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jcustis
04-29-2013, 02:52 AM
Post up your top five lessons that you hope are gleaned from our long stay in AFG. Whether we have the capacity to grasp the lesson is important, but not critical.

In no particular order, mine are:

1) The national policy goals should be clear and concise, and the integrated plan to achieve them must be properly resourced. Make sure everyone understands the goals and the plan.

2) We can't expect a tribal society to drink the democratic Kool-Aid just because we say so. The manner in which Karzai controlled the levers to choose provincial governors, and they in turn the district governors and the police chiefs, should have been a warning that our wants did not nest with reality. Those who benefit from his patronage won't be there to protect him when Karzai is strung up in a Kabul square.

3) The FOB concept was another massive failure, considering the need to secure the population and obvious approaches that work.

4) When the security forces you are training start turning on you, it is a clue. Pay attention and don't blame the victims.

5) Our disregard for the nexus of drugs, narco-warlords, and the Taliban connection, prolonged the war. Good men died because possession of ten kilos of heroin didn't warrant action by the toothless courts, among other rule of law shortcomings.

The bonus lesson is that we should have lived intermingled with the population. No commuting to work...no return to the COP at night for hot chow and a cot. If we really want to deal with rural insurgency, we've got to own it, every minute of every hour of every day. The insurgents do, and that's why they will prevail.

slapout9
04-30-2013, 06:01 AM
William S. Lind in his article "4GW First Blow A Quick Look"(available in Marine Corps Gazette Archive" thought that a Nuclear Retaliation was a viable option in the first few days after the 911 attacks to show the little terrorist how a true Super Power would respond.

I don't know if we should do this but it is worth a second look. We cannot keep spending what may amount to 3 Trillion dollars(A'stan and Iraq and GWOT) for Small Wars that we don't even win.

Bill Moore
04-30-2013, 06:33 AM
Post up your top five lessons that you hope are gleaned from our long stay in AFG. Whether we have the capacity to grasp the lesson is important, but not critical.

In no particular order, mine are:

1) The national policy goals should be clear and concise, and the integrated plan to achieve them must be properly resourced. Make sure everyone understands the goals and the plan.

2) We can't expect a tribal society to drink the democratic Kool-Aid just because we say so. The manner in which Karzai controlled the levers to choose provincial governors, and they in turn the district governors and the police chiefs, should have been a warning that our wants did not nest with reality. Those who benefit from his patronage won't be there to protect him when Karzai is strung up in a Kabul square.

3) The FOB concept was another massive failure, considering the need to secure the population and obvious approaches that work.

4) When the security forces you are training start turning on you, it is a clue. Pay attention and don't blame the victims.

5) Our disregard for the nexus of drugs, narco-warlords, and the Taliban connection, prolonged the war. Good men died because possession of ten kilos of heroin didn't warrant action by the toothless courts, among other rule of law shortcomings.

The bonus lesson is that we should have lived intermingled with the population. No commuting to work...no return to the COP at night for hot chow and a cot. If we really want to deal with rural insurgency, we've got to own it, every minute of every hour of every day. The insurgents do, and that's why they will prevail.

I need more time to reflect on this, but I thought the Army's white paper on the lessons learned over the past decade was way off the mark and mostly a self-serving paper to justify the Army's current vision. I have some initial thoughts on your comments.

1. National goals must be practical, thus feasible. It is much better to under promise and over deliver, then over promise and under deliver. We achieved a lot in Afghanistan in short order, but my staying to achieve the unachievable it now appears to be loss.

2. Most unconventional warfare adventures and military occupations result in failure because we pick and buy the easiest proxies to work with, not the best proxies, which generally over time backfires. The he's a bastard, but he's our bastard whether Karzai, the Shah of Iran, or the Contras may sound like realpolitik, but when you look at the long data it tells a different story.

3. While U.S. forces may not be welcomed in the local villages, the FOB concept is flawed. I suspect we would see a different situation today if we picked another horse other than Karzai to ride AND we employed better tactics such as implementing something along the VSO program early in the war, and using general purpose forces to aggressively and persistently patrol the areas between the villages. Taking and holding (controlling) ground is as important as it always was. The enemy needs a degree of freedom of movement to operate, if you control the ground (and you don't from a FOB) you greatly reduce his effectiveness, especially if the VSO program is flushing out the shadow governments. While we evolved our UAV and man hunting tactics to a razor's edge, they ultimately failed to facilitate anything resembling a decisive tactical operation.

jcustis
05-01-2013, 06:11 AM
Not employing a village-based focus could have made it into my top five very easily. I could see the issue with that the day I started formal prep for my deploy there.

I knew we were screwed the first time I got the sense that VSO was not considered in the capability set of general purpose forces. Yeah, great strategy implementation on that one...:rolleyes:

Chris jM
05-01-2013, 10:25 AM
Without any great depth of thought or reflection, the few that jumped into my head:

1) Vehicles are a means to an end, and should not become the end itself. There is a time and place for vehicle-based patrolling, but I am willing to bet that there is a proportionally greater need for dismounted patrolling in any type of operation. If we spend more time, effort and focus, both at the tactical/planning level and at the capability level (MRAPs?) on issues of vehicle platforms we need to do a reality check.

2) Tactical lethality at the section/squad level matters. Our sections/squads should be able to finish a fight, not just suppress. Artillery is nice, air support is nicer still, but we shouldn't have to rely on it to win an engagement. Sections and squads need to be able to do more than just suppress with small arms, they need to be able to fire and manoeuvre to win. I think the USMC has taken a step in the right direction with the IAR and the Brit Army an even better step with their 7.62mm DMW in putting a precise, powerful rifle at the lowest tactical level. I'm interested as to what the XM25 offers, too (despite my initial cynicism around such a heavy, power and tech intensive weapon).

3) Speaking the local language is very, very important. I don't think this is COIN specific, as I'm pretty sure the ability to talk with, gain info from and quickly direct locals would be equally important in a Cold War German battlefield, for example.

4) Campaign planning is essential. Killcullen's 28 principles of COIN does not equate to a campaign plan, despite the widespread interpretation of FM 3-24 in many military minds. Being able to drag an end-state out of anyone, at any time, that relates to the real world (and not a powerpoint matrix as is all too often the case) is the starting point for assessing whether a campaign plan exists.

5) Leadership is still about people. Powerpoint can't replace an orders group, an inspection or a CO's/OC's/Pl Comd's hour with soldiers.

Red Rat
05-02-2013, 05:42 PM
1) An insurgency is a political problem with a military dimension, treat it as such; understand the politics of the problem in order to understand the politics of the solution.

2) Set domestic conditions early for a long commitment. COIN takes time, nation building takes longer.

3) Build the police and judicial system first or at least concurrent with indigenous military capacity.

4) In a failed state establishing a government with no capacity to govern is not necessarily a good idea. A government with no civil service and no educated middle class to become a civil service is a government in name only, then giving it autonomy but no capacity is inviting failure.

5) Controlling the population is as important as securing the population.

Steve Blair
05-02-2013, 11:08 PM
Nothing we shouldn't have learned from Vietnam, IMO. Or any number of other places. Sadly, I have great faith in the institution's ability to learn exactly nothing lasting from all this (except perhaps the desire to plan for fantasy war).

Sorry if that sounds cynical, but just about everything listed here could have been gleaned from a good review of stuff that came out during and immediately after Vietnam. Or a close reading of the original Small Wars Manual.

As for using nukes...there are other consequences far beyond just the desire to use the big one. I don't consider that a viable option in situations like this...no matter how much Lind may think they're useful.

jcustis
05-03-2013, 02:57 AM
2) Set domestic conditions early for a long commitment. COIN takes time, nation building takes longer.

I like this point, and yes, expectations need to be set early, vice trying to manage them later when support, patience, and endurance wanes.

Where again did we turn the corner towards nation-building in AFG? Was it a creep or a sharper turn, because I cannot put my finger on it.

Firn
05-03-2013, 06:44 AM
Some quick opinions from an economic and political point of view, Red Rat did anticipate me somewhat:

1) War is still the continuation of politics with the 'intermixation' of military means. The will of the populations, the internal political games by the various actors at home and in the host nation and so forth all play a role.

2) In COIN political and economic and many other non-military means are of considerable importantance but often outside of the direct political control or even influence of the foreign nation. It can be much harder to get a specific job done at all, not to talk about getting it done efficiently. Friction is very high. Once again circumstances matter.

3) The specific political goals set by the political actors, in this case by the foreign nation should of course be determined by the (ultimate) political purpose. The resulting strategy will include in case of war those military means. Shifting the political goals, in this case seemingly from a good beating to nation-building, might not match the long-term political purpose and will of course force big shifts down the command chain and lots of different ressources.

4) Economic, political and social development in the host or occupied nation depends a great deal on the set of circumstances at the start. Simply pumping in money is generally highly inefficient or even counter-productive as it sets the wrong incentives. Amazingly macro 101 gets often ignored and in the case of a big wealthy nation just more money gets thrown at the problem (Karzai ;)) instead.

5) Not reaching ambitious political goals in a foreign land far away does of course hurt and will have negative consequences but for the big wealthy nation it is nothing vital. Think about potential positive effects, fewer arguments for Tsarnaevs, but especially about opportunity costs and sunk ones. Life will go mostly on as normal (as if it didn't already during the war), sadly not for those who suffered big physical and mental wounds in the war. For pretty much all the rest of the guys at home little will be changed.


*Almost ten years ago I could not believe that a Foreign Policy article (IIRC) did rather favourably compare the chances of nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan to the ones in Germany and Japan after the war. The author had clearly no clue of economics. Especially in Germany a lot of technology, human and physical capital was ready to get kickstarted or better to act alone if not suppressed too much. Letting the economic engine get running again was actually are rather easy job compared to building an new working one from the scratch. The political and social foundations were also completely different.

Red Rat
05-03-2013, 12:02 PM
Where again did we turn the corner towards nation-building in AFG? Was it a creep or a sharper turn, because I cannot put my finger on it.

If I remember rightly the initial 2001 Bonn Agreement (http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm) was setting the course towards nation-building, reinforced by the long term approach adopted in the 2002 Tokyo Donor's Conference (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_14/iss_1/caj_vol14.1_06_e.pdf). Certainly at the beginning of the UK's involvement there was widespread recognition that the UK would be involved for something like 25 years in order to achieve a degree of capacity building. Then as security conditions worsened long-term capacity building appeared to have been increasingly shelved in favour of short-term mitigation measures; we went from a rehabilitation programme to sticking plasters on the patient.

So to answer the question I think we turned the corner away from nation building and that this happened incrementally over the period 2006-9.

jcustis
05-03-2013, 01:51 PM
That is an amazingly interesting perspective.

I will bone up on those events and agreements you have referenced. I believe we will require a brutally-honest and transparent post-mortem of the train wreck if we are to pay any honest respect to the dead. I want the responsible actors to be accountable and the history to remain clear.

Firn
05-03-2013, 02:08 PM
@Red Rat: I guess you are right. It is important to remember how quickly the enemy has been 'defeated' and a good deal of the beating was given. The policy makers seemed to have turned quickly to nation-building, stating so much in it the Bonn agreement in December 2011.

Now paper is patient as the Germans say and between the saying and the doing lies the sea we Italians all too often state. The big questions are:

1) How shovel ready were the important political and economic projects. Were there enough of them?

2) How much mental effort and ressources were available and were directed towards them?

3) How smartly and efficently were those projects put into practice?

It would be nice to see for example the scorecard of basic physical infrastructure (streets, grids, water, ITC,...) created in the first years in Afghanistan after 9/11. At least that should be relatively easy to evaluate in an objective way.

Madhu
05-03-2013, 02:32 PM
Because it was felt early on that "Rumsfeldian transformation" had worked so quickly and brilliantly at toppling the Taliban without the dreaded mass (which, to be fair, was seen as exacerbating Afghan sensibilities, too many troops I mean), attention was turned almost immediately to peace time activities. And, of course, to Iraq.

NATO thought it had got a peacetime nation building activity, so the reliance on 90s era lessons learned, as in "capacity building". But violence didn't stay down so building could not be done. The violence precluded nation building activities so of course one turned away, except, we didn't really, we just added violence to the mix: FM3-24.

Posted at SWJ earlier in the blog section was a piece by the Afghan Analysts Network entitled "Snapshots". From that piece:


2002-2003: Despite some on-going fighting in the Southern part of the country, the resistance was basically deemed to have ended and many countries were not sure of the utility of further international forces.

As the building went on, and attention turned elsewhere, the old neighboring regional and local compulsions slowly re-emerged and the 2009 surge only made the desire to hold onto gains that much stronger by all local and regional partners and adversaries, the entire mad mix of players, good and bad depending on one's point of view.

