What Are You Currently Reading? 2012

[carl]

I just finished We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People by Peter Van Buren.

He was part of an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in 2009 and 2010. His conclusion as expressed in the book was that the PRTs, or at least his, did absolutely nothing, nothing at all to improve the situation in Iraq. Nothing...except spend lots and lots of money to no purpose.

I remember when those things were just getting started and there was much earnest discussion on SWJ and other places on how they should be set up, run, administered, financed, judged etc. In the event, it was all useless. The object of the PRTs wasn't to actually do anything, it was to appear to have been doing something so reports could be generated and careers advanced; and that was done by spending money. Nothing had to show for it, it just had to be spent.

That took up about half of the book. The rest of it was just his impressions of FOB life and seeing Iraq from the inside of an MRAP. Those parts were ok but the value of the book was the depiction of the amoral attitude many people in both State and the Army took toward civil development. The Career Centric Small War.

[AmericanPride]

Just started Daniel Yergin's The Quest.

[JMA]

Interesting perspectives in this book. Would enjoy an in depth discussion on this content with interested parties. Either here in a separate thread or privately. Any interest?

[Backwards Observer]

From Third World To First - The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 by Lee Kuan Yew


We believed the long-term future for Singapore was to rejoin Malaya, so we merged with it to form Malaysia in September 1963. Within a year, in July 1964, we suffered Malay-Chinese race riots in Singapore. We were trapped in an intractable struggle with Malay extremists of the ruling party, United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), who were intent on a Malay-dominated Malaysia. To counter their use of communal riots to cow us, we rallied the non-Malays and Malays throughout Malaysia in the Malaysian Solidarity Convention to fight for a Malaysian Malaysia. By August 1965 we were given no choice but to leave.

The communal bullying and intimidation made our people willing to endure the hardships of going it alone. That traumatic experience of race riots also made my colleagues and me even more determined to build a multiracial society that would give equality to all citizens, regardless of race, language or religion. It was an article of faith which guided our policies. (from the Preface)


The line editor at HarperCollins, New York, has meticulously Americanized my English. She has also made me politically gender correct. Whenever I wrote "man", he has become "person" or "people". I thank her for making me appear less of a male chauvinist to Americans. (from the Acknowledgments)


From Third World To First (http://www.amazon.com/Third-World-First-Singapore-1965-2000/dp/0060197765) - Amazon

[carl]

Interesting perspectives in this book. Would enjoy an in depth discussion on this content with interested parties. Either here in a separate thread or privately. Any interest?

I am. I read the book and liked it, but give me a few days to get to the library so I can review.

[carl]

Two books I recently read that I think were very good.

The Great Rifle Controversy: Search for the Ultimate Infantry Weapon from World War II Through Vietnam and Beyond, by E.C Ezell.

This book was written in 1982 and is probably known by most around here but I liked it and learned a lot about technical detail and bureaucratic dynamics. Two things, of many, stood out for me. First the author said American military rifle development was not a story of innovation, but mostly a story of incremental product improvement. He hoped that future decades would change that and see some real innovation. That was written in 1982 and the ensuing 30 years have seen...incremental product improvement.

The second thing was that I think the Senate committee that investigated the M-16 rifle introduction debacle concluded that there had been negligence rising to a criminal level but the program was structured so diffusely that no individual or small group of individuals could be held responsible. When I read that I realized how little things had changed in 50 years.

The other book is:

Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq by James R. Arnold.

The book is a study of 4 small wars, Philippine Insurrection, Algeria, Malaya and Vietnam. Mr. Arnold is an excellent writer and can use a sentence to convey an idea where others (like me) need paragraphs; so he has quite a lot of valuable things to say about these conflicts in not so many pages.

For example, he said that one of the primary reasons for the success of the much debated "Surge" in Iraq was that AQI overplayed its hand by its homicidal fanaticism. I haven't read that in too many other places and it is interesting to contemplate what would have happened if their political platform had extended much beyond maniacal killing.

[JMA]

I am. I read the book and liked it, but give me a few days to get to the library so I can review.

Give us a heads up when you have

[Firn]

Blitzkrieg legend (http://www.amazon.com/Blitzkrieg-Legend-1940-Campaign-West/dp/1591142946)

The best book I have read on the operation. BTW: Found an intersting interview of the author regarding a German wandernden Kessel/wandering kettle/moving pocket (http://www.dctp.tv/filme/ostfeldzug_kessel_nach-rueckwaerts/)



Truppenführung (http://www.amazon.com/German-Art-War-Truppenf%C3%BChrung-Military/dp/0811735524/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1329218539&sr=1-1)

There has been written so much about the second book, especially the timeless chapters that I don't want to repeat them. However Appendix E, a German analysis of FM 100-5 (the 1944 issue, I guess) done in 1952 was a bit of a surprise

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Mark @ Zenpundit for a reminder this classic book is now in paperback and cheaper to buy:http://www.amazon.com/Human-Face-War-Birmingham-Studies/dp/1441187502/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1329259943&sr=8-1

With two highly rated reviews and one by Fuchs here:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Human-Face-War-Birmingham-Studies/dp/1441187502/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1329392849&sr=1-1

Taken from Fuchs:
..I still rate it as one of the most impressive military books of the last decades..

Mark's short review:
I am intruding on Scott’s post to add my strong endorsement. If you are serious about strategy, particularly if you are a member of the armed forces with responsibility for operational planning or unit leadership, The Human Face of War by Colonel Storr is on the short list of must-read books. It no longer costs a zillion dollars, so go buy it.

Link to Zenpundit's reviews:http://zenpundit.com/?p=5397

I too baulked at buying the hardback and borrowed a library copy. In places it is a hard read, generally it flows and abounds with examples to satisfy. So I'll get a paperback copy one day soon and read again, plus add markers so I can ask Jim what he meant.

[Uboat509]

I just picked up An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, by Adam Smith and The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes on Nook. I have been meaning to read both for some time. I probably need to read Friedman as well.

[datroy]

For example, he said that one of the primary reasons for the success of the much debated "Surge" in Iraq was that AQI overplayed its hand by its homicidal fanaticism. I haven't read that in too many other places and it is interesting to contemplate what would have happened if their political platform had extended much beyond maniacal killing.

This isn't all that new - it is closely connected to the "Iraqi agency" argument that has picked up steam recently, but it really started at least as far back as Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who said the Anbar Awakening was the result of the Sunnis having to be the ones to make the decision that they had finally had enough.

This isn't wrong, but the problem with focusing specifically on this point, is that it is used to argue that an increase in US troops (called "the surge") was not responsible. The problem is that it considers each element of what happened in Iraq in 2007-2008 in isolation, trying to figure out which one was the cause of the reduction in violence. In reality, all of these things were connected, and without one you probably wouldn't have the other. Yes, the Iraqis had to make this decision for themselves, but it is not a coincidence that it also came at a time when the US finally was able to provide a viable alternative to AQI. Likewise, an increase in US forces was important, but more important was how those forces were used, and demonstrating to Iraqis that they had an alternative to al Qaeda that would keep them alive. "The Surge" was not just dumping additional bodies into Iraq and calling it a day. It was an ongoing, interconnected process in which the actions of the US, Iraqis, and al Qaeda all had an effect in reducing the violence at the time and weakening AQI.

To get back to the topic of the thread though, I just finished Execute Against Japan: The US Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. I am reading Gunther Rothenberg's The Art of War in the Age of Napoleon. After that will be John Lynn's Bayonets of the Republic: Motivations and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France.

[ganulv]

I just picked up […] The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes on Nook.

Have you seen the Keynes vs. Hayek videos put together by the Mercatus Center (http://mercatus.org/) at George Mason (http://www.gmu.edu/)? I can’t guarantee they’ll be up your alley but I really enjoy them. [LINK 1 (http://mercatus.org/video/fear-boom-and-bust-hayek-vs-keynes-rap-anthem)] [LINK 2 (http://youtu.be/GTQnarzmTOc)]

[Uboat509]

Have you seen the Keynes vs. Hayek videos put together by the Mercatus Center (http://mercatus.org/) at George Mason (http://www.gmu.edu/)? I can’t guarantee they’ll be up your alley but I really enjoy them. [LINK 1 (http://mercatus.org/video/fear-boom-and-bust-hayek-vs-keynes-rap-anthem)] [LINK 2 (http://youtu.be/GTQnarzmTOc)]

I will check them out, thanks.

