nothing like Rome and her Legions when it came to COIN; today’s RoEs are more humane (for good or ill) and less brutal than were Roman SOPs. Yet, skilfully applied violence works; nothing like a swift sharp blow to the head to bring people to their senses (as riot police know full well). Who knows, maybe one day an Iraqi will write about the uprisings against the US and Allies with the same fond if critical commemoration that one usually affords to lost causes. Perhaps over time even they will appreciate the ‘civilitas’ which they were bequeathed however strange and unappealing it may have appeared to them beforehand and however “alien” America and her allies may appear now.


B.H Liddell Hart, Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon ( http://www.amazon.com/Scipio-Africanus-B-Liddell-Hart/dp/0306805839). Originally written in 1926 by the irascible B. H. Liddell Hart ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._H._Liddell_Hart) of “indirect Approach” fame the book purports (if the introduction is anything to go by) to be a biography of the famous roman general Scipio Africanus ( ttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scipio_Africanus) but is instead a history of his campaign against Hannibal ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hannibal) in North Africa during the 2nd Punic War ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Punic_War). Indeed, the work is really rather more of a study of the generalship of Scipio vs. Hannibal with an admixture of Roman domestic political shenanigans thrown in. However, unsurprisingly for Hart, he often falls into the trap of attributing Scipio with having discovered principles that Hart would later popularise. I find the following quote ironic for being a refutation of what one of my old university lecturers called the fallacy of “Liddell-Hartism”; i.e., that the indirect approach worked only if the enemy was caught napping or decided to stand still while Hart’s forces manoeuvred around him. In this quote Hart seems to comprehend the importance of needing to hold or fix the enemy in order to develop a “decisive” manoeuvre;

In the sphere of tactics there is a lesson in his [Scipio’s] consummate blending of the principles of surprise and security, first in the way he secured every offensive move from possible interference or mischance, second in the way he “fixed” the enemy before, and during, the decisive manoeuvre. To strike at an enemy who preserves his freedom of action is to risk hitting the air and being caught off one’s balance. It is to gamble on chances, and the least mischance is liable to upset the whole plan. Yet how often in war, and even in peace-time manoeuvres, have commanders initiated some superficially brilliant manoeuvre only to find that the enemy have slipped away from the would be knock-out, because the assailant forgot the need of “fixing” and the tactical formula of fixing plus decisive manoeuvre is, after all, but the domestic proverb, “First catch your hare, then cook it”. (p.43)

[Van]

A new one from the author of "Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (http://www.amazon.com/Psychology-Intelligence-Analysis-Richards-Heuer/dp/1594546797/)"; "Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis (http://www.amazon.com/Structured-Analytic-Techniques-Intelligence-Analysis/dp/1608710181/)".

I can't recommend it highly enough. He lays down a broad range of techniques in the framework of an adaptable methodology. A little more depth in the practice of the techniques might have been nice, but he provides references and sources for further reading for each technique.

I'm going to be rereading this one, piece by piece, for weeks.

[davidbfpo]

This is a small privately published book, Own Goals: national pride and defeat in war: the Rhodesian experience, by Roger Marston. It is available via Amazon: UK link:http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/1899820817/ref=cm_cr_mts_prod_imgand USA:http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1899820817/ref=cm_cr_mts_prod_img

Attached is my review. I open with:
Roger Marston’s short book (193 pgs) is a good read and as Zimbabwe marks thirty years of independence the passage of time has enabled a fuller picture of what happened to Rhodesia. It will be difficult reading for some, not just Rhodesians, but those who admire her military performance – in a bloody insurgency campaign (1971-1979).

Closing with:
For me the author is on less certain ground when he writes in the concluding chapter ‘So what?’ that other settler countries need to learn those lessons – Israel and the USA. It would be an interesting subject for staff college discussions – the “ghost” of the last Rhodesian military commander, General Peter Walls, lives on today in Western COIN campaigns, discuss.

Cross posted on the Rhodesian COIN thread.

[GI Zhou]

I'm currently working on the PLA, COIN and trying to see if US operations in Afghanistan have influenced the PLA. So what am I reading? Mark Healy's Zitadelle. This wopuld have to be the best book on the Eastern Front from 1941 up to and including the Battle of Kursk and its aftermath. Nothing on COIN but an excellent read.

I can't seem to find much useful work on Chinese COIN or even if they are incorporating US experiences in Afghanistan into their force structure. Oh well, more digging, reading and translations I suppose.:confused:

[Uboat509]

I just finished On Infantry (http://www.amazon.com/Infantry-John-English/dp/0275949729#noop)by John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson. I thoroughly enjoyed it until the last chapter which was just odd and pretty far off of reality. I am now reading Dr. Kissinger's book Diplomacy (http://www.amazon.com/Diplomacy-Touchstone-book-Henry-Kissinger/dp/0671510991/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1273229221&sr=1-1). I am only a couple hundred pages into it and now that I have started two online college classes I don't have as much time but I am really enjoying it. Speaking of those college classes, for one of them I have to do selected readings from Creasy's 15 Decisive Battles of the World: From Marathon to Waterloo (http://www.amazon.com/Fifteen-Decisive-Battles-World-Marathon/dp/0306805596). He seems to be a pretty good historian but he takes too much artistic license with his writing for my taste.

[Backwards Observer]

Reading:

Expended Casings by Alan Farrell and Journey Into Darkness by Thomas P. Odom. Highly Recommended.

Expended Casings - Amazon (http://www.amazon.com/Expended-Casings-Alan-Farrell/dp/1430304324)

Journey Into Darkness - Amazon (http://www.amazon.com/Journey-into-Darkness-Williams-Ford-University/dp/158544457X)

[Tukhachevskii]

Derrick Wright, The Battle for Iwo Jima ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Battle-Iwo-Jima-1945/dp/0750945443). Written by a British author the book does a serviceable job of explaining the battle for Iwo Jima in a writing style that is both fresh and succinct (the volume itself is best described as “slim”). Though well written I was disappointed that the author did not cover in greater depth or at the very least acknowledge the background to the initiation of operation Detachment. The author somewhat uncritically accepts the conventional (B-29 bomber deployment) argument for the operation without exploring the inter-service debates and rivalries that went on behind the scenes (which see Robert S. Burrell, ‘Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology: A Strategic Study of Operation Detachment’ ( http://frank.mtsu.edu/~dfrisby/burrell.pdf)), The Journal of Military History, Vol. 68, No. 4, Oct. 2004). I also would have liked to have had more information on the Japanese side. However, as the author expressly states that his intention is to examine the US angle this can be forgiven. The narrative contains many firsthand accounts of the battle and includes, much to the author’s credit, chapters that cover the “forgotten” heroes; the Corpsmen and Seabees. The historical narrative itself is structured chronologically and, after a brief background assessment, follows the entire operation from D-Day to D+36. I would, however, like to know of any English language books that do cover the Japanese side in depth during the final stages of the war and would appreciate the members of the SWC pointing the way to them especially if they are better than the even slimmer and, on the whole, less than satisfactory volume below.

Patrick Hennessey, The Junior Officers’ Reading Club: Killing Time and Fighting Wars ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Junior-Officers-Reading-Club-Fighting/dp/1846141869). There is something remarkably unsatisfying about this book; though, I am certain his friends will enjoy it immensely. To be fair one learns an awful lot about life at Sandhurst, about regimental life in general and about the culture junior officers are socialised into but it still reads much less like a memoir of war and more like a cleverly marketed and pitched faux-memoir/diary for the iPod generation. Some may find that tone and style refreshing but I for one found it self-indulgent with a whiff of the flippant. The author is apparently now reading to become a lawyer and his book reads very much like a publicity exercise in preparation for a life of (self-)importance.


