What Are You Currently Reading? 2011

[Kevin23]

I just started Marin Van Creveld's The Changing Face of War: From the Marne to Iraq, which I have mixed feelings about so far. Although it is promising to provide me a picture of how war has progressed and transformed from the beginning of the 21st Century to today.

I'm also reading Michael Handel's Master's of War, which has some good readings of the classics of warfare and international relations in it.

[Xenophon]

I'm reading Van Crevald's Supplying War. It's reinforcing my thesis that logistics is the most boring subject in the history of ever.

[sullygoarmy]

Just finished reading "A Chance in Hell" by Jim Michels about 1-1 AD and the Anbar Awakening. Quick read with some salient points about the steps then COL MacFarland took with his brigade prior to the surge.

http://www.amazon.com/Chance-Hell-Triumphed-Deadliest-Turned/dp/0312587465/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1295318596&sr=8-1

About half way through "A Question of Command" by Mark Moyar. I thought the chapter on reconstruction was a reach but the book has picked up since then. His theory, that the success of an insurgency/counterinsurgency is leader centric is a interesting read and it is a nice break from the people vs enemy debates in COIN books today.

http://www.amazon.com/Question-Command-Counterinsurgency-Library-Military/dp/0300168071/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1295318693&sr=1-1

Just starting Georgina Howell's "Gertrude Bell: Queen of the Desert." Been wanting to read this one for a while and, thanks to the last book I just finished on TEL, I am more motivated to dig into Howell's take on Bell.

http://www.amazon.com/Gertrude-Bell-Desert-Shaper-Nations/dp/0374531358/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1295318799&sr=1-1

Finally, I finished Michael Korda's excellent biography of T.E. Lawrence, "Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia." I believe Korda's biography is the most balanced out of all the ones out there. He compares and contrasts the current crop of biographies in existence on Lawrence and incorporates a good deal of Lawrence's correspondence to support some of his interpretations of Lawrence's life. Well worth the read if you have any interest in TEL at all.

http://www.amazon.com/Hero-Life-Legend-Lawrence-Arabia/dp/0061712612/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1295318874&sr=1-1

Back to my Kindle!

[Tukhachevskii]

The Secrets of Saddam's Nuclear Mastermind by Mahdi Obeidi and Kurt Pitzer (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Bomb-My-Garden-Secrets-Mastermind/dp/0471741272/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1295807248&sr=8-1)
Obeidi was the mastermind behind Saddam’s nuclear weapons project (he often reminds one of an Iraqi Albert Speer), a project which was dismantled after the 1991 war and evidence of which was hidden in Obeidi’s back garden under a lotus tree in a green plastic drum and remained there until the 2003 invasion. Obeidi is honest about what drove his work; patriotism, fear of Saddam and his henchman Hussein Kamel (who was in charge of the programme) and a genuine scientific and professional enthusiasm for solving a puzzle. The book sets out in some detail the travails -technological, human and international- the nuclear programme had to contend with and the shady world of industrial and military espionage. The roles of black-marketers- such as the shady Pakistani known only as Malik- and of western industrialists such as the German and Swiss private entrepreneurs (like those at H&H Metalform) who wilfully ignored the implications of their assistance is ably spelled out. Obeidi and his team often trod the same path as A. Q. Khan and at others innovated in quite ingenious ways (i.e., regarding centrifuge technology). Indeed, it is hard not to empathise and share the joys of Obeidi and his colleagues at the first successful test of their centrifuge. Life under the Saddam regime, however, is not forgotten and the reader often feels the same paranoia that the author must have felt too. At times Obeidi was even called upon to conduct espionage himself such as when he flew to the U.S. and the University of Virginia’s Department of Mechanical Engineering to try to obtain a copy of the Zippe Report on centrifuge technology, originally published in the 1950s and unavailable in Iraq;


I approached a wiry, bespectacled librarian with the catalogue number, and he disappeared into a closed-off area of the library. When he returned several minutes later, he handed me a lengthy form and a ballpoint pen.
“You have to fill this out first,” he said. “For security purposes. And I will need some identification.”
This put me in an uncomfortable position, because filling in such forms would leave a dangerous paper trail. American intelligence agents would surely be very interested to learn that two Iraqi men had asked to see a centrifuge report at the University of Virginia. We couldn’t afford to leave such a revealing piece of evidence, particularly at the very outset of our secret program.
“Would it be possible to ensure that the report is indeed here,” I asked, “before I fill out all these forms for it?”
The librarian gave me an annoyed look, then returned to the back section of the library. We waited at his desk for what seemed like hours. Next to me, Dr. Farid fidgeted and began to sweat.
“Do you think he will call the authorities?” Dr. Farid whispered.
“Don’t worry,” I said. “We are in a university, making an everyday request. He is probably having trouble finding the report.” But I shared his nervousness. The word “security” triggered a subconscious reaction of fear in both of us. In Iraq, it usually meant just the opposite. Dr. Farid’s seemingly irrational notion suddenly took hold of me. What if a request for the Zippe report triggered an automatic security alert? If the librarian made a phone call and we were questioned, our cover story that we were from the University of Baghdad would hardly hold up. I thought of the awful consequences if Hussein Kamel learned we had exposed ourselves through such a foolish blunder. To my relief, the librarian finally returned with a thick sheaf of papers in one hand.
“Here it is,” he said, holding it back from us.“Now please fill out these forms.”
“Could I see it for a moment to be sure it is the right document?”I asked.
He handed me the report and watched closely as I took it to a nearby table and flipped through its pages. As I had hoped, it was a key piece of literature. It did not contain blueprints or dimensions of centrifuge pieces but offered a broad view of the engineering principles behind the magnetic centrifuge. It was exactly the primer
our team needed. But there was no way of reading it without filling out the release forms, and almost certainly no way of copying it. I noticed the librarian glowering at me several feet away. I intently scanned the chapter headings of the report while trying to appear as though I were only riffling through the pages.
“Is that what you are looking for?” the librarian asked impatiently.
“I’m still not sure,” I said.
I knew I had only a few more seconds to look at the report. Then I came to an appendix that listed the recipients of the report when it was first issued in 1960: the holders of the precious few copies. Scanning down the list, I recognized the name of a Milan based professor [from whom Obeidi acquired the report via his onetime colleague Dr. Giorgio Morandi, in Milan] associated with the Italian nuclear program. That was the piece of information I needed. (p. 77-78)


Obeidi also goes into some depth about Saddam’s attempts at deception during the IAEA inspections in the post-1991 period. At the Rashidiya complex a first inspection by IAEA inspectors discovered trace amounts of uranium, Obeidi ordered that the entire (former) centrifuge complex be demolished and soil excavated which may have been contaminated. It was then rebuilt.

When the inspectors returned unannounced about two weeks later, everything appeared as they had last seen it, down to the placement of the drafting tables and machines and the coffeemaker. I stayed away, but my staff later told me the inspectors had arrived with a triumphant and slightly accusatory attitude. They took dozens of samples from the walls, floor, insulation, and ground soil, and then left to send them to Vienna for confirmation. They must have been truly puzzled when the material later tested negative for abnormal uranium levels. I imagine they remain puzzled about it to this day.(p. 150)
[...]
By 1994 the inspectors had largely dismantled Iraq’s nuclear capabilities. But they had not discovered key ingredients of the centrifuge program. In addition to hiding elements of our procurement network, the Oversight Committee had avoided turning over any blueprints or documents related to detailed design. The inspectors were unaware of our plans for a longer and more advanced centrifuge. They still knew nothing of the crash program before the 1991 war or how close we had come to producing a nuclear weapon. The government continued to claim that the centrifuge program was conceived and developed at Tuwaitha and to deny the true purpose of the Engineering Design Centre. The organizational structure of our centrifuge team was still in question. The inspectors had not been able to confirm my role or interview me as the program’s supervisor.(p. 156-6)


Though not explicitly about the internal power struggles – especially between Hussein Kamel and Uday & Qusay Hussein- the book, by necessity, reveals much about the organisational and personal political manoeuvrings that formed the backdrop to the defunct programme. Hussein Kamel subsequently defected to Jordan and revealed hitherto unknown aspects of the nuclear weapons programme including the role of Karl Heinz Schaab in providing Iraq with blueprints for centrifuge technology. However, the nature of Saddam’s regime made rational policymaking a fantasy. In 2002 Britain and the US charged Iraq with reviving its WMD programme. Unfortunately, most of the industrial plants and research centres that had worked on the WMD programme were now working on conventional weapons programmes (ballistic missiles) but with the same technology. It was obvious what it looked like to Britain and America (whether or not we were justified in attacking Iraq, it didn’t help its case either).