[carl]

Have you seen the Keynes vs. Hayek videos put together by the Mercatus Center (http://mercatus.org/) at George Mason (http://www.gmu.edu/)? I can’t guarantee they’ll be up your alley but I really enjoy them. [LINK 1 (http://mercatus.org/video/fear-boom-and-bust-hayek-vs-keynes-rap-anthem)] [LINK 2 (http://youtu.be/GTQnarzmTOc)]

The second one was great.

[Uboat509]

I watched both videos and they were both pretty good. I guess I am a bigger nerd than I had previously suspected.

[carl]

Nerds can be cool too.

[Uboat509]

Nerds can be cool too.

So true...

http://ts1.mm.bing.net/images/thumbnail.aspx?q=5011754859823144&id=d9deece91c63a1b395d178c2876d5fd6&index=newexp

http://ts2.mm.bing.net/images/thumbnail.aspx?q=4725546846784733&id=2c69363657fa2659e2396b8b2bdb57a3&index=newexp

http://ts1.mm.bing.net/images/thumbnail.aspx?q=4840591843787984&id=6de4e90a688384e6b6d459628c464aef&index=newexp

[Bob's World]

"A Different Kind of War - The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001 - September 2005". Dr. Donald P Wright, May 2010. Link:http://www.amazon.com/Different-Kind-War-Operation-September/dp/1907521151/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1332087775&sr=1-1

If you want a peek into the details, from the Army perspective, of how we got where we are today, the actions taken, the thinking and intentions, the early signs that we were on the wrong track, etc, this is a fascinating read and a great resource.

Not sure where they are available, I was fortunate to pick up a copy while at Leavenworth last week.

The sections on Pages 268-9 on "Measuring Progress" and "Enabling Good Governance: The Constitutional Loya Jirga" discussing the era (where I believe we made a hard right turn in the wrong direction on a road paved with good intentions) of late 2003 and early 2004 are telling.

The Bush Administration saw the accelerated development of Afghan security forces in January 2004 as the key to transition, funding the $2.2B "Accelerating Success in Afghanistan;" the key to "begin decreasing the number of US troops in Afghanistan as soon as possible."

Meanwhile no one seemed to question why Karzai had a Constitutional Commission prepare a constitution in ADVANCE of the Dec '03 Loya Jirga:
Tensions flared over the strength of the presidency in the new system to be established by the constitution. But the disconnect was ultimately ratified by consensus (my translation, by the Northern Alliance majority seeking to secure their monopoly on governance) rather than by individual ballot.

Then, following a summary of the successes of building greater ANA security forces, the Constitutional Loya Jirga, and:
the creation of a new strategic-level headquarters in Afghanistan that introduced a new approach. CFC-A's counterinsurgency campaign focused on winning the support of the Afghan people to ensure that much of the progress made since 2001 was not undone by a growing enemy threat" (emphasis added).


Despite these successes, Taliban and al-Qaeda forces continued to oppose the Coalition and the ATA as the spring of 2004 ended. As the summer began, the number of attacks continued to rise..

You can't make this stuff up. We had just put legal authority to illegitimate, Karzai-led, Northern Alliance based ATA, and were ramping up our efforts to create a centralized security force to secure this centralized system of governance; all with unprecedented powers vested in the new President. Successes. Yet the insurgency grew in response. We were deluding ourselves then, and we continue to delude ourselves today and refuse to make the cause and effect connections between our actions and their results as we are so blinded by our own good intentions.

This is a good resource, and appears to be candid, detailed and accurate. Also filled with dozens of naive incongruities such as the ones laid out on these critical two pages.

[Infanteer]

I too baulked at buying the hardback and borrowed a library copy. In places it is a hard read, generally it flows and abounds with examples to satisfy. So I'll get a paperback copy one day soon and read again, plus add markers so I can ask Jim what he meant.

I admit to being a fan of Storr's writings. I paid a right leg to get a copy when it first came out and have piqued the author's brain on a few things.

Right now, I am reading Fukuyama's The Rise of Political Order. It should be required reading for anyone who puts a uniform on.

[carl]

"A Different Kind of War - The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001 - September 2005". Dr. Donald P Wright, May 2010. Link:http://www.amazon.com/Different-Kind-War-Operation-September/dp/1907521151/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1332087775&sr=1-1

Here it is for free in PDF form, courtesy of the USA.

usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/docs/DifferentKindofWar.pdf

Just cut and paste.

[pvebber]

REgarding Human face of war - I picked up the kindle edition for 15$.

Great suggestion - I really enjoyed it. Found myself really thinking about why some of the criticisms of assumptions raised "Struck home" with me (i.e. I was guilty of). Got me questioning other assumptions I work with.

[EPA]

Currently reading Leading Up and All In about Gen Petraeus. A little disappointed with All In. Not so much with the book itself by more with the flow and structure the author is using. There's not much of a natural structure and makes for a disjointed read.

Pete

[Mike in Hilo]

David Elliott, The Vietnamese War. Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta 1930-1975. Concise Edition. I had previously read excerpts, but finally bought the book, albeit in abridged form.

This is a must read for serious students of the Vietnam War. Elliott's main sources are the widely cited and compelling Rand interviews of communist defectors and POWs, captured documents, and some minor additions from the less credible official Province History. the result is the insiders' chronicle of the evolution of the revolutionary movement in one Deltaic province, Dinh Tuong.

The insights are noteworthy: The near destruction of Revolutionary combat forces and cadre by 1969-'70 is attributed to the massive acceleration of kinetic activity that resulted not only in devastating attrition, but the literal, physical depopulation of the rural base of the revolution as peasants fled for their lives to escape allied (mainly US) bombing and shelling, and headed for the safer GVN held areas. COIN in the sense of "draining the swamp," but little else of the substance of, say, FM 3-24. The same massive dislocations of the war, such as the changes in settlement patterns/radical urbanization, also rendered obsolete the old feudal relationships that purportedly provided the grievances on which the Revolution had originally fed, destroying the landlord class as such and taking the old grievance of land tenure essentially off the table; and creating opportunities that led to the formation of a new, peasant bourgeoisie plurality. In the final offensive, Elliott notes, the transit of Revolutionary forces was made more difficult by a populace no longer disposed to be helpful. But Elliott touches upon another, more prosaic explanation for this shift in loyalty. Universal GVN male conscription (not authorized until the aftermath of the Tet offensive), at a time when decimation of the communist units had removed the alternative, resulted in the overnight conversion of the bulk of rural families into ARVN and RF/PF dependents.

The Revolutionary base areas were never eradicated, though, and were ultimately re-infiltrated by NVA personnel for both main and local forces. But a real eyeopener was the incredible--even allowing for some exaggeration-- rebound in cadre strength, the (presumably local) Party members operating in Dinh Tuong to 7000 at war's end in 1975. And these had been drawn from a shrunken base. The Party compensated for erosion in popular support by limiting recruitment largely to the poorest peasant class, because these were less likely to forsake, under pressure or blandishment, the status and power that Party membership bestowed. A commitment less widespread, yet deeper, as Elliott put it.

A caveat: As the Rand interviewees' commitment had been sufficiently firm to merit Party membership, narratives may demonstrate a degree of self-justificatory adherence to the Party line. Example: North-South ethnic friction, a potential challenge to Party dogma on Southern impetus for reunification, is touched upon but dismissed as insignificant. Yet traditional, Southern disdain toward Northerners was a very real issue within the general population, likely contributing to the distaste with which Southerners viewed the Diem regime (and subsequent neo-Diemist governments) and its representatives; and no doubt feeding the backlash against NVA as well. (Elliott is not alone in sidestepping the ethnic issue. Since installing Diem, the US had found it impossible to appeal, without ridicule, to Southern ethnicity as a rallying point against Northern aggression, in the face of disproportionate representation of Northerners in the GVN civil service and officer corps.)