It is curious. A global war on terror was envisioned but almost no thought was given to the reasons for disorder spilling onto American shores from the region other than, "we need stability." This goes for both Administrations, Bush and Obama, and is embedded in both approaches, the Rumsfeldian and the AfPak strategy. NATO leadership had the same ideas.

That is why I keep asking people to review the history of the American military and its Nato partners in the region going back to the early days of the Cold War. We've been here before when it comes to creating or sustaining armies/intelligence and expecting it all to fit into our larger security paradigms. The late Lt. Col Nathaniel Hoskot is the name to look up on our early involvement in the region and its intellectual residues within the military, etc.

PS: On a certain level, FM 3-24 was simply the militarized version of the basic 2002-2003 understanding and phenomenon of capacity building and stability as a source of security in the region.

I don't know why the idea of capacity building as a deterrent to violence remains so embedded within the institutional mindset. The evidence in Afghanistan doesn't support the conclusion.

Steve Blair
05-03-2013, 02:40 PM
That is an amazingly interesting perspective.

I will bone up on those events and agreements you have referenced. I believe we will require a brutally-honest and transparent post-mortem of the train wreck if we are to pay any honest respect to the dead. I want the responsible actors to be accountable and the history to remain clear.

Agree 100%.

Firn
05-03-2013, 02:50 PM
Because it was felt early on that "Rumsfeldian transformation" had worked so quickly and brilliantly at toppling the Taliban without the dreaded mass (which, to be fair, was seen as exacerbating Afghan sensibilities, too many troops I mean), attention was turned almost immediately to peace time activities. And, of course, to Iraq.

NATO thought it had got a peacetime nation building activity, so the reliance on 90s era lessons learned, as in "capacity building". But violence didn't stay down so building could not be done.
.

I wonder if the economic emphasis on small government played a role in the lack of quick direct investments in big and small infrastructure. Basically let us first set the proper liberal market and political framework in place to then allow the Afghani economy to flourish. Correct me if I'm wrong on the 'lack' of said investment.

Figuratively spoken, employing quickly hundred thousends of Afghan men with shovels in relative sensible way for a very low wage for American standards on things like road work might have very efficient for the Western taxpayers if nation-building was it indeed. Maybe many thought there was a good amount of time as the peace was secured, so one had not to hurry to get such things underway. I certainly don't know...

Madhu
05-03-2013, 02:52 PM
You cannot divorce these lessons from the larger regional competitions. We turned away from nation building because violence increased and it increased for a complicated reasons.

We mistook the idea that our original victory was in any way durable. And a 25 year time span is nonsensical. I'm sorry I'm so adamant on this point but this is the source of so many troubles in Afghanistan and the larger neighborhood; the idea that others won't react to our long term plans because they conflict with local and regional plans.

If this is the lesson learned, that we turned away from nation building and that is the source of our troubles, then I am very afraid the lessons will not help.

Again, sorry to be so troublesome on the matter but it really requires a broader lens.

Madhu
05-03-2013, 02:55 PM
That's an interesting thought. I don't know. Maybe I'm wrong and it requires both a broad and very detailed lens so this is exactly the conversation that needs to take place?

omarali50
05-03-2013, 04:12 PM
Just a few of quick points:
1. Too many people underestimate how good a system "western democracy" is..for any country.
2. But its not black or white. You can (and will) have modern democracy with many many shortcomings for a very long time...in any country. But especially in poor countries where many of its modern institutions and traditions are imported and not organically developed in-situ...but even so, it can work.
3. US policy makers seem to have tried a "worst of both worlds" approach. Cynically manipulate, bribe, kill etc..and dont do it with enough intelligence to make it work.
4. That's a case by case judgement. In the best case, the people running the intervention have to be exceptional...in many cases, one exceptional person is the key. But the US is not an ancient imperial power with personalized leadership and informal networks..its a very bureaucratic modern state. That makes one think it shouldn't have tried what its institutions are not designed to do well. But there are second best options it could still have tried. Hell, it could try them even now.
5. The perfect is the enemy of the good.
6. Afghanistan is a viable country. It is even a viable democracy, but with Afghan characteristics (which may be far from Nebraska norms..but that's their problem, why should everything be America's problem?). But it was not (and is not) going to work if the hardcore Taliban are brought into it. At the same time, keeping them out is primarily an Afghan problem. WITH American help and intelligent use of its absolutely stunning technological superiority there is no reason why an American Najibullah could not beat them back for good. Even now.
7. Underestimating the hardcore enemy and having no clear mission proved costly. Were whatever "real" aims the US had in Afghanistan too base to be publicly admitted? if so, its good the US failed. If not, why the lack of clarity? It reflects poorly on US bureaucratic decision making either way.
8. In the proverbial long run, the hardcore Taliban are just a tool and not one that will last forever or work too well. If not the US, then China, or Russia or Iran or India..someone will help other Afghans cook their primitive goose. Their more modern backers, cough cough, were a different issue. They could have been convinced to let them go if the "convincers" were surer of their own ground (I am not convinced of the theory that the convincers have secret malevolent intentions that are very different from what "we" are being told...I think if they were that kind of evil genius, we wouldnt be having this discussion...but then again, how would I know?).

TheCurmudgeon
05-05-2013, 02:33 PM
These are a few thoughts, not five yet, still thinking about it. I look at these as root issues: what caused us to approach the problem, and therefore develop a solution, the wrong way. Unfortunately I see them more as lessons we should have learned, but didn't.

1. Values are not universal, they are conditional. To steal a quote from Fredrick Engles: "the simple fact, hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion..." Or, looked at another way, people value survival and identity more than freedom and liberty when survival is the more pressing need. The neocons assumed that everyone love freedom above all else, and therefore would swarm to democracy. This was an error. Unfortunately it is an error shared by many in the west. Look at the difference between the UN's declaration of "Universal " human rights and the African Union's declaration and you will see significant differences. As long as we believe that everyone is (or at least wants to be) like us we will continue to intervene to fix problems we don't understand.

2. Political legitimacy and coercion are not the same. Here I must define my terms. Political legitimacy is "precisely the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that those commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed in some sense to have moral authority, because the subjects believe they ought to be obeyed" (Barker). Notice the quote, "not out of fear or self-interest". The threat of punishment or the offer of benefit constitute coercion. So, using the offer of new roads or hospitals or even economic reward does not make your government legitimate. It is a form of coercion that lasts only as long as the goods keep coming. Legitimacy is following the edicts of the government because you believe they are right: that they match you moral beliefs and values. You cannot create political legitimacy using either threat or benefit. You can control a population using threat or benefit: using coercion. Just don't confuse the two.

3. The idea of a State or Nation is not universal. In fact, the idea of a "Nation" is a foreign concept in many parts of the world. In remote areas government authority only extends to the edge of the valley or this side of the river. Government - or political leadership - is a very local concept. The idea of being part of a "state" is not real. It is an illusion westerners created and imposed on the rest of the world to make it easier for us to understand and work with, not easier for the indigenous population to work with.

4. Nation Building and Social Engineering are not the same thing. Even assuming the population sees itself as part of a "Nation" it does not mean that they are socially ready to work within it. When you are trying to take a society that is deeply religious and turn it secular you are not Nation Building, you are trying to alter the cultural make-up of the society. This is infinitely more difficult that simple Nation Building.

I am still working on five.

jcustis
05-05-2013, 03:43 PM
Great replies, all of you.

Madhu and Curmudgeon, you've raised the discourse to a macro view, which is refreshing to see considering that I am degreed in Political Science.

Your thoughts could very easily expand into an excellent Foreign Affairs article, and I would enjoy reading it. The point that nation-building is seen as sovereignty-building in the region is a very astute one.

One quick question I want to toss out is if We agree that Red Rat has identified how we got our butts into nation/capacity-building, is there a bread crumb or two that speaks to when we stepped off that path?

I never noticed a shift because I was prepping for my Afghan deploy in 2009 and into 2010 (having finished an Iraq deploy in April '09), and FM 3-24 remained a bible we were leaning on. The notion of the PRT somehow holding the key to the lock box of answers was rampant to the point of a farce by the time I saw the PRT's shoddy work.

I appreciate the thoughts folks because this is important stuff. As I mentioned earlier, history needs to hold people accountable. More importantly, my personal skin in this game comes when one of my grandchildren asks me what Afghanistan was like. I want to know the reality of how it went down, outside of my valley, so I can tell them the truth. I imagine Cole (Infanteer) has the same desire.

jcustis
05-05-2013, 04:01 PM
The Cato Institute's Malou Innocent wrote a piece I read a short time ago, and its chidings form part of a lesson that undoubtedly ranks in my top ten. It falls in line with the idea that our views are rarely universal:

We had no business trying to transform women's rights in Afghanistan. We really, really screwed it up when we added do-goodery to what should have been a straightforward endeavour. Women's right are a morally noble idea to promote and protect, but there were already a ton of other things we couldn't do right. Our behavior in this regard actually aggravated tensions.

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/02/why-u-s-cant-deliver-womens-rights-to-afghanistan/

The subject of the photo used for the piece will haunt my memory for quite some time.

I am actually fairly pissed off that for all of our cultural awareness training, and the snake oil salesmen who have somehow embedded themselves in our warfighting functions via contracts to provide cultural advice and education, we screwed it up with the women's rights angle. I think the FETs were a mistake (despite how hard we want to believe they had value), efforts to try and promote women's community councils/groups were a worse fantasy, and we should have known better. I know the goals were often more Killcullenish and aimed at getting at the young males through their mothers, but I believe it inflamed tensions more than it provided benefit.

davidbfpo
05-05-2013, 04:03 PM
I never noticed a shift because I was prepping for my Afghan deploy in 2009 and into 2010 (having finished an Iraq deploy in April '09), and FM 3-24 remained a bible we were leaning on. The notion of the PRT somehow holding the key to the lock box of answers was rampant to the point of a farce by the time I saw the PRT's shoddy work.

Jon,

I am still working on my reflections from a faraway armchair, but this passage caught my attention.

My own reading on the PRT theme was in the earlier years and a couple of encounters with those who had been involved later on. Alongside more reading on the role of the Political Officer along the Durand Line, in the British Imperial era.

Was Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) a far more acceptable label and concept for the Afghans and those who were in the audience back home? At the start of our intervention, which was overwhelmingly coercive, Afghanistan had some limited governance at provincial level and almost none at the national level. The PRT's role was really to act as political officers, with a tiny non-military component, a small protective detail, some good comms and a bag full of cash.

It was clear by 2005 and certainly by 2006 that the level of violence within Afghanistan meant neither the political or reconstruction role was working. I recall one PRT rarely left its own base and relied on non-Afghans for security.

The British PRT which moved from the north (Mazar-i-Sharif IIRC) to Helmand, growing in size with larger civil staff (DFID, FCO, SOCA etc), then was reported to embark on projects that stretched credulity - a children's playground, with a ferris wheel comes to mind - and distributing ammonium nitrate fertiliser, in the chemical composition to make IEDs! Shoddy became dangerous.

jcustis
05-05-2013, 04:21 PM
While I cannot speak for the Afghans of Helmand and what they think per se, I cannot imagine they cared what the label was. As you mentioned, the fistfuls of cash were what mattered, and the ever opportunistic Afghans played the PRT for every cent it cared to disburse.

When the tell-all books start coming out because the generals have time to write, one of the recurring themes is sure to be the degree of outright contempt that they held for the British PRT and the female (was she Irish?) leader.

If there was ever a case study for the civil-military divide, and why sometimes the two should simply not mix, Helmand will be held up as the example. It's a shame too, because we should have learned and retained the lessons from Somalia, where the disconnect between civ-mil and the gulf between respective operations became glaringly apparent and the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) first came into collective use.

ganulv
05-05-2013, 07:43 PM
There was an NPR piece on PRTs in Afghanistan last month [LINK (http://www.npr.org/2013/04/07/176482780/revisiting-afghanistans-reconstruction-teams)].

From the transcript:


Weekend Edition Sunday host Rachel Martin talks to Kael Weston about the closing of the first Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan. PRTs are humanitarian missions run by military troops and civilians that built roads and schools. Weston spent seven years as a diplomat for the State Department, and says the teams have a mixed legacy.

Bob's World
05-06-2013, 01:47 PM
Every "lesson learned" I have seen so far coming out of our involvement in this conflict has been extremely tactical in nature. "How do we do the wrong thing better."

The lessons not learned, however, are:

1. Punitive Expeditions work.

2. "King Making" has been obsolete for at least 100 years, it is time to retire that COA.