When General al-Saadi came back on the line, I informed him that we had experimented with aluminium rotors during our early efforts with the Beams-type centrifuge, but with a larger diameter than the tubes Iraq had recently ordered for rockets. I said that aluminium rotors could not be used for the magnetic type of centrifuge with which we succeeded in enriching uranium in 1990. After we hung up, I had second thoughts. I consulted with one of my junior engineers, Jamal, from the centrifuge days, who reminded me that Professor Zippe had used aluminium in early magnetic centrifuge work at the University of Virginia during the late 1950s. I called General Saadi back to correct myself. It was extremely important, I said, to give the inspectors the right arguments for the implausibility of the aluminium tubes allegation. We could not categorically state that aluminium tubes were unsuited for magnetic centrifuges. We needed to present a very detailed case. I knew that Dr. Faris was making a thorough investigation into the tolerances and specifications of the aluminium tubes, in order to show that they were indeed intended for artillery rockets.(p. 188)


Obeidi’s fate after the 2003 invasion would be comical were it not for the very real dangers that the chaos in Iraq posed. For instance, he was courted by competing intelligence agencies while Obeidi himself tried to secure his safety through David Albright. Meanwhile US Army troops stormed his home (he was on the most-wanted list) oblivious to his dealings with the CIA (who were queued by Albright). He was finally spirited away to Kuwait and then the US. Fascinating stuff.

[davidbfpo]

This is an edited volume by Andrew Silke, with a variety of generally superb chapters and yes SWC member Randy Borum writes the second chapter. Full of gems and an easy read.

Link to publisher's USA website:http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415558402/

Link to editor's academic bio:http://www.uel.ac.uk/law/staff/andrewsilke.htm

[slapout9]

Just finished reading it, and will turn right around and read it again!....some book to say the least. Link to several author interviews and book comments.

http://www.familyofsecrets.com/

[sullygoarmy]

Just started up this one by Pete Blaber of Delta fame. So far very impressed with his outlooks and philosophies. Enjoyable read after about 1/4 of the book and work picking up if you have some time.

http://www.amazon.com/Mission-Men-Me-Lessons-Commander/dp/0425236579/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1295917129&sr=8-1

[BushrangerCZ]

"Tracking - a blueprint for learning how", Jack Kearney

[Steve Blair]

Just started up this one by Pete Blaber of Delta fame. So far very impressed with his outlooks and philosophies. Enjoyable read after about 1/4 of the book and work picking up if you have some time.

http://www.amazon.com/Mission-Men-Me-Lessons-Commander/dp/0425236579/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1295917129&sr=8-1

I read this one a while back. It's a good read, although it does start echoing Not a Good Day to Die once you hit the Anaconda section (which is understandable since he was one of the main sources for that book).

[Kiwigrunt]

First to Fight (http://www.batterypress.com/Book/index.cfm?method=viewbook&BookID=349) by Bob Breen.

Vietnam '65 - '66.
About the 173rd Airborne Brigade with 1 RAR (infantry battalion) and a Kiwi gun battery attached.
Breen describes quite nicely the very different operating methods between the US and the ANZACs.
In his words:


The paratroopers were saying to the Viet Cong, ‘You know where we are, and when and where we will strike, take us on and pay the price.’

The Diggers said to the Viet Cong, ‘You will never know where we are but we will find you and kill you.’

The Americans were hell bent on massive company and battalion size engagements and willing to pay a price for a high body count, while the Diggers preferred to spread out into large company operating area’s to kick out platoon size patrols. They where less willing to pay in blood for a body count.
Neither philosophy was ‘perfect’ but:


Given the missions of the day, the ‘bottom line’ was that the Paratroopers were killing Viet Cong and the Diggers were not.

The diggers seemed to shine in their ability to deny the enemy of initiative through well planned patrols over large areas. Once that strength was realised and appreciated they were wisely used in that way while the US battalions were used to do what they do best, kick arse with lots of noise.

Here’s a taste. (http://austmia.com/3a1%20Parker%20and%20Gillson%208%20Nov.htm)

[lewisa]

Actually nothing but, recently I read ''The Thorn Birds " by Colleen McCullough I don't know if you remember the movie? and in the queue ''Les Misérables" by Victor Hugo, classics!

[Kiwigrunt]

Fire Strike 7/9 (http://www.damienlewis.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=63&Itemid=77)

Quite an entertaining and easy read.

Seems to confirm a lot of issues discussed here, like body armour, very short range patrols (beyond 500 m or so from base is getting into uncharted bandit country), complete reliance on fire support (largely air) etc.

[Rifleman]

Listening to Horse Soldiers by Doug Stanton.

It's been slow lately, not much going on exept a little traffic enforcement, so books on tape are great. I've got 1776 to start on next.

[jcustis]

Gents,

Looking for an assist here, as I need some new nightstand material, and most of what I have is too clinical and dry right now.

I am looking for the book that I think was discussed on SWC some time ago, which detailed American fighter pilots in WWII, and covered IIRC, their training. Does anyone remember the book in question? It came highly recommended because it was a very good and detailed work.

I'd like to pick it up at the same time that I grab Stuka Pilot off of Amazon.

[Bulldog]

It's been a little while since I read it, but Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific fits that description.

[carl]

Gents,

Looking for an assist here, as I need some new nightstand material, and most of what I have is too clinical and dry right now.

I am looking for the book that I think was discussed on SWC some time ago, which detailed American fighter pilots in WWII, and covered IIRC, their training. Does anyone remember the book in question? It came highly recommended because it was a very good and detailed work.

I'd like to pick it up at the same time that I grab Stuka Pilot off of Amazon.

I think the book you are talking about is The First Team by Lundstrom. It is about the Navy fighter pilot community and how they evaluated the Wildcat vs. the Zero and came up with tactics and training to vitiate the Zero's performance superiority before the war started. It was one of the most insightful books on the subject I ever read. The sequel is called the The First Team & Guadalcanal Campaign.

You also might like The Jolly Rogers by Blackburn and Zemke's Wolfpack by Zemke. They are by a Navy squadron commander and USAAF group commander respectively. Both are extremely good works about leadership combined with the problems of flying and using groups of warplanes effectively.

A book that I thought was great about the Pacific war was The Japanese Merchant Marine in WW II by Parillo. It was a completely fascinating work about a seemingly dull subject and its' importance.

[Backwards Observer]

Just started: Wars of Empire by Douglas Porch, a solid read so far;


Every good imperial commander knew that he must deliver success at low cost. History is not about supplying 'lessons' for the future. It tells its own story. But no modern commander in Kosovo or East Timor can ignore the perils of conducting operations, far from home, with a narrow political base of support, any more than could his predecessors in earlier centuries in Africa or Asia. (from the Acknowledgements)

Wars of Empire - Amazon (http://www.amazon.com/Empire-History-Warfare-Douglas-Porch/dp/0304361283)

Douglas Porch - Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_Porch)

Also, Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite: Evolution and the Modular Mind by Robert Kurzban, not sure what to make of this guy's take on things;


Mod makes a comeback in an entertaining explanation of brain functioning that cuts the two-hemispheres theory down to size and minces the mind into modules. Coming from a background in evolutionary psychology, Kurzban suggests that the human mind is not the unified operator of actions contributing to survival and success, as many claim and even more assume, but rather a multi-faceted system of functioning parts that are not always on the same side-or even aware of the same information. The modules perform different, often separate, functions, which can account for confusing, inconsistent, and apparently contradictory behavior and speech. (from the Amazon editorial blurb)

Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite - Amazon (http://www.amazon.com/Why-Everyone-Else-Hypocrite-Evolution/dp/0691146748)

Robert Kurzban - Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Kurzban)

[Mike in Hilo]

Just finished reading The Last Valley--Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Indochina by Martin Windrow, and I am impressed. Perhaps the definitive work on the subject. (I confess I haven't read Fall's.) Chronicles in great detail the uncommon leadership and humbling heroism of so many who sacrificed so dearly for a France which, in most cases, could not presume to make any claims on their loyalty--the Foreign Legionaires, the North and West Africans, and the Vietnamese. On the French side, more Vietnamese than Frenchmen died at Dien Bien Phu. A young Lietenant who fought valiantly, Pham van Phu, 5 BPVN (5th Vietnamese Paratroop Batallion), was to survive cruel and debilitating captivity to become, eventually, an ARVN general, comitting suicide on 30 April 1975 rather than face a repeat of the reeducation ordeal.

Cheers,
Mike.

[BushrangerCZ]

"19 with a bullet", after couple of pages looks good, I´m gonna keep it unread for time abroad.

[tequila]

Just finished reading The Last Valley--Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Indochina by Martin Windrow, and I am impressed. Perhaps the definitive work on the subject. (I confess I haven't read Fall's.) Chronicles in great detail the uncommon leadership and humbling heroism of so many who sacrificed so dearly for a France which, in most cases, could not presume to make any claims on their loyalty--the Foreign Legionaires, the North and West Africans, and the Vietnamese. On the French side, more Vietnamese than Frenchmen died at Dien Bien Phu. A young Lietenant who fought valiantly, Pham van Phu, 5 BPVN (5th Vietnamese Paratroop Batallion), was to survive cruel and debilitating captivity to become, eventually, an ARVN general, comitting suicide on 30 April 1975 rather than face a repeat of the reeducation ordeal.

Cheers,
Mike.

Just wanted to second this recommendation. One of the best-written and most captivating works on DBP, but really works as a mini-history of the whole French Indochinese war. Covers the the French Expeditionary forces in depth, but also does a good job covering the Viet Minh force structure as well.

[Granite_State]

The Junior Officer's Reading Club: Easily the best Iraq or Afghanistan memoir I've read (though I still have Kaboom to get to). The author, a Grenadier Guards lieutenant, had a desultory Iraq tour but then was in the thick of it on an OMLT in Afghanistan. He includes a long look at Sandhurst, and finishes with a final little tour to the Falklands. Visceral writing, but the author also has a great sense of humor. Highly recommended, particularly if you've spent much time with Brits.