Mathew Parker, Monte Cassino: The Story of the Hardest Fought Battle of World War II ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Monte-Cassino-Story-Hardest-fought-Battle/dp/0755311760). While I would dispute the latter half of the title (there are surely other battles that are just as deserving of the title “hardest fought battle”, especially in WWII) I cannot dispute the unique conditions, hardships and challenges that the Italian campaign imposed on the multi-national combatants. Combining military history with oral history the book reads much like Max Hastings’ ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Hastings) Overlord ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Overlord-D-Day-Battle-Normandy-strategy/dp/0330390120). The author examines the inter-allied squabbles, often petty but serious nonetheless, regarding Allied strategy, courses of action, allocation of objectives and directions of advance while dispelling many myths (i.e., regarding the supposed proclivity of North African soldiers to rape and loot) and revealing much that has since faded from memory in the process. He also does a great service to the forces of countries usually under-appreciated in more general works on WWII war such as the Free French whose North African forces provided sterling service and whose metropolitan French officers suffered inordinately higher casualties than some of the Allied other units; the Poles; South Africans, Indians, Kiwis/New Zealanders, Aussies and Canadians (ANZAC). Indeed, for the Free French and the Poles the Italian Campaign held much greater import politically than it did militarily as both sides fought for their respective nation’s honour and for the right to determine their nation’s status in post-Nazi Europe.


[A German propaganda leaflet berates similar Allied Psyops efforts]: “Those of you who are lucky enough to get out of this inferno of Cassino will always remember the German parachutists, the most ferocious of them all. Yet just imagine, some greasy, slick-haired guy sitting safely way back of you tries to soften us with leaflets, asking us to wave a white handkerchief. Let this guy come to the front and find out that the paper with his trash on it is just good enough to the wipe the arse with. On second thoughts, let him continue sending his leaflets – toilet paper is becoming rare at Cassino, and tough as they are, even German parachutists don’t like using grass”. (p. 276)
Quite.

[GI Zhou]

Greetings.

I am after a good reference book on US military operations in Afghanistan, especially the early entry operations by the US Marines and helicopter operations generally from 2001- 2006.

This is for a 8,000 word advanced staff college type paper, :eek: so the more references in it, the better.:wry:

[baboon6]

Military history and current affairs I have read lately:

The Brigade by Howard Blum. The stories of three men who served with the Jewish Independent Brigade Group in battle in Italy in the last months of World War II and then on occupation duty. The latter, in Italy, the low countries and Germany, becomes both destrcuctive and constructive when an element within the brigade starts hunting down and killing alleged war criminals, and then both they and others rescue Jewish refugees and smuggle some back to Palestine. Quite an interesting story and characters but not particularly well-written.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Brigade-Story-Vengeance-Salvation-World/dp/0684866153/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1274443603&sr=1-3

Commando by Chris Terrill. The author follows a troop of Royal Marine recruits through training (and completes the Commando tests himself) and also goes off to Afghanistan to report on a newly-commissioned officer and his troop in combat. A few more details and insights than the TV series but I found the former more gripping.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Commando-Chris-Terrill/dp/1846052084/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1274444297&sr=1-1

Chasing the wind by Major-General Kenneth van der Spuy. The memoirs of one of South Africa's aviation pioneers, from his training in SA's first class of flight cadets, through action in both German South West and German East Africa and France in World War I, post-WW1 service with the RAF in North Russia including capture and imprisonment by the Bolsheviks, peacetime service in South Africa and the UK, to his final posting as the Union Defence Force's Director-General Technical Services in World War II.

http://www.abebooks.co.uk/servlet/SearchResults?bx=off&sts=t&ds=30&bi=0&an=van+der+Spuy&y=0&tn=Chasing+The+Wind&x=0&sortby=3

[Granite_State]

Gates of Fire. Pretty much required reading in the Marine Corps. Definitely enjoyed it, some great, visceral stuff, but I found the happy helots a bit hard to take.

Battle Leadership. German WWI captain's lessons, only twenty pages in but enjoying it so far. Good bit on knowing the personalities/psychologies of one's subordinates and how to issue them orders as a result.

[Tukhachevskii]

Doug Beattie MC, An Ordinary Soldier ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ordinary-Soldier-Afghanistan-Ferocious-Impossible/dp/1847373763)
The author seems to have spent his entire time in Afghanistan in a kind of moral purgatory and he is often second guessing himself throughout the work. Whether that is for civilian consumption or whether he was genuinely stricken with ethical vertigo the work is valuable in its depiction of “the face of battle” (to borrow a phrase from the title of John Keegan’s ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Keegan) book). It is very definitely narrator’s perspective to which we are treated in all its moral confusion. Yet, Beattie is no Erich Maria Remarque ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Maria_Remarque). He has a job to do and does it...with aplomb. That job was to take Garmsir “the gateway to Helmand” with the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment and elements of the ANA and ANP many of whom were of questionable ability and/or loyalty. Ironically, Beattie was initially penned for desk job as intelligence liaison officer to the Canadian contingent. When he arrived at KAF (Kandahar Airfield), in the best traditions of British ad hocary and gentlemanly amateurism...

...no one knew anything about Doug Beattie [...] I was given a choice. Either act as an operations watch keeper, another desk role also at KAF, or go down to Lashkar Gah to work at the embryonic Provincial Security and Co-ordination Centre (PSCC)(p.75)

He chose the latter and would subsequently be involved in one ambush after another as part of his job working with the ANA/P formulating a common security plan and supporting UK forces with fighting detachments of Afghans co-ordinated by OMLT (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams). Beattie then continues to explain the difficulties of leading and co-ordinating OMLTs and their Afghan charges and is, if anything, an excellent examination of the clash of cultures- professional vs “yokel” / occidental rationalism vs oriental rationalism- that NATO and Afghan soldiers must contend with. There’s also the cultural intelligence that he needs in order to operate effectively in a world of deeply held religious beliefs intermingled with “chai boys” belonging to village elders, local notables or tribal chiefs...

...there to be ordered about by the men and, when required, to provide sexual pleasure [...] The boy was fresh-faced and clean shaven. He looked timid. At some stage, as he aged, his sexual attractiveness would wane and he would be replaced by someone else, someone younger. For him the abuse would be over. Instead it was likely he would himself become a fully fledged member of the police and probably turn into an abuser too.(p.137)

Add to this the outright collusion and collaboration of certain ANP units with the Taliban (p.233) and the distrust between the ANA and ANP and you have an unenviable and heady mix. Though overly sentimental for my taste definitely an interesting, and with regards to the ANA and ANP a revealing, read.

[After a brief encounter with the Taliban, Beattie asks ANA Col. Gulzar]...what would happen to the bodies of the dead. “We will give them back to the village elders and they will return them to the Talib for burial”. There was a sense of honour between the two sides I did not expect. Perhaps it came about because there wasn’t actually much that differentiated them. Afghans take a pragmatic approach to fighting. Their loyalty can be bought, people often choosing sides on the basis of who they believe will win[.](p.109)

[Tukhachevskii]

Jake Scott, Blood Clot: In Combat with the Patrols Platoon, 3 Para, Afghanistan, 2006 ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Blood-Clot-Patrols-Platoon-Afghanistan/dp/1906033315)
In polar opposition to Beattie is the “raw” account of Jake Scott whose forthright and honest style comes as a cool breeze. At times reminiscent of the early Ernst Jünger ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_J%C3%BCnger) Scott’s prose is jagged edged and searing, he pulls no punches which, for a Para, is to be expected. A member of 3 Para’s patrols (reconnaissance) platoon of WMIKs (7) and Pinzgauers (2) he is mostly fond of the former vehicles recounting that ...

I remember talking to a Canadian officer on this while harboured up amongst their convoy for a night in the desert, he too thought we were mad. But as I explained to him and many others who question this, our Land Rovers could get in and out of most areas without being spotted unlike the big US LAVs that were seen miles off. We were small and relatively quiet, light and fast; it provided better cross-country capability and the reason why we would stay off the main routes where others would fall foul and pay the price with roadside bombs. We had better arcs of fire and a 360 view while moving. We could lie low in wadi beds and in mountain gullies. We also had the option of debussing very quickly if need be.(p.34-5)

The Patrols would do very much of this in their tour in Helmand province although they would also operate on foot during air assaults. He also excels at elucidating the unheralded and often inexplicable aspects of small unit cohesion, camaraderie and brotherhood- the banter, the jibing, driving off whilst the youngest soldier attempts a No.2 behind your WMIK, regimental and professional pride and espirit d’corps- that often determine whether or not men will fight. He’s also not afraid to criticise...