The book invites comparison with other highly laudable single province studies, Race's War Comes to Long An and Bergerud's Dynamics of Defeat. Neither provides comparable analysis of the dissolution of the old social order and consequent removal of the old grievances and shifting of loyalties. In this respect, Elliott's work is the more lucid in its conclusions.

[jmm99]

I must have gone to the same book sale. :)

I was more than satisfied with Elliott, The Vietnamese War. Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta 1930-1975 Concise Edition (http://www.amazon.com/The-Vietnamese-War-Revolution-1930-1975/dp/0765606038) (your link was underlined but not alive); and appreciated your review of the book confirming my impressions. I wasn't there; you were - and I appreciate that as well.

If possible, you and Cavguy should get together - since he's in Hawaii now - and see if you and he could put together an article on counter-revolutionary warfare comparing Vietnam and Iraq-Astan.

Regards

Mike

[Mike in Hilo]

I appreciate the comment, Mike, and your suggestion. I ought to point out, though, that to us on the Big Island, Oahu is a world away....

Cheers,
Mike.

[Firn]

I just picked up An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, by Adam Smith and The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes on Nook. I have been meaning to read both for some time. I probably need to read Friedman as well.

Reading Adam Smith and Keynes as well. I have to confess that Keynes is slow reading even with an background in economics. Reading Smith is a bit like reading Clausewitz in the sense that both are more quoted then read and that you get away with a different feeling then the one you started with. Loved many aspects of it, seen from a "modern" micro and macro view with current affairs in mind.

BTW the NYTimes has a recent article about the shortages of basic goods in Venezuela and ElPais run articles about YPF and the economic policies of Kirchner and the Argentine government. Such price controls certainly seem to result in the textbook predictions.

[Old Eagle]

Daniel Kahneman's latest on why it's so hard to reach correct conclusions. Spoiler alert -- we're hard-wired to fail.

This isn't a military book in the classical sense, but it provides important lessons on decision-making. Kahneman explains that the brain has two systems for processing thought: the fast, very basic system one, and the more deliberate, critical, analytical system two. Forcing system two to kick in and work appears to be a challenge. He also ties together other contributors in the field: Gilbert, Taleb, Tetlock, etc.

I plan to use the book in one of my analysis classes. So far, I continue to be amazed at how students who acknowledge the requirement for better analytical thought revert to the comfort zone in their own analyses. I am therefore open to suggestions.

[JMA]

Daniel Kahneman's latest on why it's so hard to reach correct conclusions. Spoiler alert -- we're hard-wired to fail.

This isn't a military book in the classical sense, but it provides important lessons on decision-making. Kahneman explains that the brain has two systems for processing thought: the fast, very basic system one, and the more deliberate, critical, analytical system two. Forcing system two to kick in and work appears to be a challenge. He also ties together other contributors in the field: Gilbert, Taleb, Tetlock, etc.

I plan to use the book in one of my analysis classes. So far, I continue to be amazed at how students who acknowledge the requirement for better analytical thought revert to the comfort zone in their own analyses. I am therefore open to suggestions.

Kahneman was discussed in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=127305&postcount=211)

It referred to his article: Don’t Blink! The Hazards of Confidence (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/magazine/dont-blink-the-hazards-of-confidence.html?_r=3&pagewanted=all)

[Backwards Observer]

Daniel Kahneman's latest on why it's so hard to reach correct conclusions. Spoiler alert -- we're hard-wired to fail.

Thanks for the book suggestion. I'm about halfway through; it made me drop my crack pipe a couple of times. An nescis, mi fili, quantilla prudentia mundus regatur?

[Backwards Observer]

Two recommended in comments by SWC member, Mark O'Neill:

- The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance - 1950 to the Present by Douglas S. Blaufarb. (1977)

- Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy by D. Michael Shafer. (1988)

Going by their respective introductions, look to be heavy going.

The Counterinsurgency Era (http://www.amazon.com/The-Counterinsurgency-Era-Doctrine-Performance/dp/002903700X/ref=pd_sim_sbs_b_1) - Amazon

Deadly Paradigms (http://www.amazon.com/Deadly-Paradigms-Failure-Counterinsurgency-Policy/dp/0691077746) - Amazon

[Bill Moore]

http://www.amazon.com/Sandstorm-Libya-Revolution-Lindsey-Hilsum/dp/159420506X

This is not, nor does it claim to be, the definitive history of the Libyan Revolution. Obviously the history of the revolution is still unfolding before our eyes, but this book provides a fascinating view of the war from the revolutionaries without romanizing the rebels. Lindsey follows five or more characters throughout the revolution that range from educated liberals with visions of modern democracy, to Islamists with visions of Sharia, and ordinary citizens who were tired of being oppressed by a brutal dictator. I was very familiar with Qadaffi's support for international terrorism, but had little insight on the crimes he committed against his own people to include his Maoist purge to purify their society.

this book provides great insights into the struggles of fighter, and although most were not trained at all and fought very poorly, they still demonstrated savvy in some areas. Of interest will be the great insights in how the rebels gathered and passed intelligence to NATO to facilitate targeting, how they used the internet, and how they described in some detail the support provided by British and French SOF.

Throughout the book the author provides a detailed description of the Regime and Qadaffi's behavior which was nothing less than bizzare. It details his support for global terrorism and revolution to include his extensive support for the IRA. Yet in another twist it describes a relatively effective deradicalization program that Libya implemented in their prisons that was considered a model, and yet at the same time Qadaffi's security forces conducted a massive slaughter of prisoners in one of the prisons that further inflammed the anger of the people that eventually exploded into a revolution.

Highly recommended read (easy and quick read) to gain the personal insights of those involved. The author correctly points out in her last chapter that there will be many challenges ahead and the chances for peace, modernization, etc. are fairly low.

For those who didn't follow terrorism trends prior to 9/11 this book will also serve as excellent introduction to the state sponsored terrorism so common in the 70's and 80's. The further back you can see the further forward you'll be able to see.

[ganulv]

[/URL]For those who didn't follow terrorism trends prior to 9/11 this book will also serve as excellent introduction to the state sponsored terrorism so common in the 70's and 80's. The further back you can see the further forward you'll be able to see.

In the same vein I would recommend Olivier Assayas’s Carlos. The 140 minute movie version is good, the 330 minute three-parter is even better. [LINK [URL="http://carlos.canalplus.fr/?nav=1"]1 (http://www.amazon.com/Sandstorm-Libya-Revolution-Lindsey-Hilsum/dp/159420506X), 2 (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1321865/), 3 (http://nymag.com/movies/reviews/68839/index1.html)]

[carl]

There is an old book called The Terror Network by Claire Sterling that goes over that ground too.

On a different note, I just finished a book called The Unknown Battle of Midway by Alvin Kernan. I've read several Midway books but this one does the best job in clearly explaining what the American carrier aircraft did and where they went. It is a short book and very well written. One thing made clear is we were very very lucky.

[Backwards Observer]

Starting two on SEAsia, look interesting:


The vast crescent of British-ruled territories from India down to Singapore appeared in the early stages of the Second World War a massive asset in the war with Germany, providing huge quantities of soldiers and raw materials and key part of an impregnable global network denied to the Nazis. Within a few weeks in 1941-2 a Japanese invasion had destroyed all this, almost effortlessly taking the impregnable fortress' of Singapore with its 80,000 strong garrison, and sweeping through South and Southeast Asia to the frontier of India itself.

This revolutionary, absolutely gripping book brings to life the entire experience of South and Southeast Asia in this extraordinary period, telling the story from an Indian, Burmese, Chinese or Malay perspective as much as from that of the British or Japanese. Effectively it is the story of the birth of modern South and Southeast Asia and the hopes and fears of the dozens of forgotten armies' marching through the jungle battlefields, so many dying for causes swept away by the reality that emerged in 1945. Even as the British successfully fought back in the bloodiest battles in South and Southeast Asia's history, there was no going back to colonial rule.(amazon blurb)

Forgotten Armies - Britain's Asian Empire and the War With Japan (http://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Armies-Britains-Empire-Christopher/dp/0140293310) by Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper - Amazon

Guardian uk review (http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2005/jan/22/featuresreviews.guardianreview8) - 1.22.2005

NY times review (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/17/books/review/17SCHWART.html?_r=0) - 4.17.2005

historynet review (http://www.historynet.com/forgotten-armies-the-fall-of-british-asia-1941-1945-book-review.htm) - 6.12.2006

+++


In September 1945, after the fall of the atomic bomb--and with it, the Japanese empire--Asia was dominated by the British. Governing a vast crescent of land that stretched from India through Burma and down to Singapore, and with troops occupying the French and Dutch colonies in southern Vietnam and Indonesia, Britain's imperial might had never seemed stronger.