Patriot Pirates: Picked this up after it was recommended by Van on this thread. The author claims Revolutionary War privateers were a "seaborne insurgency", and he's pretty persuasive. The book spends far more time on the logistics and financing of privateering than it does on sea battles, but it's still very readable.

The Big Short: A good introduction to the financial crisis and the subprime mortgage disaster. I tore through it in a weekend, fast for me. Michael Lewis is a great writer who makes finance accessible to folks like me with no background in the subject.

Flashman in the Great Game: Not quite as good as the previous one (Flashman at the Charge), but still a ton of fun.

[jcustis]

I think the book you are talking about is The First Team by Lundstrom. It is about the Navy fighter pilot community and how they evaluated the Wildcat vs. the Zero and came up with tactics and training to vitiate the Zero's performance superiority before the war started. It was one of the most insightful books on the subject I ever read. The sequel is called the The First Team & Guadalcanal Campaign.

You also might like The Jolly Rogers by Blackburn and Zemke's Wolfpack by Zemke. They are by a Navy squadron commander and USAAF group commander respectively. Both are extremely good works about leadership combined with the problems of flying and using groups of warplanes effectively.

A book that I thought was great about the Pacific war was The Japanese Merchant Marine in WW II by Parillo. It was a completely fascinating work about a seemingly dull subject and its' importance.

I am only two chapters into the book, but yes, this is precisely what I was looking for. It has reignited my interest in WWII naval history that I sort of drifted out of in my early college years. Despite having the detail of a doctorate thesis, it reads like a good novel.

[Spud]

Found Secret War Against Hanoi by Schultz in the 2nd Hand book store down the road. Got a bit repetitive in the middle but overall not a bad read. Highlights that frustrations we have today with POL-MIL and MIL-CIV interface are nothing new (in some respects they may even be as bade or worse).

Also cracked out My War by Brian Walpole. WW2 Aussie Commando and Z Special member behind the lines in PNG and Borneo. If only 10 per cent of this book is true it is still brilliant (although I know from the community it is well regarded). Really entertaining read with a strong message about the issues between mil and civ agencies conducting clandestine ops.

[jcustis]

Found Secret War Against Hanoi by Schultz in the 2nd Hand book store down the road. Got a bit repetitive in the middle but overall not a bad read. Highlights that frustrations we have today with POL-MIL and MIL-CIV interface are nothing new (in some respects they may even be as bade or worse).

Also cracked out My War by Brian Walpole. WW2 Aussie Commando and Z Special member behind the lines in PNG and Borneo. If only 10 per cent of this book is true it is still brilliant (although I know from the community it is well regarded). Really entertaining read with a strong message about the issues between mil and civ agencies conducting clandestine ops.

You might enjoy Frank Snepp's Decent Interval, which highlights some of the back channel drama surrounding the final years in Vietnam.

[davidbfpo]

I would second Jon's recommendation, even though it was read many years ago and is still on the bookshelves. At times one had to stop reading, not because it was too grim - as in Alistair Horne's book on Verdun. No, you wondered what happened to those left behind and did not become 'Boat People'.

[outletclock]

This is a nicely-done collection of oral histories from a wide-ranging number of people:

http://www.amazon.com/Tears-Before-Rain-Larry-Engelmann/dp/0306807890/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1300647320&sr=8-1


Harrowing, heartrending and bitter by turns, these recollections by 75 eyewitnesses form a tragic epic of a country in the throes of violent death. Soldiers and civilians, both American and South Vietnamese, tell what it was like in the spring of 1975 as Hanoi carried out its final, successful offensive against the Republic of Vietnam. Generals, ambassadors, CIA officials, pilots, Marines, politicians, doctors, seamen, flight attendants, journalists and ordinary citizens describe the growing chaos, demoralization and panic as the collapse gained momentum. Survivors recall the chilling helicopter airlift from the U.S. embassy roof in Saigon with raw emotions, the Americans still brooding painfully over the abandonment of their South Vietnamese allies. In an Aftermath section, several former boat people relate in hair-raising detail their encounters with Thai pirates. A moving collection of painful memories

[5th_Req]

I'm reading Cormac McCarthy's "Blood Meridian." I understand that this book does not at first glance seem in sync with the other books mentioned on this thread. It is.

Interacting with my in-laws, who are all Tennessee southeners, I think that there is much to learn about Afghan tribalism through the tribal culture of the US South. Some in-laws of mine trace their lineage back to Sam Houston, and everyone knows what's going on with their cousins, even the ones four or five times removed.

I've noticed eders are prevalent in many southern families, in a way they never were in my New Jersey family. They connect with other elders, they get elected to school boards, they know not only their cousins, but Joachim's cousins, and everyone listens to (and frequently follows) their "sage" advice, and metaphors, even if they don't agree.

Anyway, I figured Southern Gothic literature would not only provide insight into everyman, but would deliver some specific insight into the Afghan psyche. Not only theirs, but southern gothic literature frequently being about more violent, and relatively primitive times or scenarios, it might provide insight even into the average Joe of your average third world-likely-to-see-a-future-war-in country.

Naturally, I picked up Cormac McCarthy.

[carl]

I am only two chapters into the book, but yes, this is precisely what I was looking for. It has reignited my interest in WWII naval history that I sort of drifted out of in my early college years. Despite having the detail of a doctorate thesis, it reads like a good novel.

I think you would very much like then Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway by Parshall and Tully, and Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Airpower, 1909-1941 by Peattie. They are just as good but view things a little more from the Japanese point of view.

[Rachamim]

"The Struggle for National Democracy" Jose Maria Sison. The father of Maoism in the Philippines and founder of the CPP and by default the NPA and NDF (Communist Party of the Philippines, New People's Army and the National Democratic Front). It is a collection of his speeches from 1964 onward. Nothing new or exciting here but decent enough for mining background and nuance.

"Hypotheses Toward Theorizing the Concept of the Bangsamoro Nation's Struggle for Self Determination" (unpub. University of Conneticut manuscript from 1984) Erick San Juan . San Juan is now a freelance journalist based in Makati in Metro Manilam He is pretty much a Conspiracy Theorist with racist overtones BUT this manuscript is actually thought provoking and was written long before he went off the proverbial deep end.

"Caraga Antigua:1521-1910" Peter Schreurs (Cebu: San Carlos University) [1989]. Examining the history of Caraga in NE Mindanao, interesting mostly for its avoidance of Islamic, Spanish AND American dynamics.

"Sirat Rasul Allah" Abu Ishaq, via the Abu Hisham version . In Arabic, earliest extant bio of Muhammad, the founder of Islam. I am trying to catalogue differences between Hisham and Guillame's seminal English translation.

"The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967 -1977" Gershom Gorenberg (NY Times Books/Henry Holt) [2006]. Gorenberg is a Leftist writing a highly biased take on the Israeli "Settler Movement" in Gaza and the "West Bank."

[BushrangerCZ]

Just finished "19 with a bullet", superb... I ordered that Kindle thing from Amazon, so now I can start to get into dozens of free-to-download US field manuals I have in my computer. (Btw, so far I was able to compare US LRS ops manual with russian post-war equivalent, it´s very similar, even more than I anticipated).

[Bob's World]

I find myself back with my books written by Guerrillas. Far too much of our COIN doctrine and current operational design draws from what former counterinsurgents, or more accurately "counter Guerrilla" fighters believed to be important as they battled to maintain their contested colonies among resistant populaces. It is always good to spend some time with the Guerrilla as well. Learn to play on both sides of the ball.

http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/FMFRP%2012-18%20%20Mao%20Tse-tung%20on%20Guerrilla%20Warfare.pdf

On Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse-tung is worth a PhD in COIN simply in the reading of Captain (1940) and Brigadier General retired (1961) Samuel B. Griffith's outstanding introductions.

So many passages from both his lengthy introduction and Mao's base work jumped out at me with special meaning for today.

Regarding the dichotomy I see in the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, that I have frequently described as having two tiers, an upper tier revolutionary movement among the leadership taking sanctuary in Pakistan, and a lower tier resistance movement among the rank and file fighters in Afghanistan:

"THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE between patriotic
partisan resistance and revolutionary guerrilla
movements is that the first usually lacks the ideological
content that always distinguishes the second.
A resistance is characterized by the quality of spontaneity;
it begins and then is organized. A revolutionary
guerrilla movement is organized and then begins.
A resistance is rarely liquidated and terminates when
the invader is ejected; a revolutionary movement terminates
only when it has succeeded in displacing the incumbent
government or is liquidated.
Historical experience suggests that there is very little
hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement
after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the
sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population.
The size of this "significant segment" will vary; a
decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent.
in addition to an appealing program and popular support,
such factors as terrain; communications; the quality
of the opposing leadership; the presence or absence of
material help, technical aid, advisers, or "volunteers" from
outside sources; the availability of a sanctuary; the relative
military efficiency and the political flexibility of the incumbent
government are naturally relevant to the ability of a
movement to survive and expand."