After the big kick-off about the .50 Cal weapons not firing correctly in Now Zad, little had been done. [...] The Canadians and Estonians were selling the British army .50 Cal ammunition. It was ridiculous that this couldn’t be solved ourselves and we had to sponge off other countries, as whoever had ordered the ammo had, in my opinion, gone for some cheap #### and the low grade of ammo was causing problems[...] What had happened in Now Zad, Sangin, Kajaki and now Musa Qaleh had made the top brass realise that this was no ordinary Iraq, KJosovo or Northern Ireland tour. I also began seeing more kit and equipment coming through the stores, TI was the big thing, TI sights for personal weapons and the .50 Cals were like rocking horse #### yet here they were (one TI per .50 Cal and one Viper TI per team). The new body armour and swing arms for the WMIK along with run-flat tyres we also accommodated. Also more ammo was coming in and we could eventually operate with our ‘full scales’ ammunition [..] About time; but again too little too late in my eyes.(p.135)

Like Beattie, Scott also reveals the complexities/pitfalls of CIMIC when he narrates that the Governor of Helmand, Engineer Daoud was pushing for more assistance from UK forces...

One of his former commanders had been attacked and his bodyguards and family members killed. Not only that but one of the local police chiefs was under threat from the local people for raping a young girl. “Let him have it”, we yelled out on hearing the news. I definitely didn’t want to be associated with saving or protecting a rapist and paedophile, I thought we were here to protect the people of Afghanistan and rid them from the Taliban and terror. If they thought we were protecting people like this it would turn everyone against us.(p121-2)

Scott vivdly describes the intensity of small unit engagements putting the reader into the heat of battle often in circumstances at once surreal and deadly...

’Stand down lads, its just women and children’, the boss said.
‘Stand down lads just a group pof tarts having a mothers meeting’, I joked.
‘Well is there any chance of getting some scoff?’, Tommo said.
‘Yeah I’m Hank Marvin’, Lee butted in. [...] As the sun began to sink some of women walked past some of the outer positions, no more than 50m away, dressed in their female dish-dash clothing with their faces covered. The Yanks moved a Humvee up onto the high ground alongside our blokes. Chris W., a fuill screw, was the commander up there.
‘Hey what you doing’ he said to one of the Yanks now standing sky lining himself with a tab in his mouth. ‘You’re in plain view, pull your vehicle back’.
‘We are fine mate’, the Yank replied.
OK, suit yourself’, Chris finished. Minutes later as the US soldier sat at the front wheel of his Humvee a massive explosion erupted. The US Humvee exploded into flames, it took a direct hit with an RPG and then everything went noisy around them. Heavy 7.62mm weapons started firing from the location from where the Afghan women had disappeared. Pete McKinley, a tom in A Company, ran forward under fire and dragged the injured Yank back and started first aid while rounds were smacking into the ground in front of him[...] The so-called women had really been Taliban dressed to disguise themselves to get as close as possible to some of the lads and the US troops and set up a firing post right in front of their position.(p.84,85)

[Tukhachevskii]

Col. Richard Kemp & Chris Hughes, Attack State Red (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Attack-State-Col-Richard-Kemp/dp/0718155068)
The book follows the exploits of the 1st Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment Battle Group (also attached were an Estonian Armoured Infantry Company and a Danish Reconnaissance Company) during their six month tour in Helmand province’s Sangin Valley in spring 2007. The authors brilliantly capture the minutiae of small unit combat without ever losing sight of the bigger picture; strategy, operations and tactics are all covered and one would hope that the book is re-read over again for the many valuable “lessons learned” it offers.


Unlike an Ordinary Soldier and Blood Clot (see above) Attack State Red is very much a unit social history. No one man takes precedence or centre stage. Indeed the entire Royal Anglian battle group is portrayed in all its variety, colour and spirit. Like Private John Thrumble and his GPMG “Mary” tragically killed in a friendly fire incident involving a US F-15 (p. 358); Maj. Mick Aston who had formerly flown Kiowa reconnaissance helicopters in the Australian Army before being moved to the Australian Signals Corps and then turning up in ol’ Blighty (p.46); the deeply religious Fijian Jopp “Bomber” B. Matai, platoon machine gunner, who refused to continue killing Taliban because “I have killed to many today. I cannot do it” (p.303); &, Battalion sniper LCpl. Oliver “Teddy” S. Ruecker, an American, whose father – a recipient of the Bronze Star- had been a master sergeant in US Air Force Special operations (p.59). From Private to Colonel every man receives his fair dues. The book, like much of the work to come out of Afghanistan in a revelation. Having read he negative press that Mastiff’s (http://www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/june2008/mastiff.html) have gotten over the past few years, for instance, I was surprised to read about their highly effective usage in Afghanistan with one particular raid operation effectively gutting its opponents (pp.332-338). Also interesting is the thriving scrap metal market driven by enterprising Afghans who scour the battlefield for empty shell cases and ammo boxes (p.147).


Also interesting was the role of non-Taliban adversaries such as Shir Agha, a Sangin crime lord whose saw his black market profits plunge after UK forces restored order, whose men had duped a twelve-year old boy into pushing a cart laden with explosives against men of B Company (p.253). All of this would be useful to the battle group Intelligence officers who compiled the evidence which would be presented with other information to a shura in Sangin...

The elders had often been briefed on the various reconstruction projects, but most hadn’t seen them. And they were frequently told by Taliban propaganda machinery that no progress was being made and the British were doing nothing to help them. In a town without newspapers, and such low literacy levels, the people understandably didn’t know what to believe. [Lt. Col. Stuart W.]Carver had managed to get a projector into Sangin.[...]His words were accompanied by PowerPoint picture thrown up on the wall behind him, showing the Jusulay irrigation project, electricity pylons being repaired and work on schools. The audience was enthralled. Most hadn’t seen any of this before, and few had ever seen projected images of any kind. As Carver went through the presentation the excitement grew, especially when the pictures showed people and places they recognised. Then Carver flashed up ma photograph showing the devastation in the market place a few days earlier. “And this is what the Taliban are doing [actually Shir Agha’s in co-operation with the Taliban]. They are attacking you. They don’t want you to have a market. [IMO its interesting how creating “market towns” has been a part of UK COIN culture historically, a la Ireland under Cromwell] Ghey don’t want you to have the prosperity the market brings you. They want to destroy your market”. He threw up more gruesome photographs, of the wrecked phone card cart, the destroyed police vehicle, of wounded and panicking locals, and finally, the remains of the dead twelve year old boy. “You have seen everything that we are doing. It is all taking you forward, to greater security and prosperity. But this is where the Taliban want to take you. They want to take you back. Back to the time before May when there was no market. They have even stooped to using a child to destroy your future”.[...] The elders were shocked. They were muttering and tutting loudly and shaking their heads vigorously at visual evidence of what the Taliban had done.(p.267)

I’ll quote some more from the deeds of these heroes rather than try to summarise.....


Privates Parker and Thrumble’s debrief their CO Lt. Seal-Coon...

“...I figured out it [enemy small arms fire] must have come from high up and there were no compounds or anything that it could’ve been fired from. I looked across and I wondered about the trees. I thought they couldn’t be up the trees – bit too risky for them. But i had a good look and couldn’t see anything so I told Thrumbles to put a burst through the trees”. Next to Parker, Thrumble started laughing, “[...] Mary and me fired a couple of bursts of twenty, and bodies just started falling out everywhere’. “[...]Don’t exaggerate to the platoon commander”, said Parker. “But two bodies fell out of the trees. It was like some sick comedy show or
something”.(p.140)


A vicious firefight in Operation Ghartse Ghar...