Yet within a few violent years, British power in the region would crumble, and myriad independent nations would struggle into existence. Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper show how World War II never really ended in these ravaged Asian lands but instead continued in bloody civil wars, anti-colonial insurrections, and inter-communal massacres. These years became the most formative in modern Asian history, as Western imperialism vied with nascent nationalist and communist revolutionaries for political control.

Forgotten Wars, a sequel to the authors' acclaimed Forgotten Armies, is a panoramic account of the bitter wars of the end of empire, seen not only through the eyes of the fighters, but also through the personal stories of ordinary people: the poor and bewildered caught up in India's Hindu-Muslim massacres; the peasant farmers ravaged by warfare between British forces and revolutionaries in Malaya; the Burmese minorities devastated by separatist revolt. Throughout, we are given a stunning portrait of societies poised between the hope of independence and the fear of strife. Forgotten Wars vividly brings to life the inescapable conflicts and manifold dramas that shaped today's Asia.(amazon blurb)

Forgotten Wars - Freedom and Revolution in South East Asia (http://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Wars-Freedom-Revolution-Southeast/dp/0674057074) by Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper - Amazon

Guardian uk review (http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2007/mar/04/historybooks.features) - 3.4.2007

---

The Sun Never Sweats (Spinal Tap) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8zo-tX8Q6k) - Youtube

[JMA]

I am. I read the book and liked it, but give me a few days to get to the library so I can review.

Never got round to this Carl. Perhaps better that way as I doubt this is the place for such a discussion.

Another book worthy of study is (not necessarily in the way the author want):

Company Commander - Major Russell Lewis (Author) (http://www.amazon.com/Company-Commander-Major-Russell-Lewis/dp/0753540304/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1349457610&sr=8-2&keywords=company+commander)

[kstatefan40]

I've been looking back on the early years of the war in Afghanistan lately with a few good books:

I just finished reading The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service (http://www.amazon.com/The-Art-Intelligence-Lessons-Clandestine/dp/1594203342). It covers a variety of issues from the CIA's CTC in the buildup to September 11 to lessons learned from the first few years of war, but what I found most interesting was the author's description of his experience serving in Africa. Based on current events in Libya, I found this information to be timely and informative.

I've moved on to a book the previous author recommends, First In: How Seven CIA Officers Opened the War on Terror in Afghanistan (http://www.amazon.com/First-In-Officers-Afghanistan-ebook/dp/B000FCK4UE). This covers the JAWBREAKER team's entry into Afghanistan and their challenges in the opening days of the war. Very interesting so far.

[Firn]

In the last couple of months:

Thinking, Fast and Slow (http://www.amazon.com/Thinking-Fast-Slow-Daniel-Kahneman/dp/0374275637/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1349948133&sr=8-1&keywords=Thinking+fast) - Brilliant book. It is not surprising that it already has been discussed here. Regression to the mean and the law of small numbers surprised even me, despite having studied statistics at the uni. But then again, if we consider the base rate of those who failed, it is not surprising at all that I was among them. :D

Ironically the Marshmallow Study (http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2012-10/uor-tms101012.php) which is cited in the book has a clear shortcoming, which can at least partly be explained by other chapters of the book.


For the past four decades, the "marshmallow test" has served as a classic experimental measure of children's self-control: will a preschooler eat one of the fluffy white confections now or hold out for two later?

Now a new study demonstrates that being able to delay gratification is influenced as much by the environment as by innate ability. Children who experienced reliable interactions immediately before the marshmallow task waited on average four times longer—12 versus three minutes—than youngsters in similar but unreliable situations.

The Checklist Manifesto (http://www.amazon.com/Checklist-Manifesto-How-Things-Right/dp/0312430000/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1349948524&sr=1-1&keywords=Check+list+manifesto): It doesn't has the grand span of Thinking, Fast and slow but it made its manifesto very well. It shows how hard but important it is to do consistently the right things in the right way and order. Discipline forced by something like a good checklist can empower initiative and thinking, making a big difference in performance.

Wages of Destruction (http://www.amazon.com/Wages-Destruction-Making-Breaking-Economy/dp/0143113208/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1349949055&sr=1-1&keywords=wages+of+destruction): The best economic book I have read about the WWII, from an author which actually studied macroeconomics. This often basic economic knowledge was sometimes obviously missing in Why the Allies won (http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_ss_i_0_15?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=why+the+allies+won&sprefix=why+the+allies+%2Cstripbooks%2C215) and even more so in Freedoms Forge (http://www.amazon.com/Freedoms-Forge-American-Business-Produced/dp/1400069645/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1349949358&sr=1-1&keywords=Freedom+forge).

It always amazed me that such basic and thus key elements like ressources, capital, labour, productivity, monetary policy were not yet investigated with similar scientific rigour before, at least not in a widely available (and cheap) book. Even more so if we consider the amount of ink spent on this period.


Freedoms Forge (http://www.amazon.com/Freedoms-Forge-American-Business-Produced/dp/1400069645/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1349949358&sr=1-1&keywords=Freedom+forge): A nice book with good stories but it suffers greatly compared to Wages of Destruction. It is written by somebody who has no professional education in economics and it really tells. If it just had sticked to the stories, maybe with a bit less drama about heroic men and American exceptionalism it would sill be a great book. But the black-and-white description of business and labour and the fact- and senseless attacks on the New Deal of New Dealers often broke the flow. Critic is important but it should be based on facts and those were just not there. This narrow ideological approach does weaken the whole book. And this comes from a convinced capitalist. :D


The Halo Effect (http://www.amazon.com/Halo-Effect-Business-Delusions-Managers/dp/0743291263/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1349950588&sr=1-1&keywords=the+halo+effect): It is in its scope similar to the Checklist Manifesto. It limits itself, in this case to a strong attack on the way we often think and write about business, managers and success. This simple, fact-based approach makes the book powerful.

[ganulv]

Have you tried this one (http://www.dukeupress.edu/Catalog/ViewProduct.php?productid=13226), Firn?

[carl]

Another book worthy of study is (not necessarily in the way the author want):

Company Commander - Major Russell Lewis (Author) (http://www.amazon.com/Company-Commander-Major-Russell-Lewis/dp/0753540304/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1349457610&sr=8-2&keywords=company+commander)

How do you mean? I just finished The Wrong War, Little America and Losing Small Wars. All had much to say about the British effort in Helmand and Little American and Losing Small Wars were not complimentary.

[Mike in Hilo]

Owen West,The Snake Eaters....I highly recommend this book.

I had as much difficulty putting this one down as I did Owen's father Bing's The Village. Like The Village in an Iraqi context, the theme is advisers being most effective by fighting alongside their host country counterparts. The key to what is essentially a territorial security role is shown to be aggressive patrolling to seek out and engage the enemy. In The Snake Eaters, as engagements are won, the populace begins to shift their allegiance toward the winner, generating important momentum.

[From what I was privileged to observe, momentum--I mean generating and maintaining it--is a critical principle for both insurgents and COIN forces: So out of curiosity, a question: Did von Clausewitz speak to "momentum?" I looked for it in English and German versions and found nothing....]

Cheers,
Mike.

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

I agree momentum is a beautiful thing, but unless it can be advantaged to the point of culmination, the effects on the enemy are normally transient, especially if the insurgent has a safe haven across a border where they can regroup. In Afghanistan we have only been able to leverage momentum up to tactical and operational level victories, not strategic.