Or from Mao himself, some insights for those in the media who I hear agonizing daily over their concerns about Libya, and "who are we supporting" or "We know there are AQ ties and LIFG" among them. Mao is pragmatic and clear on this point:

"Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory
and those who attack the movement as a combination
of banditry and anarchism do not understand the nature
of guerrilla action. They say: "This movement is a haven
for disappointed militarists, vagabonds and bandits" (Jen
Ch'i Shan), hoping thus to bring the movement into disrepute.
We do not deny that there are corrupt guerrillas,
nor that there are people who under the guise of guerrilla
indulge in unlawful activities. Neither do we deny that
the movement has at the present time symptoms of a lack
of organization, symptoms that might indeed be serious
were we to judge guerrilla warfare solely by the corrupt
and temporary phenomena we have mentioned. We should
study the corrupt phenomena and attempt to eradicate
them in order to encourage guerrilla warfare, and to increase
its military efficiency. "This is hard work, there is
no help for it, and the problem cannot be solved immedi-
ately. The whole people must try to reform themselves
during the course of the war. We must educate them and
reform them in the light of past experience. Evil does not
exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and
undisciplined activities that are anarchism," said Lenin, in
On Guerrilla War fare."

Also from Mao, insights for those who are quick to label the problems in Mexico, where drug Cartels challenge the government in the pursuit of the profits of their illicit trade. I argue that this is not insurgency even though the government is attacked, as it lacks the political purpose and the support of the populace that defines such movements. Mao agrees:

"What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people?
Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail,
as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the
aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation,
and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla
warfare is thus revolutionary in character"

Who among us believe that the people of Mexico aspire to live in a state run by drug cartels? This is not revolution, it flies in the face of the people and is driven by local greed, bad laws that create such a powerful illegal market, and the demand of the US populace for this illegal product.

I am also re-familiarizing myself with the similarly titled "Guerrilla Warfare" by Ernesto "Che" Guevara.

We ignore the insights of former revolutionaries to our peril. Revolution is sweeping across North Africa and the Middle East today. Given the political conditions of that region and the state of the affected populaces such a rash of revolution is not only normal, but long overdue. For those looking for understanding, these two quick reads provide a great deal.

Bob

[Commando Spirit]

I'm only a few chapters in but I am constantly amazed at the number of coincidences involved as well as the personalities involved! 3 x novelists, a whole raft of the close to unbelievable... the founder of the International Table Tennis Federation, you just couldn't make it up!

Do we still have such people in the service of the government I wonder? I hope, for romantic ideals alone, that we still do! I suspect though, that these types of minds are employed in the geeky world of Internet Intelligence and, dare I say, espionage????

[jmm99]

On Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse-tung - and Sam Griffith's introductions are worth the price of admission (Griffith being of the "Never Again, but ..." school of thought ;)). "Guerrilla Warfare" by Ernesto "Che" Guevara is a bit of a ho-hum in comparison.

For Mao, go to Works of Mao Zedong by Date (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/date-index.htm). To realize he was not always a communist revolutionary, go to ...

A Study of Physical Education (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_01.htm) (April 1917) - our nation must be strong physically.

but soon, we have ....

To the Glory of the Hans (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_03.htm) (July & August 1919):


….. What is the greatest question in the world? The greatest question is that of getting food to eat. What is the greatest force? The greatest force is that of the union of the popular masses. What should we not fear? We should not fear heaven. We should not fear ghosts. We should not fear the dead. We should not fear the bureaucrats. We should not fear the militarists. We should not fear the capitalists....

The time has come! The great tide in the world is rolling ever more impetuously! .... He who conforms to it shall survive, he who resists it shall perish...

As a result of the world war and the bitterness of their lives, the popular masses in many countries have suddenly undertaken all sorts of action. In Russia, they have overthrown the aristocrats and driven out the rich... The army of the red flag swarms over the East and the West, sweeping away numerous enemies... The whole world has been shaken by it.... Within the area enclosed by the Great Wall and the China Sea, the May 4th Movement has arisen. Its banner has advanced southward, across the Yellow River to the Yangtze. From Canton to Hankow, many real-life dramas have been performed; from Lake Tungt'ing to the Min River the tide is rising. Heaven and earth are aroused, the traitors and the wicked are put to flight. Ha! We know it! We are awakened! The world is ours, the nation is ours, society is ours. If we do not speak, who will speak? If we do not act, who will act? If we do not rise up and fight, who will rise up and fight? . . . .

It is not that basically we have no strength; the source of our impotence lies in our lack of practice. For thousands of years the Chinese people of several hundred millions have all led a life of slaves. Only one person — the 'emperor'— was not a slave, or rather one could say that even he was the slave of 'heaven'. When the emperor was in control of everything, we were given no opportunity for practice.

We must act energetically to carry out the great union of the popular masses, which will not brook a moment's delay. . . our Chinese people possesses great intrinsic energy. The more profound the oppression, the greater its resistance; that which has accumulated for a long time will surely burst forth quickly. The great union of the Chinese people must be achieved Gentlemen! We must all exert ourselves, we must all advance with the utmost strength. Our golden age, our age of brightness and splendour lies ahead !

and the rest, as they say, is history - or, His Story (the 1920s through the 1970s).

Regards

Mike

PS: A bonus bibliography of the Vietnamese Guerrillas, Writings by and about Important Communist Leaders (http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/facultypages/EdMoise/commlead.html#giap) - many online and well worth the downloading and reading.

And, if you want the Vietnam War in many of the contemporary documents, go to Vietnam War Bibliography (http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/facultypages/EdMoise/bibliography.html#vil) (Ed Moise's great work).

[carl]

Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands by John R. White

Mr. White was an American officer in the Philippine Constabulary in the first years of the 20th century. The book is extremely interesting and I found myself nodding my head over and over again and saying to myself "gee, the basics don't seem to change." One of the things he did was lead Moro (Muslim) constables who sometimes would turn on the officers.

A thing he emphasized was keeping experienced people in their jobs for long periods of time so they could learn and then use what they learned.

It is quite the adventure story as well.

[LawVol]

I'm reading Cormac McCarthy's "Blood Meridian." I understand that this book does not at first glance seem in sync with the other books mentioned on this thread. It is.

Interacting with my in-laws, who are all Tennessee southeners, I think that there is much to learn about Afghan tribalism through the tribal culture of the US South. Some in-laws of mine trace their lineage back to Sam Houston, and everyone knows what's going on with their cousins, even the ones four or five times removed.

I've noticed eders are prevalent in many southern families, in a way they never were in my New Jersey family. They connect with other elders, they get elected to school boards, they know not only their cousins, but Joachim's cousins, and everyone listens to (and frequently follows) their "sage" advice, and metaphors, even if they don't agree.

Anyway, I figured Southern Gothic literature would not only provide insight into everyman, but would deliver some specific insight into the Afghan psyche. Not only theirs, but southern gothic literature frequently being about more violent, and relatively primitive times or scenarios, it might provide insight even into the average Joe of your average third world-likely-to-see-a-future-war-in country.

Naturally, I picked up Cormac McCarthy.
I'm not sure about the book you're reading, but I think you're on target with your observation on the similarities between Afghan culture and the culture of the American South. You've noted a similarity, but it goes deeper. Both have an inherent distrust of central government, a martial background, complex ideals of patriotism, respect for elders, politeness toward guests, and a deep sense of religiosity. All of these things determine who a people are. Understanding this can help us achieve our objectives. I look up the book you recommended.

[davidbfpo]

On a beautiful English Spring day, with the sun shining, I read Wilf's book 'Blackfoot is Missing: In a Secret War There Are No Rules', pub. Arrow Books 2004 (paperback). A good read and a period I've not read about before: cross-border recce Laos and Cambodia in early 1970.

To compliment his fictional account I've read a couple of books on the NVA-VC, albeit not by themselves, but currently lost on bookshelves.

[davidbfpo]

A more difficult read was the excellent 'Talking To The Enemy; Violent Extremism, Sacred Values and what it Means to be Human' by Scott Atran (Pub. 2010).

I say difficult as it is wide ranging, sociology, politics, anthropology and philosophy - the structure eluded understanding until each chapter was finished.

The chapters on the Madrid Bombings are excellent, greatly assisted by his travels to their home towns in Morocco and the scathing criticism of Spanish LE pre-2004 is a reminder what can happen. In particular the use of informants, which is painful to read now and goodness knows what the Spanish LE staff felt after the bombings.

This was a key lesson learnt:
Concentrating only on the perpetrators teaches you very little about the processes and paths of radicalisation to extreme violence.

There are numerous other key points - from a local and global perspective.

Bourbon linked this review by Jason Burke in October 2010:http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2010/oct/24/scott-atran-talking-to-the-enemy-review

[Backwards Observer]

Just picked up Warrior of Zen: The Diamond-hard Wisdom Mind of Suzuki Shosan by Arthur Braverman. Shosan features prominently in Thomas Cleary's, The Japanese Art of War, which was a pretty good read.

Warrior of Zen - Amazon (http://www.amazon.com/Warrior-Zen-Diamond-Hard-Wisdom-Kodansha/dp/1568360312)

The Japanese Art of War - Amazon (http://www.amazon.com/Japanese-Art-War-Thomas-Cleary/dp/0877736537)

Life of Suzuki Shosan (short) - Cal State Chico (http://www.csuchico.edu/~cheinz/syllabi/asst001/fall97/anth-wen.htm)

[davidbfpo]

Not in order of priority.