Private Thompson looked into the eyes of a Taliban fighter with an RPG launcher on his shoulder. Private Perry, just behind him, started to swing his weapon towards the fighter. When Thompson locked eyes with the Taliban fighter everything slowed right down. Before either Thompson or Perry could react, there was a loud bang.. Thompson saw a jet of flame flash from the back of the launcher ad a cloud of blue-grey smoke, and the missile in the air, spinning straight at him. The rocket glanced off his Osprey chest plate and flung him violently into the bank, knocking the wind out of him. It exploded against the side of the ditch between him and Perry. Thompson was engulfed in the enormous blast [...] His whole body was cut up by RPG shrapnel, with fifty holes in his legs alone.[...]Beside him Perry lay bleeding and moaning, 157 separate shrapnel wounds in his arms, legs and nose. Corporal Murphy who was close by, was hurled to the ground by the blast. He felt his legs, peppered by shrapnel, compressing and burning. Private Ross Green, Murphy’s GPMG gunner, towards the rear, and an engineer behind him, were also badly wounded”.(p.243)


Maj. Mick Aston talking in an Army Air Corps WAH-64...

The JTAC said to Aston, “He repeats what he told us before, he cannot fire until he has positively identified the target”. Fuming, Aston replied, “Well I have PID’d the target. The Viking crews have PID’d the target. 7 Platoon has. How much more PIDing does he need?”. “Sir, he says he needs to PID it himself before he can engage”. “Look I used to be in a helicopter recce squadron. I know how difficult it is to identify people from the air if they are well concealed, even with the kind of kit these fellas up there have nowadays. But we’re firing at the enemy, the Apache pilot can see our tracer. The enemy’s firing back at us, the pilot can see their tracer too. What is the problem?” [...] “What is he bothered about? Is it civvies in the area? There aren’t any. But if there had been, we’d have killed them all by now with our guns”.[...]Aston was raging. He refused to believe the Apaches had to work under such a ridiculous constraint – in this situation.[...] He said, “Let’s get rid of him now. We’ll get something else on to it. Tell the pilot – repeat these words to him exactly from me – fire at the target now or get out”.[...] Aston turned to Corporal Wilsher, his mortar fire controller. “The minute the Apache clears the airspace start engaging with mortars. I want HE up and down that treeline. Can you do that, or will the mortar line commander need to [...] do some PIDing in person?” He turned back to the JTAC. “While he’s doing that, get me some proper close air support”.(p.65)

[gute]

Finsihed WAR by Sebastian Junger a couple of weeks ago. Good book. I have tried to follow the 173BCT and their tours in Afghanistan.

Just finished Rage Company: A Marine's Baptism By Fire by Thomas P. Daly (it's okay, save your money and get it from the library) and The Last Stand: Custer, Sitting Bull, and the Battle of the Little Bighorn by Nathaniel Philbrick (nothing new in this book, Custer loses - I know big suprise).

Also reading Rakkasans: The Combat History of the 187th Airborne Infantry by E. M. Flanagan

[davidbfpo]

A Stranger to Myself, by Willy Peter Reese, a young German soldier on the Russian front during the second world war who was killed in 1944 at the age of 23....His accounts were discovered only in 2002

From:http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnists/life/22274/part_2/warrior-writer.thtml

A review article of several books by a military historian, from Arnhem 1944 'Coward at the Bridge' by James Delingpole, Imjin River 1951 'To the Last Round' by Andrew Salmon, set in the Korengal Valley 'War' by Sebastian Junger and from the later:
Not since his first world war namesake Ernst, I think, has any writer got closer to the dark, terrible but strangely touching secret of why it is that men so love war.

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnists/all/6069963/men-fight-for-their-mates-it-is-the-secret-of-why-they-so-love-war.thtml

[SJPONeill]

On the reading stand at the moment are the 1942 version of Douhet's Command of the Air and 'Johnnie' Johnson's Wing Leader...taking up a new appointment next week on the air side of the house so thought that I might start looking forward by looking back...have just finished Benoit Mandelbrot's The (mis)behaviour of Markets which is an interesting first principles look at irregularity. Although its focus is upon market systems a large proportion of his thinking, IMHO, could inform how we consider our own irregular environment...book review to follow...

[Mike in Hilo]

Learned about the book from SWJ. The author contends:

1) Jihadism is but one phase of a worldwide insurgency that will bedevil us for decades and that is an expression of alienation of 3rd world immigrant communities within rich nations. A future phase, he says, may involve millions of destitute 3rd world refugees from global warming-induced inundation of their homelands, who will have found their way to western cities.

2) Thus, the most important theater of the conflict is within the western nations, not in some Middle Eastern or Central Asian land. Not least, he posits, because the "expeditionary approach" of taking the fight overseas is stillborn by the western nations' obsession with an exit strategy even before we charge through the entrance. So, he argues, as domestic politics forecloses a winning strategy overseas, we are left to focus on the domestic threat..which is the main one in any case.

3) He cites as a potential model a UK op involving LE cum the whole of gov't
approach in engaging the Islamic immigrant community.

Opinion: May provide some insight into a Weltanschauung prevalent in some European circles. ....Also, no problem for a retired guy like me, but if your time comes at a premium you might want to weigh the opportunity cost of reading....

Cheers,
Mike.

[Tukhachevskii]

Learned about the book from SWJ. The author contends:

1) Jihadism is but one phase of a worldwide insurgency that will bedevil us for decades and that is an expression of (#1) alienation of 3rd world immigrant communities within rich nations. A future phase, he says, may involve millions of destitute 3rd world refugees from global warming-induced inundation of their homelands, who will have found their way to western cities.

2) Thus, (#2) the most important theater of the conflict is within the western nations, not in some Middle Eastern or Central Asian land. Not least, he posits, because the "expeditionary approach" of taking the fight overseas is stillborn by the western nations' obsession with an exit strategy even before we charge through the entrance. So, he argues, as domestic politics forecloses a winning strategy overseas, we are left to focus on the domestic threat..which is the main one in any case.

3) He cites as a potential model a UK op involving LE cum the whole of gov't
approach in engaging the Islamic immigrant community.

Opinion: May provide some insight into a Weltanschauung prevalent in some European circles. ....Also, no problem for a retired guy like me, but if your time comes at a premium you might want to weigh the opportunity cost of reading....

Cheers,
Mike.

Great find. Heard about that from an old professor of mine from KCL (Mackinley teaches there IIRC) but I decided to avoid the whole "coin" cottage industry/fad for a while. Disagree on #1, but I've been talking about #2 & #3 for a while (almost got myself in a spot of bother whilst at Hamas occupied SOAS:D). #1 assumes certain groups of people want to be British; IMO that's not the case, if it was we wouldn't have the parallel societies that we do (which aren't just Muslim phenomena) given the amount of money that's been wasted (IMO) in community schemes (but then again that was the point of multiculturalism (www.melaniephillips.com/articles-new/?p=718), wasn't it? Oh, what tangled webs we weave!). I find such assertions simplistic and condescending (why are we always the self-defined perpetrators in a narrative of victimhood which priveledges the Other in favour of the Self? The ghost of Edward Said me thinks-and his Leftist/Liberal supporters). As Hassan Butt said after the 7/7 attacks in London (2005) (www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/jul/01/comment.religion1);


When I was still a member of what is probably best terms the British Jihadi Network, a series of semi-autonomous British Muslim terrorist groups linked by a single ideoloy, I remmeber how we used to laugh in celebration whenever people on TV proclaimed that the sole cause for Islamic acts of terror like 9/11, the Madrid bombings and 7/7 was Western foreign policy. By blaiming the government for our actions, those who pushed the "Blair's bombs" line did our propaganda for us. More important, they also helped to draw away any critical examination from the real engine of our violence; Islamic theology.

Anyway, thanks for the synopsis, will definately search out a copy.

[Kiwigrunt]

why are we always the self-defined perpetrators in a narrative of victimhood which priveledges the Other in favour of the Self?

Another great quote!:wry:

[Commando Spirit]

Another great quote!:wry:

Speaking of great quotes, in Germany this morning on BFBS Radio I heard of the opening phrase of the winner of the Bulwer-Lytton Prize for Bad Writing which was awarded to:

Molly Ringle

For her opening phrase:

"For the first month of Ricardo and Felicity’s affair, they greeted one another at every stolen rendezvous with a kiss–a lengthy, ravenous kiss, Ricardo lapping and sucking at Felicity’s mouth as if she were a giant cage-mounted water bottle and he were the world’s thirstiest gerbil."