3. "Fixing" some foreign culture where one has no legitimacy to undertake such a program is hubris and folly. Particularly when the concept of what "fixed" looks like is based upon the history, culture and perspective of the fixer, rather than the fixee.

I could add more, but those are my top three.

slapout9
05-06-2013, 09:13 PM
Here is a link to "Top Secret America" a PBS report that covers everything not just A'stan. But it is worth watching the first 15 or 20 minutes to see how clearly the CIA understood we were fighting a Terrorist System not a Country and what to do about it. In large part the American military did not get it and still doesn't! Which is why we could have a carbon copy of the USA in A'stan and it would still not stop Terrorist attacks as we found out recently in Boston. I think that is the real lesson that needs to be learned and we can either learn it and adapt or not learn it and keep on getting attacked all the while wasting unbelievable amounts of money!
Here is the link:http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/topsecretamerica/

Bob's World
05-06-2013, 10:43 PM
Slap,

More accurately, I believe "the enemy" is a symptom, much more than "a system."

There is much friction to the US approach to propping up and sustaining systems of governance and specific individuals and families in power when and where we believe doing so is the best way to secure our interests in some particular place. When the people who live in those places and suffer under those governments grow frustrated with how that manner of US support appears to be either enabling such governments to continue on with some status quo of governance, or particularly when the US is actively contributing to the suppression of popular revolt, we make ourselves a target for acts of international terrorism.

A certain level of such violence is normal. The cost of doing business for a powerful country such as the US. But when this violence grows and and becomes connected between many diverse parties arising out of many equally diverse populaces, it is much more than a cost of business, it becomes a metric. The clear message we should have taken from the events of 9/11, and the subsequent flow of foreign fighters to Iraq, and from the subsequent Arab Spring, etc, etc, is that our approach to foreign policy designed for the Cold War is out of touch with the realities of the world we live in today.

Credit for President Obama for attempting to break from many of those outdated habits, but it is not clear that the current administration has a clear grasp on a new way forward. So we are abandoning the past without a plan for the future. I picture a circus trapeze act where one turns loose of one bar without planning for a new one to be present to grab onto. In real life, there is no net to land on.

But this in not something done to us by some "enemy," system or otherwise. This is a self-inflicted failure to anticipate and adapt to the world around us, and clinging too long to comfortable practices that were clearly in need of major overhauls long ago. The Clinton Administration largely ignored these changes and was reactive rather than proactive. The Bush Administration interpreted these changes through an obsolete lens, and saw beating up on Afghanistan and Iraq as solutions for a problem clearly centered in Saudi Arabia. The Obama administation saw doubling down on Afghanistan as key and was "surprised" by Arab Spring.

None of this is either surprising or unpredictable. The world is telling us we need a new strategy. We should listen. It will be cheaper to implement than our current approach and should cause far less friction. But giving up control is hard...

jcustis
05-06-2013, 11:48 PM
But when this violence grows and and becomes connected between many diverse parties arising out of many equally diverse populaces, it is much more than a cost of business, it becomes a metric.

Some folks would also call it a clue. :D

Bob's World
05-07-2013, 01:45 AM
Yes.

slapout9
05-07-2013, 03:53 AM
Slap,

More accurately, I believe "the enemy" is a symptom, much more than "a system."

There is much friction to the US approach to propping up and sustaining systems of governance and specific individuals and families in power when and where we believe doing so is the best way to secure our interests in some particular place. When the people who live in those places and suffer under those governments grow frustrated with how that manner of US support appears to be either enabling such governments to continue on with some status quo of governance, or particularly when the US is actively contributing to the suppression of popular revolt, we make ourselves a target for acts of international terrorism. Oh it is a System alright, make no mistake about it. I agree with the fact that our actions are a "symptom" of our inability to understand and adapt to the System and the new Larger Environment that we are operating in.


But when this violence grows and and becomes connected between many diverse parties arising out of many equally diverse populaces, it is much more than a cost of business, it becomes a metric. That is my point, that is the very definition of a a System!!!!! Diverse elements with a common purpose.
The clear message we should have taken from the events of 9/11, and the subsequent flow of foreign fighters to Iraq, and from the subsequent Arab Spring, etc, etc, is that our approach to foreign policy designed for the Cold War is out of touch with the realities of the world we live in today. Again I don't disagree. As JCustis says it's a clue but more importantly it is a System metric(not a target metric) and it is showing that our actions are increasing the Energy of the System has not decreasing it! Very bad!!


Credit for President Obama for attempting to break from many of those outdated habits, but it is not clear that the current administration has a clear grasp on a new way forward. So we are abandoning the past without a plan for the future. I picture a circus trapeze act where one turns loose of one bar without planning for a new one to be present to grab onto. In real life, there is no net to land on. Did you ever say a mouthful with that statement! And I agree 100% that is what concerns me most we quiting our current Process but we do not have a replacement Process, so we look very,very weak and the Opposing System understands this.....so we get attacked and will continue to get attacked. We are weaker in many ways now than we were after Vietnam.


But this in not something done to us by some "enemy," system or otherwise. This is a self-inflicted failure to anticipate and adapt to the world around us, and clinging too long to comfortable practices that were clearly in need of major overhauls long ago. Partially true their are most definitely certain portions of the System that are our Enemies.
The Clinton Administration largely ignored these changes and was reactive rather than proactive. Clinton is a disciple of Quigley a dangerous Globalist and we are paying many prices today for that strange theory. Independence NOT Dependence is what any System needs!
The Bush Administration interpreted these changes through an obsolete lens, and saw beating up on Afghanistan and Iraq as solutions for a problem clearly centered in Saudi Arabia. The Obama administration saw doubling down on Afghanistan as key and was "surprised" by Arab Spring. Again I agree 100%


None of this is either surprising or unpredictable. The world is telling us we need a new strategy. We should listen. It will be cheaper to implement than our current approach and should cause far less friction. But giving up control is hard... We are essentially leaderless in a dangerous world where we want to impose some kind of progressive, gay, lesbian ,transgender,tax cuts for the rich,save the banks at all cost, universal rights theory and make the world safe for bunnies,puppies and unicorns. We are floundering for our National survival. Not all of the post war cold war theories were or are wrong. The Soviet Union is gone but Marxist/Lennonism is alive and growing stronger in some cases(its called China with a lot of money and they blood RED Commies at heart) now combine that with radical jihad and well...............gonna be real interesting for a while.

Bill Moore
05-07-2013, 07:02 AM
Every "lesson learned" I have seen so far coming out of our involvement in this conflict has been extremely tactical in nature. "How do we do the wrong thing better."

The lessons not learned, however, are:

1. Punitive Expeditions work.

2. "King Making" has been obsolete for at least 100 years, it is time to retire that COA.

3. "Fixing" some foreign culture where one has no legitimacy to undertake such a program is hubris and folly. Particularly when the concept of what "fixed" looks like is based upon the history, culture and perspective of the fixer, rather than the fixee.

I could add more, but those are my top three.

No issue with any of these, and it seems to me that if we would have embraced these 3 lessons as principles to guide our foreign policy we would seen very few or no failures with our interventions. Time for our leaders to stop selling the COIN snake oil.

KingJaja
05-07-2013, 09:17 AM
I'm not an expert on Afghanistan (I'm from faraway Africa), but I think the most important lesson, which the West should heed is this:

A nation is a working social contract and US Military might and aid dollars cannot create a working social contract from scratch. You can create the apparatus of a state quite easily, but you cannot create its essence - that is left for the citizenry.

Another thing Americans don't understand is that so many states in Africa and Asia are legacies of colonial rule, they lack working social contracts - and Western aid money, "counter-insurgency efforts" and military intervention CANNOT create working social contracts.

The biggest delusion of the Western foreign policy elite is that "democracy can create a working social contract" - it cannot, classical example is Mali - elections in Mali will do that State no good, it is a nation more in theory than in fact.

The World's many artificial states will have to work out their own "Peace of Westphalia" - and there is absolutely nothing the US can do about it, except try to truncate the process via "intervention".

Bob's World
05-07-2013, 12:48 PM
KingJaja - Good points all.

Morgan
05-07-2013, 07:31 PM
What will our Afghanistan expedition teach us:
- Hopefully, it will teach us to have a strategy for winning, or at the very least, a clear goal (as many on SWJ have commented about)
- That sometimes a smaller force (SOF-oriented) is better than a huge force (GPF-oriented). Perhaps following the Central America force-cap of 55 is a better model to follow in the future
- That being more senior in rank doesn't necessarily equate to being more experienced or more knowledgeable
- That if hell-bent on executing COIN, then understanding the language and culture are pretty fraking important (I know JCustis will disagree)
- That micromanagement from multiple levels of bureaucracy does more harm than good
- That if all else fails, wearing a yellow safety belt seems to fix everything (seriously!!)

Bob's World
05-07-2013, 10:56 PM
First we must redefine "winning" for internal conflicts. For me it is simply this: "Not preserving some regime; not defeating some threat; but rather winning is increasing the percentage of the popolation who perceive themselves to be included in the overall solution."

In Afghanistan we merely flipped the table and expected the ousted 50% to lay down. Afghans don't lay down.

jcustis
05-08-2013, 04:39 AM
- That if hell-bent on executing COIN, then understanding the language and culture are pretty fraking important (I know JCustis will disagree)

I'm typically more dramatic about that topic than I probably should be. I should probably temper my distate for the snake oil sales pitch over culture and language by saying that I'd take a sharp, motivated linguist every time, over a lengthy spin-up package delivered by the culture pimps based at the mission rehearsal sites, or Quantico.

The culture pimps are a fleeting nuisance for commanders who are forced to endure the mandatory training before deployment, at a time when their schedules are already crushed.

Linguists can (and usually do) form powerful bonds that are a better return on investment. That's where the cultural immersion and language should come from.

TheCurmudgeon
05-08-2013, 10:39 PM
I should probably temper my distate for the snake oil sales pitch over culture and language by saying that I'd take a sharp, motivated linguist every time, over a lengthy spin-up package delivered by the culture pimps based at the mission rehearsal sites, or Quantico.

The culture pimps are a fleeting nuisance for commanders who are forced to endure the mandatory training before deployment, at a time when their schedules are already crushed.

JCustis, I am going to heartily, and respectfully, disagree with you. Returning to the macro level I am not sure the (US) military, as currently configured and run, has any business getting involved in these types of operations. They can effect regime change, that is easy. They cannot effect the social engineering, modernization, and nation creating necessary in a place like Afghanistan. It is well beyond their training and certainly beyond their temperament. I have heard more than one commander assess his unit's capability based on their historic body count. You are not going to change that attitude with some cultural awareness training.

I agree with KingJaja. What we are attempting to achieve, a democratic Afghanistan, is not something we can accomplish. It is something the Afghans have to do for themselves on their own timeline (if ever). It is the ultimate in Imperial Hubris to believe we can do this.

That does not mean we never get involved. That means that we are more realistic about what military force can accomplish and what it can't.

The military will remain the default organization to go to when things go to #### in a far away country. We, as members of the military, need to stop thinking "here is my chance to kick some ass" and start thinking "maybe this is something that we do not have the capability to do" -- and then have the balls to tell our civilian leadership that. It will be easier for the next decade or so but as those who have never been to war start to get in positions of power their is the inevitable erg to push the limits.

jcustis
05-09-2013, 02:49 AM
I completely agree, and I think we are more in line with common views than you realize. Yes, the military has little business trying to do what it does sometimes, and from that I think much of the money we have spent on cultural training, products (which tend to conflict each other) and immersion, is a waste of time. The proficiency has been superficial, and the guys who "get it" will always go their own way to study and prep for the mission on a path they feel they need to.

Buried somewhere here is a comment I made during my Afghan deploy. I let my bearing slip while I asserted it was time for Afgans in my valley to get off their knees and shoot some knuckleheads in the face. The answer has always rested with the Afghans, but they are incapable of unlocking it. I concur with you on that account as well.

As a case in point, a former Kabul elite can only tell me so much about pashtunwali, cultural idiocracies, and the like. The rest is just having the commonsense to be patient, tread softly, and not act like an ogre amongst the locals. I don't need a professor to teach me that stuff.

My units have always received better info from the linguists, compared to the cultural specialists back at homestation training venues. The linguists have some skin in the game. The guy pontificating about cultural norms from an office in Quantico? Not so much.

Perhaps the aim of the training has value, but we've merely failed with the delivery when trying to cram it into an already overflowing five pound bag.