'The Watchers: The Rise of America's Surveillance State' by Shane Harris, Pub. Penguin Press 2010. A surprisingly good read, aided clearly by getting insiders to talk, notably John Poindexter in particular and Jeff Jonas.

'Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics: The British Experience' by Tahir Abbas, Pub. Routledge 2011. The first two chapters From the historical to the contemporary and Islamic political radicalisation: origins and destinations provide an excellent, thorough guide to the issues globally.

'Agent Zigzag: The True Wartime Story of Eddie Chapman, Lover, Betrayer, Hero, Spy' by Ben Macintyre. An amazing true story of Eddie Chapman, a British petty criminal who became an double-agent for both England and Germany in WW2 and so full of adventure, puzzles and more it is as if it's a novel.

Started and a rare venture for me into the 'big' Vietnam War: 'Grab Their Belts: The Viet Cong's Big Unit War Against the US 1965-1966' by Warren Wilkins. Pub. NIP 2011. So far impressive, particularly the explanation of how the VC and NVA became so skilled.

Pending, again different as I keep away from economists: 'Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism' by Eli Berman, Pub. MIT Press 2009. Update when read.

[axiomatic]

"Clausewitz's Puzzle" - http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitzs-Puzzle-Political-Theory-War/dp/0199202699/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1308542642&sr=1-1&tag=smallwarsjour-20

"War And Peace in the Global Village" - http://www.amazon.com/Peace-Global-Village-Marshall-McLuhan/dp/B000NPDT7S/ref=sr_1_6?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1308542742&sr=1-6&tag=smallwarsjour-20

[Backwards Observer]

Reading Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis by Richards J. Heuer Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson. Way over my brain grade, but exhaustive and fascinating.


Anyone involved in any serious forecasting of politics or other social disciplines must have, read, and use this book. Rather than an etherial, academic reflection on why analysis is relevant, or 'what is the role of intelligence analysis', or a mathmatical treatise on Games and Decisions, this is a working reference and practical guide to structured analytical techniques. Although the title specifies "for intelligence analysis", the methodology is applicable to problem sets that are only partially or non-quantifiable, and especially applicable to issues that are ambiguous and where only incomplete information is available.

In many ways, this is the sequel to Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, also by Richard Heuer. Where "Psychology of Intelligence Analysis" focused on analytical biases, with a limited discussion of rigorous approaches to intelligence analysis, "Structured Analytic Techniques" approaches similar issues from a more pragmatic direction. As valuable as the discussion of cognative biases is, the comprehensive set of analystical tools in "Structured Analytic Techniques" does more (when applied) to mitigate many of the biases than mere knowledge of their existance, and the analytical techniques will counteract many biases, even when those biases have not been identified.

Of particular interest is the emphasis on analytical teams and group analysis, both the strengths and weaknesses, and methods for maximizing the strengths and mitigating the weaknesses. (from Amazon reviewer, E.M. Van Court)


Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis (http://www.amazon.com/Structured-Analytic-Techniques-Intelligence-Analysis/dp/1608710181) - Amazon

[BR0387]

Picked up a copy of the 1940 Small Wars Manual for $10.13. Got to love used book stores.

[BushrangerCZ]

The bear went over the mountain + Other side of the mountain - really educating read
Two tours in Afghanistan: Twenty years and two armies apart - very interesting, however I wish it would be more detailed

PS: Do you guys know links for some good free ebooks? Thanks in advance

[jmm99]

The CIA Library - Books and Monographs (https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/) - includes the 1999 Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/index.html), by Richards J. Heuer, Jr. (cited in post above); and the 2005 Curing Analytic Pathologies (https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/curing-analytic-pathologies-pathways-to-improved-intelligence-analysis-1/index.html), by Jeffrey R. Cooper.

Regards

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

Just read Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil by John H. Ghazvinian (Apr 14, 2008)

Not as detailed as I would like but a good introduction reading on oil in Africa.

[Polarbear]

For "leisure":Kilcullens accidental guerilla, who will be my holiday companion

for research: different texts from and about James Burnham and Psyops during the early years of cold war.

Regards
PB

[TedSeay]

Current Rotation:

Vietnam: Strategy for a Stalemate, F.C. Parker IV
Dynamics of Complex Systems (Studies in Nonlinearity), Yaneer Bar-Yam
Boundaries of Order, Butler Shaffer

Coming Up:

Horse Soldiers, Doug Stanton
Human Action (1st edition), Ludwig von Mises

[Backwards Observer]

Francois Jullien's, A Treatise on Efficacy, has been mentioned a few times on SWJ, initially by Dave Maxwell, if I recall correctly. Jullien's, Detour and Access, is also well worth the read for those with an interest in such stuff.


In what way do we benefit from speaking of things indirectly? How does such a distancing allow us better to discover -- and describe -- people and objects? How does distancing produce an effect? What can we gain from approaching the world obliquely? In other words, how does detour grant access?Thus begins Francois Jullien's investigation into the strategy, subtlety, and production of meaning in ancient and modern Chinese aesthetic and political texts and events. Moving between the rhetorical traditions of ancient Greece and China, Jullien does not attempt a simple comparison of the two civilizations. Instead, he uses the perspective provided by each to gain access into a culture considered by many Westerners to be strange -- "It's all Chinese to me" -- and whose strangeness has been eclipsed through the assumption of its familiarity.

[...]

Indirect speech, Jullien concludes, yields a complex mode of indication, open to multiple perspectives and variations, infinitely adaptable to particular situations and contexts. Concentrating on that which is not said, or which is spoken only through other means, Jullien traces the benefits and costs of this rhetorical strategy in which absolute truth is absent. (from Amazon back cover blurb)

Detour and Access - Strategies of Meaning in China and Greece (http://www.amazon.com/Detour-Access-Strategies-Meaning-Greece/dp/1890951110) - Amazon

A Treatise on Efficacy - Between Western and Chinese Thinking (http://www.amazon.com/Treatise-Efficacy-Between-Western-Thinking/dp/0824828305/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1314723504&sr=1-2) - Amazon

[Red Rat]

Transforming Command (https://www.amazon.co.uk/Transforming-Command-Pursuit-Mission-British/dp/0804772037/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1314803414&sr=8-1) - because it interests me and I hope it will be as good as The Culture of Military Innovation (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Culture-Military-Innovation-Cultural-Revolution/dp/0804769524/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1314804329&sr=1-3)

The Stress Effect (https://www.amazon.co.uk/Stress-Effect-Smart-Leaders-Decisions/dp/0470589035/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1314803500&sr=1-1) - because I am amazed at some of the decisions currently being taken :eek:

Losing Small Wars (https://www.amazon.co.uk/Losing-Small-Wars-Military-Afghanistan/dp/0300166710/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1314803611&sr=1-1) - pretty much says what we all know, but nice to see it in print in public ;)

and because redundancies are in the offing :rolleyes:

A Croft In The Hills (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Croft-Hills-Katharine-Stewart/dp/1841587915/ref=pd_sim_b_1)

[carl]

Several months ago I read this book-Is There Anything Good About Men?: How Cultures Flourish by Exploiting Men by Roy F. Baumeister.

It was one of the best books about how men and women are wired up dfferently and how those differences manifest themselves in behavior and how the behavior differences complement each other. Also it helps explain why women act like they do sometimes. This may be a bit of a different suggestion for this site but since half the humans are women it might be of value.

[Tukhachevskii]

Carl Ratner, Cultural Psychology: A Perspective on Psychological Functioning and Social Reform (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Cultural-Psychology-Perspective-Psychological-ebook/dp/B001PCR6OA/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1315589925&sr=8-1)

Using an explicitly Vygotskyian (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lev_Vygotsky) analysis Ratner explicates an approach to cultural psychology that reverses the erroneous methodological assumptions of “traditional” psychology which isolate and segregate the individual from his or her environment and shows how macro-culture forms a generative force in defining the individual. In doing so macro-culture both empowers and delimits the range of possible human actions. This is not, however, an Althusserian (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Althusser) tactic of denying the subject volition but of rather contextualising the notion of individual subjectivity to show the range of what is possible, why and how that changes (through contradictions in cultural norms such as, for instance, freedom and/or equality).