Clausewitz addressed this from conventional stand point, but it applies to some extent to irregular warfare.

http://books.google.com/books?id=xymyQcKTYc4C&pg=PA179&lpg=PA179&dq=Clausewitz+on+momentum&source=bl&ots=8-IXuczeD-&sig=9WaOqNC89CZ4j2GE3dlDui00PSw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=jmyDULXGJ6rriQL9rIHQCQ&ved=0CEMQ6AEwBjgK#v=onepage&q=Clausewitz%20on%20momentum&f=false


The situation is completely different when a defeated army is being pursued. Resistance becomes difficult, indeed sometimes impossible, as a consequence of battle casualties, loss of order and of courage, and anxiety about the retreat.

Skip a couple of lines to talking about the pursuer:


The faster his pace, the greater the speed with which events will run along their predtermined course: this is the primary area where psychological forces will increase and multiply without being rigidly bound to weights and measures of the material world.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.amazon.com/In-Ruins-Empire-Japanese-Surrender/dp/0375509151

In the Ruins of Empire, The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia, by Ronald Spector


I think this book is a must read for anyone interested in Small Wars and the recent and very relevant history of the Asia-Pacific. I also read Spector's "Eagle Against the Sun" and highly recommend it also. Back to the Ruins of Empire, this short excerpt from the NYT review sums it nicely:

With access to recently available firsthand accounts by Chinese, Japanese, British, and American witnesses and previously top secret U.S. intelligence records, Spector tells for the first time the fascinating story of the deadly confrontations that broke out–or merely continued–in Asia after peace was proclaimed at the end of World War II. Under occupation by the victorious Allies, this part of the world was plunged into new power struggles or back into old feuds that in some ways were worse than the war itself. In the Ruins of Empire also shows how the U.S. and Soviet governments, as they secretly vied for influence in liberated lands, were soon at odds.

At the time of the peace declaration, international suspicions were still strong. Joseph Stalin warned that “crazy cutthroats” might disrupt the surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay. Die-hard Japanese officers plotted to seize the emperor’s palace to prevent an announcement of surrender, and clandestine relief forces were sent to rescue thousands of Allied POWs to prevent their being massacred.

In the Ruins of Empire paints a vivid picture of the postwar intrigues and violence. In Manchuria, Russian “liberators” looted, raped, and killed innocent civilians, and a fratricidal rivalry continued between Chiang Kai-shek’s regime and Mao’s revolutionaries. Communist resistance forces in Malaya settled old scores and terrorized the indigenous population, while mujahideen holy warriors staged reprisals and terror killings against the Chinese–hundreds of innocent civilians were killed on both sides. In Indochina, a nativist political movement rose up to oppose the resumption of French colonial rule; one of the factions that struggled for supremacy was the Communist Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh. Korea became a powder keg with the Russians and Americans entangled in its north and south. And in Java, as the Indonesian novelist Idrus wrote, people brutalized by years of Japanese occupation “worshipped a new God in the form of bombs, submachine guns, and mortars.”

Through impeccable research and provocative analysis, as well as compelling accounts of American, British, Indian, and Australian soldiers charged with overseeing the surrender and repatriation of millions of Japanese in the heart of dangerous territory, Spector casts new and startling light on this pivotal time–and sets the record straight about this contested and important period in history.

I worked in this part of the world for a long time and felt like a novice after reading this book. I won't go as far to say the book offers lessons for post decisive operations in Iraq, but it does provide historical insights on previous efforts where a U.S. led coalition struggled with post war occupation and policy issues. As the author points out, in many countries more people were killed after Japan's surrender than during the actual war.

[carl]

Owen West,The Snake Eaters....I highly recommend this book.

I had as much difficulty putting this one down as I did Owen's father Bing's The Village. Like The Village in an Iraqi context, the theme is advisers being most effective by fighting alongside their host country counterparts. The key to what is essentially a territorial security role is shown to be aggressive patrolling to seek out and engage the enemy. In The Snake Eaters, as engagements are won, the populace begins to shift their allegiance toward the winner, generating important momentum.

Agree absolutely. I always thought of The Village as almost a how to book for small war in a rural area that was written a compelling way. The Snake Eaters is the same in that it is almost a how to book for small war in a more urban area written in a compelling way. The huge strength in both books is that the readers know as much about the Iraqis and Vietnamese in the stories as they do about the Americans.

Both are brilliant books.

[Firn]

Have you tried this one (http://www.dukeupress.edu/Catalog/ViewProduct.php?productid=13226), Firn?

No, thanks for the link. Did you?

Sounds rather interesting but I got a couple of books waiting that I take the time to read them. :D

[ganulv]

No, thanks for the link. Did you?
but I have no exposure whatsoever to that world so I have no idea whether the ethnography rings true. I find the author (http://youtu.be/h9rUzLoKpfs?t=9s) dorkily loveable so I want to give her the benefit of the doubt. :)

[jcustis]

I just finished the complete 166-pages of documents released by Republicans of the House Oversight Committee, and listened ton the four hours of hearing proceedings. Only about a third of the C-SPAN material is worth anything in terms of real testimony, as the remainder is just the standard grandstanding and political posturing.

Reporters continue to prove that the can be dumb and lazy without a great degree of effort.

[carl]

Ganulv:

What Prof. Ho says in the video jibes with many of the things I read (I'm not in that world either), especially the part about dismantling rules that had been in effect. There have been a number of those established long ago from hard experience, the Depression, that have been done away with. If there is a discrete elite on Wall Street it stands to reason that it will have a distinct culture and that help drive their behavior. And if that culture is at odds with the rest of the country and at odds with what the rest of us figure is good behavior, trouble is in the offing.

What she says also jibes with Charles Murray's thesis in Coming Apart, that there is an elite developing in the country that basically runs the place, but that this elite has nothing much in common with the rest of us.

JCustis:

Hearings on what?

[jcustis]

Crap, it was the Benghazi attack hearing.

Sorry about that. Good luck finding balanced reporting about it.

[Mike in Hilo]

Re: Bill Moore's response to my question on momentum:

Bill,

I'd say your comment on momentum only taking us so far, as when an enemy is free to regroup in a cross border sanctuary, is spot on...

And I greatly appreciate your taking the time to research von Clausewitz in response to my question.

Cheers,
Mike

[JMA]

How do you mean? I just finished The Wrong War, Little America and Losing Small Wars. All had much to say about the British effort in Helmand and Little American and Losing Small Wars were not complimentary.

Carl, it is apparent (in my interpretation) that this book was written to launch a career beyond the army lecturing on leadership aspects to civilians.

This book lacks the tactical and intel context of this company's operations in Helmand to make it meaningful to a soldier. (This maybe as a result of the threat or actual MoD censorship).

With his future career in mind we read ad nauseam about the poor conditions at FOB Inkerman. Think of the poor man having to shower using a "solar shower" and crap in a "long drop", not to mention the dust and the lack of fresh rations.

Quite frankly through trying to present himself to civilians as some sort of long suffering martyr he comes across to soldiers as some sort of self indulgent wimp. We read more about him spending time running around the FOB and in the makeshift gym, reading books, watching DVDs and "thinking" and practicing NLP, and chatting with the signalers in the ops room than we hear about any strategizing, planning, analyzing intel, training for operations.

Think of the poor man having to pace himself so he did not burn out over a six month tour. Poor darling.

Then the kicker... the loneliness of command. This tells us that his decision to leave the military was the correct one (for him). If he had stayed he would only be suitable for staff work and not command.

Let me explain it this way.

He was commanding a company of the finest soldiers - the Brit paras. It you look at the company structure as a pyramid standing firmly on its base then he was the apex. the "pyramid" (meaning the rank and file of the company) was carrying him. His job was made easy (because of the quality of the NCOs and troops).

This poor man saw his situation like an inverted Pyramid standing on/balancing on its apex (meaning him). He saw himself carrying all the responsibility... which, quite frankly, is pure nonsense (as he is not commanding a rabble but the best troops available.) One must question his fitness to command such a company of troops.

We should wish him well in his new career as a civilian.

[Tukhachevskii]

He was commanding a company of the finest soldiers - the Brit paras. It you look at the company structure as a pyramid standing firmly on its base then he was the apex. the "pyramid" (meaning the rank and file of the company) was carrying him. His job was made easy (because of the quality of the NCOs and troops).