Here's a brief side story and then I'll stop drifting off thread. It was Iraq, circa late 2008. I was having dinner with a civil affairs soldier attached to a SOF detachment operating in our battlespace. We got onto the subject of the local power player who they were conducting a lot of engagement with, and in turn getting a lot of intel from. He giggled when he said that this sheik would typically spend the majority of the visit talking about blondes, big tatas, and watching porn, while sitting around drinking chai and smoking cigarettes. You're never going to get that gouge from a culture pimp, so we need to rethink our priority and where we want to apply the resources.

The formal, stiff stuff can be saved for the diplomats, who are always optimized to live it and nurture it.

KingJaja
05-09-2013, 05:55 PM
Let me add a few words.

Is it possible that the Taliban offered Afghans a more compelling narrative than the US? Think about it - if you are poor, uneducated and religiously conservative would a US propped Karzai (corrupt, insensitive & incompetent) be vastly preferable to the simplicity & piety of the Taliban (or other religious conservatives).

America holds great promise to the World's educated middle classes, but of what relevance is it to the World's poor? This is something that strikes me when I walk around the streets of Lagos.

The last great narrative, Socialism was very attractive to the poor (I feel the US thinks it won the Cold War, so it has never seen the need to reflect on "lessons learned").

Today, the most attractive narratives to the World's poor are religion and/or ethnic nationalism. Pentecostal Christianity & Fundamentalist Islam are the two most dynamic narratives among the poor. Thankfully, the first isn't anti-US, but the second is.

Does the United States of America have a narrative it can sell to the World's poor?

US diplomats, policy makers & politicians should ponder over that question, because it will contribute to the success of future "nation building" exercises.

slapout9
05-09-2013, 07:23 PM
I don't know if this is a lesson to be learned or not but here is a link to how valuable female soldiers are in A'stan and they are clearly designated as special forces both by the commentator and their shoulder patches.



http://videos.komando.com/watch/3231/kims-picks-female-combat-soldiers-save-lives?utm_medium=nl&utm_source=tvkim&utm_content=2013-05-08-article-screen-shot-b

TheCurmudgeon
05-09-2013, 11:36 PM
Let me add a few words.

Is it possible that the Taliban offered Afghans a more compelling narrative than the US? Think about it - if you are poor, uneducated and religiously conservative would a US propped Karzai (corrupt, insensitive & incompetent) be vastly preferable to the simplicity & piety of the Taliban (or other religious conservatives).

The last great narrative, Socialism was very attractive to the poor (I feel the US thinks it won the Cold War, so it has never seen the need to reflect on "lessons learned").

This is very true. Plus American's tend to equate socialism with communism without realizing that many of the "liberal democracies" of Europe have socialist leanings including England.

Now our new "threat" is China, a poor country that rose to become a economic giant in just a few generations (much like the USSR, except with less interest in expanding beyond their own territory).


Today, the most attractive narratives to the World's poor are religion and/or ethnic nationalism. Pentecostal Christianity & Fundamentalist Islam are the two most dynamic narratives among the poor. Thankfully, the first isn't anti-US, but the second is.


Religion offers simple answers to complex questions. Religions like Christianity and Islam offers the poor the ideal narrative - the faithful will receive their just reward in the afterlife (and the immoral wealthy their just desserts). They define clearly how we need to be in life to ensure everlasting bliss - a powerful narrative and one that is difficult to overcome as long as the poor remain poor. Economic stability, personal security, and a real hope (not just failed promises) of a better future may be the only way out.

KingJaja
05-10-2013, 02:08 AM
TheCurmudgeon,


Economic stability, personal security, and a real hope (not just failed promises) of a better future may be the only way out.

That is true, but the fact is that the most dynamic economic player in the poorest and most troubled regions of the World (South Asia, Middle East and Africa) is not the US, it is China.

In a perfect World, US and China will enter a partnership - US does what it can on security (the minor part) and China does the heavy lifting (trade & infrastructure).


Please note: Aid isn't going to drive economic stability.

slapout9
05-10-2013, 05:23 AM
Buried somewhere here is a comment I made during my Afghan deploy. I let my bearing slip while I asserted it was time for Afgans in my valley to get off their knees and shoot some knuckleheads in the face. The answer has always rested with the Afghans, but they are incapable of unlocking it. I concur with you on that account as well.


JC,
I remember that post. I don't think you lost your bearing it was one of your better post and very accurate at least from my sources.

Madhu
05-10-2013, 02:56 PM
Heard the authors on the John Batchelor show sometime back. Have not read the book but it may be of interest:


These experts in the field challenge commonly held views about the success of the global war on terrorism and its campaign in Afghanistan. Their book questions some fundamentals of the population-centric COIN doctrine currently in vogue and harshly criticizes key decisions about the prosecution of the Afghan war. It is the only book to compare the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan from a national strategic perspective. It questions several key operational factors in Afghanistan, including the decision to give NATO the lead, the performance of both civilian and military leaders, and the prosecution of an Iraq War-style surge. It also contrasts the counterinsurgency campaign styles and the leadership of senior American officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan. A final chapter outlines key lessons of the two campaigns.

http://www.amazon.com/From-Kabul-Baghdad-Back-Afghanistan/dp/1612510221


Any suggestions on what to read regarding coalitions and counterinsurgency or is our NATO experiment kind of a first?

If you go back to the 2002-3 period and are given the military task again, given that NATO and the US wanted to stay in some peace keeping capacity, is there a different way to do things? I suppose the complaint back then is that requests for troops were turned down. How to stabilize in a more modest way if you are given that civilian task, whether it be wise strategically or not?

Madhu
05-10-2013, 03:08 PM
TheCurmudgeon,



That is true, but the fact is that the most dynamic economic player in the poorest and most troubled regions of the World (South Asia, Middle East and Africa) is not the US, it is China.

In a perfect World, US and China will enter a partnership - US does what it can on security (the minor part) and China does the heavy lifting (trade & infrastructure).

That is the Thomas Barnett model and I'm as skeptical of that model as I am of his Core-Gap model:

http://pundita.blogspot.com/2008/04/national-petition-bureau-will-see-you.html

In a way, isn't that the model today? China builds its export driven economic model while the US provides security and gains debt and loses market share? It hasn't worked out so well for the US (largely because of our sillier than silly elites that can't think their way out of a paper bag, IMO). Two nations that want to be the top dog are going to have trouble with that model until the whole top dog thing is sorted out. The British-American Atlantic alliance model with China?

The US doesn't need it, we are huge with two great oceans on either side and relationships with lots of different nations. We can hang out and do our own thing and be involved only as much as it suits us, the China model for the US.

That model will bankrupt the US. Heck, even the Chinese model may eventually slow down for internal reasons and as others get in on the Africa game and learn from the Chinese.

Sorry, don't see it except in a de facto way which doesn't require any kind of grand partnership. As part of larger international governing treaties and alliances and networks (UN), sure.

davidbfpo
05-10-2013, 06:16 PM
Madhu just asked:
Any suggestions on what to read regarding coalitions and counterinsurgency or is our NATO experiment kind of a first?

In modern times the USA has fought several wars, some of them with an insurgent component, with a coalition. Sometimes the extent of US fighting has been very small, e.g. French Indo-China as the logistic supplier and maybe money too.

The UK considers some of its small wars have been coalition efforts too. Not only in the colonial era, such as Malaysia and Kenya; then Oman comes to mind. To be fair even when sovereign states were involved the UK was in the lead.

What is not clear from Afghanistan is what the balance was between NATO the alliance and individual members on policy-making. An alliance that had worked together preparing for war - in Europe - appeared when campaigning in Afghanistan to - be diplomatic - lose focus.

AmericanPride
05-11-2013, 05:42 AM
(1) Human nature is dependent on the conditions of its context. War in any form is a horrible thing, but it must be understood on its own terms. The "shock value" of war needs to be stripped away to expose the foundations of conflict, which is the only issue which requires addressing. When placed within this context, all of our values must be reevaluated. If we see ourselves and the enemy within this prism, we will be must better situated to meet and destroy him.

(2) Ideas are subordinate to political interest as instruments of power politics. Principles are dangerous and get peopled killed for no good reason. Everyone is ideologically promiscuous - even the Army. What matters most is a favorable outcome; the means are relevant to the extent they influence political objects sought from the conflict. This is why the US Government can give Karzai bags of cash while talking about democracy with a straight face.

(3) Political power in some form is the object of all relevant actors. Nobody cares about building agricultural ditches through remote villages or political transparency in a mountain frontier district. Without power, principles don't matter -- so it's important to establish alliances with credible stakeholders. Karzai may not be an ideal partner, but who is the alternative?

(4) State actors are not monolithic and many decisions depend upon the resolution of internal factional struggle. The legacy of Afghanistan is it's historically weak central government in comparison to the outlying political powers in the South and West. Kabul does not command absolutely fealty from these provinces, and the Taliban is only the most recent manifestation of the lack of political control. But it goes much further with the complex intersection of economic and political interests which run amok. This inevitably leads to contradictions -- like Karzai condemning and restricting US military operations while simultaneously negotiating for an extended US military presence in the country.

(5) Conflict is determined by the position of the actors in relation to one another, rather than from some inherent conflictive nature. Our adversaries are not political drunkards looking for the next street fight -- they're smart, calculating opponents looking for every advantage. It was 20 years ago the Taliban was in negotiations with the US government for economic concessions. That prospect is far off now, and it will be a long hard road to untangle the US and the Taliban from one other. But the point is that there's a way forward, for better or worse, and there is a political relationship in which neither party is antagonizing the other. At some point, neither party will gain from continued conflict and it will end.

(6) Rational actors may be locked into a particular course irregardless of desire for it. Because of the presence of multiple, contradicting interests, there are also multiple, contradicting rationalities driving decision making, and this is compounded by the factional nature of governing and politics. So which course of action does someone choose? It's irrational for the United States to set an arbitrary date to leave Afghanistan. But is it irrational within the greater context of America's political and economic condition?

AmericanPride
05-11-2013, 05:59 AM
Let me add a few words.

Is it possible that the Taliban offered Afghans a more compelling narrative than the US? Think about it - if you are poor, uneducated and religiously conservative would a US propped Karzai (corrupt, insensitive & incompetent) be vastly preferable to the simplicity & piety of the Taliban (or other religious conservatives).

America holds great promise to the World's educated middle classes, but of what relevance is it to the World's poor? This is something that strikes me when I walk around the streets of Lagos.

The last great narrative, Socialism was very attractive to the poor (I feel the US thinks it won the Cold War, so it has never seen the need to reflect on "lessons learned").

Today, the most attractive narratives to the World's poor are religion and/or ethnic nationalism. Pentecostal Christianity & Fundamentalist Islam are the two most dynamic narratives among the poor. Thankfully, the first isn't anti-US, but the second is.

Does the United States of America have a narrative it can sell to the World's poor?

US diplomats, policy makers & politicians should ponder over that question, because it will contribute to the success of future "nation building" exercises.

I agree, perceptions matter. And perceptions must be shaped by smart information campaigns. But these information campaigns must be nested within the broader political objectives -- which may not be helpful or relevant for the poor. It's not to say that the global poor don't matter; they most certainly do, but not in every context, and their interests are definitely not the same as those shaping American foreign policy. There are also a couple of risks: (1) information blow-back where people take our ideas seriously and hold us accountable for not meeting them, thereby decreasing our legitimacy; (2) the message is convoluted because of competing bureaucratic interests within our own government and (3) ideological competition with other competing ideas. In the end, coercion is more reliable and comforting than debate, which requires a degree of trust. And trust is notably absent in conflict. Like I tell my wife: if you don't trust me, it doesn't matter if I tell the truth. ;)

jcustis
05-11-2013, 07:53 AM
(5) Conflict is determined by the position of the actors in relation to one another, rather than from some inherent conflictive nature. Our adversaries are not political drunkards looking for the next street fight -- they're smart, calculating opponents looking for every advantage. It was 20 years ago the Taliban was in negotiations with the US government for economic concessions. That prospect is far off now, and it will be a long hard road to untangle the US and the Taliban from one other. But the point is that there's a way forward, for better or worse, and there is a political relationship in which neither party is antagonizing the other. At some point, neither party will gain from continued conflict and it will end.

Alas, Columbia is experiencing this condition mentioned in the last sentence, while Mexico is just warming up.

Bob's World
05-11-2013, 12:05 PM
In most ways, I suspect we actually won't learn much from the Afghanistan experience. We have no real strategy now, so there will be no way to assess any lessons learned from that; our metrics are all tactical in nature, so all of our lessons learned are about how to optimize those metrics, while at the same time slipping farther and farther behind in regards to the larger strategic picture. Years from now retired generals will write books and give speeches about how "we defeated the Taliban, but that later, after we left, a corrupt GIRoA fell to (insert name of country here) inspired forces.