Cultural concepts comprise [for instance] colour categories, which organize colour perception. [The Soviet psychologist] Luria demonstrated this in research in Uzbekistan in 1930. He presented 27 coloured pieces of wool to traditional peasants and modern teachers on large collective farms. He asked them to categorize the wool pieces into five categories of colours that looked similar. The peasants were unable to group 27 colours into five categories. They did not perceive sufficient resemblances among any of the colours to classify them together. They said that “pig’s dung” does not look like “cow’s dung.” The teachers had no difficulty in classifying the 27 colours into five groups of similar colours. They perceived the browns as resembling each other, and so on. Although Luria did not say so, the reason that the two groups perceived the colours differently is that they had different cultural concepts of colour. The peasants construed colour as integrally part of objects, and most of their words for colour were words for objects (e.g., orange). The teachers construed colours as distinctive phenomena in their own right, and most of their colour terms were abstract (e.g., blue). These differences in linguistic codes and cultural concepts led to differences in perception. The peasants perceived the colours as properties of particular objects. Two colours appear similar only if the objects they reside in are functionally related. Colours are not colours in their own right, so perception of colours is a function of how objects go together in life. The objects that bear the colours used in the study did not have any functional relationship in the peasants’ lives. Consequently, the colours appeared to be dissimilar. In contrast, the teachers’ cultural concept and linguistic lexicon for colour abstracted colour from objects and construed it as a distinctive property based on wavelength rather than object. They perceived colours as similar or different on this basis, and were thus able to see resemblances that the peasants did not. Thus, cultural concepts and linguistic terms for colour organized the very sensory appearance of the colours in the experiment. Of course, both groups “saw” the 27 colours that were presented to them. However, they did not see them in the same ways. Their perceptual experiences of the colours were shaped by the cultural concepts and terms.(p.94)

[Tukhachevskii]

B. M. Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Echo-Battle-Armys-Way-War/dp/0674026519)
An interesting and perhaps controversial book on many counts Linn examines the role of military intellectuals during a number of key inter-war periods (the war of 1812, the Spanish-American war, WWI, WWII, Vietnam, post-Desert Storm) in drafting the US Army’s “way of war”; “the wars the United States has actually fought are important less for what happened than for what military intellectuals believed they had learned from them after the shooting stopped” (p. 9). These intellectuals are divided into three groups;

1) Managers for whom...

[...]war is fundamentally an organizational (as opposed to an engineering) problem—the rational coordination of resources, both human and materiel. [...] Should overwhelming resources, superior administration, and detailed planning fail to secure victory, the Managers’ response is to reorganize. Too often, this takes the form of what military personnel cynically term “moving the ravioli around”: drawing elaborate diagrams to rearrange (and “re-acronymize”) the chain of command, the force structure, and the budgetary priorities, while leaving the military institution and its fundamental problems virtually untouched. In the name of reform and modernization, Managers are perpetually engaged in the radical reorganization of administrative structures and tactical units, creating new concepts and buzzwords, and promoting their new, transformed military organization as superior to the one it replaced. Ironically, their reformist zeal is fed by historical lessons, so that an organizational scheme for the army of the future might claim as its inspiration a Roman victory two millennia ago. (p.8-9)

2. Guardians for whom...

[...]war is best understood as an engineering project in which the outcome is determined by the correct application of immutable scientific principles. Strategic planning for future warfare is largely a matter of determining the correct national security policy and then totalling up weaponry and manpower and comparing it with that of potential enemies. Taken to extremes, this leads to the belief that the next war is predictable and its outcome predetermined. When conflicts do not turn out as planned, Guardians blame an irrational American society, through its political representatives, for refusing to accept the Guardians’ logical and informed defence policies or for failing to allocate sufficient human resources and materiel. They reproach the army as an institution for not acknowledging their primacy in strategic direction and for pursuing risky military goals. When confronted with a war that fails to meet their pre-existing convictions, their reinterpretation soon discovers that it actually confirmstheir beliefs. (p. 7-8)

&, 3 Heroes for whom...

war is simply battle—an extension of combat between individuals on both the physical and the moral plane. The side whose commanders and soldiers exhibit superior courage, strength, discipline, martial skills, honour, and so forth will inevitably secure victory, unless betrayed by other factors. In the face of evidence that charismatic leadership, tactical skill, high morale, and martial experience does not guarantee victory, Heroes blame their enemy for failing to fight honourably and their own civil and military leaders for wanting sufficient will to win. They often accuse American society of lacking the physical and spiritual qualities needed for warfighting. They have a similarly bad opinion of the institutional army. In their view, it is a soulless corporation in which warriors are subordinated to technicians and careerists. In their criticisms of the army, Heroes tend to make no distinction between Guardians and Managers—they throw them all into the same bureaucratic pot. (p. 8)

In the post-WWII strategic environment...

As with past visions of future warfare, military thinkers once again failed to anticipate either the location of the conflict that broke out in June 1950 in Korea or its nature. Army strategists had been convinced, as were their political superiors, that the primary danger was a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe. They had paid little attention to the Far East and even less to peripheral areas. Of the three martial traditions, the Heroes came closest to foreseeing the next war’s reliance on morale, leadership, and military skill. But even their vision of tank battles and paratroop assaults proved only marginally relevant. The Korean War soon became a struggle of attrition; the use of firepower in small battles for hills and ridges was more akin to World War I than to the rapid, decisive operations predicted by military theorists (p. 161).

Post Vietnam war...

Like the Guardians and the Heroes, the Managers had to recast their assumptions. Their analysis taught them that “we did not manage the war in Vietnam efficiently or effectively. In the main, our organizational problems stemmed from the omission of basic management theories and techniques.” Between the all-volunteer force and the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, their earlier industrial concept of war, predicated on mobilizing the nation’s materiel and manpower resources, was no longer relevant. But other aspects of the Manager way of war still applied to the new priorities. With an officer-to-enlisted ratio twice that of World War II—almost one officer for every five soldiers by the mid-1990s—the post-Vietnam army was increasingly committed to bureaucracy, to planning and process, and to measuring and quantifying. As one officer noted, “The leader’s close personal contact with his troops essentially ends at [battalion] command, and the executive managerial ability takes on added importance. The skilfulness with which managerial traits are exhibited will either limit or increase the officer’s potential for future assignments of responsibility within the military organization.” The Managers interpreted war as an immense organizational problem: how to coordinate “assets” (weapons, people) and “force multipliers” (intelligence, training) to achieve “total battlefield dominance.” Significantly, in the mid-1970s a new “Profession of Arms” course emerged at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Second only to tactics in course hours, it focused on force structure, training, personnel, communication and writing, and other managerial skills only tangentially related to the practice of war.(p. 200)

Linn’s discussion of the doctrinal imbroglio surrounding Depuy (a “Manager”) and FM 100, and its successors, is also revealing (pp.201-210) as is his examination of the NTC, Command and General Staff College and the SAMS programme. Fascinating stuff!

[Tukhachevskii]

J. L. Johnson, K. M. Kartchner & J. A. Larsen, Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Strategic-Culture-Weapons-Mass-Destruction/dp/0230612210)
The authors have compiled a number of interesting and thought-provoking chapters on both the utility and validity of the concept of strategic culture and its application in analysing the policy of states such as Israel, Syria, Iran, and of non-state transnational organisations like Al-Qaeda.

On the US (Ch. 5 by T. G. Mahnken)...

The combination of the rejection of power politics and discontinuity between policy and strategy has yielded a dichotomy in American strategic culture: although Americans are basically peace loving, when aroused they mobilize the nation’s human and material resources behind in the service of high-intensity operations. Samuel Huntington saw America’s ferocity in war as the flip side of liberal pacifism outside of war. As he put it:

“The American tends to be an extremist on the subject of war: he either embraces war wholeheartedly or rejects it completely. This extremism is required by the nature of the liberal ideology. Since liberalism deprecates the moral validity of the interests of the state in security, war must be either condemned as incompatible with liberal goals or justified as an ideological movement in support of those goals. American thought has not viewed war in the [European] conservative–military sense as an instrument of national policy”.

The United States has thus displayed a strong and long-standing predilection for waging war for unlimited political aims. During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln and General Ulysses S. Grant fought to utterly defeat the Confederacy. During World War I, General John J. Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Force, favoured a policy of unconditional surrender toward Imperial Germany even as President Woodrow Wilson sought a negotiated end to the conflict. During World War II Franklin D. Roosevelt and his commanders were of one mind that the war must lead to the overthrow of the German, Japanese, and Italian governments that had started the war. [...] Just as Americans have preferred a fight to the finish, so too have they been uncomfortable with wars for limited political aims. In both the Korean and Vietnam wars, American military leaders were cool to the idea of fighting merely to restore or maintain the status quo. Indeed, Douglas MacArthur likened anything short of total victory over communist forces on the Korean peninsula to “appeasement.” Similarly, the standard explanation of American failure in Vietnam—and the one most popular among U.S. military officers—is that the U.S. military would have won the war were it not for civilian interference.(p.72)


On North Korea (Ch. 12 by Joseph S. Bermudez)...

At the time of the U.S. nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Kim and his fellow guerrillas had been fighting the Japanese for five–ten years. As the reality and the rumours of the events at Hiroshima and Nagasaki spread throughout the world, the nuclear bomb was viewed as the ultimate “doomsday” weapon. This attitude was reinforced by the experiences of those Koreans returning from Japan who had been in Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the time of the bombing. This fear became even more pronounced among Communist guerrilla leaders such as Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung. By the end of World War II, both Kim Il-sung and a number of soon to be influential Koreans had an uneducated appreciation of, and indirect exposure to, the effects of nuclear, chemical and biological warfare. This awareness shaped their developing views of the world, warfare, and politics. Combined with these early appreciations of WMD, four additional factors during the subsequent Fatherland Liberation War (i.e., Korean War) would help coalesce both Kim Il-Sung’s worldview and form the foundations of the strategic culture then developing within the nation.

1. The U.S. intervention in the Fatherland Liberation War was interpreted by Kim and his contemporaries as the prime reason the war of reunification failed. From this point forward the United States would be viewed as the primary enemy and as a bully “kicking the door in” and interfering in the purely internal affairs of nations of which it did not approve.