This poor man saw his situation like an inverted Pyramid standing on/balancing on its apex (meaning him). He saw himself carrying all the responsibility... which, quite frankly, is pure nonsense (as he is not commanding a rabble but the best troops available.) One must question his fitness to command such a company of troops.

We should wish him well in his new career as a civilian.

If this were Facebook I click on "Like";)

[wiku]

Amen!

[carl]

JMA:

Very well put and a good book review too. I wonder about guys like that who apparently find being a small scale "warrior king" isn't interesting enough for them.

I have an observation and question about a little thing but I wonder nonetheless. When you mentioned "the makeshift gym" it reminded me. What do you, and anybody else, think of the whole "gym" and "workout" subculture and how it affects the way things are run over there? I mention this because it was my subjective observation that some of the people I worked with, some, seemed to be as interested in making sure they had their full allotment of gym time as they were interested in the conflict.

[ganulv]

I have an observation and question about a little thing but I wonder nonetheless. When you mentioned "the makeshift gym" it reminded me. What do you, and anybody else, think of the whole "gym" and "workout" subculture and how it affects the way things are run over there? I mention this because it was my subjective observation that some of the people I worked with, some, seemed to be as interested in making sure they had their full allotment of gym time as they were interested in the conflict.
Sounds prison yardish to me.

[The Cuyahoga Kid]

The Chinese Army Today by Dennis Blasko 2nd Ed (2012)
(http://www.amazon.com/The-Chinese-Army-Today-Transformation/dp/0415783224/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1346287430&sr=8-1&keywords=china+dennis+blasko)

Strategic Asia 2012-13: China’s Military Challenge. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds. (2012) (http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?id=268)


The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Roles, Concepts and Capabilities. Richard Hallion, Roger Cliff, Phillip Saunders. (2012) (http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/books/chinese-air-force.pdf)

[parvati]

The Triple Agent by Joby Warrick

So far, so good.

[ganulv]

Checked out The Gun by C.J. Chivers from the library last week. Apart from the fact that I thought the book could have used a bit of editing as the topics did not seem always to stay on topic, I much enjoyed it. My knowledge of firearms is very basic, however, so I was not a very informed reader. Any informed readers of the book on the forum who would care to share their own opinions?

[carl]

Ganulv:

I am probably far less informed than I like to think I am but my opinion of the book is exactly the same as yours. Very good but it needed a tougher editor. It was as if the author and the editor knew little about firearms history before the project was started and found the whole of the subject so interesting they couldn't bear to leave anything out.

[carl]

artillery it needs; the American infantry needs all it can get."

That is what a French general said in WWI. I read it long ago and could never really understand why he said that. After reading this book, The School of Hard Knocks, Combat Leadership in the American Expeditionary Force (http://www.amazon.com/School-Hard-Knocks-Leadership-Expeditionary/dp/1603442979/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1355668103&sr=1-1&keywords=the+school+of+hard+knocks+combat+leadersh ip+in+the+american+expeditionary+), I understand.

The book is about how American small unit leaders, Lts and NCOs were trained and how they performed in battle. They were very poorly trained and consequently performed poorly, the poor performance resulting in sluggish performance inordinately high casualties for the results gained.

The Army was faced with an almost impossible task, going from around 7,000 regular and Nat Guard officers to almost 200,000 in no time at all. So only so much could be done. But the book recounts how very much of what was done was a complete waste, large blocks of time spent on close order drill, bayonet fighting and wig wag flag signaling. The Army de-emphasized training available from Allied officers in order to further an 'American' way of fighting to a certain extent.

It was surprising to me that the NCO corps basically wasn''t. The training was almost non-existent and the results showed.

The many many faults were never really corrected. Divisions fed into the line in late 1918 were as bad as the first divisions to go in and those first divisions never got much better as far as small unit fighting went. Divisions and brigades got better at things like coordinating artillery and supports but the sharp end stayed dull.

It was very interesting how Army personnel policies were hugely important in getting in the way. Wholesale drafts from units that had worked together for a while destroyed cohesion. Filling school quotas with small unit leaders pulled directly out of battles was something they insisted on doing. The book seems to describe an AEF that was approaching a crisis with straggling possibly approaching 10% as the war ended.

Another interesting point the author made was that small unit leader training and accession practices in Vietnam resembled to some extent those of WWI.

The book was a little slow in the first few chapters, neccasarily (sic) so in order to detail the initial training but it all comes together in the last chapters describing how it all played out in France.

[Fuchs]

Sadly, actual small unit combat training was a quite novel idea in WW1.
The fragmentation of infantry combat into platoon or squad actions caused by the need to exploit micro terrain features (or the need for night actions) for survivability was not adequately foreseen. Pre-1914 literature is concerned with battalion-level tactics mostly.
They did actually understand the problems caused by firepower and some authors did understand the necessary individual movement techniques, but they simply did not understand that command and tactics would break down into parallel small unit actions.

Ironically, the otherwise relatively conservative cavalry was often leading in small unit tactics (especially raiding and scouting) because it was anticipated that cavalry in action would often be about small units.


Few select units, typically meant to spearhead offensives, received much small unit combat training in form of simulated assaults on dummy trenches and the like.
Leaders of line units on battalion level and below had to improvise training based on what they've seen happening in combat (which required to survive the same yourself in the first place).
NCOs were in many armies the ones who shouted commands so the officers would not need to do so and might even be absent from the most routine exercises.

[carl]

Fuchs:

The author stated the problem the US Army had in a very expressive, pithy way. He said the US Army was a 1914 army fighting against and beside 1918 armies. Those other armies had had time to learn all those lessons and had a greater depth of pre-war small unit leaders to draw from so there would be some left alive to learn and pass on the lessons. According to the book, the US Army didn't. There was a lot covered in the book and it gives a whole lot to think about. If the war had gone on, it seems we wouldn't have done much better and may have done much much worse. The straggling (soldiers going back from the line) problem was getting very bad.

The most surprising thing to me was there was no NCO corp as we would know it.

[Bill Moore]

Carl,

The criticism of the mass and ineffective training may be accurate, but that is what happens when you don't have a standing "professional" army. Instead of overwhelming the enemy with strategy and tactical skill we overwhelmed them with industrial might (at least initially).

I realize you're summarizing the book, but if the author is claiming the European armies were better I would like to hear why he/she felt that way? The French, Italians, and British performed terribly, and while the German Army reformed prior to WWII I haven't seen much in my readings that the other nations have.

Most of my reading has been focused on Pacific region and the Europeans during WWII performed extremely poorly there. Maybe the reality is that most peacetime armies, unless they're deliberately (not in response to a crisis) prepping for an invasion of another nation, are poorly trained?

[carl]

Bill:

The author says that for all the mortal floundering around the US Army did, the strategic effect of its effort was decisive. That effect just cost much more in blood than it could have because of avoidable failures in training and leadership.

The US Army was absolutely less effective than the French, British and German armies...of 1918 and the author does in so many words say that. Those armies were not at all in 1918 what they were in 1914. They had made huge strides in effectiveness, titanic strides. In fact one British officer when he first saw the US Army upon its arrival in France said something along the lines of 'This is Kitchener's army all over again.' The British had come a long long way from Kitchener's army. None of those armies in 1918 could be compared to what they had been 4 years earlier. One example that I recall reading about. In 1918 if you were in a British defensive position and you wanted aerial photos of a German position opposite, you would have them in hand, your own personal hand, in 24 hours. Those 1918 armies were pretty sophisticated in many ways.

If a peacetime army is poorly trained, I think it is a matter of choice. They don't have to be that way. The Germans were fair enough in 1939.