Pure genius!!!!

http://www.bulwer-lytton.com/

[NihilisticZeal]

I'm currently re-reading a bunch of books for a master's dissertation / PhD proposal on Islamist military culture and their "way of war". Relying quite heavily on Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: Warriors of Contemporary Combat (http://www.amazon.com/Insurgents-Terrorists-Militias-Warriors-Contemporary/dp/0231129823) (by Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew, my review available here (http://postgradbonanza.wordpress.com/2010/04/12/book-review-insurgents-terrorists-and-militias/)), Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes (http://www.amazon.com/Military-Orientalism-Eastern-Through-Columbia/dp/0231154143/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1278416339&sr=1-1) (by Patrick Porter) and Waging Wars without Warriors? Changing Culture of Military Conflict (http://www.amazon.com/Waging-War-Without-Warriors-International/dp/1588261301/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1278416429&sr=1-1) (by Christopher Coker).

[tequila]

Just finished Matterhorn (http://www.amazon.com/Matterhorn-Novel-Vietnam-Karl-Marlantes/dp/080211928X/ref=tmm_hrd_title_0), which deserves all the accolades currently being heaped on it. What stood out for me was the quality of the writing, the recognizable culture of the Marine Corps, and the remarkable compassion of the author for almost every character in the story.

It's almost 600 pages and I finished it in two nights last week. Now rereading it. Yeah, it's that good.

Of interest, the author's Navy Cross citation (http://www.militarytimes.com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php?recipientid=4191). The author pretty much outlines how he earned this in the book, but doesn't mention the award.

[Bob's World]

I picked up a couple of books while at the National Archives this past weekend:

Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution by Woody Holton

The Quotable Founding Fathers by Buckner F. Melton, Jr.


Ken White wisely points out that much of the Constitution was to control the populace, and he is correct. Pure Democracy is not a good thing. This first book is a great read for those who want to understand the lives and times of our insurgent founding fathers as they emerged into the chaos of a newly liberated country that found itself with too pure of a democracy to be effective and struggling with the realities of what it meant to be liberated from the governance and support of Great Britain. This is the story of the first US counterinsurgency, and as such "Unruly Americans" should probably in the COIN library of anyone who has an interest or role in that field. (there is small grace period for the insurgent before he finds himself in the role of counterinsurgent. To think otherwise is to invite disaster)

The second is just a great resource to gain insights into the thoughts of individuals and what they were thinking; and quotes to toss out to support points in current arguments as well.

[slapout9]

The second is just a great resource to gain insights into the thoughts of individuals and what they were thinking; and quotes to toss out to support points in current arguments as well.

Yes, throw some from Jefferson on how the enemy of all enemies to a Republic are the Bankers!

[Fuchs]

"Operational logistics", Moshe Kress

I hope it's good, don't want to waste my time.

[MikeF]

Yes, throw some from Jefferson on how the enemy of all enemies to a Republic are the Bankers!

Was that Jefferson? Sounds like Andrew Jackson.

[slapout9]

Was that Jefferson? Sounds like Andrew Jackson.


Jefferson it could be argued started it,but Jackson came on strong later and Lincoln actually beat them with the debt free/interest free Greenbacks of the Civil War.


I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies. If the American people ever allow private banks to control the issue of their currency, first by inflation, then by deflation, the banks and corporations that will grow up around [the banks] will deprive the people of all property until their children wake-up homeless on the continent their fathers conquered. The issuing power should be taken from the banks and restored to the people, to whom it properly belongs.
Thomas Jefferson
3rd president of US (1743 - 1826)

[Steve Blair]

Just finished Matterhorn (http://www.amazon.com/Matterhorn-Novel-Vietnam-Karl-Marlantes/dp/080211928X/ref=tmm_hrd_title_0), which deserves all the accolades currently being heaped on it. What stood out for me was the quality of the writing, the recognizable culture of the Marine Corps, and the remarkable compassion of the author for almost every character in the story.

It's almost 600 pages and I finished it in two nights last week. Now rereading it. Yeah, it's that good.

Of interest, the author's Navy Cross citation (http://www.militarytimes.com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php?recipientid=4191). The author pretty much outlines how he earned this in the book, but doesn't mention the award.

Matterhorn is good, but to me it pales when compared to The 13th Valley.

[huskerguy7]

I just completed "In the Graveyard of Empires" by Seth Jones.

I was very impressed. Usually, I am very hesitant when I pick up a book talking about a current war because I'm afraid of trashy journalism. Before I read the book, I had no idea who Seth Jones was, but now I know.

The book provides a great history of Afghanistan up to 2008. I am sure that many here are already knowledgeable on this, but for those that aren't, then it's a good read. My only complaint: some of his research is dated. For example, his assertions on the Afghan National Army come from interviews that are from 2006. The ANA in 2010 is much different from the ANA in 2006. I give him credit though for writing about a current conflict.

Since I was so impressed with his writing, I picked up "The Rise of European Security Cooperation" by Seth Jones. I am currently 50 pages in, but am also very impressed. It is an academic read, but it's thought provoking.

[Tukhachevskii]

I'm currently re-reading a bunch of books for a master's dissertation / PhD proposal on Islamist military culture and their "way of war". Relying quite heavily on Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: Warriors of Contemporary Combat (http://www.amazon.com/Insurgents-Terrorists-Militias-Warriors-Contemporary/dp/0231129823) (by Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew, my review available here (http://postgradbonanza.wordpress.com/2010/04/12/book-review-insurgents-terrorists-and-militias/)), Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes (http://www.amazon.com/Military-Orientalism-Eastern-Through-Columbia/dp/0231154143/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1278416339&sr=1-1) (by Patrick Porter) and Waging Wars without Warriors? Changing Culture of Military Conflict (http://www.amazon.com/Waging-War-Without-Warriors-International/dp/1588261301/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1278416429&sr=1-1) (by Christopher Coker).

Don't forget Patrica Crone's, Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity (www.amazon.co.uk/Slaves-Horses-Evolution-Islamic-Polity/dp/0521529409)

[davidbfpo]

I have just finished reading the fully revised English edition of The Baader-Meinhof Complex by Stefan Aust (Pub. 2008), which also became a film.

The Baader-Meinhof gang in West Germany started in 1970 and ended in 1998. At one time the gang had six members engaged in a campaign of terrorism and was described as "the war of six against sixty million". The early gang was captured in 1972, a prolonged trial started in 1975 and ended in 1977 when three died in custody - after the famous GSG-9 (and SAS) hostage rescue at Mogadishu.

A really good book covering radicalisation, the state response (much still shrouded in secrecy), international links and the impact on Germany.

UK Amazon:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Baader-Meinhof-Complex-Stefan-Aust/dp/1847920454

USA Amazon, with good reviews:http://www.amazon.com/Baader-Meinhof-Inside-Story-R-F/dp/0195372751/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1280086711&sr=1-1

[Backwards Observer]

Reading Isaac Asimov's, Foundation. Mentioned recently by jmm99. Fascinating.

Foundation (amazon link) (http://www.amazon.com/Foundation-Novels-Isaac-Asimov/dp/0553293354)

[JMA]

Not a current read but from 35 years ago in the mid to late '70s.

The first book that was well circulated (and read by certainly the junior ranks) was Devil's Guard by George Robert Elford (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Devils-Guard-George-Robert-Elford/dp/0440614236) set in the First Indochina War in the time of the French Foreign Legion involvement. Good read as I remember.

That led me through a reference to the Jungle is Neutral - Spencer Chapman (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Jungle-Neutral-F-Spencer-Chapman/dp/1592281079/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1280481735&sr=1-1) which I remembered when I cam across a copy of Jungle Soldier: The True Story of Freddy Spencer Chapman (http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=9b0iQwAACAAJ&dq=%22the%20jungle%20is%20neutral%22&source=gbs_slider_thumb) the other day in a book shop.

I studied Chapman's book as a young officer and found it highly informative and helpful for what I was doing at the time.