2. During the war both the DPRK and People’s Republic of China (PRC) suffered from repeated, and to them, unexplained outbreaks of infectious diseases such as influenza, Dengue fever, and cholera. These outbreaks caused large numbers of civilian and military casualties. While the leadership knew that it was untrue, they fabricated the story that the United States was employing biological, and to a lesser degree chemical, weapons against their units in Korea and against villages within the PRC itself. Furthermore, they claimed that former Japanese soldiers [who had use Biological and chemical warfare against the Chinese during WWII] were cooperating with the United States in perpetrating these attacks. For the uninformed masses of the DPRK it became a bedrock of “truth” and these claims are still repeated.

3. The United States on numerous occasions (the earliest being President Harry S. Truman’s public statements on 30 November, 1950) threatened to employ nuclear weapons against Korean People’s Army (KPA) and “Chinese People’s Volunteers” (CPV) units in Korea, and if necessary against the PRC proper, to end the war.
These threats struck a raw nerve since the leadership of both nations remembered the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and neither the PRC nor DPRK could withstand a nuclear attack or had the capability to respond in kind. In combination with other factors the desired effect was achieved and a truce agreement was reached, thus ending the hostilities.

4. While appreciative of all the support received from the Soviet Union and PRC, Kim expressed disappointment with the Soviet Union’s pressure to sign the Armistice Agreement. This would provide a context for Kim to view future Soviet actions (e.g., the Soviets backing down during the Cuban Missile Crisis, etc.) and fostered the belief that the DPRK must become self-sufficient. (p.191-2)

[Tukhachevskii]

T. E. Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus & the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 (http://www.amazon.com/Gamble-Petraeus-American-Adventure-2006-2008/dp/1594201978)
An exemplar of what war reporting should be. I could quote from it but I think I’d end up putting the whole thing on here. Despite the title the book examines the roles of a large number of principals and some who have remained sidelined who shouldn’t have. The detail and insight is better than most books I’ve read and the author doesn’t; do a bad job at being objective either. Just read it if you haven’t already. I you have, read it again!

[Backwards Observer]

For a lark, re-reading Michael Moorcock's alternate universe trilogy, A Nomad of the Time Streams. Fascinating if one goes for that sort of thing.


Warlord of the Air

In the first book, Warlord of the Air, Bastable finds himself transported to an alternate late-20th century Earth where the European powers did not stir each other into a World War and in which the mighty airships of a British Empire on which the sun never set are threatened by the rise of new and terrible enemies. These enemies turn out to be the colonized peoples trying to break free, supported by anarchist and socialist Western saboteurs opposing their own imperialist societies, and led by a Chinese general whose country is still nominally under Western control and ravaged by civil war.

<><>

The Land Leviathan

In The Land Leviathan, Bastable visits an alternate 1904 in which most of the Western world has been devastated around the turn of the 20th century by a short, yet terrible war fought with futuristic devices and in which also biological weapons were used. In this alternate world, an Afro-American Black Attila is conquering the remnants of the Western nations, destroyed by the wars. The only remaining stable surviving nations, aside from the African-based Ashanti Empire, are an isolationist Australian-Japanese Federation, which opposes the Ashanti Empire, and the wealthy Marxist Republic of Bantustan. Bantustan is the equivalent of our world's South Africa and is led by its Indian-born president Mahatma Gandhi; having never known apartheid or hostilities between the English and the Boers, it is a wealthy, pacifist nation, in which there is no racial tension.

<><>

The Steel Tsar

In the final book, The Steel Tsar, Bastable witnesses an alternate 1941 where Great Britain and Germany became allies around the turn of the 20th century and thus neither a World War nor the October Revolution took place. In this world's Russian Empire, Bastable encounters the rebel Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili.

(from Wikipedia)

A Nomad of the Time Streams (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Nomad_of_the_Time_Streams) - Wikipedia

A Nomad of the Time Streams (http://www.amazon.com/Nomad-Time-Streams-Michael-Moorcock/dp/1565041941) - Amazon

[davidbfpo]

About to finish this excellent 300 pg. book, which is sub-titled 'A Koevoet Tracker's Story of an Insurgency War' by Sisingi Kamongo and Leon Bezuidenhout. Published by Thirty Degrees South 2011, main website in South Africa:http://www.30degreessouth.co.za/ and a UK website:http://www.30degreessouth.co.uk/

Website summary:
This is the story of a Kavango tracker who served for six years with Koevoet ‘Crowbar’), the elite South African Police anti-terrorist unit, during the South West African–Angolan bush war of the ’80s. Most white team leaders lasted only two years; the black trackers walked the tracks for years. Sisingi Kamongo tells the story of the 50 or so firefights he was involved in; he survived five anti-personnel mine and POMZ explosions and an RPG rocket on his Casspir APC vehicle; he was wounded three times; he tells of the trackers looking for the shadows on the ground, facing ambush and AP mines at every turn; he tells of the art of tracking ... where dust can tell time.

A fascinating account, probably the only black African account from the South African side. The integration of basic police skills, tracking, fire-power and mobility was awesome, terrible for those on the receiving end - which the author often acknowledges.

The UN-sponsored period appears, the bloodiest time when SWAPO decided to send its troops across the border; the author glides over the politics, although he notes the impact on the ground with local information falling away.

Jon C - another book to bring over to the USA on my next visit! Unless you decide your library needs its own copy.

I will cross-post this on the Namibia/SWAfrica COIN thread.

[M-A Lagrange]

Peace and War, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966From Raymond Aron (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raymond_Aron).

Inevitably enemies by position and by the incompatibility of their ideologies, the United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest not in ruling together over the world, but in not destroying each other. This book reflects on the problems of attaining peace. Part One deals with theory, the concepts and systems of international relations. Part Two investigates the sociology of peace and war, discussing determinants such as space, resources, and regimes. The history of the global system in the thermonuclear age is discussed in Part Three, and Part Four is concerned with morality, strategy, and the attainment of peace through law. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
Little bite dated in the exemples used but still so actual.

[Morgan]

Currently, I have "Crossroads of Intervention, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Central America" by Todd Greentree. Still in the first half of the book in which he describes how Somoza fell and the impact this had in El Salvador. Interesting stuff, especially how the Carter Administration was seemingly confused about what to do in Central America.

I'm awaiting delivery of my other books, which are in my toughbox in Riyadh along with the rest of my clothes: "The River War" by W. Churchill, a description of the Sudan campaign in the 1880s, "Fiasco" by Thomas Ricks, and I think I have one more in there but can't remember what it is....probably a Star Trek (Vanguard series) book.

[Levi]

The Accidental Guerilla by Kilcullen. Hoping to pick up a free or super cheap copy of "Kill Bin Ladin" by "Thomas Greer".

[Ken White]

Just finished Command Culture by Jorg Muth, published by the University of North Texas, ISBN 978-1-57441-303-8. (LINK) (http://www.amazon.com/Command-Culture-Education-1901-1940-Consequences/dp/1574413031/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1318195412&sr=1-1).

The Author, A partly US educated German military historian, compares US and German professional education from around 1909 until 1939 with a goal of assessing the performance of former students and thus the educational milieu in both Armies during World War II. It also addresses recent US trends in the Afterword.

I think three quotes are appropriate:

" 'It has been stated that no other Army in history has ever known its enemy as well as the American Army knew the German Army when the Americans crossed the Rhine River and began their final offensive.' While the US Army might have known a lot, it understood little." (Jorg Muth)

The other two are attributed by the author to Philip Henry Sheridan, USMA 1853:

"...Every time they have a war in Europe, we adopt the cap of the winning side."

"...an imitation of the Prussian scheme in detail rather than in spirit (would be a mistake)."

Those latter two are at separate points in the book but even in the 1870s. Sheridan was probably not alone in noting that we too slavishly adopted (and continue to adopt...) European models and that did us no favors -- the last is a comment on the old US form over function dichotomy; we cannot see a thing and adapt it correctly to our needs, we have to change it beyond recognition until it no longer works -- then we put a very phony 'Made in the US' stamp on it and adopt it...:mad:

The book provides an interesting and in my observation largely valid assessment of the shortfalls of both systems with US emphasis on West Point and the Command and General Staff School -- of which he is not complimentary; he has OTOH good words for the Infantry School (of that period...) and the War Colleges.

[Levi]

Storey's Guide to Keeping Honey Bees.

This was not a good book. I was hoping for a manual, but what I got was "cannot be a true bee keeper without being a philosopher and an artist". Not a true quote, but the gist. This book insulted me on every other page.

Today while out admiring the fall color, I stopped by a lane containing about 40 hives, and asked the older gentleman if he had any pointers. He said "nah, I just look in the spring, and if there's lot's of bee's, I might add a hive." There were bee's swarming everywhere.

I guess I better not try, the book's author drones (haw!) on about how complicated bee keeping is.

[carl]

I don't know if this is what you were after but "The Biology of the Honey Bee" by Mark L. Winston was an extremely interesting and well written book. It was great fun to read because it is great fun to learn so easily about something that I had no idea was so interesting.

[carl]

Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal by James D. Hornfischer

This book reads like a novel, understands human factors, technology and training and how they interact and is able to clearly convey how that affected the battles. The battles themselves are described in such a way that I could actually understand what was happening and, like I said, they read as good as any in Forester or O'Brien.