[Tukhachevskii]

Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam ( http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674050594)

The jurists employ overlapping linguistic, conceptual, and legal parallels between marriage, slavery, and ownership. The contracting and dissolving of a marriage gave rise to the clearest parallels between matrimony and slavery or purchase. The centrality of milk (ownership, control, dominion) emerges as the tie joining the two parties is established or dissolved. These parallels “between the condition of servility and the condition of marriage in Islam” centre on the sexual claims established by the marriage contract. In the words of John Ralph Willis, “A comparison is drawn between the dominion imposed by the husband through which his wife is caused to surrender her sexual self, and the sovereignty established by the master whereby the slave is compelled to alienate his right to dispose.” Willis notes that marriage is “likened to a sale”: “it is said that in the market the master buys his slave, whereas in marriage, the husband purchases his wife’s productive part.” Yet the fact that the wife does not lose her “right to dispose”— that is, her control over property— distinguishes the transactions even as it highlights the sexual character of the own ership conveyed through marriage. More obvious even than parallels between marriage and purchase of a slave are jurists’ frequent analogies between unilateral divorce (talaq) and manumission. Marriage, Willis says, enslaves a “woman’s sexual self”94 through the dower, as a slave comes to be owned through purchase; repudiation frees her just as manumission frees the slave. [p. 50-51]




Gog and Magog in Early Syriac and Islamic Sources ( http://ebooks.brillonline.nl/book?id=nij9789004174160_nij9789004174160_i-280)
A fascinating examination of the role of the mythical peoples Gog and Magog and of Alexander the “two horned one” in Islamic theology, mysticism and mythology. Alexander is described as two horned because, at least according to at-Tabbari, he went from one end of the world, in the west, to the other end, in the east. The word karn means horn, and the extremities of the world are called ''horns" [p. 57n3].


Islamic eschatology knows ten signs which portend the Last Day, the so-called 'signs of the Hour'. They are:
the coming out of the descendants of Asfar
the coming of the Mahdi [Sunni & Shia differ on his identity/role]
the coming of the dajjal [a figure in Islamic theology homologous with Christianity’s Antichrist]
the descent of 'Isa b. Maryam [Jesus]
the rising of the sun in the West
the coming forth of Gog and Magog
the beast coming out of the earth
the assumption of the Koran into heaven
the smoke
the burning of fire from Yemen, or, the subsiding of the earth. [p.78]


In Arabic sources the name Turk is often said to derive from turika "to be left behind", the passive form of taraka. Originally, it is said, Gog and Magog were 24 or 22 peoples, or, according to Wahb b. Munabbih and Muqatil b. Sulayman 21 peoples. When 'the two-horned one' locked them up behind the barrier, one people were lift behind (turika) because they were absent on a raid, or, according to a less anti-turkish approach, they were left out because they believed in God. On the authority of al-Suddi, Ibn Mardawayh reports that the Turks are a contingent of Gog and Magog who broke out alternately. They had gone out on a raid andthus remained 'on this (i.e. the Arab) side' of the barrier. [p. 83-4]


Mirkhwand and Khwandamir apparently also reckon Gog and Magog among the human beings. They both remark that one of their abominable customs is to devour the body of someone who dies among them. On the other hand, they also write that Gog and Magog cannot be considered as human beings for they have neither law nor religion, do know neither God nor man, and live like animals. For Ibn Khaldun, Gog and Magog are not only human beings, they are also “white”:

The inhabitants of the North are not called by their colour, because the people who established the conventional meanings of words [to them] were themselves white. Therefore the inhabitants of the North, the Turks, the Slavs, the Toghuzghuz, the Khazars, the Alans, most of the Western Christians, Gog and Magog, are found to be separate
nations and numerous races called by a variety of names. [p. 108]



Weapon Systems and Political Stability: A History ( http://www.amazon.com/Weapons-Systems-Political-Stability-Carroll/dp/081912947X)
Written in the neo/functionalist style of American sociology of the 70s and 80s (I often got the impression that I was reading something written by Pitrim Sorokin or Talcott Parsons) the book offers a number of fascinating affinities/suggestions into the relationship between modes of warfare and political institutions/regime types. Personally, I don’t find the approach wholly convincing. The Weberian breadth of historical exposition often clouds whatever point is being made or pursued. The generational or cyclical approach to politics and warfare is as flawed as the 4GW spiel. The belief, the evidence I’m afraid just doesn’t hold up for it to be anything more, that large numbers of infantry / infantry warfare coincides with democracy and democratic polities too often for the relationship to not be causal still begs the question of what, if any, relationship there is. The Spartan regime was authoritarian/monarchical and its armed forces were based on infantry contrary to Quigley’s assertions. All armies in the First World War were dominated by infantry but not all regimes were democratic thereby. Quigley sketches out the argument that military specialists cause/result from oligarchic/managerial regimes but, due to his unfortunate death, he never explains this more fully. Indeed, my comments may be unduly harsh as the work was never a completed manuscript but published from the authors notes posthumously. However, it does contain some very interesting observations that got me thinking about other things differently. In fact the recent enthusiasm for drones and other remotely piloted death-dealers can be seen as a managerial policy designed to remove one of the Clausewitzian tripods (the “People”) from the decision-making process (by removing the threat of the death of soldiers (drawn from the People) thus enabling a managerial bureaucratic style of war making that favours a technocratic elite.




Early Riders: The beginnings of mounted warfare in Asia and Europe ( http://www.amazon.com/Early-Riders-Beginnings-Mounted-Warfare/dp/0415486807)

Although debate continues about the beginnings of pastoral nomadism in the Eurasian steppe, since M.P.Gryaznov first argued the case most steppe archaeologists and prehistorians have been persuaded that it was some time after 1000 BC that a fully nomadic way of life began on the steppe, and that by the end of the eighth century permanent villages had all but disappeared. Because nomadic societies in later periods depended heavily on horseback riding, it is a reasonable assumption that the early nomads too were riders. Why the steppe dwellers abandoned their villages and became nomads is of course disputed. Anatoly Khazanov proposed that a climate shift ca. 1000 BC was responsible: as rainfall declined the steppe dwellers were forced to move their animals through an annual circuit, many hundreds of miles long, of seasonal pasturages. Another possibility (and I think a more likely one) is that a sudden improvement in horsemanship—and the consequent ability to handle a weapon while on horseback—was itself the main motivation for nomadic life. Good riding may have made it relatively easy for “poachers” or “rustlers” to drive off the cattle and sheep that lone herdsmen from the settlements had traditionally taken into the steppe. In that case, to protect their herds the settlement communities may perforce have turned to full nomadism.[p. 63]

[Tukhachevskii]

Death by Theory: A Tale of Mystery and Archaeological Theory, Rev. Ed. ( http://www.amazon.com/Death-Theory-Tale-Mystery-Archaeological/dp/0759119589)
An effective, if sometimes simplistic, introductory text exploring the different theoretical approaches to archaeology through narrative. The slant is very American centred though.

“[...]Events have proximate causes as well as structural ones. Agency theory helps us remember that things happen by people taking action.’’
‘‘Hmm. I see what you mean,’’ said Terry. ‘‘Change can happen when individuals act in weird, idiosyncratic ways, not just how their culture expects them to. But you can take it too far. Old Thomas Carlyle actually believed that ‘history is the story of great men.’ Meaning that what we call history is just the result of conscious decisions made by a few powerful individuals. Men, of course. What an elitist bozo.’’
‘‘OK, but on the other extreme are the determinists. To them history is a matter of huge forces working on each other. The way Dr. Green puts it, a theory’s useful ’cause it helps us understand why things are the way they are. But some of these models fit one situation better than another. Neoevolutionism is about the adaptive qualities of behaviour—but that’s only one reason why things happen, and a long-term, large-scale reason, too. It’s like trying to explain ‘why’ my car is running. I could say it’s because of the way air and gasoline molecules interact. Or because I turned the key. Or because I want to drive home to feed the cat. They’re all right, and none is more right than any of the others.
‘‘In evolutionary terms, religion is just a system that encourages stability and long-term reproductive success for the group. That’s true, and it’s useful to know. But it doesn’t tell you why individual people actually do religion or what it means to them. Theorists come up with generalizations about how societies work. And while they can show us the ultimate outcomes of behaviour, they may not be at all useful in understanding life as people live it. Getting at the root cause of something makes any other explanation seem somehow trivial. Like foam on the top of a wave. Until you realize that the foam is everyday life. And that although evolutionary forces are manipulating us at some deep level, people can and do affect the course of their own histories. Without agency, it’s all pattern and no people.’’
‘‘That’s a catchy phrase,’’ said Alasdair. ‘‘But the whole point of evolution is that the people who have the most efficient adaptation win the prize. That is, they get to replace whatever less efficient group came before them.’’
‘‘Humph, Al’s had a brain freeze. Must be the weather.’’ Dave took another sip from his hip flask.[p. 142]



The Most Learned of the Shi'a: The Institution of the Marja’ Taqlid ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Most-Learned-Shi%60-ebook/dp/B001V5JFHC)
Unfortunately the book was not an in depth discussion into the role, function, origin and power of the Marja’ but rather a collection of articles on various themes in Shia’ history. These articles, though interesting in and of themselves (esp. 2, 6, 11, 13), do not make up for the lack of a central guiding theme with which to tie them together. Another case of academic back scratching; publishing a book containing articles that either no-one else wanted to publish or just happened to be lying around and would look good on their CVs. Said Arjomand’s ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Amir_Arjomand) work , IMO, remains one of the first stops for serious examination of matters clerical and theological in twelver Shi’ism.