Another book I studied was Robert Taber's War of the Flea (http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=w4v2Jf2auW8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=war+of+the+flea&source=bl&ots=od3WFq49e8&sig=zbG9S_a1mavqILZc4Rd2C_mRGIc&hl=en&ei=GZFSTJSjLdX8ngemk9CGAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=false) I studied this book too and found it massively educational.

(Mike: I thought you said you had this book still? If so please check page 93 to see what he writes about the massive production of police forces and asks the question "How would the police themselves be secure where even military patrols were not?". This applies to the latest best plan of OEF to secure Afghanistan.)

I loved reading and rereading TE Lawrence's 7 Pillars of Wisdom (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Pillars-Wisdom-Wordsworth-Classics-Literature/dp/1853264695) not for any other reason that I marveled over his ability to remain a free thinker when under those circumstances one would have expected his focus to become narrower and narrower on what he was doing.

Just wondering if these books are still being read?

[Bob's World]

Hard to believe this was written 111 years ago regarding the US operation to build an empire with the Philippines and not just last week:

"Take up the White Man's burden--
Send forth the best ye breed--
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild--
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child.

Take up the White Man's burden--
In patience to abide,
To veil the threat of terror
And check the show of pride;
By open speech and simple,
An hundred times made plain
To seek another's profit,
And work another's gain.

Take up the White Man's burden--
The savage wars of peace--
Fill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all your hopes to nought.

Take up the White Man's burden--
No tawdry rule of kings,
But toil of serf and sweeper--
The tale of common things.
The ports ye shall not enter,
The roads ye shall not tread,
Go mark them with your living,
And mark them with your dead.

Take up the White Man's burden--
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better,
The hate of those ye guard--
The cry of hosts ye humour
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light:--
"Why brought he us from bondage,
Our loved Egyptian night?"

Take up the White Man's burden--
Ye dare not stoop to less--
Nor call too loud on Freedom
To cloke your weariness;
By all ye cry or whisper,
By all ye leave or do,
The silent, sullen peoples
Shall weigh your gods and you.

Take up the White Man's burden--
Have done with childish days--
The lightly proferred laurel,
The easy, ungrudged praise.
Comes now, to search your manhood
Through all the thankless years
Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,
The judgment of your peers!"

[jmm99]

First to Backwards Observer ...

The Foundation series of seven:

1. Prelude to Foundation
2. Forward the Foundation
3. Foundation
4. Foundation and Empire
5. Second Foundation
6. Foundation's Edge
7. Foundation and Earth

boils down to the four earlier books (bolded) as must reads.

I still go back and read favorite chapters - e.g., In Foundation, Part II, The Encyclopedists, Lord Dorwin's methodology for finding the "twuth" of the "Owigin Question" (ch 4), and analysing the real content of Lord Dorwin's diplomatic documents (ch 5). Both chapters are here (http://www.gramotey.com/?open_file=1269051970#TOC_id2999037).

Of course, neither Lord Dorwin's methodology nor content applies to any posts at SWC. :D

----------------------------
Well JMA, I have to confess to some common reading interests.

I did miss your Mr. Chapman and his jungle; but was (and still am) a devotee to a number of hunters and gatherers of the written word - e.g., from oldest to newest, Jim Corbett (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Corbett_(hunter)) (and his man-eater books), Ernest Hemingway (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Hemingway) (a part-time Northern Michigander when young), Robert Ruark (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Ruark) and Peter Capstick (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Hathaway_Capstick). Robert Thompson (in the preface to Defeating Communist Insurgency) recommended Corbett's man-eater books as must reads; and I still think of terrs as man-eaters - except the animal variety have an excuse (they lack a soul and hence are "innocent").

I've also managed Lawrence (a bit tedious at times), but my image is from the movie - obviously not produced and directed by Wilf. ;)

Elford is a good read - even though it is somewhat fictional (perhaps more so as to the characters than for some of the events) - see these two posts re: materials on the first Indochina War (1945-1954), Google up the links to (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=89548&postcount=5) and Hey Marc (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=90900&postcount=7).

Yup, Taber's Flea page 93 says exactly that: ""How would the police themselves be secure where even military patrols were not?"

The context, which we both will agree is all-important, was the national police program in Vietnam in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The advisors to that program were the Michigan State group led by Wesley Fischel (later unjustly persecuted by Ramparts and others). Their model was the Michigan State Police - a very good domestic police unit then and now; but not a paramilitary, gendarmerie type unit trained and equipped to fight irregulars; and led by Os and NCOs competent in that field.

Now, what you would do is tell me how to bring my cops up to RLI standards. :)

Cheers

Mike

[Backwards Observer]

First to Backwards Observer ...

The Foundation series of seven:

1. Prelude to Foundation
2. Forward the Foundation
3. Foundation
4. Foundation and Empire
5. Second Foundation
6. Foundation's Edge
7. Foundation and Earth

boils down to the four earlier books (bolded) as must reads.

Much appweciated.

[baboon6]

I'm reading at the moment:

Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939-45 by Dr R V Jones

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Most-Secret-Wordsworth-Military-Library/dp/185326699X

Coastal Forces at War: The Royal Navy's Little Ships in the Narrow Seas 1939-45 by David Jefferson

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Coastal-Forces-War-Little-1939-45/dp/184425562X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1280743049&sr=1-1

Recently read:

Military Intelligence Blunders by Colonel John Hughes-Wilson

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Military-Intelligence-Blunders-Colonel-Hughes-Wilson/dp/0786707151/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1280743470&sr=1-3

The Grand Scuttle: The Sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow in 1919 by Dan van der Wat.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Grand-Scuttle-Sinking-German-Fleet/dp/1843410389/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1280743653&sr=1-1

[MikeF]

A friend of mine gave me this book as a gift. Sorting through it now.

Walking with the Wind- A Memoir of the Movement (http://www.amazon.com/Walking-Wind-Movement-John-Lewis/dp/0156007088/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1280744423&sr=8-1) by John Lewis with Michael D'orso

While many of his current politics are questionable, John Lewis's participation in the civil rights movement is extraordinary.


John Lewis is an authentic American hero, a modest man from the most humble of beginnings who left a rural Alabama cotton farm 40 years ago and strode into the forefront of the civil rights movement. One of the young people who brought the teachings of Ghandi and King to the lunch counters of Nashville in 1960, Lewis suffered taunts and threats, beatings and arrests. He spoke at the historic 1963 March on Washington and became chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. The nation, tuned to the nightly news, watched in horror as state troopers clubbed him viciously, fracturing his skull as he led a march in Selma, Alabama, in 1965. Today, he's the only member of Congress who can be proud of having been carried off to jail more than 40 times. With the help of a collaborator, journalist Michael D'Orso, this remarkable man has written a truly remarkable book. Walking with the Wind is a deeply moving personal memoir that skillfully balances the intimate and touching recollections of the deeply thoughtful Lewis with the intense national drama that was the civil rights movement.

[M-A Lagrange]

Orson Scott Card:
The Ender Quartet: Ender's Game/ Speaker for the Dead/ Xenocide/ Children of the Mind.

And the pathfinder cycle also.
All Scott Card in fact.:D

[JMA]

Well JMA, I have to confess to some common reading interests.

I did miss your Mr. Chapman and his jungle; but was (and still am) a devotee to a number of hunters and gatherers of the written word - e.g., from oldest to newest, Jim Corbett (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Corbett_(hunter)) (and his man-eater books), Ernest Hemingway (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Hemingway) (a part-time Northern Michigander when young), Robert Ruark (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Ruark) and Peter Capstick (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Hathaway_Capstick). Robert Thompson (in the preface to Defeating Communist Insurgency) recommended Corbett's man-eater books as must reads; and I still think of terrs as man-eaters - except the animal variety have an excuse (they lack a soul and hence are "innocent").

I've also managed Lawrence (a bit tedious at times), but my image is from the movie - obviously not produced and directed by Wilf. ;)

Elford is a good read - even though it is somewhat fictional (perhaps more so as to the characters than for some of the events) - see these two posts re: materials on the first Indochina War (1945-1954), Google up the links to (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=89548&postcount=5) and Hey Marc (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=90900&postcount=7).