One fascinating point is the author touched on is the different ways the surface navy and the aviators dealt with superior Japanese weapons. The aviators recognized the superiority of the Zero before the war started and developed tactics to effectively deal with it. The surface navy ignored or refused to recognize the superiority of the Long Lance torpedo well into the war even after a lot of ships had fallen victim to it. Both groups had sufficient pre-war intel to figure out what was what, but only the aviators acted.

[BushrangerCZ]

"Assignement Selous Scouts" by Jim Parker

[davidbfpo]

BushrangerCZ,

If historical books on conflict in Southern Africa are of interest I recommend:

'Selous Scouts Top Secret War' by Lt.Col Ron Reid Daly, as told to Peter Stiff
(Pub. 1982 and IIRC now expensive. Maybe in a good library).

'The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service' by Barbara Cole (Pub. 1984)

'Koevoet:The Inside Story' by Jim Hooper (Pub. 1988 and a new edition due out soon)

The thread on Rhodesia has a larger number of suggestions:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2090.

[Fuchs]

BushrangerCZ,

If historical books on conflict in Southern Africa are of interest I recommend:

'Selous Scouts Top Secret War' by Lt.Col Ron Reid Daly, as told to Peter Stiff
(Pub. 1982 and IIRC now expensive. Maybe in a good library).

'The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service' by Barbara Cole (Pub. 1984)

'Koevoet:The Inside Story' by Jim Hooper (Pub. 1988 and a new edition due out soon)

The thread on Rhodesia has a larger number of suggestions.


I'd add "Taming the land mine" - it's technical, but very interesting.

[BushrangerCZ]

I have to say I find SA and Rhodesian conflicts interesting profesionally, in relation to infantry use for COIN in Afghanistan. So far I´ve read "Fireforce", "19 with a bullet", "The Bush War in Rhodesia", and, of course, "Tactical Tracking". I think I have found what I was looking for, now I will try to use this knowledge in training...

[GMLRS]

Outliers-- Malcolm Gladwell

The Age of the Unthinkable-- Joshua Cooper Ramo

[ganulv]

“Clothing materials: a totally (or near-totally) subjective analysis of newer clothing materials for outdoor clothing (http://conovers.org/ftp/Clothing-Materials.pdf),” an informal and uncommissioned review of high performance fabrics by Keith Conover (http://www.pitt.edu/%7Ekconover/), an emergency room doc and member of the Allegheny Mountain Rescue Group (http://www.amrg.info/). In anticipation of the change in season from muggy and tick-infested to cold and snowbound and the accompanied purchase of some new kit.

Possibly of interest to members of this forum: “Though the Army does a lot of testing of clothing materials, they often have to promise the companies not release the test results—so if you hear something unofficially from someone who knows someone [at Natick], what they say is probably true.”

[Bob's World]

Stephen Kinzer, "Reset"

Just getting started, but this look at Turkey and Iran and how important they are to the future of US foreign policy in the Middle East is worth picking up.

Consider, that "Arab Spring" really began over 100 years ago with the populaces of these two great nations rising up to challenge long standing despotic regimes in a quest for more democratic, legitimate and self-determined forms of government.

The discovery of oil in Iran, the post-WWI divvying up of the Ottoman empire, and a century of Western efforts to put any such advances in self-determination in the region on hold in favor of Western interests until the modern era is well worth considering.

For a Western society that thinks in convenient 20 year time blocks and views the Middle East through a very Western lens I think this offers a critical perspective that needs to be incorporated in our current thinking.

[Fuchs]

I don't read this, but it might interest others:

S. B. Miles, "The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf. Two volumes in one (http://avaxhome.ws/ebooks/history_military/TheCountriesssss.html)"
Publisher: Harrison and SONS | 1919 | ASIN B000WQ67LI | PDF | 283, 394 pages | 22.3 MB

[ganulv]

“On playing by the rules – the strange success of #OccupyWallStreet” by David Graeber (http://www.gold.ac.uk/anthropology/staff/d-graeber/). LINK (http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/10/david-graeber-on-playing-by-the-rules-%E2%80%93-the-strange-success-of-occupy-wall-street.html)

[Bob's World]

I don't read this, but it might interest others:

S. B. Miles, "The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf. Two volumes in one (http://avaxhome.ws/ebooks/history_military/TheCountriesssss.html)"
Publisher: Harrison and SONS | 1919 | ASIN B000WQ67LI | PDF | 283, 394 pages | 22.3 MB

I believe it was Anwar Sadat who described the countries of the Arabian Peninsula as "Tribes with Flags."

[ganulv]

but I have been working my way through Max (son of Mel) Brooks’s World War Z: An Oral History of the Zombie War (http://maxbrooks.com/books-wwz.php) while weathering a nasty virus(!) and I want to re-recommend it. It is basically GWoT issues in a hard sci-fi (http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/MohsScaleOfScienceFictionHardness) wrapper—imagine BSG before that show went teats up. The book is a series of interviews with the oral history format being inspired by Studs Terkel’s The Good War. Below is an extended excerpt of an interview with an American general. Interesting to note that the book was published in 2006. :wry:


Had any of you read the Warmbrunn-Knight report?

No, none of us. I had heard the name, but had no idea about its content. I actually got my hands on a copy about two years after the Great Panic. Most of its military measures were almost line for line in step with our own.

Your own what?

Our proposal to the White House. We outlined a fully comprehensive program, not only to eliminate the threat within the United States, but to roll back and contain it throughout the entire world.

What happened?

The White House loved Phase One. It was cheap, fast, and if executed properly, 100 percent covert. Phase One involved the insertion of Special Forces units into infested areas. Their orders were to investigate, isolate, and eliminate.

Those were the Alpha teams?

Yes, sir, and they were extremely successful. Even though their battle record is sealed for the next 140 years, I can say that it remains one of the most outstanding moments in the history of America’s elite warriors.

So what went wrong?

Nothing, with Phase One, but the Alpha teams were only supposed to be a stopgap measure. Their mission was never to extinguish the threat, only delay it long enough to buy time for Phase Two.

But Phase Two was never completed.

Never even begun, and herein lies the reason why the American military was caught so shamefully unprepared. Phase Two required a massive national undertaking, the likes of which hadn’t been seen since the darkest days of the Second World War. That kind of effort requires
Herculean amounts of both national treasure and national support, both of which, by that point, were nonexistent. The American people had just been through a very long and bloody conflict. They were tired. They’d had enough. Like the 1970s, the pendulum was swinging from a militant stance to a very resentful one. In totalitarian regimes—communism, fascism, religious fundamentalism—popular support is a given. You can start wars, you can prolong them, you can put anyone in uniform for any length of time without ever having to worry about the slightest political backlash. In a democracy, the polar opposite is true. Public support must be husbanded as a finite national resource. It must be spent wisely, sparingly, and with the greatest return on your investment. America is especially sensitive to war weariness, and nothing brings on a backlash like the perception of defeat. I say “perception” because America is a very all-or-nothing society. We like the big win, the touchdown, the knockout in the first round. We like to know, and for everyone else to know, that our victory wasn’t only uncontested, it was positively devastating. If not… well… look at where we were before the Panic. We didn’t lose the last brushfire conflict, far from it. We actually accomplished a very difficult task with very few resources and under extremely unfavorable circumstances. We won, but the public didn’t see it that way because it wasn’t the blitzkrieg smackdown that our national spirit demanded. Too much time had gone by, too much money had been spent, too many lives had been lost or irrevocably damaged. We'd not only squandered all our public support, we were deeply in the red.

[davidbfpo]

A former Washington insider, Thomas Fingar, has written a short book 'Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security', pub. July 2011 by Stanford Security Studies.

This is a real gem for all intelligence analysts that deserves a thorough reading. I'd recommend this for students on courses in international politics, history, strategy and intelligence - to name the obvious ones.

Before reading it discovered it had not been reviewed on Amazon, which was slightly puzzling.

I've added slightly different reviews on:http://www.amazon.com/Reducing-Uncertainty-Intelligence-Analysis-National/dp/080477594X/ref=cm_rdp_product and:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Reducing-Uncertainty-Intelligence-Analysis-National/dp/0804775931/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1319663070&sr=1-1

[Kiwigrunt]

Just started reading Shooting to Kill? (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Shooting-Kill-Policing-Firearms-Response/dp/0470779276/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1320310751&sr=1-2), about police shooting in the UK.

[ganulv]

Robert K. Merton, “The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action (http://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/Merton%E2%80%94The%20unanticipated%20consequences% 20of%20purposive%20social%20action.pdf),” American Sociological Review 1, no. 6 (December 1936): 894–904. doi: 10.2307/2084615 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/208461).

[BushrangerCZ]

Surveillance tradecraft, Peter Jenkins

[davidbfpo]

BushrangerCZ,

Excellent tip.

I note the book originates from the UK, claiming to be a spin-off from the Ulster experience of the military: Amazon USA http://www.amazon.com/Surveillance-Tradecraft-Peter-Jenkins/dp/095353782X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1325022333&sr=1-1 Amazon UK http://www.amazon.co.uk/Surveillance-Tradecraft-Professionals-Guide-Training/dp/095353782X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1325043556&sr=1-1

[BushrangerCZ]

I like the book, very instructional, practically a manual.

[davidbfpo]

Moderator at work

New thread created to enable easier searching, so now split into years, started with 2007.