But to get an idea of the future of Afghanistan, one need only look due north and see who it is that is earning tremendous influence throughout this central Asian region:

http://www.realclearworld.com/lists/pro_russia_countries/

davidbfpo
05-11-2013, 03:28 PM
1) Respect and understand history - from all viewpoints. In the Afghan context this appears to have come rather late - as indicated in the briefing for the UK's forces after 2006.

2) Remember however mighty external power seems local works better, even if not to our standards. This was obscured by the initial success in ejecting the Taliban and the faith on the strictures of the Bonn Agreement.

3) If external intervention in - a sovereign state - ignores or thinks that problems like corruption, drugs and a nearby "safe haven" can be accommodated defeat is more likely.

4) Professional militaries bleed and back home support will shrink over time. This effect is enhanced if reserves are called up. Expensive too.

5) If you are not welcome, don't stay. Ignore this only if you can be ruthless to all the population beyond your own announced standards.

Bob's World
05-11-2013, 07:03 PM
David,

I would add a few points a bit more fundamental and strategic in nature:

1. The form of legitimacy necessery for natural stability cannot be created or bestowed by foreign power, but rather must be bestowed by culturally accepted ways across the populace.

2. To maximize foreign influence one must first minimize foreign control.

3. Winning is not preserving some government in power or destroying some threat to the same. Winning is when the % of the population who perceive themselves as stakeholders in the solution of governance grows.

jcustis
05-11-2013, 08:23 PM
In most ways, I suspect we actually won't learn much from the Afghanistan experience. We have no real strategy now, so there will be no way to assess any lessons learned from that; our metrics are all tactical in nature, so all of our lessons learned are about how to optimize those metrics, while at the same time slipping farther and farther behind in regards to the larger strategic picture.

And this is the reason why someone needs to continue the sincere, transparent assessment, across the tactical to strategic.

Chandresekaran has laid the first stone on the path.

Dayuhan
05-12-2013, 12:12 AM
Winning is not preserving some government in power or destroying some threat to the same. Winning is when the % of the population who perceive themselves as stakeholders in the solution of governance grows.

With this I must disagree. Winning is achieving the goals you set out to achieve. Period, end of story. The percentage of Afghans who perceive themselves as stakeholders in the solution of governance doesn't have to be our problem or our business, and inherently is not our problem or our business.

I think Jon had it right from the start:


1) The national policy goals should be clear and concise, and the integrated plan to achieve them must be properly resourced. Make sure everyone understands the goals and the plan.

Winning is achieving your goals, and the first step toward winning is to start with a clear, practical, and limited set of goals. A second step would be to stick with those goals and not go looking for new ones.

As far as lessons go, I think Jon had the first one right. Keep the goals clear, practical, and limited, and make sure everybody involved knows what they are and how they are to be achieved.

Lesson 2, for me, can be summarized as "know when to go". There is nothing to gain by getting bogged down in occupation and nation-building. When you occupy you become a static target that invites insurgency. When you embrace the chimera of "nation-building" you inevitably end up harnessed to a government that cannot stand, but that you cannot allow to fall. It doesn't work. It's not necessary. Better to leave while you're still scary, while you still have the initiative, before anybody can claim to have chased you out. That might not have been best for Afghanistan, but "fixing" Afghanistan was never our problem. Convincing whoever ends up running the place that provoking us is a bad idea was our problem.

If we're ever in an analogous situation again, I hope we can compel ourselves to go there with clear, practical, limited goals. I hope we can achieve those goals and leave. Faint hope, I know, but we all have dreams.

jcustis
05-12-2013, 01:31 AM
You're touching on something that gets stuck in my craw consistently these days.

The notion that we must stay the course with disaster, so that allies believe we will follow through on a commitment/promise/partnership, tends to blind us to the truth that the disaster is overwhelming us.

That may have worked with Cold War containment strategies, but I do not believe it is valid for the small wars we have faced recently. Time to set that model aside.

Dayuhan
05-12-2013, 05:03 AM
The notion that we must stay the course with disaster, so that allies believe we will follow through on a commitment/promise/partnership, tends to blind us to the truth that the disaster is overwhelming us.

I think before we talk about staying the course we have to talk about defining the course, and that brings us back to the goals. I have no objection to "staying the course" if the course is defined by a set of clear, practical, and limited objectives. If "the course" is defined as transforming Afghanistan into a western-style market economy democracy, we shouldn't even be starting on it, let alone staying on it... IMO of course.

Bob's World
05-12-2013, 05:30 AM
As I stated in an earlier post, "punitive expeditions work."

But even if that achieves ones narrowly tailored goal of punishing for past acts and deterring future ones, that is not "winning."

The win I describe is not for the interloper, it is for those they would interlope upon. Not our job to create or even fund such a victory - but is good to understand what a true victory is.

Dayuhan
05-12-2013, 09:57 AM
But even if that achieves ones narrowly tailored goal of punishing for past acts and deterring future ones, that is not "winning."
It is for us, and that's what we need to worry about.


The win I describe is not for the interloper, it is for those they would interlope upon. Not our job to create or even fund such a victory - but is good to understand what a true victory is.

Neither you nor I nor any combination of Americans can determine what "winning" is for anyone else. Like us, they "win" when they achieve their goals, and their goals are something they have to define. We can't do it for them. If we're talking about Afghans (or many others), the chances are that some of them will have goals that are not compatible with the goals of others. Those discrepancies are something they will have to sort out in their own way. That may or may not involve violence; either way it is not our business unless they ask us to mediate (fat chance) and we think it's in our interest to do so.

We need to focus on what we need to achieve, not what we want to achieve, and on ways to achieve those needs that are consistent with the time and resources we are willing to apply. Trying to define other people's goals is just going to create more trouble, and it's not going to make us any friends.

Bill Moore
05-12-2013, 06:01 PM
As I stated in an earlier post, "punitive expeditions work."

But even if that achieves ones narrowly tailored goal of punishing for past acts and deterring future ones, that is not "winning."

The win I describe is not for the interloper, it is for those they would interlope upon. Not our job to create or even fund such a victory - but is good to understand what a true victory is.

Gradually we're returning to the Powell Doctrine, which was a doctrine born out history and non-emotional examination of our past adventures where we attempted to impose our way of life on others through various forms of coercion. The Powell Doctrine was intended scope expectations of policy makers, but unfortunately arrogance triumphed over reasoned decision making where we recognized our limitations.

COINistas like Nagl who are partly responsible for the U.S. wasting billions of dollars on these unreasonable expeditions without end continue to push for the implementation of failed approach and are apparently incapable of learning from our reason expeditions. Funny and sad in the same way because this is what Nagl accused the military of during Vietnam. Maybe the next best seller that influences military doctrine will be "Eating Soup with a Spoon."

The lessons I believe we need to take to heart are:

- Punitive operations work, even if their effects are transitory. They are often the best option unless it is feasible (not simply desirable) to address underlying issues.

- Before heading off to occupy a country and transform a foreign culture more to our liking we must do a cost benefits analysis. Transforming societies in small pockets like Iraq and Afghanistan does not address existential threats to our nation, in fact these expensive (financially and morally) expeditions distract us from what is important, and divert resources from the important to the unimportant.

- In rare cases where we need to oust an existing government and then occupy and transition to a new government we need to gain much better understanding of what is desirable and workable by the population instead of blindly barging in with an American vision of their future. Nations will evolve at their own rate when "they" are allowed to evolve.

Let's face if a nation like America existed before our own Revolution they would have been highly critical of our slow political development when it came to human rights (slavery), the right for women to vote, discrimination, etc. It takes both political space and time to evolve, and while you can impose with bayonets and leveraging financial tools, what you impose won't last.

jcustis
05-12-2013, 06:19 PM
Maybe the next best seller that influences military doctrine will be "Eating Soup with a Spoon."

Post of the year Bill...post of the year!

As for the cost-benefit analysis, the problem we seem to have stems from the limited scope of people conducting the analysis.

When it is accomplished by people you brought into your administration, and doesn't have the sense to cast the net of assessment far enough, it's screwed from the beginning. I think it's double screwed if those people have never carried a weapon before in the service of their nation, because that tends to balance out the booksmart theory, in my opinion.

AmericanPride
05-13-2013, 07:01 PM
1. The form of legitimacy necessery for natural stability cannot be created or bestowed by foreign power, but rather must be bestowed by culturally accepted ways across the populace.

I think this lesson is conditional and unique to specific circumstances. What is "natural stability"? History is replete with examples of military occupations imposing culturally unacceptable systems of power without any kind of legitimacy (legal, political, cultural, or other); some episodes with less conflict than others. The Soviet Union managed to do so in a dozen countries at the end of World War II with limited resistance - why did partisans fight the Nazis but not the Soviets? Why are there no partisans in North Korea? I doubt it has to do with legitimacy. Ultimately, power (re: coercion), not legitimacy, determines outcomes in environments with little or not political constraints. The problem we have in Afghanistan is not that the US, West, or Karzai administration is illegitimate but that their opponents have the power to resist (that in turn fuels perceptions of illegtimacy). The basic power of the state is its monopoly on violence, which obviously is in serious contention by vying political factions. So we have run into the basic problem that we have neither destroyed the enemy's will or capabilities, while watching our own will erode, and thus the basis of state legitimacy - the monopoly on violence - remains in contention.

Legitimacy as you seem to articulate it is relevant in framed political environments in which cultural and legal norms establish acceptable ends, ways, and means for action. This is where the political object constrains the military act (i.e. rules of engagement), even if not always perfectly rational, it in some way seeks to mitigate the problems you cite with legitimacy. But at the end of the day, the only thing that matters is mission achievement (addressed later in this post); how missions are selected, executed, and relate to one another and broader policy is another issue altogether.


2. To maximize foreign influence one must first minimize foreign control.

I don't think this is a lesson that can be extracted from the experience of Afghanistan -- at least not to the extent that it can be used as a hard and fast rule for future conflicts. In one sense you are correct -- committing to one course of action, in this case military intervention comes at the cost of all the other actions that could have been taken at that moment. Is influence any more desirable than control? Since ultimately we are more concerned with the ends than the means then the answer is "it depends". For Afghanistan specifically, I would argue that mission achievement cannot be attained without foreign control; the central Afghan government is virtually powerless without either support from abroad or from the regional political factions of the country. This is probably the central lesson about Afghanistan specifically. And if our interest is in imposing globalized political norms and reducing freedom of action of terrorist organization, then we must to some degree do it ourselves.


3. Winning is not preserving some government in power or destroying some threat to the same. Winning is when the % of the population who perceive themselves as stakeholders in the solution of governance grows.

"Winning" is achieving our established objectives, however defined. But this occurs on multiple levels - the selection of poor tactical objectives can lead to tactical victories and operational failures, and so on up the chain to the national level. At the end of the day, when it comes down to measuring competing interests, everyone else and everything else is expendable.

Bob's World
05-14-2013, 02:01 AM
We'll just have to disagree.

TheCurmudgeon
05-14-2013, 11:51 PM
I think this lesson is conditional and unique to specific circumstances. What is "natural stability"? History is replete with examples of military occupations imposing culturally unacceptable systems of power without any kind of legitimacy (legal, political, cultural, or other); some episodes with less conflict than others. The Soviet Union managed to do so in a dozen countries at the end of World War II with limited resistance - why did partisans fight the Nazis but not the Soviets? Why are there no partisans in North Korea? I doubt it has to do with legitimacy.

I am going to respectfully disagree with you. Even thought you state that human nature is conditional, you seem to think that legitimacy is unconditionally monolithic. It is not. Leadership at any level, with or without a political entity, can be viewed as legitimate or illegitimate, by the population it attempts to sway. The concept of legitimacy is ubiquitous - it is not restricted to the realm of politics. A religious leader can be seen as legitimate; a professor can be seen as a legitimate authority, the actions of a judge can be seen as legitimate if she follows the proper procedure. Political legitimacy is only a small part of what legitimacy is. Legitimacy is adherence to the values of the population.

I am pretty sure that most North Korean's see Kim as the legitimate leader in the same way as most surfs saw their King as the legitimate leader. His legitimacy is based in a different set of values, values tied to in-group survival similar to those of any clan or tribal group. Do you think the people of Kenya really wanted a War Criminal as their president over other, more liberal leaders, or do you think that the Uhuru Kenyatta's methods of suppressing outsiders fit more with the population's views on how different groups should be treated. Don't think it is all that unusual. George Wallace was elected governor on a segregationist platform in a first world country. in-group/out-group dynamics are very powerful under the right conditions.