[snip]

Cheers

Mike

You got to read Spencer Chapman's "The Jungle is Neutral". Its a lot about the type of mindset you want to look for in soldiers. Self reliance and resourcefulness. Marvelous man. Among the best the British have had to offer.

Just remembered another good book from back then.

The War of the Running Dogs: Malaya 1948-1960 (http://www.amazon.co.uk/War-Running-Dogs-1948-1960-Paperbacks/dp/0304366714/ref=pd_cp_b_2)

Certainly educational.

Then a book I remember well but can't find much on Google other than it is out of print and was published in 1958. Ian Henderson's The Hunt for Kamathi (http://www.amazon.com/hunt-Kimathi-Ian-Henderson/dp/B0007ILI6U/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1280753835&sr=1-5) at the time of Mau Mau. Maybe it was republished later as Man Hunt in Kenya (http://www.amazon.com/Man-Hunt-Kenya-Ian-Henderson/dp/0553267752/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1280753835&sr=1-3).

[jmm99]

On a macro-level, the Malayan Emergency illustrates a decent interplay between the police (esp. Special Branch; for which, it and its networks, Wilf has lust in his heart ;)) and military. All the standard books apply; but a freebie from Rand is Riley Sunderland's 1964 5-part monograph series (http://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/s/sunderland_riley.html):


Antiguerrilla Intelligence in Malaya, 1948-1960 - 1964

Army Operations in Malaya, 1947-1960 - 1964

Organizing Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1947-1960 - 1964

Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya - 1964

Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People: Malaya, 1948-1960 - 1964

The two keys are bolded.

The difficult question which flowed through Malaya and Vietnam - and touches us today - is how to organize small units (roughly platoon-size) that would handle local governance, justice and police matters, intelligence; as well as being "paramilitary enough" to avoid being defeated in detail. Defeat in detail was, of course, MACV's concern.

One informal solution can be found in Bing West, The Village (http://www.amazon.com/Village-Bing-West/dp/0743457579), dealing with Marine CAP in one village complex. Focus has tended to be on the Marine squads that made up one side of CAP, and sometimes on the Vietnamese Puffs (PFs)that provided the hamlet defenders. But, what is not often mentioned is that the Vietnamese police had its contingent in the village complex, as well as a local governance component. The Marines supplied the backbone and muscle to allow Vietnamese "civil affairs" to function and survive.

A more formal solution was the GVN Revolutionary (sometime "Rural") Development Team, which on paper called for about a double platoon (60 personnel, divided between infantry fighters, intelligence and local governance). That program never got off the ground. It and many of the other GVN paramilitary police and related "pacification" programs are covered well in another freebie: Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (http://www.counterinsurgency.org/Tran/Tran.htm) (1977; one of the Indochina Monographs), who was a key player in the programs, and who gives the South Vietnamese slant on the project. Two SWC threads, CORDS / Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=79988&highlight=tran#post79988), and CIA Vietnam Histories (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6843), also have a number of links.

That brings us to the most effective (per capita) organization dealing with Pacification and the neutralization (kill, capture, convert) of VCI (Viet Cong Infrastructure), the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA_activities_in_Vietnam#Covert_action_2) (PRUs), which combined infantry and close quarters combat skills with suburb intelligence collection and analysis. If one tossed in a local governance component, the PRUs would pretty much cover the type of paramilitary police unit needed to provide the local effort. See Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey (http://www.amazon.com/Phoenix-Birds-Prey-Campaign-Destroy/dp/1557505934) (a rational discussion of what the PRUs were and were not).

I'm too old and decrepit to unlearn about police; and, JMA, you are too old and decrepit to learn about police. :D So, hopefully, this post will be useful to some younger guy or gal.

I quit analysing Astan ANA and ANP some months ago - and I'll stick with that quit.

Regards (and quit ass-u-me-ing - :))

Mike

[William F. Owen]

(esp. Special Branch; for which, it and its networks, Wilf has lust in his heart ;))
Dunno why? I'm a big believer in Networks, as long as they are not elevated to something they are not - which is what NEW-COIN has tried to do. People fail to distinguish between command structures and networks. Networks are forms of communication. A network can only enable a command. It cannot make the decision or make the plan.

[Backwards Observer]

Mayhap be interesting perchance or somesuch.

Online participatory novel masterminded by Neal Stephenson (Snowcrash, Cryptonomicon).


The Mongol takeover of Europe is almost complete. The hordes commanded by the sons of Genghis Khan have swept out of their immense grassy plains and ravaged Russia, Poland, and Hungary... and now seem poised to sweep west to Paris and south to Rome. King and pope and peasant alike face a bleak future—until a small band of warriors, inheritors of a millennium-old secret tradition, set out to probe the enemy.
...
We are presenting The Mongoliad first as an online serial novel for a few reasons. One is that it lets us share an intimacy with readers that isn't possible when the books come out every three or so years, all at once, in doorstop format. When something gets you excited or bores you, we want to know. Another reason is that we are energized by the possibilities for creating parts of this novel not only as words, but as illustrations, graphic novels, maps, and eventually games and movies.
...
The Subutai Corporation is named after Genghis Khan's strategic commander, a man who rarely lost a battle and who eventually grew so obese that horses could not carry him. And you know a Mongol has to be somebody pretty special if he can't ride a horse and still gets treated with respect. So that's our guy.

The Mongoliad (http://mongoliad.com/)

[Van]

Donald Kagan's Peloponessian War (http://www.amazon.com/Peloponnesian-War-Donald-Kagan/dp/0142004375/). Easily the best treatment of the subject around, striking a balance between readability and thoroughness. The small wars aspects of the Peloponessian War are frequently ignored, but effected both sides and had (arguably) an effect on the duration and outcome of the war.

And nugging my way through a small stack of Drs Paul and Elders' critical thinking and education books.

[Jedburgh]

Donald Kagan's Peloponessian War (http://www.amazon.com/Peloponnesian-War-Donald-Kagan/dp/0142004375/). Easily the best treatment of the subject around....
What?! Better than Thucydides (http://www.amazon.com/Landmark-Thucydides-Comprehensive-Guide-Peloponnesian/dp/0684827905)? I think not.

[Van]

Well, yes.

Thucydides didn't complete the history of the Peloponnesian war, and the conclusion is usual based on Xenophon (who is easily one of the greatest writers of all time). Kagan integrated the two, added in a couple more primary and ancient secondary sources, deconflicted a bunch of stuff, and put it into clear prose.

Thucydides is good, and stands alone pretty well, but Kagan gives you a more readable and complete picture.

[PhilR]

I’m in the first part of Churchill’s biography of the Duke of Marlborough, Marlborough, written in 1933. I was taken by this passage (especially as it was written pre-WWII):

“It is customary to say that he [Marlborough] learned the art of war from Turenne. This is going too far. No competent officer of that age could watch the composed genius of Turenne in action without being enriched thereby. But no battle ever repeats itself. The success of a commander does not arise from following rules or models. It consists in an absolutely new comprehension of the dominant facts of the situation at the time, and all the forces at work. Cooks use recipes for dishes and doctors have prescriptions for diseases, but every great operation of war is unique. The kind of intelligence capable of grasping in its complete integrity what is actually happening in the field is not taught by the tactics of commanders on one side or the other—though these may train the mind—but by a profound appreciation of the actual event. There is no surer road to ill-success in war than to imitate the plans of bygone heroes and to fit them to novel situations.”

[zenpundit]

Magic and Mayhem: The Delusions of Foreign Policy from Korea to Afghanistan (http://www.amazon.com/Magic-Mayhem-Delusions-American-Afghanistan/dp/1439125694) by Derek Leebaert

and

The Bin Ladens (http://www.amazon.com/Bin-Ladens-Arabian-American-Century/dp/B002IKLO8W/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1287202303&sr=1-4) by Steve Coll

Recently finished:

Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism (http://www.amazon.com/Blood-Rage-Cultural-History-Terrorism/dp/006117386X/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1287202403&sr=1-4#_) by Michael Burleigh

Next in the queue:

The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (http://www.amazon.com/Grand-Strategy-Byzantine-Empire/dp/0674035194/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1287202519&sr=1-1) by Edward Luttwak

[Backwards Observer]

Just started - Enter The Dragon - China's Undeclared War Against The U.S. In Korea 1950-51 (1988) by Russell Spurr. Looks interesting.