[Tukhachevskii]

Infantry Combat: The Rifle Platoon (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Infantry-Combat-Interactive-Small-unit-Leadership/dp/089141536X)
Well I am disappointed to say the least. Regardless of the choices one makes the character then goes and does things you had no intention of doing. For example, early on I noticed that there was high ground on my northern and eastern flanks but only later, after I had chosen my course of action was I given the option of sending out patrols. Secondly, I was not, during this phase at least, given the option of ensuring that my sections and fireteams had mutually supporting positions and fields of fire (I assumed that was given, I now realise I am an ass for assuming that!). Thirdly, no options were given for the placing of mines in relation to avenues of approach or obstacles (which the protagonist Lt. Davis placed at his own leisure). I could go on. Infuriating. One such debacle is followed by a disquisition by Antal on

1. how I should never have chosen to mount a forward slope defence of the wadi (which I didn’t!),

2. on how I should have spread apart my high value weapons to prevent them being destroyed (an option I wasn’t given!),

3.should have conducted active security patrols (which I did only after the position had been established by Davis and not before! Again no option given. )

4. and how I should have used obstacles and mines to cover dead ground, defiles and avenues of approach (over which I had no control given that Antal/Davis placed them where THEY thought they would be most effective thereby undermining the whole point of the exercise).

You get the picture. I know I’m being bitter but I can accept mistakes of my own making, but I won’t be blamed for Davis’ mistakes especially when the option I have chosen is not quite/or never the one Davis/Antal executes. I will persevere though, don’t get me wrong, I’m learning a lot especially about Antal (I think his tacit presupposition is that there is a text book answer regardless of his protestations to the contrary). I wish I had not bought this (or, for that matter, Armour Attacks (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Armor-Attacks-Interactive-Small-unit-Leadership/dp/0891413839/ref=pd_sim_b_1) and Company Team (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Combat-Team-Captains-Interactive-Exercise/dp/0891416358/ref=pd_sim_b_2)) before taking them out on loan from the library. I could have requested a copy ordered through my local library but, given my skin tone, I was afraid that “the filth” would be knocking on my door wondering what a manual labourer with my skin tone (and a previous trip to Yemen to boot) was doing ordering the thing. We live and learn. We live and learn. I computer game version of this might be better if ALL the decisions can be taken by the player.


However, all is not doom and gloom, I also bought a copy of The Longest Night (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Longest-Night-EICHER-DAVID-J/dp/0684849453/ref=sr_1_12?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1356895883&sr=1-12), which as far as I have read is excellent. And also The Ship who Sang (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ship-Who-Sang-Anne-McCaffrey/dp/0552091154/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1356895914&sr=1-1) and The Lost Fleet: Dauntless (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Lost-Fleet-Dauntless-Book/dp/0857681303/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1356895937&sr=1-1). Both of which are excellent. The latter especially so for it’s extremely realistic (if that’s the word) depiction of what space warfare would resemble. Can’t wait to get the entire Lost Fleet series.

I also got the complete collection of the adventures of Jeeves and Wooster (http://uk.imdb.com/title/tt0098833/) (thanks Mum!) but that’s by the by.

Toodle pip chums.

Happy New Year to you all.

[Tukhachevskii]

Infantry Combat: The Rifle Platoon (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Infantry-Combat-Interactive-Small-unit-Leadership/dp/089141536X)
Well I am disappointed to say the least. Regardless of the choices one makes the character then goes and does things you had no intention of doing. For example, early on I noticed that there was high ground on my northern and eastern flanks but only later, after I had chosen my course of action was I given the option of sending out patrols. Secondly, I was not, during this phase at least, given the option of ensuring that my sections and fireteams had mutually supporting positions and fields of fire (I assumed that was given, I now realise I am an ass for assuming that!). Thirdly, no options were given for the placing of mines in relation to avenues of approach or obstacles (which the protagonist Lt. Davis placed at his own leisure). I could go on. Infuriating. One such debacle is followed by a disquisition by Antal on

1. how I should never have chosen to mount a forward slope defence of the wadi (which I didn’t!),

2. on how I should have spread apart my high value weapons to prevent them being destroyed (an option I wasn’t given!),

3.should have conducted active security patrols (which I did only after the position had been established by Davis and not before! Again no option given. )

4. and how I should have used obstacles and mines to cover dead ground, defiles and avenues of approach (over which I had no control given that Antal/Davis placed them where THEY thought they would be most effective thereby undermining the whole point of the exercise).

You get the picture. I know I’m being bitter but I can accept mistakes of my own making, but I won’t be blamed for Davis’ mistakes especially when the option I have chosen is not quite/or never the one Davis/Antal executes. I will persevere though, don’t get me wrong, I’m learning a lot especially about Antal (I think his tacit presupposition is that there is a text book answer regardless of his protestations to the contrary). I wish I had not bought this (or, for that matter, Armour Attacks (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Armor-Attacks-Interactive-Small-unit-Leadership/dp/0891413839/ref=pd_sim_b_1) and Company Team (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Combat-Team-Captains-Interactive-Exercise/dp/0891416358/ref=pd_sim_b_2)) before taking them out on loan from the library. I could have requested a copy ordered through my local library but, given my skin tone, I was afraid that “the filth” would be knocking on my door wondering what a manual labourer with my skin tone (and a previous trip to Yemen to boot) was doing ordering the thing. We live and learn. We live and learn. I computer game version of this might be better if ALL the decisions can be taken by the player.


However, all is not doom and gloom, I also bought a copy of The Longest Night (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Longest-Night-EICHER-DAVID-J/dp/0684849453/ref=sr_1_12?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1356895883&sr=1-12), which as far as I have read is excellent. And also The Ship who Sang (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ship-Who-Sang-Anne-McCaffrey/dp/0552091154/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1356895914&sr=1-1) and The Lost Fleet: Dauntless (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Lost-Fleet-Dauntless-Book/dp/0857681303/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1356895937&sr=1-1). Both of which are excellent. The latter especially so for it’s extremely realistic (if that’s the word) depiction of what space warfare would resemble. Can’t wait to get the entire Lost Fleet series.

I also got the complete collection of the adventures of Jeeves and Wooster (http://uk.imdb.com/title/tt0098833/) (thanks Mum!) but that’s by the by.

Toodle pip chums.

Happy New Year to you all.


Update: have successfully completed mission after a marathon 24 sinceposting the above. I enjoyed learning through my failures!

[Bill Moore]

Just finished the The Fifty-Year Wound, How America's Cold War Victory Shapes Our World. By Derek Leebaert

I think the review provided by Joseph Nye on the cover captured my thoughts on this book perfectly, "Read this book. You will, encounter questions worth pondering, as we enter another long struggle."

The author wrote, "The first justification of any war is that even its horrors are the lesser evil."

The author was rightfully very critical of the CIA's poor performance throughout the war, and in his view their continued incompetence. He cites repeated operations failures and worse signficant intelligence failures throughout the many decades they attempted to gain intelligence on the USSR. According to the author, President Reagan over 8 years only received briefings from the CIA three times due to his low confidence in their work.

Some may be surprised the author suggests both Ike and Reagan were the key architects of the Cold War victory. Very insightful read at many levels.

[davidbfpo]

Moderator at work

New thread created to enable easier searching, so now split into years, started with 2007.