Ultimately, power (re: coercion), not legitimacy, determines outcomes in environments with little or not political constraints. The problem we have in Afghanistan is not that the US, West, or Karzai administration is illegitimate but that their opponents have the power to resist (that in turn fuels perceptions of illegtimacy).

Not true. It is this misunderstanding that has caused us to believe that legitimacy can be imposed. Control can be imposed on the people - Legitimacy is granted by the people.


The basic power of the state is its monopoly on violence, which obviously is in serious contention by vying political factions. So we have run into the basic problem that we have neither destroyed the enemy's will or capabilities, while watching our own will erode, and thus the basis of state legitimacy - the monopoly on violence - remains in contention.

Again, I disagree. The monopoly on violence is a benefit of legitimacy. Violence can be legitimate, as when a police officer uses necessary force to apprehend a murder and the state, after all proper procedures are followed, execute that murderer. The people see that act as legitimate. The original act of the murder is not seen as legitimate. The murder can intimidate the population into refusing to testify, but that does not make the act legitimate (or make him the legitimate authority in the community, although it may make him the unopposed power in the community).

Likewise, when a political entity continually acts in a manner that part of the population views as illegitimate that part of the population may no longer feel compelled to obey the political entity and may take up arms to enforce what it sees as legitimate authority - as in the case of religious fighters taking up arms to defend a religious state against a secular invader. In their minds they are committing no crime - they are not acting illegitimately. They are acting as a legitimate authority should act. You can suppress this urge with force or bribery, but it is still there, just below the surface.

Think of legitimacy as a weak force, like gravity. It is always there, but it can be overcome by a stronger force, like the lift produced by the wings of an airplane. Think of coercion as the lift. With enough propulsion the plane can ascend into the air but it requires constant thrust to maintain speed and overcome gravity. If that thrust is lost gravity will pull it back to the ground. Coercion can overcome legitimacy, but it requires a constant effort to continually suppress it.


Legitimacy as you seem to articulate it is relevant in framed political environments in which cultural and legal norms establish acceptable ends, ways, and means for action. This is where the political object constrains the military act (i.e. rules of engagement), even if not always perfectly rational, it in some way seeks to mitigate the problems you cite with legitimacy. But at the end of the day, the only thing that matters is mission achievement (addressed later in this post); how missions are selected, executed, and relate to one another and broader policy is another issue altogether.

The problem in Afghanistan and Iraq is that mission objectives were tied to political results. The mission was not complete when we took control of the country. The mission was complete when we created a democratic state. Our mistake was to define a military objective in terms of a political result. I don't think that is a mistake that we can avoid. If one assumes that war is the extension of policy, and our policy is to spread democracy, then it is a mistake we are bound to continue to make.

AmericanPride
05-15-2013, 05:12 PM
The problem in Afghanistan and Iraq is that mission objectives were tied to political results. The mission was not complete when we took control of the country. The mission was complete when we created a democratic state. Our mistake was to define a military objective in terms of a political result. I don't think that is a mistake that we can avoid. If one assumes that war is the extension of policy, and our policy is to spread democracy, then it is a mistake we are bound to continue to make.


I partially agree. I agree that specifically it was a mistake top define "our policy... to spread democracy" insofar there are numerous conditional variables which make such an ambitious project mostly unreachable and it's questionable whether it is in our material interest to do so. However I disagree that it is a mistake to "define a military objective in terms of a political result." Ultimately, the desired "political results" should determine the shape of the military operations, even if not perfectly rationalized or connected, and the military objectives must eventually produce favorable political results to be justified. Now of course there any number of reasons why the selection or execution of political and military objectives may not pan out in the desired way.

As for the discussion on legitimacy, I think we are speaking past one another to some extent. I think that legitimacy is conditional and thus not always relevant (this depends on the selection of the desired political results and the chosen military objectives). My point is that I do not think legitimacy is a fundamental component of our problems in Afghanistan -- it's a second-order effect from our desired political results and selected military objectives. Legitimacy is conditionallly based upon the frame we have constructed around the conflict and our approach to it. This plays out on multiple levels (faction infighting, media satuation, cultural norms, etc); and its importance is not because it is inherently valuable but because these things have been made important by actors with the ability to make them important. What x% of the population thinks is legitimate vis-a-vis military operations in Afghanistan is not inherently relevant to our conduct and our performance unless; there must be a material consequence for their views one way or another and to the extent that it affects our performance.

EDIT: Political actors can act with or without legitimacy, however defined. The monopoly of violence originates from an asymmetric material advantage in capabilities and organization over potential competitors. Legitimacy is not necessary for it to exist or to function. The apperance of legitimacy can emerge under any circumstance; it can be as much a function of support as well as of hopelessness. When that monopoly fails, it invites contention -- weakness begets weakness.

TheCurmudgeon
05-15-2013, 08:09 PM
I partially agree. I agree that specifically it was a mistake top define "our policy... to spread democracy" insofar there are numerous conditional variables which make such an ambitious project mostly unreachable and it's questionable whether it is in our material interest to do so. However I disagree that it is a mistake to "define a military objective in terms of a political result." Ultimately, the desired "political results" should determine the shape of the military operations, even if not perfectly rationalized or connected, and the military objectives must eventually produce favorable political results to be justified.

I agree with you that the military objectives must produce the conditions favorable for the political result, but military objectives can only go so far to do that. The Army is fantastic at defeating any other comperable ground force. Less good at acting as a occupying force. Horrible as acting as a police force, particularly with the language and cultural barriers. And woefully unprepared to act as a democratic civilian governing agency. Unfortunately, that is what they have been asked to do, with some notible successes. Force only gets you so close to a political objective like a stable, democratic Afghanistan.



As for the discussion on legitimacy, I think we are speaking past one another to some extent. I think that legitimacy is conditional and thus not always relevant (this depends on the selection of the desired political results and the chosen military objectives)..

I agree. For most of history legitimacy on the level I am refering to rarely mattered. A king replaced another king, and the local lord was either killed or he pledged allegance to the new king. In this case there is no question of legitimacy. But when you are replacing traditional legitimacy with democratic legitimacy it is a different story. This has really only become an issue in the last hundred years or so.


My point is that I do not think legitimacy is a fundamental component of our problems in Afghanistan .

Here I disagree. If the political objective is a stable, democratic Afghanistan, legitimacy is the only issue. It does not matter how many Taliban you kill, or how many roads you build, or schools, or hospitals -- if the people still want an autocratic state built on patron-client (warloard) relationships, then you have failed.

And if you are simply replacing one coercive power with a more effective coercive power, you have still failed, even if you are the undisputed power in the country. That is not democracy, that is a military state.

AmericanPride
05-16-2013, 09:20 PM
Here I disagree. If the political objective is a stable, democratic Afghanistan, legitimacy is the only issue. It does not matter how many Taliban you kill, or how many roads you build, or schools, or hospitals -- if the people still want an autocratic state built on patron-client (warloard) relationships, then you have failed.

And if you are simply replacing one coercive power with a more effective coercive power, you have still failed, even if you are the undisputed power in the country. That is not democracy, that is a military state.

So, we have two questions: (1) is "the political objective a stable, democratic Afghanistan" and (2) if so, is "legitimacy the only issue" (emphasis added)?

The first question has a number of related questions: is it the only objective? Is it the most important objective? Does it contradict other objectives?

In 2003, the objectives in Afghanistan were stated as the following:

1.Eliminate the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan.
2.Convince or compel the Afghan Taliban to end its support for Al Qaeda.
3.Demonstrate that the United States is not at war with the Afghan people or Islam.
4.Demonstrate U. S. resolve in the war on terrorism.
5.Build international support for the war in Afghanistan.
6.Stabilize Afghanistan following the fighting.

None of these explicitly mention democratic government. Of course, there is significant domestic and international pressure for democratization through politics, think tanks, media, legal systems, and political expectations and norms. The narrative that eventually emerged could be summed up in the democratic peace theory: democracies don't war with one another, therefore, if Afghanistan was a democracy, it would not sponsor terrorism against the United States. A component of this argument included the line of thought that freedom would diminish radicalization.

What does this have to do with legitimacy? And what kind of legitimacy is necessary? In entering Afghanistan, the US had legal, political, and moral legitimacy, at least according to the norms of the globalized West, in retailation for terrorist attacks on its soil. And if the principles behind the maxims of "you break it, you own it" and "to the victor goes the spoils" is not any US action "legitimate" in some regard? My point is that defining legitimacy is nebulous, and achieving it is impossible; nor do I think from any material perspective, does it enable, justify, or complete the exercise of power. It's certainly a component of politics because legitimacy becomes an aspect of influence in the absence of power (e.g. one's inability to compel another to do one's will).

This is especially more difficult in the context of conflict, given that trust is notably absent and that numerous actors have sufficient power to act independently; why would anyone obey if they didn't have to? So what comes first, power or legitimacy?

State cohesion relies on coercive power (military capabilities, law enforcement, etc) to compel citizens and/or subjects to comply with desired practices; this is true regardless of the type of government in place. Even citizen participation in government (i.e. democracy) can also be compelled, and this is true for countries with weak and strong democratic institutions. This is the case because power is ultimately expressed materially.

There is no inherent contradiction between achieving all of the objectives highlighted above in addition to having a "democratic" Afghanistan, while simultaeneously not having "legitimacy".

TheCurmudgeon
05-17-2013, 12:57 PM
So, we have two questions: (1) is "the political objective a stable, democratic Afghanistan" and (2) if so, is "legitimacy the only issue" (emphasis added)?".

I agree with your questions. I also agree with the first part of your argument in regards to the original objectives as well as your basic arguments regarding why, from a foriegn policy perspective, the US would be interested in exporting democracy (the democratic peace theory). Where you and I fundamentally disagree is what you might call a "the Chicken and the Egg" argument, and I would call an "Apples and Oranges" argument.



This is especially more difficult in the context of conflict, given that trust is notably absent and that numerous actors have sufficient power to act independently; why would anyone obey if they didn't have to? So what comes first, power or legitimacy?

Your Chicken and Egg argument: which comes first power or legitimacy. You say power, with legitimacy following at some later date as the population comes to accept their submissive roles.


State cohesion relies on coercive power (military capabilities, law enforcement, etc) to compel citizens and/or subjects to comply with desired practices; this is true regardless of the type of government in place.

I would argue that these are apples and oranges. Coercion and Legitimacy are two completely separate things: one is not derived from the other.

Coercion, which I would define as including both force and bribery, is based on an external pressure. Legitimacy, founded in the values a person holds true, is in internal motivator. The external pressure of fear (force) or the desire for goodies (bribery) can overcome what a person holds as right and true, but it does not change what they believe it right and true. It can only suppress it.

The use of force and coercion are not the same thing. The use of force by any entity can be either coercive or legitimate depending on how the population percieve the act. You and I disagree on this fundimental point as well.


There is no inherent contradiction between achieving all of the objectives highlighted above in addition to having a "democratic" Afghanistan, while simultaneously not having "legitimacy".

Here I think you are confusing the US military's legitimacy to act, the Karzai government's legitimacy to rule the country, and the distinction between systematic political legitimacy at the national level. I am referring to systematic legitimacy - what is the source of political entities legitimacy. In a theocracy it is God; Monarchy is the King (usually via a grant from God); Democracy it is the individual citizen (We the People,...). You would argue that if we could just gain total control of the country we could impose the type of systematic legitimacy we desire (When you've got them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow). I believe that our experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan prove that this is not possible.

As long as we maintain pressure and offer material support the Afghan government will maintain the illusion of democracy. Once that pressure is gone it will return to what others have called "natural stability" - a homeostasis where the legitimacy the people prefer and the legitimacy of the government will more closely align.

As for how we moved from stability to democracy, I will refer you to an article from the Military Review, Policy, COIN Doctrine, and Political Legitimacy (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20121231_art006.pdf), for a more complete description of that process.

I don't believe that you and I are going to agree, but we don't have to. :D

Bob's World
05-17-2013, 02:09 PM
American Pride, you may want to consider a nuanced change of that handle to American Hubris.


What does this have to do with legitimacy? And what kind of legitimacy is necessary? In entering Afghanistan, the US had legal, political, and moral legitimacy, at least according to the norms of the globalized West, in retailation for terrorist attacks on its soil.

You seem to believe that what is legal is also proper. You also are assessing "legitimacy" from the wrong perspective. What is perceived anywhere outside of Afghanistan is totally irrelevant for purposes of the stability of governance there inside of Afghanistan.

Did we have legal legitimacy? Certainly, but then we are in charge of what is legal or illegal for these types of activities, so that is a bit of a false flag to operate under. I suspect if the Chinese or the Russians would have done the same thing for the same reasons we would have found their activities to be illegal.