The 1980 campaign to rehabilitate the much-beloved General Peng Dehuai, the most prominent military victim of the Cultural Revolution (and a major figure in this narrative), undoubtedly helped my researches. So too did emerging new Chinese perceptions about the background of the Korean War. "We are taking an entirely new look at the origins of that war," one Chinese friend told me recently. Another acidly observed that "China was conned into a costly struggle for which it got little thanks." Such views have not yet surfaced officially - not while North Korea's durable dictator, Kim Il Sung, continues to play off Peking against Moscow - but this underlying disillusionment, or perhaps a new-found urge to put the Chinese viewpoint forward proved helpful. (pp. xix-xx)



Russell Spurr was based in Hong Kong for more than 20 years as the China and Far East correspondent for the London Daily Express and ABC Radio Network, and the chief correspondent and deputy editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review. He was one of the first Western correspondents to report from Beijing after the establishment in 1949 of the People's Republic of China.

During World War II Spurr was in the Royal Indian Navy, and served in motor gunboats through most of the Burma campaign. After the Japanese surrender, he was assigned to Kure, Japan, where he first viewed the vacant dock built for the Yamato and began to pursue the story of its demise, told in his first book A Glorious Way to Die. He is also the author of the highly acclaimed Enter the Dragon. (from Newmarket Press Author bio)

http://www.newmarketpress.com/author.asp?id=335

Amazon Link - http://www.amazon.com/Enter-Dragon-Undeclared-Against-1950-51/dp/1557042497

Google Books - http://books.google.com.au/books?id=Y6gpLDZi4hcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=enter+the+dragon+spurr&source=bl&ots=dCGDf_KDC2&sig=R6EUoiq50lTh4rP5j-WZcXrVaVw&hl=en&ei=lZX0TLLXGIW8vgPckIXqCA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBUQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

[USMC-03]

Donald Kagan's Peloponessian War (http://www.amazon.com/Peloponnesian-War-Donald-Kagan/dp/0142004375/).

I read that one several years ago; very good book.

I just finished Agincourt by Bernard Cornwell. Right now I'm working on Caesar by Theodore Dodge along with The Commentaries, The Road to Serfdom by Fredrick Hayek and rereading Lincoln on Leadership by Donald Phillips.

[Bob's World]

I’m in the first part of Churchill’s biography of the Duke of Marlborough, Marlborough, written in 1933. I was taken by this passage (especially as it was written pre-WWII):

“It is customary to say that he [Marlborough] learned the art of war from Turenne. This is going too far. No competent officer of that age could watch the composed genius of Turenne in action without being enriched thereby. But no battle ever repeats itself. The success of a commander does not arise from following rules or models. It consists in an absolutely new comprehension of the dominant facts of the situation at the time, and all the forces at work. Cooks use recipes for dishes and doctors have prescriptions for diseases, but every great operation of war is unique. The kind of intelligence capable of grasping in its complete integrity what is actually happening in the field is not taught by the tactics of commanders on one side or the other—though these may train the mind—but by a profound appreciation of the actual event. There is no surer road to ill-success in war than to imitate the plans of bygone heroes and to fit them to novel situations.”

This has always been true, the art of battle command appears to be a rare talent if history is any judge. There is a great quote by Gen Sherman praising Gen. Grant in this regard. Sherman thought himself a better officer by practically every measure, and from what I have read, most historians agree with his assessment. What he said about Grant though was essentially (from memory) "Where he beats me and every other general is his ability to ignore his fears about what might be happening or going to happen and focus on the battle at hand." In essence his ability to envision far beyond what his eyes, reporting or intel were telling him, see the bigger picture, and have the moral and physical courage trust those instincts and execute upon them. Grant had the ability to do that at all levels, both tactically in a fight he was in, and strategically in designing and executing a campaign to defeat the Confederate Nation, as well as their military, understanding the difference and importance of each.

[Steve Blair]

Sherman was actually rather weak tactically.

[M-A Lagrange]

An Introduction to Planetary Defense: A Study of Modern Warfare Applied to Extra-Terrestrial Invasion
Travis S. Taylor (Author), Bob Boan
(Author), R.C. Anding (Author), T. Conley Powell (Author)
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1581124473?ie=UTF8&tag=slatmaga-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=1581124473

For extreme modern warfare geek only… :D

[J Wolfsberger]

A reprint of Jean Larteguy's classic novel of the French in Algeria will be released in January 2011: The Centurions (http://www.amazon.com/Centurions-Jean-Larteguy/dp/0848833015/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1291469791&sr=8-1)

If you're interested, I suggest pre-ordering. This publisher's runs are usually small.

[Backwards Observer]

My brain hurts from reading the Clausewitz thread, so I downloaded the kindle version of How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility Of Human Reason In Everyday Life by Thomas Gilovich. Hopefully I won't learn anything from it.


There is still another, less direct price we pay when we tolerate flawed thinking and superstitious belief. It is the familiar problem of the slippery slope: How do we prevent the occasional acceptance of faulty reasoning and erroneous beliefs from influencing our habits of thought more generally? Thinking straight about the world is a precious and difficult process that must be carefully nurtured. By attempting to turn our critical intelligence off and on at will, we risk losing it altogether, and thus jeopardize our ability to see the world clearly. Furthermore, by failing to fully develop our critical faculties, we become susceptible to the arguments and exhortations of those with other than benign intentions. In the words of Stephen Jay Gould, “When people learn no tools of judgment and merely follow their hopes, the seeds of political manipulations are sown.” As individuals and as a society, we should be less accepting of superstition and sloppy thinking, and should strive to develop those “habits of mind” that promote a more accurate view of the world. (p.6)

How We Know What Isn't So - Amazon (http://www.amazon.com/How-Know-What-Isnt-Fallibility/dp/0029117062/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1292785620&sr=1-1)

How We Know What Isn't So - Google Books (http://books.google.com.au/books?id=LURGkHCPAJEC&printsec=frontcover&dq=gilovich+how+we+know+what+isn't+so&source=bl&ots=Mou14X-E85&sig=Q4o-TeRykiLzXVLddhcP5TjZJPo&hl=en&ei=HlUOTfS7NceGcfW5vMYK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false)

Thomas Gilovich - Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Gilovich)

[Spud]

Finally got some down time to get a bit of reading done.

Cracked through The Fourth Star http://www.amazon.com/Fourth-Star-Generals-Struggle-Future/dp/0307409066/ref=pd_ys_iyr6 pretty quickly. Enjoyed it too as I learnt a bit more about some of the guys who were making decisions around me over the past few years.

Spent a bit of time with Victory Point http://www.amazon.com/Victory-Point-Operations-Whalers-Afghanistan/dp/B002VPE9O0/ref=pd_ys_iyr2. To be honest I really wanted to get into this as I deployed into AFG immediatly post this event and the CJSOTF was still focused on it. Should've been a great book but the author has a really weird style mixing tenses and narratives. Moreoover it is just a littl too USMC fan boy to take really seriously. Bet the Corps loves it though.

Have just finished Black Hearts http://www.amazon.com/Black-Hearts-Platoons-Descent-Triangle/dp/0307450759/ref=pd_ys_iyr4 ... holy dooley that's a confronting read and a great lesson in both leadership failures and recruiting policies ... relax the standards to let less than high calibre people in and this is the end result. Anyone whoever proposes further relaxing entrance standards needs to read this.

Current moving through The Bush War in Rhodesia http://www.amazon.com/Bush-War-Rhodesia-Extraordinary-Reconnaissance/dp/1581606141/ref=pd_ys_iyr5 Enjoying it so far but seems pretty typical of books of this style.

Still have Counter-Strike from the Sky, The Al-Jazeera Effect and New Dawn to get through in the next couple of weeks.

[davidbfpo]

Moderator at work

New thread created to enable easier searching, so now split into years, started with 2007.