It can be good to control the law, but never confuse operating within laws one controls with also making ones operations under those laws proper.

We never, however, had "political legitimacy." Perhaps with the American populace, but again, the perspective of the American populace is only important for purposes of stability in America. Did the Northern Alliance /GIRoA patron populace recognize the legitmacy of our actions to lift and sustain them in power? Probably, though even their patience is wearing thin as we ignore what they think is important to pursue and focus on what we think is important.

But we never had, and never will have, political legitimacy with the other half of Afghan society that we deposed from patronage power through our actions. And that is the half of society where the insurgency is coming from.

Just like your assessment of the nature of governance in North Korea in an earlier post. Certainly it looks pretty bad in the DPRK from what we know here in America, and as assessed through the lens of what an American thinks the standards for good or legitimate or effective governance are. But truthfully, we have no real idea how the people of the DPRK perceive or feel about their government. Surely some are not happy, but we don't know who, how many, what groups they might represent, or how significant those perceptions are. To me DPRK looks like a classic case of artifical stability, much like what exists in the KSA; but the reality is that DPRK may very well have fairly natural stability. It is much easier to operate at a lower standard when people don't know any better. The more informed the people are, the higher the standard is that governments must strive for in order to either maintain order through an artifical system (where security forces have the primary mission of protecting the government from the people), or naturally stable systems (where security forces have the primary mission of proctecting the people from each other in the day to day purusit of life, liberty and happiness as defined by that culture).

Cheers,

Bob

AmericanPride
05-21-2013, 06:46 PM
@Curmudgeon: I accept your definition of legitimacy ("founded in the values a person holds true, is in internal motivator"). And I agree with you about coercion, force, suppression, etc.

But I don't see how the acceptance of whatever form of established governance by an arbitrary percentage of the population's version of "legitimacy" is necessary or relevant to achieve the definied military objectives and political outcomes. If anything, the lesson from Afghanistan is that clear and achieveable aims are necessary, must be communicated to every level of government, and should avoid mission creep (i.e. how stability become democratization). Is it an "illusion" of democracy? Or a "military state"? Does it matter?

If it's true, as Bob states, that "what is perceived anywhere outside of Afghanistan is totally irrelevant for purposes of the stability of governance there inside of Afghanistan", then we should not be concerned with legitimacy at all. Our focus should be exclusively on the fulfillment of our own interests, legitimated by Afghans or not. And if the Afghans get something out of it, good for them.


You would argue that if we could just gain total control of the country we could impose the type of systematic legitimacy we desire

To some extent I would argue that; but as I've stated, I'm less concerned about "legitimacy" than I am about outcome. Can the objectives be achieved without "legitimacy"? If so, then why are we concerned about it? And if the "legitimacy" of the local population is unattainable, why is it an objective?

As Bob stated:


But we never had, and never will have, political legitimacy with the other half of Afghan society that we deposed from patronage power through our actions. And that is the half of society where the insurgency is coming from.

If both of these statements are true, then what other recourse is there other than the use of force? When there is a collision between two equal forces, who or what decides the outcome? There are no common frameworks for US and opposition actions (i.e. legal structures, norms and values, etc); so who is legitimate and who is illegitimate? So, really, it comes down to who gains the material advantage and who suspends his actions because the material cost is not worth the gain of continued conflict -- legitimation for either party will not aid in the conflict unless there is a direct material advantage cultivated from having "legitimacy" (however measured). And if we're going to investigate the meaning of "legitimacy" why do we assume that the occupants of any defined area of land have any more legitimate right to deciding political outcomes than anyone else? If "what is perceived anywhere outside of Afghanistan is totally irrelevant" then we must also dispose of any Western metrics that measure the organization, values, and behavior of Afghan political actors; up to and including the idea that any "tribe" or "nation" within Afghanistan is at all relevant to the formulation and achievement of our political goals outside of their impact on our own interests. That is, if "legitimacy" and the things that constitute it are transitory, then they are disposable, and if they are disposable, why are we concerned with preserving them if that comes at the costs of our own interests?


American Pride, you may want to consider a nuanced change of that handle to American Hubris.

@Bob:It's not hubris. I don't think America has any special rights or dispensations. I think every government has interests, and every government will pursue its interests while it has the power and freedom to do so. That America, with its power and freedom, failed to articulate and achieve any meaningful objectives in Afghanistan over 12 years is a strong signal that America should beware of hubris.

TheCurmudgeon
05-22-2013, 11:29 AM
So, really, it comes down to who gains the material advantage and who suspends his actions because the material cost is not worth the gain of continued conflict -- legitimation for either party will not aid in the conflict unless there is a direct material advantage cultivated from having "legitimacy" (however measured).

Here you have distilled the fundamental problem with the United States Army on the macro level. We are all about the how, we don't think about the why. Let me explain.

The US Army's mission is to fight and win America's wars. It defines winning on a military level - destroying the enemy's ability to continue to fight by destroying his material war-making ability: how an enemy fights. We design tactics and strategies to destroy his planes, tanks, and weapons and eliminate his fuel and industry so he can no longer support his war machine. The logical result is surrender. It is a material based strategy, and one we have perfected though our wealth, industry, and technology.

But it is not designed to look at why an enemy fights. It is designed to take and hold land, not win over the population. This is perfectly reasonable since the outcome of major wars since the industrial revolution have been largely centered on material advantage, as almost any foreign policy realist will remind you. But recently that changed. In the last hundred years or so there have been instances where the big industrialized power could not defeat a materially lessor enemy. That is because we were not fighting to win the why.


And if we're going to investigate the meaning of "legitimacy" why do we assume that the occupants of any defined area of land have any more legitimate right to deciding political outcomes than anyone else?

No, we don't have to. We did not with the American Indians, we just killed them off and then re-educated them more in line with what we thought were the proper morals and values - what we believed made a government legitimate. The English did the same in the Boar war. It was a common tactic, until it no longer became politically viable at home. Historically speaking, Mai Lai should have been the way things got done in Vietnam and that tactic probably would have worked in the long term. Remove those who think you are wrong and all that is left in the population are those who think you are right or who are to scared to get involved. But it was not an acceptable way for a democracy to act at home. It is not that we can't win, it is that we no longer feel that winning using these methods is an acceptable way for a modern Army to act.


If "what is perceived anywhere outside of Afghanistan is totally irrelevant" then we must also dispose of any Western metrics that measure the organization, values, and behavior of Afghan political actors; up to and including the idea that any "tribe" or "nation" within Afghanistan is at all relevant to the formulation and achievement of our political goals outside of their impact on our own interests.

Yes, and no. Certain western ideas, like the nation, are primarily western ideas and we have imposed them on the rest of the world. We are now suffering the revenge of the map makers as the lines we drew for convenience turn out to be inaccurate in terms of reality. But a Tribe is a Tribe everywhere.


That is, if "legitimacy" and the things that constitute it are transitory, then they are disposable, and if they are disposable, why are we concerned with preserving them if that comes at the costs of our own interests?

Legitimacy, like the values you hold dear, is not disposable. Would you walk away from all you believe is right and good tomorrow because someone asked you too? Are your beliefs in right and wrong transitory? Would you be willing to fight with an army that believed that rape was an acceptable tactical technique, and participate in the rape of women as part of your duties as a Soldier? Or would you fight against those who felt that tactic was acceptable. Don't discount the power of simply being human.

omarali50
05-22-2013, 02:46 PM
Zaid Hamid explains the Paknationalist viewpoint about Afghanistan

http://www.brownpundits.com/2013/05/22/zaid-hamid-explains-the-paknationalist-viewpoint-on-afghanistan/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter

The US expedition to Afghanistan has been awful in many ways. The Pakistan expedition even worse (for Pakistan and Afghanistan), both in its US supported and financed phase and in its more ambiguous recent phase. But is it possible that both Pakistan and the US (or enough influential people in both..obviously they are not unities) can still learn enough to make the next phase less of a disaster?

mustardobardo
05-22-2013, 02:51 PM
I wrote out a big long reply to this, but then my computer crashed so I'm going to keep this one short. I think the definition of legitimacy needs revisiting in terms of its importance to counterinsurgency. I am working on a thesis attempting to create a model of insurgent conflict that incorporates the population and both repressive and soft government approaches.

Legitimacy can have the value-laden meaning put forward in this debate so far, but more important is legitimacy derived from being able to back up your words with actions. This lends itself to understanding legitimacy from a political economy perspective rather than a normative one.

The oppressive government that chooses to obliterate population centres associated with insurgent groups needs to convince the population that it will do so if it has to have the desired effect, namely force the population to stop supporting the insurgent group.

The same still applies to governments who attempt to use the softer 'carrot' approach. Socioeconomic improvements and good governance are only going to have the desired effect if the government can legitimately claim to be able to keep providing them in the long term. Upon doing that the population will change its behaviour in order to maintain access to these incentives - one aspect of which will be the provision of security (the military aspect of the ops).

In Afghanistan the first option was, for good reason, not available to us. So we had to pursue to softer approach. We lost legitimacy not because we held fundamentally different beliefs to the Afghan people but because we did not provide the positive changes we promised. Largely because we placed in power a whole load of people who had no incentive to alter their behaviour to make those changes.

Democracy to this end does not create legitimacy because it idealises freedom, but because it creates a mechanism for the people to hold the government to account for failed promises. This makes the government more likely to adhere to promised improvements, knowing it will be removed if it does not. This makes long-term promises more legitimate. In Afghanistan they are rejecting democracy not because it does not sit right with their beliefs, but because democracy to them has just seen the same old people returned to power and made them powerless to resist - other than through the insurgency, which is only attractive to a few. Perhaps this is our big mistake in the West, being single minded in that democracy is the only way to create this mechanism - without understanding how more traditional systems of government create the same effect and better incorporate these into the system of government in Afghanistan.

TheCurmudgeon
05-22-2013, 11:01 PM
Democracy to this end does not create legitimacy because it idealises freedom, but because it creates a mechanism for the people to hold the government to account for failed promises.

Not really, that is a common misconception. Democracies are designed to allow the general population the ability to have input in the political process, but it really does not hold anyone responsible for anything. It is too slow. In the American Federal system people are elected for two to six years. Once elected, it is very difficult to get someone out. If it was really designed to hold people accountable it would have a recall process that would be on a regular basis. I can only think of one recent instance of that happening, and it was a state governor, not a federal Senator, Representative, or President.

jcustis
05-23-2013, 03:35 AM
Gents,

Talk of democracy, legitimacy, chicken and eggs, is fascinating and deep stuff, but I am going to prune it off into its own thread shortly.

Please take a tactical time out and reserve this thread for discussions of more concrete Afghanistan issues.

mustardobardo
05-23-2013, 09:23 AM
Not really, that is a common misconception. Democracies are designed to allow the general population the ability to have input in the political process, but it really does not hold anyone responsible for anything. It is too slow. In the American Federal system people are elected for two to six years. Once elected, it is very difficult to get someone out. If it was really designed to hold people accountable it would have a recall process that would be on a regular basis. I can only think of one recent instance of that happening, and it was a state governor, not a federal Senator, Representative, or President.

Before we get canned - you are confusing practice and theory. First, two to six years is very regular in political terms. Moreover, democracy is 100% designed to allow the general population to hold politicians to account - do individuals find ways to subvert that mechanism, absolutely. And it is to the detriment of our systems that we have not updated them over the years to iron out these kinks. When that happens though the system is no longer democratic. However, because that happens so often in practice it does not take away from the fact that democracy's principle purpose is to create a responsive and accountable government.

In terms of Afghanistan I think this is a fundamental question. In Afghanistan we were too quick to equate democracy/elections with good governance, and that led to rushing through a poorly designed constitution that did not in anyway reflect the structure of society in Afghanistan. This led to 'democracy' being coopted by vicious powerbrokers rather than having a pacifiying effect on them as we would hope, essentially making the government as undemocratic as ever. Good governance is the absolute key to defeating an insurgency through the methods we espouse. If you make improvements in that area everything else falls into place because you create a bottom-up pressure on the insurgency to use political means to support those it claims to represent. The biggest lesson we need to learn is that you cannot take short cuts on making sure that the system of government reflects and mitigates potential cleavages in society. We have suffered every minute of this campaign and are still suffering today from our failure to do this in 2002, and one way or another the highly centralised formal system of government we currently see in Afghanistan cannot last.

Bob's World
05-23-2013, 01:00 PM
In the most fundamental terms, free from the spin of any institutional or nationally promoted definitions of any of these terms, I think it is important to never lose sight of the fact that "Insurgency" - "Democracy" - "Tyranny" are all stops on the same line, separated only by ""Legality."

Democracy allows for legal, internal, populace-based, challenges to governance. When the legality of such effective challenge is denied to some part or whole of the affected populace one has illegal challenge. That is insurgency. When the incumbent acts illegally to stay in power one has tyranny.

So, even in the United States where we have a form of democracy, if a political challenger resorts to illegal means to attempt to gain office, it is insurgency. If an incumbent politician violates the law in an effort to stay in office it is tyranny. Sadly we often have a good bit of both.

These are not absolutes, where there can only be insurgency or democracy or tyranny - these conditions typically co-exist, separated by shades of grey and weighted based upon the dynamics of any particular point in time.

Now take that to Afghanistan: Democracy dedicated to the formal exclusion of the Taliban is Tryanny. Democracy that allows no legal vehicle to challenge the Northern Alliance-based GIRoA established by the US and NATO provokes insurgency. When we set out by design to create a "Democracy" that foments both Tyranny and Insurgency, it is not really democracy at all.

It is popular to believe one can resolve such things from "the bottom up." I have yet to see where that has been true, and frankly struggle to visualize how one could make it work. But certainly one can create these problems from "the top down" - after all, that is what we did in Afghanistan.

KenWats
05-23-2013, 01:44 PM
Not really, that is a common misconception. Democracies are designed to allow the general population the ability to have input in the political process, but it really does not hold anyone responsible for anything. It is too slow. In the American Federal system people are elected for two to six years. Once elected, it is very difficult to get someone out. If it was really designed to hold people accountable it would have a recall process that would be on a regular basis. I can only think of one recent instance of that happening, and it was a state governor, not a federal Senator, Representative, or President.

I would disagree with you, to a point. Gross abuses (like say, former representative Weiner, former Governor Spitzer, etc- I'm offering these examples because they're on my mind and somewhat familiar to me) can be called to account in a representative system by putting pressure on their associates who are up for reelection soon. If Elliot Spitzer was Saddam Hussein's brother in law, I have no doubt he would have been left in his position.

ganulv
05-24-2013, 01:01 AM
I was looking over the Afghanistan-related articles on my laptop and found an article from 2000 (https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/19877909/Rubin%E2%80%94The%20political%20economy%20of%20war %20and%20peace%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf) which seems to have aged well. The concluding paragraph:

The disintegration of the state paradoxically opens such possibilities, though the criminalized economy has created interests that will resist it. Peacemaking also has dangers: attempts to exercise economic pressure on Pakistan risk precipitating a worse crisis there. Attempts to weaken or replace the Taliban could easily lead to the return of anarchy and predation and a yet more bloody civil war. But unless peacemaking can transform powerful economic actors into agents of peace, it will be limited at best to halting fighting in one place before social and economic forces provoke it once again elsewhere in this dangerous region. Without such an effort, spread of both conflict and the regional war economy remain the most likely prospect.

davidbfpo
05-30-2013, 08:44 AM
There are no new lessons here, only one rather important old precept: before you engage in a war, understand the environment you are going into, precisely and realistically what it is you are trying to achieve and will it be worth the cost? In other words have a strategy.

A pithy comment by a former UK civil & military veteran of recent conflicts, Frank Ledwidge, whose views are not "on message" for officialdom. It comes from pre-publication publicity for his new book - so a fuller post on The UK in Afg thread.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/30/afghanistan-war-cost-britain-37bn-book

omarali50
05-30-2013, 02:27 PM
Why the doom and gloom? it was an unnecessary, costly, mismanaged boondoggle, but its not like the US has lost the war. In fact, NATO is on the verge of victory.
From an American citizen's perspective, the war (and other expensive adventures undertaken in the name of the war on terror) are/were loaded with incompetence, corruption, honest mistakes, dishonest mistakes etc. But that does not necessarily mean its ended in historic defeat (it could, but it doesnt NECESSARILY mean that). In this case, NATO may yet "win".
It wont be pretty, but it wont be the straightforward defeat that, say, Vietnam was.
Overoptimistic?

Madhu
05-30-2013, 03:06 PM
Why the doom and gloom? it was an unnecessary, costly, mismanaged boondoggle, but its not like the US has lost the war. In fact, NATO is on the verge of victory.
From an American citizen's perspective, the war (and other expensive adventures undertaken in the name of the war on terror) are/were loaded with incompetence, corruption, honest mistakes, dishonest mistakes etc. But that does not necessarily mean its ended in historic defeat (it could, but it doesnt NECESSARILY mean that). In this case, NATO may yet "win".
It wont be pretty, but it wont be the straightforward defeat that, say, Vietnam was.
Overoptimistic?

Human beings are not toys so it's hard to contemplate words like costly and boondoggle without thinking of them.

At any rate, we are not returning to the 90's, no matter what anyone says, so you have a point.

To answer your question further, because NATO envisioned a vastly different sort of victory, there is worry that it will all fall apart after the elections (who are the candidates even?) and if that is the case was another plan viable all along, less costly in blood and treasure? NATO and the US at the outset didn't think it would be like this and there will always be the wonder, "did it have to be this way?" Plus there is the sneaking suspicion that others benefited at the strategic level when all is said and done (the complaints about others getting the lucrative contracts while we provided the security, all that other geostrategic stuff about who's up and who's down....)

A lot of this thread isn't doom and gloom but a kind of after action report. Come on, you are a physician, you know how that goes, you examine a problematic "case" to see what you learned from it and not to make a mistake in the future :)

Human nature being what it is, though, if the American and Western economies recover some of their mojo and violence stemming from the region is negligible in the future, the national security apparatus will call it a messy victory of sorts. What those that physically secured it think is another story.

Fuchs
05-30-2013, 06:05 PM
There is no way how the mess could still turn out to have a favourable cost/benefit ratio. It may turn out to be no defeat, but it will certainly be inappropriate to claim the war was won.

I suppose that -as usual- only a few hundred or few thousand people in the world will turn out to be "winners" in this war. This is going top include some who make a quick career out of it and some who are war profiteers.


There is a potential point that some females in Afghanistan may be winners, too - but I see no guarantee that the Taliban would have stayed in power for so long without intervention.

davidbfpo
05-30-2013, 07:33 PM
Mindful of the original title and Jon's warning, with hat tip to the Australian Lowy Institute for this short article 'Afghanistan: What Went Wrong?' which reviews four books, only the second I've seen mentioned on SWC:
The books, which are all excellent, approach the subject from different vantage points. Astri Suhrke’s When More Is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan examines the internal tensions and contradictions of the overall international effort. Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan focuses more narrowly on the US military and civilian “surge” in 2010 and 2011. In Bazaar Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town, Noah Coburn conducts a micro-level analysis of the politics in one village near Kabul during the international mission. Finally, Thomas Barfield’s Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History is a macro-history of Afghan politics and governance from pre-modern times to the present.

Link to article:http://themonkeycage.org/2013/05/24/afghanistan-what-went-wrong/

The full journal article, which appears in Perspectives on Politics is available till June 23rd on:http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8923724

The Abstract says:
The US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, which deposed the Taliban regime, was followed by a major international effort to stabilize that country. More than a decade later, this effort has yielded neither security nor political stability in Afghanistan. After having been ousted from power, the Taliban reestablished itself in the borderlands of Pakistan and began fighting an effective guerrilla war against international and Afghan government forces. Despite heavy losses in recent years, the insurgency shows no sign of giving up. Meanwhile, attempts to establish a credible and legitimate Afghan government have been similarly disappointing. President Hamid Karzai, once hailed as the country's democratic savior, came to be seen instead as the leader of one of the most corrupt regimes on the planet, a perception that has damaged his government's legitimacy both at home and abroad. Afghanistan's development and human rights indicators have improved, but it remains to be seen if these gains can be sustained as the international effort is scaled back. Finally, although the United States and its partners succeeded in weakening Al Qaeda in the region, both Afghanistan and nuclear-armed Pakistan appear to have become considerably less stable over the course of the mission, with untold consequences for the future.

Firn
05-30-2013, 08:48 PM
''When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.''

Warren Buffett

Not that the management was indeed brilliant, but the second part fits Afghanistan quite nicely. Even smarter guys acting more wisely with more ressources would have had a difficult time to drink for the horse and getting it filled up with good government, democracy, impartial justice and human rights.

The lesson would be to try to avoid smaller and bigger blunders by trying to stay within the circle of competence and leave it only if you are forced to. The security return on the invested capital has been dismal for the US and it's Nato allies, especially during the last ten years.

omarali50
05-31-2013, 12:53 AM
I got inspired to write: http://www.viewpointonline.net/what-next-for-the-taliban.html
btw, I realize this is not really the debate most people here are talking about. But it does seem to me that a lot of people, as they discuss tactical blunders and administrative failures also take it for granted that Afghanistan is somehow "naturally" fated to be a Taliban state, as is the tribal area of Pakistan. I disagree. Change is already underway and NATO itself is just one of the tools Allah is using to make the changes he seems to want everywhere in the world.

excerpt: The hardcore Taliban will not win. This is the easiest prediction to make as well as the safest. The last Taliban regime conquered most of Afghanistan only after the country had been thoroughly and completely destroyed by the US-Pakistani-Saudi Jihad operation. Even then, success against other ragtag groups of extortionists and religious fanatics was only possible with the critical assistance of superior Pakistani technology and organization. Everything from the rudimentary banking system to the rudimentary communications network was provided by GHQ. Other powers like India, Iran and Russia supported other groups, but nobody had the access or the resources that Pakistan had developed during its long American-sponsored intervention in Afghanistan.

All that has changed. The current Afghan regime and its urban centers are not the same devastated country that the CIA-ISI gifted to the Jihadi warlords and Taliban. The US has completely switched sides and still has huge resources it can commit to the current regime. Russia, Iran and India are all determined to avoid a second coming of the Taliban. Last but not the least, the Taliban themselves are not one firmly disciplined group. The Mullah Umar group may have significant legitimacy in the eyes of all jihadi factions, but the young Turks of the TTP don’t really take orders from anyone. The Haqqani network is supposed to be a “veritable arm” of the finest intelligence agency in the world, but 10 years of double and triple games cannot have failed to take a toll on that beautiful relationship. The core dream may be intact but it has to work with the REALLY insane fanatics of the TTP type on one side, the more moderate nationalist and pragmatic local Afghan leaders on the other, and a Pakistani intelligence service that is, at a minimum, playing all three sides. Nothing good will come of it.

In fact I will go out on a limb and make a bolder prediction: there won’t be even a temporary phase in which the finest intelligence agency in the world tries to revive a coalition of “good Taliban” to get a piece of the pie in Afghanistan. Well before the Americans leave, the Pakistani establishment will suffer a final unpleasant rupture with its beloved good Taliban. ALL Taliban, good, bad and ugly, will be at war with the Pakistani state AND the American supported Afghan state. It doesn’t matter whether the deep state has or has not arranged the MMA-2 (PTI and JI) coalition in KP to ensure smooth sailing for its plans. Those plans (if they exist, by now, who knows) will come to nothing. The ruling elite is the ruling elite. Their future is as part of globalized capital (American, Chinese, Saudi, it hardly matters). Even Imran Khan will be re-educated and will discover how important it is to bomb terrorists in FATA. This may sound like a bold prediction to some, but war with the Taliban is coming as surely as the cart follows the horse.

Madhu
05-31-2013, 02:21 AM
Those are good points. The ground realities have changed, haven't they?, and are different from the 90's; lots more people are aware of the dangers. For Pakistan, the first elected government to transfer power is a plus, the changing nature of the regional arrangements (I'm sure the Chinese and Saudis are no longer amused) and the growth of uncontrollable elements makes a rerun of the 90's unlikely.

Interesting.

Madhu
05-31-2013, 03:41 AM
I've wanted to ask you (or others) this question for awhile now (on the more 'sophisticated' backers of the hardcore Taliban):

Shashank Joshi wrote an article suggesting that denial of visas of high ranking officials and officers might have changed a certain calculus toward Afghanistan. You said that intelligence agencies and others might have been convinced early on if the situation was approached in a certain way. It's worked in certain instances, we've denied visas to get things moving diplomatically in the region.

Do you think this sort of thing instead of the weird Holbrooke/Nasr/Kerry carrots forever and ever might have worked early on?

davidbfpo
12-31-2014, 12:02 PM
There is now a thread for 2015 called Reflections on the past (assessment of ISAF etc up to 2015) at:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=21570

This thread which started in April 2013 and ended in May 2013, is fascinating to read now and thanks to those who contributed. Plus Jon Custis for starting it.:)